Question: optimal response carbon prices

The plan’s optimal price acceleration key to tipping points – averts subsidy green paradox

Stan Olijslagers 2021 Tinbergen Institute is the graduate school and research institute in economics of Erasmus University Rotterdam, the University of Amsterdam and Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. Also (Rick van der Ploeg  Department of Economics, University of Oxford & Sweder van Wijnbergen  Centre for Economic Policy, Research, London) “On current and future carbon prices in a risky world” TI 2021-045/VI Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper
https://papers.tinbergen.nl/21045.pdf

in every assessment of uncertainty such as tipping Ice Sheet or Gulf Stream the optimal response is a rising path of carbon prices If climate sensitivity has increased or carbon sinks have weakened the optimal response is a rising path of carbon prices and a rising but higher path after uncertainty about future prices in presence of irreversible capital accumulation is an incentive to postpone investment by conferring an option value to waiting strategies convex damages, tipping points and temperature caps all require carbon prices grow faster than the economy decision makers should start with a significant carbon price and commit to a steadily rising path Only by credibly committing to such a path are corporations going to make long run irreversible investments to transition carbon-free Uncertainty about future prices will cause corporations to hold back investments politicians tend to postpone carbon pricing and prefer subsidies This can lead to adverse Green Paradox effects, where the anticipation of a stepping up climate policy induces fossil fuel reserves to extract more quickly and accelerate emissions Credible commitment to steadily rising prices is thus paramount


Question: climate policy induces fossil fuel

The plan’s optimal price acceleration key to tipping points – averts subsidy green paradox

Stan Olijslagers 2021 Tinbergen Institute is the graduate school and research institute in economics of Erasmus University Rotterdam, the University of Amsterdam and Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. Also (Rick van der Ploeg  Department of Economics, University of Oxford & Sweder van Wijnbergen  Centre for Economic Policy, Research, London) “On current and future carbon prices in a risky world” TI 2021-045/VI Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper
https://papers.tinbergen.nl/21045.pdf

in every assessment of uncertainty such as tipping Ice Sheet or Gulf Stream the optimal response is a rising path of carbon prices If climate sensitivity has increased or carbon sinks have weakened the optimal response is a rising path of carbon prices and a rising but higher path after uncertainty about future prices in presence of irreversible capital accumulation is an incentive to postpone investment by conferring an option value to waiting strategies convex damages, tipping points and temperature caps all require carbon prices grow faster than the economy decision makers should start with a significant carbon price and commit to a steadily rising path Only by credibly committing to such a path are corporations going to make long run irreversible investments to transition carbon-free Uncertainty about future prices will cause corporations to hold back investments politicians tend to postpone carbon pricing and prefer subsidies This can lead to adverse Green Paradox effects, where the anticipation of a stepping up climate policy induces fossil fuel reserves to extract more quickly and accelerate emissions Credible commitment to steadily rising prices is thus paramount


Question: carbon prices grow faster

The plan’s optimal price acceleration key to tipping points – averts subsidy green paradox

Stan Olijslagers 2021 Tinbergen Institute is the graduate school and research institute in economics of Erasmus University Rotterdam, the University of Amsterdam and Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. Also (Rick van der Ploeg  Department of Economics, University of Oxford & Sweder van Wijnbergen  Centre for Economic Policy, Research, London) “On current and future carbon prices in a risky world” TI 2021-045/VI Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper
https://papers.tinbergen.nl/21045.pdf

in every assessment of uncertainty such as tipping Ice Sheet or Gulf Stream the optimal response is a rising path of carbon prices If climate sensitivity has increased or carbon sinks have weakened the optimal response is a rising path of carbon prices and a rising but higher path after uncertainty about future prices in presence of irreversible capital accumulation is an incentive to postpone investment by conferring an option value to waiting strategies convex damages, tipping points and temperature caps all require carbon prices grow faster than the economy decision makers should start with a significant carbon price and commit to a steadily rising path Only by credibly committing to such a path are corporations going to make long run irreversible investments to transition carbon-free Uncertainty about future prices will cause corporations to hold back investments politicians tend to postpone carbon pricing and prefer subsidies This can lead to adverse Green Paradox effects, where the anticipation of a stepping up climate policy induces fossil fuel reserves to extract more quickly and accelerate emissions Credible commitment to steadily rising prices is thus paramount


Question: Disorderly Transition green paradox

2. Disorderly Transition. The plan’s “policy tipping” through the requirement for mitigation uniquely causes a view that the underlying capital stock is useless. That triggers green paradox and turns the case.

Frederick van der Ploeg 21. Department of Economics, University of Oxford, “Carbon pricing under uncertainty”, International Tax and Public Finance 28, no. 5 (2021): 1122-1142.

A disorderly transition can cause havoc in financial markets sudden climate policy policy tipping unanticipated future change in conditions affects profitability of fossil fuel assets and costly to shift around the underlying capital stocks asset value turn negative ahead of anticipated useful life assets suffer from unanticipated or premature write-offs unanticipated credible announcement of future climate policy leads to green paradox effects fossil fuel is pumped up more vigorously and warming accelerates Not much happened to share prices after Paris agreement suggests investors attached little credibility to promises made an uncertain arrival time generates a “run on oil which leads to falls in the spot price and market valuation of companies and higher temperatures A carbon bubble might occur


Question: Frederick van der Ploeg 21

2. Disorderly Transition. The plan’s “policy tipping” through the requirement for mitigation uniquely causes a view that the underlying capital stock is useless. That triggers green paradox and turns the case.

Frederick van der Ploeg 21. Department of Economics, University of Oxford, “Carbon pricing under uncertainty”, International Tax and Public Finance 28, no. 5 (2021): 1122-1142.

A disorderly transition can cause havoc in financial markets sudden climate policy policy tipping unanticipated future change in conditions affects profitability of fossil fuel assets and costly to shift around the underlying capital stocks asset value turn negative ahead of anticipated useful life assets suffer from unanticipated or premature write-offs unanticipated credible announcement of future climate policy leads to green paradox effects fossil fuel is pumped up more vigorously and warming accelerates Not much happened to share prices after Paris agreement suggests investors attached little credibility to promises made an uncertain arrival time generates a “run on oil which leads to falls in the spot price and market valuation of companies and higher temperatures A carbon bubble might occur


Question: disorderly transition

2. Disorderly Transition. The plan’s “policy tipping” through the requirement for mitigation uniquely causes a view that the underlying capital stock is useless. That triggers green paradox and turns the case.

Frederick van der Ploeg 21. Department of Economics, University of Oxford, “Carbon pricing under uncertainty”, International Tax and Public Finance 28, no. 5 (2021): 1122-1142.

A disorderly transition can cause havoc in financial markets sudden climate policy policy tipping unanticipated future change in conditions affects profitability of fossil fuel assets and costly to shift around the underlying capital stocks asset value turn negative ahead of anticipated useful life assets suffer from unanticipated or premature write-offs unanticipated credible announcement of future climate policy leads to green paradox effects fossil fuel is pumped up more vigorously and warming accelerates Not much happened to share prices after Paris agreement suggests investors attached little credibility to promises made an uncertain arrival time generates a “run on oil which leads to falls in the spot price and market valuation of companies and higher temperatures A carbon bubble might occur


Question: policy tipping

2. Disorderly Transition. The plan’s “policy tipping” through the requirement for mitigation uniquely causes a view that the underlying capital stock is useless. That triggers green paradox and turns the case.

Frederick van der Ploeg 21. Department of Economics, University of Oxford, “Carbon pricing under uncertainty”, International Tax and Public Finance 28, no. 5 (2021): 1122-1142.

A disorderly transition can cause havoc in financial markets sudden climate policy policy tipping unanticipated future change in conditions affects profitability of fossil fuel assets and costly to shift around the underlying capital stocks asset value turn negative ahead of anticipated useful life assets suffer from unanticipated or premature write-offs unanticipated credible announcement of future climate policy leads to green paradox effects fossil fuel is pumped up more vigorously and warming accelerates Not much happened to share prices after Paris agreement suggests investors attached little credibility to promises made an uncertain arrival time generates a “run on oil which leads to falls in the spot price and market valuation of companies and higher temperatures A carbon bubble might occur


Question: climate policy green paradox

2. Disorderly Transition. The plan’s “policy tipping” through the requirement for mitigation uniquely causes a view that the underlying capital stock is useless. That triggers green paradox and turns the case.

Frederick van der Ploeg 21. Department of Economics, University of Oxford, “Carbon pricing under uncertainty”, International Tax and Public Finance 28, no. 5 (2021): 1122-1142.

A disorderly transition can cause havoc in financial markets sudden climate policy policy tipping unanticipated future change in conditions affects profitability of fossil fuel assets and costly to shift around the underlying capital stocks asset value turn negative ahead of anticipated useful life assets suffer from unanticipated or premature write-offs unanticipated credible announcement of future climate policy leads to green paradox effects fossil fuel is pumped up more vigorously and warming accelerates Not much happened to share prices after Paris agreement suggests investors attached little credibility to promises made an uncertain arrival time generates a “run on oil which leads to falls in the spot price and market valuation of companies and higher temperatures A carbon bubble might occur


Question: carbon bubble

2. Disorderly Transition. The plan’s “policy tipping” through the requirement for mitigation uniquely causes a view that the underlying capital stock is useless. That triggers green paradox and turns the case.

Frederick van der Ploeg 21. Department of Economics, University of Oxford, “Carbon pricing under uncertainty”, International Tax and Public Finance 28, no. 5 (2021): 1122-1142.

A disorderly transition can cause havoc in financial markets sudden climate policy policy tipping unanticipated future change in conditions affects profitability of fossil fuel assets and costly to shift around the underlying capital stocks asset value turn negative ahead of anticipated useful life assets suffer from unanticipated or premature write-offs unanticipated credible announcement of future climate policy leads to green paradox effects fossil fuel is pumped up more vigorously and warming accelerates Not much happened to share prices after Paris agreement suggests investors attached little credibility to promises made an uncertain arrival time generates a “run on oil which leads to falls in the spot price and market valuation of companies and higher temperatures A carbon bubble might occur


Question: transition causes havoc financial markets

2. Disorderly Transition. The plan’s “policy tipping” through the requirement for mitigation uniquely causes a view that the underlying capital stock is useless. That triggers green paradox and turns the case.

Frederick van der Ploeg 21. Department of Economics, University of Oxford, “Carbon pricing under uncertainty”, International Tax and Public Finance 28, no. 5 (2021): 1122-1142.

