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TITLE : MINUTES OF MEETING OF THE SPECIAL GROUP ON MONGOOSE 6 SEP 62
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f. General Carter pointed out that reference to support of all Cuban exile groups (number 48) is impractical. The word was changed to selected.

g. Mr. Martin cautioned that results of number 50 (actions to be undertaken by other Hemisphere governments) would not be expected overnight.

General Carter urged that, in connection with number 22 (submarine broadcasts), General Lansdale should be given more latitude in working up other deception possibilities. Mr. Bundy felt, on the other hand, that particularly because of the possible Cuban countermeasures which had been outlined by Mr. Murrow, the Group should look at other possibilities in some detail.

i. General Carter felt that a determination should be made as to how far the U.S. is prepared to go in economic harassing actions. He emphasized that sabotage operations such as those under number 27 will not in themselves be especially effective in wrecking the Cuban economy.

The Group then turned to a discussion of number 32 (agricultural sabotage). General Carter emphasized the extreme sensitivity of any such operation and the disastrous results that would flow from something going wrong, particularly if there were obvious attribution to the U.S. He went on to say, however, that it would be possible to accomplish this purpose by methods more subtle than those indicated in the paper. He mentioned specifically the possibility of producing crop
failures by the introduction of biological agents which would appear to be of natural origin. Mr. Bundy said that he had no worries about any such sabotage which could clearly be made to appear as the result of local Cuban disaffection or of a natural disaster, but that we must avoid external activities such as release of chemicals, etc., unless they could be completely covered up.

5. A suggestion was made that small explosives or incendiaries which could be distributed to Cubans should be infiltrated. General Carter explained that the problem is not one of such supplies, since they can be easily improvised, but rather that the people have shown no inclination to use such materials despite many exile claims to the contrary.

6. It was suggested that the matter of attacking and harassing of Soviet personnel within Cuba should be considered.

7. The Attorney General and Mr. Bundy said that no reprisals against exiles who undertake active operations on their own are contemplated.

8. It was suggested that the possibilities of counterfeiting be looked into further.

9. General Carter urged again that a decision be reached as to how much latitude would be allowed the operating elements of the government within broad policy lines. The Chairman indicated that it would not be a simple matter to delegate responsibilities of this kind to any great degree.

10. Mr. Bundy then raised the basic question of the entire spectrum of other continuance beyond those envisaged in the WOODY program.
f. General Carter pointed out that reference to support of all Cuban exile groups (number 48) is impractical. The word was changed to selected.

g. Mr. Martin cautioned that results of number 50 (actions to be undertaken by other Hemisphere governments) would not be expected overnight.

i. General Carter urged that, in connection with General Lansdale should be given more latitude in working up other deception possibilities. Mr. Bundy felt, on the other hand, that particularly because of the possible Cuban countermeasures which had been outlined by Mr. Murrow, the Group should look at other possibilities in some detail.

i. General Carter felt that a determination should be made as to how far the U.S. is prepared to go in economic harassing actions. He emphasized that sabotage operations such as those under number 27 will not in themselves be especially effective in wrecking the Cuban economy.

4. The Group then turned to a discussion of number 32. General Carter emphasized the extreme sensitivity of any such operation and the disastrous results that would flow from something going wrong, particularly if there were obvious attribution to the U.S. He went on to say, however, that it would be possible to accomplish this purpose by methods more subtle than those indicated in the paper. He mentioned specifically the possibility of
Mr. Bundy said that he had no worries about any such sabotage which could clearly be made to appear as the result of local Cuban disaffection or but that we must avoid external activities such as.

5. A suggestion was made that small explosives or incendiaries which could be distributed to Cubans should be infiltrated. General Carter explained that the problem is not one of such supplies, since they can be easily improvised, but rather that the people have shown no inclination to use such materials despite many exile claims to the contrary.

6. It was suggested that the matter of attacking and harassing of Soviet personnel within Cuba should be considered.

7. The Attorney General and Mr. Bundy said that no reprisals against exiles who undertake active operations on their own are contemplated.

8. It was suggested that the possibilities of counterfeiting be looked into further.

9. General Carter urged again that a decision be reached as to how much latitude would be allowed the operating elements of the government, within broad policy lines. The Chairman indicated that it would not be a simple matter to delegate responsibilities of this kind to any great degree.

10. Mr. Bundy then raised the basic question of the entire spectrum of other contingencies beyond those envisaged in the WONGOOSE program.


