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crs_RS21048

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Background Overview Special operations are military operations requiring unique modes of employment, tactical techniques, equipment, and training. These operations are often conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments and are characterized by one or more of the following elements: time sensitive, clandestine, low visibility, conducted with and/or through indigenous forces, requiring regional expertise, and/or a high degree of risk. Special Operations Forces (SOF) are those active and reserve component forces of the services designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. The U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), headquartered at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, FL, is a functional combatant command responsible for training, doctrine, and equipping for all U.S. SOF units. Command Structures and Components In 1986, Congress, concerned about the status of SOF within overall U.S. defense planning, passed legislation ( P.L. 99-661 ) to strengthen special operations' position within the defense community and to strengthen interoperability among the branches of U.S. SOF. These actions included the establishment of USSOCOM as a new unified command. USSOCOM headquarters currently consists of approximately 2,500 military and Department of Defense (DOD) civilians (not including government contractors). As stipulated by U.S.C. Title X, Section 167, the commander of USSOCOM is a four-star officer who may be from any military service. U.S. Army General Raymond A. Thomas III is the current USSOCOM Commander. Army Lieutenant General Richard Clarke has been approved to replace General Thomas when he retires in March 2019. The USSOCOM Commander reports directly to the Secretary of Defense. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD SOLIC), a member of the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy (OSD-P), provides civilian oversight over USSOCOM activities and is chain of supervision between the Secretary of Defense and USSOCOM Commander. The current ASD SOLIC is Owen West. As of 2019, USSOCOM consists of over 70,000 active duty, reserve, National Guard, and civilian personnel assigned to its headquarters (about 2,500 personnel), its four components, and sub-unified commands. USSOCOM's components are the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC); the Naval Special Warfare Command (NSWC); the Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC); and the Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC). The Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) is a USSOCOM sub-unified command. Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs) Theater-level command and control responsibilities are vested in Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs). TSOCs are sub-unified commands under their respective Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs). TSOCs are special operational headquarters elements designed to support a GCC's special operations logistics, planning, and operational command and control requirements, and are normally commanded by a general officer. In February 2013, based on a request from USSOCOM and with the concurrence of every geographic and functional combatant commander and military service chiefs and Secretaries, the Secretary of Defense transferred combatant command of the TSOCs from the GCCs to USSOCOM. This means USSOCOM has the responsibility to organize, train, and equip TSOCs, as it previously had for all assigned SOF units as specified in U.S. Code, Title 10, Section 167. This change is intended to enable USSOCOM to standardize, to the extent possible, TSOC capabilities and manpower requirements. While USSOCOM is now responsible for the organizing, training, and equipping of TSOCs, the GCCs continue to have operational control over the TSOCs and all special operations in their respective theaters. TSOC commanders are the senior SOF advisors for their respective GCCs. Each TSOC is capable of forming the core of a joint task force headquarters for short-term operations, and can provide command and control for all SOF in theater on a continuous basis. The services have what the DOD calls "Combatant Command Service Agency (CCSA)" responsibilities for providing manpower, non-SOF peculiar equipment, and logistic support to the TSOCs. The current TSOCs, the GCCs they support, and the CCSA responsibility for those TSOCs are as follows. Special Operations Command South (SOCSOUTH), Homestead Air Force Base, FL; supports U.S. Southern Command; its CCSA is the Army. Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAFRICA), Stuttgart, Germany; supports U.S. Africa Command; its CCSA is the Army. Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR), Stuttgart, Germany; supports U.S. European Command; its CCSA is the Army. Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT), MacDill Air Force Base, FL; supports U.S. Central Command; its CCSA is the Air Force. Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC), Camp Smith, HI; supports U.S. Pacific Command; its CCSA is the Navy. Special Operations Command Korea (SOCKOR), Yongsang, Korea; supports U.S. Forces Korea; its CCSA is the Army. Special Operations Command U.S. Northern Command (SOCNORTH), Peterson Air Force Base, CO; supports U.S. Northern Command; its CCSA is the Air Force. Additional USSOCOM Responsibilities In addition to Title 10 authorities and responsibilities, USSOCOM has been given additional responsibilities. In the 2004 Unified Command Plan (UCP), USSOCOM was given the responsibility for synchronizing DOD planning against global terrorist networks and, as directed, conducting global operations against those networks. In this regard, USSOCOM "receives, reviews, coordinates and prioritizes all DOD plans that support the global campaign against terror, and then makes recommendations to the Joint Staff regarding force and resource allocations to meet global requirements." In October 2008, USSOCOM was designated the DOD proponent for Security Force Assistance (SFA). In this role, USSOCOM performs a synchronizing function in global training and assistance planning similar to the previously described role of planning against terrorist networks. In 2018, USSOCOM was also assigned the mission to field a transregional Military Information Support Operations (MISO) capability intended to "address the opportunities and risks of global information space." By April of 2019, a Joint MISO WebOps Center (JMWC) is planned to be operating with the Interagency and Combatant Command teams to provide joint messaging capabilities. Army Special Operations Command U.S. Army SOF (ARSOF) includes approximately 33,000 soldiers from the active Army, National Guard, and Army Reserve organized into Special Forces, Ranger, and special operations aviation units, along with civil affairs units, military information units, and special operations support units. ARSOF Headquarters and other resources, such as the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, are located at Fort Bragg, NC. Five active Special Forces (SF) Groups (Airborne), consisting of about 1,400 soldiers each, are stationed at Fort Bragg and at Fort Lewis, WA; Fort Campbell, KY; Fort Carson, CO; and Eglin Air Force Base, FL. Special Forces soldiers—also known as the Green Berets—are trained in various skills, including foreign languages, that allow teams to operate independently throughout the world. Two Army National Guard Special Forces groups are headquartered in Utah and Alabama. In addition, an elite airborne light infantry unit specializing in direct action operations, the 75 th Ranger Regiment, is headquartered at Fort Benning, GA, and consists of three battalions of about 800 soldiers each and a regimental special troops battalion providing support to the three Ranger battalions. The Army's special operations aviation unit, the 160 th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne) (SOAR), consists of five battalions and is headquartered at Fort Campbell, KY. The 160 th SOAR features pilots trained to fly the most sophisticated Army rotary-wing aircraft in the harshest environments, day or night, and in adverse weather and supports all USSOCOM components, not just exclusively Army units. Some of the most frequently deployed SOF assets are Civil Affairs (CA) units, which provide experts in every area of civil government to help administer civilian affairs in operational theaters. The 95 th Civil Affairs Brigade (Airborne) is the only active CA unit that exclusively supports USSOCOM. In September 2011 the 85 th Civil Affairs Brigade was activated to support U.S. Army General Purpose Forces (GPFs). All other CA units reside in the Reserves and are affiliated with Army GPF units. Military Information Support Operations (formerly known as psychological operations) units disseminate information to large foreign audiences through mass media. Two active duty Military Information Support Groups (MISGs)—the 4 th Military Information Support Group (MISG) (Airborne) and 8 th Military Information Support Group (MISG) (Airborne)—are stationed at Fort Bragg, and their subordinate units are aligned with Geographic Combatant Commands. Air Force Special Operations Command The Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) is one of the Air Force's 10 major commands, with approximately 19,500 active, reserve, and civilian personnel. AFSOC units operate out of four major continental United States (CONUS) locations and two overseas locations. The headquarters for AFSOC, the 1 st Special Operations Wing (1 st SOW), 24 th Special Operations Wing (24 th SOW), and the Air Force Special Operations Air Warfare Center (AFSOAWC) are located at Hurlburt Field, FL. The AFSOAWC is responsible for training, education, irregular warfare program, innovation development, and operational testing. From AFSOAWC's fact sheet: The AFSOAWC's mission includes non-standard aviation in support of Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine and allied special operations forces. The following units are consolidated under the Air Warfare Center [AFSOAWC]: ■ U.S. Air Force Special Operations School, Hurlburt Field, FL ■ 6 th Special Operations Squadron, Duke Field, FL ■ 19 th Special Operations Squadron, Hurlburt Field, FL ■ 551 st Special Operations Squadron, Cannon Air Force Base, NM ■ 5 th Special Operations Squadron, a reserve unit from the 919 th Special Operations Wing, Duke Field, FL ■ 371 st Special Operations Combat Training Squadron, Hurlburt Field, FL ■ 18 th Flight Test Squadron, Hurlburt Field, FL ■ 592 nd Special Operations Maintenance Squadron, Duke Field, FL ■ 209 th Civil Engineer Squadron, a guard unit from Gulfport, MS ■ 280 th Special Operations Communications Squadron, a guard unit from Dothan, AL The Air Warfare Center provides mission qualification training in SOF aviation platforms to include AC-130U, AC-130W, U-28, MQ-1, MQ-9, C-145, C-146 as well as small unmanned aerial systems (SUAS), Combat Aviation Advisors, medical element personnel, and AFSOC Security Forces. In addition to AFSOC personnel, AFSOAWC is responsible for educating and training other USSOCOM components and joint/interagency/coalition partners. The 27 th SOW is at Cannon AFB, NM. The 352 nd and 353 rd Special Operations Wings provide forward presence in Europe (RAF Mildenhall, England) and in the Pacific (Kadena Air Base, Japan), respectively. The 6 th SOS's mission is to assess, train, and advise partner nation aviation units with the intent to raise their capability and capacity to interdict threats to their nation. The 6 th SOS provides aviation expertise to U.S. foreign internal defense (FID) missions. The Air National Guard's 193 rd SOW at Harrisburg, PA, and the Air Force Reserve Command's 919 th SOW at Duke Field, FL, complete AFSOC's major flying units. The 24 th Special Operations Wing is one of three Air Force active duty special operations wings assigned to Air Force Special Operations Command. The 24 th SOW is based at Hurlburt Field, Fla. The 24 th SOW is the only Special Tactics wing in the Air Force. U.S. Air Force Special Tactics From the Air Force's Special Tactics fact sheet: The primary mission of the 24 SOW is to provide Special Tactics forces for rapid global employment to enable airpower success. The 24 SOW is U.S. Special Operation Command's tactical air and ground integration force, and the Air Force's special operations ground force to enable global access, precision strike, and personnel recovery operations. Core capabilities encompass: airfield reconnaissance, assessment, and control; personnel recovery; joint terminal attack control and environmental reconnaissance. Special Tactics is comprised of Special Tactics Officers, Combat Controllers, Combat Rescue Officers, Pararescuemen, Special Operations Weather Officers and Airmen, Air Liaison Officers, Tactical Air Control Party operators, and a number of combat support Airmen which compromise 58 Air Force specialties. These unique skills provide a full-spectrum, air-focused special operations capability to the combatant commander in order to ensure airpower success. With their unique skill sets, Special Tactics operators are often the first special operations elements deployed into crisis situations. Special Tactics Airmen often embed with Navy SEALs, Army Green Berets and Rangers to provide everything from combat air support to medical aid and personnel recovery, depending on their specialty. AFSOC's Special Tactics experts include Combat Controllers, Pararescuemen, Special Operations Weather Teams, Combat Aviation Advisors, and Tactical Air Control Party (TACPs). As a collective group, they are known as Special Tactics and have also been referred to as "Battlefield Airmen." Their basic role is to provide an interface between air and ground forces, and these airmen have highly developed skill sets. Usually embedded with Army, Navy, or Marine SOF units, they provide control of air fire support, medical and rescue expertise, or weather support, depending on the mission requirements. AFSOC Aircraft AFSOC's active duty and reserve component flying units operate fixed and rotary-wing aircraft, including the CV-22B, AC-130, C-130, EC-130, MC-130, MQ-1, MQ-9, U-28A, C-145A, C-146A, and PC-12. Naval Special Warfare Command19 The Naval Special Warfare Command (NSWC) is composed of approximately 10,000 personnel, including active-duty Special Warfare Operators, known as SEALs; Special Warfare Boat Operators, known as Special Warfare Combatant-craft Crewmen (SWCC); reserve personnel; support personnel; and civilians. NSWC is organized around 10 SEAL Teams, 2 SEAL Delivery Vehicle (SDV) Teams, and 3 Special Boat Teams. SEAL Teams consist of six SEAL platoons each, consisting of 2 officers and 16 enlisted personnel. The major operational components of NSWC include Naval Special Warfare Groups One, Three, and Eleven, stationed in Coronado, CA, and Naval Special Warfare Groups Two, Four, and Ten and the Naval Special Warfare Development Group in Little Creek, VA. These components deploy SEAL Teams, SEAL Delivery Vehicle Teams, and Special Boat Teams worldwide to meet the training, exercise, contingency, and wartime requirements of theater commanders. Because SEALs are considered experts in special reconnaissance and direct action missions—primary counterterrorism skills—NSWC is viewed as well postured to fight a globally dispersed enemy ashore or afloat. NSWC forces can operate in small groups and have the ability to quickly deploy from Navy ships, submarines and aircraft, overseas bases, and forward-based units. U.S. Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC)20 On November 1, 2005, DOD announced the creation of the Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC) as a component of USSOCOM. Now referred to as the U.S. Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command, MARSOC consists of the Marine Raider Regiment, which includes 1 st , 2 nd , and 3 rd Marine Raider Battalions; the Marine Raider Support Group; 1 st , 2 nd , and 3 rd Marine Raider Support Battalions; and the Marine Special Operations School. MARSOC headquarters, the 2 nd and 3 rd Marine Raider Battalions, the Marine Special Operations School, and the Marine Raider Support Group are stationed at Camp Lejeune, NC. The 1 st Marine Raider Battalion is stationed at Camp Pendleton, CA. MARSOC forces have been deployed worldwide to conduct a full range of special operations activities. MARSOC missions include direct action, special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, counterterrorism, and information operations. MARSOC currently has approximately 3,000 personnel assigned. Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC)22 From USSOCOM's 2019 Factbook: The Joint Special Operations Command, located at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, is a sub-unified command of the U.S. Special Operations Command. It is charged to study special operations requirements and techniques, ensure interoperability and equipment standardization, plan and conduct Special Operations exercises and training, and develop joint Special Operations tactics. FY2020 USSOCOM Budget Request USSOCOM's FY2020 budget request of $13.8 billion represents an increase of $381 million (2.8%) from the FY2019-enacted position. USSOCOM's FY2020 base budget request totals $9.6 billion, a $435 million (5%) increase from the FY2019-enacted position of $9.2 billion, while overall FY2020 personnel increases by 1,358 (increases military personnel by 1,407 and reduces civilian personnel by 49). The FY2020 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) request totals $4.2 billion, a $54 million decrease (-1%) from the FY2019-enacted position. FY2020 USSOCOM Requested Force Structure USSOCOM's FY2020 budget request seeks a 2.2% manpower increase, from 71,612 personnel in FY2019 to 73,204 in FY2020. Potential Issue for Congress The Future of USSOCOM and U.S. SOF. After 17 years at the forefront of the global military campaign against terrorism, policymakers, defense officials, and academics are questioning the future role of USSOCOM and U.S. SOF. Three legislative provisions in the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act ( P.L. 115-232 ) suggest growing congressional concern with misconduct, ethics, and professionalism; roles and responsibilities for ASD SOLIC; and SOF's ability to counter future threats across the spectrum of conflict. SEC. 1066. COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF PROFESSIONALISM AND ETH ICS PROGRAM S FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES (a) REVIEW REQUIRED.—The Secretary of Defense shall conduct a comprehensive review of the ethics programs and professionalism programs of the United States Special Operations Command and of the military departments for officers and other military personnel serving in special operations forces. (b) ELEMENTS OF THE REVIEW.—The review conducted under subsection (a) shall specifically include a description and assessment of each of the following: (1) The professionalism and ethics standards of the United States Special Operations Command and affiliated component commands. (2) The ethics programs and professionalism programs of the military departments available for special operations forces. (3) The ethics programs and professionalism programs of the United States Special Operations Command and affiliated component commands. (4) The roles and responsibilities of the military departments and the United States Special Operations Command and affiliated component commands in administering, overseeing, managing, and ensuring compliance and participation of special operations forces in ethics programs and professionalism programs, including an identification of— (A) Any gaps in the administration, oversight, and management of such programs and in ensuring the compliance and participation in such programs; and (B) Any additional guidance that may be required for a systematic, integrated approach in administering, over- seeing, and managing such programs and in ensuring compliance with and participation in such programs in order to address issues and improve adherence to professionalism and ethics standards. (5) The adequacy of the existing management and oversight framework for ensuring that all ethics programs and professionalism programs available to special operations forces meet Department standards. (6) Tools and metrics for identifying and assessing individual and organizational ethics and professionalism issues with respect to special operations forces. (7) Tools and metrics for assessing the effectiveness of existing ethics programs and professionalism programs in improving or addressing individual and organizational ethics-related and professionalism issues with respect to special operations forces. (8) Any additional actions that may be required to address or improve individual and organizational ethics and professionalism issues with respect to special operations forces. (9) Any additional actions that may be required to improve the oversight and accountability by senior leaders of ethics and professionalism-related issues with respect to special operations forces. (c) LIMITATION ON DELEGATION.—The Secretary of Defense may only delegate responsibility for any element of the review required by subsection (a) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, in coordination with other appropriate offices of the Secretary of Defense and the secretaries of the military departments. (d) DEADLINE FOR SUBMITTAL OF REVIEW.—The Secretary of Defense shall submit the review required by subsection (a) to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives by not later than March 1, 2019. (e) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: (1) The term ''ethics program'' means a program that includes— (A) Compliance-based ethics training, education, initiative, or other activity that focuses on adherence to rules and regulations; and (B) Values-based ethics training, education, initiative, or other activity that focuses on upholding a set of ethical principles in order to achieve high standards of conduct and incorporate guiding principles to help foster an ethical culture and inform decision-making where rules are not clear. (2) The term ''professionalism program'' means a program that includes training education, initiative, or other activity that focuses on values, ethics, standards, code of conduct, and skills as related to the military profession. SEC. 917. DEADLINE FOR COMPLETION OF FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF REQUIREMENTS IN CONNECTION WITH ORGANIZATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FOR MANAGEMENT OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that the implementation of Section 922 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 ( P.L. 114-114 –328; 130 Stat. 2354) and the amendments made by that section is fully complete by not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. SEC. 914. ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT REVIEW OF UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND (a) REVIEW REQUIRED.—The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict shall, in coordination with the Commander of the United States Special Operations Command, conduct a comprehensive review of the United States Special Operations Command for purposes of ensuring that the institutional and operational capabilities of special operations forces are appropriate to counter anticipated future threats across the spectrum of conflict. (b) SCOPE OF REVIEW.—The review required by subsection (a) shall include, at a minimum, the following: (1) An assessment of the adequacy of special operations forces doctrine, organization, training, materiel, education, personnel, and facilities to implement the 2018 National Defense Strategy, and recommendations, if any, for modifications for that purpose. (2) An assessment of the roles and responsibilities of special operations forces as assigned by law, Department of Defense guidance, or other formal designation, and recommendations, if any, for additions to or divestitures of such roles or responsibilities. (3) An assessment of the adequacy of the processes through which the United States Special Operations Command evaluates and prioritizes the requirements at the geographic combatant commands for special operations forces and special operations-unique capabilities and makes recommendations on the allocation of special operations forces and special operations unique capabilities to meet such requirements, and recommendations, if any, for modifications of such processes. (4) Any other matters the Assistant Secretary considers appropriate. (c) DEADLINES.— (1) COMPLETION OF REVIEW.—The review required by subsection (a) shall be completed by not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. (2) REPORT.—Not later than 30 days after completion of the review, the Assistant Secretary shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the review, including the findings and any recommendations of the Assistant Secretary as a result of the review. Discussion These three legislative provisions, in addition to directing the Secretary of Defense to fully implement directed changes in ASD SOLIC, call for ASD SOLIC and USSOCOM to take an introspective look at U.S. SOF's culture, roles and responsibilities, adequacy of resources, organizational structure, and the adequacy of train ing, education, and personnel. Some have suggested these provisions are a precursor for congressional and DOD actions to "rein in and reorient" U.S. SOF from fighting terrorists to taking on nation-states instead. Others, citing reportedly nonsanctioned military combat operations in Africa, where U.S. SOF are said to have strayed from their train and assist mandate, have questioned whether or not U.S. SOF was involved in direct combat in Niger. Some believe this situation calls into question the adequacy of civilian oversight and control of U.S. SOF. Others assert that the size of U.S. SOF and the scope of their missions have expanded beyond the ability of USSOCOM to handle them and that congressional actions to increase ASD SOLIC oversight and control of U.S. SOF are necessary to improve the current state of affairs. Aware that U.S. SOF are overburdened and that there is a need to find the right balance between continuing to challenge terrorist organizations while simultaneously addressing growing irregular warfare threats posed by nation-states, policymakers will likely make good use of the two forthcoming congressionally mandated reviews. It is possible that over the next few years, significant public policy debates on the future of USSOCOM and U.S. SOF will be undertaken, potentially resulting in a number of changes for ASD SOLIC, USSOCOM, and U.S. SOF.

Special Operations Forces (SOF) play a significant role in U.S. military operations and, in recent years, have been given greater responsibility for planning and conducting worldwide counterterrorism operations. U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has about 70,000 Active Duty, National Guard, and reserve personnel from all four services and Department of Defense (DOD) civilians assigned to its headquarters, its four service component commands, and eight sub-unified commands. In 2013, based on a request from USSOCOM (with the concurrence of Geographic and Functional Combatant Commanders and the Military Service Chiefs and Secretaries), the Secretary of Defense assigned command of the Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs) to USSOCOM. USSOCOM now has the responsibility to organize, train, and equip TSOCs. While USSOCOM is now responsible for the organizing, training, and equipping of TSOCs, the Geographic Combatant Commands will continue to have operational control over the TSOCs. Because the TSOCs are now classified as sub-unified commands, the services are responsible to provide non-SOF support to the TSOCs in the same manner in which they provide support to the Geographic Combatant Command headquarters. The current Unified Command Plan (UCP) stipulates USSOCOM responsibility for synchronizing planning for global operations to combat terrorist networks. This focus on planning limits its ability to conduct activities designed to deter emerging threats, build relationships with foreign militaries, and potentially develop greater access to foreign militaries. USSOCOM is proposing changes that would, in addition to current responsibilities, include the responsibility for synchronizing the planning, coordination, deployment, and, when directed, the employment of special operations forces globally and will do so with the approval of the Geographic Combatant Commanders, the services, and, as directed, appropriate U.S. government agencies. Further, the proposed changes would give broader responsibility to USSOCOM beyond counterterrorism activities, to include activities against other threat networks. In August 2016, the Obama Administration assigned USSOCOM the leading role in coordinating DOD's efforts to counter WMDs, a mission previously assigned to U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). USSOCOM is also the DOD proponent for Security Force Assistance and recently was assigned the mission to field a transregional Military Information Support Operations (MISO) capability. USSOCOM's FY2020 budget request is for $13.8 billion, and USSOCOM has requested a force structure of 66,553 military and 6,651 civilian personnel. A potential issue for Congress is the future of USSOCOM and U.S. SOF.

crs_R45636

crs_R45636_0

Introduction Since the founding, the federal courts have played a critical role in adjudicating legal disputes, including ones involving executive action. As the Supreme Court stated in Marbury v. Madison , "where a specific duty is assigned by law . . . the individual who considers himself injured[] has a right to resort to the laws of his country for a remedy." Naturally, Congress and its Members have an interest in litigating in federal court, for example, to vindicate their institutional priorities, to argue that the Executive is violating their legislative prerogatives, or to advance their legislative policy interests. During the Obama Administration, for instance, legislative entities brought or joined litigation in federal court for a host of reasons, such as to challenge the Executive's decision to allegedly expend money without a congressional appropriation, to defend the Defense of Marriage Act from constitutional challenge in lieu of the Executive, and to challenge the Executive's decision to engage in military action in Libya. Likewise, during the Trump Administration, legislators have become involved in lawsuits that challenge the President's alleged unconstitutional acceptance of emoluments, suits demanding the production of documents from the Administration, and, in an amicus capacity, challenges to legality of the so-called travel ban. Congressional interest in litigation may increase in salience under the current divided government, as illustrated by the House of Representatives' resolution to authorize the House to participate in ongoing litigation in Texas involving the Affordable Care Act and a recent lawsuit brought by several Members of Congress challenging the President's appointment of an acting Attorney General. However, whenever any party seeks to invoke the power of the federal courts, it must first show that its dispute belongs there. For nearly its entire history, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the role of courts is in "decid[ing] on the rights of individuals." By contrast, "[v]indicating the public interest (including the public interest in Government observance of the Constitution and laws) is the function of Congress and the Chief Executive." The federal courts apply a number of doctrines, known as justiciability doctrines, to ensure that they do not step beyond their bounds and decide issues more properly reserved for the other branches. Foremost among these doctrines is the requirement that a party seeking judicial relief from a federal court demonstrate "standing." This report provides an overview of the standing doctrine as it applies to lawsuits involving legislators, committees, and houses of Congress. First, the report lays out the general rules of standing as they apply in every case in the federal courts and the main purpose behind the doctrine. One central purpose of the standing doctrine—protecting the court's role in the constitutional balance of powers—is a theme that underlies this report, as many of these cases involve courts deciding whether they have the power to adjudicate high-profile political disputes between the other two branches of the federal government. Next, the report considers the relatively few Supreme Court cases to discuss legislator standing, explaining the general principles that courts have drawn from those cases. The report then analyzes how lower courts have interpreted the limited Supreme Court case law on the issue, beginning with cases involving individual legislators, and following with cases brought by entire institutions, such as committees or houses of a legislature. The report then considers other issues relating to legislator participation in litigation, such as intervention under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or participation purely as an "amicus curiae," or a "friend of the court." The report concludes by identifying unresolved doctrinal questions and offering takeaways for prospective congressional litigants. Legal Background of Article III Standing Article III of the Constitution limits the exercise of the federal courts' judicial power to "cases" and "controversies." The Supreme Court has interpreted this "case or controversy" language to impose various restrictions on the "justiciability" of disputes in the federal courts—that is, constraints on the federal courts' power to adjudicate and resolve disagreements between parties. One aspect of justiciability requires a party seeking judicial relief from a federal court to have "standing," such that the party has "a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to warrant [the] invocation of federal-court jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court's remedial powers on his behalf." Further, a litigant must demonstrate standing for each claim he seeks to press and each form of relief that he seeks to obtain. The Supreme Court articulated a three-part test for standing in its seminal 1992 decision Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife . To establish standing under that test, a party must show that it has a genuine stake in the relief sought because it has personally suffered (or will suffer) (1) a concrete and particularized and actual or imminent injury-in-fact (2) that is traceable to the allegedly unlawful actions of the opposing party and (3) that is redressable by a favorable judicial decision. While each of these requirements is complex and can blend into each other, courts generally regard the injury-in-fact requirement to be the "central focus" of the inquiry. A party that seeks to demonstrate standing must show that his injury is "concrete"—meaning an injury that is "real" and not "abstract." Nonetheless, an injury can be intangible in nature, as the deprivation of a constitutional right, like freedom of speech or the free exercise of one's religion, constitutes an injury-in-fact absent any tangible economic loss. While it may sometimes be difficult to draw a distinction between an "intangible" injury and an "abstract" injury, the Court has provided some guidance. For example, the Court has held that an alleged injury sufficient for standing may be one similar to those that have "traditionally been regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit in English or American courts," such as the interest of a qui tam relator in the outcome of his suit. The Court has also stated that Congress can build on common law conceptions of injury, as Congress is "well positioned" to "identify intangible harms that meet minimum Article III requirements" and establish new causes of action to remedy such harms. Finally, the Court has explicitly considered and rejected several types of abstract injuries in previous cases. For instance, in Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State , the Supreme Court held that a public interest organization lacked standing to challenge the transfer of federal land to a religiously affiliated school, as the only injuries identified by the plaintiffs were the "psychological consequence[s] presumably produced by observation of conduct with which one disagrees." A claim based only on this sort of psychological discomfort will generally not support an injury-in-fact. Along with the requirement of concreteness, a plaintiff's alleged injury must be "particularized." This requirement focuses on whether the alleged injury affects the plaintiff in a "personal and individual way." Significantly, the need for particularization bars plaintiffs from seeking redress for so-called "generalized grievances." Under this doctrine, a plaintiff "claiming only harm to his and every citizen's interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws" does not state a sufficiently particularized injury. This principle does not mean, however, that injuries suffered by many are not justiciable. Rather, particularization only requires plaintiffs to connect to the injury they allege in some particular way, even if that injury is widely shared. For instance, in Federal Election Commission v. Akins , the Supreme Court recognized that individual voters had suffered a justiciable injury based on the Federal Election Commission's allegedly unlawful decision to not obtain and disclose certain information about a political organization. The Court concluded that even though that injury was "widely shared," the deprivation of a statutory right granting access to information "directly related to voting" was sufficiently "specific" to allow Congress to authorize individuals to vindicate that right. These limitations on the courts, as they are rooted in the Constitution, are not easily circumvented. For example, subject to "limited exceptions," a litigant must assert "his or her own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest a claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties." To illustrate, in Hollingsworth v. Perry , the Court held that the proponents of a California voter initiative lacked standing to defend that initiative from constitutional challenge when the California Attorney General declined to do so. In that case, the Court agreed that a "political corporate body" can designate an agent to proceed in court on its behalf, but held that the proponents could not simply assert to be acting in such a capacity. Rather, some evidence of actual agency, such as the principal's right to control the agent, must be present. Because this control was lacking in Hollingsworth —the State of California had no power to control or authority over the proponents of the initiative—the proponents could not claim to be proceeding on behalf of the State, and had to rely upon their own interests, which were not sufficiently concrete or particularized to amount to an injury-in-fact. The requirement of concrete and particular injury is essential in every case, but it is especially significant in cases involving the constitutionality of government action because of the important role that the standing doctrine plays in preserving the separation of powers. As one prominent treatise explains, difficult standing decisions often depend on "the importance of having the issues decided by the courts" versus "the importance of leaving the issues for resolution by other means." In other words, "[s]eparation of powers concerns" often "control the seemingly precise concept of injury." Accordingly, the Supreme Court has long recognized that the separation of powers is the driving force behind the standing doctrine. As the Court explained in Lujan , "the Constitution's central mechanism of separation-of-powers depends largely upon common understanding of what activities are appropriate to legislatures, to executives, and to courts." The doctrine of standing, the Court explained, serves to identify those disputes that are "appropriately resolved in the judicial process." Thus, while the formal standing doctrine has some requirements that express "merely prudential considerations," its "core" is in ensuring that the courts do not stray beyond their essential role. The doctrine of standing, therefore, forces the courts to police their own jurisdiction, preventing individuals from enlisting the courts in fights that should be resolved through the political process. This conception of standing helps explain why the Court has said that the standing inquiry is "especially rigorous" in cases involving the constitutionality of government action. In such cases, the courts are being asked to participate in a dispute that may particularly involve the constitutional balance of power, placing the court's role in resolving that dispute under significant scrutiny. Legislative Standing at the Supreme Court Separation of powers is logically the central focus when the plaintiff is a branch of government, such as a legislature. Although the Supreme Court has decided relatively few cases involving legislative standing, in those cases it articulated several principles that apply specifically when the plaintiff is a legislative entity. The first significant Supreme Court case to involve legislators filing a lawsuit challenging a governmental action was the 1939 case Coleman v. Miller . Coleman involved the Kansas legislature's then-recent approval of the proposed Child Labor Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which Congress had submitted to the states for ratification 15 years prior. A bare majority of the Kansas legislature voted to ratify the amendment, with the Kansas lieutenant governor casting the tie-breaking vote in favor of ratification in the Kansas Senate. Seeking to undo this ratification, the plaintiffs, individual members of the Kansas legislature who had voted against the amendment, challenged the lieutenant governor's right to cast his tie-breaking vote. The plaintiffs argued that the lieutenant governor was not a part of the "legislature" and so his vote could not be counted to ratify the amendment under Article V of the Constitution. The Coleman plaintiffs also argued that the passage of time had sapped the amendment of its vitality. They sued to compel the Kansas secretary of state to annul the ratification. The Supreme Court splintered and issued three opinions, none of which obtained five votes. However, a majority of the Court concluded that the plaintiff legislators had standing. Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, writing the "opinion of the Court" for himself and two other Justices, concluded that the petitioners had an "adequate interest to invoke [the Court's] jurisdiction" because the senators' votes "would have been sufficient to defeat ratification" if they had been right that the lieutenant governor's vote was invalid. As a result, their votes had been "held for naught" and "overridden," which ran contrary to the senators' "plain, direct and adequate interest in maintaining the effectiveness of their votes." Justices Butler and McReynolds dissented from the majority's disposition of the case on the merits, but implicitly agreed with its conclusion that the plaintiffs had standing. Justice Frankfurter, writing for four Justices, would have held that the legislators lacked standing. He argued that so-called "intra-parliamentary disputes" should be left to parliaments, and that the injuries suffered here "pertain[ed] to legislators not as individuals but as political representatives executing the legislative process." If these interests were recognized, Frankfurter feared that the courts would end up "sit[ting] in judgment on the manifold disputes engendered by procedures for voting in legislative assemblies." Despite these arguments, Justice Frankfurter's view did not control, and Coleman is recognized as the first case in which the Supreme Court acknowledged that legislators' interest in their votes may constitute an injury that could be vindicated in federal court. The Court returned to the issue of legislator standing 30 years later in Powell v. McCormack . In that case, the House Special Subcommittee on Contracts concluded that Representative Adam Clayton Powell Jr., the chairman of the Committee on Education and Labor, had deceived House authorities as to travel expenses. After voters nonetheless reelected Representative Powell to the House of Representatives in 1966, the House adopted a resolution excluding him from taking his seat, and the House Sergeant at Arms refused to pay Representative Powell his salary. Representative Powell sued the Speaker of the House in his official capacity, seeking a declaratory judgment that his exclusion was unconstitutional, an injunction restraining respondents from excluding him from the House, and an injunction commanding the Sergeant at Arms to pay Representative Powell his salary. After the Supreme Court elected to take review of the case, the Congress that had excluded Powell terminated, and Representative Powell was seated in the House in January 1969. The Court concluded that Representative Powell's case was justiciable. In particular, the Court looked to see if Representative Powell had a "legally cognizable interest" in the outcome of the case. The Court concluded that Representative Powell's claim for back salary was itself sufficient to "supply the constitutional requirement of a case or controversy." Powell thus stands for the proposition that legislators—no less than other individuals—have a personal pecuniary interest in their salary (and other personal prerogatives of office) that can amount to an injury to support standing when a defendant threatens that interest. The next case concerning legislative standing to come before the Court was 1997's Raines v. Byrd . Raines concerned a constitutional challenge to the Line Item Veto Act of 1996, which purported to authorize the President to "cancel" certain spending and tax benefit measures after they were signed into law. The statute provided that "[a]ny Member of Congress or any individual adversely affected by [the Line Item Veto Act] may bring an action . . . for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief on the ground that any provision of this part violates the Constitution." Accordingly, the day after the statute was signed into law, four Senators and two Members of the House, including Senator Robert Byrd, all of whom had voted against the act, sued under this provision alleging that the act was unconstitutional. Senator Byrd alleged that the act injured him in his official capacity in three ways: (1) by "alter[ing] the legal and practical effect of all votes" cast in the future on bills that would be subject to the "line item" veto; (2) by divesting him of his constitutional role in the repeal of legislation; and (3) by altering the constitutional balance of powers between the legislative and executive branch. The Supreme Court held that Senator Byrd and the other legislators lacked standing to bring their claims. Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court emphasized that the standing inquiry turns, in part, on "whether the plaintiff is the proper party to bring this suit" and the requirement that the alleged injury be "particularized." The Court's opinion also restated the standing doctrine's important role in "keeping the Judiciary's power within its proper constitutional sphere" and the need to "carefully inquire" as to whether the plaintiffs had a sufficiently personal, particular, and concrete interest so as to justify a court's involvement. Chief Justice Rehnquist observed that, in contrast to the plaintiff in Powell , Senator Byrd was not asserting that he was deprived of anything to which he was personally entitled, such as a salary. Instead, Senator Byrd was asserting that he had lost power as a result of the statute because it altered the balance of power between Congress and the President. Thus, the individual legislators were, in the majority's view, impermissibly attempting to assert an "institutional injury" that they shared in common with the entire Congress. Such injuries, in the form of the dilution of the power of the legislative body, could not give rise to standing because they were neither concrete—they were "wholly abstract"—nor were they particularized—they were "widely dispersed." The Court acknowledged that, in Coleman , it had upheld standing for legislators claiming a similar institutional injury—an interest in the effectiveness of their votes. However, unlike the plaintiffs in Coleman , Senator Byrd was not complaining that some illegal action had prevented his vote from counting, causing the bill to be passed in spite of his vote. Rather, Senator Byrd had voted, and he had "simply lost that vote." In other words, as the Chief Justice explained, individual legislators could validly assert the institutional injury in Coleman only because the Kansas senators' votes would have actually been enough to defeat the measure at issue, but were "completely nullified" by the allegedly illegal action. Senator Byrd, in contrast, alleged "wholly abstract and widely dispersed" diminution of his future voting power. The Court went on to explain that Members of Congress had an alternative remedy to their judicial challenge—they could repeal the Line Item Veto Act. Further, the Court noted that the statute was not immune from other judicial challenges—an individual with a cognizable injury could still bring suit. Raines thus greatly limited the ability of individual legislators to sue on behalf of their institutions. Nevertheless, the 1997 decision reaffirmed Coleman , thereby not completely closing off the possibility that an individual legislator could assert an institutional injury. In Raines , the Court found it "of some importance" that the various houses of Congress did not authorize Byrd and the other plaintiffs to bring the suit. Although Congress had created a right to challenge the statute's constitutionality in the Line Item Veto Act itself, the plaintiffs had brought their suit only on their own behalf, and the plaintiffs' respective houses of Congress as a whole had opposed it on the merits. This factor would turn out to be decisive in the next legislative standing case to come before the Court, Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission . In that case, the Arizona state legislature—as a whole—sued the Arizona Redistricting Commission (Commission), an independent commission vested by popular initiative with the authority to draw redistricting maps for congressional districts. The Arizona legislature sought to challenge the map adopted by the Commission for the 2012 elections as unconstitutional. The Arizona legislature argued that, under the Elections Clause of the Constitution, the "Legislature" of a state had to have "primary responsibility" to set the manner of elections, and the Commission did not qualify as a legislature. The Court concluded that, in contrast with the individual Member plaintiffs in Raines , the Arizona legislature had standing. The Court found that the key difference between the Arizona legislature and the plaintiffs in Raines was that the former was "an institutional plaintiff asserting an institutional injury [that had] commenced this action after authorizing votes in both of its chambers." The problem with the individual Members asserting institutional injury in Raines , as the Arizona State Legislature Court saw it, was that the injury was "widely dispersed," and no plaintiff in the 1997 case could "tenably claim a personal stake in the suit." In contrast with Raines , the Court concluded, Arizona State Legislature was closer to the Coleman facts, in that the Commission's authority "completely nullif[ied]" any vote by the legislature purporting to adopt a redistricting plan—and that injury was adequately particularized to the plaintiff that was bringing the suit. Importantly, however, the Court stated in a footnote that the standing inquiry might have been different had the suit involved Congress mounting a legal challenge to the President, which would have raised "separation-of-powers concerns absent here." A few key principles can be drawn from this line of Supreme Court cases. With respect to cases brought by individual legislators, Raines drew a fundamental distinction between so-called "institutional injury" and the sort of personal injury that was at issue with the plaintiff's lost salary in Powell . As the Court would go on to explain in Arizona State Legislature , an "institutional injury" is an injury that "scarcely zeroe[s] in on any individual member," but rather "impact[s] all Members of Congress and both Houses . . . equally." The Arizona State Legislature court, interpreting Raines , explained that individual legislators generally cannot assert institutional injuries: "[h]aving failed to prevail in their own Houses, the suitors [in Raines ] could not repair to the Judiciary to complain." However, Raines also determined that there was an exception to this general rule based on the Court's holding in Coleman v. Miller , "[t]he one case in which [the Court] upheld standing for legislators . . . claiming an institutional injury." The Court justified this exception because the plaintiffs in Coleman , if they had been correct on the merits of their claim, would have been in a situation where "their votes not to ratify the amendment were deprived of all validity." The challenge, then, for any individual legislator asserting an institutional injury is to show that the asserted injury is analogous to the "vote nullification" that took place in Coleman . These principles will be discussed in the next section. Individual Legislators and Standing in the Lower Courts Institutional Injury Much of the lower court case law on legislative standing has focused on when an individual can assert an institutional injury akin to the injury asserted by the plaintiffs in Coleman . The courts inside and outside the D.C. Circuit have taken slightly different approaches to analyzing this question. The District of Columbia Circuit Because Members of Congress serve in the federal government in Washington, DC, and because the District is also the site of executive branch actions that could be the subject of a congressional lawsuit, such cases are often initiated in D.C. federal court. As a result, the federal appellate body in DC, the D.C. Circuit—often referred to as the second-most important court in the country —has a significant influence over the case law concerning congressional standing. In a pair of cases following Raines , the D.C. Circuit considered when individual Member plaintiffs can assert institutional injuries: the 1999 case Chenoweth v. Clinton , and the 2000 case Campbell v. Clinton . In Chenoweth , three Members of the House sued to enjoin the American Heritage Rivers Initiative (AHRI), a program promulgated by executive order that required certain federal agencies to support local efforts to preserve certain historically significant rivers and riverside communities. The Member plaintiffs argued that the AHRI violated the Constitution by depriving them of their constitutional role in the passage of legislation by creating the AHRI via executive order. The Members argued that their injury was more severe than the injury at stake in Raines because the President's action had "denied Members of Congress any opportunity to vote for or against the AHRI." The D.C. Circuit disagreed, concluding instead that the injury asserted by the plaintiffs in Chenoweth was fundamentally the same as that asserted in Raines —that their injury was an "alter[ation] [in] the constitutional balance of powers between the Legislative and Executive Branches." Further, the court observed that here, as in Raines , it was "uncontested that the Congress could terminate the AHRI were a sufficient number in each House so inclined," meaning that, as in Raines , Congress had a legislative remedy. The Chenoweth court acknowledged that, following Coleman , it might be a different case if the Representatives alleged that the necessary majorities in Congress had voted to block the AHRI. In such a case, legislators could argue that their votes had been "effectively nullified," but because plaintiffs in Chenoweth made no such allegations, the court dismissed the case for want of standing. The second of the influential post- Raines D.C. Circuit decisions is Campbell v. Clinton , decided the year after Chenoweth . That case challenged the legality of the United States' involvement in NATO air and cruise missile attacks in Yugoslavia. Prior to the lawsuit, Congress had voted on four resolutions related to the conflict, including an "authorization" of the air strikes that failed by a tie vote, 213-213, and a declaration of war that failed 427-2. Congress also voted against requiring the President to immediately end U.S. participation in the conflict and voted to fund the involvement. After these votes, the plaintiffs, 31 Members of Congress who were opposed to U.S. military involvement, filed suit, alleging that the President's use of American forces violated the Constitution's War Powers Clause and the War Powers Resolution. Representative Tom Campbell and the other Member plaintiffs argued that the Executive's action had "completely nullified" the tie vote against the airstrikes and the vote against the declaration of war, equating themselves to the Kansas senators in Coleman . The D.C. Circuit disagreed, concluding that the reason the Coleman plaintiffs' votes had been "nullified" was because of the unique context of a vote against a constitutional amendment, which left them without any alternative remedy. The appellate court argued that, in Coleman , the Kansas senators were in a unique position because they were "powerless" to rescind the ratification by legislative action—according to the court, it was "not at all clear" whether the ratification could have been rescinded once it was deemed ratified. The court saw Raines as having attached critical importance to this absence of legislative remedy; this fact is what "nullified" the Kansas senators' votes and supplied the necessary concrete injury. In contrast, the Campbell plaintiffs had several legislative remedies, including the power to withdraw appropriations and impeachment. As a result, the court concluded that their vote had not been "nullified" in the same manner as the Coleman plaintiffs. Rather, the court viewed the Campbell plaintiffs' argument to essentially be that the President acted illegally in excess of his constitutional authority and in violation of a statute. As a result, the circuit court determined that the case was indistinguishable from Raines , and the plaintiffs had not suffered a concrete and particularized injury. Following these precedents, the trial courts in the D.C. Circuit have generally been hesitant to find concrete and particularized injury in cases involving individual legislators asserting institutional injuries, especially where the legislature as a whole possessed other potential avenues for relief through the legislative process. For example, in 2002, the court concluded that 32 Members of the House of Representatives lacked standing to challenge President George W. Bush's unilateral withdrawal from 1972's Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. As in Campbell , the court emphasized the "widely dispersed" nature of the injury and the "extensive self-help" remedies available to Congress that could be used to remedy the President's allegedly illegal actions, such as the appropriations power, or, as a last resort, impeachment. The court concluded that the availability of these alternate remedies, combined with the fact that Congress as a whole had not authorized these individual Members to represent its interests in federal litigation, demonstrated that the plaintiffs could not assert the institutional injury alleged. Similarly, in a 2011 case, a D.C. district court determined that 10 Members of the House lacked standing to challenge President Obama's alleged violation of the War Powers Clause of the Constitution and the War Powers Resolution. In that case, the plaintiffs alleged that the President had pursued military action in Libya without seeking any approval from Congress and had spent funds on an "unauthorized war." The court, again following Campbell , emphasized that "nullification necessitates the absence of a legislative remedy" and found that the plaintiffs had "voted on essentially what the plaintiffs now ask this Court to award . . . . Thus, the plaintiffs' votes were given full effect. They simply lost that vote." The one post- Raines ruling from a D.C. district court to reach a contrary conclusion and find legislative standing was the 2018 case Blumenthal v. Trump . The plaintiffs in Blumenthal —approximately 201 minority Members of the Senate and House—alleged that President Donald Trump, by receiving benefits from his business entities' dealings with foreign governments, had violated the Foreign Emoluments Clause of the Constitution, which prohibits persons holding certain offices from receiving any "present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State." Plaintiffs sought declaratory as well as injunctive relief preventing the President from accepting any further emoluments without the consent of Congress. The plaintiffs argued that they had suffered injury because the President's conduct, in allegedly accepting emoluments and failing to submit those emoluments to Congress, had nullified their votes by "den[ying] them a voting opportunity to which the Constitution entitles them." The district court reasoned that, although this injury was an institutional injury dispersed among all Members of Congress, it nonetheless was comparable to the injury upheld in Coleman because the plaintiffs in Blumenthal , like the plaintiffs in Coleman , were not complaining about dilution of legislative power, but rather about the complete nullification of their votes. This distinction turned decisively on the plaintiffs' lack of a legislative remedy. The Blumenthal court contrasted the case with Raines and Chenoweth , in which the plaintiffs "either lost the vote in Congress or did not have the political influence to bring their bill to a vote." By contrast, in the view of the district court, Senator Blumenthal and the other Member plaintiffs lacked any legislative means to remedy their complaints because the President never provided them with the opportunity to approve the emoluments in the first place. Although the defendants suggested several potential nonjudicial remedies, such as a vote by Congress rejecting specific supposed emoluments, or a bill defining emoluments and prohibiting the receipt of them, the court went on to reject all of these proposed possible legislative remedies as inadequate, asserting that none would require the President to submit his emoluments for congressional consent for prior approval or even force him to provide information about future emoluments to Congress. Further, the court determined that appropriations remedies that the D.C. Circuit saw as adequate in Campbell and Chenoweth would not work in this case, as there are no federal appropriations associated with the President's alleged receipt of emoluments. Finally, the court concluded that impeachment was too "extreme" to be considered an adequate remedy. Institutional Injury to Individual Legislators Outside the D.C. Circuit Whereas the D.C. Circuit and the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia have generally concluded that whether individual legislators possess standing largely turns on the availability of alternative legislative remedies, other circuits considering the question have not arrived at the same consensus. These courts have generally viewed the Coleman exception even more narrowly than the D.C. Circuit, further limiting the availability of legislative standing. In Baird v. Norton , for example, the Sixth Circuit ruled that Members of the Michigan state legislature lacked standing to challenge the procedures followed by their legislature in approving certain gaming compacts between the State of Michigan and Indian tribes. The plaintiffs alleged that the legislature had unlawfully approved the gaming compacts without complying with certain procedural safeguards required by the Michigan Constitution. First, the court held that the procedural harm inflicted by this neglect of constitutional procedures was only a "generalized grievance shared by all Michigan residents" and could not give rise to standing. Second, in response to the argument that the use of these procedures had "nullified" the plaintiffs' votes in the legislature, the court, analyzing Raines and Coleman , concluded that "[f]or legislators to have standing as legislators, then, they must possess votes sufficient to have either defeated or approved the measure at issue." As this court read Coleman , standing required that the lawsuit be joined by sufficient members of their respective houses to defeat the legislation in order to show that actual nullification occurred. Because the legislators in Baird could not make that showing, the court concluded that they lacked standing without examining the availability of alternative legislative remedies. Reading Raines even more narrowly, the Tenth Circuit has concluded that individual legislators can never bring suit to assert institutional injuries. In Kerr v. Hickenlooper , on remand to the Tenth Circuit after the Supreme Court's decision in Arizona State Legislature , the court considered whether then-current Colorado state legislators could have standing to challenge an amendment to the Colorado Constitution that required voter approval in advance for new taxes. The Tenth Circuit had previously concluded that the legislators had standing because this amendment "deprive[d] them of their ability to perform the legislative core functions of taxation and appropriation," rendering their votes "advisory." On remand, however, the court changed its view, and read Raines and Arizona State Legislature together to conclude that "individual legislators may not support standing by alleging only an institutional injury," which only institutional plaintiffs like the Arizona state legislature could assert. Arizona State Legislature , the court determined, had changed the law such that the nature of the injury—whether it was personal or institutional—was the determinative factor. The Tenth Circuit concluded that Coleman , which Raines had characterized as an institutional injury case, was in fact a case involving a "personal" injury to the senators whose votes were allegedly nullified. This injury was not, in the Tenth Circuit's view, "institutional" as the Supreme Court used that term in Arizona State Legislature because institutional injuries necessarily affect all members of a legislature in equal measure, and in Coleman , the only injured legislators were those who had their votes nullified. As a result, the court concluded that the plaintiffs in Kerr had asserted only institutional injuries to the power of the legislature, and they accordingly lacked standing. The views on institutional injuries announced in Baird and Kerr appear to contrast with the somewhat more receptive standard that has developed in the D.C. Circuit. In both Baird and Kerr , the court interpreted the standing upheld in Coleman , the so-called vote nullification injury, as being about the deprivation inflicted on individual legislators by virtue of their vote being defeated by the allegedly unlawful action. In contrast, after Campbell , the D.C. Circuit has focused on the lack of a legislative remedy and whether the legislature as a whole continues to enjoy "ample legislative power" to remedy the alleged wrong. Personal Injury As the Supreme Court explained in R aines , there may be fewer obstacles for legislators to sue for "something to which they are personally" entitled, such as the loss of salary claimed by Representative Powell in Powell v. McCormack . This section examines how lower courts have distinguished between "personal" and "institutional" injuries and the other justiciability considerations that have been applied to injuries that were undoubtedly personal. Distinguishing Personal from Institutional Injuries In Raines and Arizona State Legislature , the alleged injuries were clearly institutional because the alleged wrongful conduct represented diminution in the power of the legislature as a whole, affecting "all Members of Congress and both Houses . . . equally." However, it is possible for an injury to have apparently unequal effects within the legislature but nonetheless be "institutional." Best illustrating this principle is a pair of cases from different districts considering claims brought under 5 U.S.C. § 2954—which provides that executive agencies, on request of the House Committee on Oversight and Reform or the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, or "any seven members thereof," "shall submit any information requested of it relating to any matter within the jurisdiction of the committee." Known as the "Seven-Member Rule," this statute authorizes Members of the minority party to obtain information from the Administration, but does not provide explicitly for judicial enforcement. In Waxman v. Thompson , a 2006 case out of the Central District of California, 18 Members of the House sued under Section 2954 after they had received an allegedly incomplete response from the Executive to their demand for documents relating to the anticipated cost of the Medicare Prescription Drug and Modernization Act of 2003. The court determined that the plaintiffs had not shown that their vote had been nullified within the meaning of Coleman —plaintiffs had alleged only that they "ha[d] been required to vote and legislate without full access to information." The plaintiffs, however, argued that their injury was personal, not institutional, because they had a "distinct legal entitlement not shared by all Members of Congress." The court disagreed. Rather, the court explained, the right the plaintiffs asserted "runs with their congressional and committee seats." Their injury, in the view of the court, was not an injury to themselves personally, but an injury to "Congress, on whose behalf they acted," and it was the same type of institutional injury that the Supreme Court deemed insufficient to confer standing in Raines . This same issue arose again in 2018, in the case Cummings v. Murphy in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. As in Waxman , the Cummings plaintiffs were minority Members of the House Oversight Committee who sought documents from an executive agency under Section 2954. The court observed that the "Plaintiffs tie[d] their injury directly to their constitutional duties as legislators, claiming their alleged harm to be impedance of the oversight and legislative responsibilities that have been delegated to them by Congress" and that the injury alleged ran "in a sense with the Plaintiff's seat." Despite these facts, the plaintiffs argued, as in Waxman , that because their injury was not shared by all Members of Congress equally, their injury was not institutional in nature. The court disagreed. Relying on Raines , the court concluded that the plaintiffs' injury was institutional because it was "rooted in a right granted to them as Members of Congress." Further, because any violation of the "Seven-Member Rule" was an institutional injury, the court determined that, although the Member plaintiffs had a "stronger case" for standing than the plaintiffs had in Raines , historical practice, a lack of congressional authorization, and the availability of alternative remedies demonstrated that the injury was too "wholly abstract" and "widely dispersed" to confer standing on an individual Member. These cases make clear that the difference between a "personal" and an "institutional injury" does not hinge on the issue of particularization. Rather, the difference is the source of the right that has been violated. The Seven-Member Rule cases demonstrate that, even where an injury has a particular effect on certain Members, it can nonetheless be insufficiently "concrete" under Raines if the Member's injury does not deprive him of something to which he is personally entitled. In other words, where the right alleged to have been violated is tied to a right granted to a plaintiff "as [a] Member[] of Congress," all of Congress is harmed equally, as a diminution of that right affects the institution as a whole, even if it is only a single Member who is asserting that right at a given moment. Personal Injury Must Comply with Traditional Standing Requirements Even if a legislator alleges an injury that seems to be genuinely "personal" rather than "institutional," that injury must nonetheless meet the typical standing requirements of particularization and concreteness. Further, that injury must be likely and imminent as opposed to merely speculative, causally connected to the challenged action, and redressable by the court. A number of cases illustrate how an alleged injury to legislators can fail to meet these requirements. For example, post- Raines , federal courts of appeals have generally concluded that a mere possibility of electoral or reputational harm to a legislator is too speculative to support Article III standing. In Schaffer v. Clinton , the Tenth Circuit dismissed a claim brought by Representative Bob Schaffer, a Member of Congress who alleged that the cost of living adjustment (COLA) in the Ethics Reform Act of 1989 violated the Twenty-seventh Amendment to the Constitution. Representative Schaffer, who received an increase in pay based on the COLAs, argued that they were "damaging to his political position and his credibility among his constituency" because the COLAs involved paying him with monies allegedly "appropriated unconstitutionally." This argument relied heavily on a pre- Raines D.C. Circuit case, Boehner v. Anderson . In Boehner , the D.C. Circuit had concluded that Representative John Boehner had standing to challenge the COLAs based on his claim that it undermined his "political position." However, as the Tenth Circuit observed, this case predated Raines , and its analysis was "cursory." Rejecting Boehner , the Tenth Circuit concluded that Representative Schaffer's asserted injury was supported by no concrete evidence of reputational injury and was much like the injury rejected in Raines —an abstract claim that applied to every Member of Congress. As a result, the injury alleged was insufficiently concrete and particularized to give rise to standing. Another pair of cases illustrates how alleged injuries to legislators can fail to meet standing requirements on causation and redressability, even if the injuries alleged are seemingly sufficiently concrete and particular. The first of these cases is a 2018 case from the Middle District of Pennsylvania, Corman v. Torres . Corman involved a challenge brought by several parties to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's 2018 decision to strike the 2011 redistricting map and issue its own replacement map. Among the challengers were eight Republican Members of Pennsylvania's delegation to the U.S. House of Representatives, who challenged the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision as a violation of the Elections Clause of the Constitution. The Members argued that they were injured by the alterations to their districts, thereby reducing their incumbency advantage, and by wasting time, energy, and resources expended in their former districts. The court set aside the question of whether these injuries were sufficiently concrete and particular, but nonetheless observed that no case supported "the proposition that an elected representative has a legally cognizable interest in the composition of his or her electoral district." Irrespective of this question, the court concluded that the Members' claim failed on the causation prong of standing. Because the plaintiff Members conceded that the state supreme court had the authority to order the redrawing of the redistricting map, they could not trace their injuries to the substantive decisions that actually led to the court-drawn map: Even if the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had simply ordered that a new redistricting map be drawn, but had given the General Assembly free substantive rein . . . to accomplish that objective, the . . . injury would persist. In that circumstance, the court would not have committed any of the improprieties alleged in the verified complaint, but district boundaries would still have changed. The court concluded that the plaintiffs could not bridge this "gap" in the causal chain and dismissed the Members' claims. Another case in which a legislator's purported claims could not overcome the second two elements of the standing inquiry is Rangel v. Boehner , a 2013 case out of the District Court for the District of Columbia. R angel arose out of disciplinary proceedings and a vote of censure against Representative Charles Rangel. Representative Rangel alleged that certain improprieties had colored the proceedings of the Ethics Committee that had investigated him. He sued officials of the House, but not the House itself, seeking declaratory relief and an injunction requiring the defendants to "remove the recording of censure." Representative Rangel claimed four separate injuries that he argued gave rise to standing: damage to his reputation, the loss of his status on the House Ways and Means Committee, "political injury," and a violation of his due process rights. On these alleged injuries, the court generally concluded that Representative Rangel's claims failed on grounds of lack of causation and redressability. For example, although the court had no doubt that alleged injury to Representative Rangel's reputation was sufficiently concrete and particularized, the plaintiff's failure to sue the House itself doomed his ability to show causation. After all, the actions of the individual defendant House Members did not cause his injury—it was, as the court noted, the House that censured him, not the individual Member defendants. Similarly, Representative Rangel was unable to demonstrate redressability because the court determined that it had no authority to order the House to rescind his censure, as authority over the House's Journal was constitutionally vested in the House itself. As a consequence, a legislator plaintiff having a concrete and particularized injury is not alone sufficient to establish Article III standing, especially when the plaintiff seeks to involve the court in the internal affairs of the other branches of government. Institutional Standing The Supreme Court's decision in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission reinforces that an institutional plaintiff, like the Arizona state legislature, will typically have standing to assert an "institutional injury." In that case, discussed above, the Court determined that the Arizona state legislature had standing based on the Redistricting Commission's usurpation of its "primary responsibility" for redistricting under the Constitution's Elections Clause. Although the Court concluded that the legislature did not, in fact, have the exclusive authority it alleged, the Court nonetheless determined that this merits determination did not undercut the legislature's claim of injury for the purposes of justiciability. This analysis indicates that an institution, such as a legislature as a whole, may potentially assert an institutional injury and obtain standing in federal court. The Court left open, however, the possibility that separation-of-powers considerations could lead to a different result if the case instead involved Congress suing the President. In addition to the separation-of-powers concerns that might arise, Arizona State Legislature raises questions regarding who constitutes an institutional plaintiff and which institutional injuries are sufficiently concrete and particularized to give rise to standing. These questions are the focus of the following sections. The Significance of Explicit Congressional Authorization Courts have routinely concluded that congressional plaintiffs who obtain authorization to sue before initiating litigation are significantly more likely to have standing. As one court has explained, the presence of authorization is the "key factor" when determining whether a congressional plaintiff possesses standing to vindicate an institutional injury on behalf of the authorizing institution. When a legislative plaintiff possesses authorization to pursue litigation from its respective institution, it decreases the likelihood that the plaintiff is impermissibly attempting to assert the rights of a third party instead of proceeding on the institution's behalf. Although the Arizona State Legislature Court deemed it important that the legislative plaintiffs commenced the lawsuit after "authorizing votes in both of its chambers," that does not mean that a congressional plaintiff must always obtain the imprimatur of both the Senate and the House of Representatives in order to bring suit. Rather, courts have held that a plaintiff may sue on behalf of a single house of Congress to vindicate that particular chamber's unique institutional interests. Several courts have considered what sort of authorization, short of authorizing votes in both chambers leading to a suit being brought by the institution itself, suffices to permit a suit on behalf of a legislative institution. A number of cases prior to Arizona State Legislature considered this question. The most common setting for these cases involved legislative demands for information. The Supreme Court has long recognized "that the power of inquiry—with process to enforce it—is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function." In other words, Congress has an interest in obtaining information necessary to fulfill its constitutionally designated role in the tripartite system of American government. At the same time, however, courts have acknowledged a distinction between a chamber of Congress utilizing its own powers to demand and obtain information and invoking the federal courts ' power to enforce its demands. In order to utilize the judicial process—rather than the political process—to enforce congressional demands for information, Supreme Court precedent requires the plaintiffs to show that they are validly acting on behalf of the injured institution. In the 1976 case of United States v. AT&T Co. , for instance, the D.C. Circuit ruled that the chairman of the House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations had standing to appear in federal court to challenge the executive branch's objection to a subpoena that the subcommittee had issued to a private party. The court reasoned "that the House as a whole has standing to assert its investigatory power, and can designate a member to act on its own behalf." Crucially, because the House of Representatives had passed a resolution authorizing the chairman to participate in the case "on behalf of the Committee and the House," the chairman did not encounter the standing obstacles that might exist if "a single [M]ember of Congress" attempted "to advocate his own interest in the congressional subpoena power" without the affirmative consent of his or her respective chamber or if "a wayward committee" were "acting contrary to the will of the House." Although AT&T predates Raines and the subsequent D.C. Circuit cases interpreting it, courts have generally concluded that AT&T 's holding—namely, that congressional plaintiffs usually have standing to assert Congress's interests in obtaining information so long as they have congressional authorization to do so—survives Raines . AT&T's holding comports with broader standing principles that a plaintiff may "designate agents to represent it in federal court" without running afoul of the standing requirement. In this vein, courts have held that a house of Congress can authorize a committee to sue on its behalf. For example, in the District Court for the District of Columbia's 2008 opinion in Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives v. Miers , the House Committee on the Judiciary filed suit in federal court to enforce a subpoena it had issued against certain executive officials. Critically, before the committee filed its lawsuit, the full House of Representatives passed a resolution authorizing the chairman of the committee "to initiate a civil action in federal court" to enforce the subpoena. The court therefore ultimately concluded "that the Committee ha[d] standing to enforce its duly issued subpoena through a civil suit." According to the court, the fact that the committee had "been expressly authorized by House Resolution to proceed on behalf of the House of Representatives as an institution " distinguished Miers from cases like Raines in which individual legislators had invalidly attempted to assert injuries to their respective institutions as a whole rather than to themselves personally. In other words, "the fact that the House ha[d] issued a subpoena and explicitly authorized th[e] suit" was "the key factor that move[d Miers ] from the impermissible category of an individual plaintiff asserting an institutional injury . . . to the permissible category of an institutional plaintiff asserting an institutional injury." Thus, the committee, acting on the full House's behalf with the House's imprimatur, could validly sue "to vindicate both its right to the information that [was] the subject of the subpoena and its institutional prerogative to compel compliance with its subpoenas." Where, by contrast, a legislative plaintiff has not obtained congressional authorization to represent his respective house via an authorizing vote, courts have typically determined that the plaintiff lacks standing to sue to enforce subpoenas or otherwise assert an informational injury to Congress as a whole. For instance, in Cummings v. Murphy , the Seven-Member Rule case discussed above, the court concluded that individual Members lacked standing to argue that they were, in fact, validly proceeding on behalf of the institution. As the court explained, "[i]ndividual Members of Congress generally do not have standing to vindicate the institutional interests of the house in which they serve" unless they have obtained affirmative authorization from their respective chambers of Congress. The court opined that "requiring authorization protects Congress' institutional concerns from the caprice of a restless minority of Members." Cummings thus demonstrates that "it is not simply enough" for individual legislators "to point to an informational injury arising from an unmet statutory demand to demonstrate standing"; courts generally also "look to the presence of authorization as a necessary . . . factor in evaluating standing in cases that pit the Executive and Legislative Branches against each other." Significantly, at least one opinion suggests that to validly authorize a plaintiff to pursue litigation on an institution's behalf, that institution must expressly authorize the plaintiff to bring that specific lawsuit prior to the commencement of that suit; a freestanding authorization to pursue litigation may not always suffice to confer standing. Namely, in Walker v. Cheney , the Comptroller General sought a court order requiring the Vice President to produce certain documents. To support his argument that he possessed congressional authorization—and thus standing—to pursue this lawsuit on Congress's behalf, the Comptroller General invoked 31 U.S.C. § 716(b)(2), which purports to authorize the Comptroller General to "bring a civil action in the district court of the United States for the District of Columbia to require the head of [an executive] agency to produce a record." The court, however, rejected that argument, concluding that this " generalized allocation of enforcement power" did not suffice to establish "that the current Congress ha[d] authorized the Comptroller General to pursue a judicial resolution of the specific issues" in the case before the court. To support that conclusion, the court emphasized that no committee requested the documents or issued a subpoena requiring the Vice President to produce them. Thus, in spite of the aforementioned statutory language purporting to empower the Comptroller General to bring suit, the court determined that "neither House of Congress, and no congressional committee, ha[d] authorized the Comptroller General to pursue the requested information through [a] judicial proceeding." When Authorization Is Insufficient for Standing Even where a legislature as a whole has purported to authorize a particular plaintiff to file suit on its behalf, that plaintiff must still satisfy the various requirements of standing, including the requirements of concrete and particular injury as to that institution. To illustrate, whereas a legislative plaintiff acting pursuant to the authorization of its respective institution generally possesses standing to sue to redress concrete and particular informational injuries to that institution, even an entire legislative body proceeding under valid authorization will not have standing to assert abstract or nonparticular injuries. As an example of a putative injury in the latter category, courts have generally rejected the idea that legislatures have standing based on their duty to legislate to challenge allegedly illegal acts by the Executive. In Alaska Legislative Council v. Babbitt , for instance, the D.C. Circuit determined that the Alaska Legislative Council lacked standing to challenge federal management of subsistence taking of fish and wildlife on federal lands in Alaska. The council claimed that it was injured because individual Alaskan legislators had a "duty to legislate for the management of all the State's resources" and the federal program interfered with this duty. Although the Alaska legislature had not explicitly voted to authorize the council to sue, the court assumed the plaintiff possessed such authorization because of its status as a "permanent interim committee and service agency of the legislature." Despite this authorization, the court concluded that the committee lacked standing because its injuries did not belong to it, but rather, belonged to the "State itself," and only the governor could bring that suit on behalf of Alaska. The legislature had thus failed to identify a "separate [and] identifiable" injury entitling it to sue. Additionally, several courts have concluded that legislative plaintiffs lack standing to assert a generalized interest in the proper interpretation or application of a statute irrespective of whether the full legislative body has authorized the plaintiffs to sue. For instance, Newdow v. U.S. Congress involved a challenge brought by an individual plaintiff to the constitutionality of the Pledge of Allegiance's use of the phrase "under God." After the Ninth Circuit had issued a ruling allowing the case to proceed, the Senate moved to intervene in the case pursuant to a provision of the U.S. Code giving the Senate Legal Counsel the right to intervene unless the Senate would lack "standing to intervene under . . . [A]rticle III of the Constitution." The court concluded that this language required it to examine the Senate's putative interest in the case at hand. The Ninth Circuit denied the Senate's motion, concluding that the Senate lacked standing to defend the law's constitutionality. The court explained that a "general desire to see the law enforced as written" did not suffice to give standing to a house of Congress to defend the law. A more recent consideration of institutional standing occurred in the 2015 case of United States House of Representatives v. Burwell . In that case, the House of Representatives asserted two claims against various executive branch entities: (1) a constitutional claim that the defendants "spent billions of unappropriated dollars to support the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act" (ACA) in violation of the Appropriations Clause of the U.S. Constitution; and (2) a statutory claim that the Secretary of the Treasury, "under the guise of implementing regulations," had "effectively amended" certain aspects of the ACA "by delaying its effect and narrowing its scope." The court concluded that the House possessed standing to pursue the constitutional claim but not the statutory claim. The court first determined that the House had standing to pursue its constitutional claim because "Congress (of which the House and Senate are equal) is the only body empowered by the Constitution to adopt laws directing monies to be spent from the U.S. Treasury," and the Executive's alleged circumvention of that structure was a sufficiently concrete and particularized injury as to the House as a whole. However, the district court then ruled that the House lacked standing to pursue its parallel challenges to the Executive's alleged violation of the statutory scheme, reasoning that Article III does not create "general legislative standing" by which the branches of Congress may sue the Executive for any alleged violation of statutes or the Constitution by the Executive. Because the Executive's alleged violation of the ACA would cause the House "no particular harm," the House lacked standing to pursue its statutory claim. Burwell also rejected the argument that separation-of-powers concerns required the dismissal of the House's claims. In Arizona State Legislature , the Court had noted that such concerns might be significant in a dispute between Congress and the President, but the Burwell court dismissed such concerns as dicta and did not find them controlling. Instead, the court determined that the case presented a "plain dispute over a constitutional command" that the judiciary was well suited to resolve. These separation-of-powers concerns, particularly as they relate to Congress's interests with respect to the executive branch's execution of a statutory scheme, play a particularly important role in answering the question of when Congress can intervene in litigation, as discussed below. Congressional Intervention to Defend a Statute's Constitutionality: Adversity and Standing Issues Whereas the analysis above focuses mainly on congressional entities filing their own lawsuits as plaintiffs , legislators or a legislature as a whole may also attempt to participate in ongoing litigation between nonlegislative parties in a variety of ways. The procedural rules governing the federal courts contemplate that, subject to specified conditions, a nonparty may "intervene" in an existing federal case. Generally, if a court permits an entity to intervene in a case, that entity becomes a full party to the litigation and may freely participate in the case to the same extent as the original parties. For instance, subject to certain exceptions and conditions, an intervenor may generally (among other things) file briefs and motions, participate in discovery, and appeal adverse judgments. As relevant here, congressional litigants periodically attempt to intervene in existing federal cases initiated by noncongressional parties. As explained in the following subsections, whether such attempts ultimately succeed depends on a variety of factors that to a large degree mirror the considerations relevant to whether a legislative plaintiff may initiate new litigation in federal court. Justiciability Issues Involved in Intervention One potentially key—albeit infrequent —situation in which a congressional entity may attempt to intervene in an ongoing lawsuit is when the executive branch declines to defend the constitutionality of a federal statute. For instance, the U.S. House of Representatives recently intervened in the case of Texas v. United States to defend the constitutionality of provisions of the Affordable Care Act after the executive branch declined to defend the law in its entirety. As explained below, at least two questions may arise when Congress (or a Member, committee, or house thereof) attempts to intervene to defend a statute's validity: (1) whether the executive branch's refusal to defend the statute renders the original parties insufficiently adverse to create a justiciable controversy; and (2) whether Congress possesses standing to intervene in the case. With regard to the first question, whenever a plaintiff sues the United States to invalidate a federal statute, and the United States does not dispute the plaintiff's assertion that the statute is unconstitutional, the fact that none of the named litigants wishes to defend the statute's validity creates a potential risk that the original parties are not truly adverse to each other. The Supreme Court has ruled that "the business of federal courts" is limited "to questions presented in an adversary context," rather than lawsuits between friendly parties. Like standing, this "adversity" requirement is a justiciability doctrine that the Supreme Court has derived (at least in part) from Article III's "case or controversy" language. The Supreme Court has held that where "both litigants desire precisely the same result" in a particular case, there is generally "no case or controversy within the meaning of [Article] III of the Constitution," and a federal court accordingly lacks jurisdiction over the case. In addition to this constitutional foundation, the Supreme Court has recognized that the adversity requirement also has a prudential dimension. In other words, "even when Article III permits the exercise of federal jurisdiction, prudential considerations" may sometimes counsel against adjudicating a lawsuit where the parties lack that "concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." With respect to the second question, while the standing doctrine is generally concerned with whether a plaintiff is a proper party to a particular lawsuit, other putative parties who are not plaintiffs, but are seeking distinct judicial relief from a federal court—such as intervenor-defendants or defendant-appellants—likewise need to demonstrate that they possess standing in order to obtain the relief sought. For example, in Diamond v. Charles , the Supreme Court concluded that an intervenor lacked standing to appeal an adverse judgment against the original defendant after that defendant declined to file an appeal of its own. Under Supreme Court precedent, as long as the existing parties to the case present a justiciable controversy on their own, an intervenor need not independently possess standing to participate in the lawsuit so long as the intervenor seeks the same judicial relief as one or more of the existing parties. To the extent an intervenor seeks "relief that is different from that which is sought by a party with standing," however, that intervenor must independently "possess Article III standing to intervene" in the case. The Supreme Court has periodically considered how the adversity and standing doctrines apply in the congressional intervention context and has ultimately concluded that cases in which the executive branch declines to defend a federal statute and Congress steps in to defend the law may potentially be justiciable. For instance, in Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) v. Chadha , an alien challenged the constitutionality of a particular provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act that had authorized one house of Congress, by resolution, to invalidate the decisions of the executive branch. Because the INS agreed with the alien that this "one-house veto" provision was unconstitutional, the Court needed to examine whether the case presented "a genuine controversy" rather than a nonjusticiable "non-adversary[] proceeding" between two friendly parties. Crucially, however, both the Senate and the House had intervened in the case to defend the statute's constitutionality. The Court therefore held that, because Congress was "a proper party to defend the constitutionality of" this statute, "the concrete adverseness" required by Article III existed "beyond doubt" "from the time of Congress' formal intervention" in the case. Going further, the Court also explained in dicta that "there was adequate [Article] III adverseness" in the case even " prior to Congress' intervention" because the "INS would have deported" the alien against his wishes if the federal courts had rejected the alien's constitutional challenge. In other words, because the INS would have enforced the challenged statute despite its unwillingness to defend the statute's constitutionality in a judicial proceeding, the majority viewed the case as presenting a justiciable controversy between the INS and the alien even if Congress had never intervened. Although the Chadha Court also acknowledged that "there may be prudential, as opposed to [Article] III, concerns about sanctioning the adjudication of th[e] case in the absence of any participant supporting the validity of" the provision's constitutionality, the Supreme Court explained that the lower court had "properly dispelled any such concerns by inviting and accepting briefs from both Houses of Congress." The Court further opined that "Congress is the proper party to defend the validity of a statute when an agency of government, as a defendant charged with enforcing the statute, agrees with [the] plaintiffs that the statute is inapplicable or unconstitutional." Prior to the Supreme Court's 2013 decision in United States v. Windsor , one might plausibly read Chadha to stand for the limited proposition that Congress may intervene to defend an undefended federal law (albeit one that the Executive has continued to enforce) only when the judicial invalidation of that law would directly affect Congress's institutional powers, such as by eliminating Congress's ability to validly utilize a one-house legislative veto. In Windsor , however, the Court appeared to implicitly adopt a broader conception of Chadha by permitting a congressional entity to intervene to defend an undefended law even though the statute at issue had no direct bearing on Congress's institutional powers. The respondents in Windsor challenged the constitutionality of a provision of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) on equal protection grounds. During the course of the litigation, however, "the Attorney General of the United States notified the Speaker of the House of Representatives . . . that the Department of Justice would no longer defend the constitutionality of" the challenged provision. Nevertheless, the Attorney General stated that he would continue to enforce the provision in order to "provid[e] Congress a full and fair opportunity to participate in the litigation" over the provision's validity, and accordingly appealed the lower court's judgment invalidating the statute to the Supreme Court. After the Attorney General announced that he would not defend the statute, the House's Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (BLAG)—which is "composed of the Speaker and the majority and minority leaderships" of the House —"voted to intervene in the litigation to defend the constitutionality of" the provision. The district court permitted BLAG to intervene. Because "the Government largely agree[d] with the opposing part[ies] on the merits of the controversy," the Supreme Court needed to determine whether the executive branch's "concession that [the challenged provision was] unconstitutional" rendered the case nonjusticiable on adversity grounds. The Court first concluded that the case presented "a justiciable dispute as required by Article III" because (1) the executive branch had announced its "inten[tion] to enforce the challenged law" if the court ultimately deemed the provision constitutional; and (2) the lower court had "order[ed] the United States to pay money" to the challengers "that it would not disburse but for the court's order." The Court accordingly determined that "the United States retain[ed] a stake sufficient to support Article III jurisdiction on appeal and in proceedings before th[e] Court." The Court next concluded that the legislative branch's presence in the case alleviated any purely prudential concerns posed by the executive branch's refusal to defend the provision's validity. The Court explained that "BLAG's sharp adversarial presentation of the issues satisfie[d] the prudential concerns that otherwise might counsel against hearing an appeal from a decision with which the principal parties agree." Critically, because Windsor and the United States presented a justiciable controversy within the meaning of Article III on their own, the Court did not need to resolve whether BLAG would have independently possessed Article III standing to intervene in the case and defend the statute on its own authority. As explained in greater detail below, however, the Court also implied that it might have deemed the case nonjusticiable if the Executive had declined to enforce the challenged statute in addition to merely refusing to defend its constitutionality. Chadha and Windsor thus stand for the propositions that (1) the Executive's refusal to defend a statute will not always render the lawsuit challenging that statute nonjusticiable; and (2) congressional intervention in ongoing federal litigation does not necessarily raise Article III standing problems —at least as long as Congress does not pursue additional relief beyond a judgment in the United States' favor. To that end, lower federal courts have frequently permitted legislative actors to intervene as defendants in cases where the executive branch agreed with the plaintiff that a challenged statute was unconstitutional . Still, the federal courts' Article III jurisdiction to adjudicate such cases may not be unlimited. Although Chadha and Windsor suggest that Congress may help alleviate prudential adversity problems created by the executive branch's nondefense of a statute by intervening to defend the challenged law, neither case says anything definitive about whether a congressional intervenor would have independently possessed Article III standing in those cases, especially in cases where the Executive refuses to enforce the underlying statute. Because the Executive continued to enforce the challenged statutes in Chadha and Windsor despite its refusal to defend their constitutionality, the Court concluded that the "refusal of the Executive to provide the relief sought" by the plaintiff "suffice[d] to preserve a justiciable dispute as required by Article III" regardless of whether or not Congress had intervened to mitigate any purely prudential obstacles to justiciability resulting from the Executive's refusal to defend the law. In other words, because "the United States retains a stake sufficient to support Article III jurisdiction" when it continues to enforce a statute that it declines to defend in court, the existence of a justiciable controversy between the plaintiff and the United States relieved the congressional intervenors in Chadha and Windsor of the burden to independently demonstrate Article III standing of their own before participating in the case. The Windsor Court expressly declined to decide, however, "whether BLAG would have standing to" defend DOMA "on BLAG's own authority" if the Executive had also refused to enforce the statute in addition to merely refusing to defend it. The dissenting Justices in Windsor —who disagreed with the majority on the issue of adversity and therefore had to reach the standing question—could not agree on whether and when a house of Congress possesses standing to defend an undefended statute. Justice Alito, for instance, reasoned that "in the narrow category of cases in which a court strikes down an Act of Congress and the Executive declines to defend the Act, Congress both has standing to defend the undefended statute and is a proper party to do so." According to Justice Alito, "because legislating is Congress' central function," a judicial decision "striking down an Act of Congress" injures each chamber of Congress as an institution by "impair[ing] Congress' legislative power." By contrast, Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas, instead suggested that the legislative branch possesses standing to intervene in such lawsuits only when the case implicates "the validity of a mode of congressional action," such as the one-house legislative veto challenged in Chadha . According to Justice Scalia, Congress may only "hale the Executive before the courts . . . to vindicate its own institutional powers to act," not "to correct a perceived inadequacy in the execution of its laws"—which, in Justice Scalia's view, does not constitute an institutional injury to Congress itself. As this exchange between the dissenting Justices in Windsor reflects, the circumstances under which Congress may permissibly intervene to defend the validity of a statute the Executive refuses to enforce remains an unanswered question, and the answer to that question will likely implicate the same sorts of policies and principles that animate the doctrines governing whether and when a plaintiff may sue to vindicate Congress's institutional interests. Other Relevant Considerations in Intervention In addition to the adversity and standing doctrines discussed above, other legal principles may also affect whether a congressional entity may permissibly intervene in a federal case to defend a statute's constitutionality or for some other purpose. For one, just as a legislator ordinarily may not initiate a lawsuit without the affirmative consent of his or her respective house, a congressional entity typically cannot intervene in a preexisting federal case without first obtaining authorization to do so. Where congressional entities have first obtained authorization to participate in an ongoing lawsuit from their respective houses, however, courts have typically allowed those entities to intervene. However, a congressional entity seeking to intervene in ongoing litigation must comply with all applicable statutory and procedural rules governing legislative intervention in federal court. Participation as Amicus Curiae If Congress (or a unit or individual Member thereof) cannot participate as a full party to a particular lawsuit due to one or more of the constitutional, statutory, procedural, and prudential obstacles discussed above, it may still be able to participate in the case in a more limited capacity as an amicus curiae . An amicus curiae —a Latin term for "friend of the court"—is an entity with "a strong interest in the subject matter" of a particular case that may submit legal briefs or other filings to the court in support of (or against) a particular position, but may not otherwise participate in the suit to the same extent as an original party or an intervenor. Members, houses, and committees of Congress have successfully filed amicus briefs in a wide variety of cases. To name just a few salient examples, after the executive branch declined to defend the validity of the independent counsel provision of the Ethics in Government Act, "both houses [of Congress] filed amicus briefs defending the legislation's constitutionality." Similarly, two opposing coalitions of individual Members of Congress filed dueling amicus briefs in a Supreme Court case concerning the continued vitality of Roe v. Wade . The procedural rules governing the submission of amicus briefs may vary from court to court. Ultimately, however, federal courts possess broad discretion to decide whether to allow a nonparty to submit an amicus brief in a particular case. Thus, on rare occasions, some courts have exercised that discretion to reject congressional attempts to file amicus briefs. For instance, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims recently prohibited the House of Representatives from filing an amicus brief in a private party's lawsuit against the United States. The court, noting that "the sole purpose of the House's proposed amicus brief [was] to urge a ground for dismissing [the] plaintiff's complaint that was not raised by the [Department of Justice] in its motion to dismiss," reasoned that allowing the House to participate as an amicus would "improperly intrud[e] on the DOJ's 'exclusive and plenary' authority to litigate the case on the United States' behalf." Considerations for Congress As discussed, courts have identified several considerations that may be relevant when assessing whether a legislative entity has suffered a justiciable injury-in-fact allowing it to seek judicial relief from a federal court, including the presence of congressional authorization; the absence of other legislative or nonlegislative remedies; allegations of vote nullification; historical practice; availability of alternative plaintiffs to bring a judicial challenge; and whether the lawsuit is an attempt to assert an interest other than the generalized interest in the proper application and implementation of the law. While these considerations provide some guidance with regard to the standing inquiry in lawsuits involving a legislative entity, they do not comprehensively resolve every question that may arise. Additionally, the legal principles that courts have articulated in congressional standing cases to date are not always perfectly consistent with each other, making it difficult to predict whether any particular legislative attempt to participate in litigation will overcome the standing hurdle. Further compounding that difficulty is the fact that there are very few cases analyzing the legislative standing doctrine and only a handful of rulings on the issue from the Supreme Court itself. As a consequence, it is important to identify areas of lingering doctrinal uncertainty, as well as measures that Members, committees, and houses of Congress may take to increase the likelihood that any given lawsuit will surmount the standing barrier. Areas of Doctrinal Uncertainty One of the key unanswered questions regarding legislative standing concerns what form of authorization is necessary to empower a legislative plaintiff to assert an institutional injury on behalf of his respective institution. In Raines v. Byrd , for instance, the Supreme Court concluded that the individual Member plaintiffs "ha[d] not been authorized to represent their respective Houses of Congress" for standing purposes even though Congress specifically enacted a statute purporting to authorize "any Member of Congress" to "bring an action . . . for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief on the ground that any provision of [the Line Item Veto Act] violates the Constitution." Similarly, in Walker v. Cheney , the court concluded that 31 U.S.C. § 716(b)(2)—which purports to grant the Comptroller General freestanding authority to "bring a civil action . . . to require the head of [an] agency to produce a record" —nonetheless did not authorize the Comptroller General to sue the Vice President. These cases suggest that a congressional litigant asserting an institutional injury who obtains express authorization to participate in a specifically identified lawsuit is more likely to satisfy the standing requirement than a litigant who does not. It remains uncertain, however, when (if ever) a statute purporting to authorize an entity to litigate on Congress's behalf generally—without a specific vote authorizing that entity to participate in a particular case—would satisfy the authorization prong of the standing analysis. An additional open question that existing precedent does not conclusively resolve is whether and under what circumstances the general availability of blunt legislative remedies—such as impeachment—will deprive a legislative litigant of standing to seek judicial relief against the executive branch. In Campbell v. Clinton , for instance, the D.C. Circuit concluded that individual Members lacked standing to sue the President in part because "there always remains the possibility of impeachment should a President act in disregard of Congress' authority." In Blumenthal v. Trump , by contrast, the court concluded that a group of individual Members did have standing to sue the President, stating (with little explanation) that "the availability of the extreme measure of impeachment to enforce the President's compliance with the [Emoluments] Clause is not an adequate remedy." Further litigation will likely be necessary to resolve these conflicting strands of congressional standing precedent. Perhaps the most difficult open question raised by the legislative standing jurisprudence concerns what sort of institutional injury is sufficient to afford a legislative entity standing. At one end of the spectrum, courts have generally recognized that institutional plaintiffs may sue to remedy discrete injuries, such as informational injuries resulting from an executive branch agency's refusal to comply with a subpoena. At the other end, courts have typically determined that even institutional plaintiffs cannot assert a generalized, nonparticularized interest in the proper application, interpretation, or enforcement of the law. Some recent cases from the district courts, however, appear to envision a broader conception of institutional injury. The court in U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell , for example, concluded that the House possessed standing to pursue constitutional claims "that the Executive ha[d] drawn funds from the Treasury without a congressional appropriation." Critical to the court's holding was the fact that the Constitution designated "the Congress (of which the House and Senate are equal)" as "the only body empowered . . . to adopt laws directing monies to be spent from the U.S. Treasury." According to the court, the "constitutional structure would collapse, and the role of the House would be meaningless, if the Executive could circumvent the appropriations process and spend funds however it pleases." Similarly, the Blumenthal v. Trump court concluded that the individual Member plaintiffs possessed standing in part because they did not merely "disagree with the manner in which the President [wa]s administering or enforcing the law," but were instead wholly prevented from discharging their constitutionally designated role in the emoluments process. Burwell and Blumenthal thus suggest that Congress could have a justiciable injury when the executive branch violates the Constitution in a way that specifically undermines Congress's authority in a particular governmental process. It is unclear whether the Supreme Court or the federal appellate courts would ultimately endorse the broad conceptions of congressional standing that the Burwell and Blumenthal courts adopted. Because the parties in Burwell ultimately settled their dispute, neither the D.C. Circuit nor the Supreme Court ever determined whether the district court's standing conclusions were correct. Nor has the D.C. Circuit resolved whether the district court correctly concluded that the plaintiffs in Blumenthal possess standing to pursue their Emoluments Clause challenges. Some (though not all) academics have argued, however, that the Burwell and Blumenthal courts' expanded conception of standing may be unsound, as these decisions would appear to authorize congressional litigants to hale executive branch entities into the federal courts in a fairly broad array of factual circumstances that implicate separation-of-powers principles. Burwell , for instance, contains language suggesting that at least some congressional litigants possess standing to sue the executive branch whenever it spends unappropriated funds. Blumenthal likewise contains language suggesting that legislative litigants—including individual Members—could very well possess standing to sue the President in a variety of contexts in which the Constitution offers Congress (or a house thereof) an opportunity to provide prior approval to a particular executive action, such as appointments. Future judicial decisions may provide further guidance on whether, how, and under what circumstances this sort of freestanding congressional authority to summon executive branch entities before a federal judge is consistent with the Supreme Court's admonition that the "standing inquiry" is "especially rigorous when reaching the merits of the dispute would require [a court] to decide whether an action taken by one of the other two branches of the Federal Government was unconstitutional." What Can Congress (or a Member or Committee) Do? The fact that standing is a constitutional requirement circumscribes Congress's ability to alter the aforementioned standing rules by enacting legislation. The Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed "that Congress cannot erase Article III's standing requirements by statutorily granting the right to sue to a plaintiff who would not otherwise have standing." At the same time, however, the Court has also recognized "that Congress may 'elevat[e] to the status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries that were previously inadequate in law.'" It is therefore possible that, even though Congress may not "abrogate the Art[icle] III minima," Congress may under presently undefined circumstances enact a statute that grants it standing to pursue a claim in federal court that it could not pursue in that statute's absence. However, whether (and to what extent) Congress possesses such power to do so in the context of legislative standing may need to await further explication from the courts. In the absence of such guidance from the judiciary, a congressional litigant's best strategy may be to attempt to satisfy as many of the considerations listed above—that is, to attempt to obtain authorization to pursue the specific lawsuit in question from one or both houses of Congress; attempt to persuade the court that all possible legislative remedies would be futile; argue that the allegedly unlawful action has deprived Members of Congress of the efficacy of their votes; analogize to historical precedent in which courts entertained similar challenges by congressional litigants; demonstrate that no other litigant would possess standing to vindicate the congressional interest in dispute; and avoid framing the legal theory as a generalized grievance challenging the opposing party's implementation or interpretation of a federal statute. Nonetheless, as several scholars have emphasized, "not all interbranch disputes—even constitutional disputes—need to be resolved in the courts." Indeed, the federal judiciary has in many cases expressed marked hesitance to interpose itself between dueling branches of the U.S. government. The lack of a judicial remedy to a congressional complaint may indicate that Congress's most promising means for resolving disputes with the executive branch may be the political process, where a significant amount of constitutional decisionmaking occurs.

Houses, committees, and Members of Congress periodically seek to initiate or participate in litigation to, among other purposes, advance their legislative objectives, argue that the Executive is violating their legislative prerogatives, or defend core institutional interests. However, the constitutionally based doctrine of "standing"—which requires a litigant seeking federal judicial relief to demonstrate (1) a concrete and particularized and actual or imminent injury-in-fact (2) that is traceable to the allegedly unlawful actions of the opposing party and (3) that is redressable by a favorable judicial decision—may prevent legislators from pursuing litigation in federal court. The U.S. Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have issued several important opinions analyzing whether—and under what circumstances—a legislative entity has standing to seek relief. Although legislative standing jurisprudence defies easy characterization, it is possible to distill several principles from existing precedent. For example, whereas courts commonly allow individual legislators to assert injuries to their own personal interests, following the Supreme Court's seminal opinion in Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997), courts have generally (though not universally) been less willing to permit individual legislators to seek redress for injuries to a house of Congress as a whole, at least in the absence of explicit authorization to do so from the legislative body itself. The Supreme Court's case Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939), is generally understood as setting forth the lone exception, allowing individual legislators to sue when their vote has been "nullified" by some claimed illegal action. In addition, generally speaking, a congressional plaintiff cannot predicate a federal lawsuit solely on a complaint that the executive branch is misapplying or misinterpreting a statute, as litigants must demonstrate concrete and particularized injury to themselves. In addition to initiating litigation, Congress also occasionally seeks to intervene in preexisting litigation. In cases in which the executive branch has declined to defend a federal statute from a constitutional challenge, for example, congressional entities have attempted to intervene as defendants in support of the law. The Supreme Court, in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) and United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013), has allowed Congress to intervene to defend a law that the executive branch has declined to defend but still enforces. Nonetheless, neither case resolved whether significant exceptions to this rule exist, let alone explored what rules are in place when the President both declines to defend and enforce a federal law. Moreover, in cases that do not involve the executive branch's refusal to defend a federal statute, Congress's ability to intervene as a full party to the case may be more circumscribed. Even when Congress lacks standing to initiate or intervene in a federal lawsuit as a full-fledged party, Congress may still play a role in litigation by participating as an amicus curiae, or "friend of the court." Courts frequently allow Members, houses, and committees of Congress to file amicus briefs in support of (or opposition to) particular parties or positions.

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Introduction Science and technology (S&T) play an important role in our society. Advances in science and technology can help drive economic growth and meet national priorities in public health, environmental protection, agricultural productivity, defense, and many other areas. Federal policies affect scientific and technological advancement on several levels. The federal government directly funds research and development (R&D) activities to achieve national goals or support national priorities, such as funding basic life science research through the National Institutes of Health (NIH) or developing new weapons systems in the Department of Defense (DOD). The federal government also establishes and maintains the legal and regulatory framework that affects S&T activities in the private sector. In addition, federal tax, trade, and education policies can have effects on private sector S&T activity. This report serves as a brief introduction to many of the science and technology policy issues that may come before the 116 th Congress. Each issue section provides background information and outlines selected policy issues that may be considered. Each issue includes a heading entitled "For Further Information" that provides the author's name and the titles of relevant CRS reports containing more detailed policy analysis and information. Cited reports are current as of their individual publication dates, but may not reflect developments that have occurred since their publication. Overarching S&T Policy Issues Several issues of potential congressional interest apply to federal science and technology policy in general. This section begins with a brief introduction to the roles each branch of the federal government plays in S&T policymaking, then discusses overall federal funding of research and development. Additional sections address issues related to the emergence of disruptive technologies; the America COMPETES Act; oversight of federally supported academic research; technology transfer; the adequacy of the science and engineering workforce; science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education; and innovation-related tax policy. Federal Science and Technology Policymaking Enterprise The federal S&T policymaking enterprise is composed of an extensive and diverse array of stakeholders in the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. The enterprise fosters, among other things, the advancement of scientific and technical knowledge; STEM education; the application of S&T to achieve economic, national security, and other societal benefits; and the use of S&T to improve federal decisionmaking. Federal responsibilities for S&T policymaking are highly decentralized. In addition to appropriating funding for S&T programs, Congress enacts laws to establish, refine, and eliminate programs, policies, regulations, regulatory agencies, and regulatory processes that rely on S&T data and analysis. However, congressional authorities related to S&T policymaking are diffuse. Many House and Senate committees have jurisdiction over important elements of S&T policy. In addition, there are dozens of informal congressional caucuses in areas of S&T policy such as research and development, specific S&T disciplines, and STEM education. The President formulates annual budgets, policies, and programs for consideration by Congress; issues executive orders and directives; and directs the executive branch departments and agencies responsible for implementing S&T policies and programs. The Office of Science and Technology Policy, in the Executive Office of the President, advises the President and other Administration officials on S&T issues. Executive agency responsibilities for S&T policymaking are also diffuse. Some agencies have broad S&T responsibilities (e.g., the National Science Foundation). Others use S&T to meet a specific federal mission (e.g., defense, energy, health, space). Regulatory agencies have S&T responsibilities in areas such as nuclear energy, food and drug safety, and environmental protection. Federal court cases and decisions often affect U.S. S&T policy. Decisions can have an impact on the development of S&T (e.g., decisions regarding the U.S. patent system); S&T-intensive industries (e.g., the break-up of AT&T in the 1980s); and the admissibility of S&T-related evidence (e.g., DNA samples). For Further Information John F. Sargent Jr., Specialist in Science and Technology Policy CRS Report R43935, Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP): History and Overview , by John F. Sargent Jr. and Dana A. Shea Federal Funding for Research and Development The federal government has long supported the advancement of scientific knowledge and technological development through investments in R&D. Federal R&D funding seeks to address a broad range of national interests, including national defense, health, safety, the environment, and energy security; advance knowledge generally; develop the scientific and engineering workforce; and strengthen U.S. innovation and competitiveness. The federal government has played an important role in supporting R&D efforts which have led to scientific breakthroughs and new technologies, from jet aircraft and the internet to communications satellites and defenses against disease. Between FY2008 and FY2013, federal R&D funding fell from $140.1 billion to $130.9 billion, a reduction of $9.3 billion (6.6% in current dollars, 13.4% in constant dollars). The decline was a reversal of sustained growth in federal R&D funding for more than half a century, and stirred debate about the potential long-term effects on U.S. technological leadership, innovation, competitiveness, economic growth, and job creation. From FY2013 to FY2017, federal funding grew, rising to an all-time current dollar high of $155.0 billion in FY2017, the most recent annual aggregate number available. However, in constant dollars, the FY2017 level was $9.6 billion (5.6%) below its high of $169.7 billion in 2010. Concerns by some about reductions in federal R&D funding have been exacerbated by increases in the R&D investments of other nations (China, in particular); globalization of R&D and manufacturing activities; and trade deficits in advanced technology products, an area in which the United States previously ran trade surpluses (most recently in 2001). At the same time, some Members of Congress express concerns about the level of federal funding in light of the current federal fiscal condition. In addition, R&D funding decisions may be affected by differing perspectives on the appropriate role of the federal government in advancing science and technology. As the 116 th Congress undertakes the appropriations process it faces two overarching issues: (1) the direction in which the federal R&D investment will move in the context of increased pressure to limit discretionary spending and (2) how available funding will be prioritized and allocated. Low or negative growth in the federal government's overall R&D investment may require movement of resources across disciplines, programs, or agencies to address priorities. Congress continues to play a central role in defining the nation's R&D priorities as it makes decisions with respect to the size and distribution of aggregate, agency, and programmatic R&D funding. For Further Information John F. Sargent Jr., Specialist in Science and Technology Policy CRS Report R45150, Federal Research and Development (R&D) Funding: FY2019 , coordinated by John F. Sargent Jr. CRS Report R44888, Federal Research and Development Funding: FY2018 , coordinated by John F. Sargent Jr. Disruptive and Convergent Technology The rapid pace of technology innovation and application is substantially affecting both the global economy and human behavior. A disruptive technology can be thought of as a rapidly evolving set of innovations in any technology space that has potentially broad economic and social impacts. Two or more different technologies may be integrated to create a new, convergent technology that may also be disruptive. Consider the smartphone, perhaps the best-known example of a technology that is both disruptive and convergent. It combines a telephone, a computer, a camera, and a geolocation application into a single device. It has become so popular over the last decade that, according to some estimates, more than half of the world's population uses one. Those users average more than four hours daily on the device, predominantly for activities other than voice phone calls. The emergence of such technologies has the potential to create large-scale economic and social disruptions. Smartphones and other forms of mobile computing, for example, have had large economic effects on the telecommunications sector, as well as large social impacts. Among other technologies associated with major disruptions are social media, cloud computing, and data analytics ("big data"). Additional examples include artificial intelligence (AI), autonomous vehicles, blockchain, energy storage, gene editing, and the internet of things. The economic and social impacts of such technologies are difficult to predict and present complex facets to Congress as it responds to the opportunities and challenges those technologies pose. Not only are the paths of their development and implementation uncertain, but systematic data collection on them is sparse. The complexity and pace of advancement of such technologies create policy issues and challenges of potential interest to the 116 th Congress. Questions disruptive technologies may raise include the following: If Congress seeks to facilitate the growth of such technologies, what options might it consider? For example, how might Congress decide which technologies to prioritize for investment? How would congressional support for research and development affect growth? What kinds of incentives might Congress consider providing? What issues do such technologies raise for international economic competition, and what are the options for congressional response? For example, if other countries are investing heavily in some potentially disruptive technologies, how might Congress balance the benefits and disadvantages to the nation of investing in the same technologies or different ones? What are the potential negative impacts of such technologies on societal goals and values, and what steps might Congress consider for prevention and mitigation? For example, how might Congress respond to public concerns about privacy and security? How might such technologies affect the U.S. workforce and economic opportunity, and what are the potential responses? For Further Information Eric A. Fischer, Senior Specialist in Science and Technology America COMPETES Act Reauthorization The America Creating Opportunities to Meaningfully Promote Excellence in Technology, Education, and Science (COMPETES) Act ( P.L. 110-69 ) was enacted in 2007. The act, a response to concerns about U.S. competitiveness, authorized certain federal research, education, and innovation-related activities. In 2010, Congress passed the America COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010 ( P.L. 111-358 ), extending and modifying certain provisions of the 2007 law, as well as establishing new provisions. Congressional appropriations have generally been below authorized levels, and the specific authorizations of appropriations in the 2010 act have expired. Following previous reauthorization efforts that inspired debate about such topics as the scientific peer review process, certain provisions of these acts were reauthorized and modified as part of the American Innovation and Competitiveness Act (AICA, P.L. 114-329 ), enacted at the end of the 114 th Congress. The 116 th Congress may consider additional provisions from the COMPETES acts that were not addressed through the AICA, such as expired authorizations of appropriations for the National Science Foundation (NSF) and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The COMPETES acts were originally enacted to address concerns that the United States could lose its advantage in scientific and technological innovation. Economists have asserted that economic, security, and social benefits accrue preferentially to nations that lead in scientific and technological advancement and commercialization. Some analysts have suggested that historical U.S. leadership in these areas is slipping. In particular, some stakeholders have questioned the adequacy of federal funding for physical sciences and engineering research and the domestic production of scientists and engineers. The COMPETES acts were designed to respond, in part, to these challenges by authorizing increased funding for the NIST, NSF, and Department of Energy's Office of Science. Together, the acts also authorized certain federal STEM education activities, the Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy (ARPA-E), and prize competitions at federal agencies, among other provisions. Those who have expressed opposition to aspects of the COMPETES acts have done so from several perspectives. Some critics question the existence of a STEM labor shortage and thus the need for programs aimed at increasing the number of STEM workers. Other critics agree with the assertion of a shortage, but question whether the federal government should address it, believing that the market will make the necessary corrections to meet the demand. With respect to U.S. competitiveness, some analysts prefer alternative approaches to those proposed in the COMPETES acts, such as research tax credits or reducing regulatory costs. Other analysts object to the financial cost associated with the COMPETES acts, given concern about the federal budget deficit and debt. For Further Information Laurie A. Harris, Analyst in Science and Technology Policy John F. Sargent Jr., Specialist in Science and Technology Policy CRS Insight IN11001, Revisiting the Doubling Effort: Trends in Federal Funding for Basic Research in the Physical Sciences and Engineering , by John F. Sargent Jr. CRS Report R44345, Efforts to Reauthorize the America COMPETES Act: In Brief , by John F. Sargent Jr. Technology Transfer from Federal Laboratories Every year, approximately one-third of the federal government's research and development spending is obligated to federal laboratories, including federally funded research and development centers, in support of agency mission requirements. The technology and expertise generated by federal laboratories may have applications beyond the immediate goals or intent of the original R&D. Over the years, Congress has established various mechanisms—primarily through the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980 ( P.L. 96-480 ) and subsequent legislation—to facilitate the transfer of technology and research generated from federal laboratories to the private sector where it can be further developed and commercialized. Congressional interest in promoting the transfer of technology from federal laboratories is largely based on meeting social needs and promoting economic growth to enhance the nation's welfare and security. Technology transfer from federal laboratories can occur in many forms. In some instances, it can occur through formal partnerships and joint research activities between federal laboratories and private firms, including through cooperative research and development agreements or CRADAs. In other cases, it can occur when the legal rights to government-owned patents are licensed to a private firm. Despite previous efforts to increase the effectiveness of technology transfer from federal laboratories to the private sector, the transfer of federal technologies remains restrained. Critics of current mechanisms argue that working with federal laboratories continues to be difficult and time-consuming. Proponents assert that federal laboratories are open and receptive to partnering with private firms, but it remains up to them to take advantage of federal laboratory technologies and capabilities. At issue is whether additional legislative initiatives and federal incentives are needed to encourage increased technology transfer from federal laboratories, or if the available resources are sufficient. In December 2018, the National Institute of Standards and Technology released "Return on Investment Initiative for Unleashing American Innovation," a draft paper proposing various strategies and actions to accelerate and improve the transfer of technology to the private sector, including building a more entrepreneurial R&D workforce and increasing engagement with private sector technology development experts and investors. Several of the proposed actions may require congressional approval and additional legislative authority to implement. Further Information Marcy E. Gallo, Analyst in Science and Technology Policy CRS Report R44629, Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs): Background and Issues for Congress , by Marcy E. Gallo Adequacy of the U.S. Science and Engineering Workforce The adequacy of the U.S. science and engineering (S&E) workforce has been an ongoing concern of Congress for more than 60 years. Scientists and engineers are widely believed to be essential to U.S. technological leadership, innovation, manufacturing, and services, and thus vital to U.S. economic strength, national defense, and other societal needs. Congress has enacted many programs to support the education and development of scientists and engineers. Congress has also undertaken broad efforts to improve science, technology, engineering, and math skills to prepare a greater number of students to pursue S&E degrees. In addition, some policymakers have sought to increase the number of foreign scientists and engineers working in the United States through changes in visa and immigration policies. Most experts agree that there is no authoritative definition of which occupations comprise the S&E workforce. Rather, the selection of occupations included in any particular analysis of the S&E workforce may vary depending on the objective of the analysis. The policy debate about the adequacy of the U.S. S&E workforce has focused largely on professional-level computer occupations, mathematical occupations, engineers, and physical scientists. Accordingly, much of the analytical focus has been on these occupations. However, some analyses may use a definition that includes some or all of these occupations, as well as life scientists, S&E managers, S&E technicians, social scientists, and related occupations. Many policymakers, business leaders, academicians, S&E professional society analysts, economists, and others hold differing views with respect to the adequacy of the S&E workforce and related policy issues. These issues include the question of the existence of a shortage of scientists and engineers in the United States, what the nature of any such shortage might be (e.g., too few people with S&E degrees, mismatches between skills and needs), and whether the federal government should undertake policy interventions or rely upon market forces to resolve any shortages in this labor market. Among the key indicators used by labor economists to assess the existence of occupational labor shortages are employment growth, wage growth, and unemployment rates. For Further Information John F. Sargent Jr., Specialist in Science and Technology Policy CRS Report R43061, The U.S. Science and Engineering Workforce: Recent, Current, and Projected Employment, Wages, and Unemployment , by John F. Sargent Jr. Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics Education The term "STEM education" refers to teaching and learning in the fields of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics. Policymakers have had an enduring interest in STEM education. Popular opinion generally holds that U.S. students perform poorly in STEM subjects—especially when compared to students in certain foreign education systems—but the data paint a complicated picture. Over time, U.S. students appear to have made gains in some areas but may be perceived as falling behind in others. Various attempts to assess the federal STEM education effort have produced different estimates of its scope and scale. These efforts have identified between 105 and 254 STEM education programs and activities across 13 to 15 federal agencies. Annual federal appropriations for STEM education are typically estimated to be in the range of $2.8 billion to $3.4 billion. The national conversation about STEM education frequently develops from concerns about the U.S. science and engineering workforce. As discussed in the previous section, some observers assert that the United States faces a shortage of STEM workers; others dispute this claim. Many proponents argue that a general increase in STEM abilities among the U.S. workforce could benefit the nation in any case. On the other hand, some scholars oppose the use of education policy to increase the supply of STEM workers, either because they perceive such policies as overemphasizing the economic outcomes of education at the expense of other values (e.g., personal development or citizenship) or because they perceive the labor market as the more efficient mechanism for dealing with these issues. Opinions differ as well on the appropriate scope, scale, and emphasis of federal STEM education policy. Some observers prefer policies aimed at lifting the STEM achievement of all students—such as teacher or faculty professional development; or changes in curriculum, standards, or pedagogy. Others emphasize policies designed to meet specific needs—such as scholarships for the "best and brightest," federal workforce training in areas of high demand (e.g., information technology and cybersecurity), efforts to close academic achievement gaps between various demographic groups, or programs to increase the participation of traditionally underrepresented groups in STEM fields. For Further I nformation Boris Granovskiy, Analyst in Education Policy CRS Report R45223, Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) Education: An Overview , by Boris Granovskiy CRS In Focus IF10654, Challenges in Cybersecurity Education and Workforce Development , by Boris Granovskiy Tax Incentives for Technological Innovation The 116 th Congress may consider new federal policies to promote technological innovation, which involves the creation, development, and use of new technologies. Among the concerns fueling such an interest is what many view as inadequate growth in domestic high-paying jobs in a range of industries in recent years. Among the pathways to accelerating growth in these jobs are (1) faster rates of entrepreneurial business formation, (2) increased business investment in domestic research and development (R&D), (3) greater domestic production of products and services derived from that research, and (4) increased employer spending on training workers to acquire the skills needed to earn higher-paying jobs. The technical skills required to perform such jobs can be thought of as a critical component of the domestic climate for investment in innovation. Congress can directly influence the rate of high-wage job creation through adopting tax incentives for investment in R&D, worker training, and higher education. Under current federal tax law, three provisions directly affect entrepreneurial business formation and business investment in R&D: (1) an expensing allowance for research expenditures under Section 174 of the tax code (which is scheduled to switch to a five-year amortization period for that spending starting in 2022), (2) a nonrefundable tax credit for increases in research expenditures above a base amount under Section 41, and (3) a full exclusion for capital gains from the sale or exchange of qualified small business stock held by the original investor for five or more years under Section 1202. There is no federal tax incentive under current law for employer investment in worker training. The 2017 tax revision ( P.L. 115-97 ) substantially cut income tax rates for corporate and noncorporate business income, beginning in 2018. The new law also modified or repealed a number of tax provisions affecting business after-tax profits. Some argue that the tax cuts alone should be sufficient to increase the number of high-paying domestic jobs in a range of industries. Others are skeptical that many large U.S. employers will invest the windfall gains from the tax cuts in expanding domestic production and boosting worker wages, training, and education. In their view, many such companies (including U.S. multinational corporations) are more likely to use much of their tax savings to buy back stock, raise dividends, or acquire competing firms. One previously proposed option for increasing the number of high-paying domestic jobs that the 116 th Congress may examine is the creation of a tax incentive known as a patent or innovation box. Such an incentive lowers the tax burden on income earned from the commercial use of qualified intellectual property, such as trademarks or patents. Depending on its design, a patent box could give U.S. and foreign companies investing in innovation a stronger incentive to expand their investment in U.S. R&D and production activities. Potential drawbacks to such a subsidy include its budgetary cost and the lack of a sound economic justification for a tax subsidy that benefits only companies that develop or purchase successful patented innovations, not companies that develop profitable new technologies that never are patented. A second option for spurring faster growth in domestic high-paying jobs is a tax incentive for employers to invest in worker training and education. Several bills were introduced in the 115 th Congress to promote employer investment in training programs such as apprenticeships and collaboration with community colleges to design courses of study targeted at the skill needs of employers. The U.S. economy benefits from an expansion in high-paying jobs only if there are enough workers to fill them. Potential drawbacks to such a tax subsidy include the likelihood it would reward employers for doing what they would do without a tax subsidy and a lack of evidence that employers systematically underinvest in worker training and education. For Further Information Gary Guenther, Analyst in Public Finance CRS Report RL31181, Research Tax Credit: Current Law and Policy Issues for the 114th Congress , by Gary Guenther CRS Report R44829, Patent Boxes: A Primer , by Gary Guenther Agriculture The federal government supports billions of dollars of agricultural research annually. The 116 th Congress is likely to face issues related to funding this research, a proposed relocation of the Department of Agriculture's science and economic analysis agencies, and issues arising from advances in agricultural biotechnology, including the development of cell-cultured meat. Agricultural Research The U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA's) Research, Education, and Economics (REE) mission area has the primary federal responsibility of advancing scientific knowledge for agriculture. USDA-funded research spans the biological, physical, and social sciences related broadly to agriculture, food, and natural resources. USDA conducts its own research and administers federal funding to states and local partners primarily through formula funds and competitive grants. The outcomes are delivered through academic and applied research findings, statistical publications, cooperative extension, and higher education. USDA's research program is funded with nearly $2.9 billion per year of discretionary funding and about $120 million of mandatory funding. The most recent farm bill (P.L. 115-661, Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018), enacted in December 2018, governs agricultural research programs through FY2023. In keeping with past farm bills, this farm bill reauthorizes a wide range of existing research and education provisions (e.g., funding of land grant university research) and also authorizes several new research provisions. One provision that is likely to be closely watched is the Agriculture Advanced Research and Development Authority (AGARDA) pilot program. Modeled on the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, AGARDA will operate under the Office of Chief Scientist to address long-term and high-risk research challenges in the agriculture and food sectors. For Further Information Tadlock Cowan, Analyst in Natural Resources and Rural Development CRS Report R40819, Agricultural Research: Background and Issues , by Jim Monke CRS Report R45197, The House Agriculture Committee's 2018 Farm Bill (H.R. 2): A Side-by-Side Comparison with Current Law , coordinated by Mark A. McMinimy CRS In Focus IF10187, Farm Bill Primer: What Is the Farm Bill? , by Renée Johnson and Jim Monke The National Institute of Food and Agriculture and Economic Research Service Relocation Proposal In August 2018, the Secretary of Agriculture announced a reorganization of the department that included relocating the National Institute of Food and Agriculture (NIFA) and Economic Research Service (ERS) outside the National Capital Region. The Secretary has stated that he would like to complete the relocation in 2019. As two of the department's science and agricultural economic analysis agencies, such a move has prompted significant commentary within Congress and by other Washington-based scientific organizations. While nearly 135 cities have announced their interest in hosting the relocated agencies, an ongoing USDA Inspector General (IG) study is examining the department's legal and budgetary authority to execute the moves. As this IG study is completed, Congress may choose to exercise its authority to ensure that the proposed move is in accordance with federal laws and regulations. For Further Information Tadlock Cowan, Analyst in Natural Resources and Rural Development Agricultural Biotechnology The 116 th Congress may provide oversight of issues regarding bioengineered foods labeling, or foods containing bioengineered ingredients, proposed regulatory changes governing the introduction of genetically engineered (GE) plants and animals into the environment, and recent technical innovations in gene editing that could raise new regulatory issues for agricultural biotechnology. The 114 th Congress passed a bill signed into law in July 2016 ( P.L. 114-216 ) to establish a "national bioengineered food disclosure standard." The final rule was published in late December 2018. Food manufacturers can adopt either text, a symbol, or an electronic/digital link for identifying bioengineered foods. The disclosure act is to cover foods made through conventional genetic engineering technology, and as well as newer techniques in the definition of bioengineered foods. P.L. 114-216 also required USDA to conduct a study that identifies potential technological factors that could affect consumer access to bioengineered food disclosure through electronic or digital methods such as codes on food products read by smart phones. Observers are concerned that such digital methods of disclosure could have differential impacts on those without cell phones (e.g., the elderly, low-income families) and those without access to high-speed broadband. The congressionally required study, completed in July 2017, specifically addresses the availability of wireless or cellular networks, availability of landline telephones in stores, and particular factors that might affect small retailers and rural retailers as well as consumers. With the final rule now published, the disclosure law is to be implemented by USDA's Agricultural Marketing Service. The 116 th Congress may begin to address various public issues that arise from implementing the new disclosure rule. The development over the past several years of new technologies to genetically engineer plants, in particular through novel gene-editing technologies such as CRISPR-Cas9, has raised new regulatory issues. USDA currently regulates GE plants under the Plant Protection Act (PPA; 7 U.S.C. §770). However, USDA has stated that newer technologies may fall outside the purview of the PPA, and thus the department might have no regulatory jurisdiction over plants genetically engineered using these new technologies. For example, USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) asserted in April 2016 that the agency had no regulatory authority under the PPA and, by default, approved a mushroom variety and a waxy corn variety created through the CRISPR-Cas9 gene editing technology. The Department of Agriculture then announced in March 2018 that they had no plans to regulate plants that could otherwise have been developed through traditional breeding techniques, which characterizes some gene editing techniques. This decision raises important questions about how such genetically engineered plants are to be regulated as they are introduced. As genetically engineered plant varieties created by these newer techniques become more common, and as the public becomes more aware that these varieties are not regulated under the PPA, Congress could revisit the 1986 framework that governs U.S. biotechnology regulation. For Further Information Tadlock Cowan, Analyst in Natural Resources and Rural Development CRS In Focus IF10376, Labeling Genetically Engineered Foods: Current Legislation , by Tadlock Cowan CRS Report R43518, Genetically Engineered Salmon , by Harold F. Upton and Tadlock Cowan CRS Report RL32809, Agricultural Biotechnology: Background, Regulation, and Policy Issues , by Tadlock Cowan CRS Report RL33334, Biotechnology in Animal Agriculture: Status and Current Issues , by Tadlock Cowan CRS Report R43100, Unapproved Genetically Modified Wheat Discovered in Oregon and Montana: Status and Implications , by Tadlock Cowan Cell-Cultured Meat Cell-cultured meat (also referred to as cell-based meat, lab-grown meat, and clean meat) is grown in laboratories from animal cell-cultures. First developed in the early 2000s, improved technological efficiencies and reduced production costs have allowed cell-cultured meat companies, including cell-cultures from cattle, hogs, poultry, and fish, to scale up and, in some instances, move closer to commercial viability. Some cell-cultured meat innovators believe their products could be sold within a few years in certain markets and become widely available in 10 years. A debate about which federal agency—the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Food and Drug Administration (FDA) or the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS)—has regulatory jurisdiction over cell-cultured meat surfaced in early 2018. Currently, FSIS regulates meat and poultry, catfish, and egg products. FDA regulates game-meat, fish and seafood, processed meat products (containing 2%-3% meat), and shell eggs. FDA and FSIS often share overlapping responsibilities for some food products and have developed "memoranda of understanding" (MOU) to facilitate communication and division of responsibilities between the two agencies. In February 2018, the U.S. Cattlemen's Association petitioned USDA to have FSIS establish meat labeling requirements that exclude cell-cultured products. The petition requested that only meat derived directly from animals raised and slaughtered be labeled "beef" and "meat." Congress took up cell-cultured meat in April 2018 when USDA Secretary Perdue testified before the House Committee on Appropriations, stating that meat grown in laboratories would be under the sole purview of USDA, and any product labeled as meat would be under USDA jurisdiction. In May 2018, the House-reported agricultural appropriations bill ( H.R. 5961 ) included a general provision that would have required USDA "for fiscal year 2018 and hereafter" to regulate cell-cultured products made from cells of amenable species of livestock and poultry, as defined in the Federal Meat Inspection Act and Poultry Products Inspection Act. In June 2018, FDA stated that under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, FDA has jurisdiction over "food," which includes "articles used for food" and "articles used for components of any such article." Thus, according to FDA, both of the substances used in the manufacture of cell-cultured products, and the final products that will be used for food, are subject to the FDA's jurisdiction. Any substance that is intentionally added to food is considered a food additive and is subject to premarket review and approval by FDA. An exception to this requirement is when there is a consensus, among qualified experts that the substance is "generally recognized as safe" (GRAS) for its intended use. In November 2018, a joint statement from USDA and FDA announced that both agencies "should jointly oversee the production of cell-cultured food products derived from livestock and poultry." The statement further clarified that FDA would oversee cell collection, cell banks, cell growth, and the process of differentiation. USDA is to oversee the production and labeling of food products derived from the cells. This statement initiates the process of developing the regulatory framework for cell-culture meat and poultry; however, other key aspects of the regulations have yet to be announced. For example, fish, for which cell-cultured technology is being developed, is regulated by FDA, but was not mentioned in the statement. In addition, there are still questions on how to obtain premarket approval and how inspection of cell-cultured meat facilities will be conducted. Finally, the statement did not resolve the contentious issue of cell-cultured meat labeling terminology. Cell-cultured meat regulation decisions may be further clarified in the near future—perhaps through a MOU between FDA and USDA. For Further Information Sahar Angadjivand, Analyst in Agricultural Policy Joel L. Greene, Analyst in Agricultural Policy CRS In Focus IF10947, Regulation of Cell-Cultured Meat , by Joel L. Greene and Sahar Angadjivand Biomedical Research and Development Advances in science and technology related to biomedical research and development underpin improvements in medications and treatments. Some of the biomedical R&D issues that the 116 th Congress may face include those related to the budget and oversight of the National Institutes of Health, the role the Food and Drug Administration in approving new medicines and laboratory tests, and issues related to stem cell-based medicine and genomic editing. National Institutes of Health and the 21st Century Cures Act The National Institutes of Health is the lead federal agency conducting and supporting biomedical research. Congress provided the agency with $39 billion in funding for FY2019 for basic, clinical, and translational research in NIH's laboratories as well as in research institutions nationwide. The extramural research program (more than 80% of the NIH budget) provides grants, contracts, and training awards to support over 30,000 individuals at more than 2,500 universities, academic health centers, and research facilities across the nation. NIH represents about one fifth of total federal research and development spending, and half of non-Department of Defense research and development funding. NIH is a large and complex organization made up of 27 institutes and centers (ICs). Each IC sets its own research priorities and manages its research programs in coordination with the Office of the Director (OD). The individual ICs may focus on particular diseases (e.g., The National Cancer Institute), areas of human health and development (e.g., The National Institute on Aging), scientific fields (e.g., National Institute for Environmental Health Sciences), or biomedical professions and technology (e.g., National Institute of Biomedical Imaging and Bioengineering). Congress provides separate appropriations to 24 of the 27 ICs, to OD, and to a buildings and facilities account. The 21 st Century Cures Act ( P.L. 114-255 ) authorized four major Innovation Projects at NIH, some conducted in partnership with other federal agencies such as the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) or Department of Defense (DOD) the Precision Medicine Initiative (PMI; $1.5 billion for FY2017 through FY2026), the Brain Research through Advancing Innovative Neurotechnologies (BRAIN) Initiative ($1.5 billion for FY2017 through FY2026), cancer research ($1.8 billion for FY2017 through FY2023), and regenerative medicine ($30 million for FY2017 through FY2020). The 116 th Congress may continue previous congressional interest and oversight of the implementation and progress of the Innovation Projects authorized by the 21 st Century Cures Act. For Further Information Kavya Sekar, Analyst in Health Policy Judith A. Johnson, Specialist in Biomedical Policy CRS Report R41705, The National Institutes of Health (NIH): Background and Congressional Issues , by Judith A. Johnson CRS Report R43341, NIH Funding: FY1994-FY2019 , by Judith A. Johnson and Kavya Sekar CRS Report R44720, The 21st Century Cures Act (Division A of P.L. 114-255) , coordinated by Amanda K. Sarata CRS Report R44916, Public Health Service Agencies: Overview and Funding (FY2016-FY2018) , coordinated by C. Stephen Redhead and Agata Dabrowska The Food and Drug Administration: Medical Product Innovation The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates the safety of foods, cosmetics, and radiation-emitting products; the safety and effectiveness of drugs, biologics, and medical devices; as well as public health aspects of tobacco products. To keep pace with changes in science and emerging safety and security issues, FDA's regulations have been subject to various modifications through legislation and administrative action. The 21 st Century Cures Act ( P.L. 114-255 ), for example, modified FDA drug and device regulatory pathways to support innovation. Administratively, FDA has issued a series of gene therapy draft guidance documents, concomitant with NIH stepping down oversight of gene therapy human clinical trials. Innovation in this area includes gene editing-based products (e.g., CRISPR) as well as cell-based gene therapies (e.g., CAR-T therapies). Pursuant to the Substance Use-Disorder Prevention that Promotes Opioid Recovery and Treatment (SUPPORT) for Patients and Communities Act ( P.L. 115-271 ), FDA must meet with stakeholders and issue guidance to address the challenges of developing nonaddictive medical products for treatment of pain or addiction through regulatory mechanisms established in the 21 st Century Cures Act (e.g., application of novel clinical trial designs). Additionally, the agency launched an Innovation Challenge to incentivize the development of medical devices to detect, treat and prevent addiction and pain. Medical devices are increasingly connected to the internet, hospital networks, and other medical devices, which can increase the risk of cybersecurity threats. Currently, FDA does not have explicit statutory authority pertaining to medical device cybersecurity. However, manufacturers are required to comply with Quality Systems Regulations (QSRs), which are good manufacturing practices for medical devices. QSRs may address, among other things, risk analysis, including cybersecurity risk. In October 2018, FDA entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with the Department of Homeland Security, to implement a framework for greater coordination and information sharing between the two agencies about medical device cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities. For Further Information Agata Dabrowska, Analyst in Health Policy Victoria Green, Analyst in Health Policy Amanda Sarata, Specialist in Health Policy CRS Report R44576, The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Budget: Fact Sheet , by Agata Dabrowska and Victoria R. Green CRS Report R44720, The 21st Century Cures Act (Division A of P.L. 114-255) , coordinated by Amanda K. Sarata CRS Report R45405, The SUPPORT for Patients and Communities Act (P.L. 115-271): Food and Drug Administration and Controlled Substance Provisions , coordinated by Agata Dabrowska CRS Report R44824, Advanced Gene Editing: CRISPR-Cas9 , by Marcy E. Gallo et al. Oversight of Laboratory-Developed Tests (LDTs) In vitro diagnostics (IVD) are devices that provide information used by clinicians and patients to make health care decisions. IVDs are used in laboratory analysis of human samples and include commercial test products and instruments used in testing, among other things. Laboratory-developed tests (LDTs) are a class of IVD that is manufactured and offered within a single laboratory. Genetic tests are a type of diagnostic test that analyzes various aspects of an individual's genetic material (DNA, RNA, chromosomes, and genes). Most genetic tests are LDTs. The regulation of LDTs has been the subject of debate over the past 15 years. The FDA has exercised enforcement discretion over LDT regulation, meaning that most LDTs and genetic tests have not undergone FDA premarket review nor received FDA clearance or approval for marketing. Given the growing use and complexity of LDTs and genetic tests, the FDA has revisited how LDTs should be regulated. In October 2014, FDA published draft guidance on the regulation of LDTs in the Federal Register . The agency summarized the public comments it received on the guidance documents in its January 2017 discussion paper on LDTs. This discussion draft included an outline of a possible approach to LDT oversight. The agency also noted in this discussion paper that it would not issue final guidance to allow for further discussion and to "give our congressional authorizing committees the opportunity to develop a legislative solution." Recently, various legislative approaches have been under discussion. A discussion draft bill circulated in early 2017, the "Diagnostic Accuracy and Innovation Act (DAIA)," was crafted with industry and other stakeholder input. It outlined a regulatory approach for IVD tests that was risk-based and flexible. FDA responded to this draft in August 2018 with a novel regulatory approach for these tests, including a mechanism for pre-certifying certain related tests to streamline premarket requirements, among other things. In December 2018, a new draft bill based on DAIA and incorporating FDA's feedback was released entitled the "Verifying Accurate, Leading-edge, IVCT Development (VALID) Act." For Further Information Amanda Sarata, Specialist in Health Policy Judith Johnson, Specialist in Biomedical Policy CRS Report R43438, Regulation of Clinical Tests: In Vitro Diagnostic (IVD) Devices, Laboratory Developed Tests (LDTs), and Genetic Tests , by Amanda K. Sarata and Judith A. Johnson CRS Report RL33832, Genetic Testing: Background and Policy Issues , by Amanda K. Sarata Stem Cells and Regenerative Medicine Stem cells have the unique ability to become many types of cells in the body. Scientists are exploring ways of using stem cells to create regenerative medicine therapies that repair damaged or diseased organs and restore them to normal functioning. Stem cells may either be pluripotent or multipotent. Pluripotent stem cells include embryonic stem cells or reprogrammed adult cells that have the ability to become any of the more than 200 cell types in the adult body. Multipotent stem cells have the capacity to become multiple (but not all) types of cells, usually within a particular organ system such as the blood or nervous system. Most adult stem cells are multipotent stem cells. Recently, Congress has taken action to boost research and development of clinical applications for stem cells, both pluripotent and multipotent. For instance, the 21 st Century Cures Act ( P.L. 114-255 ) authorized to be appropriated $30 million for FY2017 through FY2020 for regenerative medicine research and a new designation at FDA for certain regenerative medicine therapies, eligible for expedited review. The term "regenerative medicine therapy" includes cell therapy, therapeutic tissue engineering products, human cell and tissue products, and combination products using any such therapies or product. Clinical trials are underway for stem cell therapies to treat eye diseases, amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), Parkinson's disease, traumatic brain injury, and others. However, some therapies have shown safety concerns, including potential cancer risks. There has also been a rise in the number of stem cell clinics offering unapproved and potentially unsafe treatments to consumers. In response, FDA has issued guidance on the regulation of therapies using human cells. FDA has also issued warning letters and taken enforcement actions against certain stem cell clinics offering unapproved treatments. Similarly, the Federal Trade Commission has filed complaints against marketing claims made by stem cell clinics. The 116 th Congress may consider actions to boost research and clinical development of stem cell therapies, while ensuring the safety of such treatments. Policymakers may also consider addressing the rising use of unapproved stem cell treatments. For Further Information Kavya Sekar, Analyst in Health Policy Agata Dabrowska, Analyst in Health Policy Judith A. Johnson, Specialist in Biomedical Policy Amanda Sarata, Specialist in Health Policy CRS Report R44720, The 21st Century Cures Act (Division A of P.L. 114-255) , coordinated by Amanda K. Sarata CRS Report RL33540, Stem Cell Research: Science, Federal Research Funding, and Regulatory Oversight , by Judith A. Johnson and Edward C. Liu CRISPR: Advanced Genome Editing Researchers have long been searching for a reliable and simple way to make targeted changes to the genetic material of humans, animals, plants, and microorganisms. Scientists have developed a gene editing tool known as CRISPR—clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeated DNA sequences—that offers the potential for substantial improvement over previous technologies. The characteristics of CRISPR—easier to use, more precise, and less costly—have led many in the scientific and business communities to assert that CRISPR could lead to significant advances across a broad range of areas—from medicine and public health to agriculture and the environment. Over the next 5 to 10 years, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) projects a rapid increase in the number and type of biotechnology products, many enabled by CRISPR. CRISPR has increased both the pace of development and the variety of crops being genetically modified. Scientists are also beginning to use CRISPR in human clinical trials for a variety of cancers, among other conditions. While CRISPR offers a number of potential benefits it may also pose new risks and raise ethical concerns. For example, in 2018 a Chinese scientist claimed that he used CRISPR to modify human embryos creating twin girls who may be more resistant to HIV. These claims have not been published in the scientific literature and therefore have not been verified. The announcement, however, has renewed debate regarding the ethics of genetic engineering. It has also prompted discussion about how existing law and regulation in the United States apply to the conduct of this type of research, its clinical testing in humans, and specifically its potential applications in human embryos. Currently, federal funds cannot be used for research involving human embryos. Additionally, the FDA is prohibited from using federal funds to review clinical research involving the gene editing of human embryos. CRISPR-related approaches are also being considered by some researchers to reduce or eliminate mosquito populations that serve as the primary vector for the transmission of malaria—potentially saving lives and substantially reducing medical costs. A 2016 report from NAS indicates that existing mechanisms may be inadequate to assess the potential immediate and long-term environmental and public health consequences associated with this use of the technology. In the 116 th Congress, policymakers might examine the potential benefits and risks associated with the use of CRISPR gene editing, including the ethical and social implications of CRISPR-related biotechnology products. Congress might also consider whether and how to address CRISPR gene editing and future biotechnology products with respect to regulation, research and development, and economic competitiveness, including ways to harmonize CRISPR-related policies of the United States with those of other countries. For Further Information Marcy E. Gallo, Analyst in Science and Technology Policy John F. Sargent Jr., Specialist in Science and Technology Policy Amanda K. Sarata, Specialist in Health Policy Tadlock Cowan, Analyst in Natural Resources and Rural Development CRS Report R44824, Advanced Gene Editing: CRISPR-Cas9 , by Marcy E. Gallo et al. Climate Change Science and Water The 116 th Congress may consider whether and how the federal government might address climate change and issues related to water resources. Science and technology considerations permeate these deliberations and may be grouped into six interrelated topics: federal expenditures; climate change science; greenhouse gas (GHG)-related technology development and deployment; investment in infrastructure; anticipating, adapting to, and increasing resilience to the impacts of climate changes; and carbon sequestration technology. Additionally, Congress may face several issues related to ensuring reliable water quality and quantity. Climate-Related S&T Expenditures and Activities by the Federal Government Federal funding and tax incentives for climate-related S&T reached almost $17 billion in FY2016, the last year reported to Congress by the Office of Management and Budget in response to annual appropriations directives. The funding was spread across 16 reporting agencies, though some related expenditures may not be included. Of the S&T total, approximately $6.7 billion, about 42%, were tax incentives for technology deployment. Another 45% funded "clean energy technology," the large majority at the Department of Energy for R&D and deployment programs. Approximately 15% funded climate change-related science, most of which supported satellites and computing infrastructure. Congress has not thus far reduced appropriations for most climate change-related S&T programs as proposed by the President's budgets for FY2018 and FY2019. The 116 th Congress will again consider appropriations for climate change-related programs and incentives. For Further Information Jane A. Leggett, Specialist in Energy and Environmental Policy CRS Report R43227, Federal Climate Change Funding from FY2008 to FY2014 , by Jane A. Leggett, Richard K. Lattanzio, and Emily Bruner CRS Report R45258, Energy and Water Development: FY2019 Appropriations , by Mark Holt and Corrie E. Clark CRS Report RS22858, Renewable Energy R&D Funding History: A Comparison with Funding for Nuclear Energy, Fossil Energy, Energy Efficiency, and Electric Systems R&D , by Corrie E. Clark CRS In Focus IF10589, FY2019 Funding for CCS and Other DOE Fossil Energy R&D , by Peter Folger CRS In Focus IF10225, Coastal Flood Resilience: Policy, Roles, and Funds , by Nicole T. Carter, Harold F. Upton, and Francis X. McCarthy Climate Change-Related Science Congress may scrutinize several recent scientific assessments—domestic and international—that strengthened previous assessments: Human-related emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG) are accumulating in the atmosphere, intensifying the natural greenhouse gas effect, and increasing acidity of the oceans. The latest major U.S. assessment, the Climate Science Special Report (CSSR), released in October 2017 by the U.S. Global Change Research Program (USGCRP), concluded that the increase in GHG is driving global land and ocean warming and other climate changes that are now unprecedented in the history of modern civilization. It also stated, [B]ased on extensive evidence, that it is extremely likely [>95% likelihood] that human activities, especially emissions of greenhouse gases [GHG] , are the dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid-20 th century . For the warming over the last century, there is no convincing alternative explanation supported by the extent of the observational evidence. The USGCRP's November 2018 Fourth National Climate Assessment (NCA4) concluded, inter alia , that human-induced climate change is affecting U.S. communities across the country through extreme weather events and generally warmer temperatures, more variable precipitation, and other observed trends. The NCA4 anticipates continued and increasing disruption to infrastructure, economic, and social systems, including economic disparities. Such impacts would not be distributed evenly across the United States and globally. According to its assessment, projected climate change impacts are affecting, and are virtually certain to increasingly affect, the U.S. economy, trade, and other essential U.S. interests. Some stakeholders, including some Members of Congress, consider that the resulting impacts of climate change in the United States and abroad are and would be modest and manageable. The assessments above, and much of the observations and research on which they are founded, have resulted from decades of federal (and nonfederal) investment, amounting to tens of billions of dollars, in global change science. The USGCRP is an interagency mechanism, required by the Global Change Research Act of 1990 ( P.L. 101-606 ), that coordinates and integrates global change research across 13 government agencies. The 116 th Congress may seek to understand the scientific foundations for recent U.S. and international assessments, including the data and methods that increasingly support attribution of many observed changes and extreme weather events to human-related GHG emissions. Congress may also express priorities for further scientific research. In light of the state of climate science, Congress may consider the level of appropriations for its priorities and the distribution among federal climate-related science programs. For example, deliberations may concern the balance between observations and analysis, between science to increase knowledge and to support private and public decisionmaking, and between physical and social sciences, as well as public accessibility to federally supported information. For Further Information Jane A. Leggett, Specialist in Energy and Environmental Policy CRS Report R45086, Evolving Assessments of Human and Natural Contributions to Climate Change , by Jane A. Leggett GHG-Related Technology Research, Development, Demonstration, and Deployment A large majority of federal climate change-related expenditures is aimed at advancing "clean energy." Most human-related GHG emissions come from production, distribution, and combustion of fossil fuels, particularly for electricity generation and transportation, and are primarily emitted as carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) and methane (CH 4 ). Scientists agree that halting GHG-induced climate change would require eventually reducing net GHG emissions to near zero; the total amount of change would depend in large part on the cumulative emissions on that pathway. Many analysts see a decades-long path to stabilizing climate change as involving greater advance and deployment of efficiency improvements, decarbonization, and electrification of the world's economies, along with additional options in multiple sectors. Many options could potentially provide additional security and health benefits, while their costs may depend on public and private investments in research, development, demonstration, and deployment (RDD&D), as well as efforts to facilitate transitions in businesses, employment, and communities. Some see potential carbon capture, utilization, and sequestration (CCUS) technologies as key to preventing CO 2 emissions while preserving a large place for coal and other fossil fuels in the energy economy. Still others advocate for developing CO 2 removal or geoengineering technologies, along with international governance regimes, to intentionally and directly modify the climate, particularly should the climate change rapidly and adversely. The capacity to reduce GHG emissions to near zero at affordable costs, while maintaining U.S. economic growth and security, would depend on deployment of existing and demonstrated technologies supplemented by technological breakthroughs. Members may deliberate on the appropriate degree and means of federal support for advancing and deploying new technologies. Choices the 116 th Congress may address include: whether any policies should be neutral or favor selected technologies (or fuels); where federal intervention in the technology pipeline, through RDD&D, can be most cost efficient; whether policies are most effective when aimed at pushing the supply of selected technologies or incentivizing demand for low- or no-GHG technologies, or in combination; and how best to engage with the private sector and research institutions in partnerships on RDD&D. RDD&D funding has not been evenly distributed across technology types. Research has been intended to advance fossil fuel combustion, renewable energy (including biofuels), efficiency, storage, vehicles and their fuels, nuclear energy, and the electricity grid. Some incentives focus on "supply-push" of technologies (e.g., R&D funding), while others emphasize "demand-pull" (e.g., tax incentives for purchasers), with numerous examples suggesting that coordinated use of both could be most effective. Cleaner energy technologies can produce public health benefits in addition to climate benefits, while shifts in the energy economy can pose transitional challenges to workers and communities. The magnitude of federal expenditures for climate change technologies, the performance of federally supported programs, and priorities for policy tools and technologies may be topics for Congress, particularly in light of budget objectives. For Further Information Jane A. Leggett, Specialist in Energy and Environmental Policy CRS Report RS22858, Renewable Energy R&D Funding History: A Comparison with Funding for Nuclear Energy, Fossil Energy, Energy Efficiency, and Electric Systems R&D , by Corrie E. Clark CRS Report R45204, Vehicle Fuel Economy and Greenhouse Gas Standards: Frequently Asked Questions , by Richard K. Lattanzio, Linda Tsang, and Bill Canis CRS Report R42566, Alternative Fuel and Advanced Vehicle Technology Incentives: A Summary of Federal Programs , by Lynn J. Cunningham et al. CRS Report R45010, Public-Private Partnerships (P3s) in Transportation , by William J. Mallett CRS In Focus IF10979, Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks in U.S. Agriculture , by Renée Johnson Climate Change and Infrastructure Leaders in both chambers of Congress, as well as President Trump, are interested in federal investment in the nation's infrastructure. In evaluating options for infrastructure, two types of linkages with climate change may be important to consider simultaneously (along with numerous other factors) to optimize investments: infrastructure effects on long-term GHG emissions and potential effects of climate change on long-term infrastructure-related costs and public health and safety. For example, decisions regarding modernization of the electric grid may take account both of possible future policies to reduce GHG emissions and effects on electricity reliability in the context of more extreme weather events and an average increase in summer cooling demand. The first linkage between climate change and infrastructure investment arises from the foundation that infrastructure sets for certain technological choices, and consequently, levels of future U.S. GHG emissions (and the costs of reducing them). Long-lived infrastructure may exert influence on emissions for decades into the future; Infrastructure can "lock in" or support flexibility for certain technological options. Infrastructure choices could make adaption to new science, technological advances, and policy priorities more or less expensive. Infrastructure influence on GHG emissions is particularly strong for energy supply, transportation, industry, buildings, and communities. For example, pipeline infrastructure would be critical for deployment of CCUS technologies, particularly for industrial applications. In transportation, choices among transportation modes, and choices between energy types (e.g., gasoline or biofuels or electricity) would depend in part on the availability of the refueling or charging infrastructure. Similarly, land use decisions—generally made by local governments and maybe influenced by federal funding—affect transportation options, which can have long-term impacts on fossil fuel consumption. For example, land use development patterns designed for private automobiles are often not readily adaptable for installation of mass transit. A second linkage between climate change and infrastructure investment is the ability of infrastructure to avoid damages and offer resilience to climate changes, including extreme weather events that scientists expect to increase in frequency and strength. Because much infrastructure is intended to last for decades, projected climate changes in 2030 or 2050 that seem far off for current decisionmaking may have importance for future adequacy, safety, operating costs, and maintenance of investments. Some federal (including military) infrastructure has been severely damaged in recent extreme weather events, while nonfederal water, energy, transportation, urban, and other systems have been disrupted or experienced sustained damage. Congress may consider the merits of technical specifications or incentives to harden or increase the resiliency of long-lived infrastructure funded by the federal government, potentially providing model code or demonstrations to other decisionmakers. Policy choices could, on the one hand, increase near-term costs of building infrastructure; on the other hand, climate-related benefits could include avoiding future losses to life, damages to human health (including mental health), and higher federal outlays that could occur with projected climate change. For Further Information Jane A. Leggett, Specialist in Energy and Environmental Policy CRS Report R45156, The Smart Grid: Status and Outlook , by Richard J. Campbell CRS Report R45105, Potential Options for Electric Power Resiliency in the U.S. Virgin Islands , by Corrie E. Clark, Richard J. Campbell, and D. Andrew Austin CRS Report R44911, The Energy Savings and Industrial Competitiveness Act: S. 385 and H.R. 1443 , by Corrie E. Clark CRS Report R45350, Funding and Financing Highways and Public Transportation , by Robert S. Kirk and William J. Mallett CRS In Focus IF10702, Drought Response and Preparedness: Policy and Legislation , by Nicole T. Carter and Charles V. Stern CRS Report R40147, Infrastructure: Green Building Overview and Issues , by Eric A. Fischer and Danielle A. Arostegui CRS Report R43415, Keystone XL: Greenhouse Gas Emissions Assessments in the Final Environmental Impact Statement , by Richard K. Lattanzio Science and Technology for Adaptation and Resilience In light of recent scientific assessments and federal outlays for relief and recovery following extreme weather events, some of which have been statistically linked to GHG-induced climate change, Congress may review federal programs for S&T to support adaptation or resilience to projected climate change. Some issues related to infrastructure technology are discussed above, and there are additional science and technology issues associated with adaptation and resilience. For example, technological R&D needs may include new crop seed varieties suited to emerging climate conditions, better means to manage floodwaters, advanced air conditioning technologies for buildings, wildfire management techniques, and others. Further advances in climate forecasting, particularly at the local scale, could assist assessment of vulnerabilities and preparation for opportunities and risks. Improved understanding of human behavior could assist adaptation and resilience. Congress may address the federal role in supporting S&T that can facilitate effective state, local, and private decisionmaking on adaptation and resilience to climate change. Federal roles may include easing access to scientific research, climate and seasonal projections, impact assessments, and adaptation decision tools. One question would be the degree to which federal financial support encourages or discourages consideration of vulnerabilities and adaptation in private, state, and local decisionmaking, as regarding flood risk mitigation or agricultural risks. Congress may also review efforts already begun to incorporate climate change projections into federal agency management of federal personnel, infrastructure, and operations. Effective agency decisions would all depend on the adequacy and appropriate use of scientific information and available technologies. For Further Information Jane A. Leggett, Specialist in Energy and Environmental Policy CRS Report R43915, Climate Change Adaptation by Federal Agencies: An Analysis of Plans and Issues for Congress , coordinated by Jane A. Leggett CRS Report R45017, Flood Resilience and Risk Reduction: Federal Assistance and Programs , by Nicole T. Carter et al. CRS Report R43407, Drought in the United States: Causes and Current Understanding , by Peter Folger CRS Report R43199, Energy-Water Nexus: The Energy Sector's Water Use , by Nicole T. Carter CRS Report R44632, Sea-Level Rise and U.S. Coasts: Science and Policy Considerations , by Peter Folger and Nicole T. Carter CRS In Focus IF10728, After the Storm: Highway Reconstruction and Resilience , by Robert S. Kirk Carbon Capture and Sequestration Carbon capture and sequestration (or storage)—known as CCS—involves capturing carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) at its source, storing it underground, or utilizing it for another purpose or product. (As noted earlier, CCS is sometimes referred to as CCUS—carbon capture, utilization , and storage.) CCS could reduce the amount of CO 2 emitted from the burning of fossil fuels at large stationary sources. Carbon utilization recently has gained interest within Congress as a means for capturing CO 2 and converting it into potentially commercially viable products, such as chemicals, fuels, cements, and plastics. Direct air capture (DAC) is also an emerging technology. DAC would remove atmospheric CO 2 directly from the atmosphere. CCS includes three main steps: (1) capturing CO 2 ; (2) transporting CO 2 ; and (3) injecting it into the subsurface. Following injection, the CO 2 would be monitored to verify that it remains underground. Capturing CO 2 is the most costly and energy-intensive step in the process (this is sometimes referred to as the energy penalty or the parasitic load ). Emerging technologies for carbon utilization and DAC have energized some CCS advocates. A challenge for utilization is whether the market for products and uses is large enough so that the amount of carbon captured or removed has a measurable effect mitigating climate change. The challenge for DAC is fairly straightforward—how to reduce the cost per ton of CO 2 removed. Since FY2010, Congress has provided more than $5 billion total in annual appropriations for CCS activities at DOE, primarily for research and development within DOE's Office of Fossil Energy (FE). Congress provided nearly $727 million to FE R&D in FY2018 and $740 million for FY2019. The Trump Administration's FY2019 budget request would have shifted away from CCS R&D to fund other priorities. Globally, two fossil-fueled power plants currently generate electricity and capture CO 2 in large quantities: the Boundary Dam plant in Canada and the Petra Nova plant in Texas. Both plants offset some of the capture costs by selling the captured CO 2 for purposes of enhanced oil recovery. The 115 th Congress enacted a tax provision (Title II, Section 41119 of P.L. 115-123 , which amended Internal Revenue Code, Section 45Q). The amendment increases the tax credit for CCS. Some stakeholders suggest that the changes to Section 45Q could be a "game changer" for CCS development in the United States. The 116 th Congress may explore how the 45Q tax credit is being implemented, and whether further legislative changes to the provision might be needed to accelerate deployment of CCS. For Further Information Peter Folger, Specialist in Energy and Natural Resources Policy CRS Report R44902, Carbon Capture and Sequestration (CCS) in the United States , by Peter Folger CRS Report R41325, Carbon Capture: A Technology Assessment , by Peter Folger Water Reliable water quantity and quality supports the U.S. population and economy, including public and ecosystem health, agriculture, and industry (e.g., energy production, fisheries, navigation, and manufacturing). Research related to developing, using, and protecting water supplies and aquatic ecosystems is diverse. Because of this diversity, federal research activities and facilities span numerous departments, agencies, and laboratories. The federal government also funds water research through grants to universities and other researchers. In recent years, federal agencies have sponsored various prize competitions for water data, science, and technologies and developed cooperative arrangement with various entities. Drinking water contamination and recent droughts, floods, and storms also have increased interest in innovative technologies and practices (including approaches that mimic nature, often referred to as green infrastructure or nature-based infrastructure). The 116 th Congress may consider water research and technology topics which can be broadly divided into water and aquatic ecosystem information, water infrastructure and use, and water quality. Information on water and aquatic ecosystem information includes observations, forecasts, and associated modeling. Science and research agencies collect data remotely and in situ ; they use a wide variety of traditional and new technologies and techniques that inform water-related decisions for infrastructure, agriculture, and drinking water and wastewater services. Some of the water and ecosystem information research topics that may be before the 116 th Congress include the following: water monitoring infrastructure and science programs, including, water quality monitoring, stream gauges, buoys, and groundwater assessments; water-related weather, climate, and earth system science including storm surge, hurricane, rainfall, and drought forecasts and associated remote sensing investments (see " Earth-Observing Satellites "); water conditions in rivers and along coasts (e.g., relative sea-level rise rates); altering the operation of existing reservoirs (e.g., using seasonal forecasts for forecast-informed operations); monitoring and management of invasive species and harmful algal blooms; access to and use of water data (e.g., the Open Water Data Initiative); and coordination of the federal water science and research portfolio, including partnerships with academic and private entities. Water infrastructure research encompasses how to prolong and improve the performance of existing coastal and inland water infrastructure as well as the development of next-generation infrastructure technologies. Some infrastructure and water use research topics include: water augmentation technologies and science to support their adoption, including stormwater capture, water reuse, brackish and seawater desalination, as well as groundwater recharge, storage, and recovery; technologies and materials for monitoring and rehabilitating aging infrastructure, such as materials selection, construction and repair techniques, and detection technologies (e.g., structural health monitors and leak detection); water efficiency technologies and practices; and technologies to enhance infrastructure resilience to droughts, floods, hurricanes, and other natural hazards. The quality of drinking water, surface water, and groundwater is important for public health, environmental protection, food security, and other purposes. Technologies for preventing contamination and for identifying and treating existing contamination is an ongoing research topic for the federal government. Some research topics include: analytical methods and treatment technologies to detect and manage emerging contaminants (e.g., cyanotoxins associated with harmful algal blooms and perfluoroalkyl substances [PFASs]); technologies to prevent and manage contamination at drinking water treatment plants and in distribution systems (e.g., real-time monitoring, treatment to minimize disinfection byproducts, and lead pipe corrosion control); and innovative technologies and practices to protect water quality, including methods for increasing resilience of drinking water systems against natural disasters, protecting drinking water sources for public water system from contamination (e.g., nature-based stormwater management, watershed management approaches, and nonpoint source pollution management). For Further Information Nicole T. Carter, Specialist in Natural Resources Policy Peter Folger, Specialist in Energy and Natural Resources Policy Elena H. Humphreys, Analyst in Environmental Policy Eva Lipiec, Analyst in Natural Resources Policy Anna E. Normand, Analyst in Natural Resources Policy Pervaze A. Sheikh, Specialist in Natural Resources Policy CRS Report R43777, U.S. Geological Survey: Background, Appropriations, and Issues for Congress , by Pervaze A. Sheikh and Peter Folger CRS Report R43407, Drought in the United States: Causes and Current Understanding , by Peter Folger CRS Report R44632, Sea-Level Rise and U.S. Coasts: Science and Policy Considerations , by Peter Folger and Nicole T. Carter CRS Report R44871, Freshwater Harmful Algal Blooms: Causes, Challenges, and Policy Considerations , by Laura Gatz CRS Report R45259, The Federal Role in Groundwater Supply: Overview and Legislation in the 115th Congress , by Peter Folger et al. CRS In Focus IF10719, Forecasting Hurricanes: Role of the National Hurricane Center , by Peter Folger Defense Science and technology play an important role in national defense. The Department of Defense (DOD) relies on a robust research and development effort to develop new military systems and improve existing systems. Issues that may come before the 116 th Congress regarding the DOD's S&T activities include budgetary concerns and the effectiveness of programs to transition R&D results into fielded products. Department of Defense Research and Development The Department of Defense spends more than $90 billion per year on research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E). Roughly 80%-85% of this is spent on the design, development, and testing of specific military systems. Examples of such systems include large integrated combat platforms such as aircraft carriers, fighter jets, and tanks, among others. They also include much smaller systems such as blast gauge sensors worn by individual soldiers. The other 15%-20% of the RDT&E funding is spent on what is referred to as DOD's Science and Technology Program. The S&T Program includes activities ranging from basic science to demonstrations of new technologies in the field. The goal of DOD's RDT&E spending is to provide the knowledge and technological advances necessary to maintain U.S. military superiority. DOD's RDT&E budget contains hundreds of individual line items. Congress provides oversight of the program, making adjustments to the amount of funding requested for any number of line items. These changes are based on considerations such as whether the department has adequately justified the expenditure or the need to accommodate larger budgetary adjustments. RDT&E priorities and focus, including those of the S&T portion, do not change radically from year to year, though a few fundamental policy-related issues regularly attract congressional attention. These include ensuring that S&T, particularly basic research, receives sufficient funding to support next generation capabilities; seeking ways to speed the transition of technology from the laboratory to the field; and ensuring an adequate supply of S&T personnel. Additionally, the impact of budgetary constraints, including continuing resolutions, on RDT&E may be of interest to the 116 th Congress. Specifically, senior DOD officials have been describing the need to develop and implement a strategy aimed at identifying new and innovative ways to maintain the dominance of U.S. military capabilities into the future, which may require increased investment in RDT&E. In addition, as federal defense-related R&D funding's share of global R&D funding has fallen from about 36% in 1960 to about 4% in 2016, some have become concerned about the ability of DOD to direct the development of leading technologies and to control which countries have access to it. Today, commercial companies in the United States and elsewhere in the world are leading development of groundbreaking technologies in fields such as artificial intelligence, autonomous vehicles and systems, and advanced robotics. DOD has sought to build institutional mechanisms (e.g., the Defense Innovation Unit) and a culture for accessing technologies from nontraditional defense contractors. DOD's ability to maintain a technology edge for U.S. forces may depend increasingly upon these external sources of innovation for its weapons and other systems. For Further Information John F. Sargent Jr., Specialist in Science and Technology Policy Marcy E. Gallo, Analyst in Science and Technology Policy CRS Report R45403, The Global Research and Development Landscape and Implications for the Department of Defense , by John F. Sargent Jr., Marcy E. Gallo, and Moshe Schwartz CRS Report R44711, Department of Defense Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E): Appropriations Structure , by John F. Sargent Jr. CRS Report R45110, Defense Science and Technology Funding , by John F. Sargent Jr. CRS Report R45150, Federal Research and Development (R&D) Funding: FY2019 , coordinated by John F. Sargent Jr. Energy Energy-related science and technology issues that may come before the 116 th Congress include those related to reprocessing spent nuclear fuel, advances in nuclear energy technology, the development of biofuels and ocean energy technology, and international fusion research. Reprocessing of Spent Nuclear Fuel Spent fuel from commercial nuclear reactors contains most of the original uranium that was used to make the fuel, along with plutonium and highly radioactive lighter isotopes produced during reactor operations. A fundamental issue in nuclear policy is whether spent fuel should be "reprocessed" or "recycled" to extract plutonium and uranium for new reactor fuel, or directly disposed of without reprocessing. Proponents of nuclear power point out that spent fuel still contains substantial energy that reprocessing could recover, and that reprocessing could reduce the long-term hazard of radioactive waste. However, reprocessed plutonium can also be used in nuclear weapons, so critics of reprocessing contend that federal support for the technology could undermine U.S. nuclear weapons nonproliferation policies. The potential commercial viability of reprocessing or recycling is also an issue. In the 1950s and 1960s, the federal government expected that all commercial spent fuel would be reprocessed to make fuel for "breeder reactors" that would convert uranium into enough plutonium to fuel additional commercial breeder reactors. Increased concern about weapons proliferation in the 1970s and the slower-than-projected growth of nuclear power prompted President Carter to halt commercial reprocessing efforts in 1977, along with a federal demonstration breeder project. During the Reagan Administration, Congress provided funding to restart the breeder demonstration project, but then halted project funding in 1983 while continuing to fund breeder-related research and development by the Department of Energy (DOE). During the Clinton Administration, research on producing nuclear energy through reprocessing was largely halted, although some work on the technology continued for waste management purposes. During the George W. Bush Administration, there was renewed federal support for reprocessing, with a proposal to complete a pilot plant by the early 2020s. During the Obama Administration, plans for the pilot plant were halted and DOE's Fuel Cycle Research and Development Program was redirected toward development of technology options for a wide range of nuclear fuel cycle approaches, including direct disposal of spent fuel (the "once through" cycle), deep borehole disposal, and partial and full recycling. The Trump Administration proposed deep reductions in Fuel Cycle R&D in FY2018 and FY2019. However, the Consolidated Appropriations Act for 2018 ( P.L. 115-141 ) increased the program's funding from $208 million in FY2017 to $260 million in FY2018—a 26% boost. Funding was increased slightly further, to $264 million, by the Energy and Water, Legislative Branch, and Military Construction and Veterans Affairs Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P.L. 115-244 ). The level of funding for nuclear fuel cycle and waste disposal R&D may be a continuing issue in the 116 th Congress. Another DOE project related to reprocessing policy is the uncompleted Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF) at the Department's Savannah River Site in South Carolina. MFFF would produce fuel for commercial nuclear reactors using surplus nuclear weapons plutonium, as part of an agreement with Russia to reduce nuclear weapons material. Critics of the project contend that MFFF would subvert U.S. nonproliferation efforts by encouraging the use of plutonium fuel. Because of rising costs, the Obama Administration proposed to halt the MFFF project in FY2017 and pursue alternative plutonium disposition options. The Trump Administration's FY2018 budget request also called for terminating MFFF. The FY2018 National Defense Authorization Act ( P.L. 115-91 ) authorized DOE to pursue an alternative disposal option if its total costs were found to be less than half of those for completing and operating MFFF. The Consolidated Appropriations Act for 2018 conformed to the NDAA authorizing language. Energy Secretary Rick Perry certified in May 2018 that the cost saving requirement for terminating MFFF would be met. For FY2019, P.L. 115-244 appropriated $220 million, the same as the request, to begin shutting down the project. Termination of MFFF could shift the debate on plutonium disposition policy toward other options, such as dilution and disposal in a deep repository. R&D funding for such alternatives could be an issue for the 116 th Congress. For Further Information Mark Holt, Specialist in Energy Policy CRS Report R42853, Nuclear Energy: Overview of Congressional Issues , by Mark Holt CRS Report RL34234, Managing the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Policy Implications of Expanding Global Access to Nuclear Power , coordinated by Mary Beth D. Nikitin CRS Report R43125, Mixed-Oxide Fuel Fabrication Plant and Plutonium Disposition: Management and Policy Issues , by Mark Holt and Mary Beth D. Nikitin Advanced Nuclear Energy Technology All currently operating commercial nuclear power plants in the United States are based on light water reactor (LWR) technology, in which ordinary water cools the reactor and acts as a neutron moderator to help sustain the nuclear chain reaction. DOE has long conducted research and development work on other, non-LWR nuclear technologies that could have advantages in safety, waste management, and cost. A growing number of private-sector firms are pursuing commercialization of advanced nuclear technologies as well. Advanced nuclear energy technologies include high-temperature gas-cooled reactors, liquid metal-cooled reactors, and molten salt reactors (in which the nuclear fuel is dissolved in the coolant), among a wide range of other concepts. Many of these concepts would involve nuclear chain reactions using fast neutrons, which are not slowed by a moderator. Research on advanced reactor coolants, materials, controls, and safety is carried out by DOE's Advanced Reactor Technologies program. The program received $111.5 million for FY2019 ( P.L. 115-244 ), 51% above the Administration request. The appropriation includes $20 million for research and development on microreactors—reactors with electric generating capacity of only a few megawatts, a tiny fraction of the capacity of existing commercial reactors. Private-sector nuclear technology companies contend that a major obstacle to commercializing advanced reactors is that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC's) licensing process is based on existing LWR technology. They have urged NRC to develop a licensing and regulatory framework that could apply to all nuclear concepts. They also have recommended a "staged review process" to provide conditional NRC approval for advanced reactor designs at key milestones toward the issuance of an operating license. NRC and DOE are currently implementing the Joint Advanced Non-Light Water Reactors Licensing Initiative to adapt existing general design criteria for LWRs for use by advanced reactor license applications. Under that initiative, NRC issued "Guidance for Developing Principal Design Criteria for Non-Light Water Reactors" on April 9, 2018. NRC is also supporting industry efforts to develop guidance for technology-neutral reactor licensing. Legislation to promote advanced nuclear power technologies, the Nuclear Energy Innovation Capabilities Act of 2017 ( P.L. 115-248 ), was signed by President Trump on September 28, 2018. A major provision of the bill would authorize DOE national laboratories or other DOE-owned sites to host reactor demonstration projects sponsored fully or partly by the private sector. It would also require DOE to determine the need for a fast-neutron "versatile" test reactor and authorize grants to help pay for NRC licensing of advanced reactor designs. Related legislation, the Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization Act ( P.L. 115-439 ), was signed into law January 14, 2019. Among other provisions, it would require NRC to develop a regulatory framework that would encourage commercialization of advanced nuclear technology. Some public-private R&D on advanced nuclear technology is already being conducted at national labs under DOE's Gateway for Accelerated Innovation in Nuclear (GAIN) initiative. Congress appropriated $65 million ( P.L. 115-244 ) for early-stage development of a versatile advanced test reactor in FY2019. The 116 th Congress may consider additional legislation on advanced reactors, including funding for R&D, licensing, and demonstration. For Further Information Mark Holt, Specialist in Energy Policy CRS Insight IN10765, Small Modular Nuclear Reactors: Status and Issues , by Mark Holt CRS Report R42853, Nuclear Energy: Overview of Congressional Issues , by Mark Holt Biofuels Biofuels—liquid transportation fuels produced from biomass feedstock—are often described as an alternative to conventional fuels. Some see promise in producing liquid fuels from a domestic feedstock that may reduce dependence on foreign sources of oil, contribute to improving rural economies, and lower greenhouse gas emissions. Others regard biofuels as potentially causing more harm to the environment (e.g., air and water quality concerns), encouraging landowners to put more land into production, and being prohibitively expensive to produce. The debate about the feasibility of biofuels is complex, as policymakers consider a multitude of factors (e.g., feedstock costs, timeframe to reach substantial commercial-scale advanced biofuel production, environmental impact of biofuels). The debate can be even more complicated when considering that biofuels may be produced using numerous biomass feedstocks and conversion technologies. Congress has expressed interest in biofuels for decades, with most of its attention on the production of "first-generation" biofuels (e.g., cornstarch ethanol). Farm bills have had a significant effect on biofuel research and development. Starting in 2002, the farm bills have contained an energy title with several programs focused on assisting biofuel production. In addition, the DOE Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) supports research and development for domestic biofuel production. Congress and the Administration have debated the amount of funding both USDA and DOE should receive for biofuel initiatives. While commercial-scale production of "first-generation" biofuels is well established, commercial-scale production for some advanced biofuels (e.g., cellulosic ethanol) is in its infancy. In 2007, Congress expanded one policy that has supported an increase in advanced biofuel production—the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS). The RFS requires U.S. transportation fuel to contain a minimum volume of biofuel, a growing percentage of which is to come from advanced biofuels. The RFS is under scrutiny for various reasons, including the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) exercising its regulatory authority to issue a waiver and reduce the total renewable fuel volume below what was required by statute and concerns about RFS compliance. This creates significant uncertainty for certain stakeholders, with the result that some of the advanced biofuel targets are not being met. An overarching issue is that the statute may require more biofuel to be produced than can be used given the existing motor fuel distribution infrastructure and the limited fleet of passenger vehicles that are built to run on higher percentage blends of biofuels. The 116 th Congress may consider whether to modify various biofuel promotional efforts, or to maintain the status quo. For Further Information Kelsi Bracmort, Specialist in Natural Resources and Energy Policy CRS Report R43325, The Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS): An Overview , by Kelsi Bracmort CRS In Focus IF10842, The Renewable Fuel Standard: Is Legislative Reform Needed? , by Kelsi Bracmort CRS In Focus IF10639, Farm Bill Primer: Energy Title , by Kelsi Bracmort CRS In Focus IF10661, DOE Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy: FY2017 Appropriations and the FY2018 Budget Request , by Kelsi Bracmort and Corrie E. Clark Offshore Energy Development Technologies Technological innovations are key drivers of U.S. ocean energy development. They may facilitate exploration of previously inaccessible resources, provide cost efficiencies in a low-oil-price environment, address safety and environmental concerns, and enable advances in emerging sectors such as U.S. offshore wind. Private industry, universities, and government are all involved in ocean energy R&D. At the federal level, the Department of Energy and the Department of the Interior (DOI) both support ocean energy research. One area of policymaker interest involves deepwater oil and gas operations. Industry interest in expanding deepwater activities, improving efficiency, and reducing costs has prompted improvements in drilling technologies and steps toward automated monitoring and maintenance. The oil and gas industry and federal regulators also have focused on safety improvements to reduce the likelihood of catastrophic oil spills in deep water. In 2016, DOI promulgated safety regulations that tighten requirements for offshore blowout preventer systems and other well control equipment. In April 2018, DOI published proposed revisions to the rule, including several changes that could reduce the cost to industry and time involved in meeting certain technological requirements. For both the original rule and the proposed revisions, stakeholders have debated the potential costs of compliance and whether the technological requirements are unnecessarily prescriptive or, conversely, not prescriptive enough to achieve safety aims. Congress may also consider technology issues related to offshore drilling in the Arctic, where sea ice and infrastructure gaps pose challenges for the economic viability and safety of mineral exploration. A focus of industry R&D is on technology to extend the Arctic drilling season beyond the periods where sea ice is absent—for example, by developing ice-capable mobile offshore drilling units (MODUs). DOI finalized safety regulations for Arctic exploratory drilling in 2016. President Trump's Executive Order 13795 ordered DOI to review these regulations and DOI's Fall 2018 Regulatory Agenda includes an anticipated rule revision. Some have argued that the regulations are too costly for industry and give inadequate weight to available technologies (such as those for well capping) that could reduce safety costs. Others question whether any rules or technologies can adequately ensure drilling safety in the Arctic given the environmental risks. Among renewable ocean energy sources, only wind energy is poised for commercial application in U.S. waters. In December 2016, the first U.S. offshore wind farm, off of Rhode Island, began regular operations. A focus of R&D is technology to increase offshore turbine efficiency and reduce costs, including floating turbines for deep waters, where resources may be more abundant and user conflicts fewer. Other research explores improvements to electrical infrastructure, such as integrating transmission networks for multiple projects. A potential issue for Congress is whether and how to support or incentivize offshore wind development and other ocean renewables. For Further Information Laura Comay, Specialist in Natural Resources Policy CRS Report R44692, Five-Year Program for Federal Offshore Oil and Gas Leasing: Status and Issues in Brief , by Laura B. Comay CRS Report R42942, Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: Recent Activities and Ongoing Developments , by Jonathan L. Ramseur CRS Report R41153, Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress , coordinated by Ronald O'Rourke ITER ITER (formerly known as the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor) is an international fusion energy research facility currently under construction in Cadarache, France. When completed, ITER is to be the world's largest fusion reactor and the first capable of producing more energy than it consumes. Although the energy output from ITER will not be harnessed to produce electricity, fusion researchers see ITER as the next step toward implementation of fusion energy as a power source. ITER is an international collaboration. Along with the United States, the partners are the European Union, China, India, Japan, Russia, and South Korea. The United States withdrew from the initial design phase of ITER in 1998 at congressional direction, largely because of concerns about cost and scope. The project was restructured, and the United States rejoined in 2003. The formal international agreement to build the facility was approved in 2006. The European Union, as host, is responsible for 45% of the construction cost, while the United States and the other participating countries are responsible for 9% each. Most of the U.S. share (which is $132 million in FY2019) is being contributed in kind, in the form of components and equipment sourced mostly from U.S. companies, universities, and national laboratories. The construction phase of ITER is planned for completion in 2027. Once operational, the facility is expected to have a lifespan of 15-25 years. During the operation phase, and during subsequent deactivation and decommissioning, the agreed U.S. cost share is 13%. In recent years, ITER management issues, schedule delays, and cost growth have sometimes led to proposals in Congress to terminate U.S. participation. A central issue is that U.S. funding for ITER may be crowding out funding for domestic fusion energy research. DOE budget documents show the cost of U.S. participation in ITER in FY2020 and beyond as "to be determined" once the Administration decides whether to continue participating in the project. In 2018, at DOE's request, the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine issued a strategic plan for fusion energy research. It recommended, first, that "the United States should remain an ITER partner as the most cost-effective way to gain experience with a burning plasma at the scale of a power plant." Second, looking beyond ITER, it recommended that "the United States should start a national program of accompanying research and technology leading to the construction of a compact pilot plant that produces electricity from fusion at the lowest possible capital cost." The DOE Fusion Energy Sciences Advisory Committee has also embarked on a strategic planning effort, encompassing both ITER and domestic research, with a final report anticipated in late 2020. The 116 th Congress may continue oversight of ITER's scientific progress, cost, and schedule, and may revisit the debate about whether to continue U.S. participation. For More Information Daniel Morgan, Specialist in Science and Technology Policy Homeland Security The federal government spends billions of dollars supporting research and development to protect the homeland. Some of the issues that the 116 th Congress may consider include how the Department of Homeland Security performs research and development; federal efforts to develop and procure new medical countermeasures against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear agents; and federal efforts to ensure the safety and security of laboratories working with dangerous pathogens. R&D in the Department of Homeland Security The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has identified five core missions: to prevent terrorism and enhance security, to secure and manage the borders, to enforce and administer immigration laws, to safeguard and secure cyberspace, and to ensure resilience to disasters. New technology resulting from research and development can contribute to all these goals. The Directorate of Science and Technology has primary responsibility for establishing, administering, and coordinating DHS R&D activities. The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) is responsible for R&D relating to nuclear and radiological threats. Several other DHS components, including the Coast Guard, also fund R&D and R&D-related activities related to their missions. Coordination of DHS R&D is a long-standing congressional interest. In 2012, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) concluded that because so many components of the department are involved, it is difficult for DHS to oversee R&D department-wide. In January 2014, the joint explanatory statement for the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014 ( P.L. 113-76 ) directed DHS to implement and report on new policies for R&D prioritization. It also directed DHS to review and implement policies and guidance for defining and overseeing R&D department-wide. In July 2014, GAO reported that DHS had updated its guidance to include a definition of R&D and was conducting R&D portfolio reviews across the department, but that it had not yet developed policy guidance for DHS-wide R&D oversight, coordination, and tracking. In December 2015, the explanatory statement for the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 ( P.L. 114-113 ) stated that DHS "lacks a mechanism for capturing and understanding research and development (R&D) activities conducted across DHS, as well as coordinating R&D to reflect departmental priorities." The Common Appropriations Structure that DHS introduced in February 2016 in its FY2017 budget request includes an account titled Research and Development for each DHS component. It remains to be seen whether this change will help to address congressional concerns about DHS-wide R&D coordination. DHS has reorganized its R&D-related activities several times. In December 2017, it established a new Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMDO), consisting of DNDO, most functions of the Office of Health Affairs (OHA), and some other elements. DNDO and OHA were themselves both created, more than a decade ago, largely by reorganizing elements of the S&T Directorate. The Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 2018 ( P.L. 115-387 ) expressly authorized the establishment and activities of CWMDO. The 116 th Congress may examine the implementation of that act. For Further Information Daniel Morgan, Specialist in Science and Technology Policy Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Medical Countermeasures The anthrax attacks of 2001 highlighted the nation's vulnerability to biological terrorism. The federal government responded to these attacks by increasing efforts to protect civilians against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) terrorism. Effective medical countermeasures, such as drugs or vaccines, could reduce the impact of a CBRN attack. Policymakers identified a lack of such countermeasures as a challenge to responding to the CBRN threat. To address this gap, the federal government created several programs to encourage private sector development of new CBRN medical countermeasures. Despite these efforts, the federal government still lacks medical countermeasures for many CBRN threats, including Ebola. The Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA) and Project BioShield are two key pieces of the federal efforts supporting the development and procurement of new CBRN medical countermeasures. BARDA directly funds the advanced development of countermeasures through contracts with private sector developers. Project BioShield provides a procurement mechanism to remove market uncertainty for countermeasure developers. It allows the federal government to agree to buy a countermeasure up to 10 years before the product is likely to finish development. Congress has modified these and related programs to improve their performance, efficiency, and transparency to oversight. However, some key issues remain unresolved, including those related to appropriations, interagency coordination, countermeasure prioritization and implementation of the 2018 National Biodef e nse Strategy . In addition to questions regarding the amount of funding, Congress may consider whether the appropriations are efficiently balanced throughout the research and development pipeline. Policymakers may consider whether the congressionally-mandated planning and transparency requirements have sufficiently enhanced coordination of the multiagency countermeasure development enterprise. Additionally, Congress may consider whether the countermeasure prioritization process appropriately balances the need to address traditional threats such as anthrax and smallpox with the threat posed by emerging infectious diseases such as Ebola. Finally, Congress may consider the administration's progress implementing the new National Biodefense Strategy and how it affects the medical countermeasure research and development enterprise. For Further Information Frank Gottron, Specialist in Science and Technology Policy Microbial Pathogens in the Laboratory: Safety and Security In addition to its general oversight of workplace safety, the federal government addresses the safety of laboratory personnel who work with infectious microorganisms through guidance such as Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories (BMBL), published by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and National Institutes of Health (NIH). BMBL sets "Biosafety Levels" for work with the highest-risk pathogens. BMBL guidance is often adopted as a requirement; for example, compliance is required of federal grant recipients. Biosecurity requirements, to protect the public from intentional and unintentional releases of pathogens, were first mandated by Congress in 1996, and expanded through subsequent reauthorizations. The Federal Select Agent Program (FSAP), administered jointly by CDC and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), oversees the possession of "select agents," certain biological pathogens and toxins with the potential to cause serious harm to public, animal, or plant health. All U.S. laboratory facilities—including those at government agencies, universities, research institutions, and commercial entities—that possess, use, or transfer select agents must register with the program and adhere to specified best practices. All persons given access to select agents must undergo background investigations conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Several incidents involving the mishandling of select agents in federal laboratories have occurred in recent years. For example, samples of decades-old but viable smallpox virus were found in an FDA laboratory on an NIH campus. Laboratories at CDC, one of the select agent regulatory agencies, had incidents involving the anthrax agent, a virulent avian influenza virus, and Ebola virus. Each incident was attributed, at least in part, to lapses in protocol or some other form of human error. Several incident reports have recommended improvements in the "culture of safety" in laboratories, standardized microbial handling practices, and better incident reporting, among other measures. Additional entities, including the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, the Comptroller General, and the HHS Inspector General have also investigated these lapses and made similar recommendations. The FSAP is designed to ensure the secure handling of designated pathogens while allowing important research on these pathogens to proceed. The 2018 Farm Bill amended the authority to regulate animal and plant pathogens, requiring the Secretary of Agriculture, when determining which agents to list, to consider the potential effects of such listing on animal and plant disease research. The HHS Secretary is not required to make a similar consideration when determining the list of agents that may pose a threat to public health. The 116 th Congress may choose to continue FSAP program oversight, including through committee investigations, since program reports show that occupational exposures persist in regulated facilities. Congress may also review and revise the authorities for the public health and agriculture arms of the program. The authorizations of appropriations for each expired in 2007.  For Further Information Sarah A. Lister, Specialist in Public Health and Epidemiology Information Technology The rapid pace of advancements in information technology presents several issues for congressional policymakers, including those related to cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, broadband deployment, access to broadband networks and net neutrality, public safety networks, emergency alerting, 5G networks, the Internet of Things, federal networking R&D, and quantum information science. Cybersecurity The federal policy framework for cybersecurity is complex, including more than 50 statutes as well as presidential directives and related authorities. The 116 th Congress may face a number of significant issues related to cybersecurity, in addition to the oversight of enacted laws. Among those issues are the following: Cybersecurity for critical infrastructure , given that most of the nation's critical infrastructure is not owned by the federal government and regulatory cybersecurity requirements vary substantially among the sectors; Prevention of and response to cybercrime , especially given its substantially international character; The relationship between cyberspace and national security , including information operations aimed at election infrastructure and political campaigns; and Federal R&D and other investments to protect information systems and networks. In addition to such short- and medium-term issues, Congress may consider responses to a number of long-term challenges, including the following: Design— the degree to which information systems can be designed with security built in, in the face of economic obstacles and the other challenges; Incentives— ways to correct an economic incentive structure for cybersecurity that has often been called distorted or even perverse, with cybercrime widely regarded as cheap, profitable, and comparatively safe for the criminals, while cybersecurity is often considered expensive and imperfect, with uncertain economic returns; Consensus— finding consensus on a consistent and effective model for approaching cybersecurity, given stakeholders from different sectors and different work subcultures with varying needs, goals, and perspectives ; and Environment— a rapidly evolving cyberspace environment that both complicates the threat environment and may pose opportunities for shaping the direction of that evolution toward greater security, including, for example, the growth and influence of disruptive technologies (see " Disruptive and Convergent Technology "). For Further Information Eric A. Fischer, Senior Specialist in Science and Technology Chris Jaikaran, Analyst in Cybersecurity Policy CRS In Focus IF10559, Cybersecurity: An Introduction , by Chris Jaikaran CRS Report R45127, Cybersecurity: Selected Issues for the 115th Congress , coordinated by Chris Jaikaran CRS Report R45142, Information Warfare: Issues for Congress , by Catherine A. Theohary CRS In Focus IF10602, Cybersecurity: Federal Agency Roles , by Eric A. Fischer CRS In Focus IF10677, The Designation of Election Systems as Critical Infrastructure , by Eric A. Fischer CRS Report R44923, FY2018 National Defense Authorization Act: Selected Military Personnel Issues , by Kristy N. Kamarck, Lawrence Kapp, and Barbara Salazar Torreon Artificial Intelligence The rapid development and growing use of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies has been of increasing interest to policymakers. Congressional activities on AI in the 115 th Congress included multiple committee hearings in both the House of Representatives and the Senate, the introduction of numerous AI-focused bills, the passage of AI provisions in legislation, and a variety of congressional briefings. Activity related to AI may continue in the 116 th Congress. Generally, AI is considered to be computerized systems that work and react in ways commonly thought to require intelligence, encompassing many methodologies and applications. Common examples include machine learning, computer vision, natural language processing, and applications in such areas as robotics and autonomous vehicles. In addition to transportation, AI is already being employed across a variety of sectors, including health care, agriculture, manufacturing, and finance. Current AI technologies fall into a category called "narrow AI," meaning that they are highly tailored to particular tasks. In contrast, potential future AI systems that exhibit adaptable intelligence across a range of cognitive tasks, often referred to as "general AI," are unlikely to be developed for at least decades, if ever, according to most researchers. Potential policy considerations for AI span cross-sector and sector-specific topics, in both the defense and nondefense spaces. For example, broad concerns have focused on workforce impacts from the implementation of AI and AI-driven automation, including potential job losses and the need for worker retraining; the balance of federal and private sector funding for AI; international competition in AI research and development (R&D) and deployment, particularly with China and Russia; the development of standards and testing for AI systems; the need for and effectiveness of federal coordination efforts in AI; and incorporation of privacy, security, transparency, and accountability considerations in AI systems. Particular considerations for AI in the defense space have included the balance of human and automated decisionmaking in military operations; how the Department of Defense engages with the private sector for defense adaptation of commercially developed AI systems and access to AI expertise; and private sector concerns about the use of AI R&D in combat situations. For Further Information Laurie A. Harris, Analyst in Science and Technology Policy CRS In Focus IF10608, Overview of Artificial Intelligence , by Laurie A. Harris CRS In Focus IF10937, Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Education , by Joyce J. Lu and Laurie A. Harris CRS Report R45392, U.S. Ground Forces Robotics and Autonomous Systems (RAS) and Artificial Intelligence (AI): Considerations for Congress , coordinated by Andrew Feickert Broadband Deployment Broadband—whether delivered via fiber, cable modem, copper wire, satellite, or wirelessly—is increasingly the technology underlying telecommunications services such as voice, video, and data. Since the initial deployment of broadband in the late 1990s, Congress has viewed broadband infrastructure deployment as a means towards improving regional economic development, and in the long term, to create jobs. According to the Federal Communications Commission's (FCC's) National Broadband Plan, the lack of adequate broadband availability is most pressing in rural America, where the costs of serving large geographical areas, coupled with low population densities, often reduce economic incentives for telecommunications providers to invest in and maintain broadband infrastructure and service. Broadband adoption also continues to be a problem, with a significant number of Americans having broadband available, but not subscribing. Populations lagging behind in broadband adoption include people with low incomes, seniors, minorities, the less-educated, nonfamily households, and the nonemployed. The 116 th Congress may face a range of broadband-related issues. These may include the continued transition of the telephone-era Universal Service Fund from a voice to a broadband-based focus, funding for broadband programs in the Rural Utilities Service, infrastructure legislation that may include funding and incentives for broadband buildout, the adequacy of broadband deployment data and mapping, the development of new wireless spectrum policies, and to what extent, if any, regulation is necessary to ensure an open internet. Additionally, the 116 th Congress may choose to examine the existing regulatory structure and consider possible revision of the 1996 Telecommunications Act and its underlying statute, the Communications Act of 1934. Both the convergence of telecommunications providers and markets and the transition to an Internet Protocol (IP) based network have, according to a growing number of policymakers, made it necessary to consider revising the current regulatory framework. How a possible revision might create additional incentives for investment in, deployment of, and subscribership to, our broadband infrastructure is likely to be just one of many issues under consideration. To the extent that Congress may consider various options for further enhancing broadband deployment, a key issue is how to develop and implement federal policies intended to increase the nation's broadband availability and adoption, while at the same time minimizing any deleterious effects that government intervention in the marketplace may have on competition and private sector investment. For Further Information Lennard G. Kruger, Specialist in Science and Technology Policy Angele A. Gilroy, Specialist in Telecommunications Policy CRS Report RL30719, Broadband Internet Access and the Digital Divide: Federal Assistance Programs , by Lennard G. Kruger and Angele A. Gilroy CRS Report RL33816, Broadband Loan and Grant Programs in the USDA's Rural Utilities Service , by Lennard G. Kruger Access to Broadband Networks and the Net Neutrality Debate Determining the appropriate framework to ensure an open internet is central to the debate over broadband access. A focal point in the policy debate centers on what, if any, steps are necessary to ensure unfettered internet access to content, services, and applications providers, as well as consumers. The move to place restrictions on the owners of the networks that compose and provide access to the internet, to ensure equal access and nondiscriminatory treatment, is referred to as "net neutrality." While there is no single accepted definition of "net neutrality," most agree that any such definition should include the general principles that owners of the networks that compose and provide access to the internet (i.e., broadband access providers) should not control how consumers lawfully use that network, and should not be able to discriminate against content provider access to that network. Some policymakers contend that more specific regulatory guidelines are necessary to protect the marketplace from potential abuses which could threaten the net neutrality concept. Others contend that existing laws and policies are sufficient to deal with potential anti-competitive behavior and that additional regulations would have negative effects on the expansion and future development of the internet. Broadband regulation and the Federal Communications Commission's (FCC's) authority to implement such regulations is an issue of growing importance in the wide ranging policy debate over broadband access. What, if any, action should be taken to ensure net neutrality is part of the overall discussion. The FCC, in 2015, adopted rules (2015 Order) that established a comprehensive regulatory framework to address the regulation of broadband internet access providers. The 2015 Order contained among its provisions those that reclassified such services as a telecommunications service and established conduct rules for providers. However, the FCC, in December 2017, adopted new rules (2017 Order) that largely reverse the 2015 regulatory framework and shift much of the oversight from the FCC to the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice. The FCC's move to adopt the 2017 Order has reopened the debate over what the appropriate framework is to ensure an open internet and whether Congress should enact legislation to establish this framework. A consensus on what that framework should entail remains elusive. Some Members of Congress support the less regulatory approach contained in the 2017 Order, which, they argue, will stimulate broadband investment, deployment, and innovation. Others support the regulatory framework adopted in the 2015 Order, which provides for a more stringent regulatory framework, and is needed, they state, to protect content, services, and applications providers, as well as consumers, from potential discriminatory behaviors which conflict with net neutrality principles. Still others, while supporting a framework containing specific behavioral rules to address potential anticompetitive practices, do not support the telecommunications services classification. Whether Congress will take action to amend existing law to provide guidance and more stability to FCC authority remains to be seen. For Further Information Angele A. Gilroy, Specialist in Telecommunications Policy CRS In Focus IF10955, Access to Broadband Networks: Net Neutrality , by Angele A. Gilroy CRS Report R40616, The Net Neutrality Debate: Access to Broadband Networks , by Angele A. Gilroy Deployment of the FirstNet Network The Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 ( P.L. 112-96 ) authorized the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to allocate spectrum to public safety use. The act also created the First Responder Network Authority (FirstNet), authorized FirstNet to establish a new, nationwide broadband network for public safety, and provided $7 billion in funding for the project. The network is intended to address the communication problems first responders experienced during September 11, 2001, whereby public safety systems were not interoperable, and responders could not communicate or coordinate an effective response. Congress authorized FirstNet to enter into a public-private partnership to deploy the network. In March 2017, FirstNet selected AT&T, through a competitive bidding process, as its partner. AT&T has been deploying the network as specified in its agreement with FirstNet and state-specific plans, and public safety agencies are subscribing to FirstNet. A concern for policymakers is that the FirstNet/AT&T contract and state plans contain detailed information on deployment; however both are deemed proprietary and not available for public review. Without details on how the network is being deployed in each state, and how federal resources are being used, it may be difficult for Congress to ensure the requirements of the law are being met. Given the federal investment in the project ($6.5 billion and 20 MHz of valuable broadband spectrum), and the importance of the FirstNet network to the life of safety of first responders and citizens, the 116 th Congress may consider continuing its oversight of this project. For Further Information Jill Gallagher, Analyst in Telecommunications Policy CRS Report R45179, The First Responder Network (FirstNet) and Next-Generation Communications for Public Safety: Issues for Congress , by Jill C. Gallagher Emergency Alerting Local officials are responsible for issuing emergency alerts. Some localities use commercial alerting systems to send electronic alerts (e.g., cell phone alerts, email alerts). Others rely on the federal alerting system—the Integrated Public Alert and Warning System (IPAWS), which allows local officials to send alerts across many media outlets (e.g., cell phone, television, radio). Many localities use both systems to ensure alerts are received. The false alert of an incoming ballistic missile to Hawaii on January 13, 2018, raised questions about alerting roles and responsibilities. While the national alerting system—IPAWS—worked as intended, the roles and responsibilities for issuing alerts of incoming missiles was debated in Congress. The 2017 and 2018 wildfires in California raised additional alerting issues. Several counties in California used a commercial alerting system that reached only those residents who signed up for the service (whereas IPAWS would have sent an alert to all devices in the affected area). Local officials were concerned that cell phone alerts issued through IPAWS could not be narrowly targeted, and would result in over-alerting, mass evacuation, and overcrowding on evacuation routes, which could put people and first responders in danger. In January 2018, the Federal Communications Commission adopted rules requiring carriers to improve geo-targeting of wireless emergency alerts (WEA)—alerts to cell phones issued through IPAWS. Carriers must comply with these rules by November 30, 2019. The 116 th Congress may examine roles and responsibilities for issuing different alerts, and consider policies that clarify alerting procedures. Congress may also consider investments in activities (e.g., best practices) to improve local alerting capabilities, and programs that educate individuals on the appropriate response to alerts. Lastly, Congress may examine state and local back-up alerting capabilities in the event communication systems fail, and wireless alerts cannot be delivered. For Further Information Jill Gallagher, Analyst in Telecommunications Policy CRS In Focus IF10816, Emergency Alerting—False Alarm in Hawaii , by Jill C. Gallagher 5G Technologies As more people are using more data on more devices, demand for mobile data is rising. Current telecommunication networks cannot always meet consumer demands for data. Telecommunication companies are continually deploying new technologies to offer better coverage, faster speeds, more data, and new services to customers. The newest technologies are called fifth-generation (5G) technologies, as they succeed 2G, 3G, and 4G systems. 5G technologies offer vastly improved speeds and greater bandwidth to meet demands for mobile data. 5G technologies enable providers to expand services to consumers (e.g., video streaming, virtual reality applications) and support new systems for industrial users (e.g., medical monitoring, industrial control systems). When fully deployed, 5G is expected to power the Internet of Things—systems of interconnected devices (e.g., smart homes), and emerging technologies (e.g., autonomous vehicles). 5G is expected to drive the development of new technologies, support new uses by consumers and industry, and create new markets, new revenues, and new jobs. Since companies that are first to market with new technologies often capture the bulk of the new revenues, companies around the world are racing to develop and deploy 5G technologies. Recognizing the potential for economic gain, countries (i.e., central governments) are supporting the development and deployment of 5G technologies. In the United States, the federal government has allocated spectrum for 5G and streamlined cell siting regulations to speed deployment. The 116 th Congress may continue to monitor U.S. competitiveness in the global 5G market, and consider policies (e.g., spectrum allocation policies) and programs that could expedite 5G deployment. In developing 5G policies, Congress may consider concerns of some local governments and individuals related to 5G deployment, including local authority over 5G cell sites, deployment of 5G to rural areas, and privacy and security of data transmitted over 5G devices and systems. For Further Information Jill Gallagher, Analyst in Telecommunications Policy The Internet of Things The Internet of Things (IoT) may continue to be a focal point of far-reaching debates during the 116 th Congress. The term refers to networks of objects with two features—a unique identifier and internet connectivity. Such "smart" objects can form systems that communicate among themselves, usually in concert with computers, allowing automated and remote control of many independent processes and potentially transforming them into integrated systems. Such objects may include vehicles, appliances, medical devices, electric grids, transportation infrastructure, manufacturing equipment, building systems, and so forth. The IoT is increasingly impacting homes and communities, factories and cities, and nearly every sector of the economy, both domestically and globally, among them agriculture (precision farming), health (medical devices), and transportation (self-driving automobiles and unmanned aerial vehicles). An increasing number of these systems require access to radio frequency spectrum in order to connect to the internet or other networks. The development of 5G wireless technologies is likely to develop in tandem with the IoT, potentially expanding substantially the opportunities for growth in use of IoT devices. Although the full extent and nature of impacts of the IoT remain uncertain, some economic analyses predict that it will contribute trillions of dollars to economic growth over the next decade. The IoT, for example, may be able to facilitate more integrated and functional infrastructure, especially in "smart cities," through improvements in transportation, utilities, and other municipal services. Sectors that may be particularly affected are agriculture, energy, government, health care, manufacturing, and transportation. The federal government may play an important role in enabling the development and deployment of the IoT, including R&D, standards, regulation, and support for testbeds and demonstration projects. No single federal agency has overall responsibility for the IoT. Various agencies have relevant regulatory, sector-specific, and other mission-related responsibilities, such as the Departments of Commerce, Health, Energy, Transportation, and Defense, the National Science Foundation, the Federal Communications Commission, and the Federal Trade Commission. The range of issues that might be the subject of congressional activity includes the following: security of objects and the systems and networks to which they are connected, given especially that many IoT devices are operational technology, the compromise of which can have physical impacts (see also " Cybersecurity "); privacy of the information gathered and transmitted by objects; standards for the IoT, especially with respect to connectivity; transition to a new Internet Protocol (IPv6) that can handle the anticipated exponential increase in the number of IP addresses required by the IoT, along with the growth of 5G wireless; methods for updating the software used by IoT objects in response to security and other needs; energy management for IoT objects, especially those not connected to the electric grid; and the role of the federal government in development and deployment, standards, regulation, and communications, including the impact of federal rules regarding "net neutrality." The Internet of Things represents more than devices connected through networks, and more than internet or radio frequency spectrum policy. Its growth will likely require significant changes in—and coordination among—many government departments and agencies. For Further Information Eric A. Fischer, Senior Specialist in Science and Technology CRS Report R44227, The Internet of Things: Frequently Asked Questions , by Eric A. Fischer Digital Services Tax The rise of e-commerce, social media, and big data analytics have allowed new business models to emerge as part of the "digital economy." In the realm of international tax policy, though, certain types of activities and markets in the digital economy have been singled out for "digital services taxes" (DSTs) by some jurisdictions—primarily in Europe. For example, Spain is set to implement a DST of 3% on the gross revenue derived from certain digital services (e.g., online advertising, online marketplaces, and user data tracking services) derived from users within Spain beginning in 2019. Similarly, the United Kingdom (UK) intends to implement a 2% DST on revenues from social media platforms, online marketplaces, and search engines derived from UK user activity in 2020. Both DSTs have minimum thresholds based on global total revenue and revenue from covered business activities to local users that effectively target the largest global digital economy companies. The EU is also actively considering a digital tax across all member states. This issue may be of interest to Congress because the taxes appear to primarily target U.S. corporations, such as Facebook, Google, and Amazon. As such, there is opposition to unilateral efforts by foreign countries to tax the digital economy. DSTs also raise potential issues for U.S. foreign tax credit treatment under bilateral tax treaties, which are considered and ratified by the Senate. Additionally, some Members of Congress may support one of the purported justifications for DSTs (a perceived "unfairness" arising from the relatively low rate of tax paid by some firms in the digital economy), but would prefer alternative remedies to raise taxes or reduce tax preferences on these corporations. For example, the 2017 tax revision ( P.L. 115-97 ) enacted a new tax on global intangible low-taxed income ("GILTI"), which is designed to be a minimum tax on foreign-source income earned from intangible assets (e.g., patents, trade secrets). In the 115 th Congress, the "No Tax Break for Outsourcing Act" (H.R. 5108; S. 2459 ) would have increased the GILTI tax rate to 21% (the same as the top statutory corporate income tax rate), among other changes. For Further Information Sean Lowry, Analyst in Public Finance CRS Report R45186, Issues in International Corporate Taxation: The 2017 Revision (P.L. 115-97) , by Jane G. Gravelle and Donald J. Marples Evolving Technology and Law Enforcement Investigations Changing technology presents opportunities and challenges for U.S. law enforcement. Some technological advances (e.g., social media) have arguably provided a wealth of information for investigators and analysts. Others have presented unique hurdles. While some feel that law enforcement now has more information available to them than ever before, others contend that law enforcement is "going dark" as some of their investigative capabilities are outpaced by the speed of technological change. These hurdles for law enforcement include strong, end-to-end (or what law enforcement has sometimes called "warrant-proof") encryption; provider limits on data retention; bounds on companies' technological capabilities to provide specific data points to law enforcement; tools facilitating anonymity online; and a landscape of mixed wireless, cellular, and other networks through which individuals and information are constantly passing. As such, law enforcement may have trouble accessing certain information they otherwise may be authorized to obtain. The tension between law enforcement capabilities and technological change—including sometimes competing pressures for technology companies to provide data to law enforcement as well as to secure customer privacy—has received congressional attention for several decades. For instance, in the 1990s the "crypto wars" pitted the government against technology companies, and this strain was underscored by proposals to build in vulnerabilities, or "back doors," to certain encrypted communications devices as well as to restrict the export of strong encryption code. In addition, Congress passed the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA; P.L. 103-414 ) in 1994 to help law enforcement maintain their ability to execute authorized electronic surveillance as telecommunications providers turned to digital and wireless technology. More recently, there have been questions about whether CALEA should be amended to apply to a broader range of entities that provide communications services. The "going dark" debate originally focused on data in motion, or law enforcement's ability to intercept real-time communications. However, more recent technology changes have impacted law enforcement's capacity to access not only communications but stored content, or data at rest. Some officials have urged the technology community to develop a means to assist law enforcement in accessing certain data. At the same time, law enforcement entities have taken steps to bolster their technology capabilities. In addition, policymakers have been evaluating whether legislation may be an appropriate response to current law enforcement concerns involving access to communications and data. For Further Information Kristin Finklea, Specialist in Domestic Security CRS Report R44481, Encryption and the "Going Dark" Debate , by Kristin Finklea CRS Report R44827, Law Enforcement Using and Disclosing Technology Vulnerabilities , by Kristin Finklea The Networking and Information Technology Research and Development Program The Networking and Information Technology Research and Development (NITRD) Program is the United States' primary source of federally-funded information technology (IT) research and development in the fields of computing, networking, and software. The program evolved from the High-Performance Computing and Communications (HPCC) Program, which originated with the HPCC Program Act of 1991 ( P.L. 102-194 ); it coordinates the activities of multiple agencies conducting multi-disciplinary, multi-technology, and multi-sector R&D needs. The 21 NITRD member agencies invest approximately $5 billion annually in basic and applied R&D programs. Proponents of federal support of IT R&D assert that it has produced positive outcomes for the country and played a crucial role in supporting long-term research into fundamental aspects of computing. Such fundamentals may provide broad practical benefits, but generally take years to realize. Additionally, the unanticipated results of research are often as important as the anticipated results. Another aspect of government-funded IT research is that it often leads to open standards, something that many perceive as beneficial, encouraging deployment and further investment. Industry, on the other hand, is more inclined to invest in proprietary products and will diverge from a common standard when there is a potential competitive or financial advantage to do so. Supporters believe that the outcomes achieved through the various funding programs create a synergistic environment in which both fundamental and application-driven research are conducted, benefitting government, industry, academia, and the public. Critics, however, assert that the government, through its funding mechanisms, may be picking "winners and losers" in technological development, a role more properly residing with the market. For example, the size of the NITRD Program could encourage industry to follow the government's lead on research directions rather than selecting those directions itself. The NITRD Program is funded through appropriations to its individual agencies; therefore, it will be part of the continuing federal budget debate in the 116 th Congress. For Further Information Patricia Moloney Figliola, Specialist in Internet and Telecommunications Policy CRS Report RL33586, The Federal Networking and Information Technology Research and Development Program: Background, Funding, and Activities , by Patricia Moloney Figliola Quantum Information Science Quantum information science (QIS), which combines elements of mathematics, computer science, engineering, and physical sciences, has the potential to provide capabilities far beyond what is possible with the most advanced technologies available today. Although much of the press coverage of QIS has been devoted to quantum computing, there is more to QIS. Many experts divide QIS technologies into three application areas: sensing and metrology, communications, and computing and simulation. The government's interest in QIS dates back at least to the mid-1990s, when the National Institute of Standards and Technology and the DOD held their first QIS workshops. QIS is first mentioned in the FY2008 budget of what is now the Networking and Information Technology Research and Development Program and has been a component of the program since then. Today, QIS is a component of the National Strategic Computing Initiative (Executive Order 13702), which was established in 2015. More recently, in September 2018, the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) issued the National Strategic Overview for Quantum Information Science. The policy opportunities identified in this strategic overview include— choosing a science-first approach to QIS, creating a "quantum-smart" workforce, deepening engagement with the quantum industry, providing critical infrastructure, maintaining national security and economic growth, and advancing international cooperation. The United States is not alone in its increasing investment in QIS R&D. QIS research is also being pursued at major research centers worldwide, with China and the European Union having the largest foreign QIS programs. Further, even without explicit QIS initiatives, many other countries, including Russia, Germany, and Austria, are making strides in QIS R&D. In a July 2016 report, the NSTC stated that creating a cohesive and effective U.S. QIS R&D policy would require a collaborative effort in five policy areas: institutional boundaries; education and workforce training; technology and knowledge transfer; materials and fabrication; and the level and stability of funding. These areas continue to be salient in 2019 and may provide context for developing legislation in the 116 th Congress. For Further Information Patricia Moloney Figliola, Specialist in Internet and Telecommunications Policy CRS Report R45409, Quantum Information Science: Applications, Global Research and Development, and Policy Considerations , by Patricia Moloney Figliola Physical and Material Sciences Some of the policy issues in the physical and material sciences that the 116 th Congress may address include funding and oversight of the National Science Foundation and the multiagency initiative supporting research and development in the emerging field of nanotechnology. National Science Foundation The National Science Foundation supports basic research and education in the nonmedical sciences and engineering and is a primary source of federal support for U.S. university research. It is also responsible for the primary share of the federal STEM education effort, both by number of programs and total investment. Enacted funding for NSF in FY2018 was $7.77 billion. Congress has a long-standing interest in NSF's funding levels and the prioritization and direction of such funding. At various points in NSF's history, some policymakers have pursued a policy of authorizing large increases in the NSF budget over a defined period of time (e.g., a 100% increase over seven years, sometimes referred to as a "doubling path policy"). Actual appropriations have rarely reached authorized levels, however, and growth in NSF's budget has slowed in recent years. Advocates of large funding increases assert that steep and fast increases in NSF funding are necessary to ensure U.S. competitiveness. Other analysts argue that steady, reliable funding increases over longer periods of time would be less disruptive to the U.S. scientific and technological enterprise. Alternatively, some policymakers seek no additional increases in NSF funding in light of the federal deficit and spending caps. Additionally, some policymakers prefer to direct federal funding to research with a more applied or mission-oriented focus than that which is typically funded at NSF. In terms of congressional direction of funding, analysts and legislators have periodically debated questions about prioritizing NSF funding for the physical sciences and engineering over funding for the social, behavioral, and economic sciences, as well as expanding support for multidisciplinary funding. Policy issues that the 116 th Congress may continue to address include the selection, funding, and management of large-scale construction projects, scientific instruments, and facilities, including the use of management fees; increased support for mid-scale research infrastructure; research reproducibility and replicability; and the effectiveness and costs of NSF's use of nonfederal personnel—through the Intergovernmental Personnel Act program—often called "rotators." Other lasting federal policy issues for the NSF focus on the balance between scientific independence and accountability to taxpayers; the geographic distribution of grants; NSF's role in broadening participation in STEM fields; support for various STEM education programs; and the production of data about the U.S. scientific and technological enterprise. For Further Information Laurie A. Harris, Analyst in Science and Technology Policy CRS Report R45009, The National Science Foundation: FY2018 Appropriations and Funding History , by Laurie A. Harris Nanotechnology and the National Nanotechnology Initiative Nanoscale science, engineering, and technology—commonly referred to collectively as nanotechnology—is believed by many to offer extraordinary economic and societal benefits. Nanotechnology R&D is directed toward the understanding and control of matter at dimensions of roughly 1 to 100 nanometers (a nanometer is one-billionth of a meter). At this size, the properties of matter can differ in fundamental and potentially useful ways from the properties of individual atoms and molecules and of bulk matter. Many current applications of nanotechnology are evolutionary in nature, offering incremental improvements in existing products and generally modest economic and societal benefits. For example, nanotechnology is being used in automobile bumpers, cargo beds, and step-assists to reduce weight, increase resistance to dents and scratches, and eliminate rust; in clothes to increase stain- and wrinkle-resistance; and in sporting goods to improve performance. Other nanotechnology innovations play a central role in current applications with substantial economic value. For example, nanotechnology is a fundamental enabling technology in nearly all semiconductors and is key to improvements in chip speed, size, weight, and energy use. Similarly, nanotechnology has substantially increased the storage density of nonvolatile flash memory and computer hard drives. In the longer term, some believe that nanotechnology may deliver revolutionary advances with profound economic and societal implications, such as detection and treatment of cancer and other diseases; clean, inexpensive, renewable power through energy transformation, storage, and transmission technologies; affordable, scalable, and portable water filtration systems; self-healing materials; and high-density memory devices. The development of this emerging field has been fostered by sustained public investments in nanotechnology R&D. In 2001, President Clinton launched the multi-agency National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI) to accelerate and focus nanotechnology R&D to achieve scientific breakthroughs and to enable the development of new materials, tools, and products. More than 60 nations subsequently established programs similar to the NNI. Cumulatively through FY2018, Congress appropriated approximately $24.0 billion for nanotechnology R&D; for FY2019, President Trump requested $1.4 billion in funding. In 2003, Congress enacted the 21 st Century Nanotechnology Research and Development Act ( P.L. 108-153 ), providing a legislative foundation for some of the activities of the NNI, establishing programs, assigning agency responsibilities, and setting authorization levels through FY2008. Legislation was introduced in the 114 th and 115 th Congress to amend and reauthorize the act though none has been enacted into law. The 116 th Congress may continue to direct its attention primarily to three topics that may affect the realization of nanotechnology's hoped-for potential: R&D funding; U.S. competitiveness; and environmental, health, and safety concerns. For Further Information John F. Sargent Jr., Specialist in Science and Technology Policy CRS Report RL34511, Nanotechnology: A Policy Primer , by John F. Sargent Jr. CRS Report RL34401, The National Nanotechnology Initiative: Overview, Reauthorization, and Appropriations Issues , by John F. Sargent Jr. CRS Report RL34614, Nanotechnology and Environmental, Health, and Safety: Issues for Consideration , by John F. Sargent Jr. Space Congress has historically had a strong interest in space policy issues. Space topics that may come before the 116 th Congress include the funding and oversight of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and issues related to the commercialization of space and to Earth-observing satellites. NASA Spaceflight has attracted strong congressional interest since the establishment of NASA in 1958. Issues include the goals and strategy of NASA's human spaceflight program, the impact of constrained budgets on NASA's other missions, and the future of NASA's Earth Science program. The 116 th Congress may address these and other issues through NASA reauthorization legislation. With the end of the space shuttle program in July 2011, the United States lost the capability to launch astronauts into space. Since that time, NASA has relied on Russian spacecraft for crew transport to the International Space Station (ISS). For ISS cargo transport, NASA-contracted U.S. commercial flights have been delivering payloads of supplies and equipment since October 2012. As directed by the NASA Authorization Act of 2010 ( P.L. 111-267 ), NASA is pursuing a two-track strategy for human spaceflight. First, for transport to low Earth orbit, including the ISS, NASA is supporting commercial development of a crew transport capability like the commercial cargo capability achieved in 2012. Commercial crew transportation services are expected to become operational in late 2019 or 2020. Second, for human exploration beyond Earth orbit, NASA is developing a new crew capsule called Orion and a new heavy-lift rocket called the Space Launch System (SLS). The first crewed test flight of Orion and the SLS is scheduled for 2023. Most details of the subsequent exploration missions of Orion and the SLS remain to be determined. In February 2018, NASA announced plans for a Lunar Orbital Platform–Gateway (LOP-G) in lunar orbit, to be accessed via Orion and the SLS, that would serve as a platform for deep-space human exploration. Rapid developments in the commercial space sector may change the relationship between NASA and industry. For example, SpaceX has announced plans for commercial flights carrying passengers around the Moon and back as well as, in the longer term, to Mars. Some observers see this sort of development as potentially competing with NASA's human spaceflight plans. More broadly, the emergence of new commercial capabilities in space may present NASA with new opportunities for public-private partnerships or may shift its R&D priorities. For example, NASA has announced plans to end direct funding for the International Space Station by 2025, instead relying on a combination of public-private partnerships and commercial service contracts. The 2010 authorization act authorized funding increases for NASA that were not subsequently appropriated. In considering reauthorization, the 116 th Congress may examine whether reduced budget expectations require corresponding changes to planned programs. One common concern is that the cost of planned human spaceflight activities may mean less funding for other NASA missions, such as unmanned science satellites, aeronautics research, and space technology development. NASA's Earth Science program, in which climate research is a major focus, is of particular congressional interest. Some in Congress have argued that other NASA activities should have higher priority or that some or all of NASA's Earth Science responsibilities should be transferred to other agencies. Supporters counter that space-based Earth observations are an integral part of NASA's science mission. For Further Information Daniel Morgan, Specialist in Science and Technology Policy CRS Report R43419, NASA Appropriations and Authorizations: A Fact Sheet , by Daniel Morgan CRS In Focus IF10828, The International Space Station (ISS) and the Administration's Proposal to End Direct NASA Funding by 2025 , by Daniel Morgan CRS In Focus IF10940, The James Webb Space Telescope , by Daniel Morgan Commercial Space Since the earliest days of spaceflight, U.S. companies have been involved as contractors to government agencies. Increasingly, though, space is becoming commercial. A majority of U.S. satellites are now commercially owned, providing commercial services, and launched by commercial launch providers. Congressional and public interest in space is also becoming more focused on commercial activities, such as companies developing reusable rockets or collecting business data with fleets of small Earth-imaging satellites. Some observers have identified a distinct "new space" sector of relatively new companies focused on private spaceflight at low cost. One factor driving this trend is NASA's reliance on commercial providers for access to the ISS, but "new space" companies are also focused on other markets. These include the launch of national security satellites for the Department of Defense, the launch of commercial satellites for U.S. and foreign companies, the provision of commercial services such as Earth imaging and satellite communications, and even space tourism. Multiple federal agencies regulate the commercial space industry, based on statutory authorities that were enacted separately and have evolved over time. The Federal Aviation Administration licenses commercial launch and reentry vehicles (i.e., rockets and spaceplanes) as well as commercial spaceports. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) licenses commercial Earth remote sensing satellites. The Federal Communications Commission licenses commercial satellite communications. The Departments of Commerce and State license exports of space technology. The 115 th Congress considered, but did not enact, legislation to simplify and reform this regulatory framework. In addition, in May 2018, the Administration called for changes to the regulation of commercial space in Space Policy Directive–2, Streamlining Regulations on Commercial Use of Space . The 116 th Congress may continue this focus on regulatory reforms. How the federal government makes use of commercial space capabilities is also evolving. NASA used to own and operate the space shuttles that contractors built for it, but since 2012 it has contracted with commercial service providers to deliver cargo into orbit using their own spacecraft. DOD has its own satellite communications capabilities, but it also procures communications bandwidth from commercial satellite companies. Agencies are considering a host of new opportunities, including acquisition of weather data from commercial satellites, acquisition of science data from commercial lunar landers, and expanded commercial utilization of the ISS. The 116 th Congress may address these developments primarily through oversight of agency programs and decisions on agency budgets. For More Information Daniel Morgan, Specialist in Science and Technology Policy CRS Report R45416, Commercial Space: Federal Regulation, Oversight, and Utilization , by Daniel Morgan CRS Report R44708, Commercial Space Industry Launches a New Phase , by Bill Canis Earth-Observing Satellites The constellation of Earth-observing satellites launched and operated by the U.S. government performs a wide range of observational and data collecting activities. These activities include measuring the change in mass of polar ice sheets, wind speeds over the oceans, land cover change, as well as the more familiar daily measurements of key atmospheric parameters that enable modern weather forecasts and storm prediction. Satellite observations of the Earth's oceans and land surface help with short-term seasonal forecasts of El Niño and La Niña conditions, which are valuable to U.S. agriculture and commodity interests; identification of the location and size of wildfires, which can assist firefighting crews and mitigation activities; as well as long-term observational data of the global climate, which are used in predictive models that help assess the degree and magnitude of current and future climate change. Congress continues to be interested in the performance of NASA, NOAA, and the U.S. Geological Survey in building and operating U.S. Earth-observing satellites. Congress is particularly interested in the agencies meeting budgets and time schedules so that critical space-based observations are not missed due to delays and cost overruns. Concerns have been raised in the past by some in Congress about the possibility of a "data gap" in the polar-orbiting weather satellite coverage. The successful launch of the first Joint Polar Satellite System satellite JPSS-1 (now NOAA-20) on November 18, 2017, has alleviated those concerns for the near-term. Congress provided full funding, $776 million for the second polar-orbiting satellite, JPSS-2, in the FY2018 enacted appropriations. On November 19, 2016, the Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite-R (GOES-R) weather satellite launched and was placed into orbit. Renamed GOES-16, it is an advanced weather satellite with sensors that should help improve hurricane tracking and intensity forecasts, prediction and warning of severe weather events, and rainfall estimates that will lead to better flood warnings. GOES-16 also carries the first operational lightning mapper in geostationary orbit, and will better monitor space weather—perturbations to the Earth's magnetic field caused by intense bursts of energy from the sun. On March 1, 2017, GOES-S successfully launched carrying the same suite of instruments as its predecessor. The satellite is in its final stage of calibration before transitioning to operation status in January 2019. Renamed GOES-17, the satellite experienced a problem with one of its key imaging instruments after launch, the Advanced Baseline Imager (ABI), which impairs its functionality. NASA has stated that despite the ABI problem, GOES-17 will provide more and better data than currently available. Both satellites represent the first two in a series of four Earth-orbiting weather satellites planned by NOAA through 2036. The 116 th Congress may continue to scrutinize budget and time schedules for polar-orbiting and geostationary satellites, as well as consider how the private sector could provide Earth-observing satellite data to supplement the current NASA NOAA, and USGS-operated satellite systems. For Further Information Peter Folger, Specialist in Energy and Natural Resources Policy CRS Report R44335, Minding the Data Gap: NOAA's Polar-Orbiting Weather Satellites and Strategies for Data Continuity , by Peter Folger