A disorderly transition can cause havoc in financial markets sudden climate policy policy tipping unanticipated future change in conditions affects profitability of fossil fuel assets and costly to shift around the underlying capital stocks asset value turn negative ahead of anticipated useful life assets suffer from unanticipated or premature write-offs unanticipated credible announcement of future climate policy leads to green paradox effects fossil fuel is pumped up more vigorously and warming accelerates Not much happened to share prices after Paris agreement suggests investors attached little credibility to promises made an uncertain arrival time generates a “run on oil which leads to falls in the spot price and market valuation of companies and higher temperatures A carbon bubble might occur


Question: Upstream tax is popular

7. Upstream tax is popular.

Jack Calder 15. Fiscal Affairs Department, International Monetary Fund. “Administration of a US Carbon Tax.” Chapter 3 in Implementing a US Carbon Tax: Challenges and Debates. Routledge. Mar. 1, 2015. https://www.elibrary.imf.org/display/book/9781138825369/ch003.xml?tabs=fulltext.

low visibility of upstream CT to voters make it acceptable upstream CT have same price impact but low visibility as corporate tax which consumers think of as someone else even if passed on Taxing big mining might be popular with voters


Question: Jack Calder 15

7. Upstream tax is popular.

Jack Calder 15. Fiscal Affairs Department, International Monetary Fund. “Administration of a US Carbon Tax.” Chapter 3 in Implementing a US Carbon Tax: Challenges and Debates. Routledge. Mar. 1, 2015. https://www.elibrary.imf.org/display/book/9781138825369/ch003.xml?tabs=fulltext.

low visibility of upstream CT to voters make it acceptable upstream CT have same price impact but low visibility as corporate tax which consumers think of as someone else even if passed on Taxing big mining might be popular with voters


Question: upstream CT voters

7. Upstream tax is popular.

Jack Calder 15. Fiscal Affairs Department, International Monetary Fund. “Administration of a US Carbon Tax.” Chapter 3 in Implementing a US Carbon Tax: Challenges and Debates. Routledge. Mar. 1, 2015. https://www.elibrary.imf.org/display/book/9781138825369/ch003.xml?tabs=fulltext.

low visibility of upstream CT to voters make it acceptable upstream CT have same price impact but low visibility as corporate tax which consumers think of as someone else even if passed on Taxing big mining might be popular with voters


Question: upstream carbon tax popular

7. Upstream tax is popular.

Jack Calder 15. Fiscal Affairs Department, International Monetary Fund. “Administration of a US Carbon Tax.” Chapter 3 in Implementing a US Carbon Tax: Challenges and Debates. Routledge. Mar. 1, 2015. https://www.elibrary.imf.org/display/book/9781138825369/ch003.xml?tabs=fulltext.

low visibility of upstream CT to voters make it acceptable upstream CT have same price impact but low visibility as corporate tax which consumers think of as someone else even if passed on Taxing big mining might be popular with voters


Question: carbon tax big mining

7. Upstream tax is popular.

Jack Calder 15. Fiscal Affairs Department, International Monetary Fund. “Administration of a US Carbon Tax.” Chapter 3 in Implementing a US Carbon Tax: Challenges and Debates. Routledge. Mar. 1, 2015. https://www.elibrary.imf.org/display/book/9781138825369/ch003.xml?tabs=fulltext.

low visibility of upstream CT to voters make it acceptable upstream CT have same price impact but low visibility as corporate tax which consumers think of as someone else even if passed on Taxing big mining might be popular with voters


Question: upstream tax less visible

7. Upstream tax is popular.

Jack Calder 15. Fiscal Affairs Department, International Monetary Fund. “Administration of a US Carbon Tax.” Chapter 3 in Implementing a US Carbon Tax: Challenges and Debates. Routledge. Mar. 1, 2015. https://www.elibrary.imf.org/display/book/9781138825369/ch003.xml?tabs=fulltext.

low visibility of upstream CT to voters make it acceptable upstream CT have same price impact but low visibility as corporate tax which consumers think of as someone else even if passed on Taxing big mining might be popular with voters


Question: upstream CT acceptable to voters

7. Upstream tax is popular.

Jack Calder 15. Fiscal Affairs Department, International Monetary Fund. “Administration of a US Carbon Tax.” Chapter 3 in Implementing a US Carbon Tax: Challenges and Debates. Routledge. Mar. 1, 2015. https://www.elibrary.imf.org/display/book/9781138825369/ch003.xml?tabs=fulltext.

low visibility of upstream CT to voters make it acceptable upstream CT have same price impact but low visibility as corporate tax which consumers think of as someone else even if passed on Taxing big mining might be popular with voters


Question: That risks default

That risks default

Werschkul ‘1—1 [Ben Werschkul is a Washington Correspondent. “The debt ceiling is back on the table for 2025. Here's what happens next”, Yahoo!Finance, https://finance.yahoo.com/news/why-trump-is-antsy-about-the-coming-debt-ceiling-fight-163731496.html, published 1-1-2025, accessed 1-17-2025]

after Jan. 1 essentially guessing about when the moment comes measures r un out and default in the offing. analysis offered mid-June possible ceiling reached prior measures carry but length is not known


Question: Werschkul Yahoo Finance

That risks default

Werschkul ‘1—1 [Ben Werschkul is a Washington Correspondent. “The debt ceiling is back on the table for 2025. Here's what happens next”, Yahoo!Finance, https://finance.yahoo.com/news/why-trump-is-antsy-about-the-coming-debt-ceiling-fight-163731496.html, published 1-1-2025, accessed 1-17-2025]

after Jan. 1 essentially guessing about when the moment comes measures r un out and default in the offing. analysis offered mid-June possible ceiling reached prior measures carry but length is not known


Question: Ben Werschkul

That risks default

Werschkul ‘1—1 [Ben Werschkul is a Washington Correspondent. “The debt ceiling is back on the table for 2025. Here's what happens next”, Yahoo!Finance, https://finance.yahoo.com/news/why-trump-is-antsy-about-the-coming-debt-ceiling-fight-163731496.html, published 1-1-2025, accessed 1-17-2025]

after Jan. 1 essentially guessing about when the moment comes measures r un out and default in the offing. analysis offered mid-June possible ceiling reached prior measures carry but length is not known


Question: Debt ceiling 2025

That risks default

Werschkul ‘1—1 [Ben Werschkul is a Washington Correspondent. “The debt ceiling is back on the table for 2025. Here's what happens next”, Yahoo!Finance, https://finance.yahoo.com/news/why-trump-is-antsy-about-the-coming-debt-ceiling-fight-163731496.html, published 1-1-2025, accessed 1-17-2025]

after Jan. 1 essentially guessing about when the moment comes measures r un out and default in the offing. analysis offered mid-June possible ceiling reached prior measures carry but length is not known


Question: default in the offing

That risks default

Werschkul ‘1—1 [Ben Werschkul is a Washington Correspondent. “The debt ceiling is back on the table for 2025. Here's what happens next”, Yahoo!Finance, https://finance.yahoo.com/news/why-trump-is-antsy-about-the-coming-debt-ceiling-fight-163731496.html, published 1-1-2025, accessed 1-17-2025]

after Jan. 1 essentially guessing about when the moment comes measures r un out and default in the offing. analysis offered mid-June possible ceiling reached prior measures carry but length is not known


Question: US default date

That risks default

Werschkul ‘1—1 [Ben Werschkul is a Washington Correspondent. “The debt ceiling is back on the table for 2025. Here's what happens next”, Yahoo!Finance, https://finance.yahoo.com/news/why-trump-is-antsy-about-the-coming-debt-ceiling-fight-163731496.html, published 1-1-2025, accessed 1-17-2025]

after Jan. 1 essentially guessing about when the moment comes measures r un out and default in the offing. analysis offered mid-June possible ceiling reached prior measures carry but length is not known


Question: counterplan tosses PQD aside

The counterplan tosses the PQD aside.

Tribe ’10 [Laurence, Joshua Branson, and Tristan Duncan; January 2010; Carl M. Loeb University Professor, Harvard Law School; former J.D. candidate at Harvard Law School; counsel to several of the defendants involved in climate cases; Washington Legal Foundation, “Too Hot for Courts to Handle: Fuel Temperatures, Global Warming, and the Political Question Doctrine,” no. 169]

axiomatic throughout history there exist questions beyond reach of judiciary Constitution’s commitments shield issues reserved to branches from interference become commonplace that confusion distinguished doctrine which questions are political principles in play have yet to be reduced to any accepted and applied formula cannot mean courts free to toss and plunge ahead in disregard of important principles that p q d embodies


Question: Tribe 2010

The counterplan tosses the PQD aside.

Tribe ’10 [Laurence, Joshua Branson, and Tristan Duncan; January 2010; Carl M. Loeb University Professor, Harvard Law School; former J.D. candidate at Harvard Law School; counsel to several of the defendants involved in climate cases; Washington Legal Foundation, “Too Hot for Courts to Handle: Fuel Temperatures, Global Warming, and the Political Question Doctrine,” no. 169]

axiomatic throughout history there exist questions beyond reach of judiciary Constitution’s commitments shield issues reserved to branches from interference become commonplace that confusion distinguished doctrine which questions are political principles in play have yet to be reduced to any accepted and applied formula cannot mean courts free to toss and plunge ahead in disregard of important principles that p q d embodies


Question: political question doctrine

The counterplan tosses the PQD aside.

Tribe ’10 [Laurence, Joshua Branson, and Tristan Duncan; January 2010; Carl M. Loeb University Professor, Harvard Law School; former J.D. candidate at Harvard Law School; counsel to several of the defendants involved in climate cases; Washington Legal Foundation, “Too Hot for Courts to Handle: Fuel Temperatures, Global Warming, and the Political Question Doctrine,” no. 169]

axiomatic throughout history there exist questions beyond reach of judiciary Constitution’s commitments shield issues reserved to branches from interference become commonplace that confusion distinguished doctrine which questions are political principles in play have yet to be reduced to any accepted and applied formula cannot mean courts free to toss and plunge ahead in disregard of important principles that p q d embodies


Question: Constitution shields issues

The counterplan tosses the PQD aside.

Tribe ’10 [Laurence, Joshua Branson, and Tristan Duncan; January 2010; Carl M. Loeb University Professor, Harvard Law School; former J.D. candidate at Harvard Law School; counsel to several of the defendants involved in climate cases; Washington Legal Foundation, “Too Hot for Courts to Handle: Fuel Temperatures, Global Warming, and the Political Question Doctrine,” no. 169]

axiomatic throughout history there exist questions beyond reach of judiciary Constitution’s commitments shield issues reserved to branches from interference become commonplace that confusion distinguished doctrine which questions are political principles in play have yet to be reduced to any accepted and applied formula cannot mean courts free to toss and plunge ahead in disregard of important principles that p q d embodies


Question: beyond reach of judiciary

The counterplan tosses the PQD aside.