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TITLE : THE CUBA PROJECT
DATE : 01/24/62
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SUBJECT: Tasks Assigned to CIA in General Lansdale's Program Review

A. TASKS

Part V, pp. 5-8, of General Lansdale's program review of the Cuba Project, dated 18 January 1962, assigns 32 specific tasks to elements of the U.S. Government. Of these, 16 are assigned to CIA solely or jointly. The tasks have been reviewed by this Agency, and it has been determined that substantially all reporting and planning deadlines can be met. Work on all tasks, with and without assigned dates for completion, is in progress. The following detailed observations are keyed to General Lansdale's paper.

1. Task 1, p. 5. The intelligence community is hard at work on NIE 85-62 and is attempting to meet the deadline of 7 February. As was agreed in a conversation of 23 January 1962 with General Lansdale, a short extension may be necessary.

2. Task 2, p. 5. The Cpa-Locka Interrogation Center in Florida will be in operation on 15 February -- the deadline date.

3. Task 3, p. 5. The survey is in progress and will be completed on the stipulated date. On the basis of the information...
obtained the possibility of establishing additional interrogation points will be determined.

4. Task 4, p. 5. An operational assessment of the stay-behind net in Cuba will be completed and reported by the deadline of 15 February. Because communication with singleton agents is by SW, not W/T, it is unlikely that assessment can be completed by the date stipulated; an extension to 28 February may be necessary, although every effort is being made to complete the work before that date. An intensive program aimed at the acquisition of third country assets through the cooperation of liaison services is also under way, particularly in Spain, Belgium, France, Uruguay, and Costa Rica. A progress report on the status of this program will be made by 15 February, although this Agency cannot be sure that the cooperation of all intended participants will have been obtained by that date. CIA has also taken the following additional steps in respect to Task 4.

a. A cable has been sent to field stations to give added impetus to the search for assets and the development of both unilateral and joint operations. Progress reports have been required by 1 March.

b. A survey of the Cuban Chinese community and of
operational access to it is under way. Target date: end of February.

c. An assessment of more than one hundred persons to determine their suitability for return to Cuba as agents in the guise of students is also being conducted. Target date: end of February.

5. Task 5, p. 5. The 1 February deadline will be met, and by that date we shall also have begun the search for suitable intermediaries. Analysis to date has not uncovered a top-level official of the Cuban regime whose personal characteristics indicate he would accept recruitment or agree to defection now. Although some targets of opportunity will appear outside Cuba, most planning will necessarily be based upon an appeal made inside the island by intermediaries selected from the ranks of journalists, foreign officials, international businessmen, foreign lawyers, crime syndicates, international detectives and foreign police officials. Additionally, plans for the defection of lower-level Cuban officials abroad have been completed, and the search for targets and access abroad is under way.

6. Task 6, p. 5. By the assigned date we shall complete and submit a coordinated plan. We shall also have begun action on
cover and deception operations by that date.

7. Task 7, p. 5. By 1 February CIA will submit an operational schedule for the initiation of an organized resistance movement inside Cuba. The schedule will include the localities selected and the assessment of some candidates. A full assessment will be completed in accordance with the schedule listed in para. 4, above, in conformance with Task 4. It should be noted, however, that this operational schedule (like the schedules called for in Tasks 10, 26, and 30) will necessarily be tentative and subject to later revision as the number of assets inside Cuba increases and as the flow of intelligence is augmented. Moreover, the development of a resistance movement will not remain controllable, so that operational timetables produced during the next four weeks can serve only as guides for a proposed sequence of actions.

8. Task 10, p. 5. CIA has on hand both propaganda and political action assets in the Caribbean area and elsewhere in Latin America. It is planned to use those assets both to support the Project inside Cuba and to generate and mobilize public and official opinion against Castro outside Cuba. The operational schedule will be submitted on the stated date.

9. Task 18, p. 6. Discussions with the appropriate AFL-CIO
officials have been conducted and a report of developments will be submitted by 15 February.

10. Task 21, p. 7. Plans for inducing the failure of crops will be submitted by 15 February. These plans will envisage both the use of controlled assets who can be infiltrated and exfiltrated and the provision of encouragement and guidance to the resistance, so that it will undertake acts of sabotage, some of which are to be directed against crops, particularly rice.

11. Task 24, p. 7. This deadline will also be met. Primary methods of disrupting the supply of Cuban nickel to the USSR could, if approved, include (1) the sinking of Cuban or Bloc ships by open attack; (2) the use of "frogman" or UDT tactics in harbors for the same purpose; (3) the employment of torpedoes and mines toward this end; and (4) the sabotaging of primary or secondary sources of Cuban nickel, such as the Nicaro and Moa plants. CIA now has no proven internal assets capable of carrying out any of these actions. The Agency does have external assets capable of undertaking actions (2) and (3). It also has an external group capable of undertaking (4) upon the completion of specialized training. All studies, including a plan for using overt or covert means to prevent re-institution of the Canadian supply to the USSR, will be submitted by 15 February. It is suggested that consideration be given to
assigning to the economic action group, chaired by the Department of State, responsibility for overt action designed to deny Canadian nickel to the USSR.