Science and technology (S&T) have a pervasive influence over a wide range of issues confronting the nation. Public and private research and development spur scientific and technological advancement. Such advances can drive economic growth, help address national priorities, and improve health and quality of life. The ubiquity and constantly changing nature of science and technology frequently create public policy issues of congressional interest. The federal government supports scientific and technological advancement directly by funding and performing research and development and indirectly by creating and maintaining policies that encourage private sector efforts. Additionally, the federal government regulates many aspects of S&T activities. This report briefly outlines a key set of science and technology policy issues that may come before the 116th Congress. This set is not exhaustive, however. Given the rapid pace of S&T advancement and its importance in many diverse public policy contexts, other S&T-related issues not discussed in this report may come before the 116th Congress. The selected issues are grouped into 10 categories Overarching S&T Policy Issues, Agriculture, Biomedical Research and Development, Climate Change Science and Water, Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, Information Technology, Physical and Material Sciences, and Space. Each of these categories includes concise analysis of multiple policy issues. The material presented in this report should be viewed as illustrative rather than comprehensive. Each section identifies CRS reports, when available, and the appropriate CRS experts to contact for further information and analysis.

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Introduction On November 9, 1916, Jeannette Rankin (R-MT) was elected to the House of Representatives as Montana's Representative-at-Large to the 65 th Congress (1917-1919). This election win gave Representative Rankin the dist inction of being the first woman elected to serve in Congress. The first woman to serve in the Senate was Rebecca Latimer Felton (D-GA). She was appointed in 1922 and served for one day. Three hundred sixty five women have been elected or appointed to Congress. These figures include six nonvoting Delegates, one each from Guam, Hawaii, the District of Columbia, and American Samoa, and two from the U.S. Virgin Islands, as well as one Resident Commissioner from Puerto Rico. Of these 365 women, there have been 247 Democrats and 118 Republicans; 309 (211 Democrats, 98 Republicans) women elected only in the House of Representatives, including 7 (4 Democrats, 3 Republicans) women who have served as Delegates or Resident Commissioners in the House; 40 (25 Democrats, 15 Republicans) women elected or appointed only in the Senate; and 16 (11 Democrats, 5 Republicans) women elected or appointed in both houses. A record 131 women currently serve in the 116 th Congress. This is higher than the previous record from the 115 th Congress (109 women initially sworn in, 5 House Members subsequently elected, and 2 Senators subsequently appointed). Of these 131 women, there are 25 in the Senate (17 Democrats and 8 Republicans); 106 in the House (91 Democrats and 15 Republicans); 4 of the women in the House who serve as Delegates or Resident Commissioner (2 Democrats and 2 Republicans), representing the District of Columbia, American Samoa, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico; 25 African American women, 10 Asian Pacific American women, 15 Hispanic women, and 2 Native American women; and 5 women who chair House committees, 1 woman who chairs a Senate standing committee, 1 woman who chairs a House select committee, and 1 woman who chairs a Senate select committee. One of the House committee chairs also chairs a Joint Committee. Other notable facts about women in the 116 th Congress include the following: Not including Delegates and the Resident Commissioner, women currently hold 102 (23.4%) seats in the House of Representatives and 25 (25%) seats in the Senate, totaling 127 (23.7%) of the 535 voting seats in the 116 th Congress. Including Delegates and the Resident Commissioner, women currently hold 106 seats in the House of Representatives, increasing the total to 131 seats (24.2%) in the entire Congress. This report includes brief biographical information, committee assignments, dates of service, listings by Congress and state, and (for Representatives) congressional districts of the 365 women who have been elected or appointed to Congress. It will be updated when there are relevant changes in the makeup of Congress. For additional information, including a discussion of the impact of women in Congress as well as historical information, including the number and percentage of women in Congress over time, data on entry to Congress, comparisons to international and state legislatures, tenure, firsts for women in Congress, women in leadership, and African American, Asian Pacific American, Hispanic, and Native American women in Congress, see CRS Report R43244, Women in Congress: Statistics and Brief Overview , by Jennifer E. Manning and Ida A. Brudnick. Tables and Data The lists and tables that follow provide information on women Members of Congress, including the dates they were first elected or appointed, the Congresses in which they served, the committees on which they served, and, where relevant, the committees they chaired or served on as ranking Member. Table 1 lists all the women who have served in each Congress, by Congress. Table 2 lists the women Members of Congress, by state. Table 3 provides the total number of women in each Congress. Most of the data presented are from the Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, 1774-present , available at http://bioguide.congress.gov ; various editions of the Congressional Directory ; Congressional Quarterly and Leadership Directories Inc. publications; and Women in Congress website, at http://womenincongress.house.gov , maintained by the House of Representatives' Office of the Historian and the Office of Art and Archives, Office of the Clerk. The 116 th Congress committee assignments sources are the House, Official Alphabetical List of the Members with Committee Assignments in the 11 6 th Congress , available from the Clerk of the House's website at http://clerk.house.gov/committee_info/oal.aspx ; and Senate, Committee Assignments of the 11 6 th Congress , available at the Senate website at http://www.senate.gov/general/committee_assignments/assignments.htm . The names and jurisdiction of House and Senate committees have changed many times over the years. In the interest of brevity, this report does not identify all historical name changes. The committee names listed are for the most part those in effect at the time a Member served on the panel. Alphabetical Listing, Including Dates of Service and Committee Assignments5 ABEL, HAZEL HEMPEL. Republican; Nebraska, Senator. Elected to the 83 rd Congress to fill the vacancy caused by the death of Dwight P. Griswold and filled in the interim by Eva Bowring. (served Nov. 8, 1954, until her resignation Dec. 31, 1954) Committee assignments: S. Finance (83 rd Congress) S. Interstate and Foreign Commerce (83 rd Congress) ABZUG, BELLA S. Democrat; New York, 19 th District (92 nd Congress) and 20 th District (93 rd -94 th Congresses). Elected to the 92 nd -94 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1971-Jan. 3, 1977) Committee assignments: H. Government Operations (92 nd -94 th Congresses) H. Public Works (92 nd -94 th Congresses) ADAMS, ALMA S. Democrat; North Carolina, 12 th District. Elected to the 113 th Congress to fill the vacancy caused by the resignation of Melvin L. Watt, and also elected to the 114 th -116 th Congresses. (served Nov. 4, 2014-present) Committee assignments: H. Agriculture (114 th -116 th Congresses) H. Education and the Workforce/Education and Labor (114 th -116 th Congresses) H. Small Business (114 th -115 th Congresses) H. Financial Services (116 th Congress) ADAMS, SANDY. Republican; Florida, 24 th District. Elected to the 112 th Congress. (served Jan. 3, 2011-Jan. 3, 2013) Committee assignments: H. Judiciary (112 th Congress) H. Science, Space and Technology (112 th Congress) ALLEN, MARYON PITTMAN. Democrat; Alabama, Senator. Appointed to the 95 th Congress June 8, 1978, to fill vacancy caused by the death of husband James B. Allen. (served June 12, 1978-Jan. 3, 1979) Committee assignments: S. Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry (95 th Congress) S. Judiciary (95 th Congress) ANDREWS, ELIZABETH B. Democrat; Alabama, 3 rd District. Elected to the 92 nd Congress in an April 4, 1972, special election to fill vacancy caused by the death of husband George W. Andrews. (served April 10, 1972-Jan. 3, 1973) Committee assignment: H. Post Office and Civil Service (92 nd Congress) ASHBROOK, JEAN. Republican; Ohio, 17 th District. Elected to the 97 th Congress in a June 29, 1982, special election to fill vacancy caused by the death of husband John M. Ashbrook. (served July 12, 1982-Jan. 3, 1983) Committee assignment: H. Merchant Marine and Fisheries (97 th Congress) AMATA, AUMUA. See RADEWAGEN, AUMUA AMATA COLEMAN. AXNE, CYNTHIA. Democrat; Iowa, 3 rd District. Elected to the 116 th Congress. (served Jan. 3, 2019-present) Committee assignments: H. Financial Services (116 th Congress) H. Agriculture (116 th Congress) AYOTTE, KELLY. Republican; New Hampshire, Senator. Elected in 2010. (served Jan. 3, 2011-Jan. 3, 2017) Committee assignments: S. Armed Services (112 th -114 th Congresses) S. Budget (112 th -114 th Congresses) S. Commerce, Science and Transportation (112 th -114 th Congresses) S. Small Business and Entrepreneurship (112 th -114 th Congresses) S. Special Aging (112 th -113 th Congresses) S. Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (113 th -114 th Congresses) BACHMANN, MICHELE. Republican; Minnesota, 6 th District. Elected to the 110 th -113 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 2007-Jan. 3, 2015) Committee assignments: H. Financial Services (110 th -113 th Congresses) H. Intelligence (112 th -113 th Congresses) BAKER, IRENE BAILEY. Republican; Tennessee, 2 nd District. Elected to the 88 th Congress in a March 10, 1964, special election, to fill vacancy caused by the death of husband Howard H. Baker, Sr. (served March 10, 1964-Jan. 3, 1965) Committee assignment: H. Government Operations (88 th Congress) BAKER, NANCY KASSEBAUM. See KASSEBAUM, NANCY LANDON. BALDWIN, TAMMY. Democrat; Wisconsin, 2 nd District. Elected to the 106 th -112 th Congresses (served in House Jan. 3, 1999-Jan. 3, 2013). Subsequently elected to the Senate in 2012 and reelected in 2018. (served in Senate Jan. 3, 2013-present) Committee assignments: H. Budget (106 th -108 th Congresses) H. Judiciary (106 th -111 th Congresses) H. Energy and Commerce (109 th -112 th Congresses) S. Budget (113 th -114 th Congresses) S. Energy (113 th Congresses) S. Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (113 th -114 th Congresses) S. Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (113 th -116 th Congresses) S. Special Aging (113 th Congress) S. Appropriations (114 th -116 th Congresses) S. Commerce, Science and Transportation (115 th -116 th Congresses) BARRÁGAN, NANETTE DIAZ. Democrat; California, 44 th District. Elected to the 115 th -116 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 2017-present) Committee assignments: H. Homeland Security (115 th -116 th Congresses) H. Natural Resources (115 th Congress) H. Energy and Commerce (116 th Congress) BASS, KAREN. Democrat; California, 33 rd (112 th Congress) and 37 th District (113 th Congress-present). Elected to the 112 th -116 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 2011-present). Chair of the Congressional Black Caucus, 116 th Congress. Committee assignments: H. Budget (112 th Congress) H. Foreign Affairs (112 th -116 th Congresses) H. Judiciary (113 th -116 th Congresses) BEAN, MELISSA L. Democrat; Illinois, 8 th District. Elected to the 109 th -111 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 2005-Jan. 3, 2011) Committee assignments: H. Financial Services (109 th -111 th Congresses) H. Small Business (109 th -111 th Congresses) BEATTY, JOYCE. Democrat; Ohio, 3 rd District. Elected to the 113 th -116 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 2013-present) Committee assignments: H. Financial Services (113 th -116 th Congresses) Jt. Economic (116 th Congress) BENTLEY, HELEN DELICH. Republican; Maryland, 2 nd District. Elected to the 99 th -103 rd Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1985-Jan. 3, 1995) Committee assignments: H. Merchant Marine and Fisheries (99 th -103 rd Congresses) H. Public Works and Transportation (99 th , 100 th , and 102 nd Congresses) H. Select Aging (99 th -102 nd Congresses) H. Budget (101 st -102 nd Congresses) H. Appropriations (103 rd Congress) BERKLEY, SHELLEY. Democrat; Nevada, 1 st District. Elected to the 106 th -112 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1999-Jan. 3, 2013) Committee assignments: H. Small Business (106 th Congress) H. Transportation and Infrastructure (106 th -109 th Congresses) H. Veterans' Affairs (106 th -110 th Congresses) H. International Relations (107 th -109 th Congresses) H. Foreign Affairs (111 th Congress) H. Ways and Means (110 th -112 th Congresses) BIGGERT, JUDY. Republican; Illinois, 13 th District. Elected to the 106 th -112 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1999-Jan. 3, 2013) Committee assignments: H. Banking and Financial Services (106 th Congress) H. Government Reform (106 th Congress) H. Financial Services (107 th -112 th Congresses) H. Science/Science and Technology/Science, Space and Technology (106 th -112 th Congresses) H. Education and the Workforce/and Labor (107 th -112 th Congresses) H. Standards of Official Conduct (107 th -109 th Congresses) BLACK, DIANE. Republican; Tennessee, 6 th District. Elected to the 112 th -115 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 2011-Jan. 3, 2019) Committee assignments: H. Budget (112 th -115 th Congresses; chair, 115 th Congress, 1 st session) H. Ways and Means (112 th -115 th Congresses) BLACKBURN, MARSHA. Republican; Tennessee, 7 th District, and Senator. Elected to the 108 th -115 th Congresses. (served in House Jan. 3, 2003-Jan. 3, 2019). Subsequently elected to the Senate in 2018. (served in Senate Jan. 3, 2019-present) Committee assignments: H. Education and the Workforce (108 th Congress) H. Government Reform (108 th Congress) H. Judiciary (108 th Congress) H. Energy and Commerce (109 th -115 th Congresses) H. Select Energy Independence and Global Warming (111 th Congress) H. Budget (113 th -114 th Congresses) S. Armed Services (116 th Congress) S. Commerce, Science and Transportation (116 th Congress) S. Judiciary (116 th Congress) S. Veterans' Affairs (116 th Congress) BLITCH, IRIS FAIRCLOTH. Democrat; Georgia, 8 th District. Elected to the 84 th -87 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1955-Jan. 3, 1963) Committee assignment: H. Public Works (84 th -87 th Congresses) BLUNT ROCHESTER, LISA. Democrat; Delaware, At Large. Elected to the 115 th -116 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 2017-present) Committee assignments: H. Agriculture (115 th Congress) H. Education and the Workforce (115 th Congress) H. Energy and Commerce (116 th Congress) BOGGS, CORINNE C. (LINDY). Democrat; Louisiana, 2 nd District. Elected to the 93 rd Congress in a March 20, 1973, special election to fill vacancy caused by the death of husband Thomas Hale Boggs, Sr.; reelected to the 94 th -101 st Congresses. (served March 27, 1973-Jan. 3, 1991) Committee assignments: H. Banking and Currency/Banking, Currency, and Housing (93 rd -94 th Congresses) H. House Administration (94 th Congress) H. Appropriations (95 th -101 st Congresses) H. Select Children, Youth, and Families (99 th -101 st Congresses) Jt. Bicentennial Arrangements (94 th Congress; chair) Commission of the Bicentenary of the U.S. House (chair, 99 th -100 th Congresses) BOLAND, VERONICA GRACE. Democrat; Pennsylvania, 11 th District. Elected to the 77 th Congress, to fill vacancy caused by the death of husband Patrick J. Boland. (served Nov. 19, 1942-Jan. 3, 1943) No committee assignments listed. BOLTON, FRANCES PAYNE. Republican; Ohio, 22 nd District. Elected to the 76 th Congress in a Feb. 27, 1940, special election to fill vacancy caused by death of husband Chester C. Bolton; reelected to the 77 th -90 th Congresses. (served March 5, 1940-Jan. 3, 1969) Committee assignments: H. Election of President, Vice President, and Representatives in Congress (76 th Congress) H. Expenditures in Executive Departments (76 th Congress) H. Foreign Affairs (77 th -90 th Congresses; ranking member, 88 th -90 th Congresses) BONAMICI, SUZANNE. Democrat; Oregon, 1 st District. Elected to the 112 th Congress in a Jan. 31, 2012, special election to fill vacancy caused by resignation of David Wu; reelected to the 113 th -116 th Congresses. (served Feb. 7, 2012-present) Committee assignments: H. Budget (112 th Congress) H. Science, Space and Technology (112 th -116 th Congresses) H. Education and the Workforce/Education and Labor (113 th -116 th Congresses) H. Select Committee on the Climate Crisis (116 th Congress) BONO MACK, MARY. Republican; California, 44 th District (105 th -107 th Congresses) and 45 th District (108 th -112 th Congresses). Elected to the 105 th Congress in an April 7, 1998, special election to fill vacancy caused by the death of husband Sonny Bono; reelected to the 106 th -112 th Congresses. (served April 20, 1998-Jan. 3, 2013) Committee assignments: H. National Security (105 th Congress) H. Judiciary (105 th -106 th Congresses) H. Armed Services (106 th Congress) H. Small Business (106 th Congress) H. Energy and Commerce (107 th -112 th Congresses) BORDALLO, MADELEINE Z. Democrat; Delegate from Guam. Elected to the 108 th -115 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 2003-Jan. 3, 2019) Committee assignments: H. Armed Services (108 th -115 th Congresses) H. Resources/Natural Resources (108 th -115 th Congresses) H. Small Business (108 th -109 th Congresses) BOSONE, REVA ZILPHA BECK. Democrat; Utah, 2 nd District. Elected to the 81 st and 82 nd Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1949-Jan. 3, 1953) Committee assignments: H. Public Lands (81 st Congress) H. Administration (82 nd Congress) H. Interior and Insular Affairs (82 nd Congress) BOWRING, EVA KELLY. Republican; Nebraska, Senator. Appointed to the Senate April 16, 1954, to fill vacancy caused by death of Dwight Griswold. (served April 16-Nov. 8, 1954) Committee assignments: S. Interstate and Foreign Commerce (83 rd Congress) S. Labor and Public Welfare (83 rd Congress) S. Post Office and Civil Service (83 rd Congress) BOYDA, NANCY. Democrat; Kansas, 2 nd District. Elected to the 110 th Congress. (served Jan. 3, 2007-Jan. 3, 2009) Committee assignments: H. Agriculture (110 th Congress) H. Armed Services (110 th Congress) BOXER, BARBARA. Democrat; California, 6 th District. Elected to the 98 th -102 nd Congresses (served in House Jan. 3, 1983-Jan. 3, 1993). Subsequently elected to the Senate in 1992 and reelected in 1998, 2004, and 2010. (served in Senate Jan. 5, 1993-Jan. 3, 2017) Committee assignments: H. Merchant Marine and Fisheries (98 th Congress) H. Government Operations (98 th -102 nd Congresses) H. Budget (99 th -101 st Congresses) H. Select Children, Youth, and Families (99 th -102 nd Congresses) H. Armed Services (102 nd Congress) S. Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (103 rd -105 th Congresses) S. Budget (103 rd -106 th Congresses) S. Environment and Public Works (103 rd -114 th Congresses; chair, 110 th -113 th Congresses; ranking member, 114 th Congress) S. Appropriations (105 th Congress) S. Foreign Relations (106 th -114 th Congresses) S. Commerce, Science, and Transportation (107 th -113 th Congresses) S. Select Ethics (110 th -114 th Congresses; chair, 110 th -113 th Congresses; vice chair, 114 th Congress) BROOKS, SUSAN. Republican; Indiana, 5 th District. Elected to the 113 th -116 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 2013-present) Committee assignments: H. Education and the Workforce (113 th Congress) H. Ethics (113 th -115 th Congresses; chair, 115 th Congress) H. Homeland Security (113 th Congress) H. Select Terrorist Attack in Benghazi (113 th -114 th Congresses) H. Energy and Commerce (114 th -116 th Congresses) H. Select Modernization of Congress (116 th Congress) BROWN, CORRINE. Democrat; Florida, 3 rd District (103 rd -112 th Congresses), 5 th District (113 th -114 th Congress). Elected to the 103 rd -114 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1993-Jan. 3, 2017) Committee assignments: H. Government Operations (103 rd Congress) H. Public Works and Transportation (103 rd Congress) H. Transportation and Infrastructure (104 th -114 th Congresses) H. Veterans' Affairs (103 rd -114 th Congresses; ranking member, 114 th Congress) BROWN-WAITE, GINNY. Republican; Florida, 5 th District. Elected to the 108 th -111 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 2003-Jan. 3, 2011) Committee assignments: H. Budget (108 th -109 th Congresses) H. Financial Services (108 th -110 th Congresses) H. Veterans Affairs (108 th -110 th Congresses) H. Homeland Security (109 th -110 th Congresses) H. Ways and Means (111 th Congress) BROWNLEY, JULIA. Democrat; California, 26 th District. Elected to the 113 th -116 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 2013-present) Committee assignments: H. Education and the Workforce (113 th Congress) H. Science and Technology (113 th Congress) H. Transportation and Infrastructure (114 th -116 th Congresses) H. Veterans' Affairs (114 th -116 th Congresses) H. Select Committee on the Climate Crisis (116 th Congress) BUCHANAN, VERA DAERR. Democrat; Pennsylvania, 30 th District. Elected to the 82 nd Congress in a July 24, 1951, special election to fill vacancy caused by death of husband Frank Buchanan; reelected to the 83 rd -84 th Congresses. (served August 1, 1951, until her death Nov. 26, 1955) Committee assignments: H. Merchant Marine and Fisheries (82 nd Congress, 1 st session) H. Veterans' Affairs (82 nd Congress, 1 st session) H. Public Works (82 nd Congress, 2 nd session-83 rd Congress) H. Banking and Currency (84 th Congress) BUERKLE, ANN MARIE. Republican; New York, 25 th District. Elected to the 112 th Congress. (served Jan. 3, 2011-Jan. 3, 2013) Committee assignments: H. Foreign Affairs (112 th Congress) H. Oversight and Government Reform (112 th Congress) H. Veterans' Affairs (112 th Congress) BURDICK, JOCELYN BIRCH. Democrat; North Dakota, Senator. Appointed to Senate Sept. 12, 1992, to fill vacancy caused by death of husband Quentin Burdick. (served Sept. 16, 1992-Dec. 4, 1992) Committee assignment: S. Environment and Public Works (102 nd Congress) BURKE, YVONNE BRATHWAITE. Democrat; California, 37 th District. Elected to the 93 rd -95 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1973-Jan. 3, 1979). First female Chair of the Congressional Black Caucus, 94 th Congress. Committee assignments: H. Public Works (93 rd Congress) H. Interior and Insular Affairs (93 rd Congress) H. Appropriations (94 th -95 th Congresses) H. Select Committee on the House Beauty Shop (chair, 94 th -95 th Congresses) BURTON, SALA. Democrat; California, 5 th District. Elected to the 98 th Congress in a June 21, 1983, special election, to fill vacancy caused by death of husband Phillip Burton; reelected to the 99 th -100 th Congresses. (served June 28, 1983, until her death Feb. 1, 1987) Committee assignments: H. Education and Labor (98 th Congress) H. Interior and Insular Affairs (98 th Congress) H. Select Committee on Hunger (98 th -99 th Congresses) H. Rules (99 th -100 th Congresses) BUSHFIELD, VERA CAHALAN. Republican; South Dakota, Senator. Appointed to the Senate Oct. 6, 1948, to fill vacancy caused by death of husband Harlan J. Bushfield; resigned Dec. 26, 1948. No committee assignments listed. BUSTOS, CHERI. Democrat; Illinois, 17 th District. Elected to the 113 th -116 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 2013-present) Committee assignments: H. Agriculture (113 th -116 th Congresses) H. Transportation and Infrastructure (113 th -115 th Congresses) H. Appropriations (116 th Congress) BYRNE, LESLIE. Democrat; Virginia, 11 th District. Elected to the 103 rd Congress. (served Jan. 3, 1993-Jan. 3, 1995) Committee assignments: H. Post Office and Civil Service (103 rd Congress) H. Public Works and Transportation (103 rd Congress) BYRON, BEVERLY BARTON BUTCHER. Democrat; Maryland, 6 th District. Elected to the 96 th Congress to fill vacancy caused by death of husband Goodloe E. Byron; reelected to the 97 th -102 nd Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1979-Jan. 3, 1993) Committee assignments: H. Armed Services (96 th -102 nd Congresses) H. Select Committee on Aging (96 th -102 nd Congresses) H. Interior and Insular Affairs (97 th -102 nd Congresses) BYRON, KATHARINE EDGAR. Democrat; Maryland, 6 th District. Elected to the 77 th Congress in a May 27, 1941, special election to fill vacancy caused by death of husband William Devereux Byron. (served June 11, 1941-Jan. 3, 1943) Committee assignments: H. Civil Service (77 th Congress) H. War Claims (77 th Congress) CANTWELL, MARIA. Democrat; Washington, 1 st District. Elected to the 103 rd Congress (served in House Jan. 3, 1993-Jan. 3, 1995). Subsequently elected to the Senate in 2000 and reelected in 2006, 2012, and 2018. (served in Senate Jan. 3, 2001-present) Committee assignments: H. Foreign Affairs (103 rd Congress) H. Merchant Marine and Fisheries (103 rd Congress) H. Public Works and Transportation (103 rd Congress) S. Judiciary (107 th Congress) S. Energy and Natural Resources (107 th -116 th Congresses; ranking member, 114 th -115 th Congresses) S. Small Business and Entrepreneurship (107 th -116 th Congresses; chair, 113 th Congress, 2 nd session) S. Indian Affairs (107 th -116 th Congresses; chair, 113 th Congress, 1 st session) S. Commerce, Science, and Transportation (108 th -116 th Congresses; ranking member, 116 th Congress) S. Finance (110 th -116 th Congresses) CAPITO, SHELLEY MOORE. Republican; West Virginia, 2 nd District; Senator. Elected to the 107 th -113 th Congresses. (served in House Jan. 3, 2001-Jan. 3, 2015). Subsequently elected to the Senate in 2014. (served in Senate Jan. 3, 2015-present) Committee assignments: H. Financial Services (107 th -113 th Congresses) H. Small Business (107 th -108 th Congresses) H. Transportation and Infrastructure (107 th -113 th Congresses) H. Rules (109 th Congress) H. Select Committee on Energy and Global Warming (111 th Congress) S. Appropriations (114 th -116 th Congresses) S. Energy and Natural Resources (114 th -115 th Congresses) S. Environment and Public Works (114 th -116 th Congresses) S. Rules and Administration (114 th -116 th Congresses) Jt. Committee on the Library (114 th -115 th Congresses) S. Commerce, Science, and Transportation (115 th -116 th Congresses) CAPPS, LOIS. Democrat; California, 22 nd District (105 th -107 th Congresses), 23 rd District (108 th -112 th Congresses) and 24 th District (113 th -114 th Congress). Elected to the 105 th Congress in a March 9, 1998, special election to fill vacancy caused by death of husband Walter Capps; reelected to the 106 th -114 th Congresses. (served March 17, 1998-Jan. 3. 2017) Committee assignments: H. International Relations (105 th Congress) H. Science (105 th Congress) H. Commerce (106 th Congress) H. Energy and Commerce (107 th -114 th Congresses) H. Budget (109 th Congress) H. Natural Resources (110 th -111 th Congresses; 114 th Congress) H. Ethics (114 th Congress) CARAWAY, HATTIE WYATT. Democrat; Arkansas, Senator. Appointed to the Senate Nov. 13, 1931, and elected Jan. 12, 1932, to fill the vacancy caused by death of husband Thaddeus H. Caraway; reelected to two full Senate terms. (served Dec. 8, 1931-Jan. 3, 1945) Committee assignments: S. Agriculture and Forestry (72 nd -78 th Congresses) S. Commerce (72 nd -78 th Congresses) S. Enrolled Bills (72 nd -78 th Congresses; chair, 73 rd -78 th Congresses) S. Library (72 nd -78 th Congresses) CARNAHAN, JEAN. Democrat; Missouri, Senator. Appointed to the Senate Dec. 4, 2000, to fill vacancy caused by her husband's (Governor Mel Carnahan's) posthumous election to the Senate. (served Jan. 3, 2001-Nov. 25, 2003) Committee assignments: S. Armed Services (107 th Congress) S. Commerce, Science and Transportation (107 th Congress) S. Governmental Affairs (107 th Congress) S. Small Business and Entrepreneurship (107 th Congress) S. Special Committee on Aging (107 th Congress) CARSON, JULIA. Democrat; Indiana, 10 th District (105 th -107 th Congresses) and 7 th District (108 th -110 th Congresses). Elected to the 105 th -110 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1997, until her death Dec. 15, 2007) Committee assignments: H. Banking and Financial Services/Financial Services (105 th -110 th Congresses) H. Veterans' Affairs (105 th -107 th Congresses) H. Transportation and Infrastructure (108 th -110 th Congresses) CASTOR, KATHY. Democrat; Florida, 11 th District (110 th -112 th Congresses) and 14 th District (113 th Congress-present). Elected to the 110 th -116 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 2007-present) Committee assignments: H. Armed Services (110 th , 112 th Congresses) H. Rules (110 th Congress) H. Energy and Commerce (111 th -116 th Congresses) H. Standards of Official Conduct (111 th Congress) H. Budget (112 th -114 th Congresses) H. Select Committee on the Climate Crisis (116 th Congress; chair) CHENEY, LIZ. Republican; Wyoming, At Large. Elected to the 115 th -116 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 2017-present) Committee assignments: H. Armed Services (115 th -116 th Congresses) H. Natural Resources (115 th -116 th Congresses) H. Rules (115 th Congress) CHENOWETH, HELEN. Republican; Idaho, 1 st District. Elected to the 104 th -106 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1995-Jan. 3, 2001) Committee assignments: H. Agriculture (104 th -106 th Congresses) H. Resources (104 th -106 th Congresses) H. Veterans' Affairs (105 th -106 th Congresses) H. Government Reform (106 th Congress) CHISHOLM, SHIRLEY ANITA. Democrat; New York, 12 th District. Elected to the 91 st -97 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1969-Jan. 3, 1983) Committee assignments: H. Veterans' Affairs (91 st -92 nd Congresses) H. Education and Labor (92 nd -94 th Congresses) H. Rules (95 th -97 th Congresses) CHRISTENSEN, DONNA. Democrat; Delegate from the Virgin Islands. Elected to the 105 th -113 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1997-Jan. 3, 2015) Committee assignments: H. Resources/Natural Resources (105 th -112 th Congresses) H. Small Business (105 th -109 th Congresses) H. Homeland Security (108 th -110 th Congresses; 112 th Congress) H. Energy and Commerce (111 th -113 th Congresses) CHRISTIAN-GREEN, DONNA and CHRISTIAN-CHRISTENSEN, DONNA . See CHRISTENSEN, DONNA . CHU, JUDY. Democrat; California, 32 nd District (111 th -112 th Congresses) and 27 th District (113 th Congress-present). Elected to the 111 th Congress in a July 14, 2009, special election to fill vacancy caused by resignation of Hilda Solis; reelected to 112 th -116 th Congresses. Chair of the Congressional Asian Pacific American Caucus, 112 th -116 th Congresses. (served July 16, 2009-present) Committee assignments: H. Education and Labor (111 th Congress) H. Judiciary (111 th -115 th Congresses) H. Oversight and Government Reform (111 th Congress) H. Small Business (112 th -116 th Congresses) H. Ways and Means (115 th -116 th Congresses) CHURCH, MARGUERITE STITT. Republican; Illinois, 13 th District. Elected to the 82 nd -87 th Congresses (served Jan. 3, 1951-Jan. 3, 1963). Representative Church succeeded her husband, Ralph E. Church, who died in office. Committee assignments: H. Expenditures in Executive Departments (82 nd Congress) H. Government Operations (83 rd Congress) H. Foreign Affairs (83 rd -87 th Congresses) CLARK, KATHERINE M. Democrat; Massachusetts, 5 th District. Elected to the 113 th Congress in a Dec. 10, 2013, special election to fill vacancy caused by the resignation of Edward Markey. Subsequently reelected to the 114 th -116 th Congresses. (served Dec. 12, 2013-present) Committee assignments: H. Natural Resources (113 th Congress) H. Science and Technology (113 th -114 th Congresses) H. Education and the Workforce (114 th Congress) H. Appropriations (115 th -116 th Congresses) CLARKE, MARIAN WILLIAMS. Republican; New York, 34 th District. Elected to the 73 rd Congress in a Dec. 28, 1933, special election to fill vacancy caused by death of husband John Davenport Clarke. (served Jan. 3, 1934-Jan. 3, 1935) Committee assignments: H. Civil Service (73 rd Congress) H. Claims (73 rd Congress) H. Invalid Pensions (73 rd Congress) CLARKE, YVETTE. Democrat; New York, 11 th District (110 th -112 th Congresses) and 9 th District (113 th Congress-present). Elected to the 110 th -116 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 2007-present) Committee assignments: H. Education and Labor (110 th -111 th Congresses) H. Homeland Security (110 th -113 th , 116 th Congresses) H. Small Business (110 th -114 th Congresses) H. Ethics (113 th -115 th Congresses) H. Energy and Commerce (114 th -116 th Congresses) CLAYTON, EVA. Democrat; North Carolina, 1 st District. Elected to the 102 nd Congress Nov. 3, 1992, to fill vacancy caused by death of Walter Jones; simultaneously elected to the 103 rd Congress; reelected to the 104 th -107 th Congresses. (served Nov. 5, 1992-Jan. 3, 2003) Committee assignments: H. Agriculture (103 rd -107 th Congresses) H. Small Business (103 rd -104 th Congresses) H. Budget (105 th -107 th Congresses) CLINTON, HILLARY RODHAM. Democrat; New York, Senator. Elected to the Senate in 2000 and reelected in 2006. (served Jan. 3, 2001, until her resignation Jan. 21, 2009, to become Secretary of State). First Lady of the United States, 1993-2001. Committee assignments: S. Budget (107 th Congress) S. Environment and Public Works (107 th -110 th Congresses) S. Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (107 th -110 th Congresses) S. Armed Services (108 th -110 th Congresses) S. Special Aging (109 th -110 th Congresses) COLLINS, BARBARA-ROSE. Democrat; Michigan, 13 th District (102 nd Congress) and 15 th District (103 rd -104 th Congresses). Elected to the 102 nd -104 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1991-Jan. 3, 1997) Committee assignments: H. Public Works and Transportation (102 nd -103 rd Congresses) H. Science, Space and Technology (102 nd Congress) H. Government Operations (103 rd Congress) H. Post Office and Civil Service (103 rd Congress) H. Government Reform and Oversight (104 th Congress) H. Transportation and Infrastructure (104 th Congress) H. Select Children, Youth, and Families (102 nd Congress) COLLINS, CARDISS. Democrat; Illinois, 7 th District. Elected to the 93 rd Congress in a June 5, 1973, special election to fill vacancy caused by death of husband George W. Collins; reelected to the 94 th -104 th Congresses (served June 7, 1973-Jan. 3, 1997). Chair of the Congressional Black Caucus, 96 th Congress. Committee assignments: H. Government Operations/Government Reform and Oversight (93 rd -104 th Congresses) H. International Relations/Foreign Affairs (94 th -96 th Congresses) H. District of Columbia (95 th Congress) H. Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control (96 th -102 nd Congresses) H. Energy and Commerce (97 th -103 rd Congresses) H. Commerce (104 th Congress) COLLINS, SUSAN M. Republican; Maine, Senator. Elected to the Senate in 1996; reelected in 2002, 2008, and 2014. (served Jan. 3, 1997-present) Committee assignments: S. Labor and Human Resources (105 th Congress) S. Governmental Affairs (105 th -108 th Congresses; chair, 108 th Congress) S. Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (109 th -112 th Congresses; chair, 109 th Congress; ranking member, 110 th -112 th Congresses) S. Special Aging (105 th -116 th Congresses; ranking member, 113 th Congress; chair, 114 th -116 th Congresses) S. Special Committee on the Year 2000 Technology Problems (106 th Congress) S. Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (106 th -107 th Congresses; 115 th -116 th Congresses) S. Armed Services (107 th -112 th Congresses) Jt. Economic (108 th Congress) S. Appropriations (111 th -116 th Congresses) S. Select Intelligence (113 th -116 th Congresses) COMSTOCK, BARBARA J. Republican; Virginia, 10 th District. Elected to the 114 th -115 th Congresses (served Jan. 3, 2015-Jan. 3, 2019). Committee assignments: H. House Administration (114 th -115 th Congresses) H. Science and Technology (114 th -115 th Congresses) H. Transportation and Infrastructure (114 th -115 th Congresses) CORTEZ MASTO, CATHERINE . Democrat; Nevada, Senator. Elected in 2016. (served Jan. 3, 2017-present) Committee assignments: S. Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (115 th -116 th Congresses) S. Commerce, Science, and Transportation (115 th Congress) S. Energy and Natural Resources (115 th -116 th Congresses) S. Indian Affairs (115 th -116 th Congresses) S. Rules (115 th -116 th Congresses) S. Finance (116 th Congress) CRAIG, ANGELA. Democrat; Minnesota, 2 nd District. Elected to the 116 th Congress. (served Jan. 3, 2019-present) Committee assignments: H. Agriculture (116 th Congress) H. Small Business (116 th Congress) H. Transportation and Infrastructure (116 th Congress) CUBIN, BARBARA. Republican; Wyoming, At Large. Elected to the 104 th -110 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1995-Jan. 3, 2009) Committee assignments: H. Resources (104 th -109 th Congresses) H. Science (104 th Congress) H. Commerce (105 th -106 th Congresses) H. Energy and Commerce (107 th -110 th Congresses) DAHLKEMPER, KATHLEEN A. Democrat; Pennsylvania, 3 rd District. Elected to the 111 th Congress. (served Jan. 3, 2009-Jan. 3, 2011) Committee assignments: H. Agriculture (111 th Congress) H. Science and Technology (111 th Congress) H. Small Business (111 th Congress) DANNER, PAT. Democrat; Missouri, 6 th District. Elected to the 103 rd -106 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1993-Jan. 3, 2001) Committee assignments: H. Public Works and Transportation/Transportation and Infrastructure (103 rd -106 th Congresses) H. Small Business (103 rd Congress) H. International Relations (105 th -106 th Congresses) DAVIDS, SHARICE. Democrat; Kansas, 3 rd District. Elected to the 116 th Congress. (served Jan. 3, 2019-present) Committee assignments: H. Small Business (116 th Congress) H. Transportation and Infrastructure (116 th Congress) DAVIS, JO ANN. Republican; Virginia, 1 st District. Elected to the 107 th -110 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 2001, until her death Oct. 6, 2007) Committee assignments: H. Armed Services (107 th -110 th Congresses) H. Government Reform (107 th -108 th Congresses) H. International Relations (107 th -109 th Congresses) H. Foreign Affairs (110 th Congress) H. Select Intelligence (108 th -109 th Congresses) DAVIS, SUSAN. Democrat; California, 49 th District (107 th Congress) and 53 rd District (108 th Congress-present). Elected to the 107 th -116 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 2001-present) Committee assignments: H. Armed Services (107 th -116 th Congresses) H. Education and the Workforce/Education and Labor (107 th -116 th Congresses) H. Veterans' Affairs (108 th Congress) H. House Administration (110 th -111 th , 116 th Congresses) Jt. Printing (110 th , 116 th Congresses) DEAN, MADELEINE. Democrat; Pennsylvania, 4 th District. Elected to the 116 th Congress. (served Jan. 3, 2019-present) Committee assignments: H. Financial Services (116 th Congress) H. Judiciary (116 th Congress) DEGETTE, DIANA. Democrat; Colorado, 1 st District. Elected to the 105 th -116 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1997-present) Committee assignments: H. Commerce/Energy and Commerce (105 th -116 th Congresses) H. Natural Resources (111 th , 116 th Congresses) DELAURO, ROSA. Democrat; Connecticut, 3 rd District. Elected to the 102 nd -116 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1991-present) Committee assignments: H. Government Operations (102 nd Congress) H. Public Works and Transportation (102 nd Congress) H. Select Committee on Aging (102 nd Congress) H. Appropriations (103 rd Congress; 105 th -116 th Congresses) H. National Security (104 th Congress) H. Budget (108 th -111 th , 116 th Congresses) DELBENE, SUZAN. Democrat; Washington, 1 st District. Elected to the 112 th Congress in a Nov. 6, 2012, special election to fill vacancy caused by resignation of Jay Inslee; reelected to the 113 th -116 th Congresses. (served Nov. 13, 2012-present) Committee assignments: H. Agriculture (113 th -114 th Congresses) H. Judiciary (113 th -114 th Congresses) H. Budget (115 th Congress) H. Ways and Means (115 th - 116 th Congresses) H. Select Modernization of Congress (116 th Congress) DEMINGS, VAL BUTLER . Democrat; Florida, 10 th District. Elected to the 115 th -116 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 2017-present) Committee assignments: H. Homeland Security (115 th -116 th Congresses) H. Government Reform (115 th Congress) H. Judiciary (115 th -116 th Congresses) H. Intelligence (116 th Congress) DINGELL, DEBBIE. Democrat; Michigan, 12 th District. Elected to the 114 th -116 th Congress. (served Jan. 3, 2015-present) Committee assignments: H. Budget (114 th Congress) H. Natural Resources (114 th , 116 th Congresses) H. Energy and Commerce (115 th -116 th Congresses) Jt. Select Solvency Multiemployer Pension Plans (115 th Congress) DOLE, ELIZABETH H. Republican; North Carolina, Senate. Elected to the Senate in 2002. (served Jan. 3, 2003-Jan. 3, 2009) Committee assignments: S. Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry (108 th Congress) S. Armed Services (108 th -110 th Congresses) S. Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (108 th -110 th Congresses) S. Special Aging (108 th -110 th Congresses) S. Small Business and Entrepreneurship (110 th Congress) DOUGLAS, EMILY TAFT. Democrat; Illinois, At Large. Elected to the 79 th Congress. (served Jan. 3, 1945-Jan. 3, 1947) Committee assignment: H. Foreign Affairs (79 th Congress) DOUGLAS, HELEN GAHAGAN. Democrat; California, 14 th District. Elected to the 79 th -81 st Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1945-Jan. 3, 1951) Committee assignment: H. Foreign Affairs (79 th -81 st Congresses) DRAKE, THELMA. Republican; Virginia, 2 nd District. Elected to the 109 th -110 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 2005-Jan. 3, 2009) Committee assignments: H. Armed Services (109 th -110 th Congresses) H. Education and the Workforce (109 th Congress) H. Resources (109 th Congress) H. Transportation and Infrastructure (110 th Congress) DUCKWORTH, TAMMY. Democrat; Illinois, 8 th District. Elected to the 113 th -114 th Congresses. (served in House Jan. 3, 2013-Jan. 3, 2017). Subsequently elected to the Senate in 2016. (served in Senate Jan. 3, 2017-present) Committee assignments: H. Armed Services (113 th -114 th Congresses) H. Oversight and Government Reform (113 th -114 th Congresses) H. Select Terrorist Attack in Benghazi (113 th -114 th Congresses) S. Commerce, Science, and Transportation (115 th -116 th Congresses) S. Energy and Natural Resources (115 th Congress) S. Environment and Public Works (115 th -116 th Congresses) S. Small Business and Entrepreneurship (115 th -116 th Congresses) S. Armed Services (116 th Congress) DUNN, JENNIFER. Republican; Washington, 8 th District. Elected to the 103 rd -108 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1993-Jan. 3, 2005) Committee assignments: H. Administration (103 rd Congress) H. Public Works and Transportation (103 rd Congress) H. Science, Space, and Technology (103 rd Congress) Jt. Committee on Congressional Operations (103 rd Congress) H. Oversight (104 th Congress) H. Ways and Means (104 th -108 th Congresses) Jt. Economic (107 th -108 th Congresses) H. Homeland Security (108 th Congress) DWYER, FLORENCE PRICE. Republican; New Jersey, 6 th District (85 th -89 th Congresses) and 12 th District (90 th -92 nd Congresses). Elected to the 85 th -92 nd Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1957-Jan. 3, 1973) Committee assignments: H. Government Operations (85 th -92 nd Congresses; ranking member, 90 th -92 nd Congresses) H. Veterans' Affairs (85 th Congress) H. Banking and Currency (86 th -92 nd Congresses) EDWARDS, DONNA. Democrat; Maryland, 4 th District. Elected to the 110 th Congress in a June 17, 2008, special election to fill vacancy caused by the resignation of Albert Wynn; reelected to the 111 th -114 th Congresses. (served June 19, 2008-Jan. 3, 2017) Committee assignments: H. Science and Technology/Science, Space and Technology (110 th -114 th Congresses) H. Transportation and Infrastructure (110 th -114 th Congresses) H. Ethics (112 th Congress) EDWARDS, ELAINE. Democrat; Louisiana, Senator. Appointed to the Senate August 1, 1972, by her husband, Governor Edwin L. Edwards, to fill vacancy caused by death of Allen J. Ellender. (served August 7, 1972-Nov. 13, 1972) Committee assignments: S. Agriculture and Forestry (92 nd Congress) S. Public Works (92 nd Congress) ELLMERS, RENEE. Republican; North Carolina, 2 nd District. Elected to the 112 th -114 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 2011-Jan. 3, 2017) Committee assignments: H. Agriculture (112 th Congress) H. Foreign Affairs (112 th Congress) H. Small Business (112 th Congress) H. Energy and Commerce (113 th -114 th Congresses) EMERSON, JO ANN. Republican; Missouri, 8 th District. Elected to the 104 th Congress in a Nov. 5, 1996, special election to fill vacancy caused by death of husband, Bill Emerson, and simultaneously to the 105 th Congress; reelected to the 106 th -113 th Congresses. (served Nov. 5, 1996, until her resignation Jan. 22, 2013) Committee assignments: H. Agriculture (105 th Congress) H. Small Business (105 th Congress) H. Transportation and Infrastructure (105 th Congress) H. Appropriations (106 th -112 th Congresses) ENGLISH, KARAN. Democrat; Arizona, 6 th District. Elected to the 103 rd Congress. (served Jan. 3, 1993-Jan. 3, 1995) Committee assignments: H. Education and Labor (103 rd Congress) H. Natural Resources (103 rd Congress) ERNST, JONI. Republican; Iowa, Senator. Elected in 2014. (served Jan. 3, 2015-present) Committee assignments: S. Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry (114 th -116 th Congresses) S. Armed Services (114 th -116 th Congresses) S. Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (114 th Congress) S. Small Business and Entrepreneurship (114 th -116 th Congresses) S. Environment and Public Works (115 th -116 th Congresses) Jt. Select Budget and Appropriations Process Reform (115 th Congress) S. Judiciary (116 th Congress) ESCOBAR, VERONICA. Democrat; Texas, 16 th District. Elected to the 116 th Congress. (served Jan. 3, 2019-present) Committee assignments: H. Judiciary (116 th Congress) H. Armed Services (116 th Congress) ESHOO, ANNA G. Democrat; California, 14 th District (103 rd -112 th Congresses) and 18 th District (113 th Congress-present). Elected to the 103 rd -116 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1993-present) Committee assignments: H. Merchant Marine and Fisheries (103 rd Congress) H. Science, Space, and Technology (103 rd Congress) H. Commerce (104 th -106 th Congresses) H. Energy and Commerce (107 th -116 th Congresses) H. Intelligence (108 th -111 th Congresses) ESLICK, WILLA McCORD BLAKE. Democrat; Tennessee, 7 th District. Elected to the 72 nd Congress in an August 4, 1932, special election to fill vacancy caused by death of husband Edward Eslick. (served Dec. 5, 1932-March 3, 1933) Committee assignments: H. Public Buildings and Grounds (72 nd Congress) H. World War Veterans' Legislation (72 nd Congress) ESTY, ELIZABETH. Democrat; Connecticut, 5 th District. Elected to the 113 th -115 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 2013-Jan. 3, 2019) Committee assignments: H. Science, Space and Technology (113 th -115 th Congresses) H. Transportation and Infrastructure (113 th -115 th Congresses) FALLIN, MARY. Republican; Oklahoma, 5 th District. Elected to the 110 th -111 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 2007-Jan. 3, 2011) Committee assignments: H. Small Business (110 th -111 th Congresses) H. Transportation and Infrastructure (110 th -111 th Congresses) H. Natural Resources (110 th Congress) H. Armed Services (111 th Congress) FARRINGTON, MARY ELIZABETH PRUETT. Republican; Delegate from Hawaii. Elected to the 83 rd Congress in a July 31, 1954, special election to fill vacancy caused by death of husband, Joseph R. Farrington; reelected to the 84 th Congress. (served August 4, 1954-Jan. 3, 1957) Committee assignments: H. Agriculture (83 rd -84 th Congresses) H. Armed Services (83 rd -84 th Congresses) H. Interior and Insular Affairs (83 rd -84 th Congresses) FEINSTEIN, DIANNE. Democrat; California, Senator. Elected to the Senate Nov. 3, 1992, to fill the vacancy caused by the resignation of Pete Wilson. Subsequently elected to a full term on Nov. 8, 1994, and reelected in 2000, 2006, 2012, and 2018. (served Nov. 10, 1992-present) Committee assignments: S. Appropriations (103 rd Congress, 107 th -116 th Congresses) S. Judiciary (103 rd -116 th Congresses; ranking member, 115 th -116 th Congresses) S. Rules and Administration (103 rd -116 th Congresses; chair, 110 th Congress) S. Foreign Relations (104 th -105 th Congresses) Jt. Committee on the Library (105 th and 111 th Congresses; chair, 110 th Congress) S. Energy and Natural Resources (107 th -109 th Congresses) Jt. Committee on Inaugural Ceremonies (110 th -111 th Congresses) S. Select Intelligence (107 th -116 th Congresses; chair, 111 th -113 th Congresses; vice chair, 114 th Congress) Jt. Committee on Printing (106 th -107 th Congresses; vice chair, 110 th Congress) FELTON, REBECCA LATIMER. Democrat; Georgia, Senator. Appointed to the Senate on Oct. 3, 1922, to fill vacancy caused by death of Thomas E. Watson; sworn in Nov. 21, 1922; term expired Nov. 22 with the election of Walter George to the vacancy she filled. No committee assignments listed. FENWICK, MILLICENT. Republican; New Jersey, 5 th District. Elected to the 94 th -97 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1975-Jan. 3, 1983) Committee assignments: H. Banking, Currency, and Housing/Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs (94 th -95 th Congresses) H. Small Business (94 th -95 th Congresses) H. Standards of Official Conduct (95 th Congress) H. District of Columbia (96 th Congress) H. International Relations/Foreign Affairs (96 th -97 th Congresses) H. Education and Labor (97 th Congress) H. Select Committee on Aging (97 th Congress) FERRARO, GERALDINE ANN. Democrat; New York, 9 th District. Elected to the 96 th -98 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1979-Jan. 3, 1985) Committee assignments: H. Post Office and Civil Service (96 th -97 th Congresses) H. Public Works and Transportation (96 th -98 th Congresses) H. Select Committee on Aging (96 th -97 th Congresses) H. Budget (98 th Congress) FIEDLER, BOBBI. Republican; California, 21 st District. Elected to the 97 th -99 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1981-Jan. 3, 1987) Committee assignments: H. Budget (97 th -99 th Congresses) Jt. Economics (99 th Congress) FINKENAUER, ABBY. Democrat; Iowa, 1 st District. Elected to the 116 th Congress. (served Jan. 3, 2019-present) Committee assignments: H. Small Business (116 th Congress) H. Transportation and Infrastructure (116 th Congress) FISCHER, DEBRA (DEB). Republican; Nebraska, Senator. Elected to the Senate in 2012 and reelected in 2018. (served Jan. 3, 2013-present) Committee assignments: S. Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry (115 th -116 th Congresses) S. Armed Services (113 th -116 th Congresses) S. Commerce, Science and Transportation (113 th -116 th Congresses) S. Environment and Public Works (113 th -115 th Congresses) S. Indian Affairs (113 th Congress) S. Small Business and Entrepreneurship (113 th -114 th Congresses) S. Special Aging (115 th Congress) S. Rules and Administration (115 th -116 th Congresses) FLETCHER, ELIZABETH (LIZZY) . Democrat; Texas, 7 th District. Elected to the 116 th Congress. (served Jan. 3, 2019-present) Committee assignments: H. Science, Space and Technology (116 th Congress) H. Transportation and Infrastructure (116 th Congress) FOWLER, TILLIE. Republican; Florida, 4 th District. Elected to the 103 rd -106 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1993-Jan. 3, 2001) Committee assignments: H. Armed Services (103 rd , 106 th Congresses) H. National Security (104 th -105 th Congresses) H. Merchant Marine and Fisheries (103 rd Congress) H. Transportation and Infrastructure (104 th -106 th Congresses) FOXX, VIRGINIA. Republican; North Carolina, 5 th District. Elected to the 109 th -116 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 2005-present) Committee assignments: H. Agriculture (109 th -110 th Congresses) H. Education and the Workforce/Education and Labor (109 th -110 th Congresses, 113 th -116 th Congresses; chair, 115 th Congress, ranking member, 116 th Congress) H. Government Reform/Oversight and Government Reform/Oversight and Reform (109 th -110 th , 115 th -116 th Congresses) H. Rules (111 th -114 th Congresses) Jt. Select Solvency Multiemployer Pension Plans (115 th Congress) FRAHM, SHEILA. Republican; Kansas, Senator. Appointed to the Senate May 24, 1996, to fill vacancy caused by resignation of Robert Dole. (served June 11, 1996-Nov. 5, 1996) Committee assignments: S. Armed Services (104 th Congress) S. Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (104 th Congress) FRANKEL, LOIS. Democrat; Florida, 22 nd District (113 th -114 th Congresses) and 21 st District (115 th Congress-present). Elected to the 113 th -116 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 2013-present) Committee assignments: H. Foreign Affairs (113 th -115 th Congresses) H. Transportation and Infrastructure (113 th -115 th Congresses) H. Appropriations (116 th Congress) Jt. Economic (116 th Congress) FUDGE, MARCIA F. Democrat; Ohio, 11 th District. Elected to the 110 th Congress in a Nov. 4, 2008, special election to fill vacancy caused by death of Stephanie Tubbs Jones; reelected to the 111 th -116 th Congresses. (served Nov. 19, 2008-present) Chair of the Congressional Black Caucus, 113 th Congress. Committee assignments: H. Education and Labor/Education and the Workforce (111 th Congress; 113 th -116 th Congresses) H. Science and Technology/Science, Space and Technology (111 th -112 th Congresses) H. Agriculture (112 th -116 th Congresses) H. Administration (116 th Congress) FULMER, WILLA LYBRAND. Democrat; South Carolina, 2 nd District. Elected to the 78 th Congress Nov. 7, 1944, to fill vacancy caused by death of husband, Hampton P. Fulmer. (served Nov. 6, 1944-Jan. 3, 1945) No committee assignments listed. FURSE, ELIZABETH. Democrat; Oregon, 1 st District. Elected to the 103 rd -105 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1993-Jan. 3, 1999) Committee assignments: H. Armed Services (103 rd Congress) H. Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs (103 rd Congress) H. Merchant Marine and Fisheries (103 rd Congress) H. Commerce (104 th -105 th Congresses) GABBARD, TULSI. Democrat; Hawaii, 2 nd District. Elected to the 113 th -116 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 2013-present) Committee assignments: H. Armed Services (113 th -116 th Congresses) H. Foreign Affairs (113 th -115 th Congresses) H. Homeland Security (113 th Congress) H. Financial Services (116 th Congress) GARCIA, SYLVIA. Democrat; Texas, 29 th District. Elected to the 116 th Congress. (served Jan. 3, 2019-present) Committee assignments: H. Financial Services (116 th Congress) H. Judiciary (116 th Congress) GASQUE, ELIZABETH HAWLEY. Democrat; South Carolina, 6 th District. Elected to the 75 th Congress in a Sept. 13, 1938, special election to fill vacancy caused by death of her husband, Allard H. Gasque; never sworn in or seated, because Congress was not in session between the time of her election and the expiration of her term. No committee assignments listed; never sworn in. GIBBS, FLORENCE REVILLE. Democrat; Georgia, 8 th District. Elected to the 76 th Congress in an Oct. 1, 1940, special election to fill vacancy caused by death of husband, Benjamin Gibbs. (served Oct. 3, 1940-Jan. 3, 1941) No committee assignments listed. GIFFORDS, GABRIELLE. Democrat; Arizona, 8 th District. Elected to the 110 th -112 th Congresses (served Jan. 3, 2007, until her resignation on Jan. 25, 2012). Giffords was seriously wounded in an assassination attempt on Jan. 8, 2011. Committee assignments: H. Armed Services (110 th -112 th Congresses) H. Foreign Affairs (110 th -111 th Congresses) H. Science and Technology/Science, Space and Technology (110 th -112 th Congresses) GILLIBRAND, KIRSTEN. Democrat; New York, 20 th District. Elected to the 110 th -111 th Congresses (served in House Jan. 3, 2007, until resignation on Jan. 26, 2009). Appointed to the Senate to fill vacancy caused by resignation of Hillary Clinton; elected to remainder of term in 2010 and reelected in 2012 and 2018. (served in Senate Jan. 27, 2009-present) Committee assignments: H. Agriculture (110 th Congress) H. Armed Services (110 th Congress) S. Foreign Relations (111 th Congress) S. Environment and Public Works (111 th -116 th Congresses) S. Special Aging (111 th -116 th Congresses) S. Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry (111 th -116 th Congresses) S. Armed Services (112 th -116 th Congresses) GONZÁLEZ - COLÓN, JENNIFFER. Republican; Resident Commissioner from Puerto Rico. Elected to the 115 th -116 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 2017-present) Committee assignments: H. Natural Resources (115 th -116 th Congresses) H. Small Business (115 th Congress) H. Veterans' Affairs (115 th Congress) H. Transportation and Infrastructure (116 th Congress) H. Science, Space and Technology (116 th Congress) GRAHAM, GWEN. Democrat; Florida, 2 nd District. Elected to the 114 th Congress. (served Jan. 3, 2015-Jan. 3, 2017) Committee assignments: H. Agriculture (114 th Congress) H. Armed Services (114 th Congress) GRANAHAN, KATHRYN ELIZABETH. Democrat; Pennsylvania, 2 nd District. Elected to the 84 th Congress in a Nov. 6, 1956, special election to fill the vacancy caused by the death of her husband, William T. Granahan, and to the 85 th Congress; reelected to the 86 th -87 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1957-Jan. 3, 1963) Committee assignments: H. District of Columbia (85 th Congress) H. Post Office and Civil Service (85 th -87 th Congresses) H. Government Operations (85 th Congress, 2 nd session-87 th Congress) GRANGER, KAY. Republican; Texas, 12 th District. Elected to the 105 th -116 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1997-present) Committee assignments: H. Budget (105 th , 107 th Congresses) H. Oversight (105 th Congress) H. Transportation and Infrastructure (105 th Congress) Jt. Printing (105 th Congress) H. National Security (105 th Congress) H. Appropriations (106 th -116 th Congresses; ranking member, 116 th Congress) H. Homeland Security (108 th Congress) GRASSO, ELLA T. Democrat; Connecticut, 6 th District. Elected to the 92 nd -93 rd Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1971-Jan. 3, 1975) Committee assignments: H. Education and Labor (92 nd -93 rd Congresses) H. Veterans' Affairs (92 nd -93 rd Congresses) GRAVES, DIXIE BIBB. Democrat; Alabama, Senator. Appointed by her husband, Governor David Bibb Graves, to the Senate August 18, 1937, to fill the vacancy caused by the resignation of Hugo L. Black. (served August 20, 1937, until her resignation Jan. 10, 1938) Committee assignments: S. Claims (75 th Congress) S. Education and Labor (75 th Congress) S. Mines and Mining (75 th Congress) GREEN, EDITH. Democrat; Oregon, 3 rd District. Elected to the 84 th -93 rd Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1955, until her resignation Dec. 31, 1974) Committee assignments: H. Education and Labor (84 th -92 nd Congresses) H. Interior and Insular Affairs (84 th -85 th Congresses) Jt. Committee on Disposition of Executive Papers (85 th Congress) H. House Administration (86 th -87 th Congresses) H. Merchant Marine and Fisheries (88 th -90 th Congresses) H. Select Committee on the House Beauty Shop (90 th -93 rd Congresses) H. District of Columbia (92 nd Congress) H. Appropriations (93 rd Congress) GREENE, ENID. See WALDHOLTZ, ENID GREENE. GREENWAY, ISABELLA SELMES. Democrat; Arizona, At Large. Elected to the 73 rd Congress in a Oct. 3, 1933, special election to fill vacancy caused by resignation of Lewis W. Douglas; reelected to the 74 th Congress. (served Jan. 3, 1934-Jan. 3, 1937) Committee assignments: None listed (73 rd Congress) H. Indian Affairs (74 th Congress) H. Irrigation and Reclamation (74 th Congress) H. Public Lands (74 th Congress) GRIFFITHS, MARTHA WRIGHT. Democrat; Michigan, 17 th District. Elected to the 84 th -93 rd Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1955-Jan. 3, 1975) Committee assignments: H. Banking and Currency (84 th -87 th Congresses) H. Government Operations (84 th -87 th Congresses) Jt. Economic (87 th -92 nd Congresses) H. Ways and Means (88 th -92 nd Congresses) H. Select Committee on the House Beauty Shop (chair, 90 th -93 rd Congresses) H. Select Committee on Crime (91 st Congress) HAALAND, DEBRA. Democrat; New Mexico, 1 st District. Elected to the 116 th Congress. (served Jan. 3, 2019-present) Committee assignments: H. Natural Resources (116 th Congress; vice chair) H. Armed Services (116 th Congress) HAGAN, KAY. Democrat; North Carolina; Senator. Elected in 2008. (served Jan. 3, 2009-Jan. 3, 2015) Committee assignments: S. Armed Services (111 th -113 th Congresses) S. Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (111 th -113 th Congresses) S. Small Business and Entrepreneurship (111 th -113 th Congresses) S. Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (112 th -113 th Congresses) HAHN, JANICE. Democrat; California, 36 th District. Elected to the 112 th Congress in a July 12, 2011, special election to fill vacancy created by the resignation of Jane Harman; reelected to the 113 th -114 th Congresses. (served July 19, 2011, until her resignation Dec. 4, 2016) Committee assignments: H. Homeland Security (112 th Congress) H. Transportation and Infrastructure (113 th -114 th Congresses) H. Small Business (114 th Congress) HALL, KATIE. Democrat; Indiana, 1 st District. Elected to the 97 th Congress in a Nov. 2, 1982, special election to fill vacancy caused by death of Adam Benjamin Jr.; reelected to the 98 th Congress. (served Nov. 29, 1982-Jan. 3, 1985) Committee assignments: H. Post Office and Civil Service (98 th Congress) H. Public Works and Transportation (98 th Congress) HALVORSON, DEBBIE . Democrat; Illinois, 11 th District. Elected to the 111 th Congress. (served Jan. 3, 2009-Jan. 3, 2011) Committee assignments: H. Agriculture (111 th Congress) H. Small Business (111 th Congress) H. Veterans Affairs (111 th Congress) HANABUSA, COLLEEN. Democrat; Hawaii, 1 st District. Elected to the 112 th -113 th Congresses; to the 114 th Congress to fill vacancy caused by the death of Mark Takai, and to the 115 th Congress. (served Jan. 3, 2011-Jan. 3, 2015; Nov. 8, 2016-Jan. 3, 2019) Committee assignments: H. Armed Services (112 th , 113 th , 115 th Congresses) H. Natural Resources (112 th , 113 th , 115 th Congresses) HANDEL, KAREN. Republican; Georgia, 6 th District. Elected to the 115 th Congress to fill vacancy caused by the resignation of Tom Price. (served June 26, 2017-Jan. 3, 2019) Committee assignments: H. Education and the Workforce (115 th Congress) H. Judiciary (115 th Congress) HANSEN, JULIA BUTLER. Democrat; Washington, 3 rd District. Elected to the 86 th Congress Nov. 8, 1960, to fill vacancy caused by death of Russell V. Mack, and to the 87 th Congress; reelected to the 88 th -93 rd Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1961-Jan. 3, 1975) Committee assignments: H. Veterans' Affairs (87 th Congress, 1 st session) H. Education and Labor (87 th Congress) H. Interior and Insular Affairs (87 th Congress) H. Appropriations (88 th -93 rd Congresses) HARDEN, CECIL MURRAY. Republican; Indiana, 6 th District. Elected to the 81 st -95 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1949-Jan. 3, 1959) Committee assignments: H. Veterans' Affairs (81 st Congress) H. Expenditures in Executive Departments (82 nd Congress) H. Government Operations (83 rd -85 th Congresses) H. Post Office and Civil Service (83 rd -85 th Congresses) HARMAN, JANE. Democrat; California, 36 th District. Elected to the 103 rd -105 th Congresses and the 107 th -112 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1993-Jan. 3, 1999; Jan. 3, 2001, until her resignation Feb. 28, 2011) Committee assignments: H. Armed Services (103 rd Congress) H. Science, Space, and Technology/Science (103 rd -104 th Congresses) H. National Security (104 th -105 th Congresses) H. Energy and Commerce (107 th , 111 th , 112 th Congresses) H. Intelligence (104 th -105 th Congresses; 107 th -109 th Congresses) H. Homeland Security (108 th -112 th Congresses) HARRIS, KAMALA DEVI. Democrat; California, Senator. Elected in 2016. (served Jan. 3, 2017-present) Committee assignments: S. Budget (115 th -116 th Congresses) S. Environment and Public Works (115 th Congress) S. Homeland Security (115 th -116 th Congresses) S. Judiciary (115 th -116 th Congresses) S. Select Intelligence (115 th -116 th Congresses) HARRIS, KATHERINE. Republican; Florida, 13 th District. Elected to the 108 th - 109 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 2003-Jan. 3, 2007) Committee assignments: H. Financial Services (108 th -109 th Congresses) H. International Relations (108 th -109 th Congresses) H. Homeland Security (109 th Congress) HART, MELISSA. Republican; Pennsylvania, 4 th District. Elected to the 107 th -109 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 2001-Jan. 3, 2007) Committee assignments: H. Financial Services (107 th -108 th Congresses) H. Judiciary (107 th -108 th Congresses) H. Science (107 th -108 th Congresses) H. Standards of Official Conduct (109 th Congress) H. Ways and Means (109 th Congress) HARTZLER, VICKY. Republican; Missouri, 4 th District. Elected to the 112 th -116 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 2011-present) Committee assignments: H. Agriculture (112 th -116 th Congresses) H. Armed Services (112 th -116 th Congresses) H. Budget (113 th -114 th Congresses) HASSAN, MAGGIE. Democrat; New Hampshire, Senator. Elected in 2016. (served Jan. 3, 2017-present) Committee assignments: S. Commerce, Science, and Transportation (115 th Congress) S. Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (115 th -116 th Congresses) S. Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (115 th -116 th Congresses) Jt. Economic (115 th -116 th Congresses) S. Finance (116 th Congress) HAWKINS, PAULA. Republican; Florida, Senator. Elected in 1980. (served Jan. 1, 1981-Jan. 3, 1987) Committee assignments: S. Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry (97 th -99 th Congress) S. Labor and Human Resources (97 th -99 th Congress) Jt. Economic (97 th Congress) S. Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (98 th Congress) S. Foreign Relations (98 th Congress) S. Special Aging (99 th Congress) HAYES, JAHANA. Democrat; Connecticut, 5 th District. Elected to the 116 th Congress. (served Jan. 3, 2019-present) Committee assignments: H. Agriculture (116 th Congress) H. Education and Labor (116 th Congress) HAYWORTH, NAN. Republican; New York, 19 th District. Elected to the 112 th Congress. (served Jan. 3, 2011-Jan. 3, 2013) Committee assignment: H. Financial Services (112 th Congress) HECKLER, MARGARET M. Republican; Massachusetts, 19 th District. Elected to the 90 th -97 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1967-Jan. 3, 1983) Committee assignments: H. Government Operations (90 th Congress) H. Veterans' Affairs (90 th -97 th Congresses) H. Banking and Currency (91 st -93 rd Congresses) H. Select Committee on the House Beauty Shop (92 nd -93 rd Congresses) H. Agriculture (94 th -96 th Congresses) Jt. Economic (94 th , 96 th , 97 th Congresses) H. Select Committee on Ethics (96 th Congress) H. Science and Technology (97 th Congress) HEITKAMP, MARY KATHRYN (HEIDI). Democrat; North Dakota, Senator. Elected in 2012. (served Jan. 3, 2013-Jan. 3, 2019) Committee assignments: S. Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry (113 th -115 th Congresses) S. Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (113 th -115 th Congresses) S. Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (113 th -115 th Congresses) S. Indian Affairs (113 th -115 th Congresses) S. Small Business and Entrepreneurship (113 th -115 th Congresses) Jt. Select Solvency Multiemployer Pension Plans (115 th Congress) HERRERA BEUTLER, JAIME. Republican; Washington, 3 rd District. Elected to the 112 th -116 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 2011-present) Committee assignments: H. Small Business (112 th -113 th Congresses) H. Transportation and Infrastructure (112 th Congress) H. Small Business (113 th Congress) H. Appropriations (114 th -116 th Congresses) H. Science, Space and Technology (116 th Congress) HERSETH SANDLIN, STEPHANIE. Democrat; South Dakota, At-Large. Elected to the 108 th Congress in a June 1, 2004, special election, to fill vacancy caused by resignation of William Janklow; reelected to the 109 th -111 th Congresses. (served June 3, 2004-Jan. 3, 2011) Committee assignments: H. Agriculture (108 th -111 th Congresses) H. Resources (108 th -109 th Congresses) H. Natural Resources (111 th Congress) H. Veterans' Affairs (108 th -111 th Congresses) H. Select Energy, Independence, and Global Warming (110 th -111 th Congresses) HICKS, LOUISE DAY. Democrat; Massachusetts, 9 th District. Elected to the 92 nd Congress. (served Jan. 3, 1971-Jan. 3, 1973) Committee assignments: H. Education and Labor (92 nd Congress) H. Veterans' Affairs (92 nd Congress) HILL, KATIE. Democrat; California, 25 th District. Elected to the 116 th Congress. (served Jan. 3, 2019-present) Committee assignments: H. Oversight and Reform (116 th Congress) H. Science, Space and Technology (116 th Congress) H. Armed Services (116 th Congress) HIRONO, MAZIE. Democrat; Hawaii, 2 nd District. Elected to the 110 th -112 th Congresses; elected to the Senate in 2012 and reelected in 2018. (served in the House Jan. 3, 2007-Jan. 3, 2013; served in the Senate Jan. 3, 2013-present) Committee assignments: H. Education and Labor/Education and the Workforce (110 th -112 th Congresses) H. Transportation and Infrastructure (110 th -112 th Congresses) H. Small Business (110 th Congress) H. Ethics (112 th Congress, partial) S. Armed Services (113 th -116 th Congresses) S. Environment and Public Works (113 th Congress) S. Judiciary (113 th , 115 th -116 th Congresses) S. Veterans' Affairs (113 th -116 th Congresses) S. Select Intelligence (114 th Congress) S. Small Business and Entrepreneurship (114 th -116 th Congresses) S. Energy and Natural Resources (115 th -116 th Congresses) Jt. Select Budget and Appropriations Process Reform (115 th Congress) HOCHUL, KATHY. Democrat; New York, 26 th District. Elected to the 112 th Congress in a May 24, 2011, special election to fill vacancy caused by resignation of Christopher Lee. (served June 1, 2011-Jan. 3, 2013) Committee assignments: H. Armed Services (112 th Congress) H. Homeland Security (112 th Congress) HOLT, MARJORIE S. Republican; Maryland, 4 th District. Elected to the 93 rd -99 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1973-Jan. 3, 1987) Committee assignments: H. Armed Services (93 rd -99 th Congresses) H. Administration (94 th Congress) H. Budget (95 th -96 th Congresses) Jt. Economic (98 th Congress) H. District of Columbia (98 th Congress) HOLTZMAN, ELIZABETH. Democrat; New York, 16 th District. Elected to the 93 rd -96 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1973-Jan. 3, 1981) Committee assignments: H. Judiciary (93 rd -96 th Congresses) H. Budget (94 th -96 th Congresses) H. Select Committee on Aging (96 th Congress) HONEYMAN, NAN WOOD. Democrat; Oregon, 3 rd District. Elected to the 75 th Congress. (served Jan. 3, 1937-Jan. 3, 1939) Committee assignments: H. Indian Affairs (75 th Congress) H. Irrigation and Reclamation (75 th Congress) H. Rivers and Harbors (75 th Congress) HOOLEY, DARLENE. Democrat; Oregon, 5 th District. Elected to the 105 th -110 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1997-Jan. 3, 2009) Committee assignments: H. Banking and Financial Services/Financial Services (105 th -109 th Congresses) H. Science/Science and Technology (105 th , 109 th , 110 th Congresses) H. Budget (106 th -108 th Congresses; 110 th Congress) H. Veterans' Affairs (108 th -109 th Congresses) H. Energy and Commerce (110 th Congress) HORN, JOAN KELLY. Democrat; Missouri, 2 nd District. Elected to the 102 nd Congress. (served Jan. 3, 1991-Jan. 3, 1993) Committee assignments: H. Public Works and Transportation (102 nd Congress) H. Science, Space, and Technology (102 nd Congress) H. Select Children, Youth, and Family (102 nd Congress) HORN, KENDRA. Democrat; Oklahoma, 5 th District. Elected to the 116 th Congress. (served Jan. 3, 2019-present) Committee assignments: H. Science, Space and Technology (116 th Congress) H. Armed Services (116 th Congress) HOULAHAN, CHRISTINA . Democrat; Pennsylvania, 6 th District. Elected to the 116 th Congress. (served Jan. 3, 2019-present) Committee assignments: H. Small Business (116 th Congress) H. Foreign Affairs (116 th Congress) H. Armed Services (116 th Congress) HUCK, WINNIFRED SPRAGUE MAS ON. Republican; Illinois, At Large. Elected to the 67 th Congress in a Nov. 7, 1922, special election to fill vacancy caused by death of her father, William E. Mason. (served Nov. 20, 1922-March 3, 1923) Committee assignments: H. Expenditures in the Department of Commerce (67 th Congress) H. Reform in the Civil Service (67 th Congress) H. Woman Suffrage (67 th Congress) HUMPHREY, MURIEL BUCK. Democrat; Minnesota, Senator. Appointed to the Senate Jan. 25, 1978, to fill vacancy caused by death of husband, Hubert H. Humphrey. (served Feb. 6, 1978-Jan. 3, 1979) Committee assignments: S. Foreign Relations (95 th Congress) S. Governmental Affairs (95 th Congress) HUTCHISON, KAY BAILEY. Republican; Texas, Senator. Elected on June 5, 1993, to fill vacancy caused by resignation of Lloyd Bentsen. Subsequently elected to a full term in 1994, and reelected in 2000 and 2006. (served June 14, 1993-Jan. 3, 2013) Committee assignments: S. Armed Service (103 rd -104 th Congresses) S. Commerce, Science, and Transportation (103 rd -112 th Congresses; ranking member, 111 th -112 th Congresses) S. Small Business (103 rd -104 th Congresses) S. Select Intelligence (104 th Congress) S. Appropriations (105 th -112 th Congresses) S. Rules and Administration (105 th -112 th Congresses) S. Environment and Public Works (106 th Congress) S. Veterans' Affairs (107 th -110 th Congresses) S. Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (111 th Congress) HYDE-SMITH, CINDY. Republican; Mississippi, Senator. Appointed to the Senate March 21, 2018, to fill vacancy caused by resignation of Thad Cochran. Elected in Nov. 2018. (served April 9, 2018-present) Committee assignments: S. Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry (115 th -116 th Congresses) S. Appropriations (115 th -116 th Congresses) S. Rules and Administration (115 th -116 th Congresses) S. Energy and Natural Resources (116 th Congress) JACKSON LEE, SHEILA. Democrat; Texas, 18 th District. Elected to the 104 th -116 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1995-present) Committee assignments: H. Judiciary (104 th -116 th Congresses) H. Science (104 th -109 th Congresses) H. Homeland Security (108 th -116 th Congresses) H. Foreign Affairs (110 th -111 th Congresses) H. Budget (116 th Congress) JAYAPAL, PRAMILA. Democrat; Washington, 7 th District. Elected to the 115 th -116 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 2017-present) Committee assignments: H. Budget (115 th -116 th Congresses) H. Judiciary (115 th -116 th Congresses) H. Education and Labor (116 th Congress) JENCKES, VIRGINIA ELLIS. Democrat; Indiana, 6 th District. Elected to the 73 rd -75 th Congresses. (served March 9, 1933-Jan. 3, 1939) Committee assignments: H. Civil Service (73 rd -75 th Congresses) H. District of Columbia (73 rd -75 th Congresses) H. Mines and Mining (73 rd -74 th Congresses) JENKINS, LYNN. Republican; Kansas, 2 nd District. Elected to the 111 th -115 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 2009-Jan. 3, 2019) Committee assignments: H. Financial Services (111 th Congress) H. Ways and Means (112 th -115 th Congresses) JOHNSON, EDDIE BERNICE. Democrat; Texas, 30 th District. Elected to the 103 rd -116 th Congresses (served Jan. 3, 1993-present). Chair of the Congressional Black Caucus, 107 th Congress. Committee assignments: H. Public Works and Transportation (103 rd Congress) H. Science, Space, and Technology/Science/Science and Technology (103 rd -116 th Congresses; ranking member, 112 th -115 th Congresses; chair, 116 th Congress) H. Transportation and Infrastructure (104 th -116 th Congresses) JOHNSON, NANCY L. Republican; Connecticut, 6 th District (98 th -107 th Congresses) and 5 th District (108 th -109 th Congresses). Elected to the 98 th -109 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1983-Jan. 3, 2007) Committee assignments: H. Public Works and Transportation (98 th -100 th Congresses) H. Veterans' Affairs (98 th -99 th Congresses) H. Select Children, Youth, and Families (98 th -100 th Congresses) H. Budget (100 th Congress) H. Ways and Means (101 st -109 th Congresses) H. Standards of Official Conduct (102 nd -104 th Congresses; chair, 104 th Congress) Jt. Taxation (109 th Congress) JONES, BRENDA. Democrat; Michigan, 13 th District. Elected to the 115 th Congress in a Nov. 6, 2018 special election to fill vacancy caused by resignation of John Conyers. (served Nov. 29, 2018-Jan. 3, 2019) No committee assignments. JONES, STEPHANIE TUBBS. Democrat; Ohio, 11 th District. Elected to the 106 th -110 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1999, until her death on August 20, 2008) Committee assignments: H. Banking and Financial Services (106 th Congress) H. Financial Services (107 th Congress) H. Small Business (106 th -107 th Congresses) H. Standards of Official Conduct (107 th -110 th Congresses; chair, 110 th Congress) H. Ways and Means (108 th -110 th Congresses) JORDAN, BARBARA C. Democrat; Texas, 18 th District. Elected to the 93 rd -95 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1973-Jan. 3, 1979) Committee assignments: H. Judiciary (93 rd -95 th Congresses) H. Government Operations (94 th -95 th Congresses) KAHN, FLORENCE PRAG. Republican; California, 4 th District. Elected to the 69 th Congress in a Feb. 17, 1925, special election to fill vacancy caused by death of husband, Julius Kahn; reelected to the 70 th -74 th Congresses. (served Dec. 7, 1925-Jan. 3, 1937) Committee assignments: H. Census (69 th Congress) H. Coinage, Weights, and Measures (69 th Congress) H. Education (69 th Congress) H. Expenditures in the War Department (69 th Congress) H. War Claims (70 th Congress) H. Military Affairs (71 st -72 nd Congresses) H. Appropriations (73 rd -74 th Congresses) KAPTUR, MARCY. Democrat; Ohio, 9 th District. Elected to the 98 th -116 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1983-present) Committee assignments: H. Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs (98 th -101 st Congresses) H. Veterans' Affairs (98 th -100 th Congresses) H. Budget (101 st , 112 th Congresses) H. Appropriations (101 st -116 th Congresses) KASSEBAUM, NANCY LANDON. Republican; Kansas, Senator. Elected to the Senate in 1978. Reelected to the Senate in 1984 and 1990. (served Dec. 23, 1978-Jan. 3, 1997) Committee assignments: S. Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (96 th , 101 st , 102 nd Congresses) S. Special Committee on Aging (96 th -98 th Congresses; 101 st -102 nd Congresses) S. Budget (96 th -100 th Congresses) S. Commerce, Science, and Transportation (96 th -100 th Congresses) S. Select Committee on Ethics (99 th -100 th Congresses) S. Foreign Relations (97 th -104 th Congresses) S. Labor and Human Resources (101 st -104 th Congresses; ranking member, 103 rd Congress; chair, 104 th Congress) S. Indian Affairs (102 nd -104 th Congresses) Jt. Committee on the Organization of Congress (103 rd Congress) KEE, MAUDE ELIZABETH. Democrat; West Virginia, 5 th District. Elected to the 82 nd Congress in a July 16, 1951, special election to fill vacancy caused by death of husband, John Kee; reelected to the 83 rd -88 th Congresses. (served July 26, 1951-Jan. 3, 1965) Committee assignments: H. Veterans' Affairs (82 nd -88 th Congresses) H. Government Operations (85 th -87 th Congresses) H. Interior and Insular Affairs (88 th Congress) KELLY, EDNA FLANNERY. Democrat; New York, 12 th District. Elected to the 81 st Congress Nov. 8, 1949, to fill vacancy caused by death of Andrew L. Somers; reelected to the 82 nd -90 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1950-Jan. 3, 1969) Committee assignments: H. Foreign Affairs (81 st -90 th Congresses) H. Standards of Official Conduct (90 th Congress) KELLY, ROBIN. Democrat; Illinois, 2 nd District. Elected to the 113 th Congress in a April 9, 2013, special election to vacancy caused by resignation of Jesse Jackson Jr.; reelected to the 114 th -116 th Congresses. (served April 11, 2013-present) Committee assignments: H. Oversight and Government Reform/Oversight and Reform (113 th -116 th Congresses) H. Science, Space, and Technology (113 th Congress) H. Foreign Affairs (114 th -115 th Congresses) H. Energy and Commerce (116 th Congress) KELLY, SUE. Republican; New York, 19 th District. Elected to the 104 th -109 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1995-Jan. 3, 2007) Committee assignments: H. Banking and Financial Services/Financial Services (104 th -109 th Congresses) H. Small Business (104 th -109 th Congresses) H. Transportation and Infrastructure (104 th -109 th Congresses) KENNELLY, BARBARA BAILEY. Democrat; Connecticut, 1 st District. Elected to the 97 th Congress in a Jan. 12, 1982, special election to fill vacancy caused by death of William R. Cotter; reelected to the 98 th -105 th Congresses. (served Jan. 12, 1982-Jan. 3, 1999) Committee assignments: H. Government Operations (97 th Congress) H. Public Works and Transportation (97 th Congress) H. Select Intelligence (100 th -102 nd Congresses) H. Budget (103 rd Congress) H. Administration (103 rd Congress) H. Ways and Means (98 th -105 th Congresses) KEYS, MARTHA ELIZABETH. Democrat; Kansas, 2 nd District. Elected to the 94 th -95 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1975-Jan. 3, 1979) Committee assignment: H. Ways and Means (94 th -95 th Congresses) KILPATRICK, CAROLYN CHEEKS. Democrat; Michigan, 15 th District (105 th -107 th Congresses) and 13 th District (108 th -111 th Congresses). Elected to the 105 th -111 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1997-Jan. 3, 2011). Chair of the Congressional Black Caucus, 110 th Congress. Committee assignments: H. Banking and Financial Services (105 th Congress) H. House Oversight (105 th Congress) Jt. Library (105 th Congress) H. Appropriations (106 th -111 th Congresses) KILROY, MARY JO. Democrat; Ohio, 15 th District. Elected to the 111 th Congress. (served Jan. 3, 2009-Jan. 3, 2011) Committee assignments: H. Financial Services (111 th Congress) H. Homeland Security (111 th Congress) KIRKPATRICK, ANN. Democrat; Arizona, 1 st District (111 th , 113 th , and 114 th Congresses) and 2 nd District (116 th Congress-present). Elected to the 111 th , 113 th , 114 th , and 116 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 2009-Jan. 3, 2011; Jan. 3, 2013-Jan. 3, 2017; Jan. 3, 2019-present) Committee assignments: H. Homeland Security (111 th Congress) H. Small Business (111 th Congress) H. Veterans Affairs (111 th , 113 th Congresses) H. Transportation and Infrastructure (113 th -114 th Congresses) H. Agriculture (114 th , 116 th Congresses) H. Appropriations (116 th Congress) KLOBUCHAR, AMY. Democrat; Minnesota, Senator. Elected to Senate in 2006 and reelected in 2012 and 2018. (served Jan. 3, 2007-present) Committee assignments: S. Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry (110 th -116 th Congresses) S. Commerce, Science, and Transportation (110 th -116 th Congresses) S. Environment and Public Works (110 th -111 th Congresses) Jt. Economic (110 th -116 th Congresses; Vice Chair, 113 th Congress) S. Judiciary (111 th -116 th Congresses) S. Rules (114 th -116 th Congresses; ranking member, 115 th -116 th Congresses) Jt. Printing (116 th Congress) Jt. Library (116 th Congress) KNUTSON, COYA GJESDAL. Democrat; Minnesota, 9 th District. Elected to the 84 th -85 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1955-Jan. 3, 1959) Committee assignment: H. Agriculture (84 th -85 th Congresses) KOSMAS, SUZANNE. Democrat; Florida, 24 th District. Elected to the 111 th Congress. (served Jan. 6, 2009-Jan. 3, 2011) Committee assignments: H. Finance Services (111 th Congress) H. Science and Technology (111 th Congress) KUSTER, ANN McLANE. Democrat; New Hampshire, 2 nd District. Elected to the 113 th -116 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 2013-present) Committee assignments: H. Agriculture (113 th -115 th Congresses) H. Small Business (113 th Congress) H. Veterans' Affairs (113 th -115 th Congresses) H. Energy and Commerce (116 th Congress) LANDRIEU, MARY. Democrat; Louisiana, Senator. Elected to the Senate in 1996; reelected in 2002 and 2008. (served Jan. 3, 1997-Jan. 3, 2015) Committee assignments: S. Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry (105 th Congress) S. Energy and Natural Resources (105 th -113 th Congresses; chair, 113 th Congress, 2 nd session) S. Small Business and Entrepreneurship (105 th -113 th Congresses; chair, 111 th Congress-113 th Congress, 1 st session) S. Armed Services (106 th -107 th Congresses) S. Appropriations (107 th -113 th Congresses) S. Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (110 th -113 th Congresses) LANGLEY, KATHERINE GUDGER. Republican; Kentucky, 10 th District. Elected to the 70 th -71 st Congresses. (served Dec. 5, 1927-March 3, 1931) Committee assignments: H. Claims (70 th -71 st Congresses) H. Immigration and Naturalization (70 th -71 st Congresses) H. Invalid Pensions (70 th -71 st Congresses) H. Education (71 st Congress) LAWRENCE, BRENDA L. Democrat; Michigan, 14 th District. Elected to the 114 th -116 th Congress. (served Jan. 3, 2015-present) Committee assignments: H. Oversight and Government Reform/Oversight and Reform (114 th -116 th Congresses) H. Small Business (114 th Congress) H. Transportation and Infrastructure (115 th Congress) H. Appropriations (116 th Congress) LEE, BARBARA. Democrat; California, 9 th District (105 th -112 th Congresses); 13 th District (113 th -116 th Congresses). Elected to the 105 th Congress in an April 7, 1998, special election to fill vacancy caused by resignation of Ronald Dellums; reelected to the 106 th -116 th Congresses. (served April 20, 1998-present) Chair of the Congressional Black Caucus, 111 th Congress. Committee assignments: H. Banking and Financial Services/Financial Services (105 th -109 th Congresses) H. Science (105 th Congress) H. International Relations/Foreign Affairs (107 th -111 th Congresses) H. Appropriations (110 th -116 th Congresses) H. Budget (113 th -116 th Congresses) LEE, SUSIE. Democrat; Nevada, 3 rd District. Elected to the 116 th Congress. (served Jan. 3, 2019-present) Committee assignment: H. Veterans' Affairs (116 th Congress) H. Education and Labor (116 th Congress) LESKO, DEBBIE. Republican; Arizona, 8 th District. Elected to the 115 th Congress in an April 24, 2018, special election to fill vacancy caused by resignation of Trent Franks; reelected to the 116 th Congress. (served May 7, 2018-present) Committee assignments: H. Homeland Security (115 th -116 th Congresses) H. Judiciary (116 th Congress) H. Rules (116 th Congress) LINCOLN, BLANCHE LAMBERT. Democrat; Arkansas, 1 st District. Elected to the 103 rd -104 th Congresses (served in House Jan. 3, 1993-Jan. 3, 1997). Subsequently elected to the Senate in 1998 and reelected in 2004. (served in Senate Jan. 3, 1999-Jan. 3, 2011) Committee assignments: H. Agriculture (103 rd Congress) H. Energy and Commerce (103 rd Congress) H. Merchant Marine and Fisheries (103 rd Congress) H. Commerce (104 th Congress) S. Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry (106 th -111 th Congresses; chair, 111 th Congress) S. Energy and Natural Resources (106 th , 111 th Congresses) S. Special Committee on Aging (106 th -111 th Congresses) S. Finance (107 th -111 th Congresses) S. Select Committee on Ethics (107 th -108 th Congresses) LLOYD, MARILYN. Democrat; Tennessee, 3 rd District. Elected to the 94 th -103 rd Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1975-Jan. 3, 1995) Committee assignments: H. Science, Space, and Technology (94 th -103 rd Congresses) H. Public Works and Transportation (94 th -99 th Congresses) H. Select Committee on Aging (96 th -102 nd Congresses) H. Armed Services (98 th -103 rd Congresses) LOFGREN, ZOE. Democrat; California, 16 th District (104 th -112 th Congresses); 19 th District (113 th Congress-present). Elected to the 104 th -116 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1995-present) Committee assignments: H. Judiciary (104 th -116 th Congresses) H. Science/Science, Space and Technology (104 th -108 th Congresses; 113 th -116 th Congresses) H. Standards of Official Conduct (105 th -107 th Congresses; chair, 111 th Congress) H. Homeland Security (108 th -111 th Congresses) H. Administration (109 th -116 th Congresses; chair, 116 th Congress) Jt. Library (109 th -110 th Congresses; 113 th -116 th Congresses) H. Select Modernization of Congress (116 th Congress) Jt. Printing (chair, 116 th Congress) LONG, CATHERINE S. Democrat; Louisiana, 8 th District. Elected to the 99 th Congress in a March 30, 1985, special election to fill vacancy caused by death of husband, Gillis Long. (served April 4, 1985-Jan. 3, 1987) Committee assignments: H. Public Works (99 th Congress) H. Small Business (99 th Congress) LONG, JILL. Democrat; Indiana, 4 th District. Elected to the 101 st Congress in a March 28, 1989, special election to fill vacancy caused by resignation of Dan Coats; reelected to the 102 nd -103 rd Congresses. (served April 5, 1989-Jan. 3, 1995) Committee assignments: H. Agriculture (101 st -103 rd Congresses) H. Veterans' Affairs (101 st -103 rd Congresses) H. Select Committee on Hunger (101 st -102 nd Congresses) LONG, ROSE McCONNELL. Democrat; Louisiana, Senator. Appointed to the Senate Jan. 31, 1936, to fill vacancy caused by death of her husband, Huey Pierce Long; subsequently elected April 21, 1936, in a special election to fill the remaining months of his term. (served Feb. 10, 1936-Jan. 3, 1937) Committee assignments: S. Claims (74 th Congress) S. Immigration (74 th Congress) S. Interoceanic Canals (74 th Congress) S. Post Office and Post Roads (74 th Congress) S. Public Lands and Surveys (74 th Congress) LOVE, MIA B. Republican; Utah, 4 th District. Elected to the 114 th -115 th Congress. (served Jan. 3, 2015-Jan. 3, 2019) Committee assignment: H. Financial Services (114 th -115 th Congresses) LOWEY, NITA M. Democrat; New York, 20 th District (101 st -102 nd Congresses); 18 th District (103 rd -112 th Congresses); 17 th District (113 th Congress-present). Elected to the 101 st -116 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1989-present) Committee assignments: H. Education and Labor (101 st -102 nd Congresses) H. Merchant Marine and Fisheries (101 st -102 nd Congresses) H. Select Narcotics Abuse and Control (101 st -102 nd Congresses) H. Appropriations (103 rd -116 th Congresses; ranking member, 113 th -115 th Congresses; chair, 116 th Congress) H. Homeland Security (108 th -110 th Congresses) Jt. Select Budget and Appropriations Process Reform (115 th Congress; co-chair) LUCE, CLARE BOOTHE. Republican; Connecticut, 4 th District. Elected to the 78 th -79 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1943-Jan. 3, 1947) Committee assignment: H. Military Affairs (78 th -79 th Congresses) LUJAN GRISHAM, MICHELLE. Democrat; New Mexico, 1 st District. Elected to the 113 th -115 th Congresses. Chair, Congressional Hispanic Caucus, 115 th Congress. (served Jan. 3, 2013-until her resignation Dec. 31, 2018) Committee assignments: H. Agriculture (113 th -115 th Congresses) H. Budget (113 th -115 th Congresses) H. Oversight and Government Reform (113 th -114 th Congresses) LUMMIS, CYNTHIA. Republican; Wyoming, At Large. Elected to the 111 th -114 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 2009-Jan. 3, 2017) Committee assignments: H. Agriculture (111 th Congress) H. Budget (111 th Congress) H. Natural Resources (111 th Congress; 113 th -114 th Congresses) H. Appropriations (112 th Congress) H. Oversight and Government Reform (113 th -114 th Congresses) H. Science, Space and Technology (113 th Congress) LURIA, ELAINE. Democrat; Virginia, 2 nd District. Elected to the 116 th Congress. (served Jan. 3, 2019-present) Committee assignment: H. Veterans' Affairs (116 th Congress) H. Armed Services (116 th Congress) LUSK, GEORGIA LEE. Democrat; New Mexico, At Large. Elected to the 80 th Congress. (served Jan. 3, 1947-Jan. 3, 1949) Committee assignment: H. Veterans' Affairs (80 th Congress) MAJETTE, DENISE L. Democrat; Georgia, 4 th District. Elected to the 108 th Congress. (served Jan. 3, 2003-Jan. 3, 2005) Committee assignments: H. Budget (108 th Congress) H. Education and the Workforce (108 th Congress) H. Small Business (108 th Congress) MALONEY, CAROLYN. Democrat; New York, 14 th District (103 rd -112 th Congresses); 12 th District (113 th Congress-present). Elected to the 103 rd -116 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1993-present) Committee assignments: H. Government Operations/Government Reform/Oversight and Government Reform/Oversight and Reform (103 th -116 th Congresses) H. Banking and Financial Services/Financial Services (103 rd -116 th Congresses) Jt. Economic (105 th -116 th Congresses; vice chair, 110 th Congress and 116 th Congresses; chair, 111 th Congress; ranking member, 114 th Congress) MANKIN, HELEN DOUGLAS. Democrat; Georgia, 5 th District. Elected to the 79 th Congress in a Feb. 12, 1946, special election to fill vacancy caused by resignation of Robert Ramspeck. (served Feb. 25, 1946-Jan. 3, 1947) Committee assignments: H. Civil Service (79 th Congress) H. Claims (79 th Congress) H. Elections (79 th Congress) H. Revision of Laws (79 th Congress) MARGOLIES-MEZVINSKY, MARJORIE. Democrat; Pennsylvania, 13 th District. Elected to the 103 rd Congress. (served Jan. 3, 1993-Jan. 3, 1995) Committee assignments: H. Energy and Commerce (103 rd Congress) H. Government Operations (103 rd Congress) H. Small Business (103 rd Congress) MARKEY, BETSY. Democrat; Colorado, 4 th District. Elected to the 111 th Congress. (served Jan. 3, 2009-Jan. 3, 2011) Committee assignments: H. Agriculture (111 th Congress) H. Transportation and Infrastructure (111 th Congress) MARTIN, LYNN M. Republican; Illinois, 16 th District. Elected to the 97 th -101 st Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1981-Jan. 3, 1991) Committee assignments: H. Administration (97 th -98 th Congresses) H. Budget (97 th -99 th Congresses) H. Armed Services (99 th -100 th Congresses) Jt. Printing (98 th Congress) H. Rules (101 st Congress) H. Bipartisan Task Force on Ethics (vice chair, 101 st Congress) MATSUI, DORIS O. Democrat; California, 5 th District (109 th -112 th Congresses); 6 th District (113 th Congress-present). Elected to the 109 th Congress in a March 8, 2005, special election to fill vacancy caused by death of husband, Robert Matsui; reelected to the 110 th -116 th Congresses. (served March 10, 2005-present) Committee assignments: H. Rules (109 th -111 th , 116 th Congresses) H. Science (109 th Congress) H. Transportation and Infrastructure (110 th Congress) H. Energy and Commerce (110 th -116 th Congresses) MAY, CATHERINE DEAN. Republican; Washington, 4 th District. Elected to the 86 th -91 st Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1959-Jan. 3, 1971) Committee assignments: H. Agriculture (86 th -91 st Congresses) H. District of Columbia (91 st Congress, 1 st session) H. Select Committee on the House Beauty Shop (90 th -91 st Congresses) Jt. Atomic Energy (91 st Congress) MCBATH, LUCY. Democrat; Georgia, 6 th District. Elected to the 116 th Congress. (served Jan. 3, 2019-present) Committee assignments: H. Judiciary (116 th Congress) H. Education and Labor (116 th Congress) MCCARTHY, CAROLYN. Democrat; New York, 4 th District. Elected to the 105 th -113 th Congresses. (served Jan. 7, 1997-Jan. 3, 2015) Committee assignments: H. Education and the Workforce/Education and Labor (105 th -113 th Congresses) H. Small Business (105 th -106 th Congresses) H. Financial Services (108 th -113 th Congresses) MCCARTHY, KAREN. Democrat; Missouri, 5 th District. Elected to the 104 th -108 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1995-Jan. 3, 2005) Committee assignments: H. Science (104 th Congress) H. Small Business (104 th Congress) H. Transportation and Infrastructure (104 th Congress) H. Commerce/Energy and Commerce (105 th -108 th Congresses) H. Homeland Security (108 th Congress) MCCARTHY, KATHYRN O'LOUGHLIN. Democrat; Kansas, 6 th District. Elected to the 73 rd Congress. (served March 9, 1933-Jan. 3, 1935) Committee assignments: H. Education (73 rd Congress) H. Public Buildings and Grounds (73 rd Congress) H. World War Veterans' Legislation (73 rd Congress) MCCASKILL, CLAIRE. Democrat; Missouri, Senator. Elected to the Senate in 2006; reelected in 2012. (served Jan. 3, 2007-Jan. 3, 2019) Committee assignments: S. Armed Services (110 th -115 th Congresses) S. Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (110 th -115 th Congresses; ranking member, 115 th Congress) S. Indian Affairs (110 th Congress) S. Special Aging (110 th -114 th Congresses; ranking member, 114 th Congress) S. Commerce, Science, and Transportation (111 th -114 th Congresses) S. Finance (115 th Congress) MCCOLLUM, BETTY. Democrat; Minnesota, 4 th District. Elected to the 107 th -116 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 2001-present) Committee assignments: H. Education and the Workforce (107 th -109 th Congresses) H. Resources (107 th -108 th Congresses) H. International Relations (108 th -109 th Congresses) H. Appropriations (110 th -116 th Congresses) H. Oversight and Government Reform (110 th Congress) H. Budget (111 th -112 th Congresses) MCCORMICK, RUTH HANNA. Republican; Illinois, At Large. Elected to the 71 st Congress. (served April 15, 1929-March 3, 1931) Committee assignment: H. Naval Affairs (71 st Congress) MCKINNEY, CYNTHIA. Democrat; Georgia, 11 th District (103 rd -104 th Congresses) and 4 th District (105 th -107 th Congress and 109 th Congress). Elected to the 103 rd -107 th Congresses and to the 109 th Congress. (served Jan. 3, 1993-Jan. 3, 2003; Jan. 3, 2005-Jan. 3, 2007) Committee assignments: H. Agriculture (103 rd -104 th Congresses) H. Banking and Finance (104 th -105 th Congresses) H. Foreign Affairs/International Relations (103 rd -107 th Congresses) H. National Security (105 th Congress) H. Armed Services (106 th -107 th Congresses; 109 th Congress) H. Budget (109 th Congress) MCMILLAN, CLARA GOODING. Democrat; South Carolina, 1 st District. Elected to the 76 th Congress in a Nov. 7, 1939, special election to fill vacancy caused by death of husband, Thomas S. McMillan. (served Jan. 3, 1940-Jan. 3, 1941) Committee assignments: H. Election of President, Vice President, and Representatives in Congress (76 th Congress) H. Insular Affairs (76 th Congress) H. Patents (76 th Congress) H. Public Buildings and Grounds (76 th Congress) MCMORRIS RO D GERS, CATHY. Republican; Washington, 5 th District. Elected to the 109 th -116 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 2005-present) Committee assignments: H. Armed Services (109 th -111 th Congresses) H. Education and the Workforce/Education and Labor (109 th -111 th Congresses) H. Resources/Natural Resources (109 th -111 th Congresses) H. Energy and Commerce (112 th -116 th Congresses) MCSALLY, MARTHA. Republican; Arizona, 2 nd District. Elected to the 114 th -115 th Congresses. (served in House Jan. 3, 2015-Jan. 3, 2019) Appointed to the Senate Jan. 3, 2019, to fill vacancy caused by death of John McCain. (served in Senate Jan. 3, 2019-present) Committee assignments: H. Armed Services (114 th -115 th Congresses) H. Homeland Security (114 th -115 th Congresses) S. Armed Services (116 th Congress) S. Banking (116 th Congress) S. Energy and Natural Resources (116 th Congress) S. Special Committee on Aging (116 th Congress) S. Indian Affairs (116 th Congress) MEEK, CARRIE. Democrat; Florida, 17 th District. Elected to the 103 rd -107 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1993-Jan. 3, 2003) Committee assignments: H. Appropriations (103 rd Congress; 105 th -107 th Congresses) H. Budget (104 th Congress) H. Government Reform and Oversight (104 th Congress) MENG, GRACE. Democrat; New York, 6 th District. Elected to the 113 th -116 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 2013-present) Committee assignments: H. Foreign Affairs (113 th -114 th Congresses) H. Small Business (113 th -114 th Congresses) H. Appropriations (115 th -116 th Congresses) H. Ethics (116 th Congress) MEYERS, JAN. Republican; Kansas, 3 rd District. Elected to the 99 th -104 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1985-Jan. 3, 1997) Committee assignments: H. Science and Technology (99 th Congress) H. Select Aging (99 th -102 nd Congresses) H. Foreign Affairs/ International Relations (99 th -104 th Congresses) H. Economic and Educational Opportunities (104 th Congress) H. Small Business (99 th -104 th Congresses; ranking member, 103 rd Congress; chair, 104 th Congress) MEYNER, HELEN STEVENSON. Democrat; New Jersey, 13 th District. Elected to the 94 th -95 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1975-Jan. 3, 1979) Committee assignments: H. District of Columbia (94 th -95 th Congresses) H. Foreign Affairs (94 th Congress) H. International Relations (95 th Congress) MIKULSKI, BARBARA ANN. Democrat; Maryland, 3 rd District. Elected to the 95 th -99 th Congresses (served in House Jan. 3, 1977-Jan. 3, 1987). Subsequently elected to the Senate in 1986 and reelected in 1992, 1996, 2004, and 2010. (served in Senate Jan. 6, 1987-Jan. 3, 2017) Committee assignments: H. Interstate and Foreign Commerce (95 th -97 th Congresses) H. Merchant Marine and Fisheries (95 th -99 th Congresses) H. Energy and Commerce (97 th -99 th Congresses) S. Environmental and Public Works (100 th Congress) S. Appropriations (100 th -114 th Congresses; chair, 113 th Congress; ranking member, 114 th Congress) S. Labor and Human Resources (100 th -105 th Congresses) S. Small Business (100 th -102 nd Congresses) S. Select Ethics (103 rd -104 th Congresses; 109 th Congress) S. Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (106 th -114 th Congresses) S. Select Intelligence (107 th -114 th Congresses) MILLENDER-McDONALD, JUANITA. Democrat; California, 37 th District. Elected to the 104 th Congress in a March 26, 1996, special election to fill vacancy caused by resignation of Walter Tucker; reelected to the 105 th -110 th Congresses. (served April 16, 1996, until her death April 22, 2007) Committee assignments: H. Small Business (104 th -110 th Congresses) H. Transportation and Infrastructure (104 th -110 th Congresses) H. Administration (108 th -110 th Congresses; ranking member, 109 th Congress; chair, 110 th Congress) Jt. Library (108 th -110 th Congresses) Jt. Printing (109 th -110 th Congresses) MILLER, CANDICE S. Republican; Michigan, 10 th District. Elected to the 108 th -114 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 2003, until her resignation Dec. 31, 2016) Committee assignments: H. Armed Services (108 th -110 th Congresses) H. Government Reform (108 th -109 th Congresses) H. House Administration (109 th Congress; chair, 113 th - 114 th Congresses) H. Transportation and Infrastructure (110 th -114 th Congresses) H. Select Energy Independence and Global Warming (110 th -111 th Congresses) H. Homeland Security (110 th -114 th Congresses) Jt. Library (109 th Congress; 113 th -114 th Congresses) Jt. Printing (109 th Congress; 113 th -114 th Congresses) MILLER, CAROL. Republican; West Virginia, 3 rd District. Elected to the 116 th Congress. (served Jan. 3, 2019-present) Committee assignments: H. Oversight and Reform (116 th Congress) H. Transportation and Infrastructure (116 th Congress) H. Select Committee on the Climate Crisis (116 th Congress) MINK, PATSY TAKEMOTO. Democrat; Hawaii, 2 nd District. Elected to the 89 th -94 th Congresses; elected to the 101 st Congress in a Sept. 22, 1990, special election to fill vacancy caused by resignation of Daniel Akaka; reelected to the 102 nd -107 th Congresses; posthumously reelected to the 108 th Congress. (served Jan. 3, 1965-Jan. 3, 1977; Sept. 27, 1990, until her death Sept. 28, 2002) Committee assignments: H. Education and Labor (89 th -94 th Congresses; 101 st -103 rd Congresses) H. Interior and Insular Affairs (90 th -94 th Congresses) H. Budget (94 th Congress; 103 rd -105 th Congresses) H. Government Operations (101 st -102 nd Congresses) H. Natural Resources (103 rd Congress) H. Economic and Educational Opportunities/Education and the Workforce (104 th -107 th Congresses) H. Government Reform (106 th -107 th Congresses) MOLINARI, SUSAN. Republican; New York, 14 th District (101 st -102 nd Congresses) and 13 th District (103 rd -105 th Congresses). Elected to the 101 st Congress in a March 20, 1990, special election to fill vacancy caused by resignation of father, Guy Molinari; reelected to the 102 nd -105 th Congresses. (served March 27, 1990, until her resignation August 1, 1997) Committee assignments: H. Small Business (101 st Congress) H. Public Works and Transportation (101 st -103 rd Congresses) H. Transportation and Infrastructure (104 th -105 th Congresses) H. Education and Labor (102 nd -103 rd Congresses) H. Budget (104 th -105 th Congresses) MOORE, GWENDOLYNNE (GWEN). Democrat; Wisconsin, 4 th District. Elected to the 109 th -116 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 2005-present) Committee assignments: H. Financial Services (109 th -115 th Congresses) H. Small Business (109 th -111 th Congresses) H. Budget (110 th -114 th Congresses) H. Ways and Means (116 th Congress) MORELLA, CONSTANCE A. Republican; Maryland, 8 th District. Elected to the 100 th -107 th Congresses. (served Jan. 6, 1987-Jan. 3, 2003) Committee assignments: H. Post Office and Civil Service (100 th -103 rd Congresses) H. Science, Space, and Technology/Science (100 th -107 th Congresses) H. Select Aging (100 th -102 nd Congresses) H. Government Reform and Oversight (104 th -107 th Congresses) MOSELEY-BRAUN, CAROL. Democrat; Illinois, Senator. Elected to the Senate in 1992. (served Jan. 3, 1993-Jan. 3, 1999) Committee assignments: S. Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (103 rd -105 th Congresses) S. Judiciary (103 rd Congress) S. Small Business (103 rd Congress) S. Finance (104 th -105 th Congresses) S. Special Aging (104 th -105 th Congresses) MUCARSEL-POWELL, DEBBIE. Democrat; Florida, 26 th District. Elected to the 116 th Congress. (served Jan. 3, 2019-present) Committee assignments: H. Transportation and Infrastructure (116 th Congress) H. Judiciary (116 th Congress) MURKOWSKI, LISA. Republican; Alaska, Senator. Appointed to the Senate Dec. 20, 2002, by her father, Frank Murkowski, to the seat he had held before he was elected governor of Alaska. Reelected to a six-year term in 2004, as well as in 2010 and 2016. (served Jan. 3, 2003-present) Committee assignments: S. Energy and Natural Resources (108 th -116 th Congresses; ranking member, 111 th -113 th Congresses; chair, 114 th -116 th Congresses) S. Environment and Public Works (108 th -109 th Congress) S. Veterans' Affairs (108 th Congress) S. Indian Affairs (108 th -116 th Congresses; ranking member, part of 110 th Congress) S. Foreign Relations (109 th -110 th Congresses) S. Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (110 th -116 th Congresses) S. Appropriations (111 th -116 th Congresses) MURPHY, STEPHANIE. Democrat; Florida, 7 th District. Elected to the 115 th -116 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 2017-present) Committee assignments: H. Armed Services (115 th Congress) H. Small Business (115 th Congress) H. Ways and Means (116 th Congress) MURRAY, PATTY. Democrat; Washington, Senator. Elected to the Senate in 1992 and reelected in 1998, 2004, 2010, and 2016. (served Jan. 5, 1993-present) Committee assignments: S. Appropriations (103 rd -111 th Congresses; 113 th -116 th Congresses) S. Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (103 rd -104 th Congresses) S. Budget (103 rd -116 th Congresses; chair, 113 th Congress) S. Labor and Human Resources (105 th Congress) S. Veterans Affairs (105 th -116 th Congresses; chair, 112 th Congress) S. Select Ethics (105 th Congress) S. Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (106 th -116 th Congresses; ranking member, 114 th -116 th Congresses) S. Foreign Relations (110 th Congress) S. Indian Affairs (110 th Congress) Jt. Printing (111 th -112 th Congresses) S. Rules and Administration (111 th -113 th Congresses) Jt. Select Committee on Deficit Control (112 th Congress) MUSGRAVE, MARILYN. Republican; Colorado, 4 th District. Elected to the 108 th -110 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 2003-Jan. 3, 2009) Committee assignments: H. Agriculture (108 th -110 th Congresses) H. Education and the Workforce (108 th -109 th Congresses) H. Small Business (108 th -110 th Congresses) H. Resources (109 th Congress) MYRICK, SUE. Republican; North Carolina, 9 th District. Elected to the 104 th -112 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1995, to Jan. 3, 2013) Committee assignments: H. Budget (104 th Congress) H. Science (104 th Congress) H. Small Business (104 th Congress) H. Rules (105 th -108 th Congresses) H. Energy and Commerce (109 th -112 th Congresses) H. Intelligence (112 th Congress) NAPOLITANO, GRACE FLORES. Democrat; California, 34 th District (106 th -107 th Congresses), 38 th District (108 th -112 th Congresses) and 32 nd District (113 th Congress-present). Elected to the 106 th -116 th Congresses (served Jan. 3, 1999-present). Chair of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus, 109 th Congress. Committee assignments: H. Resources/Natural Resources (106 th -116 th Congresses) H. Small Business (106 th -108 th Congresses) H. International Relations (107 th -109 th Congresses) H. Transportation and Infrastructure (110 th -116 th Congresses) NEGRETE McLEOD, GLORIA. Democrat; California, 35 th District. Elected to the 113 th Congress. (served Jan. 3, 2013-Jan. 3, 2015) Committee assignments: H. Agriculture (113 th Congress) H. Veterans' Affairs (113 th Congress) NEUBERGER, MAURINE BROWN. Democrat; Oregon, Senator. Elected to the Senate in a Nov. 8, 1960, special election to fill vacancy caused by death of husband, Richard L. Neuberger, and for the ensuing six-year term. (served Nov. 9, 1960-Jan. 3, 1967) Committee assignments: S. Agriculture and Forestry (87 th -88 th Congresses) S. Banking and Currency (87 th -89 th Congresses) S. Special Committee on Aging (87 th Congress) S. Committee on Parliamentary Conference with Canada (87 th Congress, 2 nd session) S. Commerce (89 th Congress) NOEM, KRISTI. Republican; South Dakota, At Large. Elected to the 112 th -115 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 2011-Jan.3, 2019) Committee assignments: H. Education and the Workforce (112 th Congress) H. Natural Resources (112 th Congress) H. Agriculture (113 th Congress) H. Ways and Means (114 th -115 th Congresses) NOLAN, MAE ELLA. Republican; California, 5 th District. Elected to the 67 th Congress in a Jan. 23, 1923, special election to fill vacancy caused by death of husband, John Nolan, and also to the 68 th Congress. (served Feb. 2, 1923-March 3, 1925). First woman to chair a congressional committee. Committee assignments: H. Expenditures in the Post Office Department (67 th -68 th Congresses; chair, 68 th Congress) H. Labor (67 th -68 th Congresses) NORRELL, CATHERINE DORRIS. Democrat; Arkansas, 6 th District. Elected to the 87 th Congress in an April 18, 1961, special election to fill vacancy caused by death of husband, William Frank Norrell. (served April 25, 1961-Jan. 3, 1963) Committee assignment: H. Post Office and Civil Service (87 th Congress) NORTHUP, ANNE M. Republican; Kentucky 3 rd District. Elected to the 105 th -109 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1997-Jan. 3, 2007) Committee assignment: H. Appropriations (105 th -109 th Congresses) NORTON, ELEANOR HOLMES. Democrat; Delegate from the District of Columbia. Elected to the 102 nd -116 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1991-present) Committee assignments: H. District of Columbia (102 nd -103 rd Congresses) H. Post Office and Civil Service (102 nd -103 rd Congresses) H. Public Works and Transportation (102 nd -103 rd Congresses) Jt. Committee on the Organization of Congress (103 rd Congress) H. Small Business (104 th Congress) H. Oversight and Government Reform/ Government Reform/Oversight and Reform (104 th -116 th Congresses) H. Transportation and Infrastructure (104 th -116 th Congresses) H. Homeland Security (108 th -111 th Congresses) NORTON, MARY TERESA. Democrat; New Jersey, 13 th District. Elected to the 69 th -81 st Congresses. (served Dec. 7, 1925-Jan. 3, 1951) Committee assignments: H. District of Columbia (69 th -74 th Congresses; chair, 72 nd - 74 th Congresses) H. Labor (69 th -79 th Congresses; chair, 75 th -79 th Congresses) H. World War Veterans Legislation (69 th -72 nd Congresses) H. Memorials (71 st -79 th Congresses) H. Education (78 th -79 th Congresses) H. Enrolled Bills (78 th -79 th Congresses) H. Administration (ranking member, 80 th Congress; chair, 81 st Congress) Jt. Printing (81 st Congress) Jt. Library (80 th Congress) OAKAR, MARY ROSE. Democrat; Ohio, 20 th District. Elected to the 95 th -102 nd Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1977-Jan. 3, 1993) Committee assignments: H. Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs (95 th -102 nd Congresses) H. Select Committee on Aging (96 th -102 nd Congresses) H. Post Office and Civil Service (97 th -102 nd Congresses) H. Administration (98 th -102 nd Congresses) OCASIO-CORTEZ, ALEXANDRIA. Democrat; New York, 14 th District. Elected to the 116 th Congress. (served Jan. 3, 2019-present) Committee assignments: H. Oversight and Reform (116 th Congress) H. Financial Services (116 th Congress) O'DAY, CAROLINE LOVE GOODWIN. Democrat; New York, At Large. Elected to the 74 th -77 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1935-Jan. 3, 1943) Committee assignments: H. Election of President, Vice President, and Representatives (74 th -77 th Congresses; chair, 75 th -77 th Congresses) H. Immigration and Naturalization (75 th -77 th Congresses) H. Insular Affairs (75 th -77 th Congresses) OLDFIELD, PEARL PEDEN. Democrat; Arkansas, 2 nd District. Elected to the 70 th Congress in a Jan. 9, 1929, special election to fill vacancy caused by death of husband, William A. Oldfield, and also to the 71 st Congress. (served Jan. 11, 1929-March 3, 1931) Committee assignments: H. Coinage, Weights, and Measures (71 st Congress) H. Expenditures in the Executive Departments (71 st Congress) H. Public Buildings and Grounds (71 st Congress) OMAR, ILHAN. Democrat; Minnesota, 5 th District. Elected to the 116 th Congress. (served Jan. 3, 2019-present) Committee assignment: H. Budget (116 th Congress) H. Foreign Affairs (116 th Congress) H. Education and Labor (116 th Congress) OWEN, RUTH BRYAN. Democrat; Florida, 4 th District. Elected to the 71 st -72 nd Congresses. (served April 15, 1929-March 3, 1933) Committee assignment: H. Foreign Affairs (71 st -72 nd Congresses) PATTERSON, ELIZABETH J. Democrat; South Carolina, 4 th District. Elected to the 100 th -102 nd Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1987-Jan. 3, 1993) Committee assignments: H. Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs (100 th -102 nd Congresses) H. Veterans' Affairs (100 th -102 nd Congresses) H. Select Hunger (100 th -102 nd Congresses) PELOSI, NANCY. Democrat; California, 5 th District (100 th -102 nd Congresses), 8 th District (103 rd -112 th Congresses); 12 th District (113 th Congress-present). Elected to the 100 th Congress in a June 2, 1987, special election to fill vacancy caused by death of Sala Burton; reelected to the 101 st -116 th Congresses. (served June 9, 1987-present) First female Speaker of the House, 110 th , 111 th , and 116 th Congresses. Committee assignments: H. Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs (100 th -101 st Congresses) H. Government Operations (100 th -101 st Congresses) H. Appropriations (102 nd -107 th Congresses) H. Standards of Official Conduct (102 nd -104 th Congresses) H. Intelligence (104 th -107 th Congresses; Ex Officio, 108 th -113 th , 116 th Congresses) PETTIS, SHIRLEY N. Republican; California, 37 th District. Elected to the 94 th Congress in a April 29, 1975, special election to fill vacancy caused by death of husband, Jerry L. Pettis; reelected to the 95 th Congress. (served May 6, 1975-Jan. 3, 1979) Committee assignments: H. Interior and Insular Affairs (94 th Congress) H. Education and Labor (95 th Congress) H. International Relations (95 th Congress) PFOST, GRACIE BOWERS. Democrat; Idaho, 1 st District. Elected to the 83 rd -87 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1953-Jan. 3, 1963) Committee assignments: H. Interior and Insular Affairs (83 rd -87 th Congresses) H. Post Office and Civil Service (84 th -85 th Congresses) H. Public Works (86 th -87 th Congresses) PINGREE, CHELLIE. Democrat; Maine, 1 st District. Elected to the 111 th -116 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 2009-present) Committee assignments: H. Armed Services (111 th -112 th Congresses) H. Rules (111 th -112 th Congresses) H. Agriculture (112 th -116 th Congresses) H. Appropriations (113 th -116 th Congresses) PLASKETT, STACEY E. Democrat; Delegate from the U.S. Virgin Islands. Elected to the 114 th -116 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 2015-present) Committee assignments: H. Agriculture (114 th -116 th Congresses) H. Oversight and Government Reform/Oversight and Reform (114 th -116 th Congresses) H. Transportation and Infrastructure (116 th Congress) PORTER, KATIE . Democrat; California, 45 th District. Elected to the 116 th Congress. (served Jan. 3, 2019-present) Committee assignments: H. Financial Services (116 th Congress) PRATT, ELIZA JANE. Democrat; North Carolina, 8 th District. Elected to the 79 th Congress in a May 25, 1946, special election to fill vacancy caused by death of William O. Burgin. (served June 3, 1946-Jan. 3, 1947) Committee assignments: H. Flood Control (79 th Congress) H. Pensions (79 th Congress) H. Territories (79 th Congress) PRATT, RUTH SEARS BAKER. Republican; New York, 17 th District. Elected to the 71 st -72 nd Congresses. (served April 15, 1929-March 3, 1933) Committee assignments: H. Banking and Currency (71 st Congress) H. Library (71 st -72 nd Congresses) H. Education (72 nd Congress) PRESSLEY, AYANNA. Democrat; Massachusetts, 7 th District. Elected to the 116 th Congress. (served Jan. 3, 2019-present) Committee assignments: H. Oversight and Reform (116 th Congress) H. Financial Services (116 th Congress) PRYCE, DEBORAH. Republican; Ohio, 15 th District. Elected to the 103 rd -110 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1993-Jan. 3, 2009) Committee assignments: H. Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs (103 rd Congress) H. Government Operations (103 rd Congress) H. Rules (104 th -108 th Congresses) H. Financial Services (109 th -110 th Congresses) PYLE, GLADYS. Republican; South Dakota, Senator. Elected to the Senate Nov. 8, 1938, to fill vacancy caused by death of Peter Norbeck; never sworn in and seated, because Congress was not in session between her election and the expiration of the term on Jan. 3, 1939. No committee assignments listed. RADEWAGEN, AUMUA AMATA COLEMAN. Republican; Delegate from American Samoa. Elected to the 114 th -116 th Congress. (served Jan. 3, 2015-present) Committee assignments: H. Natural Resources (114 th -116 th Congresses) H. Small Business (114 th -116 th Congresses) H. Veterans' Affairs (114 th -116 th Congresses) RANKIN, JEANNETTE. Republican; Montana, At Large (65 th Congress) and 1 st District (77 th Congress). Elected to the 65 th Congress and the 77 th Congress. (served April 2, 1917-March 4, 1919; Jan. 3, 1941-Jan. 3, 1943) First woman elected to Congress. Committee assignments: H. Public Lands (65 th Congress; 77 th Congress) H. Woman Suffrage (65 th Congress) H. Insular Affairs (77 th Congress) REECE, LOUISE GOFF. Republican; Tennessee, 1 st District. Elected to the 87 th Congress in a May 16, 1961, special election to fill vacancy caused by death of her husband, B. Carroll Reece. (served May 23, 1961-Jan. 3, 1963) Committee assignment: H. Public Works (87 th Congress) REID, CHARLOTTE THOMPSON. Republican; Illinois, 15 th District. Elected to the 88 th -92 nd Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1963, until her resignation on Oct. 7, 1971) Committee assignments: H. Interior and Insular Affairs (88 th -89 th Congresses) H. Public Works (89 th Congress) H. Appropriations (90 th -92 nd Congresses) H. Standards of Official Conduct (91 st -92 nd Congresses) RICE, KATHLEEN M. Democrat; New York; 4 th District. Elected to the 114 th -116 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 2015-present) Committee assignments: H. Homeland Security (114 th -116 th Congresses) H. Veterans' Affairs (114 th -116 th Congresses) RICHARDSON, LAURA. Democrat, California, 37 th District. Elected to the 110 th Congress in an August 21, 2007, special election to fill vacancy caused by death of Juanita Millender-McDonald; reelected to the 111 th -112 th Congresses. (served Sept. 4, 2007, to Jan. 3, 2013) Committee assignments: H. Science and Technology (110 th Congress) H. Transportation and Infrastructure (110 th -112 th Congresses) H. Homeland Security (111 th -112 th Congresses) RILEY, CORINNE BOYD. Democrat; South Carolina, 2 nd District. Elected to the 87 th Congress in an April 10, 1962, special election to fill vacancy caused by death of husband, John J. Riley. (served April 12, 1962-Jan. 3, 1963) Committee assignment: H. Science and Transportation (87 th Congress) RIVERS, LYNN. Democrat; Michigan, 13 th District. Elected to the 104 th -107 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1995-Jan. 3, 2003) Committee assignments: H. Budget (104 th -106 th Congresses) H. Science (104 th -107 th Congresses) H. Education and the Workforce (107 th Congress) ROBERTSON, ALICE MARY. Republican; Oklahoma, 2 nd District. Elected to the 67 th Congress. (served April 11, 1921-March 3, 1923) Committee assignments: H. Expenditures in the Interior Department (67 th Congress) H. Indian Affairs (67 th Congress) H. Woman Suffrage (67 th Congress) ROBY, MARTHA. Republican; Alabama, 2 nd District. Elected to the 112 th -116 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 2011-present) Committee assignments: H. Agriculture (112 th -113 th Congresses) H. Armed Services (112 th -113 th Congresses) H. Education and the Workforce (112 th -113 th Congresses) H. Appropriations (113 th -116 th Congresses) H. Select Terrorist Attack in Benghazi (113 th -114 th Congresses) H. Judiciary (115 th -116 th Congresses) ROGERS, EDITH NOURSE. Republican; Massachusetts, 5 th District. Elected to the 69 th Congress in a June 30, 1925, special election to fill vacancy caused by death of husband, John J. Rogers; reelected to the 70 th -86 th Congresses. (served Dec. 7, 1925, until her death Sept. 10, 1960) Committee assignments: H. Expenditures in the Navy Department (69 th Congress) H. Industrial Arts and Expositions (69 th Congress) H. Woman Suffrage (69 th Congress) H. World War Veterans' Legislation (69 th -79 th Congresses) H. Civil Service (70 th -77 th Congresses) H. Indian Affairs (70 th Congress) H. Foreign Affairs (73 rd -79 th Congresses) H. Veterans' Affairs (80 th -86 th Congresses; ranking member, 81 st -82 nd and 84 th -86 th Congresses; chair, 80 th and 83 rd Congresses) ROSEN, JACKY. Democrat; Nevada, 3 rd District, and Senator. Elected to the 115 th Congress. (served in House Jan. 3, 2017-Jan. 3. 2019) Subsequently elected to the Senate in 2018. (served in the Senate Jan. 3, 2019-present) Committee assignments: H. Armed Services (115 th Congress) H. Science, Space and Technology (115 th Congress) S. Commerce, Science and Transportation (116 th Congress) S. Health, Education, Labor and Pensions (116 th Congress) S. Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (116 th Congress) S. Small Business (116 th Congress) S. Special Aging (116 th Congress) ROS-LEHTINEN, ILEANA. Republican; Florida, 18 th District (102 nd -112 th Congresses); 27 th District (113 th Congress-present). Elected to the 101 st Congress in an August 29, 1989, special election to fill vacancy caused by death of Claude Pepper; reelected to the 102 nd -115 th Congresses. Chair of the Congressional Hispanic Conference in the 109 th Congress. (served Sept. 6, 1989-Jan. 3, 2019) Committee assignments: H. Foreign Affairs/International Relations (101 st -115 th Congresses; ranking member, 110 th -111 th Congresses; chair, 112 th Congress) H. Government Operations/Government Reform (101 st -109 th Congresses) H. Budget (109 th Congress) H. Rules (113 th Congress) H. Intelligence (114 th -115 th Congresses) ROUKEMA, MARGARET (MARGE) SCAFATI. Republican; New Jersey, 7 th District. Elected to the 97 th -107 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1981-Jan. 3, 2003) Committee assignments: H. Education and Labor/Economic and Educational Opportunities/Education and the Workforce (97 th -107 th Congresses) H. Select Hunger (98 th -102 nd Congresses; vice chair, 100 th Congress) H. Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs/Banking and Financial Services/Financial Services (97 th -107 th Congresses) ROYBAL-ALLARD, LUCILLE. Democrat; California, 33 rd District (103 rd -107 th Congresses); 34 th District (108 th -112 th Congresses); 40 th District (113 th Congress-present). Elected to the 103 rd -116 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1993-present) Committee assignments: H. Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs/Banking and Financial Services (103 rd -105 th Congresses) H. Small Business (103 rd Congress) H. Budget (104 th -105 th Congresses) H. Select U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with … China (105 th -106 th Congresses) H. Appropriations (106 th -116 th Congresses) H. Standards of Official Conduct (108 th -110 th Congresses) Jt. Select Budget and Appropriations Process Reform (115 th Congress) SAIKI, PATRICIA F. Republican; Hawaii, 1 st District. Elected to the 100 th -101 st Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1987-Jan. 3, 1991) Committee assignments: H. Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs (100 th -101 st Congresses) H. Merchant Marine and Fisheries (100 th -101 st Congresses) H. Select Aging (100 th -101 st Congresses) ST. GEORGE, KATHARINE PRICE COLLIER. Republican; New York, 28 th District. Elected to the 80 th -88 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1947-Jan. 3, 1965) Committee assignments: H. Post Office and Civil Service (80 th -84 th Congresses; 86 th -88 th Congresses) H. Government Operations (83 rd Congress) H. Armed Services (85 th -86 th Congresses) H. Rules (87 th -88 th Congresses) SÁNCHEZ, LINDA. Democrat; California, 39 th District (108 th -113 th Congresses); 38 th District (113 th Congress-present). Elected to the 108 th -115 th Congresses (served Jan. 3, 2003-present). Sister of Loretta Sanchez. Chair of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus, 114 th Congress. Committee assignments: H. Government Reform (108 th -109 th Congresses) H. Judiciary (108 th -112 th Congresses) H. Small Business (108 th -109 th Congresses) H. Education and Labor (110 th Congress) H. Foreign Affairs (110 th Congress) H. Ways and Means (111 th Congress; 113 th -116 th Congresses) H. Veterans' Affairs (112 th Congress) H. Ethics (112 th -114 th Congresses; ranking member, 114 th Congress) H. Select Terrorist Attack in Benghazi (113 th -114 th Congresses) SANCHEZ, LORETTA. Democrat; California, 46 th District (105 th -107 th and 113 th -114 th Congresses) and 47 th District (108 th -110 th Congresses). Elected to the 105 th -114 th Congresses (served Jan. 3, 1997-Jan. 3, 2017). Sister of Linda Sánchez. Committee assignments: H. Education and the Workforce (105 th -107 th Congresses) H. National Security (105 th Congress) H. Armed Services (106 th -114 th Congresses) H. Homeland Security (108 th -114 th Congresses) Jt. Economic (109 th Congress; 111 th -114 th Congresses) SCANLON, MARY GAY. Democrat, Pennsylvania, 7 th District (115 th Congress); 5 th District (116 th Congress). Elected to the 115 th Congress in a Nov. 6, 2018 special election to fill vacancy caused by the resignation of Patrick Meehan, also elected to the 116 th Congress. (served Nov. 13, 2018-present) Committee assignments: 115 th Congress: no assignments H. Judiciary (116 th Congress) H. Rules (116 th Congress) H. Select Modernization of Congress (116 th Congress) SCHAKOWSKY, JANICE. Democrat; Illinois, 9 th District. Elected to the 106 th -116 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1999-present) Committee assignments: H. Banking and Financial Services/Financial Services (106 th -107 th Congresses) H. Government Reform (106 th -107 th Congresses) H. Small Business (106 th Congress) H. Energy and Commerce (108 th -116 th Congresses) H. Intelligence (110 th -113 th Congresses) H. Appropriations (114 th Congress) H. Budget (116 th Congress) SCHENK, LYNN. Democrat; California, 49 th District. Elected to the 103 rd Congress. (served Jan. 3, 1993-Jan. 3, 1995) Committee assignments: H. Energy and Commerce (103 rd Congress) H. Merchant Marine and Fisheries (103 rd Congress) SCHMIDT, JEAN. Republican, Ohio, 2 nd District. Elected to the 109 th Congress in an August 2, 2005, special election to fill vacancy caused by resignation of Rob Portman; reelected to the 110 th -112 th Congresses. (served Sept. 6, 2005, to Jan. 3, 2013) Committee assignments: H. Agriculture (109 th -112 th Congresses) H. Government Reform (109 th Congress) H. Transportation and Infrastructure (109 th -112 th Congresses) H. Foreign Affairs (112 th Congress) SCHNEIDER, CLAUDINE CMARADA. Republican; Rhode Island, 2 nd District. Elected to the 97 th -101 st Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1981-Jan. 3, 1991) Committee assignments: H. Merchant Marine and Fisheries (97 th -101 st Congresses) H. Science and Technology (97 th -101 st Congresses) H. Special Committee on Aging (98 th -101 st Congresses) SCHRIER, KIM. Democrat; Washington, 8 th District. Elected to the 116 th Congress (served Jan. 3, 2019 to present) Committee assignments: H. Agriculture (116 th Congress) H. Education and Labor (116 th Congress) SCHROEDER, PATRICIA S. Democrat; Colorado, 1 st District. Elected to the 93 rd -104 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1973-Jan. 3, 1997) Committee assignments: H. Armed Services (93 rd -103 rd Congresses) H. Post Office and Civil Service (93 rd -103 rd Congresses) H. Judiciary (97 th -104 th Congresses) H. Select Children, Youth, and Families (100 th -102 nd Congresses; chair, 102 nd Congress) H. National Security (104 th Congress) SCHWARTZ, ALLYSON Y. Democrat; Pennsylvania, 13 th District. Elected to the 109 th -113 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 2005-Jan. 3, 2015) Committee assignments: H. Budget (109 th -113 th Congresses) H. Transportation and Infrastructure (109 th Congress) H. Ways and Means (110 th , 111 th , 113 th Congresses) H. Foreign Affairs (112 th Congress) SEASTRAND, ANDREA . Republican; California, 22 nd District. Elected to the 104 th Congress. (served Jan. 3, 1995-Jan. 3, 1997) Committee assignments: H. Science (104 th Congress) H. Transportation and Infrastructure (104 th Congress) SEKULA GIBBS, SHELLEY . Republican; Texas, 22 nd District. Elected to the 109 th Congress in a Nov. 7, 2006, special election to fill vacancy caused by resignation of Tom Delay. (served Nov. 13, 2006-Jan. 3, 2007) Committee assignments: H. Education and the Workforce (109 th Congress) H. Transportation and Infrastructure (109 th Congress) SEWELL, T ERRYCINA ( "TERRI" ). Democrat; Alabama, 7 th District. Elected to the 112 th -116 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 2011-present) Committee assignments: H. Agriculture (112 th Congress) H. Science, Space and Technology (112 th Congress) H. Financial Services (113 th -114 th Congresses) H. Intelligence (113 th -116 th Congresses) H. Ways and Means (115 th -116 th Congresses) SHAHEEN, JEANNE D. Democrat; New Hampshire; Senator. Elected to Senate in 2008 and reelected in 2014. (served Jan. 3, 2009-present) Committee assignments: S. Energy and Natural Resources (111 th -112 th Congresses) S. Foreign Relations (111 th -116 th Congresses) S. Small Business and Entrepreneurship (111 th -116 th Congresses; ranking member, 114 th -115 th Congresses) S. Armed Services (112 th -116 th Congresses) S. Appropriations (113 th -116 th Congresses) S. Ethics (115 th -116 th Congress) SHALALA, DONNA. Democrat; Florida, 27 th District. Elected to the 116 th Congress. (served Jan. 3, 2019-present) Committee assignments: H. Education and Labor (116 th Congress) H. Rules (116 th Congress) SHEA-PORTER, CAROL, Democrat; New Hampshire, 1 st District. Elected to the 110 th , 111 th , 113 th , and 115 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 2007-Jan. 3, 2011; Jan. 3, 2013-Jan. 3, 2015; Jan. 3, 2017-Jan. 3, 2019) Committee assignments: H. Armed Services (110 th , 111 th , 113 th , 115 th Congresses) H. Education and Labor/ Education and the Workforce (110 th , 111 th , 115 th Congresses) H. Natural Resources (111 th , 113 th Congresses) SHEPHERD, KAREN. Democrat; Utah, 2 nd District. Elected to the 103 rd Congress. (served Jan. 3, 1993-Jan. 3, 1995) Committee assignments: H. Natural Resources (103 rd Congress) H. Public Works and Transportation (103 rd Congress) SHERRILL, MIKIE. Democrat; New Jersey, 11 th District. Elected to the 116 th Congress. (served Jan. 3, 2019-present) Committee assignments: H. Science, Space and Technology (116 th Congress) H. Armed Services (116 th Congress) SIMPSON, EDNA OAKES. Republican; Ohio, 28 th District. Elected to the 86 th Congress (served Jan. 3, 1959-Jan. 3, 1961). She succeeded her husband, Sidney Simpson, who died on Oct. 26, 1958. Committee assignments: H. Administration (86 th Congress) H. Interior and Insular Affairs (86 th Congress) SINEMA, KYRSTEN. Democrat; Arizona, 9 th District, and Senator. Elected to the 113 th -115 th Congresses. (served in House Jan. 3, 2013-Jan. 3, 2019) Subsequently elected to the Senate in 2018. (served in Senate Jan. 3, 2019-present) Committee assignment: H. Financial Services (113 th -115 th Congresses) S. Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (116 th Congress) S. Commerce, Science and Transportation (116 th Congress) S. Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (116 th Congress) S. Veterans' Affairs (116 th Congress) S. Special Aging (116 th Congress) SLAUGHTER, LOUISE MCINTOSH. Democrat; New York; 30 th District (100 th -102 nd Congresses); 28 th District (103 rd -112 th Congresses); 25 th District (113 th Congress-present). Elected to the 100 th -115 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1987, until her death March 16, 2018) Committee assignments: H. Government Operations (100 th -101 st Congresses) H. Public Works and Transportation (100 th -101 st Congresses) H. Select Aging (100 th -102 nd Congresses) H. Budget (102 nd -104 th Congresses) H. Government Reform and Oversight (104 th Congress) H. Rules (102 nd -115 th Congresses; chair, 110 th -111 th Congresses; ranking member, 109 th , 112 th -115 th Congresses) H. Homeland Security (108 th Congress) SLOTKIN, ELISSA. Democrat; Michigan, 8 th District. Elected to the 116 th Congress. (served Jan. 3, 2019-present) Committee assignments: H. Homeland Security (116 th Congress) H. Armed Services (116 th Congress) SMITH, LINDA. Republican; Washington, 3 rd District. Elected to the 104 th -105 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1995-Jan. 3, 1999) Committee assignments: H. Resources (104 th -105 th Congresses) H. Small Business (104 th -105 th Congresses) SMITH, MARGARET CHASE. Republican; Maine, 2 nd District, and Senator. Elected to the 76 th Congress in a June 3, 1940, special election to fill vacancy caused by death of husband, Clyde H. Smith; reelected to the 77 th -80 th Congresses (served in House June 10, 1940-Jan. 3, 1949). Subsequently elected to the Senate in 1948 and reelected in 1954, 1960, and 1966 (served in Senate Jan. 3, 1949-Jan. 3, 1973). Chair of the Senate Republican Conference, 1967-1972 (the highest Senate leadership post held by a woman). Committee assignments: H. Election of the President, Vice President, Representatives in Congress (76 th Congress) H. War Claims (76 th Congress) H. Revision of the Laws (76 th Congress) H. Invalid Pensions (76 th -77 th Congresses) H. Education (77 th Congress) H. Post Office and Post Roads (77 th Congress) H. Naval Affairs (78 th -79 th Congresses) H. Armed Services (80 th Congress) S. District of Columbia (81 st Congress) S. Expenditures in Executive Departments (81 st -82 nd Congresses) S. Rules and Administration (82 nd Congress) S. Select Senate Employees Compensation Rates (chair, 83 rd Congress) S. Appropriations (83 rd -92 nd Congresses) S. Armed Services (83 rd -92 nd Congresses; ranking member, 90 th -92 nd Congresses) S. Government Operations (83 rd -85 th Congresses) S. Aeronautical and Space Sciences (86 th -92 nd Congresses; ranking member, 88 th -91 st Congresses) SMITH, TINA. Democrat; Minnesota; Senator. Appointed to the Senate Dec. 13, 2017, to fill vacancy caused by resignation of Al Franken, reelected in 2018. (served Jan. 3, 2018-present) Committee assignments: S. Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry (115 th -116 th Congresses) S. Energy and Natural Resources (115 th Congress) S. Indian Affairs (115 th -116 th Congresses) Jt. Select Solvency Multiemployer Pension Plans (115 th Congress) S. Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (116 th Congress) S. Health, Education, Labor and Pensions (116 th Congress) SMITH, VIRGINIA. Republican; Nebraska, 3 rd District. Elected to the 94 th -101 st Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1975-Jan. 3, 1991) Committee assignments: H. Education and Labor (94 th Congress) H. Interior and Insular Affairs (94 th Congress) H. Appropriations (95 th -101 st Congresses) SNOWE, OLYMPIA J. Republican; Maine, 2 nd District, and Senator. Elected to the 96 th -103 rd Congresses (served in House Jan. 3, 1979-Jan. 3, 1995). Subsequently elected to the Senate in 1994 and reelected in 2000 and 2006. (served in Senate Jan. 3, 1995, to Jan. 3, 2013) Committee assignments: H. Government Operations (96 th Congress) H. Small Business (96 th -97 th Congresses) H. Select Committee on Aging (96 th -102 nd Congresses) H. Foreign Affairs (97 th -103 rd Congresses) Jt. Economic (98 th -102 nd Congresses) H. Budget (103 rd Congress) S. Budget (104 th -107 th Congresses) S. Commerce, Science, and Transportation (104 th -112 th Congresses) S. Foreign Relations (104 th Congress) S. Small Business and Entrepreneurship (104 th -112 th Congresses; chair, 108 th -109 th Congresses; ranking member, 110 th -112 th Congresses) S. Armed Services (105 th -106 th Congresses) S. Finance (107 th -112 th Congresses) S. Select Intelligence (108 th -112 th Congresses) SOLIS, HILDA. Democrat; California, 31 st District (107 th Congress) and 32 nd District (108 th -111 th Congresses). Elected to the 107 th -111 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 2001, until her resignation on Feb. 23, 2009, to become Secretary of Labor) Committee assignments: H. Education and the Workforce (107 th Congress) H. Resources/Natural Resources (107 th , 110 th Congresses) H. Energy and Commerce (108 th -110 th Congresses) H. Select Energy Independence and Global Warming (110 th Congress) SPANBERGER, ABIGAIL. Democrat; Virginia, 7 th District. Elected to the 116 th Congress. (served Jan. 3, 2019-present) Committee assignments: H. Agriculture (116 th Congress) H. Foreign Affairs (116 th Congress) SPEIER, JACKIE. Democrat; California, 12 th District (110 th -112 th Congresses); 14 th District (113 th Congress-present). Elected to the 110 th Congress in an April 8, 2008, special election to fill vacancy caused by death of Tom Lantos; reelected to the 111 th -116 th Congresses. (served April 10, 2008-present) Committee assignments: H. Financial Services (110 th -111 th Congresses) H. Oversight and Government Reform/Oversight and Reform (110 th -113 th , 116 th Congresses) H. Select Committee on Energy Independence and Global Warming (111 th Congress) H. Homeland Security (112 th Congress) H. Armed Services (112 th -116 th Congresses) H. Intelligence (114 th -116 th Congresses) SPELLMAN, GLADYS NOON. Democrat; Maryland, 5 th District. Elected to the 94 th -97 th Congresses. Began service Jan. 14, 1975. Unable to be sworn in to the 97 th Congress due to disability; seat declared vacant Feb. 24, 1981. Committee assignments: H. Banking, Currency, and Housing/Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs (94 th -96 th Congresses) H. Post Office and Civil Service (94 th -95 th Congresses) H. Democratic Steering and Policy (96 th Congress) STABENOW, DEBBIE. Democrat; Michigan, 8 th District, and Senator. Elected to the 105 th -106 th Congresses (served in House Jan. 3, 1997-Jan. 3, 2001). Subsequently elected to the Senate in 2000 and reelected in 2006, 2012, and 2018. (served in Senate Jan. 3, 2001-present) Committee assignments: H. Agriculture (105 th -106 th Congresses) H. Science (105 th -106 th Congresses) S. Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry (107 th -116 th Congresses; chair, 112 th -113 th Congresses, ranking member, 114 th -116 th Congresses) S. Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (107 th -109 th Congresses) S. Budget (107 th -116 th Congresses) S. Special Committee on Aging (107 th -108 th Congresses) S. Finance (110 th -116 th Congresses) S. Energy and Natural Resources (111 th -116 th Congresses) Jt. Taxation (114 th -116 th Congresses) STANLEY, WINIFRED CLAIRE. Republican; New York, At Large. Elected to the 78 th Congress. (served Jan. 3, 1943-Jan. 3, 1945) Committee assignments: H. Civil Service (78 th Congress) H. Patents (78 th Congress) STEFANIK, ELISE M. Republican; New York, 21 st District. Elected to the 114 th -116 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 2015-present) Committee assignments: H. Armed Services (114 th -116 th Congresses) H. Education and the Workforce /Education and Labor (114 th -116 th Congresses) H. Intelligence (115 th -116 th Congresses) STEVENS, HALEY. Democrat; Michigan, 11 th District. Elected to the 116 th Congress. (served Jan. 3, 2019-present) Committee assignments: H. Science, Space and Technology (116 th Congress) H. Education and Labor (116 th Congress) SULLIVAN, LEONOR KRETZER. Democrat; Missouri, 3 rd District. Elected to the 83 rd -94 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1953-Jan. 3, 1977) Committee assignments: H. Merchant Marine and Fisheries (83 rd Congress; 89 th -94 th Congresses; chair, 93 rd - 94 th Congresses) H. Banking and Currency (84 th -94 th Congresses) Jt. Committee on Defense Production (91 st -94 th Congresses) SUMNER, JESSIE. Republican; Illinois, 18 th District. Elected to the 76 th -79 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1939-Jan. 3, 1947) Committee assignment: H. Banking and Currency (76 th -79 th Congresses) SUTTON, BETTY. Democrat; Ohio, 13 th District. Elected to the 110 th -112 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 2007, to Jan. 3, 2013) Committee assignments: H. Budget (110 th Congress) H. Rules (110 th Congress) H. Energy and Commerce (111 th Congress) H. Armed Services (112 th Congress) H. Natural Resources (112 th Congress) TAUSCHER, ELLEN. Democrat; California, 10 th District. Elected to the 105 th -111 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1997, until her resignation on June 26, 2009) Committee assignments: H. National Security (105 th Congress) H. Science (105 th Congress) H. Armed Services (106 th -111 th Congresses) H. Transportation and Infrastructure (105 th -111 th Congresses) TENNEY, CLAUDIA. Republican; New York, 22 nd District. Elected to the 115 th Congress. (served Jan. 3, 2017-Jan. 3, 2019) Committee assignment: H. Financial Services (115 th Congress) THOMAS, LERA MILLARD. Democrat; Texas, 8 th District. Elected to the 89 th Congress in a March 26, 1966, special election to fill vacancy caused by death of husband, Albert Thomas. (served March 30, 1966-Jan. 3, 1967) Committee assignment: H. Merchant Marine and Fisheries (89 th Congress) THOMPSON, RUTH. Republican; Michigan, 9 th District. Elected to the 82 nd -84 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1951-Jan. 3, 1957) Committee assignments: H. Judiciary (82 nd -84 th Congresses) Jt. Committee on Immigration and Nationality Policy (84 th Congress) THURMAN, KAREN L. Democrat; Florida, 5 th District. Elected to the 103 rd -107 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1993-Jan. 3, 2003) Committee assignments: H. Agriculture (103 rd -104 th Congresses) H. Government Operations/Government Reform and Oversight (103 rd -104 th Congresses) H. Ways and Means (105 th -107 th Congresses) TITUS, DINA. Democrat; Nevada, 3 rd District (111 th Congress); 1 st District (113 th Congress-present). Elected to the 111 th and 113 th -116 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 2009-Jan. 3, 2011; Jan. 3, 2013-present) Committee assignments: H. Education and Labor (111 th Congress) H. Homeland Security (111 th , 116 th Congresses) H. Transportation and Infrastructure (111 th -116 th Congresses) H. Veterans' Affairs (113 th -114 th Congresses) H. Foreign Affairs (115 th -116 th Congresses) TLAIB, RASHIDA. Democrat; Michigan, 13 th District. Elected to the 116 th Congress. (served Jan. 3, 2019-present) Committee assignments: H. Oversight and Reform (116 th Congress) H. Financial Services (116 th Congress) TORRES, NORMA J. Democrat; California, 35 th District. Elected to the 114 th -116 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 2015-present) Committee assignments: H. Homeland Security (114 th Congress) H. Natural Resources (114 th -115 th Congresses) H. Foreign Affairs (115 th Congress) H. Rules (115 th -116 th Congresses) H. Appropriations (116 th Congress) TORRES SMALL, XOCHITL. Democrat; New Mexico, 2 nd District. Elected to the 116 th Congress. (served Jan. 3, 2019-present) Committee assignments: H. Homeland Security (116 th Congress) H. Armed Services (116 th Congress) TRAHAN, LORI. Democrat; Massachusetts, 3 rd District. Elected to the 116 th Congress. (served Jan. 3, 2019-present) Committee assignments: Education and Labor (116 th Congress) H. Armed Services (116 th Congress) TSONGAS, NIKI. Democrat; Massachusetts; 5 th District (110 th -112 th Congresses); 3 rd District (113 th Congress-present). Elected to the 110 th Congress in an Oct. 16, 2007, special election to fill vacancy caused by resignation of Martin Meehan; reelected to the 111 th -115 th Congresses. (served Oct. 18, 2007-Jan. 3, 2019) Committee assignments: H. Armed Services (110 th -115 th Congresses) H. Budget (110 th -111 th Congresses) H. Natural Resources (111 th -115 th Congresses) UNDERWOOD, LAUREN. Democrat; Illinois, 14 th District. Elected to the 116 th Congress. (served Jan. 3, 2019-present) Committee assignments: H. Homeland Security (116 th Congress) H. Veterans' Affairs (116 th Congress) H. Education and Labor (116 th Congress) UNSOELD, JOLENE. Democrat; Washington, 3 rd District. Elected to the 101 st -103 rd Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1989-Jan. 3, 1995) Committee assignments: H. Education and Labor (101 st -103 rd Congresses) H. Merchant Marine and Fisheries (101 st -103 rd Congresses) H. Select Aging (101 st -102 nd Congresses) VELÁZQUEZ, NYDIA M. Democrat; New York, 12 th District (103 rd -112 th Congresses); 7 th District (113 th District-present). Elected to the 103 rd -116 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1993-present) Chair of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus, 111 th Congress. Committee assignments: H. Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs/Banking and Financial Services/Financial Services (103 rd -116 th Congresses) H. Small Business (103 rd -115 th Congresses; chair, 110 th -111 th , 116 th Congresses; ranking member, 105 th -109 th , 112 th -115 th Congresses) H. Natural Resources (115 th -116 th Congresses) VUCANOVICH, BARBARA. Republican; Nevada, 2 nd District. Elected to the 98 th -104 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1983-Jan. 3, 1997) Committee assignments: H. Administration (98 th -101 st Congresses) H. Select Children, Youth, and Families (98 th -101 st Congresses) H. Interior and Insular Affairs (98 th -102 nd Congresses) H. Appropriations (102 nd -104 th Congresses) H. Natural Resources (103 rd Congress) WAGNER, ANN. Republican; Missouri, 2 nd District. Elected to the 113 th -116 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 2013-present) Committee assignments: H. Financial Services (113 th -116 th Congresses) H. Foreign Affairs (115 th -116 th Congress) WALDHOLTZ, ENID GREENE. Republican; Utah, 2 nd District. Elected to the 104 th Congress. (served Jan. 3, 1995-Jan. 3, 1997) Committee assignment: H. Rules (104 th Congress) WALORSKI, JACKIE. Republican; Indiana, 2 nd District. Elected to the 113 th -116 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 2013-present) Committee assignments: H. Armed Services (113 th -114 th Congresses) H. Budget (113 th Congress) H. Veterans' Affairs (113 th -114 th Congresses) H. Agriculture (114 th Congress) H. Ways and Means (115 th -116 th Congresses) WALTERS, MIMI. Republican; California, 45 th District. Elected to the 114 th -115 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 2015-Jan. 3, 2019) Committee assignments: H. Judiciary (114 th Congress) H. Transportation and Infrastructure (114 th Congress) H. Energy and Commerce (115 th Congress) H. Ethics (115 th Congress) WARREN, ELIZABETH. Democrat; Massachusetts; Senator. Elected in 2012 and reelected in 2018. (served Jan. 3, 2013-present) Committee assignments: S. Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (113 th -116 th Congresses) S. Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (113 th -116 th Congresses) S. Special Aging (113 th -116 th Congresses) S. Energy and Natural Resources (114 th Congress) S. Armed Services (115 th -116 th Congresses) WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, DEBBIE. Democrat, Florida, 20 th District (109 th -112 th Congresses); 23 rd District (113 th Congress-present). Elected to the 109 th -116 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 2005-present) Committee assignments: H. Financial Services (109 th Congress) Jt. Library (110 th -111 th Congresses) H. Appropriations (110 th -111 th Congresses; 113 th -116 th Congresses) H. Judiciary (110 th -112 th Congress, first session) H. Budget (112 th , 115 th Congresses) H. Oversight and Reform (116 th Congress) WATERS, MAXINE. Democrat; California, 29 th District (102 nd Congress), 35 th District (103 rd -112 th Congresses) and 43 rd District (113 th Congress-present). Elected to the 102 nd -116 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1991-present) Chair, Congressional Black Caucus, 105 th Congress. Committee assignments: H. Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs/Banking and Financial Services/ Financial Services (102 nd -116 th Congresses; ranking member, 113 th -115 th Congresses; chair, 116 th Congress) H. Veterans' Affairs (102 nd -104 th Congresses) H. Small Business (103 rd -104 th Congresses) H. Judiciary (105 th -112 th Congresses) WATSON, DIANE. Democrat; California, 32 nd District (107 th Congress) and 33 rd District (108 th -111 th Congresses). Elected to the 107 th Congress in a June 5, 2001, special election to fill vacancy caused by death of Julian Dixon; reelected to the 108 th -111 th Congresses. (served June 7, 2001-Jan. 3, 2011) Committee assignments: H. Government Reform/Oversight and Government Reform (107 th -111 th Congresses) H. International Relations/Foreign Affairs (107 th -111 th Congresses) WATSON COLEMAN, BONNIE. Democrat; New Jersey, 12 th District. Elected to the 114 th -116 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 2015-present) Committee assignments: H. Homeland Security (114 th -116 th Congresses) H. Oversight and Government Reform (114 th -115 th Congresses) H. Appropriations (116 th Congress) WEIS, JESSICA McCULLOUGH. Republican; New York, 38 th District. Elected to the 86 th -87 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1959-Jan. 3, 1963) Committee assignments: H. District of Columbia (86 th -87 th Congresses) H. Government Operations (86 th Congress) H. Science and Astronautics (87 th Congress) WEXTON, JENNIFER. Democrat, Virginia, 10 th District. Elected to the 116 th Congress. (served Jan. 3, 2019-present) Committee assignments: H. Science, Space and Technology (116 th Congress) H. Financial Services (116 th Congress) WILD, SUSAN. Democrat, Pennsylvania, 15 th District (115 th Congress); 7 th District (116 th Congress). Elected to the 115 th Congress in a Nov. 6, 2018 special election to fill vacancy caused by resignation of Charlie Dent; subsequently elected to the 116 th Congress. (served Nov. 27, 2018-present) Committee assignments: None in 115 th Congress H. Foreign Affairs (116 th Congress) H. Education and Labor (116 th Congress) H. Ethics (116 th Congress) WILSON, FREDERICA. Democrat; Florida; 17 th District (112 th Congress), 24 th District (113 th Congress-present). Elected to the 112 th -116 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 2011-present) Committee assignments: H. Foreign Affairs (112 th Congress) H. Science, Space and Technology (112 th -113 th Congresses) H. Education and the Workforce (114 th -116 th Congresses) H. Transportation and Infrastructure (115 th -116 th Congresses) WILSON, HEATHER. Republican; New Mexico, 1 st District. Elected to the 105 th Congress in a June 23, 1998, special election to fill vacancy caused by death of Steven Schiff; reelected to the 106 th -110 th Congresses. (served June 25, 1998-Jan. 3, 2009) Committee assignments: H. Commerce (105 th -106 th Congresses) H. Intelligence (106 th Congress; 109 th -110 th Congresses) H. Armed Services (107 th -108 th Congresses) H. Energy and Commerce (107 th -110 th Congresses) WINGO, EFFIGENE LOCKE. Democrat; Arkansas, 4 th District. Elected to the 71 st Congress Nov. 4, 1930, to fill vacancy caused by death of husband, Otis Wingo, and to the 72 nd Congress. (served Dec. 1, 1930-March 3, 1933) Committee assignments: H. Accounts (71 st Congress) H. Insular Affairs (71 st Congress) H. Foreign Affairs (72 nd Congress) WOODHOUSE, CHASE GOING. Democrat; Connecticut, 2 nd District. Elected to the 79 th and 81 st Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1945-Jan. 3, 1947, and Jan. 3, 1949-Jan. 3, 1951) Committee assignments: H. Banking and Currency (79 th , 81 st Congresses) H. Administration (81 st Congress) WOOLSEY, LYNN. Democrat; California, 6 th District. Elected to the 103 rd -112 th Congresses. (served Jan. 3, 1993-Jan. 3, 2013) Committee assignments: H. Budget (103 rd -105 th Congresses) H. Education and Labor/Economic and Educational Opportunities/Education and the Workforce (103 rd -112 th Congresses) H. Government Operations (103 rd Congress) H. Science/Science and Technology/Science, Space and Technology (106 th -112 th Congresses) H. Foreign Affairs (110 th Congress)

In total 365 women have been elected or appointed to Congress, 247 Democrats and 118 Republicans. These figures include six nonvoting Delegates, one each from Guam, Hawaii, the District of Columbia, and American Samoa, and two from the U.S. Virgin Islands, as well as one Resident Commissioner from Puerto Rico. Of these 365 women, there have been 309 (211 Democrats, 98 Republicans) women elected only to the House of Representatives; 40 (25 Democrats, 15 Republicans) women elected or appointed only to the Senate; and 16 (11 Democrats, 5 Republicans) women who have served in both houses. A record 131 women currently serve in the 116th Congress. Of these 131 women, there are 25 in the Senate (17 Democrats and 8 Republicans); 102 Representatives in the House (89 Democrats and 13 Republicans); and 4 women in the House (2 Democrats and 2 Republicans) who serve as Delegates or Resident Commissioner, representing the District of Columbia, American Samoa, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico. This report includes brief biographical information, committee assignments, dates of service, district information, and listings by Congress and state, and (for Representatives) congressional districts of the 365 women who have been elected or appointed to Congress. It will be updated when there are relevant changes in the makeup of Congress. For additional information, including a discussion of the impact of women in Congress as well as historical information, including the number and percentage of women in Congress over time, data on entry to Congress, comparisons to international and state legislatures, tenure, firsts for women in Congress, women in leadership, and African American, Asian Pacific American, and Hispanic women in Congress, see CRS Report R43244, Women in Congress: Statistics and Brief Overview, by Jennifer E. Manning and Ida A. Brudnick.