Tribe ’10 [Laurence, Joshua Branson, and Tristan Duncan; January 2010; Carl M. Loeb University Professor, Harvard Law School; former J.D. candidate at Harvard Law School; counsel to several of the defendants involved in climate cases; Washington Legal Foundation, “Too Hot for Courts to Handle: Fuel Temperatures, Global Warming, and the Political Question Doctrine,” no. 169]

axiomatic throughout history there exist questions beyond reach of judiciary Constitution’s commitments shield issues reserved to branches from interference become commonplace that confusion distinguished doctrine which questions are political principles in play have yet to be reduced to any accepted and applied formula cannot mean courts free to toss and plunge ahead in disregard of important principles that p q d embodies


Question: courts toss PQD

The counterplan tosses the PQD aside.

Tribe ’10 [Laurence, Joshua Branson, and Tristan Duncan; January 2010; Carl M. Loeb University Professor, Harvard Law School; former J.D. candidate at Harvard Law School; counsel to several of the defendants involved in climate cases; Washington Legal Foundation, “Too Hot for Courts to Handle: Fuel Temperatures, Global Warming, and the Political Question Doctrine,” no. 169]

axiomatic throughout history there exist questions beyond reach of judiciary Constitution’s commitments shield issues reserved to branches from interference become commonplace that confusion distinguished doctrine which questions are political principles in play have yet to be reduced to any accepted and applied formula cannot mean courts free to toss and plunge ahead in disregard of important principles that p q d embodies


Question: Syndicated loans cause asset stranding

2. Syndicated loans. Divestiture now is a false flag because firms are offloading risks by switching from bonds to syndicated loans, which causes asset stranding.

Natasha Chaudhary 24. Research Fellow at the Institute for Climate Economics, MBA in Financial Management from Christ University. “From Stranded Assets to Assets-at-Risk: Reframing the narrative for European private financial institutions.” Institute for Climate Economics. 2024. https://www.i4ce.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/From-Stranded-Assets-to-Assets-at-Risk.pdf

banks have not priced in stranded asset risk only scope 1 lead to inefficient underpricing underpricing makes transition more expensive (due to delayed action and magnifies asset repricing from sudden shock reaction depends on credibility of policy signals as investors factor carbon risk into bond prices firms substitute financing from bonds to syndicate loans to benefit from rates leads to a flight of carbon risk , interconnected nature of markets creates scope for risk amplification banks primarily use syndicated loans losses could be significant once stranding materializes compounded by ‘ risk-offloading ’ decisions to reallocate portfolios Private players face challenges for scoping evaluating and managing risk This could delay necessary transition finance require regulatory guidelines to retire misaligned assets guidelines are needed to define finance framework onus lies on regulatory authorities to accelerate capital flows


Question: Chaudhary 24 syndicated loans

2. Syndicated loans. Divestiture now is a false flag because firms are offloading risks by switching from bonds to syndicated loans, which causes asset stranding.

Natasha Chaudhary 24. Research Fellow at the Institute for Climate Economics, MBA in Financial Management from Christ University. “From Stranded Assets to Assets-at-Risk: Reframing the narrative for European private financial institutions.” Institute for Climate Economics. 2024. https://www.i4ce.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/From-Stranded-Assets-to-Assets-at-Risk.pdf

banks have not priced in stranded asset risk only scope 1 lead to inefficient underpricing underpricing makes transition more expensive (due to delayed action and magnifies asset repricing from sudden shock reaction depends on credibility of policy signals as investors factor carbon risk into bond prices firms substitute financing from bonds to syndicate loans to benefit from rates leads to a flight of carbon risk , interconnected nature of markets creates scope for risk amplification banks primarily use syndicated loans losses could be significant once stranding materializes compounded by ‘ risk-offloading ’ decisions to reallocate portfolios Private players face challenges for scoping evaluating and managing risk This could delay necessary transition finance require regulatory guidelines to retire misaligned assets guidelines are needed to define finance framework onus lies on regulatory authorities to accelerate capital flows


Question: Natasha Chaudhary asset risk

2. Syndicated loans. Divestiture now is a false flag because firms are offloading risks by switching from bonds to syndicated loans, which causes asset stranding.

Natasha Chaudhary 24. Research Fellow at the Institute for Climate Economics, MBA in Financial Management from Christ University. “From Stranded Assets to Assets-at-Risk: Reframing the narrative for European private financial institutions.” Institute for Climate Economics. 2024. https://www.i4ce.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/From-Stranded-Assets-to-Assets-at-Risk.pdf

banks have not priced in stranded asset risk only scope 1 lead to inefficient underpricing underpricing makes transition more expensive (due to delayed action and magnifies asset repricing from sudden shock reaction depends on credibility of policy signals as investors factor carbon risk into bond prices firms substitute financing from bonds to syndicate loans to benefit from rates leads to a flight of carbon risk , interconnected nature of markets creates scope for risk amplification banks primarily use syndicated loans losses could be significant once stranding materializes compounded by ‘ risk-offloading ’ decisions to reallocate portfolios Private players face challenges for scoping evaluating and managing risk This could delay necessary transition finance require regulatory guidelines to retire misaligned assets guidelines are needed to define finance framework onus lies on regulatory authorities to accelerate capital flows


Question: firms substitute financing from bonds

2. Syndicated loans. Divestiture now is a false flag because firms are offloading risks by switching from bonds to syndicated loans, which causes asset stranding.

Natasha Chaudhary 24. Research Fellow at the Institute for Climate Economics, MBA in Financial Management from Christ University. “From Stranded Assets to Assets-at-Risk: Reframing the narrative for European private financial institutions.” Institute for Climate Economics. 2024. https://www.i4ce.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/From-Stranded-Assets-to-Assets-at-Risk.pdf

banks have not priced in stranded asset risk only scope 1 lead to inefficient underpricing underpricing makes transition more expensive (due to delayed action and magnifies asset repricing from sudden shock reaction depends on credibility of policy signals as investors factor carbon risk into bond prices firms substitute financing from bonds to syndicate loans to benefit from rates leads to a flight of carbon risk , interconnected nature of markets creates scope for risk amplification banks primarily use syndicated loans losses could be significant once stranding materializes compounded by ‘ risk-offloading ’ decisions to reallocate portfolios Private players face challenges for scoping evaluating and managing risk This could delay necessary transition finance require regulatory guidelines to retire misaligned assets guidelines are needed to define finance framework onus lies on regulatory authorities to accelerate capital flows


Question: banks haven't priced in stranded asset risk

2. Syndicated loans. Divestiture now is a false flag because firms are offloading risks by switching from bonds to syndicated loans, which causes asset stranding.

Natasha Chaudhary 24. Research Fellow at the Institute for Climate Economics, MBA in Financial Management from Christ University. “From Stranded Assets to Assets-at-Risk: Reframing the narrative for European private financial institutions.” Institute for Climate Economics. 2024. https://www.i4ce.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/From-Stranded-Assets-to-Assets-at-Risk.pdf

banks have not priced in stranded asset risk only scope 1 lead to inefficient underpricing underpricing makes transition more expensive (due to delayed action and magnifies asset repricing from sudden shock reaction depends on credibility of policy signals as investors factor carbon risk into bond prices firms substitute financing from bonds to syndicate loans to benefit from rates leads to a flight of carbon risk , interconnected nature of markets creates scope for risk amplification banks primarily use syndicated loans losses could be significant once stranding materializes compounded by ‘ risk-offloading ’ decisions to reallocate portfolios Private players face challenges for scoping evaluating and managing risk This could delay necessary transition finance require regulatory guidelines to retire misaligned assets guidelines are needed to define finance framework onus lies on regulatory authorities to accelerate capital flows


Question: risk offloading syndicated loans

2. Syndicated loans. Divestiture now is a false flag because firms are offloading risks by switching from bonds to syndicated loans, which causes asset stranding.

Natasha Chaudhary 24. Research Fellow at the Institute for Climate Economics, MBA in Financial Management from Christ University. “From Stranded Assets to Assets-at-Risk: Reframing the narrative for European private financial institutions.” Institute for Climate Economics. 2024. https://www.i4ce.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/From-Stranded-Assets-to-Assets-at-Risk.pdf

banks have not priced in stranded asset risk only scope 1 lead to inefficient underpricing underpricing makes transition more expensive (due to delayed action and magnifies asset repricing from sudden shock reaction depends on credibility of policy signals as investors factor carbon risk into bond prices firms substitute financing from bonds to syndicate loans to benefit from rates leads to a flight of carbon risk , interconnected nature of markets creates scope for risk amplification banks primarily use syndicated loans losses could be significant once stranding materializes compounded by ‘ risk-offloading ’ decisions to reallocate portfolios Private players face challenges for scoping evaluating and managing risk This could delay necessary transition finance require regulatory guidelines to retire misaligned assets guidelines are needed to define finance framework onus lies on regulatory authorities to accelerate capital flows


Question: asset stranding divestiture false flag

2. Syndicated loans. Divestiture now is a false flag because firms are offloading risks by switching from bonds to syndicated loans, which causes asset stranding.

Natasha Chaudhary 24. Research Fellow at the Institute for Climate Economics, MBA in Financial Management from Christ University. “From Stranded Assets to Assets-at-Risk: Reframing the narrative for European private financial institutions.” Institute for Climate Economics. 2024. https://www.i4ce.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/From-Stranded-Assets-to-Assets-at-Risk.pdf

banks have not priced in stranded asset risk only scope 1 lead to inefficient underpricing underpricing makes transition more expensive (due to delayed action and magnifies asset repricing from sudden shock reaction depends on credibility of policy signals as investors factor carbon risk into bond prices firms substitute financing from bonds to syndicate loans to benefit from rates leads to a flight of carbon risk , interconnected nature of markets creates scope for risk amplification banks primarily use syndicated loans losses could be significant once stranding materializes compounded by ‘ risk-offloading ’ decisions to reallocate portfolios Private players face challenges for scoping evaluating and managing risk This could delay necessary transition finance require regulatory guidelines to retire misaligned assets guidelines are needed to define finance framework onus lies on regulatory authorities to accelerate capital flows


Question: banks use syndicated loans

2. Syndicated loans. Divestiture now is a false flag because firms are offloading risks by switching from bonds to syndicated loans, which causes asset stranding.