12. Task 26, p. 7. Together with Tasks 27 and 28, Task 26 constitutes an outline of a plan for a psychological warfare operation. These tasks are so closely interrelated that CIA proposes to submit by 15 February a single plan dealing with all three tasks.

13. Task 27, p. 7. See preceding paragraph.

14. Task 28, p. 7. See paragraph 12.

15. Task 30, p. 7. By 15 February CIA will submit an operational schedule dealing with the sabotage of (1) shipping in Cuban waters and harbors, (2) Cuban transport facilities, (3) communications facilities, (4) equipment for the refining of petroleum, (5) facilities for producing and distributing power, (6) industry, (7) food supplies, (8) key military and police installations and materiel. The schedule will also include the disruption of military and police communications and harassment of military and police training and personnel.

16. Task 31, p. 8. This deadline will be met.

5. ADDITIONAL UNDERTAKINGS

The following comments are keyed to Sections D through K.

Part IV (pp. 3 and 4) of the program review.
17. Section D, p. 3. Six men, to form the initial nucleus, have been assessed in depth. Further assessment of candidates inside and outside Cuba is in progress, and it is expected that ten of these will be recruited by 15 February.

18. Section E, p. 3. To date fifteen locations have been selected as suitable centers of resistance because of (1) the presence there of groups among which there is patent or incipient unrest, (2) the presence of strategic and tactical targets for use or deactivation, and (3) proximity to potential unconventional warfare areas. In order of priority, the fifteen centers are Havana, Camaguey, Santa Clara, Cienfuegos, Matanzas, Cardenas, Sancti Spiritus, the Escambray Mountains, Holguin, Siantago de Cuba, Ciego de Avila, Baracoa, Pinar del Rio, Manzanillo, and Colon.

19. Section F, p. 3. In support of State's efforts CIA has conducted propaganda operations, including a number of mass demonstrations in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

20. Section H, p. 1. One TV intrusion operation has been conducted, on 16 January. Plans for an intrusion during the scheduled parade and demonstration in Havana are being formulated.
21. Section K, p. 4. Groups with which CIA has exploitable access or entree include women, labor, students, teachers, jurists, and other professional classes. International contacts with labor organizations and members of the Catholic Church will also be utilized.


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FROM :
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TITLE : OPERATION MONGOOSE PROGRESS
DATE : 05/31/62
PAGES : 3
SUBJECTS : MONGOOSE

CLASSIFICATION : MEMORANDUM
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CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/30/98
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31 May 1962

SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale

Subject: Operation Mongoose Progress

Intelligence build-up by CIA includes efforts to recruit a Cuban diplomat in place and an official in an airline office in Havana. The CIA team placed in Pinar del Rio Province last March was successfully re-supplied by maritime means on 24 May. The Navy and CIA have worked out a cooperative effort to strengthen the U.S. security and intelligence program at Guantanamo.

The CAC continues to provide word from inside Cuba covering local security moves and popular unrest (unrest reportedly increasing). A substantial reduction in oil refining and manufacture of tires and tubes is reported from CAC sources.

Economic pressure upon the Communist regime may be increased by a Department of Commerce move denying bunkering facilities at U.S. ports to vessels under Sino-Soviet bloc charter carrying cargo to Cuba. State Department reports having solicited views of our Ambassador to Japan regarding possible approaches to the Japanese asking them to cease sugar purchases from Cuba.

Propaganda efforts of USIA and CIA continue to apply pressure upon the Cuban regime by focusing upon abuses of power and failure of key programs such as medical and food. The USIA use of refugees in interviews especially underlined this theme. I am looking into a USIA proposal that we counter Communist Cuba moves to impress Latin America by participation in the athletic North Central American and Caribbean Games set for August 11-21 in Kingston, Jamaica: a "free Cuba" team might be effective, with good publicity support.
Incident at Guantanamo occurred 26 May when a light Cuban aircraft landed there. Three Cubans had forced the pilot, at pistol point, to land them at our Naval Base. With State's concurrence, Defense acted: the Cuban pilot flew home, the 3 Cuban escapees stayed on the Base.

Fracturing the Regime has been given priority attention by CIA. A senior case officer has been assigned full-time to this specific action, and has preferential use of CIA assets. Of 24 desirable defection targets, CIA has found several who seem vulnerable (including the Minister of National Economy, Leon Boti).