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Introduction In academic year (AY) 2017-2018, 6,700 institutions of higher education (IHEs), enrolling over 27 million postsecondary education students in AY2016-2017, participated in the federal student aid programs authorized under Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA; P.L. 89-329, as amended). These IHEs ranged in sector, size, and educational programs offered. They comprised all sectors (i.e., public, private nonprofit, and proprietary), with some IHEs enrolling as few as three students and others enrolling over 190,000 in a single year. Offered educational programs varied from certificate programs in career and technical fields to doctoral and professional degree programs. Most of these IHEs operate from year to year with few severe financial or operational concerns; however, each year, a few do face such concerns, which may cause them to cease or significantly curtail operations. The recent closure of multiple large, proprietary (or private, for-profit) IHEs has brought into focus the extent to which a postsecondary student's education may be disrupted by a school closure. However, even in instances of a small IHE's closure, student concerns remain the same. Concerns include the following, among others: Can they continue their postsecondary education at another school? How will they finance future postsecondary educational pursuits? Are they liable for repaying loans they may have borrowed to pursue a postsecondary credential that they were unable to obtain because of an IHE's closure? This report provides an explanation of the options a postsecondary student may pursue in the event the IHE he or she attends closes, any financial relief that may be available to such students, and other practical implications for students following a school's closure. First, this report describes the academic options available to such students, such as participating in a teach-out or transferring to a new IHE. Next, it discusses issues related to financing a postsecondary education, including the extent to which borrowers may have any loans borrowed to finance educational expenses discharged due to a school closure and whether future financial assistance, including federal student loans, Pell Grants, and GI educational benefits, may be available to students should they decide to continue their postsecondary education at another IHE. This report then describes additional relief that may be available to students who attended IHEs that closed, such as the potential to have tuition paid reimbursed through a state tuition recovery fund. Finally, this report describes some potential income tax implications for students when their IHE has closed, including the extent to which they may incur a federal income tax liability for loans discharged and whether higher education tax credits remain available to them in future years. The Appendix provides a list of abbreviations used in this report. Academic Options and Consequences In the event of a school closure, currently enrolled students must consider their academic options, including whether they will continue pursuing their postsecondary education, and if so, where. Two options that may be available to students include teach-outs and credit transfer. Teach-Out Plans and Agreements To participate in the Title IV federal student aid programs, an IHE must, among other requirements, agree to submit a teach-out plan to its accrediting agency if it intends to close a location that provides 100% of at least one educational program offered by the IHE or if it intends to otherwise cease operations. As part of a teach-out plan, an IHE may enter into a teach-out agreement with another IHE to provide the closing IHE's students with an educational program of similar content. Teach-Out Plans A teach-out plan is an institution's "written plan that provides for the equitable treatment of students if [the IHE] ceases to operate before all students have completed their program of study." Accrediting agencies establish the criteria IHEs must meet when submitting a teach-out plan; thus, there are no standard components of a teach-out plan. Typically, however, in a teach-out plan, an IHE may be required to include provisions for students to complete their programs of study within a reasonable amount of time, a communication plan to affected parties (e.g., faculty and students) informing them of the impending closure, and information on how students may access their institutional records. Teach-Out Agreements As part of a teach-out plan, an IHE may enter into a teach-out agreement with another IHE. A teach-out agreement is an agreement between the closing IHE and another IHE that provides the closing IHE's students with a reasonable opportunity to complete their programs of study at the new IHE. Teach-out agreements are used when an IHE ceases operations before all of its enrolled students are able to complete their programs of study. Under a teach-out agreement, the new IHE must provide students with an educational program that is of an acceptable quality and reasonably similar in content, structure, and scheduling to that provided by the closing IHE; be accredited or preaccredited by a Department of Education (ED) recognized accrediting agency, remain stable, carry out its mission, and meet all obligations to its current students; and demonstrate that it can provide students with access to its services without requiring students to move or travel a substantial distance. In addition, teach-out agreements may establish the cost of attendance for students being taught out. When implemented, teach-out agreements may take a variety of forms. For instance, a teach-out agreement may provide that the teach-out institution will provide the faculty and student supports necessary to deliver the closing IHE's educational programs at the closing IHE's facilities for the remainder of the academic year in which the closing IHE ceases operations. In other instances, a teach-out agreement may provide educational programs to the closing IHE's students at the teach-out IHE's facilities. In the event an IHE closes without a teach-out plan or agreement in place, the IHE's accrediting agency must work with ED and appropriate state agencies to assist students in finding opportunities to complete their postsecondary education. Credit Transfer In lieu of a teach-out, students of closed IHEs may be able to continue their postsecondary education by transferring some or all of the credits earned at the closed IHE to another IHE. In general, credit transfer is the process of one institution (the accepting institution) measuring a student's prior learning (typically via coursework) at another institution (the sending institution) and comparing that prior learning against educational offerings at the accepting institution. The accepting institution determines whether a student's prior learning meets its standards and whether the prior learning is applicable to its educational programs. If it determines the prior learning meets its standards, the accepting institutions gives credit toward its educational programs for the prior learning, such that a student transferring credits need not repeat all or part of a program's curriculum. Transfer-of-credit policies are determined by individual IHEs. To smooth the credit transfer process, some IHEs have entered into articulation agreements. Articulation agreements are agreements between two or more IHEs demonstrating that a student's prior learning from a sending IHE meets the accepting IHE's standards. Typically, they guarantee acceptance of at least some credits earned at the sending institution by the accepting institution. The HEA does not require Title IV participating IHEs to maintain transfer-of-credit policies nor does it specify requirements for transfer-of-credit policies for IHEs that do have them. The HEA does, however, require that Title IV participating IHEs make publicly available any transfer-of-credit policies they may have in place. In disclosing transfer-of-credit policies, accepting IHEs must include information on the criteria the institution uses in evaluating credit transfers, and all institutions that are parties to articulation agreements must disclose a list of IHEs with which it has articulation agreements. Students who attended a closed IHE may decide to continue their postsecondary education at another IHE and may wish to transfer credits earned at the closed IHE to the new IHE. Typically, students must initiate the credit-transfer process by expressing interest in transferring credit to another IHE. The IHE would then inform the student of next steps the student must take to enroll. Because IHEs set their own credit transfer criteria, credit transfer may not be guaranteed. Thus, some students may have all or a large proportion of their previously earned credits transferred to an accepting IHE and may experience little to no disruption or delay in their postsecondary educational pursuits, while others may have few or no credits transferred to an accepting IHE and may experience significant disruptions and delays in their postsecondary education. In addition, a student may incur greater financial obligations (e.g., student loans) if he or she must repeat coursework because credit from the closed school did not transfer. Finally, students who successfully transfer some or all of their previously earned credits would be required to meet the accepting IHE's satisfactory academic progress (SAP) policies to maintain eligibility to receive Title IV funds at the accepting IHE. IHEs may establish their own SAP policies, but these policies must meet minimum federal standards, which must establish a minimum grade point average (or equivalent) and a maximum time frame in which students must complete their education program (pace of completion). Only transfer credits that count toward a student's educational program at the accepting IHE are included in the accepting IHE's calculation of SAP. Thus, if a student is unable to transfer any credits from a closed IHE to another IHE, the student's previously earned credits will not count toward the accepting IHE's SAP calculation and would not have the potential to affect the student's aid eligibility with respect to SAP at the new IHE. However, should some or all of a student's previously earned credits from a closed IHE transfer to another IHE, depending on the accepting IHE's specific SAP policy, a student's Title IV eligibility may be affected such that he or she may not be meeting the IHE's SAP policies and thus may be ineligible for Title IV aid at the accepting IHE. Financial Options and Consequences Along with considering academic options in the event of a school closure, students may also need to consider the financial options available to them, as they may have received financial assistance to help finance their education at the closed school and may need to seek financial assistance should they decide to continue pursuing a postsecondary education. Considerations for students who borrowed funds (or parents who borrowed funds on behalf of a student) to finance their education at a closed school include whether they are responsible for repaying any loans borrowed to attend the school. Considerations for students who wish to continue their education at another IHE include the extent to which their eligibility for various forms of financial aid (e.g., Direct Loans, Pell Grants, GI Bill Educational Benefits) may be affected by their previous use of those benefits at the closed school. Loan Discharge In some instances, individuals who borrowed funds to finance postsecondary education expenses may be provided some relief from being required to repay their loans, depending on the type of loan they seek to have discharged and specific borrower circumstances. Federal Student Loans Students who attended a school that closed (or the parents of students who attend a school that closed) may have borrowed federal student loans to help finance their postsecondary education at the closed school. For HEA Title IV federal student loans (i.e., loans made under the Direct Loan [DL], Federal Family Education Loan [FFEL], and Perkins Loan programs), borrowers may be provided some relief from being required to repay their federal student loans through a closed school loan discharge. In addition, borrowers who are ineligible for a closed school loan discharge may, in certain circumstances, seek debt relief on their Title IV student loans by asserting a borrower defense to repayment (BDR) for certain acts or omissions of an IHE, if the cause of action directly relates to the loan or educational services for which the loan was provided. The availability of a BDR claim may be closely related to a school's closure, as oftentimes, a BDR claim is predicated on misleading representations of an IHE relating to the educational services provided, and in recent years allegations of misrepresentation have played a part in the ultimate closure of some IHEs. Previously, regulatory provisions addressed closed school discharge standards and procedures. They also addressed BDR standards and procedures, but in a somewhat limited manner. On November 1, 2016, ED promulgated new regulations (hereinafter, "the 2016 regulations") intended to create a more robust set of standards and streamlined procedures for assessing BDR claims and to make some changes to the closed school discharge procedures. These regulations were scheduled to take effect on July 1, 2017, but prior to the effective date, ED issued a Final Rule establishing July 1, 2019, as the new effective date for the regulations. Following a series of lawsuits, however, a court vacated the delay of the 2016 regulations. The 2016 regulations went into effect October 16, 2018, and ED is currently working to fully implement the 2016 regulations. On July 31, 2018, ED issued a new Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to revise the BDR standards. A Final Rule has not yet been issued, and it appears that the potential new BDR regulations would not go into effect until at least July 2020. The following section of the report describes the closed school discharge and BDR regulations, as in effect on October 16, 2018. Closed School Loan Discharge Students who attended a school that closed (or their parents) may be eligible to have the full balance of the outstanding HEA Title IV loans they borrowed to attend the IHE discharged. In general, borrowers of Title IV loans may be eligible to have the full balance of their outstanding HEA Title IV loans discharged (including any accrued interest and collection costs) if they, or the student on whose behalf a parent borrowed in the case of Parent PLUS Loans, are unable to complete the program in which they enrolled due to the closure of the school. Borrowers who have their loans discharged due to a school closure are also eligible to be reimbursed for any amounts previously paid or collected on those loans, and if any adverse credit history was associated with the loan (e.g., default), the loan discharge will be reported to credit bureaus so that they may delete the adverse credit history associated with the loan. Closed School Loan Discharge Eligibility Typically, to be eligible for loan discharge due to school closure, a student must have been enrolled in an IHE when it closed or must have withdrawn from the IHE within 120 days prior to its closure. In addition, the student must have been unable to complete his or her program of study at the closed school or in a comparable program at another IHE, either through a teach-out agreement or by transferring any credits to another IHE. If the closing school offers the option for students to complete their education through a teach-out agreement with another IHE, a student may refuse the option, and the borrower may still qualify for loan discharge. However, in general, a borrower may not qualify for a closed school discharge in the following scenario: a student refuses the teach-out, later enrolls at another IHE in a program comparable to the one in which he or she had been enrolled, receives t ransfer credit for work completed at the closed school, and completes the program at the new IHE. Alternatively, if a student transfers credits to a new school but completes an entirely different program of study at the new school, then the borrower is eligible for loan discharge, regardless of the fact that some credits from the closed IHE may have transferred to the new IHE. This is because the program at the new school is entirely different than the one for which the loans were intended at the previous school. Finally, to obtain discharge a borrower must cooperate with ED in any judicial or administrative proceeding brought by ED to recover amounts discharged from the school. If a borrower fails to cooperate with ED, the loan discharge may be revoked. Closed School Loan Discharge Procedures Borrowers may have their loans discharged in one of two ways: (1) by applying for a closed school loan discharge or (2) by having their loans automatically discharged by the Secretary of Education (the Secretary). Borrowers applying for a closed school discharge must fill out the closed school loan discharge application and return it to their loan servicer. Generally, while a borrower's loan discharge application is being considered, the borrower's loan is placed in forbearance until a discharge decision is made. Under forbearance, a borrower is able to temporarily stop making payments or reduce the monthly payments on his or her federal student loans. During this time, interest continues to accrue on both subsidized and unsubsidized loans. In addition, collections on an eligible defaulted loan cease, although a borrower may continue to make payments on the loan. Borrowers may initiate the closed school loan discharge process on their own; however, the Secretary is required to identify all borrowers who may be eligible for a closed school discharge upon a school's closure and mail to each borrower a discharge application and an explanation of qualifications and procedures for obtaining a discharge, if the borrower's address is known. After the Secretary sends notice to a borrower, the Secretary suspends any effort to collect a borrower's defaulted loans. The borrower then has 60 days in which to submit a closed school discharge application. If the borrower fails to submit such an application within the 60-day time frame, the Secretary resumes collections and again provides the borrower with another discharge application and an explanation of qualifications and procedures for obtaining a discharge. Should a borrower not submit a closed school discharge application within the 60-day time frame, he or she may still submit a closed school discharge application at any time for consideration. Alternatively, a borrower's loans will be automatically discharged by the Secretary, if with respect to schools that closed on or after November 1, 2013, the Secretary determines that the borrower did not subsequently reenroll in any Title IV eligible institution within three years after the school closed. A borrower's loans also may be automatically discharged if the Secretary determines the borrower qualifies for the discharge based on information within ED's possession. Relief Provided If a borrower receives a closed school discharge, the full balance of the outstanding Title IV loan borrowed to attend the IHE is discharged and the borrower is qualified to be reimbursed for any amounts previously paid or collected on those loans. In addition, for loans that were considered in default, ED is to consider such loans not in default following discharge, and the borrower is to regain eligibility to receive additional Title IV assistance. Finally, ED is to update reports to consumer reporting agencies so that they may delete any adverse credit history associated with the loan. Borrower Defense to Repayment Even if borrowers who attended a closed school are ineligible for a closed school loan discharge, they may, in certain circumstances, seek debt relief on their Title IV student loans by asserting a borrower defense to repayment (BDR) certain acts or omissions of an IHE, if the cause of action directly relates to the loan or educational services for which the loan was provided. The availability of a BDR claim may be closely related to a school's closure, as oftentimes, a BDR claim is predicated on misleading representations of an IHE relating to the educational services provided, and in recent years, allegations of misrepresentation have played a part in the ultimate closure of some IHEs. Whether a borrower may seek this type of relief depends on the type of Title IV loan borrowed. The standard under which a BDR may be reviewed also depends on the type of Title IV loan borrowed and when the loan was disbursed. Newly promulgated BDR procedures apply to many, but not all, BDR claims and vary depending on the type of Title IV loan. If a borrower's BDR is successful, ED is to determine the amount of debt relief to which the borrower is entitled, which can include relief from repaying all or part of the outstanding loan balance and reimbursement for previous amounts paid toward or collected on the loan. Additionally, if an adverse credit history was associated with the loan (e.g., default), the loan discharge is to be reported to credit bureaus so that they may delete the adverse credit history associated with the loan. Applicable Borrower Defense to Repayment Standards The HEA specifies that Direct Loan borrowers may assert as a defense to repayment certain "acts or omissions of an institution of higher education." Although this statutory language is specific to Direct Loans, implementing regulations have expanded the instances in which a borrower of a non-Direct Loan may assert a BDR claim. Thus, loans that are potentially eligible for discharge under a BDR claim include Direct Loan program loans and Federal Family Education Loan program loans and Perkins Loans program loans, if they are first consolidated into a Direct Consolidation Loan. In addition, even if a FFEL program loan is not consolidated into a Direct Consolidation Loan, FFEL program regulations specify instances in which a FFEL program loan may not be legally enforceable, such that a borrower need not repay it. ED has stated that the claims a borrower could bring as a defense against repayment under the FFEL program are the same as the pre-July 1, 2017, standards (discussed later in this report) that could be brought under the DL program. Perkins Loan program loans that are not consolidated into Direct Consolidation Loans may not assert a BDR claim. In general, two separate BDR standards may be applied to eligible student loans under the Direct Loan program regulations. For eligible loans made prior to July 1, 2017, a borrower may assert as a defense to repayment an IHE's acts or omissions that "would give rise to a cause of action against the school under applicable State law," and the IHE's acts or omissions must relate to the making of the loan for enrollment at the IHE or the provision of educational services for which the loan was provided (hereinafter, "pre-July 1, 2017, standard"). For eligible loans made on or after July 1, 2017, a borrower may assert as a defense to repayment one of the following, as it relates to the making of a borrower's loan for enrollment at the IHE or the provision of the educational services for which the loan was made (hereinafter, "post-July 1, 2017, standard"): A substantial misrepresentation by an IHE that the borrower "reasonably relied on to the borrower's detriment when the borrower decided to attend, or to continue attending, the school" or decided to take out certain loans; A nondefault, contested state or federal court judgment against an IHE; or A breach of contract by an IHE, where an IHE failed to perform obligations under the terms of a contract with a student, such as the provision of specific programs or services. As indicated above, the BDR standard applied in a borrower's case may depend to a large extent on the date on which a borrower's loans were disbursed. However, other considerations that relate to the type of federal student loan made also play a role in determining which BDR standard may apply in a borrower's case. In general, for DL program loans not paid off through a Direct Consolidation Loan, the BDR standard used would depend on the date on which a borrower's loans were disbursed. For FFEL program loans not paid off through a Direct Consolidation Loan, the pre-July 1, 2017, standard would apply. For DL program loans paid off through a Direct Consolidation Loan, the BDR standard used would depend on the date on which the underlying Direct Loan was disbursed. For eligible non-DL program loans paid off through a Direct Consolidation Loan, the BDR standard used would depend on the date on which the Direct Consolidation Loan was made. Direct Consolidation Loans comprising underlying loans disbursed both before and after July 1, 2017, would necessarily have been disbursed after July 1, 2017. Thus, in this scenario, the post-July 1, 2017, standard would apply to any eligible non-DL program loans paid off through the Direct Consolidation Loan and either the pre- or post-July 1, 2017, standard would apply to any Direct Loans paid off through the Direct Consolidation Loan, depending on the date the underlying Direct Loan was disbursed. Table 1 depicts the BDR standard that would be applied in a BDR proceeding based on type of federal student loan at issue and the date on which the loan was disbursed. BDR Procedures Regulations establish two separate processes through which a BDR claim may be asserted on a borrower's DL program loans: an individual claim process and a group claim process. This section of the report describes the 2016 regulations' BDR procedures for DL program loans (including Direct Consolidation Loans that repaid eligible non-DL program loans for which a borrower asserts a BDR claim) under which BDR claims may be more likely to be asserted, as DL program borrowers account for approximately 80% of all borrowers with outstanding Title IV loans. The procedures described herein would not apply to ED-owned FFEL program loans or to FFEL programs loans held by private and state-based entities that are not consolidated into Direct Consolidation Loans. For such ED-owned FFEL program loans, ED would review and adjudicate any BDR claims. For such FFEL program loans not owned by ED, BDR claims procedures may vary by loan holder. To assert a BDR claim as an individual, a borrower must submit a BDR application, which among other items requires the borrower to provide evidence that supports his or her BDR claim. Upon receipt of the application and while the BDR claim is evaluated, ED places any nondefaulted Direct Loans into forbearance and ceases collections on defaulted loans. If a borrower with a FFEL program loan files a BDR claim with ED, ED notifies the lender or loan holder, as appropriate. The lender places the loan in forbearance in yearly increments, and the loan holder ceases collection on any defaulted loans while a borrower's BDR claim is being evaluated. If ED determines that the borrower would be eligible for relief if he or she consolidated the FFEL program loan into a Direct Consolidation Loan, the borrower would then be able to consolidate the loan into a Direct Consolidation Loan and receive BDR relief. If ED determines that the borrower would not qualify for BDR, then the loan is removed from forbearance or collections resume, as appropriate. To determine whether an individual qualifies for BDR relief, the Secretary designates an ED official to review the borrower's application and resolves the claim through a fact-finding process. As part of that process, ED notifies the IHE against which the BDR claim is asserted and reviews any evidence submitted by the borrower and other relevant information, such as ED records and any submissions from the IHE. After the fact-finding process, the ED official issues a written decision on the claim. If the claim is approved in full or in part, ED notifies the borrower of the relief provided. If the claim is denied in full or in part, ED notifies the borrower of the reason for the denial, along with other relevant information. The decision made by the ED official is "final as to the merits of the claim and any relief that may be granted on the claim." However, if the borrower's claim is denied in full or in part, the borrower may request that ED reconsider his or her claim upon the identification of new evidence. In addition, ED may reopen a BDR application at any time to consider evidence that was not considered in the previous decision. Regulations also establish a group process for BDR claims. Under these procedures, upon consideration of factors such as a common set of facts and claims or fiscal impact, the Secretary may initiate a process to determine whether a group of borrowers has a BDR claim. ED may identify members for a group BDR claim by either consolidating applications filed by individuals in the above-described process that have common facts and claims or by determining that there are common facts and claims that apply to borrowers who have not filed individual applications. Loans of borrowers who have filed individual claims that are consolidated into a group BDR claim remain in forbearance or suspended collections as described above, and loans of identified group members who have not filed individual claims are placed in forbearance or suspended collections as described above. ED notifies identified group members of the group proceeding and informs them that they may opt out of the group proceeding. ED also notifies the school against which the group BDR claim is asserted. For the fact-finding portion of a group BDR claim, one set of procedures applies to a BDR claim relating to loans made to attend a school that has closed and from which there is no financial protection or other entity that ED may recover losses from associated with the BDR claims. Another set of fact-finding procedures applies to BDR claims relating to loans made to attend a school that has closed and for which there are financial protections or other entities from which ED may recover losses associated with BDR claims, or that is open. If the claim relates to loans made to attend a school that has closed and for which there is no financial protections or entities against ED may recover, a hearing official considers any evidence and arguments presented by ED on behalf of the group, along with any additional information such as ED records or responses from the school that the ED official considers necessary. After the fact-finding process, the ED official issues a written decision on the claim. As with the individual claims process, if the group claim is approved in full or in part, ED notifies the borrowers of the relief provided. If the claim is denied in full or in part, ED notifies the borrowers of the reason for the denial, along with other relevant information. The decision made by the ED official is "final as to the merits of the group borrower defense and any relief that may be granted on the group claim." However, if relief for the group has been denied in full or in part, an individual borrower may file a claim for individual relief as previously described. In addition, ED may reopen a BDR application at any time to consider evidence that was not considered in the previous decision. Group BDR procedures for a claim that relates to loans made to attend a closed school for which there are financial protections or entities from which ED may recover losses or to loans made to attend an open school are substantially similar to those procedures for group BDR claims for closed schools without financial protections described above. However, in addition to the above-described procedures, the IHE against which the claim is brought is given the opportunity to present evidence and arguments during the fact-finding process. In addition, the school or the ED official who presented the group's BDR claims may appeal the decision of the hearing official within 30 days after the decision is issued and received by the school and the ED official. Should an appeal be made, the hearing official's decision does not take effect pending the appeal. The Secretary issues a final decision on the appealed claim. If relief for the group has been denied in full or in part, and after a final decision has been made (either following an appeal by the school or the ED official or after 30 days from the hearing official's decision have passed), an individual borrower may file a claim for individual relief as previously described. Additionally, ED may reopen a BDR application at any time to consider evidence that was not considered in the previous decision. Finally, to obtain relief a borrower must cooperate with ED in the relevant individual or group BDR proceeding. If a borrower fails to cooperate with ED, the relief may be revoked. Relief Provided Regulations specify the relief that may be afforded to a borrower who, as an individual or as part of a group, successfully asserts a BDR. This section of the report focuses on BDR relief available to borrowers with DL program loans, including Direct Consolidation Loans that repaid eligible non-DL program loans. However, it should be noted that borrowers of FFEL program loans that have not been consolidated into Direct Consolidation Loans are eligible to have all or part of their loan discharged, and may be eligible to be reimbursed for payments previously paid toward or collected on the loans if certain conditions are met. Borrowers of Perkins Loans are ineligible for BDR relief unless they first consolidate their loans into a Direct Consolidation Loan. For Direct Loans, if a borrower defense is approved, ED (either the ED official in an individual BDR claim or the hearing official in the group BDR claim) determines the appropriate amount of relief to award the borrower. Relief provided can include a discharge of all or part of the loan amounts owed to ED on the loan at issue. A borrower may also be eligible to have all or part of amounts previously paid toward or collected on his or her loan reimbursed by ED. Payments made or collections on Direct Loans, including Direct Consolidation Loans that repaid eligible non-DL program loans, are reimbursable by ED if the borrower asserted the BDR claim within the applicable statute of limitations and the payments were made directly to ED. Reimbursements are to equal the amount by which the payments or collections on the loans (or portion of the loan in the case of Direct Consolidation Loans to which a BDR claim applied to some, but not all, of the underlying loans) exceed the amount of the loan that was not discharged. To calculate the amount of relief to be provided, ED takes into account a variety of factors, depending on the basis on which the BDR claim was brought. Substantial m isrepresentation : ED is to factor the borrower's cost of attendance to attend the IHE, the value of the education the borrower received, the value of the education that a reasonable borrower in the borrower's circumstances would have received, the value of the education the borrower should have expected given the information provided to the borrower by the school, and/or any other relevant factors. Court judgment against the IHE : If the judgment provides specific financial relief, ED will provide the unsatisfied amount of relief. If the judgment does not provide specific financial relief, ED "will rely on the holding of the case and applicable law to monetize the judgment." Breach of contract by the IHE : ED is to determine relief "based on the common law of contracts" and other reasonable considerations. In addition to monetary relief, other relief, as appropriate, may be provided to a borrower. Such relief may include, but is not limited to, determining that the borrower is not in default on his or her loan and is eligible to receive additional Title IV assistance and updating reports to consumer reporting agencies so that they may delete any adverse credit history associated with the loan. Teacher Education Assistance for College and Higher Education Grants (TEACH Grants) TEACH Grant recipients whose TEACH Grants have converted into a Direct Loan for failure to complete TEACH Grant service requirements may seek relief under either a closed school discharge or a successful BDR. Program regulations specify that for individuals who do not complete the program's teaching service requirements, the TEACH Grant converts into a DL and the individual "is eligible for all of the benefits of the Direct Loan Program." Thus, so long as an individual meets all applicable closed school discharge or BDR criteria, they may be provided relief from repaying a TEACH Grant that has converted into a DL. Private Education Loans In some instances, students who attended a closed school may have borrowed private education loans to help finance their postsecondary education at the closed school. Private education loans are nonfederal loans made to a student to help finance the cost of their postsecondary education. Unlike federal student loans, which have statutorily prescribed terms and conditions that are typically uniform in nature, private education loan terms and conditions are primarily governed by market conditions that may vary greatly, depending on a variety of factors such as the lender, the borrower's creditworthiness, and the market. Thus, the extent to which a private education loan borrower may be provided relief from the requirement to repay their loans may largely depend on the individual private education loan's terms and conditions. Relief for Pell Grant Recipients96 Pell Grant recipients who attended an IHE that closed may have some portion of their Pell eligibility restored. All Pell Grant recipients are subject to a cumulative lifetime eligibility cap on Pell Grant aid equal to 12 full-time semesters (or the equivalent). The HEA exempts from a student's lifetime eligibility cap the period of attendance at an IHE at which a student was unable to complete a course of study because the IHE closed. ED uses its information technology systems to adjust Pell eligibility for those students who attended a closed school and were not reported as having "graduated" from that school. Following an adjustment, ED notifies students of the adjustment. GI Bill Educational Assistance Benefits99 GI Bill entitlement may be restored following a school closure. However, a school closure may result in some GI Bill participants receiving an overpayment of benefits that they would become responsible for repaying. Restoration of Entitlements Prior to 2015, GI Bill entitlement was not restored for benefits received at an educational institution that later closed. The Harry W. Colmery Veterans Educational Assistance Act of 2017 ( P.L. 115-48 ) authorizes the restoration of GI Bill entitlement for individuals affected by school closures. Generally, GI Bill recipients are entitled to benefits equal to 36 months of full-time enrollment (or the equivalent for part-time educational assistance) under one GI Bill. In the case of the Survivors' and Dependents' Educational Assistance Program (DEA; 38 U.S.C., Chapter 35), recipients who first enrolled in a program of education before August 1, 2018, have 45 months (or the equivalent for part-time educational assistance) of entitlement. Entitlement is restored for an incomplete course or program for which the individual is unable to receive credit or lost training time as a result of an educational institution closing. P.L. 115-48 applies to school closures occurring after January 1, 2015. In addition to restoring such entitlement, P.L. 115-48 permits the VA to continue paying a Post-9/11 GI Bill housing allowance through the end of the academic term following such closure but no longer than 120 days. Entitlement is not charged for the interim housing allowance. The extension of benefits following such closure is only applicable to the Post-9/11 GI Bill. Finally, P.L. 115-48 requires that the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) notify affected individuals of imminent and actual school closures and notify them how such closure will affect their GI Bill entitlement. GI Bill participants must apply for benefit restoration and the housing allowance extension. Overpayment of Benefits Under general GI Bill regulations, if there are mitigating circumstances, a GI Bill participant who withdraws from all courses may remain eligible for benefits for the portion of the course completed. However, if there are no mitigating circumstances, the individual may be required to repay all benefits received for pursuit of the course. Mitigating circumstances are circumstances beyond the individual's control that prevent the individual from continuously pursuing a program of education. A school closing is considered to be a mitigating circumstance. Some GI Bill benefits, such as advance payments and the Post-9/11 GI Bill tuition and fees payment, Yellow Ribbon payment, and books and supplies stipend, may be paid as a lump sum before or at the beginning of an academic term. An overpayment may occur for a prorated portion of those upfront payments if an individual is unable to complete the academic term without mitigating circumstances. Under Post-9/11 GI Bill regulations, the VA may determine the ending date of educational assistance based on the facts found if an eligible individual's educational assistance must be discontinued for any reason not described in regulations. A school that permanently closes may qualify as a reason not described in regulations. Additional Student Aid Eligibility For students who wish to continue their education at another IHE, another financial consideration related to an IHE's closure is the extent to which the students' eligibility for various financial aid sources may be affected by their previous use of those benefits at the closed institution. In addition to the duration of eligibility limits generally placed on Pell Grants and GI educational benefits discussed in the previous section, other federal student aid eligibility criteria that could affect future receipt of additional Title IV student loans include borrowing limits and eligibility limitations for receipt of Direct Subsidized Loans. Loan Limits Generally, annual and aggregate borrowing limits apply to Title IV student loans. Annual loan limits prescribe the maximum principal amount that may be borrowed in an academic year, and aggregate limits apply to the total amount of outstanding Title IV loans that borrowers may accrue. Borrowing limits for DL program loans vary by borrower academic standing (e.g., grade or credential level), loan type (e.g., Subsidized or Unsubsidized Direct Loan), and dependency status. For borrowers who receive a closed school discharge or whose loans have been discharged under a successful BDR claim, any discharged loans do not count against their annual and aggregate loan limits.   Eligibility for Direct Subsidized Loans In general, for borrowers of Direct Subsidized Loans, the federal government pays the interest that accrues on the loan while the borrower is enrolled in school on at least a half-time basis, during a six-month grace period thereafter, and during periods of authorized deferment. Individuals who are new borrowers on or after July 1, 2013, may only receive Direct Subsidized Loans for a period of time equal to 150% of the published length of the borrower's academic program (e.g., a borrower enrolled in a four-year degree program may receive six years' worth of Direct Subsidized Loans). However, for borrowers who receive a closed school loan discharge or who successfully assert a BDR claim, the discharged loan will not count against the borrower's Subsidized Loan usage period. State Tuition Recovery Funds (STRF) In addition to available debt relief, some states operate state tuition recovery funds (STRFs), which may reimburse students for charges paid to closed IHEs that are not covered by other sources. For example, a student may have his or her Direct Loan discharged due to school closure, and an STRF may provide relief to cover expenses such as cash payments made directly to a closed IHE for tuition payments or to provide relief on private student loans borrowed to attend an IHE. The availability of and eligibility for such funds vary by state; not all states operate STRFs. Income Tax Consequences113 Borrowers whose student loans are discharged due to school closure will be subject to federal and state income taxes on the discharged loans unless they qualify for an exception. Students who received funds from an STRF might similarly be subject to tax on any funds received, although the tax treatment of such funds is unclear. Additionally, there could be tax consequences for individuals who had previously claimed certain federal education tax benefits. This section examines the potential federal and state tax consequences that may arise for these borrowers and students. Federal Tax Treatment of Cancelled Debt Under the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), borrowers whose debt is forgiven must generally include the amount of the canceled debt in income when determining their federal income tax liability. In other words, they are subject to tax on the amount of the discharged loan. There are, however, various exceptions to this rule under which a borrower may exclude from income all or part of the forgiven debt. The HEA contains several exceptions providing for certain student loan discharges. These exceptions apply to borrowers of FFELs, Direct Loans, and Perkins Loans who borrowed such loans to attend any IHE and whose loans are discharged due to school closure. Under the HEA exceptions, these borrowers will not be subject to federal income taxes on the discharged amounts so long as the student borrowers (or students on whose behalf a parent borrowed) meet the general criteria regarding the discharge of debt tied to closed schools described earlier in this report. The HEA does not address the tax treatment of (1) federal student loans discharged due to a successful borrower defense to repayment or (2) private education loans that are discharged under most circumstances. As such, in these cases, the borrowers will be taxed on the amount of the discharged loan unless they qualify for an exception found outside of the HEA. Federal tax law provides several exceptions that may be relevant to borrowers whose loans are discharged. For example, IRC Section 108 excludes forgiven debt if the taxpayer is insolvent. Thus, borrowers whose liabilities exceed the fair market value of their assets immediately prior to discharge will not be taxed on the discharged student loan. Another example of an exception that might be relevant is the disputed debt doctrine. Under this doctrine, a discharged loan is not considered income for federal tax purposes if the loan was based on fraud or misrepresentation by the lender. Guidance issued by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in 2015 and 2017 illustrates how the doctrine might be applied in the student loan context. The 2015 guidance provides that former students of Corinthian Colleges, Inc. (CCI) whose federal student loans are discharged under a defense against repayment claim will not be taxed on the discharged amounts because many would likely qualify under the disputed debt doctrine due to the school's fraudulent behavior. In 2017, the IRS extended this same relief to former students of schools owned by American Career Institutes, Inc. (ACI). In addition, in 2018 the IRS issued guidance explaining that it would provide similar tax treatment regarding the discharge of private student loans taken out by borrowers who attended schools owned by CCI or ACI, where the loans are discharged due to legal settlements of cases brought by federal and state governmental agencies alleging that CCI, ACI, and certain private lenders engaged in unlawful business practices. In order to exclude a discharged loan from income, borrowers must determine that they qualify for an exception based on their individual circumstances and be able to show that the determination is correct if the IRS contests it. If the IRS disagrees and assesses tax based on the amount of the discharged loan, the taxpayer may challenge the assessment in federal court. Federal Tax Treatment of State Tuition Recovery Funds Students who receive funds from STRFs might also face federal tax consequences, although the tax treatment is less clear. As a general rule, any amount received by a taxpayer is includible in gross income, and potentially subject to taxation, unless specifically excluded by law. It is not clear how this principle applies in the context of STRF payments, as there do not appear to be court decisions or IRS guidance addressing the issue. There are several theories under which students could arguably exclude the payments from income, depending on their circumstances and the specifics of the state's plan. For example, the payment might be treated as a nontaxable reimbursement of tuition, scholarship, or state benefit. If the payment is excluded from the student's income, the student may be required to account for previously claimed federal education tax benefits, as discussed below. Federal Higher Education Tax Benefits Along with the potential taxation of discharged student loans and amounts received from STRFs, a school's closure or the discharge of a borrower's student loan may have consequences related to higher education tax benefits. While there are a variety of federal tax benefits that help offset some of the costs of a higher education, four are relevant for purposes of this report for reasons discussed below. These four benefits include the following: The student loan interest deduction , under which qualifying taxpayers may annually deduct up to $2,500 of student loan interest for the entire duration of repayment. The tuition and fees deduction , which allows taxpayers to reduce their income subject to tax for tuition and fees paid annually, up to $4,000, depending on their income level. As of the date of this report, the tuition and fees deduction cannot be claimed on 2018 or subsequent tax returns. The Lifetime Learning Credit (LLC) , under which qualifying taxpayers may annually reduce their tax liability for tuition and fees paid, up to $2,000. The LLC is a nonrefundable credit, meaning any amount of the credit in excess of income tax liability is effectively forfeited by the taxpayer. The American Opportunity Tax Credit (AOTC) , under which qualifying taxpayers can reduce tax liability by $2,500 per student annually (depending on eligible expenses and the taxpayer income level). The AOTC can be claimed for tuition and fees and books, supplies, and equipment, but not room and board. Additionally, the AOTC is a refundable credit, which means taxpayers with little to no tax liability can receive up to $1,000 of the AOTC as a refund check. Tuition and fees paid with the proceeds of a loan can count toward claiming these tax benefits, but any aid that is tax-free, such as a Pell Grant, must generally reduce the amount of expenses against which the benefits may be claimed. As a general rule, either the parent or the student who pays the qualifying education expenses will claim the tax benefit, depending on whether the student is the parent's dependent for tax purposes. Taxpayers can generally only claim one tax benefit per student annually. Availability of Benefits for Students Whose School Has Closed Students who continue to pursue higher education after a school closure are eligible for these education tax benefits, pursuant to the requirements applicable to all taxpayers. However, in some instances, a taxpayer who claims the AOTC may be ineligible for the credit in future years due to statutory restrictions on the period of education for which students may claim the credit. Specifically, the AOTC can only be claimed for expenses incurred during the first four years of a postsecondary education, irrespective of whether those first four years lead to a postsecondary credential. Therefore, for example, it appears that if a student attended a school for three years and that school closed, the maximum remaining time the student could claim the AOTC is one additional year. There is seemingly no IRS guidance or case law addressing how this requirement is applied in the context of students whose schools have closed, including students who may have to pay back previously claimed credits (discussed below). The other three benefits contain no limits on the period of education in which students may claim them. Federal Tax Treatment of Previously Claimed Education Tax Benefits Taxpayers may be required to account for previously claimed education tax benefits if they subsequently qualify to exclude discharged student loans or STRF payments. The borrowers who might be affected are those who claimed the LLC or AOTC for expenses that were paid with the proceeds from a student loan that was subsequently discharged, deducted expenses for tuition and fees that were paid with the proceeds from a student loan that was subsequently discharged, deducted interest on a student loan that was subsequently discharged, or claimed a tax credit (i.e., the LLC or AOTC) or a deduction (for tuition and fees or student loan interest) for expenses that were reimbursed by an STRF payment. In order to prevent these borrowers from getting the double benefit of both (1) a credit or deduction and (2) the exclusion of the discharged loan or STRF payment, such borrowers may be required to pay back the value of the credit or deduction. However, there may be circumstances in which the IRS will not require a taxpayer to account for previously claimed tax benefits. For example, in its 2015, 2017, and 2018 guidance addressing former students of CCI and ACI, the IRS announced that it would not require these borrowers to account for previously claimed education tax benefits. The IRS did not explain its reasoning in reaching this determination, and it is not clear the extent to which the agency may provide similar benefits to other borrowers. State Income Tax Consequences A school closure or the discharge of a student loan may also result in state income tax consequences. Most states use the IRC's definition of income as the starting point for computing state income tax liability. As such, to the extent that the borrower must pay federal income tax on the discharged debt or account for previously claimed federal education tax benefits, he or she may be taxed at the state level as well. Similarly, to the extent that the borrower qualifies to exclude the amounts from federal income taxation, such treatment may also apply at the state level. However, while most state tax codes follow the IRC, states are not required to adopt the federal definition of income and, thus, some states may provide for different tax treatment. Furthermore, states with their own education tax benefits or tuition recovery funds may have laws or policies specifically addressing the state tax treatment of the benefits and funds. Appendix. List of Abbreviations The following are abbreviations used throughout this report.

When an institution of higher education (IHE) closes, a student's postsecondary education may be disrupted. Students enrolled at closing IHEs may face numerous issues and may be required to make difficult decisions in the wake of a closure. Two key issues students may face when their IHEs close relate to their academic plans and their personal finances. The academic issues faced by students when their schools close include whether they will continue to pursue their postsecondary education, and if so, where and how they might do so. Students deciding to continue their postsecondary education have several options. They may participate in a teach-out offered by the closing institution or by another institution. A teach-out is a plan that provides students with the opportunity to complete their program of study after a school's closure. Students may also be able to transfer the credits they previously earned at the closed IHE to another IHE. If a student is able to transfer some or all of the previously earned credits, he or she would not be required to repeat the classes those credits represent at the new institution; if a student is unable to transfer previously earned credits, the student may be required to repeat the classes those credits represent at the new IHE. Decisions regarding the acceptance of credit transfers are within the discretion of the accepting IHE. The financial issues faced by students when their schools close include whether they are responsible for repaying any loans borrowed to attend a closed school and how they might finance any additional postsecondary education they pursue. In general, a closed school loan discharge is available to a borrower of federal student loans made under Title IV of the Higher Education Act (P.L. 89-329, as amended), if the student was enrolled at the IHE when it closed or if the student withdrew from the IHE within 120 days prior to its closure. Additionally, the student must have been unable to complete his or her program of study at the closed school or a comparable program at another IHE, either through a teach-out agreement or by transferring any credits to another IHE. Borrowers ineligible for a closed school discharge may be able to have eligible Title IV federal student loans discharged by successfully asserting as a borrower defense to repayment (BDR) certain acts or omissions of an IHE, if the cause of action directly relates to the loan or educational services for which the loan was provided. Whether a borrower may have discharged all or part of any private education loans borrowed to attend the closed IHE may depend on the loan's terms and conditions. Some students may also face issues regarding how they might finance future postsecondary educational pursuits. If a borrower receives a closed school discharge or has a successful BDR claim, the discharged loan will not count against the borrower's Subsidized Loan usage period, which typically limits certain borrowers' receipt of Direct Subsidized Loans for a period equal to 150% of the published length of his or her academic program, and a borrower's statutory annual and aggregate borrowing limits on Direct Subsidized and Direct Unsubsidized Loans are unlikely to be affected. Students who receive a Pell Grant for enrollment at a school that closed may have an equivalent amount of Pell eligibility restored. Likewise, if the student used GI Bill educational benefits from the Department of Veterans Affairs for attendance at a closed school, those benefits can be restored. Students may be reimbursed for payments on charges levied by closed IHEs that are not covered by other sources from a State Tuition Recovery Fund (STRF). The availability of and student eligibility for such funds vary by state, and not all states operate STRFs. Finally, the receipt of any of the above-mentioned benefits may have federal and state income tax implications, including the potential creation of a federal income tax liability for borrowers who have certain loans discharged.

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Background What is the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (IDFC)? The IDFC is authorized by statute to be a "wholly owned Government corporation ... under the foreign policy guidance of the Secretary of State" in the executive branch. Its purpose is to "mobilize and facilitate the participation of private sector capital and skills in the economic development" of developing and transition countries, in order to complement U.S. development assistance objectives and foreign policy interests (§1412). In other words, the IDFC's mission is to promote private investment in support of both U.S. global development goals and U.S. economic interests. Not yet operational, the IDFC represents a potentially major overhaul of U.S. development finance efforts. The IDFC's enabling legislation is the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 (BUILD Act), which was enacted on October 5, 2018, as Division F of a law to reauthorize the (unrelated) Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) ( H.R. 302 / P.L. 115-254 ). Under the BUILD Act, the IDFC is to consolidate and expand the U.S. government's existing development finance functions—currently conducted primarily by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). By statute, the IDFC is a successor agency to OPIC, which is to terminate when the IDFC is operational. What existing agency functions are consolidated? The BUILD Act consolidates functions currently carried out primarily by OPIC and certain elements of USAID (see Appendix ). The act established the new IDFC to be a successor entity to OPIC, taking over all of its functions and authorities and adding new ones. The IDFC's authorities would expand beyond OPIC's existing authorities to make loans and guarantees and issue insurance or reinsurance. They would also include the authority to take minority equity positions in investments, subject to limitations. In addition, unlike OPIC, the IDFC would be able to issue loans in local currency. The extent to which USAID functions will be transferred to the new IDFC is less clear. The act specifies that the Development Credit Authority (DCA), the existing legacy credit portfolio under the Urban and Environment Credit Program, and any other direct loan programs and non-DCA guarantee programs shall be transferred to the IDFC. It also provides the authority for, but does not require, the transfer of USAID's Office of Private Capital and Microenterprise, the existing USAID-managed enterprise funds (it gives the IDFC authority to establish new funds), and the sovereign loan guarantee portfolio. The disposition of these functions is to be detailed in the reorganization plan that the Administration must submit to Congress within 120 days of enactment. The reorganization plan is expected to be submitted by early February 2019. In addition, the IDFC would have the authority to conduct feasibility studies on proposed investment projects (with cost sharing) and provide technical assistance. What is development finance? "Development finance" is a term commonly used to describe government-backed financing to support private sector capital investments in developing and emerging economies. It can be viewed on a continuum of public and private support, situated between pure government support through grants and concessional loans and pure commercial financing at market-rate terms. Development finance generally is targeted toward promoting economic development by supporting foreign direct investment (FDI) in underserved types of projects, regions, and countries; undercapitalized sectors; and countries with viable project environments but low credit ratings. Such support is aimed to increase private sector activity and public-private partnerships that would not happen otherwise in the absence of development finance support because of the actual or perceived risk associated with the activity. Tools of development finance may include equity (raising capital through the sale of ownership shares), direct loans, loan guarantees, political risk insurance, and technical assistance. Development financing is particularly important for infrastructure funding, where annual global investment in transportation, power, water, and telecommunications systems falls, by one account, almost $800 million short of the estimated $3.3 trillion required to keep pace with projected economic growth. The largest infrastructure investment gaps are in the road and electricity sectors in developing and emerging economies. What are development finance institutions (DFIs)? DFIs are specialized entities that supply development finance, generally aiming to be catalytic agents in promoting private sector investment in developing countries. In the United States, OPIC has been the primary DFI since the 1970s. In FY2017, OPIC reported authorizing $3.8 billion in new commitments for 112 projects, and its exposure reached a record high of $23.2 billion (see Figure 1 ). OPIC estimated that it helped mobilize $6.8 billion in capital and supported 13,000 new jobs in host countries that year. Sub-Saharan Africa represents the largest share of OPIC's portfolio by region. OPIC has committed $2.4 billion in financing and political risk insurance for Power Africa−a major public-private partnership coordinated by USAID−to date, including committing $12.4 million for a loan to support construction of a hydropower plant in Uganda in FY2017. Among other focus areas, OPIC currently has $5 billion invested in the Indo-Pacific in projects to expand access to energy, education, and financial services, as well as to support local farmers. On July 30, 2018, OPIC, the Japanese Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC, Japan's counterpart to OPIC), and the Australian government announced a trilateral partnership to mobilize investments in infrastructure projects in the Indo-Pacific region to support development, connectivity, and economic growth in the region. Other agencies, such as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), also provide development finance. The IDFC is to take on the DFI mantle for the United States under the BUILD Act. At the bilateral level, national governments can operate DFIs. The United Kingdom was the first country to establish a DFI in 1948. Many countries have followed suit. In the United States, OPIC began operations in 1971, but the U.S. government's role in overseas investment financing predates OPIC's formal establishment. Bilateral DFIs are typically wholly or majority government-owned. They operate either as independent institutions or as a part of larger development banks or institutions. Their organizational structures have evolved, in some cases, due to changing perceptions of how to address identified development needs in the most effective way possible. Unlike OPIC, other bilateral DFIs tend to be permanent and not subject to renewals by their countries' legislatures. DFIs also can operate multilaterally, as parts of international financial institutions (IFIs), such as the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the private-sector arm of the World Bank. They can operate regionally through regional development banks as well. Examples of these banks include the African Development Bank (AfDB), the Asian Development Bank (AsDB), the European Bank for Reconstruction & Development (EBRD), and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). DFIs vary in their specific objectives, management structures, authorities, and activities. How does development finance relate to foreign assistance? Historically, official development assistance (ODA) has been a primary way that the United States and other developed countries have provided support for infrastructure projects in developing countries. However, foreign aid for infrastructure has declined over decades while the growth of direct private investment flows has outpaced ODA, making development finance an increasingly prominent way to encourage private investment in undercapitalized areas. Private investors face challenges investing in developing countries due to political risk, exchange rate risk, and weaknesses in legal, regulatory, and institutional environments, among other things. In such cases, government support, whether through equity, financing, or political risk insurance, may provide needed liquidity or assurances to catalyze private investment. How does the IDFC aim to respond to China's growing economic influence in developing countries? While it does not mention China by name, the BUILD Act alludes to concerns with state-directed investments, such as China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which launched in 2013. The act states that it is U.S. policy to "facilitate market-based private sector development and inclusive economic growth in less developed countries" through financing, including to provide countries a robust alternative to state-directed investments by authoritarian governments and [U.S.] strategic competitors using best practices with respect to transparency and environmental and social safeguards, and which take into account the debt sustainability of partner countries (§1411). Supporters view the IDFC as a central part of the U.S. response to China's growing economic influence in developing countries, exemplified by the BRI—which could provide, by some estimates, anywhere from $1 trillion to $8 trillion in Chinese investments and development financing for infrastructure projects in developing countries (see text box ). The Administration and many Members of Congress have been critical of China's financing model, which they find to lack transparency, operate under inadequate environmental and social safeguards for projects, and employ questionable lending practices that may lead to unsustainable debt burdens in some poorer countries (so-called "debt diplomacy"). Under this view, the IDFC (when operational) may help the United States compete more effectively or strategically with China. While even a strengthened OPIC may not be able to compete "dollar-for-dollar" with China's DFI activity, supporters argue that the United States "can and should do more to support international economic development with partners who have embraced the private sector-driven development model." Others, however, argued that the act could have tightened the IDFC's focus with respect to China, for instance, by requiring the IDFC to have a specific focus on countering China's investment and economic influence; from this perspective, the failure to narrow the IDFC's scope makes it likely that the new entity may support projects of limited U.S. foreign policy and strategic interest—a concern that some critics have levied against OPIC. BUILD Act Formulation and Debate What is the BUILD Act's legislative history?15 In February 2018, two proposed versions of the BUILD Act, H.R. 5105 in the House and S. 2463 in the Senate, were introduced to create a new U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (IDFC). Both bills proposed consolidating all of OPIC's functions and certain elements of USAID—including the Development Credit Authority (DCA), Office of Private Capital and Microenterprise, and enterprise funds. A major difference between the two bills, as introduced, was that H.R. 5105 would have authorized the IDFC for seven years, while S. 2463 would have authorized it for two decades, until September 30, 2038. The House-passed version (July 17, 2018; H.Rept. 115-814 ) and Senate committee-reported version (June 27, 2018) bridged some differences, including both providing a seven-year authorization. On September 26, 2018, the House adopted a resolution ( H.Res. 1082 ) to pass the BUILD Act as part of the Federal Aviation Administration Reauthorization Act of 2018 (FAA Reauthorization Act; H.R. 302 ). The Senate followed with its passage of the BUILD Act as part of the FAA Reauthorization Act on October 3, 2018. On October 5, 2018, the President signed into law the FAA Reauthorization Act, with the BUILD Act in Division F. What is the Trump Administration's development finance policy approach? Although the President's FY2018 budget request called for eliminating OPIC's funding as part of its critical view of U.S. government agencies with international development orientations, the Administration ultimately pursued development finance reform through OPIC as an opportunity to respond to China's growing economic influence in developing countries. The Trump Administration included development finance consolidation in its FY2019 budget request and subsequent set of government-wide reorganization proposals. The Administration supported the BUILD Act bills introduced in Congress ( H.R. 5105 , S. 2320 ), viewing them as broadly consistent with its goals, while calling for some modifications. It later said that amendments to the BUILD Act fulfilled the Administration's goals, including to "align U.S. government development finance with broader foreign policy and development goals, enhancing the competitiveness and compatibility of the U.S. development finance toolkit." What was the policy debate over the BUILD Act? The BUILD Act follows long-standing debate among policymakers over whether or not government financing of private-sector activity is appropriate. Supporters argued that OPIC helps fill in gaps in private-sector support that arise from market failures and helps U.S. firms compete against foreign firms backed by foreign DFIs for investment opportunities—thereby advancing U.S. foreign policy, national security, and economic interests. Various civil society stakeholders have proposed consolidating the development finance functions of OPIC and other agencies into a new DFI in order to boost OPIC and make U.S. development finance efforts more competitive with those of foreign countries. Opponents held that OPIC diverts capital away from efficient uses and crowds out private alternatives, criticized OPIC for assuming risks unwanted by the private sector, and questioned the development benefits of its programs. They have called for terminating OPIC's functions or privatizing them. While the BUILD Act garnered overall support, specific aspects of it were subject to debate. Some development advocates expressed concern that the BUILD Act's transfer of DCA and other credit program authority from USAID to the IDFC may sever the close link between these funding mechanisms and the USAID development programs into which they have been embedded, potentially making the tools less effective and less development-oriented. Others saw potential for the DCA to become a more robust financing option for USAID programs under the new IDFC, with its expanded authorities. In response to these concerns, the BUILD Act includes many provisions, discussed later in this report, to promote coordination and linkages between USAID and the IDFC, and to emphasize the development mission of the IDFC. Some in the development community also questioned whether the new DFI would have a sufficiently strong development mandate, as well as raised concerns about the transparency, environmental, and social standards of the new DFI relative to OPIC. Some critics of OPIC supported strengthening statutorily the aim of the IDFC in specifically countering China's influence in the developing countries. Other possible policy alternatives include focusing on enhancing coordination of development finance functions among agencies or supporting development goals through multilateral and regional DFIs in which the United States plays a major leadership role. IDFC Organizational Structure and Management While the IDFC authorized by the BUILD Act has yet to be established, and some implementation questions remain, the act detailed many aspects of how the new entity should be structured, managed, and overseen by Congress. This section discusses the BUILD Act provisions that describe how the new IDFC is expected to function once established. What are the congressional committees of jurisdiction? The BUILD Act defines "appropriate congressional committees" as the Senate Foreign Relations and Appropriations committees and the House Foreign Affairs and Appropriations committees (§1402(1)). It imposes a number of reporting and notification requirements on the IDFC with respect to these congressional committees. These committees have typically been the same ones in which legislation related to OPIC and USAID is introduced. What is the IDFC's mission? The BUILD Act establishes the IDFC for the stated purpose of mobilizing private-sector capital and skills for the economic benefit of less-developed countries, as well as countries in transition from nonmarket to market economies, in support of U.S. development assistance and other foreign policy objectives (§1412(b)). This is very similar to the mission of OPIC, as described in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. The legislation includes several provisions intended to ensure that the corporation remains focused on this development mission. The act directs the IDFC to prioritize support to countries with low-income or lower-middle-income economies, establishes a position of Chief Development Officer on the board, and requires that a performance measurement system be developed that includes, among other things, standards and methods for ensuring the development performance of the corporation's portfolio. The annual report required by the BUILD Act also must include an analysis of the desired development outcomes for IDFC-supported projects and the extent to which the corporation is meeting associated development metrics, goals, and objectives. How will the IDFC be managed? The BUILD Act establishes a Board of Directors ("Board"), a Chief Executive Officer (CEO), a Deputy Chief Executive Officer (Deputy CEO), a Chief Risk Officer, a Chief Development Officer, and any other officers as the Board may determine, to manage the IDFC (§1413(a)). The BUILD Act vests all powers of the IDFC in the nine-member Board of Directors (§1413(b)). By statute, the Board is composed of a C hief Executive Officer ; four U.S. government officials —the Secretary of State, USAID Administrator, Secretary of the Treasury, and Secretary of Commerce (or their designees); and four non government members appointed by the President of the United States by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, with "relevant experience" to carry out the IDFC's purpose, which "may include experience relating to the private sector, the environment, labor organizations, or international development." These members have three-year terms, can be reappointed for one additional term, and serve until their successors are appointed and confirmed. The Board's Chairperson is the Secretary of State and the Vice Chairperson is the USAID Administrator (or their designees). The Board differs in size and potentially composition from that of OPIC's Board. By statute, OPIC's 15-member Board of Directors is composed of eight "private sector" Directors, with specific requirements for representation of small business, labor, and cooperatives interests, and seven "federal government" Directors (including the OPIC President, USAID Administrator, U.S. Trade Representative, and a Labor Department officer). The President of the United States appoints the Board Chairman and Vice Chairman from among the members of the Board. Five members of the Board constitutes a quorum for the transaction of business. The Board is required to hold at least two public hearings each year to allow for stakeholder input. What will be the responsibilities of the officers? The BUILD Act establishes four officers for IDFC management. A Chief Executive Officer, who is under the Board's direct authority, is responsible for the IDFC's management and exercising powers and duties as the Board directs (§1413(d)). The BUILD Act also establishes a Deputy Chief Executive Officer (§1413(e)). The Chief Executive Officer and Deputy Chief Executive Officer are appointed by the President of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and serve at the pleasure of the President. The act outlines the positions of the Chief Risk Officer and Chief Development Officer in more detail. Both officers are to be appointed by the CEO, subject to Board approval, from among individuals with senior-level experience in financial risk management and development, respectively. They each are to report directly to the Board and are removable only by a majority Board vote. The Chief Risk Officer, in coordination with the Audit Committee established by the act, is responsible for developing, implementing, and managing a comprehensive process for identifying, assessing, monitoring, and limiting risks to the IDFC (§1413(f)). The Chief Development Officer's responsibilities include coordinating the IDFC's development policies and implementation efforts with USAID, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), and other relevant U.S. government departments and agencies; managing IDFC employees dedicated to working on transactions and projects codesigned with USAID and other relevant U.S. government entities; and authorizing and coordinating interagency transfers of funds and resources to support the IDFC (§1413(g)). OPIC's enabling legislation does not include either a specific Chief Risk Officer or Chief Development Officer. Will the IDFC have any advisory support? The BUILD Act establishes a Development Advisory Council to advise the Board on the IDFC's development objectives (§1413(i)). By statute, its members are Board-appointed on the recommendation of the CEO and Chief Development Officer, and composed of no more than nine members "broadly representative" of NGOs and other international development-related institutions. Its functions are to advise the Board on the extent to which the IDFC is meeting its development mandate and any suggestions for improvements. What oversight structures will the IDFC have? The BUILD Act establishes several oversight structures to govern the agency overall and particular aspects. Unlike OPIC, which is overseen by the USAID Inspector General, the IDFC is to have its own Inspector General (IG) (§1414) to conduct reviews, investigations, and inspections of its operations and activities. In addition, the act requires the Board to establish a "transparent and independent accountability mechanism" to annually evaluate and report to the Board and Congress regarding statutory compliance with environmental, social, labor, human rights, and transparency standards; provide a forum for resolving concerns regarding the impacts of specific IDFC-supported projects with respect to such standards; and provide advice regarding IDFC projects, policies, and practices (§1415). The BUILD Act also requires the IDFC to establish a Risk Committee and Audit Committee to ensure monitoring and oversight of the IDFC's investment strategies and finances (§1441). Both committees are under the direction of the Board. The Risk Committee is responsible for overseeing the formulation of the IDFC's risk governance structure and risk profile (e.g., strategic, reputational, regulatory, operational, developmental, environmental, social, and financial risks) (§1441(b)), while the Audit Committee is responsible for overseeing the IDFC's financial performance management structure, including the integrity of its internal controls and financial statements, the performance of internal audits, and compliance with legal and regulatory finance-related requirements (§1444(c)). IDFC Operations For what purposes can the IDFC use its authorities? In general, the IDFC's authorities are limited to (§1421(a)) carrying out U.S. policy and the IDFC's purpose, as outlined in the statute; mitigating risks to U.S. taxpayers by sharing risks with the private sector and qualifying sovereign entities through cofinancing and structuring of tools; and ensuring that support provided is "additional" to private-sector resources by mobilizing private capital that would otherwise not be deployed without such support. The emphasis on additionality reflects OPIC's current policy, but is not explicitly in OPIC's enabling legislation. Policymakers have debated whether OPIC supports or crowds out private-sector activity. What financial authorities and tools will the IDFC have? Under the BUILD Act, the IDFC's authorities would expand beyond OPIC's existing authorities to make loans and guarantees and issue insurance or reinsurance (see Table 1 ). They would also include the authority to take minority equity positions in investments. USAID-drawn authorities include technical assistance and the establishment of enterprise funds. In addition, the IDFC would have the authority to conduct feasibility studies on proposed investment projects (with cost-sharing) and provide technical assistance. A chart depicting the current development finance functions of relevant U.S. agencies, as well as how those functions may be shifted by the BUILD Act, is in the Appendix . The IDFC's functions are discussed below. Loan and Guarantees. The IDFC is authorized to make loans or guarantees upon the terms and conditions that it determines (§1421(b)). Loans and guarantees are subject to the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 (FCRA). IDFC financing may be denominated and repayable in either U.S. dollars or foreign currencies, the latter only in cases where the Board determines there is a "substantive policy rationale." This is distinct from OPIC, which is limited to making loans in U.S. currency. Equity Investments. The BUILD Act authorizes the IDFC to take equity stakes in private investments (§1421(c)). The IDFC can support projects as a minority investor acquiring equity or quasiequity stake of any entity, including as a limited partner or other investor in investment funds, upon such terms and conditions as the IDFC may determine. Loans and guarantees may be denominated and repayable in either U.S. dollars or foreign currencies, the latter only in cases where the Board determines there is a "substantive policy rationale." The IDFC is required to develop guidelines and criteria to require that the use of equity authority has a clearly defined development and foreign policy purpose, taking into account certain factors. The BUILD Act places limitations on equity investment, both in terms of the specific project and the overall support. The total amount of support with respect to any project cannot exceed 30% of the total amount of all equity investment made to that project at the time the IDFC approves support. Furthermore, equity support is limited to no more than 35% of the IDFC's total exposure. The BUILD Act directs the IDFC to sell and liquidate its equity investment support as soon as commercially feasible commensurate with other similar investors in the project, taking into account national security interests of the United States. The addition of equity authority is potentially significant. OPIC does not have the capacity to make equity investments; it can only provide debt financing as a senior lender, meaning it is repaid first in the event of a loss. Foreign DFIs often have been reluctant to partner with OPIC because they would prefer to be on an equal footing. Potential expansion of OPIC's equity authority capability has met resistance from some Members of Congress in the past, based on discomfort with the notion of the U.S. government acquiring ownership stakes in private investments, among other concerns. Insurance and r einsurance . The IDFC may issue insurance or reinsurance to private-sector entities and qualifying sovereign entities assuring protection of their investments in whole or in part against political risks (§1421(d)). Examples include currency inconvertibility and transfer restrictions, expropriation, war, terrorism, civil disturbance, breach of contract, or non-honoring of financial obligations. Investment promotion . The IDFC is authorized to initiate and support feasibility studies for planning, developing, and managing of and procurement for potential bilateral and multilateral development projects eligible for support (§1421(e)). This includes training on how to identify, assess, survey, and promote private investment opportunities. The BUILD Act directs the IDFC, to the maximum extent practicable, to require cost-sharing by those receiving funds for investment promotion. Special projects and programs. The IDFC is authorized to administer and manage special projects and programs to support specific transactions, including financial and advisory support programs that provide private technical, professional, or managerial assistance in the development of human resources, skills, technology, capital savings, or intermediate financial and investment institutions or cooperatives (§1421(f)). This includes the initiation of incentives, grants, or studies for the energy sector, women's economic empowerment, microenterprise households, or other small business activities. Enterprise funds. The BUILD Act authorizes but does not require the transfer of existing USAID enterprise funds to the IDFC (§1421(g)). Existing Europe/Eurasia enterprise funds are winding down. The two newer funds, in Tunisia and Egypt, remain primarily funded by U.S. government grant funds and are private sector-managed, arguably requiring close USAID oversight and an in-country presence to ensure the funds fulfill a development, rather than a purely for-profit, mission. As such, their removal to an agency without either feature may make this model less effective as a development instrument. The BUILD Act also gives the IDFC authority to establish new enterprise funds. It has been argued, however, that the IDFC's authority to conduct equity investment would make enterprise funds unnecessary. Will the IDFC's activities have U.S. government backing? All of the IDFC's authorities, like prior support by OPIC and USAID components, are backed by the full faith and credit of the U.S. government. In other words, the full faith and credit of the U.S. government is pledged for full payment and performance of obligations under these authorities (§1434(e)). Will the IDFC have an exposure limit? The maximum contingent liability (overall portfolio) that the IDFC can have outstanding at any one time cannot exceed $60 billion (§1433). This is more than double OPIC's current exposure limit—$29 billion. In recent years, OPIC support has reached record highs—totaling $23.2 billion in FY2017. While the IDFC's exposure cap is small compared to the potentially trillions of dollars that China is pouring into development efforts like the BRI, supporters argue that the IDFC could catalyze other private investment to developing countries through the U.S. development finance model. How will the IDFC be funded? According to the BUILD Act, the IDFC will be funded through a Corporate Capital Account comprised of fees for services, interest earnings, returns on investments, and transfers of unexpended balances from predecessor agencies (§1434). Annual appropriations legislation will designate a portion of these funds that may be retained for operating and program expenses, while the rest will revert to the Treasury, much like the current OPIC funding process. Like OPIC, the new IDFC is expected to be self-sustaining, meaning that anticipated collections are expected to exceed expenses, resulting in a net gain to the Treasury. The act also authorizes transfers of funds appropriated to USAID and the State Department to the IDFC. This authority will allow USAID missions and bureaus to continue to fund DCA activities related to their projects through transfers, as they now do through transfers to the DCA office within USAID. The BUILD Act does not authorize annual appropriations levels for administrative and program expenses for the new IDFC, and it is unclear how future appropriations provisions for the IDFC will compare to current OPIC and DCA provisions. In FY2018, appropriators made $79.2 million of OPIC revenue available for OPIC's administrative expenses and $20 million available for loans and loan guarantees. DCA was appropriated $10 million for administrative expenses and authorized to use up to $55 million transferred from foreign assistance accounts managed by USAID to support loan guarantees. How are losses to be repaid? In general, if the IDFC determines that the holder of a loan guaranteed by the IDFC suffers a loss as a result of default by the loan borrower, the IDFC shall pay to the holder the percentage of loss per contract after the holder of the loan has made further collection efforts and instituted any required enforcement proceedings (§1423). The IDFC also must institute recovery efforts on the borrower. The BUILD Act puts limitations on the payment of losses, such as generally limiting it to the dollar value of tangible or intangible contributions or commitments made in the project plus interest, earnings, or profits actually accrued on such contributions or commitments to the extent provided by such insurance, reinsurance, or guarantee. The Attorney General must take action as may be appropriate to enforce any right accruing to the United States as a result of the issuance of any loan or guarantee under this title. The BUILD Act also imposes certain limitations on payments of losses. For how long is the IDFC authorized? The BUILD Act provides that the IDFC's authorities terminate seven years after the date of the enactment of the act (§1424). It also provides that the IDFC terminates on the date on which its portfolio is liquidated. This is markedly different from the annual extensions of authority required for OPIC in recent years. A longer-term authorization as given to the IDFC could be beneficial for supporting investments in infrastructure projects, which often are multiyear endeavors, as well as underscore a sustained U.S. commitment to respond to China's BRI. Statutory Parameters for IDFC Project Support Will there be terms and conditions of IDFC support? The BUILD Act authorizes the IDFC to set terms and conditions for its support, subject to certain parameters. Reason for support. The IDFC is only permitted to provide its support if it is necessary either to alleviate a credit market imperfection or to achieve a specified goal of U.S. development or foreign policy by providing support in the most efficient way to meet those objectives on a case-by-case basis (§1422(b)(1)). Length of support. The final maturity of a loan or guarantee cannot exceed 25 years or the debt servicing capabilities of the project to be financed by the loan, whichever is lesser (§1422(b)(2)). Risk-sharing. With respect to any loan guarantee to a project, the IDFC must require parties to bear the risk of loss in an amount equal to at least 20% of the guaranteed support by the IDFC to the project (§1422(b)(3))—compared to 50% risk-sharing in most cases for OPIC. U.S. financial interest. The IDFC may not make a guarantee or loan unless it determines that the borrower or lender is responsible and that adequate provision is made for servicing the loan on reasonable terms and protecting the U.S. financial interest (§1422(b)(4)). Interest rate. The interest rate for direct loans and interest supplements on guaranteed loans shall be set by reference to a benchmark interest rate (yield) on marketable Treasury securities or other widely recognized or appropriate comparable benchmarks, as determined in consultation with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget and the Secretary of the Treasury. The IDFC must establish appropriate minimum interest rates for loan guarantees, and other instruments as necessary. The minimum interest rate for new loans must be adjusted periodically to account for changes in the interest rate of the benchmark financial interest (§1422(b)(5) and (6)). Fees and premiums. The IDFC must set fees or premiums for support at levels that minimize U.S. government cost while supporting the achievement of objectives for that support. The IDFC must review fees for loan guarantees periodically to ensure that fees on new loan guarantees are at a level sufficient to cover the IDFC's most recent estimates of its cost (§1422(b)(7)). Budget authority. The IDFC may not make loans or loan guarantees except to the extent that budget authority to cover their costs is provided in advance in an appropriations act (§1422(b)(10)). Standards. The IDFC must prescribe explicit standards for use in periodically assessing the credit risk of new and existing direct loans or guaranteed loans. It also must rely upon specific standards to assess the developmental and strategic value of projects for which it provides support and should only provide the minimum level of support needed to support such projects (§1422(b)(9) and (11)). Seniority. Any loan or guarantee by the IDFC is to be on a senior basis or pari passu with other senior debt unless there is a substantive policy rationale for otherwise (§1422(b)(12)). In which countries can the IDFC operate? In general, the IDFC is to prioritize support for less-developed countries (i.e., with a "low-income economy or a lower-middle-income economy"), as defined by the World Bank (§1402 and §1411). It must restrict support in less-developed countries with "upper-middle-income economies" unless (1) the President certifies to Congress that such support furthers U.S. national economic or foreign policy interests; and (2) such support is designed to have "significant development outcomes or provide developmental benefits to the poorest population" of that country (§1412). This arguably narrows the IDFC's focus to low-income and lower-middle-income countries, compared to OPIC's statutory requirements and practice. The IDFC may provide support in any country the government of which has entered into an agreement with the United States authorizing the IDFC to provide support (§1431). What considerations will factor into the IDFC's decision to support projects? Preference for U.S. sponsors. The IDFC must give preferential consideration to projects sponsored by or involving private-sector entities that are "U.S. persons"—defined as either U.S. citizens or entities owned or controlled by U.S. citizens (§1451(b)). This presumably eases OPIC's requirement for projects to have a "U.S. connection" based on U.S. citizenship or U.S. ownership shares; the particular requirements vary by program. This change arguably opens up the possibility that the IDFC could support investments by foreign project sponsors, assuming they meet other statutory requirements. Preference for countries in compliance with i nternational trade obligations . The IDFC must consult at least annually with the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) regarding countries' eligibility for IDFC support and compliance with international trade obligations (§1451(c)). The IDFC must give preferential consideration to countries in compliance with (or making substantial progress in coming into compliance with) their international trade obligations. While OPIC does not have a comparable obligation, the USTR (or a designated Deputy USTR) is a member of OPIC's Board of Directors. Worker rights. The IDFC can only support projects in countries taking steps to adopt and implement laws that extend internationally recognized worker rights (as defined in §507 of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. 2467) to workers in that country. It must include specified language in all contracts for support regarding worker rights and child labor (§1451(d)). These provisions appear to be similar to OPIC's requirements in terms of worker rights. Environmental and social impact. The Board is prohibited from voting in favor of any project that is likely to have "significant adverse environmental or social impact impacts that are sensitive, diverse, or unprecedented" unless it provides an impact notification (§1451(e)). The act requires that (1) the notification be at least 60 days before the date of the Board vote and take the form of an environmental and social impact assessment or initial audit; (2) the notification be made available to the U.S. public and locally affected groups and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in the host country; and (3) the IDFC include provisions in any contract relating to the project to ensure mitigation of any such adverse environmental or social impacts. OPIC's enabling legislation has substantially similar requirements as the IDFC's first two requirements with respect to environmental and social impacts. Women's economic empowerment consideration. The IDFC must consider the impact of its support on women's economic opportunities and outcomes and take steps to reduce gender gaps and maximize development impact by working to improve women's economic opportunities (§1451(f)). This is distinct from OPIC's statutory requirements. C ountries embracing private enterprise. The IDFC is directed to give preferential consideration to projects for which support may be provided in countries whose governments have demonstrated "consistent support for economic policies that promote the development of private enterprise, both domestic and foreign, and maintain the conditions that enable private enterprise to make full contribution to the development of such countries" (§1451(g)). The BUILD Act gives examples of market-based economic policies, protection of private property rights, respect for rule of law, and systems to combat corruption and bribery. OPIC's private enterprise-related requirement appears to be more limited. Small business support. The IDFC must, using broad criteria, to the maximum extent possible, give preferential consideration to supporting projects sponsored by or involving small business, and ensure that small business-related projects are not less than 50% of all projects for which the IDFC provides support and that involve U.S. persons (§1451(i)). OPIC's small business support requirement has a 30% target. What limitations will there be on the IDFC's support? Limitation on support for a single entity. No entity receiving IDFC support may receive more than an amount equal to 5% of the IDFC's maximum contingent liability (§1451(a)). In comparison, OPIC has specific limitations by program; for example, no more than 10% of maximum contingent liability of investment insurance can be issued to a single investor, and no more than 15% of maximum contingent liability of investment guarantees can be issued to a single investor. Boycott restriction. When considering whether to approve a project, the IDFC must take into account whether the project is sponsored by or substantially affiliated with any individual involved in boycotting a country that is "friendly" with the United States and is not subject to a boycott under U.S. law or regulation (§1451(h)). The measure is aimed at ensuring that beneficiaries of the new DFI's support are "not undermining [U.S.] foreign policy goals." Concerns about boycotts against Israel appear to figure prominently. International terrorism/human rights violations restriction . The IDFC is prohibited from providing support for a government or entity owned or controlled by a government if the Secretary of State has determined that the government has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism or has engaged in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights (§1453(a)). In comparison, OPIC must take into account human rights considerations in conducting its programs. Sanctions restriction. The IDFC is also prohibited from all dealings related to any project prohibited under U.S. sanctions laws or regulations, including dealings with persons on the list of specially designated persons and blocked persons maintained by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the Department of the Treasury, except to the extent otherwise authorized by the Secretaries of the Treasury or State (§1453(b) and (c)). OPIC is subject to sanctions restrictions as well. What requirements will the IDFC have to avoid market distortion? Commercial banks can provide financing for foreign investment, such as through project finance, and political risk insurance. The BUILD Act requires that before the IDFC provides support, it must ensure that private-sector entities are afforded an opportunity to support the project. The IDFC must develop safeguards, policies, and guidelines to ensure that its support supplements and encourages, but does not compete with, private-sector support; operates according to internationally recognized best practices and standards to avoid market-distorting government subsidies and crowding out of private-sector lending; and does not have significant adverse impact on U.S. employment (§1452). Monitoring and Transparency What performance measures and evaluation will the IDFC have? The BUILD Act requires the IDFC to develop a performance measurement system to evaluate and monitor its projects and to guide future project support, using OPIC's current development impact measurement system as a starting point (§1442). The IDFC must develop standards for measuring the projected and ex post development impact of a project. It also must regularly make information about its performance available to the public on a country-by-country basis. Measuring development impact can be complicated for a number of reasons, including definitional issues, difficulties isolating the impact of development finance from other variables that affect development outcome, challenges in monitoring projects for development impact after DFI support for a project ends, and resource constraints. Comparing development impacts across DFIs is also difficult as development indicators may not be harmonized. To the extent that the proposed DFI raises questions within the development community about whether it would be truly "developmental" at its core, rigorous adherence to development objectives through a measurement system will likely be critical to gauging its effectiveness. Moreover, Congress may choose to take a broader view of U.S. development impact, given the active U.S. contributions to regional and multilateral DFIs. What are the IDFC's reporting and notification requirements? At the end of each fiscal year, the IDFC must submit to Congress a report including an assessment of its economic and social development impact, the extent to which its operations complement or are compatible with U.S. development assistance programs and those of qualifying sovereign entities, and the compliance of projects with statutory requirements (§1443). In addition, no later than 15 days before the IDFC makes a financial commitment over $10 million, the Chief Executive Officer must submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report with information on the financial commitment (§1446(a) and (b)). The CEO also must notify the committees no later than 30 days after entering into a new bilateral agreement (§1446(c)). What information must it make available to the public? The IDFC must "maintain a user-friendly, publicly available, machine-readable database with detailed project-level information," including description of support provided, annual report information provided to Congress, and project-level performance metrics, along with a "clear link to information on each project" online (§1444). The new agency also must cooperate with USAID to engage with investors to develop a strategic relationship "focused at the nexus of business opportunities and development priorities" (§1445). This includes IDFC actions to develop risk mitigation tools and provide transaction-structuring support for blending finance models (generally referring to the strategic use of public or philanthropic capital to catalyze private-sector investment for development purposes). Implementation How and when is the IDFC expected to become operational? The BUILD Act requires the President to submit to Congress within 120 days of enactment a reorganization plan that details the transfer of agencies, personnel, assets, and obligations to the IDFC. The reorganization plan is expected to be submitted by early February 2019. The President must consult with Congress on the plan not less than 15 days before the date on which the plan is transmitted, and before making any material modification or revision to the plan before it becomes operational. The reorganization plan becomes effective for the IDFC on the date specified in the plan, which may not be earlier than 90 days after the President has transmitted the reorganization plan to Congress (§1462(e)). The actual transfer of functions may occur only after the OPIC President and CEO and the USAID Administrator jointly submit to the foreign affairs committees a report on coordination, including a detailed description of the procedures to be followed after the transfer of functions to coordinate between the IDFC and USAID (§1462(c)). During the transition period, OPIC and USAID are to continue to perform their existing functions. Thus, the IDFC could become operational as early as summer 2019 based on this timeline ( Figure 2 ). OPIC anticipates that the IDFC could become operational as of October 1, 2019. At that time, OPIC is to be terminated and its enabling legislation is to be repealed (§1464). How will the IDFC relate to other U.S. trade and investment promotion efforts? The IDFC is to replace OPIC, and, as such, would be among other federal entities that play a role in promoting U.S. trade and investment efforts. The Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im Bank) provides direct loans, loan guarantees, and export credit insurance to support U.S. exports, in order to support U.S. jobs. The Trade and Development Agency (TDA) aims to link U.S. businesses to export opportunities in overseas infrastructure and other development projects, in order to support economic growth in these overseas markets. TDA provides funding for project preparation activities, such as feasibility studies, and partnership building, such as reverse trade missions bringing foreign decisionmakers to the United States. The IDFC's authority to conduct feasibility studies and provide other forms of technical assistance has raised questions about overlap with the functions of TDA, but BUILD Act supporters note that while functions may overlap, they will be for different purposes—supporting U.S. investment abroad in the case of the IDFC and supporting U.S. exports in the case of TDA. There may also be some overlap of function between the IDFC and USAID if the reorganization plan calls for the transfer of the Office of Private Capital and Microenterprise from USAID to the IDFC and the IDFC starts its own microfinance programs, as microfinance activities are integrated throughout USAID and would not cease with the transfer of the office. Similarly, if the IDFC uses its authority to create new enterprise funds while declining to transfer existing funds under USAID authority, there may be some overlap in that authority as well. Issues for the 116th Congress The 116 th Congress will have responsibility for overseeing the implementation of the BUILD Act, including review of the reorganization plan, the transition it prescribes, and impact on U.S. foreign policy objectives. As part of this process, Congress may consider a number of policy issues, including the following: Is the Administration meeting the implementation requirements of the BUILD Act? Does the reorganization plan reflect congressional intent, and are the choices made within the discretion allowed by the BUILD Act justified? How can the IDFC best balance its mission to support U.S. businesses in competing for overseas investment opportunities with its development mandate? What are the policy trade-offs associated with the capacity limits, authorities, policy parameters, and other features formulated by Congress in the BUILD Act? Does the legislation find the right balance, or does the implementation process identify areas where legislative changes might be beneficial? In creating the BUILD Act, Congress gave great consideration to strategic foreign policy concerns. In addition to providing commercial opportunities for U.S. firms, development finance may shape how countries connect to the rest of the world through ports, roads, and other transportation and technological links, providing footholds for the United States to advance its approaches to regulations and standards. Another potential role for development finance is to provide a means to spread U.S. values on governance, transparency, and environmental and social safeguards. Does the current statutory framework enable the IDFC to respond effectively to U.S. strategic concerns, particularly with regard to China's BRI? More fundamentally, is the IDFC's aim to compete with, contain, or counter the BRI and Chinese world vision it represents? Beyond establishing the IDFC, Congress may consider whether to advocate for creating international "rules for the road" for development finance. Such rules could help ensure that the IDFC operates on a "level playing field" relative to its counterparts, given the variation in terms, conditions, and practices of DFIs internationally. U.S. involvement in developing such rules could help advance U.S. strategic interests. However, such rules would only be effective to the extent that major suppliers of development finance are willing to abide by them. For example, China is not a party to international rules on export credit financing, though it has been involved in recent negotiations to develop new rules on such financing. Should Congress press the Administration to pursue international rules on development finance? Is it feasible to engage China in this regard? Appendix. Reorganization of U.S. Government Development and/or Finance Functions

Members of Congress and Administrations have periodically considered reorganizing the federal government's trade and development functions to advance various U.S. policy objectives. The Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 (BUILD Act), which was signed into law on October 5, 2018 (P.L. 115-254), represents a potentially major overhaul of U.S. development finance efforts. It establishes a new agency—the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (IDFC)—by consolidating and expanding existing U.S. government development finance functions, which are conducted primarily by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and some components of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). While the IDFC is expected to carry over OPIC's authorities and many of its policies, there are some key distinctions. For example, in comparison to OPIC, the new IDFC, by statute, is to have the following: More "tools" to provide investment support (e.g., authority to make limited equity investments and provide technical assistance). More capacity (a $60 billion exposure cap compared to OPIC's $29 billion exposure cap). A longer authorization period (seven years compared to OPIC's year-to-year authorization through appropriations legislation in recent years). More specific oversight and risk management (including its own Inspector General [IG], compared to OPIC, which is under the USAID IG's jurisdiction). A key policy rationale for the BUILD Act was to respond to China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and China's growing economic influence in developing countries. In this regard, the IDFC aims to advance U.S. influence in developing countries by incentivizing private investment as an alternative to a state-directed investment model. The BUILD Act also aims to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of U.S. government development finance functions, as well as to achieve greater cost savings through consolidation. The BUILD Act requires the Administration to submit to Congress a reorganization plan within 120 days of enactment of the act, and the IDFC is not permitted to become operational any sooner than 90 days after the President has transmitted the reorganization plan. The 116th Congress will have responsibility for overseeing the Administration's implementation of the BUILD Act. As the IDFC is operationalized, Members of Congress may examine whether the current statutory framework allows the IDFC to balance both its mandates to support U.S. businesses in competing for overseas investment opportunities and to support development, as well as whether it enables the IDFC to respond effectively to strategic concerns especially vis-à-vis China. Congress also may consider whether to press the Administration to pursue international rules on development finance comparable to those that govern export credit financing. More broadly, the IDFC's establishment could renew legislative debate over the economic and policy benefits and costs of U.S. government activity to support private investment, and whether such activity is an effective way to promote broad U.S. foreign policy objectives.

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Federal Management and Technical Assistance Training Programs The Small Business Administration (SBA) administers several programs to support small businesses, including loan guaranty programs to enhance small business access to capital; programs to increase small business opportunities in federal contracting; direct loans for businesses, homeowners, and renters to assist their recovery from natural disasters; and access to entrepreneurial education to assist with business formation and expansion. The SBA has provided "technical and managerial aides to small-business concerns, by advising and counseling on matters in connection with government procurement and on policies, principles and practices of good management" since it began operations in 1953. Initially, the SBA provided its own management and technical assistance training programs. Over time, the SBA has relied increasingly on third parties to provide that training. More than 1.2 million aspiring entrepreneurs and small business owners receive training from an SBA-supported resource partner each year. The SBA has argued that its support of management and technical assistance training for small businesses has contributed "to the long-term success of these businesses and their ability to grow and create jobs." It currently provides financial support to about 14,000 resource partners, including 63 small business development centers (SBDCs) and nearly 900 SBDC local outreach locations, 128 women's business centers (WBCs), and 350 chapters of the mentoring program, SCORE (Service Corps of Retired Executives). The SBA receives an annual appropriation for entrepreneurial development/noncredit programs collectively (currently $247.7 million). The SBA uses these funds for its management and training programs ($226.7 million in FY2019), administration of the HUBZone program ($3.0 million), and the State Trade and Export Promotion program ($18.0 million). Congress specifies the appropriation amount for SBDCs (currently $131.0 million) and the Microloan Technical Assistance Program (currently $31.0 million) in its annual appropriation act and includes recommended appropriation amounts for the SBA's other management and training programs in either the explanatory statement or the committee report accompanying the appropriations act. The SBA is not legally required to adhere to the recommended amounts but has traditionally done so in the past. Table 1 shows the appropriation amounts Congress specified for SBDCs and the Microloan Technical Assistance Program and the appropriation amounts Congress recommended for the SBA's other management and training programs in FY2015 ($198.6 million), FY2016 ($210.1 million), FY2017 ($224.1 million), FY2018 ($226.1 million), and FY2019 ($226.7 million). The Department of Commerce also provides management and technical assistance training for small businesses. For example, the Department of Commerce's Minority Business Development Agency (MBDA) provides training to minority business owners to assist them in obtaining contracts and financial awards. In addition, the Department of Commerce's Economic Development Administration's Local Technical Assistance Program promotes efforts to build and expand local organizational capacity in economically distressed areas. As part of that effort, it funds projects that focus on technical or market feasibility studies of economic development projects or programs, which often include consultation with small businesses. For many years, a recurring theme at congressional hearings concerning the SBA's management and technical assistance training programs has been the perceived need to improve program efficiency by eliminating duplication of services and increasing cooperation and coordination both within and among its training resource partners. For example, the Obama Administration recommended in its FY2012-FY2017 budget recommendations that funding for the PRIME technical assistance program end. The Administration argued that PRIME overlaps and duplicates "the technical assistance provided by SBA's microlending intermediaries." The Trump Administration has also requested the program's elimination. The House Committee on Small Business has argued that the SBA's various management and technical assistance training programs should be "folded into the mission of the SBDC program or their responsibilities should be taken over by other agencies" because they "overlap each other and duplicate the educational services provided by other agencies." Congress has also explored ways to improve the SBA's measurement of these programs' effectiveness. This report examines the historical development of federal small business management and technical assistance training programs; describes their current structures, operations, and budgets; and assesses their administration and oversight, including measures used to determine their effectiveness. This report also examines legislation to improve SBA program performance and oversight, including P.L. 114-88 , the Recovery Improvements for Small Entities After Disaster Act of 2015 (RISE After Disaster Act of 2015), which, among other things, authorizes the SBA to provide up to two years of additional financial assistance, on a competitive basis, to SBDCs, WBCs, SCORE, or any proposed consortium of such individuals or entities to assist small businesses located in a presidentially declared major disaster area and authorizes SBDCs to provide assistance to small businesses outside the SBDC's state, without regard to geographical proximity to the SBDC, if the small business is in a presidentially declared major disaster area. This assistance can be provided "for a period of not more than two years after the date on which the President" has declared the area a major disaster; and P.L. 115-141 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018, among other provisions, relaxed requirements that Microloan intermediaries may spend no more than 25% of Microloan technical assistance grant funds on prospective borrowers and no more than 25% of those funds on contracts with third parties to provide that technical assistance by increasing those percentages to no more than 50% (originally in H.R. 2056 , the Microloan Modernization Act of 2017, and S. 526 , the Microloan Modernization Act of 2018). In addition, it discusses H.R. 1774 , the Developing the Next Generation of Small Businesses Act of 2017, which was introduced during the 115 th Congress. The bill would have required the SBA to only use authorized entrepreneurial development programs (SCORE, WBCs, SBDCs, etc.) to deliver specified entrepreneurial development services; added data collection and reporting requirements for SBDCs; authorized to be appropriated $21.75 million for WBCs for each of FY2018-FY2021 (WBCs were appropriated $18.0 million in FY2018); increased the WBC annual grant award from not more than $150,000 to not more than $185,000 (adjusted annually to reflect change in inflation); authorized the award of an additional $65,000 to WBCs under specified circumstances; authorized the SBA to waive, in whole or in part, the WBC nonfederal matching requirement for up to two consecutive fiscal years under specified circumstances; modified SCORE program requirements with respect to the role of participating volunteers, program plans and goals, and reporting; and added language concerning the provision and reporting of online counseling by SCORE. SBA Management and Technical Assistance Training Programs The SBA supports a number of management and technical assistance training programs, including the following: Small Business Development Center Grants Program, Microloan Technical Assistance Program, Women's Business Center Grants Program, Veterans Business Development Programs, SCORE (Service Corps of Retired Executives), PRIME Technical Assistance Program, 7(j) Technical Assistance Program, Native American Outreach Program, and Several initiatives, including the Entrepreneurial Development Initiative (Regional Innovation Clusters), Boots to Business, Entrepreneurial Education, and Growth Accelerators. The legislative history and current operating structures, functions, and budget for each of these programs is presented in this report. In addition, if the data are available, the program's performance based on outcome-based measures, such as their effect on small business formation, survivability, and expansion, and on job creation and retention, is also presented. Also, a brief description of each of these programs is provided in the Appendix . Small Business Development Centers In 1976, the SBA created the University Business Development Center pilot program to establish small business centers within universities to provide counseling and training for small businesses. The first center was founded at California State Polytechnic University at Pomona in December 1976. Seven more centers were funded over the next six months at universities in seven different states. By 1979, 16 SBDCs received SBA funding and were providing management and technical training assistance to small businesses. The SBDC program was provided statutory authorization by P.L. 96-302 , the Small Business Development Center Act of 1980. SBDCs were to "rely on the private sector primarily, and the university community, in partnership with the SBA and its other programs, to fill gaps in making quality management assistance available to the small business owner." Although most SBDCs continued to be affiliated with universities, the legislation authorized the SBA to provide funding to any State government or any agency thereof, any regional entity, any State-chartered development, credit or finance corporation, any public or private institution of higher education, including but not limited to any land-grant college or university, any college or school of business, engineering, commerce, or agriculture, community college or junior college, or to any entity formed by two or more of the above entities. SBDC funding is allocated on a pro rata basis among the states (defined to include the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, and American Samoa) by a statutory formula "based on the percentage of the population of each State, as compared to the population of the United States." If, as is currently the case, SBDC funding exceeds $90 million, the minimum funding level is "the sum of $500,000, plus a percentage of $500,000 equal to the percentage amount by which the amount made available exceeds $90 million." In 1984, P.L. 98-395 , the Small Business Development Center Improvement Act of 1984, required SBDCs, as a condition of receiving SBA funding, to contribute a matching amount equal to the grant amount, and that the match must be provided by nonfederal sources and be comprised of not less than 50% cash and not more than 50% of indirect costs and in-kind contributions. It also required SBDCs to have an advisory board and a full-time director who has authority to make expenditures under the center's budget. It also required the SBA to implement a program of onsite evaluations for each SBDC and to make those evaluations at least once every two years. Today, the SBA provides grants to SBDCs that are "hosted by leading universities, colleges, and state economic development agencies" to deliver management and technical assistance training "to small businesses and nascent entrepreneurs (pre-venture) in order to promote growth, expansion, innovation, increased productivity and management improvement." These services are delivered, in most instances, on a nonfee, one-on-one confidential counseling basis and are administered by 63 lead service centers, one located in each state (four in Texas and six in California), the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, and American Samoa. These lead centers manage nearly 900 service centers located throughout the United States and the territories. As shown in Table 2 , SBDCs provided technical assistance training services to 443,376 clients in FY2018 (250,926 clients received training and 192,450 clients were advised), and assisted in forming 14,422 new businesses. SBDCs received an appropriation of $115.0 million in FY2015, $117.0 million in FY2016, $125.0 million in FY2017, $130.0 million in FY2018, and $131.0 million in FY2019 (see Table 1 ). The Trump Administration requested $110.0 million for the program in FY2018 and $110.0 million in FY2019. In addition, as mentioned earlier, P.L. 114-88 expanded the role of SBDCs by, among other things authorizing the SBA to provide up to two years of additional financial assistance, on a competitive basis, to SBDCs, WBCs, SCORE, or any proposed consortium of such individuals or entities to assist small businesses located in a presidentially declared major disaster area; and authorizing SBDCs to provide assistance to small businesses outside the SBDC's state, without regard to geographical proximity to the SBDC, if the small business is located in a presidentially declared major disaster area. This assistance can be provided "for a period of not more than two years after the date on which the President" has declared the area a major disaster. As part of its legislative mandate to evaluate each SBDC, in 2003, the SBA's Office of Entrepreneurial Development designed "a multi-year time series study to assess the impact of the programs it offers to small businesses." The survey has been administered annually in partnership with a private firm. The 2014 survey was sent to 70,262 SBDC clients who had received five or more hours of counseling assistance in calendar year 2012. The survey was administered in the spring and summer of 2013. A total of 10,407 surveys (14.8% return rate) were completed either by mail, email, or the internet. The 2014 survey indicated that, of the SBDC clients 90.7% reported that the services they received from SBDC counselors were beneficial; 87.8% reported that the knowledge and expertise of their SBDC counselor was excellent (66.0%) or above average (21.8%); 86.2% reported that their overall working relationship with their SBDC counselor was excellent (68.9%) or above average (17.3%); and 94.4% reported that they would recommend that other businesspersons contact the SBDC. Legislation As mentioned previously, P.L. 114-88 , among other things, authorizes the SBA to provide up to two years of additional funding to its management and training resource partners to assist small businesses located in a presidentially declared major disaster area and authorizes SBDCs to provide assistance outside the SBDC's state, without regard to geographical proximity to the SBDC, if the small business is in a presidentially declared major disaster area. This assistance can be provided "for a period of not more than two years after the date on which the President" has declared the area a major disaster. Also, H.R. 1774 , the Developing the Next Generation of Small Businesses Act of 2017, introduced during the 115 th Congress, among other provisions, would have required the SBA to only use authorized entrepreneurial development programs (SCORE, WBCs, SBDCs, etc.) "to deliver entrepreneurial development services, entrepreneurial education, support for the development and maintenance of clusters, or business training" and would have added SBDC data collection and reporting requirements. Similar legislation was introduced during the 114 th Congress ( H.R. 207 and S. 999 ). Microloan Technical Assistance Program Congress authorized the SBA's Microloan lending program in 1991 ( P.L. 102-140 , the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1992) to address the perceived disadvantages faced by women, low-income, veteran, and minority entrepreneurs and business owners gaining access to capital for starting or expanding their business. The program became operational in 1992. Its stated purpose is to assist women, low-income, veteran ... and minority entrepreneurs and business owners and other individuals possessing the capability to operate successful business concerns; to assist small business concerns in those areas suffering from a lack of credit due to economic downturns; ... to make loans to eligible intermediaries to enable such intermediaries to provide small-scale loans, particularly loans in amounts averaging not more than $10,000, to start-up, newly established, or growing small business concerns for working capital or the acquisition of materials, supplies, or equipment; [and] to make grants to eligible intermediaries that, together with non-Federal matching funds, will enable such intermediaries to provide intensive marketing, management, and technical assistance to microloan borrowers. Initially, the SBA's Microloan program was authorized as a five-year demonstration project. It was made permanent, subject to reauthorization, by P.L. 105-135 , the Small Business Reauthorization Act of 1997. The SBA's Microloan Technical Assistance Program, which is affiliated with the SBA's Microloan lending program but receives a separate appropriation, provides grants to Microloan intermediaries to provide management and technical training assistance to Microloan program borrowers and prospective borrowers. There are currently 147 active Microloan intermediaries serving 49 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. Intermediaries are eligible to receive a Microloan technical assistance grant "of not more than 25% of the total outstanding balance of loans made to it" under the Microloan program. Grant funds may be used only to provide marketing, management, and technical assistance to Microloan borrowers, except that no more than 50% of the funds may be used to provide such assistance to prospective Microloan borrowers and no more than 50% of the funds may be awarded to third parties to provide that technical assistance. Grant funds also may be used to attend required training. In most instances, intermediaries must contribute, solely from nonfederal sources, an amount equal to 25% of the grant amount. In addition to cash or other direct funding, the contribution may include indirect costs or in-kind contributions paid for under nonfederal programs. The SBA does not require Microloan borrowers to participate in the Microloan Technical Assistance Program. However, intermediaries typically require Microloan borrowers to participate in the training program as a condition of the receipt of a microloan. Combining loan and intensive management and technical assistance training is one of the Microloan program's distinguishing features. As shown in Table 3 , the Microloan Technical Assistance Program provided counseling services to 21,800 small businesses in FY2018 and there were 147 grant eligible microloan intermediaries. The program was appropriated $22.3 million in FY2015, $25.0 million in FY2016, and $31.0 million in FY2017, FY2018, and FY2019 (see Table 1 ). The Trump Administration requested $25.0 million for the program in FY2018 and $25.0 million in FY2019. Legislation As mentioned previously, P.L. 115-141 , among other provisions, relaxed requirements that Microloan intermediaries may spend no more than 25% of Microloan technical assistance grant funds on prospective borrowers and no more than 25% of those funds on contracts with third parties to provide that technical assistance by increasing those percentages to no more than 50%. These provisions were originally in H.R. 2056 and S. 526 . During the 114 th Congress, H.R. 2670 and S. 1857 (its Senate companion bill) would have required the SBA administrator to establish a rule enabling intermediaries to apply for a waiver to the requirement that no more than 25% of Microloan technical assistance grant funds may be used to provide technical assistance to prospective borrowers. Women's Business Centers The Women's Business Center (WBC) Renewable Grant Program was initially established by P.L. 100-533 , the Women's Business Ownership Act of 1988, as the Women's Business Demonstration Pilot Program. The act directed the SBA to provide financial assistance to private, nonprofit organizations to conduct demonstration projects giving financial, management, and marketing assistance to small businesses, including start-up businesses, owned and controlled by women. Since its inception, the program has targeted the needs of socially and economically disadvantaged women. The WBC program was expanded and provided permanent legislative status by P.L. 109-108 , the Science, State, Justice, Commerce, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2006. Since the program's inception, the SBA has awarded WBCs a grant of up to $150,000 per year. Initially, the grant was awarded for one year, with the possibility of being renewed twice, for a total of up to three years. As a condition of the receipt of funds, the WBC was required to raise at least one nonfederal dollar for each two federal dollars during the grant's first year (1:2), one nonfederal dollar for each federal dollar during year two (1:1), and two nonfederal dollars for each federal dollar during year three (2:1). Over the years, Congress has extended the length of the WBC program's grant award and reduced the program's matching requirement. Today, WBC initial grants are awarded for up to five years, consisting of a base period of 12 months from the date of the award and four 12-month option periods. The SBA determines if the option periods are exercised and makes that determination subject to the continuation of program authority, the availability of funds, and the recipient organization's compliance with federal law, SBA regulations, and the terms and conditions specified in a cooperative agreement. WBCs that successfully complete the initial five-year grant period may apply for an unlimited number of three-year funding intervals. During their initial five-year grant period, WBCs are now required to provide a nonfederal match of one nonfederal dollar for each two federal dollars in years one and two (1:2), and one nonfederal dollar for each federal dollar in years three, four and five (1:1). After the initial five-year grant period, the matching requirement in subsequent three-year funding intervals is not more than 50% of federal funding (1:1). The nonfederal match may consist of cash, in-kind, and program income. Today, there are 128 WBCs located throughout most of the United States and the territories. As shown in Table 4 , WBCs provided assistance to 151,861 clients in FY2018 (123,680 clients received technical assistance training services and 28,181 clients were advised), and assisted in the formation of 11,687 new businesses. Congress recommended that the WBC program receive $15.0 million in FY2015, $17.0 million in FY2016, $18.0 million in FY2017, $18.0 million in FY2018, and $18.5 million in FY2019 (see Table 1 ). The Trump Administration requested $16.0 million for the program for FY2018 and $16.0 million for FY2019. P.L. 105-135 required the SBA to "develop and implement an annual programmatic and financial examination of each" WBC. As part of its legislative mandate to implement an annual programmatic and financial examination of each WBC, the SBA's Office of Entrepreneurial Development includes WBCs in its previously mentioned multiyear time series study of its programs. Data from the SBA's 2014 client survey concerning WBCs are not yet available. The firm administering the 2013 survey of SBA management and training clients contacted 2,997 WBC clients and received 529 completed surveys (17.7% return rate). The survey indicated that 80% of WBC clients reported that the services they received from counselors were useful or very useful, 2% had no opinion, and 18% reported that the services they received from counselors were somewhat useful or not useful; 61% of WBC clients reported that they changed their management practices/strategies as a result of the assistance they received; and the top five changes to management practices involved their business plan (56%), marketing plan (46%), general management (36%), cash flow analysis (31%), and financial strategy (30%). Legislation As mentioned earlier, P.L. 114-88 expanded the role of WBCs by authorizing the SBA to provide up to two years of additional financial assistance, on a competitive basis, to SBDCs, WBCs, SCORE, or any proposed consortium of such individuals or entities to assist small businesses located in a presidentially declared major disaster area. In addition, H.R. 1774 , introduced during the 115 th Congress, would have required the SBA to use only authorized entrepreneurial development programs (SCORE, WBCs, SBDCs, etc.) to deliver specified entrepreneurial development services; authorized to be appropriated $21.75 million for WBCs for each of FY2018-FY2021 (WBCs received $18.0 million in FY2018); increased the WBC annual grant award from not more than $150,000 to not more than $185,000 (adjusted annually to reflect change in inflation); authorized the award of an additional $65,000 to WBCs under specified circumstances; and authorized the SBA to waive, in whole or in part, the WBC nonfederal matching requirement for up to two consecutive fiscal years under specified circumstances. Similar legislation was introduced during the 114 th Congress ( H.R. 207 and S. 2126 ). Veterans Business Development Programs The SBA has supported management and technical assistance training for veteran-owned small businesses since its formation as an agency. However, during the 1990s, some in Congress noted that a direct loan program for veterans was eliminated by the SBA in 1995 and that the "training and counseling for veterans dropped from 38,775 total counseling sessions for veterans in 1993 to 29,821 sessions in 1998." Concerned that "the needs of veterans have been diminished systematically at the SBA," Congress adopted P.L. 106-50 , the Veterans Entrepreneurship and Small Business Development Act of 1999. The act reemphasized the SBA's responsibility "to reach out to and include veterans in its programs providing financial and technical assistance." It also included veterans as a target group for the SBA's 7(a), 504/CDC, and Microloan programs. In addition, it required the SBA to enter into a memorandum of understanding with SCORE to, among other things, establish "a program to coordinate counseling and training regarding entrepreneurship to veterans through the chapters of SCORE throughout the United States." The act also directed the SBA to enter into a memorandum of understanding with SBDCs, the Department of Veteran Affairs, and the National Veterans Business Development Corporation "with respect to entrepreneurial assistance to veterans, including service-disabled veterans." It specified, among other things, that the SBA conduct and distribute studies on the formation, management, financing, marketing, and operation of small business concerns by veterans; provide training and counseling on these topics to veterans; assist veterans regarding procurement opportunities with federal, state, and local agencies, especially agencies funded in whole or in part with federal funds; and provide internet or other distance-learning academic instruction for veterans in business subjects, including accounting, marketing, and business fundamentals. The SBA's Office of Veterans Business Development (OVBD) was established to address these statutory requirements. The OVBD currently administers several management and training programs to assist veteran-owned businesses, including the following: The Entrepreneurship Bootcamp for Veterans with Disabilities Consortium of Universities provides "experiential training in entrepreneurship and small business management to post-9/11 veterans with disabilities" at eight universities. The Veteran Women Igniting the Spirit of Entrepreneurship (V-WISE) program, administered through a cooperative agreement with Syracuse University, offers women veterans a 15-day, online course on entrepreneurship skills and the "language of business," followed by a 3-day conference (offered twice a year at varying locations) in which participants "are exposed to successful entrepreneurs and CEOs of Fortune 500 companies and leaders in government" and participate in courses on business planning, marketing, accounting and finance, operations and production, human resources, and work-life balance. The Operation Endure and Grow Program, administered through a cooperative agreement with Syracuse University, offers an eight-week online training program on "the fundamentals of launching and/or growing a small business" and is available to National Guard and reservists and their family members. The Boots to Business program (started in 2012), which is "an elective track within the Department of Defense's revised Training Assistance Program called Transition Goals, Plans, Success (Transition GPS) and has three parts: the Entrepreneurship Track Overview—a 10-minute introductory video shown during the mandatory five-day Transition GPS course which introduces entrepreneurship as a post-service career option; Introduction to Entrepreneurship—a two-day classroom course on entrepreneurship and business fundamentals offered as one of the three Transition GPS elective tracks; and Foundations of Entrepreneurship—an eight-week, instructor-led online course that offers in-depth instruction on the elements of a business plan and tips and techniques for starting a business." The Boots to Business Reboot program (started in 2014) assists veterans who have already transitioned to civilian life. The Veterans Business Outreach Centers (VBOC) program provides veterans and their spouses management and technical assistance training at 22 locations, including assistance with the Boots to Business program, the development and maintenance of a five-year business plan, and referrals to other SBA resource partners when appropriate for additional training or mentoring services. Prior to FY2016, Congress recommended appropriations for VBOCs and the Boots to Business initiative. Funding for the OVBD's other veterans assistance programs was provided through the SBA's salaries and expenses account. Starting in FY2016, Congress has recommended a single amount for all OVBD programs (currently $12.7 million) (see Table 1 ). The Trump Administration requested $11.25 million for these programs in FY2018 and $11.25 million in FY2019. As shown in Table 5 , VBOCs trained or advised 51,945 veterans in FY2018 and 17,167 veterans participated in the Boots to Business Initiative. SCORE (Service Corps of Retired Executives) The SBA has partnered with various voluntary business and professional service organizations to provide management and technical assistance training to small businesses since the 1950s. On October 5, 1964, using authority under the Small Business Act to provide "technical and managerial aids to small business concerns" in cooperation with "educational and other nonprofit organizations, associations, and institutions," then-SBA Administrator Eugene P. Foley officially launched SCORE (Service Corps of Retired Executives) as a national, volunteer organization with 2,000 members, uniting more than 50 independent nonprofit organizations into a single, national nonprofit organization. Since then, the SBA has provided financial assistance to SCORE to provide training to small business owners and prospective owners. Over the years, Congress has authorized the SBA to take certain actions relating to SCORE. For example, P.L. 89-754, the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966, authorized the SBA to permit members of nonprofit organizations use of the SBA's office facilities and services. P.L. 90-104, the Small Business Act Amendments of 1967, added the authority to pay travel and subsistence expenses "incurred at the request of the Administration in connection with travel to a point more than fifty miles distant from the home of that individual in providing gratuitous services to small businessmen" or "in connection with attendance at meetings sponsored by the Administration." P.L. 93-113 , the Domestic Volunteer Service Act of 1973, was the first statute to mention SCORE directly, providing the Director of ACTION authority to work with SCORE to "expand the application of their expertise beyond Small Business Administration clients." P.L. 95-510 , a bill to amend the Small Business Act, provided the SBA explicit statutory authorization to work with SCORE (Section 8(b)(1)(B)). P.L. 106-554 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2001 (Section 1(a)(9)—the Small Business Reauthorization Act of 2000) authorized SCORE to solicit cash and in-kind contributions from the private sector to be used to carry out its functions. The SBA currently provides grants to SCORE to provide in-person mentoring, online training, and "nearly 9,000 local training workshops annually" to small businesses. SCORE's 350 chapters and more than 800 branch offices are located throughout the United States and partner with more than 11,000 volunteer counselors, who are working or retired business owners, executives and corporate leaders, to provide management and training assistance to small businesses "at no charge or at very low cost." As shown in Table 6 , SCORE's volunteer network of business professionals provided assistance to 686,208 clients in FY2018 (559,805 clients received technical assistance training services and 126,403 client received counseling services). Congress recommended that SCORE receive $8.0 million in FY2015, $10.5 million in FY2016 and FY2017, $11.5 million in FY2018, and $11.7 million in FY2019 (see Table 1 ). The Trump Administration requested $9.9 million for the program in FY2018 and FY2019. The SBA Office of Entrepreneurial Development includes SCORE in its multiyear time series study to assess its programs' effectiveness. The 2014 survey was sent to 124,612 SCORE clients who had a valid email address and received at least one mentoring session in any form (telephone, online/email, in-person, or other form) during FY2013 (October 2012-September 2013). The survey was initially distributed by email, and telephone calls were used as a follow-up to ensure at least 30 responses were received from each responding SCORE chapter. The survey was administered between October 2013 and December 2013. A total of 13,548 surveys (10.9% return rate) were completed either by email or telephone, representing 318 of SCORE's then-330 chapters. The 2014 survey indicated that, of the SCORE clients 60.9% reported that they strongly agreed (32.2%) or agreed (28.7%) with the following statement: SCORE is important to my success; 44.8% reported that they strongly agreed (18.4%) or agreed (26.4%) with the following statement: As a result of working with SCORE, I have changed my business strategies or practices; 32.6% reported that they strongly agreed (12.1%) or agreed (20.5%) with the following statement: Working with SCORE helped me add employees in the past year; and 51.8% reported that they strongly agreed (17.0%) or agreed (34.8%) with the following statement: Working with SCORE helped me grow my business revenue. Legislation As mentioned earlier, P.L. 114-88 expanded SCORE's role by authorizing the SBA to provide up to two years of additional financial assistance, on a competitive basis, to SBDCs, WBCs, SCORE, or any proposed consortium of such individuals or entities to assist small businesses located in a presidentially declared major disaster area. In addition, H.R. 1774 , introduced during the 115 th Congress, would have required the SBA to use only authorized entrepreneurial development programs (SCORE, WBCs, SBDCs, etc.) to deliver specified entrepreneurial development services; modified SCORE program requirements with respect to the role of participating volunteers, program plans and goals, and reporting; and added language concerning the provision and reporting of online counseling by SCORE. Similar legislation was introduced during the 114 th Congress ( H.R. 207 , H.R. 4788 , and S. 1000 ). Program for Investment in Micro-entrepreneurs (PRIME) P.L. 106-102 , the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (of 1999) (Subtitle C—Microenterprise Technical Assistance and Capacity Building Program), amended P.L. 103-325 , the Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994, to authorize the SBA to "establish a microenterprise technical assistance and capacity building grant program." The program was to "provide assistance from the Administration in the form of grants" to nonprofit microenterprise development organizations or programs (or a group or collaborative thereof) that has a demonstrated record of delivering microenterprise services to disadvantaged entrepreneurs; an intermediary; a microenterprise development organization or program that is accountable to a local community, working in conjunction with a state or local government or Indian tribe; or an Indian tribe acting on its own, if the Indian tribe can certify that no private organization or program referred to in this paragraph exists within its jurisdiction." The SBA was directed "to ensure that not less than 50% of the grants … are used to benefit very low-income persons, including those residing on Indian reservations." It was also directed to (1) provide training and technical assistance to disadvantaged entrepreneurs; (2) provide training and capacity building services to microenterprise development organizations and programs and groups of such organizations to assist such organizations and programs in developing microenterprise training and services; (3) aid in researching and developing the best practices in the field of microenterprise and technical assistance programs for disadvantaged entrepreneurs; and (4) for such other activities as the Administrator determines are consistent with the purposes of this subtitle. The SBA's PRIME program was designed to meet these legislative requirements by providing assistance to organizations that "help low-income entrepreneurs who lack sufficient training and education to gain access to capital to establish and expand their small businesses." The program offers four types of grants: Technical Assistance Grants support training and technical assistance to disadvantaged microentrepreneurs, Capacity Building Grants support training and capacity building services to microenterprise development organizations and programs to assist them in developing microenterprise training and services, Research and Development Grants support the development and sharing of best practices in the field of microenterprise development and technical assistance programs for disadvantaged microentrepreneurs, and Discretionary Grants support other activities determined to be consistent with these purposes. Grants are awarded on an annual basis. Applicants may be approved for option year funding for up to four subsequent years. Award amounts vary depending on the availability of funds. However, no single grantee may receive more than $250,000 or 10% of the total funds made available for the program in a single fiscal year, whichever is less. The minimum grant award for technical assistance and capacity building grants is $50,000. There is no minimum grant award amount for research and development or discretionary grants. The SBA typically awards at least 75% of the grant funds for technical assistance, at least 15% for capacity building, and the remainder for research and development or discretionary activities. Recipients must match 50% of the funding from nonfederal sources. Revenue from fees, grants, and gifts; income from loan sources; and in-kind resources from nonfederal public or private sources may be used to comply with the matching requirement. SBA regulations indicate that "applicants or grantees with severe constraints on available sources of matching funds may request that the Administrator or designee reduce or eliminate the matching requirements." Any reductions or eliminations must not exceed 10% of the aggregate of all PRIME grant funds made available by SBA in any fiscal year. Table 7 provides the number and amount of PRIME awards from FY2014 to FY2018. Congress has recommended that the PRIME program receive $5.0 million in each fiscal year since FY2015 (see Table 1 ). As mentioned previously, the Obama Administration recommended in its FY2012-FY2017 budget requests that funding for the PRIME program be eliminated. It argued that the PRIME program overlaps and duplicates the SBA's Microloan Technical Assistance Program. The Trump Administration requested that the program receive no funding in FY2018 and FY2019. 7(j) Management and Technical Assistance Program Using what it viewed as broad statutory powers granted under Section 8(a) of the Small Business Act of 1958, as amended, the SBA issued regulations in 1970 creating the 8(a) contracting program to "assist small concerns owned by disadvantaged persons to become self-sufficient, viable businesses capable of competing effectively in the market place." Using its statutory authority under Section 7(j) of the Small Business Act to provide management and technical assistance through contracts, grants, and cooperative agreement to qualified service providers, the regulations specified that "the SBA may provide technical and management assistance to assist in the performance of the subcontracts." On October 24, 1978, P.L. 95-507 , to amend the Small Business Act and the Small Business Investment Act of 1958, provided the SBA explicit statutory authority to extend financial, management, technical, and other services to socially and economically disadvantaged small businesses. The SBA's current regulations indicate that the 7(j) Management and Technical Assistance Program, named after the section of the Small Business Act of 1958, as amended, authorizing the SBA to provide management and technical assistance training, will, "through its private sector service providers" deliver "a wide variety of management and technical assistance to eligible individuals or concerns to meet their specific needs, including: (a) counseling and training in the areas of financing, management, accounting, bookkeeping, marketing, and operation of small business concerns; and (b) the identification and development of new business opportunities." Eligible individuals and businesses include "8(a) certified firms, small disadvantaged businesses, businesses operating in areas of high unemployment, or low income or firms owned by low income individuals." As shown on Table 8 , the 7(j) program assisted 6,483 small business owners in FY2018. Congress has recommended that the 7(j) program receive $2.8 million in each fiscal year since FY2015 (see Table 1 ). The Trump Administration requested $2.8 million for the program in FY2018 and FY2019. Native American Outreach Program The SBA established the Office of Native American Affairs in 1994 to "address the unique needs of America's First people." It oversees the Native American Outreach Program, which provides management and technical educational assistance to American Indians, Alaska Natives, Native Hawaiians, and "the indigenous people of Guam and American Samoa … to promote entity-owned and individual 8(a) certification, government contracting, entrepreneurial education, and capital access." The program's management and technical assistance services are available to members of these groups living in most areas of the nation. However, "for Native Americans living in much of Indian Country, actual reservations communities where the land is held in trust by the U.S. federal government, SBA loan guaranties and technical assistance services are not available." In FY2018, the SBA's Office of Native American Affairs assisted 1,549 small businesses. It provided workshops on business development and financial literacy, training webinars, incubator training, and online classes for Native American entrepreneurs. Congress has recommended that the Native American Outreach Program receive $2.0 million in each fiscal year since FY2015 (see Table 1 ). The Trump Administration requested $1.5 million for the program in FY2018 and FY2019. SBA Initiatives In addition to the Boots to Business initiative discussed under " Veterans Business Development Programs ," Congress has recommended appropriations for the following three Obama Administration management and training initiatives: the Entrepreneurial Development Initiative (Regional Innovation Clusters), Entrepreneurial Education, and Growth Accelerators. Entrepreneurial Development Initiative (Regional Innovation Clusters) The SBA has supported regional innovation clusters since FY2009, when it partnered with small business suppliers working in the field of robotics in Michigan. In FY2010, the SBA was involved in the rollouts of two additional clusters: another robotics cluster in southeast Virginia and a cluster involving a partnership with the Department of Energy and several other federal agencies with the goal of developing a regional cluster in energy efficiency homes and businesses. In FY2011, SBA awarded funds to 10 regional innovation clusters. In FY2012, these clusters "spurred $48 million in private capital raised through venture and angel capital sources, $6.5 million in early stage investment from SBIR [Small Business Innovation Research program] and STTR [Small Business Technology Transfer program] awards, and over $217 million in contracts or subcontracts from the federal government." President Obama requested, and Congress recommended, an appropriation of $5.0 million for the SBA's Entrepreneurial Development Initiative (Regional Innovation Clusters) in FY2014. Congress recommended that the program receive $6.0 million in FY2015, $6.0 million in FY2016, and $5.0 million in each fiscal year since FY2017 (see Table 1 ). The Trump Administration requested that the program receive no funds in FY2018 and in FY2019. The SBA reports that there are currently 56 federally supported regional innovation clusters, with the SBA directly involved in 40 of them. The SBA describes regional innovation clusters as "on-the-ground collaborations between business, research, education, financing and government institutions that work to develop and grow a particular industry or related set of industries in a particular geographic region." Targeted activities for the 40 clusters currently being supported by the SBA include "business development, intellectual property matters, export and import development, finance, marketing, commercialization of new technology and federal and private-sector supply chain opportunities." Entrepreneurial Education The SBA started its Entrepreneurship Education initiative in 2008. At that time, it was called the Emerging 200 Underserved initiative (E200), reflecting the initiative's provision of assistance to 200 inner city small businesses. In FY2009, it was renamed the Emerging Leaders initiative to reflect the SBA's decision to increase the number of small businesses participating in the initiative. It was renamed the Entrepreneurial Education initiative in FY2013, and it is funded under that name in appropriation acts, but the SBA, and others, often still call it the Emerging Leaders Initiative. The initiative currently offers high‐growth small businesses in underserved communities a seven‐month executive leader education series that elevates their growth trajectory, creates jobs, and contributes to the economic well‐being of their local communities. Participants receive more than 100 hours of specialized training, technical resources, a professional networking system, and other resources to strengthen their business model and promote economic development within urban communities. At the conclusion of the training, participants produce a three‐year strategic growth action plan with benchmarks and performance targets that help them access the necessary support and resources to move forward for the next stage of business growth. The Entrepreneurial Education initiative was initially offered in 10 communities (Albuquerque, Atlanta, Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Des Moines, Memphis, Milwaukee, New Orleans, and Philadelphia) and provided training to 200 inner city small businesses. The program was funded through the SBA's Office of Entrepreneurship Education. Since the initiative's inception, the SBA has requested separate appropriations to fund and expand the initiative. In FY2012, the initiative offered training in 27 communities, with more than 450 small businesses participating. The Obama Administration requested $40.0 million in its FY2014 budget request to sponsor entrepreneur training in 40 locations and to create an online entrepreneurship training program. Congress included the Entrepreneurship Education initiative in its list of SBA entrepreneurial development/noncredit programs to be funded in FY2014. This was the first time that the initiative was included in the list. In the explanatory statement accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, Congress recommended that the initiative receive $5.0 million in FY2014. Congress recommended that the program receive $7.0 million in FY2015, $10.0 million in FY2016 and FY2017, $6.0 million in FY2018, and $3.5 million in FY2019 (see Table 1 ). The Trump Administration requested $2.0 million for the program in FY2018 and FY2019. The Entrepreneurship Education initiative was offered in 60 cities in FY2018 and served more than 800 small business owners. These owners are required to have been in business for at least three years, have annual revenue of at least $400,000, and have at least one employee, other than the owner, to participate in the initiative. There is no cost to the participants. Growth Accelerators The SBA describes growth accelerators as "organizations that help entrepreneurs start and scale their businesses." Growth accelerators are typically run by experienced entrepreneurs and help small businesses access seed capital and mentors. The SBA claims that growth accelerators "help accelerate a startup company's path towards success with targeted advice on revenue growth, job, and sourcing outside funding." In FY2012, the SBA sponsored several meetings with university officials and faculty, entrepreneurs, and representatives of growth accelerators to discuss mentoring and how to best assist "high-growth" entrepreneurs. These meetings "culminated with a White House event co‐hosted by the SBA and the Department of Commerce to help formalize the network of universities and accelerators, provide a series of 'train the trainers' events on various government programs that benefit high‐growth entrepreneurs, and provide a playbook of best practices on engaging universities on innovation and entrepreneurship." In FY2014, the Obama Administration requested $5.0 million, and Congress recommended an appropriation of $2.5 million, for the growth accelerator initiative. The Obama Administration proposed to use the funding to provide matching grants to universities and private sector accelerators "to start a new accelerator program (based on successful models) or scale an existing program." The Obama Administration also indicated that it planned to request funding for five years ($25 million in total funding) and feature a required 4:1 private-sector match. However, because it received half of its budget request ($2.5 million), the SBA decided to reconsider the program's requirements. As part of that reconsideration, the SBA decided to drop the 4:1 private-sector match in an effort to enable the program to have a larger effect. The SBA announced the availability of 50 growth accelerator grants of $50,000 each on May 12, 2014, and received more than 800 applications by the August 2, 2014, deadline. The 50 awards were announced in September 2014. Congress recommended that the program receive $4.0 million in FY2015, $1.0 million in FY2016, FY2017, and FY2018, and $2 million in FY2019 (see Table 1 ). Congress also directed the SBA in its explanatory statements accompanying P.L. 113-235 and P.L. 114-113 to "require $4 of matching funds for every $1 awarded under the growth accelerators program." The Trump Administration requested that the program receive no funding in FY2018 and FY2019. The SBA announced the award of 80 growth accelerator grants of $50,000 each on August 4, 2015 ($4.0 million), 68 growth accelerator grants of $50,000 each on August 31, 2016 ($3.4 million), and 20 growth accelerator grants of $50,000 each on October 30, 2017 ($1 million). The SBA did not issue a competitive announcement for Growth Accelerator awards in FY2018. The SBA plans to make Growth Accelerator awards in FY2019 using both the FY2018 and FY2019 funding amounts. Department of Commerce Small Business Management and Technical Assistance Training Programs As mentioned previously, the Department of Commerce's Minority Business Development Agency (MBDA) provides training to minority business owners to assist them in obtaining contracts and financial awards. In addition, the Department of Commerce's Economic Development Administration's Local Technical Assistance Program promotes efforts to build and expand local organizational capacity in distressed areas. As part of that effort, it funds projects that focus on technical or market feasibility studies of economic development projects or programs, which often include consultation with small businesses. The Minority Business Development Agency The MBDA was established by President Richard M. Nixon by Executive Order 11625, issued on October 13, 1971, and published in the Federal Register the next day. It clarified the authority of the Secretary of Commerce to implement federal policy in support of the minority business enterprise program, provide additional technical and management assistance to disadvantaged businesses, assist in demonstration projects, and coordinate the participation of all federal departments and agencies in an increased minority enterprise effort. The MBDA received an appropriation of $30.0 million in FY2015, $32.0 million in FY2016, $34.0 million in FY2017, $39.0 million in FY2018, and $40 million in FY2019. The Trump Administration requested $6.0 million to close the agency in FY2018 and a reduction to $10.0 million in FY2019. As part of its mission, the MBDA seeks to train minority business owners to become first- or second-tier suppliers to private corporations and the federal government. Progress is measured in the business's increased gross receipts, number of employees, and size and scale of the firms associated with minority business enterprises. The MBDA reported that in FY2015 it helped to create and retain 36,896 jobs and assisted minority-owned and operated businesses in obtaining more than $5.9 billion in contracts and capital awards. The EDA Local Technical Assistance Program P.L. 89-186, the Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965, authorized the Department of Commerce's Economic Development Administration (EDA) to provide financial assistance to economically distressed areas in the United States that are characterized by high levels of unemployment and low per-capita income. The EDA currently administers seven Economic Development Assistance Programs (EDAPs) that award matching grants for public works, economic adjustment, planning, technical assistance, research and evaluation, trade adjustment assistance, and global climate change mitigation. Grants awarded under the EDA's Local Technical Assistance Program are designed to help solve specific economic development problems, respond to development opportunities, and build and expand local organizational capacity in distressed areas. The majority of local technical assistance projects focus on technical or market feasibility studies of economic development projects or programs, including consultation with small businesses. The EDA's Local Technical Assistance Program received an appropriation of $11.0 million in FY2015, $10.5 million in FY2016, $9.0 million in FY2017, and $9.5 million in FY2018 and FY2019. The Trump Administration requested $30.0 million to close the EDA in FY2018 and $14.9 million to close it in FY2019. Congressional Issues For many years, a recurring theme at congressional hearings concerning the SBA's management and technical assistance training programs has been the perceived need to improve program efficiency by eliminating duplication of services or increasing cooperation and coordination both within and among SCORE, WBCs, and SBDCs. For example, the House Committee on Small Business has argued that the SBA's various management and technical assistance training programs should be "folded into the mission of the SBDC program or their responsibilities should be taken over by other agencies" because they "overlap each other and duplicate the educational services provided by other agencies." In addition, as mentioned previously, the Obama Administration recommended that the PRIME program be eliminated, arguing that it overlaps and duplicates the SBA's Microloan Technical Assistance Program. The Trump Administration has also recommended that the PRIME program, the Growth Accelerators Initiative, and the Entrepreneurial Development Initiative (Regional Innovation Clusters) be eliminated because they overlap private-sector "mechanisms to foster local business development and investment" or are "duplicative of other federal programs." In contrast, Congress has approved continued funding for these programs and the Boots to Business and Boots to Business: Reboot initiatives. In recent years, Congress has also explored ways to improve the SBA's measurement of its management and training programs' effectiveness. Program Administration In 2007, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) was asked to assess the SBA's oversight of WBCs and the coordination and duplication of services among the SBA's management and technical training assistance programs. GAO found that As described in the terms of the SBA award, WBCs are required to coordinate with local SBDCs and SCORE chapters. In addition, SBA officials told us that they expected district offices to ensure that the programs did not duplicate each other. However, based on our review, WBCs lacked guidance and information from SBA on how to successfully carry out their coordination efforts. Most of the WBCs that we spoke with explained that in some situations they referred clients to an SBDC or SCORE counselor, and some WBCs also took steps to more actively coordinate with local SBDCs and SCORE chapters to avoid duplication and leverage resources. We learned that WBCs used a variety of approaches to facilitate coordination, such as memorandums of understanding, information-sharing meetings, and co-locating staff and services. However, some WBCs told us that they faced challenges in coordinating services with SBDC and SCORE, in part because the programs have similar performance measures, and this could result in competition among the service providers in some locations. We also found that on some occasions SBA encouraged WBCs to provide services that were similar to services already provided by SBDCs in their district. Such challenges thwart coordination efforts and could increase the risk of duplication in some geographic areas. Some organizations have argued that the SBA's management and technical assistance training programs should be merged. For example, the U.S. Women's Chamber of Commerce argued that over the last 50 years, the SBA entrepreneurial development system has grown into a fragmented array of programs, which has resulted in a disorganized, overlapping, and [in] efficient delivery of service through a system that is ill-prepared to effectively address the challenges of our economy…. if we are to serve the needs of American entrepreneurs, we must commit to a top to bottom restructuring of the delivery of the entrepreneurial services of the SBA. The myriad of entrepreneurial development programs should be unified into one centrally managed organization that has the flexibility to provide services when and where they are needed. These organizations argue that merging the SBA's management and technical assistance training programs would provide greater coordination of services and "one clear channel for assistance" that "is paramount to the average business owner seeking help." Advocates of merging the SBA's management and technical assistance training programs often mention merging them into the SBDC Program because, in their view, it has the advantage of having a broader connection to mainstream resources and its locations are "greater and more diverse" than other SBA management and technical assistance training programs. Others argue that providing separate management and training assistance programs for specific groups is the best means to ensure that those groups' unique challenges are recognized and their unique needs are met. For example, when asked at a congressional hearing about the rationale for having separate management and technical assistance training programs for specific groups, a representative of the Association of Women's Business Centers stated, I think that there is tremendous rationale for having different programs…. The women's business center programs really target a very different kind of population than the SBDCs.… We serve very different clientele…. We create a very different culture at the women's business center. We really have made it a welcoming place where … they feel comfortable.… And it's very important to me that the woman have a place where they feel comfortable … and where they see other women like themselves who are aspiring to reach their dreams. At another congressional hearing, the Association of Women's Business Centers' executive director argued that "the new three-year funding arrangement" for WBCs had enabled them to "concentrate on better serving their clients and growing their programs" and that WBCs should be provided continued and expanded funding because they provide effective services: We know that when our program performance is measured against any other enterprise assistance program, we will meet or exceed any performance measures. Indeed, the SBA's own client-based performance reviews have shown our clients to be just as satisfied or in some cases more satisfied with the services they have received compared to the SBA's other entrepreneurial development efforts. Instead of merging programs, some argue that improved communication among the SBA's management and technical assistance training resource partners and enhanced SBA program oversight is needed. For example, during the 111 th Congress, the House passed H.R. 2352 , the Job Creation Through Entrepreneurship Act of 2009, on May 20, 2009, by a vote of 406-15. The Senate did not take action on the bill. In its committee report accompanying the bill, the House Committee on Small Business concluded that Each ED [Entrepreneurial Development] program has a unique mandate and service delivery approach that is customized to its particular clients. However, as a network, the programs have established local connections and resources that benefit entrepreneurs within a region. Enhanced coordination among this network is critical to make the most of scarce resources available for small firms. It can also ensure that best practices are shared amongst providers that have similar goals but work within different contexts. In an effort to enhance the oversight and coordination of the SBA's management and technical assistance training programs, the Job Creation Through Entrepreneurship Act of 2009 would have required the SBA to create a new online, multilingual distance training and education program that was fully integrated into the SBA's existing management and technical assistance training programs and "allows entrepreneurs and small business owners the opportunity to exchange technical assistance through the sharing of information." coordinate its management and technical assistance training programs "with State and local economic development agencies and other federal agencies as appropriate." "report annually to Congress, in consultation with other federal departments and agencies as appropriate, on opportunities to foster coordination, limit duplication, and improve program delivery for federal entrepreneurial development activities." During the 112 th Congress, S. 3442 , the SUCCESS Act of 2012, and S. 3572 , the Restoring Tax and Regulatory Certainty to Small Businesses Act of 2012, sought to address the coordination issue by requiring the SBA, in consultation with other federal departments and agencies, to submit an annual report to Congress "describing opportunities to foster coordination of, limit duplication among, and improve program delivery for federal entrepreneurial development programs." The SUCCESS Act of 2012 was referred to the Senate Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship, which held hearings on the bill. The Restoring Tax and Regulatory Certainty to Small Businesses Act of 2012 was referred to the Senate Committee on Finance. There has also been some discussion of merging SBA's small business management and training programs with business management and training programs offered by other federal agencies, both as a means to improve program performance and to achieve savings. For example, P.L. 111-139 , Increasing the Statutory Limit on the Public Debt, requires GAO to "conduct routine investigations to identify programs, agencies, offices, and initiatives with duplicative goals and activities within Departments and governmentwide and report annually to Congress on the findings." GAO identified 51 programmatic areas in its 2012 annual report on federal duplication "where programs may be able to achieve greater efficiencies or become more effective in providing government services." GAO identified management and training assistance provided to businesses by the SBA and the Departments of Commerce, Housing and Urban Development, and Agriculture as one of these areas. GAO identified 53 business management and technical assistance programs sponsored by the SBA and these three departments. GAO reported that "the number of programs that support entrepreneurs—53—and the overlap among these programs raise questions about whether a fragmented system is the most effective way to support entrepreneurs. By exploring alternatives, agencies may be able to determine whether there are more efficient ways to continue to serve the unique needs of entrepreneurs, including consolidating various programs." As mentioned previously, the House Committee on Small Business has argued that "given tight budgetary constraints" the SBA's various management and technical assistance training programs "should be folded into the mission of the SBDC program or their responsibilities should be taken over by other agencies." The House Committee on Small Business has also indicated its opposition to the Obama Administration's increased use of, and requests for increased funding for, management and training initiatives. For example, Representative Sam Graves, then-chair of the House Committee on Small Business, indicated in his opening remarks at a congressional hearing in April 2014 that Despite reports that the federal government is riddled with redundant [management and training] programs for entrepreneurs, the SBA has increasingly spawned its own entrepreneurial development initiatives. In doing so, the SBA has repeatedly requested increased funding for its own initiatives while allowing funding for statutorily authorized programs, such as SBDCs, to remain static.… I continue to question the necessity of these initiatives given the potential overlap with both private and public sector efforts already in existence. In addition, as mentioned previously, H.R. 1774 would, among other provisions, require the SBA to only use authorized entrepreneurial development programs (SCORE, WBCs, SBDCs, etc.) to deliver specified entrepreneurial development services. Program Evaluation GAO noted in its 2007 assessment of the SBA's management and technical assistance training programs that, in addition to its annual survey of WBC, SBDC, and SCORE participants, the SBA requires WBCs to provide quarterly performance reports that include "the WBCs' actual accomplishments, compared with their performance goals for the reporting period; actual budget expenditures, compared with an estimated budget; cost of client fees; success stories; and names of WBC personnel and board members." GAO also noted that WBCs are also required to issue fourth quarter performance reports that "also include a summary of the year's activities and economic impact data that the WBCs collect from their clients, such as number of business start-ups, number of jobs created, and gross receipts." SBDCs have similar reporting requirements. In recent years, Congress has considered requiring the SBA to expand its use of outcome-based measures to determine the effectiveness of its management and technical training assistance programs. For example, during the 111 th Congress, the previously mentioned Job Creation Through Entrepreneurship Act of 2009 would have required the SBA to create "outcome-based measures of the amount of job creation or economic activity generated in the local community as a result of efforts made and services provided by each women's business center." It would also have required the SBA to "develop and implement a consistent data collection process to cover all entrepreneurial development programs" including "data relating to job creation, performance, and any other data determined appropriate by the Administrator with respect to the Administration's entrepreneurial development programs." During the 112 th Congress, the SUCCESS Act of 2012 and Restoring Tax and Regulatory Certainty to Small Businesses Act of 2012 would have required the SBA to "promulgate a rule to develop and implement a consistent data collection process for the entrepreneurial development programs" that included data "relating to job creation and performance and any other data determined appropriate by the Administrator." During the 114 th Congress, H.R. 207 would have required the SBA to issue an annual report concerning "all entrepreneurial development activities undertaken in the current fiscal year." This report would include a description and operating details for each program and activity; operating circulars, manuals, and standard operating procedures for each program and activity; a description of the process used to award grants under each program and activity; a list of all awardees, contractors, and vendors and the amount of awards provided for the current fiscal year for each program and activity; the amount of funding obligated for the current fiscal year for each program and activity; and the names and titles for those individuals responsible for each program and activity. This legislative language was reintroduced during the 115 th Congress in H.R. 1774 , the Developing the Next Generation of Small Businesses Act of 2017. Concluding Observations Congressional interest in the federal government's small business management and technical assistance training programs has increased in recent years. One of the reasons for the heightened level of interest in these programs is that small business has led job formation and retention during previous economic recoveries. It has been argued that effective small business management and technical assistance training programs are needed if small businesses are to lead job creation and retention during the current economic recovery. As then-Representative Heath Shuler stated during a congressional hearing in 2009: We often talk about the role that small business plays in the creation of jobs and with good reason. Small firms generate between 60 and 80 percent of new positions. Following the recession in the mid-1990s, they created 3.8 million jobs…. we could use that growth today. But unfortunately, many firms are struggling to make ends meet. Let's allow them to hire new workers. In the face of historic economic challenges, we should be investing in America's job creators. SBA's Entrepreneurial Development Programs, or ED, do just that. Of all the tools in the small business toolbox, these are some of the most critical. They help small firms do everything from draft business plans to access capital. The general consensus is that federal management and technical assistance training programs serve an important purpose and, for the most part, are providing needed services that are not available elsewhere. As Karen Mills, then-SBA administrator, stated during a press interview in 2010: We find that our counseling operations are equally important as our credit operations because small businesses really need help and advice, and when they get it, they tend to have more sales and more profits and more longevity, and they hire more people. So we have looked forward and said, "How do we get all the tools small businesses need into their hands?" Maybe they want to export. Maybe they want to know how to use broadband. Maybe they are veterans who are coming back and want to start a business or grow their business. Our job is to make sure all that information and opportunity is accessible for small businesses so they can do what they do, which is keep our economy strong. There is also a general consensus that making federal management and technical assistance training programs more effective and responsive to the needs of small business would assist the national economic recovery. However, there are disagreements over how to achieve that goal. Some advocate (1) increasing funding for existing programs to enable them to provide additional training opportunities for small businesses while, at the same time, maintaining separate training programs for specific demographic groups as a means to ensure that those groups' specific needs are met; (2) requiring the SBA to make more extensive use of outcome-based measures to better determine the programs' effect on small business formation and retention, job creation and retention, and the generation of wealth; and (3) temporarily reducing or eliminating federal matching requirements to enable SBA's management and technical assistance training resource partners to focus greater attention to service delivery and less to fund raising. Others argue for a merger of existing programs to reduce costs and improve program efficiency, to focus available resources on augmenting the capacity of SBDCs to meet the needs of all small business groups, and require the SBA to make more extensive use of outcome-based performance measures to determine program effectiveness. No case studies or empirical data are available concerning the efficiencies that might be gained by merging the SBA's management and technical assistance training programs. Advocates argue that merging the programs would improve communications, reduce confusion by business owners seeking assistance by ensuring that all small business management and technical assistance training centers serve all small business owners and aspiring entrepreneurs, lead to more sustainable and predictable funding for the programs from nonfederal sources, and result in more consistent and standard operating procedures throughout the country. Opponents argue that any gains in program efficiency that might be realized would be more than offset by the loss of targeted services for constituencies that often require different information and training to meet their unique challenges and needs. Appendix. Brief Descriptions of SBA Management and Technical Assistance Training Programs

The Small Business Administration (SBA) has provided technical and managerial assistance to small businesses since it began operations in 1953. Initially, the SBA provided its own small business management and technical assistance training programs. Over time, the SBA has relied increasingly on third parties to provide that training. Congressional interest in the SBA's management and technical assistance training programs ($226.7 million in FY2019) has increased in recent years, primarily because these programs are viewed as a means to assist small businesses create and retain jobs. These programs fund about "14,000 resource partners," including 63 lead small business development centers (SBDCs) and nearly 900 SBDC local outreach locations, 128 women's business centers (WBCs), and 350 chapters of the mentoring program, SCORE. The SBA reports that more than 1.2 million aspiring entrepreneurs and small business owners receive training from an SBA-supported resource partner each year. The Department of Commerce also provides management and technical assistance training for small businesses. For example, its Minority Business Development Agency provides training to minority business owners to assist them in obtaining contracts and financial awards. Some have argued that the SBA could improve program efficiency by eliminating duplication of services across federal agencies and improving cooperation and coordination among the SBA's resource partners. Congress has also explored ways to improve the SBA's measurement of these programs' effectiveness. This report examines the historical development of federal small business management and technical assistance training programs; describes their current structures, operations, and budgets; and assesses their administration and oversight and the measures used to determine their effectiveness. It also discusses legislation to improve program performance, including P.L. 114-88, the Recovery Improvements for Small Entities After Disaster Act of 2015 (RISE After Disaster Act of 2015), which, among other things, authorizes the SBA to provide up to two years of additional funding to its resource partners to assist small businesses located in a presidentially declared major disaster area and authorizes SBDCs to provide assistance outside the SBDC's state, without regard to geographical proximity to the SBDC, if the small business is in a presidentially declared major disaster area. This assistance can be provided "for a period of not more than two years after the date on which the President" has declared the area a major disaster; and P.L. 115-141, the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018, among other provisions, relaxed requirements that Microloan intermediaries may spend no more than 25% of Microloan technical assistance grant funds on prospective borrowers and no more than 25% of those funds on contracts with third parties to provide that technical assistance by increasing those percentages to no more than 50%.