Natasha Chaudhary 24. Research Fellow at the Institute for Climate Economics, MBA in Financial Management from Christ University. “From Stranded Assets to Assets-at-Risk: Reframing the narrative for European private financial institutions.” Institute for Climate Economics. 2024. https://www.i4ce.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/From-Stranded-Assets-to-Assets-at-Risk.pdf

banks have not priced in stranded asset risk only scope 1 lead to inefficient underpricing underpricing makes transition more expensive (due to delayed action and magnifies asset repricing from sudden shock reaction depends on credibility of policy signals as investors factor carbon risk into bond prices firms substitute financing from bonds to syndicate loans to benefit from rates leads to a flight of carbon risk , interconnected nature of markets creates scope for risk amplification banks primarily use syndicated loans losses could be significant once stranding materializes compounded by ‘ risk-offloading ’ decisions to reallocate portfolios Private players face challenges for scoping evaluating and managing risk This could delay necessary transition finance require regulatory guidelines to retire misaligned assets guidelines are needed to define finance framework onus lies on regulatory authorities to accelerate capital flows


Question: Existential risks underrated

Existential risks are underrated.

Jonathan B. Wiener 16, Law and Public Policy Professor at Duke University, University Fellow at the Resources for the Future, Past President of the Society for Risk Analysis, the scientific committee member at the International Risk Governance Council, “The Tragedy of the Uncommons: On the Politics of Apocalypse”, Global Policy, 7(S1): Too Big to Handle: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on the Question of Why Societies Ignore Looming Disasters, 6-6-16, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1758-5899.12319, Stras

ultra risks are not experienced it is experts, applying quant methods while public seems less interested Describing risks in a speech is less effective in stimulating reaction the prefrontal cortex draw on experience brain relies on ‘available’ events even for analytic about scenarios unavailability’ neglect compound disdain for warnings second is magnitude psych large impact yields ‘ numbing’ as lives rise respondents feel overwhelmed The ‘end of the world’ may be too much disabling rather than mobilizing people deflect problems so large they would consume capacity public may be eager to save the refugee less willing to save a large unidentified population ex risks lack a single individual


Question: Jonathan Wiener 16

Existential risks are underrated.

Jonathan B. Wiener 16, Law and Public Policy Professor at Duke University, University Fellow at the Resources for the Future, Past President of the Society for Risk Analysis, the scientific committee member at the International Risk Governance Council, “The Tragedy of the Uncommons: On the Politics of Apocalypse”, Global Policy, 7(S1): Too Big to Handle: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on the Question of Why Societies Ignore Looming Disasters, 6-6-16, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1758-5899.12319, Stras

ultra risks are not experienced it is experts, applying quant methods while public seems less interested Describing risks in a speech is less effective in stimulating reaction the prefrontal cortex draw on experience brain relies on ‘available’ events even for analytic about scenarios unavailability’ neglect compound disdain for warnings second is magnitude psych large impact yields ‘ numbing’ as lives rise respondents feel overwhelmed The ‘end of the world’ may be too much disabling rather than mobilizing people deflect problems so large they would consume capacity public may be eager to save the refugee less willing to save a large unidentified population ex risks lack a single individual


Question: The Tragedy of the Uncommons

Existential risks are underrated.

Jonathan B. Wiener 16, Law and Public Policy Professor at Duke University, University Fellow at the Resources for the Future, Past President of the Society for Risk Analysis, the scientific committee member at the International Risk Governance Council, “The Tragedy of the Uncommons: On the Politics of Apocalypse”, Global Policy, 7(S1): Too Big to Handle: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on the Question of Why Societies Ignore Looming Disasters, 6-6-16, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1758-5899.12319, Stras

ultra risks are not experienced it is experts, applying quant methods while public seems less interested Describing risks in a speech is less effective in stimulating reaction the prefrontal cortex draw on experience brain relies on ‘available’ events even for analytic about scenarios unavailability’ neglect compound disdain for warnings second is magnitude psych large impact yields ‘ numbing’ as lives rise respondents feel overwhelmed The ‘end of the world’ may be too much disabling rather than mobilizing people deflect problems so large they would consume capacity public may be eager to save the refugee less willing to save a large unidentified population ex risks lack a single individual


Question: existential risks are ignored

Existential risks are underrated.

Jonathan B. Wiener 16, Law and Public Policy Professor at Duke University, University Fellow at the Resources for the Future, Past President of the Society for Risk Analysis, the scientific committee member at the International Risk Governance Council, “The Tragedy of the Uncommons: On the Politics of Apocalypse”, Global Policy, 7(S1): Too Big to Handle: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on the Question of Why Societies Ignore Looming Disasters, 6-6-16, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1758-5899.12319, Stras

ultra risks are not experienced it is experts, applying quant methods while public seems less interested Describing risks in a speech is less effective in stimulating reaction the prefrontal cortex draw on experience brain relies on ‘available’ events even for analytic about scenarios unavailability’ neglect compound disdain for warnings second is magnitude psych large impact yields ‘ numbing’ as lives rise respondents feel overwhelmed The ‘end of the world’ may be too much disabling rather than mobilizing people deflect problems so large they would consume capacity public may be eager to save the refugee less willing to save a large unidentified population ex risks lack a single individual


Question: prefrontal cortex experience

Existential risks are underrated.

Jonathan B. Wiener 16, Law and Public Policy Professor at Duke University, University Fellow at the Resources for the Future, Past President of the Society for Risk Analysis, the scientific committee member at the International Risk Governance Council, “The Tragedy of the Uncommons: On the Politics of Apocalypse”, Global Policy, 7(S1): Too Big to Handle: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on the Question of Why Societies Ignore Looming Disasters, 6-6-16, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1758-5899.12319, Stras

ultra risks are not experienced it is experts, applying quant methods while public seems less interested Describing risks in a speech is less effective in stimulating reaction the prefrontal cortex draw on experience brain relies on ‘available’ events even for analytic about scenarios unavailability’ neglect compound disdain for warnings second is magnitude psych large impact yields ‘ numbing’ as lives rise respondents feel overwhelmed The ‘end of the world’ may be too much disabling rather than mobilizing people deflect problems so large they would consume capacity public may be eager to save the refugee less willing to save a large unidentified population ex risks lack a single individual


Question: public deflects large problems

Existential risks are underrated.

Jonathan B. Wiener 16, Law and Public Policy Professor at Duke University, University Fellow at the Resources for the Future, Past President of the Society for Risk Analysis, the scientific committee member at the International Risk Governance Council, “The Tragedy of the Uncommons: On the Politics of Apocalypse”, Global Policy, 7(S1): Too Big to Handle: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on the Question of Why Societies Ignore Looming Disasters, 6-6-16, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1758-5899.12319, Stras

ultra risks are not experienced it is experts, applying quant methods while public seems less interested Describing risks in a speech is less effective in stimulating reaction the prefrontal cortex draw on experience brain relies on ‘available’ events even for analytic about scenarios unavailability’ neglect compound disdain for warnings second is magnitude psych large impact yields ‘ numbing’ as lives rise respondents feel overwhelmed The ‘end of the world’ may be too much disabling rather than mobilizing people deflect problems so large they would consume capacity public may be eager to save the refugee less willing to save a large unidentified population ex risks lack a single individual


Question: magnitude numbing existential risks

Existential risks are underrated.

Jonathan B. Wiener 16, Law and Public Policy Professor at Duke University, University Fellow at the Resources for the Future, Past President of the Society for Risk Analysis, the scientific committee member at the International Risk Governance Council, “The Tragedy of the Uncommons: On the Politics of Apocalypse”, Global Policy, 7(S1): Too Big to Handle: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on the Question of Why Societies Ignore Looming Disasters, 6-6-16, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1758-5899.12319, Stras

ultra risks are not experienced it is experts, applying quant methods while public seems less interested Describing risks in a speech is less effective in stimulating reaction the prefrontal cortex draw on experience brain relies on ‘available’ events even for analytic about scenarios unavailability’ neglect compound disdain for warnings second is magnitude psych large impact yields ‘ numbing’ as lives rise respondents feel overwhelmed The ‘end of the world’ may be too much disabling rather than mobilizing people deflect problems so large they would consume capacity public may be eager to save the refugee less willing to save a large unidentified population ex risks lack a single individual


Question: plan horse-traded for CBAM

The plan is horse-traded for a CBAM:

As policymakers hone their domestic climate policies to strengthen nationally determined contributions under the 2015 Paris Agreement, a persistent fear weighs on them. No leader wants to be the one who, in the name of combating climate change, ends up putting their domestic industries at a global competitive disadvantage, costing good paying jobs, reducing the tax base, and creating new security risks.

CBAMs provide way out of dilemma By adding tariff CBAMs aim to preserve domestic gains


Question: CBAMs preserve domestic gains

The plan is horse-traded for a CBAM:

As policymakers hone their domestic climate policies to strengthen nationally determined contributions under the 2015 Paris Agreement, a persistent fear weighs on them. No leader wants to be the one who, in the name of combating climate change, ends up putting their domestic industries at a global competitive disadvantage, costing good paying jobs, reducing the tax base, and creating new security risks.

CBAMs provide way out of dilemma By adding tariff CBAMs aim to preserve domestic gains


Question: climate policy competitive disadvantage

The plan is horse-traded for a CBAM:

As policymakers hone their domestic climate policies to strengthen nationally determined contributions under the 2015 Paris Agreement, a persistent fear weighs on them. No leader wants to be the one who, in the name of combating climate change, ends up putting their domestic industries at a global competitive disadvantage, costing good paying jobs, reducing the tax base, and creating new security risks.

CBAMs provide way out of dilemma By adding tariff CBAMs aim to preserve domestic gains


Question: CBAMs way out of dilemma

The plan is horse-traded for a CBAM:

As policymakers hone their domestic climate policies to strengthen nationally determined contributions under the 2015 Paris Agreement, a persistent fear weighs on them. No leader wants to be the one who, in the name of combating climate change, ends up putting their domestic industries at a global competitive disadvantage, costing good paying jobs, reducing the tax base, and creating new security risks.

CBAMs provide way out of dilemma By adding tariff CBAMs aim to preserve domestic gains


Question: nationally determined contributions

The plan is horse-traded for a CBAM:

As policymakers hone their domestic climate policies to strengthen nationally determined contributions under the 2015 Paris Agreement, a persistent fear weighs on them. No leader wants to be the one who, in the name of combating climate change, ends up putting their domestic industries at a global competitive disadvantage, costing good paying jobs, reducing the tax base, and creating new security risks.