Priority Operations Schedule of 21 May, seeking some positive actions in behalf of our project during the next several weeks, has brought a very healthy response from CIA and USIA. The CIA determination to meet the challenge has surfaced four policy-type questions which I note for you on behalf of CIA:

1. Task 7. "Voice of Free Cuba," is almost immediately feasible, if the Group will approve CIA arranging with Navy for use of a submarine. CIA has firm plans for worrying the Communist regime through broadcasts which would appear to come from local dissident groups actively planning to harass the regime.

2. Task 19. CIA is prepared to disseminate leaflets on Castro's failure to the Cuban population via balloon with a view of increasing instability of the Communist machine. The technique is tested and CIA has plans to operate from a surface ship in international waters. The Group is asked to approve the idea, including Navy support. This could be operating in time to exploit the 26 July anniversary of Castro's attack upon government forces at Santiago de Cuba in 1953, for "the revolution" he has now betrayed.

3. Task 17. CIA believes it can recruit some 25-man teams for possible use in beating up resistance groups within Cuba. Group approval is asked for Defense support in training, holding, logistics. The "noise level" hazard is noted, but this special project could be almost unnoticed if timed with proposed U.S. military enlistment of Cubans.
Task 23. Counterfeit Currency to increase Cuban economic problems is considered feasible within 30-60 days upon a limited basis and in considerable scale within six months. CIA asks the Group approval before proceeding with this action.

Other Tasks.

I note here that CIA does not feel it has the operational means to undertake Task No. 22, black-market activities, at this time. Further that Task No. 11, Time magazine dissemination, would require operational facilities not now available. I accept indefinite deferral of Task No. 22 and scrubbing of Task No. 11 on this basis.

The Department of State reaction, to my effort to get the U.S. into priority actions towards our project's goals, has been disappointing to me thus far. Apparently, my schedule of targets for special efforts is accepted only as it may fit into long-range, existing programs already under way. If this is the theory of our project, I believe that the project then becomes only a special reporting device and not a special U.S. effort to win the goal of helping the Cubans recapture their country from a gang of Communists.

"Eyes Only" copies to:

1. General Taylor
2. Mr. Johnson
3. Mr. Gilpatric
4. Mr. McCona
5. Mr. Kennedy
6. General Kennitzer
7. Chief of Operations


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ORIGINATOR : OSD
FROM : CYRUS R. VANCE
TO : MULTIPLE RECIPIENTS
TITLE : CUBAN AFFAIRS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DATE : 06/26/65
PAGES : 27
SUBJECTS : ICCCA, ADMINISTRATION

PSYCHOLOGICAL PROGRAMS - CUBA
SECOND LATIN AMERICAN YOUTH CONGRESS
POSSIBLE RETALIATORY ACTIONS BY CUBAN GOVERNMENT

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : CONFIDENTIAL
RESTRICTIONS : 1A, 1C
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 05/15/98
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : JCS Central File, Box 3, 4 of 15. Memo from Vance to SecArm, SecNav, SecAir, CJCS, and ASD(ISA) re: Cuban Affairs in the Dept. of Defense. ICCCA report on Possible Retaliatory Actions by the Castro Government.

EXEMPT PER E.O. 13526
SEC 3.3(b) 5/8
DATE EXEMPTED: MAR 2016
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MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL HAIG
OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, DA

Subject: Psychological Programs Subcommittee - Cuba

1. An informal meeting of the Interdepartmental Subcommittee (Psychological Programs) on Cuban Affairs was convened in Room 7519, New State at 1430 hours, 30 December 1963. The agenda for the meeting was not pre-announced. Present from State were Chairman Bowdler, Sylvester, and Montenegro; from CIA, Tilton and [Holloway]; from USIA, Murphy; and the undersigned.

2. The following topics were discussed:

   a. CUTAL (Unified Labor Federation for Latin America) meeting scheduled for Rio de Janeiro, 24 - 28 January 1964. Mr. Montenegro, State labor advisor for Latin America, described the anticipated meeting as a "founding" assemblage of left-wing labor leaders, socialists, and communists who will attempt to resolve their differences. State believes that there will be a concerted effort by the communists to wrest the leadership of the fledgling federation from Mexican socialist elements. Following actions were discussed:

      (1) State to cable US Ambassador to Brazil to ascertain the degree to which local (not national) governmental elements will support disruptive and harassing actions before and during the meeting.

      (2) State to circularize Latin American posts with the suggestion that local influences be brought to bear in order to discourage country delegates from attending the meeting.

      (3) USIA to consider VOA broadcasts to Latin America in order to exploit exposes of Cuban, East German, and Chinese Communist labor conditions.