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Introduction This report provides an overview of the federal response to domestic violence—defined broadly to include acts of physical and nonphysical violence against spouses and other intimate partners—through the Family Violence Prevention and Services Act (FVPSA). FVPSA programs are carried out by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS's) Administration for Children and Families (ACF) and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). ACF administers most FVPSA programming, including grants to states, territories, and Indian tribes to support local organizations that provide immediate shelter and related assistance for victims of domestic violence and their children. ACF also provides funding for a national domestic violence hotline that responds to calls, texts, and web-based chats from individuals seeking assistance. The funding for ACF also supports state domestic violence coalitions that provide training for and advocacy on behalf of domestic violence providers within each state, as well as multiple resource centers that provide training and technical assistance on various domestic violence issues for a variety of stakeholders. The CDC funds efforts to prevent domestic violence through a program known as Domestic Violence Prevention Enhancement and Leadership Through Allies (DELTA). The House Committee on Education and Labor and the Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pension (HELP) Committee have exercised jurisdiction over FVPSA. The report begins with background on the definitions of domestic violence and related terms. This background section also describes the risk factors for domestic violence and estimates of the number of victims. The next section of the report addresses the history leading up to the enactment of FVPSA, and the major components of the act: a national domestic violence hotline, support for domestic violence shelters and nonresidential services, and community-based responses to prevent domestic violence. The report then discusses efforts under FVPSA to assist children and youth exposed to domestic violence, including teen dating violence. Finally, the report provides an overview of FVPSA's interaction with other federal laws, including the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA) and the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA, P.L. 103-322 ). FVPSA was the first federal law to address domestic violence, with a focus on providing shelter and services for survivors; however, since the enactment of VAWA in 1994, the federal response to domestic violence has expanded to involve multiple departments and activities that include investigating and prosecuting crimes and providing additional services to victims and abusers. FVPSA also includes provisions that encourage or require program administrators to coordinate FVPSA programs with related programs and research carried out by other federal agencies. The appendices provide further detail about FVPSA-related definitions and funding, and statistics related to domestic violence victimization. Background Definitions The FVPSA statute focuses on "family violence," which can involve many types of family relationships and forms of violence. FVPSA defines the term as acts of violence or threatened acts of violence, including forced detention, that result in physical injury against individuals (including elderly individuals) who are legally related by blood or marriage and/or live in the same household. This definition focuses on physical forms of violence and is limited to abusers and victims who live together or are related by blood or marriage; however, researchers and others generally agree that family violence is broad enough to include nonphysical violence and physical violence that occurs outside of an intimate relationship. Such a definition can encompass a range of scenarios—rape and other forms of sexual violence committed by a current or former spouse or intimate partner who may or may not live in the same household; stalking by a current or former spouse or partner; abuse and neglect of elderly family members and children; and psychologically tormenting and controlling a spouse, intimate partner, or other member of the household. While family violence can encompass child abuse and elder abuse, FVPSA programs focus on individuals abused by their spouses and other intimate partners. Further, FVPSA references the terms "domestic violence" and "dating violence" as they are defined under VAWA, and discusses these terms alongside family violence. (The FVPSA regulations also define these terms as generally consistent with VAWA, but recognize that the term "dating violence" encompasses additional acts.) The VAWA definition of "domestic violence" encompasses forms of intimate partner violence—involving current and former spouses or individuals who are similarly situated to a spouse, cohabiting individuals, and parents of children in common—that are outlawed under state or local laws. VAWA defines "dating violence" as violence committed by a person who has been in a social relationship of a romantic or intimate nature with the victim; and where the existence of such a relationship is determined based on consideration of the length of the relationship, the type of relationship, and the frequency of interaction between the individuals involved. ( Appendix A provides a summary of these and related terms as they are defined in statute.) The federal government responds to child abuse and elder abuse through a variety of separate programs. Federal law authorizes and funds a range of activities to prevent and respond to child abuse and neglect under Titles IV-B and IV-E of the Social Security Act and CAPTA. Separately, the Older Americans Act (OAA), the major federal vehicle for the delivery of social and nutrition services for older persons, has authorized projects to address elder abuse. In addition, the OAA authorizes, and the federal government funds, the National Center on Elder Abuse . The center provides information to the public and professionals regarding elder abuse prevention activities, and provides training and technical assistance to state elder abuse agencies and to community-based organizations. The Social Services Block Grant, as amended, also includes elder justice provisions, including several grant programs and other activities to promote the safety and well-being of older Americans. Risk Factors for Domestic Violence The evidence base on domestic violence does not point strongly to any one reason that it is perpetrated, in part because of the difficulty in measuring social conditions (e.g., status of women, gender norms, and socioeconomic status, among others) that can influence this violence. Still, the research literature has identified two underlying influences: the unequal position of women and the normalization of violence, both in society and some relationships. Certain risk variables are often associated with—but not necessarily the causes—of domestic violence. Such factors include a pattern of problem drinking, poverty and economic conditions, and early parenthood. For example, substance abuse often precedes incidents of domestic violence. A U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) study found that substance abuse tracked closely with homicide, attempted homicide, or the most severe violent incidents of abuse perpetrated against an intimate partner. Among men who killed or attempted to kill their intimate partners, over 80% were problem drinkers in the year preceding the incident. Profiles of Survivors Estimating the number of individuals involved in domestic violence is complicated by the varying definitions of the term and methodologies for collecting data. For example, some research counts a boyfriend or girlfriend as a family relationship while other research does not; still other surveys are limited to specific types of violence and whether violence is reported to police. Certain studies focus more broadly on various types of violence or more narrowly on violence committed among intimate partners. In addition, domestic violence is generally believed to be underreported. Survivors may be reluctant to disclose their victimization because of shame, embarrassment, fear, or belief that they may not receive support from law enforcement. Overall, two studies—the National Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence Survey (NISVS) and the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS)—show that violence involving intimate partners is not uncommon, and that both women and men are victimized sexually, physically, and psychologically. Women tend to first be victimized at a younger age than men. Further, minority women and men tend to be victimized at higher rates than their white counterparts. National Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence Survey NISVS provides information on the prevalence of domestic violence among individuals during their lifetimes and in the past 12 months prior to the survey. The CDC conducted the study annually in each of 2010-2012 and in 2015. The survey examines multiple aspects of intimate partner violence—including contact sexual violence, which encompasses rape and other acts; physical violence, including slapping, kicking, and more severe acts like being burned; and stalking, which is a pattern of harassing or threatening tactics. Select findings from the study are summarized in Table B-1 . Generally, the 2015 survey found that women and men were victimized at about the same rate over their lifetime. Over one-third (36%) of women and more than one-third (34%) of men in the United States reported that they experienced sexual violence, physical violence, and/or stalking by an intimate partner in their lifetimes. However, women were more likely than men to experience certain types of intimate partner violence, including contact sexual violence (18% vs. 8%), stalking (10% vs. 2%), and severe physical violence (21% vs. 15%). Women were also much more likely than men to report an impact related to partner violence over their lifetimes (25% vs 11%). Such impacts included having injuries, being fearful, being concerned for their safety, missing work or school, needing medical care, or needing help from law enforcement. Women and men of color, particularly individuals who are multiracial, tended to experience domestic violence at higher lifetime rates. As reported in the 2010 NISVS, women who are multiracial (57%) were most likely to report contact sexual violence, physical violence, and/or stalking by an intimate partner, followed by American Indian or Alaska Native women (48%), black women (45%), white women (37%), Hispanic women of any race (34%), and Asian or Pacific Islander women (18%). Among men, those who were black (40%) and multiracial (39%) were more likely to experience intimate partner violence than white (32%) and Hispanic (29%) men; estimates were not reported for American Indian or Alaska Native or Asian or Pacific Islander males because the data were unreliable. Special Populations The 2010 NISVS examined the prevalence of this violence based on how adult respondents identified their sexual orientation (heterosexual or straight, gay or lesbian, or bisexual). The study found that overall, bisexual women had significantly higher lifetime prevalence of sexual violence, physical violence, and stalking by an intimate partner when compared to both lesbian and heterosexual women. The 2010 NISVS also surveyed women on active duty in the military and the wives of active duty men. These women were asked to respond to whether they experienced intimate partner violence over their lifetime and during the four years prior to the survey. The study found that the majority of women affiliated with the military were significantly less likely to be victims of intimate partner violence compared to women in the general population. However, active duty women who were deployed during the three years prior to the survey were significantly more likely to have experienced intimate partner violence during this period and over their lifetime compared to active duty women who were not deployed. Among those who deployed, 12% had been victims of physical violence, rape, or stalking by an intimate partner during the past three years and 35% had experienced victimization over their lifetime. This is compared to 10% (during the past three years) and 28% (lifetime prevalence) of women who had not deployed. National Crime Victimization Survey The National Crime Victimization Survey is a survey coordinated by DOJ's Bureau of Justice Statistics within the Office of Justice Programs. NCVS surveys a nationally representative sample of households. It is the primary source of information on the characteristics of criminal nonfatal victimization and on the number and types of crimes that may or may not be reported to law enforcement authorities. NCVS surveyed respondents about whether they have been victims of a violent crime, including rape/sexual assault, robbery, aggravated assault, and simple assault; and for victims, the relationship to the perpetrator. The survey reports the share of crimes that are committed by an intimate partner (current or former spouses, boyfriends, or girlfriends), other family members, friends/acquaintances, or strangers. The survey found that nearly 600,000 individuals were victims of intimate partner violence in 2016. An earlier NCVS study examined changes in the rate of intimate partner violence over time. The study found that the number of female victims of domestic violence declined from 1.8 million in 1994 to about 621,000 in 2011. Over this period, the rate of serious intimate partner violence—rape or sexual assault, robbery, and aggravated assault—declined by 72% for females and 64% for males. Approximately 4% of females and 8% of males who were victimized by intimate partners were shot at, stabbed, or hit with a weapon over the period from 2002 through 2011. Effects of Domestic Violence Domestic violence is associated with multiple negative outcomes for victims, including mental and emotional distress and health effects. The 2015 NISVS study found that these effects appeared to be greater for women. About 1 in 4 women (25.1%) and 1 in 10 men (10.9%) who experienced sexual violence, physical violence, and/or stalking by an intimate partner in their lifetime reported at least one impact as a result of this violence, including being fearful; being concerned for their safety or having an injury or need for medical care; needing help from law enforcement; missing at least one day of work; or missing at least one day of school. Domestic Violence: Development of the Issue Early marriage laws in the United States permitted men to hit their wives, and throughout much of the 20 th century family violence remained a hidden problem. Victims, mostly women, often endured physical and emotional abuse in silence. These victims were hesitant to seek help because of fear of retaliation by their spouses/partners and concerns about leaving their homes, children, and neighborhoods behind. Women were worried that they would be perceived as deviant or mentally unstable or would be unable to get by financially. In addition, victims were often blamed for their abuse, based on stereotypical notions of women (e.g., demanding, aggressive, and frigid, among other characteristics). In the 1960s, shelters and services for victims of domestic violence became available on a limited basis; however, these services were not always targeted specifically to victims per se. Social service and religious organizations provided temporary housing for displaced persons generally, which could include homeless and abused women. In addition, a small number of organizations provided services to abused women who were married to alcoholic men. Beginning in the 1970s, the "battered women's movement" began to emerge; it sought to heighten awareness of women who were abused by spouses and partners. The movement developed from influences both abroad and within the United States. In England, the first battered women's shelter, Chiswick Women's Aid, galvanized support to establish similar types of services. In addition, the feminist movement in the United States increasingly brought greater national attention to the issue. As part of the battered women's movement, former battered women, civic organizations, and professionals opened shelters and began to provide services to victims, primarily abused women and their children. Shelters were most often located in old homes, at Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA) centers, or housed in institutional settings, such as motels or abandoned orphanages. In addition to providing shelter, groups in the battered women's movement organized coalitions to combine resources for public education on the issue, support groups for victims, and services that were lacking. For example, the YWCA and Women in Crisis Can Act formed a hotline for abused women in Chicago. These and other groups convened the Chicago Abused Women's Coalition to address concerns about services for battered women. The coalition spoke to hundreds of community groups and professional agencies about battered women's stories, explained the significance of violence, detailed how violence becomes sanctioned, dispelled common myths, and challenged community members to provide funding and other support to assist abused women. The coalition mobilized around passage of a state law to protect women and require police training on domestic violence, among other accomplishments. Based on a survey in the late 1970s, 111 shelters were believed to be operating across all states and in urban, suburban, and rural communities. These shelters generally reported that they provided a safe and secure environment for abused women and their children, emotional support and counseling for abused women, and information on legal rights and assistance with housing, among other supports. Approximately 90 of these shelters fielded over 110,000 calls for assistance in a given year. Around this same time, the public became increasingly aware of domestic violence. In 1983, Time magazine published an article, "Wife Beating: The Silent Crime," as part of a series of articles on violence in the United States. The article stated: "There is nothing new about wife beating…. What is new is that in the U.S. wife beating is no longer widely accepted as an inevitable and private matter. The change in attitude, while far from complete, has come about in the past 10 to 15 years as part of the profound transformation of ideas about the roles and rights of women in society." In 1984, then-U.S. Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti established the Department of Justice Task Force on Family Violence, which issued a report examining the scope and impact of domestic violence in America. The report also provided recommendations to improve the nation's law enforcement, criminal justice, and community response to offenses that were previously considered "family matters." Congressional Response Largely as a result of efforts by advocates and the Justice Department, Congress began to take an interest in domestic violence issues. The House Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families conducted a series of hearings in 1983 and 1984 on child abuse and family violence throughout the country, to understand the scope of family violence better and explore possible federal responses to the problem. The committee heard from victims, domestic violence service providers, researchers, law enforcement officials, and other stakeholders about the possible number of victims and the need for additional victim services. In 1984, the Family Violence Prevention and Services Act (FVPSA) was enacted as Title III of the Child Abuse Amendments of 1984 ( P.L. 98-457 ). Title I of that law amended the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA), and most of the seven subsequent reauthorizations of FVPSA have occurred as part of legislation that reauthorized CAPTA. This includes the most recent reauthorization ( P.L. 111-320 ), which extended funding authority for FVPSA through FY2015. As discussed later in this report, Congress subsequently broadened the federal response to domestic violence with the enactment of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994. FVPSA Overview As originally enacted, FVPSA included both a social service and law enforcement response to preventing and responding to domestic violence. Grants were authorized for states, territories, and Indian tribes to establish and expand programs to prevent domestic violence and provide shelter for victims. In addition, the law authorized grants to provide training and technical assistance to law enforcement personnel, and this funding was ultimately used to train law enforcement personnel throughout the country. From FY1986 through FY1994, funding for these grants was transferred from HHS to DOJ, which carried out the grants under the Office for Victims of Crime (OVC). DOJ funded 23 projects to train law enforcement officers on domestic violence policies and response procedures, with approximately 16,000 law enforcement officers and other justice system personnel from 25 states receiving this training. The training emphasized officers as participants working with other agencies, victims, and community groups in a coordinated response to domestic violence. Over time, FVPSA was expanded to include support of other activities, including state domestic violence coalitions and grants that focus on prevention activities; however, authorization of funding for FVPSA law enforcement training grants was discontinued in 1992, just before the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 authorized a similar purpose. Specifically, VAWA authorizes training and support of law enforcement officials under the Services, Training, Officers, and Prosecutors (STOP) Grant program. As outlined in Figure 1 , FVPSA currently authorizes three major activities: domestic violence prevention activities under a program known as DELTA; the national domestic violence hotline; and domestic violence shelters, services, and program support. The CDC administers the DELTA program. The Family and Youth Services Bureau (FYSB) in HHS/ACF administers funding for the hotline and the domestic violence shelters and support. Funding Authorization of funding under FVPSA has been extended multiple times, most recently through FY2015 by the CAPTA Reauthorization Act of 2010 ( P.L. 111-320 ). Congress has appropriated funding in subsequent years. Table 1 includes actual funding from FY1993 to FY2018, which includes reductions in some years, and appropriated funding for FY2019 for the three major FVPSA activities. Congress appropriated just over $180 million for FY2019, the highest total to date. Domestic Violence Prevention Enhancement and Leadership Through Alliances (DELTA)34 Since 1994, FVPSA has authorized the HHS Secretary to award cooperative agreements to state domestic violence coalitions that coordinate local community projects to prevent domestic violence, including such violence involving youth. Congress first awarded funding for prevention activities in FY1996 under a pilot program carried out by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. The pilot program was formalized in 2002 under a program now known as the Domestic Violence Prevention Enhancement and Leadership Through Alliances (DELTA) program. The focus of DELTA is preventing domestic violence before it occurs, rather than responding once it happens or working to prevent its recurrence. The program has had four iterations: DELTA, which was funded from FY1996 through FY2012 and involved 14 states; DELTA Prep, which extended from FY2008 through FY2012 and involved 19 states that had not received the initial DELTA funds; DELTA FOCUS, which extended from FY2013 through FY2017 and involved 10 states, all of which had previously received funding under DELTA or DELTA Prep; and DELTA Impact, which began with FY2018 and involves 10 states, all of which except one has previously received DELTA funding. As originally implemented, the program provided funding and technical assistance to 14 state domestic violence coalitions to support local efforts to carry out prevention strategies and work at the state level to oversee these strategies. Local prevention efforts were referred to as coordinated community responses (CCRs). The CCRs were led by domestic violence organizations and other stakeholders across multiple sectors, including law enforcement, public health, and faith-based organizations. For example, the Michigan Coalition Against Domestic and Sexual Violence supported two CCRs—the Arab Community Center for Economic and Social Services and the Lakeshore Alliance Against Domestic and Sexual Violence—that focused on faith-based initiatives. Both CCRs held forums that provided resources and information about the roles of faith leaders in preventing the first-time occurrence of domestic violence. The 14 state domestic violence coalitions developed five- to eight-year domestic violence prevention plans known as Intimate Partner Violence Prevention Plans. These plans were developed with multiple stakeholders, and they discuss the strategies needed to prevent first-time perpetration or victimization and to build the capacity to implement these strategies. The CDC issued a brief that summarizes the plans and identifies the successes and challenges for state domestic violence coalitions in supporting and enhancing intimate partner violence prevention efforts. Overall, the report found that states improved their capacity to respond to intimate partner violence through evidence-based planning and implementation strategies. DELTA Prep DELTA Prep was a project that extended from FY2008 through FY2012, and was a collaborative effort among the CDC, the CDC Foundation, and the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. Through DELTA Prep, the CDC extended the DELTA Program to 19 states that did not receive the initial DELTA funds. State and community leaders in these other states received training and assistance in building prevention strategies, based on the work of the 14 state domestic violence coalitions that received DELTA funds. DELTA Prep states integrated primary prevention strategies into their work and the work of their partners, and built leadership for domestic violence prevention in their states. DELTA FOCUS DELTA FOCUS (Focusing on Outcomes for Communities United within States) continued earlier DELTA work. From FY2013 through FY2017, DELTA FOCUS funded 10 state domestic violence coalition grantees to implement and evaluate strategies to prevent domestic violence. Funding was provided by the coalitions to 18 community response teams that engaged in carrying out these strategies. DELTA FOCUS differed from DELTA and DELTA Prep by placing greater emphasis on implementing prevention strategies rather than building capacity for prevention. DELTA FOCUS also put more emphasis on evaluating the program to help build evidence about effective interventions. DELTA Impact DELTA Impact, which began in FY2018, provides funding to 10 state domestic violence coalitions. This grant supports community response teams in decreasing domestic violence risk factors and increasing protective factors by implementing prevention activities that are based on the best available evidence. Grantees are implementing and evaluating policy efforts under three broad strategies to address domestic violence prevention: (1) engaging influential adults and peers, including by engaging men and boys as allies in prevention; (2) creating protective environments, such as improving school climates and safety; and (3) strengthening economic supports for families. National Domestic Violence Hotline41 As amended by the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) of 1994, FVPSA directs the HHS Secretary to award a grant to one or more private entities to operate a 24-hour, national, toll-free hotline for domestic violence. Since 1996, HHS has competitively awarded a cooperative agreement to the National Council on Family Violence in Texas to operate the National Domestic Violence Hotline (hereinafter, hotline). The agreement was most recently awarded for a five-year period that extends through the end of FY2020. FVPSA requires that the hotline provide information and assistance to adult and youth victims of domestic violence, family and household members of victims of such violence, and "persons affected by victimization." This includes support related to domestic violence, children exposed to domestic violence, sexual assault, intervention programs for abusive partners, and related issues. As required under FVPSA, the hotline carries out multiple activities: It employs, trains, and supervises personnel to answer incoming calls; provides counseling and referral services; and directly connects callers to service providers. In FY2018, the hotline received about 23,000 calls each month and responded to 74% of all calls. It also had an average of nearly 4,000 online chats on a monthly basis. HHS reported that some calls were missed due to increased media coverage of domestic violence, increased Spanish chat services, and forwarding of calls from local domestic violence hotlines due to severe weather. It maintains a database of domestic violence services for victims throughout the United States, including information on the availability of shelter and services. It provides assistance to meet the needs of special populations, including underserved populations, individuals with disabilities, and youth victims of domestic violence and dating violence. The hotline provides access to personnel for callers with limited English proficiency and persons who are deaf and hard of hearing. Since 2007, the hotline has operated a separate helpline for youth victims of domestic violence, the National Dating Abuse Helpline (known as loveisrespect.org), which is funded through the appropriation for the hotline. This helpline offers real-time support primarily from peer advocates trained to provide support, information, and advocacy to those involved in abusive dating relationships, as well as others who support victims. In FY2018, the helpline received a monthly average of about 2,400 calls; 4,000 online chats; and nearly 1,300 texts. A 2019 study of these two lines examined a number of their features, including who contacts the lines, the study needs and demographic characteristics of those contacts, how contacts reach the lines, and the type of support they receive. The study found that nearly half (48%) the contacts were victims/survivors and another 39% did not identify themselves. The remaining contacts were from family/friends, abusers, and service providers. According to the study, the service most commonly provided to contactors was emotional support and contactors valued this support highly. The National Domestic Violence Hotline has collaborated with the National Indigenous Women's Resource Center to develop and fund the StrongHearts Native Helpline for Native American survivors of domestic abuse. The helpline uses the technology and infrastructure of the hotline, and draws from the National Indigenous Women's Resource Center to provide Native-centered, culturally appropriate services for survivors and others. Overview of Shelter, Services, and Support Funding for shelter, support services, and program support (hereinafter, shelter and services) encompasses multiple activities: formula grants to states and territories; grants to tribes; state domestic violence coalitions; national and special issue resource centers, including those that provide technical assistance; specialized services for abused parents and children exposed to domestic violence; and program support and administration. Figure 2 shows FY2018 allocations for activities included as part of shelter, support services, and program support. The following sections of the report provide further information about grants to states, territories, and tribes; and state domestic violence coalitions. In addition, the report provides information about national and special issue resource centers. The section of the report on services for children and youth exposed to domestic violence includes information about FY2018 and earlier support for specialized services for abused parents and children exposed to domestic violence. Formula Grants to States, Territories, and Tribes No less than 70% of FVPSA appropriations for shelter and services must be awarded to states and territories through a formula grant. The formula grant supports the establishment, maintenance, and expansion of programs and projects to prevent incidents of domestic violence and to provide shelter and supportive services to victims of domestic violence. Each of the territories—Guam, American Samoa, U.S. Virgin Islands, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands—receives no less than one-eighth of 1% of the appropriation, or, in combination, about one-half of 1% of the total amount appropriated. Of the remaining funds, states (including the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico) receive a base allotment of $600,000 and additional funding based on their relative share of the U.S. population. Appendix C provides formula funding for FY2018 and FY2019 by state and territory. In addition, no less than 10% of FVPSA appropriations for shelter and services are awarded to Indian tribes. Indian tribes have the option to authorize a tribal organization or a nonprofit private organization to submit an application for and to administer FVPSA funds. In applying for grant funding, states and territories (hereinafter, states) must make certain assurances pertaining to the use and distribution of funds and to victims. Nearly all of the same requirements that pertain to states and territories also pertain to tribes. Selected Grant Conditions Pertaining to Use and Distribution of Funds49 States may use up to 5% of their grant funding for state administrative costs. The remainder of the funds are used to make subgrants to eligible entities for community-based projects (hereinafter, subgrantees) that meet the goals of the grant program. No less than 70% of subgrant funding is to be used to provide temporary shelter and related supportive services, which include the physical space in which victims reside as well as the expenses of running shelter facilities. No less than 25% of subgrant funding is to be used for the following supportive services and prevention services: assisting in the development of safety plans, and supporting efforts of victims to make decisions about their ongoing safety and well-being; providing individual and group counseling, peer support groups, and referrals to community-based services to assist victims and their dependents in recovering from the effects of domestic violence; providing services, training, technical assistance, and outreach to increase awareness of domestic violence and increase the accessibility of these services; providing culturally and linguistically appropriate services; providing services for children exposed to domestic violence, including age-appropriate counseling, supportive services, and services for the nonabusing parent that support that parent's role as caregiver (which may include services that work with the nonabusing parent and child together); providing advocacy, case management services, and information and referral services concerning issues related to domestic violence intervention and prevention, including providing assistance in accessing federal and state financial assistance programs; legal advocacy; medical advocacy, including provision of referrals for appropriate health care services (but not reimbursement for any health care services); assistance in locating and securing safe and affordable permanent housing and homelessness prevention services; and transportation, child care, respite care, job training and employment services, financial literacy services and education, financial planning, and related economic empowerment services; providing parenting and other educational services for victims and their dependents; and providing prevention services, including outreach to underserved populations. States must also provide assurances that they will consult with and facilitate the participation of state domestic violence coalitions in planning and monitoring the distribution of grants and administering the grants (the role of state domestic violence coalitions is subsequently discussed further). States must describe how they will involve community-based organizations, whose primary purpose is to provide culturally appropriate services to underserved populations, including how such organizations can assist states in meeting the needs of these populations. States must further provide assurances that they have laws or procedures in place to bar an abuser from a shared household or a household of the abused persons, which may include eviction laws or procedures, where appropriate. Such laws or procedures are generally enforced by civil protection orders, or restraining orders to limit the perpetrators' physical proximity to the victim. In funding subgrantees, states must "give special emphasis" to supporting community-based projects of "demonstrated effectiveness" carried out by nonprofit organizations that operate shelters for victims of domestic violence and their dependents; or that provide counseling, advocacy, and self-help services to victims. States have discretion in how they allocate their funding, so long as they provide assurances that grant funding will be distributed equitably within the state and between urban and rural areas of the state. Subgrantees that receive funding must provide a nonfederal match—of not less than $1 for every $5 of federal funding—directly from the state or through donations from public or private entities. The matching funds can be in cash or in kind. Further, federal funds made available to a state must supplement, and not supplant, other federal, state, and local public funds expended on services for victims of domestic violence. States have two years to spend funds. For example, funds allotted for FY2019 may be spent in FY2019 or FY2020. The HHS Secretary is authorized to reallocate the funds of a state, by the end of the sixth month of a fiscal year that funds are appropriated, if the state fails to meet the requirements of the grant. The Secretary must notify the state if its application for funds has not met these requirements. State domestic violence coalitions are permitted to help determine whether states are in compliance with these provisions. States are allowed six months to correct any deficiencies in their application. Selected Grant Conditions Pertaining to Victims54 In FY2017, programs funded by grants for states and tribes supported over 240,000 clients in residential settings and more than 1 million clients in nonresidential settings. Nearly 93% of clients reported that they had improved knowledge of planning for their safety. Also in FY2017, programs were not able to meet 226,000 requests for shelter. The grant for states addresses the individual characteristics and privacy of participants and shelters. Both states and subgrantees funded under FVPSA may not deny individuals from participating in support programs on the basis of disability, sex, race, color, national origin, or religion (this also applies to FPVSA-funded activities generally). In addition, states and subgrantees may not impose income eligibility requirements on individuals participating in these programs. Further, states and subgrantees must protect the confidentiality and privacy of victims and their families to help ensure their safety. These entities are prohibited from disclosing any personally identifying information collected about services requested, and from revealing personally identifying information without the consent of the individual, as specified in the law. If disclosing the identity of the individual is compelled by statutory or court mandate, states and subgrantees must make reasonable attempts to notify victims, and they must take steps to protect the privacy and safety of the individual. States and subgrantees may share information that has been aggregated and does not identify individuals, and information that has been generated by law enforcement and/or prosecutors and courts pertaining to protective orders or law enforcement and prosecutorial purposes. In addition, the location of confidential shelters may not be made public, except with written authorization of the person(s) operating the shelter. Subgrantees may not provide direct payment to any victim of domestic violence or the dependent(s) of the victim. Further, victims must be provided shelter and services on a voluntary basis. In other words, providers cannot compel or force individuals to come to a shelter, participate in counseling, etc. State Domestic Violence Coalitions56 Since 1992, FVPSA has authorized funding for state domestic violence coalitions (SDVCs). A SDVC is defined under the act as a statewide nongovernmental, nonprofit private domestic violence organization that (1) has a membership that includes a majority of the primary-purpose domestic violence service providers in the state; (2) has board membership that is representative of domestic violence service providers, and that may include representatives of the communities in which the services are being provided; (3) has as its purpose to provide education, support, and technical assistance to such service providers so they can maintain shelter and supportive services for victims of domestic violence and their dependents; and (4) serves as an information clearinghouse and resource center on domestic violence for the state and supports the development of policies, protocols, and procedures to enhance domestic violence intervention and prevention in the state. Funding for SDVCs is available for each of the 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and four territories (American Samoa, Guam, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands). Each jurisdiction has one SDVC, and these coalitions are designated by HHS. Funding is divided evenly among these 56 jurisdictions. SDVCs must use FVPSA funding for specific activities, as follows: working with local domestic violence service programs and providers of direct services to encourage appropriate and comprehensive responses to domestic violence against adults or youth within the state, including providing training and technical assistance and conducting needs assessments; participating in planning and monitoring the distribution of subgrants and subgrant funds within the state under the grant program for states and territories; working in collaboration with service providers and community-based organizations to address the needs of domestic violence victims and their dependents who are members of racial and ethnic minority populations and underserved populations; collaborating with and providing information to entities in such fields as housing, health care, mental health, social welfare, or business to support the development and implementation of effective policies, protocols, and programs that address the safety and support needs of adult and youth victims of domestic violence; encouraging appropriate responses to cases of domestic violence against adult and youth victims, including by working with judicial and law enforcement agencies; working with family law judges, criminal court judges, child protective service agencies, and children's advocates to develop appropriate responses to child custody and visitation issues in cases of children exposed to domestic violence, and in cases where this violence is concurrent with child abuse; providing information to the public about prevention of domestic violence and dating violence, including information targeted to underserved populations; and collaborating with Indian tribes and tribal organizations (and Native Hawaiian groups or communities) to address the needs of Indian (including Alaska Native) and Native Hawaiian victims of domestic dating violence, as applicable in the state. Training and Technical Assistance Centers As originally enacted, FVPSA authorized a national information and research clearinghouse on the prevention of domestic violence. As part of the act's reauthorization in 1992, the language about the clearinghouse was struck and replaced with authorization for resource centers on domestic violence, including special issue resource centers to address key areas of domestic violence. Reauthorization of FVPSA in 2010 added authorization for a national resource center on American Indian women and three culturally specific resources, which had previously been funded through discretionary funds. The 2010 law also authorized special issue resource centers that provide training and technical assistance on domestic violence intervention and prevention topics and state resource centers to address disparities in domestic violence in states with high proportions of Indian (including Alaska Native) or Native Hawaiian populations. In total, HHS administers grants for 14 training and technical assistance centers that are funded by the FVPSA appropriation for shelter, services, and support. The purpose of these resource centers is to provide information, training, and technical assistance on domestic violence issues. This assistance is provided by nonprofit organizations and other entities to multiple stakeholders—individuals, organizations, governmental entities, and communities—so that they can improve their capacity for preventing and responding to domestic violence. Teen Dating Violence Background Teenagers may be exposed to violence in their dating relationships. The CDC reports that on an annual basis, 1 in 9 female teens and 1 in 13 male teens experienced physical dating violence involving a person who hurts or tries to hurt a partner by hitting, kicking, or using another type of physical force. Further, over 1 in 7 female teens and nearly 1 in 19 male teens reported experiencing sexual dating violence in the last year, which includes forcing or attempting to force a partner to take part in a sexual act, sexual touching, or a nonphysical sexual event (e.g., sexting) when the partner does not or cannot consent. The FVPSA statute references dating violence throughout and uses the definition of "dating violence" that is in VAWA. The term is defined as violence committed by a person who is or has been in a social relationship of a romantic or intimate nature with the victim, and where the existence of the relationship is determined based on the length, type, and frequency of interaction between the persons in it. Domestic violence shelters and supportive services funded by FVPSA are intended for adult victims and their children if they accompany the adult into shelter. The law does not explicitly authorize supports for youth victims of dating violence who are unaccompanied by their parents; however, the law does not limit eligibility for shelter and services based on age. Access to domestic violence shelters and supports for teen victims, including protective orders against abusers, varies by state. The primary source of support for teen victims under FVPSA is provided via the National Domestic Violence Hotline. The hotline includes the loveisrespect helpline and related online resources. Youth victims can call, chat, or text with peer advocates for support. The loveisrespect website includes a variety of materials that address signs of abuse and resources for getting help. Children Exposed to Domestic Violence Background FVPSA references children exposed to domestic violence, but does not define related terminology. According to the research literature, this exposure can include children who see and/or hear violent acts, are present for the aftermath (e.g., seeing bruises on a mother's body, moving to a shelter), or live in a house where domestic violence occurs, regardless of whether they see and/or hear the violence. A frequently cited estimate is that between 10% and 20% of children (approximately 7 million to 10 million children) are exposed to adult domestic violence each year. The literature about the impact of domestic violence is evolving. The effects of domestic violence on children can range from little or no effect to severe psychological harm and physical effects, depending on the type and severity of abuse and protective factors, among other variables. Multiple FVPSA activities address children exposed to domestic and related violence: One of the purposes of the formula grant program for states is to provide specialized services (e.g., counseling, advocacy, and other assistance) for these children. The National Resource Center on Domestic Violence is directed to offer domestic violence programs and research that include both victims and their children exposed to domestic violence. The national resource center that addresses mental health and trauma issues is required to address victims of domestic violence and their children who are exposed to this violence. State domestic violence coalitions must, among other activities, work with the legal system, child protective services, and children's advocates to develop appropriate responses to child custody and visitation issues in cases involving children exposed to domestic violence. In addition to these provisions, the FVPSA statute authorizes funding for specialized services for abused parents and their children. FVPSA activities for children exposed to domestic violence have also been funded through discretionary funding and funding leveraged through a semipostal stamp. Specialized Services for Abused Parents and Their Children/Expanding Services for Children and Youth Exposed to Domestic Violence69 Since 2003, FVPSA has specified that funding must be set aside for activities to address children exposed to domestic violence if the appropriation for shelter, victim services, and program support exceeds $130 million. Under current law, if funding is triggered, HHS must first reserve not less than 25% of funding above $130 million to make grants to a local agency, nonprofit organization, or tribal organization with a demonstrated record of serving victims of domestic violence and their children. These funds are intended to expand the capacity of service programs and community-based programs to prevent future domestic violence by addressing the needs of children exposed to domestic violence. Funding has exceeded $130 million in FY2010 and FY2014 through FY2019. In FY2010, funding for shelter and services was just over $130 million. HHS reserved the excess funding as well as FVPSA discretionary funding (under shelter, victim services, and program support) to fund specialized services for children through an initiative known as Expanding Services for Children and Youth Exposed to Domestic Violence. HHS also used discretionary money to fund the initiative in FY2011 and FY2012. Total funding for the initiative was $2.5 million. This funding was awarded to five grantees—four state domestic violence coalitions and one national technical assistance provider—to expand supports to children, youth, and parents exposed to domestic violence and build strategies for serving this population. For example, the Alaska Network on Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault, the state domestic violence coalition for Alaska, used the funding to improve coordination between domestic violence agencies and the child welfare system. Their work involved developing an integrated training curriculum and policies, and creation of a multidisciplinary team of child welfare and domestic violence stakeholders in four communities. Funding again exceeded $130 million in each of FY2014 through FY2019, thereby triggering the set-aside. In FY2014 and FY2015, HHS directed the extra funding for shelter, services, and support. In FY2016 through FY2018, HHS provided funding for specialized services for abused parents and their children and expects to continue such funding for FY2019. Of the approximately $20 million in excess funding for each of these three years, approximately $5.0 million to $5.6 million was allocated in each year for these services. This recent funding has been allocated to 12 grantees to provide direct services under the grant, Specialized Services for Abused Parents and their Children (SSPAC). Grantees include domestic violence coalitions and other entities. They are working to alleviate trauma experienced by children who are exposed to domestic violence, support enhanced relationships between these children and their parents, and improve systemic responses to such families. A separate grant of $500,000 annually—known as Expanding Services to Children, Youth, and Abused Parents (ESCYAP)—has been awarded to the nonprofit organization Futures Without Violence to provide training and technical assistance to the 12 grantees and facilitate coordination among them. FVPSA Interaction with Other Federal Laws In addition to the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA), FVPSA has been reauthorized by VAWA and shares some of that law's purposes. In addition, FVPSA interacts with the Victims of Crime Act (VOCA) because some FVPSA-funded programs receive VOCA funding to provide legal and other assistance to victims. Further, FVPSA includes provisions that encourage or require HHS to coordinate FVPSA programs with related programs and research carried out by other federal agencies. Child Abuse and Neglect FVPSA does not focus on child abuse per se; however, in enacting FVPSA as part of the 1984 amendments to CAPTA, some Members of Congress and other stakeholders noted that child abuse and neglect and intimate partner violence are not isolated problems, and can arise simultaneously. The research literature has focused on this association. In a national study of children in families who come into contact with a public child welfare agency through an investigation of child abuse and neglect, investigative caseworkers identified 28% of the children's households as having a history of domestic violence against the caregiver and 12% of those caregivers as being in active domestic violence situations. Further, about 1 out of 10 of the child cases of maltreatment reported included domestic violence. CAPTA provides funding to states to improve their child protective services (CPS) systems. It requires states, as a condition of receiving certain CAPTA funds, to describe their policies to enhance and promote collaboration between child protective service and domestic violence agencies, among other social service providers. Other federal efforts also address the association between domestic violence and child abuse. For example, the Maternal, Infant, and Early Childhood Home Visiting (MIECHV) program supports efforts to improve the outcomes of young children living in communities with concentrations of domestic violence or child maltreatment, among other factors. The program provides grants to states, territories, and tribes for the support of evidence-based early childhood home visiting programs that provide in-home visits by health or social service professionals with at-risk families. Separately, the Family Connection Grants program, authorized under Title IV-B of the Social Security Act, provided funding from FY2009 through FY2014 to public child welfare agencies and nonprofit private organizations to help children—whether they are in foster care or at risk of entering foster care—connect (or reconnect) with birth parents or other extended kin. The funds were used to establish or support certain activities, including family group decisionmaking meetings that enable families to develop plans that nurture children and protect them from abuse and neglect, and, when appropriate, to safely facilitate connecting children exposed to domestic violence to relevant services and reconnecting them with the abused parent. In addition, HHS and the Department of Justice supported the Greenbook Initiative in the early 2000s. The Greenbook was developed from the efforts of the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, which convened family court judges and experts on child maltreatment and domestic violence. In 1999, this group developed guidelines for child welfare agencies, domestic violence providers, and dependency courts in responding to domestic violence and child abuse in a publication that came to be known as the Greenbook. Soon after, HHS and DOJ funded efforts in six communities to address domestic violence and child maltreatment by implementing guidelines from the Greenbook. The HHS-led Federal Interagency Working Group on Child Abuse and Neglect includes a Domestic Violence Subcommittee. The committee focuses on interagency initiatives that address children exposed to domestic violence and promoting information exchange and joint planning among federal agencies. Violence Against Women Act (VAWA)86 FVPSA has twice been amended by VAWA. Both FVPSA and VAWA are the primary vehicles for federal support to prevent and respond to domestic violence, including children and youth who are exposed to this violence; however, FVPSA has a more singular focus on prevention and services for victims, while VAWA's unique contributions are more focused on law enforcement and legal response to domestic violence. VAWA was enacted in 1994 after Congress held a series of hearings on the causes and effects of domestic and other forms of violence against women. Some Members of Congress and others asserted that communities needed a more comprehensive response to violence against women generally—not just against intimate partners—and that perpetrators should face harsher penalties. The shortfalls of legal response and the need for a change in attitudes toward violence against women were reasons cited for the passage of the law. Since VAWA's enactment, the federal response to domestic violence has expanded to involve multiple departments and activities that include investigating and prosecuting crimes, providing additional services to victims and abusers, and educating the criminal justice system and other stakeholders about violence against women. Although VAWA also addresses other forms of violence against women and provides a broader response to domestic violence, some VAWA programs have a similar purpose to those carried out under FVPSA. Congress currently funds VAWA grant programs that address the needs of victims of domestic violence. These programs also provide support to victims of sexual assault, dating violence, and stalking. For example, like the FVPSA grant program for states, territories, and tribes, VAWA's STOP (Services, Training, Officers, Prosecutors) Violence Against Women Formula Grant program provides services to victims of domestic and dating violence (and sexual assault and stalking) that include victim advocacy designed to help victims obtain needed resources or services, crisis intervention, and advocacy in navigating the criminal and/or civil legal system. Of STOP funds appropriated, 30% must be allocated to victim services. STOP grants also support activities that are not funded under FVPSA, including for law enforcement, courts, and prosecution efforts. Another VAWA program, Transitional Housing Assistance Grants for Victims of Domestic Violence, provides transitional housing services for victims, with the goal of moving them into permanent housing. Through the grant program to states, territories, and tribes, FVPSA provides immediate and short-term shelter to victims of domestic violence and authorizes service providers to assist with locating and securing safe and affordable permanent housing and homelessness prevention services. Victims of Crime Act (VOCA) FVPSA requires that entities receiving funds under the grant programs for states, territories, and tribes use a certain share of funding for selected activities, including assistance in accessing other federal and state financial assistance programs. One source of federal finance assistance for victims of domestic violence is the Crime Victims Fund (CVF), authorized under the Victims of Crime Act (VOCA) and administered by the Department of Justice's Office of Victims of Crime (OVC). Within the CVF, funds are available for victims of domestic violence through the Victim Compensation Formula Grants program and Victims Assistance Formula Grants program. The Victims Compensation Grants may be used to reimburse victims of crime for out-of-pocket expenses such as medical and mental health counseling expenses, lost wages, funeral and burial costs, and other costs (except property loss) authorized in a state's compensation statute. In recent years, approximately 40% of all claims filed were for victims of domestic violence. The Victims Assistance Formula Grants may be used to provide grants to state crime victim assistance programs to administer funds for state and community-based victim service program operations. The grants support direct services to victims of crime including information and referral services, crisis counseling, temporary housing, criminal justice advocacy support, and other assistance needs. In recent years, approximately 50% of victims served by these grants were victims of domestic violence. Federal Coordination Both FVPSA, which is administered within HHS, and VAWA, which is largely administered within DOJ, require federal agencies to coordinate their efforts to respond to domestic violence. For example, FVPSA authorizes the HHS Secretary to coordinate programs within HHS and to "seek to coordinate" those programs "with programs administered by other federal agencies, that involve or affect efforts to prevent family violence, domestic violence, and dating violence or the provision of assistance for adults and youth victims of family violence, domestic violence, or dating violence." In addition, FVPSA directs HHS to assign employees to coordinate research efforts on family and related violence within HHS and research carried out by other federal agencies. Similarly, VAWA requires the Attorney General to consult with stakeholders in establishing a task force—comprised of representatives from relevant federal agencies—to coordinate research on domestic violence and to report to Congress on any overlapping or duplication of efforts on domestic violence issues. In 1995, HHS and DOJ convened the first meeting of the National Advisory Council on Violence Against Women. The purpose of the council was to promote greater awareness of violence against women and to advise the federal government on domestic violence issues. Since that time, the two departments have convened subsequent committees to carry out similar work. In 2010, then-Attorney General Eric Holder rechartered the National Advisory Committee on Violence Against Women, which had previously been established in 2006 under his predecessor. As stated in the charter, the committee is intended to provide the Attorney General and the HHS Secretary with policy advice on improving the nation's response to violence against women and coordinating stakeholders at the federal, state, and local levels in this response, with a focus on identifying and implementing successful interventions for children and teens who witness and/or are victimized by intimate partner and sexual violence. Separately, the director for FVPSA programs and the deputy director of HHS's Office on Women's Health provide leadership to the HHS Steering Committee on Violence Against Women. This committee supports collaborative efforts to address violence against women and their children, and includes representatives from the CDC and other HHS agencies. The members of the committee have established links with professional societies in the health and social service fields to increase attention on women's health and violence issues. In addition to these collaborative activities, multiple federal agencies participate in the Federal Interagency Workgroup on Teen Dating Violence, which was convened in 2006 to share information and coordinate teen dating violence program, policy, and research activities to combat teen dating violence from a public health perspective. The workgroup has funded a project to incorporate adolescents in the process for developing a research agenda to address teen dating violence. Finally, the Office of the Vice President (under Joe Biden) coordinated federal efforts to end violence against women, including by convening Cabinet-level officials to address issues concerning domestic and other forms of violence against women. Appendix A. Definitions Appendix B. Prevalence and Effects of Domestic Violence Appendix C. State and Territory Funding for Selected FVPSA Services Appendix.

Family violence broadly refers to acts of physical and sexual violence perpetrated by individuals against family members. The federal government has responded to various forms of family violence, including violence involving spouses and other intimate partners, children, and the elderly. The focus of this report is on the federal response to domestic violence under the Family Violence Prevention and Services Act (FVPSA). "Domestic violence" is used in the report to describe violence among intimate partners, including those involved in dating relationships. Generally speaking, victims tend to be women, although a sizable share of men are also victimized. A 2015 survey conducted by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) found that approximately one-third of women and men had experienced sexual violence, physical violence, and/or stalking in their lifetimes. It showed that women were more likely than men to have experienced contact sexual violence (18% vs. 8%), stalking (10% vs. 2%), and severe physical violence (21% vs. 15%). Women were also more likely than men to report an impact related to partner violence over their lifetimes (25% vs 11%). Such impacts included having injuries, being fearful, being concerned for their safety, missing work or school, needing medical care, or needing help from law enforcement. Throughout much of the 20th century, domestic violence remained a hidden problem. Victims, or survivors, of this abuse often endured physical and emotional abuse in silence out of fear of retaliation by their spouses or partners. In the 1970s, former battered women, civic organizations, and professionals began to open shelters and provide services to abused women and their children. As a result of these efforts and greater national attention to domestic violence, Congress conducted a series of hearings in the early 1980s to understand the scope of domestic violence and explore possible responses. FVPSA was enacted in 1984 (Title III of P.L. 98-457), and has been reauthorized seven times, most recently by the CAPTA Reauthorization Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-320). FVPSA authorizes three primary sets of activities, all of which are administered by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). These activities are authorized through FY2015, per P.L. 113-320, and funds have continually been appropriated in each subsequent year. FY2019 funding is $180 million. First, a national domestic violence hotline receives calls for assistance related to this violence. The hotline provides crisis intervention and counseling, maintains a database of service providers throughout the United States and the territories, and provides referrals for victims and others affected by domestic violence. Second, FVPSA funds efforts to prevent domestic violence through a program known as Domestic Violence Prevention Enhancement and Leadership Through Allies (DELTA). The program supports efforts in selected communities to prevent domestic violence. Third, FVPSA supports direct services for victims and their families, including victims in underserved and minority communities and children exposed to domestic violence. Most of this funding is awarded via grants to states, territories, and tribes, which then distribute the funds to local domestic violence service organizations. These organizations provide shelter and a number of services—counseling, referrals, development of safety plans, advocacy, legal advocacy, and other services. This funding also supports state domestic violence coalitions that provide training and support for service providers, and national resource centers that provide training and technical assistance on various domestic violence issues for a variety of stakeholders. FVPSA was the first federal law to address domestic violence. Since the law was enacted, it has continued to have a primary focus on providing shelter and services for survivors and has increasingly provided support to children exposed to domestic violence and teen dating violence. With the enactment of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA, P.L. 103-322), the federal response to domestic violence has expanded to include investigating and prosecuting crimes and providing additional services to victims and abusers. VAWA activities are administered by multiple federal agencies.

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Introduction Enacted in 1937, the Federal Aid in Wildlife Restoration Act, now known as the Pittman-Robertson Wildli fe Restoration Act (hereinafter referred to as Pittman-Robertson), provides funding for states and territories to support projects that promote the conservation and restoration of wild birds and mammals and their habitats and programs that provide hunter education and safety training and opportunities. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), an agency within the Department of the Interior, administers Pittman-Robertson as part of its Wildlife and Sport Fish Restoration program. Revenues generated through excise taxes on pistols and revolvers, other firearms, ammunition, bows, and other archery equipment provide the funding for Pittman-Robertson. After collection, receipts from these excise taxes are deposited into the Federal Aid to Wildlife Restoration Fund in the Treasury, and monies from the fund are made available for FWS for Pittman-Robertson activities in the fiscal year following their collection without any further action by Congress. For three programs within Pittman-Robertson, FWS apportions the funds directly among the states and territories. All 50 states as well as Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands (collectively referred to as territories in this report) are eligible to receive funding through Pittman-Robertson. Since its creation, Pittman-Robertson has provided over $18.8 billion (in 2018 dollars; $12.2 billion in nominal dollars) to states and territories. This report provides an overview of the Pittman-Robertson state and territory programs that support wildlife restoration and hunter education and safety activities, including a breakdown of the various apportionment formulas and an analysis of related issues that may be of interest to Congress. This report focuses on the formula-based programs within Pittman-Robertson that provide funding for states and territories. Revenues and Apportionments7 The Pittman-Robertson Wildlife Restoration Act apportions and allocates funding for five distinct purposes: 1. program administration (Section 4(a)); 2. Wildlife Restoration (Section 4(b)); 3. Basic Hunter Education and Safety (Section 4(c)); 4. Enhanced Hunter Education and Safety Grants (Section 10); and 5. Multistate Conservation Grants (Section 11). Funds for three of these programs—Wildlife Restoration, Basic Hunter Education and Safety, and Enhanced Hunter Education and Safety Grants—are disbursed directly to states based on two apportionment formulas (both hunter education and safety programs use the same formula). The formulas take into account a state's acreage, number of hunting licenses sold, and population ( Figure 1 and Table A-1 ). Territories are apportioned a set percentage of the funds for each program. Washington, DC, does not receive funding under these programs. States and territories can use their apportionments to support the federal share of wildlife and hunter and safety projects that receive Pittman-Robertson funding. Additionally, Pittman-Robertson provides for FWS to allocate nonformula based funding for multistate conservation grants and program administration. Revenues Funding for programs authorized in Pittman-Robertson comes from excise taxes on certain firearms, ammunition, and archery equipment. Taxes on these items are imposed on the manufacturer, producer, or importer of these goods. However, these taxes may result in higher prices for the purchaser if part or all of the cost is passed on in the final purchase price. The tax rates are 10% for pistols and revolvers, 11% for other firearms and ammunition, 11% for bows and archery equipment, and a per shaft tax for arrows that is adjusted annually for inflation. Receipts from these excise taxes are deposited into the Federal Aid to Wildlife Restoration Fund in the Treasury, and monies from the fund are made available for FWS in the fiscal year following their collection without any further action by Congress. Revenues generated from these excise taxes vary year by year both in total revenue ( Figure 2 ) and in revenue attributable to a specific item group ( Table 1 ). From FY2007 through FY2016, FWS reported a total of $6.2 billion (in 2018 dollars) of revenue. Ammunition accounted for $2.1 billion (34%), firearms for $1.9 billion (32%), pistols and revolvers for $1.7 billion (27%), and archery equipment for $0.5 billion (8%) of the total (in 2018 dollars). The revenues attributable to ½ the revenues generated from excise taxes on pistols, revolvers, and archery equipment accounted for 17% of the total revenue. These revenues determined the amount available for apportionments through the Basic Hunter Education and Safety program for the years from FY2008 through FY2017 (the years following excise tax collection). The remaining revenues, 83% for FY2007 through FY20016, provide funds for the Wildlife Restoration and Enhanced Hunter Education and Safety programs as well as the Multistate Conservation Grant program and the set-aside for administration. While the overall revenues generated determines the total amount available for apportionment in the year following collection, the amount available for Basic Hunter Education and Safety program (Section 4(c)) is solely based on revenues generated from pistols, revolvers, and archery equipment. As such, amounts available for apportionment and disbursement are program specific and fluctuate based on the total volume of shooting and archery equipment and the type of goods. State and Territory Apportionment Between FY1939 and FY2019, FWS disbursed $18.8 billion (in constant 2018 dollars; $12.2 billion in nominal dollars) for wildlife restoration and hunter education and safety activities to states and territories ( Figure 3 ). Annual apportionments have increased over time. However, in recent years, there have been fluctuations of over $100 million between years. FWS disbursed $3.8 billion (in nominal dollars)—an average of $751 million per year—to states and territories for the Wildlife Restoration and the two Hunter Education and safety programs for FY2015 through FY2019 ( Figure 3 ). Each year, individual states received between $4.5 million and $34.7 million, on average, in total apportionments for FY2015 through FY2019. American Samoa, Guam, the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands, and the Virgin Islands each received $1.3 million per year, on average, and Puerto Rico received $3.3 million per year, on average. Table B-1 provides the annual total apportionment for each state and territory for FY2015 through FY2019. Wildlife Restoration Program The Wildlife Restoration program, also known as Section 4(b), comprises the largest funding stream within Pittman-Robertson. From FY2015 through FY2019, annual state and territory apportionments for the Wildlife Restoration Program averaged $606 million (81% of the $751 million, on average, disbursed directly to states and territories under Pittman-Robertson; see Figure 3 and Table B-2 ). The total amount of funding available for the Wildlife Restoration program for states is determined by deducting the amounts available for administration, the Basic and Enhanced Hunter Education and Safety programs (Sections 4(c) and 10, respectively), multistate conservation grants, and territorial allocations for wildlife restoration activities from the total amount of revenues generated from the excise taxes on pistols, revolvers, firearms, ammunition, and archery equipment in the previous year. States and territories may use this funding to pay the federal share of wildlife restoration projects. States and territories may use their apportionments to pay for up to 75% of the total project cost; they are responsible for the remaining cost of the project using non-Pittman-Robertson funds. Wildlife Restoration program funds are available for use by the states and territories for the fiscal year in which they are apportioned and the following fiscal year. FWS calculates the Wildlife Restoration apportionment for each state using a two-part formula, with each part determining half of the amount apportioned. The formula is based on the ratio of the area of a state compared with the total area of all 50 states and the number of paid hunting licenses sold in a state compared with the total number of paid hunting licenses sold in all 50 states. The area of and number of licenses sold in the territories and Washington, DC, are not included in the totals for all 50 states. However, the minimum and maximum amount any state may receive is 0.5% and 5%, respectively. Territorial apportionments are not formula based. Rather, the caps for territorial apportionments for wildlife restoration activities are set in statute: Puerto Rico receives not more than one-half of 1% (0.5%), and Guam, the U.S. Virgin Islands, American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands each receive not more than one-sixth of 1% (0.17%) of the total funds apportioned. Collectively, territories can receive slightly more than 1% of the allocated funding. FWS calculates state area as the sum of land and inland water areas in a state. State area does not include coastal, Great Lakes, or territorial waters. The area within an individual state is compared to the total area in all 50 states (territorial area is not counted in the total). In total, the United States contains 3.6 million square miles of land and inland water areas. States' areas vary from 0.03% (Rhode Island) to over 16% (Alaska) of the total U.S. area ( Figure 4 ). States' areas do not change on an annual basis, though they may be updated periodically. The number of paid hunting-license holders used for the calculation in a given apportionment year (also known as calculation year) is "the number of paid hunting-license holders in each State in the second fiscal year preceding the fiscal year for which such apportionment is made." The act does not distinguish between in-state and out-of-state hunters; a hunting license purchased by a nonresident would be equivalent under this formula to one purchased by a resident. For calculation years 2015 to 2019, states collectively sold 15.4 million licenses per year, on average, in the United States. During these five years, Rhode Island sold the fewest licenses per year (8,404, on average) and Texas sold the most (1.1 million per year, on average) ( Figure 4 ). Unlike area, the number of hunting licenses sold varies from year to year ( Table A-2 ). This annual variation influences the apportionment level and can result in states receiving more or less in a given year (subject to minimum and maximum requirements; Table 2 ). From FY2015 through FY2019, 8 states each received the minimum of 0.5% of the apportionments for the Wildlife Restoration program ($3.0 million per year, on average), 40 states received between the minimum and maximum, and 2 states received the maximum of 5% ($30.3 million). All 8 states receiving the minimum allocation are comparatively small (each consists of less than 0.5% of the total U.S. area) and sold a comparatively small number of hunting licenses in recent years (on average, each sold less than 0.5% of the U.S. total). The 2 states—Texas and Alaska—that received the maximum apportionment of 5% are both large (7.4% and 16.3% of the total U.S. area, respectively) but differed significantly in license sales in recent years (on average 7.4% and 0.7%, respectively). Hunter Education and Safety Programs Two programs within Pittman-Robertson provide support to states and territories for hunter education and safety projects: Basic Hunter Education and Safety (Section 4(c)) and Enhanced Hunter Education and Safety Grants (Section 10). The amount of funding available for state and territorial apportionments for the Basic Hunter Education and Safety program fluctuates based on annual revenues deposited in the Federal Aid to Wildlife Restoration Fund from excise taxes on pistols, revolvers, and archery equipment ( Figure 1 ). The Enhanced Hunter Education and Safety Grants program receives a statutorily fixed amount of $8 million per year. Both programs use the same apportionment structure, premised on the ratio of a state's population to the total population of the United States, as reported in the most recent decennial census. Statute dictates a minimum (1%) and maximum (3%) state apportionment cap for both programs. Each of the five eligible territories receives one-sixth of 1% (0.17%) of the total amount available for each program. States and territories may use their apportionments to pay for up to 75% of the total cost of a project. Based on the 2010 decennial census, 21 states each contain less than 1% of the U.S. population. Of the 29 remaining, 12 contain between 1% and 2%, 7 between 2% and 3%, 4 between 3% and 4%, and 6 more than 4%. The most populous state, California, contains 12.1% of the total U.S. population. Figure 5 shows the percentage of the population for each state compared with the total for all 50 states calculated from the 2010 U.S. decennial census. Because apportionments are determined based on the decennial census, which only changes when a new decennial census is conducted, the percentage of apportionment each state receives is constant in the years between decennial censuses, though the actual apportionment will fluctuate based on revenues generated by the excise tax on pistols, revolvers, and archery equipment. Based on the 2010 decennial census, 21 states have received the minimum 1%, 3 states have received between 1% and 2%, 9 states between 2% and 3%, and 17 states the 3% cap. The territories have received 0.17% as required in statute. Basic Hunter Education and Safety Program (Section 4(c)) The total amount of funding available for the Basic Hunter Education and Safety program is equal to the revenue generated by half of the excise taxes collected on pistols, revolvers, and archery equipment but not other firearms and ammunition. Apportionments for the Basic Hunter Education and Safety program represent the second-largest component of Pittman-Robertson in terms of funding. Between FY2015 and FY2019, the Basic Hunter Education and Safety program apportioned an average of $136 million per year in total to states and territories (18.2% of the $751 million total average annual apportionments disbursed to states and territories under Pittman-Robertson apportionment programs; see Figure 3 and Table B-3 ). Between FY2015 and FY2019, the majority of states received either the minimum or the maximum allocation established in statute each year; 21 states received the minimum amount required by law (1%, or $1.4 million per year, on average), and 17 states received the maximum (3%, or $4.1 million per year, on average). Each territory received 0.17% ($227,473 per year, on average), as required by statute. States may use funding under this program to pay the federal share of the "costs of a hunter safety program and the construction, operation, and maintenance of public target ranges, as part of such program." Basic Hunter Education and Safety program funds are available for use by states and territories for the fiscal year in which they are apportioned and the following fiscal year. Enhanced Hunter Education and Safety Grants Program (Section 10) Congress passed legislation to add the Enhanced Hunter Education and Safety Grants program (also known as Section 10) to Pittman-Robertson in 2000. Since FY2003, $8.0 million has been set aside annually for the program for firearm and bow hunter education and safety grants. Pittman-Robertson states that the allowed uses for these grants are determined based on whether a state or territory has "used all of the funds apportioned to the State under section 669c(c) [Section 4(c)] of this title for the fiscal year." If a state or territory has not used all the funds apportioned to it under the Basic Hunter Education and Safety program, it may use monies apportioned under the Enhanced Hunter Education and Safety Grants program for the enhancement of hunter education programs, hunter and firearm safety programs, and hunter development programs; interstate coordination, hunter education, and shooting range programs; bow hunter and archery education, safety, and development; and construction and updating of firearm and archery shooting ranges. If a state or territory has used all of its Basic Hunter Education and Safety program apportionment, it may use its Enhanced Hunter Education and Safety Grants apportionment for any purpose authorized by Pittman-Robertson. FWS annually apportions and disburses funding to states and territories under the Enhanced Hunter Education and Safety Grants program ( Figure 3 and Table B-4 ). For FY2015 to FY2019, each state received between 1% ($80,160 per year, on average) and 3% ($240,480 per year, on average) of the total amount apportioned for these grants. Each eligible territory received 0.17% ($13,360 per year, on average) of the total Enhanced Hunter Education and Safety Grants program apportionments. Because both hunter education programs use the same distribution formula, apportionments for the Enhanced Hunter Education and Safety Grants program follow the same pattern as apportionments for the Basic Hunter Education and Safety program. Unlike the Basic Hunter Education and Safety program, Enhanced Hunter Education and Safety Grant program funds are available for use by states and territories only for the fiscal year in which they are apportioned. Issues for Congress Members of Congress have routinely introduced legislation to amend Pittman-Robertson. In particular, Congress has considered issues related to eligible uses of state and territorial apportionments, the funding structure and funding sources for the program, and the apportionment formulas. Eligible Uses In recent Congresses, some Members have introduced several bills that would amend the way states and territories are able to spend their apportionments. Some bills have proposed amending Pittman-Robertson to allow additional uses, such as hunter recruitment and retention; others have proposed modifying the federal share and eligible uses of funds for existing or related activities, such as for public target ranges. Some Members introduced multiple bills for both purposes in recent Congresses, including in the 115 th and 116 th Congresses. Recruitment, Retention, and Promotion Several bills in the 115 th Congress would have allowed and in the 116 th Congress would allow states to use funds provided through Pittman-Robertson to promote hunting and recreational shooting, recruitment and retention of hunters and shooters, and public relations. According to the 2016 National Survey of Fishing, Hunting, and Wildlife-Associated Recreation , the number of hunters in the United States declined by 16% (2.2 million individuals) compared to the similar survey in 2011 (from 13.7 million in 2011 to 11.5 million in 2016). These bills would allow states to use funds currently provided for the Wildlife Restoration, Basic Hunter Education and Safety, and Enhanced Hunter Education and Safety Grants programs for hunter and recreational shooter recruitment and retention. In addition, they would create a funding mechanism for the Secretary of the Interior to use for recruitment and retention purposes at the national level. Currently, Pittman-Robertson prohibits the use of Wildlife Restoration program apportionments for public relations related to wildlife management activities. These proposals would remove this prohibition. Proponents of this type of legislation have argued that these bills would provide states with flexibility to use Pittman-Robertson apportionments to support recruitment efforts that would promote participation in hunting and shooting sports. They contend there is a need to attract and retain hunters and recreational shooters, which, in turn, could increase excise tax revenues that support Pittman-Robertson. Stakeholders also point out that wildlife restoration would remain the primary purpose of the act even if amended. Other stakeholders have raised the concern that these bills would diminish wildlife restoration activities by allowing states to use funds currently apportioned for wildlife restoration purposes for recruitment and retention. Shooting Ranges Other legislation has been introduced, including in the 115 th and 116 th Congresses, that would change the terms under which states may use Pittman-Robertson allocations for projects related to the construction and expansion of public target ranges. Currently, Pittman-Robertson allows states to use funds apportioned under the Basic Hunter Education and Safety program (Section 4(c)) for the "construction, operation, and maintenance of public target ranges." Funds apportioned under the Enhanced Hunter Education and Safety Grants program (Section 10) may be used for "enhancement of construction or development of firearm shooting ranges and archery ranges, and the updating of safety features of firearm shooting ranges and archery ranges." However, both programs have a 75% cap for the federal share of projects supported by Pittman-Robertson funding. All of the proposals in the 115 th and 116 th Congress to amend the eligibility of activities related to shooting ranges would allow states and territories to use their Basic Hunter Education and Safety program apportionments for land acquisition, expansion, and construction related to a target range, rather than solely for construction, operation, and maintenance of a range; allow states and territories to use up to 10% of funds apportioned to them through the Wildlife Restoration program to supplement apportionments for the Enhanced Hunter Education and Safety Grants program to be used for land acquisition, expansion, and construction related to a target range; allow states and territories to use their apportionments to pay for up to 90% of the total cost of a project related to a shooting range, instead of the current 75% federal cost-share cap; and extend the obligation and expenditure window of Enhanced Hunter Education and Safety Grants program apportionments used for shooting ranges to up to five fiscal years from the current window (the fiscal year for which they were apportioned). According to their authors, these bills would address a stated decline in the availability of public target ranges and would provide increased opportunity for target practice at public shooting ranges. Some proponents have further argued that this type of legislation would allow the use of more funds to provide the public with opportunities to "embrace hunting and shooting sports," which could lead to economic benefits. Some proponents also contend that this legislation would make it easier for states to use federal funding, because it would lower the state matching requirement from at least 25% to 10% for target range-related projects and extend the funding window for certain funds. Some stakeholders have raised concerns that this legislation would allow states to use funding for target range-purposes that otherwise would be available for wildlife restoration activities under Section 4(b). Funding Sources and Structure Under current law, the Federal Aid to Wildlife Restoration Fund receives revenues generated through an excise tax on firearms, ammunition, and archery equipment. Because Pittman-Robertson funding is entirely reliant on revenues from these taxes, it is subject to spending patterns on these items and can fluctuate with the markets for these goods. In addition, although firearm and archery equipment owners, hunters, and recreational shooters generate the funds used by Pittman-Robertson, many stakeholders contend that the act's wildlife restoration benefits accrue to the American public at large (this is often referred to as user-pay, public-benefit). Both the potential for market-based fluctuation of the excise tax structure and the public benefit nature of Pittman-Robertson have led some stakeholders to propose amending the act to include a funding source that they argue is more stable and not solely reliant on hunters and recreational shooters. Congress has structured revenue sources for Pittman-Robertson so that those who recreate with firearms or bows contribute to funding that is used to maintain and preserve wildlife and hunter safety programs. Upon enactment of the Federal Aid in Wildlife Restoration Act, in 1937, Congress only included revenues generated from excise taxes on firearms (not including pistols and revolvers) and shells and cartridges. In debating this act, some Members stated that taxes imposed on sporting arms and ammunition should be used to benefit wildlife restoration. In 1970, Congress enacted legislation to deposit revenues from an excise tax on pistols and revolvers into the Federal Aid to Wildlife Restoration Fund rather than into the general fund of the Treasury, into which they were being deposited. The purpose of this legislation was to increase revenues available to support wildlife restoration and programs for hunter safety. Congress further amended the revenue sources in 1972, providing that an excise tax on bows and arrows, also created in the same law, also be deposited into the Federal Aid to Wildlife Restoration Fund. This inclusion provided that archers also contribute to the benefits provided by the act. The concept of providing more stable and diversified funds for Pittman-Robertson is not new, and both stakeholders and Congress have addressed this issue on several occasions. For example, some stakeholders have suggested that given the public benefit nature of Pittman-Robertson, an excise tax should be imposed on other categories of goods and services related to outdoor recreation (e.g., backpacks, bicycles, climbing gear, and sport utility vehicles, among other items). This proposal—sometimes referred to as a backpack tax —has spurred an ongoing debate for several decades. Proponents have contended that it would be fairer for all users, not just hunters and shooters, to support wildlife conservation and restoration and that broadening the tax base could raise more revenue for restoration. Conversely, opponents have suggested that the proposal would place an untenable burden on the outdoor industry, leading to fewer sales and making items prohibitively expensive for some stakeholders, and that it could deter individuals from enjoying the outdoors. Congress has not enacted legislation to broaden the excise tax base supporting Pittman-Robertson beyond firearms, ammunition, and archery equipment. However, in FY2001, Congress amended Pittman-Robertson to include an additional subaccount within the Federal Aid to Wildlife Restoration Fund, the Wildlife Restoration and Conservation Account, to provide supplemental funding for wildlife restoration and conservation. In the same law that created the subaccount, Congress appropriated $50 million to the subaccount "for the development, revision, and implementation of wildlife conservation and restoration plans and programs." Congress appropriated funding to this subaccount only in FY2001. In recent Congresses, including the 115 th Congress, some Members have introduced legislation that would have amended Pittman-Robertson to repurpose the subaccount. These bills would have transferred up to $1.3 billion per year into the subaccount from revenues deposited into the Treasury under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act and the Mineral Leasing Act. These funds would have been available for states and territories for a variety of conservation and restoration activities. In the 116 th Congress, Congress may continue to consider alternate funding sources for Pittman-Robertson through existing or new mechanisms. Proponents have argued that additional funds from alternate sources would bolster restoration and conservation activities and provide a secure source of funding for Pittman-Robertson. Some stakeholders also have stated that a bill authorizing such alternate funding sources could provide additional resources for federal agencies or tribal partners to implement the conservation of threatened and endangered species, among other concerns. However, Congress may consider if providing funding for conservation and restoration under Pittman-Robertson could affect other potential uses of federal funds. Apportionment Formulas In addition to eligible uses and funding sources, Congress may consider amending Pittman-Robertson's apportionment structure. Currently, states and territories are treated differently under the program; states are apportioned funds based on area, population, and number of hunting licenses (see " State and Territory Apportionment " above), whereas territories are allocated funding based on a set percentage or percentage caps. For the Wildlife Restoration program, states receive a minimum of 0.5% of the program's total apportionment, Puerto Rico receives not more than 0.5%, and each of the remaining four eligible territories receives not more than 0.17%. For both the Basic and Enhanced Hunter Education and Safety programs, states receive at least 1% of the total apportionments and territories receive 0.17% of the apportionments. Under current law, Washington, DC, does not receive funding through any of these programs. However, in FY2001, Washington, DC, received funding through the Wildlife Conservation and Restoration Account. Congress may consider issues related to apportionment formulas, including topics related to parity between states, territories, and others. It also may consider amending the apportionment structures, including minimum and maximum allocations, in general. The current structure is the result of multiple congressional actions since the original enactment in 1937. Through these actions, Congress has added and modified apportionment formula and eligibility. Some stakeholders have expressed concern over the discrepancy between the minimum apportionment to states and the set percentage provided to territories; they contend there should be greater parity between states and territories. Other stakeholders have suggested that tribes also should be eligible to receive allocations under Pittman-Robertson programs. Appendix A. State Characteristics Appendix B. Annual Pittman-Robertson Wildlife Restoration Act Apportionments by State and Territory, FY2015-FY2019

The Federal Aid in Wildlife Restoration Act (16 U.S.C. §§669 et seq.), enacted in 1937 and now known as the Pittman-Robertson Wildlife Restoration Act, provides funding for states and territories to support wildlife restoration, conservation, and hunter education and safety programs. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), within the Department of the Interior, administers Pittman-Robertson. All 50 states (but not the District of Columbia) as well as the 5 inhabited U.S. territories receive Pittman-Robertson funds. Funding for FWS to carry out Pittman-Robertson programs comes from excise taxes on firearms, ammunition, and archery equipment. Receipts from these excise taxes are deposited into the Federal Aid to Wildlife Restoration Fund in the Treasury, and monies from the fund are made available for FWS in the fiscal year following their collection without any further action by Congress. Between FY1939 and FY2019, FWS disbursed $18.8 billion (in 2018 dollars) for wildlife restoration and hunter education and safety activities for Pittman-Robertson programs. FWS apportions and disburses funds to states and territories through three formula-based programs: Wildlife Restoration (known as Section 4(b)), Basic Hunter Education and Safety (Section 4(c)), and Enhanced Hunter Education and Safety Grants (Section 10). FWS also allocates nonformula funding for multistate conservation grants and program administration. State apportionments for wildlife restoration projects are based on the land and inland water area and the number of hunting licenses sold in each state. State population is used to determine apportionments for both the Basic and Enhanced Hunter Education and Safety programs. FWS also apportions funding for territories. For Wildlife Restoration, Puerto Rico receives not more than 0.5% of the apportionments made under the act and American Samoa, Guam, the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands each receive not more than 0.17%. Each territory receives 0.17% of the total apportionments for both the Basic and Enhanced Hunter Education and Safety programs. Amending Pittman-Robertson is of perennial interest to some in Congress. Members routinely consider legislation to amend how states and territories may use their Pittman-Robertson apportionments, sources of funding to support Pittman-Robertson, and the Pittman-Robertson apportionment formulas. Issues of interest have included whether Pittman-Robertson funds should be available for hunter recruitment and retention activities and the amount available for the expansion or construction of public shooting ranges. Because Pittman-Robertson derives its funding through an excise tax on shooting and archery equipment, the number of people participating in these and related activities influences the amount of available funding for these programs. This, in turn, can lead some to consider issues related to funding sources and whether the existing revenue sources derived from excise taxes on shooting and archery equipment should be modified. Other issues that Congress has addressed include whether to modify the existing apportionment structure, including whether to amend how funding is apportioned for states and territories.

crs_98-505

crs_98-505_0

F ederal law provides a variety of powers for the President to use in response to crisis, exigency, or emergency circumstances threatening the nation. They are not limited to military or war situations. Some of these authorities, deriving from the Constitution or statutory law, are continuously available to the President with little or no qualification. Others—statutory delegations from Congress—exist on a standby basis and remain dormant until the President formally declares a national emergency. Congress may modify, rescind, or render dormant such delegated emergency authority. Until the crisis of World War I, Presidents utilized emergency powers at their own discretion. Proclamations announced the exercise of exigency authority. During World War I and thereafter, Chief Executives had available to them a growing body of standby emergency authority that became operative upon the issuance of a proclamation declaring a condition of national emergency. Sometimes such proclamations confined the matter of crisis to a specific policy sphere, and sometimes they placed no limitation whatsoever on the pronouncement. These activations of standby emergency authority remained acceptable practice until the era of the Vietnam War. In 1976, Congress curtailed this practice with the passage of the National Emergencies Act. Background and History The exercise of emergency powers had long been a concern of the classical political theorists, including the 18 th -century English philosopher John Locke, who had a strong influence upon the Founding Fathers in the United States. A preeminent exponent of a government of laws and not of men, Locke argued that occasions may arise when the executive must exert a broad discretion in meeting special exigencies or "emergencies" for which the legislative power provided no relief or existing law granted no necessary remedy. He did not regard this prerogative as limited to wartime or even to situations of great urgency. It was sufficient if the "public good" might be advanced by its exercise. Emergency powers were first expressed prior to the actual founding of the Republic. Between 1775 and 1781, the Continental Congress passed a series of acts and resolves that count as the first expressions of emergency authority. These instruments dealt almost exclusively with the prosecution of the Revolutionary War. At the Constitutional Convention of 1787, emergency powers, as such, failed to attract much attention during the course of debate over the charter for the new government. It may be argued, however, that the granting of emergency powers by Congress is implicit in its Article I, Section 8, authority to "provide for the common Defense and general Welfare;" the commerce clause; its war, armed forces, and militia powers; and the "necessary and proper" clause empowering it to make such laws as are required to fulfill the executions of "the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." There is a tradition of constitutional interpretation that has resulted in so-called implied powers, which may be invoked in order to respond to an emergency situation. Locke seems to have anticipated this practice. Furthermore, Presidents have occasionally taken an emergency action that they assumed to be constitutionally permissible. Thus, in the American governmental experience, the exercise of emergency powers has been somewhat dependent upon the Chief Executive's view of the presidential office. Perhaps the President who most clearly articulated a view of his office in conformity with the Lockean position was Theodore Roosevelt. Describing what came to be called the "stewardship" theory of the presidency, Roosevelt wrote of his "insistence upon the theory that the executive power was limited only by specific restrictions and prohibitions appearing in the Constitution or imposed by the Congress under its constitutional powers." It was his view "that every executive officer, and above all every executive officer in high position, was a steward of the people," and he "declined to adopt the view that what was imperatively necessary for the Nation could not be done by the President unless he could find some specific authorization to do it." Indeed, it was Roosevelt's belief that, for the President, "it was not only his right but his duty to do anything that the needs of the Nation demanded unless such action was forbidden by the Constitution or by the laws." Opposed to this view of the presidency was Roosevelt's former Secretary of War, William Howard Taft, his personal choice for and actual successor as Chief Executive. He viewed the presidential office in more limited terms, writing "that the President can exercise no power which cannot be fairly and reasonably traced to some specific grant of power or justly implied and included within such express grant as proper and necessary to its exercise." In his view, such a "specific grant must be either in the Federal Constitution or in an act of Congress passed in pursuance thereof. There is," Taft concluded, "no undefined residuum of power which he can exercise because it seems to him to be in the public interest." Between these two views of the presidency lie various gradations of opinion, resulting in perhaps as many conceptions of the office as there have been holders. One authority has summed up the situation in the following words: Emergency powers are not solely derived from legal sources. The extent of their invocation and use is also contingent upon the personal conception which the incumbent of the Presidential office has of the Presidency and the premises upon which he interprets his legal powers. In the last analysis, the authority of a President is largely determined by the President himself. Apart from the Constitution, but resulting from its prescribed procedures, there are statutory grants of power for emergency conditions. The President is authorized by Congress to take some special or extraordinary action, ostensibly to meet the problems of governing effectively in times of exigency. Sometimes these laws are of only temporary duration. The Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, for example, allowed the President to impose certain wage and price controls for about three years before it expired automatically in 1974. The statute gave the President emergency authority to address a crisis in the nation's economy. Many of these laws are continuously maintained or permanently available for the President's ready use in responding to an emergency. The Defense Production Act, originally adopted in 1950 to prioritize and regulate the manufacture of military material, is an example of this type of statute. There are various standby laws that convey special emergency powers once the President formally declares a national emergency activating them. In 1973, a Senate special committee studying emergency powers published a compilation identifying some 470 provisions of federal law delegating to the executive extraordinary authority in time of national emergency. The vast majority of them are of the standby kind—dormant until activated by the President. However, formal procedures for invoking these authorities, accounting for their use, and regulating their activation and application were established by the National Emergencies Act of 1976. The Emergency Concept Relying upon constitutional authority or congressional delegations made at various times over the past 230 years, the President of the United States may exercise certain powers in the event that the continued existence of the nation is threatened by crisis, exigency, or emergency circumstances. What is a national emergency? In the simplest understanding of the term, the dictionary defines emergency as "an unforeseen combination of circumstances or the resulting state that calls for immediate action." In the midst of the crisis of the Great Depression, a 1934 Supreme Court majority opinion characterized an emergency in terms of urgency and relative infrequency of occurrence as well as equivalence to a public calamity resulting from fire, flood, or like disaster not reasonably subject to anticipation. An eminent constitutional scholar, the late Edward S. Corwin, explained emergency conditions as being those that "have not attained enough of stability or recurrency to admit of their being dealt with according to rule." During congressional committee hearings on emergency powers in 1973, a political scientist described an emergency in the following terms: "It denotes the existence of conditions of varying nature, intensity and duration, which are perceived to threaten life or well-being beyond tolerable limits." Corwin also indicated it "connotes the existence of conditions suddenly intensifying the degree of existing danger to life or well-being beyond that which is accepted as normal." There are at least four aspects of an emergency condition. The first is its temporal character: An emergency is sudden, unforeseen, and of unknown duration. The second is its potential gravity: An emergency is dangerous and threatening to life and well-being. The third, in terms of governmental role and authority, is the matter of perception: Who discerns this phenomenon? The Constitution may be guiding on this question, but it is not always conclusive. Fourth, there is the element of response: By definition, an emergency requires immediate action but is also unanticipated and, therefore, as Corwin notes, cannot always be "dealt with according to rule." From these simple factors arise the dynamics of national emergency powers. These dynamics can be seen in the history of the exercise of emergency powers. Law and Practice In 1792, residents of western Pennsylvania, Virginia, and the Carolinas began forcefully opposing the collection of a federal excise tax on whiskey. Anticipating rebellious activity, Congress enacted legislation providing for the calling forth of the militia to suppress insurrections and repel invasions. Section 3 of this statute required that a presidential proclamation be issued to warn insurgents to cease their activity. If hostilities persisted, the militia could be dispatched. On August 17, 1794, President Washington issued such a proclamation. The insurgency continued. The President then took command of the forces organized to put down the rebellion. Here was the beginning of a pattern of policy expression and implementation regarding emergency powers. Congress legislated extraordinary or special authority for discretionary use by the President in a time of emergency. In issuing a proclamation, the Chief Executive notified Congress that he was making use of this power and also apprised other affected parties of his emergency action. Over the next 100 years, Congress enacted various permanent and standby laws for responding largely to military, economic, and labor emergencies. During this span of years, however, the exercise of emergency powers by President Abraham Lincoln brought the first great dispute over the authority and discretion of the Chief Executive to engage in emergency actions. By the time of Lincoln's inauguration (March 4, 1861), seven states of the lower South had announced their secession from the Union; the Confederate provisional government had been established (February 4, 1861); Jefferson Davis had been elected (February 9, 1861) and installed as president of the confederacy (February 18, 1861); and an army was being mobilized by the secessionists. Lincoln had a little over two months to consider his course of action. When the new President assumed office, Congress was not in session. For reasons of his own, Lincoln delayed calling a special meeting of the legislature but soon ventured into its constitutionally designated policy sphere. On April 19, he issued a proclamation establishing a blockade on the ports of the secessionist states, "a measure hitherto regarded as contrary to both the Constitution and the law of nations except when the government was embroiled in a declared, foreign war." Congress had not been given an opportunity to consider a declaration of war. The next day, the President ordered the addition of 19 vessels to the navy "for purposes of public defense." A short time later, the blockade was extended to the ports of Virginia and North Carolina. By a proclamation of May 3, Lincoln ordered that the regular army be enlarged by 22,714 men, that navy personnel be increased by 18,000, and that 42,032 volunteers be accommodated for three-year terms of service. The directive antagonized many Representatives and Senators, because Congress is specifically authorized by Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution "to raise and support armies." In his July message to the newly assembled Congress, Lincoln suggested, "These measures, whether strictly legal or not, were ventured upon under what appeared to be a popular and a public necessity, trusting then, as now, that Congress would readily ratify them. It is believed," he wrote, "that nothing has been done beyond the constitutional competency of Congress." Congress subsequently did legislatively authorize, and thereby approve, the President's actions regarding his increasing armed forces personnel and would do the same later concerning some other questionable emergency actions. In the case of Lincoln, the opinion of scholars and experts is that "neither Congress nor the Supreme Court exercised any effective restraint upon the President." The emergency actions of the Chief Executive were either unchallenged or approved by Congress and were either accepted or—because of almost no opportunity to render judgment—went largely without notice by the Supreme Court. The President made a quick response to the emergency at hand, a response that Congress or the courts might have rejected in law but, nonetheless, had been made in fact and with some degree of popular approval. Similar controversy would arise concerning the emergency actions of Presidents Woodrow Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt. Both men exercised extensive emergency powers with regard to world hostilities, and Roosevelt also used emergency authority to deal with the Great Depression. Their emergency actions, however, were largely supported by statutory delegations and a high degree of approval on the part of both Congress and the public. During the Wilson and Roosevelt presidencies, a major procedural development occurred in the exercise of emergency powers—use of a proclamation to declare a national emergency and thereby activate all standby statutory provisions delegating authority to the President during a national emergency. The first such national emergency proclamation was issued by President Wilson on February 5, 1917. Promulgated on the authority of a statute establishing the U.S. Shipping Board, the proclamation concerned water transportation policy. It was statutorily terminated, along with a variety of other wartime measures, on March 3, 1921. President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued the next national emergency proclamation some 48 hours after assuming office. Proclaimed March 6, 1933, on the somewhat questionable authority of the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, the proclamation declared a "bank holiday" and halted a major class of financial transactions by closing the banks. Congress subsequently gave specific statutory support for the Chief Executive's action with the passage of the Emergency Banking Act on March 9. Upon signing this legislation into law, the President issued a second banking proclamation, based upon the authority of the new law, continuing the bank holiday until it was determined that banking institutions were capable of conducting business in accordance with new banking policy. Next, on September 8, 1939, President Roosevelt promulgated a proclamation of "limited" national emergency, though the qualifying term had no meaningful legal significance. Almost two years later, on May 27, 1941, he issued a proclamation of "unlimited" national emergency. This action, however, did not actually make any important new powers available to the Chief Executive in addition to those activated by the 1939 proclamation. The President's purpose in making the second proclamation was largely to apprise the American people of the worsening conflict in Europe and growing tensions in Asia. These two war-related proclamations of a general condition of national emergency remained operative until 1947, when certain of the provisions of law they had activated were statutorily rescinded. Then, in 1951, Congress terminated the declaration of war against Germany. In the spring of the following year, the Senate ratified the treaty of peace with Japan. Because these actions marked the end of World War II for the United States, legislation was required to keep certain emergency provisions in effect. Initially, the Emergency Powers Interim Continuation Act temporarily maintained this emergency authority. It was subsequently supplanted by the Emergency Powers Continuation Act, which kept selected emergency delegations in force until August 1953. By proclamation in April 1952, President Harry S. Truman terminated the 1939 and 1941 national emergency declarations, leaving operative only those emergency authorities continued by statutory specification. President Truman's 1952 termination, however, specifically exempted a December 1950 proclamation of national emergency he had issued in response to hostilities in Korea. This condition of national emergency would remain in force and unimpaired well into the era of the Vietnam War. Two other proclamations of national emergency would also be promulgated before Congress once again turned its attention to these matters. Faced with a postal strike, President Richard Nixon declared a national emergency in March 1970, thereby gaining permission to use units of the Ready Reserve to assist in moving the mail. President Nixon proclaimed a second national emergency in August 1971 to control the balance of payments flow by terminating temporarily certain trade agreement provisos and imposing supplemental duties on some imported goods. Congressional Concerns In the years following the conclusion of U.S. armed forces involvement in active military conflict in Korea, occasional expressions of concern were heard in Congress regarding the continued existence of President Truman's 1950 national emergency proclamation long after the conditions prompting its issuance had disappeared. There was some annoyance that the President was retaining extraordinary powers intended only for a time of genuine emergency and a feeling that the Chief Executive was thwarting the legislative intent of Congress by continuously failing to terminate the declared national emergency. Growing public and congressional displeasure with the President's exercise of his war powers and deepening U.S. involvement in hostilities in Vietnam prompted interest in a variety of related matters. For Senator Charles Mathias, interest in the question of emergency powers developed out of U.S. involvement in Vietnam and the incursion into Cambodia. Together with Senator Frank Church, he sought to establish a Senate special committee to study the implications of terminating the 1950 proclamation of national emergency that was being used to prosecute the Vietnam War "to consider problems which might arise as the result of the termination and to consider what administrative or legislative actions might be necessary." Such a panel was initially chartered by S.Res. 304 as the Special Committee on the Termination of the National Emergency in June 1972, but it did not begin operations before the end of the year. With the convening of the 93 rd Congress in 1973, the special committee was approved again with S.Res. 9 . Upon exploring the subject matter of national emergency powers, however, the mission of the special committee became more burdensome. There was not just one proclamation of national emergency in effect but four such instruments, issued in 1933, 1950, 1970, and 1971. The United States was in a condition of national emergency four times over, and with each proclamation, the whole collection of statutorily delegated emergency powers was activated. Consequently, in 1974, with S.Res. 242 , the study panel was rechartered as the Special Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers to reflect its focus upon matters larger than the 1950 emergency proclamation. Its final mandate was provided by S.Res. 10 in the 94 th Congress, although its termination date was necessarily extended briefly in 1976 by S.Res. 370 . Senators Church and Mathias co-chaired the panel. The Special Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers produced various studies during its existence. After scrutinizing the U . S . Code and uncodified statutory emergency powers, the panel identified 470 provisions of federal law that delegated extraordinary authority to the executive in time of national emergency. Not all of them required a declaration of national emergency to be operative, but they were, nevertheless, extraordinary grants. The special committee also found that no process existed for automatically terminating the four outstanding national emergency proclamations. Thus, the panel began developing legislation containing a formula for regulating emergency declarations in the future and otherwise adjusting the body of statutorily delegated emergency powers by abolishing some provisions, relegating others to permanent status, and continuing others in a standby capacity. The panel also began preparing a report offering its findings and recommendations regarding the state of national emergency powers in the nation. The National Emergencies Act The special committee, in July 1974, unanimously recommended legislation establishing a procedure for the presidential declaration and congressional regulation of a national emergency. The proposal also modified various statutorily delegated emergency powers. In arriving at this reform measure, the panel consulted with various executive branch agencies regarding the significance of existing emergency statutes, recommendations for legislative action, and views as to the repeal of some provisions of emergency law. This recommended legislation was introduced by Senator Church for himself and others on August 22, 1974, and became S. 3957 . It was reported from the Senate Committee on Government Operations on September 30 without public hearings or amendment. The bill was subsequently discussed on the Senate floor on October 7, when it was amended and passed. Although a version of the reform legislation had been introduced in the House on September 16, becoming H.R. 16668 , the Committee on the Judiciary, to which the measure was referred, did not have an opportunity to consider either that bill or the Senate-adopted version due to the press of other business—chiefly the impeachment of President Nixon and the nomination of Nelson Rockefeller to be Vice President of the United States. Thus, the National Emergencies Act failed to be considered on the House floor before the final adjournment of the 93 rd Congress. With the convening of the next Congress, the proposal was introduced in the House on February 27, 1975, becoming H.R. 3884 , and in the Senate on March 6, becoming S. 977 . House hearings occurred in March and April before the Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the Committee on the Judiciary. The bill was subsequently marked up and, on April 15, was reported in amended form to the full committee on a 4-0 vote. On May 21, the Committee on the Judiciary, on a voice vote, reported the bill with technical amendments. During the course of House debate on September 4, there was agreement to both the committee amendments and a floor amendment providing that national emergencies end automatically one year after their declaration unless the President informs Congress and the public of a continuation. The bill was then passed on a 388-5 yea and nay vote and sent to the Senate, where it was referred to the Committee on Government Operations. The Senate Committee on Government Operations held a hearing on H.R. 3884 on February 25, 1976, the bill was subsequently reported on August 26 with one substantive and several technical amendments. The following day, the amended bill was passed and returned to the House. On August 31, the House agreed to the Senate amendments, clearing the proposal for President Gerald Ford's signature on September 14. In its final report, issued in May 1976, the special committee concluded "by reemphasizing that emergency laws and procedures in the United States have been neglected for too long, and that Congress must pass the National Emergencies Act to end a potentially dangerous situation." Other issues identified by the special committee as deserving attention in the future, however, did not fare so well. The panel, for example, was hopeful that standing committees of both houses of Congress would review statutory emergency power provisions within their respective jurisdictions with a view to the continued need for, and possible adjustment of, such authority. Actions in this regard were probably not as ambitious as the special committee expected. A title of the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 granting the President or Congress power to declare a civil defense emergency in the event of an attack on the United States occurred or was anticipated expired in June 1974 after the House Committee on Rules failed to report a measure continuing the statute. A provision of emergency law was refined in May 1976. Legislation was enacted granting the President the authority to order certain selected members of an armed services reserve component to active duty without a declaration of war or national emergency. Previously, such an activation of military reserve personnel had been limited to a "time of national emergency declared by the President" or "when otherwise authorized by law." Another refinement of emergency law occurred in 1977 when action was completed on the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). Reform legislation containing this statute modified a provision of the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, authorizing the President to regulate the nation's international and domestic finance during periods of declared war or national emergency. The enacted bill limited the President's Trading with the Enemy Act power to regulate the country's finances to times of declared war. In IEEPA, a provision conferred authority on the Chief Executive to exercise controls over international economic transactions in the future during a declared national emergency and established procedures governing the use of this power, including close consultation with Congress when declaring a national emergency to activate IEEPA. Such a declaration would be subject to congressional regulation under the procedures of the National Emergencies Act. Other matters identified in the final report of the special committee for congressional scrutiny included investigation of emergency preparedness efforts conducted by the executive branch, attention to congressional preparations for an emergency and continual review of emergency law, ending open-ended grants of authority to the executive, investigation and institution of stricter controls over delegated powers, and improving the accountability of executive decisionmaking. There is some public record indication that certain of these points, particularly the first and the last, have been addressed in the past two decades by congressional overseers. As enacted, the National Emergencies Act consisted of five titles. The first of these generally returned all standby statutory delegations of emergency power, activated by an outstanding declaration of national emergency, to a dormant state two years after the statute's approval. However, the act did not cancel the 1933, 1950, 1970, and 1971 national emergency proclamations, because the President issued them pursuant to his Article II constitutional authority. Nevertheless, it did render them ineffective by returning to dormancy the statutory authorities they had activated, thereby necessitating a new declaration to activate standby statutory emergency authorities. Title II provided a procedure for future declarations of national emergency by the President and prescribed arrangements for their congressional regulation. The statute established an exclusive means for declaring a national emergency. Emergency declarations were to terminate automatically after one year unless formally continued for another year by the President, but they could be terminated earlier by either the President or Congress. Originally, the prescribed method for congressional termination of a declared national emergency was a concurrent resolution adopted by both houses of Congress. This type of "legislative veto" was effectively invalidated by the Supreme Court in 1983. The National Emergencies Act was amended in 1985 to substitute a joint resolution as the vehicle for rescinding a national emergency declaration. When declaring a national emergency, the President must indicate, according to Title III, the powers and authorities being activated to respond to the exigency at hand. Certain presidential accountability and reporting requirements regarding national emergency declarations were specified in Title IV, and the repeal and continuation of various statutory provisions delegating emergency powers was accomplished in Title V. Emergency Declarations in Effect and Emergency Declarations No Longer in Effect Since the 1976 enactment of the National Emergencies Act, various national emergencies have been declared pursuant to its provisions. Some were subsequently revoked, while others remain in effect. Table 1 displays the number of national emergencies in effect (some may refer to these as "active") and the number of national emergencies no longer in effect (some may refer to these as "inactive"), by President. Detailed information regarding the 31 national emergencies in effect may be found in Table 2 . Similar information regarding the 22 national emergencies no longer in may be found in Table 3 . The second column in Table 2 and Table 3 identifies the national emergency declaration, which is either an executive order (E.O.) or a presidential proclamation (Proc.). Table 3 includes declared national emergencies that are no longer in effect. Concluding Remarks The development, exercise, and regulation of emergency powers, from the days of the Continental Congress to the present, reflect at least one highly discernable trend: Those authorities available to the executive in time of national crisis or exigency have, since the time of the Lincoln Administration, come to be increasingly rooted in statutory law. The discretion available to a Civil War President in his exercise of emergency power has been harnessed, to a considerable extent, in the contemporary period. Due to greater reliance upon statutory expression, the range of this authority has come to be more circumscribed, and the options for its use have come to be regulated procedurally through the National Emergencies Act. Since its enactment the National Emergencies Act has not been revisited by congressional overseers. The 1976 report of the Senate Special Committee on National Emergencies suggested that the prospect remains that further improvements and reforms in this policy area might be pursued and perfected. An anomaly in the activation of emergency powers appears to have occurred on September 8, 2005, when President George W. Bush issued a proclamation suspending certain wage requirements of the Davis-Bacon Act in the course of the federal response to the Gulf Coast disaster resulting from Hurricane Katrina. Instead of following the historical pattern of declaring a national emergency to activate the suspension authority, the President set out the following rationale in the proclamation: "I find that the conditions caused by Hurricane Katrina constitute a 'national emergency' within the meaning of section 3147 of title 40, United States Code." A more likely course of action would seemingly have been for the President to declare a national emergency pursuant to the National Emergencies Act and to specify that he was, accordingly, activating the suspension authority. Although the propriety of the President's action in this case might have been ultimately determined in the courts, the proclamation was revoked on November 3, 2005, by a proclamation in which the President cited the National Emergencies Act as authority, in part, for his action.

The President of the United States has available certain powers that may be exercised in the event that the nation is threatened by crisis, exigency, or emergency circumstances (other than natural disasters, war, or near-war situations). Such powers may be stated explicitly or implied by the Constitution, assumed by the Chief Executive to be permissible constitutionally, or inferred from or specified by statute. Through legislation, Congress has made a great many delegations of authority in this regard over the past 230 years. There are, however, limits and restraints upon the President in his exercise of emergency powers. With the exception of the habeas corpus clause, the Constitution makes no allowance for the suspension of any of its provisions during a national emergency. Disputes over the constitutionality or legality of the exercise of emergency powers are judicially reviewable. Both the judiciary and Congress, as co-equal branches, can restrain the executive regarding emergency powers. So can public opinion. Since 1976, the President has been subject to certain procedural formalities in utilizing some statutorily delegated emergency authority. The National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. §§1601-1651) eliminated or modified some statutory grants of emergency authority, required the President to formally declare the existence of a national emergency and to specify what statutory authority activated by the declaration would be used, and provided Congress a means to countermand the President's declaration and the activated authority being sought. The development of this regulatory statute and subsequent declarations of national emergency are reviewed in this report.

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Introduction Medicare is a federal program that pays for covered health care services of qualified beneficiaries. It was established in 1965 under Title XVIII of the Social Security Act to provide health insurance to individuals 65 and older, and has been expanded over the years to include permanently disabled individuals under 65. The program is administered by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Medicare consists of four distinct parts: Part A (Hospital Insurance, or HI) covers inpatient hospital services, skilled nursing care, hospice care, and some home health services. The HI trust fund is mainly funded by a dedicated payroll tax of 2.9% of earnings, shared equally between employers and workers. Since 2013, workers with income of more than $200,000 per year for single tax filers (or more than $250,000 for joint tax filers) pay an additional 0.9% on income over those amounts. Part B (Supplementary Medical Insurance, or SMI) covers physician services, outpatient services, and some home health and preventive services. The SMI trust fund is funded through beneficiary premiums (set at 25% of estimated program costs for the aged) and general revenues (the remaining amount, approximately 75%). Part C (Medicare Advantage, or MA) is a private plan option for beneficiaries that covers all Parts A and B services, except hospice. Individuals choosing to enroll in Part C must also enroll in Part B. Part C is funded through the HI and SMI trust funds. Part D covers outpatient prescription drug benefits. Funding is included in the SMI trust fund and is financed through beneficiary premiums, general revenues, and state transfer payments. Medicare serves approximately one in six Americans and virtually all of the population aged 65 and older. In 2019, the program will cover an estimated 61 million persons (52 million aged and 9 million disabled). The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that total Medicare spending in 2019 will be about $772 billion; of this amount, approximately $749 billion will be spent on benefits. About 28% of Medicare benefit spending is for hospital inpatient and hospital outpatient services (see Figure 1 ). CBO also estimates that federal Medicare spending (after deduction of beneficiary premiums and other offsetting receipts) will be about $637 billion in 2019, accounting for about 14% of total federal spending and 3% of GDP. Medicare is required to pay for all covered services provided to eligible persons, so long as specific criteria are met. Spending under the program (except for a portion of administrative costs) is considered mandatory spending and is not subject to the appropriations process. Medicare is expected to be a high-priority issue in the current Congress. The program has a significant impact on beneficiaries and other stakeholders as well as on the economy in general through its coverage of important health care benefits for the aged and disabled, the payment of premiums and other cost sharing by those beneficiaries, its payments to providers who supply those health care services, and its interaction with other insurance coverage. Projections of future Medicare expenditures and funding indicate that the program will place increasing financial demands on the federal budget and on beneficiaries. In response to these concerns, Congress may consider a range of Medicare reform options, from making changes within the current structure, including modifying provider payments and revising existing oversight and regulatory mechanisms, to restructuring the entire program. The committees of jurisdiction for the mandatory spending (benefits) portion of Medicare are the Senate Committee on Finance, the House Committee on Ways and Means, and the House Committee on Energy and Commerce. The House and Senate Committees on Appropriations have jurisdiction over the discretionary spending used to administer and oversee the program. Medicare History Medicare was enacted in 1965 (P.L. 89-97) in response to the concern that only about half of the nation's seniors had health insurance, and most of those had coverage only for inpatient hospital costs. The new program, which became effective July 1, 1966, included Part A coverage for hospital and posthospital services and Part B coverage for doctors and other medical services. As is the case for the Social Security program, Part A is financed by payroll taxes levied on current workers and their employers; persons must pay into the system for 40 quarters to become entitled to premium-free benefits. Medicare Part B is voluntary, with a monthly premium required of beneficiaries who choose to enroll. Payments to health care providers under both Part A and Part B were originally based on the most common form of payment at the time, namely "reasonable costs" for hospital and other institutional services or "usual, customary and reasonable charges" for physicians and other medical services. Medicare is considered a social insurance program and is the second-largest such federal program, after Social Security. The 1965 law also established Medicaid, the federal/state health insurance program for the poor; this was an expansion of previous welfare-based assistance programs. Some low-income individuals qualify for both Medicare and Medicaid. In the ensuing years, Medicare has undergone considerable change. P.L. 92-603, enacted in 1972, expanded program coverage to certain individuals under 65 (the disabled and persons with end-stage renal disease (ESRD)), and introduced managed care into Medicare by allowing private insurance entities to provide Medicare benefits in exchange for a monthly capitated payment. This law also began to place limitations on the definitions of reasonable costs and charges in order to gain some control over program spending which, even initially, exceeded original projections. During the 1980s and 1990s, a number of laws were enacted that included provisions designed to further stem the rapid increase in program spending through modifications to the way payments to providers were determined, and to postpone the insolvency of the Medicare Part A trust fund. This was typically achieved through tightening rules governing payments to providers of services and limiting the annual updates in such payments. The program moved from payments based on reasonable costs and reasonable charges to payment systems under which a predetermined payment amount was established for a specified unit of service. At the same time, beneficiaries were given expanded options to obtain covered services through private managed care arrangements, typically health maintenance organizations (HMOs). Most Medicare payment provisions were incorporated into larger budget reconciliation bills designed to control overall federal spending. This effort culminated in the enactment of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA 97; P.L. 105-33 ). This law slowed the rate of growth in payments to providers and established new payment systems for certain categories of providers, including establishing the sustainable growth rate (SGR) methodology for determining the annual update to Medicare physician payments. It also established the Medicare+Choice program, which expanded private plan options for beneficiaries and changed the way most of these plans were paid. BBA 97 further expanded preventive services covered by the program. Subsequently, Congress became concerned that the BBA 97 cuts in payments to providers were somewhat larger than originally anticipated. Therefore, legislation was enacted in both 1999 (Balanced Budget Refinement Act of 1999, or BBRA; P.L. 106-113 ) and 2000 (Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Benefits Improvement and Protection Act of 2000, or BIPA; P.L. 106-554 ) to mitigate the impact of BBA 97 on providers. In 2003, Congress enacted the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA; P.L. 108-173 ), which included a major benefit expansion and placed increasing emphasis on the private sector to deliver and manage benefits. The MMA included provisions that (1) created a new voluntary outpatient prescription drug benefit to be administered by private entities; (2) replaced the Medicare+Choice program with the Medicare Advantage (MA) program and raised payments to plans in order to increase their availability for beneficiaries; (3) introduced the concept of income testing into Medicare, with higher-income persons paying larger Part B premiums beginning in 2007; (4) modified some provider payment rules; (5) expanded covered preventive services; and (6) created a specific process for overall program review if general revenue spending exceeded a specified threshold. During the 109 th Congress, two laws were enacted that incorporated minor modifications to Medicare's payment rules. These were the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA; P.L. 109-171 ) and the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 (TRHCA; P.L. 109-432 ). In the 110 th Congress, additional changes were incorporated in the Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Extension Act of 2007 (MMSEA; P.L. 110-173 ) and the Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of 2008 (MIPPA; P.L. 110-275 ). In the 111 th Congress, comprehensive health reform legislation was enacted that, among other things, made statutory changes to the Medicare program. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148 ), enacted on March 23, 2010, included numerous provisions affecting Medicare payments, payment rules, covered benefits, and the delivery of care. The Health Care and Education Affordability Reconciliation Act of 2010 (the Reconciliation Act, or HCERA; P.L. 111-152 ), enacted on March 30, 2010, made changes to a number of Medicare-related provisions in the ACA and added several new provisions. Included in the ACA, as amended, are provisions that (1) constrain Medicare's annual payment increases for certain providers; (2) change payment rates in the MA program so that they more closely resemble those in fee-for-service; (3) reduce payments to hospitals that serve a large number of low-income patients; (4) create an Independent Payment Advisory Board (IPAB) to make recommendations to adjust Medicare payment rates; (5) phase out the Part D prescription drug benefit "doughnut hole"; (6) increase resources and enhance activities to prevent fraud and abuse; and (7) provide incentives to increase the quality and efficiency of care, such as creating value-based purchasing programs for certain types of providers, allowing accountable care organizations (ACOs) that meet certain quality and efficiency standards to share in the savings, creating a voluntary pilot program that bundles payments for physician, hospital, and post-acute care services, and adjusting payments to hospitals for readmissions related to certain potentially preventable conditions. In the 112 th and 113 th Congresses, the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (ATRA; P.L. 112-240 ), the Continuing Appropriations Resolution of 2014 ( P.L. 113-67 ), and the Protecting Access to Medicare Act of 2014 (PAMA; P.L. 113-93 ) primarily made short-term modifications to physician payment updates and payment adjustments for certain types of providers. PAMA also established a new skilled nursing facility (SNF) value-based purchasing program and a new system for determining payments for clinical diagnostic laboratory tests. The Improving Medicare Post-Acute Care Transformation Act of 2014 (IMPACT; P.L. 113-185 ) required that post-acute care providers—defined in the law as long-term care hospitals (LTCHs), inpatient rehabilitation facilities (IRFs), SNFs, and home health agencies (HHAs)—report standardized patient assessment data and data on quality measures and resource use. IMPACT also modified the annual update to the hospice aggregate payment cap and required that hospices be reviewed every three years to ensure that they are compliant with existing regulations related to patient health and safety and quality of care. In the 114 th Congress, the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015 (MACRA; P.L. 114-10 ) repealed the SGR formula for calculating updates to Medicare payment rates to physicians and other practitioners and established an alternative set of methods for determining the annual updates . MACRA also introduced alternatives to the current fee-for-service (FFS) based physician payments by creating a new merit-based incentive payment system (MIPS) and put in place processes for developing, evaluating, and adopting alternative payment models (APMs). Additionally, MACRA reduced updates to hospital and post-acute care provider payments, extended several expiring provider payment adjustments, made adjustments to income-related premiums in Parts B and D, and prohibited using Social Security numbers on beneficiaries' Medicare cards. Among other changes, the Increasing Choice, Access, and Quality in Health Care for Americans Act (Division C of the 21 st Century Cures Act; P.L. 114-255 ) made adjustments to LTCH reimbursement and modified the average length of stay criteria, which determines whether a hospital qualifies as an LTCH. It also delayed payment reductions and required the Secretary of Health and Human Services (the Secretary) to make changes to how payments are determined for certain durable medical equipment, prosthetics, orthotics, and supplies (DMEPOS). Lastly, it allowed beneficiaries with ESRD to enroll in MA beginning January 1, 2021. In the 115 th Congress, the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA 18; P.L. 115-123 ) made a number of changes to federal health care programs, including Medicare. For example, BBA 18 included provisions designed to expand care for beneficiaries with chronic health conditions, such as promoting team-based care by providers, increasing the use of telehealth services, and expanding certain MA supplemental benefits. In addition, BBA 18 extended for five years a number of existing Medicare provisions that were set to expire (or that had temporarily expired), including the Medicare dependent hospital program and add-on payments for low-volume hospitals, rural home health services, and certain ambulance services. BBA 18 also specified payment updates for the Medicare physician fee schedule, SNFs, and home health services; reduced payments for non-emergency ambulance transports; and required modification of the home health prospective payment system starting in 2020. In addition, the act provided for indefinite authority for MA special needs plans, repealed limits on outpatient therapy services, and eliminated the IPAB. Starting in 2019, the act will require that pharmaceutical manufacturers participating in Medicare Part D provide a larger discount on brand-name drugs purchased by enrollees in the coverage gap and will create a new high-income premium category under Parts B and D. Eligibility and Enrollment Most persons aged 65 or older are automatically entitled to premium-free Part A because they or their spouse paid Medicare payroll taxes for at least 40 quarters (about 10 years) on earnings covered by either the Social Security or the Railroad Retirement systems. Persons under the age of 65 who receive cash disability benefits from Social Security or the Railroad Retirement systems for at least 24 months are also entitled to Part A. (Since there is a five-month waiting period for cash payments, the Medicare waiting period is effectively 29 months.) The 24-month waiting period is waived for persons with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS, "Lou Gehrig's disease"). Individuals of any age with ESRD who receive dialysis on a regular basis or a kidney transplant are generally eligible for Medicare. Medicare coverage for individuals with ESRD usually starts the first day of the fourth month of dialysis treatments. In addition, individuals with one or more specified lung diseases or types of cancer who lived for six months during a certain period prior to diagnosis in an area subject to a public health emergency declaration by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) as of June 17, 2009, are also deemed entitled to benefits under Part A and eligible to enroll in Part B. Persons over the age of 65 who are not entitled to premium-free Part A may obtain coverage by paying a monthly premium ($437 in 2019) or, for persons with at least 30 quarters of covered employment, a reduced monthly premium ($240 in 2019). In addition, disabled persons who lose their cash benefits solely because of higher earnings, and subsequently lose their extended Medicare coverage, may continue their Medicare enrollment by paying a premium, subject to limitations. Generally, enrollment in Medicare Part B is voluntary. All persons entitled to Part A (and persons over the age of 65 who are not entitled to premium-free Part A) may enroll in Part B by paying a monthly premium. In 2019, the monthly premium is $135.50; however, about 3.5% of Part B enrollees pay less, due to a "hold-harmless" provision in the Social Security Act. Since 2007, higher-income Part B enrollees pay higher premiums. (See " Part B Financing .") Although enrollment in Part B is voluntary for most individuals, in most cases, those who enroll in Part A by paying a premium also must enroll in Part B. Additionally, ESRD beneficiaries and Medicare Advantage enrollees (discussed below) also must enroll in Part B. Together, Parts A and B of Medicare comprise "original Medicare," which covers benefits on a fee-for-service basis. Beneficiaries have another option for coverage through private plans, called the Medicare Advantage (MA or Part C) program. When beneficiaries first become eligible for Medicare, they may choose either original Medicare or they may enroll in a private MA plan. Each fall, there is an annual open enrollment period during which time Medicare beneficiaries may choose a different MA plan, or leave or join the MA program. Beneficiaries are to receive information about their options to help them make informed decisions. In 2019, the annual open enrollment period runs from October 15 to December 7 for plan choices starting the following January. Since 2012, MA plans with a 5-star quality rating have been allowed to enroll Medicare beneficiaries who are either in traditional Medicare or in an MA plan with a lower quality rating at any time. Finally, each individual enrolled in either Part A or Part B is also entitled to obtain qualified prescription drug coverage through enrollment in a Part D prescription drug plan. Similar to Part B, enrollment in Part D is voluntary and the beneficiary pays a monthly premium. Since 2011, some higher-income enrollees pay higher premiums, similar to enrollees in Part B. Generally, beneficiaries enrolled in an MA plan providing qualified prescription drug coverage (MA-PD plan) must obtain their prescription drug coverage through that plan. In general, individuals who do not enroll in Part B or Part D during an initial enrollment period (when they first become eligible for Medicare) must pay a permanent penalty of increased monthly premiums if they choose to enroll at a later date. Individuals who do not enroll in Part B during their initial enrollment period may enroll only during the annual general enrollment period, which occurs from January 1 to March 31 each year. Coverage begins the following July 1. However, the law waives the Part B late enrollment penalty for current workers who have primary coverage through their own or a spouse's employer-sponsored plan. These individuals have a special enrollment period once their employment ends; as long as they enroll in Part B during this time, they will not be subject to penalty. Individuals who do not enroll in Part D during their initial enrollment period may enroll during the annual open enrollment period, which corresponds with the Part C annual enrollment period—from October 15 to December 7, with coverage effective the following January. Individuals are not subject to the Part D penalty if they have maintained "creditable" drug coverage through another source, such as retiree health coverage offered by a former employer or union. However, once employees retire or have no access to "creditable" Part D coverage, a penalty will apply unless they sign up for coverage during a special enrollment period. Finally, for persons who qualify for the low-income subsidy for Part D, the delayed-enrollment penalty does not apply. Benefits and Payments Medicare Parts A, B, and D each cover different services, with Part C providing a private plan alternative for all Medicare services covered under Parts A and B, except hospice. The Parts A-D covered services are described below, along with a description of Medicare's payments. Part A Part A provides coverage for inpatient hospital services, posthospital skilled nursing facility (SNF) services, hospice care, and some home health services, subject to certain conditions and limitations. Approximately 20% of fee-for-service enrollees use Part A services during a year. Inpatient Hospital Services Medicare inpatient hospital services include (1) bed and board; (2) nursing services; (3) use of hospital facilities; (4) drugs, biologics, supplies, appliances, and equipment; and (5) diagnostic and therapeutic items and services. (Physicians' services provided during an inpatient stay are paid under the physician fee schedule and discussed below in the " Physicians and Nonphysician Practitioner Services " section.) Coverage for inpatient services is linked to an individual's benefit period or "spell of illness" (defined as beginning on the day a patient enters a hospital and ending when he or she has not been in a hospital or skilled nursing facility for 60 days). An individual admitted to a hospital more than 60 days after the last discharge from a hospital or SNF begins a new benefit period. Coverage in each benefit period is subject to the following conditions: Days 1-60. Beneficiary pays a deductible ($1,364 in 2019). Days 61-90. Beneficiary pays a daily co-payment charge ($341 in 2019). Days 91-150. After 90 days, the beneficiary may draw on one or more of 60 lifetime reserve days, provided they have not been previously used. (Each of the 60 lifetime reserve days can be used only once during an individual's lifetime.) For lifetime reserve days, the beneficiary pays a daily co-payment charge ($682 in 2019); otherwise the beneficiary pays all costs. Days 151 and over. Beneficiary pays for all costs for these days. Inpatient mental health care in a psychiatric facility is limited to 190 days during a patient's lifetime. Cost sharing is structured similarly to that for stays in a general hospital (above). Medicare makes payments to most acute care hospitals under the inpatient prospective payment system (IPPS), using a prospectively determined amount for each discharge. Medicare's payments to hospitals is the product of two components: (1) a discharge payment amount adjusted by a wage index for the area where the hospital is located or where it has been reclassified, and (2) the weight associated with the Medicare severity-diagnosis related group (MS-DRG) to which the patient is assigned. This weight reflects the relative costliness of the average patient in that MS-DRG, which is revised annually, generally effective October 1 st of each year. Additional payments are made to hospitals for cases with extraordinary costs (outliers), for indirect costs incurred by teaching hospitals for graduate medical education, and to disproportionate share hospitals (DSH) which provide a certain volume of care to low-income patients. Additional payments may also be made for qualified new technologies that have been approved for special add-on payments. Medicare also makes payments outside the IPPS system for direct costs associated with graduate medical education (GME) for hospital residents, subject to certain limits. In addition, Medicare pays hospitals for 65% of the allowable costs associated with beneficiaries' unpaid deductible and co-payment amounts as well as for the costs for certain other services. IPPS payments may be reduced by certain quality-related programs based on a hospital's quality performance. These quality-related programs include the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program, the Hospital-Acquired Condition Reduction Program, and the Hospital Value-Based Purchasing Program. Further, hospitals may receive Medicare payment reductions for failing to demonstrate meaningful use of certified electronic health record (EHR) technology. Additional payment adjustments or special treatment under the IPPS may apply for hospitals meeting one of the following designations: (1) sole community hospitals (SCHs), (2) Medicare dependent hospitals, (3) rural referral centers, and (4) low-volume hospitals. Certain hospitals or distinct hospital units are exempt from IPPS and paid on an alternative basis, including (1) inpatient rehabilitation facilities, (2) long-term care hospitals, (3) psychiatric facilities including hospitals and distinct part units, (4) children's hospitals, (5) cancer hospitals, and (6) critical access hospitals. Skilled Nursing Facility Services Medicare covers up to 100 days of posthospital care for persons needing skilled nursing or rehabilitation services on a daily basis. The SNF stay must be preceded by an inpatient hospital stay of at least 3 consecutive calendar days, and the transfer to the SNF typically must occur within 30 days of the hospital discharge. Medicare requires SNFs to provide services for a condition the beneficiary was receiving treatment for during his or her qualifying hospital stay (or for an additional condition that arose while in the SNF). There is no beneficiary cost sharing for the first 20 days of a Medicare-covered SNF stay. For days 21 to 100, beneficiaries are subject to daily co-payment charges ($170.50 in 2019). The 100-day limit begins again with a new spell of illness. SNF services are paid under a prospective payment system (PPS), which is based on a per diem urban or rural base payment rate, adjusted for case mix (average severity of illness) and area wages. The per diem rate generally covers all services, including room and board, provided to the patient that day. The case-mix adjustment is made using the resource utilization groups (RUGs) classification system, which uses patient assessments to assign a beneficiary to one of 66 groups that reflect the beneficiary's expected use of services. Patient assessments are done at various times during a patient's stay and a beneficiary's designated RUG category can change with changes in the beneficiary's condition. Extra payments are not made for extraordinarily costly cases ("outliers"). Hospice Care The Medicare hospice benefit covers services designed to provide palliative care and management of a terminal illness; the benefit includes drugs and medical and support services. These services are provided to Medicare beneficiaries with a life expectancy of six months or less for two 90-day periods, followed by an unlimited number of 60-day periods. The individual's attending physician and the hospice physician must certify the need for the first benefit period, but only the hospice physician needs to recertify for subsequent periods. Since January 1, 2011, a hospice physician or nurse practitioner must have a face-to-face encounter with the individual to determine continued eligibility prior to the 180 th day recertification, and for each subsequent recertification. Hospice care is provided in lieu of most other Medicare services related to the curative treatment of the terminal illness. Beneficiaries electing hospice care from a hospice program may receive curative services for illnesses or injuries unrelated to their terminal illness, and they may disenroll from the hospice at any time. Nominal cost sharing is required for drugs and respite care. Payment for hospice care is based on one of four prospectively determined rates (which correspond to four different levels of care) for each day a beneficiary is under the care of the hospice. The four rate categories are routine home care, continuous home care, inpatient respite care, and general inpatient care. Payment rates are adjusted to reflect differences in area wage levels, using the hospital wage index. Payments to a hospice are limited by two caps; the first limits the number of days of inpatient care to 20% or less of total patient care days, and the second limits the average annual payment per beneficiary. Parts A and B Home health services and services for individuals with end-stage renal disease are covered under both Parts A and B of Medicare. Home Health Services Medicare covers visits by participating home health agencies for beneficiaries who (1) are confined to home and (2) need either skilled nursing care on an intermittent basis or physical or speech language therapy. After establishing such eligibility, the continuing need for occupational therapy services may extend the eligibility period. Covered services include part-time or intermittent nursing care, physical or occupational therapy or speech language pathology services, medical social services, home health aide services, and medical supplies and durable medical equipment. The services must be provided under a plan of care established by a physician, and the plan must be reviewed by the physician at least every 60 days. There is no beneficiary cost sharing for home health services (though some other Part B services provided in connection with the visit, such as durable medical equipment, may be subject to cost-sharing charges). Home health services are covered under both Medicare Parts A and B. There are special eligibility requirements and benefit limits for home health services furnished under Part A to beneficiaries who are enrolled in both Parts A and B. For such a beneficiary, Part A pays for only postinstitutional home health services furnished for up to 100 visits during a spell of illness, while Part B covers any medically necessary home health services that exceed the 100-visit limit, as well as medically necessary home health services that do not qualify as "postinstitutional." For beneficiaries enrolled in only Part A or only Part B, the requirements described above do not apply. Part A or Part B, as applicable, covers all medically necessary episodes of home health care, without a visit limit, regardless of whether the episode follows a hospitalization. Regardless of whether the beneficiary is enrolled in Part A only, in Part B only, or in both parts, the scope of the Medicare home health benefit is the same, Medicare's payments to HHAs are calculated using the same methods, and beneficiaries have no cost-sharing. Home health services are paid under a home health PPS, based on 60-day episodes of care; a patient may have an unlimited number of episodes. The physician's certification of an initial 60-day episode of home health must be supported by a face-to-face encounter with the patient related to the primary reason that the patient needs home health services. Under the PPS, for episodes with five or greater visits, a nationwide base payment amount is adjusted by differences in wages (using the hospital wage index). This amount is then adjusted for case mix using the applicable Home Health Resource Group (HHRG) to which the beneficiary has been assigned. The HHRG applicable to a beneficiary is determined following an assessment of the patient's condition and care needs using the Outcome and Assessment Information Set (OASIS); there are 153 HHRGs. For episodes with four or fewer visits, the PPS reimburses the provider for each visit performed. Further payment adjustments may be made for services provided in rural areas, outlier visits (for extremely costly patients), a partial episode for beneficiaries that have an intervening event during their episode, or an agency's failure to submit quality data to CMS. Since January 1, 2016, home health agencies in nine states are being reimbursed under a home health value-based purchasing (HHVBP) model. These home health agencies can receive increased or decreased home health reimbursements depending on their performance across certain quality measures. End-Stage Renal Disease Individuals with end-stage renal disease (ESRD) are eligible for all services covered under Parts A and B. Kidney transplantation services, to the extent they are inpatient hospital services, are subject to the inpatient hospital PPS and are reimbursed by both Parts A and B. However, kidney acquisition costs are paid on a reasonable cost basis under Part A. Dialysis treatments, when an individual is admitted to a hospital, are covered under Part A. Part B covers their dialysis services, drugs, biologicals (including erythropoiesis stimulating agents used in treating anemia as a result of ESRD), diagnostic laboratory tests, and other items and services furnished to individuals for the treatment of ESRD. In effect since January 1, 2011, the ESRD prospective payment system (PPS) makes no payment distinction as to the site where renal dialysis services are provided. With the implementation of the ESRD PPS, Medicare dialysis payments provide a single "bundled" payment for Medicare renal dialysis services that includes (1) items and services included in the former payment system's base rate as of December 31, 2010; (2) erythropoiesis stimulating agents (ESAs) for the treatment of ESRD; (3) other drugs and biologicals for which payment was made separately (before bundling); and (4) diagnostic laboratory tests and other items and services furnished to individuals for the treatment of ESRD. The system is case-mix adjusted based on factors such as patient weight, body mass index, comorbidities, length of time on dialysis, age, race, ethnicity, and other appropriate factors as determined by the Secretary. Under the ESRD Quality Incentive Program, dialysis facilities that fail to meet certain performance standards receive reduced payments. Part B Medicare Part B covers physicians' services, outpatient hospital services, durable medical equipment, and other medical services. Initially, over 98% of the eligible population voluntarily enrolled in Part B, but in recent years the percentage has fallen to about 91%. About 89% of enrollees in original (FFS) Medicare use Part B services during a year. The program generally pays 80% of the approved amount (most commonly, a fee schedule or other predetermined amount) for covered services in excess of the annual deductible ($185 in 2019). The beneficiary is liable for the remaining 20%. Most providers and practitioners are subject to limits on amounts they can bill beneficiaries for covered services. For example, physicians and some other practitioners may choose whether or not to accept "assignment" on a claim. When a physician signs a binding agreement to accept assignment for all Medicare patients, the physician accepts the Medicare payment amount as payment in full and can bill the beneficiary only the 20% coinsurance plus any unmet deductible. The physician agrees to accept assignment on all Medicare claims in a given year and is referred to as a "participating physician." There are several advantages to being a participating provider, including higher payment under the Medicare fee schedule, a lower beneficiary co-payment, and automatic forwarding of Medigap claims. Physicians who do not agree to accept assignment on all Medicare claims in a given year are referred to as nonparticipating physicians. Nonparticipating physicians may or may not accept assignment for a given service. If they do not, they may charge beneficiaries more than the fee schedule amount on nonassigned claims; however, these "balance billing" charges are subject to certain limits. Alternatively, physicians may choose not to accept any Medicare payment and enter into private contracts with their patients where no Medicare restrictions on payment or balance billing apply; however, this requires that physicians "opt out" of Medicare for two years. For some providers, such as nurse practitioners and physician assistants, assignment is mandatory; these providers can only bill the beneficiary the 20% coinsurance and any unmet deductible. For other Part B services, such as durable medical equipment, assignment is optional; for these services, applicable providers may bill beneficiaries for amounts above Medicare's recognized payment level and may do so without limit. Physicians and Nonphysician Practitioner Services Medicare Part B covers medically necessary physician services and medical services provided by some nonphysician practitioners. Covered nonphysician practitioner services include, but are not limited to, those provided by physician assistants, nurse practitioners, certified registered nurse anesthetists, and clinical social workers. Certain limitations apply for services provided by chiropractors and podiatrists. Beneficiary cost sharing is typically 20% of the approved amount, although most preventive services require no coinsurance from the beneficiary. A number of Part B services are paid under the Medicare physician fee schedule (MPFS), including services of physicians, nonphysician practitioners, and therapists. There are over 7,000 service codes under the MPFS. The fee schedule assigns relative values to each service code. These relative values reflect physician work (based on time, skill, and intensity involved), practice expenses (e.g., overhead and nonphysician labor), and malpractice expenses. The relative values are adjusted for geographic variations in the costs of practicing medicine. These geographically adjusted relative values are converted into a dollar payment amount by a national conversion factor. Annual updates to payments are determined through changes in the conversion factor. MACRA made several fundamental changes to how Medicare pays for physician and practitioner services by (1) changing the methodology for determining the annual updates to the conversion factor, (2) establishing a merit-based incentive payment system (MIPS) to consolidate and replace several existing incentive programs and to apply value and quality adjustments to the MPFS, and (3) establishing the development of, and participation in, alternative payment models (APMs). Prior to MACRA, the SGR system, which had been in place since BBA 97, tied annual updates to the Medicare fee schedule to cumulative Part B expenditure targets. MACRA repealed the SGR methodology, established annual fee schedule updates in the short term, and put in place a new method for determining updates thereafter. As a result of the MACRA changes, the update to physician payments under the MPFS was 0% from January 2015 through June 2015; for the remainder of that year—July 2015 through December 2015—the payments were increased by 0.5%. In each of the next four years, 2016 through 2019, the payments were to increase by 0.5% each year; however, the BBA 18 reduced the 2019 update to 0.25%. For the next six years, from 2020 through 2025, the payment update will be 0%. In addition to changes to the annual update, MACRA established two pathways for payment reform, collectively referred to as the Quality Payment Program (QPP). Medicare payment to all physicians and other practitioners will be determined by which conditions of the QPP, either MIPS or APM, the participant satisfies. The MIPS is a new program that remains based on FFS rates but combines four categories of performance measures (quality of care, cost/resource use, clinical practice improvement activities, and promoting interoperability) into a single adjustment to the base MPFS payment. Following several years of data collection and feedback on measures, the MIPS adjustments will affect actual payments for the first time in 2019. In contrast, qualified advanced APMs are intended to be alternatives to FFS, incorporating new approaches to paying for medical care that reward quality and efficiency while de-emphasizing the number of services billed (volume of care). Proposed advanced APMs are evaluated by an ad hoc committee (the Physician-Focused Payment Models Technical Advisory Committee), which provides comments and recommendations to the Secretary as to whether new payment models meet the criteria of APMs. For 2019, there are 13 advanced APMs under the QPP, though not all are available to all physicians and practitioners, as some are restricted to certain special services (e.g., oncology care, joint replacement) or geographic locations (e.g., Vermont's Medicare ACO Initiative, Maryland's Total Cost of Care Model). MACRA established incentives to make APMs more attractive than MIPS. First, qualifying participants in advanced APMs are eligible for an annual prepaid bonus (paid 2019-2024). Second, beginning in 2026, there will be two update factors, one for items and services furnished by a participant in an advanced APM and another for those electing to remain in the modified FFS payment system (MIPS) that do not participate in an advanced APM. The update factor for the advanced APM participants will be 0.75%, and the update factor for MIPS will be 0.25%, causing a difference between the payment levels that will grow over time. Therapy Services Medicare covers medically necessary outpatient physical and occupational therapy and speech-language pathology services. Beginning in 1997 and for many years subsequently but intermittently, beneficiaries faced limits ( therapy caps ) on how much Medicare would pay for outpatient therapy services in a calendar year. BBA 18 permanently repealed the outpatient therapy caps beginning January 1, 2018, and established a requirement that therapy services exceeding $3,000 would trigger a manual medical review (MMR) of the medical necessity of these services, in years 2018-2028. Beginning with 2029, the annual MMR threshold limit is to be increased by the percentage increase in the MEI, and it is to be applied separately for (1) physical therapy services and speech-language pathology services combined and (2) occupational therapy services. Preventive Services55 Medicare statute prohibits payments for covered items and services that are "not reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of illness or injury or to improve the functioning of a malformed body member," which would effectively exclude the coverage of preventive and screening services. However, Congress has explicitly added and expanded Medicare coverage for a number of such services through legislation, including through MMA, MIPPA, and ACA. Under current law, if a preventive service is recommended for use by the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force (USPSTF, an independent evidence-review panel) and Medicare covers the service, all cost sharing must be waived. Also, the Secretary may add coverage of a USPSTF-recommended service that is not already covered. Coverage for preventive and screening services currently includes, among other services, (1) a "welcome to Medicare" physical exam during the first year of enrollment in Part B and an annual visit and prevention plan thereafter; (2) flu vaccine (annual), pneumococcal vaccine, and hepatitis B vaccine (for persons at high risk); (3) screening tests for breast, cervical, prostate, and colorectal cancers; (4) screening for other conditions such as depression, alcohol misuse, heart disease, glaucoma, and osteoporosis; and (5) intensive behavioral therapy for heart disease and for obesity. Payments for these services are provided under the physician fee schedule and/or the clinical laboratory fee schedule. Clinical Laboratory and Other Diagnostic Tests Part B covers outpatient clinical laboratory tests, such as certain blood tests, urinalysis, and some screening tests, provided by Medicare-participating laboratories. These services may be furnished by labs located in hospitals and physician offices, as well as by independent labs. Beneficiaries have no co-payments or deductibles for covered clinical lab services. From 1984 until recently, payments for outpatient clinical laboratory services were made on the basis of the Medicare clinical laboratory fee schedule (CLFS), which set payment amounts as the lesser of the amount billed, the local fee for a geographic area, or a national limit amount. Most clinical lab services were paid at the national limit amount. The national limits were set at a percentage (74%) of the median of all local fee schedule amounts for each laboratory test code; therefore, fee schedule amounts may differ by region. In general, annual increases in clinical lab fees have been based on the percentage change in the CPI-U. However, since 1987, Congress has specified lower updates. Beginning in 2014, with certain exceptions, laboratory tests provided in hospital outpatient departments are no longer paid separately under the CLFS and are instead included in the OPPS payments. PAMA introduced a new method for determining clinical laboratory payments and required CMS to base Medicare CLFS reimbursement on reported private insurance payment amounts. Medicare has been using weighted median private insurer rates to calculate Medicare payment rates for laboratory tests paid under the CLFS since January 1, 2018. These payment rates are national and do not vary by geographic area. Part B also covers diagnostic nonlaboratory x-ray tests and other diagnostic tests, as well as x-ray, radium, and radioisotope therapy. Generally, these services are paid for under the physician fee schedule, with beneficiaries responsible for a 20% coinsurance payment. Durable Medical Equipment, Prosthetics, Orthotics, and Supplies Medicare covers a wide variety of equipment and devices under the heading of durable medical equipment (DME), prosthetics, and orthotics (PO) if they are medically necessary and are prescribed by a physician. DME is defined as equipment that (1) can withstand repeated use, (2) has an expected life of at least three years (effective for items classified as DME after January 1, 2012), (3) is used primarily to serve a medical purpose, (4) is not generally useful in the absence of an illness or injury, and (5) is appropriate for use in the home. DME includes such items as hospital beds, wheelchairs, blood glucose monitors, and oxygen and oxygen equipment. It also includes related supplies (S), such as drugs and biologics that are necessary for the effective use of the product. Prosthetics (P) are items that replace all or part of a body organ or its function, such as colostomy bags, pacemakers, and artificial eyes, arms, or legs. Orthotics (O) are braces that support a weak or deformed body member, such as leg or back braces. Except in competitive bidding areas (CBAs, described below), Medicare pays for most durable medical equipment, prosthetics, orthotics, and supplies (DMEPOS) based on fee schedules. Medicare pays 80% of the lower of the supplier's charge for the item or the fee schedule amount. The beneficiary is responsible for the remaining 20%. In general, fee schedule amounts are updated each year by a (1) measure of price inflation, and (2) a measure of economy-wide productivity, which may result in lower fee schedule amounts from one year to the next. Since 2016, the fee schedule rates that applied outside of competitive bidding areas for certain DMEPOS have been reduced based on price information from the competitive bidding program. The reductions were phased in during 2016, and fully phased in starting in January 2017. In response to concerns that the adjusted rates were too low, the Secretary again applied the phase-in rate for rural and noncontiguous areas not subject to competitive bidding starting in June 2018. Currently, two different fee schedules apply outside of CBAs. First, in rural or noncontiguous areas, the fee schedule is a 50/50 blend of the fee schedule with and without the reductions based on information from competitive bidding (i.e., the phase-in methodology). Second, in nonrural and contiguous areas, the fee schedule amounts are fully adjusted by information from the competitive bidding program. Numerous studies and investigations indicated that Medicare paid more for certain items of DME and PO than some other health insurers and some retail outlets. Such overpayments were attributed, in part, to the fee schedule mechanism of payment. MMA required the Secretary to establish a Competitive Acquisition Program for certain DMEPOS in specified areas. Instead of paying for medical equipment based on a fee schedule established by law, payment for items in competitive bidding areas was based on the supplier bids. The program started in 9 metropolitan areas in January 2011 and had expanded to 130 competitive bidding areas in 2018. However, the program has been suspended while a new bidding methodology is established. During the gap, the payments for previously competitively bid items in competitive bidding areas will be the amounts that applied on December 31, 2018, increased, yearly, by a measure of inflation. Part B Drugs and Biologics Certain specified outpatient prescription drugs and biologics are covered under Medicare Part B. (However, most outpatient prescription drugs are covered under Part D, discussed below.) Covered Part B drugs and biologics include drugs furnished incident to physician services, immunosuppressive drugs following a Medicare-covered organ transplant, erythropoietin for treatment of anemia for individuals with ESRD when not part of the ESRD composite rate, oral anticancer drugs (provided they have the same active ingredients and are used for the same indications as chemotherapy drugs that would be covered if furnished incident to physician services), certain vaccines under selected conditions, and drugs administered through DME. Generally, Medicare reimburses physicians and other providers, such as hospital outpatient clinics, for covered Part B drugs and biologics at 106% of the volume weighted average sales price of all drugs billed under the same billing code, although some Part B drugs, such as those administered through DME, are reimbursed at 95% of the drug's average wholesale price. Health care providers also are paid separately for administering Medicare Part B drugs. Medicare pays 80% of the amount paid to providers, and beneficiaries are responsible for the remaining 20%. Hospital Outpatient Department Services A hospital outpatient is a person who has not been admitted by the hospital as an inpatient but is registered on the hospital records as an outpatient. Generally, payments under the hospital outpatient prospective payment system (OPPS) cover the operating and capital-related costs that are directly related and integral to performing a procedure or furnishing a service on an outpatient basis. These payments cover services such as the use of an operating suite, treatment, procedure, or recovery room; use of an observation bed as well as anesthesia; certain drugs or pharmaceuticals; incidental services; and other necessary or implantable supplies or services. Payments for services such as those provided by physicians and other professionals as well as therapy and clinical diagnostic laboratory services, among others, are separate. Under the OPPS, the unit of payment for acute care hospitals is the individual service or procedure as assigned to an ambulatory payment classification (APC). To the extent possible, integral services and items (excluding physician services paid under the physician fee schedule) are bundled within each APC. Specified new technologies are assigned to "new technology APCs" until clinical and cost data are available to permit assignment into a "clinical APC." Medicare's hospital outpatient payment is calculated by multiplying the relative weight associated with an APC by a conversion factor. For most APCs, 60% of the conversion factor is geographically adjusted by the wage index used for the inpatient prospective payment system. Except for new technology APCs, each APC has a relative weight that is based on the median cost of services in that APC. The OPPS also includes pass-through payments for new technologies (specific drugs, biologicals, and devices) and payments for outliers. The Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) has recommended site-neutral payment policies that base payments on the resources needed to provide high-quality care in the most efficient setting. The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 (BBA 15; P.L. 114-74 ) gave CMS the authority to add new restrictions on Medicare payments for services furnished in provider-based off-campus hospital outpatient departments (HOPDs) to address discrepancies between payments under the MPFS and the OPPS for similar services. In its 2019 OPPS Final Rule, CMS explicitly applies the site-neutral policy to clinic visits, the most commonly billed service in hospital outpatient departments. Ambulatory Surgical Center Services An ambulatory surgical center (ASC) is a distinct entity that furnishes outpatient surgical procedures to patients who do not require an overnight stay after the procedure. According to MedPAC, most ASCs are freestanding facilities rather than part of a larger facility, such as a hospital. Medicare covers surgical and medical services performed in an ambulatory surgical center that are (1) commonly performed on an inpatient basis but may be safely performed in an ASC; (2) not of a type that are commonly performed or that may be safely performed in physicians' offices; (3) limited to procedures requiring a dedicated operating room or suite and generally requiring a postoperative recovery room or short-term (not overnight) convalescent room; and (4) not otherwise excluded from Medicare coverage. Medicare pays for surgery-related facility services provided in ASCs using a prospective payment system based on the OPPS. (Associated physician fees are paid for separately under the physician fee schedule.) Each of the approximately 3,500 procedures approved for payment in an ASC is classified into an APC group on the basis of clinical and cost similarity. The ASC system primarily uses the same payment groups as the OPPS; however, ASC payment rates are generally lower. The ASC weights are scaled (reduced) to account for the different mix of services in an ASC, and the ASC conversion factor (the base payment amount) is lower. A different payment method is used to set ASC payment for office-based procedures, separately payable radiology services, separately payable drugs, and device-intensive procedures. In addition, separate payments are made for certain ancillary items and services when they are integral to surgical procedures, including corneal tissue acquisition, brachytherapy sources, certain radiology services, many drugs, and certain implantable devices. The application of the site-neutral payment policy to clinic visits also affects such payments to ASCs (see discussion above). Ambulance Medicare Part B covers emergency and nonemergency ambulance services to or from a hospital, a critical access hospital, a skilled nursing facility, or a dialysis facility for End-Stage Renal Disease (ESRD) beneficiaries who require dialysis when other modes of transportation could endanger the Medicare beneficiary's health. In most cases, the program covers 80% of the allowed amount for the service, and the beneficiary is responsible for the remaining 20%. Generally, ambulance services are covered if (1) transportation of the beneficiary occurs; (2) the beneficiary is taken to an appropriate location (generally, the closest appropriate facility); (3) the ambulance service is medically necessary (other forms of transportation are contraindicated); (4) the ambulance provider or supplier meets state licensing requirements; and (5) the transportation is not part of a Medicare Part A covered stay. Medicare covers both scheduled and nonscheduled nonemergency transports if the beneficiary is bed-confined or meets other medical necessity criteria. Medicare may also cover emergency ambulance transportation by airplane or helicopter if the beneficiary's location is not easily reached by ground transportation or if long distance or obstacles, such as heavy traffic, would prevent the individual from obtaining needed care. Medicare pays for ambulance services according to a national fee schedule. The fee schedule establishes seven categories of ground ambulance services and two categories of air ambulance services. Medicare pays for different levels of ambulance services, which reflect the staff training and equipment required to meet the patient's medical condition or health needs. Generally, basic life support is provided by emergency medical technicians (EMTs). Advanced life support is provided by EMTs with advanced training or by paramedics. Some rural ground and air ambulance services may qualify for increased payments. Also, ambulance providers that are CAHs, or that are entities that are owned and operated by a CAH, are paid on a reasonable-cost basis rather than the fee schedule if they are the only ambulance provider within a 35-mile radius. Rural Health Clinics and Federally Qualified Health Centers Medicare covers Part B services in rural health clinics (RHCs) and federally qualified health centers (FQHCs) provided by (1) physicians and specified nonphysician practitioners; (2) visiting nurses for homebound patients in home health shortage areas; (3) registered dieticians or nutritional professionals for diabetes training and medical nutrition therapy; and (4) others, as well as certain drugs administered by a physician or nonphysician practitioner. RHCs are paid based on an "all-inclusive" cost-based rate per beneficiary visit subject to a per visit upper limit, adjusted annually for inflation. For cost-reporting periods that began on or after October 1, 2014, FQHCs are paid a base payment rate per visit (with a limit, in most cases, of one billable visit per day) under a PPS methodology. Each FQHC's PPS rate is adjusted based on the location where the service is furnished using geographic adjustment factors, which are the geographic practice cost indices (GPCI) used in Medicare's physician fee schedule (MPFS). This rate is increased by 34% for new patients (those not seen in the FQHC organization within the past three years). The 34% increase also applies when a beneficiary receives a comprehensive initial Medicare visit (an initial preventive physician examination or an initial annual wellness visit) or a subsequent annual wellness visit. Effective January 1, 2017, the FQHC PPS base rate is updated annually using an FQHC-specific market basket. Medicare's payment to the FQHC is equal to 80% of the lesser of the adjusted PPS rate or the FQHC's actual charges associated with the visit, and the beneficiary is responsible for a 20% coinsurance. Part C, Medicare Advantage Medicare Advantage (MA) is an alternative way for Medicare beneficiaries to receive covered benefits. Under MA, private health plans are paid a per-person amount to provide all Medicare covered benefits (except hospice) to beneficiaries who enroll in their plan. Medicare beneficiaries who are eligible for Part A, enrolled in Part B, and do not have ESRD are eligible to enroll in an MA plan if one is available in their area. Some MA plans may choose their service area (local MA plans), while others agree to serve one or more regions defined by the Secretary (regional MA plans). In 2019, nearly all Medicare beneficiaries have access to an MA plan and approximately a third of beneficiaries are enrolled in one. Private plans may use different techniques to influence the medical care used by enrollees. Some plans, such as health maintenance organizations (HMOs), may require enrollees to receive care from a restricted network of medical providers; enrollees may be required to see a primary care physician who will coordinate their care and refer them to specialists as necessary. Other types of private plans, such as private fee-for-service (PFFS) plans, may look more like original Medicare, with fewer restrictions on the providers an enrollee can see and minimal coordination of care. In general, MA plans offer additional benefits or require smaller co-payments or deductibles than original Medicare. Sometimes beneficiaries pay for these additional benefits through a higher monthly premium, but sometimes they are financed through plan savings. The extent of extra benefits and reduced cost sharing varies by plan type and geography. However, MA plans are seen by some beneficiaries as an attractive alternative to more expensive supplemental insurance policies found in the private market. By contract with CMS, a plan agrees to provide all required services covered in return for a capitated monthly payment adjusted for the demographics and health history of their enrollees. The same monthly payment is made regardless of how many or few services a beneficiary actually uses. In general, the plan is at-risk if costs, in the aggregate, exceed program payments; conversely, the plan can retain savings if aggregate costs are less than payments. Payments to MA plans are based on a comparison of each plan's estimated cost of providing Medicare covered services (a bid) relative to the maximum amount the federal government will pay for providing those services in the plan's service area (a benchmark). If a plan's bid is less than the benchmark, its payment equals its bid plus a rebate. The size of the rebate is dependent on plan quality and ranges from 50% to 70% of the difference between the bid and the benchmark. The rebate must be returned to enrollees in the form of additional benefits, reduced cost sharing, reduced Part B or Part D premiums, or some combination of these options. If a plan's bid is equal to or above the benchmark, its payment will be the benchmark amount and each enrollee in that plan will pay an additional premium, equal to the amount by which the bid exceeds the benchmark. The MA benchmarks are determined through statutorily specified formulas that have changed over time. Since BBA 97, formulas have increased the benchmark amounts, in part, to encourage plan participation in all areas of the country. As a result, however, the benchmark amounts (and plan payments) in some areas have been higher than the average cost of original FFS Medicare. The ACA changed the way benchmarks are calculated by tying them closer to (or below) spending in FFS Medicare, and adjusting them based on plan quality. In a recent analysis, MedPAC found that "over the past few years, plan bids and payments have come down in relation to FFS spending while MA enrollment continues to grow. The pressure of lower benchmarks has led to improved efficiencies and more competitive bids that enable MA plans to continue to increase enrollment by offering benefits that beneficiaries find attractive." In 2006, the MA program began to offer MA regional plans. Regional MA plans must agree to serve one or more regions designated by the Secretary. There are 26 MA regions consisting of states or groups of states. Regional plan benchmarks include two components: (1) a statutorily determined amount (comparable to benchmarks described above) and (2) a weighted average of plan bids. Thus, a portion of the benchmark is competitively determined. Similar to local plans, plans with bids below the benchmark are given a rebate, while plans with bids above the benchmark require an additional enrollee premium. In general, MA eligible individuals may enroll in any MA plan that serves their area. However, some MA plans may restrict their enrollment to beneficiaries who meet additional criteria. For example, employer-sponsored MA plans are generally only available to the retirees of the company sponsoring the plan. In addition, Medicare Special Needs Plans (SNPs) are a type of coordinated care MA plan that exclusively enrolls, or enrolls a disproportionate percentage of, special needs individuals. Special needs individuals are any MA eligible individuals who are either institutionalized as defined by the Secretary, eligible for both Medicare and Medicaid, or have a severe or disabling chronic condition and would benefit from enrollment in a specialized MA plan. Part D Medicare Part D provides coverage of outpatient prescription drugs to Medicare beneficiaries who choose to enroll in this optional benefit. (As previously discussed, Part B provides limited coverage of some outpatient prescription drugs.) In 2019, about 47 million (about 77%) of eligible Medicare beneficiaries are estimated to be enrolled in a Part D plan. Prescription drug coverage is provided through private prescription drug plans (PDPs), which offer only prescription drug coverage, or through Medicare Advantage prescription drug plans (MA-PDs), which offer prescription drug coverage that is integrated with the health care coverage they provide to Medicare beneficiaries under Part C. Plans must meet certain minimum requirements; however, there are significant variations among them in benefit design, including differences in premiums, drugs included on plan formularies, and cost sharing for particular drugs. Part D prescription drug plans are required to offer either "standard coverage" or alternative coverage that has actuarially equivalent benefits. In 2019, "standard coverage" has a $415 deductible and a 25% coinsurance for costs between $415 and $3,820. From this point, there is reduced coverage until the beneficiary has out-of-pocket costs of $5,100 (an estimated $8,139.54 in total spending); this coverage gap has been labeled the "doughnut hole." Once the beneficiary reaches the catastrophic limit, the program pays all costs except for the greater of 5% coinsurance or $3.40 for a generic drug and $8.50 for a brand-name drug. As required by the ACA, in 2010, Medicare sent a tax-free, one-time $250 rebate check to each Part D enrollee who reached the doughnut hole. Additionally, starting in 2011, the coverage gap is being gradually reduced each year. Under the ACA, the coverage gap for both brand-name and generic drugs was to be eliminated in 2020, but Congress moved up the date to 2019 for brand-name drugs as part of BBA 18. In 2019, a 70% discount is provided by drug manufacturers and Medicare pays an additional 5% of the cost of brand-name drugs dispensed during the coverage gap. In 2019, Medicare also pays 63% of the cost of generic drugs dispensed during the coverage gap and enrollees pay 37%. (See Figure 2 .) By 2020, through a combination of manufacturer discounts and increased Medicare coverage, Part D enrollees will be responsible for 25% of the costs for brand-name and generic drugs in the coverage gap (the same as during the initial coverage period). Most plans offer actuarially equivalent benefits rather than the standard package, including alternatives such as reducing or eliminating the deductible, or using tiered cost sharing with lower cost sharing for generic drugs. Medicare's payments to plans are determined through a competitive bidding process, and enrollee premiums are tied to plan bids. Plans are paid a risk-adjusted monthly per capita amount based on their bids during a given plan year. Part D plan sponsors determine payments for drugs and are expected to negotiate prices. The federal government is prohibited from interfering in the price negotiations between drug manufacturers, pharmacies, and plans (the so-called "non-interference clause"). Part D also provides enhanced coverage for low-income enrolled individuals, such as persons who previously received drug benefits under Medicaid (known as "dual eligibles"—enrollees in both Medicare and Medicaid). Additionally, certain persons who do not qualify for Medicaid, but whose incomes are below 150% of poverty, may also receive assistance for some portion of their premium and cost-sharing charges. The MMA included significant incentives for employers to continue to offer coverage to their retirees by providing a 28% federal subsidy. In 2019, the maximum potential subsidy per covered retiree is $2,264 for employers or unions offering drug coverage that is at least actuarially equivalent (called "creditable" coverage) to standard coverage. Employers or unions may select an alternative option (instead of taking the subsidy) with respect to Part D, such as electing to pay a portion of the Part D premiums. They may also elect to provide enhanced coverage, though this has some financial consequences for the employer or union. Alternatively, employers or unions may contract with a PDP or MA-PD to offer the coverage or become a Part D plan sponsor themselves for their retirees. Administration A variety of public and private entities are involved in carrying out Medicare administrative and oversight functions. CMS, an agency within HHS, has primary operational responsibilities. Such responsibilities include managing program finances, developing policies and regulations, setting payment rates, and developing the program's information-technology infrastructure. CMS conducts its activities through its headquarters and 10 regional offices. The Social Security Administration, however, enrolls beneficiaries into the program and issues Medicare beneficiary cards. CMS also contracts with various private entities, including private health insurance companies, to help administer the program. For example, Medicare Administrative Contractors (MACs) process and pay Parts A and B reimbursement claims, enroll providers and suppliers, educate providers and suppliers on billing requirements, support appeal processes, and answer provider and supplier inquiries through call centers, as well as other activities. Qualified Independent Contractors (QICs) perform second-level reviews on appeals initially reviewed by MACs. Medicare's quality assurance activities are primarily handled by State Survey Agencies and Quality Improvement Organizations (QIOs), which operate in all states and the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. The State Survey Agencies are responsible for inspecting Medicare provider facilities (e.g., nursing homes, home health agencies, and hospitals) to ensure that they are in compliance with federal safety and quality standards referred to as Conditions (or Requirements) of Participation. Alternatively, some types of providers, including hospitals, may receive certification through private accrediting agencies, such as the Joint Commission. QIOs are mostly private, not-for-profit organizations that monitor the quality of care delivered to Medicare beneficiaries and educate providers on the latest quality-improvement techniques. Medicare program integrity activities, such as audits, provider education, medical review, and predictive data analysis, also are carried out by a variety of government and private entities. For example, the Center for Program Integrity within CMS works together with the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and the HHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) to identify and prevent fraud, waste, and abuse in Medicare. CMS also works with private contractors to carry out certain program-integrity functions. Unified Program Integrity Contractors (UPICs) perform integrity-related activities including data analysis to identify potentially fraudulent claims (bills) for Medicare Parts A and B, home health and hospice services, and DME. Similarly, the National Benefit Integrity Medicare Drug Integrity Contractor (MEDIC) is responsible for identifying and investigating fraud, waste, and abuse in Medicare Advantage and Part D. When appropriate, the UPICs and MEDIC work with and refer cases to law enforcement, including OIG and DOJ. In addition, Recovery Audit Contractors (RACs) are responsible for identifying improper Medicare payments, including both underpayments and overpayments, and for recouping any overpayments made to providers. Each year, the Comprehensive Error Rate Testing (CERT) program quantifies a national improper Medicare payment rate by examining a random sample of claims. In turn, the Supplemental Medical Review Contractor targets medical reviews in areas where OIG, RACs, and CERT have identified vulnerabilities and/or questionable billing patterns to identify ways to lower improper payment rates. As required by the ACA, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation (CMMI) was established in January 2011 to test and evaluate innovative payment and service delivery models to reduce program expenditures under Medicare. Examples of these models include providing payment incentives for groups of doctors, hospitals, and other health care providers (Accountable Care Organizations, or ACOs) to coordinate the services they provide to Medicare beneficiaries; bundling payments for services provided in different settings during a beneficiary's episode of care; and reimbursing health providers based on the quality of care rather than on the volume of services. CMMI also plays an important role in developing and implementing the new physician payment models required by MACRA. Medicare beneficiary education and outreach duties are shared between CMS and the Social Security Administration. Each year, CMS mails out a "Medicare and You" handbook to beneficiaries, which provides information on their benefits for the upcoming year. Additional educational materials and responses to frequently asked questions may be found on the CMS-maintained "Medicare.gov" website, and beneficiaries may call a CMS-operated 1-800 number for assistance with specific questions and help with selecting and enrolling in a Medicare Advantage and/or Part D plan. A Medicare beneficiary ombudsman is also available to provide assistance to Medicare consumers with their complaints, grievances, and requests. The Social Security Administration is responsible for notifying low-income Medicare beneficiaries about programs that may be able to assist them with their medical and prescription drug expenses. The Social Security Administration also provides general Medicare eligibility and enrollment information on its webpage and on Social Security benefit statements. Finally, CMS partners with community-based organizations, such as State Health Insurance Assistance Programs, in every state to provide educational resources and personalized assistance to Medicare beneficiaries. Financing Medicare's financial operations are accounted for through two trust funds maintained by the Department of the Treasury—the Hospital Insurance (HI) trust fund for Part A and the Supplementary Medical Insurance (SMI) trust fund for Parts B and D. For beneficiaries enrolled in Medicare Advantage (Part C), payments are made on their behalf in appropriate portions from the HI and SMI trust funds. HI is primarily funded by payroll taxes, while SMI is primarily funded through general revenue transfers and premiums. (See Figure 3 .) The HI and SMI trust funds are overseen by a Board of Trustees that provides annual reports to Congress. The trust funds are accounting mechanisms. Income to the trust funds is credited to the fund in the form of interest-bearing government securities. Expenditures for services and administrative costs are recorded against the fund. These securities represent obligations that the government has issued to itself. As long as a trust fund has a balance, the Department of the Treasury is authorized to make payments for it from the U.S. Treasury. Medicare expenditures are primarily paid for through mandatory spending—generally Medicare pays for all covered health care services provided to beneficiaries. Aside from certain constraints in HI described below, the program is not subject to spending limits. Additionally, most Medicare expenditures (aside from premiums paid by beneficiaries) are paid for by current workers through income taxes and dedicated Medicare payroll taxes, that is, current income is used to pay current expenditures. Medicare taxes paid by current workers are not set aside to cover their future Medicare expenses. Part A Financing The primary source of funding for Part A is payroll taxes paid by employees and employers. Each pays a tax of 1.45% on the employee's earnings; the self-employed pay 2.9%. Beginning in 2013, some higher-income employees pay higher payroll taxes. Unlike Social Security, there is no upper limit on earnings subject to the tax. Other sources of income include (1) interest on federal securities held by the trust fund, (2) a portion of federal income taxes that individuals pay on their Social Security benefits, and (3) premiums paid by voluntary enrollees who are not automatically entitled to Medicare Part A. Income for Part A is credited to the HI trust fund. Part A expenditures for CY2019 are estimated to reach approximately $330 billion. Revenue to the trust fund is expected to consist of about $285 billion in payroll tax income and another $38 billion in interest and other income. The Medicare Trustees project that in CY2019, the HI trust fund will incur a deficit of approximately $7 billion. As long as the HI trust fund has a balance, the Treasury Department is authorized to make payments for Medicare Part A services. To date, the HI trust fund has never run out of money (i.e., become insolvent), and there are no provisions in the Social Security Act that govern what would happen if that were to occur. Part A expenditures exceeded HI income each year from 2008 through 2015, and the assets credited to the trust fund were drawn down to make up the deficit in those years. Although the HI trust fund accumulated small surpluses in 2016 and 2017, the Medicare Trustees estimate that, beginning in 2018, expenditures will outpace income in all future years, and project that the HI trust fund will become insolvent in 2026 (i.e., the balance of the trust fund will reach $0). At that time there would no longer be sufficient funds to fully cover Part A expenditures. Part B Financing Medicare Part B is financed primarily from federal general revenues and from beneficiary premiums, which are set at 25% of estimated per capita program costs for the aged. (The disabled pay the same premium as the aged.) Income for Part B is credited to the SMI trust fund. Total spending for Part B is estimated to reach about $368 billion in CY2019, with premiums financing about $98 billion of that amount and general revenues financing most of the rest. Most beneficiaries who enroll in Medicare Part B pay a monthly premium. Individuals receiving Social Security benefits have their Part B premium payments automatically deducted from their Social Security benefit checks. Due to a "hold-harmless" provision in the Social Security Act, an individual's Social Security check cannot decrease from one year to the next as a result of the annual Part B premium increase (except in the case of higher-income individuals subject to income-related premiums). The 2019 monthly Part B premium is $135.50. However, about 3.5% of Medicare enrollees are protected by the hold-harmless provision and pay lower premium amounts because the dollar amount of the 2019 cost-of-living increase in their Social Security benefits was not sufficient to cover the full premium increase. Since 2007, higher-income Part B enrollees have paid higher premiums. In 2019, individuals whose modified adjusted gross income (AGI) exceeds $85,000 and each member of a couple filing jointly whose modified AGI exceeds $170,000 are subject to higher premium amounts. These higher-income premiums range from 35% to 85% of the value of Part B and affect about 5% of Medicare enrollees. (See Appendix B for 2019 Part B premiums and high-income thresholds.) Part C Financing Payments for spending under the Medicare Advantage program are made in appropriate portions from the HI and SMI trust funds. There is no separate trust fund for Part C. Part D Financing Medicare Part D is financed through a combination of beneficiary premiums and federal general revenues. In addition, certain transfers are made from the states. These transfers, referred to as "clawback payments," represent a portion of the amounts states could otherwise have been expected to pay for drugs under Medicaid if drug coverage for the dual eligible population had not been transferred to Part D. Part D revenues are credited to a separate Part D account within the SMI trust fund. In CY2019, total spending for Part D is estimated to reach approximately $98 billion, with about $71 billion of that amount paid for by general revenues, $16 billion from beneficiary premiums, and $12 billion from state transfers. In 2019, the base beneficiary premium is $33.19; however, beneficiaries pay different premiums depending on the plan they have selected and whether they are entitled to low-income premium subsidies. Additionally, beginning in 2011, higher income Part D enrollees pay higher premiums. (The income thresholds are the same as for Part B, as described above.) On average, beneficiary premiums are set at 25.5% of expected total Part D costs for basic coverage. Medicare and Sequestration The Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 112-25 ) provided for increases in the debt limit and established procedures designed to reduce the federal budget deficit, including the creation of a Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction. The failure of the Joint Committee to propose deficit reduction legislation by its mandated deadline triggered automatic spending reductions ("sequestration" of mandatory spending and reductions in discretionary spending) in fiscal years 2013 through 2021. The American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (ATRA; P.L. 112-240 ) delayed the automatic reductions by two months, while the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 (BBA; P.L. 113-67 ) extended sequestration for mandatory spending for an additional two years—through FY2023. In 2014, the President signed into law an amended version of S. 25 ( P.L. 113-82 ), which included a provision to extend BCA's sequester of mandatory spending through FY2024. BBA 15 extended the sequestration of mandatory spending another year, through FY2025. Most recently, BBA 18 extended the BCA mandatory spending sequester through FY2027. Section 256(d) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (BBEDCA; P.L. 99-177 ) contains special rules for the Medicare program in the event of a sequestration. Among other things, it specifies that for Medicare, sequestration is to begin the month after the sequestration order has been issued. Therefore, as the sequestration order was issued March 2013, Medicare sequestration began April 1, 2013, and will continue through March 31, 2028. Under sequestration, Medicare's benefit structure generally remains unchanged; however, benefit related payments are subject to 2% reductions. In other words, most Medicare payments to health care providers, as well as to MA and Part D plans, are being reduced by 2%. Certain Medicare payments are exempt from sequestration and therefore not reduced. These exemptions include (1) Part D low-income subsidies, (2) the Part D catastrophic subsidy, and (3) Qualified Individual (QI) premiums. Some non-benefit related Medicare expenses, such as administrative and operational spending, are subject to higher reductions, 6.2% in 2019. Additional Insurance Coverage While Medicare provides broad protection against the costs of many, primarily acute care, services, the program does not cover all services that may be used by its aged and disabled beneficiaries. In general, Medicare does not cover eyeglasses, hearing aids, dentures, or most long-term care services. Further, unlike most private insurance policies, it does not include an annual "catastrophic" cap on out-of-pocket spending on cost-sharing charges for services covered under Parts A and B (except for persons enrolled in Medicare Advantage plans). Most Medicare beneficiaries have some coverage in addition to Medicare. The following are the main sources of additional coverage for Medicare enrollees: Medicare Advantage. Many MA plans offer services in addition to those covered under original Medicare, reduced cost sharing, or reduced Part B or D premiums. All MA plans have a catastrophic cap. Employer Coverage. Coverage may be provided through a current or former employer. In recent years, a number of employers have cut back on the scope of retiree coverage. Some have dropped such coverage entirely, particularly for future retirees. As noted earlier, the MMA attempted to stem this trend, at least for prescription drug coverage, by offering subsidies to employers who offer drug coverage, at least as good as that available under Part D. Medigap. Individual insurance policies that supplement fee-for-service Medicare are referred to as Medigap policies. Beneficiaries with Medigap insurance typically have coverage for a portion of Medicare's deductibles and coinsurance; they may also have coverage for some items and services not covered by Medicare. Individuals select from a set of standardized plans, though not all plans are offered in all states. Medicaid. Certain low-income Medicare beneficiaries also may be eligible for full or partial benefits under their state's Medicaid program. Individuals eligible for both Medicare and Medicaid are referred to as dual eligibles. The lowest-income dual eligibles qualify for full Medicaid benefits, so that the majority of their health care expenses are paid by either Medicare or Medicaid; Medicare pays first, with Medicaid picking up most of the remaining costs. In addition to full-benefit dual eligibles, state Medicaid programs pay Medicare premiums and some cost sharing for other partial dual eligibles, who have higher income than full-benefit dual eligibles but are still considered to have low income. Other Public Sources. Individuals may have additional coverage through the Department of Veterans Affairs, or TRICARE for military retirees eligible for Medicare (and enrolled in Part B). In 2015, about 87% of Medicare beneficiaries had some form of additional coverage. Some persons may have had more than one type of additional coverage. Appendix A. Abbreviations Appendix B. 2019 Medicare Beneficiary Costs

Medicare is a federal program that pays for covered health care services of qualified beneficiaries. It was established in 1965 under Title XVIII of the Social Security Act to provide health insurance to individuals 65 and older, and has been expanded over the years to include permanently disabled individuals under the age of 65. Medicare, which consists of four parts (A-D), covers hospitalizations, physician services, prescription drugs, skilled nursing facility care, home health visits, and hospice care, among other services. Generally, individuals are eligible for Medicare if they or their spouse worked for at least 40 quarters in Medicare-covered employment, are 65 years old, and are a citizen or permanent resident of the United States. Individuals may also qualify for coverage if they are a younger person who cannot work because they have a medical condition that is expected to last at least one year or result in death, or have end-stage renal disease (permanent kidney failure requiring dialysis or transplant). The program is administered by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and by private entities that contract with CMS to provide claims processing, auditing, and quality oversight services. In FY2019, the program is expected to cover approximately 61 million persons (52 million aged and 9 million disabled) at a total cost of about $772 billion. Spending under the program (except for a portion of administrative costs) is considered mandatory spending and is not subject to the annual appropriations process. Services provided under Parts A and B (also referred to as "original" or "traditional" Medicare) are generally paid directly by the government on a "fee-for-service" basis, using different prospective payment systems or fee schedules. Under Parts C and D, private insurers are paid a monthly "capitated" amount to provide enrollees with required benefits. Medicare is required to pay for all covered services provided to eligible persons, so long as specific criteria are met. Since 1965, the Medicare program has undergone considerable change. For example, during the 111th Congress, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148 and P.L. 111-152) made numerous changes to the Medicare program that modified provider reimbursements, provided incentives to increase the quality and efficiency of care, and enhanced certain Medicare benefits. In the 114th Congress, the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015 (MACRA; P.L. 114-10) changed the method for calculating updates to Medicare payment rates to physicians and altered how physicians and other practitioners will be paid in the future. Projections of future Medicare expenditures and funding indicate that the program will place increasing financial demands on the federal budget and on beneficiaries. For example, the Hospital Insurance (Part A) trust fund is projected to become insolvent in 2026. Additionally, although the Supplementary Medical Insurance (Parts B and D) trust fund is financed in large part through federal general revenues and cannot become insolvent, associated spending growth is expected to put increasing strains on the country's competing spending priorities. As such, Medicare is expected to be a high-priority issue in the current Congress, and Congress may consider a variety of Medicare reform options ranging from further modifications of provider payment mechanisms to redesigning the entire program. This report provides a general overview of the Medicare program including descriptions of the program's history, eligibility criteria, covered services, provider payment systems, and program administration and financing. A list of commonly used acronyms, as well as information on beneficiary cost sharing, may be found in the appendixes.

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Introduction Congress is currently considering reauthorization of the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) for either a shorter or longer term, while the program is still dealing with the financial impact of the 2017 and 2018 hurricane seasons. Total losses (insured and uninsured) for the 2017 hurricane season are estimated at a record $273 billion, with losses for Hurricane Harvey estimated at $128.8 billion, Hurricane Maria at $92.7 billion, and Hurricane Irma at $51.5 billion. Total losses for the 2018 hurricane season are estimated at $49.4 billion, with Hurricane Florence at $24.2 billion and Hurricane Michael at $25.2 billion. NFIP claims for Harvey, Irma, and Maria amounted to more than $10.1 billion as of January 31, 2019, while NFIP claims for Florence and Michael amounted to more than $850 million as of that date. The NFIP is designed to borrow money from the Treasury to cover claims for extreme events; however, the 2017 losses would have pushed the program over its authorized borrowing limit. Rather than increase the borrowing limit, in 2017, Congress canceled $16 billion of NFIP debt to allow the program to pay claims. Expanding the role of private insurers, including reinsurers, has been seen by many as an answer to the variability of the financial position of the NFIP. Increasing participation by private insurers could transfer more flood risk from policyholders to the private insurance sector, as opposed to transferring the risk to the federal government through the NFIP. In addition to the possible advantage to the NFIP, the increased availability of flood insurance as private companies enter the market may benefit households and businesses, as insured flood victims are likely to recover more quickly and more fully after a flood. Private insurer interest in directly providing and underwriting flood risk has increased in recent years. Advances in the analytics and data used to quantify flood risk along with increases in capital market capacities may allow private insurers to take on flood risks that they shunned in the past. However, increasing the private sector role in providing flood insurance coverage directly to consumers may have implications for the operations and fiscal solvency of the NFIP as currently structured. Increased access to private flood insurance could provide individual policyholders with a wider choice of coverage and possibly cheaper premiums, but may also lead to variable consumer protections. The extent to which private insurance companies participate in the U.S. flood insurance market represents an area of congressional concern. Both the 114 th and 115 th Congress addressed the issue with legislation passing the House; however, no legislation was ultimately enacted. The NFIP is currently operating under a short-term reauthorization until May 31, 2019. This report describes the current role of private insurers in U.S. flood insurance, and discusses barriers to private sector involvement. The report considers potential effects of increased private sector involvement in the U.S. flood market, both for the NFIP and for consumers. Finally, the report outlines the provisions relevant to private flood insurance in House and Senate NFIP reauthorization bills from the 115 th Congress. It will be updated to reflect legislative developments in the 116 th Congress, particularly focusing on private flood insurance. Background6 The NFIP is the main provider of primary flood insurance coverage for residential properties in the United States, providing nearly $1.42 trillion in coverage for over 5 million residential flood insurance policies. In FY2018, the program collected about $3.5 billion in annual premium revenue, $1.1 billion in assessments, fees, and surcharges and $1.0 billion in payments from private reinsurers. Nationally, over 22,000 communities participate in the NFIP. The role of the federal government in flood insurance is in contrast to the majority of other property and casualty risks, such as damage from fire or accidents, which are covered by a broad array of private insurance companies. Total premiums for private property and casualty insurance in 2018 totaled $611 billion, with the policies backed by over $2 trillion in assets held by private insurers. Objectives of the NFIP The NFIP has two main policy goals: (1) to provide access to primary flood insurance, thereby allowing for the transfer of some of the financial risk of property owners to the federal government; and (2) to mitigate and reduce the nation's comprehensive flood risk through the development and implementation of floodplain management standards. A longer-term objective of the NFIP is to reduce federal expenditure on disaster assistance after floods. As a public insurance program, the NFIP is designed differently from the way in which private-sector companies provide insurance. As currently authorized, the NFIP also encompasses social goals to provide flood insurance in flood-prone areas to property owners who otherwise would not be able to obtain it, and to reduce the government's cost after floods. The NFIP also engages in many "non-insurance" activities in the public interest: it disseminates flood risk information through flood maps, requires communities to adopt land use and building code standards in order to participate in the program, potentially reduces the need for other post-flood disaster aid, contributes to community resilience by providing a mechanism to fund rebuilding after a flood, and may protect lending institutions against mortgage defaults due to uninsured losses. The benefits of such tasks are not directly measured in the NFIP's financial results from selling flood insurance. From the inception of the NFIP, the program has been expected to achieve multiple objectives, some of which may conflict with one another: To ensure reasonable insurance premiums for all; To have risk-based premiums that would make people aware of and bear the cost of their floodplain location choices; To secure widespread community participation in the NFIP and substantial numbers of insurance policy purchases by property owners; and To earn premium and fee income that, over time, covers claims paid and program expenses. Primary Flood Insurance Through the NFIP The NFIP offers flood insurance to anyone in a community that chooses to participate in the program. Flood insurance purchase generally is voluntary, except for property owners who are in a Special Flood Hazard Area (SFHA) and whose mortgage is backed by the federal government. Flood insurance policies through the NFIP are sold only in participating communities and are offered to both property owners and renters and to residential and non-residential properties. NFIP policies have relatively low coverage limits, particularly for non-residential properties or properties in high-cost areas. The maximum coverage for single-family dwellings (which also includes single-family residential units within a 2-4 family building) is $100,000 for contents and up to $250,000 for building coverage. The maximum available coverage limit for other residential buildings is $500,000 for building coverage and $100,000 for contents coverage, and the maximum coverage limit for non-residential business buildings is $500,000 for building coverage and $500,000 for contents coverage. The Mandatory Purchase Requirement By law and regulation, federal agencies, federally regulated lending institutions, and government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) must require the property owners in an SFHA to purchase flood insurance as a condition of any mortgage that these entities make, guarantee, or purchase. In addition to this legal mandatory purchase requirement, lenders may also require borrowers outside of an SFHA to maintain flood insurance as a means of financially securing the property. In order to comply with this mandate, property owners may purchase flood insurance through the NFIP, or through a private company, so long as the private flood insurance "provides flood insurance coverage which is at least as broad as the coverage" of the NFIP, among other conditions. The mandatory purchase requirement is enforced by the lender, rather than FEMA, and lenders can be fined up to $2,000 by banking regulators for each failure to require flood insurance or provide notice. Property owners who do not obtain flood insurance when required may find that they are not eligible for certain types of disaster assistance after a flood. Premium Subsidies and Cross-Subsidies Flood insurance rates in the NFIP generally are directed by statute to be "based on consideration of the risk involved and accepted actuarial principles," meaning that the rate is reflective of the true flood risk to the property. However, Congress has directed FEMA not to charge actuarial rates for certain categories of properties and to offer discounts to other classes of properties. FEMA is not, however, provided funds to offset these subsidies and discounts, which has contributed to FEMA's need to borrow from the U.S. Treasury to pay NFIP claims. There are three main categories of properties that pay less than full risk-based rates: Pre-FIRM : properties that were built or substantially improved before December 31, 1974, or before FEMA published the first Flood Insurance Rate Map (FIRM) for their community, whichever was later; Newly mapped : properties that are newly mapped into a SFHA on or after April 1, 2015, if the applicant obtains coverage that is effective within 12 months of the map revision date; and Grandfathered : properties that were built in compliance with the FIRM in effect at the time of construction and are allowed to maintain their old flood insurance rate class if their property is remapped into a new flood rate class. NFIP Reauthorization and Legislation 116th Congress The NFIP is currently authorized until May 31, 2019. Since the end of FY2017, 10 short-term NFIP reauthorizations have been enacted. As of the date of this report, in the 116 th Congress, no NFIP legislation has been considered in committee in the Senate. The House Financial Services Committee held a hearing on March 13, 2019, on NFIP reauthorization at which four draft bills were circulated. Prior Congresses In the 115 th Congress, a number of bills were introduced to provide a longer-term reauthorization of the NFIP as well as make numerous other changes to the program. The House of Representatives passed H.R. 2874 (The 21 st Century Flood Reform Act) by a vote of 237-189 on November 14, 2017. Among its numerous provisions, H.R. 2874 would have authorized the NFIP until September 30, 2022. Three bills were introduced in the Senate that would have reauthorized the expiring provisions of the NFIP: S. 1313 (Flood Insurance Affordability and Sustainability Act of 2017); S. 1368 (Sustainable, Affordable, Fair, and Efficient [SAFE] National Flood Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2017); and S. 1571 (National Flood Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2017). None of these bills were considered by the full Senate in the 115 th Congress. Among their other provisions, S. 1313 would have authorized the NFIP until September 30, 2027; S. 1368 would have authorized the NFIP until September 30, 2023; and S. 1571 would have authorized the NFIP until September 30, 2023. The four reauthorization bills differed significantly in the degree to which they would have encouraged private participation in flood insurance, particularly flood insurance sold by private companies in competition with the NFIP. In general, legislation passed by the House was more encouraging of private flood insurance than Senate legislation. The House passed standalone legislation to encourage private insurance in the 114 th Congress ( H.R. 2901 ); however, the Senate did not take up H.R. 2901 in the 114 th Congress. In the 115 th Congress, the House included the same provisions in H.R. 2874 and in an unrelated bill to reauthorize the Federal Aviation Administration ( H.R. 3823 ). The Senate removed the flood insurance language from H.R. 3823 before passing it. Reportedly, the provisions relating to private flood insurance were a particular issue of concern. The Senate ultimately did not take up H.R. 2874 during the 115 th Congress. S. 1313 included some similar provisions to H.R. 2874 , but S. 1368 and S. 1571 did not. Details of the provisions relating to private insurance in the 115 th Congress House and Senate bills are described in the Appendix, and Table A-1 relates the provisions in the bills to the issues discussed in this report. The Current Role of Private Insurers in the NFIP Private insurers can be involved in the flood insurance market in a number of ways, including (1) by helping to administer the NFIP; (2) by sharing risk with the NFIP as a reinsurer; or (3) by taking on risk themselves as a primary insurer, where the insurer contracts directly with a consumer. Since 1983, private insurers have played a major role in administering the NFIP, including selling and servicing policies and adjusting claims, but they largely have not been underwriting flood risk themselves. Instead, the NFIP retains the direct financial risk of paying claims for these policies. Since 2016, the NFIP has purchased a limited amount of reinsurance, thus transferring some of the flood risk to the private sector. Servicing of Policies and Claims Management While FEMA provides the overarching management and oversight of the NFIP, the majority of the day-to-day operation of the NFIP is handled by private companies. This includes marketing, selling and writing policies, and all aspects of claims management. FEMA has established two different arrangements with private industry. The first is the Direct Servicing Agent, or DSA, which operates as a private contractor, selling NFIP policies on behalf of FEMA for individuals seeking to purchase flood insurance policies directly from the NFIP. The DSA also handles the policies of severe repetitive loss properties. The second arrangement is the Write-Your-Own (WYO) program, where private insurance companies are paid to issue and service NFIP policies. With either the DSA or WYO program, the NFIP retains the actual financial risk of paying claims for the policy, and the policy terms and premiums are the same. Approximately 13% of the total NFIP policy portfolio is managed through the DSA and 87% of NFIP policies are sold by the 60 companies participating in the WYO program. Companies participating in the WYO program are compensated through a variety of methods, but this compensation is not directly based on the costs incurred by the WYOs. In the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 (Title II of P.L. 112-141 , hereinafter BW-12), Congress required FEMA to develop and issue a rulemaking on a "methodology for determining the appropriate amounts that property and casualty insurance companies participating in the WYO program should be reimbursed for selling, writing, and servicing flood insurance policies and adjusting flood insurance claims on behalf of the National Flood Insurance Program." This rulemaking was required within a year of enactment of BW-12. As of April 2019, FEMA has yet to publish a rulemaking to revise the compensation structure of the WYO companies. Without this analysis, it is difficult to ascertain how much it actually costs WYO companies to administer the NFIP policies, or the WYO's profit margins (if any). In the 115 th Congress, H.R. 2874 would have capped the allowance paid to the WYOs at 27.9% of premiums, while S. 1368 would have capped the allowance at 22.46%. Reinsurance In the Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014 ( P.L. 113-89 , HFIAA), Congress revised the authority of FEMA to secure reinsurance for the NFIP from the private reinsurance and capital markets. The purchase of private market reinsurance reduces the likelihood of FEMA needing to borrow from the Treasury to pay claims. In addition, as the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) noted, reinsurance could be beneficial because it allows FEMA to price some of its flood risk up front through the premiums it pays to the reinsurers rather than borrowing from Treasury after a flood. From a risk management perspective, using reinsurance to cover losses in only the more extreme years could help the government to manage and reduce the volatility of its losses over time. Transfer of risk to the private sector through reinsurance, however, is unlikely to lower the overall cost of the NFIP because reinsurers understandably charge FEMA premiums to compensate for the risk they assume. The primary benefit of reinsurance is to transfer and manage risk rather than to reduce the NFIP's long-term fiscal exposure. For example, a reinsurance scenario which would provide the NFIP with $16.8 billion coverage (sufficient for Katrina-level losses) could cost an estimated $2.2 billion per year. Such a reinsurance premium, however, would be a large portion of the total premiums paid into the NFIP, approximately two-thirds of the current premium amounts. Devoting such a large portion of premiums to reinsurance could leave insufficient funds for paying claims outside of large disasters, or for covering the other purposes for NFIP funds, such as flood mitigation, mapping, and improving NFIP rating structures. Reinsurance has been purchased by FEMA through two different mechanisms, "traditional" reinsurance and reinsurance backed by catastrophe bonds. The traditional reinsurance has been purchased from a varied group of reinsurance companies with each reinsurer bearing part of the risk. The catastrophe bond reinsurance is facilitated by a single company, with the risk then transferred to capital market investors who purchase the bonds. The specifics of each reinsurance purchase has varied, but in general, the reinsurance has been designed to pay a certain percentage of the losses from a single, large scale event, with a higher percentage if losses are higher. Coverage has typically started after $4 billion in losses, a loss level that has only been reached by the NFIP in three events—Hurricane Katrina, Superstorm Sandy, and Hurricane Harvey. Table 1 outlines the various reinsurance purchases, including the dates in force, type of reinsurance, amount of coverage, premiums paid by FEMA, and claims paid to FEMA. To date, the reinsurance purchases have been a net fiscal positive for the NFIP with a total of $655 million in premiums paid and $1.042 billion received from claims. This is due to the extremely high losses experienced after Hurricane Harvey, which resulted in over $8.6 billion paid by the NFIP to policyholders. Unless another large scale flooding event occurs, the balance of premiums vs. claims is likely to turn negative in the next two to three years if FEMA continues similar reinsurance purchases. In the 115 th Congress, H.R. 2874 , S. 1313 , and S. 1571 all contained provisions that would have required or encouraged the NFIP to transfer a portion of its risk to the private reinsurance market. Private Flood Insurance Outside the NFIP: Issues and Barriers One of the reasons that Congress created the NFIP in 1968 was the general unavailability of flood insurance from private insurers. Private flood insurance was offered between 1895 and 1927, but losses incurred from the 1927 Mississippi River floods and additional flood losses in 1928 led most insurers to stop offering flood policies. Private flood insurance companies largely concluded that flood peril was uninsurable because of the catastrophic nature of flooding, the difficulty of determining accurate rates, the risk of adverse selection, and the concern that they could not profitably provide risk-based flood coverage at a price that consumers felt they could afford. Currently, the private flood insurance market most commonly provides commercial coverage, secondary coverage above the NFIP maximums, or coverage in the lender-placed market. The 2018 premiums for private flood insurance as reported to the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) totaled $644 million, up from $589 million in 2017 and $376 million in 2016, compared to the $3.5 billion total amount of NFIP premiums. In general, the private flood market tends to focus on high-value properties, which command higher premiums and therefore the extra expense of flood underwriting can be more readily justified. Currently few private insurers compete with the NFIP in the primary residential flood insurance market. One illustration of this is that the NAIC only began systematically collecting separate data on private flood insurance in 2016. As discussed in the following sections, private insurers have identified a number of potential barriers to more widespread private sector involvement in providing flood insurance. Increasing private insurance may present a number of issues for the NFIP and for consumers. Flood Insurance Coverage "at Least as Broad as" the NFIP In BW-12, Congress explicitly provided for private flood insurance to fulfill the mandatory purchase mortgage requirement as long as the private flood insurance "provides flood insurance coverage which is at least as broad as the coverage" of the NFIP, among other conditions. Implementation of this requirement has proved challenging. The crux of the implementation issue is in answering the question of who would evaluate whether specific policies met the "at least as broad as" standard and what criteria would be used in making this evaluation. Some lending institutions feel that they lack the necessary technical expertise to evaluate whether a flood insurance policy meets the definition of private flood insurance set forth in BW-12. The responsible federal agencies issued two separate Notices of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) on the question, the first in October 2013, and the second in November 2016. On February 12, 2019, the agencies announced a final rule implementing this BW-12 requirement. Of particular note, the agencies indicate the rule "allows institutions to rely on an insurer's written assurances in a private flood insurance policy stating the criteria are met; [and] clarifies that institutions may, under certain conditions, accept private flood insurance policies that do not meet the Biggert-Waters Act criteria." This second point may seem unusual, because BW-12 included a specific definition of private flood insurance, while the agencies indicate that the rule allows acceptance of private flood insurance that does not meet this statutory definition. In creating the exception that allows private flood insurance that does not follow the statutory definition of "private flood insurance," the agencies relied on the usage of the more general term "flood insurance" in 42 U.S.C. 4012a(b)(1)(A) combined with the perceived congressional intent to promote private insurance in BW-12. The rule takes effect on July 1, 2019. Press reports described it as generally welcomed by the banking industry, but it is unclear to what extent this new rule will encourage private flood insurance or whether additional legislative changes might be needed if Congress seeks to further encourage development of the private flood insurance market. In the 115 th Congress, H.R. 2874 and S. 1313 included provisions that would have revised the definition of private flood insurance, striking existing statutory language requiring private flood insurance to provide coverage "at least as broad as the coverage" provided by the NFIP in order to meet the mandatory purchase requirements. Instead, the new definition would have relied on whether the insurance policy and insurance company were in compliance with the laws and regulations in the state where the insurance was purchased. S. 1368 and S. 1571 had no similar provisions. Continuous Coverage An associated issue is that of continuous coverage, which is required for property owners to retain any subsidies or cross-subsidies in their NFIP premium rates. Under existing law, if an NFIP policyholder allows their policy to lapse, any subsidy that they currently receive would be eliminated immediately. Unless legislation specifically allows private flood insurance to count for continuous coverage, a borrower may be reluctant to purchase private insurance if doing so means they would lose their subsidy should they later decide to return to NFIP coverage. In the 115 th Congress, H.R. 2874 included a provision that would have specified that if a property owner purchases private flood insurance and decides then to return to the NFIP, they would be considered to have maintained continuous coverage. S. 1313 included a provision to allow private flood insurance to count as continuous coverage. S. 1368 and S. 1571 had no similar provisions. In the 116 th Congress, H.R. 1666 , introduced on March 11, 2019, would consider any period during which a property is covered by a flood insurance policy, either through the NFIP or a private company, to be a period of continuous coverage. The "Non-Compete" Clause Before FY2019, the Write Your Own carriers, private insurers who sell and service NFIP policies, were restricted in their ability to sell flood insurance policies on their own behalf while also participating as a WYO, due to a "non-compete" clause contained in the standard NFIP contracts. These contracts governing the WYO companies' participation in the NFIP restricted the WYO carriers from selling their own standalone private flood products. A non-compete clause would require WYO companies to decide whether to offer private flood insurance policies in their own right or to act as WYO carriers, thus potentially limiting the size of the private flood market. In the 115 th Congress, H.R. 2874 would have eliminated the non-compete clause in place at the time, while S. 1313 would have provided temporary authorization for WYOs to sell private flood insurance for certain types of properties, with a follow-up study by FEMA to determine if the authorization should be made permanent. FEMA implemented changes in the standard WYO contracts for FY2019 removing the restrictions on WYO companies offering private flood insurance, while maintaining requirements that such private insurance lines remain entirely separate from a WYO company's NFIP insurance business. This action removes the non-compete clause without legislation, although FEMA in the future would retain the authority to reinstate the non-compete clause. Possible implications of the removal of the non-compete clause are discussed later in this report in the section on " Adverse Selection ." NFIP Subsidized Rates FEMA's subsidized rates are often seen as one of the primary barriers to private sector involvement in flood insurance. However, even without the subsidies mandated by law, the NFIP's definition of full-risk rates differs from that of private insurers. Whereas the NFIP's full-risk rates must incorporate expected losses and operating costs, a private insurer's full-risk rates must also incorporate a profitable return on capital. As a result, even those NFIP policies which are considered to be actuarially sound from the perspective of the NFIP may still be underpriced from the perspective of private insurers. In order to make the flood insurance market attractive, private insurers would want to be able to charge premium rates that reflect the full estimated risk of potential flood losses while still allowing the companies to make a profit. A reformed NFIP rate structure could have the effect of encouraging more private insurers to enter the primary flood market because NFIP full-risk based rates would be closer to the rates that private insurers would likely charge; however, this could lead to higher rates for households. In the 115 th Congress, H.R. 2874 would have phased out the pre-FIRM subsidy for primary residences at a rate of 6.5%-15% (compared to the current rate of 5%-18%), in a staged manner. In the first year after enactment, the minimum rate increase would have been 5%; in the second year after enactment, the minimum rate increase would have been 5.5%; and in the third year of enactment, the minimum rate increase would have been 6%. The phaseout of the pre-FIRM subsidy for other categories of properties would have remained at 25%. The Senate bills did not contain any provisions related to premium rate subsidies. FEMA is in the process of developing a redesigned risk rating system for the NFIP, known as Risk Rating 2.0. The new flood insurance rates for single-family properties are to be announced on April 1, 2020, and the new rates planned to go into effect for single-family properties across the country on October 1, 2020. As of January 31, 2019, there were 3.53 million single-family policies in force nationally. Many details are not yet known, but FEMA representatives have indicated the new rating structure will include replacement cost value and the distance between the property and a source of water. Risk Rating 2.0 is to also include new sources of flooding, such as intense rainfall, that are not currently included in the rating structure. Regulatory Uncertainty As addressed above, the rules on the acceptance of private insurance for the mandatory purchase requirement, and whether or not private flood insurance would count for continuous coverage, have had a significant impact on the market potential for private insurers. Another driver of private sector concern is regulatory uncertainty at the state level. The role of state regulators would increase in a flood insurance market with increased private sector involvement, which could increase the burden of oversight. The involvement of 56 state and territorial insurance regulators is likely to add complexity and additional costs for insurers, lenders, or property owners. For example, some private insurers cited the intervention of state regulators in controlling rates for wind insurance in Florida as a reason for withdrawing from that market. However, this could also lead to the development of state-specific insurance solutions, which might better suit local social and economic conditions. In the 115 th Congress, H.R. 2874 and S. 1313 referenced state laws and regulations in their definition of private flood insurance that could meet the mandatory purchase requirements. Ability to Assess Flood Risk Accurately Many insurers view the lack of access to NFIP data on flood losses and claims as a barrier to more private companies offering flood insurance. It is argued that increasing access to past NFIP claims data would allow private insurance companies to better estimate future losses and price flood insurance premiums, and ultimately to determine which properties they might be willing to insure. However, FEMA's view is that the agency would need to address privacy concerns in order to provide property level information to insurers, because the Privacy Act of 1974 prohibits FEMA from releasing policy and claims data which contain personally identifiable information. Private insurers have also suggested that better flood risk assessment tools such as improved flood maps and inland and storm surge models are needed in order to price risks at the individual and portfolio level. In the 115 th Congress, H.R. 2874 would have required FEMA to make all NFIP claims data publicly available in a form that does not reveal personally identifiable information, while S. 1313 would have authorized FEMA to sell or license individual claims data while requiring FEMA to make aggregate claims data available. Adequate Consumer Participation Insurers need sufficient consumer participation to manage and diversify their risk exposure. Many private insurers have expressed the view that broader participation in the flood insurance market would be necessary to address adverse selection and maintain a sufficiently large risk pool. A long-standing objective of the NFIP has been to increase purchases of flood insurance policies, and this objective was the motivation for introducing the mandatory purchase requirement. Despite the mandatory purchase requirement, not all covered mortgages carry the insurance as dictated, and no up-to-date data on national compliance rates with the mandatory purchase requirement are available. A 2006 study commissioned by FEMA found that compliance with this mandatory purchase requirement may be as low as 43% in some areas of the country (the Midwest), and as high as 88% in others (the West). A more recent study of flood insurance in New York City found that compliance with the mandatory purchase requirement by properties in the SFHA with mortgages increased from 61% in 2012 to 73% in 2016. The escrowing of insurance premiums, which began in January 2016, may increase compliance with the mandatory purchase requirement more widely, but no data are yet available. The mandatory purchase requirement could potentially be expanded to more (or all) mortgage loans made by federally regulated lending institutions for properties in communities participating in the NFIP. Another possible option would be to require all properties within the SFHA to have flood insurance, not just those with federally backed mortgages. Consumer participation could also be increased if the federal government were to mandate that homeowners' insurance policies include flood coverage or require all homeowners to purchase flood insurance. All four 115 th Congress bills contained provisions for some form of study to assess the compliance with the mandatory purchase requirement. H.R. 2874 would also have increased civil penalties on lenders for failing to enforce the mandatory purchase requirement. Potential Effects of Increased Private Sector Involvement in the Flood Market Increased Consumer Choice Current NFIP policies offer a relatively limited array of coverages, particularly compared to what is available in private markets for similar insurance against perils other than floods. Private insurance companies could potentially compete with the NFIP by offering coverage not available under the NFIP, such as business interruption insurance, living expenses while a property is being repaired, basement coverage, coverage of other structures on a property, and/or by offering policies with coverage limits higher than the NFIP. The NFIP currently also has a 30-day waiting period in almost all cases before the insurance coverage goes into effect, whereas private insurance companies may have a shorter waiting period. Private companies could also offer flood coverage as an add-on to a standard homeowners' policy, which could eliminate the current problem of distinguishing between flood damage (which is covered by the NFIP) and wind damage (which is often covered by standard homeowners' insurance). Unlike the NFIP, private flood insurance companies may also issue a policy without necessarily requiring elevation certificates, perhaps by using new technology to measure the elevation of individual structures. Cheaper Flood Insurance Since some properties receive lower NFIP rates due to cross subsidies from other NFIP policyholders, it seems likely that some of the non-subsidized NFIP policyholders would be able to obtain less expensive flood insurance from private insurers. Private insurers may also be able to offer premiums more closely tied to individual risks than the NFIP currently does, which would provide lower premiums for some policyholders. Quantifying the potential savings for some policyholders from private insurance is, however, difficult. The amount and extent of cross-subsidization within the NFIP is not currently known, as the NFIP has not historically tracked the number of grandfathered properties. One example of an attempt to provide estimates of NFIP versus private insurance is a modeling exercise carried out by two private companies, Milliman and KatRisk, which looked at premiums for single-family homes in Louisiana, Florida, and Texas. Their modeling suggested that 77% of single-family homes in Florida, 69% in Louisiana, and 92% in Texas would pay less with a private policy than with the NFIP; however, 14% in Florida, 21% in Louisiana, and 5% in Texas would pay over twice as much. Milliman did not provide any details of the coverage offered by these private policies, nor the basis on which their figures were estimated. Variable Consumer Protections The consumer protections associated with private policies are likely to be enforced at a state level and will therefore be variable; some states may offer a higher level of protection than others. Because private insurers are free to accept or reject potential policyholders as necessary in order to manage their risk portfolio, private insurers may not necessarily renew a policy. A private flood insurance policy might be less expensive than an NFIP policy, but it might also offer less extensive coverage, which a policyholder may not realize until they make a claim following a flood. Unlike the NFIP, the language in private flood insurance policies is not standardized and has not yet been tested in court in the same way as, for example, homeowners' insurance. Thus there may be greater variability in claims outcomes for consumers in the early years of private flood insurance penetration. Adverse Selection Private sector competition might increase the financial exposure and volatility of the NFIP, as private markets will likely seek out policies that offer the greatest likelihood of profit. In the most extreme case, the private market may "cherry-pick" (i.e., adversely select against the NFIP) the profitable, lower-risk NFIP policies that are "overpriced" either due to cross-subsidization or imprecise flood insurance rate structures, particularly when there is pricing inefficiency in favor of the customer. This could leave the NFIP with a higher density of actuarially unsound policies that are being directly subsidized or benefiting from cross-subsidization. Because the NFIP cannot refuse to write a policy, those properties that are considered "undesirable" by private insurers are likely to remain in the NFIP portfolio—private insurers will not compete against the NFIP for policies that are inadequately priced from their perspective. Private insurers, as profit-seeking entities, are unlikely independently to price flood insurance policies in a way that ensures affordable premiums as a purposeful goal, although some private policies could be less expensive than NFIP policies. It is likely that the NFIP would be left with a higher proportion of subsidized policies, which may become less viable in a competitive market. The extent of such "cherry picking" is uncertain with some arguing that it would have little effect. However, evidence from the UK flood insurance market suggests that even in an entirely private market "cherry picking" can be difficult to avoid. Interviews of private insurers indicate that one of the key drivers for the introduction of Flood Re, the new UK private flood insurance scheme, was the emergence of new entrants in the flood insurance market after 2000. These new entrants had little or no existing high-flood-risk business and no commitment to continue to insure this business under the terms of the informal agreement with the government. This gave them a competitive advantage, as they could choose to select the more profitable lower-risk business. One driver for change therefore was that Flood Re would include these new entrants and force them to contribute by charging their clients for the cross-subsidy for Flood Re, leveling the playing field between the private insurers. A significant increase in private flood insurance policies that "depopulates" the NFIP may also undermine the NFIP's ability to generate revenue, reducing the amount of past borrowing that can be repaid or extending the time required to repay the debt. If the number of NFIP policies decreases, it would likely become increasingly difficult for the remaining NFIP policyholders to subsidize policies, raising prices for the non-subsidized policyholders and thus accelerating the move to private insurance. In the long term the program could be left as a "residual market" for subsidized or high-risk properties. Residual market mechanisms are used in areas such as auto insurance, where consumers may be required to purchase insurance, but higher risk individuals may be unable to purchase it from regular insurers. The exact form of residual market mechanisms vary in different states and for different types of insurance, but they typically require some form of outside support either from the government or from insurers themselves. In the 115 th Congress, CBO cost estimate of H.R. 2874 considered the impact of eliminating the WYO companies' non-compete agreement. CBO estimated that, over the 2017-2027 period, holders of about 690,000 properties that, under current law, would have been purchased under the NFIP would instead choose to buy private flood insurance to cover those properties if H.R. 2874 were enacted. CBO did not expect any property owners who are subsidized by the NFIP to be among those leaving the program. CBO estimated that eliminating the non-compete clause and making NFIP data publically available would lead to an increase in spending of $39 million for the 2018-2022 period and $393 million for the 2018-2017 period. S. 1313 would have required FEMA, within two years of enactment, to report on the extent to which the properties for which private flood insurance is purchased tend to be at a lower risk than properties for which NFIP policies are purchased (i.e., the extent of adverse selection), by detailing the risk classifications of the private flood insurance policies. S. 1313 would also have provided the FEMA Administrator the power to limit the participation of WYO companies in the broader flood insurance marketplace if the Administrator determined that private insurance adversely impacts the NFIP. Issues for NFIP Flood Mapping and Floodplain Management If the number of NFIP policyholders were to decrease significantly, it might also be difficult to support the NFIP's functions of reducing flood risk through flood mapping and floodplain management. NFIP flood mapping is currently funded in two ways, through (1) annual discretionary appropriations; and (2) discretionary spending authority from offsetting money collected from the Federal Policy Fee (FPF). The FPF is paid to FEMA and deposited in the National Flood Insurance Fund (NFIF). The income from the FPF is designated to pay for floodplain mapping activities, floodplain management programs, and certain administrative expenses. About 66% of the resources from the FPF are allocated to flood mapping, with floodplain management receiving about 19% of the overall income from the FPF. To the extent that the private flood insurance market grows and policies move from the NFIP to private insurers, FEMA will no longer collect the FPF on those policies and less revenue will be available for floodplain mapping and management. Concerns have been raised about maintaining the activities funded by the FPF, with some stakeholders arguing that a form of FPF equivalency, or some form of user fee, should be applied to private flood insurance. In the 115 th Congress, both S. 1313 and S. 1368 contained mechanisms by which private insurance companies could have contributed to the costs of floodplain mapping in lieu of paying the FPF. Enforcement of floodplain management standards could be more challenging within a private flood insurance system, as the current system makes the availability of NFIP insurance in a community contingent on the implementation of floodplain management standards. For example, the Association of State Floodplain Managers (ASFPM) has expressed concerns that the widespread availability of private flood insurance could lead some communities to drop out of the NFIP and rescind some of the floodplain management standards and codes they had adopted, leading to more at-risk development in flood hazard areas. ASFPM suggested that this issue could be addressed by allowing private policies to meet the mandatory purchase requirement only if they were sold in participating NFIP communities. FEMA suggested that access to federal disaster assistance could be made partially contingent on the adoption of appropriate mitigation policies, but noted that this approach could be politically challenging. However, a positive consequence is that government investment in mitigation could increase private market participation by reducing the flood exposure of high-risk properties and thereby increasing the number of properties that private insurers would be willing to cover. Concluding Comments The policy debate surrounding NFIP and private insurance has evolved over the last few years. The discussion in 2012 was framed in the context of privatization of the NFIP and actions that might be taken to create conditions for private sector involvement. One of the primary interests of Congress at the time was to reduce the federal government's role in flood insurance by transferring its exposure to the private sector, with an expectation that a realignment of roles would allow the federal government to focus on flood risk mitigation while private markets focused on providing flood insurance. One argument for increasing private sector participation in the U.S. flood market was that competition should lead to innovation in flood risk analytics and modeling and produce new flood insurance products that would better meet customer needs and lead to greater levels of insurance market penetration. In fact, private sector flood risk analytics and modeling have improved significantly before any sizable entry of private insurers into the market. Another argument was that, in contrast to the NFIP, which cannot diversify its portfolio of flood risk by insuring unrelated risks, the insurance industry can diversify catastrophic risks with uncorrelated or less correlated risks from other perils, other geographic regions, non-catastrophic risks, or risks from unrelated lines of business. FEMA considered a range of concrete steps by which the barriers to private sector involvement could be addressed. One of these has been introduced: the purchase of reinsurance. Two others are in progress: the reduction of premium subsidies for some properties and reporting to make premium subsidies and cross-subsidies more transparent. Although BW-12 directed FEMA to make a recommendation about the best manner in which to accomplish the privatization of the NFIP, FEMA presented the report without a recommendation, arguing that any privatization strategy is complex and involves significant policy decisions that would require input from a variety of stakeholders. They concluded that there is no single, clear solution; it is heavily politicized; and harsh criticism of any change is inevitable. Currently the discussion is more focused on sharing risk, with the recognition that neither the NFIP nor the private sector is likely to be able to write all of the policies needed to cover all of the flood risk in the United States. FEMA has identified the need to increase flood insurance coverage across the nation as a major priority for NFIP reauthorization, and this also forms a key element of their 2018-2022 strategic plan. FEMA has developed a "moonshot" with the goal of doubling flood insurance coverage by 2023 through the increased sale of both NFIP and private policies. The 2017 hurricane season highlighted the flood insurance gap in the United States, where many people that are exposed to flood risk are not covered by flood insurance. For example, in Texas and Florida, less than a third of the flooded residential structures in SFHAs were insured, and no more than 10%-12% of flooded residential structures outside the SFHA were insured. Recent floods have also demonstrated that insured flood victims generally receive significantly more from NFIP flood insurance than from FEMA Individual Assistance (IA). For example, in the 2015 South Carolina floods, the average NFIP claim was $35,172, while the average IA payment was about $3,199. In the 2016 Louisiana floods, the average NFIP claim was $91,507, while the average IA payment was about $9,349. For Hurricane Harvey, the average NFIP claim was $116,823, while the average IA payment in Texas was about $4,426. For Hurricane Irma, the average NFIP claim in Florida was $51,773, while the average IA payment was about $1,315. FEMA's view is that both the NFIP and an expanded private market will be needed to increase flood insurance coverage for the nation and reduce uninsured flood losses. However, the private market is unlikely to expand significantly without congressional action. The concerns of private companies related to the mandatory purchase requirement and continuous coverage and the concerns of some Members of Congress about adverse selection are among the most pressing issues likely to be addressed in any long-term NFIP reauthorization. Appendix. Provisions Related to Private Flood Insurance in Legislation in the 115th Congress The provisions in the 115 th Congress legislation that related to private flood insurance, and the issues raised as barriers to private sector involvement, are summarized below and compared side-by-side in Table A-1 . All of the bills also included provisions related to administrative reforms of the NFIP, some of which may be relevant to private insurance companies, which are not described in this report. H.R. 2874 , 21 St Century Flood Reform Act H.R. 2874 , Section 102, would have phased out the pre-FIRM subsidy for primary residences at a rate of 6.5%-15% (compared to the current rate of 5%-18%), except that in the first year after enactment, the minimum rate increase would have been 5%; in the second year after enactment, the minimum rate increase would have been 5.5%; and in the third year after enactment, the minimum rate increase would have been 6%. The phaseout of the pre-FIRM subsidy for other categories of properties (non-primary residences, non-residential properties, severe repetitive loss properties, properties with substantial cumulative damage, and properties with substantial damage or improvement after July 6, 2012) would have remained at 25%. This section would have made it possible, but not certain, for FEMA to raise premiums more rapidly than under current law by increasing the minimum rate at which the pre-FIRM subsidy could be removed for primary residences. H.R. 2874 , Section 201, would have revised the definition of private flood insurance previously defined in BW-12. This section would have struck existing statutory language describing how private flood insurance must provide coverage "as broad as the coverage" provided by the NFIP. Instead, the new definition would have relied on whether the insurance policy and insurance company were in compliance in the individual state (as defined to include certain territories and the District of Columbia) where the policy applies. Further, "private flood insurance" would have been specifically defined as including surplus lines insurance. Though the majority of regulation of private flood insurance would have rested with individual states, federal regulators would have been required to develop and implement requirements relating to the financial strength of private insurance companies from which such entities and agencies accepted private insurance, provided that such requirements not affect or conflict with any state law, regulation, or procedure concerning the regulation of the business of insurance. The dollar amount of coverage would still have had to meet federal statutory requirements and requirements relating to the financial strength of such companies offering flood insurance could still be implemented. This section would also have specified that if a property owner purchased private flood insurance and decided then to return to the NFIP, they would be considered to have maintained continuous coverage. This section would have allowed private insurers to offer policies that provide coverage that might differ significantly from NFIP coverage, either by providing greater coverage or potentially providing reduced coverage that could leave policyholders exposed after a flood. H.R. 2874 , Section 202, would have applied the mandatory purchase requirement only to residential improved real estate, thereby eliminating the requirement for other types of properties (e.g., all commercial properties) to purchase flood insurance from January 1, 2019. This would likely have affected the policy base of the NFIP by reducing the number of commercial properties covered. However, it is uncertain how many would have elected to forgo insurance coverage (public or private) entirely. H.R. 2874 , Section 203, would have eliminated the non-compete requirement in the WYO arrangement with FEMA that restricted WYO companies from selling both NFIP and private flood insurance policies. This would have allowed the WYO companies to offer their own insurance policies while also receiving reimbursement for their participation in the WYO program to administer the NFIP policies. This section was largely pre-empted by FEMA's proposed changes for FY2019 to remove the WYO non-compete clause. H.R. 2874 , Section 204, would have required FEMA to make publicly available all data, models, assessments, analytical tools, and other information that is used to assess flood risk or identify and establish flood elevations and premiums. This section would also have required FEMA to develop an open-source data system by which all information required to be made publicly available may be accessed by the public on an immediate basis by electronic means. Within 12 months after enactment, FEMA would have been required to establish and maintain a publicly searchable database that provides information about each community participating in the NFIP. This section provided that personally identifiable information would not have been made available; the information provided would be based on data that identifies properties at the zip code or census block level. H.R. 2874 , Section 506, would have established that the allowance paid to WYO companies would not be greater than 27.9% of the chargeable premium for such coverage. It would also have required FEMA to reduce the costs to WYO companies participating in the program. H.R. 2874 , Section 507, would have increased the civil penalties from $2,000 to $5,000 on federally regulated lenders for failure to comply with enforcing the mandatory purchase requirement. In addition, the federal entities for lending regulations, in consultation with FEMA, would have been required jointly to update and reissue the guidelines on compliance with mandatory purchase. H.R. 2874 , Section 513, would have required GAO to issue a report, within 18 months of enactment, on the implementation and efficacy of the mandatory purchase requirement. H.R. 2874 , Section 511, would have required that, no later than 18 months after enactment, FEMA begin to annually transfer a portion of the risk of the NFIP to the private reinsurance or capital markets to cover a FEMA-determined probable maximum loss target expected to occur in the fiscal year. S. 1313 , Flood Insurance Affordability and Sustainability Act of 2017 S. 1313 , Section 101, would have required annual transfer of a portion of the risk of the NFIP to the private reinsurance or capital markets in an amount sufficient to maintain the ability of the program to pay claims, and limit the exposure of the NFIP to potential catastrophic losses from extreme events. S. 1313 , Section 102, would have required FEMA to conduct a study in coordination with the National Association of Insurance Commissioners to address how to increase participation in flood insurance coverage through programmatic and regulatory changes, and report to Congress no later than 18 months after enactment. This study would have been required to include but not be limited to options to (1) expand coverage beyond the SFHA to areas of moderate flood risk; (2) automatically enroll customers in flood insurance while providing customers the opportunity to decline enrollment; and (3) create bundled flood insurance coverage that diversifies risk across multiple-peril insurance. S. 1313 , Section 401, would have allowed any state-approved private insurance to satisfy the mandatory purchase requirement, and allowed private flood insurance to count as continuous coverage. This section would also have changed the amount of insurance required for both private flood insurance policies and NFIP policies in order to satisfy the mandatory purchase requirement. S. 1313 , Section 402, would have provided temporary authority during the first two years after enactment for WYO companies to sell private flood insurance for certain properties (e.g., non-residential properties, severe repetitive loss properties, business properties, or any property that has incurred flood-related damage in which the cumulative amount of payments equaled or exceeded the fair market value of the property) with the possibility of expanded participation after two years and further study. S. 1313 , Section 403, would have required FEMA to study the feasibility of selling or licensing the use of historical structure-specific NFIP claims data to non-governmental entities, while reasonably protecting policyholder privacy, and report within a year of enactment. This section would also have authorized FEMA to sell or license claims data as the Administrator determines is appropriate and in the public interest, with the proceeds to be deposited in the National Flood Insurance Fund (NFIF). S. 1313 , Section 404, would have required an insurance company issuing a policy for private flood insurance to impose and collect an annual surcharge equivalent to the Federal Policy Fee (FPF), to be transferred to the FEMA Administrator and deposited in the NFIF. S. 1313 , Section 602, would have required FEMA, not later than one year from enactment, to create and maintain a publicly searchable database that includes the aggregate number of claims filed each month, by state; the aggregate number of claims paid in part or in full; and the aggregate number of claims denials appealed, denials upheld on appeal, and denials overturned on appeal; without making personally identifiable information available. S. 1368 , Sustainable, Affordable, Fair, and Efficient [SAFE] National Flood Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2017 S. 1368 , Section 302, would have established that the total amount of FEMA reimbursement paid to WYO companies could not be greater than 22.46% of the chargeable premium for such coverage. S. 1368 , Section 303, would have required FEMA to develop a fee schedule based on recovering the actual costs of providing Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRMs) and charge any private entity an appropriate fee for use of such maps. This requirement would have provided a mechanism by which private insurance companies could contribute to the costs of floodplain mapping in lieu of paying the FPF. S. 1368 , Section 304, would have required FEMA, within 12 months of enactment, to develop a schedule to determine the actual costs of WYO companies, including claims adjusters and engineering companies, and reimburse the WYO companies only for the actual costs of the service or products. S. 1368 , Section 410, would have required FEMA to conduct a study and report to Congress within one year of enactment on the percentage of properties with federally backed mortgages located in SFHAs that satisfy the mandatory purchase requirement, and the percentage of properties with federally backed mortgages located in the 500-year floodplain that would satisfy the mandatory purchase requirement if the mandatory purchase requirement applied to such properties. S. 1571 , National Flood Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2017 S. 1571 , Section 302, would have specified that FEMA may consider any form of risk transfer, including traditional reinsurance, catastrophe bonds, collateralized reinsurance, resilience bonds, and other insurance-linked securities. S. 1571 , Section 303, would have required the federal banking regulators to conduct an annual study regarding the rate at which persons who are subject to the mandatory purchase requirement are complying with that requirement. Section 303 would also have required FEMA to conduct an annual study of participation rates and financial assistance to individuals who live in areas outside SFHAs.