CBAMs provide way out of dilemma By adding tariff CBAMs aim to preserve domestic gains


Question: domestic climate policies

The plan is horse-traded for a CBAM:

As policymakers hone their domestic climate policies to strengthen nationally determined contributions under the 2015 Paris Agreement, a persistent fear weighs on them. No leader wants to be the one who, in the name of combating climate change, ends up putting their domestic industries at a global competitive disadvantage, costing good paying jobs, reducing the tax base, and creating new security risks.

CBAMs provide way out of dilemma By adding tariff CBAMs aim to preserve domestic gains


Question: Paris agreement CBAMs

The plan is horse-traded for a CBAM:

As policymakers hone their domestic climate policies to strengthen nationally determined contributions under the 2015 Paris Agreement, a persistent fear weighs on them. No leader wants to be the one who, in the name of combating climate change, ends up putting their domestic industries at a global competitive disadvantage, costing good paying jobs, reducing the tax base, and creating new security risks.

CBAMs provide way out of dilemma By adding tariff CBAMs aim to preserve domestic gains


Question: Inequality degrades institutions

Inequality degrades institutions through populism AND nativism---extinction.

Andreas T. Schmidt & Daan Juijn 21, Schmidt, Faculty of Philosophy, Centre for PPE, University of Groningen; Juijn, CE Delft, Delft, the Netherlands, “Economic inequality and the long-term future,” GPI Working Paper No. 4-2021

inequality reduction decrease existential risk performance depends on quality of institutions high inequality worsen disaster preparedness fo po science policy existential risk reduction require public goods and collective action high inequality lead to elite capture elite interests less likely to be geared towards public goods societies with higher social capital show greater resilience to shocks have lower death rates in catastrophes polarization increases violent conflict inequality increases polarization Populist politicians are less cooperative


Question: Schmidt and Juijn 21

Inequality degrades institutions through populism AND nativism---extinction.

Andreas T. Schmidt & Daan Juijn 21, Schmidt, Faculty of Philosophy, Centre for PPE, University of Groningen; Juijn, CE Delft, Delft, the Netherlands, “Economic inequality and the long-term future,” GPI Working Paper No. 4-2021

inequality reduction decrease existential risk performance depends on quality of institutions high inequality worsen disaster preparedness fo po science policy existential risk reduction require public goods and collective action high inequality lead to elite capture elite interests less likely to be geared towards public goods societies with higher social capital show greater resilience to shocks have lower death rates in catastrophes polarization increases violent conflict inequality increases polarization Populist politicians are less cooperative


Question: inequality reduction existential risk

Inequality degrades institutions through populism AND nativism---extinction.

Andreas T. Schmidt & Daan Juijn 21, Schmidt, Faculty of Philosophy, Centre for PPE, University of Groningen; Juijn, CE Delft, Delft, the Netherlands, “Economic inequality and the long-term future,” GPI Working Paper No. 4-2021

inequality reduction decrease existential risk performance depends on quality of institutions high inequality worsen disaster preparedness fo po science policy existential risk reduction require public goods and collective action high inequality lead to elite capture elite interests less likely to be geared towards public goods societies with higher social capital show greater resilience to shocks have lower death rates in catastrophes polarization increases violent conflict inequality increases polarization Populist politicians are less cooperative


Question: inequality worsen disaster preparedness

Inequality degrades institutions through populism AND nativism---extinction.

Andreas T. Schmidt & Daan Juijn 21, Schmidt, Faculty of Philosophy, Centre for PPE, University of Groningen; Juijn, CE Delft, Delft, the Netherlands, “Economic inequality and the long-term future,” GPI Working Paper No. 4-2021

inequality reduction decrease existential risk performance depends on quality of institutions high inequality worsen disaster preparedness fo po science policy existential risk reduction require public goods and collective action high inequality lead to elite capture elite interests less likely to be geared towards public goods societies with higher social capital show greater resilience to shocks have lower death rates in catastrophes polarization increases violent conflict inequality increases polarization Populist politicians are less cooperative


Question: inequality and populism

Inequality degrades institutions through populism AND nativism---extinction.

Andreas T. Schmidt & Daan Juijn 21, Schmidt, Faculty of Philosophy, Centre for PPE, University of Groningen; Juijn, CE Delft, Delft, the Netherlands, “Economic inequality and the long-term future,” GPI Working Paper No. 4-2021

inequality reduction decrease existential risk performance depends on quality of institutions high inequality worsen disaster preparedness fo po science policy existential risk reduction require public goods and collective action high inequality lead to elite capture elite interests less likely to be geared towards public goods societies with higher social capital show greater resilience to shocks have lower death rates in catastrophes polarization increases violent conflict inequality increases polarization Populist politicians are less cooperative


Question: inequality and nativism

Inequality degrades institutions through populism AND nativism---extinction.

Andreas T. Schmidt & Daan Juijn 21, Schmidt, Faculty of Philosophy, Centre for PPE, University of Groningen; Juijn, CE Delft, Delft, the Netherlands, “Economic inequality and the long-term future,” GPI Working Paper No. 4-2021

inequality reduction decrease existential risk performance depends on quality of institutions high inequality worsen disaster preparedness fo po science policy existential risk reduction require public goods and collective action high inequality lead to elite capture elite interests less likely to be geared towards public goods societies with higher social capital show greater resilience to shocks have lower death rates in catastrophes polarization increases violent conflict inequality increases polarization Populist politicians are less cooperative


Question: inequality increases polarization

Inequality degrades institutions through populism AND nativism---extinction.

Andreas T. Schmidt & Daan Juijn 21, Schmidt, Faculty of Philosophy, Centre for PPE, University of Groningen; Juijn, CE Delft, Delft, the Netherlands, “Economic inequality and the long-term future,” GPI Working Paper No. 4-2021

inequality reduction decrease existential risk performance depends on quality of institutions high inequality worsen disaster preparedness fo po science policy existential risk reduction require public goods and collective action high inequality lead to elite capture elite interests less likely to be geared towards public goods societies with higher social capital show greater resilience to shocks have lower death rates in catastrophes polarization increases violent conflict inequality increases polarization Populist politicians are less cooperative


Question: inequality elite capture

Inequality degrades institutions through populism AND nativism---extinction.

Andreas T. Schmidt & Daan Juijn 21, Schmidt, Faculty of Philosophy, Centre for PPE, University of Groningen; Juijn, CE Delft, Delft, the Netherlands, “Economic inequality and the long-term future,” GPI Working Paper No. 4-2021

inequality reduction decrease existential risk performance depends on quality of institutions high inequality worsen disaster preparedness fo po science policy existential risk reduction require public goods and collective action high inequality lead to elite capture elite interests less likely to be geared towards public goods societies with higher social capital show greater resilience to shocks have lower death rates in catastrophes polarization increases violent conflict inequality increases polarization Populist politicians are less cooperative


Question: Subsidy repeal unlimits

Subsidy repeal unlimits.

Osaka 21, reporter @ Grist. (Shannon, 1-28-2021, "Biden is canceling fossil fuel subsidies. But he can't end them all.," Grist, https://grist.org/politics/biden-is-eliminating-fossil-fuel-subsidies-but-he-cant-end-them-all/)

not everyone agrees on what counts as a fossil subsidy and what doesn’t Subsidies aren’t checks from the government They take tax breaks loopholes or anything that gives a industry a leg up .


Question: Osaka 21

Subsidy repeal unlimits.

Osaka 21, reporter @ Grist. (Shannon, 1-28-2021, "Biden is canceling fossil fuel subsidies. But he can't end them all.," Grist, https://grist.org/politics/biden-is-eliminating-fossil-fuel-subsidies-but-he-cant-end-them-all/)

not everyone agrees on what counts as a fossil subsidy and what doesn’t Subsidies aren’t checks from the government They take tax breaks loopholes or anything that gives a industry a leg up .


Question: Shannon Osaka

Subsidy repeal unlimits.

Osaka 21, reporter @ Grist. (Shannon, 1-28-2021, "Biden is canceling fossil fuel subsidies. But he can't end them all.," Grist, https://grist.org/politics/biden-is-eliminating-fossil-fuel-subsidies-but-he-cant-end-them-all/)

not everyone agrees on what counts as a fossil subsidy and what doesn’t Subsidies aren’t checks from the government They take tax breaks loopholes or anything that gives a industry a leg up .


Question: fossil fuel subsidies definition

Subsidy repeal unlimits.

Osaka 21, reporter @ Grist. (Shannon, 1-28-2021, "Biden is canceling fossil fuel subsidies. But he can't end them all.," Grist, https://grist.org/politics/biden-is-eliminating-fossil-fuel-subsidies-but-he-cant-end-them-all/)

not everyone agrees on what counts as a fossil subsidy and what doesn’t Subsidies aren’t checks from the government They take tax breaks loopholes or anything that gives a industry a leg up .


Question: subsidies tax breaks loopholes

Subsidy repeal unlimits.

Osaka 21, reporter @ Grist. (Shannon, 1-28-2021, "Biden is canceling fossil fuel subsidies. But he can't end them all.," Grist, https://grist.org/politics/biden-is-eliminating-fossil-fuel-subsidies-but-he-cant-end-them-all/)

not everyone agrees on what counts as a fossil subsidy and what doesn’t Subsidies aren’t checks from the government They take tax breaks loopholes or anything that gives a industry a leg up .


Question: Biden fossil fuel subsidies

Subsidy repeal unlimits.

Osaka 21, reporter @ Grist. (Shannon, 1-28-2021, "Biden is canceling fossil fuel subsidies. But he can't end them all.," Grist, https://grist.org/politics/biden-is-eliminating-fossil-fuel-subsidies-but-he-cant-end-them-all/)

not everyone agrees on what counts as a fossil subsidy and what doesn’t Subsidies aren’t checks from the government They take tax breaks loopholes or anything that gives a industry a leg up .


Question: sliding scale cut larger investments

View it on a sliding scale---the larger the cut, the larger the investments.

Gina Potthoff 24, March 7; Deputy Digital Editor; Chicago Booth Review, “How High Interest Rates Harm Innovation,” https://www.chicagobooth.edu/review/high-interest-rates-harm-innovation

high rates discourage investing in tech leading to slower innovation that limit growth widely used indicators aggregate investment in i p v c r n d and patent For every 1 percent rise in rates R&D VC fell 25 percent patent declined 9 percent shifts lower overall output and decrease t f p reduce aggregate demand make it less profitable to innovate less incentive to develop new products sap investors’ appetite for risk-taking reduce financing rates rose venture fell 30 percent decline occurred in all industries new patents for important tech m l and cloud computing affected by rates


Question: Gina Potthoff 24

View it on a sliding scale---the larger the cut, the larger the investments.