      (4) CIA to continue black propaganda operations in [Brazil] which suggest postponement of the meeting.
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JOHN H. CRIMMINS
Coordinator of Cuban Affairs
Department of State

SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs: Possible Retaliatory Actions by the Castro Government (U)

Reference: Memorandum from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs Dept of State, subject as above, 13 Sep 63

In response to reference memorandum, outlined below is the status of existing contingency plans for those priority situations agreed upon at our meeting of September 12, 1963. The numbering of the paragraphs below corresponds to the format utilized in the attachment to reference memorandum and includes those actions for which Department of Defense specific or related military contingency plans exist.

"A. Actions Against U. S. Targets in Cuba

"4. Harassment of Guantanamo

"(a) Cutting off of the water supply"

COMMENT: A minimum of approximately 20 days supply of water is maintained in reserve storage at the naval base. Provision is made for the emergency resupply of water by tanker, which would require a maximum of eighteen days and which would be implemented on order of CINCLANTFLT. In addition, evacuation of non-essential personnel in 24 hours or less can be accomplished if directed.

"(b) Closing access to the base by Cuban workers who commute"
purpose of substantially reducing the time required for the U. S. fighter aircraft to reach the scene. Such overflights may be authorized only by specifically designated commanders.

"5. Attack on staging areas employed by exiles in the Caribbean"

COMMENT: With regard to Castro attacks on areas in Latin America, plans exist for the U. S. military to respond to requests for assistance by Latin American governments subject to U. S. Governmental approval. There is also an arrangement for the interchange of information between the U. S. Coast Guard and British naval forces with regard to possible staging areas which may be used by exiles in the Bahamas.

"E. Actions Against Targets in the US"

"1. Sabotage or terroristic bombings"

COMMENT: The level of intensity of such actions contemplated within the context of the paper is not considered to exceed the capabilities of law enforcement agencies to control. There are military contingency plans to protect against this type of activity at a much higher level of intensity.

"2. Jamming of US radio stations"

COMMENT: There are standing operating procedures to overcome interference and jamming methods employed against military communications.

The summaries of actions set forth above are essentially defensive reactions to Cuban initiatives. There are, of course, existing and related military plans, retaliatory in nature, which range up to and include a full scale military invasion of Cuba.

It was generally agreed at the September 13, 1963 meeting of the Committee that the most likely actions of the Cuban government are those which would not provoke United States retaliation seriously and immediately endangering the Castro regime. It appears more likely that Castro might intensify his support of subversive forces in Latin
REPORT CONCERNING POSSIBLE RETALIATORY ACTIONS BY THE CASTRO GOVERNMENT

1. The numbering of the subparagraphs below corresponds to the numbering of those actions for which specific or related military contingency plans exist. A brief summary of the action contemplated by those plans is also provided.

"A. Actions Against U.S. Targets in Cuba

"4. Harassment of Guantanamo

"(a) Cutting off of the water supply"

COMMENT A minimum of approximately 20 days supply of water is maintained in reserve storage at the naval base. Provision is made for the emergency resupply of water by tanker, which would require a maximum of eighteen days and which would be implemented on order of CINCLANTFLT. Evacuation of non-essential personnel in 24 hours or less if directed and consistent with national policy.

"(b) Closing access to the base by Cuban workers who commute"

COMMENT Provision is made for the introduction of a tailored Naval Construction Battalion unit containing necessary skills, the requisite labor force, and the possible stationing of a repair ship at Guantanamo Bay aboard which are personnel with appropriate skills. Critical personnel would be transported by air, to arrive within 48 hours, when ordered by CINCLANTFLT.

"(c) Staging demonstration and riots at the gates"

COMMENT Execution of measures appropriate to the degree, kind, and exact location of the disturbance, ranging from no action through such measures as the use of fire hoses and lacrimating agents may be ordered by the Commander, U.S. Naval Base, Guantanamo.

"(d) Sniping at base sentries resulting in injury or death"

COMMENT Measures may be taken appropriate to the

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS; NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED.

Enclosure
circumstance and situation ranging from no action, through action taken in self defense by a wounded sentry or those assisting him, through increased defense conditions, placing personnel in positions protected from fire, and return of fire if appropriate and required as determined by the Commander Naval Base, Guantanamo. The precise nature of the U.S. response cannot be determined in advance. A single shot from an unseen sniper resulting in injury or death to a sentry is one thing, a continued sniping fusillade from a number of persons is another.

"(e) Sabotaging of base facilities"

COMMENT Extensive security measures are taken to prevent such sabotage by the Commander U.S. Naval Base, Guantanamo. The nature of the action taken would depend upon the nature of the sabotage and be designed to assure the continued functioning of the Base.