The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) is the main source of primary flood insurance coverage in the United States, collecting approximately $4.75 billion in premiums, fees, and surcharges for over five million flood insurance policies. This is in contrast to the majority of other property and casualty risks, such as damage from fire or accidents, which are covered by a broad array of private insurance companies. One of the primary reasons behind the creation of the NFIP in 1968 was the withdrawal by private insurers from providing flood insurance coverage, leaving flood victims largely reliant on federal disaster assistance to recover after a flood. While private insurers have taken on relatively little flood risk, they have been involved in the administration of the NFIP through sales and servicing of policies and claims. In recent years, private insurers have expressed increased interest in providing flood coverage. Advances in the analytics and data used to quantify flood risk along with increases in capital market capacities may allow private insurers to take on flood risks that they shunned in the past. Private flood insurance may offer some advantages over the NFIP, including more flexible flood polices, integrated coverage with homeowners insurance, or lower-cost coverage for some consumers. Private marketing might also increase the overall amount of flood coverage purchased, reducing the amount of extraordinary disaster assistance necessary to be provided by the federal government. Increased private coverage could reduce the overall financial risk to the NFIP, reducing the amount of NFIP borrowing necessary after major disasters. Increasing private insurance, however, may have some downsides compared to the NFIP. Private coverage would not be guaranteed to be available to all floodplain residents, unlike the NFIP, and consumer protections could vary in different states. The role of the NFIP has historically been broader than just providing insurance. As currently authorized, the NFIP also encompasses social goals to provide flood insurance in flood-prone areas to property owners who otherwise would not be able to obtain it, and to reduce government's cost after floods. Through flood mapping and mitigation efforts, the NFIP has tried to reduce the future impact of floods, and it is unclear how effectively the NFIP could play this broader role if private insurance became a large part of the flood marketplace. Increased private insurance could also have an impact on the subsidies that are provided for some consumers through the NFIP. The 2012 reauthorization of the NFIP (Title II of P.L. 112-141) included provisions encouraging private flood insurance; however, various barriers have remained. Legislation passed the House in the 114th Congress (H.R. 2901) and 115th Congress (H.R. 2874) which would have attempted to expand the role of private flood insurance; neither bill was taken up by the Senate. In the 116th Congress, no NFIP legislation has advanced past introduction. The NFIP is currently operating under a short-term reauthorization until May 31, 2019; some NFIP legislation may be considered prior to this date.

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Introduction The 116 th Congress may consider a variety of housing-related issues. These may involve assisted housing programs, such as those administered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and issues related to housing finance, among other things. Specific topics of interest may include ongoing issues such as interest in reforming the nation's housing finance system, how to prioritize appropriations for federal housing programs in a limited funding environment, oversight of the implementation of changes to certain housing programs that were enacted in prior Congresses, and the possibility of extending certain temporary housing-related tax provisions. Additional issues may emerge as the Congress progresses. This report provides a high-level overview of the most prominent housing-related issues that may be of interest during the 116 th . It is meant to provide a broad overview of major issues and is not intended to provide detailed information or analysis. However, it includes references to more in-depth CRS reports on these issues where possible. Housing and Mortgage Market Conditions This section provides background on housing and mortgage market conditions to provide context for the housing policy issues discussed in the remainder of the report. This discussion of market conditions is at the national level. However, it is important to be aware that local housing market conditions can vary dramatically, and national housing market trends may not reflect the conditions in a specific area. Nevertheless, national housing market indicators can provide an overall sense of general trends in housing. In general, rising home prices, relatively low interest rates, and rising rental costs have been prominent features of housing and mortgage markets in recent years. Although interest rates have remained low, rising house prices and rental costs that in many cases have outpaced income growth have led to increased concerns about housing affordability for both prospective homebuyers and renters. Owner-Occupied Housing Markets and the Mortgage Market Most homebuyers take out a mortgage to purchase a home. Therefore, owner-occupied housing markets and the mortgage market are closely linked, although they are not the same. The ability of prospective homebuyers to obtain mortgages, and the costs of those mortgages, impact housing demand and affordability. The following subsections show current trends in selected owner-occupied housing and mortgage market indicators. House Prices As shown in Figure 1 , nationally, nominal house prices have been increasing on a year-over-year basis in each quarter since the beginning of 2012, with year-over-year increases exceeding 5% for much of that time period and exceeding 6% for most quarters since mid-2016. These increases follow almost five years of house price declines in the years during and surrounding the economic recession of 2007-2009 and associated housing market turmoil. House price increases slowed somewhat during 2018, but year-over-year house prices still increased by nearly 6% during the fourth quarter of 2018. House prices, and changes in house prices, vary greatly across local housing markets. Some areas of the country are experiencing rapid increases in house prices, while other areas are experiencing slower or stagnating house price growth. Similarly, prices have fully regained or even exceeded their pre-recession levels in nominal terms in many parts of the country, but in other areas prices remain below those levels. House price increases affect participants in the housing market differently. Rising prices reduce affordability for prospective homebuyers, but they are generally beneficial for current homeowners due to the increased home equity that accompanies them (although rising house prices also have the potential to negatively impact affordability for current homeowners through increased property taxes). Interest Rates For several years, mortgage interest rates have been low by historical standards. Lower interest rates increase mortgage affordability and make it easier for some households to purchase homes or refinance their existing mortgages. As shown in Figure 2 , average mortgage interest rates have been consistently below 5% since May 2010 and have been below 4% for several stretches during that time. After starting to increase somewhat in late 2017 and much of 2018, mortgage interest rates showed declines at the end of 2018 into early 2019. The average mortgage interest rate for February 2019 was 4.37%, compared to 4.46% in the previous month and 4.33% a year earlier. Homeownership Affordability House prices have been rising for several years on a national basis, and mortgage interest rates, while still low by historical standards, have also risen for certain stretches. While incomes have also been rising in recent years, helping to mitigate some affordability pressures, on the whole house price increases have outpaced income increases. These trends have led to increased concerns about the affordability of owner-occupied housing. Despite rising house prices, many metrics of housing affordability suggest that owner-occupied housing is currently relatively affordable. These metrics generally measure the share of income that a median-income family would need to qualify for a mortgage to purchase a median-priced home, subject to certain assumptions. Therefore, rising incomes and, especially, interest rates that are still low by historical standards contribute to monthly mortgage payments being considered affordable under these measures despite recent house price increases. However, some factors that affect housing affordability may not be captured by these metrics. For example, several of the metrics are based on certain assumptions (such as a borrower making a 20% down payment) that may not apply to many households. Furthermore, because they typically measure the affordability of monthly mortgage payments, they often do not take into account other affordability challenges that homebuyers may face, such as affording a down payment and other upfront costs of purchasing a home (costs that generally increase as home prices rise). Other factors—such as the ability to qualify for a mortgage, the availability of homes on the market, and regional differences in house prices and income—may also make homeownership less attainable for some households.  Some of these factors may have a bigger impact on affordability for specific demographic groups, as income trends and housing preferences are not uniform across all segments of the population. Given that house price increases are showing some signs of slowing and interest rates have remained low, the affordability of owner-occupied homes may hold steady or improve. Such trends could potentially impact housing market activity, including home sales. Home Sales In general, annual home sales have been increasing since 2014 and have improved from their levels during the housing market turmoil of the late 2000s, although in 2018 the overall number of home sales declined from the previous year. While home sales have been improving somewhat in recent years (prior to falling in 2018), the supply of homes on the market has generally not been keeping pace with the demand for homes, thereby limiting home sales activity and contributing to house price increases. Home sales include sales of both existing and newly built homes. Existing home sales generally number in the millions each year, while new home sales are usually in the hundreds of thousands.  Figure 3 shows the annual number of existing and new home sales for each year from 1995 through 2018. Existing home sales numbered about 5.3 million in 2018, a decline from 5.5 million in 2017 (existing home sales in 2017 were the highest level since 2006). New home sales numbered about 622,000 in 2018, an increase from 614,000 in 2017 and the highest level since 2007. However, the number of new home sales remains appreciably lower than in the late 1990s and early 2000s, when they tended to be between 800,000 and 1 million per year. Housing Inventory and Housing Starts The number and types of homes on the market affect home sales and home prices. On a national basis, the supply of homes on the market has been relatively low in recent years, and in general new construction has not been creating enough new homes to meet demand. However, as noted previously, national housing market indicators are not necessarily indicative of local conditions. While many areas of the country are experiencing low levels of housing inventory that contribute to higher home prices, other areas, particularly those experiencing population declines, face a different set of housing challenges, including surplus housing inventory and higher levels of vacant homes. On a national basis, the inventory of homes on the market has been below historical averages in recent years, though the inventory, of new homes in particular, has begun to increase somewhat of late. Homes come onto the market through the construction of new homes and when current homeowners decide to sell their existing homes. Existing homeowners' decisions to sell their homes can be influenced by expectations about housing inventory and affordability. For example, current homeowners may choose not to sell if they are uncertain about finding new homes that meet their needs, or if their interest rates on new mortgages would be substantially higher than the interest rates on their current mortgages. New construction activity is influenced by a variety of factors including labor, materials, and other costs as well as the expected demand for new homes. One measure of the amount of new construction is housing starts. Housing starts are the number of new housing units on which construction is started in a given period and are typically reported monthly as a "seasonally adjusted annual rate." This means that the number of housing starts reported for a given month (1) has been adjusted to account for seasonal factors and (2) has been multiplied by 12 to reflect what the annual number of housing starts would be if the current month's pace continued for an entire year. Figure 4 shows the seasonally adjusted rate of starts on one-unit homes for each month from January 1995 through December 2018. Housing starts for single-family homes fell during the housing market turmoil, reflecting decreased home purchase demand. In recent years, levels of new construction have remained relatively low by historical standards, reflecting a variety of considerations including labor shortages and the cost of building. Housing starts have generally been increasing since about 2012, but remain well below their levels from the late 1990s through the mid-2000s. For 2018, the seasonally adjusted annual rate of housing starts averaged about 868,000. In comparison, the seasonally adjusted annual rate of housing starts exceeded 1 million from the late 1990s through the mid-2000s. Furthermore, high housing construction costs have led to a greater share of new housing being built at the more expensive end of the market. To the extent that new homes are concentrated at higher price points, supply and price pressures may be exacerbated for lower-priced homes. Mortgage Market Composition When a lender originates a mortgage, it can choose to hold that mortgage in its own portfolio, sell it to a private company, or sell it to Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, two congressionally chartered government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs). Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac bundle mortgages into securities and guarantee investors' payments on those securities. Furthermore, a mortgage might be insured by a federal government agency, such as the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) or the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). Most FHA-insured or VA-guaranteed mortgages are included in mortgage-backed securities that are guaranteed by Ginnie Mae, another government agency. The shares of mortgages that are provided through each of these channels may be relevant to policymakers because of their implications for mortgage access and affordability as well as the federal government's exposure to risk. As shown in Figure 5 , during the first three quarters of 2018, about two-thirds of the total dollar volume of mortgages originated was either backed by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac (45%) or guaranteed by a federal agency such as FHA or VA (22%). Nearly one-third of the dollar volume of mortgages originated was held in bank portfolios, while close to 2% was included in a private-label security without government backing. The shares of mortgage originations backed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and held in bank portfolios are roughly similar to their respective shares in the early 2000s. The share of private-label securitization has been, and continues to be, very small since the housing market turmoil of the late 2000s, while the FHA/VA share is higher than it was in the early and mid-2000s. The share of mortgages insured by FHA or guaranteed by VA was low by historical standards during that time period as many households opted for other types of mortgages, including subprime mortgages. Rental Housing Markets As has been the case in owner-occupied housing markets, affordability has been a prominent concern in rental markets in recent years. In the years since the housing market turmoil of the late 2000s, the number and share of renter households has increased, leading to lower rental vacancy rates and higher rents in many markets. Share of Renters The housing and mortgage market turmoil of the late 2000s led to a substantial decrease in the homeownership rate and a corresponding increase in the share of households who rent their homes. As shown in Figure 6 , the share of renters increased from about 31% in 2005 and 2006 to a high of about 36.6% in 2016, before decreasing slightly to 36.1% in 2017 and continuing to decline to 35.6% in 2018. The homeownership rate correspondingly fell from a high of 69% in the mid-2000s to 63.4% in 2016, before rising to 63.9% in 2017 and continuing to rise to 64.4% in 2018. The overall number of occupied housing units also increased over this time period, from nearly 110 million in 2006 to 121 million in 2018; most of this increase has been in renter-occupied units. The number of renter-occupied units increased from about 34 million in 2006 to about 43 million in 2018. The number of owner-occupied housing units fell from about 75 million units in 2006 to about 74 million in 2014, but has since increased to about 78 million units in 2018. Rental Vacancy Rates The higher number and share of renter households has had implications for rental vacancy rates and rental housing costs. More renter households increases competition for rental housing, which may in turn drive up rents if there is not enough new rental housing created (whether through new construction or conversion of owner-occupied units to rental units) to meet the increased demand. As shown in Figure 7 , the rental vacancy rate has generally declined in recent years and was under 7% at the end of 2018. Rental Housing Affordability Rental housing affordability is impacted by a variety of factors, including the supply of rental housing units available, the characteristics of those units (e.g., age and amenities), and the demand for available units. New housing units have been added to the rental stock in recent years through both construction of new rental units and conversions of existing owner-occupied units to rental housing. However, the supply of rental housing has not necessarily kept pace with the demand, particularly among lower-cost rental units, and low vacancy rates have been especially pronounced in less-expensive units. The increased demand for rental housing, as well as the concentration of new rental construction in higher-cost units, has led to increases in rents in recent years. Median renter incomes have also been increasing for the last several years, at times outpacing increases in rents. However, over the longer term, median rents have increased faster than renter incomes, reducing rental affordability. Rising rental costs and renter incomes that are not keeping up with rent increases over the long term can contribute to housing affordability problems, particularly for households with lower incomes. Under one common definition, housing is considered to be affordable if a household is paying no more than 30% of its income in housing costs. Under this definition, households that pay more than 30% are considered to be cost-burdened, and those that pay more than 50% are considered to be severely cost-burdened. The overall number of cost-burdened renter households has increased from 14.8 million in 2001 to 20.5 million in 2017, although the 20.5 million in 2017 represented a decrease from 20.8 million in 2016 and over 21 million in 2014 and 2015. (Over this time period, the overall number of renter households has increased as well.) While housing cost burdens can affect households of all income levels, they are most prevalent among the lowest-income households. In 2017, 83% of renter households with incomes below $15,000 experienced housing cost burdens, and 72% experienced severe cost burdens. A shortage of lower-cost rental units that are both available and affordable to extremely low-income renter households (households that earn no more than 30% of area median income), in particular, contributes to these cost burdens. Housing Issues in the 116th Congress A variety of housing-related issues may be of interest to the 116 th Congress, including housing finance, housing assistance programs, and housing-related tax provisions, among other things. Many of these are ongoing or perennial housing-related issues, though additional issues may emerge as the Congress progresses. Status of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Two major players in the U.S. housing finance system are Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) that were created by Congress to provide liquidity to the mortgage market. By law, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac cannot make mortgages; rather, they are restricted to purchasing mortgages that meet certain requirements from lenders. Once the GSEs purchase a mortgage, they either package it with others into a mortgage-backed security (MBS), which they guarantee and sell to institutional investors (which can be the mortgage originator), or retain it as a portfolio investment. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are involved in both single-family and multifamily housing, though their single-family businesses are much larger. In 2008, in the midst of housing and mortgage market turmoil, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac experienced financial trouble and entered voluntary conservatorship overseen by their regulator, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA). As part of the legal arrangements of this conservatorship, the Department of the Treasury contracted to purchase a maximum of $200 billion of new senior preferred stock from each of the GSEs; in return for this support, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac pay dividends on this stock to Treasury. These funds become general revenues. Several issues related to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac could be of interest to the 116 th Congress. These include the potential for legislative housing finance reform, new leadership at FHFA and the potential for administrative changes to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and certain issues that could affect Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's finances and mortgage standards, respectively. For more information on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, see CRS Report R44525, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in Conservatorship: Frequently Asked Questions . Potential for Legislative Housing Finance Reform Since Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac entered conservatorship in 2008, policymakers have largely agreed on the need for comprehensive housing finance reform legislation that would resolve the conservatorships of these GSEs and address the underlying issues that are perceived to have led to their financial trouble and conservatorships. Such legislation could eliminate Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, possibly replacing them with other entities; retain the companies but transform their role in the housing finance system; or return them to their previous status with certain changes. In addition to addressing the role of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, housing finance reform legislation could potentially involve changes to the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) or other federal programs that support the mortgage market. While there is generally broad agreement on certain principles of housing finance reform—such as increasing the private sector's role in the mortgage market, reducing government risk, and maintaining access to affordable mortgages for creditworthy households—there is disagreement over how best to achieve these objectives and over the technical details of how a restructured housing finance system should operate. Since 2008, a variety of housing finance reform proposals have been put forward by Members of Congress, think tanks, and industry groups. Proposals differ on structural questions as well as on specific implementation issues, such as whether, and how, certain affordable housing requirements that currently apply to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac would be included in a new system. Previous Congresses have considered housing finance reform legislation in varying degrees. In the 113 th Congress, the House Committee on Financial Services and Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs considered different versions of comprehensive housing finance reform legislation, but none were ultimately enacted. The 114 th  Congress considered a number of more-targeted reforms to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, but did not actively consider comprehensive housing finance reform legislation. At the end of the 115 th Congress, the House Committee on Financial Services held a hearing on a draft housing finance reform bill released by then-Chairman Jeb Hensarling and then-Representative John Delaney, but no further action was taken on it. In the 116 th Congress, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Chairman Mike Crapo has released an outline for potential housing finance reform legislation. The committee held hearings on March 26 and March 27, 2019 on the outline. New FHFA Director and Possible Administrative Changes to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac FHFA, an independent agency, is the regulator for Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Bank System as well as the conservator for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The director of FHFA is appointed by the President, subject to Senate confirmation, for a five-year term. The term of FHFA Director Mel Watt expired in January 2019. President Trump nominated Mark Calabria to be the next FHFA director. The Senate confirmed the nomination on April 4, 2019, and Dr. Calabria was sworn in on April 15, 2019. FHFA has relatively wide latitude to make many changes to Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's operations without congressional approval, though it is subject to certain statutory constraints. In recent years, for example, FHFA has directed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to engage in risk-sharing transactions, develop a common securitization platform for issuing mortgage-backed securities, and undertake certain pilot programs. The prospect of new leadership at FHFA led many to speculate about possible administrative changes that FHFA could make to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac going forward. Any such changes could potentially lead to congressional interest and oversight. FHFA could make many changes to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, including changes to the pricing of mortgages they purchase, to their underwriting standards, or to certain product offerings. It could also make changes to pilot programs, start laying the groundwork for a post-conservatorship housing finance system, or take a different implementation approach to certain affordable housing initiatives required by statute, such as Duty to Serve requirements. Because the new FHFA director has been critical of certain aspects of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the past, some have expressed concerns that the new leadership could result in the agency taking steps to reduce Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's role in the mortgage market. In March 2019, nearly 30 industry groups sent a letter to Acting Director Otting urging that FHFA proceed cautiously with any administrative changes to ensure that they do not disrupt the mortgage market. That same month, President Trump issued a memorandum directing the Secretary of the Treasury to work with other executive branch agencies to develop a plan to end the GSEs' conservatorship, among other goals. Other Issues Related to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Certain other issues related to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac may be of interest during the 116 th Congress. A new accounting standard (current expected credit loss, or CECL) that could require the GSEs to increase their loan loss reserves goes into effect in 2020. CECL could result in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac needing to draw on their support agreements with Treasury. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act ( P.L. 111-203 ) requires mortgage lenders to document and verify a borrower's ability to repay (ATR). If a mortgage lacks certain risky features and a lender complies with the ATR regulations, the mortgage is considered to be a qualified mortgage (QM), which provides the lender certain protections against lawsuits claiming that the ATR requirements were not met. Mortgages purchased by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac currently have an exemption (known as the QM Patch) from the debt-to-income ratio ATR rule. This exemption expires in early 2021 (or earlier if Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac exit conservatorship before that date). Appropriations for Housing Programs For several years, concern in Congress about federal budget deficits has led to increased interest in reducing the amount of discretionary funding provided each year through the annual appropriations process. This interest manifested most prominently in the enactment of the Budget Control Act of 2011( P.L. 112-25 ), which set enforceable limits for both mandatory and discretionary spending. The limits on discretionary spending, which have been amended and adjusted since they were first enacted, have implications for HUD's budget, the largest source of funding for direct housing assistance, because it is made up almost entirely of discretionary appropriations. In FY2020, the discretionary spending limits are slated to decrease, after having been increased in FY2018 and FY2019 by the Bipartisan Budget Act of FY2018 (BBA; P.L. 115-123 ). The nondefense discretionary cap (the one relevant for housing programs and activities) will decline by more than 9% in FY2020, absent any additional legislative changes. More than three-quarters of HUD's appropriations are devoted to three rental assistance programs serving more than 4 million families: the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher (HCV) program, Section 8 project-based rental assistance, and the public housing program. Funding for the HCV program and project-based rental assistance has been increasing in recent years, largely because of the increased costs of maintaining assistance for households that are currently served by the programs. Public housing has, arguably, been underfunded (based on studies undertaken by HUD of what it should cost to operate and maintain it) for many years. Despite the large share of total HUD funding these rental assistance programs command, their combined funding levels only permit them to serve an estimated one in four eligible families, which creates long waiting lists for assistance in most communities. A similar dynamic plays out in the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Rural Housing Service budget. Demand for housing assistance exceeds the supply of subsidies, yet the vast majority of the RHS budget is devoted to maintaining assistance for current residents. In a budget environment with limits on discretionary spending, the pressure to provide increased funding to maintain current services for existing rental assistance programs must be balanced against the pressure from states, localities, and advocates to maintain or increase funding for other popular programs, such as HUD's Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program, grants for homelessness assistance, and funding for Native American housing. FY2020 Budget The Trump Administration's budget request for FY2020 proposes an 18% decrease in funding for HUD's programs and activities as compared to the prior year. It proposes to eliminate funding for several programs, including multiple HUD grant programs (CDBG, the HOME Investment Partnerships Program, and the Self-Help and Assisted Homeownership Opportunity Program (SHOP)), and to decrease funding for most other HUD programs. In proposing to eliminate the grant programs, the Administration cites budget constraints and proposes that state and local governments take on more of a role in the housing and community development activities funded by these programs. Additionally, the budget references policy changes designed to reduce the cost of federal rental assistance programs, including the Making Affordable Housing Work Act of 2018 (MAHWA) legislative proposal, released by HUD in April 2018. If enacted, the proposal would make a number of changes to the way tenant rents are calculated in HUD rental assistance programs, resulting in rent increases for assisted housing recipients, and corresponding decreases in the cost of federal subsidies. Further, it would permit local program administrators or property owners to institute work requirements for recipients. In announcing the proposal, HUD described it as setting the programs on "a more fiscally sustainable path," creating administrative efficiency, and promoting self-sufficiency. Low-income housing advocates have been critical of it, particularly the effect increased rent payments may have on families. Beyond HUD, the Administration's FY2020 budget request for USDA's Rural Housing Service would eliminate funding for most rural housing programs, except for several loan guarantee programs. It would continue to provide funding to renew existing rental assistance, but also proposes a new minimum rent policy for tenants designed to help reduce federal subsidy costs. For more on HUD appropriations trends in general, see CRS Report R42542, Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD): Funding Trends Since FY2002 . For more on the FY2020 budget environment, including discretionary spending caps, see CRS Report R44874, The Budget Control Act: Frequently Asked Questions . Implementation of Housing Assistance Legislation Several pieces of assisted housing legislation that were enacted in prior Congresses are expected to be implemented during the 116 th Congress. Moving to Work (MTW) Expansion In the FY2016 HUD appropriations law, Congress mandated that HUD expand the Moving to Work (MTW) demonstration by 100 public housing authorities (PHAs). MTW is a waiver program that allows a limited number of participating PHAs to receive exceptions from HUD for most of the rules and regulations governing the public housing and voucher programs. MTW has been controversial for many years, with PHAs supporting the flexibility it provides (e.g., allowing PHAs to move funding between programs), and low-income housing advocates criticizing some of the policies being adopted by PHAs (e.g., work requirements and time limits). Most recently, GAO issued a report raising concerns about HUD's oversight of MTW, including the lack of monitoring of the effects of policy changes under MTW on tenants. HUD was required to phase in the FY2016 expansion and evaluate any new policies adopted by participating PHAs. Following a series of listening sessions and advisory committee meetings, and several solicitations for comment, HUD issued a solicitation of interest for the first two expansion cohorts in December 2018. As of the date of this report, no selections had yet been made for those cohorts. Rental Assistance Demonstration Expansion The Rental Assistance Demonstration (RAD) was an Obama Administration initiative initially designed to test the feasibility of addressing the estimated $25.6 billion backlog in unmet capital needs in the public housing program by allowing local PHAs to convert their public housing properties to either Section 8 Housing Choice Vouchers or Section 8 project-based rental assistance. PHAs are limited in their ability to mortgage, and thus raise private capital for, their public housing properties because of a federal deed restriction placed on the properties as a condition of federal assistance. When public housing properties are converted under RAD, that deed restriction is removed. As currently authorized, RAD conversions must be cost-neutral, meaning that the Section 8 rents the converted properties may receive must not result in higher subsidies than would have been received under the public housing program. Given this restriction, and without additional subsidy, not all public housing properties can use a conversion to raise private capital, potentially limiting the usefulness of a conversion for some properties. While RAD conversions have been popular with PHAs, and HUD's initial evaluations of the program have been favorable, a recent GAO study has raised questions about HUD's oversight of RAD, and about how much private funding is actually being raised for public housing through the conversions. RAD, as first authorized by Congress in the FY2012 HUD appropriations law, was originally limited to 60,000 units of public housing (out of roughly 1 million units). However, Congress has since expanded the demonstration. Most recently, in FY2018, Congress raised the cap so that up to 455,000 units of public housing will be permitted to convert to Section 8 under RAD, and it further expanded the program so that Section 202 Housing for the Elderly units can also convert. Not only is HUD currently implementing the FY2018 expansion, but the President's FY2020 budget request to Congress requests that the cap on public housing RAD conversions be eliminated completely. Housing and Disaster Response Several major disasters that have recently affected the United States have led to congressional activity related to disaster response and recovery programs. When such incidents occur, the President may authorize an emergency or major disaster declaration under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act; P.L. 93-288 , as amended), making various housing assistance programs, including programs provided by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) , available to disaster survivors. FEMA-provided housing assistance may include short-term, emergency sheltering accommodations under Section 403—Essential Assistance—of the Stafford Act (e.g., the Transitional Sheltering Assistance (TSA) program, which is intended to provide short-term hotel/motel accommodations). Interim housing needs may be met through the Individuals and Households Program (IHP) under Section 408—Federal Assistance to Individuals and Households—of the Stafford Act. IHP assistance may include financial (e.g., assistance to rent alternate housing accommodations ) and/or direct assistance (e.g., multi family lease and repair , Transportable Temporary Housing Units , or direct lease ) to eligible individuals and households who, as a result of an emergency or disaster, have uninsured or under-insured necessary expenses and serious needs that cannot be met through other means or forms of assistance. IHP assistance is intended to be temporary and is generally limited to a period of 18 months following the date of the declaration , but it may be extended by FEMA. Implementation of Housing-Related Provisions of the Disaster Recovery Reform Act (DRRA) The Disaster Recovery Reform Act of 2018 (DRRA, Division D of P.L. 115-254 ), which became law on October 5, 2018, is the most comprehensive reform of FEMA's disaster assistance programs since the passage of the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of 2013 (SRIA, Division B of P.L. 113-2 ) and, prior to that, the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (PKEMRA, P.L. 109-295 ). The DRRA legislation focuses on improving pre-disaster planning and mitigation, response, and recovery, and increasing FEMA accountability. As such, it amends many sections of the Stafford Act. In addition to those amendments, DRRA includes new standalone authorities and requires reports to Congress, rulemaking, and other actions. The 116 th Congress has expressed interest in the oversight of DRRA's implementation, including sections that amend FEMA's temporary housing assistance programs under the Stafford Act. These sections include the following: DRRA Section 1211—State Administration of Assistance for Direct Temporary Housing and Permanent Housing Construction—amends Stafford Act Section 408(f)—Federal Assistance to Individuals and Households, State Role—to allow state, territorial, or tribal governments to administer Direct Temporary Housing Assistance and Permanent Housing Construction, in addition to Other Needs Assistance (ONA). It also provides a mechanism for state and local units of government to be reimbursed for locally implemented housing solutions. This provision may allow states to customize disaster housing solutions and expedite disaster recovery; however, FEMA may need to provide guidance to clarify the requirements of the application and approval process for the state, territorial, or tribal government that seeks to administer these programs. DRRA Section 1212—Assistance to Individuals and Households—amends Stafford Act Section 408(h)—Federal Assistance to Individuals and Households, Maximum Amount of Assistance—to separate the cap on the maximum amount of financial assistance eligible individuals and households may receive for housing assistance and ONA. The provision also removes financial assistance to rent alternate housing accommodations from the cap, and creates an exception for accessibility-related costs. This may better enable FEMA's disaster assistance programs to meet the recovery-related needs of individuals, including those with disabilities and others with access and functional needs, and households who experience significant damage to their primary residence and personal property as a result of an emergency or major disaster. However, there is also the potential that this change may disincentivize sufficient insurance coverage because of the new ability for eligible individuals and households to receive separate and increased housing and ONA awards that more comprehensively cover disaster-related real and personal property losses. DRRA Section 1213—Multifamily Lease and Repair Assistance—amends Stafford Act Section 408(c)(1)(B)—Federal Assistance to Individuals and Households, Direct Assistance—to expand the eligible areas for multifamily lease and repair, and remove the requirement that the value of the improvements or repairs not exceed the value of the lease agreement. This may increase housing options for disaster survivors. The Inspector General of the Department of Homeland Security must assess the use of FEMA's direct assistance authority to justify this alternative to other temporary housing options, and submit a report to Congress. For more information on DRRA, see CRS Insight IN11055, The Disaster Recovery Reform Act: Homeland Security Issues in the 116th Congress . Additionally, tables of deadlines associated with the implementation actions and requirements of DRRA are available upon request. Native American Housing Programs Native Americans living in tribal areas experience a variety of housing challenges. Housing conditions in tribal areas are generally worse than those for the United States as a whole, and factors such as the legal status of trust lands present additional complications for housing. In light of these challenges, and the federal government's long-standing trust relationship with tribes, certain federal housing programs provide funding specifically for housing in tribal areas. Tribal HUD-VASH The Tribal HUD-Veterans Affairs Supportive Housing (Tribal HUD-VASH) program provides rental assistance and supportive services to Native American veterans who are homeless or at risk of homelessness. Tribal HUD-VASH is modeled on the broader HUD-Veterans Affairs Supportive Housing (HUD-VASH) program, which provides rental assistance and supportive services for homeless veterans. Tribal HUD-VASH was initially created and funded through the FY2015 HUD appropriations act ( P.L. 113-235 ), and funds to renew rental assistance have been provided in subsequent appropriations acts. However, no separate authorizing legislation for Tribal HUD-VASH currently exists. In the 116 th Congress, a bill to codify the Tribal HUD-VASH program ( S. 257 ) was ordered to be reported favorably by the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs in February 2019. A substantively identical bill passed the Senate during the 115 th Congress ( S. 1333 ), but the House ultimately did not consider it. For more information on HUD-VASH and Tribal HUD-VASH, see CRS Report RL34024, Veterans and Homelessness . NAHASDA Reauthorization The main federal program that provides housing assistance to Native American tribes and Alaska Native villages is the Native American Housing Block Grant (NAHBG), which was authorized by the Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act of 1996 (NAHASDA,  P.L. 104-330 ). NAHASDA reorganized the federal system of housing assistance for tribes while recognizing the rights of tribal self-governance and self-determination. The NAHBG provides formula funding to tribes that can be used for a range of affordable housing activities that benefit primarily low-income Native Americans or Alaska Natives living in tribal areas. A separate block grant program authorized by NAHASDA, the Native Hawaiian Housing Block Grant (NHHBG), provides funding for affordable housing activities that benefit Native Hawaiians eligible to reside on the Hawaiian Home Lands. NAHASDA also authorizes a loan guarantee program, the Title VI Loan Guarantee, for tribes to carry out eligible affordable housing activities. The most recent authorization for most NAHASDA programs expired at the end of FY2013, although NAHASDA programs have generally continued to be funded in annual appropriations laws. (The NHHBG has not been reauthorized since its original authorization expired in FY2005, though it has continued to receive funding in most years. ) NAHASDA reauthorization legislation has been considered in varying degrees in the 113 th , 114 th , and 115 th Congresses but none was ultimately enacted. The 116 th Congress may again consider legislation to reauthorize NAHASDA. In general, tribes and Congress have been supportive of NAHASDA, though there has been some disagreement over specific provisions or policy proposals that have been included in reauthorization bills. Some of these disagreements involve debates over specific program changes that have been proposed. Others involve debate over broader issues, such as the appropriateness of providing federal funding for programs specifically for Native Hawaiians and whether such funding could be construed to provide benefits based on race. For more information on NAHASDA, see CRS Report R43307, The Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act of 1996 (NAHASDA): Background and Funding . Housing-Related Tax Extenders In the past, Congress has regularly extended a number of temporary tax provisions that address a variety of policy issues, including certain provisions related to housing. This set of temporary provisions is commonly referred to as "tax extenders." Two housing-related provisions that have been included in tax extenders packages recently are (1) the exclusion for canceled mortgage debt, and (2) the deduction for mortgage insurance premiums, each of which is discussed further below. The most recently enacted tax extenders legislation was the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 ( P.L. 115-123 ) in the 115 th Congress. That law extended the exclusion for canceled mortgage debt and the ability to deduct mortgage insurance premiums through the end of 2017 (each had previously expired at the end of 2016). As of the date of this report, these provisions had not been extended beyond 2017. In the 116 th Congress, S. 617 , the Tax Extender and Disaster Relief Act of 2019, would extend each of these provisions through calendar year 2019. For more information on tax extenders in general, see CRS Report R45347, Tax Provisions That Expired in 2017 ("Tax Extenders") . Exclusion for Canceled Mortgage Debt Historically, when all or part of a taxpayer's mortgage debt has been forgiven, the forgiven amount has been included in the taxpayer's gross income for tax purposes. This income is typically referred to as canceled mortgage debt income. During the housing market turmoil of the late 2000s, some efforts to help troubled borrowers avoid foreclosure resulted in canceled mortgage debt. The Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007 ( P.L. 110-142 ), signed into law in December 2007, temporarily excluded qualified canceled mortgage debt income associated with a primary residence from taxation. The provision was originally effective for debt discharged before January 1, 2010, and was subsequently extended several times. Rationales put forth when the provision was originally enacted included minimizing hardship for distressed households, lessening the risk that nontax homeownership retention efforts would be thwarted by tax policy, and assisting in the recoveries of the housing market and overall economy. Arguments against the exclusion at the time included concerns that it makes debt forgiveness more attractive for homeowners, which could encourage homeowners to be less responsible about fulfilling debt obligations, and concerns about fairness given that the ability to realize the benefits depends on a variety of factors. More recently, because the economy, housing market, and foreclosure rates have improved significantly since the height of the housing and mortgage market turmoil, the exclusion may no longer be warranted. For more information on the exclusion for canceled mortgage debt, see CRS Report RL34212, Analysis of the Tax Exclusion for Canceled Mortgage Debt Income . Deductibility of Mortgage Insurance Premiums Traditionally, homeowners have been able to deduct the interest paid on their mortgage, as well as property taxes they pay, as long as they itemize their tax deductions. Beginning in 2007, homeowners could also deduct qualifying mortgage insurance premiums as a result of the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 ( P.L. 109-432 ). Specifically, homeowners could effectively treat qualifying mortgage insurance premiums as mortgage interest, thus making the premiums deductible if homeowners itemized and their adjusted gross incomes were below a specified threshold ($55,000 for single, $110,000 for married filing jointly). Originally, the deduction was to be available only for 2007, but it was subsequently extended several times. Two possible rationales for allowing the deduction of mortgage insurance premiums are that it assisted in the recovery of the housing market, and that it promotes homeownership. The housing market, however, has largely recovered from the market turmoil of the late 2000s, and it is not clear that the deduction has an effect on the homeownership rate. Furthermore, to the degree that owner-occupied housing is over subsidized, extending the deduction could lead to a greater misallocation of the resources that are directed toward the housing industry. Housing-Related Tax Extenders In the past, Congress has regularly extended a number of temporary tax provisions that address a variety of policy issues, including certain provisions related to housing. This set of temporary provisions is commonly referred to as "tax extenders." Two housing-related provisions that have been included in tax extenders packages recently are (1) the exclusion for canceled mortgage debt, and (2) the deduction for mortgage insurance premiums, each of which is discussed further below. The most recently enacted tax extenders legislation was the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 ( P.L. 115-123 ) in the 115 th Congress. That law extended the exclusion for canceled mortgage debt and the ability to deduct mortgage insurance premiums through the end of 2017 (each had previously expired at the end of 2016). As of the date of this report, these provisions had not been extended beyond 2017. In the 116 th Congress, S. 617 , the Tax Extender and Disaster Relief Act of 2019, would extend each of these provisions through calendar year 2019. For more information on tax extenders in general, see CRS Report R45347, Tax Provisions That Expired in 2017 ("Tax Extenders") . Exclusion for Canceled Mortgage Debt Historically, when all or part of a taxpayer's mortgage debt has been forgiven, the forgiven amount has been included in the taxpayer's gross income for tax purposes. This income is typically referred to as canceled mortgage debt income. During the housing market turmoil of the late 2000s, some efforts to help troubled borrowers avoid foreclosure resulted in canceled mortgage debt. The Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007 ( P.L. 110-142 ), signed into law in December 2007, temporarily excluded qualified canceled mortgage debt income associated with a primary residence from taxation. The provision was originally effective for debt discharged before January 1, 2010, and was subsequently extended several times. Rationales put forth when the provision was originally enacted included minimizing hardship for distressed households, lessening the risk that nontax homeownership retention efforts would be thwarted by tax policy, and assisting in the recoveries of the housing market and overall economy. Arguments against the exclusion at the time included concerns that it makes debt forgiveness more attractive for homeowners, which could encourage homeowners to be less responsible about fulfilling debt obligations, and concerns about fairness given that the ability to realize the benefits depends on a variety of factors. More recently, because the economy, housing market, and foreclosure rates have improved significantly since the height of the housing and mortgage market turmoil, the exclusion may no longer be warranted. For more information on the exclusion for canceled mortgage debt, see CRS Report RL34212, Analysis of the Tax Exclusion for Canceled Mortgage Debt Income . Deductibility of Mortgage Insurance Premiums Traditionally, homeowners have been able to deduct the interest paid on their mortgage, as well as property taxes they pay, as long as they itemize their tax deductions. Beginning in 2007, homeowners could also deduct qualifying mortgage insurance premiums as a result of the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 ( P.L. 109-432 ). Specifically, homeowners could effectively treat qualifying mortgage insurance premiums as mortgage interest, thus making the premiums deductible if homeowners itemized and their adjusted gross incomes were below a specified threshold ($55,000 for single, $110,000 for married filing jointly). Originally, the deduction was to be available only for 2007, but it was subsequently extended several times. Two possible rationales for allowing the deduction of mortgage insurance premiums are that it assisted in the recovery of the housing market, and that it promotes homeownership. The housing market, however, has largely recovered from the market turmoil of the late 2000s, and it is not clear that the deduction has an effect on the homeownership rate. Furthermore, to the degree that owner-occupied housing is over subsidized, extending the deduction could lead to a greater misallocation of the resources that are directed toward the housing industry.

The 116th Congress may consider a variety of housing-related issues. These could include topics related to housing finance, federal housing assistance programs, and housing-related tax provisions, among other things. Particular issues that may be of interest during the Congress include the following: The status of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, two government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) that have been in conservatorship since 2008. Congress might consider comprehensive housing finance reform legislation to resolve the status of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Furthermore, a new director for the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's regulator and conservator, was sworn in on April 15, 2019. Congress may take an interest in any administrative changes that FHFA might make to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac under new leadership. Appropriations for federal housing programs, including programs at the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and rural housing programs administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), particularly in light of discretionary budget caps that are currently scheduled to decrease for FY2020. Oversight of the implementation of certain changes to federal assisted housing programs that were enacted in prior Congresses, such as expansions of HUD's Moving to Work (MTW) program and Rental Assistance Demonstration (RAD) program. Considerations related to housing and the federal response to major disasters, including oversight of the implementation of certain changes related to Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) assistance that were enacted in the previous Congress. Consideration of legislation related to certain federal housing programs that provide assistance to Native Americans living in tribal areas. Consideration of legislation to extend certain temporary tax provisions that are currently expired, including housing-related provisions that provide a tax exclusion for canceled mortgage debt and allow for the deductibility of mortgage insurance premiums, respectively. Housing and mortgage market conditions provide context for these and other issues that Congress may consider, although housing markets are local in nature and national housing market indicators do not necessarily accurately reflect conditions in specific communities. On a national basis, some key characteristics of owner-occupied housing markets and the mortgage market in recent years include increasing housing prices, low mortgage interest rates, and home sales that have been increasing but constrained by a limited inventory of homes on the market. Key characteristics of rental housing markets include an increasing number of renters, low rental vacancy rates, and increasing rents. Rising home prices and rents that have outpaced income growth in recent years have led to policymakers and others increasingly raising concerns about the affordability of both owner-occupied and rental housing. Affordability challenges are most prominent among the lowest-income renter households, reflecting a shortage of rental housing units that are both affordable and available to this population.

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Overview The existence and treatment of political prisoners in Burma (Myanmar) has been a central issue in the formulation of U.S. policy toward Burma for more than 25 years. The arrest, detention, prosecution, and imprisonment of Burmese political prisoners—including Aung San Suu Kyi —frequently were cited as reasons for imposing political and economic sanctions on Burma and the leaders of its ruling military junta. The release of political prisoners was often listed as a necessary condition for the repeal of those sanctions. When announcing waivers of existing sanctions, the Obama Administration often cited progress on the release of political prisoners as evidence for why the waiver was warranted. During a discussion of the human rights situation in Burma during the 34 th session of the U.N. Human Rights Council in March 2017, William J. Mozdzierz, Director of the Office of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs within the State Department's Bureau of International Organization Affairs, stated that the U.S. government was "concerned by new political arrests under the current [Burmese] government," and urged "the [Burmese] government to immediately and unconditionally release all political prisoners, and to drop charges against individuals for taking part in protected political activities." What actions, if any, the 116 th Congress or the Trump Administration may take with respect to U.S. policy toward Burma may hinge, in part, on the issue of political prisoners in Burma. Eight years have passed since Burma's ruling military junta, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), transferred power over to a newly reconstituted Union Parliament and President Thein Sein, a retired general and the SPDC's last Prime Minister. In 2016, Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy (NLD) assumed control over the Union Parliament after NLD's landslide victory in the 2015 parliamentary elections. Although both the Thein Sein and NLD-led governments periodically pardoned political prisoners, authorities continue to arrest, detain, prosecute, and imprison people for peacefully expressing their political opinions. One reason that controversy over political imprisonment persists in Burma is the lack of agreement on the definition of "political prisoner." Some in Burma would restrict the definition to "prisoners of conscience"; others prefer a broader definition that would include persons who took up arms against the SPDC and the Burmese military. Efforts to forge an official definition for political prisoners during the Thein Sein government were unsuccessful. So far, the NLD-led government has made little progress on the definition issue. A second reason the issue of political imprisonment persists in Burma is the existence of many laws—some dating back to the time of British colonial rule—that restrict freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom of the press. Various human rights organizations have identified Burmese laws that violate international standards on these freedoms. Because these laws remain in force, Burmese security personnel can arrest, detain, and prosecute people for their political views. Burma's courts have also shown a willingness to convict people for their political views. During the Thein Sein government, the Union Parliament made some progress on legal reform, but also passed new laws that some observers maintain restrict political expression. Since the NLD took control of the Union Parliament, little progress has been made on repealing or revising Burma's questionable laws. A third reason the issue of political imprisonment persists in Burma has to do with who holds administrative authority over Burma's criminal cases. All security forces in Burma—including the military (or Tatmadaw), the Myanmar Police Force (MPF), the Border Guard Police, and local militias—directly or indirectly report to the Tatmadaw's Commander-in-Chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, and not to President Win Myint or the Union Parliament. As a result, people will continue to be arrested for political expression, in accordance with existing Burmese laws, so long as Min Aung Hlaing supports such a policy. President Win Myint does have authority over the prosecution of criminal offenses and the power to grant amnesty to convicted criminals. If addressing political imprisonment remains a priority in U.S. policy toward Burma, then the 116 th Congress and the Administration could consider several options, such as reimposing sanctions and restrictions previously waived, or providing assistance in repealing or revising problematic laws or the provisions in the 2008 constitution. However, it may be useful for such options to be evaluated in the context of and with consideration of the possible impact on other priorities in U.S. relations with Burma, including: the creation of a democratically elected civilian government in Burma; the protection of the human rights of the people of Burma; progress toward greater economic prosperity for the people of Burma; and the establishment of direct civilian control over the Tatmadaw and the rest of Burma's security forces. Current Status of Political Prisoners in Burma The number of political prisoners in Burma fluctuates over time, depending on the termination of prison sentences, the status of pending trials, and the arrest and detention of new alleged political prisoners by Burma's security forces. The number also varies depending on which definition of "political prisoner" is used when categorizing cases. The figures released by the Assistance Association of Political Prisoners (Burma), or AAPP(B), in its monthly report on political prisoners are widely used by the Burmese media, the international press, and the State Department, as a comparatively reliable estimate of the number of political prisoners in Burma. The AAPP(B) is a nonprofit human rights organization formed in 2000 by former Burmese political prisoners. For over a decade, the AAPP(B) has released a monthly report on the number of political prisoners in Burma, based on its definition of political prisoner (see " Definition of Political Prisoners " below) and its network of researchers who monitor Burma's security system for information on alleged political prisoner arrests, detentions, trials, and incarceration. The monthly reports include a description of related events of the past month and a detailed list containing the names, alleged violation, prison (where applicable), sentence (where applicable), and political affiliation (if any) of each political prisoner. According to the AAPP(B), there were 331 political prisoners in Burma as of the end of April 2019. Of those, 48 were serving prison sentences, 90 were being held in detention awaiting trial, and 193 were awaiting trial outside of prison (see Figure 1 ). The number of political prisoners in Burma declined sharply after the NLD-led government took power in April 2016, but has been gradually increasing since June 2017, setting aside the anticipated downturn following the Myanmar New Year's presidential pardons. In addition, the number of political prisoners serving sentences or being detained while awaiting trial has slowly risen over the last year. Political Prisoners and the NLD-Led Government The success of Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy (NLD) in Burma's 2015 parliamentary elections raised the hopes of many in Burma that the arrest and detention of political prisoners would soon come to an end. During his term in office (2011-2016), former President Thein Sein promised to release all "prisoners of conscience" and at one point pledged that there would be no more "prisoners of conscience" in Burmese prisons by the end of 2014. According to most observers, he failed to fulfill his pledge. In January 2016, an NLD spokesperson told the press that the new government once in power would adopt an official definition of "political prisoner" and "would not arrest anyone as political prisoners." The spokesperson also stated that the NLD-led government "can control the arresting of political prisoners in accordance with existing laws," but did not elaborate on how that would be accomplished. Prisoner Releases Soon after assuming office in April 2016, former President Htin Kyaw and State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi took steps to secure the release of nearly 235 political prisoners. On April 7, 2016, the Office of the State Counsellor announced that "releasing prisoners of conscience who are behind bars for their involvement in peaceful political activities is one of the priorities of the new government." The following day, Aung San Suu Kyi ordered that charges be dropped for 114 people facing charges for their participation in a peaceful protest against a proposed National Education Bill. On April 16, 2016—Burma's traditional New Year—President Htin Kyaw issued Order 33/2016 granting amnesty to 83 political prisoners. The amnesty was reportedly granted to "make people feel happy and peaceful, and (promote) national reconciliation during the New Year." According to the Ministry of Home Affairs, between April and mid-August 2016, the NLD-led government released 457 people facing trial for political activity, and 274 political cases were closed. On May 23, 2017, President Htin Kyaw granted amnesty to 259 prisoners in recognition of the second 21 st Century Panglong Peace Conference, held on May 24-29, 2017. On April 17, 2018, current President Win Myint pardoned 8,541 prisoners, including 36 political prisoners. In its comments on the April pardons, AAPP(B) stated the following: In light of the Presidential pardons, persecuting journalists for seeking the truth and others for speaking leaves a bitter taste in the mouth, particularly considering NLD's broken promise, made in 2016, that it would release all political prisoners when it came to power. President Win Myint has issued three separate prisoner pardons in 2019. On April 17, 2019, he granted amnesty to 9,551 prisoners, of which 2 were considered political prisoners according to AAPP(B). On April 26, 2019, 6,948 additional prisoners received a presidential pardon. On May 7, 2019, President Win Myint pardoned 6,520 prisoners, bringing the total for the year to 23,019. According to AAPP(B), the three releases in 2019 included 20 political prisoners. The most prominent among them were the journalists Kyaw Soe Oo and Wa Lone. The released political prisoners also included 6 individuals imprisoned under the Unlawful Associations Act for their alleged association with one of Burma's ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), 5 people sentenced for violations of the Telecommunications Law, and 4 persons convicted of violating Penal Code 505(b). These three laws are among a number of Burmese laws that have been identified as unduly restricting human rights and civil liberties (see " Problematic Laws "). According to a spokesperson from the State Counsellor's Office, 27 people with affiliations with three EAOs—the All Burma Students' Democratic Front (ABSDF), the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS) and the Shan State Progressive Party (SSPP)—were released as part of peace and national reconciliation efforts. Continuing Arrests and Trials of Political Prisoners In between the episodic presidential pardons, the NLD-led government has continued to arrest, detain, try, and convict individuals for political reasons using various laws, some of which date back to British colonial rule (see " Problematic Laws "). According to the AAPP(B), 25 of the 48 political prisoners serving sentences as of the end of April 2019 were convicted under the Unlawful Association Act of 1908 for their alleged association with a prohibited EAO. Another 4 people were imprisoned under Section 505(b) of the Penal Code, which makes it illegal to "cause fear or alarm to the public." In addition, 5 of those in prison were convicted for violating Section 66(d) of the Telecommunications Act of 2013 for allegedly "using a telecommunication network to extort, threaten, obstruct, defame, disturb, inappropriately influence or intimidate." Three cases in particular have garnered strong international responses. The first case involves a former "child soldier," Aung Ko Htwe, who was arrested and convicted in March 2018 for violation of Section 505(b) of the Penal Code. The second concerns the arrest and conviction on September 3, 2018, of two Reuters reporters, Kyaw Soe Oo and Wa Lone, for violating the Official Secrets Act of 1923. Kyaw Soe Oo and Wa Lone were granted presidential pardons on May 7 2019; Aung Ko Ktwe remains in prison. The third case pertains to the December 2, 2018, convictions of Lum Zawng, Nang Pu, and Zau Jet, for their alleged defamation of the Burmese military during peaceful protests in Mytkyina, the capital of Kachin State, in April 2018. The Case of Aung Ko Htwe Aung Ko Htwe claims he was kidnapped and enlisted in the Burmese Army in 2005 at the age of 10. In 2008, he deserted, but was soon arrested and charged with murder; he was convicted and sentenced to death, but his sentence was commuted to 10 years by Commander-in-Chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. Following an August 10, 2017, interview with Radio Free Asia (RFA) in which he recounted his alleged kidnapping and enlistment, he was arrested and charged with violating Section 505(b) of the Penal Code that makes it illegal to "cause fear or alarm to the public." On March 28, 2018, Aung Ko Htwe was convicted and sentenced to two years imprisonment with hard labor. In addition, he was sentenced to six months in prison in February 2018 for criticizing the judge presiding over his trial. On October 30, 2018, he was acquitted of subsequent charges arising from his trial. He remains in prison, serving out the rest of his term. The Case of Kyaw Soe Oo and Wa Lone Kyaw Soe Oo and Wa Lone are reporters for Reuters who broke the story in February 2018 about the murder of 10 Rohingya by Tatmadaw soldiers in Inn Din village during the "clearance operations" in Rakhine State (see text box). On December 17, 2017—two months before their story was published—they were arrested for allegedly violating the Official Secrets Act of 1923. The next day, Acting President Myint Swe granted Lieutenant Colonel Yu Naing the authority to press charges under the Official Secrets Act and Burma's Information Ministry announced their arrest and detention for "possessing important and secret government documents related to Rakhine State and security forces (with the intent) to send them to a foreign news agency." The trial of Kyaw Soe Oo and Wa Lone lasted over eight months and was full of conflicting and unusual testimony. On February 6, 2018, a police lieutenant informed the court that he burned all his notes pertaining to the case. On April 20, 2018, prosecution witness Captain Moe Yan Naing testified that police Brigadier General Tin Ko Ko ordered him and other police officers to entrap the two reporters by giving them "secret documents" as part of a sting operation. After his testimony, Captain Moe Yan Naing was arrested and sentenced to one year in prison for violating the Police Disciplinary Act. On September 3, 2018, Kyaw Soe Oo and Wa Lone were convicted of violating the Official Secrets Act and sentenced to seven years in prison. The U.S. Embassy in Burma released the following statement: Today's conviction of journalists Wa Lone and Kyaw Soe Oo under the Official Secrets Act is deeply troubling for all who support press freedom and the transition toward democracy in Myanmar. The American people have long stood with the people of Myanmar in support of democracy, and we continue to support civilian rule and those advocating for freedom, reform, and human rights in Myanmar. The clear flaws in this case raise serious concerns about rule of law and judicial independence in Myanmar, and the reporters' conviction is a major setback to the Government of Myanmar's stated goal of expanding democratic freedoms. We urge the Government of Myanmar to release Wa Lone and Kyaw Soe Oo immediately, and to end the arbitrary prosecution of journalists doing their jobs. Then-U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley also released a statement about the convictions, stating the following: It is clear to all that the Burmese military has committed vast atrocities. In a free country, it is the duty of a responsible press to keep people informed and hold leaders accountable. The conviction of two journalists for doing their job is another terrible stain on the Burmese government. We will continue to call for their immediate and unconditional release. Other governments, including the European Union and the United Kingdom, as well as many human rights organizations, also issued statements calling for the immediate release of Kyaw Soe Oo and Wa Lone. On April 23, 2019, Burma's Supreme Court upheld the convictions and sentences imposed on Kyaw Soe Oo and Wa Lone. The following day, the State Department issued a press statement, indicating that the Court's decision "sends a profoundly negative signal about freedom of expression and the protection of journalists in Burma." The statement also urged Burma "to protect hard-earned freedoms, prevent further backsliding on recent democratic gains, and reunite these journalists with their families." Kyaw Soe Oo and Wa Lone were among the 6,520 prisoners granted a pardon on May 7, 2019. The Case of Lum Zawng, Nang Pu, and Zau Jet On April 30, 2018, peaceful protests were held in Myitkyina, the capital of Kachin State to demand that the Tatmadaw and the NLD-led government take steps to provide assistance to an estimated 2,000 people displaced by fighting between the Tatmadaw and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA). On September 3, 2018, Lum Zawng, Nang Pu, and Zau Jet were arrested for alleged violations of Section 500 of the Penal Code, defamation of the Burmese military. The three activists supposedly made inaccurate and derogatory statements about the Burmese military during the protests in Myitkyina and in a press conference the following day. On December 7, 2018, Lum Zawng, Nang Pu, and Zau Jet were convicted and sentenced to six months in jail. A number of embassies, including the U.S. Embassy in Rangoon, as well as several human rights organizations criticized the convictions and called for the immediate release of the three activists. Nang Pu was released from prison on March 29, 2019, for health reasons. Lum Zawng and Zau Jet were granted pardons on April 26, 2019. Definition of Political Prisoners One factor complicating the end of political prisoners in Burma is a lack of agreement on the definition of a political prisoner. While the concept of political prisoner has a long history, there is no single international standard for defining political prisoners. Prisoners detained for political reasons are afforded some protection by international agreements, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The State Department's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor considers someone a political prisoner if 1. the person is incarcerated in accordance with a law that is, on its face, illegitimate; the law may be illegitimate if the defined offense either impermissibly restricts the exercise of a human right; or is based on race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular group; 2. the person is incarcerated pursuant to a law that is on its face legitimate, where the incarceration is based on false charges where the underlying motivation is based on race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular group; or 3. the person is incarcerated for politically motivated acts, pursuant to a law that is on its face legitimate, but who receives unduly harsh and disproportionate treatment or punishment because of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular group; this definition generally does not include those who, regardless of their motivation, have gone beyond advocacy and dissent to commit acts of violence. In applying this definition, the State Department recognizes that being accused of violent acts and committing violent acts are two different matters, and considers the circumstances pertaining to a particular person when determining whether she or he is to be considered a political prisoner. Following a human rights dialogue with the Thein Sein government in January 2015, the State Department issued a press release that included the statement, "The United States [government] expressed the need to adopt consensus definitions of 'prisoner of conscience' and 'political prisoner' as a basis to review cases." In Burma, one of the more critical issues in defining political prisoners is whether or not to include individuals who have been detained for their alleged association with Burma's ethnic-based militias or their associated political parties. Because these militias periodically have been involved in armed conflict with the Burmese military, some analysts exclude detainees allegedly associated with the militias from their estimates of Burma's political prisoners. Ex-President Thein Sein consistently confined his definition to include only "prisoners of conscience," and generally used that phrase when discussing the issue. He repeatedly stated that individuals who have committed criminal acts are not considered "prisoners of conscience," and are expected to serve out their prison sentences. Similarly, Aung San Suu Kyi and Burma's military leaders prefer to restrict the definition of political prisoner to only include "prisoners of conscience." Some international groups, such as Amnesty International (AI), also use a narrower definition that emphasizes so-called "prisoners of conscience." The AAPP(B) and Human Rights Watch (HRW) use a broader definition of political prisoner. The AAPP(B) defines a political prisoner as "anyone who is arrested because of his or her perceived or real involvement in or supporting role in opposition movements with peaceful or resistance means." The AAPP(B) rejects the limitation of political prisoners to "prisoners of conscience" for several reasons. First, the AAPP(B) maintains that Burmese security forces frequently detain political dissidents with false allegations that they committed violent or nonpolitical crimes. Restricting the definition to "prisoners of conscience" would exclude many political prisoners. Second, the AAPP(B) maintains that the decision to participate in armed resistance against the government in Naypyidaw should be "viewed with the backdrop of violent crimes committed by the state, particularly against ethnic minorities." In short, the AAPP(B) views armed struggle as a reasonable form of political opposition given the severity of the violence perpetrated by the Burmese military and police. The Political Prisoners Review Committee (PPRC, also known as the Political Prisoner Scrutiny Committee), set up by former Burmese President Thein Sein, reportedly attempted to develop a consensus definition of political prisoners. Bo Kyi, the committee's AAPP(B) representative, told the press in May 2013 that the 19 members had agreed to a definition, but that the Thein Sein government did not formally adopt the definition. On August 17 and 18, 2014, AAPP(B) and the FPPS held a workshop in Rangoon to discuss a common definition of political prisoners and to open a discussion with the Thein Sein government and Burma's Union Parliament on the topic. Representatives of various Burmese organizations and political parties, as well as the International Committee of the Red Cross, attended the workshop. The attendees at the conference agreed to the following definition of political prisoner: Anyone who is arrested, detained, or imprisoned for political reasons under political charges or wrongfully under criminal and civil charges because of his or her perceived or known active role, perceived or known supporting role, or in association with activities promoting freedom, justice, equality, human rights, and civil and political rights, including ethnic rights, is defined as a political prisoner. The adopted statement of the conferees further explained: The above definition relates to anyone who is arrested, detained, or imprisoned because of his or her perceived or known active role, perceived or known supporting role, or in association with political activities (including armed resistance but excluding terrorist activities), in forming organizations, both individually and collectively, making public speeches, expressing beliefs, organizing or initiating movements through writing, publishing, or distributing documents, or participating in peaceful demonstrations to express dissent and denunciation against the stature and activities of both the Union and state level executive, legislative, judicial, or other administrative bodies established under the constitution or under any previously existing law. Following the workshop, a Member of Parliament from Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD) reportedly said that the NLD would submit a proposed definition of political prisoner to the Union Parliament. Since the NLD has assumed power, different voices have called for establishing a legal definition of political prisoners. In their May 2016 report cited above, the AAPP(B) and FPPS recommended that the NLD-led government adopt an internationally recognized definition of political prisoners. On June 2, 2016, Pe Than, an Arakan National Party (ANP) member of the Union Parliament's lower house, spoke on the chamber's floor in support of adopting legal definitions of "political prisoners" and "political offenses" to protect political activists. Deputy Minister of Home Affairs General Aung Soe voiced his ministry's opposition to Pe Than's proposal, stating that providing special treatment to political prisoners would discriminate against other people arrested for alleged violations of the law. In addition, human rights abuses by the government against two segments of Burmese society also have been raised in association with the issue of political prisoners. First, allegations of corruption among local Burmese officials are fairly common, with officials reportedly frequently using their official power to detain people on falsified charges in order to confiscate property (particularly land) or otherwise exact revenge on their opponents. In addition, officials have reportedly used provisions in old and new laws to arrest and detain people protesting alleged violations of their legal rights by those very same officials. These reported abuses of power by officials have been portrayed as creating a special group of "political prisoners." Second, past governments in Burma singled out the Rohingya, a predominately Muslim ethnic minority residing in northern Rakhine State along the border with Bangladesh, and allegedly subjected them to more extensive and invasive political repression, including restrictions on movement, employment, education, and marriage. The NLD-led government has done little to reverse the previous practice of discrimination against the Rohinyga. Problematic Laws Burma's 2008 Constitution provides for the continued authority of any laws promulgated prior to the adoption of the Constitution, unless they contravene provisions in the Constitution or are superseded by laws passed by the Union Parliament. As a result, many comparatively repressive laws, including some dating back to British colonial rule, remain in force in Burma. Over the last six years, the Union Parliament has repealed or amended some of the more problematic laws, but has also passed new laws that some observers view as being similarly repressive of human rights. Burma's security forces, and in particular, the Myanmar Police Force, have used these laws to suppress the voices of political opposition in Burma. In its monthly report on political prisoners, the AAPP(B) includes information on which laws were allegedly violated. The following laws are those most frequently cited in the AAPP(B) monthly reports: The Unlawful Associations Act of 1908 —Section 17(1) states that association with any organization that the President declares illegal is punishable by two to three years' imprisonment, along with a possible fine. Under Section 17(2), managing an unlawful association or promoting its meetings is subject to three to five years of imprisonment, and a possible fine. This law has been frequently used to declare ethnic armed organizations and their militias "unlawful associations." As of December 2016, at least 72 people were serving sentences for alleged violations of this act. The Telecommunications Law of 2013 —Section 66(d) subjects anyone found "[e]xtorting, coercing, restraining wrongfully, defaming, disturbing, causing undue influence or threatening to any person by using any Telecommunications Network" to up to three years in prison and/or a fine. This law is being used to arrest and try political commentators and journalists who criticize government policy, government officials, or the Tatmadaw on social media. The AAPP(B) has compiled a list of 37 Section 66(d) cases since October 2015, including 10 convictions. The Right to Peaceful Assembly and Peaceful Procession Act of 2011 (as amended in 2016) —The law places restrictions on the freedom of assembly and expression inconsistent international human rights laws and standards. Violators of the law are subject to up to two years in prison and/or a fine. This law has reportedly been used to arrest and try people protesting against alleged illegal land confiscations by local officials and the Tatmadaw, as well as individuals rallying in opposition to other actions by the Burmese government and the military. On July 15, 2015, the U.S. Embassy in Rangoon issued a statement indicating, "The United States is concerned over continued reports or arrests and excessive prison terms handed down to peaceful protesters under Article 18 of the Peace Assembly and Processions Act." Section s 505(a) and 505(b) of the Penal Code —These sections make it illegal to publish or circulate statements that either cause or is likely to cause "any officer, soldier, sailor, or airman, in the Army, Navy or Airforce to mutiny or otherwise disregard or fail in his duty" [Section 505(a)] or "fear or alarm to the public or to any section of the public whereby any person may be induced to commit an offence against the State or against the public tranquility" [Section 505(b)]. This law is frequently used against journalists who publish stories that contradict or question official accounts of events in Burma, particularly those associated with the nation's ongoing low-grade civil war. In April 2016, Burma's Legal Affairs and Special Cases Assessment Commission, a governmental body established by Burma's Union Parliament, recommended that 142 laws be repealed or amended, including some that have been used to suppress political opposition and expression. The commission recommended abolishing the Emergency Provisions Act of 1950 (which made it illegal to engage in activities that hindered the ability of the government or the military to perform their duties) and Section 505(b) of the Penal Code (which makes it illegal to circulate, make, or publish any statement, rumor, or report "with intent to cause, or which is likely to cause, fear or alarm to the public or to any section of the public whereby any person may be induced to commit an offence against the State or against the public tranquility"), as well as amend Article 18 of the Peace Assembly and Processions Act. In January 2016, the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), a federation of over 180 international human rights organizations, called on the incoming Union Parliament to repeal or amend several laws enacted by the outgoing Union Parliament. The laws identified by FIDH included the Right to Peaceful Assembly and Peaceful Procession Act of 2011; the Telecommunications Act of 2013; the Printing and Publications Act of 2014; the Media Act of 2014; and the four so-called "Race and Religion Protection Laws" of 2015 (the Interfaith Marriage Law, the Monogamy Law, the Population Control Law, and the Religious Conversion Law), which are seen as discriminating against Burma's Muslim population. Human Rights Watch issued a report in 2016, entitled "They Can Arrest You at Any Time: The Criminalization of Peaceful Expression in Burma," that also cited these laws as tools of political oppression, as well as several others, including the Electronic Transactions Act of 2004; the Official Secrets Act of 1923; and various sections of the Penal Code (Sections 124A, 130B, 141-147, 153A, 295A, 298, 503, 405, 505(b), 505(c), and 509). Since taking office in January 2016, the NLD-led Union Parliament has made some efforts to repeal or amend a few of the problematic laws. In May 2016, the Union Parliament revoked the State Protection Act of 1975, which allowed the government to declare a State of Emergency and to suspend citizens' basic rights. In October 2016, it repealed the Emergency Provisions Act of 1950, which effectively prohibited criticism of the Tatmadaw or the government. In December 2016, proposals were submitted to amend Section 66(d) of the Telecommunications Act of 2013, but they have not been approved. Civilian Government Authority over Criminal Cases Under Burma's 2008 constitution, the President has limited authority over the arrest and detention of people for alleged criminal activity; the Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services controls the security forces that make arrests. In part as a result, people in Burma continue to be arrested and convicted for their political activities. The President, however, can direct that pending cases be dropped, as well as grant pardons and amnesties once people have been convicted. Burma's 2008 constitution stipulates "All the armed forces in the Union shall be under the command of the Defence Services" (Article 338) and "The Defence Services shall lead in safeguarding the Union against all internal and external dangers" (Article 339). The Commander-in-Chief is to be appointed by the President, "with the proposal and approval of the National Defence and Security Council" (Article 342). Article 20(c) states, "The Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Services is the Supreme Commander of all armed forces." Burma's Defence Services includes the Myanmar Armed Forces (or Tatmadaw), the Border Guard Forces, and the Myanmar Police Force. The Myanmar Armed Forces and the Border Guard Forces are part of the Ministry for Defence; the Myanmar Police Force are part of the Ministry for Home Affairs. Article 232(b)(ii) of the 2008 constitution requires the President "obtain a list of suitable Defence Services personnel nominated by the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Services for Ministries of Defence, Home Affairs and Border Affairs," thereby requiring that those Ministers be active military personnel and giving the Commander-in-Chief authority over who is selected as Minister of Defence, Home Affairs, and Border Affairs. As a result, the Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services has authority over Burma's security forces and, by extension, over the arrest and detention of persons who allegedly have violated the law. Once arrests have been made, the cases are directed to Burma's attorney general, who is appointed by the president (subject to the approval of the Union Parliament) and reports directly to the president. Public prosecutors, appointed at the local level and under the attorney general's authority, are responsible for prosecuting criminal cases. As such, the president does have the authority to direct the attorney general and the public prosecutors to drop charges considered political in nature. In April 2016, State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi exercised such authority to secure the release of over 100 people being detained for participation in peaceful protests. Article 204 of the constitution gives the president the power to grant pardons and amnesties (in accord with the recommendation of the National Defence and Security Council). In addition, Section 401(1) of Burma's Code of Criminal Procedures states the following: When any person has been sentenced to punishment for an offence, the President of the Union may at any time, without conditions or upon any conditions which the person sentenced accepts, suspend the execution of his sentence or remit the whole or any part of the punishment to which he has been sentenced. The authority to grant pardons and amnesties was used several times by former Presidents Thein Sein and Htin Kyaw, and has been used by current President Win Myint. Pending Legislation The Burma Political Prisoners Assistance Act (BPPAA, H.R. 2327 ) was introduced on April 15, 2019, by Representatives Andy Levin and Ann Wagner. It would call for immediate release of Kyaw Soe Oo, Lum Zawng, Nang Pu,Wa Lone, and Zau Jet (all five have been released or granted pardons since the bill's introduction). The legislation would also state that it is U.S. policy that (1) all prisoners of conscience and political prisoners in Burma be "unconditionally and immediately released"; (2) the Administration and the Department of State "should use all their diplomatic tools" to ensure such a release occurs; and (3) the NLD-led government should "repeal or amend all laws that violate the rights to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly, or association." In addition, the BPPAA would require that the Secretary of State provide assistance to civil society organizations in Burma that "work to secure the release of prisoners of conscience and political prisoners in Burma," as well as assistance to current and former prisoners of conscience and political prisoners in Burma. That assistance shall include: Support for documentation of human rights violations with respect to prisoners of conscience and political prisoners; Support for awareness and advocacy in Burma on the issue of political prisoners; Support for efforts to repeal or amend laws that "are used to imprison individuals as either prisoners of conscience or political prisoners"; travel costs and legal fees for families of prisoners of conscience or political prisoners; post-incarceration assistance—including mental health and other health care, access to education and employment assistance, and other forms of reparation—for former prisoners of conscience or political prisoners; and the creation of an independent prisoner review mechanism in Burma. The BPPAA would also include definitions for prisoners of conscience and political prisoners. The legislation's definition of prisoners of conscience is similar to that used by Amnesty International. It would define political prisoners as any person: who is arrested, detained, or imprisoned for political reasons under political charges or wrongfully under criminal and civil charges because of his or her perceived or known active role in, perceived or known supporting role in, or perceived or known association with activities promoting freedom, justice, equality, human rights, or civil and political rights, including ethnic rights. Issues for U.S. Policy Some of the options that Congress may consider to address issues of political imprisonment in Burma include the following: Providing technical and other forms of assistance to the Union Parliament and the Ministry of Justice in identifying and revising those laws that have been or could be used to arrest and prosecute people for political reasons; Pressuring the NLD-led government to reevaluate and consider repealing laws or regulations that declare any of the ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) illegal under the Unlawful Associations Act of 1908; Supporting the reestablishment of a Political Prisoners Review Committee or a similar body to identify alleged political prisoners and develop an official definition of political prisoners; Imposing suitable restrictions on relations with Burma until all political prisoners have been unconditionally released; Conditioning the provision of certain types of assistance to the NLD-led government and/or the Tatmadaw contingent on the adoption of an official definition of political prisoner, and on the release of political prisoners; Imposing suitable restrictions on relations with Burma until sufficient reforms of Burma's security forces, including the Myanmar Police Force, have been undertaken to preclude or reduce the likelihood people will be arrested or prosecuted as political prisoners; and Including the absence of political prisoners in Burma as a criteria for determining that a democratic civilian government that respects human rights and civil liberties has been established in Burma, and that certain restrictions on bilateral relations can be removed. The presence of political prisoners in Burma is only one of several possible issues that Congress may consider when examining U.S. policy toward Burma. Other key issues may be as follows: The Low- G rade Civil War : Burma has endured a low-grade civil war between the Tatmadaw and up to 20 ethnic armed organizations for over 50 years. Aung San Suu Kyi has made the peace process a high priority for the NLD-led government, but the three "21 st Century Panglong Peace Conferences" (held on August 31-September 3, 2016, May 24-29, 2017, and July 11-16, 2018, respectively) have made little progress toward ending the long-standing conflict. Tatmadaw Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing announced a unilateral ceasefire in eastern Burma for the first half of 2019, but periodic fighting between the Tatmadaw and several EAOs continues to be reported. Violence in Rakhine State and the Rohingya Refugee Crisis : On August 25, 2017, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) attacked 30 security outposts along Burma's border with Bangladesh. The Tatmadaw responded with a "clearance operation" that resulted in the flight of over 700,000 Rohingya into Bangladesh. A United Nations Fact Finding Mission on Myanmar has recommended that the United Nations Security Council refer six Tatmadaw senior officers to the International Criminal Court for investigation and possible prosecution for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes for serious human rights abuses committed during the clearance operations. In December 2018, the Arakan Army began a campaign to establish bases in northern Rakhine State. The Tatmadaw responded by deploying heavily-armed troops into the region. Frequent fighting between the Arakan Army and the Tatmadaw continues to occur, complicating any plans of the safe and voluntary return of the Rohingya. Relations between the two major ethnic minorities residing in Rakhine State—the Rakhine (also known as Arakan) and the Rohingya—have been problematic for decades. In 1982, Burma's military junta stripped the Rohingya of their citizenship, and began portraying the vast majority of them as illegal immigrants from Bangladesh and India. Violent unrest broke out in Rakhine State in 2012, resulting in the deaths of at least 57 Rohingya and 31 Rakhine, and the displacement of an estimated 90,000 people, mostly Rohingya. In October 2016, after a group of assailants attacked three police outposts, the Tatmadaw began a "clearance operation" in northern Rakhine State that, according to the U.N. Office of High Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR), resulted in the murder, enforced disappearance, torture, rape, arbitrary detention, and forced deportation of hundreds of Rohingya. Constitutional and Legal Reform : During the parliamentary campaign, the NLD stated that it would seek to implement both constitutional and legal reforms aimed at establishing a more democratic government and protecting the human rights of the people of Burma. Some analysts note that, since taking office in April 2016, the NLD has made little progress on either campaign pledge.

Despite a campaign pledge that they "would not arrest anyone as political prisoners," Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy (NLD) have failed to fulfil this promise since they took control of Burma's Union Parliament and the government's executive branch in April 2016. While presidential pardons have been granted for some political prisoners, people continue to be arrested, detained, tried, and imprisoned for alleged violations of Burmese laws. According to the Assistance Association of Political Prisoners (Burma), or AAPP(B), a Thailand-based, nonprofit human rights organization formed in 2000 by former Burmese political prisoners, there were 331 political prisoners in Burma as of the end of April 2019. During its three years in power, the NLD government has provided pardons for Burma's political prisoners on six occasions. Soon after assuming office in April 2016, former President Htin Kyaw and State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi took steps to secure the release of nearly 235 political prisoners. On May 23, 2017, former President Htin Kyaw granted pardons to 259 prisoners, including 89 political prisoners. On April 17, 2018, current President Win Myint pardoned 8,541 prisoners, including 36 political prisoners. In April and May 2019, he pardoned more than 23,000 prisoners, of which the AAPP(B) considered 20 as political prisoners. Aung San Suu Kyi and her government, as well as the Burmese military, however, also have demonstrated a willingness to use Burma's laws to suppress the opinions of its political opponents and restrict press freedoms. The NLD-led government arrested two Reuters reporters who had reported on alleged murders of Rohingya by Tatmadaw soldiers, Kyaw Soe Oo and Wa Lone, in December 2017 and charged them with violating the Official Secrets Act of 1923. On September 3, 2018, the two reporters were sentenced to seven years in prison. Kyaw Soe Oo and Wa Lone were granted a presidential pardon on May 7, 2019, after serving 511 days in prison. In addition, Aung Ko Htwe was sentenced to two years in prison with hard labor on March 28, 2018, following his August 2017 interview with Radio Free Asia about his allegations that he was forced by the Tatmadaw to become a "child soldier." The Union Parliament has repealed or amended a few of the numerous laws that authorities use to arrest and prosecute people for political reasons, and further has passed new laws that some observers see as limiting political expression and protection of human rights. In addition, the Tatmadaw, which directly or indirectly control the nation's security forces (including the Myanmar Police Force), has not demonstrated an interest in ending Burma's history of political imprisonment. Tatmadaw leaders have brought multiple defamation cases against journalists who publish stories critical of Burma's military. The Burma Political Prisoners Assistance Act (H.R. 2327) would make it U.S. policy to support the immediate and unconditional release of "all prisoners of conscience and political prisoners in Burma," and require the Secretary of State to "provide assistance to civil society organizations in Burma that work to secure the release of prisoners of conscience and political prisoners in Burma." Congress may consider if and how to integrate concerns regarding political imprisonment into overall U.S. policy in Burma. Congress may also choose to assess how other important issues in Burma should influence U.S. policy, including efforts to end the nation's ongoing low-grade civil war, the forced deportation of more than 700,000 Rohingya from Rakhine State, and prospects for constitutional and legal reform designed to establish a democratically elected civilian government that respects the human rights and civil liberties of all Burmese people.

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Introduction Including the first woman to serve in 1917, a total of 365 women have been elected or appointed to serve in the U.S. Congress. That first woman was Jeannette Rankin (R-MT), who was elected on November 9, 1916, to the 65 th Congress (1917-March 4, 1919). Table 1 details this service by women in the House, Senate, and both chambers. The 116 th Congress began with 131 women. Table 2 shows that women account for 23.7% of voting Members in the House and Senate (127 of 535); 24.2% of total Members in the House and Senate (131 of 541, including the Delegates and Resident Commissioner); 23.4% of voting Representatives in the House (102 of 435); 24.0% of total Members in the House (106 of 441, including the Delegates and Resident Commissioner); and 25.0% of the Senate. This report includes historical information, including the (1) number and percentage of women in Congress over time; (2) means of entry to Congress; (3) comparisons to international and state legislatures; (4) records for tenure; (5) firsts for women in Congress; (6) African American, Asian Pacific, Hispanic American, and American Indian women in Congress; and (7) women in leadership. It also provides a brief overview of research questions related to the role and impact of women in Congress. For additional biographical information—including the names, committee assignments, dates of service, listings by Congress and state, and (for Representatives) congressional districts of the women who have served in Congress—see CRS Report RL30261, Women in Congress, 1917-2019: Service Dates and Committee Assignments by Member, and Lists by State and Congress , by Jennifer E. Manning and Ida A. Brudnick. Since the 65 th Congress (1917-1918), the number of women serving in Congress generally increased incrementally, and on a few occasions, decreased. In an exception to these incremental changes, the elections in 1992, which came to be known popularly as the "Year of the Woman," represented a jump in the number of women in Congress. As a result of this 1992 election, whereas the 102 nd Congress (1991-1992) concluded with 34 women, on the first day of the 103 rd Congress (1993-1994), the number of women in Congress increased 58.8%, to 54 women. More recently, the 115 th Congress concluded with 115 women, and on the first day of the 116 th Congress, the number of women in Congress increased 13.9%, to 131 women. Figure 1 shows the changes in the number of women serving in each Congress. For a table listing the total number of women who have served in each Congress, including information on turnover within a Congress, please see Table A-2 in the Appendix . Figure 2 shows division of men and women in Congress historically and in the 116 th Congress. As seen in Figure 3 , 49 states (all except Vermont), 4 territories (American Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands), and the District of Columbia have been represented by a woman in Congress at some time since 1917. Four states (Alaska, Mississippi, North Dakota, and Vermont) have never elected a woman to the House. Eighteen states have never been represented by a female Senator. Fourteen states have been represented by one female Senator, 12 have sent two, and 6 states have sent three. How Women Enter Congress: Regular Elections, Special Elections, and Appointments Pursuant to Article I, Section 2, clause 4 of the U.S. Constitution, all Representatives enter office through election, even those who enter after a seat becomes open during a Congress. By contrast, the Seventeenth Amendment to the Constitution, which was ratified on April 8, 1913, gives state legislatures the option to empower governors to fill Senate vacancies by temporary appointment. The 56 women who have served in the Senate entered initially through three different routes: 34 entered through regularly scheduled elections, 17 were appointed to unexpired terms, and 5 were elected by special election. As Figure 4 shows, approximately 70% (39) of all women who have served in the Senate initially entered Senate service by winning an election (regular or special). Approximately 30% of women Senators entered the Senate initially through an appointment. Of the 17 women who entered by appointment, 10 served less than one year. Since the ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment to the Constitution in 1913, nine years prior to the first appointment of a woman to fill a Senate vacancy, 200 Senators have been appointed. Of these appointees, 91.5% (183) have been men, and 8.5% (17) were women. Women in Congress as Compared with Women in Other Legislative Bodies International Perspective The current total percentage of voting female representation in Congress (23.7%) is slightly lower than averages of female representation in other countries. According to the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), as of January 1, 2019, women represented 24.3% of national legislative seats (both houses) across the entire world. In the IPU database of worldwide female representation, the United States ties for 78 th worldwide for women in the lower chamber. The Nordic countries (Sweden, Iceland, Finland, Denmark, and Norway) lead the world regionally with 42.3% female representation in national legislatures. State-House Perspective The percentage of women in Congress also is lower than the percentage of women holding seats in state legislatures. According to the Center for American Women and Politics, in 2019, "2,117, or 28.7% of the 7,383 state legislators in the United States are women. Women currently hold 504, or 25.6%, of the 1,972 state senate seats and 1,613, or 29.8%, of the 5,411 state house or assembly seats." Across the 50 states, the total seats held by women range from 13.8% in Mississippi to 50.8% in Nevada. Since the beginning of the 92 nd Congress (1971-1972), the first Congress for which comparative state legislature data are available, the total percentage of women in state legislatures has eclipsed the percentage of women in Congress (see Figure 5 ). The greatest disparity between the percentages of female voting representation in state legislatures as compared with Congress occurred in the early 1990s, when women comprised 6.0% of the total Congress in the 102 nd Congress (1991-1992), but 18.3% of state legislatures in 1991. The gap has since narrowed. Female Election Firsts in Congress First woman elected to Congress. Representative Jeannette Rankin (R-MT, 1917-1919, 1941-1943). First woman to serve in the Senate. Rebecca Latimer Felton (D-GA) was appointed in 1922 to fill the unexpired term of a Senator who had died in office. In addition to being the first female Senator, Mrs. Felton holds two other Senate records. Her tenure in the Senate remains the shortest ever (one day), and, at the age of 87, she is the oldest person ever to begin Senate service. First woman to succeed her spouse in the Senate and also the first female initially elected to a full six-year term. Hattie Caraway (D-AR, 1931-1945) was first appointed in 1931 to fill the vacancy caused by the death of her husband, Thaddeus H. Caraway (D-AR, House, 1913-1921; Senate, 1921-1931), and then was subsequently elected to two six-year terms. First woman elected to the Senate without having first been appointed to serve in that body and first woman to serve in both houses of Congress . Margaret Chase Smith (R-ME) was elected to the Senate and served from January 3, 1949, until January 3, 1973. She had previously served in the House (June 3, 1940, to January 3, 1949). First woman elected to the Senate without first having been elected to the House or having been elected or appointed to fill an unexpired Senate term. Nancy Landon Kassebaum (R-KS, 1979-1997). First woman elected Speaker of the House. As Speaker of the House in the 110 th and 111 th Congresses (2007-2010), Nancy Pelosi held the highest position of leadership ever by a woman in the U.S. government. She was elected Speaker again at the beginning of the 116 th Congress. Records for Length of Service Longest total length of service by a woman in Congress. Senator Barbara Mikulski (D-MD), who served from January 3, 1977, to January 3, 2017, holds this record (40 years, 10 of which were spent in the House). On March 17, 2012, Senator Mikulski surpassed the record previously held by Edith Nourse Rogers (R-MA). Longest length of service by a woman in the House. On March 18, 2018, currently serving Representative Marcy Kaptur (D-OH) surpassed the record previously held by Representative Rogers. Representative Kaptur has been serving in the House since January 3, 1983 (36 years). Representative Rogers served in the House for 35 years, from June 25, 1925, until her death on September 10, 1960. Longest length of service by a woman in the Senate. Senator Mikulski also holds the record for length of Senate service by a woman (30 years). In January 2011, she broke the service record previously held by Senator Margaret Chase Smith (R-ME), who served 24 years in the Senate and 8.6 years in the House. Women Who Have Served in Both Houses Sixteen women have served in both the House of Representatives and the Senate. Margaret Chase Smith (R-ME) was the first such woman, as well as the first woman elected to the Senate without first having been elected or appointed to fill a vacant Senate seat. She was first elected to the House to fill the vacancy caused by the death of her husband (Clyde Smith, R-ME, 1937-1940), and she served from June 10, 1940, until January 3, 1949, when she began her Senate service. She served in the Senate until January 3, 1973. African American Women in Congress Twenty-five African American women serve in the 116 th Congress, including 2 Delegates, a record number. The previous record number was 21, including 2 Delegates, serving at the end of the 115 th Congress. A total of 47 African American women have served in Congress. The first was Representative Shirley Chisholm (D-NY, 1969-1983). Senator Carol Moseley-Braun (D-IL, 1993-1999) was the first African American woman to have served in the Senate. The African American women Members of the 116 th Congress are listed in Table 3 . Asian Pacific American Women in Congress Ten Asian Pacific American women serve in the 116 th Congress. Patsy Mink (D-HI), who served in the House from 1965-1977 and again from 1990-2002, was the first of 13 Asian Pacific American women to serve in Congress. Mazie Hirono (D-HI) is the first Asian Pacific American woman to serve in both the House and Senate. Hispanic Women in Congress Twenty Hispanic or Latino women have served in Congress, all but one in the House, and 15 of them, a record number, serve in the 116 th Congress. Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL, 1989-2018) is the first Hispanic woman to serve in Congress, and Catherine Cortez Masto (D-NV, 2017-present) is the first Hispanic woman Senator. American Indian (Native American) Women in Congress Representatives Sharice Davids (D-KS) and Deb Haaland (D-NM), both first elected to the 116 th Congress, are the first female enrolled members of federally recognized tribes to serve in Congress. Women Who Have Served in Party Leadership Positions19 A number of women in Congress, listed in Table 6 , have held positions in their party's leadership. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) holds the highest position of leadership in the U.S. government ever held by a woman. As Speaker of the House in the 116 th Congress, she is second in the line of succession for the presidency. She also served as Speaker in the 110 th and 111 th Congresses. In the 108 th , 109 th , and 112 th -115 th Congresses, she was elected the House Democratic leader. Previously, Representative Pelosi was elected House Democratic whip, in the 107 th Congress, on October 10, 2001, effective January 15, 2002. She was also the first woman nominated to be Speaker of the House. Senator Margaret Chase Smith (R-ME), chair of the Senate Republican Conference from 1967 to 1972, holds the Senate record for the highest, as well as first, leadership position held by a female Senator. The first woman Member to be elected to any party leadership position was Chase Going Woodhouse (D-CT), who served as House Democratic Caucus Secretary in the 81 st Congress (1949-1950). Women and Leadership of Congressional Committees As chair of the House Expenditures in the Post Office Department Committee (67 th -68 th Congresses), Mae Ella Nolan was the first woman to chair any congressional committee. As chair of the Senate Enrolled Bills Committee (73 rd -78 th Congresses), Hattie Caraway was the first woman to chair a Senate committee. In total, 26 women have chaired a House committee (including select committees); 14 women have chaired a Senate committee (including select committees); 1 female Senator has chaired two joint committees (related to her service on a standing committee); and 2 female Representatives have chaired a joint committee. In the 116 th Congress, there are currently nine committees led by women: five standing committees in the House, one standing committee in the Senate, one select committee in the House, one select committee in the Senate, and one joint committee. Women in Congress: Examinations of their Role and Impact As the number of women in Congress has increased in recent decades, and following the large increase in women following the 1992 elections in particular, numerous studies of Congress have examined the role and impact of these women. Central to these studies have been questions about the following: The legislative behavior of women in Congress, including whether the legislative behavior of female Members differs from their male counterparts. For example, what has the increase in women in Congress meant for descriptive representation (i.e., when representatives and those represented share demographic characteristics, such as representation of women by women) and substantive representation (i.e., representation of policy preferences and a linkage to policy outcomes)? This also includes examinations of whether women Members sponsor more "women's issues bills" or speak more frequently on the House floor about women. These examinations also include questions regarding whether there are any differences in roll call voting behavior between men and women Members of Congress, with a focus on successive Members in the same district, in the same party, or in the chamber overall. The "effectiveness" of female legislators, particularly in comparison to male legislators. These studies have examined bill sponsorship and cosponsorship; women's success in shepherding sponsored bills or amendments into law; committee work; success in securing federal funds; consensus building activities and efforts to form coalitions; effectiveness while in the majority and minority; and their impact on the institution overall. The path that leads women to run for office, comparative success rates of female compared with male candidates, and career trajectory once in Congress. This includes professional backgrounds and experience, barriers to entry, and fundraising; the so-called widow effect, in which many women first secured entry to Congress following the death of a spouse; and reelection efforts and influences on decisions regarding voluntary retirement or pursuing other office. Appendix. Total Number of Women Who Served in Each Congress

A record 131 women currently serve in the 116th Congress. There are 106 women serving in the House (including Delegates and the Resident Commissioner), 91 Democrats and 15 Republicans. There are 25 women in the Senate, 17 Democrats and 8 Republicans. These 131 women surpass the previous record of 115 women at the close of the 115th Congress. The numbers of women serving fluctuated during the 115th Congress; there were 109 women initially sworn in, 5 women subsequently elected to the House, 2 appointed to the Senate, and 1 woman in the House who died in office. The very first woman elected to Congress was Representative Jeannette Rankin (R-MT, served 1917-1919 and 1941-1943). The first woman to serve in the Senate was Rebecca Latimer Felton (D-GA). She was appointed in 1922 and served for only one day. Hattie Caraway (D-AR, served 1931-1945) was the first Senator to succeed her husband and the first woman elected to a six-year Senate term. A total of 365 women have ever been elected or appointed to Congress, including 247 Democrats and 118 Republicans. These figures include six nonvoting Delegates (one each from Guam, Hawaii, the District of Columbia, and American Samoa, and two from the U.S. Virgin Islands), as well as one Resident Commissioner from Puerto Rico. Of these, 309 (211 Democrats, 98 Republicans) women have been elected only to the House of Representatives; 40 (25 Democrats, 15 Republicans) women have been elected or appointed only to the Senate; 16 (11 Democrats, 5 Republicans) women have served in both houses; 47 African American women have served in Congress (2 in the Senate, 45 in the House), including 25 serving in the 116th Congress; 13 Asian Pacific American women have served in Congress (10 in the House, 1 in the Senate, and 2 in both the House and Senate), including 10 in the 116th Congress; 20 Hispanic women have served in Congress (including 1 in the Senate), including 15 in the 116th Congress; and 2 American Indian women, both currently serving in the House, have served in Congress. In the 116th Congress, eight women serve as committee chairs (six in the House, two in the Senate). This report includes historical information, including the number of women in Congress over time; means of entry to Congress; comparisons to international and state legislatures; records for tenure; firsts for women in Congress; women in leadership; African American, Asian Pacific American, Hispanic, and American Indian women in Congress; as well as a brief overview of research questions related to the role and impact of women in Congress. The Appendix provides details on the total number of women who have served in each Congress, including information on changes within a Congress. The numbers in the report may be affected by the time periods used when tallying any particular number. The text and notes throughout the report provide details on time periods used for the tallies and the currency of the information. For additional biographical information—including the committee assignments, dates of service, listings by Congress and state, and (for Representatives) congressional districts of the 365 women who have been elected or appointed to Congress—see CRS Report RL30261, Women in Congress, 1917-2019: Service Dates and Committee Assignments by Member, and Lists by State and Congress, by Jennifer E. Manning and Ida A. Brudnick.

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Introduction Established by Congress as an amendment to the Clean Air Act, the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) mandates that U.S. transportation fuels contain a minimum volume of biofuel. The mandated minimum volume increases annually and must be met using both conventional biofuel (e.g., corn starch ethanol) and advanced biofuel (e.g., cellulosic ethanol). For a renewable fuel to be applied toward the mandate, it must be used for certain purposes (i.e., transportation fuel, jet fuel, or heating oil) and meet certain environmental and biomass feedstock criteria. A variety of factors, such as infrastructure, technology, and limited federal assistance, have led to challenges in meeting the total volume requirement established by Congress. These challenges have included a lack of cellulosic biofuel production and delays by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in approving fuel pathways. Further, it is not clear how changes in gasoline consumption in response to fluctuating crude oil and gasoline prices impact the biofuel or conventional fuel industries. It is also uncertain how the program will fare once EPA implements the "reset" provision of the statute, which allows the agency to modify the volumes required for future years (starting in 2016) if certain conditions are met. In addition, some stakeholders have expressed concern about the transparency of the market wherein credits are traded to demonstrate compliance with the mandate. Lastly, there is concern by some biofuel producers that the Trump Administration's issuance of multiple small refinery exemptions has adversely affected, or will adversely affect, biofuel demand. Small refiners may petition the EPA Administrator for an exemption from the RFS mandate if they can prove disproportionate economic hardship. There are, however, two fuel categories that have consistently met their statutory targets: conventional biofuel and biomass-based diesel. Also, since 2014, two advanced biofuel pathways—renewable compressed natural gas and renewable liquefied natural gas—have constituted the majority of the cellulosic biofuel volume target established by EPA. Challenges in implementing the RFS have led to scrutiny of the program in Congress and to litigation about EPA's regulations. Largely due to concerns about the implementation and feasibility of the RFS, some Members of Congress have expressed their perspectives on EPA's proposed and final rules as well as EPA's implementation of the program. They also have questioned whether to amend or repeal the RFS or whether to maintain the status quo. This report provides a basic description of the RFS, including some of the widely discussed policy issues related to it. The Statute The Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) was established by the Energy Policy Act of 2005 ( P.L. 109-58 ; EPAct05) and expanded in 2007 by the Energy Independence and Security Act ( P.L. 110-140 ; EISA). The RFS mandate requires that transportation fuels sold or introduced into commerce in the United States contain an increasing volume of a predetermined suite of renewable fuels. The statute required 4.0 billion gallons of renewable fuel in 2006, ascending to 36.0 billion gallons required in 2022, with EPA determining the volume amounts after 2022 in future rulemakings. The statute centers on four renewable fuel categories—conventional biofuel, advanced biofuel, cellulosic biofuel, and biomass-based diesel—each with its own target volume. The total renewable fuel requirement under the RFS is met with the combination of fuels from two renewable fuel categories: conventional biofuel and advanced biofuel. The requirement for advanced biofuel, in general, can be met with the combination of three types of advanced biofuel: cellulosic biofuel, biomass-based diesel, and other advanced biofuels. To date, the total annual volumes required have been met mostly with conventional biofuel (e.g., corn starch ethanol). Beginning in 2015, the mandate capped the conventional biofuel volume amounts while increasing the requirement for advanced biofuels. For instance, the statutory RFS total advanced biofuel requirement increases over time from approximately 7% of the RFS in 2010 to 58% of the RFS in 2022. A key part of the statutory definition of each fuel category is whether the fuel achieves certain greenhouse gas (GHG) reductions relative to gasoline and diesel fuel. Each fuel is assigned a lifecycle GHG emission threshold (in proportion to baseline lifecycle GHG emissions for gasoline and diesel). For example, a fuel must achieve at least a 50% GHG reduction to be considered an advanced biofuel , at least a 60% reduction to be considered a cellulosic biofuel , and at least a 50% reduction to be considered biomass-based diesel . Similarly, biofuel from new facilities—those built after enactment of the 2007 law—must achieve at least a 20% GHG reduction to qualify as a conventional renewable fuel. Statutory Compliance EPA regulates compliance with the RFS using a tradable credit system. Obligated parties (generally, refiners) submit credits—called renewable identification numbers (RINs)—to EPA that equal the number of gallons in their annual obligation. This annual obligation, referred to as the renewable volume obligation (RVO), is the obligated party's total gasoline and diesel sales multiplied by the annual renewable fuel percentage standards announced by EPA. RINs are valid for use in the year they are generated and the following year. Obligated parties may carry a deficit from one year to the next, but in the year following the deficit, the obligated party must meet compliance for that year's renewable fuel volume requirement and purchase or generate enough credits to satisfy the deficit from the previous year. RINs may be used by the party that generates them or they may be traded with other parties. The EPA Moderated Transaction System (EMTS) is used to register RIN transactions. Different biofuels are not treated equally within the RFS. The categories are nested within each other, such that some fuels qualify for multiple categories (e.g., cellulosic ethanol), while others (mainly corn starch ethanol) may only be used to meet the overall RFS but not the advanced category or its nested subcategories. For example, a gallon of cellulosic biofuel may be used to meet the cellulosic biofuel mandate, the advanced biofuel mandate, and the total renewable fuel mandate, possibly making it a more highly valued fuel. In addition, some biofuels generate more RINs per volume than others because of the difference in the fuel's energy content. This difference is accounted for by a metric referred to as the equivalence value (EV) of the biofuel. The EV of a renewable fuel represents the number of gallons that can be claimed for compliance purposes for every physical gallon of renewable fuel used, and it is generally the ratio of the energy content of a gallon of the fuel to a gallon of ethanol. For example, because biodiesel has an EV of 1.5 when being used as an advanced biofuel, 1,000 physical gallons of biodiesel would equal 1,500 RIN gallons of advanced biofuels. The 2019 Final Rule EPA released the final rule for the RFS for 2019 on November 30, 2018. The rule calls for 19.92 billion gallons of total renewable fuel for 2019—a 1% increase from the 19.29 billion gallons required in 2018 (see Table 1 ). The conventional biofuel volume requirement remains at 15.00 billion gallons. The volume requirements set by EPA for 2019 for total renewable fuel, advanced biofuel, and cellulosic biofuel are all less than the volumes called for in statute but greater than the previous year's volumes—an annual occurrence that started in 2014. EPA used the cellulosic waiver authority to reduce the statutory volumes. EPA reduced the statutory targets for both advanced biofuel and total renewable by the same amount as the reduction for the cellulosic biofuel (i.e., 8.08 billion gallons). EPA reports that the advanced biofuel statutory target of 13.0 billion gallons "cannot be reached in 2019 … primarily due to the expected continued shortfall in cellulosic biofuel." EPA estimates there are 2.59 billion carryover RINs available. In its response to comments regarding the rule, EPA mentions a forthcoming reset rulemaking. EPA set the biomass-based diesel 2020 volume requirement at 2.43 billion gallons. Biomass-based diesel is the predominant biofuel used to satisfy the advanced biofuel portion of the mandate. Previously, it has been used to backfill the overall advanced biofuel requirement if another advanced biofuel fell short (e.g., cellulosic biofuel). EPA reports "the advanced biofuel volume requirement is driving the production and use of biodiesel and renewable diesel volumes over and above volumes required through the separate BBD [biomass-based diesel] standard" and that the 2020 volume requirement "provides sufficient incentive to producers of 'other' advanced biofuels." EPA acknowledges that it took into consideration the unavailability of the biodiesel tax credit for 2019, the tariffs on imports of biodiesel from Argentina and Indonesia, the tariffs on soybeans exported to China, and more in its assessment of the biodiesel requirement for 2020. RFS Implementation Issues Implementation of the RFS has been complex, and compliance with some of its parts has been challenging, according to some stakeholders. This section briefly explains some of the general concerns and challenges with implementing the RFS. Administering Agency EPA administers the RFS. This responsibility includes evaluating renewable fuel pathways eligible for the RFS. In addition, EPA is required to evaluate the ability of the biofuel industry to produce enough fuel to meet the annual volume standard, release an annual volume standard based on its research findings, and ensure that annual compliance by obligated parties is met. All of the above must be completed annually, taking into consideration comments from other government agencies, the public, and, recently, court decisions. These responsibilities could be viewed as an addition to EPA's regulatory workload and have required EPA to develop new capabilities to carry them out. For several years following the 2010 issuance of the amended RFS final rule, EPA has had difficulty projecting certain volume requirements (e.g., cellulosic biofuels) which have led EPA to use its waiver authority to set annual volume requirements for cellulosic biofuel, total advanced biofuel, and total renewable fuel different from what was stated in the statute. Legal challenges have been brought against the EPA regarding some of these annual fuel volume projections. For instance, the American Petroleum Institute objected to EPA's 2012 cellulosic biofuel production projection, among other things, and challenged it in court. The federal court vacated the 2012 cellulosic biofuel standard and provided principles for EPA to apply to future annual projections. Likewise, Americans for Clean Energy and other petitioners challenged various aspects of the final rule that set the volume requirements and projections for 2014-2016 and 2017 for biomass-based diesel, including EPA's interpretation of "inadequate domestic supply" in exercising its general waiver authority to reduce the total volume requirements. The D.C. Circuit Court vacated EPA's 2016 total renewable fuel volume requirement and remanded the 2015 final rule to EPA for reconsideration consistent with the court's decision. In some instances the timing of EPA's RFS regulatory actions, such as the annual announcement of the renewable fuel volume requirements, has not met statutory deadlines. The most recent final rules, including the 2019 final rule, adhere to the statutory schedule. However, some of the earlier final rules did not meet the statutory deadline. A lack of timely rulemaking combined with inaccurate volume projections could affect private investment, according to some advanced biofuel producers. Regardless, they lead to uncertainty in compliance for obligated parties. The amount of time it takes the agency to approve new fuel pathways and register new facilities has been raised in public comments to proposed RFS rules. Slow approval could stifle investment and production of new fuels. Further, prolonged processing time for some program enhancement rules—such as the Proposed Renewables Enhancement and Growth Support Rule (REGS rule)—may impede the growth of the program. Lastly, the final rule for 2014 through 2016 triggered the "reset" provision of the RFS for the advanced biofuel and cellulosic biofuel categories. The 2019 final rule triggered the "reset" provision for total renewable fuel. Thus, three of the four renewable fuel categories identified in statute are subject to being "reset" by the EPA Administrator. The reset provision gives the EPA Administrator authority to adjust the applicable volumes of the RFS for future years starting in 2016 if certain conditions are met. How EPA implements this provision will affect renewable fuel production and compliance with the overall program. EPA reports that it will issue a rulemaking in early 2019 that proposes to reset the cellulosic biofuel, advanced biofuel, and total renewable fuel volume targets for the years 2020-2022. Qualifying Biofuels As noted above, there are a number of nested categories within the RFS; a fuel may qualify as a biofuel for one or more portions of the mandate. Difficulty by some advanced biofuel producers in understanding which advanced biofuels qualify for the RFS can lead to challenges in determining how compliance is being met. Not all fuels from a renewable source are eligible under the RFS. The RFS operates as a biofuel standard, with priority assigned to liquid transportation fuels from biomass feedstocks. Other renewable sources (e.g., wind) do not qualify. Before a fuel can generate RFS RINs, however, that fuel pathway must be approved by EPA; according to advanced biofuel producers that process can take a considerable amount of time for some fuels. Lastly, some may view the RFS as a biofuel production mandate. The statutory language does not mandate the production of biofuels; rather, it mandates the use of biofuel. However, it could be argued that it is difficult to use a fuel that is not being produced and that the RFS therefore indirectly creates a demand for certain biofuels and thus stimulates their production. Cellulosic Biofuel Production By statute, cellulosic biofuel is targeted to comprise approximately 44% of the total renewable fuel mandate in 2022. However, the annual cellulosic biofuel production volume established by Congress is not being met. Actual cellulosic biofuel production volumes (e.g., cellulosic ethanol) are below the expectations set when the law was passed. For instance, in 2019, the statute requires 8.5 billion gallons of cellulosic biofuel. EPA set the 2019 target volume at 418 million gallons for 2019. This shortfall is due to several factors, including lack of private investment, technology setbacks, and uneven support from the federal government. These factors, coupled with the fact that annual volumes in the statute were established when market conditions for raising investment capital for new biofuel technologies were more favorable, may suggest unrealistic targets for some advanced biofuels for the near future. These production limitations have raised questions about whether the statutory cellulosic biofuel volumes are attainable. Blend Wall The "blend wall"—the upper limit to the total amount of ethanol that can be blended into U.S. gasoline and still maintain automobile performance and comply with the Clean Air Act—has been viewed by many to be in direct conflict with the biofuel volumes mandated in the RFS. Thus far, the largest volume being met under the RFS is for the nonadvanced (conventional) biofuel segment of the mandate, met mainly with corn starch ethanol blended into gasoline. Due to a variety of factors, ethanol content in gasoline is generally limited to 10% (E10). With a relatively fixed supply of gasoline, the amount of ethanol that can be supplied this way is also limited. If the ethanol content of gasoline for the majority of vehicles remains at 10%, and given current fuel consumption rates, the conventional biofuel portion of the RFS is requiring slightly more ethanol than can technically be blended into gasoline. While the blend wall remains a concern, it may not be as significant an impediment to immediate fuel consumption as previously considered by some. Indeed, EPA reports "the E10 blendwall is not the barrier that some stakeholders believe it to be." Had the RFS mandates—for both conventional biofuel and advanced biofuel—come to fruition in the form of mostly ethanol, or had fuel consumption decreased further, the blend wall potentially could have led to more discussion about the volume mandates. However, primarily due to the lack of cellulosic biofuel production, more time has been granted to address the blend wall and the scheduled levels of biofuels in the RFS. Some possible approaches could alleviate blend wall concerns in the near term. One option suggested by some is to blend higher levels of ethanol into conventional gasoline. In 2010 EPA granted a Clean Air Act waiver that allows gasoline to contain up to 15% ethanol for use in model year 2001 and newer light-duty motor vehicles. However, limited demand, infrastructure and automobile warranty concerns, and the lack of a waiver to sell E15 during the summer months, have precluded widespread offering and purchase of E15, gasoline blended with 10.5% to 15% ethanol. Widespread use of E15 could potentially postpone the blend wall for a few years. Another option to address the blend wall would be an aggressive push for the use of ethanol in flexible-fuel vehicles capable of using E85, a gasoline-ethanol blend containing 51% to 83% ethanol. However, there are infrastructure constraints with the use of E85. For example, the number of E85 fueling stations is limited. To help address these infrastructure issues, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) announced $100 million in matching grants in 2015 under its Biofuel Infrastructure Partnership. The grants may be used for blender pumps, dedicated E15 or E85 pumps, and new storage tanks and related equipment associated with new facilities or additional capacity. Other Factors The RFS is not a stand-alone policy. It interacts with many factors that are not easily controlled. For example, cellulosic biofuel production, at a minimum, requires conversion technology, which itself requires technical expertise and time to ramp up to commercial scale. The large quantity of biomass feedstocks needed to produce such biofuels requires factors such as appropriate weather conditions and an expectation of stable markets for feedstock commodities. Further, some types of biofuel production thus far have been sensitive to the availability of tax incentives in order to be economically feasible (e.g., biodiesel). Unexpected occurrences (e.g., drought, failed technology, tax incentive expiration) could potentially impact an entire industry, especially for some advanced biofuels in nascent industries compared to conventional transportation fuels. Congressional Issues The RFS was established in 2005 at a time when Congress foresaw the need to diversify the country's energy portfolio, strengthen the economy of rural communities that could contribute to biofuel production, bolster U.S. standing in an emerging segment of the energy technology market, and protect the environment, among other objectives. The RFS was then subsequently expanded in 2007. Over the past decade some components of the RFS have progressed steadily toward meeting statutory requirements and other components have not. The RFS is a program with ambitious objectives. Policy questions surrounding future consideration of the RFS might include What should be the purposes of the RFS? Is the RFS properly designed to achieve those purposes? What happens when, and if, the RFS achieves its purposes? At the outse t, some would argue that the first question may seem straightforward; the RFS exists to introduce more biofuels into the transportation fuel market to achieve a number of transportation fuel supply and environmental objectives. However, the statute does not list any specific purposes or objectives. Some stakeholders argue that the RFS exists primarily to find another market for biomass feedstocks or to promote the economy of rural America (e.g., the construction of biofuel facilities that create jobs). To the extent the RFS was designed to reduce U.S. dependence on foreign oil, and to the extent that hydraulic fracturing and the growth of unconventional oil and gas production have contributed to achieving that objective, some stakeholders have questioned whether the RFS is still needed for energy security purposes. Likewise, the environmental impact of the RFS could be challenged, as the advanced biofuel component of the RFS—set to yield greater greenhouse gas emission reduction benefits—has missed the statutory targets by a large margin. In examining whether the RFS is well designed to realize its general purpose, some have inquired about the challenges in achieving the ambitious RFS targets, given concerns about the slow development of some advanced biofuel supplies. Additionally, past delays in announcing final annual standards by EPA have led to uncertainty for biofuel producers, feedstock growers, and refiners. Whether the RFS should be eliminated, amended to address the current challenges in the program, or maintained in its current form is an ongoing question for Congress. A related question is whether the current provisions for EPA to waive various portions of the RFS mandates and to reset the RFS are sufficient to address the current supply challenges or whether the use of these waivers runs counter to the goals of the program. Some Members of Congress have proposed alternatives to the RFS, such as transitioning to an octane standard. Other Members of Congress have expressed interest in modifying or eliminating the conventional biofuel (e.g., corn starch ethanol) portion of the mandate. Some contend that the conventional biofuel segment of the biofuels industry is well established, so it should not require a use mandate. In addition, it has been argued that a demand for conventional biofuels exists regardless of congressional involvement. Others counter that the RFS is needed to help lower GHG emissions and to assure that the biofuels industry continues to have access to a fuel distribution infrastructure that is largely controlled by petroleum interests.

The Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) requires U.S. transportation fuel to contain a minimum volume of renewable fuel. The RFS—established by the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-58; EPAct05) and expanded in 2007 by the Energy Independence and Security Act (P.L. 110-140; EISA)—began with 4 billion gallons of renewable fuel in 2006 and aims to ascend to 36 billion gallons in 2022. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has statutory authority to determine the volume amounts after 2022. The total renewable fuel statutory target consists of both conventional biofuel and advanced biofuel. Since 2014, the total renewable fuel statutory target has not been met, with the advanced biofuel portion falling below the statutory target by a large margin since 2015. Going forward, it is unlikely that the United States will meet the total renewable fuel target as outlined in statute. EPA administers the RFS and is responsible for several tasks. For instance, within statutory criteria EPA evaluates which renewable fuels are eligible for the RFS program. Also, EPA establishes the amount of renewable fuel that will be required for the coming year based on fuel supply and other conditions although waiver authority in the statute allows the EPA Administrator to reduce the statutory volumes if necessary. Further, the statute requires that the EPA Administrator "reset" the RFS—whereby the fuel volumes required for future years are modified by the Administrator if certain conditions are met. EPA monitors compliance for the RFS using a system of tradable credits referred to as renewable identification numbers (RINs). Congress has expressed ongoing interest in the RFS, particularly as the mandate relates to other legislative efforts (e.g., Reid Vapor Pressure requirements for ethanol-gasoline fuel blends containing greater than 10% ethanol, a national octane standard) and about oversight of the RIN market, among other things. Some assert it is time to amend or repeal the RFS, while others contend the best course of action is to maintain the status quo. For instance, some Members contend the RFS hurts consumers by creating an artificial market for ethanol. Others see ethanol as a part of a competitive energy strategy. Congress may also express interest in how the EPA Administrator applies the RFS "reset" authority. EPA reports that in early 2019 it will issue a rulemaking that proposes to modify—or "reset"—the cellulosic biofuel, advanced biofuel, and total renewable fuel volume targets for the years 2020-2022.

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A ccording to Article 1, Section 7, of the Constitution, when the President chooses not to sign a bill and instead returns it to the chamber that originated it, the chamber shall enter the message of the President detailing the reasons for the veto in its Journal and then "proceed to reconsider" the bill. A vetoed bill can become law if two-thirds of the Members voting in each chamber agree, by recorded vote, a quorum being present, to repass the bill and thereby override the veto of the President. The chamber that originated the bill sent to the President acts first on the question of its reconsideration. In other words, the House acts first on vetoed bills that carry an "H.R." or "H.J. Res." designation, and the Senate acts first on vetoed bills that carry an "S." or "S.J. Res." designation. If the chamber of origin votes to repass the bill, then the bill with the veto message is transmitted to the second chamber, which then also reconsiders it. Nothing in the Constitution requires that either chamber vote directly on the question of repassing a vetoed bill. The chambers have, for example, referred a vetoed bill to committee instead. If either chamber fails to vote on the question of repassing the bill, then the measure dies at the end of the Congress. Both chambers will not necessarily even have a chance to take up the question. If two-thirds of the Members of the chamber of origin do not agree to override a veto, then the measure dies, and the other chamber does not have an opportunity to vote on the question of repassing the bill. The Constitution does not otherwise address how Congress should consider a vetoed bill, and it is therefore House and Senate rules and practices that additionally govern the treatment of bills vetoed and returned by the President. House Procedure Overview The consideration of a vetoed bill is a matter of high privilege in the House, and the chamber generally votes to override or sustain the veto shortly after the message is received from the President or the Senate. Time for debate on the question is usually controlled and allocated by members of the committee of jurisdiction, and a majority of the House can vote to bring consideration to a close. To repass the bill over the veto of the President requires the support of two-thirds of the Members voting, a quorum being present. Beginning Reconsideration of a Vetoed Bill in the House On the day a vetoed bill and accompanying presidential message are received, the Speaker lays the message before the House. The veto message is read and entered in the House Journal . It is not necessary for a Member to make a motion to reconsider the vetoed bill. If no Member seeks recognition after the message is read, the Speaker will put the question of overriding the veto before the House by stating: The pending question is whether the House will, on reconsideration, pass the bill, the objections of the President to the contrary notwithstanding. If Members do not wish to debate the question immediately, several preferential motions can be made before the Speaker states it. The House can agree by motion (or unanimous consent) to postpone the consideration of a veto message to a named day or to refer it to committee. The motion to postpone consideration of a veto message and the motion to refer a veto message are debatable under the hour rule. The House may also agree to a nondebatable motion to lay the vetoed bill on the table. While the motion to table usually permanently and adversely disposes of a matter, that is not true in the case of a vetoed bill. A motion to remove the bill from the table could be made at any time. House Debate on Veto Override Debate on the question of overriding a veto takes place under the hour rule. In practice, the Speaker recognizes the chair of the committee with jurisdiction over the vetoed bill for an hour of debate, and the chair in turn yields 30 minutes to the ranking minority member for purposes of the debate only. The chair and ranking member of the committee serve as floor managers of the debate, yielding portions of time to other Members who wish to speak. Typically, after the hour is consumed or yielded back, the majority floor manager moves the previous question. If a majority of the House votes to order the previous question, the vote immediately occurs on the question of overriding the veto. Voting in the House To override a veto, two-thirds of the Members voting, a quorum being present, must agree to repass the bill over the President's objections. The Constitution requires that the vote be by the "yeas and nays," which in the modern House means that Members' votes will be recorded through the electronic voting system. The vote on the veto override is final because, in contrast to votes on most other questions in the House, a motion to reconsider the vote on the question of overriding a veto is not in order. If the override vote on a House or Senate bill is unsuccessful, then the House informs the Senate of this fact and typically refers the bill and veto message to committee. If the House votes to override a veto of a bill that originated in the House (H.R. or H.J. Res.), the bill and veto message are sent to the Senate for action. If the House successfully overrides a veto of a bill that originated in the Senate (S. or S.J. Res.), then the bill becomes law, because two-thirds of both chambers have agreed to override the veto. Senate Procedure Overview If the Senate wishes to reconsider a vetoed bill, Senators generally enter into a unanimous consent agreement that the message be considered as read, printed in the Congressional Record , and, as required by the Constitution, entered in the Senate Journal . Senators often also agree, by unanimous consent, to limit time for debate on the question of overriding the veto. When the Senate receives a vetoed measure from the President or the House, it is quite common for it to be "held at the desk" for several days and considered only after unanimous consent has been reached on the terms of its consideration. When the vote on the question occurs, it must be taken by roll-call vote and receive support from two-thirds of the Senators voting, a quorum being present. Beginning Reconsideration of a Vetoed Bill in the Senate Without a Unanimous Consent Agreement Although generally the Senate reconsiders a vetoed bill under the terms of a unanimous consent agreement, it is not necessary to secure the support of all 100 Senators to consider a vetoed bill in the Senate. Absent an arrangement to hold the veto message at the desk, it would be read and then entered into the Journal after its receipt from the President or the House. The presiding officer would then state: Shall the bill pass, the objections of the President of the United States to the contrary notwithstanding? Several debatable motions are in order, however, that could displace consideration of the veto message. The message could be referred to committee, for example, or postponed to a specific time. Alternatively, the majority leader might make a motion to proceed to another matter. The question of overriding the veto could be brought back before the Senate with the consent of all Senators or by a numerical majority through a nondebatable motion to proceed. Finally, once the veto message has been laid before the Senate, it could also be tabled or indefinitely postponed, which would normally preclude any further action on the matter. Senate Debate on Veto Override The question of overriding a veto is debatable under the regular rules of the Senate. The question could be debated as long as any Senator sought recognition to discuss it. Debate on the question of overriding a veto can be limited by unanimous consent or by invoking cloture. Ending debate through a cloture motion requires the support of three-fifths of Senators duly chosen and sworn, or 60 Senators if there is no more than one vacancy. Cloture is rarely used to end debate on overriding a presidential veto. The number of Senators required to end debate is less than the number required to override a veto (assuming that there are no vacancies and more than 90 Senators vote on the override question). Voting in the Senate Two-thirds of the Senators voting, a quorum being present, must agree to override the veto and repass the bill. The vote must be a roll-call vote and not a voice vote, due to the constitutional requirement that the vote be by the "yeas and nays." A motion to reconsider the vote on the question of overriding a veto is in order only if the Senate fails to override the veto. In other words, if two-thirds of the Senators agree to override the veto, a motion to reconsider that vote is not in order. If the Senate fails to override a veto of a Senate-originated bill (S. or S.J. Res.), then the question of override never reaches the House. The Senate simply informs the House that the override vote on a House or Senate bill was unsuccessful. If the override vote on a Senate-originated measure (S. or S.J. Res.) is successful in the Senate, the bill and veto message are sent to the House for action. If the override vote on a House-originated measure (H.R. or H.J. Res.) is successful, then the bill becomes law, because two-thirds of both chambers have agreed to override the veto.

A bill or joint resolution that has been vetoed by the President can become law if two-thirds of the Members voting in the House and the Senate each agree to pass it over the President's objection. The chambers act sequentially on vetoed measures: The House acts first on House-originated measures (H.R. and H.J. Res.), and the Senate acts first on Senate-originated measures (S. and S.J. Res.). If the first-acting chamber fails to override the veto, the other chamber cannot consider it. The House typically considers the question of overriding a presidential veto under the hour rule, with time customarily controlled and allocated by the chair and ranking member of the committee with jurisdiction over the bill. The Senate usually considers the question of overriding a veto under the terms of a unanimous consent agreement.