Gina Potthoff 24, March 7; Deputy Digital Editor; Chicago Booth Review, “How High Interest Rates Harm Innovation,” https://www.chicagobooth.edu/review/high-interest-rates-harm-innovation

high rates discourage investing in tech leading to slower innovation that limit growth widely used indicators aggregate investment in i p v c r n d and patent For every 1 percent rise in rates R&D VC fell 25 percent patent declined 9 percent shifts lower overall output and decrease t f p reduce aggregate demand make it less profitable to innovate less incentive to develop new products sap investors’ appetite for risk-taking reduce financing rates rose venture fell 30 percent decline occurred in all industries new patents for important tech m l and cloud computing affected by rates


Question: high rates harm innovation

View it on a sliding scale---the larger the cut, the larger the investments.

Gina Potthoff 24, March 7; Deputy Digital Editor; Chicago Booth Review, “How High Interest Rates Harm Innovation,” https://www.chicagobooth.edu/review/high-interest-rates-harm-innovation

high rates discourage investing in tech leading to slower innovation that limit growth widely used indicators aggregate investment in i p v c r n d and patent For every 1 percent rise in rates R&D VC fell 25 percent patent declined 9 percent shifts lower overall output and decrease t f p reduce aggregate demand make it less profitable to innovate less incentive to develop new products sap investors’ appetite for risk-taking reduce financing rates rose venture fell 30 percent decline occurred in all industries new patents for important tech m l and cloud computing affected by rates


Question: interest rates and R&D

View it on a sliding scale---the larger the cut, the larger the investments.

Gina Potthoff 24, March 7; Deputy Digital Editor; Chicago Booth Review, “How High Interest Rates Harm Innovation,” https://www.chicagobooth.edu/review/high-interest-rates-harm-innovation

high rates discourage investing in tech leading to slower innovation that limit growth widely used indicators aggregate investment in i p v c r n d and patent For every 1 percent rise in rates R&D VC fell 25 percent patent declined 9 percent shifts lower overall output and decrease t f p reduce aggregate demand make it less profitable to innovate less incentive to develop new products sap investors’ appetite for risk-taking reduce financing rates rose venture fell 30 percent decline occurred in all industries new patents for important tech m l and cloud computing affected by rates


Question: VC falls with rates

View it on a sliding scale---the larger the cut, the larger the investments.

Gina Potthoff 24, March 7; Deputy Digital Editor; Chicago Booth Review, “How High Interest Rates Harm Innovation,” https://www.chicagobooth.edu/review/high-interest-rates-harm-innovation

high rates discourage investing in tech leading to slower innovation that limit growth widely used indicators aggregate investment in i p v c r n d and patent For every 1 percent rise in rates R&D VC fell 25 percent patent declined 9 percent shifts lower overall output and decrease t f p reduce aggregate demand make it less profitable to innovate less incentive to develop new products sap investors’ appetite for risk-taking reduce financing rates rose venture fell 30 percent decline occurred in all industries new patents for important tech m l and cloud computing affected by rates


Question: high interest rates innovation

View it on a sliding scale---the larger the cut, the larger the investments.

Gina Potthoff 24, March 7; Deputy Digital Editor; Chicago Booth Review, “How High Interest Rates Harm Innovation,” https://www.chicagobooth.edu/review/high-interest-rates-harm-innovation

high rates discourage investing in tech leading to slower innovation that limit growth widely used indicators aggregate investment in i p v c r n d and patent For every 1 percent rise in rates R&D VC fell 25 percent patent declined 9 percent shifts lower overall output and decrease t f p reduce aggregate demand make it less profitable to innovate less incentive to develop new products sap investors’ appetite for risk-taking reduce financing rates rose venture fell 30 percent decline occurred in all industries new patents for important tech m l and cloud computing affected by rates


Question: rates and technology investment

View it on a sliding scale---the larger the cut, the larger the investments.

Gina Potthoff 24, March 7; Deputy Digital Editor; Chicago Booth Review, “How High Interest Rates Harm Innovation,” https://www.chicagobooth.edu/review/high-interest-rates-harm-innovation

high rates discourage investing in tech leading to slower innovation that limit growth widely used indicators aggregate investment in i p v c r n d and patent For every 1 percent rise in rates R&D VC fell 25 percent patent declined 9 percent shifts lower overall output and decrease t f p reduce aggregate demand make it less profitable to innovate less incentive to develop new products sap investors’ appetite for risk-taking reduce financing rates rose venture fell 30 percent decline occurred in all industries new patents for important tech m l and cloud computing affected by rates


Question: interest rates decline patents

View it on a sliding scale---the larger the cut, the larger the investments.

Gina Potthoff 24, March 7; Deputy Digital Editor; Chicago Booth Review, “How High Interest Rates Harm Innovation,” https://www.chicagobooth.edu/review/high-interest-rates-harm-innovation

high rates discourage investing in tech leading to slower innovation that limit growth widely used indicators aggregate investment in i p v c r n d and patent For every 1 percent rise in rates R&D VC fell 25 percent patent declined 9 percent shifts lower overall output and decrease t f p reduce aggregate demand make it less profitable to innovate less incentive to develop new products sap investors’ appetite for risk-taking reduce financing rates rose venture fell 30 percent decline occurred in all industries new patents for important tech m l and cloud computing affected by rates


Question: Radical Green New Deal

The plan is a radical version of the Green New Deal—Emory’s 1AC solvency advocate admits their mechanism is legally suspicious, requires Congress, would be widely unpopular, and links to politics and backlash.

Hammerschlag 22 – Notes Editor of the Texas Law Review, JD Candidate at the University of Texas School of Law.
Bryan Hammerschlag, “A ‘Green New Fed’: How the Federal Reserve’s Existing Legal Powers Could Allow It to Take Action on Climate Change,” Texas Law Review, Volume 100, Issue 3, 2022,  https://texaslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/6Hamerschlag.Printer.pdf

A common trope among politicians is that the Fed shouldn’t “pick winners .” there is a cohort of influential bankers who disfavor political action legal forces make the Fed’s intervention uncertain the program rely on a broad congressional mandate it would have to impose a significant price . Regulating financed emissions would mean stepping into a controversial area that is political . It would create a clear economic preference for low-emitting over high-emitting activities. philosophies are preferences the Fed duty to effectuate its mandates should triumph over preconceived notions in society the Fed has a long history of political actions outside the proper scope of what unelected technocrats It’s time for the Fed’s own “ whatever it takes ” moment It is time for a Green New Fed


Question: Hammerschlag 22

The plan is a radical version of the Green New Deal—Emory’s 1AC solvency advocate admits their mechanism is legally suspicious, requires Congress, would be widely unpopular, and links to politics and backlash.

Hammerschlag 22 – Notes Editor of the Texas Law Review, JD Candidate at the University of Texas School of Law.
Bryan Hammerschlag, “A ‘Green New Fed’: How the Federal Reserve’s Existing Legal Powers Could Allow It to Take Action on Climate Change,” Texas Law Review, Volume 100, Issue 3, 2022,  https://texaslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/6Hamerschlag.Printer.pdf

A common trope among politicians is that the Fed shouldn’t “pick winners .” there is a cohort of influential bankers who disfavor political action legal forces make the Fed’s intervention uncertain the program rely on a broad congressional mandate it would have to impose a significant price . Regulating financed emissions would mean stepping into a controversial area that is political . It would create a clear economic preference for low-emitting over high-emitting activities. philosophies are preferences the Fed duty to effectuate its mandates should triumph over preconceived notions in society the Fed has a long history of political actions outside the proper scope of what unelected technocrats It’s time for the Fed’s own “ whatever it takes ” moment It is time for a Green New Fed


Question: Green New Fed unpopular

The plan is a radical version of the Green New Deal—Emory’s 1AC solvency advocate admits their mechanism is legally suspicious, requires Congress, would be widely unpopular, and links to politics and backlash.

Hammerschlag 22 – Notes Editor of the Texas Law Review, JD Candidate at the University of Texas School of Law.
Bryan Hammerschlag, “A ‘Green New Fed’: How the Federal Reserve’s Existing Legal Powers Could Allow It to Take Action on Climate Change,” Texas Law Review, Volume 100, Issue 3, 2022,  https://texaslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/6Hamerschlag.Printer.pdf

A common trope among politicians is that the Fed shouldn’t “pick winners .” there is a cohort of influential bankers who disfavor political action legal forces make the Fed’s intervention uncertain the program rely on a broad congressional mandate it would have to impose a significant price . Regulating financed emissions would mean stepping into a controversial area that is political . It would create a clear economic preference for low-emitting over high-emitting activities. philosophies are preferences the Fed duty to effectuate its mandates should triumph over preconceived notions in society the Fed has a long history of political actions outside the proper scope of what unelected technocrats It’s time for the Fed’s own “ whatever it takes ” moment It is time for a Green New Fed


Question: Fed shouldn't pick winners

The plan is a radical version of the Green New Deal—Emory’s 1AC solvency advocate admits their mechanism is legally suspicious, requires Congress, would be widely unpopular, and links to politics and backlash.

Hammerschlag 22 – Notes Editor of the Texas Law Review, JD Candidate at the University of Texas School of Law.
Bryan Hammerschlag, “A ‘Green New Fed’: How the Federal Reserve’s Existing Legal Powers Could Allow It to Take Action on Climate Change,” Texas Law Review, Volume 100, Issue 3, 2022,  https://texaslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/6Hamerschlag.Printer.pdf

A common trope among politicians is that the Fed shouldn’t “pick winners .” there is a cohort of influential bankers who disfavor political action legal forces make the Fed’s intervention uncertain the program rely on a broad congressional mandate it would have to impose a significant price . Regulating financed emissions would mean stepping into a controversial area that is political . It would create a clear economic preference for low-emitting over high-emitting activities. philosophies are preferences the Fed duty to effectuate its mandates should triumph over preconceived notions in society the Fed has a long history of political actions outside the proper scope of what unelected technocrats It’s time for the Fed’s own “ whatever it takes ” moment It is time for a Green New Fed


Question: Green New Deal politics

The plan is a radical version of the Green New Deal—Emory’s 1AC solvency advocate admits their mechanism is legally suspicious, requires Congress, would be widely unpopular, and links to politics and backlash.