"B. Actions Against U.S. Aircraft and Shipping"

"1. Harassment of U.S. Shipping using Yucatan Channel, Florida Straits, Windward Passage"

COMMENT The rules of engagement, which have been approved by the highest national authority provide that ships or aircraft ordered to the area may take immediate protective measures including pursuit to, but not into, Cuban air space or territorial waters. Commanders are not authorized to organize deliberately a pursuing force. U.S. pilots are not authorized to attack unless either they or the ship they are defending is endangered by Cuban attack. In the event Cuban aircraft limit their action to harassment, U.S. pilots are limited to making their presence known by flying close aboard the Cuban plane.

"C. Actions Against Cuban Exiles"

"1. Shooting down of pirate planes, possibly of US registry.

"2. Hot pursuit of or attack on raiding planes over the high seas or another country's territory.

Enclosure
"3. Hot pursuit of or attack on raiding boats on the high seas or another country's territorial waters

"4. Attack on mother ship or exile raiders on the high seas or in another country's territorial waters

COMMENT It is noted that it is contrary to national policy to permit raids on Cuba originating from U.S. territory, however, at the time a ship or aircraft is discovered to be under Cuban attack it may be difficult to identify it as a "pirate", "raider", "mother ship" or "exile raider", even though this, in fact, may be the case. All the situations, set forth above, are covered, at least in part, by the rules of engagement which have been approved by the highest national authority. However, the action summarized below is authorized only in the case of U.S. ships and aircraft and those not clearly identified as being of foreign registry. Commanders are not authorized to organize deliberately a pursuing force, however ships or aircraft ordered to the area of the attack may take immediate protective measures including pursuit to, but not into, Cuban air space or territorial waters. U.S. pilots are not authorized to attack unless either they or the ship or aircraft they are defending is endangered by Cuban attack. In the event Cuban aircraft limit their action to harassment, U.S. pilots are limited to making their presence known by flying close aboard the Cuban plane. Overflight of Cuba by fighter aircraft is authorized only in those instances where it has been established that Cuban attack is being made on a U.S. ship or aircraft and then only for the purpose of substantially reducing the time required for the U.S. fighter aircraft to reach the scene. Such overflights may be authorized only by specifically designated commanders.

"5. Attack on staging areas employed by exiles in the Caribbean

COMMENT With regard to Castro attacks on areas in Latin America, plans exist for the U.S. military to respond to requests for assistance by Latin American governments subject to U.S. governmental approval. There is also an arrangement for the

Enclosure
Interchange of information between the U.S. Coast Guard and British naval forces with regard to possible staging areas which may be used by exiles in the Bahamas.

"E. Actions Against Targets in the US"

"1. Sabotage or terrorist bombings"

**COMMENT** The level of intensity of such actions contemplated within the context of the paper is not considered to exceed the capabilities of law enforcement agencies to control. There are military contingency plans to protect against this type of activity at a much higher level of intensity.

"2. Jamming of US radio stations"

**COMMENT** There are standing operating procedures to overcome interference and jamming methods employed against military communications.

2. "Any additional pertinent information on existing or related plans" and "recommendations, if any, on other likely actions which might be taken by the Castro government in retaliation for Cuban exile raids" was also requested. The furnished list of possible retaliatory actions by the Castro government were of "the level of intensity which the committee agreed to be in the most likely category." It is inferred that what the committee had in mind by the most likely "level of intensity" was that level which would not provoke the United States into taking extensive countermeasures which might seriously endanger the Castro regime. The summaries of actions, set forth above, which might be taken under existing military contingency plans are essentially defensive reactions to Cuban initiatives. There are, however, existing and related military plans, retaliatory in nature, which range up to and include a full scale military invasion of Cuba.

3. If it is assumed that the most likely actions of the Cuban government are those which would not provoke United States retaliation seriously and immediately endangering the Castro regime, it appears more likely that Castro might intensify his support of subversive forces in Latin America.
MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL HAIG
OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, DA

Subject: Psychological Programs Subcommittee - Cuba

1. An informal meeting of the Interdepartmental Subcommittee (Psychological Programs) on Cuban Affairs was convened in Room 7519, New State at 1430 hours, 30 December 1963. The agenda for the meeting was not pre-announced. Present from State were Chairman Bowdler, Sylvester, and Montenegro; from CIA, Tilton and [redacted] from USIA, Murphy; and the undersigned.

2. The following topics were discussed:

   a. CUTAL (Unified Labor Federation for Latin America) meeting scheduled for Rio de Janeiro, 24 - 28 January 1964. Mr. Montenegro, State labor advisor for Latin America, described the anticipated meeting as a "founding" assemblage of left-wing labor leaders, socialists, and communists who will attempt to resolve their differences. State believes that there will be a concerted effort by the communists to wrest the leadership of the fledgling federation from Mexican socialist elements. Following actions were discussed:

      (1) State to cable US Ambassador to Brazil to ascertain the degree to which local (not national) governmental elements will support disruptive and harassing actions before and during the meeting.