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Introduction National Security, Arms Control, and Nonproliferation For much of the past century, U.S. national security strategy focused on several core, interrelated objectives. These include enhancing U.S. security at home and abroad; promoting U.S. economic prosperity; and promoting free markets and democracy around the world. The United States has used both unilateral and multilateral mechanisms to achieve these objectives, with varying amounts of emphasis at different times. These mechanisms have included a range of military, diplomatic, and economic tools. One of these core objectives—enhancing U.S. security—generally is interpreted as the effort to protect the nation's interests and includes, for instance, protecting the lives and safety of Americans; maintaining U.S. sovereignty over its values, territory, and institutions; and promoting the nation's well-being. The United States has wielded a deep and wide range of military, diplomatic, and economic tools to protect and advance its security interests. These include, for instance, the deployment of military forces to deter, dissuade, persuade, or compel others; the formation of alliances and coalitions to advance U.S. interests and counter aggression; and the use of U.S. economic power to advance its agenda or promote democratization, or to impose sanctions or withhold U.S. economic support to condemn or punish states hostile to U.S. interests. In this context, arms control and nonproliferation efforts are two of the tools that have occasionally been used to implement the U.S. national security strategy. They generally are not pursued as ends in and of themselves, and many argue that they should not become more important than the strategy behind them. But many believe their effective employment can be critical to the success of that broader strategy. Many analysts see them as a complement to, rather than a substitute for, military or economic efforts. Effective arms control measures are thought to enhance U.S. national security in a number of ways. For example, many arms control and nonproliferation tools include monitoring mechanisms that can provide early warning of efforts to evade or ignore the obligations. These mechanisms also promote transparency in a way that might increase U.S. knowledge about and understanding of the size, makeup, and operations of an opposing military force. This might not only ease U.S. military planning, but it might also reduce an opponent's incentives for and opportunities to attack U.S. forces, or the forces of its friends and allies. Transparency measures can also build confidence among wary adversaries. Effective arms control measures can also be designed to complement U.S. force structure objectives by limiting or restraining U.S. and other nations' forces. During times of declining defense budget resources, arms control measures may also help ensure reciprocity in force reductions. Indeed, some analysts consider such arms control measures essential to the success of our national military objectives. Similarly, U.S. officials from several Administrations have identified efforts to prevent the further spread of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery to be an essential element of U.S. national security. For one reason, proliferation can exacerbate regional tensions that might escalate to conflict and involve or threaten U.S. forces or those of its friends and allies. Proliferation might also introduce new and unexpected threats to U.S. allies or the U.S. homeland. Furthermore, proliferation can greatly complicate U.S. national military strategy, force structure design, and conduct of operations. And these weapons could pose a threat to the U.S. homeland if they were acquired by terrorists or subnational groups. Hence, the United States employs diplomatic, economic, and military tools to restrain these threats and enhance its national security. This view is not universal, however, as critics of arms control and nonproliferation arrangements often argue that the United States should not limit its own forces or flexibility in exchange for the promise that others might do so as well. They often argue that, absent stringent enforcement mechanisms that force other nations to comply with their obligations, these agreements can become unbalanced, with the United States abiding by the terms while others fail to do so. During the Cold War, arms control played a key role in the relationship between the United States and Soviet Union. Although the agreements rarely forced either side to accept significant changes in i ts planned nuclear forces, the arms control process, and the formal negotiations, were often one of the few channels for communication between the United States and Soviet Union. Further, the United States participated in many multilateral regimes that sought to limit the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their means of delivery. Beginning in the early 1990s, it also extended assistance to Russia and other former Soviet states in an effort to reduce the threat that these weapons might fall into the hands of hostile states or nonstate actors. It has explored the possible use of similar tools to provide other nations with assistance in containing and controlling weapons and weapons-grade materials. During the George W. Bush Administration, the President and many in his Administration questioned the degree to which arms control negotiations and formal treaties could enhance U.S. security objectives. They argued that the United States did not need formal treaties to reduce or restrain its strategic nuclear forces. As a result, President Bush initially intended to reduce U.S. nuclear forces without signing a treaty that would require Russia to do the same. The Bush Administration only incorporated these reductions into a formal treaty after Russia insisted on such a document. Similarly, some in the Bush Administration argued that some formal, multilateral arms control regimes went too far in restraining U.S. options without limiting the forces of potential adversaries. Instead, the Administration preferred, when necessary, that the United States take unilateral military action or join in ad hoc coalitions to stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The absence of confidence in arms control during the George W. Bush Administration extended to the State Department, where the Administration removed the phrase "arms control" from all bureaus that were responsible for this policy area. The focus remained on nonproliferation, but it was seen as a policy area that no longer required formal treaties to meet its objectives. This changed with the Obama Administration. The State Department restored the phrase "arms control" to some bureau titles, and "arms control" was again listed as a central issue on the State Department website. The Obama Administration sought to enhance the role of arms control and nonproliferation agreements in U.S. national security policy. In a speech in Prague in April 2009, the President outlined an agenda that included the pursuit of a new strategic arms control treaty with Russia, efforts to secure the ratification and entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and the eventual negotiation of a Fissile Material Control Treaty. President Obama also convened an international nuclear security summit, in April 2010, in an effort to win global cooperation in efforts to contain and eliminate vulnerable nuclear materials. The United States has participated in three additional nuclear security summits, with the fourth and final summit occurring in early April 2016 in Washington. President Obama also pledged to take a number of steps to strengthen the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in conjunction with its review conference in May 2010. President Obama's embrace of arms control and nonproliferation tools to address U.S. national security needs led many to expect wide-ranging agreements and activities in pursuit of these goals. However, efforts on this agenda produced limited results during President Obama's first term. The United States and Russia signed the 2010 New START Treaty, and have completed the implementation of its modest reductions, but there was little evidence of progress toward discussions on further reductions on nuclear weapons. President Obama also did not seek Senate advice and consent on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and the Fissile Material Control Treaty remained stalled in the U.N. Conference on Disarmament. Progress was also scant in President Obama's second term. Not only did the United States and Russia fail to negotiate further reductions in their offensive nuclear weapons, the United States highlighted concerns with Russia's compliance with past agreements. Specifically, the United States accused Russia of violating the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and the 1992 Open Skies Treaty. Some have argued that these actions, when combined with Russia's annexation of Crimea and invasion of Ukraine in early 2014, indicate that Russia may be rejecting the web of arms control and security agreements that have contributed to U.S., Russian, and European security for the past two decades. On the other hand, in 2015, the United States, Russia, and other nations reached an agreement with Iran that restricted Iran's nuclear program and introduced new, extensive international monitoring mechanisms to ensure that Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapon. The debate in Congress over its provisions and implications revealed broad disagreement about the role and value of arms control and nonproliferation agreements in supporting U.S. national security. The Trump Administration, like the Bush Administration, has voiced skepticism about the role that arms control and nonproliferation agreements can play in strengthening U.S. national security. This view reflects growing concerns about Russian compliance with existing arms control agreements, but also derives from the view that arms control does too much to restrict U.S. flexibility and too little to limit the capabilities of others. Moreover, while some would argue that growing tensions between the United States and Russia strengthen the case for further negotiated limits on U.S. and Russian forces, the Trump Administration, and the Obama Administration in its later years, notes that Russia is not, at this time, willing to pursue such agreements. In response to these views, and after years of trying to convince Russia to return to compliance with the INF Treaty, the Trump Administration announced on February 1, 2019, that the United States was suspending its participation in INF and would withdraw on August 2, 2019, following the treaty-mandated six-month withdrawal period. Moreover, while President Trump's approach to diplomatic engagement with North Korea has raised hope for some resolution to the nuclear crisis with that country, the Trump Administration has withdrawn U.S. support for the agreement with Iran. The Arms Control Agenda The United States has participated in numerous arms control and nonproliferation efforts over the past 60 years. These efforts have produced formal treaties and agreements that impose restrictions on U.S. military forces and activities, informal arrangements and guidelines that the United States has agreed to observe, and unilateral restraints on military forces and activities that the United States has adopted either on its own, or in conjunction with reciprocal restraints on other nations' forces and activities. Because these arms control arrangements affect U.S. national security, military programs, force levels, and defense spending, Congress has shown a continuing interest in the implementation of existing agreements and the prospects for further negotiations. The changing international environment in the 1990s led many analysts to believe that the United States and other nations could enter a new era of restraint in weapons deployments, weapons transfers, and military operations. These hopes were codified in several treaties signed between 1991 and 1996, such as the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START I and START II), the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Yet, for many, hopes for a new era were clouded by the slow pace of ratification and implementation for many agreements. The 1991 START I Treaty did not enter into force until late 1994; the 1993 START II Treaty never entered into force and was replaced by a new, less detailed Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty in 2002. The 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), in spite of widespread international support, failed to win approval from the U.S. Senate in October 1999. Furthermore, India, Pakistan, Iran, and North Korea raised new questions about the viability of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and its role in stemming nuclear proliferation. Some progress did occur in the latter years of the decade. In 1997, the United States and Russia, the two nations with the largest stockpiles of chemical weapons, both ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention. In December 1997, more than 120 nations signed an international agreement banning the use of antipersonnel land mines; however, a number of major nations, including the United States, have so far declined to sign. However, the U.S. Senate's rejection of the CTBT, the Bush Administration's withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in 2002, and the U.S. rejection of a verification protocol for the Biological Weapons Convention led many nations to question the U.S. commitment to the arms control process. During the Bush Administration, the United States outlined new initiatives in nonproliferation policy that took a far less formal approach, with voluntary guidelines and voluntary participation replacing treaties and multilateral conventions. The Bush Administration also signaled a change in the focus of U.S. nonproliferation policy. Instead of offering its support to international regimes that sought to establish nonproliferation norms that apply to all nations, the Bush Administration turned to arrangements that sought, instead, to prevent proliferation only to those nations and groups that the United States believed could threaten U.S. or international security. In essence, nonproliferation became a tool of antiterrorism policy. The Obama Administration also viewed nonproliferation policy as a tool of antiterrorism policy, and highlighted the importance of keeping nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons away from nonstate actors who might threaten the United States or its allies. But it also viewed nonproliferation as a more general tool of U.S. national security policy. And, where the Bush Administration focused its efforts on denying these weapons to specific nations or groups who might threaten the United States, the Obama Administration adopted the more general goals of establishing and supporting international norms and regimes to control these weapons, regardless of which nations might seek them. For example, in a speech in Moscow in July 2009, President Obama noted that "the notion that prestige comes from holding these weapons, or that we can protect ourselves by picking and choosing which nations can have these weapons, is an illusion." He went on to state that stopping the spread of nuclear weapons "is not about singling out individual nations—it's about the responsibilities of all nations." The Trump Administration has offered some support for existing arms control and nonproliferation tools; it noted, in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, that the United States continues to support the goals of the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and that it would continue to abide by the terms of the 2010 New START Treaty, although it had not decided whether to extend it past 2021. At the same time, the Administration has noted that, in the current international security environment, the United States might be better served by bolstering its military capabilities than by negotiating additional limits or reductions. This report provides an overview of many of the key arms control and nonproliferation agreements and endeavors of the past 40 years. It is divided into three sections. The first describes arms control efforts between the United States and the states of the former Soviet Union, covering both formal, bilateral treaties, and the cooperative threat reduction process. The second section describes multilateral nuclear nonproliferation efforts, covering both formal treaties and less formal accommodations that have been initiated in recent years. The final section reviews treaties and agreements that address chemical, biological, and conventional weapons. The report concludes with several appendices. These provide a list of treaties and agreements that the United States is a party to, a description of the treaty ratification process, and a list of the bilateral and international organizations tasked with implementation of arms control efforts. Arms Control Between the United States and States of the Former Soviet Union The Early Years: SALT I and SALT II The United States and Soviet Union signed their first formal agreements limiting nuclear offensive and defensive weapons in May 1972. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, known as SALT, produced two agreements—the Interim Agreement ... on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and the Treaty ... on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems. These were followed, in 1979, by the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, known as SALT II, which sought to codify equal limits on U.S. and Soviet strategic offensive nuclear forces. The Interim Agreement on Offensive Arms The Interim Agreement on Offensive Arms imposed a freeze on the number of launchers for intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) that the United States and Soviet Union could deploy. The parties agreed that they would not begin construction of new ICBM launchers after July 1, 1972; at the time the United States had 1,054 ICBM launchers and the Soviet Union had 1,618 ICBM launchers. They also agreed to freeze their number of SLBM launchers and modern ballistic missile submarines, although they could add SLBM launchers if they retired old ICBM launchers. A protocol to the Treaty indicated that the United States could deploy up to 710 SLBM launchers on 44 submarines, and the Soviet Union could deploy up to 950 SLBM launchers on 62 submarines. The inequality in these numbers raised serious concerns both in Congress and in the policy community in Washington. When approving the agreement, Congress adopted a provision, known as the Jackson amendment, that mandated that all future arms control agreements would have to contain equal limits for the United States and Soviet Union. The Interim Agreement was to remain in force for five years, unless the parties replaced it with a more comprehensive agreement limiting strategic offensive weapons. In 1977, both nations agreed to observe the agreement until the completed the SALT II Treaty. The Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II) The United States and Soviet Union completed the SALT II Treaty in June 1979, after seven years of negotiations. During these negotiations, the United States sought limits on quantitative and qualitative changes in Soviet forces. The U.S. negotiating position also reflected the congressional mandate for numerically equal limits on both nations' forces. As a result, the treaty limited each nation to a total of 2,400 ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers, with this number declining to 2,250 by January 1, 1981. Within this total, the Treaty contained sublimits for the numbers launchers that could be deployed for ICBMs with multiple independent reentry vehicles (MIRVed ICBMs); MIRVed ICBMs and MIRVed SLBMs; and MIRVed ICBMs, MIRVed SLBMs, MIRVed air-to-surface ballistic missiles (ASBMs), and heavy bombers. The Treaty would not have limited the total number of warheads that could be carried on these delivery vehicles, which was a growing concern with the deployment of large numbers of multiple-warhead missiles, but the nations did agree that they would not increase the numbers of warheads on existing types of missiles and would not test new types of ICBMs with more than 10 warheads and new types of SLBMs with more than 14 warheads. They also agreed to provisions that were designed to limit missile modernization programs, in an effort to restrain qualitative improvements in their strategic forces. Although it contained equal limits on U.S. and Soviet forces, the SALT II Treaty still proved to be highly controversial. Some analysts argued that the Treaty would fail to curb the arms race because the limits on forces were equal to the numbers already deployed by the United States and Soviet Union; they argued for lower limits and actual reductions. Other analysts argued that the Treaty would allow the Soviet Union to maintain strategic superiority over the United States because the Soviet force of large, land-based ballistic missiles would be able to carry far greater numbers of warheads, even within the equal limits on delivery vehicles, than U.S. ballistic missiles. Some argued that, with this advantage, the Soviet Union would be able to target all U.S. land-based ICBMs in a first strike, which created a "window of vulnerability" for the United States. The Treaty's supporters argued that the Soviet advantage in large MIRVed ICBMs was more than offset by the U.S. advantage in SLBM warheads, which could not be destroyed in a first strike and could retaliate against Soviet targets, and the U.S. advantage in heavy bombers. The continuing Soviet build-up of strategic nuclear forces, along with the taking of U.S. hostages in Iran and other challenges to the U.S. international position in the late 1970s, combined with the perceived weaknesses to the Treaty to raise questions about whether the Senate would muster the votes needed to consent to the Treaty's ratification. Shortly after the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, President Carter withdrew the Treaty from the Senate's consideration. The ABM Treaty The 1972 ABM Treaty permitted the United States and Soviet Union to deploy ABM interceptors at two sites, one centered on the nation's capital and one containing ICBM silo launchers. Each site could contain up to 100 ground-based launchers for ABM interceptor missiles, along with specified radars and sensors. The ABM Treaty also obligated each nation not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems for the "defense of the territory of its country" and not to provide a base for such a defense. It forbade testing and deployment of space-based, sea-based, or air-based ABM systems or components and it imposed a number of qualitative limits on missile defense programs. The Treaty, however, imposed no restrictions on defenses against aircraft, cruise missiles, or theater ballistic missiles. In a Protocol signed in 1974, each side agreed that it would deploy an ABM system at only one site, either around the nation's capital or around an ICBM deployment area. The Soviet Union deployed its site around Moscow; this system has been maintained and upgraded over the years, and remains operational today. The United States deployed its ABM system around ICBM silo launchers located near Grand Forks, ND; it operated this facility briefly in 1974 before closing it down when it proved to be not cost effective. The ABM Treaty was the source of considerable controversy and debate for most of its history. Presidents Reagan, George H. W. Bush, and Clinton all wrestled with the conflicting goals of defending the United States against ballistic missile attack while living within the confines of the ABM Treaty. President George W. Bush resolved this conflict in 2002, when he announced that the United States would withdraw from the ABM Treaty so that it could deploy ballistic missile defenses. The substance of this debate during the Clinton and Bush years is described in more detail below. The Reagan and Bush Years: INF and START During the election campaign of 1980, and after taking office in January 1981, President Ronald Reagan pledged to restore U.S. military capabilities, in general, and nuclear capabilities, in particular. He planned to expand U.S. nuclear forces and capabilities in an effort to counter the perceived Soviet advantages in nuclear weapons. Initially, at least, he rejected the use of arms control agreements to contain the Soviet threat. However, in 1982, after Congress and many analysts pressed for more diplomatic initiatives, the Reagan Administration outlined negotiating positions to address intermediate-range missiles, long-range strategic weapons, and ballistic missile defenses. These negotiations began to bear fruit in the latter half of President Reagan's second term, with the signing of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in 1987. President George H. W. Bush continued to pursue the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), with the United States and Soviet Union, signing this Treaty in July 1991. The collapse of the Soviet Union later that year led to calls for deeper reductions in strategic offensive arms. As a result, the United States and Russia signed START II in January 1993, weeks before the end of the Bush Administration. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty In December 1979, NATO decided upon a "two track" approach to intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) in Europe: it would seek negotiations with the Soviets to limit such systems, and at the same time schedule deployments as a spur to such negotiations. Negotiating sessions began in the fall of 1980 and continued until November 1983, when the Soviets left the talks upon deployment of the first U.S. INF systems in Europe. The negotiations resumed in January 1985. At the negotiations, the Reagan Administration initially called for a "double zero" option, which would eliminate all short- as well as long-range INF systems, a position at the time viewed by most observers to be unattractive to the Soviets. The negotiations proceeded to discuss possible limits on the systems, with progress slowed by the Soviet refusal to consider limits on its systems in Asia. Nevertheless, significant progress began to occur during the Gorbachev regime. At the Reykjavik summit in October 1986, Gorbachev agreed to include reductions of Soviet INF systems in Asia. Then, in June 1987, the Soviets proposed a global ban on short- and long-range INF systems, which was similar to the U.S. proposal for a double zero. Gorbachev also accepted the U.S. proposal for an intrusive verification regime. The United States and the Soviet Union signed the Treaty on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) on December 8, 1987. The INF Treaty was seen as a significant milestone in arms control because it established an intrusive verification regime and because it eliminated entire classes of weapons that both sides regarded as modern and effective. The United States and Soviet Union agreed to destroy all intermediate-range and shorter-range nuclear-armed ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles, which are those missiles with a range between 300 and 3,400 miles. The launchers associated with the controlled missiles were also to be destroyed. The signatories agreed that the warheads and guidance systems of the missiles need not be destroyed; they could be used or reconfigured for other systems not controlled by the Treaty. The Soviets agreed to destroy approximately 1,750 missiles and the United States agreed to destroy 846 missiles, establishing a principle that asymmetrical reductions were acceptable in order to achieve a goal of greater stability. On the U.S. side, the principal systems destroyed were the Pershing II ballistic missile and the ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM), both single-warhead systems. On the Soviet side, the principal system was the SS-20 ballistic missile, which carried three warheads. These systems, on both sides, were highly mobile and able to strike such high-value targets as command-and-control centers, staging areas, airfields, depots, and ports. The Soviets also agreed to destroy a range of older nuclear missiles, as well as the mobile, short-range SS-23, a system developed and deployed in the early 1980s. The parties had eliminated all their weapons by May 1991. The verification regime of the INF Treaty permitted on-site inspections of selected missile assembly facilities and all storage centers, deployment zones, and repair, test, and elimination facilities. Although it did not permit "anywhere, anytime" inspections, it did allow up to 20 short-notice inspections of sites designated in the Treaty. The two sides agreed to an extensive data exchange, intended to account for all systems covered by the agreement. The Treaty also established a continuous portal monitoring procedure at one assembly facility in each country. Inspections under the INF Treaty continued until May 2001, however, the United States continues to operate its site at Russia's Votkinsk Missile Assembly facility under the terms of the 1991 START Treaty. The INF Treaty returned to the news in 2007. Russia, partly in response to U.S. plans to deploy a missile defense radar in the Czech Republic and interceptor missiles in Poland, stated that it might withdraw from the INF Treaty. Some Russian officials claimed this would allow Russia to deploy missiles with the range needed to threaten the missile defense system, in case it were capable of threatening Russia's strategic nuclear forces. Analysts outside Russia also noted that Russia might be responding to concerns about the growing capabilities of China's missiles, or of those in other countries surrounding Russia. During the Obama Administration, the United States grew concerned about Russia's testing and development of a new ground-launched cruise missile of INF range. Since 2014, the United States has expressed these concerns in the State Department's annual report on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments . This report has stated that the United States has determined that "the Russian Federation is in violation of its obligations under the [1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces] INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles." In the 2018 version of the report, it identified the missile's designation as the 9M729. The United States addressed its concerns about this missile repeatedly with Russia in a number of diplomatic meetings, including in 2016 and 2017 meetings of the Treaty's Special Verification Commission (SVC). Russia first denied that any such cruise missile existed, and after the United States identified the specific missile, Russia denied that it had been tested to INF range. It responded with its own accusations of U.S. noncompliance, noting, particularly, that U.S. missile defense launchers located in Romania could be equipped with offensive ground-launched cruise missiles. The United States has denied this accusation. According to U.S. officials, Russia began to deploy the new cruise missile in late 2016. The Trump Administration conducted an extensive review of the INF Treaty during 2017 to assess the potential security implications of Russia's violation and to determine how the United States would respond going forward. On December 8, 2017—the 30 th anniversary of date when the Treaty was signed—the Administration announced that the United States would implement an integrated response that included diplomatic, military, and economic measures. This includes establishing a new program in the Pentagon that will fund research into a possible new ground-launched cruise missile. However, in October 2018, then-Secretary of Defense Mattis informed U.S. allies in NATO that the situation had become "untenable" because Russia refused to acknowledge and address its violation. On October 20, 2018, President Trump announced that the United States would withdraw from the Treaty, and Secretary of State Pompeo announced that the United States had submitted its formal notice of withdrawal to Russia on February 1, 2019. Russia followed suit by suspending its participation in the Treaty, leading to the near certainty that the Treaty will lapse on August 2, 2019. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) Like INF, START negotiations began in 1982, but stopped between 1983 and 1985 after a Soviet walk-out in response to the U.S. deployment of intermediate-range missiles in Europe. They resumed later in the Reagan Administration, and were concluded in the first Bush Administration. The United States and Soviet Union signed the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) on July 31, 1991. START After the Soviet Union The demise of the Soviet Union in December 1991 immediately raised questions about the future of the Treaty. At that time, about 70% of the strategic nuclear weapons covered by START were deployed at bases in Russia; the other 30% were deployed in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. Russia initially sought to be the sole successor to the Soviet Union for the Treaty, but the other three republics did not want to cede all responsibility for the Soviet Union's nuclear status and treaty obligations to Russia. In May 1992, the four republics and the United States signed a Protocol that made all four republics parties to the Treaty. At the same time, the leaders of Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan agreed to eliminate all of their nuclear weapons during the seven-year reduction period outlined in START. They also agreed to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear weapons states. The U.S. Senate gave its consent to the ratification of START on October 1, 1992. The Russian parliament consented to the ratification of START on November 4, 1992, but it stated that Russia would not exchange the instruments of ratification for the Treaty until all three of the other republics adhered to the NPT as non-nuclear states. Kazakhstan completed the ratification process in June 1992 and joined the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state on February 14, 1994. Belarus approved START and the NPT on February 4, 1993, and formally joined the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state on July 22, 1993. Ukraine's parliament approved START in November 1993, but its approval was conditioned on Ukraine's retention of some of the weapons based on its territory and the provision of security guarantees by the other nuclear weapons states. In early 1994, after the United States, Russia, and Ukraine agreed that Ukraine should receive compensation and security assurances in exchange for the weapons based on its soil, the parliament removed the conditions from its resolution of ratification. But it still did not approve Ukraine's accession to the NPT. The Ukrainian parliament took this final step on November 16, 1994, after insisting on and apparently receiving additional security assurances from the United States, Russia, and Great Britain. START officially entered into force with the exchange of the instruments of ratification on December 5, 1994. START Provisions START limited long-range nuclear forces—land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers—in the United States and the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union. Each side could deploy up to 6,000 attributed warheads on 1,600 ballistic missiles and bombers. (Some weapons carried on bombers do not count against the Treaty's limits, so each side could deploy 8,000 or 9,000 actual weapons.) Each side could deploy up to 4,900 warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs. Throughout the START negotiations, the United States placed a high priority on reductions in heavy ICBMs because they were thought to be able to threaten a first strike against U.S. ICBMs. Therefore, START also limits each side to 1,540 warheads on "heavy" ICBMs, a 50% reduction in the number of warheads deployed on the SS-18 ICBMs in the former Soviet republics. START did not require the elimination of most of the missiles removed from service. The nations had to eliminate launchers for missiles that exceeded the permitted totals, but, in most cases, missiles could be placed in storage and warheads could either be stored or reused on missiles remaining in the force. START contained a complex verification regime. Both sides collect most of the information needed to verify compliance with their own satellites and remote sensing equipment—the National Technical Means of Verification (NTM). But the parties also used data exchanges, notifications, and on-site inspections to gather information about forces and activities limited by the Treaty. Taken together, these measures are designed to provide each nation with the ability to deter and detect militarily significant violations. (No verification regime can ensure the detection of all violations. A determined cheater could probably find a way to conceal some types of violations.) Many also believe that the intrusiveness mandated by the START verification regime and the cooperation needed to implement many of these measures built confidence and encouraged openness among the signatories. The United States and Russia completed the reductions in their forces by the designated date of December 5, 2001. All the warheads from 104 SS-18 ICBMs in Kazakhstan were removed and returned to Russia and all the launchers in that nation have been destroyed. Ukraine has destroyed all the SS-19 ICBM and SS-24 ICBM launchers on its territory and returned all the warheads from those missiles to Russia. Belarus had also returned to Russia all 81 SS-25 missiles and warheads based on its territory by late November 1996. START Expiration The START Treaty expired in December 2009. According to the terms of the Treaty, the parties could allow START to lapse, extend it without modification for another five years, or seek to modify the Treaty before extending it for five-year intervals. The United States and Russia began, in 2006, to hold a series of discussions about the future of START, but, through the latter years of the Bush Administration, the two sides held sharply different views on what that future should be. Russian officials believed that the two nations should replace START with a new Treaty that would reduce the numbers of deployed warheads but contain many of the definitions, counting rules, and monitoring provisions of START. The Bush Administration rejected that approach; it noted that the new Moscow Treaty (described below) called for further reductions in offensive nuclear weapons and it argued that many of the detailed provisions in START were no longer needed because the United States and Russia were no longer enemies. The United States suggested that the two sides reaffirm their commitment to the Moscow Treaty, and add to it an informal monitoring regime that would extend some of the monitoring and verification provisions in START. Analysts outside government also suggested that the nations extend the monitoring provisions, at least through 2012, as the Moscow Treaty did not have its own verification regime. Some in the United States, however, objected to this approach because some of the monitoring provisions had begun to impinge on U.S. strategic weapons and missile defense programs. The Obama Administration altered the U.S. approach and decided to negotiate a new Treaty that would replace START (this is discussed in more detail below). The United States and Russia began these discussions in April 2009, but were unable to complete them before START expired on December 5, 2009. As is noted, below, they did complete a New START Treaty in April 2010. START II The United States and Russia signed the second START Treaty, START II, on January 3, 1993, after less than a year of negotiations. The Treaty never entered into force. Its consideration was delayed for several years during the 1990s, but it eventually received approval from both the U.S. Senate and Russian parliament. Nevertheless, it was overcome by events in 2002. START II Provisions START II would have limited each side to between 3,000 and 3,500 warheads; reductions initially were to occur by the year 2003 and would have been extended until 2007 if the nations had approved a new Protocol. It would have banned all MIRVed ICBMs and would have limited each side to 1,750 warheads on SLBMs. To comply with these limits the United States would have removed two warheads (a process known as "downloading") from each of its 500 3-warhead Minuteman III missiles and eliminated all launchers for its 50 10-warhead MX missiles. The United States also stated that it would reduce its SLBM warheads by eliminating 4 Trident submarines and deploying the missiles on the 14 remaining Trident submarines with 5, rather than 8, warheads. Russia would have eliminated all launchers for its 10-warhead SS-24 missiles and 10-warhead SS-18 missiles. It would also have downloaded to a single warhead 105 6-warhead SS-19 missiles, if it retained those missiles. It would also have eliminated a significant number of ballistic missile submarines, both for budget reasons and to reduce to START II limits. These changes would have brought Russian forces below the 3,500 limit because so many of Russia's warheads are deployed on MIRVed ICBMs. As a result, many Russian officials and Duma members insisted that the United States and Russia negotiate a START III Treaty, with lower warhead numbers, so that Russia would not have to produce hundreds of new missiles to maintain START II levels. START II implementation would have accomplished the long-standing U.S. objective of eliminating the Soviet SS-18 heavy ICBMs. The Soviet Union and Russia had resisted limits on these missiles in the past. Russia would have achieved its long-standing objective of limiting U.S. SLBM warheads, although the reductions would not have been as great as those for MIRVed ICBMs. The United States had long resisted limits on these missiles, but apparently believed a 50% reduction was a fair trade for the complete elimination of Russia's SS-18 heavy ICBMs. START II would have relied on the verification regime established by START, with a few new provisions. For example, U.S. inspectors would be allowed to watch Russia pour concrete into the SS-18 silos and to measure the depth of the concrete when Russia converted the silos to hold smaller missiles. In addition, Russian inspectors could have viewed the weapons carriage areas on U.S. heavy bombers to confirm that the number of weapons the bombers are equipped to carry did not exceed the number attributed to that type of bomber. START II Ratification Although START II was signed in early January 1993, its full consideration was delayed until START entered into force at the end of 1994. The U.S. Senate further delayed its consideration during a Senate dispute over the future of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The Senate eventually approved ratification of START II, by a vote of 87-4, on January 26, 1996. The Russian Duma also delayed its consideration of START II. Many members of the Duma disapproved of the way the Treaty would affect Russian strategic offensive forces and many objected to the economic costs Russia would bear when implementing the treaty. The United States sought to address the Duma's concerns during 1997, by negotiating a Protocol that would extend the elimination deadlines in START II, and, therefore, reduce the annual costs of implementation, and by agreeing to negotiate a START III Treaty after START II entered into force. But this did not break the deadlock; the Duma again delayed its debate after the United States and Great Britain launched air strikes against Iraq in December 1998. The Treaty's future clouded again after the United States announced its plans in January 1999 to negotiate amendments to the 1972 ABM Treaty, and after NATO forces began their air campaign in Yugoslavia in April 1999. President Putin offered his support to START II and pressed the Duma for action in early 2000. He succeeded in winning approval for the treaty on April 14 after promising, among other things, that Russia would withdraw from the Treaty if the United States withdrew from the 1972 ABM Treaty. However, the Federal Law on Ratification said the Treaty could not enter into force until the United States approved ratification of several 1997 agreements related to the 1972 ABM Treaty. President Clinton never submitted these to the Senate, for fear they would be defeated. The Bush Administration also never submitted these to the Senate, announcing, instead, in June 2002, that the United States would withdraw from the ABM Treaty. Russia responded by announcing that it had withdrawn from START II and would not implement the Treaty's reductions. The Clinton and Bush Years: Moving Past START and the ABM Treaty The arms control process between the United States and Russia essentially stalled during the 1990s, as efforts to ratify and implement START II dragged on. In 1997, in an effort to move the agenda forward, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed to a framework for a START III Treaty. But these negotiations never produced a Treaty, as the U.S.-Russian arms control agenda came to be dominated by U.S. plans for ballistic missile defenses and issues related to the ABM Treaty. When President Bush took office in 2001, he had little interest in pursuing formal arms control agreements with Russia. He signed the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (known as the Moscow Treaty) in 2002, even though he would have preferred that the United States and Russia each set their force levels without any formal limits. START III Framework for Strategic Offensive Forces Many in Russia argued the United States and Russia should bypass START II and negotiate deeper reductions in nuclear warheads that were more consistent with the levels Russia was likely to retain by the end of the 1990s. The Clinton Administration did not want to set START II aside, in part because it wanted to be sure Russia eliminated its MIRVed ICBMS. However, many in the Administration eventually concluded that Russia would not ratify START II without some assurances that the warhead levels would decline further. So the United States agreed to proceed to START III, but only after START II entered into force; Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed to this timeline in March 1997. The START III framework called for reductions to between 2,000 and 2,500 warheads for strategic offensive nuclear weapons on each side. The United States and Russia held several rounds of discussions on START III, but they did not resolve their differences before the end of the Clinton Administration. President Bush did not pursue the negotiations after taking office in 2001. The demise of these discussions left many issues that had been central to the U.S.-Russian arms control process unresolved. For example, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin had agreed to explore possible measures for limiting long-range, nuclear-armed, sea-launched cruise missiles and other tactical nuclear weapons in the START III framework. These weapons systems are not limited by existing treaties. Many in Congress have joined analysts outside the government in expressing concerns about the safety and security of Russia's stored nuclear weapons and about the numerical discrepancy between U.S. and Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons. In addition, when establishing the START III framework, the United States and Russia agreed that they would explore proposals to enhance transparency and promote the irreversibility of warhead reductions. Many analysts viewed this step as critical to lasting, predictable reductions in nuclear weapons. The Bush Administration, however, rejected this approach. Although it pledged to eliminate some warheads removed from deployment, and implemented deep reductions in the U.S. stockpile of stored nuclear weapons, it did not offer any measures promoting the transparency or irreversibility of this process. It wanted to retain U.S. flexibility and the ability to restore warheads to deployed forces. Many critics of the Bush Administration opposed this policy, in part, because they argued it would undermine U.S. efforts to encourage Russia to eliminate warheads that might be at risk of loss or theft. Ballistic Missile Defenses and the ABM Treaty As was noted above, the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and 1974 Protocol allowed the United States and Soviet Union to deploy limited defenses against long-range ballistic missiles. The United States completed, then quickly abandoned a treaty-compliant ABM system near Grand Forks, ND, in 1974. The Soviet Union deployed, and Russia continues to operate, a treaty-compliant system around Moscow. Missile Defense Plans and Programs During the 1980s and early 1990s, the United States conducted research on a variety of ballistic missile defense technologies. In 1983 President Reagan collected and expanded these programs in the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which sought to develop and deploy comprehensive missile defenses that would defend the United States against a deliberate, massive attack from the Soviet Union. The first Bush Administration changed this focus, seeking instead to provide a defense against possible limited missile attacks that might arise from any number of countries throughout the world. After the Persian Gulf War in 1991, with Iraq's attacks with Scud missiles alerting many to the dangers of missile proliferation and the threats posed by short- and medium-range theater ballistic missiles, the United States began developing several advanced theater missile defense (TMD) systems. At the same time, the Clinton Administration pursued research and technology development for national missile defenses (NMD). The Department of Defense concluded that there was no military requirement for the deployment of such a system after intelligence estimates found that no additional nations (beyond China, Russia, France, and Great Britain) were likely to develop missiles that could threaten the continental United States for at least the next 10-15 years. However, after a congressionally mandated commission raised concerns about the proliferation of long-range missiles in July 1998 and North Korea tested a three-stage missile in August 1998, the Clinton Administration began to consider the deployment of an NMD, with a program structured to achieve that objective in 2005. On September 1, 2000, after disappointing test results, President Clinton announced that he would not authorize construction needed to begin deployment of an NMD. President George W. Bush altered U.S. policy on missile defenses. His Administration sought to develop a layered defense, with land-based, sea-based, and space-based components, that could protect the United States, its allies, and its forces overseas from short-, medium-, and long-range ballistic missiles. It deployed land-based missile interceptors for defense against long-range missiles in Alaska and California, and pursued the deployment of defenses against shorter-range missiles on naval ships. The Bush Administration declared the interceptors in Alaska to be operational in late 2004, but their status and capabilities remain uncertain. ABM Treaty Issues and Negotiations The missile defense systems advocated by the Reagan Administration and first Bush Administration would not have been permitted under the ABM Treaty. In 1985, the United States proposed, in negotiations with the Soviet Union, that the two sides replace the ABM Treaty with an agreement that would permit deployment of more extensive defenses. These negotiations failed, and, in 1993, the Clinton Administration altered their focus. It sought a demarcation agreement to clarify the difference between theater missile defenses and strategic missile defenses so the United States could proceed with theater missile defense (TMD) programs without raising questions about compliance with the Treaty. The United States and Russia signed two joint statements on ABM/TMD Demarcation in September 1997. As amendments to the ABM Treaty, these agreements required the advice and consent of the Senate before they entered into force. But President Clinton never submitted them to the Senate, knowing that the required 67 votes would prove elusive as many of the Senators in the Republican majority believed the ABM Treaty, even if modified, would stand in the way of the deployment of robust missile defenses. In February 1999, the United States and Russia began to discuss ABM Treaty modifications that would permit deployment of a U.S. national missile defense (NMD) system. The United States sought to reassure Russia that the planned NMD would not interfere with Russia's strategic nuclear forces and that the United States still viewed the ABM Treaty as central to the U.S.-Russian strategic balance. The Russians were reportedly unconvinced, noting that the United States could expand its system so that it could intercept a significant portion of Russia's forces. They also argued that the United States had overstated the threat from rogue nations. Furthermore, after Russia approved START II, President Putin noted that U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty would lead not only to Russian withdrawal from START II, but also Russian withdrawal from a wider range of arms control agreements. Through the end of the Clinton Administration, Russia refused to consider U.S. proposals for modifications to the ABM Treaty. Some argued that Russia's position reflected its belief that the United States would not withdraw from the ABM Treaty and, therefore, if Russia refused to amend it, the United States would not deploy national missile defenses. Officials in the George W. Bush Administration referred to the ABM Treaty as a relic of the Cold War and the President stated that the United States would need to move beyond the limits in the Treaty to deploy robust missile defenses. In discussions that began in the middle of 2001, the Bush Administration sought to convince Russia to accept a U.S. proposal for the nations to "set aside" the Treaty together. The Administration also offered Russia extensive briefings to demonstrate that its missile defense program would not threaten Russia but that the ABM Treaty would interfere with the program. Russia would not agree to set the Treaty aside, and, instead, suggested that the United States identify modifications to the Treaty that would allow it to pursue the more robust testing program contained in its proposals. But, according to some reports, Russia would have insisted on the right to determine whether proposed tests were consistent with the Treaty. The Bush Administration would not accept these conditions and President Bush announced, on December 13, 2001, that the United States would withdraw from the ABM Treaty. This withdrawal took effect on June 13, 2002. Russia's President Putin stated that this action was "mistaken." Russia responded by withdrawing from the START II Treaty, but this action was largely symbolic as the Treaty seemed likely to never enter into force. Missile Defense After the ABM Treaty In addition to deploying long-range missile defense interceptors in Alaska and California, the George W. Bush Administration proposed that the United States deploy a third missile defense site in Europe to defend against a potential Iranian missile threat. The system was to include 10 interceptors based in Poland and a radar in the Czech Republic. Russia's President Putin and his successor, Vladimir Medvedev, argued that the proposal would reignite the arms race and upset U.S.-Russian-European security relations. U.S. officials disputed Russia's objections, noting that the interceptors would not be able to intercept Russian missiles or undermine Russia's deterrent capabilities. In mid-2007, Russia offered to cooperate on missile defense, proposing the use of a Russian-leased radar in Azerbaijan, but urging that U.S. facilities not be built in Eastern Europe. President Bush welcomed the idea in principle, but insisted upon the need for the European sites. Despite ongoing discussions over the issue, sharp Russian criticism of the program continued. Medvedev said that Russia might deploy Iskander tactical missiles to Kaliningrad, but later stated that Moscow would not do so if the United States reversed its plan to emplace GMD facilities in Poland and the Czech Republic. Congress resisted the Bush Administration's request for funding for this system. It withheld much of the funding, pending at least two successful tests and the completion of agreements with the Polish and Czech governments. It also requested further reports on the need for and capabilities of the proposed system. The Obama Administration reviewed and restructured U.S. plans for a missile defense site in Europe. On September 17, 2009, the Administration announced it would cancel the system proposed by the Bush Administration. Instead, Defense Secretary Gates announced U.S. plans to develop and deploy a regional BMD capability that could be deployed around the world on relatively short notice during crises or as the situation may demand. Gates argued this new capability, based primarily around current BMD sensors and interceptors, would be more responsive and adaptable to growing concern over the direction of Iranian short- and medium-range ballistic missile proliferation. This capability would continue to evolve and expand as the United States moved forward with the concept known as the "Phased Adaptive Approach." As missile threats matured during the next decade, the missile defense system would include interceptors that could respond against more numerous and more sophisticated threats. The United States and its NATO allies have moved forward with the deployment of components of this missile defense system; ships armed with the Aegis missile defense system are deployed at Rota, Spain, and patrol regularly in the Mediterranean. The United States has also deployed missile defense assets on land in Europe, in an effort known as Aegis Ashore. The United States completed deployment of the site in Romania on December 1, 2015, and plans to complete the deployment in Poland in the 2018-2019 time frame. While the United States insists that these systems do not have the range or capability to threaten Russian ballistic missiles, Russia continues to object to these deployments and to insist that it is unwilling to discuss further limits on offensive weapons until the United States agrees to limit the numbers and capabilities of its missile defense systems. The Trump Administration is conducting a new Missile Defense Review that will chart a path forward for U.S. missile defense systems. While this review is likely to continue to support the deployment of missile defenses in Europe and Asia to address regional missile threats from nations such as North Korea and Iran, it may also outline plans to move toward the deployment of more robust sensors, and possibly interceptors, that could address threats from other nations. The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty During a summit meeting with President Putin in November 2001, President George W. Bush announced that the United States would reduce its "operationally deployed" strategic nuclear warheads to a level between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads during the next decade. He stated that the United States would reduce its forces unilaterally, without signing a formal agreement. President Putin indicated that Russia wanted to use the formal arms control process, emphasizing that the two sides should focus on "reaching a reliable and verifiable agreement." Russia sought a "legally binding document" that would provide "predictability and transparency" and ensure for the "irreversibilty of the reduction of nuclear forces." The United States wanted to maintain the flexibility to size and structure its nuclear forces in response to its own needs. It preferred a less formal process, such as an exchange of letters and, possibly, new transparency measures that would allow each side to understand the force structure plans of the other side. Within the Bush Administration, Secretary of State Powell supported the conclusion of a "legally binding" agreement because he believed it would help President Putin's standing with his domestic critics. He apparently prevailed over the objections of officials in the Pentagon. Although the eventual outcome did differ from the initial approach of the Bush Administration, most observers agree that it did not undermine the fundamental U.S. objectives in the negotiations because the Treaty's provisions would not impede the Bush Administration's plans for U.S. strategic nuclear forces. The United States and Russia signed the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty on May 24, 2002. The U.S. Senate gave its advice and consent to the ratification of the Treaty on March 6, 2003. The Russian Duma approved the Federal Law on Ratification for the Treaty on May 14, 2003. The Treaty entered into force on June 1, 2003. The Treaty was due to remain in force until December 31, 2012, after which it could be extended or replaced by another agreement. It lapsed, however, on February 5, 2011, when the New START Treaty (see below) entered into force. Treaty Provisions Article I contained the only limit in the Treaty, stating that the United States and Russia will reduce their "strategic nuclear warheads" to between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads by December 31, 2012. The text did not define "strategic nuclear warheads" and, therefore, did not indicate whether the parties would count only those warheads that are "operationally deployed," all warheads that would count under the START counting rules, or some other quantity of nuclear warheads. The text did refer to statements made by Presidents Bush and Putin in November and December 2001, when each outlined their own reduction plans. This reference may have indicated that the United States and Russia could each use their own definition when counting strategic nuclear warheads. The Treaty did not limit delivery vehicles or impose sublimits on specific types of weapons systems. Each party could determine its own "composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms." Monitoring and Verification The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty did not contain any monitoring or verification provisions. The Bush Administration noted that the United States and Russia already collected information about strategic nuclear forces under START I and during implementation of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. Some in Congress questioned, however, whether this information would be sufficient for the duration of the Treaty, since START I was due to expire in 2009, three years before the end of implementation under the new Treaty. Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty also did not contain any limits or restrictions on nonstrategic nuclear weapons. Yet, as was noted above, many Members of Congress had argued that these weapons pose a greater threat to the United States and its allies than strategic nuclear weapons. During hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Powell both agreed that the disposition of nonstrategic nuclear weapons should be on the agenda for future meetings between the United States and Russia, although neither supported a formal arms control regime to limit or contain these weapons. These discussions did not occur, and many analysts outside government have renewed their calls for reductions in nonstrategic nuclear weapons. The Obama Administration: New START The United States and Russia began to discuss their options for arms control after START in mid-2006. During the Bush Administration, they were unable to agree on a path forward. Neither side wanted to extend START in its original form, as some of the Treaty's provisions had begun to interfere with some military programs on both sides. Russia wanted to replace START with a new Treaty that would further reduce deployed forces while using many of the same definitions and counting rules in START. The United States initially did not want to negotiate a new treaty, but, under the Bush Administration, would have been willing to extend, informally, some of START's monitoring provisions. In 2008, the Bush Administration agreed to conclude a new Treaty, with monitoring provisions attached, but this Treaty would have resembled the far less formal Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty. In December 2008, the two sides agreed that they wanted to replace START before it expired, but acknowledged that this task would have to be left to negotiations between Russia and the Obama Administration. Pursuing an Agreement The United States and Russia began to hold talks on a new treaty during the first few months of the Obama Administration. In early March 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Russia's Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov agreed that the two nations would seek to reach an agreement that would replace START by the end of 2009. In April, after their meeting in London prior to the G-20 summit, Presidents Obama and Medvedev endorsed these negotiations and their goal of reaching an agreement by the end of 2009. When Presidents Obama and Medvedev met in Moscow on July 6-7, 2009, they signed a Joint Understanding for the START follow-on Treaty. This statement contained a range for the numerical limits that would be in the Treaty—between 500 and 1,100 of strategic delivery vehicles and between 1,500 and 1,675 for their associated warheads. It also included a list of other issues—such as provisions for calculating the limits, provisions on definitions, and a provision on the relationship between strategic offensive and strategic defensive weapons—that would be addressed in the Treaty. START expired on December 5, 2009. At the time, the negotiating teams continued to meet in Geneva, but the negotiations concluded shortly before the end of 2009 without reaching a final agreement. The formal talks resumed in late January 2010, and the parties concluded the New START Treaty in early April 2010. Presidents Obama and Medvedev signed the Treaty in Prague on April 8, 2010; it entered into force on February 5, 2011. The two parties completed their required reductions by the treaty's seven-year deadline of February 5, 2018. Treaty Provisions Limits on Warheads and Launchers The New START Treaty contains three central limits on U.S. and Russian strategic offensive nuclear forces. First, it limits each side to no more than 800 deployed and nondeployed ICBM and SLBM launchers and deployed and nondeployed heavy bombers equipped to carry nuclear armaments. Second, within that total, it limits each side to no more than 700 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers equipped to carry nuclear armaments. Third, the treaty limits each side to no more than 1,550 deployed warheads. Deployed warheads include the actual number of warheads carried by deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, and one warhead for each deployed heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments. According to New START's Protocol, a deployed ICBM launcher is "an ICBM launcher that contains an ICBM and is not an ICBM test launcher, an ICBM training launcher, or an ICBM launcher located at a space launch facility." A deployed SLBM launcher is a launcher installed on an operational submarine that contains an SLBM and is not intended for testing or training. A deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs is one that contains an ICBM and is not a mobile test launcher or a mobile launcher of ICBMs located at a space launch facility. These deployed launchers can be based only at ICBM bases. A deployed ICBM or SLBM is one that is contained in a deployed launcher. A deployed heavy bomber is one that is equipped for nuclear armaments but is not a "test heavy bomber or a heavy bomber located at a repair facility or at a production facility." Moreover, a heavy bomber is equipped for nuclear armaments if it is "equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, nuclear air-to-surface missiles, or nuclear bombs." Nondeployed launchers are, therefore, those that are used for testing or training, those that are located at space launch facilities, or those that are located at deployment areas or on submarines but do not contain a deployed ICBM or SLBM. The warhead limits in New START differ from those in the original START Treaty. First, the original START Treaty contained several sublimits on warheads attributed to different types of strategic weapons, in part because the United States wanted the treaty to impose specific limits on elements of the Soviet force that were deemed to be "destabilizing." New START, in contrast, contains only a single limit on the aggregate number of deployed warheads. This provides each nation with the freedom to mix their forces as they see fit. This change reflects, in part, a lesser concern with Cold War models of strategic and crisis stability. It also derives from the U.S. desire to maintain flexibility in determining the structure of its own nuclear forces. Second, under START, to calculate the number of warheads that counted against the treaty limits, the United States and Russia counted deployed launchers, assumed launcher contained an operational missile, and assumed each missile carried an "attributed" number of warheads. The number of warheads attributed to each missile or bomber was the same for all missiles and bombers of that type. The parties then multiplied these warhead numbers by the number of deployed ballistic missiles and heavy bombers to determine the number of warheads that counted under the treaty's limits. Under New START, the United States and Russia will also count the number of deployed launchers. But they will not calculate the number of deployed warheads by multiplying the number of launchers by a warhead attribution number. Instead, each side will simply declare the total number of warheads deployed across their force. This counting method will provide the United States with the flexibility to reduce its forces without eliminating launchers and to structure its deployed forces to meet evolving operational needs. Monitoring and Verification The New START Treaty contains a monitoring and verification regime that resembles the regime in START, in that its text contains detailed definitions of items limited by the treaty; provisions governing the use of NTM to gather data on each side's forces and activities; an extensive database that identifies the numbers, types, and locations of items limited by the treaty; provisions requiring notifications about items limited by the treaty; and inspections allowing the parties to confirm information shared during data exchanges. At the same time, the verification regime has been streamlined to make it less costly and complex than the regime in START. It also has been adjusted to reflect the limits in New START and the current circumstances in the relationship between the United States in Russia. In particular, it focuses on maintaining transparency, cooperation, and openness, as well as on deterring and detecting potential violations. Under New START, the United States and Russia continue to rely on their NTM to collect information about the numbers and locations of their strategic forces. They may also broadcast and exchange telemetry—the data generated during missile flight tests—up to five times each year. They do not need these data to monitor compliance with any particular limits in New START, but the telemetry exchange will provide some transparency into the capabilities of their systems. The parties will also exchange a vast amount of data about those forces, specifying not only their distinguishing characteristics, but also their precise locations and the number of warheads deployed on each deployed delivery vehicle. They will notify each other, and update the database, whenever they move forces between declared facilities. The treaty also requires the parties to display their forces, and allows each side to participate in exhibitions, to confirm information listed in the database. Under New START, each party can conduct up to 18 short-notice, on-site inspections each year; both sides used this full quota of inspections during the three years of the treaty's implementation. The treaty divides these into Type One inspections and Type Two inspections. Each side can conduct up to 10 Type One inspections and up to 8 Type Two inspections. Moreover, during each Type One inspection, the parties will be able to perform two different types of inspection activities—these are essentially equivalent to the data update inspections and reentry vehicle inspections in the original START Treaty. As a result, the 18 short-notice inspections permitted under New START are essentially equivalent to the 28 short-notice inspections permitted under START. Relationship Between Offensive and Defensive Weapons In the Joint Understanding signed at the Moscow summit in July 2009, the United States and Russia agreed that the new treaty would contain a "provision on the interrelationship of strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms." This statement, which appears in the preamble to New START, states that the parties recognize "the existence of the interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms, that this interrelationship will become more important as strategic nuclear arms are reduced, and that current strategic defensive arms do not undermine the viability and effectiveness of the strategic offensive arms of the parties." Russia and the United States each issued unilateral statements when they signed New START that clarified their positions on the relationship between New START and missile defenses. Russia indicated that it might exercise its right to withdraw from the treaty if the United States increased the capabilities of its missile defenses "in such a way that threatens the potential of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation. " The United States responded by noting that its "missile defense systems are not intended to affect the strategic balance with Russia. The United States missile defense systems would be employed to defend the United States against limited missile launches, and to defend its deployed forces, allies and partners against regional threats." Officials from the Obama Administration testified to the Senate and repeatedly emphasized that these statements did not impose any obligations on either the United States or Russia and would not result in any limits on U.S. missile defense programs. These statements also did not provide Russia with "veto power" over U.S. missile defense systems. Although Russia has said it may withdraw from the treaty if the U.S. missile defenses threaten "the potential of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation," the United States has no obligation to consult with Russia to confirm that its planned defenses do not cross this threshold. It may develop and deploy whatever defenses it chooses; Russia can then determine, for itself, whether those defenses affect its strategic nuclear forces and whether it thinks the threat to those forces justifies withdrawal from the treaty. Implementation New START has been in force for eight years. According to the U.S. State Department, the United States and Russia have successfully cooperated in implementing the treaty, and both have completed their required reductions. Russia, however, has raised concerns about the method that the United States has used to eliminate some of its accountable weapons, and has, therefore, been unwilling to agree, unequivocally that the United States is in compliance with the Treaty. According to the latest data exchange, with data current as of September 1, 2018, the United States had met its New START levels with 1,398 warheads on 659 deployed launchers, within a total of 800 deployed and nondeployed launchers. On February 5, 2018, Russia reported that it had met the New START limits with 1,420 warheads on 517 deployed launchers, within a total of 775 deployed and nondeployed launchers. The two sides have shared more than 17,375 notifications, and each has conducted its full allotment of 18 onsite inspections each year. New START is scheduled to expire on February 5, 2021. According to the terms of the Treaty, the parties can extend it for a period not to exceed five years, which would extend it through February 2026. Press reports indicate that President Putin proposed that the parties pursue this extension, but the United States has not yet announced its position on this issue. Administration officials have stated that the possible extension is under review in the interagency process. Some, including General John Hyten, the Chairman of U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), have noted that the limits on Russian forces and the transparency afforded by the verification regime continue to serve U.S. national security interests. However, he and others have noted that Russia appears to be developing new kinds of long-range nuclear delivery systems that may not be captured by the Treaty limits. While some have argued that the United States and Russia should extend New START first, then discuss measures to bring these weapons into the Treaty framework, others have suggested that the United States withhold approval of an extension unless Russia first agrees to count these weapons under the Treaty limits. Threat Reduction and Nonproliferation Assistance As the Soviet Union collapsed in late 1991, many Members of Congress grew concerned that deteriorating social and economic conditions in Russia would affect control over Soviet weapons of mass destruction. In December 1991, Congress authorized the transfer of $400 million from the FY1992 Department of Defense (DOD) budget to help the republics that inherited the Soviet nuclear and chemical weapons stockpile—Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus—transport and dismantle these weapons. This effort grew substantially, with Congress appropriating more than $1 billion each year for nonproliferation and threat reduction programs administered by the Department of Defense (DOD), the State Department, and the Department of Energy (DOE). Funding for programs in the former Soviet Union has declined sharply in recent years, while funding for programs in other nations around the world has increased. DOD's Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR) At its inception, DOD's CTR program sought to provide Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan with assistance in the safe and secure transportation, storage, and dismantlement of nuclear weapons. The initial Nunn-Lugar legislation, which established the program in 1991, was tightly focused on the transport, storage, and destruction of weapons of mass destruction. But the focus of CTR funding has changed as the program has evolved. As the work on strategic offensive arms reductions was completed, a growing proportion of the funding focused on securing and eliminating chemical and biological weapons. Over the past decade, the United States has also viewed the CTR program, and other U.S. nonproliferation assistance to the former Soviet states, as a part of its efforts to keep weapons of mass destruction away from terrorists. Moreover, an increasing proportion of CTR funding has been allocated to projects outside the former Soviet Union, as the United States seeks to engage a greater number of nations as partners in the effort to secure vulnerable nuclear materials and other weapons of mass destruction. CTR Program Areas The United States has provided Russia and the other former Soviet states with extensive assistance with projects designed to help with the elimination of nuclear, chemical, and other weapons and their delivery vehicles. These projects helped Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan remove warheads, deactivate missiles, and eliminate launch facilities for nuclear weapons covered by the START Treaty. Several projects were also designed to enhance the safety, security, and control over nuclear weapons and fissile materials. The CTR program also funded several projects at storage facilities for nuclear weapons and materials, to improve security and accounting systems and to provide storage space for plutonium removed from nuclear warheads when they are dismantled. The United States and Russia also used CTR funds to construct a chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuch'ye that was intended to help Russia comply with its obligations under the Chemical Weapons convention and to prevent the loss or theft of Soviet-era chemical weapons by ensuring their safe and secure destruction. The United States also helped install equipment at the destruction facility and to train the operating personnel. Operations at the facility began in March 2009, and it was officially dedicated in late May 2009. At the end of 2012, Russia had used it to eliminate over 3,321.5 metric tons of nerve agent. In the late 1990s, Congress added funds to the CTR budget for biological weapons proliferation prevention; this effort has expanded substantially in recent years. The Soviet Union had reportedly developed the world's largest biological weapons program and reportedly continued to pursue research and development of biological agents in the 1990s, even as the security systems and supporting infrastructure at its facilities began to deteriorate. The United State began to provide Russia with CTR assistance to improve safety and security at its biological weapons sites and to help employ biological weapons scientists during the late 1990s. Much of the work in Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union focused on safe and secure storage and handling of biological pathogen collections. Biological proliferation prevention programs in Russia lapsed after the expiration of the memorandum of understanding in June 2013, but the United States has expanded its biological engagement programs beyond the former Soviet Union, and now works globally to secure pathogen collections, train scientists on security issues, and improve disease surveillance. The Obama Administration stated that the goal of the CBE program is to counter the "threat of state and non-state actors acquiring biological materials and expertise that could be used to develop or deploy a biological weapon." In recent years, biological weapons engagement programs have accounted for more than 70% of the CTR budget. Future of the CTR Program The United States and Russia initially signed the Memorandum of Understanding, known as the Umbrella Agreement, that governs implementation of CTR projects in 1992. This agreement had an initial seven-year duration and was renewed in 1999 and 2006. It expired in June 2013. The United States and Russia replaced it with a bilateral protocol under the Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Program in the Russian Federation Agreement (MNEPR). Russia's Ministry of Defense no longer participates in these cooperative programs. As a result, many of the CTR projects in Russia have ended, although the two countries will continue to cooperate on some areas of nuclear security. The United States will also continue to fund cooperative engagement programs in countries around the world. Department of Energy Nonproliferation Cooperation Programs The Department of Energy has contributed to U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation assistance to the former Soviet states from the start, when CTR included a small amount of funding for materials control and protection. Since then, the United States and Russia have cooperated, through several programs, to secure and eliminate many of the materials that could help terrorists or rogue nations acquire their own nuclear capabilities. In late 2014, however, Russia indicated that it would no longer cooperate in programs funded by DOE. Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting When the United States began to provide Russia with assistance securing its nuclear weapons and materials in the mid-1990s, concerns about the safety and security of nuclear materials located at civilian research facilities were paramount. Through the Material Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A) program, the United States has provided upgrades to security at more than 50 facilities in the former Soviet Union to security to reduce the risk of a loss of materials. The United States also funded upgrades at nuclear weapons storage facilities and at research facilities that store nuclear materials. These upgrades include the installation of improved security systems that use modern technology and strict material control and accounting systems. The program has also provided security training for Russian nuclear specialists and helped Russia improve border security and monitoring to discourage and detect illicit efforts to transfer these materials. Global Threat Reduction Initiative On May 26, 2004, Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham announced the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI). Over the years, GTRI has worked to secure, protect, and, in some cases, remove vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials at civilian facilities worldwide, in an effort to mitigate the risk of terrorists obtaining nuclear material that could be used in a nuclear or radiological device. Specifically, GTRI repatriates U.S.- and Russian-origin highly enriched uranium (HEU) spent and fresh nuclear fuel from research reactors located in countries around the world. In some cases, the United States converts those reactors to operate with low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel, which is not useful for a nuclear weapon. In addition, GTRI installs physical security upgrades at nuclear and radiological sites, and recovers disused and unwanted radioactive sources at home and abroad. In its FY2016 budget request, the Department of Energy outlined a reorganization of its nonproliferation programs. It identified two new program areas—Material Management and Minimization, and Global Material Security—that would incorporate most of the nonproliferation programs described above. Plutonium Disposition In the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA), which was signed in 2000 and amended in 2010, the United States and Russia each agreed to dispose of 34 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium, and to do so at roughly the same time. The parties agreed they could either convert the plutonium to mixed oxide fuel (MOX) for nuclear power reactors or immobilize it and dispose of it in a way that would preclude its use in nuclear weapons. Russia expressed little interest in the permanent disposal of plutonium, noting that the material could have great value for its civilian power program. The agreement was amended in 2010 to allow Russia to convert its plutonium to MOX fuel. The United States initially outlined a plan to convert almost all its surplus plutonium to MOX fuel. However, partially due to escalating costs of the U.S. MOX facility, both the Obama Administration and Trump Administration have sought to cancel the MOX program and instead pursue a dilute and dispose method. In October 2016, Russia announced that it was suspending its participation in the agreement due to what it called "hostile actions" by the United States. Nevertheless, both countries have said they were committed to keeping the 34 tons out of weapons and appear to be continuing their plans for surplus plutonium disposition. State Department Programs The United States, Japan, the European Union, and Russia established the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) in Moscow. A similar center began operating in Kiev in 1993. In subsequent years, several other former Soviet states have joined and other nations have added their financial support. These centers responded to concerns that scientists from Russia's nuclear weapons complex might sell their knowledge to other nations seeking nuclear weapons. Most of these scientists spent fewer than 50 days per year on projects funded by the science centers and continued to work at their primary jobs. The Russian government announced in August 2010 that it would withdraw from the science centers, but other member states reaffirmed their commitment to their countries' participation. The State Department's Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS) program helps the former Soviet states and other nations improve their ability to interdict nuclear smuggling and their ability to stop the illicit trafficking of all materials for weapons of mass destruction, along with dual-use goods and technologies. The EXBS program currently has projects underway in more than 30 nations, and is expanding its reach around the globe. Multilateral Nuclear Nonproliferation Activities The International Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime The United States is a leader of an international regime that attempts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons through treaties, export control coordination and enforcement, and U.N. Security Council resolutions. Much of the focus of U.S. nonproliferation policy in the past decade has focused on the cases of Iran and North Korea. Moreover, increased awareness of the need to keep sensitive materials and technologies out of terrorist hands has reinvigorated efforts to control not just nuclear weapons and weapons-usable materials, but also radioactive materials that could be used in radiological dispersal devices. Key issues in this area that the 116 th Congress might consider include preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons in the long term; North Korea's nuclear weapons program; U.S. civilian nuclear cooperation agreements; and tensions between India and Pakistan as amplified by their nuclear weapons programs, among other issues. Congress may also consider how cooperation under the international nonproliferation regimes can be leveraged to prevent nuclear terrorism. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which entered into force in 1970 and was extended indefinitely in 1995, is the centerpiece of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. The treaty currently has 191 states parties. It is complemented by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, national export control laws, coordinated export control policies under the Nuclear Suppliers Group, U.N. Security Council resolutions, and ad hoc initiatives. The NPT recognizes five nations (the United States, Russia, France, Britain, and China) as nuclear weapon states—a distinction that is carried over in other parts of the regime and in national laws. Three nations that have not signed the NPT—India, Israel, and Pakistan—possess significant nuclear weapon capabilities. North Korea, which had signed the NPT but withdrew in 2003, is now thought to possess a small number of nuclear weapons. Several countries, including Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa, suspended their nuclear weapons programs and joined the NPT in the 1990s. Others—Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan—gave up former Soviet weapons on their territories and joined the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states in the 1990s. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty is unique in its near universality—only India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea are now outside the treaty. In signing the NPT, non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) pledge not to acquire nuclear weapons in exchange for a pledge by the nuclear weapon states (NWS) not to assist the development of nuclear weapons by any NNWS and to facilitate "the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy" (NPT, Article IV-2). The NWS, defined as any state that tested a nuclear explosive before 1967, also agree to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament" (NPT, Article VI). A P-5 Dialogue, led by the United States, meets to coordinate and advance transparency and disarmament steps by all five nuclear weapon states. Many NNWS have often expressed dissatisfaction with the apparent lack of progress toward disarmament. Nuclear proliferation often has significant regional security repercussions, but there is also a growing realization that the current constellation of proliferation risks may require further improvements to the system itself. Concern has shifted from keeping technology from the states outside the NPT to stemming potential further proliferation, either from those states outside the regime or through black markets, such as the Pakistani A. Q. Khan network. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) The International Atomic Energy Agency was established in 1957 to assist nations in their peaceful nuclear programs (primarily research and nuclear power programs) and to safeguard nuclear materials from these peaceful programs to ensure that they are not diverted to nuclear weapons uses. As of February 2019, it has 171 member states. The IAEA safeguards system relies on data collection, review, and periodic inspections at declared facilities. The IAEA may also inspect other facilities if it suspects undeclared nuclear materials or weapons-related activities are present. Non-nuclear weapon NPT members are required to declare and submit all nuclear materials in their possession to regular IAEA inspections to ensure that sensitive nuclear materials and technologies are not diverted from civilian to military purposes. Some states who are not parties to the NPT (India, Israel, Pakistan) are members of the IAEA and allow inspections of some, but not all, of their nuclear activities. The IAEA also provides technical assistance for peaceful applications of nuclear technology for energy, medicine, agriculture, and research. After the 1991 Persian Gulf War, IAEA inspection teams working with the U.N. Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) revealed an extensive covert nuclear weapons program that had been virtually undetected by annual inspections of Baghdad's declared facilities. This knowledge inspired efforts to strengthen the IAEA's authority to conduct more intrusive inspections of a wider variety of installations, to provide the agency with intelligence information about suspected covert nuclear activities, and to provide the agency with the resources and political support needed to increase confidence in its safeguards system. In 1998, the IAEA adopted an "Additional Protocol" that would give the agency greater authority and access to verify nuclear declarations. The protocol enters into force for individual NPT states upon ratification. For the United States, the Senate gave its advice and consent to the protocol on March 31, 2004 (Treaty Doc. 107-7, Senate Executive Report 108-12), and it entered into force on January 6, 2009. As of February 2019, 148 countries have signed an Additional Protocol and 134 have entered into force. The IAEA has had an expanded mission in recent years, increasingly called upon to implement nuclear security-related activities. The IAEA also faces a potential worldwide expansion in the number of nuclear power plants it will need to monitor. Congress may consider U.S. support for the IAEA in light of these challenges. The Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration is studying the future of international safeguards through its Next Generation Safeguards Initiative, which includes how to better share U.S. expertise and new safeguards technologies with the IAEA. Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones Several regions of the world have treaties in force that ban the development, deployment, and use of nuclear weapons, known as nuclear-weapon-free zones, including Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), Central Asia (Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia), the South Pacific (Treaty of Rarotonga), Africa (Treaty of Pelindaba), and Southeast Asia (Treaty of Bangkok). Mongolia has declared itself a single-state Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. Also, the Treaty of Antarctica established that Antarctica will be used for peaceful uses only. Nuclear weapons are also banned on the seabed, in outer space, and on the moon by international treaties. The nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) reinforce the undertakings of NPT non-nuclear-weapon state members and give confidence at a regional level that states are not seeking nuclear weapons. Each treaty has protocols for nuclear weapon states to ratify. These protocols are pledges that the nuclear weapon states will not base nuclear weapons in the zone, test nuclear weapons in the zone, or use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the countries in the zone. The "negative security assurance" provided to members of the zone through the nuclear weapon state protocol is considered one of the key benefits of membership for non-nuclear weapon states. The United States ratified the protocols to the Latin American NWFZ. The Obama Administration, as pledged at the 2010 NPT Review Conference, submitted the Protocols to the Treaties of Pelindaba (Africa) and Rarotonga (South Pacific) to the Senate for advice and consent for ratification on May 2, 2011. The United States signed the protocols at the time these treaties were open for signature (April 11, 1996, for the Treaty of Pelindaba and August 6, 1985, for the Treaty of Rarotonga). The other four nuclear weapon states besides the United States (China, France, Russia, United Kingdom) have ratified those protocols. The Obama Administration has also said it would work with parties to the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone and the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone to resolve outstanding issues related to the protocols in order to "sign the protocols to those treaties as soon as possible." In August 2011, the United States along with the other four NPT nuclear weapon states began consultations with the SEANWFZ countries regarding the NWS protocols to that agreement. Those consultations reportedly continue. The five nuclear-weapon states announced their signature of the CANWFZ Protocol at the NPT Preparatory Committee meeting in May 2014. The Obama Administration submitted the CANFWZ Protocol to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification on April 27, 2015. The presidential letter says that the protocol would require "no changes in U.S. law, policy or practice." The five nuclear weapon states recognized Mongolia as a single-state nuclear-weapon-free zone in September 2012 by signing parallel declarations formally acknowledging this status. Talks have been held to discuss the establishment of a Middle East WMD-free zone. Nuclear Suppliers Group The United States has been a leader in establishing export controls, a key component of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 established controls on nuclear exports that gradually gained acceptance by other nuclear suppliers. The Export Administration Act of 1979 (EAA) authorized controls on dual-use technology that could contribute to foreign weapons. Export controls require exporters to get a license before selling sensitive technology to foreign buyers and, in some cases, ban certain exports to some countries. International nuclear controls are coordinated by an informal association of 48 nuclear exporters called the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), founded in 1975. NSG members voluntarily agree to coordinate exports of civilian nuclear material and nuclear-related equipment and technology to non-nuclear weapon states. The Group agreed to guidelines for export that include lists of materials and equipment that are to be subject to export control. NSG guidelines require that the recipient country offer assurances that the importing items will not be used for a weapons program, will have proper physical security, and will not be transferred to a third party without the permission of the exporter. Recipient countries' nuclear programs must also have full-scope IAEA safeguards. In September 2008, the NSG agreed to exempt India from the full-scope safeguards requirement, although it retained a policy of restraint on the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing equipment. NSG members in June 2011 adopted additional guidelines that define eligibility criteria for the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to new states. The NSG's effectiveness is limited by its voluntary nature. Countries such as Iraq and Pakistan, and individuals like A. Q. Khan and others, have exploited weaknesses in the national export control systems of many countries to acquire a wide range of nuclear items. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), adopted in 1987, sets international standards for nuclear trade and commerce. The Convention established security requirements for the protection of nuclear materials against terrorism; parties to the treaty agree to report to the IAEA on the disposition of nuclear materials being transported and agree to provide appropriate security during such transport. As of June 2018, 157 countries are party to the CPPNM. The United States had advocated strengthening the treaty by extending controls to domestic security. In July 2005, states parties convened to extend the convention's scope in an amendment that covers not only nuclear material in international transport, but also nuclear material in domestic use, storage, and transport, as well as the protection of nuclear material and facilities from sabotage. President George W. Bush submitted the amendment to the Senate in September 2007 (Treaty Doc. 110-6), and the Senate approved a resolution of advice and consent to ratification on September 25, 2008. The new rules come into effect once two-thirds of the states parties of the convention have ratified the amendment. The United States submitted its instrument of ratification to the Amendment on July 31, 2015. As of July 2018, 118 states had deposited their instruments of ratification, acceptance, or approval of the amendment with the depositary. The amendment entered into force on May 8, 2016, following the deposit of the instrument of ratification by Nicaragua, the 102 nd state. Congress needed to also approve implementing legislation before the United States could deposit its instrument of ratification to the Amendment. In the 112 th Congress, the Obama Administration submitted draft implementing legislation to the Senate Judiciary Committee in April 2011. The House passed implementing legislation in the 112 th Congress, but the Senate did not take action. In the 113 th Congress, the House passed the Nuclear Terrorism Conventions Implementation and Safety of Maritime Navigation Act of 2013 ( H.R. 1073 ) in May 2013, which approved implementing legislation for the CPPNM Amendment and the Nuclear Terrorism Convention (as well as agreements on maritime security). The Senate did not take action. In the 114 th Congress, implementing legislation for three nuclear terrorism-related conventions, called the Nuclear Terrorism Conventions Implementation and Safety of Maritime Navigation Act ( H.R. 1056 ), was incorporated into Title VIII of the USA Freedom Act of 2015 ( P.L. 114-23 ), which became law on June 2, 2015 ( H.R. 2048 ). International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism The U.N. General Assembly adopted the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (also known as the Nuclear Terrorism Convention) in 2005 after eight years of debating a draft treaty proposed by Russia in 1997. Disputes over the definition of terrorism, omitted in the final version, and over the issue of nuclear weapons use by states, complicated the discussions for many years. After September 11, 2001, states revisited the draft treaty and the necessary compromises were made. The Convention entered into force in July 2007. There were 115 states parties and 115 signatories as of March 2019. The United States has strongly supported the Convention, and President Bush was the second to sign it (after Russian President Putin) on September 14, 2005. The Senate recommended advice and consent on September 25, 2008 (Treaty Doc. 110-4). Congress needed to also approve implementing legislation before the United States could deposit its instrument of ratification to the Convention. In the 112 th Congress, the Obama Administration submitted draft legislation to the Senate Judiciary Committee in April 2011. The House passed implementing legislation in the 112 th Congress, but the Senate did not take action. In the 113 th Congress, the House passed the Nuclear Terrorism Conventions Implementation and Safety of Maritime Navigation Act of 2013 ( H.R. 1073 ) in May 2013, which approved implementing legislation for the CPPNM Amendment and the Nuclear Terrorism Convention (as well as agreements on maritime security). The Senate did not take action. In the 114 th Congress, implementing legislation for three conventions— H.R. 1056 , called the Nuclear Terrorism Conventions Implementation and Safety of Maritime Navigation Act—was incorporated into Title VIII of the USA Freedom Act of 2015 ( P.L. 114-23 ), which became law on June 2, 2015. The United States deposited its instrument of ratification with the United Nations on September 30, 2015. The Convention defines offenses related to the unlawful possession and use of radioactive or nuclear material or devices, and the use of or damage to nuclear facilities. The Convention commits each party to adopt measures in its national law to criminalize these offenses and make them punishable. It covers acts by individuals, not states, and does not govern the actions of armed forces during an armed conflict. The Convention also does not address "the issue of legality of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by States." It also commits states parties to exchange information and cooperate to "detect, prevent, suppress and investigate" those suspected of committing nuclear terrorism, including extraditions. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty12 The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) would ban all nuclear explosions. It opened for signature in 1996 but has not yet entered into force. Previous treaties have restricted nuclear testing: the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty barred explosions in the atmosphere, in space, and under water, and the 1974 U.S.-U.S.S.R. Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty limited the explosive yield of underground nuclear explosions. In the debate on the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995, many non-nuclear weapon states saw the early conclusion of the CTBT as a key step by the nuclear weapon states to comply with their obligations under Article VI of the NPT; critics argue that the United States has taken many steps in support of these obligations. President Clinton signed the CTBT when it opened for signature and submitted the treaty to the Senate for advice and consent in 1997. The Senate rejected the treaty by a vote of 48 for, 51 against, and 1 present, on October 13, 1999. Parties to the treaty agree "not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion." The treaty establishes a Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) of all member states to implement the treaty. The CTBTO oversees a Conference of States Parties, an Executive Council, and a Provisional Technical Secretariat. The latter would operate an International Data Center to process and report on data from an International Monitoring System (IMS), a global network that, when completed, would consist of 321 monitoring stations and 16 laboratories. A Protocol details the monitoring system and inspection procedures. The CTBTO would come into effect if the treaty entered into force; until that time, the CTBTO Preparatory Commission conducts work to prepare for entry into force, such as building and operating the IMS. For the treaty to enter into force, 44 specified states must ratify it. As of April 11, 2018, 184 states had signed the CTBT and 168 had ratified. Of the 44 required nations, 36 have ratified, 3 have not signed (India, North Korea, and Pakistan), and another 5 have not ratified (China, Egypt, Iran, Israel, and the United States). States that have ratified the treaty have held conferences every two years since 1999 to discuss how to accelerate entry into force. The CTBT remains on the calendar of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The Bush Administration opposed U.S. ratification of the CTBT but continued a U.S. nuclear test moratorium in effect since October 1992. In contrast, President Obama stated his support for the CTBT. For example, he said, "As president, I will reach out to the Senate to secure the ratification of the CTBT at the earliest practical date and will then launch a diplomatic effort to bring onboard other states whose ratifications are required for the treaty to enter into force." Senator Hillary Clinton, as nominee for Secretary of State, previewed the Administration's approach to securing the Senate's advice and consent: "A lesson learned from [the treaty's defeat in] 1999 is that we need to ensure that the administration work intensively with Senators so they are fully briefed on key technical issues on which their CTBT votes will depend.... Substantial progress has been made in the last decade in our ability to verify a CTBT and ensure stockpile reliability." Critics responded that confidence in the nuclear stockpile requires nuclear testing, and that certain techniques would enable a determined cheater to avoid detection or attribution of its tests. The Obama Administration decided not to submit the treaty to the Senate for its advice and consent before the end of its term. In a March 2016 speech, Ambassador Adam Scheinman said that "we are realistic about prospects for U.S. ratification and have no set timeframe for pursuing the Senate's advice and consent. Instead, our aim is to re-introduce CTBT to the American public and generate discussion on the treaty and its merits." The Trump Administration's February 2018 Nuclear Posture Review said that "although the United States will not seek ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban treaty, it will continue to support the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization Preparatory Committee as well as the International Monitoring System and International Data Center." Fissile Material Production Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) The United States first proposed that the international community negotiate a ban on the production of fissile material (plutonium and enriched uranium) that could be used in nuclear weapons over 50 years ago. Negotiators of the NPT realized that fissile material usable for nuclear weapons could still be produced under the guise of peaceful nuclear activities within the Treaty. Consequently, a fissile material production ban, or FMCT, has remained on the long-term negotiating agenda at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva. These negotiations have been largely stalled since 1993. In 1995, the CD agreed to the "Shannon Mandate," which called for an "non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices." The Bush Administration undertook a comprehensive review of the U.S. position on the FMCT in 2004 and concluded that such a ban would be useful in creating "an observed norm against the production of fissile material intended for weapons," but argued that such a ban is inherently unverifiable. The Bush Administration proposed a draft treaty in May 2006 that contained no verification measures. In contrast, the Obama Administration supported the negotiation of an FMCT with verification measures on the basis of the Shannon mandate. The Trump Administration "will continue to support the commencement of negotiations on an FMCT," Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Ford stated on April 25, 2018. One key issue is whether or not such a treaty would seek to include existing stocks of fissile material. The United States has strongly objected to such an approach, but it is supported by some non-nuclear weapon states. The Shannon Mandate states that it "does not preclude any delegation" from proposing the inclusion of existing stocks in the negotiations. Many observers believed that negotiations at the CD were preferable to other fora because they would establish a global norm and would not have the appearance of conferring nuclear weapons status upon India, Pakistan, and Israel. As of March 2019, such CD negotiations had not begun. Pakistan, which is widely regarded as the main opponent to the start of negotiations (the CD operates on the basis of consensus), argues that a treaty on fissile material should not only prohibit the production of new material, but should also require states with such material to reduce their stocks. A 2012 U.N. General Assembly resolution requested the U.N. Secretary-General to "establish a group of governmental experts" to make recommendations on "possible aspects [of] ... a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices." The group began its work in March 2014 and completed its work in 2015. The General Assembly resolution called upon the Secretary-General to transmit the group's report to the General Assembly and the CD. A 2016 U.N. General Assembly resolution requested the Secretary-General to establish a "high-level fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) expert preparatory group," to "examine" the experts' group report, as well as "consider and make recommendations on substantial elements of a future non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, on the basis" of the Shannon Mandate. The resolution required the group to meet for two-week sessions in both 2017 and 2018. The group presented its final report in June 2018. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 In April 2004, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1540, which requires all states to "criminalize proliferation, enact strict export controls and secure all sensitive materials within their borders." UNSCR 1540 called on states to enforce effective domestic controls over WMD and WMD-related materials in production, use, storage, and transport; to maintain effective border controls; and to develop national export and trans-shipment controls over such items, all of which should help interdiction efforts. The resolution did not, however, provide any enforcement authority, nor did it specifically mention interdiction. About two-thirds of all states have reported to the U.N. on their efforts to strengthen defenses against WMD trafficking. U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1673 (2006), 1810 (2008), 1977 (2011) (which extended the duration of the 1540 Committee), 2055 (2012), and 2325 (2016) all modified the original resolution. The 2011 resolution extended the committee's mandate for 10 years and called for a review after 5 years and for another before the end of the mandate. The 2012 resolution increased the number of members of the Group of Experts from eight to nine and the 2016 resolution reasserts the importance of full implementation of resolution 1540. The committee is currently focused on identifying assistance projects for states in need and matching donors to improve these WMD controls. Congress may consider how the United States is contributing to this international effort. Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons UNGA Resolution A/71/258 ( 2016) called on U.N. member states to negotiate in 2017 a legally binding Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, also known as the nuclear "ban treaty." Negotiations were held in New York, February 27-March 31, and June 15-July 7, 2017. At the end of the conference, 122 countries voted to approve the treaty. Singapore abstained, and the Netherlands voted against it, citing conflicts between the treaty and the Netherlands' commitments as a member of NATO. Article 1 says that adherents would never "develop, produce, manufacture, otherwise acquire, possess or stockpile nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices." This includes a prohibition on hosting nuclear weapons that are owned or controlled by another state. Nor would states parties transfer, receive control over, or assist others in developing nuclear weapons. They also would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Article 7 requires states to give assistance to individuals affected by the use or testing of nuclear weapons and provide for environmental remediation. As of March 2019, the treaty had 22 states parties and 70 signatories. Treaty supporters seek to establish an international norm against the possession and use of nuclear weapons, which they argue would strengthen nonproliferation norms and raise awareness of the humanitarian consequences of developing and using nuclear weapons. Some critics of the ban treaty are concerned that a new agreement would undermine the NPT and its verification system of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. The Obama and Trump Administrations have opposed a ban treaty and, along with 40 other states, did not participate in negotiations. In response to the conclusion of the treaty, a joint press release from the United States, UK, and French Permanent Representatives said, "A purported ban on nuclear weapons that does not address the security concerns that continue to make nuclear deterrence necessary cannot result in the elimination of a single nuclear weapon and will not enhance any country's security, nor international peace and security." Informal Cooperative Endeavors G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction At their June 2002 summit at Kananaskis, Canada, the Group of Eight (United States, Canada, UK, France, Germany, Italy, Japan [G-7] plus Russia [G-8]) formed the Global Partnership (GP) Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. Under this partnership, the United States, other members of the G-7, and the European Union agreed to raise up to $20 billion over 10 years for projects related to disarmament, nonproliferation, counterterrorism, and nuclear safety. These projects were initially focused on programs in Russia. The Global Partnership spurred Russia to take on a greater portion of the financial burden for these projects, and increased donor funds from countries other than the United States. The United States promised an additional $10 billion in Global Partnership funds in the 2012-2022 time frame, subject to congressional appropriations. Over the past decade, the Global Partnership has expanded its donors and its recipients. The G8 Global Partnership Working Group provides a coordinating mechanism for nonproliferation assistance globally, and sub-working groups concentrate on specific nonproliferation areas. Recent priorities have included biological threat reduction and radiological security. Since the 2013 invasion of Crimea, Russia has not participated in the G-8 or the Global Partnership. Canada chaired the G-7 in 2018, and placed priority on the Global Partnership. In the April 2018 communique, the G-7 reaffirmed their "strong commitment" to the GP and recognized the importance of continuing this joint effort to reduce WMD threats. France holds the G-7 Presidency in 2019. Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) President Bush announced the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) on May 31, 2003. This Initiative is primarily a diplomatic tool developed by the United States to gain support for interdicting shipments of weapons of mass destruction-related (WMD) equipment and materials. Through the PSI, the Bush Administration sought to "create a web of counterproliferation partnerships through which proliferators will have difficulty carrying out their trade in WMD and missile-related technology." The states involved in PSI have agreed to review their national legal authorities for interdiction, provide consent for other states to board and search their own flag vessels, and conclude ship-boarding agreements. The Proliferation Security Initiative has no budget, no formal offices supporting it, no international secretariat, and no formal mechanism for measuring its effectiveness (like a database of cases). To many, these attributes are positive, allowing the United States to respond swiftly to changing developments. Others question whether the international community can sustain this effort over the longer term. Obama Administration officials have pledged to "institutionalize" PSI, although how they will carry this out is not yet clear. As of April 2018, 105 countries have committed formally to PSI participation. Sixteen "core" nations have pledged their cooperation in interdicting shipments of WMD materials, agreeing in Paris in 2003 on a set of interdiction principles. The 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 recommended that PSI be expanded and coordination within the U.S. government improved. The United States has prioritized the conclusion of ship-boarding agreements with key states that have high volumes of international shipping. The United States has signed 11 agreements with Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Belize, Croatia, Cyprus, Liberia, Malta, the Marshall Islands, Mongolia, Panama, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. Since PSI is an activity rather than an organization, and has no budget or internal U.S. government organization, it may be difficult for Congress to track PSI's progress. Several intelligence resource issues may be of interest to Congress, including whether intelligence information is good enough for effective implementation and whether intelligence-sharing requirements have been established with non-NATO allies. Another issue may be how PSI is coordinated with other federal interdiction-related programs, like export control assistance. Reporting and coordination requirements now in public law may result in more information and better interagency coordination than in the past. Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism In July 2006, Russia and the United States announced the creation of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism before the G-8 Summit in St. Petersburg. Like PSI, this initiative is nonbinding, and requires agreement on a statement of principles. Thirteen nations—Australia, Canada, China, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Morocco, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Russia—endorsed a Statement of Principles at the initiative's first meeting in October 2006. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), European Union (EU), Interpol, U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) have observer status. As of April 2018, 88 states have agreed to the statement of principles and are Global Initiative partner nations. U.S. officials have described the Initiative as a "flexible framework" to prevent, detect, and respond to the threat of nuclear terrorism. It is meant to enhance information sharing and build capacity worldwide. The Statement of Principles pledges to improve each nation's ability to secure radioactive and nuclear material, prevent illicit trafficking by improving detection of such material, respond to a terrorist attack, prevent safe haven to potential nuclear terrorists and financial resources, and ensure liability for acts of nuclear terrorism. Participating states share a common goal to improve national capabilities to combat nuclear terrorism by sharing best practices through multinational exercises and expert level meetings. Without dues or a secretariat, actions under the Initiative will take legal guidance from the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, and U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1540 and 1373. Global Initiative partner nations periodically hold exercises and workshops to improve coordination and exchange best practices. These are the primary activities held under the initiative. The Global Initiative does not have program funding of its own in the U.S. budget, and therefore Congress may consider whether its goals can be achieved within these constraints. Ad Hoc Sanctions and Incentives Other efforts—such as economic, military, or security assistance—may also help slow the proliferation of nuclear weapons. These cooperative measures have been effective in some cases (South Korea, Taiwan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine), but failed in others (Iraq, Israel, Pakistan). Some favor greater use of sanctions against countries that violate international nonproliferation standards, while others view sanctions as self-defeating. Most observers conclude that a mix of positive and negative incentives, including diplomacy to address underlying regional security problems, provides the best opportunity for controlling the spread of nuclear weapons. However, when diplomacy fails, some policymakers have argued that military measures may be necessary to attack nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and related facilities in states hostile to the United States or its allies. For example, the Bush Administration claimed that the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq was justified, in part, on the basis of claims that Iraq possessed chemical and biological weapons and might resume efforts to develop nuclear weapons. As developments revealed, however, accurate intelligence is a key component of both diplomatic and military approaches to nonproliferation. Non-Nuclear Multilateral Endeavors The international community has concluded a number of arms control agreements, conventions, and arrangements that affect non-nuclear weapons. Two of these, the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) and the Open Skies Treaty, were a part of the late-Cold War effort to enhance stability and predictability in Europe. Others seek to control the spread of technologies that might contribute to developing conventional or unconventional weapons programs. Finally, several seek to ban whole classes of weapons through international conventions. European Conventional Arms Control Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) In late 1990, 22 members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact signed the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, agreeing to limit NATO and Warsaw Pact non-nuclear forces in an area from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains. The CFE treaty did not anticipate the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. Consequently, the participants signed the so-called "Tashkent Agreement" in May 1992, allocating responsibility for the Soviet Union's Treaty-Limited items of Equipment (TLEs) among Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine, and Georgia. It also established equipment ceilings for each nation and the implied responsibility for the destruction/transfer of equipment necessary to meet these national ceilings. In 1999, the CFE Adaptation Agreement was signed to further adjust to the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the expansion of NATO. As discussed below, this agreement has not entered into force pending its ratification by NATO members, and Russia has suspended its participation in the CFE Treaty. Key Limits and Restrictions CFE placed alliance-wide, regional (zonal), and national ceilings on specific major items of military equipment. It sought to promote stability not only by reducing armaments, but also by reducing the possibility of surprise attack by preventing large concentrations of forces. The CFE treaty also provides for (1) very detailed data exchanges on equipment, force structure, and training maneuvers; (2) specific procedures for the destruction or redistribution of excess equipment; and (3) verification of compliance through on-site inspections. Its implementation has resulted in an unprecedented reduction of conventional arms in Europe, with over 50,000 (TLEs) removed or destroyed; almost all agree it has achieved most of its initial objectives. Under the CFE treaty all equipment reductions needed to comply with overall, national, and zonal ceilings were to have been completed by November 1995. As this deadline approached, it was evident that Russia would not meet those requirements, particularly in the so-called "flank zones," which include the Leningrad Military District in the north, and more importantly, the North Caucasus Military District in the south. The outbreak of armed ethnic conflicts in and around the Caucasus, most notably in Chechnya, led Russia to claim it needed to deploy equipment in excess of treaty limits in that zone. Russia placed this claim in the context of broader assertions that some CFE provisions reflected Cold War assumptions and did not fairly address its new national security concerns. Further, it argued that economic hardship was making the movement of forces unaffordable in some cases. To address these concerns, the CFE parties negotiated a Flank Agreement, in early 1996. This agreement removed several Russian (and one Ukrainian) administrative districts from the old "flank zone," thus permitting existing flank equipment ceilings to apply to a smaller area. To provide some counterbalance to these adjustments, reporting requirements were enhanced, inspection rights in the zone increased, and district ceilings were placed on armored combat vehicles to prevent their concentration. The Adaptation Agreement The 1996 CFE Review Conference opened negotiations to modify the treaty to account for the absence of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact, and the expansion of NATO into the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary. Most CFE signatories did not want to completely renegotiate the treaty. Russia, however, sought broader revisions, and, ironically, it sought to maintain the alliance-wide equipment ceilings. An alliance-wide cap on NATO would presumably force adjustments of national holdings as the NATO alliance expanded; such adjustments probably would not favor new member nations close to Russia's borders. The CFE parties did not adopt Russia's position and Russia ultimately agreed to a largely NATO-drafted document. This agreement called for, among other things, lower equipment levels throughout the "Atlantic to the Urals" area; enhanced verification procedures; and the replacement of NATO-Warsaw Pact "bloc to bloc" ceilings with national limits on all categories of TLEs. It also stated that the Flank Agreement was to remain in effect. The Adaptation Agreement reiterates that NATO has "no plan, no intention, and no reason" to deploy nuclear weapons on new members' territory; and seeks to improve new members' defensive capabilities through interoperability and capability for reinforcement, rather than by stationing additional combat forces on new members' territory. Russia's most serious focus has been, however, on NATO enlargement and how CFE could adapt to mitigate what many Russians see as an encroaching threat. Russia has called for the new members of NATO, particularly the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, to become CFE state parties. These countries have indicated a willingness to join, however, they cannot do so until the Adaptation Agreement is ratified and the new CFE regime comes into force. At the Istanbul Summit in 1999, where the Adaptation Agreement was concluded, Russia undertook the so-called Istanbul Commitments to remove its troops from both the Republic of Georgia and the "breakaway" province of Transdniestra in Moldova. Though not part of the CFE Adaptation Agreement document, NATO members considered Russian fulfillment of these commitments a prerequisite for the ratification of the Agreement. Consequently, of the CFE signatories only Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan ratified the adapted treaty. Compliance Concerns In past compliance reports, the State Department asserted that Russian equipment holdings "continue to exceed most of the legally binding limits for both the original and revised flank zones." It also cited Russia for relatively minor reporting violations and for its failure to complete withdrawals of its troops from Georgia and Moldova. It also cited Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Ukraine for noncompliance. Armenia and Azerbaijan, engaged in a conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh territory, have not completed equipment reductions; nor provided complete equipment declarations; nor provided timely notification of new equipment acquisition. Belarus was also cited for questionable equipment declarations and its refusal to allow inspectors access to an equipment storage site. The State Department deems Ukraine to have substantially complied with CFE requirements, but notes that it retained several hundred equipment items in excess of treaty limits. The State Department has raised significant issues with Russia's compliance, particularly in the years since Russia suspended its participation in the treaty. Russian CFE Suspension On April 26, 2007, Russian President Putin announced a "moratorium" on Russian CFE compliance, pointing to, among other things, the NATO nations' not having ratified the treaty as adapted. Subsequently, in statements to the press and diplomatic conferences, Russian officials elucidated the Russian position and its concerns. Among the major points are the following: During its CFE "moratorium" Russia will not allow CFE inspections nor will it report on its military movements. The Istanbul Commitments regarding troop withdrawals in Georgia and Moldova are not an integral part of the CFE Adaptation Agreement document, and consequently not legally binding and should not stand in the way of NATO members' ratification of the Agreement. The Baltic States and Slovakia are not bound by the CFE and their NATO membership, coupled with the new U.S. basing agreements with Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania, constitute an unacceptable encroachment on Russian national security. If the NATO nations do not ratify the CFE Adaptation Agreement within a year, Russia will consider complete withdrawal from the treaty. Russian officials, military leaders, and political commentators increasingly referred to the CFE treaty as a "Cold War agreement," which no longer reflected the realities of the European security environment. Russian military officials' consultations at NATO Headquarters on May 10 brought no softening of the Russian position. A Russian request to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe for a special conference of CFE signatories in June was granted. The conference failed to resolve any of the outstanding issues, and the State Parties were unable to find sufficient common ground to issue a final joint statement. The European and U.S. governments reacted with some surprise at the harshness of Russian statements, and urged Russia to address its concerns within the consultative framework of the treaty rather than pursue a withdrawal. However, then-Secretary of State Rice and Secretary of Defense Gates, in conversations with President Putin and Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov, and the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, in testimony before the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, reiterated the U.S. position that ratification of the CFE Adaptation Agreement still remained contingent upon Russia fulfilling its commitment to withdraw its military forces from Georgia and Moldova. On November 30, 2007, President Putin signed legislation from the Duma that suspended Russian compliance with CFE, effective December 12, 2007. This action came during the Madrid OSCE summit meeting and evoked an expression of regret on the part of NATO officials, who noted that Russia's military posture would be under discussion at the NATO foreign ministers meeting in December. Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns characterized the Russian action as a "mistake" and urged Russia to negotiate its concerns within the CFE framework. Russian officials emphasized that this action was not a withdrawal from the treaty, and that they were willing to participate in further discussions if they perceived a greater willingness on the part of the NATO allies to address their concerns. However, in recent years, it has become clear that Russia does not intend to return to the CFE Treaty; it would prefer the negotiation of a new agreement that reflected the new security environment in Europe. Moreover, in March 2015, Russia suspended its participation in the Joint Consultative Group of the CFE Treaty, leaving little room for continued dialogue or cooperation. Russian officials indicated, in 2007, that Russia did not plan to conduct any significant redeployment of forces outside the treaty limits. However, in August 2008, Russia sent military forces into Georgia without the consent of the Georgian government and recognized two provinces of Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as independent states. U.S. officials have noted that these steps are inconsistent with Russia's obligation under the CFE Treaty "to refrain ... from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State." In addition, because Russia has suspended its participation in the treaty, it has not allowed any on-site inspections and has not provided any data mandated by the treaty. Some observers, and Russian spokesmen, portrayed the Russian moves regarding CFE as an asymmetrical response to the Bush Administration's proposed deployment of a U.S. ground-based missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic. Others, including Chief of the Russian General Staff Baluyevsky, discounted a specific linkage, seeing the missile defense controversy as merely one element of a more broadly ranged dissatisfaction with changes in the European security environment, which, from the Russian perspective, have favored the NATO allies. The U.S. Response In November 2011, the United States announced that it would stop implementing its data exchange obligations under the CFE Treaty with respect to Russia. The United States would continue to share data with other treaty partners, and would not exceed the numerical limits on conventional armaments and equipment established by the treaty. But it would withhold data from Russia because Russia has refused to accept inspections and ceased to provide information to other CFE Treaty parties since its 2007 decision. The U.S. State Department, in its statement on the treaty, indicated that the United States remained committed to revitalizing conventional arms control in Europe. It also indicated that, in order to increase transparency and promote stability in the region, the United States would voluntarily inform Russia of any significant change in the U.S. force posture in Europe. Treaty on Open Skies34 Open Skies was originally proposed by President Eisenhower in 1955. In the years before satellites began to collect intelligence data, aerial overflights were seen as a way to gain information needed for both intelligence and confidence-building purposes. The Soviet Union rejected President Eisenhower's proposal because it considered the overflights equal to espionage. President George H. W. Bush revived the Open Skies proposal in May 1989. By this time, both the United States and Soviet Union employed satellites and remote sensors for intelligence collection, so aircraft overflights would add little for that objective. But, at the time when Europe was emerging from the East-West divide of the Cold War, the United States supported increased transparency throughout Europe as a way to reduce the chances of military confrontation and to build confidence among the participants. On March 24, 1992, the United States, Canada, and 22 European nations signed the Treaty on Open Skies. The U.S. Senate gave its advice and consent to the ratification of the Open Skies Treaty in August 1993, but Russia and Belarus delayed their ratification until May 2001. The Treaty entered into force on January 1, 2002. It currently has 34 participating member states that have conducted more than 1,000 observation flights since the treaty entered into force. Under the Open Skies Treaty, the parties agreed to permit unarmed aircraft to conduct observation flights over their territories. Although the flights often focus on military activities, the information they gather was not intended to be used to verify compliance with limits in other arms control agreements. Instead, Open Skies is designed as a confidence-building measure, to promote openness and enhance mutual understanding about military activities. It was designed to allow all nations, including those without access to satellites, to collect information on military forces and activities of other parties to the treaty and to gain an improved understanding of military activities in other nations. Overflights may provide early signs of efforts to build up military forces or, conversely, assurances that an adversary or neighbor is not preparing its military for a possible conflict. In addition, in recent years, it has helped nations in Europe observe and monitor Russian forces in areas near its border with Ukraine, where Russian forces are supporting an insurgency. The Provisions of Open Skies The parties to the Open Skies Treaty have agreed to make all of their territory accessible to overflights by unarmed fixed wing observation aircraft. They can restrict flights over areas, such as nuclear power plants, where safety is a concern, but they cannot impede or prohibit flights over any area, including military installations that are considered secret or otherwise off-limits. In most cases, the nation conducting the observation flight will provide the aircraft and sensors for the flight. However, Russia insisted that the Treaty permit the observed country to provide the aircraft if it chose to do so. Nations can also team up to conduct overflights to share the costs of the effort or use aircraft and sensor suites provided by other nations. Each nation is assigned a quota of overflights that it can conduct and must be willing to receive each year. The quota is determined, generally, by the size of the nation's territory. For the United States, this quota is equal to 42 observation flights per year. The treaty permits the nations to use several types of sensors—including photographic cameras, infrared cameras, and synthetic aperture radars—during their observation flights. The permitted equipment allows the nations to collect basic information on military forces and activities, but it is not intended to provide them with detailed technical intelligence. For example, the resolution on the sensors would allow the nations to identify vehicles and distinguish between tanks and trucks, but probably will not allow them to tell one type of tank from another. Each observation flight produces two sets of data—one for the observing nation and one for the observed nation. This allows the nation under observation to know what information was collected during the flight. Other parties to the treaty can purchase copies of the data, so all parties can share in the information collected during all flights. Each nation is responsible for its own analysis of the data. The participants to the treaty have revisited the agreement's list of permitted sensors as technology has moved forward. For example, the permitted cameras use film that is no longer available, and parts that are no longer supported by most manufacturers, leading several countries to pursue a transition to digital cameras. Russia, in particular, has petitioned the Open Skies Consultative Commission to use digital cameras in flights over the United States. Russia has also asked the Open Skies Consultative Commission for permission to use high-powered digital cameras on flights over the United States. The capabilities of these cameras are within the scope permitted by the treaty and they use commercially available, unclassified technology. Russia already uses them on flights over Europe. However, some officials in the Pentagon and U.S. intelligence community have expressed concern about the quality of data that Russia may collect with these cameras, noting that the information could help Russia fill in gaps in its satellite surveillance capabilities. Implementation Although several of the participating nations conducted practice missions in the years before the Treaty entered into force, the first official overflight mission occurred in 2002. The parties conduct approximately 100 observation flights each year. In recent years, the United States has received 4-9 observation flights from Russia and has conducted 14-16 flights over Russia each year, although there were no flights in 2018. The United States also, occasionally, uses its open skies aircraft to monitor natural disasters, such as the recent earthquake in Haiti. It has also joined with Ukraine and other participants to conduct flights over Ukraine that can monitor Russian military forces across the border in Russia. In recent years, the United States has raised concerns about Russia's compliance with the Open Skies Treaty. For example, according to the U.S. State Department's annual report on compliance with arms control agreements, Russia has refused access for Open Skies observation over Chechnya and nearby areas of southwestern Russia. It has also limited access to a region over Moscow, and along the border of Russia with the Georgian regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Moreover, according to the State Department, Russia has failed to provide priority flight clearance for Open Skies flights on a few occasions. The United States has responded to limitations imposed by Russia by restricting Russian flights over the United States. In late 2017, it limited the length of flights over Hawaii and removed access to two U.S. air force bases the Russians used to overnight during their missions over the United States. In 2018, the United States also blocked approval of Russia's use of new cameras on its Open Skies Aircraft, although this decision was quickly reversed and flights have resumed in 2019. The Missile Technology Control Regime The United States, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom established the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) on April 16, 1987. Designed to slow the proliferation of ballistic and cruise missiles, rockets, and unmanned air vehicles (UAV) capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, the MTCR is an informal, voluntary arrangement in which participants agree to adhere to common export policy guidelines applied to an "annex" that lists controlled items. Partner-countries adopt the guidelines as national policy and are responsible for restraining their own missile-related transfers. In addition, partners regularly exchange information on relevant export licensing issues, including denials of technology transfers. The MTCR has neither an independent means to verify whether states are adhering to its guidelines nor a mechanism to penalize states if they violate them. The MTCR is based on the premise that foreign acquisition or development of delivery systems can be delayed and made more difficult and expensive if major producers restrict exports. Analysts credit the MTCR with slowing missile development in Brazil and India, blocking a cooperative missile program of Argentina, Egypt, and Iraq, and eliminating missile programs in South Africa and Hungary. Moreover, partner countries have tightened their export control laws and procedures, and several have taken legal action against alleged missile-technology smugglers. On the other hand, some analysts note that the MTCR does not regulate countries' acquisition or production of missiles and cannot prevent nonpartners from exporting missiles and technology. It has also been difficult to restrain exports of ballistic and cruise missile technology from some partners—Russia has exported technology to Iran and Great Britain has done so to the United Arab Emirates. In addition, many analysts have argued that advances in missile-related technology will challenge the MTCR's future ability to check missile proliferation. Analysts and experts in the international community have also discussed the possibility that the "supply side" approach of the MTCR has outlived its usefulness and that a "demand side" approach to proliferation, on a regional or global basis, might prove more effective. Participants Since 1987, the number of MTCR partners has grown from 7 to 35, with India joining the regime in 2016. Several nonpartners, including China, Israel, Romania, Slovakia, and India, have said they will restrict their transfers of missile equipment and technology according to the MTCR. Membership in the regime is decided by consensus. According to former MTCR Chairman Per Fischer, "[p]otential members are reviewed on a case-by case basis, and decisions regarding applications are based on the effectiveness of a state's export controls … its potential contribution to the regime and its proliferation record." The United States supports new requests for membership to the regime only if the country in question agrees not to develop or acquire missiles (excluding space launch vehicles) that exceed MTCR guidelines. Substance of the MTCR The MTCR guidelines call on each partner country to exercise restraint when considering transfers of equipment or technology, as well as "intangible" transfers, that would provide, or help a recipient country build, a missile capable of delivering a 500 kilogram (1,100 pound) warhead to a range of 300 kilometers (186 miles) or more. The 500 kilogram weight threshold was intended to limit transfers of missiles that could carry a relatively crude nuclear warhead. A 1993 addition to the guidelines calls for particular restraint in the export of any missiles or related technology if the nation controlling the export judges that the missiles are intended to be used for the delivery of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, or biological). Thus some missiles with warheads weighing less than 500 kilograms also fall under MTCR guidelines. From time to time, regime partners update the MTCR guidelines and annex. The MTCR annex contains two categories of controlled items. Category I items are the most sensitive. There is "a strong presumption to deny such transfers," according to the MTCR guidelines. Regime partners have greater flexibility in exports of Category II items. Category I items include complete rocket systems (including ballistic missiles, space launch vehicles, and sounding rockets), UAV systems (including cruise missiles systems, target and reconnaissance drones), production facilities for such systems, and major subsystems (including rocket stages, reentry vehicles, rocket engines, guidance systems, and warhead mechanisms). Transfers of Category I production facilities are not to be authorized. Category II items are other less sensitive and dual-use missile-related components that could be used to develop a Category I system, and complete missiles and major subsystems of missiles capable of delivering a payload of any size to a range of 300 km. Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC) The Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC) was inaugurated on November 25, 2002. The HCOC is not a treaty but instead a set of "fundamental behavioral norms and a framework for cooperation to address missile proliferation." It focuses on the possession of ballistic missiles, as a complement to the supply-side-oriented MTCR. Subscribing states have held regular conferences since the code came into effect. The code intends to "prevent and curb the proliferation of Ballistic Missile systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction." It calls on subscribing states "to exercise maximum possible restraint in the development, testing and deployment of Ballistic Missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction [WMD], including, where possible, to reduce national holdings of such missiles." Subscribing states also agree not to assist ballistic missile programs in countries suspected of developing WMD. The HCOC also calls for subscribing states to "exercise the necessary vigilance" in assisting other countries' space-launch programs, which could serve as covers for ballistic missile programs. Additionally, subscribing states "resolve to implement" several transparency measures, such as producing annual declarations that provide outlines of their ballistic missile policies, as well as "information on the number and generic class" of such missiles launched during the preceding year. The code also calls on subscribing states to provide similar annual declarations regarding their "expendable Space Launch Vehicle" programs. Furthermore, the HCOC calls on states to "exchange pre-launch notifications on their Ballistic Missile and Space Launch Vehicle launches and test flights." Signatories are required to provide such notifications to Austria, which serves as the Immediate Central Contact and Executive Secretariat for the HCOC. The United States and Russia each provide such notifications and the annual declarations described above. The Wassenaar Arrangement In July 1996, 33 nations approved the Wassenaar Arrangement (formally titled the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies) on export controls for conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies. This agreement replaces the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom)—the Cold War organization that controlled sensitive exports of technologies to Communist nations. According to its Guidelines and Procedures, the Wassenaar Arrangement is not formally targeted at "any state or group of states." But it is "intended to enhance co-operation to prevent the acquisition of armaments and sensitive dual-use items for military end-uses, if the situation in a region or the behaviour of a state is, or becomes, a cause for serious concern." The arrangement is designed "to contribute to regional and international security and stability, by promoting transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies, thus preventing destabilizing accumulations." Member decisions are made by consensus. This group has a broader membership but smaller lists of controlled goods than did CoCom. Its control regime is also less rigorous. Under Wassenaar, each national government regulates its own exports, whereas under CoCom, any member could disapprove any other members' export by of a controlled item to a proscribed destination. There is also no mechanism to punish a participating state for violating Wassenaar guidelines. Membership The arrangement's guidelines specify that several factors must be considered when deciding on a potential new member's eligibility. These include whether the state has adopted the arrangement's control lists "as a reference in its national export controls," the government's "adherence to fully effective export controls," and whether the state adheres to several other multilateral agreements. Items Controlled Participating states agree to control exports and retransfers of items on a Munitions List and a List of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies. The decision to allow or deny transfer of an item is the sole responsibility of each participating state. The control lists are updated frequently. Organization and Operations Twice a year participating states report all transfers or licenses issued for sensitive dual-use goods or technology and all deliveries of items on the Munitions List. The data exchange identifies the supplier, recipient, and items transferred. Participating states also report denials of licenses to transfer items on the dual-use list to nonmember states. The arrangement does not prohibit a participating country from making an export that has been denied by another participant (this practice is called "undercutting"). But participants are required to report soon after they approve a license for an export of dual-use goods that are essentially identical to those that have been denied by another participant during the previous three years. During plenary and working group discussions, participating states voluntarily share information on potential threats to peace and stability and examine dangerous acquisition trends. The participants review the scope of reporting and coordinating national control policies and develop further guidelines and procedures. Twice a year, the group reviews the Munitions List with a view to extending information and notifications. Weapons Control and Elimination Conventions Chemical Weapons Convention The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) bans the development, production, transfer, stockpiling, and use of chemical and toxin weapons, mandates the destruction of all chemical weapons production facilities, and seeks to control the production and international transfer of the key chemical components of these weapons. Negotiations began in 1968, but made little progress for many years. Verification issues, in particular, stalled the talks until the Soviet Union accepted challenge inspections. In September 1992, the Conference on Disarmament's 40 member-nations agreed on the final draft for the Convention, and it opened for signature in January 1993. As of November 30, 2015, 192 nations were party to the treaty, which entered into force on April 29, 1997. Israel has signed but not ratified the Convention. Egypt, North Korea, and South Sudan have not signed the CWC. Under the convention, states-parties provide declarations, which detail chemical weapons-related activities or materials and relevant industrial activities, to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The OPCW inspects and monitors states-parties' facilities and activities that are relevant to the convention. The U.S. Senate held hearings and debated the CWC for more than four years before consenting to its ratification on April 24, 1997. Congress passed the CWC implementing legislation, as a part of the FY1999 Omnibus Appropriations Act ( P.L. 105-277 ), in late October 1998. This legislation provides the statutory authority for U.S. domestic compliance with the convention's provisions. The legislation also provides detailed procedures to be used for on-site inspections by the OPCW, including limitations on access and search warrant procedures, should they be required. Limits and Restrictions Parties to the convention have agreed to cease all offensive chemical weapons research and production and close all relevant facilities. They agreed to declare all chemical weapons stockpiles, allow an inventory by international inspectors, and seal their stocks. They must also destroy their weapons within 10 years, unless the OPCW approves an extension. They must also destroy all chemical weapons production facilities within 10 years. In "exceptional cases of compelling need," the OPCW may approve the conversion of these facilities to peaceful purposes. The CWC contains a complex verification regime, with different obligations applying to different types of chemical facilities. The convention establishes three schedules of chemicals, grouped by relevance to chemical weapons production and extent of legitimate peaceful uses. Some facilities are subject to systematic on-site verification; others are subject to periodic verification inspections. Facilities for a third class of chemicals are subject to random or "ad hoc" inspections. Signatories may also request challenge inspections at facilities suspected to be in violation of the convention. The OPCW will carry out these inspections on short notice. Inspected nations will have the right to negotiate the extent of inspectors' access to any facility, but must make every reasonable effort to confirm compliance. Destruction Deadlines According to the OPCW, all of the member-states' declared chemical weapons production facilities have been inactivated and, as of March 13, 2018, approximately 96% of declared chemical weapons agent stockpiles had been destroyed. This amount does not include the chemical stockpiles declared by Syria (see below). Six countries declared possession of chemical weapons, but none destroyed their stocks by the original April 29, 2007, deadline. In July 2007, Albania became the first country to have destroyed its declared chemical weapons. South Korea became the second on July 10, 2008. India became the third on March 16, 2009. Five other states—Iraq, Libya, Russia, Syria, and the United States—have declared possession of such weapons. Libya Libya joined the CWC in January 2004. At that time, Libya declared nearly 25 metric tonnes of bulk sulfur mustard agent, several thousand unloaded aerial munitions designed for use with chemical warfare agents, and several chemical weapons production facilities. The declared aerial munitions were destroyed in March 2004. Production facilities were destroyed or converted under OPCW supervision. Libya had said that it would destroy its Category One weapons by December 31, 2010, and its Category Two weapons by December 31, 2011. However, Tripoli was given until May 15, 2011, to destroy all of its Category One weapons. As of October 31, 2010, Libya had destroyed approximately 4% of its Category One weapons and over 39% of its Category Two weapons. These weapons, which included some undeclared stocks of mustard gas, remained on Libyan territory after the 2011 revolution and fall of the Muammar al Qadhafi regime. Libya's Permanent Representative to the OPCW stated March 11, 2011, that the country's "situation regarding the chemical weapons to be destroyed remains unchanged and under control." In January 2012, OPCW inspectors returned to Libya to verify the status of Libya's chemical weapons stockpiles. In 2013, Libya completed the destruction of its stock of bulk mustard agent. Libya announced in January 2014 that it had completed destruction of the CW-filled munitions it had discovered and declared in 2011 and 2012. Libya was to have destroyed its stocks of Category 2 (precursor) chemicals by the end of 2016, but stated in a February 2016 letter to the OPCW Director-General that "it is not realistic to expect that the destruction of these chemical weapons will be completed within the set time frame without an effective international assistance." Libya had informed the OPCW Executive Council in September 2015 that Tripoli lacked the appropriate technology for destroying its remaining stockpile. On February 24, 2016, the council requested the OPCW Director-General "to identify and evaluate the technical, operational, security, financial, and legal factors relevant to all the options for addressing the destruction of the remaining Libyan chemical weapons, including the removal of some or all the chemicals from Libya and destruction outside Libya, and options for in-country destruction." The U.N. Security Council endorsed this in July (UNSC Resolution 2298 [2016]). In August 2016, Denmark led a maritime operation that removed all 500 metric tons of precursor chemicals from Libya to a destruction facility in Germany. According to the OPCW, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Malta, Spain, United Kingdom, and the United States contributed financial and technical assistance. The OPCW confirmed the complete destruction of all of Libya's chemical weapons in January 2018. Syria52 Syria acceded to the CWC as part of a diplomatic effort in the fall of 2013. The United States threatened military action against Syria in response to chemical weapons use against civilians in August 2013. The United States withdrew the threat, and Syria agreed to join the CWC and declare and destroy all of its chemical weapons stocks and production facilities. U.N. Security Council Resolution 2118 (2013) mandated that Syria give up all its chemical weapons under Chapter VII provisions of the U.N. Charter and created a mechanism for verifying this process, with a primary role for the OPCW Secretariat. At the start of its civil war, Syria had more than 1,000 metric tons of chemical warfare agents and precursor chemicals, including several hundred metric tons of the nerve agent sarin, several hundred metric tons of mustard agent in ready-to-use form, and several metric tons of the nerve agent VX. A U.N. and OPCW Joint Mission oversaw the removal and destruction of these chemical weapons agents from Syria, and all Category 1 and 2 declared chemicals were destroyed as of June 2014. Destruction of chemical weapons facilities is still underway, and serious questions remain over whether Syria has declared all of its chemical weapons stocks. The OPCW's Declaration Assessment Team (DAT) continues to investigate these outstanding issues through interviews and lab analysis of samples from site visits. The State Department's 2018 report assessing CWC compliance says that the United States cannot certify that Syria is in compliance with the CWC, that Syria has been using chemical weapons systematically for years, and that Syria has not declared "all the elements of its chemical weapons program" and has retained some chemical weapons. The Syrian government continues to deny categorically that it has used chemical weapons or toxic chemicals, while accusing opposition forces of doing so. The U.N. representatives of the United States, France, and the United Kingdom continue to cite information they believe suggests Syrian government complicity in conducting ongoing chemical attacks, particularly with chlorine. Expert teams affiliated with the Joint U.N. Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic (JIM) and the OPCW Fact Finding Mission (FFM) in Syria have investigated some of these allegations and have found evidence that in some cases confirms and in others suggests that chemical weapons (such as sarin) and/or toxic chemicals have been used in attacks. Russia The CWC Conference of States-Parties gave Russia until December 31, 2009, to destroy 45% of its Category One stockpiles and until April 29, 2012, to destroy the rest. Russia did not meet the 2012 deadline but stated that it planned to destroy its stockpiles by December 31, 2020. In September 2017, the OPCW confirmed that the Russian Federation had totally destroyed its declared chemical weapons stockpile. The OPCW had verified the destruction of 39,967 metric tons of Category One chemical weapons at seven facilities. Moscow had previously destroyed its Category Two and Category Three chemical weapons stockpiles. Under DOD's Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, the United States and other partner countries provided Russia with considerable financial assistance for chemical weapons destruction. In congressionally mandated annual reports to Congress, the State Department has said it could not certify that the Russian Federation was in compliance with the CWC because its required declarations of stockpile and development and production facilities were incomplete. In addition, the 2018 report said that due to "Russia's March 4, 2018, use of a military-grade nerve agent to attack two individuals in the United Kingdom, the United States certifies that the Russian Federation is in non-compliance with its obligations under the CWC." The United States The United States has also encountered difficulties in destroying its Category One chemical weapons stockpile and did not meet its 2007 deadline for doing so. Washington has already destroyed its Category Three stockpile and has declared no Category Two weapons. In April 2006, the United States submitted its formal request to the OPCW Chairman and Director-General to extend the United States' final chemical weapons destruction deadline from April 2007 to April 29, 2012, the latest possible date allowed under the CWC. However, Ambassador Eric Javits, then-U.S. Permanent Representative to the OPCW, added that the United States did "not expect to be able to meet that deadline" because Washington had encountered "delays and difficulties" in destroying its stockpile. These delays have generally resulted from the need to meet state and federal environmental requirements and from both local and congressional concerns over the means of destruction. The 2008 Defense Appropriations Act ( P.L. 110-116 ) required the Defense Department to "complete work on the destruction" of the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile by the 2012 deadline "and in no circumstances later than December 31, 2017." The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 ( P.L. 114-92 ) changed this deadline to December 31, 2023. The OPCW reported in April 2018 that the organization had verified the destruction of about 90.5% of the U.S. Category One stockpile. The United States projects that the Colorado and Kentucky facilities will destroy the remaining chemical agents stockpiles. According to a 2017 Defense Department report, these stockpiles are to be destroyed by November 2019 and September 2023, respectively. Iraq Iraq used chemical weapons during its 1980-1988 war with Iran and against Iraqi Kurds in 1988. Following the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 687 on April 3, 1991. This resolution was the first in a series of resolutions that required Iraq to declare its programs for nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, as well as missiles with ranges exceeding 150 kilometers, and to destroy the weapons and related materials under U.N. monitoring. Regarding chemical weapons, Resolution 687 required Iraq to "unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision of ... [a]ll chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities." The resolutions also required Baghdad to accept an ongoing U.N. monitoring regime to prevent Iraqi reconstitution of its prohibited weapons programs. The U.N. Secretary-General subsequently formed the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) to verify Iraq's compliance with the resolution. Iraq's chemical weapons generally met one of four fates: they were used during the Iran-Iraq war; they were destroyed by Iraq under UNSCOM supervision; they were secretly destroyed by Iraq outside UNSCOM supervision; or they were destroyed by coalition forces during the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Although "a number of issues relating to Iraq's chemical weapons programme remain unresolved," according to a 2006 U.N. report, the inspectors "were able to identify the major parameters of this programme, its scope and the results achieved." Moreover, the "vast majority" of chemical agents and munitions which Iraq possessed in 1991 were "declared by Iraq, identified by the inspectors and destroyed under international supervision," according to the report. Iraq's legacy chemical weapons were "contained in two sealed bunkers" at an old Iraqi chemical weapons production facility, according to a July 31, 2012, British Ministry of Defense statement. These weapons were "left over after being rendered unusable by the UN inspection teams," OPCW Director-General Ambassador Ahmet Üzümcü said in a June 6, 2013, speech. Iraq acceded to the CWC in 2009 and worked with the OCPW and several countries to devise an appropriate disposal method for these weapons. Permanent Representative of Iraq Mohamed Alhakim stated in a June 30, 2014, letter to U.N. Secretary–General Ban Ki-moon that Iraq is currently "unable to fulfill its obligations to destroy chemical weapons" and will resume these "obligations as soon as the security situation has improved and control of the facility has been regained." Iraq reiterated its "commitment to continue implementing the destruction plan for the remnants of the former regime's chemical programme, as early as possible," according to a March 17, 2015, statement. "Due to the ongoing security situation, no further action has been taken," Üzümcü stated on November 30, 2015. However, Iraq began to destroy the weapons in 2017, "once the on-going security situation had been addressed." The OPCW confirmed in November 2017 and February 2018 that the four former chemical weapons production facilities in Iraq were completely destroyed. Üzümcü stated in March 2018 that Iraq had completed destroying its "chemical weapons remnants." On June 11, 2014, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) invaded the al-Muthanna chemical weapons facility. The Iraqi government has stated that "the relevant Iraqi authorities saw to it that all sensitive equipment and instruments" at the site "were transferred to safe locations." Iraqi armed forces regained control of the site on October 28, 2014. An Iraqi assessment "confirmed the integrity" of the bunkers' "walls and entries." However, ISIL has apparently been using chemical weapons in Iraq. The group "was likely responsible" for some attacks in Iraq with mustard agent, State Department spokesperson Elizabeth Trudeau told reporters on April 1, 2016. Director-General Üzümcü stated on March 23, 2016, that the OPCW has helped Iraq confirm "the use of sulfur mustard in an attack in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq." Experts and government officials have argued that ISIL probably did not obtain chemical agents from Iraqi stockpiles. Other Compliance Issues A State Department report covering 2014 raised some additional compliance questions, but did not conclude that any other CWC state-party had a chemical weapons program in violation of the Convention. Biological Weapons Convention In 1969, the Nixon Administration unilaterally renounced U.S. biological weapons (BW). Offensive BW development and production ceased, and destruction of the U.S. BW stockpile began. Simultaneously, the United States pressed the Soviet Union to follow its example. After some delay, agreement was reached, and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) was signed in 1972. The United States, after lengthy Senate consultations, ratified the convention in 1975, the same year that the convention entered into force. The BWC bans the development, production, stockpiling, and transfer of biological weapons, as well as biological agents and toxins. It also bans "equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict." In addition, the convention requires states-parties to destroy all relevant "agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery." The BWC permits only defensive biological warfare research (e.g., vaccines, protective equipment) and allows production and stockpiling of BW agents only in amounts justifiable for protective or peaceful purposes. Unlike the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the BWC does not specify particular biological agents, but generically defines them as "microbial or other biological agents or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic or peaceful purposes." The convention does not contain any independent verification or enforcement mechanisms. Verification and Enforcement The Fifth Review Conference of the BWC, which took place in November 2001, ended in disarray, with the parties unable to agree upon a final declaration. The primary deadlock was the issue of an adaptive protocol to the convention, intended to enhance its enforcement. In July 2001, after almost seven years of negotiations, the United States declared the 200-page protocol unacceptable as basis for further negotiation. A Bush Administration review concluded that the draft protocol would not provide adequate security against covert violations, yet could endanger the security of U.S. biodefense programs and U.S. commercial proprietary information. Alone in its complete rejection of the draft protocol, the United States came under widespread international criticism, including from close allies, for "jeopardizing" the future of biological arms control. In response, the Administration put forward several proposals at the 2001 Review Conference, urging their adoption by BWC State Parties at the national level. These included the following: Criminalization of BWC violations and expedited extradition procedures for violators. United Nations investigation of suspicious disease outbreaks or alleged BW use. Procedures for addressing BWC compliance concerns. Improved international disease control. Improved security over research on pathogenic organisms. The Review Conference was unable to reach a compromise final declaration on future activities satisfactory to all state parties, and adjourned until November 2002. The United States has continued to oppose further negotiations on verification. Confronted with the U.S. position, the chairman of the 2002 Review Conference presented a minimal program emphasizing only annual meetings to discuss strengthening national laws and ways to respond to BW attacks. These were endorsed by the United States and accepted by the conference. The 6 th BWC Review Conference, held in December 2006, could not reach consensus on a comprehensive set of guidelines for national implementation of the convention owing to differences between the United States and the nonaligned nations group over technology transfer control issues. The assumption of U.S. opposition also precluded consideration of enhanced verification or enforcement provisions for the convention. The conference, however, did establish a new program of work for annual meetings, which took place before the 7 th Review Conference in December 2011. The meetings included discussion and information exchanges on a variety of issues, including domestic enforcement of BWC provisions, pathogen security, and oversight of potentially dual-use research. The United States required, however, that these sessions be prohibited from reaching binding decisions. Beginning in 2007, the BWC states-parties have met annually. The Obama Administration chose not to support revival of the negotiations on a BWC verification protocol, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Ellen Tauscher announced in a December 9, 2009, address to the BWC states-parties. The Administration has "determined that a legally binding protocol would not achieve meaningful verification or greater security," she explained, adding [t]he ease with which a biological weapons program could be disguised within legitimate activities and the rapid advances in biological research make it very difficult to detect violations. We believe that a protocol would not be able to keep pace with the rapidly changing nature of the biological weapons threat. Instead, Tauscher stated, the United States believes that "confidence in BWC compliance should be promoted by enhanced transparency about activities and pursuing compliance diplomacy to address concerns." Pointing out that part of the November 2009 U.S. National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats is to "reinvigorate" the BWC, Tauscher exhorted the convention's states-parties to join the United States in "increasing transparency, improving confidence building measures and engaging in more robust bilateral compliance discussions." She proposed such measures as increasing participation in the convention's confidence-building measures, as well as bilateral and multilateral cooperation in such areas as pathogen security and disease surveillance and response. The 7 th Review Conference took place from December 5 to 22, 2011. The conference participants decided to continue the intersessional process with some changes. The annual meetings will address three standing agenda items: cooperation and assistance, review of relevant scientific and technological developments, and strengthening national implementation. In addition, during the intersessional program, the states-parties were to discuss enabling fuller participation in BWC-related confidence-building measures and strengthening implementation of Article VII of the convention. After the most recent review conference, which took place from November 7 to 25, 2016, the conference participants decided that the states-parties are to meet annually. The first meeting was to "seek to make progress on issues of substance and process for the period before the next Review Conference, with a view to reaching consensus on an intersessional process," according to the final conference document. During that meeting, w hich took place from December 4 to 8, 2017, the participants decided that a group of experts meeting would also take place annually. Groups of experts have met annually in the past as part of the intersessional process. The Arms Trade Treaty The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) is a multilateral treaty of unlimited duration. Its stated objectives are to "[e]stablish the highest possible common international standards for regulating or improving the regulation of the international trade in conventional arms ..." and to "[p]revent and eradicate the illicit trade in conventional arms and prevent their diversion." Though various concepts similar to the ATT have been discussed in international circles for decades, a speech by the UK Foreign Secretary backing the concept in 2004 is widely credited as giving critical momentum to the movement by adding a major conventional arms exporter to it. Beginning in 2006, the treaty was negotiated in the U.N. General Assembly (UNGA) and specialized fora. A UNGA vote in early April 2013 approved the treaty in its negotiated form. The ATT opened for signature on June 3, 2013, and entered into force on December 24, 2014. The United States participated in drafting the ATT and voted for it in the UNGA on April 2, 2013. The United States signed the ATT on September 25, 2013, but has not ratified it. Because the United States already has strong export control laws in place, the ATT would likely require no significant changes to policy, regulations, or law. The ATT regulates trade in conventional weapons between and among countries. It does not affect sales or trade in weapons among private citizens within a country. The treaty obligates states parties engaged in the international arms trade to establish national control systems to review, authorize, and document the import, export, brokerage, transit, and transshipment of conventional weapons, their parts, and ammunition. The treaty also requires that states parties report on their treaty-specified transfers to other nations on an annual basis to the Secretariat. The scope of the weapons covered by the treaty includes the following, though states parties may voluntarily include other conventional weapons as well: battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, large-caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles and missile launchers, and small arms and light weapons. The ATT also binds states parties to certain preexport review processes that take into account various criteria related to possible destabilizing effects on international security, terrorism, transnational crime, human rights, and other factors in determining whether or not a transfer should be approved. A state party is specifically prohibited from approving a transfer to another nation that violates a United Nations Security Council Resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, especially an arms embargo. Also explicitly prohibited is any transfer where a state party "has knowledge" when reviewing the proposed transfer that the treaty-specified arms, parts, or ammunition would be used in the "commission of genocide, crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, attacks directed against civilian objects or civilians protected as such, or other war crimes as defined by international agreements to which it is a party." Parties to the treaty are obligated to take measures to prevent the illegal diversion of covered arms and ammunition, to mitigate risks of diversion occurring by cooperating with each other and exchanging information, and to "take appropriate measures" if a diversion is detected. States parties are also encouraged to exchange relevant information about effectively addressing illicit diversion. Finally, the ATT encourages cooperation between states parties in the development of implementing legislation, institutional capacity building, and other pertinent areas. According to the treaty text, the ATT's Secretariat will have a "minimized structure" and shall receive, make available and distribute the reports as mandated by this Treaty; maintain and make available to States Parties the list of national points of contact; facilitate the matching of offers of and requests for assistance for Treaty implementation and promote international cooperation as requested; facilitate the work of the Conference of States Parties, including making arrangements and providing the necessary services for meetings under this Treaty; and perform other duties as decided by the Conferences of States Parties. Controlling the Use of Antipersonnel Landmines Antipersonnel landmines (APL) are small, inexpensive weapons that kill or maim people upon contact. Abandoned, unmarked minefields can remain dangerous to both soldiers and civilians for an indefinite time. Mines were addressed in The Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed To Be Excessively Injurious or To Have Indiscriminate Effects , also known as the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). Protocol II of this contains rules for marking, registering, and removing minefields. The CCW was concluded in 1980 and entered into force in 1993. The United States signed it in 1982 and the U.S. Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification on March 24, 1995. U.S. Initiatives In 1992, Congress established a one year moratorium on U.S. exports of APL ( P.L. 102-484 ) and subsequently extended it for 15 more years (see P.L. 107-115 ). H.R. 948 , introduced in the first session, 107 th Congress, sought to make the ban permanent but was not brought to a vote. Many nations have followed the U.S. example and imposed their own moratoria. In the FY1996 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act ( P.L. 104-107 ), Congress established a one-year ban on the use of APL by U.S. personnel to begin in 1999, but the 105 th Congress repealed the moratorium in the FY1999 Defense Authorization Act ( P.L. 105-261 ). In 1996, President Clinton announced a policy that immediately discontinued U.S. use of "dumb" APL (except in the DMZ of Korea); supported negotiation of a worldwide ban on APL in the United Nations; and supported development of alternative technologies to perform landmine functions without endangering civilians and expanded mine detection and clearing technology efforts and assistance to mine-plagued countries. This initiative temporarily retained the possible use of "smart" mines that render themselves harmless after a certain period of time, either through self-destruction, self-neutralization, or self-deactivation. Clinton subsequently set a goal of 2003 to replace even smart mines everywhere except Korea, and of 2006 in Korea. In November 1996, the United States introduced a resolution to the U.N. General Assembly to pursue an international agreement that would ban use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of APL—there were 84 cosponsors. Some countries, such as Canada, already abided by the intent of the proposed agreement and pushed for an early deadline to reach agreement. Others, however, were concerned that verifying such an agreement would be difficult, or that AP landmines still have a useful and legitimate role in their security planning. Landmine control, specifically a ban on exports, was briefly on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva for 1999. During 2000, however, that body could not agree on its program of work and the landmine issue was not addressed again. During 1997, the government of Canada and a number of nongovernmental organizations, such as the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, sponsored conferences to craft a treaty outside the CD process. Over 100 nations signed the Ottawa Treaty, formally titled the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, which entered into force for its parties on March 1, 1999. The Clinton Administration participated in the Ottawa Process, but declined to sign the treaty after failing to gain certain temporary exceptions to treaty language. Specifically, the United States wanted to continue to use APL in the defense of South Korea until 2006 if necessary, and the ability to include smart APL (or "devices") within antitank landmine munitions. President Clinton suggested that the United States would sign the Ottawa Treaty in 2006 if effective alternatives to APL were available. The Ottawa Convention requires states parties to stop the production, use, and transfer of APL, as well as destroy all stockpiled APL, except for the "minimum number absolutely necessary" for training purposes, within four years. As of April 8, 2016, 162 countries had become states-parties to the treaty. Belarus, Greece, Turkey, and Ukraine all missed their stockpile destruction deadlines. Turkey completed destroying its APL in June 2011. Poland must also destroy APL stockpiles. States parties are also required to clear APL within 10 years of becoming party to the convention, but can request extensions of up to 10 years to complete this task. Thirty-one states-parties have not yet met their clearance obligations. The Convention does not include a verification body, but states parties may submit allegations of noncompliance, as well as requests for "clarification" from relevant governments, to the U.N. Secretary-General. A State-Party may also request that a special meeting of other treaty members address the compliance matters. States parties can initiate fact-finding missions and also request relevant governments to address compliance issues. In February 2004, the Bush Administration announced that, after 2010, the United States would not use any type of persistent landmines, whether antipersonnel or—a new policy—antivehicle. Self-destruct and self-deactivating landmines will be used and will meet or exceed specifications of the Amended Mines Protocol, CCW. It also indicated that alternatives to persistent landmines would be developed that incorporate enhanced technologies. This policy did not include a date to join the Ottawa Treaty. Richard Kidd, then-Director of the State Department's Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement, said in a November 21, 2007, speech that the United States would not sign the Ottawa Convention. If needed, U.S. forces will use nonpersistent mines. Various U.S. landmine systems were reportedly prepositioned in the Middle East in preparation for the 2003 war in Iraq, but were not used. The Obama Administration conducted a review of U.S. policy regarding landmines. On June 27, 2014, during the Third Review Conference of the Ottawa Convention, the United States announced that it "will not produce or otherwise acquire any anti-personnel landmines in the future," including for the purpose of replacing expiring stockpiles. Moreover, the United States is "conducting a high fidelity modeling and simulation effort to ascertain how to mitigate the risks associated with the loss" of such mines. On September 23, 2014, the Obama Administration stated that the United States is aligning its "APL policy outside the Korean Peninsula with the key requirements of the Ottawa Convention." Specifically, the United States will "not use APL outside the Korean Peninsula; not assist, encourage, or induce anyone outside the Korean Peninsula to engage in activity prohibited by the Ottawa Convention; and undertake to destroy APL stockpiles not required for the defense of the Republic of Korea." Puneet Talwar, Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, stated on December 9, 2014, that the United States is "pursuing solutions that would be compliant with the convention and that would ultimately allow us to accede to the convention while ensuring that we are still able to meet our alliance commitments" to South Korea. Tina Kaidanow, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, stated during a December 13, 2017, press conference that "[t]here is no current review" of U.S. policy regarding landmines, adding that "in most places we have hewn to those standards [of the Ottawa Convention], with an exception, for an example, in the Korean Peninsula, where we cannot make that commitment." Cluster Munitions89 Cluster munitions are weapons that open in midair and dispense smaller submunitions—anywhere from a few dozen to hundreds—into an area. They can be delivered by aircraft or from ground systems such as artillery, rockets, and missiles. Cluster munitions are valued militarily because one munition can kill or destroy many targets within its impact area, and fewer weapons systems are needed to deliver fewer munitions to attack multiple targets. They also permit a smaller force to engage a larger adversary and are considered by some an "economy of force" weapon. On the other hand, critics note that cluster munitions disperse their large numbers of submunitions imprecisely over an extended area, that they frequently fail to detonate and are difficult to detect, and that the submunitions can remain explosive hazards for decades. They can also produce high civilian casualties if they are fired into areas where soldiers and civilians are intermixed or if inaccurate cluster munitions land in populated areas. Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) A number of CCW members, led by Norway, initiated negotiations in 2007 outside of the CCW to ban cluster munitions. On May 30, 2008, they reached an agreement to ban cluster munitions. The United States, Russia, China, Israel, Egypt, India, and Pakistan did not participate in the talks or sign the agreement. During the Signing Conference in Oslo on December 3-4, 2008, 94 states signed the convention and 4 of the signatories ratified the convention at the same time. China, Russia, and the United States abstained, but France, Germany, and the United Kingdom were among the 18 NATO members to sign the convention. The convention entered into force on August 1, 2010. The Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM), inter alia, bans the use of cluster munitions, as well as their development, production, acquisition, transfer, and stockpiling. The convention does not prohibit cluster munitions that can detect and engage a single target or explosive submunitions equipped with an electronic self-destruction or self-deactivating feature —an exemption that seemingly permits sensor-fuzed or "smart" cluster submunitions. Appendix A. List of Treaties and Agreements This appendix lists a wide range of arms control treaties and agreements. The date listed in each entry indicates the year in which the negotiations were completed. In some cases, entry into force occurred in a subsequent year. The Geneva Protocol, 1925: Bans the use of poison gas and bacteriological weapons in warfare. The Antarctic Treaty, 1959: Demilitarizes the Antarctic continent and provides for scientific cooperation on Antarctica. Memorandum of Understanding ... Regarding the Establishment of a Direct Communications Link (The Hot Line Agreement), 1963: Provides for a secure, reliable communications link between Washington and Moscow. Modified in 1971, 1984, and 1988 to improve the method of communications. Limited Test Ban Treaty, 1963: Bans nuclear weapons tests or any nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, outer space, and under water. Outer Space Treaty, 1967: Bans the orbiting or stationing on celestial bodies (including the moon) of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction. Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), 1967: Obligates nations in Latin America not to acquire, possess, or store nuclear weapons on their territory. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1968: Non-nuclear signatories agree not to acquire nuclear weapons; nuclear signatories agree to cooperate with non-nuclear signatories in peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Seabed Arms Control Treaty, 1971: Bans emplacement of military installations, including those capable of launching weapons, on the seabed. Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War (Accident Measures Agreement), 1971: Outlines measures designed to reduce the risk that technical malfunction, human failure, misinterpreted incident, or unauthorized action could start a nuclear exchange. Biological Weapons Convention, 1972: Bans the development, production, stockpile, or acquisition of biological agents or toxins for warfare. Agreement ... on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas, 1972: Establishes "rules of the road" to reduce the risk that accident, miscalculation, or failure of communication could escalate into a conflict at sea. Interim Agreement ... on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT I Interim Agreement), 1972: Limits numbers of some types of U.S. and Soviet strategic offensive nuclear weapons. Treaty ... on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty), 1972: Limits United States and Soviet Union to two ABM sites each; limits the number of interceptor missiles and radars at each site to preclude nationwide defense. Modified in 1974 to permit one ABM site in each nation. U.S. withdrew in June 2002. Agreement ... on the Prevention of Nuclear War, 1973: United States and Soviet Union agreed to adopt an "attitude of international cooperation" to prevent the development of situations that might lead to nuclear war. Treaty ... on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapons Tests (Threshold Test Ban Treaty), 1974: Prohibits nuclear weapons tests with yields of more than 150 kilotons. Ratified and entered into force in 1990. Treaty ... on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes (Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty), 1976: Extends the limit of 150 kilotons to nuclear explosions occurring outside weapons test sites. Ratified and entered into force in 1990. Concluding Document of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki Final Act), 1975: Outlines notifications and confidence-building measures with respect to military activities in Europe. Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, 1978: Bans the hostile use of environmental modification techniques that have lasting or widespread effects. Treaty ... on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT II), 1979: Places quantitative and qualitative limits on some types of U.S. and Soviet strategic offensive nuclear weapons. Never ratified. The Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed To Be Excessively Injurious or To Have Indiscriminate Effects: This Convention, also known as the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), was concluded in Geneva in 1980 and entered into force in 1993. Protocol II (Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-traps and Other Devices) contains rules for marking, registering, and removing minefields, in an effort to reduce indiscriminate casualties caused by antipersonnel landmines. Protocol IV prohibits laser weapons designed to cause blindness. Document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (Stockholm Document), 1986: Expands on the notifications and confidence-building measures in the Helsinki Final Act. Provides for ground and aerial inspection of military activities. Treaty of Rarotonga, 1986: Establishes a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in the South Pacific. The United States signed the Protocols in 1996; the Senate has not yet provided its advice and consent to ratification. Agreement ... on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, 1987: Establishes communications centers in Washington and Moscow and improves communications links between the two. Treaty ... on the Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, 1987: Bans all U.S. and Soviet ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 300 and 3,400 miles. U.S. announced withdrawal on February 1, 2019. Agreement ... on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles, 1988: Obligates United States and Soviet Union to provide at least 24 hours' notice before the launch of an ICBM or SLBM. Agreement on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities, 1989: Outlines cooperative procedures that are designed to prevent and resolve peacetime incidents between the armed forces of the United States and Soviet Union. U.S.-U.S.S.R. Chemical Weapons Destruction Agreement, 1990: Mandates the destruction of the bulk of the U.S. and Soviet chemical weapons stockpiles. Vienna Document of the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures, 1990: Expands on the measures in the 1986 Stockholm Document. Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty), 1990: Limits and reduces the numbers of certain types of conventional armaments deployed from the "Atlantic to the Urals." Treaty ... on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START), 1991: Limits and reduces the numbers of strategic offensive nuclear weapons. Modified by the Lisbon Protocol of 1992 to provide for Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Russia to succeed to Soviet Union's obligations under the Treaty. Entered into force on December 5, 1994. Vienna Document of the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures, 1992: Expands on the measures in the 1990 Vienna Document. Treaty on Open Skies, 1992: Provides for overflights by unarmed observation aircraft to build confidence and increase transparency of military activities. Agreement ... Concerning the Safe and Secure Transportation, Storage, and Destruction of Weapons and Prevention of Weapons Proliferation, 1992: Provides for U.S. assistance to Russia for the safe and secure transportation, storage, and destruction of nuclear, chemical, and other weapons. Agreement Between the United States and Republic of Belarus Concerning Emergency Response and the Prevention of Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 1992: Provides for U.S. assistance to Belarus in eliminating nuclear weapons and responding to nuclear emergencies in Belarus. Treaty ... on the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II) 1993: Would have further reduced the number of U.S. and Russian strategic offensive nuclear weapons. Would have banned the deployment of all land-based multiple-warhead missiles (MIRVed ICBMs), including the Soviet SS-18 "heavy" ICBM. Signed on January 3, 1993; U.S. Senate consented to ratification in January 1996; Russian Duma approved ratification in April 2000. Treaty never entered into force. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction: Bans chemical weapons and requires elimination of their production facilities. Opened for signature on January 13, 1993; entered into force in April 1997. Agreement ... Concerning the Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Resulting from the Dismantlement of Nuclear Weapons in Russia, 1993: Provides for U.S. purchase of highly enriched uranium removed from Russian nuclear weapons; uranium to be blended into low enriched uranium for fuel in commercial nuclear reactors. Signed and entered into force on February 18, 1993. Agreement Between the United States and Ukraine Concerning Assistance to Ukraine in the Elimination of Strategic Nuclear Arms, and the Prevention of Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Provides for U.S. assistance to Ukraine to eliminate nuclear weapons and implement provisions of START I. Signed in late 1993, entered into force in 1994. Agreement Between the United States and Republic of Kazakhstan Concerning the Destruction of Silo Launchers of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, Emergency Response, and the Prevention of Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 1993: Provides for U.S. assistance to Kazakhstan to eliminate nuclear weapons and implement provisions of START I. Trilateral Statement by the Presidents of the United States, Russia, and Ukraine, 1994: Statement in which Ukraine agreed to transfer all nuclear warheads on its territory to Russia in exchange for security assurances and financial compensation. Some compensation will be in the form of fuel for Ukraine's nuclear reactors. The United States will help finance the compensation by purchasing low enriched uranium derived from dismantled weapons from Russia. Treaty of Pelindaba, 1996: Establishes a nuclear weapons free zone in Africa. The United States has signed, but not yet ratified Protocols to the Treaty. Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), 1996: Bans all nuclear explosions, for any purpose. The United States and more than 130 other nations had signed the Treaty by late 1996. The U.S. Senate voted against ratification in October, 1999. Ottawa Treaty, 1997: Convention for universal ban against the use of antipersonnel landmines, signed in 1997 and entered into force in 1999. The United States and other significant military powers are not signatories. Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (Moscow Treaty), 2002: Obligates the United States and Russia to reduce strategic nuclear forces to between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads. Does not define weapons to be reduced or provide monitoring and verification provisions. Reductions must be completed by December 31, 2012. Treaty lapsed upon entry into force of New START. Signed in May 2002, entered into force June 1, 2003. Treaty … On Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START), 2010: Obligates the United States and Russia to reduce strategic nuclear forces to 1,550 warheads on up to 700 deployed delivery vehicles, within a total of 800 deployed and nondeployed delivery vehicles. Reductions must occur within 7 years, treaty remains in force for 10 years. Signed on April 10, 2010, entered into force on February 5, 2011. Treaty On the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons , 2017: Obligates the parties to never "develop, produce, manufacture, otherwise acquire, possess or stockpile nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices." Parties agree not to host nuclear weapons that are owned or controlled by another state or to transfer, receive control over, or assist others in developing nuclear weapons. The United States has not signed this treaty and does not support its entry into force. Appendix B. The U.S. Treaty Ratification Process Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution establishes responsibilities for treaty ratification. It provides that the President "shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur." Contrary to common perceptions, the Senate does not ratify treaties; it provides its advice and consent to ratification by passing a resolution of ratification. The President then "ratifies" a treaty by signing the instrument of ratification and either exchanging it with the other parties to the treaty or depositing it at a central repository (such as the United Nations). In Section 33 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (P.L. 87-297, as amended), Congress outlined the relationship between arms control agreements and the treaty ratification process. This law provides that "no action shall be taken under this or any other law that will obligate the United States to disarm or to reduce or to limit the Armed Forces or armaments of the United States, except pursuant to the treaty-making power of the President under the Constitution or unless authorized by further affirmative legislation by the Congress of the United States." In practice, most U.S. arms control agreements have been submitted as treaties, a word reserved in U.S. usage for international agreements submitted to the Senate for its approval in accordance with Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution. The Senate clearly expects future arms control obligations would be made only pursuant to treaty in one of its declarations in the resolution of ratification of the START Treaty. The declaration stated: "The Senate declares its intention to consider for approval international agreements that would obligate the United States to reduce or limit the Armed Forces or armaments of the United States in a militarily significant manner only pursuant to the treaty power set forth in Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution." Nonetheless, some arms control agreements have been made by other means. Several "confidence building" measures have been concluded as legally binding international agreements, called executive agreements in the United States, without approval by Congress. These include the Hot Line Agreement of June 20, 1963, the Agreement on Prevention of Nuclear War of June 22, 1973, and agreements concluded in the Standing Consultative Commission established by the Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty. In another category that might be called statutory or congressional-executive agreements, the SALT I Interim Agreement was approved by a joint resolution of Congress in 1972. In a third category, the executive branch has entered some arms control agreements that it did not submit to Congress on grounds that they were "politically binding" but not "legally binding." Such agreements include several measures agreed to through the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, such as the Stockholm Document on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, signed September 19, 1986. Senate Consideration The conclusion or signing of a treaty is only the first step toward making the agreement legally binding on the parties. First, the parties decide whether to ratify, that is, express their consent to be bound by, the treaty that the negotiators have signed. Each party follows its own constitutional process to approve the treaty. In the United States, after a treaty has been signed, the President at a time of his choice submits to the Senate the treaty and any documents that are to be considered an integral part of the treaty and requests the Senate's advice and consent to ratification. The President's message is accompanied by a letter from the Secretary of State to the President which contains an analysis of the treaty. After submittal, the Senate may approve the agreement, approve it with various conditions, or not approve it. Senate consideration of a treaty is governed by Senate Rule XXX, which was amended in 1986 to simplify the procedure. The treaty is read a first time and the injunction of secrecy is removed by unanimous consent, although normally the text of a treaty has already been made public. The treaty is then referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations under Senate Rule XXV on jurisdiction. After consideration, the committee reports the treaty to the Senate with a proposed resolution of ratification that may contain any of the conditions described below. If the committee objects to a treaty, or believes the treaty would not receive the necessary majority in the Senate, it usually simply does not report the treaty to the Senate and the treaty remains pending indefinitely on the committee calendar. After it is reported from the committee, a treaty is required to lie over for one calendar day before Senate consideration. The Senate considers the treaty after adoption of a nondebatable motion to go into executive session for that purpose. Rule XXX provides that the treaty then be read a second time, after which amendments to the treaty may be proposed. The majority leader typically asks unanimous consent that the treaty be considered to have passed through all the parliamentary stages up to and including the presentation of the resolution of ratification. After the resolution of ratification is presented, amendments to the treaty itself, which are rare, may not be proposed. The resolution of ratification is then "open to amendment in the form of reservations, declarations, statements, or understandings." Decisions on amendments and conditions are made by a majority vote. Final approval of the resolution of ratification with any conditions that have been approved requires a two-thirds majority of those Senators present. After approving the treaty, the Senate returns it to the President with the resolution of ratification. If he accepts the conditions of the Senate, the President then ratifies the treaty by signing a document referred to as an instrument of ratification. Included in the instrument of ratification are any of the Senate conditions that State Department officials consider require tacit or explicit approval by the other party. The ratification is then complete at the national level and ready for exchange or deposit. The treaty enters into force in the case of a bilateral treaty upon exchange of instruments of ratification and in the case of a multilateral treaty with the deposit of the number of ratifications specified in the treaty. The President then signs a document called a proclamation which publicizes the treaty domestically as in force and the law of the land. If the President objects to any of the Senate conditions, or if the other party to a treaty objects to any of the conditions and further negotiations occur, the President may resubmit the treaty to the Senate for further consideration or simply not ratify it. Approval with Conditions The Senate may stipulate various conditions on its approval of a treaty. Major types of Senate conditions include amendments, reservations, understandings, and declarations or other statements or provisos. Sometimes the executive branch recommends the conditions, such as the December 16, 1974, reservation to the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibiting the use of poison gas and the understandings on the protocols to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. An amendment to a treaty proposes a change to the language of the treaty itself, and Senate adoption of amendments to the text of a treaty is infrequent. A formal amendment to a treaty after it has entered into force is made through an additional treaty often called a protocol. An example is the ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Protocol, signed July 3, 1974, which limited the United States and the Soviet Union to one ABM site each instead of two as in the original 1972 ABM Treaty. While the Senate did not formally attach amendments to the 1974 Threshold Test Ban and 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosion treaties, it was not until Protocols relating to verification were concluded in 1990 that the Senate approved these two Treaties. A reservation is a limitation or qualification that changes the obligations of one or more of the parties. A reservation must be communicated to the other parties and, in a bilateral treaty, explicitly agreed to by the other party. President Nixon requested a reservation to the Geneva Protocol on the use of poison gases stating that the protocol would cease to be binding on the United States in regard to an enemy state if that state or any of its allies failed to respect the prohibition. One of the conditions attached to the INF treaty might be considered a reservation although it was not called that. On the floor the sponsors referred to it as a Category III condition. The condition was that the President obtain Soviet consent that a U.S.-Soviet agreement concluded on May 12, 1988, be of the same effect as the provisions of the treaty. An understanding is an interpretation or elaboration ordinarily considered consistent with the treaty. In 1980, the Senate added five understandings to the agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the Application of Safeguards in the United States. The understandings concerned implementation of the agreement within the United States. A condition added to the INF treaty resolution, requiring a presidential certification of a common understanding on ground-launched ballistic missiles, might be considered an understanding. The sponsor of the condition, Senator Robert Dole, said, "this condition requires absolutely nothing more from the Soviets, but it does require something from our President." A declaration states policy or positions related to the treaty but not necessarily affecting its provisions. Frequently, like some of the understandings mentioned above, declarations and other statements concern internal procedures of the United States rather than international obligations and are intended to assure that Congress or the Senate participate in subsequent policy. The resolution of ratification of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty adopted in 1990 made approval subject to declarations (1) that to preserve a viable deterrent a series of specified safeguards should be an ingredient in decisions on national security programs and the allocation of resources, and (2) the United States shared a special responsibility with the Soviet Union to continue talks seeking a verifiable comprehensive test ban. In a somewhat different step, in 1963 the Senate attached a preamble to the resolution of ratification of the limited nuclear test ban treaty. The preamble contained three "Whereas" clauses of which the core one stated that amendments to treaties are subject to the constitutional process. The important distinction among the various conditions concerns their content or effect. Whatever designation the Senate applies to a condition, if the President determines that it may alter an international obligation under the treaty, he transmits it to the other party or parties and further negotiations or abandonment of the treaty may result. During its consideration of the SALT II Treaty, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee grouped conditions into three categories to clarify their intended legal effect; (I) those that need not be formally communicated to or agreed to by the Soviet Union, (II) those that would be formally communicated to the Soviet Union, but not necessarily agreed to by them, and (III) those that would require the explicit agreement of the Soviet Union. In the resolution of ratification of the START Treaty, the Senate made explicit that some of the conditions were to be communicated to the other parties. The Senate approves most treaties without formally attaching conditions. Ten arms control treaties were adopted without conditions: the Antarctic, Outer Space, Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Seabed, ABM, Environmental Modification, and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties, the Biological Weapons and the Nuclear Materials Conventions, and the ABM Protocol. In some of these cases, however, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee included significant understandings in its report. Even when it does not place formal conditions in the resolution of ratification, the Senate may make its views known or establish requirements on the executive branch in the report of the Foreign Relations Committee or through other vehicles. Such statements become part of the legislative history but are not formally transmitted to other parties. In considering the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963, the Senate turned down a reservation that "the treaty does not inhibit the use of nuclear weapons in armed conflict," but Senate leaders insisted upon a written assurance on this issue, among others, from President Kennedy. In reporting the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the committee stated that its support of the Treaty was not to be construed as approving security assurances given to the non-nuclear-weapon parties by a U.N. Security Council resolution and declarations by the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom. The security assurances resolution and declarations were, the committee reported, "solely executive measures." Appendix C. Arms Control Organizations

Arms control and nonproliferation efforts are two of the tools that have occasionally been used to implement U.S. national security strategy. Although some believe these tools do little to restrain the behavior of U.S. adversaries, while doing too much to restrain U.S. military forces and operations, many other analysts see them as an effective means to promote transparency, ease military planning, limit forces, and protect against uncertainty and surprise. Arms control and nonproliferation efforts have produced formal treaties and agreements, informal arrangements, and cooperative threat reduction and monitoring mechanisms. The pace of implementation for many of these agreements slowed during the Clinton Administration, and the Bush Administration usually preferred unilateral or ad hoc measures to formal treaties and agreements to address U.S. security concerns. The Obama Administration resumed bilateral negotiations with Russia and pledged its support for a number of multilateral arms control and nonproliferation efforts, but succeeded in negotiating only a few of its priority agreements. The Trump Administration has offered some support for existing agreements, but has announced the U.S. withdrawal from the INF Treaty, citing Russia's violation of that agreement, and has not yet determined whether it will support the extension of the 2010 New START Treaty through 2026. It shows little interest in pursuing further agreements. The United States and Soviet Union began to sign agreements limiting their strategic offensive nuclear weapons in the early 1970s. Progress in negotiating and implementing these agreements was often slow, and subject to the tenor of the broader U.S.-Soviet relationship. As the Cold War drew to a close in the late 1980s, the pace of negotiations quickened, with the two sides signing treaties limiting intermediate-range and long-range weapons. But progress again slowed in the 1990s, as U.S. missile defense plans and a range of other policy conflicts intervened in the U.S.-Russian relationship. At the same time, however, the two sides began to cooperate on securing and eliminating Soviet-era nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. Through these efforts, the United States has allocated more than $1 billion each year to threat reduction programs in the former Soviet Union. These programs have recently reached their conclusion. The United States is also a prominent actor in an international regime that attempts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. This regime, although suffering from some setbacks in recent years in Iran and North Korea, includes formal treaties, export control coordination and enforcement, U.N. resolutions, and organizational controls. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) serves as the cornerstone of this regime, with all but four nations participating in it. The International Atomic Energy Agency not only monitors nuclear programs to make sure they remain peaceful, but also helps nations develop and advance those programs. Other measures, such as sanctions, interdiction efforts, and informal cooperative endeavors, also seek to slow or stop the spread of nuclear materials and weapons. The international community has also adopted a number of agreements that address non-nuclear weapons. The CFE Treaty and Open Skies Treaty sought to stabilize the conventional balance in Europe in the waning years of the Cold War. Other arrangements seek to slow the spread of technologies that nations could use to develop advanced conventional weapons. The Chemical Weapons and Biological Weapons Conventions sought to eliminate both of these types of weapons completely. This report will be updated annually or as needed.

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Introduction The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) was created by the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 (NFIA). The NFIP received a short-term reauthorization through December 8, 2017, a second short-term reauthorization through December 22, 2017, and a third short-term reauthorization through January 19, 2018. The NFIP lapsed between January 20 and January 22, 2018, and received a fourth short-term reauthorization until February 8, 2018. The NFIP lapsed for approximately eight hours during a brief government shutdown in the early morning of February 9, 2018, and was then reauthorized until March 23, 2018. The NFIP received a sixth reauthorization until July 31, 2018, a seventh reauthorization until November 30, 2018, an eighth reauthorization until December 7, 2018, a ninth reauthorization until December 21, 2018, and a tenth reauthorization until May 31, 2019. The last long-term reauthorization of the NFIP was by the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 (hereinafter BW-12), from July 6, 2012, to September 30, 2017. Congress amended elements of BW-12, but did not extend the NFIP's authorization further, in the Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014 (HFIAA). The NFIP is managed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), through its subcomponent the Federal Insurance and Mitigation Administration (FIMA). As of October 2018, the NFIP had more than 5.1 million flood insurance policies providing over $1.3 trillion in coverage. The program collects about $3.6 billion in annual premium revenue. Nationally, as of January 2019, about 22,355 communities in 56 states and jurisdictions participated in the NFIP. According to FEMA, the program saves the nation an estimated $1.87 billion annually in flood losses avoided because of the NFIP's building and floodplain management regulations. This report provides introductory information on key components of the NFIP, ranging from floodplain mapping to the standard flood insurance forms. This report will be updated as significant revisions are made to the NFIP through legislation or administrative action. However, this report does not provide detail on current or future legislative issues for Congress, which are covered in a separate report. CRS also has a separate report on flood insurance and other federal disaster assistance programs. Purpose of the NFIP In the original NFIP statute, Congress stipulated that "a program of flood insurance can promote the public interest by providing appropriate protection against the perils of flood losses and encouraging sound land use by minimizing exposure of property to flood losses." Congress had found that postdisaster flood losses, and the subsequent federal disaster relief assistance to help communities recover from those flood losses, had "placed an increasing burden on the Nation's resources" and that as a matter of national policy "a reasonable method of sharing the risk of flood losses is through a program of flood insurance which can complement and encourage preventive and protective measures." At the time of establishment of the NFIP, as is generally still the case today, it was found that "many factors have made it uneconomic for the private insurance industry alone to make flood insurance available to those in need of such protection on reasonable terms and conditions." Thus, the NFIP essentially has two interrelated policy purposes that can be summarized as 1. to provide access to primary flood insurance, thereby allowing for the transfer of some of the financial risk of property owners to the federal government, and 2. to mitigate and reduce the nation's comprehensive flood risk through the development and implementation of floodplain management standards. A core design feature of the NFIP is that communities are not required to participate in the program by any law or other regulation. Rather, communities in the United States voluntarily participate in the NFIP generally as a means of securing access to the primary flood insurance offered by the NFIP. Essentially, the NFIP is structured so that the availability of primary flood insurance through the NFIP (purpose #1 from above) is tied to the adoption and enforcement of floodplain management standards by participating communities (purpose #2). FEMA is only allowed to provide flood insurance to "those States or areas (or subdivisions thereof)" where "adequate land use and control measures" have been adopted that "are consistent with the comprehensive criteria for land management and use developed" by the NFIP. Thus, communities that participate in the NFIP, and therefore whose residents may access the NFIP's primary flood insurance, also adopt through local or state laws minimum floodplain management standards that are described in FEMA regulations. Reduction of Comprehensive Flood Risk The NFIP accomplishes the goal of reducing comprehensive flood risk primarily by requiring participating communities to Collaborate with FEMA to develop and adopt flood maps called Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRMs). Enact minimum floodplain standards based on those flood maps. In addition, premiums collected from the sale of insurance in the NFIP finance a Flood Mitigation Assistance (FMA) grant program that reduces overall flood risk. This section of the report briefly discusses each of these means of reducing comprehensive flood risk. Risk Mapping, Assessment, and Planning (Risk MAP) and Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRMs) FEMA is responsible for undertaking Flood Insurance Studies (FISs) nationwide to identify areas within the United States having special flood, mudslide, and flood-related erosion hazards; assess the flood risk; and designate insurance zones. FEMA develops, in coordination with participating communities, flood maps called Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRMs) using these FISs that depict the community's flood risk and floodplain. In BW-12, Congress revised the authorities of FEMA as it relates to flood hazard mapping to formally establish what FEMA has called the Risk Mapping, Assessment and Planning (Risk MAP) process. Though formally authorized in BW-12, FEMA started the Risk MAP process at the request of Congress in 2009. While FEMA is largely responsible for the creation of the FIRM, the community itself must pass the map into its local or state law in order for the map to be effective. Flood Zones An area of specific focus on the FIRM is the Special Flood Hazard Area (SFHA). The SFHA is intended to distinguish the flood risk zones that have a chance of flooding during a "1 in 100 year flood" or greater frequency. This means that properties in the SFHA have a risk of 1% or greater risk of flooding every year. Table 1 shows flood-risk zones that are depicted on the FIRMs. Zones A (A1-30), AE, AH, AO, V, VE, VO, and V1-30 constitute the designated SFHA on the community's FIRM. V zones are distinguished from A zones in that V zones are subject to tidal wave action (i.e., coastal flooding). Two other designations for classifying zones in the SFHA are the Zone AR, which is an area where a levee or similar structure is determined not to provide sufficient flood protection, but is undergoing restoration; and the Zone A99, an area where a federal flood protection structure is under construction to provide the necessary flood protection standard. Updating Flood Maps Flood maps adopted across the country vary considerably in age and in quality. While some FIRMs may have last been developed and adopted by a community in the 1980s, especially in rural areas of the country, most communities will have maps adopted within the past 15 to 20 years. All official FIRMs can be accessed, and are searchable by address and location, on a FEMA website called the Map Service Center, and modern FIRMs can be digitally viewed via the Geographic Information System in the National Flood Hazard Layer. There is no consistent, definitive timetable for when a particular community will have their maps revised and updated. FEMA uses a process called the Coordinated Needs Management Strategy to prioritize, identify, and track the lifecycle of mapping needs of Risk MAP. Generally, flood maps may require updating when there have been significant new building developments in or near the flood zone, changes to flood protection systems (e.g., levees and sand dunes), and environmental changes in the community. Because of the variability in how and when a FIRM is updated, for example, one community may be undergoing the process of updating its map while a neighboring community is not, and one community may have had its map last updated in 2016 while a neighboring community had its last revised in 2005, etc. There are statutory guidelines for how FEMA is allowed to develop new FIRMs for a community. These guidelines require, for example, FEMA to conduct extensive communication and outreach efforts with the community during the mapping process and include various minimum waiting periods after intermediary steps are taken in the process. In addition, during this process, communities are asked to submit pertinent data concerning their flood hazards, flooding experience, mitigation plans to avoid potential flood hazards, and estimates of historical and prospective economic impacts flooding has had on the community. Generally, FEMA seeks to make the Risk MAP process a collaborative process with local communities to encourage a joint sense of "ownership" of the maps. There are also legal requirements allowing communities and individuals to appeal during the process of updating FIRMs. This appeal process now includes the option, first authorized in BW-12, for communities to appeal to a Scientific Resolution Panel regarding a proposed FIRM. In BW-12, Congress reestablished and reauthorized a council called the Technical Mapping Advisory Council (TMAC). The TMAC is broadly authorized to review and recommend improvements to how FEMA produces and disseminates flood hazard, flood risk, and flood map information. In particular, the TMAC is authorized to recommend to FEMA "mapping standards and guidelines for—(A) flood insurance rate maps [FIRMs]; and (B) data accuracy, data quality, data currency, and data eligibility." Currently, the TMAC estimates that the production of a new or revised FIRM is designed to take three to five years under the Risk MAP program, but can often take as long as six and a half years or longer. The TMAC has suggested that the ideal Risk MAP project timeline is 25 months. Map Corrections After a map is finalized and adopted by a community, it can still be revised to correct for errors in map accuracy. To correct these inaccuracies, FEMA allows individuals and communities to request letters amending or revising the flood map. In general, two primary circumstances may result in changes to the flood map. First, the natural elevation of property may be incorrectly accounted for on a FIRM, and that natural elevation is such that the property should not be considered part of the SFHA. Generally, in this circumstance, an individual or community may request a Letter of Map Amendment (LOMA). Second, a community may feel that a physical development in the community has resulted in a reduction of the flood risk for areas previously mapped in the floodplain. Generally, in this circumstance, the community may request a Letter of Map Revision (LOMR). In either a LOMA or LOMR, the decision to correct a map must be based on scientific information validating the inaccuracy of the current map. In most circumstances, the cost of requesting the map correction is borne by the community or individual. State and Local Land Use Controls As authorized in law, FEMA has developed a set of minimum floodplain management standards that are intended to (1) constrict the development of land which is exposed to flood damage where appropriate, (2) guide the development of proposed construction away from locations which are threatened by flood hazards, (3) assist in reducing damage caused by floods, and (4) otherwise improve the long-range land management and use of flood-prone areas. Communities are required to adopt these minimum floodplain management standards in order to participate in the NFIP. FEMA has set forth the minimum standards it requires for participation in the NFIP in federal regulations. Though the standards appear in federal regulations, the standards only have the force of law because they are adopted and enforced by a state or local government. Key conditions of the NFIP minimum standards include, among many other conditions, that communities: require permits for development in the SFHA; require elevation of the lowest floor of all new residential buildings in the SFHA to or above the Base Flood Elevation (BFE); restrict development in the regulatory floodway to prevent increasing the risk of flooding; and require certain construction materials and methods that minimize future flood damage. Legal enforcement of the floodplain management standards is the responsibility of the participating NFIP community. However, FEMA, often in cooperation with state governments, will conduct community assistance visits (CAVs) to monitor how and if a community is adequately enforcing its floodplain ordinances. Two previous reviews commissioned by FEMA on community enforcement of minimum floodplain standards have estimated that the nationwide rate of community compliance with the standards is 70% to 85%, and that between 58% and 70% of buildings are built in full compliance with the standards. A community that has been found failing to enforce the floodplain management standards may be placed on probation and ultimately suspended from the NFIP (as discussed later in this report). As these standards are just minimum requirements, states and communities can elect to adopt higher standards as a means of mitigating flood risk. In addition, FEMA operates a program, called the Community Rating System, to incentivize NFIP communities to adopt more rigorous floodplain management standards (as discussed later in this report). Flood Mitigation Assistance Grants To reduce comprehensive flood risk, FEMA also operates a Flood Mitigation Assistance (FMA) Grant Program that is funded through revenue collected by the NFIP. The FMA Program awards grants for a number of purposes, including state and local mitigation planning; the elevation, relocation, demolition, or flood proofing of structures; the acquisition of properties; and other activities. In FY2019, the FMA Program was authorized to use $175 million of NFIP revenue. The funding is available until it is expended, so in certain years the amount awarded may exceed the amount authorized by Congress in an appropriation act for a specific fiscal year. A database of approved FMA grants that is available from FEMA indicates that over $905 million in projects was approved between July 1997 and November 2017. Primary Flood Insurance through the NFIP Standard Flood Insurance Policies (SFIPs) FEMA has considerable discretion under the law to craft the details of the flood insurance policies it sells through the NFIP. Currently, there are three policies that the NFIP uses to sell primary flood insurance—the Dwelling, the General Property, and the Residential Condominium Building Association policy forms. Collectively, these Standard Flood Insurance Policies (SFIPs) appear in regulations, and coverage qualifications are generally equivalent. Table 2 displays the maximum available coverage limits for SFIPs by occupancy type. These coverage amounts are set by law. Policyholders are able to elect coverage for both their building property and separate coverage for contents. Renters may obtain contents-only coverage. Because SFIP coverage limits are often less than the value of a structure or the value of the property's contents, policyholders can obtain excess flood insurance to cover losses beyond the coverage limit. However, such excess coverage is not sold by the NFIP, and can only be purchased through the private insurance market. Within the SFIPs sold by the NFIP, there are numerous policy exclusions that are often not understood by policyholders. For example, SFIPs do not provide coverage for alternative living expenses (e.g., the cost of staying in a hotel while a house is being repaired) or business interruption expenses, and SFIPs have limited coverage of basements or crawlspaces. In addition, the SFIP does not cover damage caused by earth movement, including landslides. Mandatory Mortgage Purchase Requirement In a community that participates or has participated in the NFIP, owners of properties in the mapped SFHA are required to purchase flood insurance as a condition of receiving a federally backed mortgage. By law and regulation, federal agencies, federally regulated lending institutions, and government-sponsored enterprises must require these property owners to purchase flood insurance as a condition of any mortgage that these entities make, guarantee, or purchase. Examples of the types of lenders that are mandated to issue regulations requiring the purchase of flood insurance related to mortgages include federal agency lenders, such as the Department of Veterans Affairs, or the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), or federally regulated lending institutions, such as banks covered by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) or the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). Property owners falling under this mandate may purchase flood insurance through the NFIP, or through a private company, so long as the private flood insurance provides "flood insurance coverage which is at least as broad as the coverage provided under a [SFIP] … including when considering deductibles, exclusions, and conditions offered by the insurer." The implementation of this requirement has proved challenging, with the responsible federal regulators (the Federal Reserve, Farm Credit Administration, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, National Credit Union Administration, and Comptroller of the Currency) issuing two separate Notices of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) addressing the issue in October 2013 and November 2016 . The crux of the implementation issue can be seen as answering the question of who would judge whether specific policies met the "at least as broad as" standard and what criteria would be used in making this judgment? The uncertainty as to whether particular private policies would meet the standard has been seen as " at odds with " greater private participation in the flood insurance marketplace. On February 12, 2019, the regulators announced a final rule implementing the BW-12 "requirement that regulated lending institutions accept private flood insurance policies" that takes effect July 1, 2019. Of particular note, the rule "allows institutions to rely on an insurer's written assurances in a private flood insurance policy stating the criteria are met; [and] clarifies that institutions may, under certain conditions, accept private flood insurance policies that do not meet the Biggert-Waters Act criteria." The rule does not apply directly to other federal agencies, nor to the GSEs, which would be subject to separate rulemaking. Not all mortgages in the SFHA are affected by this mandatory purchase requirement. For example, a personal mortgage loan between two private parties (such as between family members), or a mortgage issued by a private mortgage company that is not then sold on the secondary market to a bank or entity like Fannie Mae, may not require flood insurance. Even if they are not technically required to mandate flood insurance by federal law, the issuing party may still require it as a means of financially securing the property. While the exact percentage of total mortgages requiring flood insurance is unknown, one study suggested at least 77% of all mortgages in SFHAs in 2003 would be subject to the requirement. Despite the mandatory purchase requirement, not all covered mortgages carry the insurance as dictated. Though there are no official statistics available from the federal mortgage regulators responsible for implementation of the mandate, a 2006 study commissioned by FEMA found that compliance with this mandatory purchase requirement may be as low as 43% in some areas of the country (the Midwest), and as high as 88% in others (the West). In a 2013 analysis done following Hurricane Sandy, one study found that approximately 65% of properties in New York City required to have insurance through their mortgage had such insurance. A 2017 study of flood insurance in New York City by the same authors reassessed the 2013 data and suggested that the estimate in their earlier study may have slightly overstated the actual take-up rate, which the 2017 study estimated at 61%. The later study found that compliance with the mandatory purchase requirement by properties in the SFHA with mortgages increased from 61% in 2012 to 73% in 2016. The later study also argued that findings for properties without mortgages indicate the effectiveness of the mandatory purchase requirement, as the 37% take-up rate for properties without mortgages in the SFHA was similar to take-up rates outside the SFHA (37% for properties with mortgages and 32% for properties without mortgages). The escrowing of insurance premiums may increase compliance with the mandatory purchase requirement. Federal mortgage regulators have required the escrowing of flood insurance premiums on certain mortgages in compliance with regulations issued after changes to the law made in 1994. Expanding upon existing requirements, Section 100209 of BW-12, as subsequently revised by Section 25 of HFIAA, has required that regulated lenders start escrowing flood insurance for all mortgages, except if the lending institution is under a regulated size or the loan is a subordinate to another loan. This broader implementation of the escrowing provision began in January 2016, per law and regulations. Preferred Risk Policies (PRPs) Flood insurance is optional for properties outside the SFHA regardless of whether they have a federally backed mortgage. However, as there is still a risk of flooding outside the SFHA, members of NFIP participating communities with property located in the B, C, or X Zones of a FIRM may voluntarily purchase a lower-cost Preferred Risk Policy. Unlike with properties in the SFHA, an individual may be denied a PRP if there is significant loss history for the property. FEMA encourages the purchase of PRPs both to reduce the financial flood risk of a broader group of individuals, and to expand the policy base of the NFIP writ large, thus improving the fiscal soundness of the NFIP portfolio. A PRP uses the same basic policy forms as properties within the SFHA, but receives discounted rates in accordance with its lower risk profile. Increased Cost of Compliance (ICC) Coverage The NFIP requires most SFIP and PRP policyholders to purchase what is in effect a separate insurance policy to offset the expense of complying with more rigorous building code standards when local ordinances require them to do so. This increased cost of compliance coverage is authorized in law, and rates for the coverage, as well as how much can be paid out for claims, are set by FEMA. Congress has capped the amount that can be paid for ICC coverage at $75. The ICC policy has a separate rate premium structure, and provides an amount up to $30,000 in payments for certain eligible expenses. For example, when a building is determined by a community to be substantially damaged following a flood, floodplain management standards adopted by local communities can require the building to be rebuilt to current floodplain management requirements, even if the property previously did not need to do so. For instance, the new compliance standard may require the demolition and elevation of the rebuilt building to above the BFE. An ICC claim may then be submitted by the policyholder to offset the cost of complying with the elevation standard. FEMA also makes ICC coverage available if a building has been declared a repetitive loss by a community's floodplain management regulations. However, not all participating NFIP communities have or enforce a "repetitive loss provision" that records, declares, and mandates improvements to properties that have experienced repetitive loss. Thus, certain structures that have experienced repetitive loss may not be eligible for ICC payments. FEMA has not implemented ICC coverage for two conditions that they are authorized to do so by law. These two conditions are for properties that have sustained flood damage on multiple occasions, if the Administrator determines that it is cost-effective and in the best interests of the NFIP, and for properties for which an offer of mitigation assistance is made under various federal assistance programs. FEMA's decision not to implement these provisions has provoked criticism from some stakeholders of the NFIP. Servicing of Policies and Claims Management While FEMA provides the overarching management and oversight of the NFIP, the bulk of the day-to-day operation of the NFIP, including the marketing, sale, writing, and claims management of policies, is handled by private companies. This arrangement between the NFIP and private industry is authorized by statute and guided by regulation. There are two different arrangements that FEMA has established with private industry. The first is the Direct Servicing Agent, or DSA, which operates as a private contractor on behalf of FEMA for individuals seeking to purchase flood insurance policies directly from the NFIP. The second arrangement is called the Write-Your-Own (WYO) Program, where private insurance companies are paid to directly write and service the policies themselves. With either the DSA or WYO Program, the NFIP retains the actual financial risk of paying claims for the policy (i.e., underwrites the policy), and the policy terms and premiums are the same. Currently, approximately 13% of the total NFIP policy portfolio is managed through the DSA, and 87% of NFIP policies are sold by the 59 companies participating in the WYO Program. Over the years, the balance between the number of policies serviced by the WYO Program or the DSA has evolved, with the WYOs covering approximately 50% of policies in 1986, and approximately 97% of policies in 2008. Because most purchasers of the NFIP policies never interface directly with a FEMA representative, and only deal with a WYO company or the DSA, they may not be aware that they are actually purchasing insurance from FEMA. Companies participating in the WYO Program are compensated through a variety of methods, as summarized in Table 3 . The Government Accountability Office (GAO) and Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Inspector General (DHS IG) have produced a number of reports investigating how much the WYOs were compensated for the services they provided in support of the NFIP. In BW-12, Congress required FEMA to develop and issue a rulemaking on a "methodology for determining the appropriate amounts that property and casualty insurance companies participating in the Write Your Own program should be reimbursed for selling, writing, and servicing flood insurance policies and adjusting flood insurance claims on behalf of the National Flood Insurance Program." This rulemaking was required within a year of enactment of BW-12. As of April 2019, FEMA has yet to publish a rulemaking to revise the compensation structure of the WYOs. Following Hurricane Sandy, there were concerns raised regarding the possible systematic underpayment of claims for flood losses through the NFIP. As a result of these issues, FEMA carried out a process by which Hurricane Sandy survivors could resubmit their NFIP claims to be reevaluated by FEMA. FEMA reviewed the resubmitted claims and provided additional claim payments to those deemed warranted in the review, and concluded the Sandy Claims Review Process on March 1, 2018. As of January 29, 2018, approximately 85% of policyholders who requested a review had received additional payments, resulting in approximately $258.6 million in additional claims payments. The remaining 15% of reviewed files received no additional payment. In addition, FEMA settled and litigated lawsuits initiated by claimants following Hurricane Sandy, with 1,631 of the 1,633 court cases settled, resulting in approximately $164 million in settlement payments. Pricing and Premium Rate Structure Except for certain subsidies, flood insurance rates in the NFIP are directed to be "based on consideration of the risk involved and accepted actuarial principles," meaning that the rate is reflective to the true flood risk to the property. Essentially, FEMA uses several basic characteristics to classify properties based on flood risks. Structures are evaluated by their specific risk zone on a FIRM, the elevation of the structure relative to the Base Flood Elevation (BFE) in each risk zone, and occupancy type (e.g., single family, other residential, nonresidential, and mobile/manufactured homes), along with other specific determinants of risk. In addition, the premium structure includes estimates for the expenses of the NFIP, including servicing of policies. A detailed discussion of the premium rate structure of the NFIP, and how or why it is and is not actuarially sound, is beyond the scope of this report. However, additional resources exist to assist Congress with this issue. Pre-FIRM Subsidy While most premium rates in the NFIP are intended to represent the full flood risk of a given structure, Congress has directed FEMA not to charge actuarial rates for properties that were constructed or substantially improved before December 31, 1974, or before the date upon which FEMA has published the first Flood Insurance Rate Map for the community, whichever was later. Therefore, by statute, premium rates charged on structures built before they were first mapped into a flood zone that have not been substantially improved, known as pre-FIRM structures, are allowed to have lower premiums than what would be expected to cover predicted claims. The availability of this pre-FIRM subsidy was intended to allow preexisting floodplain properties to contribute in some measure to prefunding their recovery from a flood disaster instead of relying solely on federal disaster assistance. In essence, the flood insurance could distribute some of the financial burden among those protected by flood insurance and the public. As of September 2016, 817,344 policies received a pre-FIRM subsidy, representing approximately 16.1% of all NFIP policies. Historically, the total number of pre-FIRM policies is relatively stable, but the percentage of those policies by comparison to the total policy base has decreased. The pricing subsidy for pre-FIRM policies is progressively being phased out of the NFIP, as was initially required under Section 100205 of BW-12, as revised by Sections 3 and 5 of HFIAA. Under current law, all premiums for pre-FIRM properties will eventually reach actuarially sound rates (i.e., the rate equivalent structures pay without the subsidy, reflecting true flood risk), but at a different pace of phaseout depending on the property type. Table 4 provides an adaptation of a table from GAO regarding the multifaceted phaseout of the pre-FIRM subsidy following BW-12, as revised by HFIAA. In summary, HFIAA slowed the rate of phaseout of the pre-FIRM subsidy for most primary residences, but retained the pace of the phaseout of the subsidy from BW-12 for business properties and secondary homes. In addition, HFIAA created a minimum and maximum increase in the amount for the phaseout of pre-FIRM subsidies for all primary residences of 5%-15% annually. Unless otherwise noted, the percentage increases are based on the current premium (e.g., a 15% annual increase from the prior year premium), rather than the percentage difference between the current premium and the actuarial rate (i.e., a rate increase of 25% does not mean the pre-FIRM subsidy is eliminated in four years). Newly Mapped Subsidy Congress introduced a new form of subsidy in HFIAA, for owners of properties newly mapped into a SFHA. The newly mapped procedure applies to properties previously in zones B, C, X, D, AR, or A99 (see Table 1 ), which are newly mapped into a SFHA on or after April 1, 2015, if the applicant obtains coverage that is effective within 12 months of the map revision date. The newly mapped procedure does not apply to properties mapped into a SFHA by the initial FIRM for a community entering the NFIP, and certain properties may be excluded based on their loss history. The rate for eligible newly mapped properties is equal to the PRP rate, but with a higher Federal Policy Fee, for the first 12 months following the map revision. After the first year, the newly mapped rate will begin its transition to a full-risk rate, with annual increases to newly mapped policy premiums calculated using a multiplier that varies by the year of the map change. Annual increases are restricted to no more than 18% per year. As of September 2016, 3.9% of all policies received a newly mapped subsidy. Grandfathering Cross-Subsidy Using the authority to set rate classes for the NFIP and to offer lower than actuarial premiums, FEMA allows property owners to maintain their old flood insurance rate class if their property is remapped into a new flood rate class. This practice is colloquially referred to as "grandfathering," "administrative grandfathering," or the "grandfather rule" and is separate and distinct from the pre-FIRM subsidy. To understand the grandfather rule, consider a hypothetical property X that is currently mapped into one flood zone (e.g., Zone AE), and is built to the proper building code and standards. If property X then is remapped to a new flood zone (e.g., Zone VE) and has maintained continuous insurance coverage under the NFIP, the owner of property X can pay the flood insurance rate and premium based on the prior mapped zone (i.e., pay the AE rate instead of the higher VE rate). A policyholder with a property may also be grandfathered if the elevation of a base flood is changed in a map, but the property itself does not change flood zones. Congress eliminated the practice of offering grandfathering to policyholders after new maps were issued in BW-12, but then subsequently reinstated the practice in HFIAA. FEMA does not have a definitive estimate on the number of properties that have a grandfathered rate in the NFIP, though data are being collected to fulfill a separate mandate of HFIAA. Unofficial estimates suggest that at least 10%-20% of properties are grandfathered, and these figures may increase with time as newer maps are introduced in high population areas. FEMA does not consider the practice of grandfathering to be a subsidy for the NFIP, per se, because the discount provided to an individual policyholder is cross-subsidized by other policyholders in the NFIP. Thus, while grandfathering does intentionally allow grandfathered policyholders to pay premiums that are less than their known actuarial rate, the discount is offset by others in the same rate class as the grandfathered policyholder. Although FEMA does not have an estimate of how many properties are paying grandfathered rates, the program tries to recoup lost revenue by charging higher rates for other policies in the SFHA. It is not clear, however, whether the NFIP is increasing other SFHA policy premiums by an amount equal to the discount from other NFIP risk-based rates that are being paid by the grandfathered properties. Community Rating System Through a program called the Community Rating System (CRS), FEMA encourages communities to improve upon the minimum floodplain management standards that are required to participate in the NFIP. The CRS Program, as authorized by law, is intended to incentivize the reduction of flood and erosion risk, as well as the adoption of more effective measures to protect natural and beneficial floodplain functions. FEMA awards points that increase a community's "class" rating in the CRS on a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 being the highest ranking. Points are awarded for an array of improvements for how the community informs its public on flood risk; maps and regulates its floodplain; reduces possible flood damage; and provides immediate warnings and responds to flooding incidents. Starting at Class 9, policyholders in the SFHA within a CRS community receive a 5% discount on their SFIP premiums, with increasing discounts of 5% per class until reaching Class 1, and at that level, policyholders in the SFHA can receive a 45% discount on their SFIP premiums. These discounts are not extended to PRPs. In order to participate in the CRS Program, a community must apply to FEMA and document its creditable improvements through site visits and assessments. As of June 2017, FEMA estimated that only 5% of eligible NFIP communities participate in the CRS program. However, these communities have a large number of flood policies, so more than 69% of all flood policies are written in CRS-participating NFIP communities. One can determine if and how highly rated a community is in the CRS Program through the most recent Flood Insurance Manual. For April 2014 premium rates, the National Research Council estimated that the CRS program provided an average 11.4% discount on SFIP premiums across the NFIP. The CRS discount is cross-subsidized into the NFIP program, such that the discount for one community ends up being offset by increased premium rates in all communities across the NFIP. Therefore, for April 2014 rates, the average 11.4% discount for CRS communities was cross-subsidized and shared across NFIP communities through a cost (or load) increase of 13.4% to overall premiums. Thus in some circumstances, the discount provided to communities participating in the CRS Program may be less than the expense of the overall CRS Program. Affordability Study and Framework Congress has expressed concern related to the perceived affordability of flood insurance premiums. In BW-12, Congress required FEMA to commission a study with the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) regarding participation in the NFIP and the affordability of premiums. The Affordability Study was not finished by its original deadline (270 days following enactment of BW-12). Congress amended the authorization for the Study while also extending the deadline in HFIAA. The NAS has since completed the Affordability Study report in two parts. In HFIAA, Congress also required FEMA to develop a Draft Affordability Framework "that proposes to address, via programmatic and regulatory changes, the issues of affordability of flood insurance sold under the National Flood Insurance Program, including issues identified in the affordability study." Due 18 months following the submission of the Affordability Study, the deadline for the Framework, based on FEMA's stated date of submittal of the Affordability Study, was September 10, 2017. FEMA published their Affordability Framework on April 17, 2018. Nonparticipating Communities and Community Suspension FEMA enforces two regulatory conditions—probation and suspension—for removing a participating community from the NFIP. Whether or not a particular community has either been placed on probation or suspended can be found using the NFIP's Community Status Book. Notably, a community cannot be removed from the NFIP because of increased or excess flood insurance claims and losses. Rather, probation and suspension only occur if the community fails to uphold its obligations related to floodplain management. A community can be placed on probation by FEMA if it is found that it is failing to adequately enforce the floodplain management standards it has adopted. As established by regulations, probation can result in a fee of $50 being charged to all policyholders in the community while the community is given time to rectify FEMA's concerns regarding their implementation of the floodplain management standards. Ultimately, if the community does not correct its cited deficiencies after given time periods described in regulations, the community will be suspended from the NFIP by FEMA. A community can also be involuntarily suspended from the NFIP for either failing to adopt an approved floodplain map and an approved set of floodplain management standards within the time periods required by regulations; or repealing or revising its floodplain management standards to a level below the minimum standards set forth in regulations. A suspended community may be reinstated to the NFIP once the relevant errors or deficiencies provoking the suspension have been resolved to meet FEMA's specification. Communities that have been suspended or those communities that do not participate in the NFIP can face significant consequences. Primarily, members of these communities are not able to purchase primary flood insurance through the NFIP, which may result in significant uninsured property risk in that community. However, communities may elect not to participate in the NFIP because they have very little flood risk to begin with, given their particular geography or climate. In addition, if a community does not participate in, or has been suspended from, the NFIP but has been previously mapped by FEMA for flood hazards, it is difficult for the community and policyholders to access other forms of federal assistance for areas in the floodplain. For example, by law, no federal assistance may be provided for acquisition or construction purposes in an area that has been identified as having special flood hazards unless the property is covered by flood insurance. Likewise, federally backed mortgages still require flood insurance for properties in the SFHA, so these property-owners would be required to obtain such insurance in the private market. A community is allowed to leave the NFIP at its will, but the potential consequences of that decision are similar to those if the community has been suspended. Funding The funding for the NFIP is primarily maintained in an authorized account called the National Flood Insurance Fund (NFIF). Generally, the NFIP has been funded through three methods: receipts from the premiums of flood insurance policies, including fees and surcharges; direct annual appropriations for specific costs of the NFIP; and borrowing from the U.S. Treasury when the balance of the NFIF has been insufficient to pay the NFIP's obligations (e.g., insurance claims). This section of the report briefly discusses each of these three methods of NFIP funding. Premium Fees and Surcharges As of November 2018, the written premium on approximately 5.1 million policies in force was about $3.6 billion. Included within the premiums are several fees and surcharges on flood insurance policies mandated by law. First, the Federal Policy Fee (FPF) was authorized by Congress in 1990 and helps pay for the administrative expenses of the program, including floodplain mapping and some of the insurance operations. The amount of the FPF is set by FEMA and can increase or decrease year to year. Since the April 2016 rating period, the FPF has been set at a flat rate of $50 for SFIPs, and $25 for PRPs. Since October 2017, the FPF is also $25 for contents-only policies. Second, a Reserve Fund assessment was authorized by Congress in BW-12 to establish and maintain a Reserve Fund to cover future claim and debt expenses, especially those from catastrophic disasters. By law, FEMA is ultimately required to maintain a reserve ratio of 1% of the total loss exposure through the Reserve Fund assessment. As of January 2019, the amount required for the Reserve Fund ratio was approximately $13.07 billion. However, FEMA is allowed to phase in the Reserve Fund assessment to obtain the ratio over time, with an intended target of not less than 7.5% of the 1% Reserve Fund ratio in each fiscal year (so, using January 2019 figures, not less than approximately $980 million each year). Since April 2016, using its discretion, FEMA has charged every NFIP policy a Reserve Fund assessment equal to 15% of the premium charged for both SFIPs and PRPs. The Reserve Fund assessment has increased from its original status, in October 2013, of 5% on all SFIPs, and 0% on PRPs. In addition to the Reserve Fund assessment, all NFIP policies are also assessed a surcharge following the passage of HFIAA. The amount of the surcharge is dependent on the type of property being insured. For primary residences, the charge is $25; for all other properties, the charge is $250. Starting on April 1, 2019, FEMA will be introducing a 5% surcharge for severe repetitive loss properties. Revenues from these surcharges are deposited into the Reserve Fund. Appropriations and Offsetting Receipts Table 5 displays how Congress has appropriated and authorized offsetting receipts for the NFIP from FY2015 to FY2018. As provided for in law, all premiums from the sale of NFIP insurance are transferred to FEMA and deposited in the NFIF. Congress then authorizes FEMA to withdraw funds from the NFIF, and use those funds for specified purposes needed to operate the NFIP. In addition to premiums, Congress has also provided annual appropriations to supplement floodplain mapping activities. In addition to the mix of discretionary and mandatory funding levels indicated in Table 5 , which are set in appropriations legislation, fluctuating levels of mandatory spending occur in the NFIP in order to pay and adjust claims on affected NFIP policies. Borrowing from the U.S. Treasury, NFIP Debt Congress has authorized FEMA to borrow no more than $30.425 billion from the U.S. Treasury in order to operate the NFIP. The authorization for this borrowing would be reduced to $1 billion after May 31, 2019, were the NFIP to be allowed to lapse. In January 2017, the NFIP borrowed $1.6 billion due to losses in 2016 (the August 2016 Louisiana floods and Hurricane Matthew). On September 22, 2017, the NFIP borrowed the remaining $5.825 billion from the Treasury to cover claims from Hurricane Harvey, Hurricane Irma, and Hurricane Maria, reaching the NFIP's authorized borrowing limit of $30.425 billion. On October 26, 2017, Congress cancelled $16 billion of NFIP debt, making it possible for the program to pay claims for Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria. This represents the first time that NFIP debt has been cancelled, although Congress appropriated funds between 1980 and 1985 to repay NFIP debt. FEMA borrowed another $6.1 billion on November 9, 2017, to fund estimated 2017 losses, including those incurred by Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria and anticipated programmatic activities, bringing the debt up to $20.525 billion. The NFIP currently has $9.9 billion of remaining borrowing authority. The NFIP's debt to the U.S. Treasury cannot be tied directly to any single incident, as any insurance claim paid by the NFIP is in some way responsible for the existing debt of the NFIP (i.e., a dollar paid in claims, and therefore expended by the NFIP, following a minor flooding incident is no different than a dollar paid following a major hurricane). However, the NFIP was forced to borrow heavily to pay claims in the aftermath of two catastrophic flood seasons, the 2005 hurricane season (particularly Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma) and Hurricane Sandy in 2012. For example, following Hurricane Sandy, Congress passed P.L. 113-1 to increase the borrowing limit of the NFIP from $20.775 billion to the current $30.425 billion. Prior to Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the NFIP had generally been able to cover its costs, borrowing relatively small amounts from the U.S. Treasury to pay claims, and then repaying the loans with interest. The NFIP's debt is conceptually owed by current and future participants in the NFIP, as the insurance program itself owes the debt to the Treasury and pays for accruing interest on that debt through the premium revenues of policyholders. For example, from FY2006 to FY2016 (i.e., since the NFIP borrowed funds following Hurricane Katrina), the NFIP has paid $2.82 billion in principal repayments and $3.83 billion in interest to service the debt through the premiums collected on insurance policies. Under its current authorization, the only means the NFIP has to pay off the debt is through the accrual of premium revenues in excess of outgoing claims, and from payments made out of the growing Reserve Fund. As required by law, FEMA submitted a report to Congress in 2013 on how the borrowed amount from the U.S. Treasury could be repaid within a 10-year period. Whether or not FEMA will ultimately be able to pay off the debt is largely dependent on future insurance claims, namely if a catastrophic flooding incident such as Hurricanes Harvey, Sandy, or Katrina occurs again and with what frequency. However, using various predictions for both revenues (i.e., premiums) and losses (i.e., insurance claims), FEMA's report on debt repayment indicated even with the most optimistic scenario of future flooding it would take at least 13 years to repay the debt. In more realistic scenarios, the debt would not be paid off for at least 20 years, or it may increase considerably with future catastrophic incidents. For example, in April 2017, CBO projected that the NFIP would have insufficient receipts to pay the expected claims and expenses over the 2018-2027 period and that FEMA would need to use about $1 billion of its then-current $5.825 billion borrowing authority to pay those expected claims. Also in April 2017, FEMA updated some of the assumptions in the October 2015 NFIP Semi-Annual Debt Repayment Progress Report and estimated that at the end of 20 years, the NFIP's net debt would increase by a further $9.4 billion. No projections of the NFIP debt have yet been made that take account of the cancellation of $16 billion of NFIP debt, or the as yet unknown total claims of the 2017 hurricane season. NFIP Purchase of Reinsurance In HFIAA-14, Congress revised the authority of FEMA to secure reinsurance for the NFIP from the private reinsurance and capital markets. In September 2016, FEMA secured its first placement of reinsurance for the NFIP, contracting for reinsurance cover which ran from September 19, 2016, through March 19, 2017, structured into two coverage layers. Under the first layer, the reinsurers would indemnify FEMA $1 million for flood claims losses that exceed $5 million. Under the second layer, the reinsurers would indemnify FEMA $1,000,000 when the total losses from a single flood event exceed $5.5 billion. In January 2017, FEMA purchased $1.042 billion of insurance, to cover the period from January 1, 2017, to January 1, 2018, for a reinsurance premium of $150 million. Under this agreement, the reinsurance covered 26% of losses between $4 billion and $8 billion arising from a single flooding event. The purchase of private market reinsurance reduces the likelihood of FEMA needing to borrow from the Treasury to pay claims. However, since FEMA is withdrawing funds from the Reserve Fund to pay for this reinsurance, it subsequently increases the cost of insurance to policyholders. FEMA's modeling of the NFIP portfolio before the reinsurance purchase suggested that there was a 17.2% chance of losses from an event exceeding $4 billion in 2017. FEMA has already paid over $8.67 billion in claims for Hurricane Harvey, triggering the full 2017 reinsurance. In January 2018, FEMA purchased $1.46 billion of insurance to cover the period from January 1, 2018, to January 1, 2019, for a reinsurance premium of $235 million. The agreement is structured to cover losses above $4 billion for a single flooding event, covering 18.6% of losses between $4 billion and $6 billion, and 54.3% of losses between $6 billion and $8 billion. In August 2018, FEMA entered into its first transfer of NFIP risk to private risk markets through an insurance-linked securities transfer, in the form of a three-year agreement with Hannover Re, a reinsurance company. Hannover Re is acting as a "transformer," transferring $500 million of the NFIP's financial risk to the capital markets by sponsoring issuance of an indemnity-triggered cat bond. Hannover Re will indemnify FEMA for a portion of claims for a single qualifying flooding event that occurs between August 1, 2018, and July 31, 2021. The agreement is structured into two tranches. The first provides reinsurance coverage for 3.5% of losses between $5 and $10 billion, and the second for 13% of losses between $7.5 and $10 billion. FEMA paid a premium of $62 million for the first year of coverage. Unlike the earlier reinsurance purchases, which covered all NFIP flood losses, the catastrophe bond applies only to flooding resulting directly or indirectly from a named storm and covers only the 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Combined with the January 2018 reinsurance placement, FEMA transferred $1.96 billion of the NFIP's flood risk for the 2018 hurricane season to the private sector. FEMA has not claimed on the reinsurance purchased in 2018. In January 2019, FEMA purchased $1.32 billion of insurance to cover the period from January 1, 2019, to January 1, 2020, for a reinsurance premium of $186 million. The agreement is structured to cover losses above $4 billion for a single flooding event, covering 14% of losses between $4 billion and $6 billion, and 25.6% of losses between $6 billion and $8 billion, and 26.6% of losses between $8 billion and $10 billion. Expiration of Certain NFIP Authorities The statute for the NFIP does not contain a comprehensive expiration, termination, or sunset provision for the whole of the program. Rather, the NFIP has multiple different legal provisions that generally tie to the expiration of key componen ts of the program. Unless reauthorized or amended by Congress, the following will occur after May 31, 2019: The authority to provide new flood insurance contracts will expire. Flood insurance contracts entered into before the expiration would continue until the end of their policy term of one year. The authority for NFIP to borrow funds from the Treasury will be reduced from $30.425 billion to $1 billion. Other activities of the program would technically remain authorized following May 31, 2019, such as the issuance of FMA grants. However, the expiration of the key authorities described above would have varied, generally serious effects on these remaining NFIP activities.

The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) was established by the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 (NFIA, 42 U.S.C. §4001 et seq.), and was most recently reauthorized to May 31, 2019, through a series of short-term reauthorizations. The general purpose of the NFIP is both to offer primary flood insurance to properties with significant flood risk, and to reduce flood risk through the adoption of floodplain management standards. Communities volunteer to participate in the NFIP in order to have access to federal flood insurance, and in return are required to adopt minimum standards. The NFIP is managed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), through its subcomponent the Federal Insurance and Mitigation Administration (FIMA). FEMA manages a Risk Mapping, Assessment and Planning (Risk MAP) process to produce Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRMs). Depicted on FIRMs are Special Flood Hazard Areas (SFHAs), which are areas exposed to a 1% or greater risk of annual flooding. FIRMs vary in age across the country, and are updated on a prioritized basis. The Risk MAP process provides extensive outreach and appeal opportunities for communities. Updating a community's FIRMs can take three to five years or more. Participating communities must adopt a flood map and enact minimum floodplain standards to regulate development in the SFHA. FEMA encourages communities to enhance their floodplain standards by offering reduced premium rates through the Community Rating System (CRS). FEMA also manages a Flood Mitigation Assistance (FMA) grant program using NFIP revenues to further reduce comprehensive flood risk. Participating communities that fail to adopt FIRMs or maintain minimum floodplain standards can be put on probation or suspended from the NFIP. In communities that do not participate in the NFIP, or have been suspended, individuals cannot purchase NFIP insurance. Individuals in these communities also face challenges receiving federal disaster assistance in flood hazard areas, and have difficulties receiving federally backed mortgages. NFIP insurance uses one of three types of Standard Flood Insurance Policies (SFIPs). SFIPs have maximum coverage limits set by law. Any federal entity that makes, guarantees, or purchases mortgages must, by law, require property owners in the SFHA to purchase flood insurance, generally through the NFIP. In moderate risk areas, community members may purchase Preferred Risk Policies (PRPs) that offer less costly insurance. The day-to-day sale, servicing, and claims processing of NFIP policies are conducted by private industry partners. Most policies are serviced by companies that are reimbursed through the Write Your Own (WYO) Program. The premium rate for most NFIP policies is intended to reflect the true flood risk. However, Congress has directed FEMA to subsidize flood insurance for properties built before the community's first FIRM (i.e., the pre-FIRM subsidy). In addition, FEMA "grandfathers" properties at their rate from past FIRMs to updated FIRMs through a cross-subsidy. Congress has provided appropriations to the NFIP for some of the cost of Risk MAP. Congress also authorizes the use of premium revenues for other NFIP costs, including administration, salaries, and other expenses. NFIP premiums also include other charges, such as a Federal Policy Fee, a Reserve Fund assessment, and a surcharge to help fund the NFIP. In October 2017, Congress cancelled $16 billion of NFIP debt, making it possible for the program to pay claims for Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria. The NFIP currently owes $20.525 billion to the U.S. Treasury, leaving $9.9 billion in borrowing authority from a $30.425 billion limit in law. This debt is serviced by the NFIP and interest is paid through premium revenues. After May 31, 2019, key authorities of the NFIP, such as the authority to issue new insurance contracts, will expire if they are not reauthorized by Congress.

crs_R40589

crs_R40589_0

Introduction Concurrent receipt refers to the simultaneous receipt of two types of monetary benefits: military retired pay and Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) disability compensation. With several separate programs, varying eligibility criteria, and several eligibility dates, some observers find the subject complex and somewhat confusing. There are, however, two common criteria: first, all recipients are military retirees; second, they are also eligible for VA disability compensation. This report addresses the two primary components of the concurrent receipt program: Combat-Related Special Compensation (CRSC) and Concurrent Retirement and Disability Payments (CRDP). It reviews the possible legislative expansion of the program to additional populations and provides several potential options for Congress to consider. Background In 1891, Congress first prohibited payment of both military retired pay and a disability pension under the premise that it represented dual or overlapping compensation for the same purpose. The original law was modified in 1941, and the present system of VA disability compensation offsetting military retired pay was adopted in 1944. Under this system, retired military personnel were required to waive a portion of their retired pay equal to the amount of VA disability compensation, a dollar-for-dollar offset. If, for example, a military retiree received $1,500 a month in retired pay and was rated by the VA as 70% disabled (and therefore entitled to approximately $1,000 per month in disability compensation), the offset would operate to pay $500 monthly in retired pay and the $1,000 in disability compensation. The advantage for the retiree was that VA disability compensation was not taxable. For many years some military retirees and advocacy groups sought a change in law to permit receipt of all, or some, of both payments. Opponents of concurrent receipt frequently referred to it as double dipping , maintaining that it represented two payments for the same condition. In the FY2003 NDAA ( P.L. 107-314 ), Congress created a benefit known as Combat Related Special Compensation (CRSC). CRSC provided, for certain disabled retirees whose disability is combat-related, a cash benefit financially identical to what concurrent receipt would provide them. The FY2004 NDAA ( P.L. 108-136 ) authorized, for the first time, the phase-in of actual concurrent receipt (now referred to as Concurrent Retirement and Disability Payments or CRDP), and a greatly expanded CRSC program. The FY2005 NDAA ( P.L. 108-375 ) further liberalized the concurrent receipt rules contained in the FY2004 NDAA and authorized immediate concurrent receipt for those rated by the VA totaling 100%. The FY2008 NDAA ( P.L. 110-181 ) expanded concurrent receipt eligibility to include those who are 100% disabled due to unemployability and provided CRSC to those who were medically retired or retired prematurely due to force reduction programs prior to completing 20 years of service. CRDP phase-in was fully implemented by 2014, allowing retirees with a disability rated at 50% or greater to receive full retired pay and full VA disability compensation without an offset. Military Retirement and VA Disability Compensation An understanding of military retirement, VA disability compensation, and the interaction of these two elements is helpful in discussing concurrent receipt. Military Retirement An active duty servicemember becomes entitled to retired pay, frequently referred to as vesting , upon completion of 20 years of service, regardless of age. A member who retires is immediately paid a monthly annuity based on a percentage of their final base pay or the average of their high three years of base pay, depending on when they entered active duty. Retired pay accrues at the rate of 2.5% per year of service for those who have entered the service prior to January 1, 2018, and 2.0% for those entering service on or after January 1, 2018. An alternative retirement option, known as "Redux," was also available for certain active duty servicemembers, depending on their date of entry. Reserve Retirement Reserve component servicemembers also become eligible for retirement upon completion of 20 years of qualifying service, regardless of age. However, their retired pay calculation is based on a point system that results in a number of "equivalent years" of service. In addition, a reserve component retiree does not usually begin receiving retired pay until reaching age 60. Disability Retirement While retirement eligibility at 20 years of service is the norm for active component members and age 60 for reserve component members, there are some circumstances that result in earlier retirement. Servicemembers found to be unfit for continued service due to physical disability may be retired if the condition is permanent and stable and the disability is rated by DOD as 30% or greater. These retirees are generally referred to as Chapter 61 retirees , a reference to Chapter 61 of Title 10, which covers disability retirement. As a result, some disability retirees are retired before becoming eligible for longevity retirement while others have completed 20 or more years of service. A servicemember retired for disability may select one of two available options for calculating their monthly retired pay: 1. Longevity Formula. Retired pay is computed by multiplying the years of service times 2.5% or 2.0% (respectively based on a date of entry into service before or after Jan 1, 2018) and then times the pay base. Monthly Retired Pay= (years of service x 2.5% or 2.0%) x (pay base) 2. Disability Formula. Retired pay is computed by multiplying the DOD disability percentage by the pay base. Monthly Retired Pay= disability % x (pay base) The maximum retired pay calculation under either formula cannot exceed 75% of base pay. The retired pay computed under the disability formula is fully taxed unless the disability is the result of a combat-related injury. Since the disability percentage method usually results in higher retired pay, it is most commonly selected. Generally, military retired pay based on longevity is taxable. In certain instances, a portion of disability retired pay may be tax-free. Temporary Early Retirement Authority (TERA) Personnel retired due to force management requirements and before completing 20 years of service are generally referred to as "TERA retirees" because the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 granted Temporary Early Retirement Authority (TERA) as a manpower tool to entice voluntary retirements during the drawdown of the early 1990s. This authority was in effect from 1992 to 2001. TERA retired pay is calculated in the same way as longevity retirement, but there is a retired pay reduction of 1% for every year of service below 20. VA Disability Compensation To qualify for VA disability compensation, the VA must make a determination that the veteran sustained a particular injury or disease, or had a preexisting condition aggravated, while serving in the Armed Forces. Some exceptions exist for certain conditions that may not have been apparent during military service but which are presumed to have been service-connected. The VA has a scale of 10 ratings, from 10% to 100%, although there is no direct arithmetic relationship between the amounts of money paid for each step. Each percentage rating entitles the veteran to a specific level of disability compensation. In a major difference from the DOD disability retirement system, a veteran receiving VA disability compensation can ask for a medical reexamination at any time (or a veteran who does not receive disability compensation upon separation or retirement from service can be examined or reexamined later). All VA disability compensation is tax-free, which makes receipt of VA compensation desirable, even with the operation of the offset. As a general rule of thumb, DOD pays for longevity while the VA pays for disability. Interaction of DOD and VA Disability Benefits12 As veterans, military retirees can apply to the VA for disability compensation. A retiree may (1) apply for VA compensation any time after leaving the service and (2) have his or her degree of disability changed by the VA as the result of a later medical reevaluation, as noted above. Many retirees seek benefits from the VA years after retirement for a condition that may have been incurred during military service but that does not manifest itself until many years later. Typical examples include hearing loss, some cardiovascular problems, and conditions related to exposure to Agent Orange. The DOD and VA disability rating systems have much in common, but there are also significant differences. DOD makes a determination of eligibility for disability retirement only once, at the time the individual is separating from the service. Although DOD uses the VA rating schedule to determine the percentage of disability, DOD measures disability, or lack thereof, against the extent to which the individual can or cannot perform military duties. Military disability retired pay, but not VA disability compensation, is usually taxable, unless related to a combat disability. As a result of the current disability process, a retiree can have both a DOD and a VA disability rating and these ratings will not necessarily be the same percentage. The percentage determined by DOD is used to determine fitness for duty and may result in the medical separation or disability retirement of the servicemember. The VA rating, on the other hand, was designed to reflect the average loss of earning power. Studies over the past several years have consistently recommended a single, comprehensive medical examination that would establish a disability rating that could be used by both DOD and the VA. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 required a joint DOD and VA report on the feasibility of consolidating disability evaluation systems to eliminate duplication by having one medical examination and a single-source disability rating. As a result, DOD and the VA initiated a one-year pilot program, now called the Integrated Disability Evaluation System (IDES), at the Walter Reed Army Medical Center, the National Naval Medical Center at Bethesda, and the Malcolm Grove Medical Center at Andrews Air Force Base. The program was expanded to other sites in 2009 and 2010, and since September 2011 all new disability retirement cases at facilities worldwide have been processed through IDES. As IDES streamlined the disability evaluation process, DOD and VA now focus on improving health care data and records sharing, a process deemed "vital to Service members who are leaving the DOD system with complex medical issues and ongoing health care needs." In September 2018, DOD and VA issued a joint statement indicating their commitment to implement an integrated electronic health system that will allow for seamless sharing of health care data between both departments and aid the disability rating process. Combat-Related Special Compensation (CRSC) The FY2003 NDAA, as amended by the FY2004 NDAA, authorized Combat-Related Special Compensation (CRSC). Military retirees with at least 20 years of service and who meet either of the following two criteria are eligible for CRSC: A disability that is "attributable to an injury for which the member was awarded the Purple Heart," and is not rated as less than a 10% disability by the VA; or A disability rating resulting from involvement in "armed conflict," "hazardous service," "duty simulating war," or "through an instrumentality of war." This liberal definition of combat-related encompasses disabilities associated with any kind of hostile force; hazardous duty such as diving, parachuting, or using dangerous materials such as explosives; individual training and unit training and exercises and maneuvers in the field; and "instrumentalities of war." Retirees must apply for CRSC to their parent service, and the parent service is responsible for verifying that the disability is combat-related. This process is not automatic; it is application-driven. CRSC payments will generally be equal to the amount of VA disability compensation that has been determined to be combat-related. The legislation does not end the requirement that the retiree's military retired pay be reduced by the amount of the total VA disability compensation the retiree receives. Instead, CRSC beneficiaries are to receive the financial equivalent of concurrent receipt as "special compensation," but the statute states explicitly that it is not retired pay per se. CRSC payments are paid from the Department of Defense Military Retirement Fund. As of September 2017, a total of 90,740 retirees were receiving CRSC (see Figure 1 ). CRSC for Military Disability (Chapter 61) and TERA Retirees Servicemembers with a permanent DOD disability rating of 30% or greater may be retired and receive retired pay prior to completing 20 years of service. These retirees are generally referred to as "Chapter 61" retirees, a reference to Chapter 61, Title 10, which governs disability retirement. In addition to the Chapter 61 retirees with less than 20 years of service, those who voluntarily retired under the Temporary Early Retirement Authority (TERA) during the military drawdown of the early to mid-1990s also have less than 20 years of service. The original CRSC legislation excluded those active duty members who retired with less than 20 years of service. However, the FY2008 NDAA expanded CRSC to include Chapter 61 and active duty TERA retirees effective January 1, 2008. Eligibility no longer requires a minimum number of years of service or a minimum disability rating (other than the 30% noted above for disability retirement); a 10% VA rating may qualify if it is combat-related. Eligible retirees must still apply to their parent service to validate that the disability is combat-related. The FY2008 NDAA included almost all reserve disability retirees in the eligible CRSC population except those retired under 10 U.S.C. 12731b, a special provision which allows reservists with a physical disability not incurred in the line of duty to retire with between 15 and 19 creditable years of service. The "Special Rule" for Disability Retirees As noted earlier, an individual generally cannot receive two separate lifelong government annuities from federal agencies for the same purpose or qualifying event, for example, disability retired pay and VA disability compensation. To preclude this, there is a "special rule" for Chapter 61 disability retirees. Application of the special rule caps the CRSC at the level to which the retiree could have qualified based solely on years of service or longevity. In some instances, the special rule could limit or completely eliminate the concurrent receipt payment. In other instances, application of the rule may not result in any changes. Each situation is unique (rank, years of service, DOD and VA disability ratings, and the disability percentage attributable to combat) and requires independent calculations. It appears that those most vulnerable to the reduction of CRSC due to the special rule would be active duty servicemembers with a disability retirement, significantly less than 20 years of service, and a high VA disability rating. Others potentially impacted would be reserve members with little active duty. CRSC for Reserve Retirees When CRSC was originally enacted in 2002, it required all applicants to have at least 20 years of service creditable for computation of retired pay. As a result, reserve retirees had to have at least 7,200 reserve retirement points to be eligible for CRSC. As noted earlier, a reservist receives a certain number of retirement points for varying levels of participation in the reserves, or active duty military service. The 7,200-point figure was extraordinarily high; it could only have been attained by a reservist who had many years of active duty military service in addition to a long reserve career. Initially this law, as enacted, effectively denied CRSC to almost all reservists. However, a provision in the FY2004 NDAA clarified the service requirement for reserve component personnel. It specified that personnel who qualify for reserve retirement by having at least 20 years of duty creditable for reserve retirement are eligible for CRSC. While eligible for CRSC, reserve retirees must be drawing retired pay (generally at age 60) to actually receive the CRSC payment. CRSC Eligibility Summary Essentially, with the exception of reserve component members injured while not in a duty status, all military retirees who have been awarded a Purple Heart or have combat-related disabilities compensable by the VA are eligible for CRSC (see Figure 2 ). Military retirees with service-connected disabilities which are not combat-related as defined by the statute are not eligible for CRSC, but may be eligible for CRDP as discussed below. Concurrent Retirement and Disability Payments (CRDP) The FY2004 NDAA authorized, for the first time, actual concurrent receipt for retirees with at least a 50% disability, regardless of the cause of disability. However, the amount of concurrent receipt was to be phased in over a 10-year period, from 2004 to 2013, except for 100% disabled retirees, who became entitled to immediate concurrent receipt effective January 1, 2005. Depending on the degree of disability, the initial amount of retired pay that the retiree could have restored would vary from $100 to $750 per month, or the actual amount of the offset, whichever was less. In 2014, all offsets ended and military retirees with at least a 50% disability became eligible to receive their entire military retired pay and VA disability compensation. In FY2017 there were 577,399 retirees receiving CRDP. A retiree cannot receive both CRSC and CRDP benefits. The retiree may choose whichever is more financially advantageous to him or her and may change the type of benefit to be received during an annual o pen s eason to maximize the payments received. There are currently two groups of retirees who are not eligible for CRDP benefits (see Figure 4 ). The first group is nondisability military retirees with service-connected disabilities that have been rated by the VA at 40% or less. The second group includes Chapter 61 disability retirees with service-connected disabilities of 100% or less and with less than 20 years of service. CRDP for Temporary Early Retirement Authority (TERA) Retirees The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 granted temporary authority (which expired on September 30, 2001) for the services to offer early retirements to personnel with more than 15 but less than 20 years of service. TERA was used as a manpower tool to entice voluntary retirements during the post-Cold War drawdown. TERA retired pay was calculated in the usual way except that there is an additional reduction of 1% for every year of service below 20. Part or all of this latter reduction could be restored if the retiree worked in specified public service jobs (such as law enforcement, firefighting, and education) during the period immediately following retirement, until the point at which the retiree would have reached the 20-year mark if he or she had remained in the service. TERA retirees are eligible for CRSC and CRDP even though they have less than 20 years of service. The "special rule" for disability retirees (discussed below) does not apply to TERA retirees since TERA was not a disability retirement, but rather a regular retirement but for those with less than 20 years of service. Concurrent Receipt and Blended Retirement System Lump Sum Payments The Blended Retirement System (BRS), effective for all servicemembers joining on or after January 1, 2018, offers servicemembers the option to select a lump sum payment of a portion of their military retired pay in lieu of a monthly annuity. If a member retiring under the BRS is eligible for CRDP and elects the lump sum payment of retired pay, the individual will continue to receive a monthly VA disability payment. If the member electing the lump sum payment is not eligible for CRDP (i.e., the retired pay offset applies), the VA will withhold disability payments until the sum of the amount withheld over time equals the gross amount of the lump sum payment. If the member is eligible for CRSC, the procedures for withholding VA disability payments relate to the combat-related portion of the total VA entitlement. CRSC and CRDP Comparisons and Costs CRSC and CRDP share some common elements, but are unique benefits. Table 1 summarizes some of the similarities and differences between CRSC and CRDP. CRDP and CRSC are paid from the DOD Military Retirement Fund. Costs have been rising every year as a consequence of the phased implementation and a rise in the number of eligible recipients. As of September 2017, one-third of all military retirees collecting retired pay were receiving either CRDP or CRSC. Issues and Options for Congress Veteran advocacy groups continue to lobby for changes to the concurrent receipt programs that would expand benefits to a larger population of retirees. Other groups have pressed Congress to offset or streamline duplicative benefits, contending that the dual receipt of VA and DOD payments amounts to double-dipping , or in some cases triple-dipping for those veterans also eligible for Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) from the Social Security Administration. Some of the factors that Congress might consider regarding potential changes include program costs, program efficiencies, individual eligibility requirements, and interaction with other servicemembers' and veterans' benefits and programs. Below are some options to change concurrent receipt programs that have been proposed or considered. Eliminate or Sunset Concurrent Receipt Programs The Congressional Budget Office has estimated that eliminating the CRDP program would save the government $139 billion between 2018 and 2026. While achieving significant cost savings, eliminating or sunsetting concurrent receipt programs could be unpopular among servicemembers, veterans, and their families. Previous efforts to reduce benefits to servicemembers have typically included a grandfather clause that would allow all current servicemembers and retirees to maintain existing benefits while the law would only apply to those who joined the service after a specific date. Extend CRDP to Chapter 61 Disability Retirees with Less Than 20 Years of Service As previously discussed, the FY2008 NDAA extended CRSC eligibility to Chapter 61 retirees who retired due to combat-related physical disability prior to completing 20 years of service. However, Chapter 61 retirees with service-connected disabilities rated less than 50% or with less than 20 years of service are not eligible for CRDP. Congress could expand the CRDP provision to include this cohort. This option would extend CRDP eligibility to approximately 100,000 additional disability retirees at an estimated 10-year cost of $5.8 billion. Extend CRDP to Those with a 40% or Less VA Disability Rating At present, those military retirees with service-connected disabilities rated at 50% or greater are eligible for CRDP. Congress could revise the concurrent receipt legislation to include the entire population of military retirees with service-connected disabilities. In 2014, CBO estimated that to extend benefits to all veterans who would be eligible for both disability benefits and military retired pay would cost $30 billion from 2015 to 2024. Modify or Eliminate the Special Rule With the extension of CRSC to Chapter 61 disability retirees, the special rule factors significantly into the concurrent receipt calculations. For those whose CRSC payment is limited or eliminated by the special rule , there may be a perceived inequity between CRSC recipients with 20 or more years of service (longevity retirees) and Chapter 61 (disability retirees who generally have less than 20 years of service) retirees. To resolve this potential issue, Congress could modify or eliminate the special rule or limit its application to specific military operations. However, some observers may note that eliminating or modifying the special rule would result in paying for the same disability twice, by DOD and by VA. It might also complicate future initiatives to simplify and streamline postservice compensation whereby DOD would only compensate for years of service and the VA would only compensate for disability, as recommended by the Dole/Shalala commission.