Hammerschlag 22 – Notes Editor of the Texas Law Review, JD Candidate at the University of Texas School of Law.
Bryan Hammerschlag, “A ‘Green New Fed’: How the Federal Reserve’s Existing Legal Powers Could Allow It to Take Action on Climate Change,” Texas Law Review, Volume 100, Issue 3, 2022,  https://texaslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/6Hamerschlag.Printer.pdf

A common trope among politicians is that the Fed shouldn’t “pick winners .” there is a cohort of influential bankers who disfavor political action legal forces make the Fed’s intervention uncertain the program rely on a broad congressional mandate it would have to impose a significant price . Regulating financed emissions would mean stepping into a controversial area that is political . It would create a clear economic preference for low-emitting over high-emitting activities. philosophies are preferences the Fed duty to effectuate its mandates should triumph over preconceived notions in society the Fed has a long history of political actions outside the proper scope of what unelected technocrats It’s time for the Fed’s own “ whatever it takes ” moment It is time for a Green New Fed


Question: Fed climate action political

The plan is a radical version of the Green New Deal—Emory’s 1AC solvency advocate admits their mechanism is legally suspicious, requires Congress, would be widely unpopular, and links to politics and backlash.

Hammerschlag 22 – Notes Editor of the Texas Law Review, JD Candidate at the University of Texas School of Law.
Bryan Hammerschlag, “A ‘Green New Fed’: How the Federal Reserve’s Existing Legal Powers Could Allow It to Take Action on Climate Change,” Texas Law Review, Volume 100, Issue 3, 2022,  https://texaslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/6Hamerschlag.Printer.pdf

A common trope among politicians is that the Fed shouldn’t “pick winners .” there is a cohort of influential bankers who disfavor political action legal forces make the Fed’s intervention uncertain the program rely on a broad congressional mandate it would have to impose a significant price . Regulating financed emissions would mean stepping into a controversial area that is political . It would create a clear economic preference for low-emitting over high-emitting activities. philosophies are preferences the Fed duty to effectuate its mandates should triumph over preconceived notions in society the Fed has a long history of political actions outside the proper scope of what unelected technocrats It’s time for the Fed’s own “ whatever it takes ” moment It is time for a Green New Fed


Question: Congress Green New Deal

The plan is a radical version of the Green New Deal—Emory’s 1AC solvency advocate admits their mechanism is legally suspicious, requires Congress, would be widely unpopular, and links to politics and backlash.

Hammerschlag 22 – Notes Editor of the Texas Law Review, JD Candidate at the University of Texas School of Law.
Bryan Hammerschlag, “A ‘Green New Fed’: How the Federal Reserve’s Existing Legal Powers Could Allow It to Take Action on Climate Change,” Texas Law Review, Volume 100, Issue 3, 2022,  https://texaslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/6Hamerschlag.Printer.pdf

A common trope among politicians is that the Fed shouldn’t “pick winners .” there is a cohort of influential bankers who disfavor political action legal forces make the Fed’s intervention uncertain the program rely on a broad congressional mandate it would have to impose a significant price . Regulating financed emissions would mean stepping into a controversial area that is political . It would create a clear economic preference for low-emitting over high-emitting activities. philosophies are preferences the Fed duty to effectuate its mandates should triumph over preconceived notions in society the Fed has a long history of political actions outside the proper scope of what unelected technocrats It’s time for the Fed’s own “ whatever it takes ” moment It is time for a Green New Fed


Question: Fed has political actions

The plan is a radical version of the Green New Deal—Emory’s 1AC solvency advocate admits their mechanism is legally suspicious, requires Congress, would be widely unpopular, and links to politics and backlash.

Hammerschlag 22 – Notes Editor of the Texas Law Review, JD Candidate at the University of Texas School of Law.
Bryan Hammerschlag, “A ‘Green New Fed’: How the Federal Reserve’s Existing Legal Powers Could Allow It to Take Action on Climate Change,” Texas Law Review, Volume 100, Issue 3, 2022,  https://texaslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/6Hamerschlag.Printer.pdf

A common trope among politicians is that the Fed shouldn’t “pick winners .” there is a cohort of influential bankers who disfavor political action legal forces make the Fed’s intervention uncertain the program rely on a broad congressional mandate it would have to impose a significant price . Regulating financed emissions would mean stepping into a controversial area that is political . It would create a clear economic preference for low-emitting over high-emitting activities. philosophies are preferences the Fed duty to effectuate its mandates should triumph over preconceived notions in society the Fed has a long history of political actions outside the proper scope of what unelected technocrats It’s time for the Fed’s own “ whatever it takes ” moment It is time for a Green New Fed


Question: Blue carbon wetlands

--blue carbon

Pew 21, Pew Charitable Trusts is an independent non-profit, non-governmental organization. (September 20, 2021 Updated:   October 1, 2021, “Coastal ‘Blue Carbon’: An Important Tool for Combating Climate Change,” Pew Trusts, https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2021/09/coastal-blue-carbon-an-important-tool-for-combating-climate-change)

wetlands provide many benefits such as sequestering carbon conservation and restoration of these areas is important for mitigating climate change


Question: Pew Charitable Trusts

--blue carbon

Pew 21, Pew Charitable Trusts is an independent non-profit, non-governmental organization. (September 20, 2021 Updated:   October 1, 2021, “Coastal ‘Blue Carbon’: An Important Tool for Combating Climate Change,” Pew Trusts, https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2021/09/coastal-blue-carbon-an-important-tool-for-combating-climate-change)

wetlands provide many benefits such as sequestering carbon conservation and restoration of these areas is important for mitigating climate change


Question: wetlands sequester carbon

--blue carbon

Pew 21, Pew Charitable Trusts is an independent non-profit, non-governmental organization. (September 20, 2021 Updated:   October 1, 2021, “Coastal ‘Blue Carbon’: An Important Tool for Combating Climate Change,” Pew Trusts, https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2021/09/coastal-blue-carbon-an-important-tool-for-combating-climate-change)

wetlands provide many benefits such as sequestering carbon conservation and restoration of these areas is important for mitigating climate change


Question: coastal blue carbon

--blue carbon

Pew 21, Pew Charitable Trusts is an independent non-profit, non-governmental organization. (September 20, 2021 Updated:   October 1, 2021, “Coastal ‘Blue Carbon’: An Important Tool for Combating Climate Change,” Pew Trusts, https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2021/09/coastal-blue-carbon-an-important-tool-for-combating-climate-change)

wetlands provide many benefits such as sequestering carbon conservation and restoration of these areas is important for mitigating climate change


Question: wetlands mitigate climate change

--blue carbon

Pew 21, Pew Charitable Trusts is an independent non-profit, non-governmental organization. (September 20, 2021 Updated:   October 1, 2021, “Coastal ‘Blue Carbon’: An Important Tool for Combating Climate Change,” Pew Trusts, https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2021/09/coastal-blue-carbon-an-important-tool-for-combating-climate-change)

wetlands provide many benefits such as sequestering carbon conservation and restoration of these areas is important for mitigating climate change


Question: wetlands conservation

--blue carbon

Pew 21, Pew Charitable Trusts is an independent non-profit, non-governmental organization. (September 20, 2021 Updated:   October 1, 2021, “Coastal ‘Blue Carbon’: An Important Tool for Combating Climate Change,” Pew Trusts, https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2021/09/coastal-blue-carbon-an-important-tool-for-combating-climate-change)

wetlands provide many benefits such as sequestering carbon conservation and restoration of these areas is important for mitigating climate change


Question: Carbon tax mining process

Carbon taxing the mining process limits funds for terror by denying evasion and lowering income.

Baer et. al 23, (Katherine Baer – Vice President of River Programs & Program Officer of Z. Smith Reynolds Foundation, Ruud De Mooij - Deputy Director in the International Monetary Fund's Fiscal Affairs Department, Shafik Hebous - deputy division chief in the IMF's Fiscal Affairs Department, Michael Keen - Head of the Tax Policy Division IMF, 8-18-2023, Taxing cryptocurrencies, OUP Academic, https://academic.oup.com/oxrep/article/39/3/478/7245712)//CHale

compelling case for corrective taxation is Proof-of-work Voluntariness unlikely to provide solution externalities best addressed  within carbon tax automatically internalize the costs of the energy-heavy mechanisms meaningful measure limit income for energy costs incurred in mining paramount concern has been facilitating criminal activities use is extensive negative cross-country correlation between Bitcoin and corruption money laundering, trade in drugs and financing of terrorism Tax evasion commonly included


Question: Baer et al 23

Carbon taxing the mining process limits funds for terror by denying evasion and lowering income.

Baer et. al 23, (Katherine Baer – Vice President of River Programs & Program Officer of Z. Smith Reynolds Foundation, Ruud De Mooij - Deputy Director in the International Monetary Fund's Fiscal Affairs Department, Shafik Hebous - deputy division chief in the IMF's Fiscal Affairs Department, Michael Keen - Head of the Tax Policy Division IMF, 8-18-2023, Taxing cryptocurrencies, OUP Academic, https://academic.oup.com/oxrep/article/39/3/478/7245712)//CHale

compelling case for corrective taxation is Proof-of-work Voluntariness unlikely to provide solution externalities best addressed  within carbon tax automatically internalize the costs of the energy-heavy mechanisms meaningful measure limit income for energy costs incurred in mining paramount concern has been facilitating criminal activities use is extensive negative cross-country correlation between Bitcoin and corruption money laundering, trade in drugs and financing of terrorism Tax evasion commonly included


Question: taxing cryptocurrencies

Carbon taxing the mining process limits funds for terror by denying evasion and lowering income.

Baer et. al 23, (Katherine Baer – Vice President of River Programs & Program Officer of Z. Smith Reynolds Foundation, Ruud De Mooij - Deputy Director in the International Monetary Fund's Fiscal Affairs Department, Shafik Hebous - deputy division chief in the IMF's Fiscal Affairs Department, Michael Keen - Head of the Tax Policy Division IMF, 8-18-2023, Taxing cryptocurrencies, OUP Academic, https://academic.oup.com/oxrep/article/39/3/478/7245712)//CHale

compelling case for corrective taxation is Proof-of-work Voluntariness unlikely to provide solution externalities best addressed  within carbon tax automatically internalize the costs of the energy-heavy mechanisms meaningful measure limit income for energy costs incurred in mining paramount concern has been facilitating criminal activities use is extensive negative cross-country correlation between Bitcoin and corruption money laundering, trade in drugs and financing of terrorism Tax evasion commonly included


Question: carbon tax limits funds

Carbon taxing the mining process limits funds for terror by denying evasion and lowering income.