      (2) State to circularize Latin American posts with the suggestion that local influences be brought to bear in order to discourage country delegates from attending the meeting.

      (3) USIA to consider VOA broadcasts to Latin America in order to exploit exposes of Cuban, East German, and Chinese Communist labor conditions.

      (4) CIA to continue black propaganda operations in [redacted] which suggest postponement of the meeting.
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JOHN H. CRIMMINS
Coordinator of Cuban Affairs
Department of State

SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs: Possible Retaliatory Actions by the Castro Government (U)

Reference: Memorandum from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs Dept of State, subject as above, 13 Sep 63

In response to reference memorandum, outlined below is the status of existing contingency plans for those priority situations agreed upon at our meeting of September 12, 1963. The numbering of the paragraphs below corresponds to the format utilized in the attachment to reference memorandum and includes those actions for which Department of Defense specific or related military contingency plans exist.

"A. Actions Against U. S. Targets in Cuba

"4. Harassment of Guantanamo

"(a) Cutting off of the water supply"

COMMENT: In addition, evacuation of non-essential personnel in 24 hours or less can be accomplished if directed.

"(b) Closing access to the base by Cuban workers who commute"
COMMENT: Provision is made for the introduction of

"(c) Staging demonstration and riots at the gates"

COMMENT: Execution of measures appropriate to the degree, kind, and exact location of the disturbance, ranging from no action

"(d) Sniping at base sentries resulting in injury or death"

COMMENT: Measures may be taken appropriate to the circumstances and situation ranging from no action, through action taken in self defense by a wounded sentry or those assisting him.

"(e) Sabotaging of base facilities"

COMMENT: Extensive security measures are taken to prevent such sabotage by the Commander U. S. Naval Base, Guantanamo. The nature of the action taken would depend upon the nature of the sabotage and be designed to assure the continued functioning of the Base.

"B. Actions Against U. S. Aircraft and Shipping"

"1. Harassment of U. S. Shipping using Ucatan Channel, Florida Straits, Windward Passage"

COMMENT: The rules of engagement, which have been approved by the highest national authority provide that ships or aircraft ordered to
"C. Actions Against Cuban Exiles

1. Shooting down of pirate planes, possibly of US registry.

2. Hot pursuit of or attack on raiding planes over the high seas or another country's territory.

3. Hot pursuit of or attack on raiding boats on the high seas or another country's territorial waters.

4. Attack on mother ship or exile raiders on the high seas or in another country's territorial waters."

COMMENT: It is noted that it is contrary to national policy to permit raids on Cuba originating from U. S. territory, however, at the time a ship or aircraft is discovered to be under Cuban attack it may be difficult to identify it as a "pirate," "raider," "mother ship" or "exile raider," even though this, in fact, may be the case. All the situations, set forth above, are covered, at least in part, by the rules of engagement which have been approved by the highest national authority. However, the action summarized below is authorized only in the case of U. S. ships and aircraft and those not clearly identified as being of foreign registry.
"5. Attack on staging areas employed by exiles in the Caribbean"

"E. Actions Against Targets in the US"

"1. Sabotage or terroristic bombings"

COMMENT: The level of intensity of such actions contemplated within the context of the paper is not considered to exceed the capabilities of law enforcement agencies to control. There are military contingency plans to protect against this type of activity at a much higher level of intensity.

"2. Jamming of US radio stations"

COMMENT: There are standing operating procedures to overcome interference and jamming methods employed against military communications.

The summaries of actions set forth above are essentially defensive reactions to Cuban initiatives. There are, of course, existing and related military plans, retaliatory in nature, which range up to and include a full scale military invasion of Cuba.

It was generally agreed at the September 13, 1963 meeting of the Committee that the most likely actions of the Cuban government are those which would not provoke United States retaliation seriously and immediately endangering the Castro regime. It appears more likely that Castro might intensify his support of subversive forces in Latin
REPORT CONCERNING POSSIBLE RETALIATORY ACTIONS BY THE CASTRO GOVERNMENT

1. The numbering of the subparagraphs below corresponds to the numbering of those actions for which specific or related military contingency plans exist. A brief summary of the action contemplated by those plans is also provided.

"A. Actions Against U.S. Targets in Cuba

"4. Harassment of Guantanamo

"(a) Cutting off of the water supply"

COMMENT

Evacuation of non-essential personnel in 24 hours or less if directed and consistent with national policy.