Concurrent receipt refers to the simultaneous receipt of two types of federal monetary benefits: military retired pay and Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) disability compensation. Prior to 2004, existing laws and regulations dictated that a military retiree could not receive two payments from federal agencies for the same purpose. As a result, military retirees with physical disabilities recognized by the VA would have their military retired pay offset or reduced dollar-for-dollar by the amount of their nontaxable VA compensation. Legislative activity on the issue of concurrent receipt began in the late 1980s and culminated in the provision for Combat-Related Special Compensation (CRSC) in the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (P.L. 107-314). Since then, Congress has added Concurrent Retirement and Disability Payments (CRDP) for those retirees with a disability rated at 50% or greater, extended concurrent receipt to additional eligible populations, and further refined and clarified the program. There are two common criteria that define eligibility for concurrent receipt: (1) all recipients must be military retirees and (2) they must also be eligible for VA disability compensation. An eligible retiree cannot receive both CRDP and CRSC. The retiree must choose whichever is most financially advantageous to him or her and may change the type of benefit to be received during an annual open season. In FY2017, approximately one-third of the retired military population was receiving either CRSC or CRDP at a cost of $12.4 billion. Nevertheless, there are also military retirees who receive VA disability compensation but are not eligible for concurrent receipt. Determining whether to make some or all of this population eligible for concurrent receipt remains a point of contention in Congress. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has estimated that to extend benefits to all veterans who would be eligible for both disability benefits and military retired pay would cost $30 billion from 2015 to 2024. In 2016, CBO estimated that eliminating concurrent receipt would save the government $139 billion between 2018 and 2026.

crs_R45249

crs_R45249_0

Introduction On March 8, 2018, President Trump issued two proclamations imposing tariffs on U.S. imports of certain steel and aluminum products, respectively, using presidential powers granted under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. Section 232 authorizes the President to impose restrictions on certain imports based on an affirmative determination by the Department of Commerce (Commerce) that the targeted products are being imported into the United States "in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security." Section 232 investigations and actions are important for Congress, as the Constitution gives it primary authority over international trade matters. In the case of Section 232, Congress has delegated to the President broad authority to impose limits on imports in the interest of U.S. national security. The statute does not require congressional approval of any presidential actions that fall within its scope. In the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980, however, Congress amended Section 232 by creating a joint disapproval resolution provision under which Congress can override presidential actions in the case of adjustments to petroleum or petroleum product imports. Section 232 is one of several tools the United States has at its disposal to address trade barriers and other foreign trade practices. These include investigations and actions to address import surges that are a "substantial cause of serious injury" or threat thereof to a U.S. industry (Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974), those that address violations or denial of U.S. benefits under trade agreements (Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974), and antidumping and countervailing duty laws (Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930). Trade is an important component of the U.S. economy, and Members often hear from constituents when factories and other businesses are hurt by competing imports, or if exporters face trade restrictions and other market access barriers overseas. Section 232 actions may affect industries, workers, and consumers in congressional districts and states (both positively and negatively). Following the steel and aluminum Section 232 actions, Commerce initiated Section 232 investigations into imports of automobiles and automobile parts in May 2018, uranium ore and product imports in July 2018, and titanium sponges in March 2019. Commerce submitted the auto investigation report to the President on February 17, 2019, but the report has not been made public or shared with Congress; the uranium report is expected by mid-April 2019, and the titanium sponges report is due in late November 2019. The current investigations have raised a number of economic and broader policy issues for Congress. This report provides an overview of Section 232, analyzes the Trump Administration's Section 232 investigations and actions, and considers potential policy and economic implications and issues for Congress. To provide context for the current debate, the report also includes a discussion of previous Section 232 investigations and a brief legislative history of the statute. Overview of Section 232 The Trade Act of 1962, including Section 232, was enacted during the Cold War when national security issues were at the forefront. Section 232 has been used periodically in response to industry petitions, as well as through self-initiation by the executive branch. The Trade Expansion Act establishes a clear process and timelines for a Section 232 investigation, but the executive branch's interpretation of "national security" and the potential scope of any investigation can be expansive. Key Provisions and Process Upon request by the head of any U.S. department or agency, by application by an interested party, or by self-initiation, the Secretary of Commerce must commence a Section 232 investigation. The Secretary of Commerce conducts the investigation in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and other U.S. officials, as appropriate, to determine the effects of the specified imports on national security. Public hearings and consultations may also be held in the course of the investigation. Commerce has 270 days from the initiation date to prepare a report advising the President whether or not the targeted product is being imported "in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair" U.S. national security, and to provide recommendations for action or inaction based on the findings. Any portion of the report that does not contain classified or proprietary information must be published in the Federal Register . See Figure 1 for the Section 232 process and timeline. While there is no specific definition of national security in the statute, it states that the investigation must consider certain factors, such as domestic production needed for projected national defense requirements; domestic capacity; the availability of human resources and supplies essential to the national defense; and potential unemployment, loss of skills or investment, or decline in government revenues resulting from displacement of any domestic products by excessive imports. Once the President receives the report, he has 90 days to decide whether or not he concurs with the Commerce Department's findings and recommendations, and to determine the nature and duration of the action he views as necessary to adjust the imports so they no longer threaten to impair the national security (generally, imposition of some trade-restrictive measure). The President may implement the recommendations suggested in the Commerce report, take other actions, or decide to take no action. After making a decision, the President has 15 days to implement the action and 30 days to submit a written statement to Congress explaining the action or inaction; he must also publish his findings in the Federal Register . Presidential actions may stay in place "for such time, as he deems necessary to adjust the imports of such article and its derivatives so that such imports will not so threaten to impair the national security." Section 232 Investigations to Date The Commerce Department (or the Department of the Treasury before it) initiated a total of 31 Section 232 investigations between 1962 and 2019, including three investigations that remain ongoing (see Table B-1 ). In 16 of these cases, Commerce determined that the targeted imports did not threaten to impair national security. In 11 cases, Commerce determined that the targeted imports threatened to impair national security and made recommendations to the President. The President took action eight times. One case was terminated at the petitioner's request before Commerce completed its investigation. Prior to the Trump Administration, 10 Section 232 investigations were self-initiated by the Administration. (For a full list of cases to date, see Appendix B .) In eight investigations dealing with crude oil and petroleum products, Commerce decided that the subject imports threatened to impair national security. The President took action in five of these cases. In the first three cases on petroleum imports (1973-1978), the President imposed licensing fees and additional supplemental fees on imports, which are no longer in effect, rather than adjusting tariffs or instituting quotas. In two cases, the President imposed oil embargoes, once in 1979 (Iran) and once in 1982 (Libya). Both were superseded by broader economic sanctions in the following years. In the three most recent crude oil and petroleum investigations (from 1987 to 1999), Commerce determined that the imports threatened to impair national security, but did not recommend that the President use his authority to adjust imports. In the first of these reports (1987), Commerce recommended a series of steps to increase domestic energy production and ensure adequate oil supplies rather than imposing quotas, fees, or tariffs because any such actions would not be "cost beneficial and, in the long run, impair rather than enhance national security." In the latter two investigations (1994 and 1999), Commerce found that existing government programs and activities related to energy security would be more appropriate and cost effective than import adjustments. By not acting, the President in effect followed Commerce's recommendation. Prior to the Trump Administration, a President arguably last acted under Section 232 in 1986. In that case, Commerce determined that imports of metal-cutting and metal-forming machine tools threatened to impair national security. In this case, the President sought voluntary export restraint agreements with leading foreign exporters, and developed domestic programs to revitalize the U.S. industry. These agreements predate the founding of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which established multilateral rules prohibiting voluntary export restraints (see " WTO Cases "). In addition to the two recent cases on steel and aluminum, on May 23, 2018, after consultations with President Trump, Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross announced the initiation of a Section 232 investigation to determine whether imports of automobiles, including SUVs, vans and light trucks, and automotive parts threaten to impair national security. In January 2018, two U.S. mining companies petitioned for the investigation into uranium imports. On July 18, Commerce announced the initiation of a Section 232 investigation on these imports and informed the Secretary of Defense. In September 2018, a U.S. titanium company petitioned for the investigation into titanium sponge imports. In March 2019, Commerce announced the initiation of a Section 232 investigation on these imports and informed the Secretary of Defense. Relationship to WTO While unilateral trade restrictions may appear to be counter to U.S. trade liberalization commitments under the WTO agreements, Article XXI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which predates and was one of the foundational agreements of the WTO, allows WTO members to take measures to protect "essential security interests." Broad national security exceptions are also included in international trade obligations at the bilateral and regional levels, and could potentially limit the ability of countries to challenge such actions by trade partners. Historically, exceptions for national security have been rarely invoked and multiple trading partners have challenged recent U.S. actions under the WTO agreements (see " WTO Cases "). Recent Section 232 Actions on Steel and Aluminum In April 2017, two presidential memoranda instructed Commerce to give priority to two self-initiated investigations into the national security threats posed by imports of steel and aluminum. In conducting its investigation, Commerce held public hearings and solicited public comments via the Federal Register and consulted with the Secretary of Defense and other agencies, as required by the statute. In addition to the hearings, stakeholders submitted approximately 300 comments regarding the Section 232 investigation and potential actions. Some parties (mostly steel producers) supported broad actions to limit steel imports, while others (mostly users and consuming industries such as automakers) opposed any additional tariffs or quotas on imports. The U.S. aluminum industry held differing views of the global aluminum tariff, with most parties opposing it. Some stakeholders in the steel and aluminum industries sought a middle ground, endorsing limited actions to target the underlying issues of overcapacity and unfair trade practices. Still others focused on the process, voicing caution in the use of Section 232 authority and warning against an overly broad definition of "national security" for protectionist purposes. The Commerce investigations analyzed the importance of certain steel and aluminum products to national security, using a relatively broad definition of "national security," defining it to include "the general security and welfare of certain industries, beyond those necessary to satisfy national defense requirements, which are critical for minimum operations of the economy and government." The scope of the investigations extended to current and future requirements for national defense and to 16 specific critical infrastructure sectors, such as electric transmission, transportation systems, food and agriculture, and critical manufacturing, including domestic production of machinery and electrical equipment. The reports also examined domestic production capacity and utilization, industry requirements, current quantities and circumstances of imports, international markets, and global overcapacity. Commerce based its definition of national security on a 2001 investigation on iron ore and semi-finished steel. Section 232 investigations prior to 2001 generally used a narrower definition considering U.S. national defense needs or overreliance on foreign suppliers. Commerce Findings and Recommendations The final reports, submitted to the President on January 11 and January 22, 2018, respectively, concluded that imports of certain steel mill products and of certain types of primary aluminum and unwrought aluminum "threaten to impair the national security" of the United States. The Secretary of Commerce asserted that "the only effective means of removing the threat of impairment is to reduce imports to a level that should ... enable U.S. steel mills to operate at 80 percent or more of their rated production capacity" (the minimum rate the report found necessary for the long-term viability of the U.S. steel industry and, separately, for the aluminum industry). The Secretary further recommended the President "take immediate action to adjust the level of these imports through quotas or tariffs" and identified three potential courses of action for both steel and aluminum imports, including tariffs or quotas on all or some steel imports from specific countries. The Secretary of Defense, while concurring with Commerce's "conclusion that imports of foreign steel and aluminum based on unfair trading practices impair the national security," recommended targeted tariffs and that "an inter-agency group further refine the targeted tariffs, so as to create incentives for trade partners to work with the U.S. on addressing the underlying issue of Chinese transshipment" in which Chinese producers ship goods to another country to reexport. He also noted, however, that "the U.S. military requirements for steel and aluminum each only represent about three percent of U.S. production." Presidential Actions On March 8, 2018, President Trump issued two proclamations imposing duties on U.S. imports of certain steel and aluminum products, based on the Secretary of Commerce's findings. The proclamations outlined the President's decisions to impose tariffs of 25% on steel and 10% on aluminum imports effective March 23, 2018, but provided for flexibility in regard to country and product applicability of the tariffs (see below). The new tariffs were to be imposed  in addition  to any duties already in place, including antidumping and countervailing duties. In the proclamations, the President established a bifurcated approach, instructing Commerce to establish a process for domestic parties to request individual product exclusions and a U.S. Trade Representative (USTR)-led process to discuss "alternative ways" through diplomatic negotiations to address the threat with countries having a "security relationship" with the United States. The President officially notified Congress of his actions in a letter dated April 6, 2018. Several Members actively engaged in voicing their views since the investigations were launched, including through hearings and letters to the President. Country Exemptions Initially, the President temporarily excluded imports of steel and aluminum products from Mexico and Canada from the new tariffs, and the Administration implicitly and explicitly linked a successful outcome of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) renegotiation to maintaining the exemptions. With regard to other countries, the President expressed a willingness to be flexible, stating that countries with which the United States has a "security relationship" may discuss "alternative ways" to address the national security threat and gain an exemption from the tariffs. The President charged the USTR with negotiating bilaterally with trading partners on potential exemptions. On March 22, after discussions with multiple countries, the President issued proclamations temporarily excluding Australia, Argentina, Brazil, South Korea, the European Union (EU), Canada and Mexico, from the Section 232 tariffs. The President gave a deadline of May 1, 2018, by which time each trading partner had to negotiate "a satisfactory alternative means to remove the threatened impairment to the national security by imports" for steel and aluminum in order to maintain the exemption. On April 30, 2018, the White House extended negotiations and tariff exemptions with Canada, Mexico, and the EU for an additional 30 days, until June 1, 2018, and exempted Argentina, Australia, and Brazil from the tariffs indefinitely pending final agreements. South Korea, which pursued a resolution over the tariffs in the context of discussions to modify the U.S.-South Korea (KORUS) Free Trade Agreement, agreed to an absolute annual quota for 54 separate subcategories of steel and was exempted from the steel tariffs. South Korea did not negotiate an agreement on aluminum and its exports to the United States have been subject to the aluminum tariffs since May 1, 2018. On May 31, 2018, the President proclaimed Argentina and Brazil, in addition to South Korea, permanently exempt from the steel tariffs, having reached final quota agreements with the United States on steel imports. Brazil, like South Korea, did not negotiate an agreement on aluminum and is subject to the aluminum tariffs. The Administration also proclaimed aluminum imports from Argentina permanently exempt from the aluminum tariffs subject to an absolute quota. The Administration proclaimed imports of steel and aluminum from Australia permanently exempt from the tariffs as well, but did not set any quantitative restrictions on Australian imports. As of June 1, 2018, imports of steel and aluminum from Canada, Mexico, and the European Union are subject to the Section 232 tariffs. These countries are among the largest suppliers of U.S. imports of the targeted goods, accounting for nearly 50% by value in 2018 (see Appendix D ). The imposition of tariffs on these major trading partners increases the economic significance of the tariffs and prompted criticism from several Members of Congress, including the chairs of the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees. The Trump Administration completed negotiations on the proposed United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) on September 30, 2018, to replace the NAFTA. The USMCA did not resolve or address the Section 232 tariffs on imported steel and aluminum from Canada and Mexico, but it includes a requirement that motor vehicles contain 70% or more of North American steel and aluminum content to qualify for duty-free treatment. The three parties continue to discuss the steel and aluminum tariffs, which some analysts speculate could result in quotas on imports of Mexican and Canadian steel and aluminum. Some U.S., Canadian, and Mexican policymakers have suggested that the parties will not ratify the new agreement until the Section 232 tariffs are removed; the White House economic adviser stated that the Administration continues to negotiate the tariffs as "part of the bigger legislative picture discussion" for passage of USMCA. With respect to the EU, on July 27, 2018, after meeting with EU President Juncker, President Trump announced plans for "high-level trade negotiations" to eliminate tariffs, including those on steel and aluminum, among other objectives. The two sides agreed to not impose further tariffs on each other's trade products while negotiations are active. It is unclear what those negotiations may seek in terms of alternative measures, but the United States could seek some type of quantitative restriction given the agreements the Administration has negotiated to date with most exempted countries. In addition to seeking quantitative restrictions, the Trump Administration may also pursue increasing traceability and reporting requirements, which may help limit transshipments of steel or aluminum originating from nonexempt countries. Product Exclusions To limit potential negative domestic impacts of the tariffs on U.S. consumers and consuming industries, Commerce published an interim final rule for how parties located in the United States may request exclusions for items that are not "produced in the United States in a sufficient and reasonably available amount or of a satisfactory quality." Requests for exclusions and objections to requests have been and will continue to be posted on regulations.gov. The rule went into effect the same day as publication to allow for immediate submissions. Exclusion determinations are based upon national security considerations. To minimize the impact of any exclusion, the rule allows only "individuals or organizations using steel articles ... in business activities ... in the United States to submit exclusion requests," eliminating the ability of larger umbrella groups or trade associations to submit petitions on behalf of member companies. Any approved product exclusion is limited to the individual or organization that submitted the specific exclusion request. Parties may also submit objections to any exclusion within 30 days after the exclusion request is posted. The review of exclusion requests and objections will not exceed 90 days, creating a period of uncertainty for petitioners. Exclusions will generally last for one year from the date of signature. As of March 4, 2019, Commerce received almost 70,000 steel product exclusion requests, with 16,500 exclusions granted and 500 denied. As of the same date, Commerce received 10,000 aluminum exclusion requests, with 3,000 exclusions granted and 500 denied. Companies have complained about the intensive, time-consuming process to submit exclusion requests; the lengthy waiting period to hear back from Commerce, which has exceeded the 90 days in some cases; what some view as an arbitrary nature of acceptances and denials; and that all exclusion requests to date have been rejected when a U.S. steel or aluminum producer has objected. Alcoa, the largest U.S. aluminum maker, requested an exemption for all aluminum imported from Canada, where it operates three aluminum smelters. While the company benefits from higher aluminum prices as a result of the tariffs, it is also seeing increased costs in its own supply chain. In addition, the Cause of Action Institute filed a series of Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests to gain insight into the exclusion process. Commerce did not respond, leading the organization to file a lawsuit against the agency. Several Members of Congress have raised concerns about the exclusion process. A bipartisan group of House Members, for example, raised concerns about the speed of the review process and the significant burden it places on manufacturers, especially small businesses. The Members included specific recommendations, such as allowing for broader product ranges to be included in a single request, allowing trade associations to petition, grandfathering in existing contracts to avoid disruptions, and regularly reviewing the tariffs' effects and sunsetting them if they have a "significant negative impact." Commerce asserts it has taken several steps to improve the exclusion process, including increasing and organizing its staff "to efficiently process exclusion requests," and "expediting the grant of properly filed exclusion requests that receive no objections." The agency's International Trade Administration (ITA) also became involved in the exclusion process by analyzing exclusion requests and objections to determine whether there is sufficient domestic production available to meet the requestor's product needs. BIS remains the lead agency involved in making final decisions regarding whether the requests are granted or denied. Some Members have questioned the Administration's processes and ability to pick winners and losers through granting or denying exclusion requests. On August 9, 2018, Senator Ron Johnson requested that Commerce provide specific statistics and information on the exclusion requests and process and provide a briefing to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Senator Elizabeth Warren requested that the Commerce Inspector General investigate the implementation of the exclusion process, including a review of the processes and procedures Commerce has established; how they are being followed; and if exclusion decisions are made on a transparent, individual basis, free from political interference. She also requested evidence that the exclusions granted meet Commerce's stated goal of "protecting national security while also minimizing undue impact on downstream American industries," and that the exclusions granted to date strengthen the national security of the United States. Pending legislation to revise Section 232 also addresses the process for excluding products (e.g., S. 287 ). On September 6, 2018, Commerce announced a new rule to allow companies to rebut objections to petitions. The new rule, published September 11, 2018, includes new rebuttal and counter-rebuttal procedures, more information about the exclusion submission requirements and process, the criteria Commerce uses in deciding whether to grant an exclusion request, and revised estimates of the total number of exclusion requests and objections that Commerce expects to receive. On October 29, 2018, the Commerce Inspector General's office (IG) initiated an audit of the agency's processes and procedures for reviewing and adjudicating product exclusion requests. The audit is ongoing. To ensure that Commerce follows through with improving the exclusion process, in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P.L. 116-6 ), signed on February 15, 2019, Congress provided funding for "contractor support to implement the produ ct exclusion process for articles covered by actions taken under section 232." To ensure improvements to the exclusion process, Congress indicated that the additional money is to be "devoted to an effective Section 232 exclusion process" and required that Commerce submit quarterly reports to Congress. Congress mandated that the reports identify the number of exclusion requests received; the number of exclusion requests approved and denied; the status of efforts to assist small- and medium-sized businesses in navigating the exclusion process; Commerce-wide staffing levels for the exclusion process, including information on any staff detailed to complete this task; and Commerce-wide funding by source appropriation and object class for costs undertaken to process the exclusions. Tariffs Collected to Date As of March 28, 2019, U.S. Customs and Border Protection assessed $4.7 billion and $1.5 billion from the Section 232 tariffs on steel and aluminum, respectively. The tariffs collected are put in the general fund of the U.S. Treasury and are not allocated to a specific fund. Based on 2017 U.S. import values, annual tariff revenue from the Section 232 tariffs could be as high as $5.8 billion and $1.7 billion for steel and aluminum, respectively, but such estimates do not account for dynamic effects that may impact import flows. Generally, higher import prices resulting from the tariffs should cause both import demand and tariff revenue to decrease over time, provided that U.S. production increases and sufficient domestic alternatives become available. Tariff revenue is also likely to decline as the Commerce Department grants additional product exclusions. According to the President's proclamations implementing the Section 232 tariffs, one of the objectives of the tariffs is to "reduce imports to a level that the Secretary assessed would enable domestic steel (and aluminum) producers to use approximately 80 percent of existing domestic production capacity and thereby achieve long-term economic viability through increased production." U.S. Steel and Aluminum Industries and International Trade In 2018, U.S. imports of steel and aluminum products covered by the Section 232 tariffs totaled $29.5 billion and $17.6 billion, respectively (see Appendix D ). Over the past decade, steel imports have fluctuated significantly, by value and quantity, while imports of aluminum have generally increased. U.S. imports of both metals increased slightly by value from 2017 to 2018 (Section 232 tariffs became effective at different times for different countries), but imports of both decreased by more than 10% in quantity terms (-3.8 million metric tons for steel and -0.9 million metric tons for aluminum). U.S. imports from individual countries fluctuated to an even greater degree over the past year ( Figure 3 ). The largest declines in U.S. steel imports, by value, were from South Korea (-$430 million, -15%), Turkey (-$413 million, -35%), and India (-$372 million, -49%), with significant increases from the EU (+$567 million, +22%), Mexico (+$508 million, +20%), and Canada (+$404 million, +19%). The largest declines in aluminum imports were from China (-$729 million, -40%), Russia (-$676 million, -42%), and Canada (-$294 million, -4%), with major increases from the EU (+$395 million, 9%), India (+$221 million, 58%), and Oman ($186 million, +200%). The countries with permanent exclusions from the tariffs (all except Australia are instead subject to quotas) accounted for 18.4% of U.S. steel imports in 2018 and 4.4% of U.S. aluminum imports. In 2018, U.S. steelmakers employed 140,100 workers ( Figure 4 ), accounting for 1.1% of the nation's 12.7 million factory jobs. Employment in the steel industry has declined for many years as new technology, particularly the increased use of electric arc furnaces to make steel, has reduced the demand for workers. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, labor productivity in steelmaking nearly tripled since 1987 and rose 20% over the past decade. Hence, even a significant increase in domestic steel production is likely to result in a relatively small number of additional jobs. In 2018, for the first time since 2014, steel manufacturers added 2,700 jobs, a rise of 2% from a year earlier. Aluminum manufacturers employed 58,100 workers in 2018, a figure that has changed little since the 2007-2009 recession. Domestic smelting of aluminum from bauxite ore, which requires large amounts of electricity, has been in long-term decline, and secondary aluminum produced from recycled scrap melted in a smelter now accounts for the majority of domestic aluminum production. Imports of secondary unwrought aluminum are not covered by the Section 232 aluminum trade action. Steelmaking and aluminum smelting are both extremely capital intensive. As a result, even small changes in output can have major effects on producers' profitability. Domestic steel producers have operated at 80% or less of production capacity in recent years, with a shift in recent months to a capacity utilization rate at U.S. steel mills of more than 80%. Primary aluminum producers in the United States have operated at about 78% of production capacity in December 2018, up from around 43% in December 2017. A stated aim of the metals tariffs is to enable U.S. producers in both sectors to use an average of 80% of their production capacity, which the Section 232 reports deem necessary to sustain adequate profitability and continued capital investment. Global Production Trends The OECD Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity estimates global steel overcapacity was at 595 million metric tons in 2017. While China is the world's largest steel producer, accounting for roughly 45% of global capacity, relatively little Chinese steel enters the U.S. market directly, due to extensive U.S. dumping and subsidy determinations, but the large amount of Chinese production acts to depress prices globally. China has indicated that it plans to reduce its crude steelmaking capacity by 100-150 million metric tons over the five-year period from 2016 to 2020. According to the Chinese government, the country's crude steel capacity has fallen by more than 120 million metric tons since it announced its steel reduction goal in 2016. No OECD or other multinational forum has been established to monitor global aluminum overcapacity, though aluminum industry groups have called for such a forum. Although China accounted for more than half of the world's primary aluminum production in 2017, it does not export aluminum in commodity form to the United States. China ships semi-finished aluminum such as bars, rods, and wire to the United States. These are subject to the Section 232 tariffs. Metals imports should be put in the context of U.S. production. In 2018, the United States produced more than twice the amount of steel it imported. According to ITA, import penetration—the share of U.S. demand met by steel imports—reached 33% in 2016, compared to 23% in 2006. Some segments of the domestic steel industry, such as slab converters, import a sizable share of their semi-finished feedstock from foreign suppliers, totaling nearly 7.5 million tons in 2018. In the primary aluminum market, U.S. net import reliance rose to 50% in 2018 from 33% in 2014, according to the U.S. Geological Survey. Most U.S. foreign trade in steel and aluminum is with Canada (see Appendix C ). International Efforts to Address Overcapacity OECD analysis has found that ongoing global steel overcapacity and excess production are largely caused by government intervention, subsidization, and other market-distorting practices, although these are not the only factors. Other reasons for excess capacity include cyclical market downturns. The situation is similar in the aluminum industry, where government financial support for large aluminum stockpiles has delayed the response to lower demand. Past Administrations worked to address the issue of steel overcapacity. President George W. Bush, for example, initiated international discussions on global capacity reduction and improved trade discipline in the steel industry as part of his general steel announcement of 2001. Other governments agreed to join the Bush Administration in discussing overcapacity and trade issues at the OECD in a process that started in mid-2001. The industrial, steel-producing members of the OECD were joined by major non-OECD steel producers, such as India, Russia, and, during later stages of the talks, China. Negotiations were suspended indefinitely in 2004, and by 2005, the OECD had abandoned this effort to negotiate an agreement among all major steel-producing countries to ban domestic subsidies for steel mills. The Obama Administration also participated in international efforts to curb steel imports, including the launch of the G-20 Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity in 2016, another venue that sought to address the challenges of excess capacity in steel worldwide. In December 2016, the G-20 convened its first meeting of more than 30 economies—all G-20 members plus interested OECD members—as a global platform to discuss steel issues among the world's major producers. The same year, as part of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (SE&D) established in 2009, the Obama Administration agreed to address excess steel production and also to communicate and exchange information on surplus production in the aluminum sector. In September 2018, the OECD Forum agreed on a process to identify and remove subsidies and take other measures to reduce the global steel overcapacity. The OECD issued a consensus report outlining six principles and specific policy recommendations to address excess steel capacity. The USTR, while supportive of the recommendations, questioned the Forum's ability to pursue effective implementation and did not rule out unilateral action. The aluminum industry argues it is also suffering because of China's excess production of primary aluminum. According to the aluminum associations of Japan, Europe, Canada, and the United States, global overcapacity amounted to 11 million metric tons in 2017. Akin to the global steel industry, aluminum producers contend that excess production has been largely caused by government intervention, subsidization, and other market-distorting practices, among other factors. As noted, the U.S. Aluminum Association and some of its international counterparts seek to establish a global forum to address aluminum excess capacity. The Trump Administration's Section 232 actions have led multiple U.S. trading partners, such as the EU, the UK, and Canada, to initiate their own safeguard investigations and quota restrictions to prevent dumping of steel and aluminum exports and protect domestic industries. Unlike the OECD efforts, the individual country safeguard actions are uncoordinated. In addition to the Section 232 action, the Trump Administration is pursuing joint action on industrial overcapacity in other forums. The USTR, Ambassador Lighthizer, met with his EU and Japanese counterparts in May 2018, and the three countries agreed to  concrete steps  to address "nonmarket-oriented policies and practices that lead to severe overcapacity, create unfair competitive conditions for our workers and businesses, hinder the development and use of innovative technologies, and undermine the proper functioning of international trade." The ministers agreed to work toward negotiation of new international rules on subsidies and state-owned enterprises and improved compliance with WTO transparency commitments. The parties also agreed to cooperate on their concerns with third parties' technology transfer policies and practices and issued a joint statement containing a list of factors that identify if market conditions for competition exist. The parties have met multiple times and continue to work together, aiming to identify signals for nonmarket policies, enhance information sharing, and work with third parties to ensure market economy conditions exist and discuss potential new rules and means of enforcement. In addition, in November 2018, the United States, the EU, Japan, Argentina, and Costa Rica put forward a joint proposal in the WTO to increase transparency, proposing incentives for compliance or penalties for noncompliance with WTO notification reporting requirements regarding subsidies. U.S. unilateral tariff actions, however, may limit other countries' willingness to participate in multilateral forums. Policy and Economic Issues Section 232 tariffs on steel and aluminum imports into the United States raise a number of issues for Congress. The economic repercussions of U.S. and foreign actions may be felt not only by domestic steel and aluminum producers, but by downstream manufacturers or other industries targeted for retaliation, and consumers. The response by other countries can have implications for the U.S. economy and multilateral world trading system. Also, other countries may be hesitant in the future to cooperate with the United States to address broader global issues, including steel and aluminum overcapacity, if their exports are subject to U.S. tariffs. U.S. trading partners' responses to Section 232 actions have varied based on the country's relationship with the United States. Some countries are pursuing direct negotiations, while keeping other countermeasures in reserve, and raising actions at the WTO (see below). Others have proposed or pursued retaliation with their own tariffs. Some companies have pursued litigation, and may also seek alternative markets for their own products to avoid U.S. tariffs. Retaliation Several major U.S. trading partners have proposed or are imposing retaliatory tariffs in in response to the U.S. actions (see Figure 5 below). In total, retaliatory tariffs are in effect on products accounting for approximately $23.2 billion of U.S. exports in 2018. The process of retaliation is complex given multiple layers of relevant international rules and the potential for unilateral action, which may or may not adhere to those existing rules. Both through agreements at the WTO and in bilateral and regional free trade agreements (FTAs), the United States and its trading partners have agreed to maintain certain tariff levels. Those same agreements include rules on potential responses, including formal dispute settlement procedures and in some cases commensurate tariffs, when one party increases its tariffs above agreed-upon limits. In addition to the national security considerations the Trump Administration has cited as justification for its Section 232 actions, increased tariffs are permitted under these agreements, under specific circumstances, including for example, antidumping tariffs, countervailing duties, and safeguard tariffs. The retaliatory actions of U.S. trading partners to date have been notified to the WTO pursuant to the Agreement on Safeguards. These retaliatory notifications are in addition to ongoing WTO dispute settlement proceedings (see " WTO Cases "). FTA partner countries may also claim that the increase in U.S. tariff rates violates U.S. FTA commitments and seek recourse through those agreements. For example, Canada and Mexico, U.S. partners in NAFTA, claim that the U.S. actions violate commitments in both NAFTA and the WTO agreements. Canada initially announced its intent to launch a dispute under the NAFTA's dispute settlement provisions in addition to actions at the WTO, although it appears Canada has taken no such action to date. U.S. trading partners' retaliation to the Trump Administration's Section 232 tariff actions has magnified the effects of the Section 232 tariffs. From an economic perspective, retaliation increases the scope of industries affected by the tariffs. U.S. agriculture exports, for example, are among the largest categories of U.S. exports targeted for retaliation, which may have contributed to reduced sales of certain U.S. farm products. Given the scale of U.S. motor vehicle and parts imports, if the Trump Administration moves forward with Section 232 tariffs on that sector and U.S. trading partners respond with retaliation of a similar magnitude, it could have significant negative effects on U.S. exporters. For example, the United States imported more than $50 billion of motor vehicles and parts from the EU in 2018, and the EU has announced it has prepared potential retaliatory tariffs on a commensurate value of U.S. exports. Retaliatory actions may also heighten concerns over the potential strain the Section 232 tariffs place on the international trading system. Many U.S. trading partners view the Section 232 actions as protectionist and in violation of U.S. commitments at the WTO and in U.S. FTAs, while the Trump Administration views the actions within its rights under those same commitments. Furthermore, the Trump Administration argues that retaliation to its Section 232 tariffs, which U.S. trading partners have imposed under WTO safeguard commitments, violates WTO rules because it has imposed Section 232 tariffs pursuant to WTO national security exceptions. If the dispute settlement process in those agreements cannot satisfactorily resolve this conflict, it could lead to further unilateral actions and increasing retaliation. Domestic Court Challenges The President's actions under Section 232 have resulted in legal challenges in the U.S. domestic court system. Specifically, the Section 232 actions on steel and aluminum have been challenged in cases before the U.S. Court of International Trade (CIT). In one case, Severstal Export Gmbh, a U.S. subsidiary of a Russian steel producer, sought a preliminary injunction from the United States Court of International Trade to prevent the United States from collecting the import tariffs on certain steel products. The company and its Swiss affiliate argued that the President acted outside of the authority that Congress had delegated to him because the tariffs were not truly imposed for national security purposes. The court denied the motion, determining that the plaintiffs were unlikely to prevail on the merits of their challenge. According to the case docket, the parties agreed to dismiss the case in May 2018. In another case, which was heard by a three-judge panel of the court, the American Institute for International Steel (AIIS), a trade association, challenged the constitutionality of Congress's delegation of authority to the President under Section 232. The plaintiffs in the case argued that "Congress created an unconstitutional regime in section 232, in which there are essentially no limits or guidelines on the trigger or the remedies available to the President, and no alternative protections to assure that the President stays within the law, instead of making the law himself." On March 25, 2019, the court issued an opinion rejecting the plaintiffs' arguments that Congress delegated too much of its legislative power to the President in Section 232, in violation of the separation of powers established in the Constitution. In granting the United States' motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court held that it was bound by a 1976 Supreme Court precedent determining that Section 232 did not amount to an unconstitutional delegation because it established an "intelligible principle" to guide presidential action. One member of the three-judge panel, Judge Katzmann, wrote separately to express his significant concerns about the ruling without openly dissenting. Katzmann wrote that he was bound to follow Supreme Court precedent and uphold the delegation but questioned whether the nondelegation doctrine retained any significant meaning if a delegation as broad as that in Section 232 was permissible. The case is currently under appeal. Most recently, U.S. importers of Turkish steel have initiated a case arguing that the President's increase of the Section 232 steel tariffs from 25% to 50% on U.S. imports from Turkey did not have a sufficient national security rationale, did not follow statutory procedural mandates, and violates the plaintiffs' Fifth Amendment Due Process rights because the action "creates an arbitrary distinction between importers of steel products from Turkey and importers of steel products from all other sources." The case remains pending before the CIT. WTO Cases The President's imposition of tariffs on certain imports of steel and aluminum products, as well as Commerce's exemption of certain WTO members' products from such tariffs, may also have implications for the United States under WTO agreements. As an example, on April 9, 2018, China took the first step in challenging the executive branch's actions as violating U.S. obligations under the WTO agreements (particularly the Agreement on Safeguards) by requesting consultations with the United States. Under WTO dispute settlement rules, members must first attempt to settle their disputes through consultations. If these fail, the member initiating a dispute may request the establishment of a dispute settlement panel composed of trade experts to determine whether a country has violated WTO rules. In October, China requested the formation of a panel. Other WTO members have requested consultations with the United States, or joined existing requests, and panels have been composed to hear the cases (see Figure 6 ). In its request, China alleged that the U.S. tariff measures and exemptions are contrary to U.S. obligations under several provisions of the GATT, the foundational WTO agreement that sets forth binding international rules on international trade in goods. In particular, China alleged that the measure violates GATT Article II, which generally prohibits members from imposing duties on imported goods in excess of upper limits to which they agreed in their Schedules of Concessions and Commitments. It further alleged that Commerce's granting of exemptions from the import tariffs to some WTO member countries, but not to China, violates GATT Article I, which obligates the United States to treat China's goods no less favorably than the goods of other WTO members (i.e., most-favored-nation treatment). China also maintained that the Section 232 tariff measures are "in substance" a safeguards measure intended to alleviate injury to a domestic industry from increased quantities of imported steel that competes with domestic steel, but that the United States did not make the proper findings and follow the proper procedures for imposing such a measure as required by the GATT and WTO Safeguards Agreement. The United States has invoked the so-called national security exception in GATT Article XXI in defense of the steel and aluminum tariffs. GATT Article XXI states, in relevant part, that the GATT will not be construed . . . (b) to prevent any [member country] from taking any action which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests (i) relating to fissionable materials or the materials from which they are derived; (ii) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and to such traffic in other goods and materials as is carried on directly or indirectly for the purpose of supplying a military establishment; [or] (iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations. . . While some analysts argue that a WTO panel may evaluate whether a WTO member's use of the national security exception falls within one of the three provisions listed above, historically, the United States has taken the position that this exception is self-judging—or, in other words, once a WTO member has invoked the exception to justify a measure potentially inconsistent with its WTO obligations, a WTO panel may not proceed to the merits of the dispute and cannot evaluate whether the WTO member's use of the exception is proper. Though this exception has been invoked several times throughout the history of the WTO and its predecessor agreement, the GATT 1947, it has yet to be interpreted by a WTO dispute settlement panel. Accordingly, there is little guidance as to (1) whether a WTO panel would decide, as a threshold matter, that it had the authority to evaluate whether the United States' invocation of the exception was proper; and (2) how a panel might apply the national security exception, if invoked, in any dispute before the WTO involving the new steel and aluminum tariffs. In the past, however, WTO members have expressed concern that overuse of the exception will undermine the world trading system because countries might enact a multitude of protectionist measures under the guise of national security. If one of the WTO panels renders an adverse decision against the United States, the United States would be expected to remove the tariffs, generally within a reasonable period of time, or face the possibility of paying compensation to the complaining member or being subject to countermeasures allowed under the rules. Such countermeasures might include the complaining member imposing higher duties on imports of selected products from the United States. However, China has already begun imposing its own duties on selected U.S. exports without awaiting the outcome of a dispute settlement proceeding, perhaps because it often takes years before the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body authorizes a prevailing WTO member to retaliate. In turn, the United States has argued that unilateral imposition of tariffs in response to the U.S. Section 232 measures cannot be justified under WTO rules. On July 16, 2018, the United States filed its own WTO complaints over the retaliatory tariffs imposed by five countries (Canada, China, EU, Mexico, and Turkey) in response to U.S. actions, and in late August filed a similar case against Russia. Dispute settlement panels have been composed to hear these cases. Additional Section 232 Investigations Automobiles and Parts As mentioned, subsequent to the steel and aluminum investigations, the Trump Administration initiated a third Section 232 investigation into the imports of automobiles, including SUVs, vans and light trucks, and automotive parts in May 2018. Commerce held a public hearing to inform the investigation and requested comments from stakeholders on the impact of these imports on national security, identifying a broad set of factors related to national defense and the national economy for consideration. As many foreign auto manufacturers have established facilities in the United States, Commerce specifically requested information on how the impact may differ when "U.S. production by majority U.S.-owned firms is considered separately from U.S. production by majority foreign-owned firms." The value of U.S. imports potentially covered under the new investigation is significantly greater than that of steel and aluminum imports. With complex global supply chains, industry dynamics such as the existence of foreign-owned auto manufacturing facilities in the United States, and the potential for further retaliation by trading partners if tariffs are imposed as a result of the investigation, the economic consequences could be substantial. According to Ford Motor Co.'s executive vice president and president of global operations, Joe Hinrichs, "the auto industry is a global business. The benefits of scale and global reach are important ... The big companies that we compete against—Toyota, Volkswagen, General Motors, Nissan, Hyundai, Kia—are all global in nature because we realize the benefits of sharing the engineering, the platforms and scale, and our supply base." Some Members and auto industry representatives have spoken out in opposition to the new Section 232 investigation. The Driving American Jobs Coalition was created to oppose the potential tariffs and is comprised of a coalition of industry groups representing auto manufacturers, parts suppliers, auto dealers, parts distributors, retailers, and vehicle service providers. Others view the investigation as a tactical move by the Administration to pressure trade negotiating partners as the President continues to threaten auto tariffs. As mentioned, the EU has reportedly drafted a list of targets for retaliatory tariffs if the Administration moves forward with auto tariffs under Section 232. Three groups have voiced support for at least limited measures to address auto imports: the United Automobile Workers, the United Steelworkers, and the Forging Industry Association. Commerce submitted the final Section 232 report to the President on February 17, 2019, but the report has not been publicly released. Some Members have asked for the report to be made public, and the Cause of Action Institute sued Commerce to release the report after an unsuccessful Freedom of Information Act request. As noted earlier, the President has 90 days to review the report and make his determination as to whether he agrees or not with the Commerce findings and/or recommendation. In advance of the report's release, Senate Finance Chairman Grassley publicly reiterated his opposition to potential tariffs on auto or auto part imports, stating "I hope the president will heed my call to forgo the auto tariffs and focus on opening new markets.... In short, raising tariffs on cars and parts would be a huge tax on consumers who buy or service their cars, whether they are imported or domestically produced." Proposed legislation in the House and Senate would require a report by the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) on the economic importance of domestic automotive manufacturing before the President could act ( S. 121 , H.R. 1710 ). Uranium Unlike the self-initiated investigations into steel, aluminum, and auto imports, the Trump Administration opened two additional Section 232 investigations in response to industry petitions. In July 2018, Commerce launched a Section 232 investigation into uranium ore and product imports in response to a petition from two U.S. mining companies and after consulting with industry and government officials. The petitioners, the uranium-mining companies Energy Fuels and Ur-Energy, requested limiting imports to guarantee about 25% of the U.S. nuclear market for U.S. uranium producers, and "Buy American" provisions for government purchases of uranium to bolster the industry. Uranium mining is a relatively small-scale industry in the United States, accounting for 1.6% of global production of uranium from mines. At the end of 2017, Energy Fuels was the only remaining operator of a uranium mine in the United States. The Energy Information Administration (EIA) reports U.S. production at U.S. mines shrank to 1.2 million pounds, down 55% from 2016, and U.S. production in 2017 was at its lowest annual level since 2004. EIA also reports annual drops since 2013 in shipments, employment, and expenditures in the U.S. uranium production industry. Kazakhstan accounted for 39% of the world's production of uranium; Canada and Australia supplied roughly a third of the world's production in 2017. China made up 3.2% of worldwide uranium production in 2017. The House Natural Resources Subcommittee questioned the need for the investigation and requested documentation from the petitioners regarding their communication with the Administration. The U.S. nuclear power industry opposes the investigation and claims that a uranium quota would lead to job losses in their industry. Titanium Sponge In March 2019, Commerce launched another Section 232 investigation in response to a petition from a U.S. titanium firm. In explaining the investigation, the Commerce Secretary stated, "Titanium sponge has uses in a wide range of defense applications, from helicopter blades and tank armor to fighter jet airframes and engines." Titanium Metals Corporation (known as Timet) is currently the only producer of titanium sponge in the United States; USGS estimates that titanium sponge manufacturing employed 150 workers in 2018. In 2015, there were three such producers. For 2018, and the United States was 75% import reliant for titanium sponge. In 2018, Japan was the biggest supplier of titanium sponge, accounting for more than 90% of sponge imports; Kazakhstan was the second-leading supplier to the United States, making up 6.5% of imported titanium sponge. Although China was the world's largest producer of titanium sponge, producing 70,000 tons in 2018, it is not an important source of sponge imports for the United States. Any Section 232 tariff would be added to the existing 15% ad valorem tariff on titanium sponge imports. Unlike steel and aluminum imports, which have multiple countervailing and antidumping duties in place, there are no such duties in place for uranium or titanium sponge imports; however, there is a suspended investigation into Russian uranium imports. Potential Economic Impact The Section 232 tariffs affect various stakeholders in the U.S. economy, prompting reactions from several Members of Congress, some in support and others voicing concern. Congress has also held a number of hearings to examine the issue. For example, the tariffs and their effects on U.S. stakeholders were a focus of Members' questions during recent House Ways and Means and Senate Finance hearings on U.S. trade policy with USTR Robert Lighthizer. In general, the tariffs are expected to benefit domestic steel and aluminum producers by restricting imports, thereby putting upward pressure on U.S. steel and aluminum prices and expanding production in those sectors, while potentially negatively affecting consumers and downstream domestic industries (e.g., manufacturing and construction) due to higher costs of input materials. In addition, retaliatory tariffs by other countries raise the price of U.S. exports, potentially leading to fewer sales of U.S. products abroad, magnifying the possible negative impact of the Section 232 tariffs. Economic studies of the tariffs estimate varying potential aggregate outcomes, but generally suggest an overall modest negative effect on the U.S. economy of the tariffs imposed to date, which could increase considerably if the Administration proceeds with Section 232 tariffs on U.S. motor vehicles and parts. U.S. motor vehicle and parts imports totaled $373.7 billion in 2018, nearly eight times the value of U.S. steel and aluminum imports ($47.1 billion) subject to Section 232 tariffs. Economic Dynamics of the Tariff Increase Changes in tariffs affect economic activity directly by influencing the price of imported goods and indirectly through changes in exchange rates and real incomes. The extent of the price change and its impact on trade flows, employment, and production in the United States and abroad depend on resource constraints and how various economic actors (foreign producers of the goods subject to the tariffs, producers of domestic substitutes, producers in downstream industries, and consumers) respond as the effects of the increased tariffs reverberate throughout the economy. The following outcomes are generally expected at the level of individual firms and consumers: The price of the imported goods subject to the tariff is likely to increase . The magnitude of the price increase will depend on a number of factors, including the extent to which foreign producers lower their own prices and absorb a portion of the tariff increase. Known as the tariff "pass-through" rate, recent economic studies find that the tariffs have been nearly completely passed through to downstream industries and consumers with little effect on foreign export prices. Anecdotal reports suggest U.S. firms are paying increased prices for steel and aluminum purchased from abroad. For example, CP Industries, a maker of steel cylinders based in McKeesport, PA, is paying tariffs on imports of certain Chinese steel pipes it asserts cannot be produced in sufficient quantity in the United States to meet its demands. The company claims this raises the costs of its production by roughly 10%. The higher input costs potentially give foreign competitors an advantage in the U.S. market and abroad. Demand for the imported goods facing the tariffs is likely to decrease, while demand for those goods produced domestically is likely to increase. Consumers and downstream firms' sensitivity to the price increase (their price elasticity of demand) will depend in large part on the degree to which the steel and aluminum products produced domestically are sufficient substitutes for the products facing the tariffs. In 2018, the year the tariffs went into effect, U.S. imports of steel and aluminum subject to higher tariffs decreased by more than 10% in quantity terms, although both increased slightly in value terms ( Figure 3 ). Annual domestic U.S. steel production meanwhile increased by 6% from 2017 to 2018, while primary U.S. aluminum production increased by 18% (January-November, latest data available). The price and output of goods subject to the tariff produced domestically are likely to increase. As consumers of the products facing the tariffs shift their demand to lower- or zero-tariff substitutes, domestic producers are likely to respond with a combination of increased output and prices. Resource constraints that may limit or slow an expansion of output could cause prices to increase more rapidly. The low U.S. unemployment rate suggests such constraints may include frictions in shifting labor from other domestic industries into steel and aluminum production. In addition to reacting to higher-cost production and supply constraints, domestic steel and aluminum producers may also increase prices simply as a strategic response to the higher prices charged by their foreign competitors subject to the tariffs. In an anticipation of higher domestic demand and the ability to charge higher prices on U.S. steel and aluminum, some producers have announced investment and production increases. For example, U.S. Steel Corporation announced plans to increase capacity through a number of new or expanded facilities, including most recently a new furnace near Birmingham, AL. Similarly, three U.S. aluminum smelters are being restarted, including a Century Aluminum facility in Kentucky. Broad indices of U.S. steel and aluminum producer prices were up 14% and 5% between 2017 and 2018, respectively. Input costs for downstream domestic producers are likely to increase. As prices likely rise in the United States for the goods subject to the tariffs, domestic industries that use steel and aluminum in their products ("downstream" industries, such as auto manufacturers and oil producers) face higher input costs. Higher input costs for downstream domestic producers are likely to lead to some combination of lower profits for producers and higher prices for consumers, which in turn could dampen demand for downstream products and result in a reduction of output in these sectors, and possibly employment declines. For example, Ford CEO James Hacket suggested the metal tariffs are expected to cost the auto manufacturer roughly $1 billion. U.S. exports from the industries subject to retaliatory tariffs are likely to decline. Six U.S. trading partners (Canada, Mexico, EU, China, Turkey, and Russia) have imposed retaliatory tariffs in response to U.S. Section 232 tariffs affecting approximately $23 billion of U.S. exports in 2018, including many U.S. agricultural goods such as pork and dairy products. The retaliatory tariffs may have led to decreased demand for U.S. exports and given U.S. exporters an incentive to manufacture abroad to avoid the tariffs. For example, according to U.S. Department of Agriculture, Chinese tariffs on soybeans caused overall U.S. agricultural and food exports to China to decline in 2018, and China increased its purchases of soybeans from Brazil and elsewhere. Canada, Mexico, and the EU account for 80% of U.S. exports subject to retaliatory tariffs in response to Section 232 actions. Since the retaliatory tariffs took effect, U.S. exports to these trading partners have decreased on average by 25%, 10%, and 38%, respectively. Facing retaliatory tariffs on U.S. motorcycle exports to the EU, Harley Davidson has announced its intent to shift some of its production out of the United States in order to remain competitive in the EU market. Aggregating these microeconomic effects, tariffs also have the potential to affect macroeconomic variables, although these impacts may be limited in the case of the Section 232 tariffs, given their focus on two specific commodities with potential exemptions, relative to the size of the U.S. economy. With regard to the value of the U.S. dollar, as demand for foreign goods potentially falls in response to the tariffs, U.S. demand for foreign currency may also fall, putting upward pressure on the relative exchange value of the dollar. This in turn would reduce demand for U.S. exports and increase demand for foreign imports, partly offsetting the effects of the tariffs. Tariffs may also affect national consumption patterns, depending on how the shift to higher-cost domestic substitutes affects consumers' discretionary income and therefore aggregate demand. Finally, given their ad hoc nature, these tariffs, in particular, are also likely to increase uncertainty in the U.S. business environment, potentially placing a drag on investment. Assessing the Overall Economic Impact From a global standpoint, tariff increases on steel and aluminum are likely to result in an unambiguous welfare loss due to what most economists consider is a misallocation of resources caused by shifting production from lower-cost to higher-cost producers. On the other hand, some see the Administration's trade actions as addressing long-standing issues of fairness that are intended to provide U.S. producers with a more level playing field. Looking solely at the domestic economy, the net welfare effect is unclear, but also likely negative. Generally, economic models would suggest the negative impact of higher prices on consumers and industries using the imported goods is likely to outweigh the benefit of higher profits and expanded production in the import-competing industry and the additional government revenue generated by the tariff. It is theoretically plausible to generate an overall positive welfare effect for the domestic economy if the foreign producers absorb a large enough portion of the tariff increase. Given the current excess capacity and intense price competition in the global steel and aluminum industries, however, this level of tariff absorption by foreign firms seems unlikely. Moreover, retaliation by foreign governments would erode this welfare gain. The direct economic effects of the Section 232 tariffs on steel and aluminum may be limited due to the relatively small share of economic activity directly affected. In 2018, U.S. steel and aluminum imports were $29.5 billion and $17.6 billion, respectively, roughly 2% of all U.S. imports. Various stakeholder groups have prepared quantitative estimates of the costs and benefits across the economy. Specific estimates from these studies should be interpreted with caution given their sensitivity to modeling assumptions and techniques, but generally they suggest a small negative overall effect on U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) from the tariffs with employment shifts into the domestic steel and aluminum industries and away from other sectors in the economy. Issues for Congress As Congress debates the Administration's Section 232 actions it may consider the following issues, many of which include potential legislative responses. Appropriate Delegation of Constitutional Authority In enacting Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act, Congress delegated aspects of its authority to regulate international commerce to the executive branch. Use of the statute to restrict imports does not require any formal approval by Congress or an affirmative finding by an independent agency, such as the USITC, granting the President broad discretion in applying this authority. Should Congress disapprove of the President's use of the statute, its current recourse is limited to passing new legislation or using informal tools to pressure the Administration (e.g., putting holds on presidential nominee confirmations in the Senate). Some Members and observers have suggested that Congress should require additional steps in the Section 232 process. In the 116 th Congress, a variety of proposals have been introduced to amend Section 232, in various ways, such as by requiring an economic impact study by the USITC, congressional consultation, or approval of any new tariffs, allowing for a resolution of disapproval of trade actions, or revisiting the delegation of its constitutional authority more broadly, such as by requiring congressional approval of executive branch trade actions more generally. Some Members, including Senate Finance Chair Grassley, seek to draft a consensus bill to restore congressional authority that would gain sufficient bipartisan support to withstand a possible presidential veto. Issues under debate include whether any changes would be retroactive, potentially affecting the steel and aluminum tariffs, or whether they would only apply to future actions, and whether Congress's role should be consultative or decisive (e.g., requiring congressional approval). For a list of proposals in the 116th Congress, see Appendix C . Legislative Responses to Retaliatory Tariffs Several major U.S. trading partners have proposed or are currently imposing retaliatory tariffs in response to the U.S. actions. In the 115 th Congress, some Members of Congress proposed legislation to respond to the potential economic impact of these foreign retaliatory tariffs. Some proposals expand programs like trade adjustment assistance to include assistance for workers, firms, and farmers harmed by foreign retaliation. Other measures propose increased funding and programming for certain agricultural export programs to help farmers find new markets for their exports. For a list of proposals from the 115 th Congress, see Appendix C . Establishing Threshold It is relatively easy for a stakeholder to prompt the Section 232 investigation process. The statute states that "Upon request of the head of any department or agency, upon application of an interested party, or upon his own motion, the Secretary of Commerce ... shall immediately initiate an appropriate investigation." To limit the volume of Section 232 petitions and ensure that any requests are sufficiently justified, Congress may consider establishing criteria or a threshold that a request must meet before Commerce and Defense agencies invest resources in conducting a Section 232 investigation. Similarly, Congress may consider limiting the types of imported articles that may be considered under Section 232 (e.g., S. 287 ). Interpreting National Security Congress created the Section 232 process to try to ensure that U.S. imports do not cause undue harm to U.S. national security. Some observers have raised concerns that restrictions on U.S. imports under Section 232, however, may harm U.S. allies, which could also have negative implications for U.S. national security. For example, Canada is considered part of the U.S. defense industrial base according to U.S. law and is also a top source of U.S. imports of steel and aluminum. National security is not clearly defined in the statute, allowing for ambiguity and alternative interpretations by an Administration. International trade commitments both at the multilateral and FTA level generally include broad exceptions on the basis of national security. The Trump Administration argues its Section 232 actions are permissible under these exceptions, while many U.S. trading partners claim the actions are unrelated to national security. If the United States invokes the national security exemption in what may be perceived to be an arbitrary way, it could similarly encourage other countries to use national security as a rationale to enact protectionist measures and limit the scope of potential U.S. responses to such actions. Congress may consider amending Section 232 to address these concerns. For example, some Members have proposed to narrowly defin e "national security" under Section 232 and the factors to be considered in a Section 232 investigation . One bill limits it to protection against foreign aggression ( S. 287 ). Establishing New International Rules Addressing the specific market-distorting practices that are the root causes of steel and aluminum overcapacity (e.g., government intervention, subsidization) may require updating or amending existing trade agreements. Broad WTO negotiations for new multilateral rules, which may have offered opportunity to address some of these issues, have stalled. Recent U.S. FTA negotiations, including the recently concluded USMCA, include related disciplines (e.g., by establishing rules on state-owned enterprises or anticorruption), and the United States is engaged in negotiations with China on overcapacity and other trade barriers. To address these issues, Congress could consider establishing specific or enhanced new negotiating objectives for trade agreement negotiations, potentially through new or modified Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) legislation. Congress could also consider directing the executive branch to prioritize engagement in such negotiations, by, for example, endorsing the current OECD discussions or the trilateral negotiations announced by USTR with the EU and Japan to address nonmarket practices, including subsidies, state-owned enterprises, and technology transfer requirements, mostly aimed at China. Impact on the Multilateral Trading System Some analysts argue that the United States risks undermining the international system it helped create when it invokes unilateral trade actions that may violate core commitments and with regard to broad use of national security exemptions. These observers fear that disagreements at the WTO on these issues may be difficult to resolve through the existing dispute settlement procedures given the concerns over national sovereignty that would likely be raised if a WTO dispute settlement panel issued a ruling relating to national security. Furthermore, actions by the United States that do not make use of the multilateral system's dispute settlement process may open the United States to criticism and could impede U.S. efforts to use the multilateral system for its own enforcement purposes. For example, China called on other parties such as the EU to join it in opposition to the U.S. actions on Section 232, while simultaneously promoting domestic policies often seen as undermining WTO rules. Congress could potentially address these concerns by conducting increased oversight of the Administration's actions by inviting testimony from multiple parties, considering legislation to establish more stringent criteria, or requiring congressional approval of any use of Section 232, among other possible actions. Impact on Broader International Relationships The U.S. unilateral actions under Section 232 have raised the level of tension with U.S. trading partners and could pose risks to broader international economic cooperation. For example, trade tensions between the United States and its traditional allies contributed to the lack of consensus at the conclusion of the G-7 summit in June 2018. The strain on international trading relationships also could have broader policy implications, including for cooperation between the United States and allies on foreign policy issues. Appendix A. Amendments to and Past Uses of Section 232 (19 U.S.C. §1862) Concern over national security, trade, and domestic industry was first raised by the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1954 (P.L. 83-464 §2). The 1954 act prohibited the President from decreasing duties on any article if the President determined that such a reduction might threaten domestic production needed for national defense. In 1955, the provision was amended to also allow the President to increase trade restrictions, in cases where national security may be threatened. The Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1958 (P.L. 85-686 §8) expanded the 1955 provisions, by outlining specific factors to be considered during an investigation, allowing the private sector to petition for relief, and requiring the President to publish a report on each petition. The factors to be considered during an investigation included (1) the domestic production capacity needed for U.S. national security requirements, (2) the effect of imports on domestic production needed for national security requirements, and (3) "the impact of foreign competition on the economic welfare of individual domestic industries." Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (P.L. 87-794) continued the provisions of the 1958 Act. Section 232 has been amended multiple times over the years, including (1) to change the time limits for investigations and actions; (2) to change the advisory responsibility from the Secretary of the Treasury to the Secretary of Commerce; and (3) to limit presidential authority to adjust petroleum imports. In 1980, Congress amended Section 232 to create a joint disapproval resolution provision under which Congress could override presidential actions to adjust petroleum or petroleum product imports. The bill was signed into law on April 2, 1980, the same day that President Carter proclaimed a license fee on crude oil and gasoline pursuant to Section 232 in Proclamation 4744. On April 15, 1980, two weeks after the President's proclamation on the crude oil and gasoline license fee, Representative James Shannon introduced House Joint Resolution 531 to disapprove and effectively nullify the presidential action. The House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Trade voted 14 to 4 to disapprove the presidential action; the resolution was favorably reported out of the full committee on a 27 to 7 vote. Dissenting views were voiced by Members who supported the fee program and were concerned about U.S. dependence on foreign oil. While the measure passed the House, it was indefinitely postponed in the Senate. Multiple joint resolutions of disapproval were introduced in Congress in 1980, but none passed both chambers. In addition to the disapproval mechanism created in the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980, President Carter's action in Proclamation 4744 was also challenged in court and through separate legislation in Congress. On May 13, 1980, a federal district court struck down the President's action on petroleum imports as unlawful, thereby preventing the government from implementing the program. The court's decision, however, was appealable to the higher courts. Before a court could consider an appeal, Congress enacted an amendment to a bill to extend the public debt limit ( P.L. 96-264 , Section 2) on June 6, 1980, which terminated Proclamation 4744's petroleum import program. Section 2 of P.L. 96-264 did not use the disapproval mechanism established in the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980; it was a separate piece of legislation that was attached as an amendment to an unrelated bill. On June 19, 1980, the President formally rescinded Proclamation 4744 "in its entirety, effective March 15, 1980." Appendix B. Section 232 Investigations Appendix C. Proposals Concerning Section 232 Appendix D. 2018 U.S. Steel and Aluminum Imports

President Trump has used Section 232 authority to apply new tariffs to steel and aluminum imports and potentially on automobile and automobile parts and other sectors currently under investigation. These actions have raised a number of policy issues and some Members of Congress have introduced legislation to revise various Section 232 authorities. Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. §1862) provides the President with the ability to impose restrictions on certain imports based on an affirmative determination by the Department of Commerce (Commerce) that the product under investigation "is being imported into the United States in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security." Section 232 actions are of interest to Congress because they are a delegation of Congress's constitutional authority "To lay and collect … Duties" and "To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations." Global overcapacity in steel and aluminum production, mainly driven by China, has been an ongoing concern of Congress. The George W. Bush, Obama, and Trump Administrations each engaged in multilateral discussions to address global steel capacity reduction through the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). While the United States has extensive antidumping and countervailing duties on Chinese steel imports to counter China's unfair trade practices, steel industry and other experts argue that the magnitude of Chinese production acts to depress prices globally. Effective March 23, 2018, President Trump applied 25% and 10% tariffs, respectively, on certain steel and aluminum imports. The President temporarily exempted several countries from the tariffs pending negotiations on potential alternative measures. Permanent tariff exemptions in exchange for quantitative limitations on U.S. imports were eventually announced covering steel for Brazil and South Korea, and both steel and aluminum for Argentina. Australia was permanently exempted from both tariffs with no quantitative restrictions. In August 2018, President Trump raised the tariff to 50% on steel imports from Turkey. The proposed United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) would not resolve or address the Section 232 tariffs on imported steel and aluminum from Canada and Mexico. Commerce is managing a process for potential product exclusions in order to limit potential negative domestic effects of the tariffs on U.S. businesses and consumers. Of the nearly 70,000 steel exclusion requests, over 16,000 have been granted, and about 46,000 have been denied to date. Commerce also received about 10,000 aluminum exclusion requests, with 3,000 exclusions granted and 500 denied. Several Members have raised issues and concerns about the exclusionary process. U.S. trading partners are challenging the tariffs under World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement rules and have threatened or enacted retaliatory measures. Some analysts view the U.S. unilateral actions as potentially undermining WTO rules, which generally prohibit parties from acting unilaterally, but provide exceptions, including when parties act to protect "essential security interests." Congress enacted Section 232 during the Cold War when national security issues were at the forefront of national debate. The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 sets clear steps and timelines for Section 232 investigations and actions, but allows the President to make a final determination over the appropriate action to take following an affirmative finding by Commerce that the relevant imports threaten to impair national security. Prior to the Trump Administration, there were 26 Section 232 investigations, resulting in nine affirmative findings by Commerce. In six of those cases the President imposed a trade action. The Trump Administration has launched three additional Section 232 investigations. On May 23, 2018, Commerce initiated an investigation on U.S. automobile and automobile part imports; on July 18, 2018, Commerce launched a Section 232 investigation into uranium ore and product imports; and on March 4, 2019, Commerce began an investigation into titanium sponge imports. The latter two investigations were in response to petitions by U.S. firms. These investigations, as well as the Administration's decision to apply the steel and aluminum tariffs on imports from Canada, Mexico, and the EU—all major suppliers of the affected imports—have prompted further questions by some Members of Congress and trade policy analysts on the appropriate use of the trade statute and the proper interpretation of threats to national security on which Section 232 investigations are based. These actions have also intensified debate over potential legislation to constrain the President's authority with respect to Section 232. The steel and aluminum tariffs are affecting various stakeholders in the U.S. economy, prompting reactions from several Members of Congress, some in support of the measures and others voicing concerns. In general, the tariffs are expected to benefit some domestic steel and aluminum manufacturers, leading to potentially higher domestic steel and aluminum prices and expansion in production in those sectors, while potentially negatively affecting consumers and many end users (e.g., auto manufacturing and construction) through higher costs. To date, Congress has held hearings on the potential economic and broader policy effects of the tariffs, and legislation has been introduced to override the tariffs that have already been imposed, or to revise or potentially limit the authority previously delegated to the President in future investigations.

crs_R45472

crs_R45472_0

Introduction Human activities, particularly fossil fuel combustion and industrial operations, have raised the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) and other greenhouse gases (GHG) by about 40% over the past 150 years. Almost all climate scientists agree that these GHG increases have contributed to a warmer climate today and that, if they continue, will contribute to future climate change. Although a range of actions that seek to reduce GHG emissions are currently underway or being developed on the international and sub-national level (e.g., individual state actions or regional partnerships) , federal policymakers and stakeholders have different viewpoints over what to do, if anything, about future climate change and related impacts. Congressional interest in GHG emission control legislation has fluctuated over the last 15 years. Proposals to limit GHG emissions have often focused on market-based approaches, such as a GHG emission cap-and-trade program or a GHG emissions tax (often referred to as a carbon tax) or fee. In general, a market-based approach would place a price on GHG emissions (e.g., through an emissions cap or emission tax or fee), allowing covered entities to determine their pathway of compliance. This report provides a comparison of the legislative proposals from the 108 th through the 116 th Congresses that were and are designed primarily to reduce GHG emissions using market-based approaches such as cap-and-trade or carbon tax/fee programs. During this time frame, Members introduced multiple energy-related proposals that would have likely resulted in reductions in GHG emissions—legislation that promotes renewable energy or encourages carbon capture and sequestration —but these bills are not discussed in this report. In addition, starting in the 112 th Congress, some Members have introduced resolutions in the House and Senate expressing the view that a carbon tax is not in the economic interests of the United States. In September 2018, the House passed a resolution "expressing the sense of Congress that a carbon tax would be detrimental to the United States economy" ( H.Con.Res. 119 ). An analogous resolution was not introduced in the Senate in the 115 th Congress. As Figure 2 illustrates, between the 108 th and 111 th Congresses, most of the introduced bills would have established cap-and-trade systems. Between the 112 th and 115 th Congresses, most of the introduced bills would have established carbon tax or emissions fee programs. In the 111 th Congress, Members offered multiple and varied proposals, ultimately resulting in the House passage of H.R. 2454 , an economy-wide cap-and-trade bill. A companion bill in the Senate ( S. 1733 ) was ordered reported from the Committee on Environment and Public Works, but the bill was never brought to the Senate floor for consideration. In subsequent Congresses, some Members continued to offer GHG emission control legislation, but these proposals saw minimal legislative activity. During that time frame, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) used existing Clean Air Act authorities to promulgate GHG emission standards for key sectors, including the electric power and transportation sectors. EPA rulemakings in this area—particularly the 2015 Clean Power Plan final rule and the 2018 Affordable Clean Energy proposed rule —generated considerable interest and debate in Congress. The proposals from the 116 th Congress range in their scope of emissions covered from CO 2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion to multiple GHG emissions from a broader array of sources. In addition, the proposals differ by how, to whom, and for what purpose the fee revenues or allowance value would be applied. Some economic analyses indicate that policy choices to distribute the tax, fee, or emission allowance revenue would yield greater economic impacts than the direct impacts of the carbon price. The first section of this report provides background information on cap-and-trade and carbon tax or emission fee programs. The second section compares the GHG emission reduction legislation in each Congress (108 th -116 th ). Background Over the last 15 years, broad GHG emission reduction legislation has generally involved market-based approaches—such as cap-and-trade systems or carbon tax programs—that rely on private sector choices and market forces to minimize the costs of emission reductions and spur innovation. Both carbon tax and emissions cap-and-trade programs would place a price—directly or indirectly—on GHG emissions or their inputs (e.g., fossil fuels), both would increase the price of fossil fuels for the consumer, and both would reduce GHG emissions to some degree. Preference between the two approaches ultimately depends on which variable policymakers prefer to precisely control: emission levels or emission prices. As a practical matter, these market-based policies may include complementary or hybrid designs, incorporating elements to increase certainty in price or emissions quantity. For example, legislation could provide mechanisms for adjusting a carbon tax/fee if a targeted range of emissions reductions were not achieved in a given period. Alternatively, legislation could include mechanisms that would bound the range of market prices for a cap-and-trade system's emissions allowances to improve price certainty. What Is a GHG Emissions Cap-and-Trade System? A GHG cap-and-trade system creates an overall limit, or cap, on GHG emissions from certain sources. Cap-and-trade programs can vary by the sources covered, which often include major emitting sectors (e.g., power plants and carbon-intensive industries), fuel producers and/or processors (e.g., coal mines or petroleum refineries), or some combination of both. The emissions cap is partitioned into emission allowances . Typically, in a GHG cap-and-trade system, one emission allowance represents the authority to emit one metric ton of carbon dioxide-equivalent (mtCO 2 e). The emissions cap creates a new commodity—the emission allowance. Policymakers may decide to distribute the emission allowances to covered entities at no cost (based on, for example, previous years' emissions), sell the allowances (e.g., through an auction), or use some combination of these strategies. The distribution of emission allowances is typically a source of significant debate during a cap-and-trade program's development, because the allowances have monetary value. At the end of each established compliance period (e.g., a calendar year or multiple years), covered sources submit emission allowances to an implementing agency to cover the number of tons emitted. If a source did not provide enough allowances to cover its emissions, the source would be subject to penalties. Covered sources would have a financial incentive to make reductions beyond what is required, because they could (1) sell or trade unused emission allowances to entities that face higher costs to reduce their facility emissions, (2) reduce the number of emission allowance they need to purchase, or (3) bank them, if allowed, to use in a future year. The use of emission offsets as a compliance option received attention during debate over cap-and-trade programs. An offset is a measurable reduction, avoidance, or sequestration of GHG emissions from a source not covered by an emission reduction program. Economic analyses of cap-and-trade proposals concluded that offset treatment (i.e., whether or not to allow their use and, if so, to what degree) would have a substantial impact on overall program cost. This is because some emissions and sources often not covered in cap-and-trade programs can reduce emissions at a lower cost per ton than many typically covered sources. However, the use of offsets generates considerable controversy, primarily over the concern that difficult-to-assess or fraudulent offsets could create uncertainty about the quantity of emission reductions. In addition, other mechanisms—such as allowance banking or borrowing—may be included to increase the flexibility of the program and, generally, reduce the costs. What Is a Carbon Tax or Emissions Fee? In a carbon tax or emissions fee program, policymakers attach a price to GHG emissions or the inputs that create them. A carbon tax/fee on emissions or emissions inputs—namely fossil fuels—would increase the relative price of the more carbon-intensive energy sources. This result is expected to spur innovation in less carbon-intensive technologies and stimulate other behavior that may decrease emissions. Economic modeling indicates that a carbon tax/fee approach could achieve emission reductions, the level of which would depend on the scope and stringency (i.e., tax or fee level) of the program. For example, to address emissions from fossil fuel combustion—76% of total U.S. GHG emissions —policymakers could apply a tax/fee to fossil fuels at approximately 3,000 entities, including coal mines, petroleum refineries, and entities required to report natural gas deliveries. A carbon tax/fee would generate a new revenue stream. The magnitude of the revenues would depend on the scope and rate of the tax or fee, the responsiveness of covered entities in reducing their potential emissions, and multiple other market factors. A 2016 Congressional Budget Office study estimated that a $25/ton carbon tax would yield approximately $100 billion in the first year of the program. When designing a carbon tax/fee system, one of the more controversial and challenging questions for policymakers is how, to whom, and for what purpose the new tax or fee revenues could be applied. Congress would face the same issues that would be encountered during a debate over emission allowance value distribution in a cap-and-trade system. When deciding how to allocate the revenues, policymakers would encounter trade-offs among objectives. The central trade-offs involve minimizing economy-wide costs, lessening the costs borne by specific groups—particularly low-income households and displaced workers or communities—and supporting a range of specific policy objectives. A primary argument against a carbon tax/fee system (and a cap-and-trade program) is the concern about the economy-wide costs that a carbon price could impose. The potential costs would depend on a number of factors, including the magnitude, design, and use of revenues of the carbon tax or fee. Others who may oppose a carbon tax system express opposition to federal taxes in general or the possibility that the revenues would enable greater federal spending. Owners of coal resources, in particular, would likely lose asset values under a carbon tax system—as under a cap-and-trade system—to the degree that coal becomes less competitive under the costs of emission reductions. GHG Emission Reduction Legislation by Congress This section compares GHG emission reduction legislation from the 108 th Congress to the 116 th Congress by including a separate legislative table for each Congress. The tables compare the bills by their overall framework, scope, stringency, and selected design elements. Categories of comparison include General framework: the proposed program structure—emissions cap, emissions tax or fee, or some combination of both—and scope in terms of emissions covered (multiple GHG emissions or just CO 2 emissions). Covered entities/materials: the industries, sectors, or materials that would be subject to the program. Emissions limit or target: the GHG or CO 2 emissions target or cap for a particular year. Some targets/caps would apply only to covered sources; others apply to total U.S. GHG emissions. Distribution of allowance value or tax revenue: how emission allowance value or carbon tax or fee revenue would be distributed (if applicable). Offset and international allowance treatment: the degree to which offsets and international allowances could be used for compliance purposes and the types of offset activities that would qualify. Some proposals limit offsets by percentage of required reductions; others limit offsets as a percentage of allowance submissions. Mechanism to address carbon-intensive imports: a central concern with a U.S. GHG reduction program is that it could raise U.S. prices more than goods manufactured abroad, potentially creating a competitive disadvantage for some domestic businesses, particularly carbon-intensive, trade-exposed industries. Policymakers could address these potential impacts in several ways—for example, through border adjustments, tax rebates, or emission allowances provided at no cost to selected industrial sectors. Additional GHG reduction measures: other mechanisms that are designed to further reduce GHG emissions that are not covered in the central program.

Congressional interest in market-based greenhouse gas (GHG) emission control legislation has fluctuated over the past 15 years. During that time, legislation has often involved market-based approaches, such as a cap-and-trade system or a carbon tax or fee program. Both approaches would place a price—directly or indirectly—on GHG emissions or their inputs (e.g., fossil fuels), both would increase the price of fossil fuels, and both would reduce GHG emissions to some degree. Both would allow emission sources to choose the best way to meet their emission requirements or reduce costs, potentially by using market forces to minimize national costs of emission reductions. Preference between the two approaches ultimately depends on which variable policymakers prefer to precisely control—emission levels or emission prices. A primary policy concern with either approach is the economic impacts that may result from the program. Expected energy price increases could have both economy-wide impacts (e.g., on the U.S. gross domestic product) and disproportionate effects on specific industries and particular demographic groups. The degree of these potential effects would depend on a number of factors, including the magnitude, design, and scope of the program and the use of tax or fee revenues or emission allowance values. This report includes a separate table for each Congress, comparing GHG emission reduction legislation by the following characteristics: General framework: the proposed program structure and scope in terms of emissions covered, multiple GHG emissions, or just carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. Covered entities/materials: a list of the industries, sectors, or materials that would be subject to the program. Emissions limit or target: the GHG or CO2 emissions target or cap for a specified year. Distribution of allowance value or tax revenue: how emission allowance value or carbon tax or fee revenue would be distributed. Offset and international allowance treatment: the degree to which offsets and international allowances could be used for compliance purposes and the types of offset activities that would qualify. Mechanism to address carbon-intensive imports: a U.S. GHG reduction program may create a competitive disadvantage for some domestic businesses, particularly carbon-intensive, trade-exposed industries. Additional GHG reduction measures: other mechanisms designed to further reduce GHG emissions that are not covered in the central program. As the figure below illustrates, between the 108th and 111th Congresses, most of the introduced bills would have established cap-and-trade systems. Between the 112th and 115th Congresses, most of the introduced bills would have established carbon tax or emissions fee programs. The proposals from the 116th Congress range in their scope of emissions covered from CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion to multiple GHG emissions from a broader array of sources. In addition, the proposals differ by how, to whom, and for what purpose the fee revenues or allowance value would be applied. Some economic analyses indicate that policy choices to distribute the tax, fee, or emission allowance revenue would yield greater economic impacts than the direct impacts of the carbon price.

crs_R45576

crs_R45576_0

Introduction During World War II and then again after the outbreak of fighting in Korea, Congress found that the existence of thousands of small business concerns was being threatened by war-induced shortages of materials coupled with an inability to obtain defense contracts or financial assistance. Concerned that many small businesses might fail without government assistance, in 1953, Congress passed and President Dwight Eisenhower signed into law the Small Business Act (P.L. 83-163), which authorized the Small Business Administration (SBA). The act specifies that it is the declared policy of Congress to promote the interests of small businesses to "preserve free competitive enterprise." Congress specified that one of the ways to preserve free competitive enterprise was to insure that small businesses received a "fair proportion" of federal contracts and subcontracts: It is the declared policy of the Congress that the Government should aid, counsel, assist, and protect, insofar as is possible, the interests of small-business concerns in order to preserve free competitive enterprise, to insure that a fair proportion of the total purchases and contracts or subcontracts for property and services for the Government (including but not limited to contracts or subcontracts for maintenance, repair, and construction) be placed with small-business enterprises, to insure that a fair proportion of the total sales of Government property be made to such enterprises, and to maintain and strengthen the overall economy of the Nation. Congress indicated that its intent in supporting small businesses was not to "favor small business at the expense of its larger competitors. Our only purpose in supporting the creation and effective operation of the SBA is to equalize the scales when necessary to guarantee the continued vigor of our competitive free enterprise system." More recently, a House committee report indicated that the primary rationale for small business contracting programs is the positive economic benefits they provide, as well as assisting small businesses overcome the complexities of the system. The economic benefits of these programs can be seen in two primary areas—market competition and local economic development. First, [these] programs … are designed to increase and diversify small contractors with the intent of expanding the federal supplier base. This leads to increased competition, which results in higher quality, greater product variety, and lower prices. Second, these contracting initiatives lower barriers to entry in a wide range of markets for small businesses. This provides greater market access for small firms' goods and services. From an economic perspective, such access is critical to generating positive macroeconomic benefits, including higher job creation, wage growth, and greater income distribution. Over the years, Congress has approved legislation to support small business in various ways. For example, the SBA administers several types of programs to support small businesses, including loan guaranty and venture capital programs to enhance small business access to capital; contracting programs to increase small business opportunities in federal contracting; direct loan programs for businesses, homeowners, and renters to assist their recovery from natural disasters; and small business management and technical assistance training programs to assist business formation and expansion. In recent years, congressional interest in these programs has increased, primarily because assisting small businesses is viewed as a means to stimulate economic activity and create jobs. This report describes the various federal programs, requirements, procurement officers, and procurement offices involved in promoting federal contracting and subcontracting with small businesses, small disadvantaged businesses (SDBs), SDBs participating the SBA's "8(a) Program," Historically Underutilized Business Zone (HUBZone) small businesses, women-owned small businesses (WOSBs), and service-disabled veteran-owned small businesses (SDVOSBs). The SBA administers many, but not all, of these programs. It examines the following federal requirements and authorities in promoting contracting and subcontracting with small businesses: 1. The requirement that federal agencies generally reserve contracts that have an anticipated value greater than the micro-purchase threshold (currently $10,000) but not greater than the simplified acquisition threshold (currently $250,000) exclusively for small businesses unless the contracting officer is unable to obtain offers from two or more small businesses that are competitive with market prices and the quality and delivery of the goods or services being purchased. 2. The establishment of small business procurement goals, both government-wide and agency specific, to promote the awarding of contracts to small businesses. 3. The requirement that federal agencies generally set aside contracts that have an anticipated value exceeding the simplified acquisition threshold exclusively for small businesses when there is a reasonable expectation that offers will be obtained from at least two responsible small businesses offering the products of different small businesses (Rule of Two) and the award will be made at a fair market price. 4. The authority provided federal agencies to make sole source awards to small businesses when the award could not otherwise be made (e.g., only a single source is available, under urgent and compelling circumstances). 5. The authority provided federal agencies to set aside contracts for, or grant other contracting preference to, specific types of small businesses (e.g., 8(a) small businesses, HUBZone small businesses, WOSBs, and SDVOSBs). It discusses the SBA's oversight and responsibilities concerning the small business goaling program, small business mentor-protégé programs, the 7(j) management and training program, and the surety bond guaranty program. It also discusses the role of the Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization (OSDBU), located in each federal agency, in promoting contracting with small businesses, and examines the role and responsibilities of various federal procurement officers, including procurement center representatives, commercial market representatives, and business opportunity specialists, in promoting small business contracting opportunities. This report concludes with a brief discussion of the strong bipartisan support for small business contracting programs. However, that does not mean that these programs face no opposition, or that issues have not been raised concerning the impact and operations of specific programs. For example, small business advocates note that implementing regulations in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) narrow the reach (and impact) of some small business contracting preferences by excluding specific types of contracts, such as those listed in the Federal Supply Schedules, from FAR requirements pertaining to small business contracting. Advocates want the federal government to enact policies that reduce or eliminate exclusions that narrow the reach of small business contracting preferences. Critics have questioned some of these programs' effectiveness, in terms of promoting both small business opportunities to win federal contracts and a more diversified, robust economy. Basic Contracting Requirements Federal Contractors With a few exceptions, businesses interested in bidding on a federal contract must obtain a Dun & Bradstreet Data Universal Numbering System (DUNS) number (i.e., a unique nine-digit identification number) for each of the business's physical locations, and register with the federal government's System for Award Management (SAM). SAM is used by government agencies for several purposes, including to find contractors. Businesses also must match their products and services to a North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code. Businesses generally have a primary NAICS code, and may have multiple NAICS codes if they sell multiple products and services. Businesses that identify themselves as a small business in SAM must (1) meet the Small Business Act's definition of a small business and (2) not exceed size standards established, and updated periodically, by the SBA. The Small Business Act defines a small business as one that is organized for profit; has a place of business in the United States; operates primarily within the United States or makes a significant contribution to the U.S. economy through payment of taxes or use of American products, materials, or labor; is independently owned and operated; and is not dominant in its field on a national basis. The business may be a sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, or any other legal form. The Small Business Act authorizes the SBA to establish size standards to ensure that only small businesses are provided SBA assistance. The SBA currently uses two types of size standards to determine SBA program eligibility: industry-specific size standards and alternative size standards , for some lending and venture capital investment programs based on the applicant's maximum tangible net worth and average net income after federal taxes. The SBA's industry-specific size standards are used to determine eligibility for federal small business contracting purposes. The SBA determines if a business is small by comparing that business's economic characteristics (typically number of employees or average annual receipts) to size standards listed in the SBA's Table of Small Business Size Standards . The table has size standards for 1,036 industrial classifications in the North American Industrial Classification System. Businesses that exceed the applicable size standard for their primary industry do not meet the requirement of being small. The SBA's size standards are designed to (1) encourage competition within each industry and (2) ensure that SBA assistance is provided only to firms that are not dominant in their field on a national basis. The size standards are derived through an assessment of four economic factors: (1) the average firm size, (2) the average assets size as a proxy of start-up costs and entry barriers, (3) the four-firm concentration ratio (the cumulative share of total industry receipts of that industry's four biggest firms) as a measure of industry competition, and (4) the size distribution of firms. The SBA also considers the ability of small businesses to compete for federal contracting opportunities and, when necessary, several secondary factors "as they are relevant to the industries and the interests of small businesses, including technological change, competition among industries, industry growth trends, and impacts of size standard revisions on small businesses." Historically, the SBA has used the number of employees to determine if manufacturing and mining companies are small (ranging from fewer than 50 employees for some industries to fewer than 1,500 employees for others) and average annual receipts for most other industries (ranging from no more than $1 million for some industries to no more than $40 million for others). Federal Agencies To make it easier to determine if an offeror meets the SBA's definition of a small business, prior to soliciting bids, federal agencies are required to classify a product or service being acquired in only one (NAICS code) industry, "whose definition best describes the principal nature of the product or service being acquired even though for other purposes it could be classified in more than one." When acquiring a product or service that could be classified in two or more industries with different size standards, contracting officers must "apply the size standard for the industry accounting for the greatest percentage of the contract price." If a solicitation calls for more than one item and allows offers to be submitted on any or all of the items, "an offeror must meet the size standard for each item it offers to furnish." If a solicitation calling for more than one item requires offers on all or none of the items, "an offeror may qualify as a small business by meeting the size standard for the item accounting for the greatest percentage of the total contract price." With several notable exceptions (e.g., HUBZone small businesses, SBA 8(a) program participants, and veteran-owned small businesses [VOSBs] and SDVOSBs seeking contracts with the Department of Veterans Affairs), businesses generally self-certify their status as small when they register their business in the SAM database. The contracting officer is required to accept an offeror's representation in a specific bid or proposal that it is a small business unless "(1) another offeror or interested party challenges the concern's small business representation or (2) the contracting officer has a reason to question the representation." If an offeror's small business status is challenged, the contracting officer is generally not allowed to award the contract until the SBA has made a size determination or 15 business days after the SBA receives the protest, whichever occurs first. The SBA's Office of Government Contracting Area Office (Area Office) serving the area in which the headquarters of the offeror is located initially reviews the protest. The Area Office is required, by regulation, to determine the offeror's size status within 15 business days after receipt of the protest, or "within any extension of time granted by the contracting officer." If the SBA does not make a determination within the required time, the contracting officer "may award the contract after determining in writing that there is an immediate need to award the contract and that waiting until SBA makes its determination will be disadvantageous to the government." An appeal of the Area Office's decision may be filed with the SBA's Office of Hearings and Appeals (OHA) . If the OHA accepts the appeal for consideration and finds the protested concern to be ineligible for award, the contracting officer must "terminate the contract unless termination is not in the best interests of the government, in keeping with the circumstances described in the [aforementioned] written determination. However, the contracting officer shall not exercise any options or award further task or delivery orders." Furthermore, a concern cannot become eligible for a specific award after the SBA has determined that it is not a small business, even if the concern takes action to meet the definition of a small business. The SBA or the federal agency may suspend or debar a firm from future government contracts for misrepresenting its size status. In addition, individuals that knowingly misrepresent a business's size to secure a federal contract can be subject to civil and criminal penalties. The Pre-Award Process Federal Agency Requirements 15 U.S.C. §644(e)(1) states, "To the maximum extent practicable, procurement strategies used by a Federal department or agency having contracting authority shall facilitate the maximum participation of small business concerns as prime contractors, subcontractors, and suppliers." To accomplish this goal, FAR regulations (FAR §19.202-1) require contracting officers, when applicable, to take the following actions prior to awarding a federal contract: 1. "Divide proposed acquisitions of supplies and services (except construction) into reasonably small lots (not less than economic production runs) to permit offers on quantities less than the total requirement." 2. "Plan acquisitions such that, if practicable, more than one small business concern may perform the work, if the work exceeds the amount for which a surety may be guaranteed by the SBA against loss under 15 U.S.C. §694b [generally $6.5 million, or $10 million if the contracting officer certifies that the higher amount is necessary]." 3. "Ensure that delivery schedules are established on a realistic basis that will encourage small business participation to the extent consistent with the actual requirements of the Government." 4. "Encourage prime contractors to subcontract with small business concerns [primarily through the agency's role in negotiating an acceptable small business subcontracting plan with prime contractors on contracts anticipated to exceed $700,000 or $1.5 million for construction contracts]." 5. "Provide a copy of the proposed acquisition package to the SBA procurement center representative [PCR, duties are described later]" for his or her review, comment and recommendation, or, if a PCR is not assigned, to the SBA Area Office serving the area in which the procuring activity is located "at least 30 days prior to the issuance of the solicitation if (i) The proposed acquisition is for supplies or services currently being provided by a small business and the proposed acquisition is of a quantity or estimated dollar value, the magnitude of which makes it unlikely that small businesses can compete for the prime contract; (ii) The proposed acquisition is for construction and seeks to package or consolidate discrete construction projects and the magnitude of this consolidation makes it unlikely that small businesses can compete for the prime contract; or (iii) The proposed acquisition is for a consolidated or bundled requirement.… The contracting officer shall provide all information relative to the justification for the consolidation or bundling, including the acquisition plan or strategy and if the acquisition involves substantial bundling, the information identified in [FAR] 7.107-4. The contracting officer shall also provide the same information to the agency Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization [duties are described later]." 6. "Provide a statement explaining why the (i) Proposed acquisition cannot be divided into reasonably small lots (not less than economic production runs) to permit offers on quantities less than the total requirement; (ii) Delivery schedules cannot be established on a realistic basis that will encourage small business participation to the extent consistent with the actual requirements of the government; (iii) Proposed acquisition cannot be structured so as to make it likely that small businesses can compete for the prime contract; (iv) Consolidated construction project cannot be acquired as separate discrete projects; or (v) Consolidation or bundling is necessary and justified." 7. "Process the 30-day notification concurrently with other processing steps required prior to the issuance of the solicitation." 8. "If the contracting officer rejects the SBA procurement center representative's recommendation … document the basis for the rejection and notify the SBA procurement center representative [who (as described later) may appeal the rejection to the chief of the contracting office and, ultimately, to the agency head]." The Role of SBA Procurement Center Representatives The SBA may assign one or more procurement center representatives (PCRs) to any contracting activity or contract administration office to implement the SBA's policies and programs. The SBA currently has 49 PCRs located in the SBA's six Area Offices. PCRs are required to comply with the contracting agency's directives governing the conduct of contracting personnel and the release of contract information. PCR duties include the following: Review proposed acquisitions to recommend "the setting aside of selected acquisitions not unilaterally set aside by the contracting officer;" new qualified small business sources; and the feasibility of breaking out components of the contract for competitive acquisitions. Review proposed acquisition packages. If the PCR (or, if a PCR is not assigned, the SBA Area Office serving the area in which the procuring activity is located) "believes that the acquisition, as proposed, makes it unlikely that small businesses can compete for the prime contract," the PCR can recommend any alternate contracting method that he or she "reasonably believes will increase small business prime contracting opportunities." The recommendation must be made to the contracting officer within 15 days after the package's receipt. Recommend small businesses "for inclusion on a list of concerns to be solicited in a specific acquisition." Appeal to the contracting office's chief "any contracting officer's determination not to solicit a concern recommended by the SBA for a particular acquisition, when not doing so results in no small business being solicited." This appeal may be further appealed to the agency head. Conduct periodic reviews of the agency's contracting activity, including the agency's assessment of any required small business subcontracting plan, "to ascertain whether the agency is complying with the small business policies in this regulation." Sponsor and participate in conferences and training "designed to increase small business participation in the contracting activities of the office." The Role of the Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization Every federal agency (except the SBA) that has procurement powers is required to have an OSDBU, whose director, by statute, reports directly to the head of the agency and has supervisory authority over agency staff performing certain procurement functions. The OSDBU's primary responsibility is to ensure that small businesses, SDBs, WOSBs, SDVOSBs, and HUBZone small businesses are treated fairly and that they have an opportunity to compete and be selected for a fair amount of the agency's contract dollars. Among its statutory responsibilities are the following: "Identify proposed solicitations that involve significant bundling of contract requirements, and work with the agency acquisition officials and the Administration to revise the procurement strategies for such proposed solicitations where appropriate to increase the probability of participation by small businesses as prime contractors, or to facilitate small business participation as subcontractors and suppliers, if a solicitation for a bundled contract is to be issued." Assist small businesses "to obtain payments, required late payment interest penalties, or information regarding payments due to the concern from an executive agency or a contractor." Assign "a small business technical adviser to each office to which the SBA has assigned" a PCR. The small business technical advisor "shall be a full-time employee of the procuring activity, well qualified, technically trained and familiar with the supplies or services purchased at the activity; and whose principal duty shall be to assist" the PCR. Provide the agency's "Chief Acquisition Officer and senior procurement executive … with advice and comments on acquisition strategies, market research, and justifications [related to limitations on the consolidation of contracts as a means to provide small businesses appropriate opportunities to participate as prime contractors and subcontractors]." Provide training to small businesses and contract specialists, provided that the training does not interfere with the director carrying out his or her other responsibilities. Ensure that a small business that notifies the PCR prior to a contract's award that "a solicitation, request for proposal, or request for quotation unduly restricts [its] ability … to compete for the award … is aware of other resources and processes available to address unduly restrictive provisions … even if such resources and processes are provided by such agency, the Administration, the Comptroller General, or a Department of Defense (DOD) procurement technical assistance program [described below]." Review all subcontracting plans "to ensure that the plan provides maximum practicable opportunity for small business concerns to participate in the performance of the contract to which the plan applies." In accordance with P.L. 109-163 , the National Defense Authorization Act of 2006, the DOD renamed its OSDBU the Office of Small Business Programs (OSBP). The act also redesignated the Army, Navy, and Air Force's OSDBUs to OSBPs of the Department of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, respectively. The Roles of Other Procurement Officers and Offices At the agency level, procurement department heads (sometimes titled senior procurement executive ) are responsible for implementing small business programs at their agencies, including achieving program goals. In general, procurement department staff who work on small business issues (often titled small business specialists ) coordinate with OSDBU directors on their agencies' small business programs. Chief acquisition officers provide a focal point for acquisition in agency operations. Their key functions include "monitoring and evaluating agency acquisition activities, increasing the use of full and open competition, increasing performance-based contracting, making acquisition decisions, managing agency acquisition policy, acquisition career management, acquisition resources planning, and conducting acquisition assessments." The SBA must assign a breakout procurement center representative (breakout PCR) to each major procurement center. A major procurement center is, in the opinion of the SBA Administrator, a procurement center that purchases substantial dollar amounts of other than commercial items, and has the potential to incur significant savings as a result of the placement of a breakout PCR. The breakout PCR advocates for (1) the appropriate use of full and open competition, and (2) the breakout of items, "when appropriate and while maintaining the integrity of the system in which such items are used." The breakout PCR is in addition to the PCR. When a breakout PCR is assigned, the SBA must assign at least two co-located small business technical advisors. SBA breakout PCRs and technical advisors must comply with the contracting agency's directives governing the conduct of contracting personnel and the release of contract information. The SBA must obtain security clearances for its breakout PCRs and technical advisors as required by the contracting agency. The SBA has four commercial market r epresentatives who, among other duties, help prime contractors find small businesses that are capable of performing subcontracts; provide counseling on the contractor's responsibility to maximize subcontracting opportunities for small businesses; and conduct periodic reviews of contractors awarded contracts requiring an acceptable subcontracting plan that provides small businesses "the maximum practicable opportunity to participate in contract performance consistent with its efficient performance" (generally any solicitation to perform a contract that is expected to exceed $700,000 ($1.5 million for construction) and that has subcontracting possibilities). The SBA's business opportunity s pecialists provide, among other duties, guidance, counseling, and referrals for assistance with technical, management, financial, or other matters intended to improve the competitive viability of SBA 8(a) program participants. They provide 8(a) program participants comprehensive assessments of the firm's strengths and weaknesses; monitor and document their compliance with 8(a) program requirements; advise them on compliance with contracting regulations after the award of a 8(a) program contract or subcontract; review and monitor their compliance with mentor-protégé agreements; represent the interests of the SBA Administrator and small businesses in the award, modification, and administration of 8(a) program contracts and subcontracts; and report fraud or abuse involving the 8(a) program. The Small Business Procurement Advisory Council (SBPAC), whose members are composed of the SBA Administrator (or his or her designee), the director of the Minority Business Development Agency, and the head of each OSDBU in each federal agency having procurement powers, has the following statutory duties: 1. Develop positions on proposed procurement regulations affecting the small business community. 2. Submit comments reflecting such positions to appropriate regulatory authorities. 3. Conduct reviews of each OSDBU to determine the office's compliance with its statutory requirements. 4. Identify best practices for maximizing small business utilization in federal contracting that may be implemented by federal agencies having procurement powers. 5. Submit annually, to the House Committee on Small Business and Senate Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship, a report describing (1) the comments submitted to appropriate regulatory authorities, including any outcomes related to the comments; (2) the results of its review of each OSDBU ; and (3) best practices identified for maximizing small business contracting . The Defense Logistic Agency's Procurement Technical Assistance Program (PTAC) helps "businesses pursue and perform under contracts with the Department of Defense, other federal agencies, state and local governments and with government prime contractors. Most of the assistance the PTACs provide is free. PTAC support to businesses includes registration in systems such as the System for Award Management (SAM), identification of contract opportunities, and help in understanding requirements and in preparing and submitting bids." Set-Asides and Sole Source Awards The Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 generally requires "full and open competition" for government procurement contracts. However, various provisions of the Small Business Act authorize or, in some cases, require federal agencies to provide for other than "full and open competition through the use of competitive procedures" when contracting with small businesses. For example, as mentioned previously, federal agencies are generally required to reserve contracts that have an anticipated value greater than the micro-purchase threshold (currently $10,000), but not greater than the simplified acquisition threshold (currently $250,000) exclusively for small businesses unless the contracting officer is unable to obtain offers from two or more small businesses that are competitive with market prices and the quality and delivery of the goods or services being purchased. In addition, federal agencies are generally required to set aside contracts that have an anticipated value exceeding the simplified acquisition threshold exclusively for small businesses when there is a reasonable expectation by the contracting officer that offers will be obtained by at least two responsible small businesses offering the products of different small businesses (Rule of Two) and the award will be made at a fair market price; may similarly set aside contracts exceeding the simplified acquisition threshold for competition reserved for specific types of small businesses (e.g., 8(a) small businesses, HUBZone small businesses, WOSBs and SDVOSBs); may enter into negotiations directly with particular types of small businesses (e.g., a sole source award) when the award could not otherwise be made (e.g., only a single source is available or under urgent and compelling circumstances); and are required to grant HUBZone small businesses a price evaluation preference of not more than 10% in open and unrestricted competitions. SBA Contracting Programs66 Several SBA programs assist small businesses in obtaining and performing federal contracts and subcontracts. These include various prime contracting programs; subcontracting programs; and other assistance (e.g., contracting technical training assistance and oversight of the federal small business goaling program and the Surety Bond Guarantee program). Prime Contracting Programs Several contracting programs allow small businesses to compete only with similar firms for government contracts or receive sole source awards in circumstances in which such awards could not be made to other firms. These programs provide small businesses an opportunity to win government contracts without having to compete against larger and more experienced companies. 8(a) Program67 The 8(a) Minority Small Business and Capital Ownership Development Program (named for the section of the Small Business Act from which it derives its authority) provides business development assistance to businesses owned and controlled by persons who are socially and economically disadvantaged. African Americans, Hispanics, Native Americans (including American Indians, Eskimos, Aleuts, and Native Hawaiians), Asian-Pacific Americans, and Subcontinent Asian Americans are presumed to be socially and economically disadvantaged. Other individuals can also qualify as socially and economically disadvantaged on a case-by-case basis. To be considered economically disadvantaged, an individual's net worth, excluding ownership interest in the 8(a) firm and equity in his or her primary personal residence, must be less than $250,000 at the time of application to the 8(a) Program, and less than $750,000 thereafter. Federal agencies are authorized to award contracts for goods or services, or to perform construction work, to the SBA for subcontracting to 8(a) firms. The SBA is authorized to delegate the function of executing contracts to the procuring agencies and often does so. Once the SBA has accepted a contract for the 8(a) Program, the contract is awarded through either a set-aside or on a sole source basis, with the contract amount generally determining the acquisition method used. When the contract's anticipated total value, including any options, is less than $4 million ($7 million for manufacturing contracts), the contract is normally awarded without competition (as a sole source award). In contrast, when the contract's anticipated value exceeds these thresholds, the contract generally must be awarded via a set-aside with competition limited to 8(a) firms so long as there is a reasonable expectation that at least two eligible and responsible 8(a) firms will submit offers and the award can be made at fair market price. The SBA also provides technical assistance and training to 8(a) firms. Firms may participate in the 8(a) Program for no more than nine years. In FY2017, the federal government awarded $27.2 billion to 8(a) firms. $16.4 billion was awarded with an 8(a) preference ($8 billion through an 8(a) set-aside and $8.4 billion through an 8(a) sole source award); $4.8 billion was awarded to an 8(a) firm in open competition with other firms; and $6 billion was awarded with another small business preference (e.g., set-asides and sole source awards for small businesses generally and for HUBZone firms, women-owned small businesses, and service-disabled veteran-owned small businesses). Historically Underutilized Business Zone Program72 This program assists small businesses located in Historically Underutilized Business Zones (HUBZones) through set-asides, sole source awards (so long as the award can be made at a fair and reasonable price, and the anticipated total value of the contract, including any options, is below $4 million, or $7 million for manufacturing contracts) and price evaluation preferences (of up to 10%) in full and open competitions. The HUBZone program targets assistance to small businesses located in areas with low income, high poverty, or high unemployment. To be certified as a HUBZone small business, at least 35% of the small business's employees must generally reside in a HUBZone. In FY2017, the federal government awarded $7.53 billion to HUBZone-certified small businesses. $1.90 billion was awarded with a HUBZone preference ($1.49 billion through a HUBZone set-aside, $65.3 million through a HUBZone sole source award, and $346.9 million through a HUBZone price-evaluation preference); $1.53 billion was awarded to HUBZone-certified small businesses in open competition with other firms; and $4.10 billion was awarded with another small business preference (e.g., set-asides and sole source awards for small businesses generally and for 8(a), women-owned, and service-disabled veteran-owned small businesses). Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Business Program This program allows agencies to set aside contracts for SDVOSBs. Also, federal agencies may award sole source contracts to SDVOSBs so long as the award can be made at a fair and reasonable price, and the anticipated total value of the contract, including any options, is below $4 million ($6.5 million for manufacturing contracts). For purposes of this program, veterans and service-related disabilities are defined as they are under the statutes governing veterans affairs. In FY2017, the federal government awarded $18.2 billion to SDVOSBs. $6.8 billion was awarded through a SDVOSB set-aside award; $4.3 billion was awarded to a SDVOSB in open competition with other firms; and $7.1 billion was awarded with another small business preference (e.g., set-asides and sole source awards for small businesses generally and for HUBZone firms, 8(a) firms, and WOSBs). Women-Owned Small Business Program Under this program, contracts may be set aside for economically disadvantaged WOSBs in industries in which women are underrepresented and substantially underrepresented. Federal agencies may award sole source contracts to WOSBs so long as the award can be made at a fair and reasonable price, and the anticipated total value of the contract, including any options, is below $4 million ($6.5 million for manufacturing contracts). In FY2017, the federal government awarded $21.3 billion to WOSBs. $648.9 million was awarded with a WOSB preference ($580.5 million through a WOSB set-aside and $68.4 million through a WOSB sole source award); $7.0 billion was awarded to a WOSB in open competition with other firms; and $13.7 billion was awarded with another small business preference (e.g., set-asides and sole source awards for small businesses generally and for HUBZone firms, 8(a) firms, and SDVOSBs). Subcontracting Programs Federal contracting officers are required to provide the SBA's PCR (or, if a PCR is not assigned, the SBA Area Office serving the procuring activity area) a "reasonable period of time" to review any solicitation requiring submission of a small business subcontracting plan and to submit advisory findings before the solicitation is issued. The PCR's advisory comments regarding the small business subcontracting plan's acceptability must be submitted, in writing, to the appropriate contracting officer within five working days after the plan's receipt. As mentioned previously, the SBA's commercial market representatives help prime contractors find small businesses to perform subcontracts; counsel contractors on their responsibility to maximize subcontracting opportunities for small businesses; and conduct periodic reviews, often in concert with a SBA PCR, of contractors awarded contracts that require an acceptable small business subcontracting plan. Other Federal Agency Contracting Programs Federal agencies may also set aside contracts or make sole source awards to small businesses not participating in any other program under certain conditions. Department of Transportation Disadvantaged Business Enterprise Program The Department of Transportation's (DOT's) Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (DBE) Program originally began in 1980 as a minority/women's business enterprise program "established by regulation under the authority of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and other nondiscrimination statutes that apply to DOT financial assistance programs." Congress has reauthorized the DBE program several times since its inception; most recently in P.L. 114-94 , the Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act (FAST-Act). The FAST-Act provides, that, except to the extent the Secretary of Transportation determines otherwise, not less than 10% of the amounts made available for any program under Titles I (federal-aid highways), II (innovative project finance), III (public transportation) and VI (innovation) of the act and 23 U.S. Code 403 (highway safety research and development), shall be expended with DBEs. DOT also has a separate DBE program for airport concessions. A DBE is a for-profit small business owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals. Eligibility for the DBE program differs somewhat from the 8(a) program. For example, under the DBE program, women are presumed to be socially and economically disadvantaged individuals. Also, to be regarded as economically disadvantaged, an individual must have a personal net worth (excluding ownership interest in the firm and equity in his or her primary personal residence) that does not exceed $1.32 million. The DBE must also meet SBA size criteria and have average annual gross receipts not exceeding $23.98 million. Size limits for the airport concessions DBE program are higher. The DBE program's eight objectives are to 1. ensure nondiscrimination in the award and administration of DOT-assisted contracts in the department's highway, transit, and airport financial assistance programs; 2. create a level playing field on which DBEs can compete fairly for DOT-assisted contracts; 3. ensure that the department's DBE program is narrowly tailored in accordance with applicable law; 4. ensure that only firms that fully meet the program's eligibility standards are permitted to participate as DBEs; 5. help remove DBE-participation barriers in DOT-assisted contracts; 6. promote the use of DBEs in all types of federally-assisted contracts and procurement activities conducted by recipients; 7. assist the development of firms that can compete successfully in the marketplace outside the DBE program; and 8. provide appropriate flexibility to recipients of federal financial assistance in establishing and providing opportunities for DBEs. Subcontracting Programs for Small Disadvantaged Businesses Other federal programs promote subcontracting with small disadvantaged businesses (SDBs). SDBs include 8(a) participants and other small businesses that are at least 51% unconditionally owned and controlled by socially or economically disadvantaged individuals or groups. Individuals owning and controlling non-8(a) SDBs may have net worth of up to $750,000 (excluding ownership interests in the SDB firm and equity in their primary personal residence). Otherwise, however, SDBs must generally satisfy the same eligibility requirements as 8(a) firms, although they do not apply to the SBA to be designated SDBs in the same way that 8(a) firms do. Federal agencies must negotiate "subcontracting plans" with the apparently successful bidder or offeror on eligible prime contracts prior to awarding the contract. Subcontracting plans set goals for the percentage of subcontract dollars to be awarded to SDBs, among others, and describe efforts that will be made to ensure that SDBs "have an equitable opportunity to compete for subcontracts." Federal agencies may also consider the extent of subcontracting with SDBs in determining to whom to award a contract or give contractors "monetary incentives" to subcontract with SDBs. As of February 11, 2019, the SBA's Dynamic Small Business Search database included 2,538 SBA-certified SDBs and 100,595 self-certified SDBs. Other Small Business Programs of Interest The SBA 7(j) Management and Technical Assistance Program The SBA's 7(j) Management and Technical Assistance program provides "a wide variety of management and technical assistance to eligible individuals or concerns to meet their specific needs, including: (a) counseling and training in the areas of financing, management, accounting, bookkeeping, marketing, and operation of small business concerns; and (b) the identification and development of new business opportunities." Eligible individuals and businesses include "8(a) certified firms, SDBs, businesses operating in areas of high unemployment, or low income or firms owned by low income individuals." In FY2017, the 7(j) Management and Technical Assistance program assisted 4,100 small businesses. SBA Surety Bond Guarantee Program94 The SBA's Surety Bond Guarantee program aims to increase small businesses' access to federal, state, and local government contracting, as well as private-sector contracts, by guaranteeing bid, performance, and payment bonds for small businesses that cannot obtain surety bonds through regular commercial channels. The program guarantees individual contracts of up to $6.5 million and up to $10 million if a federal contracting officer certifies that such a guarantee is necessary. The SBA's guarantee ranges from not to exceed 80% to not to exceed 90% of the surety's loss if a default occurs. In FY2017, the SBA guaranteed 10,397 bid and final surety bonds with a total contract value of more than $6.3 billion. A surety bond is a three-party instrument between a surety (someone who agrees to be responsible for the debt or obligation of another), a contractor, and a project owner. The agreement binds the contractor to comply with the terms and conditions of a contract. If the contractor is unable to successfully perform the contract, the surety assumes the contractor's responsibilities and ensures that the project is completed. The surety bond reduces the risk associated with contracting. Surety bonds are meant to encourage project owners to contract with small businesses that may not have the credit history or prior experience of larger businesses and may be at greater risk of failing to comply with the contract's terms and conditions. Surety bonds are important to small businesses interested in competing for federal contracts because the federal government requires prime contractors—prior to the award of a federal contract exceeding $150,000 for the construction, alteration, or repair of any building or public work of the United States—to furnish a performance bond issued by a surety satisfactory to the contracting officer in an amount that the officer considers adequate to protect the government. Small Business Mentor-Protégé Programs101 Small business mentor-protégé programs typically seek to pair new businesses with more experienced businesses in mutually beneficial relationships. Protégés may receive financial, technical, or management assistance from mentors in obtaining and performing federal contracts or subcontracts, or serving as suppliers under such contracts or subcontracts. Mentors may receive credit toward subcontracting goals, reimbursement of certain expenses, or other incentives. The federal government currently has several mentor-protégé programs to assist small businesses in various ways. The 8(a) Mentor-Protégé Program is a government-wide program designed to assist small businesses "owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals" participating in the SBA's Minority Small Business and Capital Ownership Development Program (commonly known as the 8(a) program) in obtaining and performing federal contracts. For that purpose, mentors may (1) form joint ventures with protégés that are eligible to perform federal contracts set aside for small businesses; (2) make certain equity investments in protégé firms; (3) lend or subcontract to protégé firms; and (4) provide technical or management assistance to their protégés. The SBA's A ll S mall B usiness Mentor-Protégé Program is a government-wide mentor-protégé program for all small business concerns, consistent with the SBA's mentor-protégé program for participants in the SBA's 8(a) Business Development program. The Department of Defense (DOD) Mentor-Protégé Program , in contrast, is agency-specific. It assists various types of small businesses and other entities in obtaining and performing DOD subcontracts and serving as suppliers on DOD contracts. Mentors may (1) make advance or progress payments to their protégés that DOD reimburses; (2) award subcontracts to their protégés on a noncompetitive basis when they would not otherwise be able to do so; (3) lend money to or make investments in protégé firms; and (4) provide or arrange for other assistance. Other agencies also have agency-specific mentor-protégé programs to assist various types of small businesses or other entities in obtaining and performing subcontracts under agency prime contracts. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), for example, has a mentor-protégé program wherein mentors may provide protégés with rent-free use of facilities or equipment, temporary personnel for training, property, loans, or other assistance. Because these programs are not based in statute, unlike the SBA and DOD programs, they generally rely upon preexisting authorities (e.g., authorizing use of evaluation factors) or publicity to incentivize mentor participation. Currently, more than 1,200 mentor-protégé agreements are in place, even though there are issues with the accuracy and thoroughness of some federal agency records. Small Business Procurement Goals Since 1978, federal agency heads have been required to establish federal procurement goals, in consultation with the SBA, "that realistically reflect the potential of small business concerns and small business concerns owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals" to participate in federal procurement. Each agency is required, at the conclusion of each fiscal year, to report its progress in meeting the goals to the SBA. In 1988, Congress authorized the President annually to establish government-wide minimum participation goals for procurement contracts awarded to small businesses and small businesses owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals. Congress required the government-wide minimum participation goal for small businesses to be "not less than 20% of the total value of all prime contract awards for each fiscal year" and "not less than 5% of the total value of all prime contract and subcontract awards for each fiscal year" for small businesses owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals. Each federal agency was also directed to "have an annual goal that presents, for that agency, the maximum practicable opportunity for small business concerns and small business concerns owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals to participate in the performance of contracts let by such agency." The SBA was also required to report to the President annually on the attainment of the goals and to include the information in an annual report to Congress. The SBA negotiates the goals with each federal agency and establishes a small business eligible baseline for evaluating the agency's performance. The agency head is required to "make consistent efforts to annually expand participation by small business concerns from each industry category." If the SBA and the agency cannot agree on the goals, the agency may submit the case to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) for resolution. The small business eligible baseline excludes certain contracts that the SBA has determined do not realistically reflect the potential for small business participation in federal procurement (such as those awarded to mandatory and directed sources), contracts funded predominately from agency-generated sources (i.e., non-appropriated funds), contracts not covered by the FAR, acquisitions on behalf of foreign governments, and contracts not reported in the Federal Procurement Data System – Next Generation, or FPDS-NG (such as government procurement card purchases and contracts valued less than $10,000). These exclusions typically account for 18% to 20% of all federal prime contracts each year. The SBA then evaluates the agencies' performance against their negotiated goals annually, using FPDS-NG data, managed by the U.S. General Services Administration (GSA), to generate the small business eligible baseline. This information is compiled into the official Small Business Goaling Report, which the SBA releases annually. Each agency that fails to achieve any proposed prime or subcontract goal is required to submit a justification to the SBA on why it failed to achieve a proposed or negotiated goal with a proposed plan of corrective action. Agencies can take credit in every category that is applicable to the recipient of the contract. For example, "when counting goaling achievements, a contract awarded to a service-disabled Veteran-Owned Woman-Owned Small Business would be counted toward the Small Business (SB) goal, the Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Business (SDVOSB) goal and the Women-Owned Small Business (WOSB) goal. However, these category counts are not summed to triple the total count. The Sum of Parts Does Not Equal the Whole (italics in original)." Over the years, federal government-wide procurement goals have been established for small businesses generally ( P.L. 100-656 , the Business Opportunity Development Reform Act of 1988, and P.L. 105-135 , the HUBZone Act of 1997—Title VI of the Small Business Reauthorization Act of 1997); small businesses owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals ( P.L. 100-656 ); women ( P.L. 103-355 , the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994); small businesses located within a HUBZone ( P.L. 105-135 ); and small businesses owned and controlled by a service-disabled veteran ( P.L. 106-50 , the Veterans Entrepreneurship and Small Business Development Act of 1999). The current federal small business procurement goals are at least 23.0% of the total value of all small business eligible prime contract awards to small businesses for each fiscal year; 5.0% of the total value of all small business eligible prime contract awards and subcontract awards to small disadvantaged businesses (including participants in the SBA's 8(a) Program) for each fiscal year; 5.0% of the total value of all small business eligible prime contract awards and subcontract awards to women-owned small businesses; 3.0% of the total value of all small business eligible prime contract awards and subcontract awards to HUBZone small businesses; and 3.0% of the total value of all small business eligible prime contract awards and subcontract awards to service-disabled veteran-owned small businesses. There are no punitive consequences for not meeting these goals. However, the SBA's Small Business Goaling Report is distributed widely, receives media attention, and serves to heighten public awareness of the issue of small business contracting. For example, agency performance as reported in the SBA's Small Business Goaling Report is often cited by Members during their questioning of federal agency witnesses during congressional hearings. As shown in Table 1 , the FY2017 Small Business Goaling Report , using FPDS-NG data, indicates that federal agencies met the federal procurement goal for small businesses generally, small disadvantaged businesses, and service-disabled veteran-owned small businesses in FY2017. Table 1 also provides, for comparative purposes, the percentage of total reported federal contracts (without exclusions) awarded to those small businesses in FY2017. Certificate of Competency Program Before awarding a federal contract, the contracting officer must affirmatively determine that the business is responsible to perform the contract. If the contracting officer determines that an apparent successful small business offeror lacks certain elements of responsibility (e.g., is unable to fulfill the requirements of a specific government procurement because it lacks capability, competency, capacity, credit, integrity, perseverance, tenacity, or limitations on subcontracting), the officer is required to refer the matter in writing to the SBA for review and a possible Certificate of Competency (COC), even if the next acceptable offer is also from a small business. The COC certifies in writing that the small business meets all required elements of responsibility for the purpose of receiving and performing a specific government contract. The "COC program empowers the SBA to certify to contracting officers as to all elements of responsibility of any small business concern to receive and perform a specific government contract. The COC program does not extend to questions concerning regulatory requirements imposed and enforced by other federal agencies." Post-Award Requirements As mentioned previously, the SBA's commercial market representatives conduct periodic compliance reviews of contractors awarded contracts that require an acceptable small business subcontracting plan. In addition, once the contract is completed, federal agencies are required to pay the contractor on a timely basis and pay interest penalties for late payments. Under specified circumstances, federal agencies may also pay contractors before the contract's payment's due date. Small Business Subcontracting Plan Reviews The periodic compliance review can take place on-site, at the contracting agency, or virtual. Materials that may be reviewed include the contractor's contract files, correspondence that is directly or indirectly related to the contract, IT systems, subcontracting methods, and procedures. Contractors are selected randomly for audit. The SBA may enter into agreements with other federal agencies to conduct these assessments. The compliance report includes compliant and non-compliant items found during the assessment of the contractor's subcontracting activities and a rating indicating the contractor's level of compliance or non-compliance, ranging from unsatisfactory to outstanding. If any deficiencies are found, the contractor is required to submit, within 30 days of the compliance review rating letter date, a corrective action plan (CAP). The CAP is submitted to the SBA Area Office via email, or any method designated by the SBA. The commercial market representative conducts a follow-up compliance report within six months to a year of the date the SBA acknowledges receipt of the contractor's CAP to ensure that corrective actions have been taken to eliminate the deficiencies. The SBA keeps the federal agency that awarded the contract informed of the contractor's adherence to correcting the deficiencies. If the contractor refuses to provide or address all deficiencies in the CAP, a delinquent CAP letter is sent advising the contractor that it has 15 days from the letter's date to comply with federal regulations. If an acceptable CAP is not received in the allotted time frame the case is escalated to the SBA's subcontracting program manager who informs the SBA's Office of Government Contracting director and works with the SBA's Office of General Counsel and the federal agency that awarded the contract for resolution or to begin accessing liquidated damages. Prompt Payments Once a contract is awarded, federal agencies are generally required to pay interest to prime contractors on any invoice payments the agency fails to make by the date(s) specified in the contract, or within 30 days of receipt of a proper invoice for the amount due if no date is specified in the contract. Similar requirements exist for prime contractors in paying subcontractors on construction contracts. These requirements are especially important for small businesses in the construction industry. Specifically, every construction contract awarded by a federal agency must contain clauses obligating the prime contractor to (1) pay the subcontractor for "satisfactory performance" under the subcontract within seven days of receiving payment from the agency and (2) pay interest on any amounts that are not paid within the proper time frame. The contract must also obligate the prime contractor to include similar payment and interest penalty terms in its subcontracts, as well as require its subcontractors to impose these terms on their subcontractors. This latter provision ensures that the payment and interest penalty requirements flow down to all tiers of construction subcontractors. In addition, required subcontracting plans must incorporate terms obligating the prime contractor to notify the agency awarding the contract in writing if a subcontractor is paid a reduced price for goods supplied or services completed under the contract, or if payment is made to the subcontractor more than 90 days past due. The prime contractor must include the reason for the reduction in payment or failure to pay a subcontractor within 90 days. If the contracting officer for a covered contract (a contract that requires an acceptable subcontracting plan) determines that a prime contractor has a history of unjustified, untimely payments to contractors, the contracting officer shall record the contractor's identity, describe the circumstances under which the contractor may be determined to have a history of unjustified, untimely payments to subcontractors, and include the contractor's identity in, and make publicly available through, the Federal Awardee Performance and Integrity Information System, or any successor. This information is used by federal agencies to "evaluate the business ethics and quality of prospective contractors competing for Federal contracts and to protect taxpayers from doing business with contractors that are not responsible sources." Accelerated Payments Federal agencies are permitted to make an accelerated payment up to seven days before the required payment date in a federal contract, or earlier if the agency deems it necessary on a case-by-case basis if, after receiving a proper invoice, it is in the best interest of the government, and any of the following is true: the invoice in under $2,500; the payment is to a small business; or the payment is related to an emergency, disaster, or military deployment. In addition, the Secretary of Defense is required, to the fullest extent permitted by law, to establish an accelerated payment date for its small business prime contractors, with a goal of 15 days after receipt of a proper invoice for the amount due if a specific payment date is not established by contract. The Secretary of Defense is also required to establish, to the fullest extent permitted by law, an accelerated payment date for its prime contractors that subcontract with small businesses, with a goal of 15 days after receipt of a proper invoice for the amount due if a specific payment date is not established by contract and the prime contractor agrees to make payments to the subcontractor "in accordance with the accelerated payment date, to the maximum extent practicable, without any further consideration from or fees charged to the subcontractor." Concluding Observations The small business contracting programs described in this report generally have strong bipartisan support. However, that does not mean that these programs face no opposition or that issues have not been raised concerning the impact or operations of specific programs. For example, small business advocates seek policies that reduce or eliminate exclusions that narrow the reach of small business contracting preferences, want the SBA to use the total value of all prime contract awards in the Small Business Goaling Report, and want the SBA to use a more discerning methodology for awarding performance grades to federal agencies in meeting its small business contracting goals. Critics have questioned some of these programs' effectiveness, in terms of both promoting small business opportunities to win federal contracts and a more diversified, robust economy. Many observers judge the relative success or failure of federal efforts to enhance small business contracting opportunities by whether the federal government and individual federal agencies meet the procurement goals in the annual Small Business Goaling Report. In recent years, the federal government has generally succeeded in meeting the government-wide goals of awarding 23% of the total value of all small business eligible prime contract awards to small businesses generally, 5% to SDBs, and 3% to SDVOSBs. However, it has had difficulty meeting the goals of 5% to WOSBs and 3% to HUBZone small businesses. The Small Business Goaling Report is the most convenient measure available to compare federal small business contracting performance over time, but it has limitations. For example, the report does not include all federal contracts, because some are not deemed to be small business eligible and others are not recorded in the FPDS-NG. In addition, the report does not evaluate the effect these contracts have on small businesses, industry competitiveness, or the overall economy. As one group of researchers has argued, the entire goal-setting process … is geared to measuring the dollars and contracts awarded to small business, and pays little attention to the effect that access to government contracts has on small business starts, growth, and wealth generation. Results of the program are also hard to isolate, difficult to measure, and generally not judged against the next best or other alternative policies [emphasis in original]. Comprehensive studies examining the effect of small business contracting preferences on small business startups, growth, wealth generation, and industry competitiveness may prove useful for congressional oversight. In the meantime, although the Small Business Goaling Report has its limitations, it can help policymakers identify programs most in need of examination. For example, the SBA has announced that it is focusing additional efforts on promoting the HUBZone program to federal contracting officials, primarily due to the continuing difficulties federal agencies have had in meeting the 3% goal for HUBZone small businesses.

Congress has broad authority to impose requirements upon the federal procurement process, that is, the process whereby agencies obtain goods and services from the private sector. One way in which Congress has exercised this authority is by adopting measures to promote contracting and subcontracting between "small businesses" and federal agencies. These measures, among other things, declare a congressional policy of ensuring that a "fair proportion" of federal contract and subcontract dollars is awarded to small businesses; establish government-wide and agency-specific goals for the percentage of federal contract and subcontract dollars awarded to small businesses; establish an annual Small Business Goaling Report to measure progress in meeting these goals; generally require federal agencies, under specified circumstances, to reserve contracts that have an anticipated value greater than the micro-purchase threshold (currently $10,000), but not greater than the simplified acquisition threshold (currently $250,000) exclusively for small businesses; authorize federal agencies, under specified circumstances, to set aside contracts that have an anticipated value greater than the simplified acquisition threshold exclusively for small businesses; authorize federal agencies to make sole source awards to small businesses when the award could not otherwise be made (e.g., only a single source is available, under urgent and compelling circumstances); authorize federal agencies to set aside contracts for, or grant other contracting preference to, specific types of small businesses (e.g., 8(a) small businesses, HUBZone small businesses, women-owned small businesses (WOSBs) and service-disabled veteran-owned small businesses (SDVOSBs)); and task the Small Business Administration (SBA) and other federal procurement officers with reviewing and restructuring proposed procurements to maximize opportunities for small business participation. Small business contracting programs generally have strong bipartisan support. However, that does not mean that these programs face no opposition, or that issues have not been raised concerning the impact and operations of specific programs. For example, small business advocates note that implementing regulations in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) narrow the reach (and impact) of some small business contracting preferences by excluding specific types of contracts, such as those listed in the Federal Supply Schedules, from FAR requirements pertaining to small business contracting. Advocates want the federal government to enact policies that reduce or eliminate such exclusions. Critics have questioned some of these programs' effectiveness, in terms of both promoting small business opportunities to win federal contracts and promoting a more diversified, robust economy. Many observers judge the relative success or failure of federal efforts to enhance small business contracting opportunities by whether federal government and individual federal agencies meet the predetermined procurement goals in the annual Small Business Goaling Report. In recent years, the federal government has generally succeeded in meeting the government-wide goals of awarding 23% of the total value of all small business eligible prime contract awards to small businesses, 5% to small disadvantaged businesses (SDBs), and 3% to SDVOSBs. It has had difficulty meeting the goals of 5% to WOSBs and 3% to HUBZone small businesses. The Small Business Goaling Report is the most convenient measure available to compare federal small business contracting performance over time, but it has limitations. For example, the SBA excludes some contracts from the report in its determination of what is "small business eligible" and some federal procurement activities are not included because they are not recorded in the Federal Procurement Data System—Next Generation. It also does not evaluate the effect these contracts have on small businesses, industry competitiveness, or the overall economy.

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Introduction Under the Appointments Clause of the Constitution, the President and the Senate share responsibility for making appointments to the Supreme Court, as well as to various lower courts of the federal judiciary. While the President nominates persons to fill federal judgeships, the appointment of each nominee also requires Senate confirmation. Historically, the vast majority of appointments to federal judgeships (other than to the Supreme Court) have typically not involved much public disagreement between the President and the Senate or between the parties within the Senate. Debate in the Senate over particular lower court nominees, or over the lower court appointment process itself, was uncommon. Typically, such nominations were both reported out of the Judiciary Committee and confirmed by the Senate without any recorded opposition. In recent decades, however, appointments to two kinds of lower federal courts—the U.S. circuit courts of appeals and the U.S. district courts—have often been the focus of heightened Senate interest and debate, as has the process itself for appointing judges to these courts. Given congressional interest in the subject, this report provides statistics and analysis related to the nomination and confirmation of U.S. circuit and district court judges from 1977 (the beginning of the Carter presidency) through 2018 (the second year of the Trump presidency). The report's exclusive focus are the U.S. circuit courts of appeals and U.S. district courts. Excluded from the scope of the report are the U.S. Supreme Court; the U.S. Court of International Trade; the U.S. Court of Federal Claims; and territorial district courts (e.g., the District Court of Guam). Overview of the U.S. Courts of Appeals and U.S. District Courts U.S. Circuit Courts The U.S. courts of appeals, or circuit courts, take appeals from federal district court decisions and are also empowered to review the decisions of many administrative agencies. Cases presented to the courts of appeals are generally considered by judges sitting in three-member panels. Courts within the courts of appeals system are often called "circuit courts" (e.g., the First Circuit Court of Appeals is also referred to as the "First Circuit"), because the nation is divided into 12 geographic circuits, each with a U.S. court of appeals. One additional nationwide circuit, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, has specialized subject matter jurisdiction. Altogether, 179 judgeships for these 13 courts of appeals are currently authorized by law (167 for the 12 regional U.S. courts of appeals and 12 for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit). The First Circuit (comprising Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Puerto Rico) has the fewest number of authorized appellate court judgeships, 6, while the Ninth Circuit (comprising Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington) has the most, 29. U.S. District Courts U.S. district courts are the federal trial courts of general jurisdiction. There are 91 Article III district courts: 89 in the 50 states, plus 1 in the District of Columbia and 1 more in Puerto Rico. Each state has at least one U.S. district court, while some states (specifically California, New York, and Texas) have as many as four. Altogether, 673 Article III U.S. district court judgeships are currently authorized by law. Congress has authorized between 1 and 28 judgeships for each district court. The Eastern District of Oklahoma (Muskogee) has 1 authorized judgeship, the smallest number among Article III district courts, while the Southern District of New York (Manhattan) and the Central District of California (Los Angeles) each have 28 judgeships, the most among Article III district courts. U.S. Circuit and District Court Vacancies Opportunities for a President to make circuit and district court appointments arise when judgeships are vacant or are scheduled to become vacant. Various factors influence the number of such opportunities a President will have during his tenure in office, including the frequency with which judicial departures occur; whether any new judgeships are statutorily created by Congress (which consequently provide a President with the opportunity to nominate individuals to the new judgeships); the number of judicial nominations submitted by a President; and the speed by which the Senate considers such nominations. Table 1 reports the percentage of U.S. circuit and district court judgeships that were vacant on January 1 immediately prior to the beginning of each new Congress and four-year presidential term from 1977 through 2017. Overall, during this period, the median percentage of circuit court judgeships that were vacant immediately prior to the start of a new Congress was 8.9%. The median percentage of district court judgeships that were vacant immediately prior to the start of a new Congress was 7.2%. As shown by the table, the percentage of U.S. circuit judgeships that were vacant was highest at the beginning of the 96 th Congress, 28.8%, and lowest at the beginning of the 98 th Congress, 3.5%. The percentage of U.S. district court judgeships that were vacant was also highest at the beginning of the 96 th Congress, 24.7%, and lowest at the beginning of the 109 th Congress, 3.1%. The percentage of judgeships that are vacant at the beginning of a presidency is influenced, in part, by the extent to which the preceding President's nominees were approved by the Senate during the final year or two of his term. For example, most recently, at the beginning of the Trump presidency, the percentage of U.S. district court judgeships that were vacant was 12.8%. This was due, in part, to the comparatively small number of district court nominations confirmed by the Senate during the final two years of the Obama presidency. Number and Percentage of Nominees Confirmed Various factors influence the number and percentage of judicial nominees confirmed during any given presidency or Congress. These factors include, but are not limited to, the frequency with which judges depart the bench; the speed with which a presidential Administration vets and selects nominees for vacant judgeships; whether a President is of the same political party as the majority party in the Senate; whether a congressional session coincides with a presidential election year; and the point in a congressional session when nominations arrive in the Senate. By Presidency As shown by Table 2 , the number of U.S. circuit court nominees confirmed during a completed presidency ranged from a high of 83 during the Reagan presidency to a low of 42 during the single four-year term of George H. W. Bush. Of two-term Presidents, the high ranged from a high of 83 (Reagan) to a low of 55 during the Obama presidency. In terms of the percentage of circuit court nominees confirmed during a completed presidency, which takes into account the number of circuit court nominations submitted to the Senate, the greatest percentage of nominees were confirmed during the Carter presidency (93.3%), and the smallest percentage were confirmed during the George W. Bush presidency (71.8%). Of two-term Presidents, the high ranged from 88.3% during the Reagan presidency to a low of 71.8% (George W. Bush). The number of U.S. district court nominees confirmed during a completed presidency ranged from a high of 305 during the Clinton presidency to a low of 148 during the single four-year term of George H. W. Bush. Of two-term Presidents, the high ranged from a high of 305 (Clinton) to a low of 261 during the George W. Bush presidency. In terms of the percentage of district court nominees confirmed during a completed presidency, which takes into account the number of district court nominations submitted to the Senate, the greatest percentage of nominees were confirmed during the Reagan presidency (94.8%), and the smallest percentage were confirmed during the George H. W. Bush presidency (77.1%). Of two-term Presidents, the high ranged from 94.8% (Reagan) to a low of 83.2% during the Obama presidency. By Congress The median number of U.S. circuit court nominees confirmed during a Congress, from the 95 th through the 115 th , was 17 (while the median number of circuit court nominations submitted to the Senate was 26). And as shown by Table 3 , the number of U.S. circuit court nominees confirmed during this same period ranged from a low of 2 (during the 114 th Congress, 2015-2016) to a high of 44 (during the 96 th Congress, 1979-1980). The median percentage of circuit court nominees confirmed during a Congress, from the 95 th through the 115 th , was 65.4%. The smallest percentage of circuit court nominees, 22.2%, were confirmed during the 114 th Congress (2015-2016). All (100%) of the circuit court nominations submitted to the Senate during the 95 th and 99 th Congresses (1977-1978 and 1985-1986, respectively) were confirmed by the Senate. The median number of U.S. district court nominees confirmed during a Congress, from the 95 th through the 115 th , was 66 (while the median number of district court nominations submitted to the Senate was 85). The number of nominees confirmed ranged from a low of 18 (during the 114 th Congress, 2015-2016) to a high of 154 (during the 96 th Congress, 1979-1980). The median percentage of district court nominees confirmed during a Congress, from the 95 th through the 115 th , was 84.0%. The smallest percentage confirmed during this period was 29.5% (during the 114 th Congress, 2015-2016) and the greatest percentage confirmed was 98.6% (during the 97 th Congress, 1981-1982). Influence of Unified and Divided Party Control In general, both a greater number and percentage of circuit and district court nominees were confirmed during Congresses in which the party of the President was the same as the majority party in the Senate. During Congresses in which there was unified party control (i.e., the party of the President and the majority party in the Senate were the same), the median number of circuit court nominees confirmed was approximately 18, and the median percentage of nominees confirmed was 80.0%. In contrast, during Congresses in which there was divided party control (i.e., the party of the President was different than the majority party in the Senate), the median number of circuit court nominees confirmed was 16, and the median percentage of nominees confirmed was 59.7%. During Congresses in which there was unified party control, the median number of district court nominees confirmed was approximately 76, and the median percentage of nominees confirmed was 89.5%. In contrast, during Congresses in which there was divided party control, the median number of district court nominees confirmed was 60, and the median percentage of nominees confirmed was 73.1%. Multiple Nominations of the Same Person Prior to Final Action by the Senate Over the last several presidencies, it has become increasingly common for a President to nominate an individual two or more times to a U.S. circuit or district court judgeship prior to final action on the nomination by the Senate (irrespective of whether the Senate ultimately approved the nomination). Consequently, the percentage of nominees confirmed during a presidency who were nominated two or more times prior to being approved by the Senate has also increased in recent years. U.S. Circuit Court Nominees As shown by Table 4 , the total number of circuit court nominees who were nominated two or more times prior to final action, whether confirmed or not, ranged from a low of 1 (during the Carter and George H. W. Bush presidencies) to a high of 39 (during the George W. Bush presidency). The number of circuit court nominees who were nominated more than once and ultimately confirmed by the Senate ranged from a low of 0 (during the George H. W. Bush presidency) to a high of 28 (during the George W. Bush presidency). And the number of nominees who were nominated more than once but not confirmed by the Senate ranged from a low of 0 (during the Carter presidency) to a high of 11 (during the George W. Bush presidency). Overall, of the six presidencies listed in Table 4 , President George W. Bush had the greatest percentage of confirmed circuit court nominees who were nominated more than once prior to being confirmed by the Senate (45.9%). Most recently, during the Obama presidency, the percentage of confirmed circuit court nominees who were nominated more than once prior to being approved by the Senate declined to 36.4% (representing the second-highest percentage of circuit court nominees nominated more than once prior to Senate approval). U.S. District Court Nominees As shown by Table 5 , the total number of district court nominees who were nominated two or more times prior to final action ranged from a low of 3 (during the George H. W. Bush presidency) to a high of 111 (during the Obama presidency). The number of district court nominees who were nominated more than once and ultimately confirmed by the Senate ranged from a low of 2 (during the George H. W. Bush presidency) to a high of 104 (during the Obama presidency). And the number of nominees who were nominated more than once but not confirmed by the Senate ranged from a low of 1 (during the Carter and George H. W. Bush presidencies) to a high of 9 (during the Clinton presidency). Overall, of the six presidencies listed in Table 5 , President Obama had the greatest percentage of confirmed district court nominees who were nominated more than once prior to being confirmed by the Senate (38.8%). This was an increase from the George W. Bush presidency, when 23.8% of district court nominees were nominated more than once prior to being confirmed (which represents the second-highest percentage of district court nominees nominated more than once prior to Senate approval). Nominees Whose Nominations Were Returned at the End of a Congress Table 6 provides data related to the number of U.S. circuit and district court nominees whose nominations were returned by the Senate to the President at the end of each Congress, from the 95 th through the 115 th . The table also indicates how many of these nominees had been given a hearing (or not) by the Judiciary Committee as well as how many had their nominations reported by the committee and pending on the Executive Calendar prior to being returned to the President. For a Congress that did not coincide with the last two years of a presidency, it was not uncommon for a nominee whose nomination was returned at the end of it to be resubmitted during a subsequent Congress and eventually be approved by the Senate. For a Congress, however, that did coincide with the last two years of a presidency, a nominee whose nomination was returned at the end of it was not confirmed by the Senate. U.S. Circuit Court Nominees The median number of U.S. circuit court nominees whose nominations were returned to a President at the end of a Congress during this period was 8, while the median number of district court nominees whose nominations were returned at the end of a Congress was 13. For the 13 most recent Congr esses (corresponding to Congresses during the Clinton, George W. Bush, Obama, and Trump presidencies), the median number of circuit court nominees whose nominations were returned to a President at the end of a Congress was 9, while the median number of district court nominations returned was 20. No circuit court nominees had nominations returned at the end of the 95 th Congress (during the Carter presidency) or during the 99 th Congress (during the Reagan presidency). The 106 th Congress, during the Clinton presidency, had the greatest number of circuit court nominees whose nominations were returned at the end of a Congress (17)—followed by the 107 th and 108 th Congresses, both during the George W. Bush presidency, when 15 circuit court nominations were returned at the end of each Congress. The greatest percentage of circuit court nominees who had nominations returned, as a percentage of all nominees who were nominated during a Congress, occurred at the end of the 114 th Congress during the Obama presidency (seven of nine nominations, or 77.8%, were returned). U.S. District Court Nominees A single district court nominee had a nomination returned at the end of each of the 95 th and 97 th Congresses during the Carter and Reagan presidencies, respectively. The 115 th Congress had the greatest number of district court nominees whose nominations were returned at the end of a Congress (56). The smallest percentage of district court nominees who had nominations returned, as a percentage of all nominees who were nominated during a Congress, occurred at the end of the 97 th Congress, 1981-1982, during the Reagan presidency (1 of 69, or 1.4%, were returned). The greatest percentage of district court nominees who had nominations returned, as a percentage of all nominees who were nominated during a Congress, occurred at the end of the 114 th Congress, 2015-2016, during the Obama presidency (43 of 61 nominations, or 70.5%, were returned). Table 6 does not indicate when, during a Congress, a President submitted nominations to the Senate. If nominations are submitted for the first time relatively late in a Congress, it may not give the Senate adequate time to act on them prior to adjournment. Time from Nomination to Confirmation This section provides, for nominees confirmed by the Senate from 1977 through 2018, the median number of days from nomination to confirmation by presidency and by Congress. In general, the length of time from when a President nominates an individual to a vacant circuit or district court judgeship to when the Senate approves that nomination has steadily increased, for most nominees, since 1977. In addition to the general increase in the length of time of the confirmation process itself, an individual nominee might experience a relatively longer period of time from nomination to confirmation due to opposition to the nomination by the nonpresidential party in the Senate; committee and floor scheduling decisions unrelated to partisan opposition to the nomination; and delays in receiving requested background information from the nominee. By Presidency As shown by Table 7 , the median number of days from nomination to confirmation for U.S. circuit court nominees for completed presidencies ranged from a low of 45.0 days during the Reagan presidency to a high of 229.0 days during the Obama presidency. Following the Reagan presidency, the median number of days from nomination to confirmation increased during each successive completed presidency (increasing to 83.0 days during the George H. W. Bush presidency, 139.0 days during the Clinton presidency, 216.0 days during the George W. Bush presidency, and 229.0 days during the Obama presidency). The first two years of the Trump presidency, with a median of 140.5 days, represent a decline in this trend. If the average, rather than the median, is used to measure the length of time a President's circuit court nominees waited from nomination to confirmation, the average number of days from nomination to confirmation for completed presidencies ranged from a low of 68.7 days during the Reagan presidency to a high of 350.6 days during the George W. Bush presidency. For completed presidencies, the median number of days from nomination to confirmation for U.S. district court nominees ranged from a low of 41.0 days during the Reagan presidency to a high of 215.0 days during the Obama presidency. Following the Reagan presidency, the median number of days from nomination to confirmation increased during each successive completed presidency (increasing to 93.0 days during the George H. W. Bush presidency, 99.0 days during the Clinton presidency, 141.0 days during the George W. Bush presidency, and to 215.0 days during the Obama presidency). The first two years of the Trump presidency, with a median of 235.0 days, represented a continuation of this upward trend. U.S. Circuit Court Nominees Figure 1 shows, for each U.S. circuit court nominee who was confirmed from 1977 through 2018, the number of days from when that individual was first nominated to when he or she was confirmed by the Senate. The particular circuit court nominee who waited the longest period of time from nomination to confirmation is also labeled for each presidency. 365 or More Days from Nomination to Confirmation As shown by the figure, there was a notable increase after the George H. W. Bush presidency in the number of nominees who waited one year or more from nomination to confirmation. During the Carter, Reagan, and George H. W. Bush presidencies, no circuit court nominees waited 365 days or more to be confirmed. During the Clinton presidency, there were 12 circuit court nominees who waited one year or more to be confirmed. The number of circuit court nominees who waited at least 365 days to be confirmed increased further, to a high of 18, during the George W. Bush presidency. During the Obama presidency, there were 8 circuit court nominees who waited at least one year to be confirmed. During the first two years of the Trump presidency, none of the 30 circuit court nominees whose nominations were confirmed by the Senate waited at least 365 days to be confirmed. Overall, 18% of President Clinton's circuit court nominees waited at least 365 days to be confirmed, 30% of President George W. Bush's nominees waited at least this long (the highest among the six completed presidencies), and 15% of President Obama's nominees waited at least 365 days. 90 or Fewer Days from Nomination to Confirmation During the Carter and Reagan presidencies, 47 and 63 circuit court nominees, respectively, waited 90 or fewer days from nomination to confirmation. During the George H. W. Bush presidency, 24 circuit court nominees waited 90 or fewer days to confirmation. President Clinton had 18 circuit court nominees confirmed within 90 days (i.e., within approximately three months) of being nominated, while President George W. Bush had 11 such nominees. President Obama had 2 circuit court nominees confirmed within three months of being nominated (the lowest number among the completed presidencies). During the first two years of the Trump presidency, eight circuit court nominees were confirmed within 90 or fewer days of being nominated. Overall, 84% of President Carter's circuit court nominees were confirmed within 90 days of being nominated. During the Reagan presidency, 76% of circuit court nominees were confirmed within 90 days of nomination, while during the George H. W. Bush presidency 57% of circuit court nominees were confirmed within this time frame. During the Clinton presidency, the percentage of circuit court nominees approved by the Senate within 90 days fell below half of all circuit court nominees confirmed (to 26%). The percentage of nominees confirmed in 90 or fewer days decreased further during both the George W. Bush presidency (to 16%) and the Obama presidency (to 4%, the lowest percentage among the six completed presidencies). During the first two years of the Trump presidency, 27% of circuit court nominees were confirmed within 90 days of being nominated. U.S. District Court Nominees Figure 2 shows, for each U.S. district court nominee who was confirmed from 1977 through 2018, the number of days from when that individual was first nominated to when he or she was confirmed by the Senate. The particular district court nominee who waited the longest period of time from nomination to confirmation is also labeled for each presidency. 365 or More Days from Nomination to Confirmation As shown by the figure, there was a notable increase after the George H. W. Bush presidency in the number of nominees who waited one year or more from nomination to confirmation. During the Carter and Reagan presidencies, a combined total of five district court nominees waited 365 days or more to be confirmed. No district court nominees during the George H. W. Bush presidency waited 365 or more days from nomination to confirmation. During the Clinton presidency, there were 14 district court nominees who waited one year or more to be confirmed. The number of district court nominees who waited at least 365 days to be confirmed increased further, to a high of 17, during the George W. Bush presidency. During the Obama presidency, there were 16 district court nominees who waited at least 365 days to be confirmed (which was the second highest among the completed presidencies). During the first two years of the Trump presidency, there were six district court nominees who waited at least 365 days from nomination to confirmation. Overall, 5% of President Clinton's district court nominees waited at least 365 days to be confirmed, 7% of President George W. Bush's nominees waited at least this long, and 6% of President Obama's nominees waited at least 365 days. During the first two years of the Trump presidency, 11% of district court nominees waited at least 365 days from nomination to confirmation. 90 or Fewer Days from Nomination to Confirmation During the Carter and Reagan presidencies, 157 and 234 district court nominees, respectively, waited 90 or fewer days from nomination to confirmation. During the George H. W. Bush presidency, 72 district court nominees waited 90 or fewer days to confirmation. President Clinton had 129 district court nominees confirmed within 90 days (i.e., within approximately three months) of being nominated, while President George W. Bush had 41 such nominees. President Obama had five district court nominees, the fewest of any completed presidency, confirmed within three months of being nominated. During the first two years of the Trump presidency, two district court nominees were confirmed within 90 or fewer days of being nominated. Overall, 78% of President Carter's district court nominees were confirmed within 90 days of being nominated. During the Reagan presidency, 81% of district court nominees were confirmed within 90 days of nomination, while during the George H. W. Bush presidency 49% of district nominees were confirmed within this time frame. During the Clinton and George W. Bush presidencies, the percentage of district court nominees approved by the Senate within 90 days declined further to 42% and 16%, respectively. During the Obama presidency, the percentage of nominees confirmed in 90 or fewer days was 2% (the lowest percentage of the completed presidencies). During the first two years of the Trump presidency, 4% of district court nominees were confirmed within 90 days of being nominated. By Congress Table 8 reports the median number of days from nomination to confirmation for U.S. circuit and district court nominees whose nominations were approved by the Senate from the 95 th Congress through the 115 th Congress. U.S. Circuit Court Nominees For circuit court nominees, the median number of days from nomination to confirmation ranged from a low of 28.0 days during the 97 th Congress (1981-1982) to a high of 331.0 days during the 114 th Congress (2015-2016). The second-shortest median number of days from nomination to confirmation was 29.0 days during the 95 th Congress (1977-1978), while the second-highest median number of days was 281.5 days during the 109 th Congress (2005-2006). The median number of days from nomination to confirmation for U.S. circuit court nominees stayed above 200 days from the 106 th through 114 th Congresses. In contrast, for the 115 th Congress, the median number of days from nomination to confirmation (140.5 days, or 4.6 months) declined to its lowest point since the 103 rd Congress. If the average, rather than the median, is used to measure the length of time circuit court nominees waited from nomination to confirmation, the average number of days from nomination to confirmation ranged from a low of 32.6 days during the 95 th Congress to a high of 562.9 days during the 109 th Congress. Additionally, the average time from nomination to confirmation for U.S. circuit court nominees increases by more than 30 days, relative to the median, for the 106 th Congress (to 373.9 days); 105 th Congress (303.1 days); 108 th Congress (287.2 days); 113 th Congress (281.2 days); and 110 th Congress (268.8 days). U.S. District Court Nominees For U.S. district court nominees, the median number of days from nomination to confirmation ranged from a low of 26.0 days during the 98 th Congress (1983-1984) to a high of 299.5 days during the 114 th Congress (2015-2016). The second-shortest median was 30.0 days during the 97 th Congress (1981-1982), while the second-longest median was 235.0 days during the 115 th Congress (2017-2018). The median number of days from nomination to confirmation during the 115 th Congress was the fourth consecutive Congress for which the median wait time from nomination to confirmation for district court nominees was greater than 200 days. The first Congress during which the median wait time for district court nominees exceeded 200 days was the 112 th Congress (2011-2012). Figure 3 displays the overall trends in the median number of days from nomination to confirmation for U.S. circuit and district court nominees who were confirmed from the 95 th Congress through the 115 th Congress (and also indicates the corresponding presidency for each Congress during this period). For circuit court nominees, the five greatest increases in the number of median days from nomination to confirmation occurred during the 114 th Congress (an increase of 102.0 days from the 113 th Congress); the 109 th Congress (an increase of 80.5 days from the 108 th Congress); 100 th Congress (an increase of 73.0 days from the 99 th Congress); 104 th Congress (an increase of 68.0 days from the 103 rd Congress); and the 107 th Congress (an increase of 52.0 days from the 106 th Congress). Most recently, from the 114 th to 115 th Congress, the median number of days from nomination to confirmation for U.S. circuit court nominees declined from 331.0 to 140.5 days. For district court nominees, the five greatest increases in the number of median days from nomination to confirmation occurred during the 114 th Congress (an increase of 96.5 days from the 113 th Congress); 112 th Congress (an increase of 85.0 days from the 111 th Congress); 110 th Congress (an increase of 67.0 days from the 109 th Congress); 100 th Congress (an increase of 57.0 days from the 99 th Congress); and the 102 nd Congress (an increase of 45.5 days from the 101 st Congress). Most recently, from the 114 th to 115 th Congress, the median number of days from nomination to confirmation for U.S. district court nominees declined from 299.5 to 235.0 days. Time from Nomination to Committee Hearing The President customarily transmits a circuit or district court nomination to the Senate in the form of a written nomination message. Once received, the nomination is numbered by the Senate executive clerk, read on the floor, and then immediately referred to the Judiciary Committee. The Judiciary Committee's processing of the nomination typically consists of three phases—a prehearing phase, the holding of a hearing on the nomination, and voting on whether to report the nomination to the Senate. During a hearing on the nomination, lower court nominees engage in a question-and-answer session with members of the Senate Judiciary Committee. The hearing typically is held for more than one judicial nominee at a time. From 1977 through 2018, the median length of time from when an individual was first nominated to a circuit court judgeship to when he or she received a hearing by the Judiciary Committee was 63.0 days (or 2.1 months). During this same period, the median length of time from when an individual was nominated to a district court judgeship to when he or she received a hearing was also 63.0 days. As shown in Table 9 , the median length of time from nomination to committee hearing for circuit and district court nominees has, however, varied across presidencies. For individuals nominated during more recent presidencies, the length of time from nomination to committee hearing has been relatively longer than the median for all nominees from 1977 through 2018. The median number of days from nomination to committee hearing for U.S. circuit court nominees ranged from a low of 23.0 days (during the Reagan presidency) to a high of 154.0 days (during the George W. Bush presidency). For the first two years of the Trump presidency, the median number of days from nomination to hearing for U.S. circuit court nominees was 69.0 days. The median number of days from nomination to committee hearing for U.S. district court nominees ranged from a low of 22.0 days (during the Reagan presidency) to a high of 87.5 days (during the George W. Bush presidency). For the first two years of the Trump presidency, the median number of days from nomination to hearing for U.S. district court nominees was 77.0 days. Time from Committee Report to Confirmation After a nominee receives a hearing by the Judiciary Committee, she awaits a vote by the committee on whether her nomination will be reported to the Senate as a whole. If the nomination is not put to the committee for a vote, or if the committee votes against reporting it (i.e., rejects the nomination), the nomination will not move forward, ultimately failing to receive Senate confirmation. The committee, in reporting a nomination to the Senate as a whole, has three options—to report a nomination favorably, unfavorably, or without recommendation. Almost always, when the committee votes on a nomination, it votes to report favorably. The committee, however, may vote (as it has done in the past, but only on rare occasions) to report unfavorably or without recommendation. Such a vote advances the nomination for Senate consideration despite the lack of majority support for it in committee. After it is reported by the Judiciary Committee, a circuit or district court nomination is listed on the Executive Calendar and is eligible for floor consideration. The nominees who are included in this part of the analysis all had their nominations reported by the Judiciary Committee (i.e., their nominations advanced to the full Senate for consideration) and were confirmed by the Senate. From 1977 through 2018, the median length of time from when an individual who was nominated to a circuit court judgeship had his nomination reported by the Judiciary Committee to when he was confirmed by the Senate was 9.0 days. During this same period, the median length of time from when a district court nominee had his nomination reported to when he was confirmed was 8.0 days. There was, however, variation during this period across presidencies in how long circuit and district court nominees waited to be confirmed once their nominations were reported by the Judiciary Committee—with nominees during more recent presidencies waiting longer to be confirmed once their nominations were reported by the committee. As shown by Table 10 , for completed presidencies, the median number of days from committee report to confirmation for U.S. circuit court nominees ranged from a low of 1.0 day (during the George H. W. Bush presidency) to a high of 98.0 days (during the Obama presidency). For the first two years of the Trump presidency, the median number of days from committee report to confirmation was 26.0 days. For completed presidencies, the median number of days from committee report to confirmation for U.S. district court nominees ranged from a low of 1.0 day (during the George H. W. Bush presidency) to a high of 84.0 days (during the Obama presidency). For the first two years of the Trump presidency, the median number of days from committee report to confirmation for U.S. district court nominees was 133.0 days. Ratings by the American Bar Association for Confirmed Nominees Since 1953, every presidential Administration, except those of George W. Bush and Donald Trump, has sought prenomination evaluations of its candidates for district and circuit court judgeships by the American Bar Association (ABA). The committee that performs this evaluation, the ABA's Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary, is made up of 15 lawyers with various professional experiences. The stated objective of the committee is to assist the White House in assessing whether prospective judicial nominees should be nominated. It seeks to do so by providing what it describes as an "impartial peer-review evaluation" of each candidate's professional qualifications. This evaluation, according to the committee, focuses strictly on a candidate's "integrity, professional competence and judicial temperament" and does not take into account the candidate's "philosophy, political affiliation or ideology." In evaluating professional competence, the committee assesses the prospective nominee's "intellectual capacity, judgment, writing and analytical abilities, knowledge of the law, and breadth of professional experience." Following the multistep evaluation process by the committee, a nominee is given an official rating of "well qualified," "qualified," or "not qualified." A rating is provided strictly on an advisory basis; it is solely in the President's discretion as to how much weight to place on a judicial candidate's ABA rating in deciding whether to nominate him or her. As shown by Table 11 , there is some variation across presidencies in the percentage of confirmed U.S. circuit and district court nominees who received a particular rating by the ABA. For U.S. circuit court nominees for completed presidencies, the percentage who received a well qualified rating ranged from a low of 56.6% during the Reagan presidency to a high of 80.0% during the Obama presidency. During the first two years of the Trump presidency, 80.0% of confirmed circuit court nominees also received a well qualified rating. None of the completed presidencies listed in the table had any confirmed circuit court nominees who were rated as not qualified by the ABA. During the first two years of the Trump presidency, two circuit court nominees were rated as not qualified (comprising 6.7% of the circuit court nominees confirmed during this period). For confirmed U.S. district court nominees, the percentage who received a well qualified rating ranged from a low of 51.0% during the Carter presidency to a high of 69.3% during the George W. Bush presidency. During the first two years of the Trump presidency, 62.3% of confirmed district court nominees received a well qualified rating. For completed presidencies during which at least one confirmed district court nominee was rated as not qualified, the percentage of nominees who received such a rating ranged from a high of 1.5% of all confirmed nominees during the Carter and George W. Bush presidencies to a low of 1.3% of such nominees during the Clinton presidency. During the first two years of the Trump presidency, 3.8% of confirmed district court nominees received a rating of not qualified. Frequency of Roll Call Votes for Confirmed Nominees The Senate may confirm nominations by unanimous consent, voice vote, or by recorded roll call vote. When the question of whether to confirm a nomination is put to the Senate, a roll call vote will be taken on the nomination if the Senate has ordered "the yeas and nays." The support of 11 Senators is necessary to order the roll call. Historically, the Senate confirmed most U.S. circuit and district court nominations by unanimous consent or by voice vote. As shown by Figure 4 , however, using roll call votes to confirm nominees has become much more common during recent presidencies. A relatively small percentage of circuit court nominees were confirmed by roll call vote during the Carter, Reagan, and George H. W. Bush presidencies. Specifically, 7.1%, 6.0%, and 2.4% of circuit court nominees were confirmed by roll call during each of these three presidencies, respectively. Additionally, only one district court nominee was confirmed by roll call vote during each of the Carter and Reagan presidencies, and no district court nominees were confirmed by roll call vote during George H. W. Bush's presidency. Confirmation by roll call vote became more common during the Clinton presidency, with nearly one-quarter, 24.6%, of circuit court nominees and 10.5% of district court nominees receiving roll call votes at the time of Senate confirmation. It was not, however, until the George W. Bush presidency that a majority of lower court nominees were approved using roll call votes, with 80.3% of circuit court nominees and 54.0% of district court nominees confirmed in this way. This trend continued under President Obama, with 89.1% of circuit court nominees and 64.6% of district court nominees being confirmed by roll call vote. During the first two years of the Trump presidency, all U.S. circuit court nominees were confirmed using roll call votes, representing an increase from recent years in the frequency of using roll call votes to confirm circuit court nominees. In contrast, 50.9% of district court nominees were confirmed by roll call vote, representing a decrease from recent years in the frequency of using roll call votes to confirm district court nominees. Number of Nay Votes Received The increased frequency with which roll call votes have been used to confirm U.S. circuit and district court nominations has not always been correlated with Senators using roll call votes to express opposition to a nominee by voting against his or her nomination. As shown by Figure 5 , there is notable variation in the number of nay votes received by circuit and district court nominations when they have been confirmed by roll call vote. The figure shows the number of nominations that received zero nay votes at the time of confirmation. For nominations that received at least one nay vote, the roll call data are presented using five ranges to reflect the number of nay votes received by a President's nominees: (1) 1 to 10 nay votes; (2) 11 to 20 nay votes; (3) 21 to 30 nay votes; (4) 31 to 40 nay votes; and (5) more than 40 nay votes. During the Clinton presidency, 12 (75.0%) of 16 circuit court nominees who were confirmed by roll call vote received at least one nay vote (with 9, or 56.2%, receiving more than 20 nay votes). Of the 32 district court nominees who were confirmed by roll call vote, 18 (56.2%) received at least one nay vote. In contrast to the Clinton presidency, a majority of the circuit and district court nominees approved by roll call vote during the George W. Bush and Obama presidencies were confirmed after having received zero nay votes. During the Bush presidency, 30 (61.2%) of 49 circuit court nominees confirmed by roll call votes received zero nay votes. For the 141 district court nominees confirmed by roll call vote, 136 (96.4%) received zero nay votes. During the Obama presidency, 26 (53.1%) of 49 circuit court nominees confirmed by roll call vote received zero nay votes. For the 173 district court nominees confirmed by roll call vote, 95 (54.9%) received zero nay votes. During the first two years of the Trump presidency, 18 (60.0%) of 30 circuit court nominees approved by roll call vote were confirmed with more than 40 nay votes. In contrast, 2 (6.7%) were confirmed with zero nay votes. For district court nominees, 17 (63.0%) of 27 confirmed by roll call vote received at least one nay vote (while 10, or 37.0%, received zero nay votes). Of the 17 who received at least one nay vote, a plurality (5, or 29.4%) received more than 40 nay votes. Demographic Characteristics of Confirmed Nominees This section provides data related to the gender and race of U.S. circuit and district court nominees confirmed by the Senate during each presidency since the Carter Administration. These particular demographic characteristics of judicial nominees are of ongoing interest to Congress. Such interest is demonstrated especially at the time circuit and district court nominations are considered by the Senate. For example, floor statements by Senators in support of circuit or district court nominees frequently emphasize the particular demographic characteristics of nominees who would enhance the diversity of the federal judiciary. Gender As shown by Figure 6 , for completed presidencies, the percentage of confirmed U.S. circuit court nominees who were women ranged from a low of 7.2% during the Reagan presidency to a high of 43.6% during the Obama presidency. For district court nominees, the percentage of confirmed nominees who were women ranged from a low of 8.3% during the Reagan presidency to a high of 41.0% during the Obama presidency. During the first two years of the Trump presidency, 20.0% of confirmed U.S. circuit court nominees were women, while 26.4% of confirmed district court nominees were women. Race Figure 7 shows the percentage of each President's confirmed U.S. circuit and district court nominees who were African American, Asian American, Hispanic, and white. Confirmed African American Nominees For completed presidencies, the percentage of confirmed U.S. circuit court nominees who were African American ranged from a low of 1.2% during the Reagan presidency to a high of 16.4% during the Obama presidency. During the first two years of the Trump presidency, no confirmed circuit court nominees were African American. For completed presidencies, the percentage of confirmed U.S. district court nominees who were African American ranged from a low of 2.1% during the Reagan presidency to a high of 18.7% during the Obama presidency. During the first two years of the Trump presidency, 1.9% of confirmed district court nominees were African American. Confirmed Asian American Nominees For completed presidencies, there were no Asian American circuit court judges appointed during the Reagan, George H. W. Bush, or George W. Bush presidencies. The greatest percentage was appointed during the Obama presidency (7.3%). During the first two years of the Trump presidency, 10.0% of confirmed circuit court nominees were Asian American. For past presidencies, there were no Asian American district court judges appointed during the George H. W. Bush presidency. The greatest percentage was appointed during the Obama presidency (5.2%). During the first two years of the Trump presidency, 3.8% of confirmed district court nominees were Asian American. Confirmed Hispanic Nominees For completed presidencies, the percentage of confirmed U.S. circuit court nominees who were Hispanic ranged from a low of 1.2% during the Reagan presidency to a high of 10.9% during the Obama presidency. During the first two years of the Trump presidency, no confirmed circuit court nominees were Hispanic. For completed presidencies, the percentage of confirmed U.S. district court nominees who were Hispanic ranged from a low of 4.1% during the George H. W. Bush presidency to a high of 10.3% during the George W. Bush presidency. During the first two years of the Trump presidency, 1.9% of confirmed district court nominees were Hispanic.

In recent decades, the process for appointing judges to the U.S. circuit courts of appeals and the U.S. district courts has been of continuing Senate interest. The President and the Senate share responsibility for making these appointments. Pursuant to the Constitution's Appointments Clause, the President nominates persons to fill federal judgeships, with the appointment of each nominee also requiring Senate confirmation. Although not mentioned in the Constitution, an important role is also played midway in the appointment process by the Senate Judiciary Committee. The statistics presented in this report reflect congressional interest in issues related to the confirmation process for lower federal court nominees. Statistics are provided for each stage of the nomination and confirmation process—from the frequency of judicial vacancies that require a presidential nomination for a judgeship to be filled to the frequency of roll call votes (rather than the use of unanimous consent or voice votes) to confirm judicial nominees. Statistics are also provided related to the length of the confirmation process itself. Additional statistics provided relate to the demographic characteristics of circuit and district court nominees confirmed by the Senate. The period covered by the report, 1977 through 2018, includes every Administration from the Carter presidency to the first two years of the Trump presidency. This period also includes every Congress from the 95th (1977-1978) through the 115th (2017-2018). Because the statistics presented for the Trump presidency are for the first two years of his Administration (while statistics for other presidencies reflect each President's entire Administration, whether four or eight years), the statistics presented for the Trump presidency may be different at the conclusion of his Administration. This report will be next updated by CRS at the conclusion of the 116th Congress.