Baer et. al 23, (Katherine Baer – Vice President of River Programs & Program Officer of Z. Smith Reynolds Foundation, Ruud De Mooij - Deputy Director in the International Monetary Fund's Fiscal Affairs Department, Shafik Hebous - deputy division chief in the IMF's Fiscal Affairs Department, Michael Keen - Head of the Tax Policy Division IMF, 8-18-2023, Taxing cryptocurrencies, OUP Academic, https://academic.oup.com/oxrep/article/39/3/478/7245712)//CHale

compelling case for corrective taxation is Proof-of-work Voluntariness unlikely to provide solution externalities best addressed  within carbon tax automatically internalize the costs of the energy-heavy mechanisms meaningful measure limit income for energy costs incurred in mining paramount concern has been facilitating criminal activities use is extensive negative cross-country correlation between Bitcoin and corruption money laundering, trade in drugs and financing of terrorism Tax evasion commonly included


Question: proof of work taxation

Carbon taxing the mining process limits funds for terror by denying evasion and lowering income.

Baer et. al 23, (Katherine Baer – Vice President of River Programs & Program Officer of Z. Smith Reynolds Foundation, Ruud De Mooij - Deputy Director in the International Monetary Fund's Fiscal Affairs Department, Shafik Hebous - deputy division chief in the IMF's Fiscal Affairs Department, Michael Keen - Head of the Tax Policy Division IMF, 8-18-2023, Taxing cryptocurrencies, OUP Academic, https://academic.oup.com/oxrep/article/39/3/478/7245712)//CHale

compelling case for corrective taxation is Proof-of-work Voluntariness unlikely to provide solution externalities best addressed  within carbon tax automatically internalize the costs of the energy-heavy mechanisms meaningful measure limit income for energy costs incurred in mining paramount concern has been facilitating criminal activities use is extensive negative cross-country correlation between Bitcoin and corruption money laundering, trade in drugs and financing of terrorism Tax evasion commonly included


Question: corrective taxation Bitcoin

Carbon taxing the mining process limits funds for terror by denying evasion and lowering income.

Baer et. al 23, (Katherine Baer – Vice President of River Programs & Program Officer of Z. Smith Reynolds Foundation, Ruud De Mooij - Deputy Director in the International Monetary Fund's Fiscal Affairs Department, Shafik Hebous - deputy division chief in the IMF's Fiscal Affairs Department, Michael Keen - Head of the Tax Policy Division IMF, 8-18-2023, Taxing cryptocurrencies, OUP Academic, https://academic.oup.com/oxrep/article/39/3/478/7245712)//CHale

compelling case for corrective taxation is Proof-of-work Voluntariness unlikely to provide solution externalities best addressed  within carbon tax automatically internalize the costs of the energy-heavy mechanisms meaningful measure limit income for energy costs incurred in mining paramount concern has been facilitating criminal activities use is extensive negative cross-country correlation between Bitcoin and corruption money laundering, trade in drugs and financing of terrorism Tax evasion commonly included


Question: Bitcoin and corruption

Carbon taxing the mining process limits funds for terror by denying evasion and lowering income.

Baer et. al 23, (Katherine Baer – Vice President of River Programs & Program Officer of Z. Smith Reynolds Foundation, Ruud De Mooij - Deputy Director in the International Monetary Fund's Fiscal Affairs Department, Shafik Hebous - deputy division chief in the IMF's Fiscal Affairs Department, Michael Keen - Head of the Tax Policy Division IMF, 8-18-2023, Taxing cryptocurrencies, OUP Academic, https://academic.oup.com/oxrep/article/39/3/478/7245712)//CHale

compelling case for corrective taxation is Proof-of-work Voluntariness unlikely to provide solution externalities best addressed  within carbon tax automatically internalize the costs of the energy-heavy mechanisms meaningful measure limit income for energy costs incurred in mining paramount concern has been facilitating criminal activities use is extensive negative cross-country correlation between Bitcoin and corruption money laundering, trade in drugs and financing of terrorism Tax evasion commonly included


Question: Dollar strong macroeconomic divergence

4. Dollar strong now---global macroeconomic divergence and growth

Goldman Sachs ’24, “Why the US dollar is likely to stay ‘stronger for longer’”, https://www.goldmansachs.com/insights/articles/why-the-dollar-is-likely-to-stay-stronger-longer, June 6, 2024, DA: 9/14/24, DMurph

the US currency at essentially the same level in 12 months limited prospects for global, macroeconomic divergence and the continued solid growth by the US economy we will continue to live in a strong US dollar Any erosion in the dollar’s strong valuation will likely be gradual


Question: Goldman Sachs dollar strong

4. Dollar strong now---global macroeconomic divergence and growth

Goldman Sachs ’24, “Why the US dollar is likely to stay ‘stronger for longer’”, https://www.goldmansachs.com/insights/articles/why-the-dollar-is-likely-to-stay-stronger-longer, June 6, 2024, DA: 9/14/24, DMurph

the US currency at essentially the same level in 12 months limited prospects for global, macroeconomic divergence and the continued solid growth by the US economy we will continue to live in a strong US dollar Any erosion in the dollar’s strong valuation will likely be gradual


Question: US dollar strong

4. Dollar strong now---global macroeconomic divergence and growth

Goldman Sachs ’24, “Why the US dollar is likely to stay ‘stronger for longer’”, https://www.goldmansachs.com/insights/articles/why-the-dollar-is-likely-to-stay-stronger-longer, June 6, 2024, DA: 9/14/24, DMurph

the US currency at essentially the same level in 12 months limited prospects for global, macroeconomic divergence and the continued solid growth by the US economy we will continue to live in a strong US dollar Any erosion in the dollar’s strong valuation will likely be gradual


Question: US economy growth

4. Dollar strong now---global macroeconomic divergence and growth

Goldman Sachs ’24, “Why the US dollar is likely to stay ‘stronger for longer’”, https://www.goldmansachs.com/insights/articles/why-the-dollar-is-likely-to-stay-stronger-longer, June 6, 2024, DA: 9/14/24, DMurph

the US currency at essentially the same level in 12 months limited prospects for global, macroeconomic divergence and the continued solid growth by the US economy we will continue to live in a strong US dollar Any erosion in the dollar’s strong valuation will likely be gradual


Question: global macroeconomic divergence

4. Dollar strong now---global macroeconomic divergence and growth

Goldman Sachs ’24, “Why the US dollar is likely to stay ‘stronger for longer’”, https://www.goldmansachs.com/insights/articles/why-the-dollar-is-likely-to-stay-stronger-longer, June 6, 2024, DA: 9/14/24, DMurph

the US currency at essentially the same level in 12 months limited prospects for global, macroeconomic divergence and the continued solid growth by the US economy we will continue to live in a strong US dollar Any erosion in the dollar’s strong valuation will likely be gradual


Question: dollar's strong valuation

4. Dollar strong now---global macroeconomic divergence and growth

Goldman Sachs ’24, “Why the US dollar is likely to stay ‘stronger for longer’”, https://www.goldmansachs.com/insights/articles/why-the-dollar-is-likely-to-stay-stronger-longer, June 6, 2024, DA: 9/14/24, DMurph

the US currency at essentially the same level in 12 months limited prospects for global, macroeconomic divergence and the continued solid growth by the US economy we will continue to live in a strong US dollar Any erosion in the dollar’s strong valuation will likely be gradual


Question: Politics of naming pain narratives

4--- Their politics of naming pain narratives inscribe the subaltern’s suffering onto its identity -- the subaltern is recognizable by academia only when depicted in its suffering which internalizes violence

Tuck & Yang 14 ( Eve Tuck and K Wayne Yang, 2014, Eve Tuck is Associate Professor of Critical Race and Indigenous Studies at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education (OISE), University of Toronto. She is Canada Research Chair of Indigenous Methodologies with Youth and Communities. She is a William T Grant Scholar (2015-2020) and was a Ford Foundation Postdoctoral Fellow (2011-2012). K Wayne Yang - Ph.D., 2004, Social and Cultural Studies, University of California, Berkeley, “R-Words: Refusing Research” https://static1.squarespace.com/static/557744ffe4b013bae3b7af63/t/557f2ee5e4b0220eff4ae4b5/1434398437409/Tuck+and+Yang+R+Words_Refusing+Research.pdf Pages 227-230 Eve; K. Wayne “R-Words: Refusing Research” pp. 232-235)

does narratives of pain may be language, experiences, and wisdoms better left alone there are stories that are entrusted to us, stories that are told to us make meaningful relationships in peoples’ lives these stories are not simply not ours to take. underrepresented in the academy by social location frequently experience a pressure to become the Native informant We carry the proof of oppression on our backs These stories are not always ours to give away Stories are meant to be passed among loved ones what am I revealing here and why Who benefits Academic knowledge is particular and privileged disguises itself as universal does so through erasure also through inclusion


Question: Tuck and Yang 14

4--- Their politics of naming pain narratives inscribe the subaltern’s suffering onto its identity -- the subaltern is recognizable by academia only when depicted in its suffering which internalizes violence

Tuck & Yang 14 ( Eve Tuck and K Wayne Yang, 2014, Eve Tuck is Associate Professor of Critical Race and Indigenous Studies at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education (OISE), University of Toronto. She is Canada Research Chair of Indigenous Methodologies with Youth and Communities. She is a William T Grant Scholar (2015-2020) and was a Ford Foundation Postdoctoral Fellow (2011-2012). K Wayne Yang - Ph.D., 2004, Social and Cultural Studies, University of California, Berkeley, “R-Words: Refusing Research” https://static1.squarespace.com/static/557744ffe4b013bae3b7af63/t/557f2ee5e4b0220eff4ae4b5/1434398437409/Tuck+and+Yang+R+Words_Refusing+Research.pdf Pages 227-230 Eve; K. Wayne “R-Words: Refusing Research” pp. 232-235)

does narratives of pain may be language, experiences, and wisdoms better left alone there are stories that are entrusted to us, stories that are told to us make meaningful relationships in peoples’ lives these stories are not simply not ours to take. underrepresented in the academy by social location frequently experience a pressure to become the Native informant We carry the proof of oppression on our backs These stories are not always ours to give away Stories are meant to be passed among loved ones what am I revealing here and why Who benefits Academic knowledge is particular and privileged disguises itself as universal does so through erasure also through inclusion