"(b) Closing access to the base by Cuban workers who commute"

COMMENT Provision is made for the introduction of

"(c) Staging demonstration and riots at the gates"

COMMENT Execution of measures appropriate to the degree, kind, and exact location of the disturbance, ranging from no action

"(d) Sniping at base sentries resulting in injury or death"

COMMENT Measures may be taken appropriate to the

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS; NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED.

Enclosure
circumstance and situation ranging from no action, through action taken in self defense by a wounded sentry or those assisting him.

"(e) Sabotaging of base facilities"

**COMMENT** Extensive security measures are taken to prevent such sabotage by the Commander U.S. Naval Base, Guantanamo. The nature of the action taken would depend upon the nature of the sabotage and be designed to assure the continued functioning of the Base.

"B. Actions Against U.S. Aircraft and Shipping"

"1. Harassment of U.S. Shipping using Yucatan Channel, Florida Straits, Windward Passage"

**COMMENT** The rules of engagement, which have been approved by the highest national authority provide that ships or aircraft ordered to the area may take immediate protective measures.

"C. Actions Against Cuban Exiles"

"1. Shooting down of pirate planes, possibly of US registry.

"2. Hot pursuit of or attack on raiding planes over the high seas or another country's territory."
"3. Hot pursuit of or attack on raiding boats on the high seas or another country's territorial waters

"4. Attack on mother ship or exile raiders on the high seas or in another country's territorial waters

COMMENT It is noted that it is contrary to national policy to permit raids on Cuba originating from U.S. territory, however, at the time a ship or aircraft is discovered to be under Cuban attack it may be difficult to identify it as a "pirate", "raider", "mother ship" or "exile raider", even though this, in fact, may be the case. All the situations, set forth above, are covered, at least in part, by the rules of engagement which have been approved by the highest national authority. However, the action summarized below is authorized only in the case of U.S. ships and aircraft and those not clearly identified as being of foreign registry.

"5. Attack on staging areas employed by exiles in the Caribbean

COMMENT
"E. Actions Against Targets in the US

1. Sabotage or terroristic bombings"

COMMENT The level of intensity of such actions contemplated within the context of the paper is not considered to exceed the capabilities of law enforcement agencies to control. There are military contingency plans to protect against this type of activity at a much higher level of intensity.

2. Jamming of US radio stations"

COMMENT There are standing operating procedures to overcome interference and jamming methods employed against military communications.

2. "Any additional pertinent information on existing or related plans" and "recommendations, if any, on other likely actions which might be taken by the Castro government in retaliation for Cuban exile raids" was also requested. The furnished list of possible retaliatory actions by the Castro government were of "the level of intensity which the committee agreed to be in the most likely category." It is inferred that what the committee had in mind by the most likely "level of intensity" was that level which would not provoke the United States into taking extensive countermeasures which might seriously endanger the Castro regime. The summaries of actions, set forth above, which might be taken under existing military contingency plans are essentially defensive reactions to Cuban initiatives. There are, however, existing and related military plans, retaliatory in nature, which range up to and include a full scale military invasion of Cuba.

3. If it is assumed that the most likely actions of the Cuban government are those which would not provoke United States retaliation seriously and immediately endangering the Castro regime, it appears more likely that Castro might intensify his support of subversive forces in Latin America
than risk direct confrontation with the United States. In the long run, such action is more dangerous and difficult to combat, and in the short run is less likely to provoke immediate and effective United States retaliation. Such actions would be in keeping with Castro's repeated declarations that Cuba is the main source of guidance inspiration for the "inevitable" Latin American revolution. Whereas an inflamed American public opinion over the killing of even a few sentries might require strong countermeasures, the training of a greater number of Latin American guerrillas than the 1500 or more trained in fiscal year 1962, probably would not. Nor is it likely that the return of those trainees to Latin American countries, their establishment of guerrilla training bases, recruitment of additional personnel, and engagement in insurgency actions would be as immediately provocative as interference with the water supply at Guantanamo. Similarly, closing access to the naval base Cuban workers who commute would deprive Castro of a source of foreign exchange. While such items as, "the harassment of air traffic into and out of Guantanamo," or "the harassment of US aircraft operating in the vicinity of or overflying Cuba," might be added to the list, it is considered that specific provocative actions are less likely and less dangerous than the intensification of support to subversive forces in Latin America. Such action not only is in keeping with the declared communist intention to support "national liberation movements of oppressed peoples" but may be done by means which avoid an invitation to overt US military countermeasures which would endanger the Castro regime. Thus, they are considered as of that level of intensity which places them in the most likely category as well as being in the category of most dangerous to the long range interests of the United States.