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Background Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX) provides an avenue of legal relief for victims of sexual abuse and harassment committed by professors, teachers, coaches, and others at educational institutions. The statute prohibits discrimination "on the basis of sex" of any person in an educational program or activity receiving federal funding. Though Title IX makes no explicit reference to sexual abuse or harassment, the Supreme Court has held that a school district can violate the statute, and be held liable for damages, based on a deliberately indifferent response to a teacher's sexual abuse or harassment of a student. The Court has also held that a school board may be liable under Title IX for a deliberately indifferent response to student-on-student sexual harassment. Meanwhile, federal agencies that administratively enforce the statute, such as the Department of Education (ED), have also determined that educational institutions can be held responsible for instances of sexual harassment under Title IX in certain circumstances. Title IX is thus primarily enforced in two ways: (1) through private rights of action directly against schools by or on behalf of students subject to such harassment in certain circumstances; and (2) by federal agencies that provide funding to educational programs. With respect to the latter enforcement prong, like several other federal civil rights statutes, Title IX makes compliance with its antidiscrimination mandate a condition for receiving federal funding in any education program or activity. Title IX applies to federal-funded schools at all levels of education. For instance, all public school districts receive some federal financial assistance, as do most institutions of higher education through participation in federal student aid programs. Notably, when any part of a school district or institution of higher education receives federal funds, all of the recipient's operations are covered by Title IX. The text of Title IX does not expressly mention sexual abuse or harassment, while current regulations implementing the statute also do not explicitly address sexual harassment (although the regulations do require schools to designate at least one employee to function as a Title IX Coordinator). In each of the last several presidential administrations, however, the Department of Education (ED) has issued guidance documents that instruct schools regarding their responsibilities under Title IX when addressing allegations of sexual harassment. In response, educational institutions have developed procedures and practices to investigate and respond to allegations of sexual harassment and assault. And ED recently issued another notice of proposed rulemaking, after having revoked some of its prior guidance to schools in 2017. As discussed in this report, if adopted, the regulations would significantly change educational institutions' responsibilities for responding to sexual harassment allegations. To place the proposed Title IX regulations in context, this report provides background on the legal landscape that informs the proposal. First, the report examines how federal courts have understood Title IX's requirements in the context of private rights of actions brought by students directly against educational institutions seeking damages for sexual abuse or harassment. The report continues by examining how federal agencies have enforced Title IX, with particular focus on ED's guidance documents that direct schools on how to respond to sexual harassment and assault allegations. The report then considers various constitutional challenges brought by students against public universities, which claim that some universities' responses to allegations of sexual harassment have violated the due process rights of the accused. With this backdrop set, the report examines ED's proposed regulations with an emphasis on how they would alter the responsibilities of schools in complying with Title IX. A Private Right of Action to Enforce Title IX Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 states that "No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance," subject to certain exemptions. In other words, recipients of federal funding, which administer an educational program or activity, are prohibited from discriminating on the basis of sex. The statute, however, does not expressly provide for a private right of action by which victims of sex discrimination may recover for a Title IX violation. Nor does the statute expressly prohibit sexual harassment, abuse, or molestation as forms of unlawful sex discrimination, or otherwise define unlawful sexual abuse or harassment. Title IX also does not delineate the circumstances in which a school or educational program may be liable for such conduct. Given the absence of statutory text "to shed light on Congress' intent," federal courts have played a primary, if not exclusive, role in establishing the remedial scheme by which victims of sexual harassment or abuse may seek relief under Title IX through a private right of action. The Supreme Court first interpreted Title IX to provide for a judicially implied private right of action against a federal-funded educational institution for sexual harassment, and later, an implied damages remedy in such actions. Since then, and in the absence of legislative amendments to Title IX on those issues, the Court has also created the legal standard for establishing liability under Title IX for sexual abuse or harassment committed by a teacher, and other students. The Court, and numerous federal courts of appeals, have described this judicially created liability standard—which draws upon the "deliberate indifference" standard as applied under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 —as a "high bar for plaintiffs to recover under Title IX." Critically, in a Title IX private right of action for damages, an educational institution (or other federally funded program or activity) is not strictly liable for a principal's or teacher's sexual harassment or abuse of a student. In other words, the fact that sexual harassment or abuse occurred and was committed by these individuals is not the basis for a funding recipient's liability under the Supreme Court's remedial scheme. Rather, Title IX liability turns on the recipient's response to its actual knowledge of that conduct. A recipient will be liable only when its response was so deficient as to amount to "deliberate indifference" to the alleged harassment or abuse. Gebser and Davis: The Supreme Court's Title IX Liability Standard The private right of action currently available under Title IX is one of judicial implication—that is, the Court has interpreted the statute to imply such a right, in the absence of express statutory language providing for it. A private right of action provides a personal legal remedy for victims of sex discrimination in the form of specific relief or damages. In contrast, and as discussed in a later section, administrative enforcement of the statute makes its general focus the institutional policies and practices of the recipient educational institution. Two Supreme Court decisions, together, set out the requirements for establishing an educational funding recipient's liability under Title IX for damages for sexual abuse or harassment: Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District and Davis N ext Friend LaShonda D. v. Monroe County Board of Education . The Court's liability standard premises an institution's Title IX liability for sexual harassment or abuse based on the institution's "deliberate indifference" in responding to knowledge of that conduct. Thus—and critical to understanding a Title IX private right of action for damages—an educational institution (or other federally funded program or activity) is not strictly liable for a principal's or teacher's sexual harassment or abuse of a student. Indeed, the Supreme Court in Gebser expressly rejected such arguments urging it to apply agency principles to Title IX such that a school would be vicariously liable for such harassment. Instead, liability attaches only if a plaintiff establishes that the funding recipient's response to its "actual" knowledge of the discrimination was deliberately indifferent. Put another way, under the Court's remedial scheme, liability under Title IX is based on the funding recipient's " own failure to act" adequately in response to known misconduct, not the misconduct itself. Thus, an institution will not be liable absent a showing of deliberate indifference, regardless of whether the conduct committed by a principal or teacher could be characterized as egregious. In creating this standard in Gebser , the Court had attempted to "'infer how the [1972] Congress would have addressed the issue had the . . . action been included as an express provision in the' statute." That task, the Court observed, "inherently entail[ed] a degree of speculation." To inform its analysis, the Court relied significantly on the statute's administrative enforcement provision because, in its view, the provision "contain[ed] important clues" from which to infer legislative intent regarding Title IX liability. The Court observed that, pursuant to that provision, agencies that disburse federal funds may suspend or cut funds to a funding recipient for violating Title IX, but only after they "ha[ve] advised the appropriate person or persons of the failure to comply with the requirement and ha[ve] determined that compliance cannot be secured by voluntary means." Because the statute's administrative procedure "require[s] notice to the recipient and an opportunity to come into voluntary compliance," the Court reasoned that it too would similarly require "actual notice" to an "appropriate person" to establish liability for damages in a private right of action under Title IX. The Court also concluded that a recipient would be liable under Title IX only where a school official responds to that "actual" notice so deficiently that its response amounts to "deliberate indifference." In so holding, the Court again looked to Title IX's administrative enforcement scheme and observed that it "presupposes that an official who is advised of a Title IX violation refuses to take action to bring the recipient into compliance." The Court found "a rough parallel in the standard of deliberate indifference," from case law arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 addressing claims "alleging that a municipality's actions in failing to prevent a deprivation of federal rights" caused a violation. The Court thus held that "[u]ntil Congress speaks directly on the subject . . . we will not hold a school district liable in damages under Title IX for a teacher's sexual harassment of a student absent actual notice and deliberate indifference" —a conclusion that elicited a strong dissent. Deliberate Indifference Deliberate indifference is a "high standard," as described by the Supreme Court in Davis , and must "at a minimum, 'cause [students] to undergo' harassment or 'make them liable or vulnerable' to it." Notably, the "deliberate indifference" standard does not require funding recipients to "remedy" the harassment. Rather, under Davis , a recipient's response to harassment will amount to deliberate indifference only if it is " clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances." Because this standard is not "a mere 'reasonableness' standard," a plaintiff must show more than the unreasonableness of a funding recipient's response to sexual abuse or harassment. The plaintiff must show that the recipient was clearly unreasonable in its response. Accordingly, a funding recipient is not liable under Title IX if it responds to sexual abuse or harassment "in a manner that is not clearly unreasonable." In addition to the requisite showing of "deliberate indifference," the Court's standard also requires a plaintiff to establish other threshold showings to prevail in a Title IX suit for damages—both before reaching the question of "deliberate indifference" and after establishing "deliberate indifference" on the part of the school or entity. "Actual" Notice of Discrimination by "An Appropriate Person" Before reaching the issue of whether a funding recipient acted with "deliberate indifference," Gebser requires that a plaintiff establish that "an appropriate person" at the funding recipient had "actual knowledge of discrimination." Failure to show either "actual" notice or that such notice was provided to "an appropriate person" of the funding recipient may constitute the sole basis for a court's dismissal of a Title IX claim seeking damages for sexual harassment or abuse. An "appropriate person," under Gebser , is "an official who at a minimum has authority to address the alleged discrimination and to institute corrective measures on the recipient's behalf." As discussed later in this report, what constitutes "actual" notice, and who may constitute an "appropriate person," have caused substantive splits among the circuits. Student-to-Student Harassment: "Substantial Control," "Severe, Pervasive, and Objectively Offensive" Harassment, Denial of Educational Access Even where "deliberate indifference" is established, the Supreme Court's liability standard further requires a plaintiff alleging student-to-student or peer harassment to make several additional showings: (1) that a funding recipient exercised "substantial control" over the harasser and the context in which the harassment occurred; (2) that the harassment itself was "severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive"; and (3) the denial of educational access resulting from the harassment. With respect to "substantial control," Davis limits a school's liability for damages to circumstances in which the funding recipient exercised "substantial control" over the harasser and in which the harassment took place in a context subject to the recipient's control. If "the harasser is under the school's disciplinary authority," a recipient of federal funding may be liable for its deliberate indifference to the harassment, as the Court in Davis particularly emphasized the recipient's authority to take "remedial action" against the harassment. As for "substantial control" over the environment, "the harassment must take place in a context subject to the school district's control." As to the nature of the sexual harassment itself, Davis requires that the plaintiff show that the conduct "is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive, and [] so undermines and detracts from the victims' educational experience, that the victim-students are effectively denied equal access to an institution's resources and opportunities." Whether the conduct rises to this level depends, as the Court stated in Davis , "on a constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships," "including, but not limited to, the ages of the harasser and the victim and the number of individuals involved." Finally, for harassment to have sufficiently affected the victim's education, the Court in Davis made two additional observations. On the one hand, the Court noted that evidence of a decline in the victim's grades—as was alleged there—"provides necessary evidence of a potential link between her education" and the alleged harassment. Yet, the Court also concluded that harassment is actionable under Title IX only when it is "serious enough to have the systemic effect of denying the victim equal access to an educational program or activity." Without defining what might constitute a "systemic effect," the Court offered one example of harassment that does not have such effect: "a single instance" of harassment, even when "sufficiently severe." Federal Courts' Application of Gebser and Davis to Title IX Claims for Sexual Harassment or Abuse The Supreme Court's Gebser and Davis decisions establish that a school or other educational program that receives federal funding will be liable under Title IX for damages for the sexual abuse or harassment of a student only if it acted with "deliberate indifference" in its response to known discrimination. Deliberate indifference, the Fifth Circuit has recently observed, "'is an extremely high standard to meet.'" Applying this and other components of the Supreme Court's Title IX liability standard, lower federal courts have varied in their formulations of the evidence required to prove a Title IX claim. Some courts, for example, have interpreted Gebser and Davis to adopt a "hostile environment" analysis of Title IX claims alleging teacher-to-student harassment, in light of precedent analyzing harassment claims in the workplace context under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Meanwhile, other federal courts have focused their teacher-to-student analysis on whether a plaintiff has established the following elements: "actual" notice of discrimination; by an "appropriate person" authorized to take corrective measures; and "deliberate indifference" by the funding recipient in response to known discrimination. Where a Title IX claim alleges sexual harassment or assault committed by a student against another student , courts have additionally required the plaintiff to establish that: the harassment was "so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive"; the "victim-students [were] effectively denied equal access to an institution's resources and opportunities"; and the recipient exercised "substantial control" over the harasser and the context in which the harassment occurred. As discussed in further detail below, federal courts of appeals vary—and at times directly conflict—regarding the evidence sufficient to satisfy these elements. Failure to satisfy any one of the elements may be the sole basis for dismissal of a Title IX claim. What Knowledge Gives Rise to "Actual" Notice? Under Gebser , a plaintiff must show that the funding recipient had "actual" notice of the discrimination; therefore, it is not enough to present evidence that a funding recipient reasonably s hould have known about the alleged sexual misconduct. Under the standard, then, what type of allegations reported to a school give rise to "actual" notice? Is it enough, for example, if a funding recipient has actual knowledge of a " substantial risk of abuse"? Does it require knowledge of specific allegations of harassment or abuse or—perhaps most narrowly—require knowledge of "severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive" conduct? Meanwhile, if a school is notified of a perpetrator's previous acts of sexual harassment or abuse, may that constitute actual notice of that individual's conduct as to others ? Federal courts differ on these questions of actual notice, with some courts further differentiating between evidence that establishes actual notice of a teacher's sexual abuse versus actual notice of sexual violence or harassment committed by a student. As reflected below, which standard a court applies to evaluate "actual notice" is determinative—the claim may either proceed to the next phase of the analysis or be foreclosed altogether. In Doe v. School Board of Broward County , the Eleventh Circuit addressed the question of whether complaints of two separate students about the same teacher were "sufficient in substance to alert [the principal] to the possibility" of that teacher's sexual assault of a third student. The court held in the affirmative, emphasizing the similarity between the two preceding reports, which alleged multiple occasions of the teacher's propositions for sex and dates, sexual touching, and sexual comments about their bodies. These reports, the court held, raised a triable issue that the principal had actual notice "of a pattern of harassment." And where the analysis of "actual notice" looks to knowledge of the risk of sexual abuse or harassment, the court further observed, "lesser harassment may [] provide actual notice of sexually violent conduct." In Bay n ard v. Malone , however, the Fourth Circuit held that the school principal had no "actual" notice that a sixth grade teacher was sexually abusing a student in his class, despite receiving multiple prior reports that he molested children. There, the evidence reflected that before the plaintiff started sixth grade at the school, the principal had met with one of this teacher's former students, who reported that he had been sexually molested by the teacher while in the sixth grade, warned that the teacher was a pedophile, and that the principal should watch for certain behaviors. In addition, another teacher at the school told the principal about allegations that this teacher sexually molested children. Separately, the school librarian reported to the principal that she had walked in on the teacher with the plaintiff sitting in his lap, with his arm around the student, and their faces very close together, and that when the teacher saw her, he jumped up and the plaintiff fell to the floor. In relaying the incident, the librarian told the principal the behavior had been "inappropriate." Though the court noted that the principal "certainly should have been aware of the potential for abuse," it held that there was "no evidence in the record to support a conclusion that [the principal] was in fact aware that a student was being abused." The court dismissed the Title IX claim on the basis that no appropriate person had actual notice of the abuse of the plaintiff student. As the above cases reflect, in the absence of a clear definition—either in the statute or from the Supreme Court—courts vary with respect to the nature, specificity, and frequency of allegations sufficient to constitute "actual" notice for the purpose of satisfying the first prong of the analysis for Title IX liability for sexual abuse or harassment. Who Constitutes an "Appropriate Person"? The Supreme Court's liability standard for Title IX not only requires actual notice, but also that this notice be made to "an appropriate person"—that is, "an official who at a minimum has authority to address the alleged discrimination and to institute corrective measures on the recipient's behalf." Generally, federal appellate case law reflects that rather than treating an individual's title as dispositive, courts engage in fact-specific determinations that appear to focus principally on whether an individual had the ability to halt or address the misconduct or whether the individual occupied a position high enough within the hierarchy of the funding recipient to be fairly said to act in a representative capacity for the recipient. Because the Court's opinions in Gebser and Davis do not clearly delineate which individuals may constitute "appropriate person[s]," federal courts have reached varying—and at times conflicting—determinations. In the elementary or secondary school context, for example, courts vary as to which individuals— a principal, teacher, or guidance counselor —have the requisite "authority to address the alleged discrimination" and "institute" corrective action to constitute "an appropriate person." Some federal courts of appeals have held that a public school principal may—but not always—constitute "an appropriate person." In Warren ex rel . Good v. Reading School District , the Third Circuit held, in a Title IX case alleging sexual abuse by a fourth grade teacher, that the school principal was an "appropriate person" in light of her authority to investigate a teacher's misconduct, which in turn implied her authority to "initiate" corrective measures such as reporting her findings to the school board. The Fourth Circuit, however, reached the opposite conclusion in Baynard v. Malone , holding that the principal—despite being responsible for supervising and evaluating teachers—was not an "appropriate person." The court emphasized that the principal could not "be considered the functional equivalent of the school district" and lacked the authority to "hire, fire, transfer, or suspend teachers." Meanwhile, at least one federal court of appeals has held that a principal who engages directly in sexual abuse or harassment may not constitute an "appropriate person." In Salazar v. South San Antonio Independent School District , the Fifth Circuit interpreted Gebser to hold that where a school official sexually abuses a student, he or she cannot be considered an "appropriate person," even if he would otherwise constitute an "appropriate person." That case involved allegations that a vice principal, who later became principal, sexually abused a student from his third grade to seventh grade year. Though "uncontroverted testimony at trial" established that the school official had corrective authority to address sexual harassment during the time he molested the plaintiff, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that it was "highly unlikely" that he would take corrective measures or report his own behavior so as to provide actual notice to the funding recipient. The court further rejected the argument that the principal's abuse should be treated as an official action of the school district for Title IX liability purposes, given the Supreme Court's rejection of agency principles to Title IX. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the "goals and purpose" of Title IX "would not be accomplished or effectuated by permitting damage awards" in such circumstances. In the higher education context, federal courts of appeals have engaged in similarly fact-specific analyses to determine whether a university employee—for example, a college dean, university counsel, or athletics director —constitutes an "appropriate person" for the purposes of a Title IX private right of action. The analyses in these cases appear to emphasize evidence relating to the individual's ranking in the university hierarchy, responsibilities involving receiving allegations of harassment, and ability to correct or halt the misconduct. Yet, even when there arguably is such evidence, it may not be sufficient to render that individual an "appropriate person." In Ross v. University of Tulsa , for example, the Tenth Circuit held that campus security officers were not "appropriate person[s]" through whom the university could have actual notice of an on-campus sexual assault. The court rejected the contention that the officers' mandatory reporting of sexual assaults to university personnel rendered them "appropriate person[s]," instead likening mandatory reporting to a "clerical act" rather than taking corrective action. The court also rejected the argument that the officers' participation in investigations of campus violence rendered them "appropriate person[s]," as that contention, as presented, "would assume that anyone participating in the initiation of a corrective process" is an "appropriate person." Given the variability of courts' analyses as to who may constitute an "appropriate person," it is unlikely that a school's or university's Title IX Coordinator will categorically constitute an "appropriate person." Rather, as reflected in the above decisions, a court's determination—based on the legal standard set out in Gebser —will likely depend on the characteristics it finds indicative of an "appropriate person" and the evidence relating to the individual's responsibilities in that institution. Deliberate Indifference: A "Clearly Unreasonable" Response As discussed earlier, after establishing "actual notice" of the discrimination to an "appropriate person," a plaintiff must additionally prove that the funding recipient acted with deliberate indifference in its response—that is, that the entity acted in a manner that was " clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances." Federal appellate courts interpret this standard to require more than a showing that the school or institution failed to respond or act reasonably, or was negligent. Nor is a school required to remedy the harassment to avoid liability in a private right of action based on "deliberate indifference." In these highly fact-intensive analyses, courts examine the nature of the allegations the funding recipient had knowledge of, and what actions the recipient took, if any, in response to that information to determine whether the response was so "clearly unreasonable" as to amount to "deliberate indifference" to the alleged sexual harassment or abuse. The clearest cases of "deliberate indifference" generally concern evidence that the recipient made no effort to respond at all to "actual" notice of sexual harassment or abuse. Evidence of such circumstances might include, for example, a funding recipient's failure to initiate an investigation into serious allegations, or take any disciplinary actions in light of repeated reports of sexual harassment. Where there is evidence that the funding recipient responded in some manner, however, federal case law reflects what appear to be divergent and variable analyses as to whether a response is so deficient as to amount to deliberate indifference. Federal appellate courts have commonly described the requisite showing for deliberate indifference as a "high" bar to meet. In Doe ex rel . Doe v. Dallas Independent School District , for example, the Fifth Circuit held that the school district's response did not amount to deliberate indifference, despite evidence that could arguably be described as reflecting a deficient response. In that case, the plaintiffs, a group of former students, alleged that the same third grade teacher had sexually abused numerous male students, over the course of four years. The plaintiffs presented evidence that in response to a report of sexual molestation, the principal told the parent that the alleged perpetrator was a "good teacher" and that he knew her son was lying; failed to report the allegation to Child Protective Services; did not monitor the teacher further or require him to attend any training; and never raised the issue of sexual abuse again with the teacher until he was ultimately arrested. In the court's view, this evidence failed to create a triable issue of deliberate indifference, as the principal had nonetheless interviewed the student, spoken with his mother, and warned the teacher that if the allegations were true, "he would be 'dealt with.'" It could not say, the court concluded, that these actions "were an inadequate response" to the student's allegation. When faced with apparently similar evidence of a school's response to allegations of teacher sexual misconduct, the Eleventh Circuit held that, given "serious deficiencies," the district court had erred in holding that defendant's response, as a matter of law, was not deliberately indifferent. There, the principal had received sexual harassment complaints by two students about the same teacher. In its analysis, the court highlighted the response to the second complaint, because by that time, the principal had notice of a possible pattern. The principal, however, "effectively did nothing other than obtain a written statement" from the student and the teacher. In addition, though the principal, as he had with the first complaint, reported the second complaint to the school board's special investigative unit, he nonetheless failed to notify the unit that the allegation concerned "the same teacher who had been the subject of a formal investigation just months earlier." It could not be said, the court concluded, that "merely because school officials 'confronted [the teacher],' 'obtained statements' from the complaining students, and 'informed the [unit] of the sexual misconduct allegations' (while omitting material details)," that this response was reasonable. Rather, the "failure to institute any corrective measures aimed at ferreting out the possibility of [the teacher]'s sexual harassment of his students could constitute deliberate indifference." Meanwhile, some courts of appeals have analyzed allegations of deliberate indifference that, in their view, the Court's Gebser and Davis decisions did not directly address. In Simpson v. University of Colorado, Boulder , for example, the Tenth Circuit addressed allegations that a university had an "official policy of deliberate indifference" by failing to provide adequate training or guidance in light of an "obvious" need for such actions. There, the head coach and other staff of the university's football program selected current players to host high school recruits on campus, for the purpose of "'show[ing] the recruits a good time.'" During one such football recruiting visit, the plaintiffs, who had agreed to meet with them, alleged that university football players and high school recruits sexually assaulted them. In analyzing the issue of deliberate indifference, the court highlighted evidence that the university coaching staff had prior and ongoing knowledge of sexual assaults occurring during football recruitment and by football players, including the rape of a female student by a university football player two months before the plaintiffs were assaulted. The university had also been previously advised by the local district attorney to implement changes and training to its football recruiting program in light of such sexual assaults. In addition, the head coach "continued to resist recruiting reforms." One player testified that he received little guidance on his responsibilities as a "player-host"; and a handbook provided by the school to the players, the court observed, did not "provide guidance to player-hosts on appropriate behavior by themselves and recruits." The court emphasized that the evidence would support findings that, before the plaintiffs had been assaulted, the head coach had both general and specific knowledge of sexual assaults occurring during recruiting visits, that there had been no change in the recruiting program to lessen the likelihood of such assaults, and that the university "nevertheless maintained an unsupervised player-host program." The evidence, the court held, created a triable issue of deliberate indifference. As with the other components of the Supreme Court's standard for a Title IX private right of action—"actual" notice to an "appropriate person"—federal case law reflects fact-intensive, variable determinations with respect to the evidence necessary to meet the "high" bar for showing deliberate indifference on the part of a funding recipient. Administrative Enforcement of Title IX In addition to the private rights of action discussed above, Title IX is also enforced by federal agencies that provide funding to educational programs. Title IX makes nondiscrimination based on sex a condition for receiving federal financial assistance in any education program or activity. In this administrative enforcement context, if a school is found to have violated Title IX, the ultimate sanction is termination or suspension of federal funds, rather than a legal judgment requiring payment of damages to a particular student. Agencies are authorized to issue regulations (subject to presidential approval) and orders to enforce the statute and are responsible for monitoring recipients' compliance with Title IX. While a number of federal agencies issue funds for educational programs, and thus are responsible for enforcing the statute with respect to recipients of financial assistance for educational programs, two agencies play particularly prominent roles in enforcing Title IX. Pursuant to the Education Amendments of 1974, the Secretary of Education (ED) is specifically directed to promulgate regulations concerning the prohibition of sex discrimination at education programs that receive federal assistance. Because ED is, among other things, "the primary administrator of federal financial assistance to education," the agency plays a lead role in enforcing Title IX against educational institutions. And according to an executive order, the Attorney General coordinates the implementation and enforcement of Title IX across the executive branch. Subject to the coordinating function of the Attorney General, the Department of Justice's Civil Rights Division and OCR collaborate in enforcing Title IX consistent with a memorandum of understanding reached between the agencies, which notes that OCR has primary responsibility for enforcing the statute directly against recipients of financial assistance from ED through complaint investigations and compliance reviews. Accordingly, ED has promulgated regulations implementing Title IX that apply to traditional educational institutions of all levels that receive federal assistance, including elementary and secondary schools, as well as institutions of higher education. Those regulations specifically bar educational institutions from excluding individuals or denying the benefits of any education program or activity on the basis of sex. ED regulations also require that recipients of federal financial assistance that operate education programs designate an employee (commonly referred to as the Title IX Coordinator) to coordinate efforts to comply with ED regulations regarding sex-based discrimination. Further, schools must establish grievance procedures that provide "prompt and equitable resolution" of complaints alleging prohibited actions. Pursuant to its role in enforcing Title IX, OCR may conduct periodic reviews of institutions, or directed investigations, to ensure that recipients of federal funds are complying with applicable requirements. OCR also receives complaints from individuals alleging violations of Title IX by educational institutions and investigates allegations. When violations of the statute are found through these means, the office can seek informal resolution through a resolution agreement. According to OCR, if negotiations do not reach a resolution agreement, it may then take more formal enforcement measures, including seeking to suspend or terminate an institution's funding. Notably, neither Title IX's text nor ED's current regulations directly address sexual harassment. In the administrative context, ED's OCR has issued a series of guidance documents that have interpreted Title IX to bar sexual harassment and define distinct responsibilities for educational institutions with regard to such allegations. These documents—while sometimes subject to change—generally reflect a different analysis for assessing a school's Title IX liability for harassment than the Supreme Court case law addressing private rights of action for damages for sexual abuse or harassment. In particular, ED has applied a constructive notice requirement that prompts a school's Title IX responsibility to respond, rather than "actual notice" to "an appropriate person" as required in the context of suits for damages. In addition, while the Supreme Court has explained that a school's response will result in liability only where "clearly unreasonable," ED has articulated baseline standards for how schools must respond to comply with Title IX. Finally, while the Supreme Court rejected holding schools responsible for sexual harassment under theories of vicarious liability, ED has held schools responsible for sexual harassment under Title IX where a teacher commits misconduct in the scope of their employment. 1997 ED Guidance and Subsequent Supreme Court Decisions Regarding Sexual Harassment In 1997, OCR released a guidance document stating that sexual harassment of students by school employees, other students, or third parties is a form of sex discrimination prohibited by Title IX. The guidance explained that two general types of conduct constituted sexual harassment: 1. Quid pro quo harassment: wherein a school employee "explicitly or implicitly conditions a student's participation in an education program or activity or bases an educational decision on the student's submission to unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or other verbal, nonverbal, or physical conduct of a sexual nature"; or 2. Hostile environment harassment: wherein sexual harassing conduct by a school's employee, another student, or a third party "is sufficiently severe, persistent, or pervasive to limit a student's ability to participate in or benefit from an education program or activity, or to create a hostile or abusive educational environment." In the former case, the 1997 Guidance explained that a school would be liable for quid pro quo harassment by an employee in a position of authority whether or not it knew or should have known of the harassment. In the latter case, the 1997 Guidance explained that, in instances of hostile environment harassment by employees , a school would be liable for harassment if the employee acted with apparent authority or was aided in carrying out the harassment due to his or her position. With respect to sexual harassment by other students or third parties , a school would be liable for harassment if "(i) a hostile environment exists in the school's programs or activities, (ii) the school knows or should have known of the harassment, and (iii) the school fails to take immediate and appropriate corrective action." The Guidance explained that while Title IX does not render a school responsible for the actions of its students, it does make schools responsible for their "own discrimination in failing to remedy [harassment] once the school has notice." Following the release of OCR's 1997 Guidance, the Supreme Court shortly thereafter recognized a substantively different standard for establishing liability in a private suit for damages directly against a school. As discussed above, in 1998, in Gebser , the Supreme Court ruled that in cases of harassment committed by a teacher , a school district is liable only when it has actual knowledge of allegations by an "appropriate person," and so deficiently responds to those allegations that its response amounts to deliberate indifference to the discrimination. And the next year in Davis , the Court held that in addition to a showing of actual knowledge by an appropriate person, and deliberate indifference, a plaintiff suing for damages for sexual harassment committed by a student must show that the conduct was "so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive" that it denied the victim equal access to educational opportunities or benefits. Crucially, the Court in Gebser distinguished between actions by a school that could result in Title IX liability for damages in a private right of action, and Title IX administrative requirements imposed by a federal agency in implementing and enforcing the statute. According to the Court, agencies possess authority to enforce requirements that effectuate Title IX's mandate, "even if those requirements do not purport to represent a definition of discrimination under the statute." In other words, agencies enforcing Title IX may administratively require recipients to comply with certain procedures and rescind funding for violations, even though breaches of such requirements might not subject a school to liability under a private suit for damages. ED's Guidance Documents Regarding Sexual Harassment Subsequent to Gebser and Davis Following these Supreme Court decisions regarding the standard for liability in Title IX damages suits alleging sexual harassment, ED issued a number of guidance documents generally reaffirming its basic position outlined in its 1997 Guidance, including with respect to notice, a school's responsibilities under Title IX to comply with the statute, and the application of vicarious liability in certain situations. In these documents, ED has indicated that the liability standard imposed by the Supreme Court for Title IX sexual harassment violations is distinct from the standards appropriate in the administrative enforcement context. In other words, a school's responsibilities in responding to sexual harassment allegations under Title IX have been treated differently in the context of a suit for damages than in the administrative enforcement context. 2001 Sexual Harassment Guidance In 2001, OCR issued a Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance document that—in light of the intervening Supreme Court decisions that set a more stringent standard for obtaining relief regarding private damages actions —reaffirmed the standards of the agency's 1997 Guidance as grounded in Title IX regulations and distinct from private damages litigation. The guidance explicitly applies to all educational institutions that receive federal funds, including universities. It outlines the compliance standards OCR uses for enforcing and investigating violations of Title IX. Required Response As a threshold matter, schools are responsible for adopting grievance procedures that provide prompt and equitable resolution of complaints of sexual harassment. Failure to do so will mean that a school is in violation of Title IX. Generally speaking, when sexual harassment has occurred, educational institutions must take "prompt and effective action calculated to end the harassment, prevent its recurrence, and, as appropriate, remedy its effects." If the "school, upon notice of the harassment, responds by taking prompt and effective action to end the harassment and prevent its recurrence, the school has carried out its responsibility under the Title IX regulations." Though framed as guidance, the 1997 and 2001 documents were promulgated by ED after an opportunity for the public to comment on them. (This does not mean, however, that the documents are legislative rules that carry the force of law; guidance documents generally serve to inform the public about the agency's approach to enforcement of the laws and regulations it administers. ) Types of Harassment The 2001 Guidance stated that "unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature" constitutes sexual harassment. It indicated, however, that it aimed to "move away from specific labels for types of sexual harassment." Instead, the 2001 Guidance explained that the crucial issue in each case "is whether the harassment rises to a level that it denies or limits a student's ability to participate in or benefit from the school's program based on sex." In that situation, "harassment has occurred that triggers a school's responsibilities under, or violates, Title IX or its regulations." That said, it went on to describe types of harassment that largely tracked the categories outlined in the 1997 Guidance: quid pro quo harassment and hostile environment harassment. In the former situation, wherein a teacher or employee conditions a benefit or educational decision on a student's submission to unwelcome sexual conduct, such harassment is automatically considered harassment that limits or denies a student's ability to participate in or benefit from the school's program and thus discriminates based on sex in violation of Title IX. Unlike so-called quid pro quo harassment, a case of hostile environment harassment requires a further investigation into whether the conduct is sufficiently serious to limit or deny a student's ability to benefit from or participate in a school's program because of sex. Because fellow students do not generally have positions of authority, student-on-student harassment generally is considered hostile environment harassment rather than quid pro quo harassment, although teachers and employees may also create a hostile environment. The 2001 Guidance explained that, in evaluating whether hostile environment harassment has occurred, OCR examines all circumstances relevant to the situation. This includes whether the conduct in question was welcome. Harassment by a Teacher or Employee The 2001 Guidance also explained that, in the context of harassment by a teacher or school employee, the extent of a school's responsibilities to address harassment depends on whether the harassment occurs within "the context of the employee's provision of aid, benefits, or services to students" (i.e., in the context of their job responsibilities). With respect to harassment by teachers or employees in the scope of their job responsibilities (or who reasonably appear to be acting in that capacity), assuming the harassment limits or denies a student's ability to benefit from or participate in a school program, a school is responsible for the discriminatory conduct and must stop the behavior, prevent its recurrence, and remedy the effects of harassment for the victim. In such situations, a school is responsible to do this "whether or not" it has notice of the behavior. Whether sexual harassment occurs within the scope of an employee's job responsibilities can depend on a variety of factors. In cases of quid pro quo harassment, the behavior clearly occurs in the scope of an employee's job responsibilities. For hostile environment harassment, OCR will evaluate a number of factors to determine whether the harassment occurred in the context of an employee's job responsibilities. The 2001 Guidance also indicates that sometimes harassment that does not occur within an employee's job responsibilities will be sufficiently serious to create a hostile environment. In these cases, once a school has notice of the behavior, it has a duty to stop the harassment and prevent its recurrence. Harassment by Other Students or Third Parties Likewise, in the context of student-on-student harassment (or harassment by third parties) that creates a hostile environment, the school is responsible for eliminating the environment and preventing its recurrence. However, a school is in violation of Title IX if it has notice of the environment and fails to take "prompt and effective action" to correct the situation. In that case, the school is responsible for ending the harassment, preventing its recurrence, and remedying the effects of harassment for the student that "could reasonably have been prevented" if the school reacted appropriately. Notice of Sexual Harassment As noted above, in certain situations of harassment by a teacher or employee, schools are responsible for harassment even without notice. Otherwise, in cases of sexual harassment by employees, students, or third parties, the 2001 Guidance explains that recipients have notice of a sexually hostile environment if a responsible school employee "knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known," of the harassment. A responsible employee is "any employee who has the authority to take action to redress the harassment, who has the duty to report to appropriate school officials sexual harassment or any other misconduct by students or employees, or an individual who a student could reasonably believe has this authority or responsibility." Even if a student fails to inform the school or use the appropriate grievance procedures to complain of harassment, a school will be in violation of Title IX if it knows or reasonably should know of a hostile environment. A school is in violation of Title IX if it has notice of a hostile environment and fails to take immediate and effective corrective action. A School's Responsibilities Once a school has notice of potential sexual harassment of students, the 2001 Guidance explained that "it should take immediate and appropriate steps to investigate or otherwise determine what occurred and take prompt and effective steps reasonably calculated to end any harassment, eliminate a hostile environment if one has been created, and prevent harassment from occurring again." In cases of reports of harassment by a student, parent of an elementary or secondary student, or harassment observed by a responsible employee, regardless of whether the harassed student, or student's parents, decide to file a formal complaint, "the school must promptly investigate to determine what occurred and then take appropriate steps to resolve the situation." For situations where a school learns of harassment via other means, a variety of factors will determine whether there are reasonable grounds for the school to investigate. If the allegations are confirmed, then a school has a responsibility to respond as described above. The 2001 Guidance also noted that informal mechanisms may sometimes be used to resolve complaints if the parties agree to do so. However, it made clear that certain informal procedures, such as mediation, are not appropriate in certain cases, such as alleged sexual assault. Finally, the Guidance noted that while "the rights established under Title IX must be interpreted consistent with any federal guaranteed due process rights," schools should nevertheless "ensure that steps to accord due process rights do not restrict or unnecessarily delay the protections provided by Title IX to the complainant." 2011 Dear Colleague Letter Regarding Sexual Violence Between Peers In 2011, OCR issued a Dear Colleague Letter that supplemented its 2001 Guidance and focused on the obligations under Title IX for schools that focused exclusively on peer-to-peer harassment, rather than harassment by a teacher. The Letter explained that sexual harassment "is unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature," and includes "unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal, nonverbal, or physical conduct of a sexual nature." Sexual harassment also includes sexual violence, which refers to "physical sexual acts perpetrated against a person's will or where a person is incapable of giving consent due to the victim's use of drugs or alcohol." Sexual harassment creates a hostile environment "if the conduct is sufficiently serious that it interferes with or limits a student's ability to participate in or benefit from the school's program." When a school "knows or reasonably should know about student-on-student harassment that creates a hostile environment, Title IX requires the school to take immediate action to eliminate the harassment, prevent its recurrence, and address its effects." The Letter also noted that schools will sometimes have an obligation to respond to incidents of sexual harassment that occur "off school grounds, outside a school's education program or activity." And whether or not the conduct occurred, if a student files a complaint, "the school must process the complaint in accordance with its established procedures." Because students can experience the effects of off-campus sexual harassment at school, "schools should consider the effects of the off-campus conduct when evaluating whether there is a hostile environment on campus." With respect to investigations of sexual harassment allegations, the Letter stated that the standards for liability in the criminal context are distinct from Title IX, and therefore a criminal investigation into allegations of sexual violence does not relieve a school of its duty to conduct a Title IX investigation. It also instructed schools not to wait until the conclusion of a criminal investigation or proceeding to begin their own investigation under Title IX, and if appropriate, to take immediate steps to protect students while a criminal investigation occurs. Although a school may need to temporarily delay an investigation while a criminal fact-finding occurs by police, once the police have finished their fact-finding, the school must promptly resume and complete its fact-finding for Title IX purposes. The 2011 Dear Colleague Letter also outlined various elements of a school's grievance procedures that are critical in order to provide "prompt and equitable resolution of sexual harassment complaints," including sexual violence. The Letter noted "in order for a school's grievance procedures to be consistent with Title IX standards, the school must use a preponderance of the evidence standard." This standard contrasted with the 2001 Guidance, which did not impose an evidentiary standard on school investigations, as well as the prior practice of some schools, which used a "clear and convincing" standard. A preponderance of the evidence standard, which requires a showing that a fact or event is more likely than not, is lower than a clear and convincing standard, which requires providing the "ultimate factfinder [with] an abiding conviction that the truth of . . . factual contentions are 'highly probable.'" The Letter also strongly discouraged schools from allowing the parties in a hearing to personally cross-examine one another. It noted that if a school allows parties to appeal a finding or remedy, it must do so for both parties. 2014 Q&A Document: Investigating Allegations of Sexual Violence Following requests by schools on how to adequately comply with the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter, ED issued a forty-six-page supplemental Questions and Answers document in 2014 (2014 Q&A) that further explained the responsibilities of schools with regard to allegations of student-on-student sexual violence. It provided more specific instructions to educational institutions regarding their obligations under Title IX. Like the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter, the 2014 Q&A took the form of a guidance document, rather than a legally enforceable legislative rule. The Q&A made clear that when "a school knows or reasonably should know of possible sexual violence, it must take immediate and appropriate steps to investigate or otherwise determine what occurred." It clarified that, in cases of student-on-student sexual violence, a school violates Title IX when (1) "the alleged conduct is sufficiently serious to limit or deny a student's ability to participate in or benefit from the school's educational program" (creating a hostile environment) and (2) "the school, upon notice, fails to take prompt and effective steps reasonably calculated to end the sexual violence, eliminate the hostile environment, prevent its recurrence, and, as appropriate, remedy its effects." The 2014 Q&A also explained that Title IX requires schools, upon notice of an allegation, to protect complainants and ensure their safety through the use of interim steps before an investigation is complete. Among other things, it further specified in detail the requirements of Title IX with respect to the responsibilities of a school's Title IX Coordinator (the employee required by regulation to coordinate a school's compliance with Title IX), the elements expected in a school's written grievance procedures for responding to complaints of sexual violence, and which individuals qualify as responsible employees who are required to report allegations of sexual violence to a school's Title IX Coordinator. The document also detailed the requirements for schools in conducting investigations into alleged sexual violence. It stressed that while a school is permitted to use its own "student disciplinary procedures" to process complaints of sexual violence, that if a school chooses to do so, the imposition of sanctions against a perpetrator, "without additional remedies, likely will not be sufficient to eliminate the hostile environment and prevent recurrence." The 2014 Q&A noted that because Title IX investigations will not result in the incarceration of individuals, "the same procedural protections and legal standards are not required" in Title IX investigations as are compelled in criminal proceedings. Even if a criminal investigation of student-on-student sexual violence is ongoing, a school must conduct its own Title IX investigation. Indeed, the conclusion of a criminal investigation without charges "does not affect a school's Title IX obligations." The document also explained that schools were not required to conduct hearings to assess allegations of sexual violence, but if they did, they could not require the complainant to attend. Further, in the 2014 Q&A, OCR "strongly discourage[d]" schools from allowing parties to personally cross-examine one another because such actions "may be traumatic or intimidating, and may perpetuate a hostile environment." Instead, schools could allow parties to submit questions to a trained third party to ask on their behalf. The third party was advised to screen those questions "and only ask those it deem[ed] appropriate and relevant to the case." Legal Challenges to University Title IX Procedures In response to the foregoing guidance from ED, as well as increased oversight from OCR between 2011 and 2016, schools developed a variety of procedures to ensure that their responses to allegations of sexual assault complied with Title IX. Generally speaking, the specific type of procedures for investigating allegations of sexual harassment vary considerably across educational institutions. While Title IX provides ED with some discretion in terms of administrative enforcement of the statute's bar on sex-based discrimination, including the ability to require public and private schools to develop certain procedures for handling complaints (as long as those schools receive federal funds), this discretion is constrained with respect to state actors (including public universities) by due process protections that set a baseline for the procedural protections afforded to the accused. In the public university context, a number of students subject to disciplinary sanctions for misconduct thus challenged the disciplinary procedures in state and federal courts as unconstitutional. In particular, a number of students faced with disciplinary action by public universities have raised constitutional challenges to the Title IX procedures used to find them responsible for sexual misconduct, arguing that universities violated the Due Process Clause in the handling of their case. Due Process Clause: Background Principles The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires states to observe certain procedures when depriving individuals of life, liberty, or property. In addition to protecting against the deprivation of an individual's physical property, the Constitution guards against the deprivation of certain "property interests" without due process. The property interests protected by the Due Process Clause are not themselves created by the Constitution; instead, those interests arise from an independent source, such as state or federal law. To have a protected property interest in a government-created benefit, one must show a "legitimate claim of entitlement" that originates in "existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law." Likewise, when a state deprives an individual of liberty, states must afford due process to the individual. In fact, when a "person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him," due process may be implicated. In these circumstances, courts often require an accompanying state action that alters or removes a legal status to constitute a deprivation of liberty. Precisely what procedures are constitutionally required before depriving individuals of a protected interest can vary. When deciding what process is due, courts balance three factors enunciated by the Supreme Court in Ma thews v. Eldridge : (1) "the private interest that will be affected by the official action"; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation and the probable value of additional procedures; and (3) the interest of the government. In general, the Court has made clear that individuals with a protected interest are entitled to notice of the proposed action and a "meaningful opportunity to be heard" before the state may deprive them of that interest. The Supreme Court has explained, however, that due process is not a "technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place, and circumstances." Instead, the concept is "flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands." In conducting the balancing of factors pursuant to  M athews v. Eldridge , the severity of the deprivation is a key factor in determining what procedures are constitutionally required. In general, the stronger the private interest at risk of deprivation, the more formal and exacting procedures will be required by courts. The only Supreme Court case to focus on procedural due process in the (nonacademic) student discipline context is Goss v. Lopez . In that case, high school students challenged their suspension from school for up to 10 days without a hearing. The Court first ruled that the public school students had a "legitimate entitlement to a public education," which was a property interest protected by due process; and that interest was deprived by the suspension. As to the process required, the Court ruled that, at a minimum, "students facing suspension . . . must be given some kind of notice and some kind of hearing." The Court also clarified that cases of more stringent sanctions, such as suspensions beyond 10 days or expulsions, "may require more formal procedures." Due Process Rights for Students at Public Universities Generally speaking, because public universities constitute state actors subject to the Due Process Clause, they must comply with constitutional standards when suspending or expelling students. Private universities, on the other hand, do not. The Supreme Court has assumed, without deciding on the merits, that students of public universities enjoy a "constitutionally protectable property right" in their continued enrollment in an educational institution. A number of federal courts of appeals have ruled that students enrolled in public universities have liberty and/or property interests in their education and that expulsion and certain suspensions can constitute a deprivation of that interest. As discussed in further detail below, as a baseline matter, federal courts have held that due process requires public schools to provide students with notice of the charges against them, the evidence used to make a determination, and the ability to present their side of the story to an unbiased decisionmaker. Of course, whether a public university has afforded a student due process "is a fact-intensive inquiry and the procedures required to satisfy due process will necessarily vary depending on the particular circumstances of each case." Due Process Challenges to Procedures Used by Public Universities in Sexual Assault Investigations While colleges and universities have developed various procedures to comply with OCR's guidance regarding an institution's response to allegations of sexual harassment, a number of individuals subject to these disciplinary processes have challenged some of these procedures in federal court. Several courts have since issued decisions in cases brought by students asserting a due process violation in the context of a Title IX investigation or adjudicatory proceeding. The following section discusses recent notable judicial rulings that address the constitutionality of disciplinary proceedings in the context of sexual misconduct. The discussion below is organized by the type of claim raised against the public university: 1. the university failed to provide adequate notice of the charges against the student; 2. the university did not permit the accused student to confront and challenge the credibility of witnesses who testified against him; 3. the university allowed biased decisionmakers to oversee the proceedings; and 4. the university employed unfair review processes when rehearing an allegation brought by a complainant. Importantly, some of the judicial rulings discussed below address whether a student's stated claim is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss and do not reach conclusive determinations about the evidence sufficient to establish a due process violation. Claims Alleging Inadequate Notice of the Charges One type of legal challenge raised by students accused of sexual misconduct is that the public universities failed to adequately notify them of the charges. As an initial matter, reviewing courts have taken the view that there generally will be no due process violation on notice grounds when the school (1) provides a student with timely notice of the actual, full charges against him; and (2) provides the accused student with a meaningful opportunity to prepare for the disciplinary hearing against him. The absence of such protocols, however, can form the basis of a viable due process claim. For example, at one university, an accused student alleged that he was interviewed by a school staff member assigned to investigate charges of sexual misconduct against him without first being notified of the existence of the sexual misconduct allegation. The student was eventually suspended from the university. A federal district court ruled that, given the severity of the suspension (three years), the lack of notice could amount to a due process violation. The court thus held that the student had stated a claim sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. In another case, an accused student alleged that he was not given adequate notice of the scope of charges against him. Rather, the school only notified him that his conduct on a particular day was under review, but expelled him for sexual misconduct that occurred in relation to other incidents and dates. The federal district court ruled that "[b]y conveying a limited scope of focus to plaintiff, defendants prejudiced plaintiff's ability to mount an effective defense, which increased the possibility of an erroneous outcome." Taken together with other procedural issues in the school's investigation and decision, the court concluded that the school had deprived the student of a liberty interest without due process of law. Similarly, the Sixth Circuit ruled that a student suspended by a university because of suspected sexual assault had sufficiently pleaded a due process violation when the university allegedly did not make available the evidence used in its disciplinary decision against him. The university's Title IX investigator compiled an investigatory report, which was allegedly used by the school's disciplinary hearing panel to adjudicate the student's case. However, the investigator failed to provide the report to the defendant. The court reasoned that the Constitution requires that a school provide the evidence used against a student in the context of significant disciplinary decisions and that a failure to do so constitutes a due process violation. Claims Relating to Cross-Examination of Witnesses and Exculpatory Evidence A number of students have brought claims alleging a denial of due process because they were not afforded the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses in school disciplinary hearings. Courts have often rejected these arguments, however, in both sexual harassment proceedings and other disciplinary hearings, noting that the rights of students in disciplinary proceedings are not the same as those of criminal defendants. Case law reflects that courts have been more willing to entertain such claims when students have been denied an opportunity to challenge the credibility of witnesses where a witness's testimony concerns disputed and critical facts. As a general matter, cross-examination has not been regarded as a necessary feature of due process in the civil context. Even outside the context of sexual harassment allegations, courts have often denied due process challenges to university adjudicatory proceedings where students were not permitted to directly cross-examine witnesses, noting that the Due Process Clause does not guarantee the right to cross-examination in school disciplinary proceedings. This principle has been applied in recent cases alleging due process violations in the sexual harassment context. In one case, students challenged a university's adjudicatory proceedings regarding allegations of sexual assault, where accused students were permitted to submit written questions to a panel chair rather than directly to the complainant. The reviewing district court nonetheless rejected a due process challenge to the proceedings. Similarly, the Sixth Circuit denied a due process challenge to a university's disciplinary hearing concerning sexual assault allegations where students were not permitted to directly cross-examine their accuser. The students were permitted to submit written questions to the hearing panel, but were not permitted to submit any follow-up questions, and the panel failed to ask all of the questions they submitted. The circuit court reasoned that the proceedings satisfied the "limited" requirement of cross-examination where credibility is at issue, as the "marginal benefit that would accrue to the fact-finding process by allowing follow-up questions … is vastly outweighed by the burden" on the school. Likewise, the Fifth Circuit rejected a due process challenge to a university's disciplinary proceedings where the challengers argued they were denied the ability to effectively cross-examine witnesses and confront their accuser. In that case, the court noted that the school's decision did not rest on testimonial evidence, but on the videos and a photo taken and distributed by one of the challengers. Where a credibility determination was critical to the outcome of a proceeding, however, courts have often ruled in favor of due process challenges. For instance, the Sixth Circuit held that a university violated due process when it failed to provide any form of cross-examination in the hearing and the disciplinary decision necessarily rested on a credibility determination. In that case, the university based its decision to suspend a student entirely on the hearsay statement of the complainant, who did not appear at the disciplinary hearing. Importantly, the court noted that the suspended student only requested the additional procedure of posing questions to his accuser through the hearing panel, but he did not ask for the opportunity to directly cross-examine her. The court concluded that in such circumstances, some method must be made available to the adjudicative body to "assess the demeanor of both the accused and his accuser." The court concluded this procedure was necessary to comport with due process when the university's decision rested on a credibility determination. Likewise, the absence of a live hearing may sometimes form the basis of a viable due process claim. For instance, one federal district court ordered a university to provide an accused student facing the possibility of expulsion with a live hearing in order to comply with due process. In that case, the university's procedures for handling sexual misconduct allegations involved an investigator who would meet separately with the parties, conduct interviews with witnesses, and eventually reach a determination as to culpability without any opportunity for a hearing. The court reasoned that due to "the University's method of private questioning through the investigator, Plaintiff has no way of knowing which questions are actually being asked of Claimant or her response to those questions." Accordingly, the court concluded that the university violated the accused student's right to due process. Similarly, the Sixth Circuit has ruled that where credibility is at issue, a university "must give the accused student or his agent an opportunity to cross-examine the accuser and adverse witnesses in the presence of a neutral fact-finder." In that case, a university investigator concluded that the evidence supporting a finding of sexual misconduct was not sufficient, but the university's appeals board reversed after reviewing the report because it found the description of events given by the alleged victim and adverse witnesses more persuasive. At no time was the accused student given a live hearing or a chance to cross-examine his accuser or any adverse witnesses. The Sixth Circuit ruled that because the university ultimately had to "choose between competing narratives" in order to resolve the case, due process required a chance to cross-examine his accuser and adverse witnesses before a neutral fact-finder. Some students have also brought due process claims alleging that they were denied the ability to offer exculpatory evidence on their own behalf. Courts appear to examine such claims on a largely fact-specific basis. For instance, in one suit brought against a university, a student alleged he was denied the opportunity to present physical exculpatory evidence on his own behalf at a sexual assault disciplinary hearing. Specifically, the student claimed he was unable to present text messages at his hearing that he claimed would exonerate him. The district court ruled that this allegation raised concerns that he was denied due process. Claims Alleging Biased Decisionmakers in Disciplinary Proceedings Students subject to disciplinary proceedings regarding sexual harassment or assault at institutions of higher education have also brought challenges alleging that a decisionmaker was biased against them. As a threshold matter, courts generally assume that school disciplinary panels are "entitled to a presumption of impartiality, absent a showing of actual bias." A plaintiff must generally allege facts sufficient to overcome this baseline presumption, such as statements by decisionmakers or a pattern of decisionmaking evidencing bias. For instance, a Fifth Circuit panel rejected a due process claim alleging bias in a university disciplinary hearing concerning sexual assault because the challengers failed to show how the integrity of the proceedings was undermined. In that case, the individual tasked as a victim advocate for the school investigated the charges against the accused and advised the panel members who made the disciplinary decision. The court reasoned that the investigator relied on photo and video evidence to render his findings to the panel and "there is nothing in the record . . . to suggest that a different investigator would have uncovered information diminishing the significance of that graphic evidence to the initial findings." Further, a separate university attorney advised the panel that they were free to draw their own conclusions from the proffered evidence. Evidence of bias in the consequential behavior or statements of decisionmakers, however, may give rise to a viable due process challenge. For example, the Sixth Circuit recently held that a student sufficiently pleaded a due process claim where he alleged that a university disciplinary hearing for alleged sexual assault was biased against him. In that case, one of the hearing panel members acted as investigator, prosecutor, and judge. The court noted that that fact alone did not give rise to a due process violation. Rather, because that individual also allegedly dominated the panel with remarks intended to reduce the defendant's credibility, and reportedly said during the hearing, "I'll bet you do this [commit sexual assault] all the time," the student had plausibly alleged that the hearing panel member was not impartial and had pre-judged his case. Courts have also addressed claims alleging a due process violation for bias based on institutional pressures, such as the sexual assault training received by university officials. For example, one district court rejected a due process claim which argued that university staff members were biased because they received sexual assault training that was not balanced with training for protecting the due process rights of accused students. The court reasoned that it was a "laudable goal" for the university to raise awareness of sexual assault and increase sensitivity to problems that victims of sexual violence experience. Plaintiffs' mere belief that the school "ha[d] a practice of railroading students accused of sexual misconduct simply to appease the Department of Education and preserve its federal funding" was unsupported by any evidence. In contrast, another district court rejected a motion to dismiss a due process claim brought by an expelled student alleging that the investigation and training materials given to the panel who decided his case were biased. The court reasoned that while this was a "he-said/she-said" case, "there seems to have been an assumption under [the] training materials that an assault occurred. As a result, there is a question whether the panel was trained to ignore some of the alleged deficiencies in the investigation and official report the panel considered." Accordingly, the court concluded that there may have been a due process violation because it was "plausible that the scales were tipped" against the accused student. Claims Alleging Unfair Rehearing or Appeal Processes Finally, a number of federal district court cases have addressed allegations that a university's disciplinary proceedings violated due process on the basis of unfair review processes for rehearing appeals. In one district court case, a student was cleared by a hearing panel on a charge of sexual assault, but the university ordered a new hearing, apparently premised only on the school being unable to adequately prove its case in the first hearing. The district court found this to be fundamentally unfair to the student and ruled that the allegations survived the university's motion to dismiss. Similarly, in another district court case, a suspended student challenged the validity of a school's procedures where he was initially found not responsible for sexual misconduct by a hearing board, but was later determined guilty after the complainant appealed that decision. At the administrative appeal stage, the school did not give the defendant sufficient notice of, or time to respond to, new evidence against him; did not provide him with details of the identity of a woman he was newly accused of assaulting; did not tell him the names of the members of the appeal board; did not give him notice of the appeal board's meeting; and did not permit him to attend that meeting. The appeals board reversed the initial hearing board's determination that the student was not responsible for sexual misconduct, without explanation, and without any oral presentations or live testimony. The reviewing federal district court ruled that the school failed to provide the student with a meaningful hearing. Likewise, a student brought a claim in federal district court against a university after being expelled for sexual assault even though he had been found not responsible by an initial hearing panel. In that case the school permitted a rehearing after the complainant appealed the initial hearing panel's decision, and subsequently the individual presiding over the appeal expelled the student. The individual presiding over the appeal conducted off-the-record and ex parte meetings with the accuser and failed to deliver the accused student a record of those meetings. According to the reviewing court, by the time the student was permitted to present his defense, the individual overseeing his appeal had pre-judged the case, and expelled the accused student without providing a basis for the decision. The court ruled that these procedural inadequacies, combined with a failure to offer the student notice of the full scope of allegations against him, combined to constitute a due process violation. ED's Proposed Title IX Regulations Regarding Sexual Harassment With the foregoing considerations in the background, in September 2017 OCR withdrew the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter and 2014 Questions and Answers document. ED explained that it would begin the rulemaking process to codify a school's responsibilities under Title IX. In the interim, ED stated that it would continue to rely on the 2001 Guidance; it also issued a new Question and Answer document indicating how the department would address sexual misconduct during that time. The document notifies schools that they may, in certain circumstances, resolve complaints through mediation. It also notifies schools that they may choose to allow appeals either by both parties or solely by the party found to have committed sexual misconduct and not the alleged victim. On November 29, 2018, ED issued a notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register . If adopted, the proposal would significantly alter the responsibilities of schools in responding to allegations of sexual harassment. Among other things, the proposed regulation would (1) define in narrower terms what conduct qualifies as sexual harassment under Title IX; (2) require "actual notice" of harassment, rather than constructive notice, to trigger a school's Title IX responsibilities; (3) provide that a school's response to allegations of sexual harassment will violate the statute only if amounting to deliberate indifference; and (4) impose new procedural requirements that reflect concern for due process when schools investigate allegations and make determinations of culpability. Conduct That Constitutes Sexual Harassment Under Title IX The proposed regulation would first define sexual harassment in the following ways: an employee conditioning the provision of a benefit, service, or aid on the individual's participation in unwelcome sexual conduct (i.e., quid pro quo); "unwelcome conduct on the basis of sex that is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively denies a person equal access to the recipient's education program or activity" (i.e., hostile environment); or sexual assault (as defined in regulations implementing the Clery Act). Notably, among the changes to past definitions of sexual harassment issued by ED, the proposal would establish a higher threshold to show a Title IX violation based on hostile environment harassment than that required by ED in the past. As explained in an earlier section of this report, ED's 2001 Guidance described hostile environment harassment as sexually harassing "conduct [that] is sufficiently serious to deny or limit a student's ability to participate in or benefit from the school's program based on sex." The proposed regulations would instead generally adopt the standard for actionable harassment that the Supreme Court's 1999 Davis decision applied in the context of private suits for damages: "unwelcome conduct on the basis of sex that is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively denies a person equal access to the recipient's education program or activity." In other words, whereas ED previously defined a hostile environment harassment as harassment that is "sufficiently serious to limit" a student's ability to benefit from or participate in a school's program, the proposed regulations would define a hostile environment as one "that is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively denies a person equal access to the recipient's education program or activity." Adopting "Actual Notice" Requirement Second, in a departure from past administrative practice, in which ED considered "constructive notice" (i.e., known or should have known) to trigger a school's responsibilities in cases of student-on-student harassment, and did not impose a notice requirement in certain cases of harassment by a teacher or employee, the proposal would establish that a school has a duty to respond to allegations of sexual harassment only when it has "actual knowledge." Actual knowledge is defined as notice of harassment (or allegation of harassment) to a school's Title IX Coordinator or official with authority to institute corrective measures; the regulations explicitly reject imputing knowledge to a school based on respondeat superior or constructive notice. Notably, in contrast to past guidance from ED, the mere ability or obligation to report by a school employee does not qualify them as one who possesses authority to institute corrective measures. The proposal explains that this threshold for triggering a school's obligations is intended to align the administrative standard imposed by ED with that articulated by the Supreme Court in Gebser and Davis in the context of private litigation seeking money damages. Further, the proposed regulations would compel schools to respond only to sexual harassment that occurs within a school's "education program or activity." This contrasts with past ED guidance which provided that schools sometimes will be responsible to respond to harassment that occurs "outside a school's education program or activity." For instance, past ED guidance (since rescinded) required schools to "process all complaints of sexual violence, regardless of where the conduct occurred," in order to determine if the conduct has effects on campus. Adopting the "Deliberate Indifference" Standard to Evaluate a School's Response In another departure from prior administrative practice, in which ED judged a school's response under a "reasonableness" standard, the proposed regulations only require a school to respond in a manner that is not "deliberately indifferent." Deliberate indifference is a "response to sexual harassment [that] is clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances." Once again, this would tether a school's responsibility to that announced by the Court in Davis in the context of private suits for damages. The proposal explains that, for ED, this standard aptly holds schools accountable while allowing for flexibility in making disciplinary decisions. The proposal outlines three situations in which a safe harbor is provided to a school from a finding of deliberate indifference. First, when a formal Title IX complaint is made (by a complainant or Title IX Coordinator), the proposed regulations outline a number of grievance procedures (outlined below) that schools must follow. When a school follows these procedures it would not be deliberately indifferent and has not discriminated under Title IX. Second, if a school has actual knowledge of harassment because of multiple complainants, the Title IX Coordinator must file a complaint. Again, compliance with the grievance procedures would negate any inference of deliberate indifference in this situation. Third, with respect to institutions of higher education, and in situations where there is not a formal complaint, a school would not be deliberately indifferent if it offers and implements supportive measures to the complainant that are aimed to restore or preserve the complainant's access to a school's education program or activity. The school must also at this time notify the complainant in writing of the right to file a formal complaint. As long as an institution of higher education follows these requirements, it would not be deliberately indifferent. Aside from these three situations, the proposed regulations provide that a school with actual knowledge of sexual harassment in an education program or activity must respond in a manner that is not deliberately indifferent. The proposal would also allow schools to remove an individual accused of sexual harassment from an educational program or activity on an emergency basis. However, a school must conduct an individualized risk and safety analysis, determine that the removal is justified because of an immediate threat to students or employees, and provide the accused with notice and an opportunity to challenge the decision. The regulations also allow schools to place a nonstudent employee on administrative leave during an investigation. Protocols for Fact-Finding and Determining Culpability A significant component of the proposal reflects concern that schools provide accused students with due process protections during the fact-finding process and ultimate determination of culpability. As a threshold matter, schools must investigate allegations received in a formal complaint, but if the alleged conduct would not (if proved) constitute sexual harassment under the regulations, or if it did not occur within a sch ool's program or activity, the complaint must be dismissed. Upon receipt of a formal Title IX complaint regarding sexual harassment, a school must provide written notice to the relevant parties of the allegations, including notice of the available grievance procedures, and notice of the allegations constituting a potential violation, "including sufficient details known at the time and with sufficient time to prepare a response before any initial interview." Procedures for Handling Formal Complaints A school's grievance procedures must treat complainants and respondents equitably, which means that a school must both provide remedies for complainants upon a finding of sexual harassment as well as due process protections for a respondent before any sanctions are imposed. The proposal would provide that a school's treatment of a complainant in response to a formal complaint of harassment can constitute discrimination in violation of Title IX; likewise, a school's treatment of a respondent can discriminate on the basis of sex in violation of Title IX. The procedures must also require an objective evaluation of evidence (both inculpatory and exculpatory) and provide that credibility determinations not be made based on one's status; require that individuals involved in the investigation or decisionmaking process not be biased and receive training on ensuring student safety and providing due process for all parties; include a presumption that respondents are not guilty until proven otherwise; and describe the range of possible sanctions and remedies available, the standard of evidence used, the ability to appeal (if offered) and the range of available supportive measures. With respect to a school's actual investigation of alleged harassment, the proposed regulations require that a school must: place the burden of proof and of gathering evidence on the school (rather than either party); allow each party equal opportunity to present witnesses and evidence; not restrict parties from gathering and presenting relevant evidence or from discussing the allegations; permit both parties equally to have their choice of advisor or other person join them during proceedings, although the school may restrict an advisor's participation so long as restrictions apply equally to both parties; provide parties with written notice of the relevant details of hearings and interviews and allow sufficient time to prepare; for institutions of higher education, provide a live hearing where the decisionmaker must allow each party to ask the other party and witnesses all relevant questions (and follow-up questions) including those that challenge one's credibility; cross-examination must be done by the party's advisor; at the request of either party, schools must allow for cross-examination via technology with the parties in separated rooms; decisionmakers must not rely on any party or witness's statement if they do not submit to cross-examination; allow both parties an equal opportunity to review evidence from the investigation that is directly related to the allegations; and develop a report summarizing the relevant evidence and provide this to the parties at least 10 days prior to a hearing (or time where responsibility is determined). Notably, these requirements depart from past ED guidance by requiring, for institutions of higher education, a quasi-judicial proceeding in the form of a live hearing. Each party may question the other side, and cross-examination must be conducted by a party's advisor. Determinations of Responsibility The proposed regulations would also significantly alter the ultimate decisionmaking requirements for schools. For instance, the decisionmaker in a proceeding may not be the investigator or the school's Title IX Coordinator. This would bar the practice of some universities that have used a single investigator to both examine allegations and reach a decision regarding culpability. And in contrast to past guidance from ED, the new regulations permit schools to apply either a preponderance of the evidence standard or a clear and convincing standard. However, schools may apply the former only if they use that same standard for conduct violations other than sexual harassment that carry the same maximum disciplinary penalty. Further, schools must apply the same standard of evidence for complaints against students as it does for employees and faculty. A schools may, but is not required to, allow appeals of decisions. If it does so, it must allow both parties to appeal. A school may also, at any point before reaching a final determination, facilitate an informal resolution process as long as it obtains the parties' written consent and notifies them of the requirements of the process. Considerations for Congress As discussed above, the antidiscrimination mandate of Title IX, enacted in 1972, prohibits discrimination "on the basis of sex" in educational programs in general terms. The statute does not expressly refer to or address sex discrimination in the form of sexual abuse, sexual harassment, or sexual assault. Nor does the statute address when, by whom, or under what circumstances such conduct will amount to a Title IX violation. Given the statute's silence on these issues, federal courts have largely determined when relief is available for individual victims of sexual abuse or harassment. Indeed, in creating the remedial scheme for a private right of action to address such claims, the Supreme Court sought to "'infer how the [1972] Congress would have addressed the issue'" if there had been an express provision in the statute, an approach that the Court observed "inherently entails a degree of speculation, since it addresses an issue on which Congress has not specifically spoken." Likewise, given the sparse statutory language, federal agencies have issued shifting guidelines at to the responsibilities of educational institutions in complying with Title IX. As a general matter, Congress enjoys substantial discretion to modify the terms of Title IX to clarify the appropriate standard in private suits for damages as well as in the administrative enforcement context. Congress could, for instance, amend Title IX to define the specific conduct that amounts to a violation of the statute regarding sexual abuse or harassment. In addition, an amendment could also clarify whether liability for harassment should be handled differently in elementary and secondary schools, as opposed to the university context. Likewise, legislation could distinguish between harassment by teachers from that between students. Further, because the private right of action under Title IX has been judicially implied, rather than expressly codified in statute, Congress could modify the legal standards that apply in a private suit for damages. Finally, aside from directly amending Title IX, Congress could also direct federal agencies to alter their administrative enforcement of the statute. For example, Congress could direct ED to promulgate regulations that distinguish between various types of sexual harassment or treat harassment differently depending on the context.

Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX) provides an avenue of legal relief for victims of sexual abuse and harassment at educational institutions. It bars discrimination "on the basis of sex" in an educational program or activity receiving federal funding. Although Title IX makes no explicit reference to sexual harassment or abuse, the Supreme Court and federal agencies have determined that such conduct can sometimes constitute discrimination in violation of the statute; educational institutions in some circumstances can be held responsible when a teacher sexually harasses a student or when one student harasses another. Title IX is mainly enforced (1) through private rights of action brought directly against schools by or on behalf of students subjected to sexual misconduct; and (2) by federal agencies that provide funding to educational programs. To establish liability in a private right of action, a party seeking damages for a Title IX violation must satisfy the standards set forth by the Supreme Court in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, decided in 1998, and Davis Next Friend LaShonda D. v. Monroe County Board of Education, decided the next year. Gebser provides that when a teacher commits harassment against a student, a school district is liable only when it has actual knowledge of allegations by an "appropriate person," and so deficiently responds to those allegations that its response amounts to deliberate indifference to the discrimination. Davis instructs that, besides showing actual knowledge by an appropriate person and deliberate indifference, a plaintiff suing for damages for sexual harassment committed by a student must show that the conduct was "so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive" that it denied the victim equal access to educational opportunities or benefits. Taken together, the Supreme Court's decisions set forth a high threshold for a private party seeking damages against an educational institution based on its response to sexual harassment. In turn, federal appellate courts have differed in how to apply the standards set in Gebser and Davis, diverging on the nature and amount of evidence sufficient to support a claim. In each of the last several presidential administrations, the Department of Education (ED) issued a number of guidance documents that instruct schools on their responsibilities under Title IX when addressing allegations of sexual harassment. These documents—while sometimes subject to change—generally reflected a different standard than the Supreme Court case law addressing private rights of action for damages for sexual abuse or harassment (the Court in Davis acknowledged that the threshold for liability in a private right of action could be higher than the standard imposed in the administrative enforcement context). Those guidance documents had, among other things, established that sometimes a school could be held responsible for instances of sexual harassment by a teacher, irrespective of actual notice; and schools could be held responsible for student-on-student harassment if a "responsible employee" knew or should have known of the harassment (constructive notice). ED's previous guidance also instructed educational institutions that they sometimes could be responsible for responding to incidents of sexual harassment occurring off campus. ED also cautioned schools on the use of mediation to resolve allegations of sexual harassment. With regard to the procedures used by schools to resolve sexual harassment allegations, ED informed schools that they must use the preponderance of the evidence standard to establish culpability, and the agency strongly discouraged schools from allowing parties in a hearing to personally cross-examine one another. In response to guidance from ED, as well as increased oversight from the department's Office for Civil Rights (OCR) between 2011 and 2016, schools developed several procedures to ensure that their responses to allegations of sexual harassment and assault complied with Title IX. A number of students faced with disciplinary action by public universities raised constitutional challenges to the Title IX procedures used to find them responsible for sexual misconduct, arguing that universities violated the Due Process Clause in handling their case. ED issued a notice of proposed rulemaking in late 2018, after revoking some of its previous guidance to schools in 2017. The proposed regulations would, in several ways, tether the administrative requirements for schools to the standard set by the Supreme Court in Gebser and Davis. In doing so, the proposed regulations would depart from the standards set by ED in previous guidance documents (some of which have since been rescinded). The new regulations would require "actual notice," rather than constructive notice, of harassment by an education institution to trigger a school's Title IX responsibilities, and provide that a school's response to allegations of sexual harassment will violate Title IX only if it amounts to deliberate indifference. In addition, the new regulations would more narrowly define what conduct qualifies as sexual harassment under Title IX, and also impose new procedural requirements, which appear to reflect due process concerns, when schools investigate sexual harassment or assault allegations and make determinations of culpability.

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crs_R44389_0

Background The Constitution provides Congress with broad powers over the Armed Forces, including the power "to raise and support Armies," "to provide and maintain a Navy," and "to make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces." It also provides the Senate with the authority to provide "Advice and Consent" on presidential nominations of "all other Officers of the United States," which includes military officers. On the basis of its constitutional authority, Congress has passed a number of laws which govern important aspects of military officer personnel management, including appointments, assignments, grade structure, promotions, and separations. The most senior officers in the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps are known as general officers. The most senior officers in the Navy are known as flag officers. The phrase "general and flag officers" or "GFO" refers to all officers in paygrades O-7 through O-10, thereby including one-star, two-star, three-star, and four-star officers. At the highest level, O-10, GFOs hold the most visible and important military positions in the Department of Defense, including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the chiefs of the four military services, and the combatant commanders. At the lowest level, O-7, they hold positions that span an array of roles, including commanders, deputy commanders, and key staff roles in large organizations. This report provides an overview of active duty GFOs in the United States Armed Forces—including authorizations, duties, and compensation—historical trends in the proportion of GFOs relative to the total force, criticisms and justifications of GFO to total force proportions, and statutory controls. National Guard and Reserve GFOs are not addressed in this report, unless they are serving on active duty in a manner that counts against the active duty caps on GFOs. Given the authority granted to general and flag officers, Congress has developed a statutory framework applicable to this elite group, and considers changes to these laws as it deems appropriate. Congress also periodically reviews the number, duties, and compensation of GFOs. A frequent tension during these reviews has been DOD requests for additional GFOs versus congressional concerns that there are too many GFOs. As one senior DOD official noted during a 1997 congressional hearing: throughout our history there has been a dialogue, just as is going on now, that has ebbed and flowed between the Congress and the military on the number of general and flag officers we need.... I think it is fair to say that over the years, the Congress has consistently taken the view that we have needed fewer general and flag officers, and that we have taken the opposite view, that we needed more than the Congress would allow. These debates tended to intensify during periods of major downsizing and restructuring of our forces, such as after World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and now after the cold war. References in this report to specific grades (ranks) within the general and flag officer corps will use the appropriate capitalized title, insignia, or paygrade as indicated in Table 1 . Current Number of General and Flag Officers As of November 1, 2018, there were 920 active duty GFOs, of which 891 were subject to the statutory caps and 29 were exempt from the statutory caps. Distribution by grade and service is summarized in Table 2 . The 891 GFOS subject to the statutory caps is lower than the maximum of 963 authorized in statute (see " Current Grade Limits " later in this report). This is in accord with an intentional decision made by DOD in 2011 as part of an efficiency initiative directed by then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. By keeping GFO numbers substantially below the maximum authorized, this policy provides DOD flexibility to respond to new requirements for GFOs without the delays caused by the need to find an "offset" by downgrading or eliminating another GFO position. Responsibilities of General and Flag Officer Positions While Congress has specified functions or duties for some key positions—such as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commanders, the top two officers of each service, the Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau —the great majority of GFO positions are not defined in statute. In these instances DOD uses the following criteria for determining whether a position should be filled by a general or flag officer: Nature, characteristics, and function of the position; Grade and position of superior, principal subordinates, and lateral points of coordination; Degree of independence of operation; Official relations with other U.S. and foreign governmental positions; Magnitude of responsibilities; Mission and special requirements; Number, type, and value of resources managed and employed; Forces, personnel, value of equipment, total obligation authority; Geographic area of responsibility; Authority to make decisions and commit resources; Development of policy; National commitment to international agreements; Impact on national security and other national interests; and Effect on the prestige of the nation or the armed force Historical Changes in General and Flag Officer Levels A summary of the number of active duty GFOs and the proportion of GFOs relative to the total force over the past five decades is provided in Table 3 . A review of GFO levels indicates an 11% increase in the number of four-star officers (36 on September 30, 1965 vs. 40 on September 30, 2018) and a 24% increase in the number of three-star officers (119 vs. 147). At the same time, the number of one-star and two-star officers has decreased by about 35% (1,129 vs. 734). However, during this time period, the size of the total force was cut roughly in half, dropping from 2.66 million on September 30, 1965, to 1.32 million on September 30, 2018. Thus, a more salient measure may be the proportion of GFOs to the total force. Looking at the data from this perspective, it is clear that while GFOs have always made up a very small percentage of the total force, the general and flag officer corps has increased as a percentage of the total force over the past five decades. GFOs made up about one-twentieth of one percent (0.048%) of the total force in 1965, while they made up about one-fifteenth of one percent (0.070%) of the total force in 2018, indicating that the share of the total force made up of GFOs increased by 46%. This historical trend is more pronounced with respect to four-star officers (which grew from 0.0014% of the total force to 0.0030%, a 114% increase) and three-star officers (which grew from 0.0045% of the total force to 0.0112%, a 149% increase). One- and two-star officers as a percentage of the total force increased less rapidly (from 0.0425% of the total force to 0.0557%, a 31% increase). These increases occurred at the same time that the size of the officer corps in general was increasing as a percentage of the total force. As indicated in the last column of Table 3 , between 1965 and 2018, the officer corps increased from 12.76% of the total force in 1965 to 17.51% in 2018, indicating that the share of the total force made up of officers increased by 37%. Criticisms of the Increasing Proportion of GFOs There have been two principal criticisms raised against the increasing proportion of GFOs relative the total force. The first criticism revolves around the increased cost of employing a GFO in comparison to a lower ranking officer. The second relates to the belief that too many GFOs slow down decisionmaking processes. Each point is explained in more detail below. Cost . GFOs cost more to employ than officers of a lower rank. In part, this is due to the higher compensation they receive. For example, the average GFO in paygrade O-7 receives $204,405 in regular military compensation 14 in 2019, while the average officer in paygrade O-6 receives $180,709. Additionally, there can be other costs associated with GFOs, particularly at higher grades, such as the costs of larger staffs, official travel, security details, and aides. An example of this perspective was provided by a witness at a 2011 congressional hearing, who stated "The progression towards a more top-heavy force is not without its consequences.... The cost of officers increases markedly with their rank, so taxpayers are overpaying whenever a G/FO is in a position that could be filled by a lower ranking officer." Decision making . Another criticism is that an increasing proportion of GFOs slows down decisionmaking by adding additional layers of management between the highest echelons of command and the lowest. In a 2010 speech, former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates criticized the impact of an increase in GFOs and senior civilians in making the Department of Defense a top-heavy and overly bureaucratic organization: During the 1990s, the military saw deep cuts in overall force structure—the Army by nearly 40 percent. But the reduction in flag officers—generals and admirals—was about half that. The Department's management layers—civilian and military—and numbers of senior executives outside the services grew during that same period. Almost a decade ago, Secretary Rumsfeld lamented that there were 17 levels of staff between him and a line officer. The Defense Business Board recently estimated that in some cases the gap between me and an action officer may be as high as 30 layers.... Consider that a request for a dog-handling team in Afghanistan—or for any other unit—has to go through no fewer than five four-star headquarters in order to be processed, validated, and eventually dealt with. This during an era when more and more responsibility—including decisions with strategic consequences—is being exercised by young captains and colonels on the battlefield. Justifications for Increasing Proportion of GFOs The increasing proportion of GFOs in comparison to the total force has been a topic of particular interest during past congressional hearings. During these hearings, and particularly during a 1997 congressional review of GFO authorizations, witnesses from the Department of Defense put forth a number of rationales for this growth, including the following: Joint requirements . One frequently cited cause of the increasing ratio of GFOs during past congressional hearings has been the increase in "joint" requirements that followed enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA) in 1986. While removing the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from the chain of command, GNA enhanced the authority of the Chairman in other ways; significantly increased the roles and authorities of commanders of the joint Combatant Commands; and emphasized joint duty assignments for officers. These new institutional arrangements led to the creation of more joint GFO positions and powerful career incentives to serve in those positions. Testifying before Congress in 1997, the Vice Director of the Joint Staff emphasized how the growth of joint organizations affected the proportion of GFOs to the total force: "There is really no law of proportionality here when you talk about joint growth. If you think about it, sir, where we have been since 1980, we stood up CENTCOM, SOCOM, Space Command; we have reorganized to form ACOM, TRANSCOM, [and] STRATCOM." Since then, additional joint headquarters have been established, to include U.S. Northern Command (established in 2002), Joint Task Force Guantanamo (established 2002), Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (established 2002), U.S. Africa Command (2007), and U.S. Cyber Command (2009). Coalition Operations . Another rationale used to explain the increased proportion of GFOs has been an increased emphasis by the United States on forging coalitions with other nations to achieve common security objectives. This has, in turn, generated a demand for senior military leaders to conduct coordinated planning, training, and operations with their peers from foreign nations. The argument is also linked to the number of contingency operations the U.S. military has conducted since the end of the Cold War, which have often involved forces from dozens of countries, including the forces of the nation in which the operations take place. Examples of these coalition operations include Iraq and Afghanistan as well as smaller-scale contingencies such as Bosnia, Haiti, and Kosovo (ongoing). Contingency operations such as these are commanded by a GFO, who usually has additional GFOs as subordinate commanders and senior staff officers. Both their experience and the authority inherent in their grade can be considered important elements to the success of complex operations. Political and diplomatic considerations can also be a factor, as the officers leading these operations are normally expected to interact with the senior military and civilian leadership of the foreign nation where the operations are occurring. Organizational structure . As noted previously, the increase in the proportion of GFOs over the past 50 years has not been due to an increase in the number of GFOs, which has gone down in this time period, but to the much larger decrease in the size of the Armed Forces in general. In part, this slower reduction is due to the organizational structure of the Armed Forces, which includes certain GFO positions whether the Armed Forces are comparatively large or small. For example, there was a Chief of Staff of the Air Force at the peak of the Vietnam War, when the Air Force had about 900,000 airmen, and there is one today, when the Air Force has approximately 325,000 airmen. A similar case can be made for many of the GFOs who serve on the Joint Staff, the Service Staffs, the Combatant Commands, and certain defense agencies. Given the organizational structure of the Armed Forces—some of which is required by law—the amount of management "overhead" does not necessarily change in direct proportion to the size of the force. Another way of illustrating this is to consider what would happen if an Army division were disestablished: doing so would eliminate about 15,000 soldiers, but only three of them would be general officers. Technological changes . A fourth justification for increased GFO ratios is that technological advances have changed the way the United States fights its wars. Modern weapons systems, much more powerful and accurate than their predecessors, require fewer personnel to deliver greater firepower. Thus, while the number of personnel a GFO commands may decline as more sophisticated equipment is substituted for manpower, the lethality of those forces may increase. From this perspective, the lethality of the weapons systems, rather than the number of people, provides the justification for an organization to be led by a very senior military officer. Additionally, the advent and development of new domains of warfare—such as space and cyber—has led to the creation of new organizations to exploit advantages and defend against vulnerabilities in those environments. Regular Military Compensation for General and Flag Officers There are three main ways in which military personnel, including general and flag officers, are compensated: cash compensation (pay and allowances), non-cash compensation (benefits), and deferred compensation (retired pay and benefits). In this report, only the compensation elements which make up r egular m ilitary c ompensation will be discussed. An Overview of Regular Military Compensation Regular Military Compensation (RMC) is a statutorily defined measure of the major compensation elements which every servicemember receives. It is widely used as a basic measure of military cash compensation levels and for comparisons with civilian salary levels. RMC, as defined in law, is "the total of the following elements that a member of the uniformed services accrues or receives, directly or indirectly, in cash or in kind every payday: basic pay, basic allowance for housing, basic allowance for subsistence, and Federal tax advantage accruing to the aforementioned allowances because they are not subject to Federal income tax." These elements are described in more detail in the Appendix . Certain GFOs receive a "personal money allowance" as well. This is not part of RMC, but is described in a footnote below. Congress included provisions in recent National Defense Authorization Acts to deny GFOs any increase in basic pay during calendar years 2015 and 2016. Regular Military Compensation for General and Flag Officers Table 4 provides the average RMC that general and flag officers received in 2019. It assumes that all GFOs receive BAH, rather than living in government provided housing. Statutory Controls on GFOs Congress has established a statutory framework for GFOs which limits their numbers by grade, requires presidential determination of many three-star and four-star positions, and specifies the grade and/or duties of certain key positions. This framework provides for greater congressional control over the most senior GFO positions, while providing substantial latitude to the executive branch in the management of the remaining GFOs. Current Grade Limits Sections 525 and 526 of Title 10 establish the number of general and flag officers that may be on active duty in the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. The two provisions establish separate caps for each service and for the joint community. There are certain circumstances under which a general or flag officer does not "count" against these caps. Additionally, the President has authority under 10 U.S.C. §527 to suspend the operation of the caps in time of war or national emergency declared by the Congress or the President. Table 5 summarizes the statutory limitations by grade for GFOs for service-specific positions. Table 6 summarizes the statutory limitations for GFOs service in Joint positions. Combining the maximum number of service and joint GFO authorizations, the maximum number of GFO positions authorized is currently 963. The current number of active duty GFOs subject to the statutory caps is 891. There are another 29 active duty GFOs who are not subject to the statutory caps. (See " Current Number of General and Flag Officers " earlier in the report.) Grade Limits after December 31, 2022 The FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act included a provision, codified at 10 U.S.C. §526a, to reduce the number of GFOs authorized to be on active duty. The conference report that accompanied the bill highlighted congressional concerns that the military departments had not demonstrated a willingness to implement GFO reductions directed by then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in 2011 and, furthermore, noted the context of significant reductions in personnel strength that occurred in the 2011-2016 time frame. Starting in 2023, §526a will lower the number of GFOs that may be on active duty to a maximum of 620 for Service positions and 232 for Joint positions, a reduction of 111 from the current number of GFO positions authorized by 10 U.S.C. §526. Presidential Determination for Three-Star and Four-Star positions Section 601 of Title 10 provides that "[t]he President may designate positions of importance and responsibility to carry the grade of general or admiral or lieutenant general or vice admiral.... An officer assigned to any such position has the grade specified for that position if he is appointed to that grade by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate." Thus, with the exception of those so designated in statute, all three-star and four-star positions must be designated as such by the President. Congress can review the rationale for this designation as part of its oversight function, and the Senate retains the power to confirm or reject the nomination of an individual to fill such a position. The authority of the President to designate such positions is also limited by the strength caps on general and flag officers found in 10 U.S.C. §§525 and 526. Statutorily Defined Positions Congress has established a number of GFO positions in law which carry designated grades, designated duties, or both. Statutory Grades Congress has specified the grade for a number of key positions. For example, 10 U.S.C. §152 specifies that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff holds the rank of General or Admiral. Similar language also exists for the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the top two officers of each service, the Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau. Table 7 highlights some positions with statutorily required grades. Congress sometimes changes these statutory grades. For example, in 2008, Congress increased the grade of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau from Lieutenant General to General. Additionally, Section 502 of the FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act amended various statutory provisions to eliminate the statutory grade for 54 positions. As explained in the report that accompanied the Senate version of the FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act, where the provision originated: The Committee determined that in order to effectively manage the reduction in the number of general and flag officers prescribed elsewhere in this Act, that the Secretary of Defense must be given the flexibility to assign appropriate officer grades to positions. The provision would not prohibit the position from being filled by an officer with the same, or a higher, or lower grade than the law currently requires. Statutory Duties Positions with statutorily required grades typically have statutorily required duties as well. Table 7 provides excerpts of the statutorily required responsibilities, duties, or functions of certain GFO positions. Congress sometimes changes these duties. For example, in 2011, Congress changed the law to specify that the Chief of the National Guard Bureau was a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff whose duties included "the specific responsibility of addressing matters involving non-Federalized National Guard forces in support of homeland defense and civil support missions." Considerations for Congress Congress has a long-standing interest in the military officer corps in general, and has periodically focused additional attention on its most senior officers. Should Congress elect to address GFO authorizations, duties, compensation, or other related topics in more detail, it may wish to consider the following: What is the most appropriate way to determine how many GFOs the Department of Defense should have? How closely should this be linked to total force size? What other factors would be useful in determining what the right number of GFOs is? How do advances in information technology and decisionmaking tools impact the need for GFOs? Could use of these technologies result in flattened management structures and decrease the need for GFOs? Should Congress modify the current statutory framework that governs GFOs? Should it modify the caps set out in 10 U.S.C. §§525, 526, and 526a? To what extent do other statutory requirements, such as the Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA), drive GFO requirements? Should GNA be revised to alter this effect? Could organizational restructuring of the Joint Staff and Service Staffs decrease the need for GFOs, or allow positions to be held by lower graded GFOs? Could certain organizations be merged to reduce the requirements for GFOs? Could military relations with international partners be restructured so as to lessen the need for GFO representation? How important is rank equivalence when senior U.S. military personnel work with their allied peers? Could National Guard and Reserve GFOs be used to reduce the need for active duty GFOs? Are there GFO positions that could be eliminated or "downgraded" to a lower rank? Are there GFO positions that could be replaced by civilian employees? What are the costs and benefits associated with these actions? How might this impact military effectiveness? Can the direct and indirect costs associated with GFOs be reduced? For example, could compensation or staff costs be reduced without significantly affecting the ability of GFOs to carry out their duties? Appendix. Elements of Regular Military Compensation Regular Military Compensation (RMC), as defined in law, is "the total of the following elements that a member of the uniformed services accrues or receives, directly or indirectly, in cash or in kind every payday: basic pay, basic allowance for housing, basic allowance for subsistence, and Federal tax advantage accruing to the aforementioned allowances because they are not subject to Federal income tax." Each of these elements is described below. Basic Pay All members of the Armed Forces receive basic pay, although the amount varies by pay grade (rank) and years of service (also called longevity). For most servicemembers, basic pay is the largest element of the compensation they receive in their paycheck and typically accounts for about two-thirds of an individual's RMC. It is roughly analogous to civilian salary. Basic Allowance for Housing All servicemembers living in the United States are entitled to either government-provided housing or a housing allowance, known as basic allowance for housing (BAH). About 17% of GFOs living in the United States receive government-provided housing with the remainder receiving BAH to offset the costs of the housing they rent or purchase in the civilian economy. The amount of BAH a servicemember receives is based on three factors: paygrade (rank), geographic location, and whether or not the servicemember has dependents. However, there is no increase in BAH after paygrade O-7. Therefore, the amount of BAH for GFOs does not vary by rank, but only by locality and dependency status. Paygrade and dependency status are used to determine the type of accommodation—or "housing profile"—that would be appropriate for the servicemember (for example, one-bedroom apartment, two-bedroom townhouse, or three-bedroom single family home). Geographic location is used to determine the average costs associated with each of these housing profiles. The average costs of these housing profiles are the basis for BAH rates. As a result of this methodology, BAH rates are much higher in some areas than others, but servicemembers of similar paygrade and dependent status should be able to pay for roughly comparable housing regardless of their duty location. Basic Allowance for Subsistence Nearly all servicemembers receive a monthly payment to defray their personal food costs. This is known as basic allowance for subsistence (BAS). BAS is provided at a flat rate, with separate rates for officers and enlisted personnel. In 2019, all officers, including GFOs, received $254.39 a month. Federal Tax Advantage Military allowances are generally not considered part of gross income and are not subject to federal income tax, thus generating a tax benefit for servicemembers. RMC considers only the federal income tax advantage provided by the exemption of housing and subsistence allowances from gross income. The precise value of the federal tax advantage for an individual servicemember will vary depending on his or her unique tax situation.

In the exercise of its constitutional authority over the Armed Forces, Congress has enacted an array of laws which govern important aspects of military officer personnel management, including appointments, assignments, grade structure, promotions, and separations. Some of these laws are directed specifically at the most senior military officers, known as general and flag officers (GFOs). Congress periodically reviews these laws and considers changes as it deems appropriate. Areas of congressional interest have included the number of GFOs authorized, the proportion of GFOs to the total force, compensation levels of GFOs, and duties and grades of certain GFOs. As of November 1, 2018, there were 891 active duty GFOs subject to statutory caps, which is 72 less than the maximum of 963 authorized by law. There were also another 29 exempt from the statutory caps. The current number is about average for the post-Cold War era, though substantially lower than the number of GFOs in the 1960s-1980s, when the Armed Forces were much larger in size than they are today. However, while always very small in comparison to the total force, the general and flag officer corps has increased as a percentage of the total force over the past five decades. GFOs made up about one-twentieth of one percent (0.048%) of the total force in 1965, while they made up about one-fifteenth of one percent (0.069%) of the total force in 2018, indicating that the share of the total force made up of GFOs increased by 44%. Some argue that this increased proportion of GFOs is wasteful and contributes to more bureaucratic decisionmaking processes. Others counter that the increased proportion is linked to the military's greater emphasis on joint and coalition operations, core organizational requirements, and the increasing use of advanced technologies. Compensation for GFOs varies. One commonly used measure of compensation, known as regular military compensation (RMC), includes basic pay, basic allowance for housing, basic allowance for subsistence, and the federal tax advantage associated with allowances, which are exempt from federal income tax. In 2019, the lowest-ranking GFOs make about $204,000 per year in RMC, while the highest-ranking GFOs make about $238,000 per year. Congress has also used its authority to specify the grade and duties of certain GFO positions. For example, Congress increased the grade of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau (CNGB) from Lieutenant General to General in 2008. Three years later, Congress again changed the law to specify that the CNGB was a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff whose duties included "the specific responsibility of addressing matters involving non-Federalized National Guard forces in support of homeland defense and civil support missions." In 2016, Congress removed the statutory grade requirement from 54 GFO positions. This report provides an overview of active duty GFOs in the United States Armed Forces—including authorizations, duties, and compensation—historical trends in the proportion of GFOs relative to the total force, criticisms and justifications of GFO to total force proportions, and statutory controls. National Guard and Reserve GFOs are not addressed in this report, unless they are serving on active duty in a manner that counts against the active duty caps on GFOs.

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Introduction International trophy hunting is a multinational, multimillion-dollar industry practiced in countries on almost every continent. Trophy hunting is broadly defined as the killing of animals for recreation with the purpose of collecting trophies such as horns, antlers, skulls, skins, tusks, or teeth for display. International and domestic trophy hunting has a long history in the United States, and U.S. citizens import more wildlife trophies than citizens of any other country—over 650,000 trophies in 2017 alone. Many of these trophies are deer, geese, and other common species that were hunted in neighboring countries, such as Canada. However, some of these trophies are rare and threatened animals hunted in countries throughout Africa and parts of Asia and South America. The practice of international trophy hunting, especially of rare and endangered species, has generated controversy for a number of reasons, including its relation to conservation (including of wildlife populations), ethical considerations, and its effect on local economies where the animals are hunted. Proponents of trophy hunting contend that the practice is a potential source of funding for the conservation of species in exchange for the hunting of a proportionally small number of individuals. Further, they argue that trophy hunting can create incentives for conserving habitat and ecosystems where hunted animals roam and, in some impoverished areas in range countries, can provide a means of income, employment, and community development. Critics of trophy hunting contend that the practice can lead to the decline of rare and endangered species and that the pathway of moving funds from hunting to conservation can be fraught with corruption and mismanagement. Further, some argue that it is unethical to kill animals for sport and that the life of an animal should not be valued according to how much a hunter would pay to kill it. Determining the effects of international trophy hunting on species—with regard to either killing animals or conserving them through hunting revenue—can be challenging for several reasons, namely due to lack of data, according to scientists. Difficulty gathering data from range countries can hinder attempts to develop an accurate sense of how hunting affects animals. For example, limited data may misrepresent the number of trophies harvested or animals killed, corruption can blur the route of money from hunters to conservation efforts, and a lack of information on conservation plans and practices associated with domestic laws and regulations can lead to questions about the effectiveness of these conservation efforts. From a scientific perspective, teasing out the effects of trophy hunting from those of other factors that affect a species also can be challenging. Several factors affect the viability of animal populations in the wild, including habitat alteration or destruction, prey or resource availability, genetic makeup of the population, changes in climate, presence of non-native species, poaching, subsistence or market hunting, and trophy hunting, among others. Measuring the condition of a population usually involves taking into consideration several of these factors, and more than one factor typically affects the population's condition. Many scientific studies on trophy hunting's effects on wildlife populations contain disclaimers of insufficient data to measure the effect of hunting on a species. Some studies have reported that unregulated hunting has contributed to the decline of several species. For example, in the 1980s, hunting reportedly played a part in the decline of both the dorcas gazelle ( Gazella dorcus ) and the Nubian bustard ( Neotis nuba ) from Sahelian Africa. Some scientists contend that there are no documented extinctions solely resulting from trophy hunting. Congressional interest in trophy hunting hinges on several aspects of the practice and its potential consequences. There is interest among some Members of Congress and constituents in international trophy hunting of rare and threatened species, such as African lions, elephants, and rhinoceroses. As the largest importer of sport-hunted trophies in the world, the United States can play a role in shaping policy, which likely bolsters this interest. The killing of Cecil the lion in Africa in 2015 drew particular public interest and attention in Congress. The incident stimulated debate on trophy hunting and raised questions about the relative importance of trophy hunting versus other threats to a species. Congress's role in addressing international trophy hunting is limited in some aspects, because the range country oversees most controversial aspects of the activity. However, Congress can address the import of wildlife trophies into the United States and can use laws and regulations to indirectly influence trophy-hunting practices in range countries. Congress has addressed international trophy hunting through several bills and through oversight of the implementation of the Endangered Species Act (ESA; 16 U.S.C. §§1531-1543) and the Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES). In addition, some Trump Administration policies have stimulated congressional interest in trophy hunting, such as one to evaluate permits issued for importing sport-hunted trophies of listed animals into the United States on a case-by-case basis, a change from the previous practice of evaluating the range country before issuing permits for hunting these animals. Further, the Trump Administration established an International Wildlife Conservation Council, which is charged with providing advice to the Secretary of the Interior on the benefits of U.S. citizens hunting overseas. This report discusses the history and scope of international trophy hunting in the United States, selected U.S. laws and international agreements that address trophy hunting, and potential issues for Congress to consider regarding international trophy hunting. It does not cover domestic trophy hunting. Historical Perspective on Trophy Hunting Sport hunting is one of the oldest known recreational activities, according to some historians. Although the origin of sport hunting remains unclear, some historians trace the practice to instances in Ancient Egypt and more prominently in the Middle Ages. Some authors note that game parks for controlled hunting were prevalent in the Persian Empire (534 BCE-330 BCE). Early reports of sport hunting indicate that it was unregulated and generally occurred in a commons area. Restrictions on sport hunting, according to some historians, first began in the Middle Ages, when it was forbidden to hunt in certain forests owned by a king or other royalty. In the 18 th and 19 th centuries, concerns about overhunting and its consequences for species led to the creation of parks and game lands with hunting regulations. For example, game reserves were created in England and its colonies to monitor and control the effects of sport hunting on animals in the 19 th century. Sport hunting was also practiced in the name of conservation and science, in addition to recreation. Former President Teddy Roosevelt went on hunting expeditions throughout the world; in 1909, he went on an 11-month expedition through British-controlled East Africa and Sudan and reportedly shot or trapped nearly 11,000 animals, including hippopotamuses, elephants, and white rhinoceroses. The Smithsonian Institution financed the expedition, and many of the specimens were deposited into the Smithsonian Natural History Museum. In the 20 th century, sport hunting became a resource, in part, for conservation. For example, sport hunting in the United States contributes to conservation through the Federal Aid in Wildlife Restoration Act of 1937 ( 16 U.S.C. 669-669i) , also known as the Pittman-Robertson Act. Under this act, the purchase of guns, hunting licenses, and ammunition generates revenue for conservation. Further, fees from federal and state duck stamps (stamps are required for waterfowl hunting) and hunting permits have generated funds for conservation in the United States. Trophy hunting originated, in part, during the colonial settlement in Africa. Some note that the establishment of the Dutch East India Company in 1652 led foreign hunters to Africa. Explorers and hunters killed animals for ivory and hides; the emphasis on hunting was for subsistence and trade. Hunters later took advantage of an expanding railway system to access areas infrequently occupied by settlements. Hunters combined sport hunting with the international wildlife trade to generate money, as exemplified by killing elephants and harvesting their ivory and hides for trade. Trophy hunting in Africa increased in the 19 th century and was encouraged by the British authorities, who promoted sport hunting as a way to increase agricultural expansions into historic rangelands. Tourist trophy hunting started in Kenya in the 20 th century and later spread throughout Africa. According to some scientists, trophy hunting aligned with and aided in conservation and development in the 20 th century; funding from trophy hunts, according to some, led to the establishment of protected areas in Africa. Trophy hunting was seen as a mechanism to support development in local communities (see " Trophy Hunting and Local Communities "). Scope of International Trophy Hunting Trophy hunting occurs throughout the world in areas where wild and managed populations of hunted animals exist. Trophy hunting can target large, charismatic mammals, such as white rhinoceroses ( Ceratotherium simum ) and elephants ( Loxodonta africana ), as well as smaller, lesser-known species, such as markhor ( Capra falconeri ) and argali ( Ovis ammon ). Trophy hunting generates millions of dollars each year through trophy fees and other revenue connected with associated tourism. The largest community of international trophy hunters is from the United States. The United States is also the largest importer of animal trophies; it imports over 10 times more trophies than China, the world's second-largest trophy importer. Several species listed under CITES are hunted for trophies, and their export and import data can provide insight into the practice of international trophy hunting. CITES lists animals that are considered threatened or endangered due to trade and therefore require greater monitoring or conservation. From 2011 to 2015, trophy imports of CITES-listed species into the United States exceeded the sum of CITES-listed species imported into the other top nine trophy-importing countries in the world. (See Figure 1 .) Africa is the most popular place for the international hunting of rare and threatened species for trophies (see Figure 2 ), and several African countries are popular areas for sport hunting. South Africa and Namibia export the most mammalian trophies listed under CITES; in these countries, most trophies exported from CITES-listed species are from lions, lechwe (antelope), certain species of zebra, and leopards. (Data for non-CITES listed species were not readily available.) Some of the most prized species for trophy hunting come from Africa, and their notoriety is reflected in the hunting fees the species command. Fees for hunting animals for trophies vary considerably and are based on the rarity of the animal, the effort needed to hunt the animal, and the animal's popularity for hunting. (See Table 1 .) In Africa, the so-called big five animals of trophy hunting are lions, white rhinoceroses, elephants, leopards, and buffalo. All five species are coveted trophies for hunters, although most international hunters in Africa seek more plentiful, less costly plains game. The big five are notable for the difficulty in hunting them and the high trophy fees that hunters pay, which can range from $9,000 to upward of $350,000. (See Table 1 .) Some studies indicate that many African countries earn most of their trophy-hunting revenue from the big five animals. Four of the big five species are protected under CITES, ESA, or both. Role of the United States in International Sport Hunting As discussed, the United States is the largest importer of sport-hunted trophies in the world for all species and for CITES-listed species. This distinction gives the United States, according to some, an opportunity to influence international sport hunting through its policies for importing trophies and actions by its hunters. U.S. hunters primarily import sport trophies from Canada and South Africa, according to Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) records; this also holds true for CITES-listed species. (See Figure 3 .) Of the species imported into the United States, the snow goose, mallard, and black bear are the most common (see Figure 4 ). Most of these trophies are imported from Canada, and most imported species into the United States are not considered to be threatened or endangered. Of the CITES-listed species, the black bear and the Sandhill crane are the most imported trophies into the United States with a permit. (See Figure 5 .) The black bear and the sandhill crane are imported largely from Canada; most of the other species are imported from Africa. International Sport Hunting: Regulatory Framework International sport hunting is largely regulated through laws of the range country, the country importing trophies, and international agreements. Hunters generally must consider regulations of all three entities and apply for applicable permits to hunt and transport trophies. This section will discuss the regulations associated with each category. Multilateral and Foreign Country Regulations for Sport Hunting International trophy hunting can be regulated through some international agreements, depending on the species being hunted. If the hunted species is considered rare or endangered due to trade, CITES might apply. CITES CITES is an international agreement signed by 183 governments, including the United States, which voluntarily agreed to adhere to a series of incrementally more stringent restrictions on imports and exports of wildlife, depending on the sustainability of such trade for the species. CITES lists and categorizes wildlife and plant species based on the extent that these species might be threatened by trade. Protected species are organized under CITES into three appendixes. Species in Appendix I are threatened with extinction due primarily to trade, and trade in Appendix I species for commercial purposes is prohibited. Appendix II contains species that are not necessarily threatened with extinction but require controlled trade to prevent population declines. Species in Appendix III are listed because at least one country has requested other countries to assist in regulating trade of that species. Countries regulate trade through a permit system for importing and exporting species and a quota system for regulating species' take (the act of killing or harvesting a species). Many CITES signatories have implemented permit regulations in their national laws. For the United States, CITES is implemented under ESA. CITES regulates the import and export of trophies from threatened wildlife through permits. For example, a hunter attempting to import a trophy of an animal listed under CITES Appendix I (the most protective category) into the United States would be required to obtain an import and export permit (from the importing country and range country, respectively) for the wildlife or wildlife parts. Trophy imports of CITES-listed species under Appendixes I and II generally are administered through a quota system established by the range country (or in some cases the CITES Secretariat), and they require a determination that the killing of the animal causes no detriment to the population, referred to as a n on- d etriment f inding (NDF). NDFs are required for Appendix I and II species only but can be used to guide the trade of Appendix III species. An NDF for an import permit is made by the designated CITES Scientific Authority of the country of import through the analysis of information (e.g., population status and trade information) from the range country and the permit. FWS is the United States' Scientific Authority for CITES-listed species. The establishment of a quota for exporting individuals of a species can meet the requirements of an NDF. The CITES Secretariat does not necessarily have complete information regarding how range countries set their quotas, but it receives reports from participating countries. For example, range countries regulate African elephant, cheetah, black rhinoceros, and lion trophies by voluntary quotas. Trade of a particular species or exports of a species from a range country can be temporarily suspended under CITES. Such a suspension may occur if there are not sufficient guarantees that trade is not detrimental to the survival of the listed species or if adequate legislation to implement CITES is absent, illegal trade is prevalent, or required scientific reports are missing. Some suspensions of trade are specific to the species, whereas other suspensions can be for all trade for a country. Currently, 29 countries are affected by species-specific trade suspension resolutions, including Equatorial Guinea, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, Ghana, Niger, Liberia, Vietnam, Benin, and Togo, among others. Of those 29 countries, Afghanistan, Djibouti, Grenada, Liberia, Mauritania, and Somalia are subject to a complete suspension of trade on all species. European Union Another multilateral framework for addressing trophy hunting is the European Union (EU). The EU governs international trophy hunting under the EU Wildlife Trade Regulations (WTR). The WTR implements CITES for the EU and aims to protect species by regulating trade, authorizing permits for trade, and allowing for the suspension of certain species from trade with the EU. Regulations promulgated by the EU are in place for all national governments within the EU; however, individual countries enact enforcement regulations. The EU regulates the trade of species through a permit system that is based on the classification of a species within four annexes. The annexes list species according to how trade affects the species. The classification of species within the annexes largely follows CITES classifications, but the annexes contain species not listed by CITES. The permit system addresses sport-hunted trophies directly and recently has listed regulations for the import of polar bear, African elephant, and African lion trophies, among others. Member states under the EU can implement more stringent policies than the EU to address the trade of species. For example, under German regulations, import applications of CITES Appendix I species that do not have an established quota go through heavier review than applications with export quotas. EU regulations also contain a suspension rule, which allows the European Commission (the EU executive arm) to restrict the entry of a species into any country in the EU. A handful of species are prohibited from entry into the EU, including the West African seahorse ( Hippocampus algiricus ) from Guinea and Senegal and the crab-eating macaque ( Macaca fascicularis ) from Laos. EU regulations differ from CITES regulations in a few ways. The EU regulations, according to some observers, are stricter than CITES regulations. For example, some CITES Appendix II species are in Annex A under the EU, and Annex A contains stricter regulations for trade than CITES, according to some. Annex B species under the EU require both import and export permits, whereas similar CITES Appendix II species require only an export permit. The EU wildlife trade system also regulates trade within the EU. Despite its potentially stricter regulations, the EU system is in compliance with CITES, because CITES stipulates that parties can have laws and regulations that are stricter than CITES. Range Country The hunting and killing of animals generally are regulated by laws of the range country, which vary by country. Some range countries address trophy hunting with a combination of policies that involve annual quotas for hunting particular species, designated hunting ranges, and permit systems for allowing hunts (e.g., Zimbabwe and South Africa). Other range countries ban trophy hunting outright. Trophy hunting is currently banned in 13 range countries: Angola, Botswana, Congo, Gabon, Ghana, India, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, and South Sudan. Countries such as Romania and Holland ban imports of sport-hunted trophies. Analyzing trophy-hunting laws in range countries is beyond the scope of this report. U.S. Regulations on International Trophy Hunting In the United States, laws related to international trophy hunting are governed by ESA, which implements CITES and is administered by FWS. ESA does not regulate trophy-hunting activities within range countries directly; rather, the law governs what can be imported into the United States. The actual killing of a listed species in a foreign country is governed by the range country. Trophy hunting is regulated by FWS based on the status of the species. Most trophies that are imported into the United States come through a designated port of entry and must have a declaration filled out. FWS may inspect the declaration and the trophy before allowing it into the country. If the species is listed under CITES or ESA, a permit from FWS might be necessary to import the trophy into the United States. For species listed under ESA or CITES, an import and potentially export permit from the range country might be needed. An enhancement-of-survival permit is needed to import trophies of species listed under ESA. Enhancement of survival implies that the import of endangered animals or their parts or products will provide incentives to increase the survival of the species in its native habitat. If a species is listed as threatened, the same concepts apply, unless there is a special rule under Section 4(d) of ESA, which may allow for a limited number of trophies to be imported under different circumstances. In the past, when making an enhancement finding for issuing permits to import trophies, FWS reviewed information in the application and the status of species and conservation programs in the range country. The evaluation was a three-part process to ensure the survival of the species, according to FWS. First, FWS assessed the hunted animal's range country, looking at whether the management of the species is sustainable, if there are resources that support the enforcement of laws and illegal poaching, and whether the country will hold hunters accountable if violations arise. FWS also considered a hunter's actions; for example, a permit application for species in Mozambique asked the hunter to provide a written statement detailing antipoaching activities, clarifying whether the meat from the hunt goes to local communities, and affirming the status of the hunting organization. Reviewing the country's data and conservation program was, in part, an effort to streamline the issuance of individual permits for importing trophies. FWS also used to make non-detriment findings (NDFs) under CITES to facilitate the issuance of CITES permits for importing trophies of CITES-listed species. Species listed under Appendix I need an import permit from FWS; this permit is issued if the imported trophy will not be detrimental to the species' survival and is not primarily intended for commercial purposes. A recent policy change by FWS has altered the process for evaluating the enhancement-of-survival criteria and issuing NDFs for permits related to sport-hunted trophies. FWS issued a memorandum stating that the agency would withdraw ESA enhancement-of-survival findings and CITES NDFs for several species in various countries around the world and evaluate applications for ESA and CITES permits on a case-by-case basis pursuant to the authorities under ESA, which includes CITES. The memorandum further stated that FWS would use status and monitoring information from range countries and evaluate information in each application to ensure that management programs are promoting the conservation of the hunted species. It is unclear whether permit applications or their status will be made public or if there are specific criteria being evaluated in each application to make determinations in lieu of countrywide evaluations. According to the memorandum, the changes were derived from a District of Columbia Court of Appeals opinion on issuing enhancement-of-survival permits under ESA. The appeals court decided that FWS did not adhere to notice and comment rulemaking requirements under the Administrative Procedure Act when making a negative enhancement finding for the import of sport-hunted trophies from Zimbabwe. Ecological, Ethical, and Economic Considerations of Trophy Hunting The controversies surrounding international trophy hunting are rooted in the ecological, ethical, and economic considerations of the practice. Numerous factors affect a species, and teasing out the effects of trophy hunting is challenging due to a lack of long-term monitoring of hunted populations. Most studies also report that with appropriate and consistent management, trophy hunting can be potentially beneficial for species; however, with poor management, trophy hunting can be detrimental for species. This section will analyze several identified ecological and economic factors that are affected by international trophy hunting. Ecological Factors Affected by Trophy Hunting Scientists report that trophy hunting can affect a species population with respect to how many individuals are hunted annually ( rate of offtake ), the genetic consequences of hunting, the traits of the individuals selected for hunting (including the social status of the hunted individuals), and the consequences of hunting for the ecosystem where the species resides. Hunting Rates Hunting could significantly affect a population, if the number of animals killed is greater than the reproductive rate of the individuals in the population. According to scientists, high rates of trophy hunting have caused population declines in African lions ( Panthera leo ), American cougars ( Felis concolor ), and possibly African leopards ( Panthera pardus ). High rates of trophy hunting also could combine with other factors to cause population declines in animals. For example, poaching and, to a lesser extent, hunting of wild elephants in Africa currently are outpacing the species' reproductive rate, causing an unsustainable loss of elephants annually. To combat this problem, some range countries have adopted regulations that limit hunting certain animals from a given species based on their age. Studies have shown that using an age-restricted quota system that allows the hunting of older animals could lead to sustainable growth of the species population. For example, these types of restrictions could be applied to long-lived species such as African elephants, according to some scientists. In some African countries, such as Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe, regulations regarding age-restricted hunting incentivize hunters to respect this system by increasing quotas for hunters who adhere to age restrictions. Hunting rates also are correlated to the rarity of the species, according to some scientists. Some have introduced the concept of the Anthropogenic Allee (AA) Effect (see box for description) to explain why the interest in trophy hunting increases as the species becomes rare. This hypothesis, under certain scenarios, could explain how trophy hunting could severely diminish a species. In contrast to this perspective, some observers contend that managed trophy hunting, which includes scientifically determined quotas, monitoring, and enforcement, can have few negative effects on a wildlife population and can be beneficial for a population in some cases. Genetic Effects of Trophy Hunting Trophy hunting might have a significant effect on the genetic makeup of a population if the population is small or if hunting is prolific and focused on individuals with specific traits (e.g., large horns or antlers). Trophy hunting of individuals in small populations could reduce the population's gene pool and increase the chance of inbreeding and breeding by less vigorous males; if too many males are removed from the population by hunting, there is less fighting to establish dominance and breeding rights among males, which can allow less vigorous males to breed. Inbreeding and a reduced gene pool can affect the population's viability and can cause extinction. Managing trophy hunting in small populations of animals through accurate quotas and population monitoring could avoid this problem, according to some scientists. Selectively hunting animals based on gender or body traits could have genetic and evolutionary consequences for the population and species. Targeting only males or females in a population could affect the animals' ability to disperse their traits to future generations. If trophy hunting, for example, focuses on larger, breeding males, there would be fewer males to mate and the population could suffer from low reproductive rates. African lions are vulnerable to excessive losses of males in their population. In addition to the probability of inbreeding, scientists report that removing too many males from a pride could lead to females being unable to mate. These genetic effects of trophy hunting can be mitigated with accurate quotas and managed hunting that targets specific animals in a population, according to some scientists. In one case, scientists recommended that one lion be taken per 2,000 square kilometers in Africa, where population densities are low. Others note that restricting trophy hunting to male lions that are older than six years of age would allow younger males to reproduce and allow for higher-quality trophies from the population. Effect of Trophy Hunting on the Social Organization of Animals Trophy hunting can disrupt the social makeup of a population or pride if the species is social, such as brown bears ( Ursus arctos ) and African lions ( Panthera leo ). If a dominant male is killed, the male taking over the pride or social group might improve its reproductive success by killing the offspring of the former rival male. If this practice occurs frequently, the population's viability could suffer from lower growth rates and diminished reproduction. For example, in populations of brown bears in Alberta, Canada, scientists reported that cub survival lowered when mature males were killed, causing population declines. Further, male takeovers of lion prides due to trophy hunting can cause the dispersal of subadults away from the population or injury and death to remaining males. Management techniques to avoid these problems have been suggested and include specifying which individual in a social group to hunt and monitoring populations to see if target individuals change. Trophy Hunting and Habitat Conservation Trophy hunting could be a driver for increasing biodiversity and habitat conservation within range countries. Hunting lands often are cited as conservation areas because of the efforts made to maintain a pristine environment for game animals. In the United States, for example, Ducks Unlimited is involved in conserving nearly 10 million acres of waterfowl habitat used for hunting. In Africa, the area of hunting grounds is significant and exceeds the area of national parks in a few range countries. (See Table 2 .) Observers report that protected and managed hunting lands increase the biodiversity of a range country and could be considered a conservation tool. Some contend that without hunting, these lands would be converted to rangelands for livestock production, which have lower biodiversity than native habitat. Proponents of hunting also suggest that managed hunting grounds protect animals from poaching. Some critics of trophy hunting suggest that hunting grounds do not ensure that threatened or endangered animal populations will rebound from low levels. They contend that some rangeland managers artificially alter the ecosystem by introducing exotic species or manually reducing predators of trophy animals. Further, some note that rangelands for hunting generally are fenced, thus fragmenting the habitat into small blocks. Fenced ranges also could alter the migration and range of several non-hunted species, especially in Africa. In contrast, fences could protect animals from poachers. Selected Ethical Considerations of International Trophy Hunting Several ethical concerns are associated with trophy hunting, and these issues add to the debate on whether the practice is beneficial to conservation. Some critics of the practice contend that paying a fee to kill an animal and collect a trophy as a sign of conquest is unethical and represents objectification of the hunted animal. They further question the role of trophy hunting in aiding conservation, citing lack of data and other forms of generating value from wildlife, such as wildlife viewing. Some supporters of the practice contend that trophy hunting is a recreational pursuit that could increase the value of certain animals and aid in the overall conservation of a population. Some ethical arguments can be relevant in discussing the practice of trophy hunting and its alternative forms. For example, the practice of captive hunting (i.e., hunting animals within an enclosure) causes some hunters to question whether the hunting in this environment represents fair chase . Fair chase has been defined by one organization as "the ethical, sportsmanlike, and lawful pursuit of free-ranging wild game animals in a manner which does not give the hunter an improper or unfair advantage over the animal." Some other hunters claim that fair chase is achieved if the enclosure is large enough for animals to roam a certain distance. Critics of trophy hunting also cite ethical considerations associated with other hunting practices, including shooting animals from vehicles and luring animals with baits. Economic Considerations of International Trophy Hunting Overall, research on trophy-hunting operations and their economic effect is limited and varies according to the areas studied. Researchers describe both economic benefits and limitations of trophy hunting. Trophy hunting can be a lucrative enterprise for certain parties throughout the world, according to some scientists. In the United States and Europe, trophy hunting can generate billions of dollars. Revenues from trophy hunting in Africa, in comparison, are estimated to generate more than $200 million annually. This estimate varies among sources, causing some to question the accuracy of reported revenue data and the methodology used to aggregate reported revenue data over time and across countries. These data do not illustrate how economically important or insignificant trophy hunting might be in different range countries in Africa. For example, FWS reports that 7 of the 10 countries where lions are allowed to be hunted for trophies are considered developing nations in which 27%-64% of the population is living in poverty. Trophy hunting in these areas could have a proportionally larger effect than in wealthier countries because of the low base income. Proponents of trophy hunting also argue that trophy hunting is economically viable in areas that are unsuitable for photographic ecotourism—areas that are remote, lack infrastructure, contain little attractive scenery, have experienced ongoing or recent struggles with political instability, and contain low densities of viewable wildlife. Countries such as Mozambique, which are less attractive ecotourism destinations, are nevertheless able to generate revenue from sport hunting. Researchers have used survey techniques to evaluate such assertions and found willingness among respondents to finance hunting trips to sites typically less suitable for ecotourism. Critics contend that trophy hunting does not have the significant effect on gross domestic product (GDP) that supporters claim. They argue that trophy-hunting revenue remains a small percentage—1.8%, according to one study—of overall tourism revenues and just a fraction of overall GDP for some of the core wildlife source countries in Africa. A 2009 study by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) further criticized big-game hunting, particularly in West Africa, as a financially suboptimal use of land, because land used for big-game hunting generates smaller economic returns than land used for agriculture or livestock breeding. Additionally, studies have shown that in some instances, revenues associated with trophy hunting provide insufficient economic benefits to motivate local communities to promote the conservation of certain species—particularly carnivores that prey on livestock, such as leopards. This was found to be the case in Niassa National Reserve, Mozambique. Another study found that local benefits derived from wildlife-related activities, including hunting revenue, were insufficient to change incentives for conservation in two observed sites in Mozambique and Namibia. Trophy Hunting and Local Communities Some proponents of trophy hunting contend that the money generated by trophy hunts helps the communities in and around the range areas by providing jobs and money for community services. For example, some found that trophy hunters were willing to pay substantial premiums for hunting trips that were advertised as offering benefit-sharing arrangements with local communities. The literature often cites community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) as a mechanism to encourage local community involvement in wildlife management decisionmaking and to increase the amount of financial benefits associated with wildlife-related revenue that accrue to local communities. In practice, the results have been mixed. For example, the Communal Areas Management Plan for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) program in Zimbabwe attempted to create economic incentives for communities and landowners to conduct habitat and ecosystem restoration. At one point, CAMPFIRE generated more than $20 million, of which almost 90% came from trophy hunting, allowing communities to establish management over the habitat and resources within the range area. Of the income generated from tourist activities, such as trophy hunts, 49% went to the communities and 20% went to wildlife management; the remaining 31% went to other administrative projects. Trophy hunting, however, is one of several conservation-oriented wildlife management tools. However, some scientists emphasize that the amount of trophy-hunting revenue that accrues to local communities is disproportionately small. These researchers note that in Cameroon, less than 3% of trophy-hunting revenues accrued to local communities; in Zambia, local communities received some 12% of hunting revenues; and in Tanzania, though law requires a percentage of hunting revenues to accrue to communities living in or adjacent to hunting areas, the funding rarely has reached past the local council level. Others reported that approximately 3% of trophy hunting revenue in Tanzania was allocated to "area and community development," which is vague and creates uncertainty about whether the funds went to species conservation. In some areas, however, a higher percentage of revenues from trophy hunting flows to local communities. Some, for example, cite Zambia's ADMADE (Administrative Design for Game Management Areas) program as a model for locally accruing trophy-hunting revenue, noting that ADMADE receives 67% of all trophy-hunting revenue in game management areas and that 53% of ADMADE revenue is directed toward local wildlife management; the remainder goes to community development. They also cite Botswana and Namibia as examples where trophy-hunting revenue accrues locally. Some scientists conducted an evaluation of the economic contributions of safari hunting to the rural livelihoods of a CBNRM-participating village in Botswana. In addition to documenting multiple economic benefits, including cash dividends, employment income, and community facilities infrastructure development, the scientists found that the distribution of safari hunting benefits was "fairly equitable" among village households. Trophy Hunting and Conservation Congress might consider whether international trophy hunting is a benefit or detriment to wildlife conservation. There does not appear to be consensus among stakeholders as to whether international trophy hunting is being applied and used as an effective conservation tool throughout range countries where it is practiced. Several observers note that more data need to be collected on how species respond to trophy hunting in the short and long terms and how revenue from trophy hunting is managed in range countries. Proponents of trophy hunting contend that it can be used as a conservation tool if managed in a sustainable and scientifically based manner. They argue that revenue from hunting operations can be channeled into conservation programs and activities that aim to support hunted species and their habitat. Some contend that governance (e.g., having laws in place that require hunting fees to be made available for conservation) is critical for trophy hunting to contribute to conservation. Conservation benefits associated with trophy hunting are seen as wide and varied. Some contend that trophy hunting incentivizes land managers to conserve populations of hunted species, which include threatened and endangered species. In some instances, it may protect species from poaching and use hunting quotas to manage species in a sustainable manner. Additionally, efforts to support trophy hunting can lead to the protection and management of rangelands, which support hunted species and other wildlife in the ecosystem. Local communities can benefit from trophy hunting as part of a tourism framework that could bolster economies through the development of hotels, restaurants, and other tourism-related activities. In certain areas where tourism is sparse, some have noted that trophy hunting can provide income to sustain communities. South Africa provides economic incentives to maintain white and black rhinoceros populations through limited trophy hunting, along with other forms of tourism. Some economists note that countries sometimes use revenue to fund the operational costs of government wildlife management authorities, counterpoaching enforcement activities, and development assistance to local communities. In Zambia, for example, hunting revenues have been used to train and hire village scouts for antipoaching activities in game management areas and to support community development projects for clinics, shelters, and schools. Critics of trophy hunting as a conservation tool question the effectiveness of trophy-hunting management. They note several aspects of trophy-hunting management that could be weak and negatively affect conservation of species and the ecosystem. Critics also question the premise that significant funds from trophy hunting are used to conserve hunted species and the ecosystems they use; these critics cite issues such as corruption as a barrier to ensuring revenues are used for conservation. For example, corruption may result in local people allowing and sometimes assisting poachers. Corruption can take the form of exceeding quotas, allowing hunting outside of rangelands, accepting bribes to overlook illegal activities, and using funds for nonconservation activities. For example, some contend that corruption detrimentally affects conservation effectiveness of trophy hunting in Ethiopia; funds reportedly are funneled to uses other than for conservation. Tanzania also suffers from mismanagement of both resources and funds, according to some studies. From failing to implement new policies designed to include communities in the trophy-hunting revenue cycle to operating a public auction system that allows discretionary spending by officials, leading to corruption and patronage, Tanzania is alleged to have misgoverned trophy hunting. This mismanagement led, in part, to a decreasing lion population, according to some. Scientists also noted that a lack of community involvement in the practice of trophy hunting led communities to defend themselves from lion encroachment, thus adding to the population's decline. Critics contend that offtake rates for some trophy hunted species are unsustainable and could affect populations. Some quotas for hunting animals do not use the best scientific information or are fixed and do not reflect changes in the population. In addition, some quotas do not accurately specify which individual animals may be hunted and their ages, which may have long-term negative genetic consequences on the population. Hunting the wrong individual animals also could have social consequences (e.g., infanticide) in some instances and could affect the viability of a population. Moreover, by not having a defined area or population to manage, hunting could result in several groups hunting the same population of animals without coordination, leading to overhunting quotas or other negative effects on the population. Fenced areas for hunting also could have negative effects on the ecosystem by preventing the migration of nonhunted species and allowing for the introduction of exotic species. In addition, critics argue that if local communities do not receive revenues from trophy hunting, they might be alienated, which could have consequences for maintaining and monitoring the hunted species. Many communities report hunting revenue failing to reach them due to potential corruption and other factors. For example, some communities in Tanzania claim that hunting organizations fail to pay local communities the 5% of revenue upon which the parties agreed. Some stakeholders contend that trophy hunting in any form is unethical. They argue in favor of using other alternatives for generating income from natural resources in its stead (e.g., birdwatching and safari). Potential Issues for Congress International trophy hunting is an issue for Congress for several reasons, including the practice's recreational qualities; its effect on wildlife, especially charismatic species; constituent interest in the practice; its relevance to laws that regulate the trade of threatened and endangered animals; and its ethical considerations, among other things. For example, some argue that the killing of Cecil the Lion in 2015 heightened congressional interest because lions are charismatic species and some are against killing threatened species due to ethical concerns. Congress and the Trump Administration have addressed international trophy hunting through the implementation of laws and the dissemination of regulations that address the import of sport-hunted trophies into the United States. Further, the Trump Administration has established the International Wildlife Conservation Council to provide recommendations to the Secretary of the Interior on various aspects of U.S. international trophy hunting. The role of Congress in this issue is limited by the jurisdiction of the United States overseas; hunting quotas, conservation activities, and the flow of revenue from international trophy-hunting activities are largely dictated by the range country. However, the congressional role is potentially meaningful in several areas discussed below. Monitoring and Data Gaps Some scientists and policymakers contend that fully evaluating the effects of trophy hunting on species conservation depends on monitoring and collecting more data on hunting operations and hunted species in range countries. Data from most hunting operations are largely self-reported. In some cases, they are gathered by the range country and international NGOs. Some policy experts contend that the United States could incentivize range countries and hunters to collect and report more data. For example, some argue that Congress could provide overseas development assistance for international programs and grants for NGOs to conduct studies on the effects of trophy hunting on wildlife populations and the distribution of revenue generated by trophy-hunting operations. Some contend that Congress or FWS could require permit applicants to solicit certain data from hunting operations that would verify the operations' conservation activities and the distribution of hunting revenue. Some might propose that international multilateral organizations, such as CITES, could encourage or require range countries to conduct oversight and report data on hunting operations and wildlife operations. This might take the form of long-term monitoring of hunted wildlife populations and systematic surveying of how trophy hunting affects local communities. For example, CITES collects data on specific species, such as African elephants. The Monitoring the Illegal Killing of Elephants Program aims to help range states improve their ability to monitor elephant populations, identify changes in the illegal and natural deaths of elephants, and apply these data to improve law enforcement and strengthen regulatory measures to conserve and manage elephants. This program is supported by parties to CITES and works with range countries and third parties to collect data. Some might contend that a similar program could be used to monitor and collect data on trophy hunting of selected iconic species, such as African lions, pangolins, and leopards. Critics of these approaches could argue that there are limited resources and incentives available for range countries to collect data on trophy hunting and monitoring. In addition, they might contend that data provided by hunting operations could be falsified or could fail to account for corruption and other illegal activities associated with the distribution of hunting revenue. They might question self-reporting by range countries, specifically, whether the data are accurate and affected by corruption. Some contend that to alleviate this issue, data should be transparent and fully identified when planning regulatory actions either through CITES or individual countries. Permits for Importing Sport-Hunted Trophies Congress can address international trophy hunting by U.S. hunters through the process of issuing permits to import trophies. In most cases, hunters need a permit to import a trophy from a listed species into the United States. The type of permit varies according to the status of the species under U.S. law or CITES. Currently, FWS is evaluating permit applications on a case-by-case basis, which involves reviewing individual hunting operations and potentially conservation programs in the range country. It is unclear what standards or methodology FWS uses to evaluate each permit on a case-by-case basis. Some might advocate for Congress to enact legislation that would direct the Secretary of the Interior to create and disseminate specific standards for evaluating trophy-import permits, including increasing the amount of information on the condition of the hunted species. Some might argue that equivalent standards across species for measuring whether hunting could enhance the survival of a population (e.g., criteria used by ESA) or be nondetrimental to a population (e.g., criteria used by CITES) could create consistency in evaluating trophy-import permits and lower the time needed to issue them. In addition, some Members argued that making permit applications and decisions publicly available could increase oversight over the process. H.R. 6885 in the 115 th Congress would have authorized this approach. However, other stakeholders could contend that a consistent approach for evaluating permits might not be applicable to all species being hunted or to all hunting operations being considered. For example, evaluating the conservation and hunting of listed species at the country level could mask individual hunting operations that might have different standards and conservation priorities than the range country as a whole. Some stakeholders might petition Congress to establish a third-party certification system to evaluate hunting operations that frequently appear on permit applications for importing trophies. The certification system could employ standards that reflect best practices for trophy hunting; some of these practices could include transparency in funding flows, support for local communities in proximity to hunts, equitable allocations of hunting concessions, and a quota system for hunted animals. A certification system might also alleviate concerns of questionable data sources for certain countries by having a standardized system for evaluating hunting operations. Under certain situations, a certification system could have a provision that allows for a moratorium on hunting a species to allow it to be replenished in the wild. The International Union for the Conservation of Nature has created a set of guiding principles and recommendations for sustainable trophy hunting that could be converted into standards. The principles include biological sustainability; net conservation benefit; socioeconomic benefit; adaptive management in planning, reporting, and monitoring hunting; and accountable and effective governance. Certification systems are used with other natural resources. For example, two primary wood certification programs affect wood consumed in the United States. The Forest Stewardship Council is an independent, international NGO that certifies that wood comes from well-managed forests that meet an established set of criteria. One key criterion is that the "chain of custody" information is provided; ideally, this information includes the names and locations of each handler of the wood from the forest where it originated to the shop where the product is being sold. A second certification program is offered by the Sustainable Forest Initiative (SFI). SFI also contains a set of guidelines and principles that must be followed to earn SFI certification, which is done for North American forests and does not have a chain-of-custody requirement. Approximately 120 million hectares are certified under this program in North America. Alternative Forms of Trophy Hunting or Bans As Congress debates whether international trophy hunting is a benefit or a detriment to wildlife conservation, it might consider promoting alternative forms of trophy hunting in the wild. Some contend that trophy hunting in enclosed ranges could give hunting operations greater control over wildlife populations. The practice of hunting animals that are enclosed within a private game ranch is referred to as captive hunting or, in some cases, canned hunting . The species in captive hunts usually are larger megafauna, such as lions, and typically are bred in captivity for game ranches. Proponents of captive hunting contend that it guarantees hunting success for the hunter, allows hunts to be shorter and less expensive, produces better trophies, drives conservation through economic incentives, and allows for easier management of populations, because they are in a contained environment where hunting can be limited. Critics of captive hunting have a different perspective that drives the controversy behind the practice; they contend that killing animals in a contained environment with no chance of escape is unethical and detracts from the sport of hunting. This concept is termed fair chase and is considered the "ethical, sportsmanlike, and lawful pursuit and taking of any free-ranging wild, big game animal in a manner that does not give the hunter an improper or unfair advantage over the game animals." They argue that animals bred in captivity are not equivalent to wild animals and therefore do not have conservation value or enhance the long-term survival of the wild population. In addition, animals bred in captivity can suffer from limited genetic diversity, and fenced game ranches fragment habitat and limit the free range of wild animals. Central to the controversy behind captive hunting are lion populations in South Africa. Captive hunting is prevalent in South Africa, where over 80%-90% of the lions hunted are believed to be captive. Consumers of these hunts are largely from the United States (approximately 60% of captive lion trophies are exported to the United States) and the EU (approximately 40% of captive lion trophies are exported to the EU). Some in South Africa want to ban the hunting of lions bred in captivity; others note that it is a multi-million dollar industry that generates jobs and argue that the practice should stay. Captive breeding of species listed under ESA with trophy hunting also occurs in the United States. Several species listed under ESA are bred in captivity on ranches in the United States for reintroduction to the wild and, in some cases, for trophy hunting. Ranchers can obtain an enhancement-of-survival permit to allow for the limited killing of some animals in a population. The aim is that the revenue generated from hunting surplus captive-bred animals will aid in the captive breeding and reintroduction of the species into the wild. Some also contend that limited trophy hunting of captive-bred populations could reduce hunting pressure in the wild. There are several examples of how certain species have thrived on ranches and bolstered their international populations; the scimitar-horned oryx ( Oryx dammah ), addax ( Addax nasomaculatus ), and dama gazelle ( Gazella dama ) are captive-bred in the United States and have an exemption under ESA that allows for sport hunting and trophies. The objective is to generate funds from hunting to bolster captive breeding that aims to enhance the propagation and survival of the species in the wild. Congress could address captive hunting through permit regulations, either supporting permits that request trophies imported from captive hunting operations or denying permits from these areas. Another alternative to trophy hunting in wild areas is to ban trophy hunting outright. The range country would make this decision, with little to no participation from the United States. Several countries have banned trophy hunting, as discussed in the section on " Range Country ," above. Some contend that banning hunting could benefit wildlife populations even with the loss of revenue from hunting fees. They argue that other forms of tourism (e.g., wildlife viewing) could sustain financial flows and incentivize conservation. Opponents of a ban on trophy hunting contend that trophy hunting has a positive impact in supporting biodiversity through increased revenue flows and rangeland conservation. They note that hunting bans result in lower revenues for wildlife conservation and communities and could be detrimental to certain communities that depend on hunting revenues. Furthermore, they contend that banning trophy hunting could affect habitat conservation; such a ban could allow for increased habitat conversion to agriculture or livestock rangelands, which has caused species declines due to poaching and human-wildlife conflicts. Banning trophy hunting in fringe regions within a country, where the only form of tourism that can be sustained is trophy hunting, can have negative economic effects, according to some. A ban on trophy hunting in Northern Botswana revealed negative consequences on the communal economy in areas that were previously hunting grounds. According to one study, the revenue generated by hunting expeditions represented around two-thirds of total tourism income. The ban on trophy hunting also led to halting certain CBNRM programs due to loss of funding for these opportunities. The ban on lion hunting particularly affected Botswana's economy, causing it to fall by almost 10% of GDP, according to some sources. In some cases, the banning of hunting correlates with animal population declines. For example, in Kenya, which instituted a hunting ban in 1977, almost all the common wildlife species have declined from their previous levels since the ban to 2016. Concurrently, livestock numbers, notably sheep and goats, increased by 76.3% during the same period. Kenya's population increased from 14.5 million in 1977 to 48.5 million in 2016. Based, in part, on these data, scientists note that demographic pressure and livestock encroachment on wildlife rangelands appear to be the decisive factors leading to wildlife declines in Kenya.

International trophy hunting is a multinational, multimillion-dollar industry practiced throughout the world. Trophy hunting is broadly defined as the killing of animals for recreation with the purpose of collecting trophies such as horns, antlers, skulls, skins, tusks, or teeth for display. The United States imports the most trophies of any country in the world. Congressional interest in trophy hunting is related to the recreational and ethical considerations of hunting and the potential consequences of hunting for conservation. For some, interest in trophy hunting centers on particular charismatic species, such as African lions, elephants, and rhinoceroses. Congress's role in addressing international trophy hunting is limited, because hunting is regulated by laws of the range country (i.e., the country where the hunted species resides). However, Congress could address trophy hunting through actions such as regulating trophy imports into the United States or providing funding and technical expertise to conserve hunted species in range countries. International trophy hunting generates controversy because of its potential costs and benefits to conservation, ethical considerations, and its contribution to local economies in range states. Proponents of trophy hunting contend that the practice provides an estimated millions of dollars for the conservation of species in exchange for the hunting of a proportionally small number of individuals. Further, they argue that trophy hunting can create incentives for conserving habitat and ecosystems where hunted animals roam and, in some impoverished areas in range countries, can provide a means of income, employment, and community development. Critics of trophy hunting contend that the practice can lead to the decline of rare and endangered species and that the pathway of moving funds from hunting to conservation can be fraught with corruption and mismanagement. Further, some contend it is unethical to kill animals for sport, or at all, and that animals should not be valued according to how much a hunter would pay to hunt them. The international community, including the United States, has laws and regulations related to international trophy hunting. The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) is an international agreement that creates a series of incrementally more stringent restrictions on imports and exports of wildlife, depending on the sustainability of such trade. The European Union (EU) also addresses trophy hunting through regulating trade of trophies, issuing permits for trade of trophies, and suspending certain species from trade with the EU if the species is in peril. In the United States, international trophy hunting is addressed by several laws, including the Endangered Species Act (ESA; 16 U.S.C. §§1531-1543), which implements CITES. ESA does not regulate trophy-hunting activities within range countries directly; rather, the law governs what can be imported into the United States. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) regulates trophy hunting, in part, by issuing permits to import trophies of species that are listed as threatened or endangered under ESA. Congress could address international sport hunting by regulating trophy imports and funding conservation and research activities overseas, among other options. Some activities that Congress could consider, according to observers, include directing the U.S. government to work with foreign governments and partners to monitor hunting practices and game species to help ensure a positive impact from trophy hunting in range states; creating uniform standards for evaluating trophy import permits, specifically whether trophy hunting could enhance the survival of a population as addressed under ESA or be nondetrimental to a population as defined by CITES; mandating that permit applications and decisions be made publicly available; and creating an independent third-party certification system to evaluate trophy hunting operations. Congress also might evaluate alternatives to trophy hunting in the wild. In Africa, for example, some countries have banned trophy hunting altogether and support wildlife viewing and tourism in its place. Some countries, such as South Africa, have large, fenced game ranches where animals can be hunted in a practice called captive hunting. Some contend these operations do not allow for fair chase hunting (i.e., hunting wild animals without boundaries) or contribute to conservation, whereas others argue that they facilitate wildlife management and reduce poaching.

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Introduction The Minority Small Business and Capital Ownership Development Program—commonly known as the "8(a) Program"—provides participating small businesses with training and technical assistance designed to enhance their ability to compete effectively in the private marketplace. One of the program's major benefits is that 8(a) firms can receive federal contracting preferences in the form of set-aside and sole-source awards. A set-aside award is a contract in which only certain contractors may compete, whereas a sole-source award is a contract awarded, or proposed for award, without competition. As a business development program, its overall goal is for 8(a) firms to graduate from the program and continue to do well in a competitive business environment. 8(a) Program eligibility is generally limited to small businesses which are "unconditionally owned and controlled by one or more socially and economically disadvantaged individuals who are of good character and citizens of and residing in the United States" and demonstrate "potential for success." However, small businesses owned by Alaska Native Corporations (ANCs), Community Development Corporations (CDCs), Indian tribes, and Native Hawaiian Organizations (NHOs) are also eligible to participate in the 8(a) Program under somewhat different terms. In FY2017, 3,421 8(a) firms were awarded more than $27.1 billion in federal contracts, including $8.0 billion in 8(a) set-aside awards and $8.4 billion in 8(a) sole-source awards. Other programs provide similar assistance to other types of small businesses (e.g., women-owned, HUBZone, and service-disabled veteran-owned). Congress has a perennial interest in small business programs, including the 8(a) Program. As stated in the Small Business Act It is the declared policy of the Congress that the Government should aid, counsel, assist, and protect, insofar as is possible, the interests of small-business concerns in order to preserve free competitive enterprise, to insure that a fair proportion of the total purchases and contracts or subcontracts for property and services for the Government (including but not limited to contracts or subcontracts for maintenance, repair, and construction) be placed with small-business enterprises, to insure that a fair proportion of the total sales of Government property be made to such enterprises, and to maintain and strengthen the overall economy of the Nation. The Small Business Act also indicates "that the opportunity for full participation in our free enterprise system by socially and economically disadvantaged persons is essential if we are to obtain social and economic equality for such persons and improve the functioning of our national economy." To help achieve these goals, the 8(a) Program's stated statutory purposes are to (A) promote the business development of small business concerns owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals so that such concerns can compete on an equal basis in the American economy; (B) promote the competitive viability of such concerns in the marketplace by providing such available contract, financial, technical, and management assistance as may be necessary; and (C) clarify and expand the program for the procurement by the United States of articles, supplies, services, materials, and construction work from small business concerns owned by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals. Recent Congresses have had particular interest in the 8(a) Program largely because of its effects on minority-owned small businesses and small businesses' overall role in job creation. 8(a) business development assistance has many forms, including business counseling and mentoring, both in online and traditional face-to-face settings; access to capital and surety bond guarantees; contract marketing guidance; and assistance with acquiring federal government surplus property. In addition, the Small Business Administration (SBA) reviews and certifies eligible clients; assigns SBA personnel (Business Opportunity Specialists, BOSs) to monitor and measure each firm's progress through annual reviews, business planning collaboration, and systematic evaluations; helps to identify potential contract opportunities; and markets each firm's technical capabilities to federal agency procurement officials. This report examines the 8(a) Program's historical development, key requirements, administrative structures and operations, and the SBA's oversight of 8(a) firms. It also discusses two SBA programs designed to support 8(a) firms, the 7(j) Management and Technical Assistance Program and the 8(a) Mentor-Protégé Program, and provides various program statistics. It concludes with an analysis of the following current 8(a) Program issues: The SBA's decision to address recent declines in the number of program participants by revising and streamlining the program's application process, an action which the SBA's Office of Inspector General (SBA OIG) reports "may erode core safeguards that prevented questionable firms from entering the 8(a) Program." Reported variation in 8(a) Program service delivery. Reported deficiencies in the oversight of 8(a) Program participant's continuing eligibility. Disagreements concerning the financial thresholds used to determine economic disadvantage, including the SBA's decision to exclude equity in a primary residence from the calculation of an individual's net worth. The adequacy of the performance measures used to evaluate the program's effectiveness in meeting its statutory goals. Historical Development Program Origins The current 8(a) Program is the result of the merger of two distinct types of federal programs: those seeking to assist small businesses in general and those seeking to assist racial and ethnic minorities. The merger first occurred, as a matter of executive branch practice, in 1967 and was given a statutory basis in 1978. Federal Programs for Small Businesses In 1942, Congress first authorized a federal agency to enter into prime contracts with other agencies and subcontract with small businesses for the performance of these contracts. The agency was the Smaller War Plants Corporation (SWPC), which was partly created for this purpose, and Congress gave it these powers to ameliorate small businesses' financial difficulties while "mobiliz[ing] the productive facilities of small business in the interest of successful prosecution of the war." The SWPC's subcontracting authority expired along with the SWPC at the end of the World War II. However, in 1951, at the start of the Korean War, Congress created the Small Defense Plants Administration (SDPA), which was generally given the same powers that the SWPC had exercised. Two years later, in 1953, Congress transferred the SDPA's subcontracting authorities, among others, to the newly created SBA, with the intent that the SBA would exercise these powers in peacetime, as well as in wartime. When the Small Business Act of 1958 transformed the SBA into a permanent agency, this subcontracting authority was included in Section 8(a) of the act. At its inception, the SBA's subcontracting authority was not limited to small businesses owned and controlled by the socially and economically disadvantaged. Under the original Section 8(a), the SBA could contract with any "small-business concerns or others," but it reportedly seldom, if ever, employed this subcontracting authority, focusing instead upon its loan and other programs. Federal Programs for Racial and Ethnic Minorities Federal programs for racial and ethnic minorities began developing at approximately the same time as those for small businesses, although there was initially no explicit overlap between them. The earliest programs were created by executive orders, beginning with President Franklin Roosevelt's order on June 25, 1941, requiring that all federal agencies include a clause in defense-related contracts prohibiting contractors from discriminating on the basis of "race, creed, color, or national origin." Subsequent Presidents followed Roosevelt's example, issuing a number of executive orders seeking to improve the employment opportunities for various racial and ethnic groups. These executive branch initiatives took on new importance after the Kerner Commission's report on the causes of the 1966 urban riots concluded that African Americans would need "special encouragement" to enter the economic mainstream. Presidents Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon laid foundations for the present 8(a) Program in the hope of providing such "encouragement." Johnson created the President's Test Cities Program (PTCP), which involved a small-scale use of the SBA's authority under Section 8(a) to award contracts to firms willing to locate in urban areas and hire unemployed individuals, largely African Americans, or sponsor minority-owned businesses by providing capital or management assistance. However, under the PTCP, small businesses did not have to be minority-owned to receive subcontracts under Section 8(a). Nixon's program was larger and focused more specifically on minority-owned small businesses. During the Nixon Administration, the SBA promulgated its earliest regulations for the 8(a) Program. In 1970, the first of these regulations articulated the SBA's policy of using Section 8(a) to "assist small concerns owned by disadvantaged persons to become self-sufficient, viable businesses capable of competing effectively in the market place." A later regulation, promulgated in 1973, defined disadvantaged persons as including, but not limited to, "black Americans, Spanish-Americans, oriental Americans, Eskimos, and Aleuts." However, the SBA lacked explicit statutory authority for focusing its 8(a) Program on minority-owned businesses until 1978, although courts generally rejected challenges alleging that SBA's implementation of the program was unauthorized because it was "not specifically mentioned in statute." 1978 Amendments to the Small Business Act and Subsequent Regulations In 1978, Congress amended the Small Business Act to give the SBA express statutory authority for its 8(a) Program for minority-owned businesses. Under the 1978 amendments, the SBA can only subcontract under Section 8(a) with "socially and economically disadvantaged small business concerns," or businesses that are least 51% owned by one or more socially and economically disadvantaged individuals and whose management and daily operations are controlled by such individual(s). The 1978 amendments established a basic definition of socially disadvantaged individuals , which included those who have been "subjected to racial or ethnic prejudice or cultural bias because of their identity as a member of a group without regard to their individual qualities." They also included congressional findings that "Black Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, and other minorities" are socially disadvantaged. Thus, if an individual was a member of one of these groups, he or she was presumed to be socially disadvantaged. Otherwise, the amendments were generally seen to grant the SBA discretion to recognize additional groups or individuals as socially disadvantaged based upon criteria promulgated in regulations. Under these regulations, which include a three-part test for determining whether minority groups not mentioned in the amendment's findings are disadvantaged, the SBA recognized the racial or ethnic groups listed in Table 1 as socially disadvantaged for 8(a) purposes. The regulations also established standards of evidence to be met by individuals demonstrating personal disadvantage and procedures for rebutting the presumption of social disadvantage accorded to members of recognized minority groups. The 1978 amendments also defined economically disadvantaged individuals , for purposes of the 8(a) Program, as "those socially disadvantaged individuals whose ability to compete in the free enterprise system has been impaired due to diminished capital and credit opportunities as compared to others in the same business area who are not socially disadvantaged." In 1989, the SBA established by regulation that personal net worth of less than $250,000 at the time of entry into the program ($750,000 for continuing eligibility) constitutes economic disadvantage. As will be discussed, these financial thresholds have not been adjusted for inflation. Adding "Disadvantaged" Groups Although the 8(a) Program was originally established for the benefit of disadvantaged individuals , in the 1980s, Congress expanded the program to include small businesses owned by four disadvantaged groups . The first owner-group to be included was Community Development Corporations (CDCs). A CDC is a nonprofit organization responsible to residents of the area it serves which is receiving financial assistance under part A of this subchapter [42 U.S.C. §§9805 et seq .] and any organization more than 50 percent of which is owned by such an organization, or otherwise controlled by such an organization, or designated by such an organization for the purpose of this subchapter [42 U.S.C. §§9801 et seq .]. Congress created CDCs with the Community Economic Development Act of 1981 and instructed the SBA to issue regulations ensuring that CDCs could participate in the 8(a) Program. In 1986, two additional owner-groups, Indian tribes and Alaska Native Corporations (ANCs), became eligible for the program when Congress passed legislation providing that firms owned by Indian tribes, which include ANCs, were to be deemed socially disadvantaged for 8(a) Program purposes. In 1992, ANCs were further deemed to be "economically disadvantaged." The final owner-group, Native Hawaiian Organizations (NHOs), was recognized in 1988. An NHO is defined as any community service organization serving Native Hawaiians in the State of Hawaii which (A) is a nonprofit corporation that has filed articles of incorporation with the director (or the designee thereof) of the Hawaii Department of Commerce and Consumer Affairs, or any successor agency, (B) is controlled by Native Hawaiians, and (C) whose business activities will principally benefit such Native Hawaiians. Program Requirements Detailed statutory and regulatory requirements govern 8(a) Program eligibility, set-aside and sole-source awards, and related issues. These requirements are generally the same for all 8(a) firms, although there are instances where there are "special rules" for group-owned 8(a) firms. An Appendix to this report compares the requirements applicable to individual owners of 8(a) firms to those applicable to groups owning 8(a) firms (i.e., ANCs, CDCs, NHOs, and Indian tribes). General Requirements Program Eligibility As mentioned previously, 8(a) Program eligibility is limited to "small business[es] which [are] unconditionally owned and controlled by one or more socially and economically disadvantaged individuals who are of good character and citizens of and residing in the United States, and which demonstrates potential for success." Each of these terms is defined by the Small Business Act; SBA regulations; and judicial and administrative decisions. The eligibility requirements are the same at the time of entry into the program and throughout the program unless otherwise noted. Business Except for small agricultural cooperatives, a business is a for-profit entity that has a place of business located in the United States and operates primarily within the United States or makes a significant contribution to the U.S. economy by paying taxes or using American products, materials, or labor. For 8(a) Program purposes, businesses are individual proprietorships, partnerships, limited liability companies, corporations, joint ventures, associations, trusts, or cooperatives. Small A business is small if it is independently owned and operated; is not dominant in its field of operations; and meets any definitions or standards established by the SBA Administrator. These standards focus primarily upon the size of the business as measured by the number of employees or average annual receipts (gross income for sole proprietorships), but they also take into account the size of other businesses within the same industry. For example, businesses in the field of scheduled passenger air transportation are small if they have 1,500 or fewer employees, whereas those in the data processing field are small if they have average annual receipts of $32.5 million or less. Affiliations among businesses, or relationships allowing one party control or the power of control over another, generally count in size determinations, with the SBA considering "the receipts, employees, or other measure of size of the concern whose size is at issue and all of its domestic and foreign affiliates, regardless of whether the affiliates are organized for profit." Businesses can thus be determined to be other than small because of their involvement in joint ventures, subcontracting arrangements, or franchise or license agreements, among other things, provided that their income or personnel numbers, plus those of their affiliate(s), are over the pertinent size threshold. Unconditionally Owned and Controlled 8(a) firms must be "at least 51% unconditionally and directly owned by one or more socially and economically disadvantaged individuals who are citizens of the United States" unless they are owned by an ANC, CDC, NHO, or Indian tribe. Ownership is unconditional when it is not subject to any conditions precedent or subsequent, executory agreements, voting trusts, restrictions on or assignments of voting rights, or other arrangements that could cause the benefits of ownership to go to another entity. Ownership is direct when the disadvantaged individuals own the business in their own right and not through an intermediary (e.g., ownership by another business entity or by a trust that is owned and controlled by one or more disadvantaged individuals). Non-disadvantaged individuals and nonparticipant businesses that own at least 10% of an 8(a) business may generally own no more than 10% to 20% of any other 8(a) firm. Nonparticipant businesses that earn the majority of their revenue in the same or similar line of business are likewise barred from owning more than 10% (increasing to 20%-30% in certain circumstances) of another 8(a) firm. In addition, 8(a) firms must be controlled by one or more disadvantaged individuals. "Control is not the same as ownership" and includes both strategic policy setting and day-to-day management and administration of business operations. Management and daily business operations must be conducted by one or more disadvantaged individuals unless the 8(a) business is owned by an ANC, CDC, NHO, or Indian tribe. These individuals must have managerial experience "of the extent and complexity needed to run the concern" and generally must devote themselves full-time to the business "during the normal working hours of firms in the same or similar line of business." A disadvantaged individual must hold the highest officer position within the business. Non-disadvantaged individuals may otherwise be involved in the management of an 8(a) business, or may be stockholders, partners, limited liability members, officers, or directors of an 8(a) business. However, non-disadvantaged individuals may not exercise actual control or have the power to control the firm or its disadvantaged owner(s), or receive compensation greater than that of the highest-paid officer (usually the chief executive officer or president) without the SBA's approval. Socially Disadvantaged Individual Socially disadvantaged individuals are "those who have been subjected to racial or ethnic prejudice or cultural bias within American society because of their identities as members of groups and without regard to their individual qualities." Members of designated groups, listed in Table 1 , are entitled to a rebuttable presumption of social disadvantage for 8(a) Program purposes, although this presumption can be overcome with "credible evidence to the contrary." Individuals who are not designated-group members must prove they are socially disadvantaged by a preponderance of the evidence. Such individuals must show (1) at least one objective distinguishing feature that has contributed to social disadvantage (e.g., race, ethnic origin, gender, physical handicap, long-term residence in an environment isolated from mainstream American society); (2) personal experiences of substantial and chronic social disadvantage in American society; and (3) negative impact on entry into or advancement in the business world. In assessing the third factor, the SBA will consider all relevant evidence the applicant produces, but must consider the applicant's education, employment, and business history to see if the totality of the circumstances shows disadvantage. Groups not included in Table 1 may obtain eligibility by demonstrating disadvantage by a preponderance of the evidence. Economically Disadvantaged Individual Economically disadvantaged individuals are "socially disadvantaged individuals whose ability to compete in the free enterprise system has been impaired due to diminished capital and credit opportunities as compared to others in the same or similar line of business who are not socially disadvantaged." Individuals claiming economic disadvantage must submit financial documentation for eligibility purposes. The SBA will examine the individual's personal income for the past three years, their net worth, and the fair market value of their assets. However, principal ownership in a prospective or current 8(a) business is generally excluded when calculating net worth, as is equity in individuals' primary residence. For initial eligibility, applicants must have a net worth of less than $250,000. For continued eligibility, net worth must be less than $750,000. Good Character In determining whether an applicant to, or participant in, the 8(a) Program possesses good character , the SBA considers any criminal conduct, violations of SBA regulations, current debarment or suspension from government contracting, managers or key employees who lack business integrity, and the knowing submission of false information to the SBA. Demonstrated Potential for Success For a firm to have demonstrated potential for success, it generally must have been in business in its primary industry classification for at least two full years immediately prior to the date of its application to the 8(a) Program. However, the SBA may grant a waiver allowing firms that have been in business for less than two years to enter the program under specified circumstances. Set-Asides and Sole-Source Awards Under Section 8(a) Section 8(a) of the Small Business Act authorizes agencies to award contracts for goods or services, or to perform construction work, to the SBA for subcontracting to 8(a) firms. The act also authorizes the SBA to delegate the function of executing contracts to the procuring agencies and often does so. A set-aside award is a contract awarded in which only certain contractors may compete, whereas a sole-source award is a contract awarded, or proposed for award, without competition. The Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) generally requires federal agencies to allow full and open competition through the use of competitive procedures when procuring goods or services. However, set-aside and sole-source awards to 8(a) firms are permissible under CICA under certain circumstances. In fact, an 8(a) set-aside is a recognized competitive procedure. Agencies are effectively encouraged to subcontract through the 8(a) Program because there are government-wide and agency-specific goals regarding the percentage of procurement dollars awarded to small disadvantaged businesses, which include 8(a) firms (the current government-wide goal is 5% of all small business eligible federal contracts). Discretion to Subcontract Through the 8(a) Program There are few limits on agency discretion to subcontract through the 8(a) Program. However, the SBA is prohibited by regulation from accepting procurements for award under Section 8(a) when 1. the procuring agency issued a solicitation for or otherwise expressed publicly a clear intent to reserve the procurement as a set-aside for small businesses not participating in the program prior to offering the requirement to the SBA for award as an 8(a) contract; 2. the procuring agency competed the requirement among 8(a) firms prior to offering the requirement to the SBA and receiving the SBA's acceptance of it; or 3. the SBA makes a written determination that "acceptance of the procurement for 8(a) award would have an adverse impact on an individual small business, a group of small businesses located in a specific geographical location, or other small business programs." In addition, the SBA is barred from awarding an 8(a) contract, either via a set-aside or on a sole-source basis, "if the price of the contract results in a cost to the contracting agency which exceeds a fair market price." Otherwise, agency officials may offer contracts to the SBA "in [their] discretion," and the SBA may accept requirements for the 8(a) Program "whenever it determines such action is necessary or appropriate." The courts and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) will generally not hear protests of agencies' determinations regarding whether to procure specific requirements through the 8(a) Program unless it can be shown that government officials acted in bad faith or contrary to federal law. Monetary Thresholds and Subcontracting Mechanisms Once the SBA has accepted a contract for the 8(a) Program, the contract is awarded through either a set-aside or on a sole-source basis, with the contract amount generally determining the acquisition method used. When the contract's anticipated total value, including any options, is less than $4 million ($7 million for manufacturing contracts), the contract is normally awarded without competition. In contrast, when the contract's anticipated value exceeds these thresholds, the contract generally must be awarded via a set-aside with competition limited to 8(a) firms so long as there is a reasonable expectation that at least two eligible and responsible 8(a) firms will submit offers and the award can be made at fair market price. Sole-source awards of contracts valued at $4 million ($7 million or more for manufacturing contracts) may be made only when (1) there is not a reasonable expectation that at least two eligible and responsible 8(a) firms will submit offers at a fair market price or (2) the SBA accepts the requirement on behalf of an 8(a) firm owned by an Indian tribe, an ANC or, in the case of Department of Defense contracts, an NHO. Requirements valued at more than $4 million ($7 million for manufacturing contracts) cannot be divided into several acquisitions at lesser amounts in order to make sole-source awards. In addition, the Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council has the responsibility of adjusting each acquisition-related dollar threshold (including those for the 8(a) Program), on October 1, of each year that is evenly divisible by five. The next adjustment for inflation will take place on October 1, 2020. Other Requirements Other key 8(a) Program requirements include the following: Inability to protest an 8(a) firm's eligibility for an award . When the SBA makes or proposes an award to an 8(a) firm, the firm's eligibility cannot be challenged or protested as part of the solicitation or proposed contract award. Instead, information concerning a firm's eligibility must be submitted to the SBA in accordance with separate requirements contained in Section 124.517 of Title 13 of the Code of Federal Regulations . Nine-year m aximum participation. Firms may participate in the program for no more than nine years from the date of their admission, although they may be terminated or graduate from the program before nine years have passed. One-time eligibility . Once a firm or a disadvantaged individual upon whom a firm's eligibility was based has exited the program after participating in it for any length of time, neither the firm nor the individual is generally eligible to participate in the program again. Firms are considered identical for purposes of program eligibility when at least 50% of the assets of one firm are the same as those of another firm. Ownership l imit ation s on family members of current or former 8(a) firm owners . Individuals generally may not use their disadvantaged status to qualify a firm for the program if the individual has an immediate family member who is using, or has used, the disadvantaged status to qualify a firm for the program. Award Limit ations. In general, 8(a) firms may not receive additional 8(a) sole-source awards once they have been awarded a combined total of competitive and sole-source awards in excess of $100 million, in the case of firms whose size is based on their number of employees, or in excess of an amount equivalent to the lesser of (1) $100 million or (2) five times the size standard for the industry, in the case of firms whose size is based on their revenues. In addition, 8(a) firms in the transitional stage , or the last five years of participation, must achieve annual targets for the amount of revenues they receive from non-8(a) sources. These targets increase over time, with firms required to attain 15% of their revenue from non-8(a) sources in the fifth year, 25% in the sixth year, 35% in the seventh year, 45% in the eight year, and 55% in the ninth year. Firms that do not display the relevant percentages of revenue from non-8(a) sources are ineligible for sole-source 8(a) contracts "unless and until" they correct the situation. Subcontracting Limitations . Federal subcontracting limitations require small businesses receiving contracts under set-asides to perform work that equals certain minimum percentages of the amount paid under the contract. Specifically, small businesses must generally perform at least 50% of the costs of the contract incurred for personnel with its own employees, in the case of service contracts; and at least 50% of the cost of manufacturing supplies or products (excluding the cost of materials), in the case of manufacturing contracts. Requirements for Tribally, ANC-, NHO-, and CDC-Owned Firms Tribes, Alaska Native Corporations (ANCs), Native Hawaiian Organizations (NHOs) or Community Development Corporations (CDCs) themselves generally do not participate in the 8(a) Program. Rather, businesses that are at least 51% owned by such entities participate in the program, although the rules governing their participation are somewhat different from those for the program generally. Program Eligibility Small Firms owned by Indian tribes, ANCs, NHOs, and CDCs must be deemed small under the SBA's size standards. However, certain affiliations with the owning entity or other business enterprises of that entity are excluded in size determinations unless the SBA Administrator determines that a small business owned by an ANC, CDC, NHO, or Indian tribe "[has] obtained, or [is] likely to obtain, a substantial unfair competitive advantage within an industry category" because of such exclusions. Other affiliations of small businesses owned by ANCs, CDCs, NHOs, and Indian tribes may be included in size determinations, and ANC-owned firms, in particular, have been subjected to early graduation from the 8(a) Program because they exceeded size standards. Business Firms owned by ANCs, CDCs, NHOs, and Indian tribes must be "businesses" under the SBA's definition. Although ANCs themselves may be for-profit or nonprofit, ANC-owned businesses must be for-profit to participate in the program. Unconditionally Owned and Controlled Firms owned by ANCs, CDCs, NHOs, or Indian tribes must be unconditionally owned and substantially controlled by the ANC, CDC, NHO, or Indian tribe, respectively. However, under SBA regulations, tribally or ANC-owned firms may be managed by individuals who are not members of the tribe or Alaska Natives if the firm can demonstrate: that the Tribe [or ANC] can hire and fire those individuals, that it will retain control of all management decisions common to boards of directors, including strategic planning, budget approval, and the employment and compensation of officers, and that a written management development plan exists which shows how Tribal members will develop managerial skills sufficient to manage the concern or similar Tribally-owned concerns in the future. NHO-owned firms must demonstrate that the NHO controls the board of directors. However, the individual who is responsible for the NHO-owned firm's day-to-day management need not establish personal social and economic disadvantage. CDCs are to be managed and have their daily operations conducted by individuals with "managerial experience of an extent and complexity needed to run the [firm]." Socially Disadvantaged As owners of prospective or current 8(a) firms, Indian tribes, ANCs, NHOs, and CDCs are all presumed to be socially disadvantaged. Economically Disadvantaged By statute, ANCs are deemed to be economically disadvantaged, and CDCs are similarly treated as economically disadvantaged. In contrast, Indian tribes and NHOs must establish economic disadvantage. Indian tribes must present data on, among other things, the number of tribe members; the tribe members' unemployment rate and per capita income; the percentage of the local Indian population above the poverty level; the tribe's access to capital and assets as disclosed in current financial statements; and all businesses wholly or partially owned by tribal enterprises or affiliates, as well as their primary industry classification. Effective August 24, 2016, NHOs establish economic disadvantage in the same manner as Indian tribes. Prior to this revision, the SBA considered "the individual economic status of NHO's members," the majority of whom had to qualify as economically disadvantaged, under the same standards as individual applicants to the program. Once a tribe or NHO has established that it is economically disadvantaged for purposes of one 8(a) business, it need not reestablish economic disadvantage in order to have other businesses certified for the program unless the Director of the Office of Business Development requires it to do so. Good Character The SBA's regulations governing tribally and ANC-owned 8(a) firms explicitly state that the good character requirement applies only to officers or directors of the firm, or shareholders owning more than a 20% interest. NHO-owned firms may be subject to the same requirements in practice. With CDC-owned firms, the firm itself and "all of its principals" must have good character. Demonstrated Potential for Success Firms owned by ANCs, CDCs, NHOs, and Indian tribes may provide evidence of potential for success in several ways: 1. The firm has been in business for at least two years, as shown by individual or consolidated income tax returns for each of the two previous tax years showing operating revenues in the primary industry in which the firm seeks certification. 2. The individuals who will manage and control the firm's daily operations have substantial technical and management experience; the firm has a record of successful performance on government or other contracts in its primary industry category; and the firm has adequate capital to sustain its operations and carry out its business plan. 3. The owner-group has made a firm written commitment to support the firm's operations and has the financial ability to do so. The first of these ways for demonstrating potential for success is the same for individually owned firms, and the second arguably corresponds to the circumstances in which the SBA may waive the requirement that individually owned firms have been in business for at least two years. There is no equivalent to the third way for individually owned firms, and some commentators have suggested that this provision could "benefit ANCs [and other owner groups] by allowing more expeditious and effortless access to 8(a) contracts for new concerns without having to staff new subsidiaries with experienced management." Report of Benefits for Firms Owned By ANCs, Indian Tribes, NHOs, and CDCs 8(a) firms owned by ANCs, CDCs, NHOs, and Indian tribes must submit information with its annual financial statement to the SBA showing how the Tribe, ANC, NHO or CDC has provided benefits to the Tribal or native members and/or the Tribal, native or other community due to the Tribe's/ANC's/NHO's/CDC's participation in the 8(a) … program through one or more firms. This data includes information relating to funding cultural programs, employment assistance, jobs, scholarships, internships, subsistence activities, and other services provided by the Tribe, ANC, NHO or CDC to the affected community. Set-Asides and Sole-Source Awards Similar to other participants, firms owned by ANCs, CDCs, NHOs, and Indian tribes are eligible for 8(a) set-asides and may receive sole-source awards valued at less than $4 million ($7 million for manufacturing contracts). However, firms owned by ANCs and Indian tribes can also receive sole-source awards in excess of $4 million ($7 million for manufacturing contracts) even when contracting officers reasonably expect that at least two eligible and responsible 8(a) firms will submit offers and the award can be made at fair market price. NHO-owned firms may receive sole-source awards from the Department of Defense under the same conditions. Other Requirements Firms owned by ANCs, CDCs, NHOs, and Indian tribes are governed by the same regulations as other 8(a) firms in which certain of the "other requirements" are involved, including (1) inability to protest an 8(a) firm's eligibility for an award; (2) maximum of nine years in the program (for individual firms); and (3) limits on subcontracting. However, requirements for such firms differ somewhat from those for other 8(a) firms, including the one-time eligibility for the 8(a) Program; limits on majority ownership of 8(a) firms; and limits on the amount of 8(a) contracts that a firm may receive. Firms owned by ANCs, CDCs, NHOs, and Indian tribes may participate in the 8(a) Program only one time. However, unlike the disadvantaged individuals upon whom other firms' eligibility for the 8(a) Program is based, ANCs, CDCs, NHOs, and Indian tribes may confer program eligibility upon firms on multiple occasions and for an indefinite period. In addition, ANCs, CDCs, NHOs, and Indian tribes may not own 51% or more of another firm that "either at the time of application or within the previous two years," obtains the majority of its revenue from the same "primary" industry as the applicant. However, there are no limits on the number of firms they may own that operate in other primary industries. Moreover, ANCs, CDCs, NHOs, and Indian tribes may own multiple firms that earn less than 50% of their revenue in the same "secondary" industries. Finally, firms owned by ANCs, CDCs, NHOs, and Indian tribes may continue to receive additional sole-source awards even after they have received a combined total of competitive and sole-source 8(a) contracts in excess of the dollar amount set forth in Section 124.519 of Title 13 of the Code of Federal Regulations . Individually owned firms may not exceed this threshold. However, firms owned by any of these four types of entities are subject to the same requirements regarding the percentages of revenue received from non-8(a) sources at various stages of their participation in the program as other 8(a) firms. Organizational Structure The SBA's Office of Business Development (BD), housed within the Office of Government Contracts and Business Development, oversees the 8(a) Program. BD has three offices: the Office of Certification and Eligibility (OCE), the Office of Management and Technical Assistance (OMTA); and the Office of Program Review (OPR). Their functions are provided in the footnote below. Applications for the 8(a) Program are processed at one of two central office duty stations (CODS), one located in San Francisco, CA, and the other in Philadelphia, PA. Applicants apply to the CODS that serve the territory where the applicant's principal place of business is located. Business Opportunity Specialists (BOSs) work directly with 8(a) firms in district offices under the general supervision of the SBA's Office of Field Operations (OFO). Although BOSs report to the SBA's OFO, they interact extensively with BD, which is located in the SBA's headquarters building in Washington, DC. As will be discussed, GAO and others have argued that this overlapping organizational structure may "create programmatic challenges." The Application Process Prior to applying for certification, firms must complete all requirements for contracting with the federal government (e.g., get a free D-U-N-S number—a unique nine-digit identification number of each physical business location from Dun and Bradstreet; obtain a free tax identification number or employer identification number from the Internal Revenue Service; create a profile in the federal System for Award Management, and get a free SBA general login system user ID). The SBA's district office staff generally encourage potential 8(a) Program applicants "to attend an information session to obtain information regarding the program and its eligibility criteria prior to filing an application … [and] also refer the applicant to SBA's website for forms, specific eligibility criteria, pertinent regulatory sections in the Code of Federal Regulations, and overall information on the program." In an attempt to encourage more applicants, the SBA revised and streamlined the 8(a) Program's application process in 2016 by accepting online applications only (hard copy applications are no longer accepted) and eliminating the requirement for a wet signature application; a completed IRS Form 4506T, Request for Copy or Transcript of Tax Form, in every case; and narrative statements in support of the applicants' claims of economic disadvantage. That determination is now based solely on an analysis of objective financial data relating to the individual's net worth, income and total assets. In addition, to prevent what it viewed as unnecessary delays for minor infractions that may have "occurred many years ago" and may have "nothing to do with the individual's business integrity," the SBA made optional the automatic suspension of consideration and referral to the SBA OIG of all applications with adverse information regarding the applicant's or any of its principals' possible criminal conduct. Despite these changes, applicants still have a relatively long list of supporting documents (and required SBA Forms) that they must submit, including the following: Signed and dated federal income tax returns for the firm and all individuals that either own more than 10% of the firm or have a key position in the firm for the past three years preceding the date of application (including all forms, statements, schedules and attachments). The firm's financial statements, balance sheet, and profit and loss statements for the past three years (including the most recent balance sheet, current within 90 days of application). A completed personal financial statement form (from all principals and their spouses), including a list of all assets, liabilities, real estate and other personal property, including transferred assets, information on delinquent federal obligations, past due taxes or liens, bankruptcy filings and pending civil lawsuits, and a list of any SBA loans for the firm and other businesses owned by the principal(s). A list or chart of the firm's current and past federal and nonfederal contracts within the most recently completed fiscal year. A list of any lease agreements. Proof of signature authority on the firm's bank account(s) (i.e., signature card(s) for firm bank account(s) or letter from the bank). Documented proof of contributions: (1) used to acquire ownership (for each owner), (2) of any transfer of assets to or from the firm, and (3) of any transfer of assets to or from any of the firm's owners over the past two years. State filings (signed, dated and stamped by the state where the firm does business) and certificate of good standing. List of any foreign corporation filings. Articles of incorporation, articles of organization, any DBA ("doing business as") filings, governing documents signed by the principals, bylaws, operating agreements, partnership agreements, and meeting minutes. Any stock certificates and ledgers. Proof of social disadvantage from majority owners and firm managers. Background information and personal information from all principals, including a resume, a completed Statement of Personal History form, proof of U.S. citizenship or naturalization, duties within the firm and time devotion, a list of other business interests and time devotion, and the nature of outside employment and time devotion. Documentation addressing how the firm meets specified objectives, if it is applying for a two-year waiver. As mentioned previously, applications are processed at the San Francisco or Philadelphia CODS. In general, the SBA processes an application and issues a decision letter within 90 days of the receipt of an application package. The processing time will be suspended only if an applicant is referred to the SBA OIG, for a formal size determination, or both. Applicants are notified within 15 days of receipt whether the application package is complete or incomplete. The SBA will not process an incomplete application. Complete means that the application is ready to be processed. A BOS, at one of the CODS, initially reviews the application. If, during the eligibility review process, it is determined that an application is incomplete, the BOS may request additional information or clarification "via a delivery method that tracks delivery and provides return receipt capability." The applicant must provide the requested information within five calendar days of receipt of the request. Failure to meet the deadline may result in the applicant's ineligibility to participate in the program. However, a request for additional information does not stop the 90-day processing clock. "Once the requested information is provided, the case may require priority handling in order for the CODS to complete the eligibility review within the required timeframe." After the initial review, the BOS submits the case file, the BOS analysis, and a decision letter to the CODS' chief for review. The chief examines the BOS analysis and decision letter to verify that all required steps and regulations have been properly applied. Upon completing the examination, the chief returns the case file and attachments to the BOS along with any applicable comments and recommendations. The BOS then makes any changes or corrections to the analysis or decision letter as requested by the chief. The chief then signs and returns the case file to the processing BOS. The chief makes his or her recommendation in the electronic application system (which is equivalent to transmitting it to the OCE's director, who approves or declines the application largely based on the CODS' review). After the OCE review, the associate administrator for Business Development (AA/BD) ultimately approves or declines the application in writing. The electronic application system notifies the firm by issuing an approval or declination letter. All declination letters must clearly explain the reason(s) why the firm was found to be ineligible, including a direct reference to regulatory provisions that the applicant failed to satisfy. The letter must also include the applicant's right to request reconsideration and, if applicable, to appeal the decision to the SBA's Office of Hearings and Appeals. As discussed below in the "Current Issues" section, the SBA and others have identified the application process, and its relatively high rate of rejection, as an impediment to the 8(a) Program's growth. Business Opportunity Specialists and Reporting Requirements BOSs assist both prospective and existing 8(a) firms with questions related to the application process, required forms, and the program's various eligibility, reporting, and performance requirements. BOSs also provide general business development assistance, assist with the firm's planning and establishment of goals, work with the firm as it develops and submits its required business plan, and ensure that the firm is on track regarding anticipated business growth. BOSs "on-going responsibility is to assist the Participant in developing its business to the fullest extent possible so that it attains competitive viability during its program participation term, and maintains viability thereafter." As directed, BOSs accomplish this by (1) helping the firm identify its strengths and weaknesses; (2) providing advice, counsel, and guidance in the areas of marketing to the federal government, prime contracting, and contract administration; (3) referring the firm to appropriate internal and external resources for assistance in technical, management, and financial matters; and (4) monitoring the firm's progress in the program and its compliance with program requirements. 8(a) firms must demonstrate program compliance by reporting specific information to the SBA on an as needed, periodic, or requested basis. Much of the reporting is accomplished through the required annual review, which focuses on the firm and its business development, and the continuing eligibility review. The annual review requires numerous forms and documentation, including the following: Form 1450—8(a) Annual Update Review (information about the firm, including its tenure in the program, current financial data, business development targets, loans and other sources of capital, and applicable bonding information); Form 1623—Certification Regarding Debarment, Suspension, and Other Responsibility Matters Primary Covered Transactions (detailed information regarding any debarments, suspensions, or other potentially adverse matters); Form 1790—Representatives Used and Compensation Paid for Services in Connection with Obtaining Federal Contracts (required semiannually, includes a list of any agents, representatives, accountants, consultants, etc. that receive fees, commissions, or compensation of any kind to assist the firm in obtaining or seeking federal contracts); Form 912—Statement of Personal History (information related to claiming disadvantaged status for all officers, directors, general partners, managing members, and holders of more than 10% ownership in the firm); and Form 413—Personal Financial Statement (information concerning the owner's and their spouse's personal net worth). 8(a) firms are also required to provide any updates or modifications to their business plan. If the firm participates in the 8(a) Mentor-Protégé Program (see below) it must provide "a narrative report detailing the contracts it has had with its mentor and benefits it has received from the mentor/protégé relationship." In addition, the firm must provide a report for each 8(a) contract performed during the year "explaining how the performance of work requirements are being met for the contract, including any 8(a) contracts performed as a joint venture." In 2010, GAO reported that the district staff's "dual role of advocacy for and monitoring of the firms may have contributed in part to the retention of ineligible firms." In response, in 2012, the SBA shifted responsibility for processing the continued eligibility portion of the required annual review from BOSs located in the SBA district offices to its Washington, DC, office. While BOSs continue to perform other components of the annual review, "shifting the responsibility for processing continued eligibility to headquarters was designed to eliminate conflict of interest for district offices associated with performing both assistance and oversight roles." 8(a) firms may leave the program by any of the following means: voluntary withdrawal; voluntary early graduation (where the firm voluntarily decides to leave the program after the SBA has determined that the firm has substantially achieved its business plan's targets, objectives, and goals and has demonstrated the ability to compete in the marketplace without program assistance); involuntary early graduation (where the SBA requires a firm to leave the program because it has determined that the firm has substantially achieved its business plan's targets, objectives, and goals and has demonstrated the ability to compete in the marketplace without program assistance; or one or more of the disadvantaged owners upon whom the firm's eligibility is based are no longer economically disadvantaged); termination for good cause; expiration of the program term (maximum of nine years) without meeting the SBA's graduation requirements; or graduation at the expiration of the program term. 7(j) Management and Technical Assistance Program The SBA's 7(j) Management and Technical Assistance Program assists 8(a) firms by providing management and technical assistance training. The program's origin dates back to 1970 when the SBA issued regulations creating the 8(a) contracting program to "assist small concerns owned by disadvantaged persons to become self-sufficient, viable businesses capable of competing effectively in the market place." Using its statutory authority under Section 7(j) of the Small Business Act to provide management and technical assistance through contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements to qualified service providers, the regulations specified that "the SBA may provide technical and management assistance to assist in the performance of the subcontracts." On October 24, 1978, P.L. 95-507 , To amend the Small Business Act and the Small Business Investment Act of 1958, provided the SBA explicit statutory authority to extend financial, management, technical, and other services to socially and economically disadvantaged small businesses. The SBA's current regulations indicate that the 7(j) Management and Technical Assistance Program will, "through its private sector service providers [deliver] a wide variety of management and technical assistance to eligible individuals or concerns to meet their specific needs, including: (a) counseling and training in the areas of financing, management, accounting, bookkeeping, marketing, and operation of small business concerns; and (b) the identification and development of new business opportunities." Eligible individuals and businesses include "8(a) certified firms, small disadvantaged businesses, businesses operating in areas of high unemployment or low income, or small businesses owned by low income individuals." As shown in Table 2 , 6,483 small businesses received 7(j) program assistance in FY2018. The SBA has been marketing the 7(j) program to 8(a) firms in an effort increase awareness of the program, to help those small businesses "better prepare themselves for federal contracting opportunities," and to retain 8(a) firms in the 8(a) program. Table 2 also shows the amount of total administrative resources the SBA provides the 7(j) program each year. 8(a) Mentor-Protégé Program183 The SBA established the 8(a) Mentor-Protégé Program on July 30, 1998. The program is designed to "enhance the capabilities" of 8(a) firms and "improve [their] ability to successfully compete for contracts" by providing various forms of assistance, including technical or management training, financial assistance in the form of equity investments or loans, subcontracts, trade education, and assistance in performing prime contracts with the federal government through joint venture agreements. Although the SBA established the 8(a) Mentor-Protégé Program and SBA rules govern participation in the program, the 8(a) Mentor-Protégé Program is government-wide in the sense that firms may enjoy the benefits of participation in the program while performing the contracts of any federal agency. In fact, when agencies that do not have their own mentor-protégé programs are involved, the 8(a) Mentor-Protégé Program may be referred to as if it were that agency's program. The SBA's Office of Business Development (BD) administers the 8(a) Mentor-Protégé Program. This makes it somewhat different from agency-specific mentor-protégé programs, which are generally administered by the agency's Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization (OSDBU) and may involve coordination with agency contracting offices. SBA regulations govern various aspects of the 8(a) Mentor-Protégé Program, including who may qualify as a mentor or protégé, the content of written agreements between mentors and protégés, and the SBA's evaluation of the mentor-protégé relationship. For example, mentors must be for-profit concerns that demonstrate a commitment and the ability to assist developing 8(a) firms, including large firms, other small businesses, firms that have graduated from the program, and other 8(a) firms that are in the transitional stage , or final five years of the program. Only SBA approved firms may serve as mentors, and each mentor must (1) demonstrate that it "is capable of carrying out its responsibilities to assist the protégé firm under the proposed mentor-protégé agreement"; (2) possess good character; (3) not be debarred or suspended from government contracting; and (4) be able to "impart value to a protégé firm due to lessons learned and practical experienced gained because of the [8(a) program], or through its knowledge of general business operations and government contracting." Protégés, in turn, are required to be small businesses owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals that are in good standing in the 8(a) Program. Protégés must also qualify as small for the size standard corresponding to their primary (or, under specified circumstances, their secondary) North American Industry (NAICS) code and demonstrate how the business development assistance to be received through the mentor-protégé relationship would advance the goals and objectives set forth in their business plans. Mentors are generally expected to have only one protégé at a time. However, mentors may have up to three protégés at one time provided they can demonstrate that "the additional mentor/protégé relationship[s] will not adversely affect the development of either protégé firm." Similarly, protégés are expected to have one mentor at a time. However, protégés may, under specified circumstances, have two mentors. Mentors and protégés are required to enter a written agreement, approved by the SBA's AA/BD which sets forth the protégé's needs and describes the mentor's assistance. This agreement generally obligates the mentor to furnish assistance to the protégé for at least one year, although it does allow either mentor or protégé to terminate the agreement with 30 days' advance notice to the other party and the SBA. Unless rescinded in writing, the mentor-protégé agreement automatically renews for another year. The term of a mentor-protégé agreement is limited to three years but may be extended for a second three-year period. The 8(a) Mentor-Protégé Program is intended to benefit both mentors and protégés. Serving as a mentor to an 8(a) firm counts toward any subcontracting requirements to which the mentor firm may be subject under Section 8(d) of the Small Business Act. Section 8(d) requires that all federal contractors awarded a contract valued in excess of $700,000 ($1.5 million for construction contracts) that offers subcontracting possibilities agree to a "subcontracting plan" that ensures small businesses have "the maximum practicable opportunity to participate in [contract] performance." In addition, in certain circumstances, mentors may form joint ventures with their protégés that are eligible to be awarded an 8(a) contract or another contract set aside for small businesses. Mentor firms and joint ventures involving mentor firms would otherwise generally be ineligible for such contracts because they would not qualify as small under SBA regulations. Mentor firms may also acquire an equity interest of up to 40% in the protégé firm in order to help the protégé firm raise capital. Because mentor firms are not 8(a) participants, they would generally be prohibited from owning more than 10%-20% of an 8(a) firm. However, their participation in the 8(a) Mentor-Protégé Program permits them to acquire a larger ownership share. Protégés not only receive various forms of assistance from their mentors, but also may generally retain their status as "small businesses" while doing so. If they received similar assistance from entities other than their mentors, they could risk being found to be other than "small" because of how the SBA determines size. The SBA combines the gross income of the firm, or the number of its employees, with those of its "affiliates" when determining whether the firm is small, and the SBA could potentially find that firms are affiliates because of assistance such as that which mentors provide to protégés. However, SBA regulations provide that "[n]o determination of affiliation or control may be found between a protégé firm and its mentor based on the mentor-protégé agreement or any assistance provided pursuant to the agreement." As of September 30, 2017, there were 314 active 8(a) mentor-protégé agreements. 8(a) Program Statistics As shown in Table 3 , the number of 8(a) firms assisted by SBA Business Opportunity Specialists (BOS) has declined somewhat since FY2010, the number of federal contracts awarded to 8(a) firms increased from 3,421 in FY2017 to 3,709 in FY2018, and the 8(a) program's administrative costs have increased. As shown in Table 4 , in FY2017, 8(a) firms were awarded $27.167 billion in federal contracts (5.14% of all federal contracts awarded). Of that amount, these firms received $7.971 billion through an 8(a) set-aside award, $8.445 billion through an 8(a) sole-source award, and $6.110 billion through either open competition or with another small business preference applied (e.g., small business set-aside and HUBZone set-aside or sole-source award). From FY2010 through FY2017, 8(a) firms were awarded, on average, approximately 5.45% of the total amount of federal contracts awarded, ranging from a low of 4.97% of all federal contracts in FY2011 to a high of 6.11% in FY2014. During this period, 8(a) firms received about $214.902 billion in federal contracts: $58.609 billion through an 8(a) set-aside (27.2% of all 8(a) contracts), $73.544 billion through an 8(a) sole-source award (34.3% of all 8(a) contracts), and $82.749 billion through either open competition or with another small business preference applied (38.5% of all 8(a) contracts). Current Issues The SBA faces several challenges concerning the 8(a) Program, including a recent decline in participation, reported variation in program service delivery, disagreements related to the program's financial thresholds used to determine economic disadvantage, and concerns related to the performance measures used to evaluate the program's success. Declining Participation Noting that the number of certified 8(a) firms had declined from 2010 to 2015, the SBA announced in 2015 that it was establishing a goal to "increase the number of approved firms" in the program by 5% in FY2016 and FY2017. In an effort to achieve this goal and increase 8(a) Program retention, the SBA initiated a pilot program to streamline the program's application process; increased its marketing of the 7(j) Management and Training Assistance Program to 8(a) firms; increased its efforts to expand the 8(a) Mentor-Protégé Program by streamlining that program's application process, shortening its application response time from 45 days to 10 days, and initiating an annual mentor-protégé conference to help 8(a) firms become more knowledgeable about the potential benefits of joint ventures and the various rules and compliance requirements for mentor-protégé agreements. The SBA presented four reasons to streamline the program's application process: 1. Although regulatory guidance provides the SBA approximately 90 days to process a complete application, several firms endured delays that extended anywhere from six months to several years. 2. Nearly three-quarters of 8(a) applications are initially rejected due to incomplete or missing documentation. 3. Less than half of complete applications are approved. 4. The SBA's low rate of approval has led to an industry of third party firms that charge 8(a) applicants from $5,000 to $75,000 to prepare the application and respond to the SBA's processors. The SBA argued that some of these firms are taking advantage of applicants, and regardless of the amount paid, there is no guaranteed approval because the approval rate is consistently less than 50%. The SBA reported that it certified 568 applicants to the 8(a) Program in FY2015 (before the streamlined process), 911 in FY2016 (after the streamlined process was instituted on a pilot basis), and 557 in FY2017. The agency declared the pilot streamlined application process a success. However, the SBA's OIG has argued that shortening the review process by eliminating required documents may erode core safeguards that prevented questionable firms from entering the program: Federal prosecutors have told OIG that it would be difficult for them to describe SBA, the procuring agency, or honest 8(a) competitors as fraud victims when SBA is perceived not to have exercised proper due diligence in admitting firms' into the 8(a) Program. Although SBA's efforts to increase the participation in the 8(a) Program is commendable, SBA still needs to ensure that only eligible firms are admitted into the program, and the documentation supporting 8(a) Program application approvals is maintained in a method ensuring clear eligibility of the applicant. In a related development, a recent SBA OIG audit of the 8(a) Program's application determination process found that the SBA did not always document why the AA/BD approved applications even though lower-level "reviewers [had] identified one or more eligibility issues" with the applications. The OIG concluded that this lack of documentation resulted in "potentially ineligible firms" being accepted into the program. To address this situation, the SBA agreed with the OIG's recommendation to clearly document, in its Business Development Management Information System (BDMIS) which tracks 8(a) Program applications, justifications for approval when they differ from that of lower-level reviewers. The SBA asserted that this lack of documentation was not an indication that ineligible firms were being certified into the program without adequate review. Reported Variation in Service Delivery Witnesses at congressional hearings have reported that common Business Opportunity Specialists (BOS) practices, including the interpretation and implementation of standardized policies and procedures, vary from SBA district office to SBA district office and across state lines. Some Members of Congress have argued that "many of the problems with … BOS advocates are compounded by the fact that" the position's responsibilities are not laid out in statute. Instead, they argue, the position's responsibilities "have been left to develop with SOPs [Standard Operating Procedures] and common practices." They have also asserted that BOSs are "often pulled by their district offices to help with other small business programs rather than overseeing the 8(a) participants as intended." During the 115 th Congress, P.L. 115-91 , the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, among other provisions, amended the Small Business Act to clarify the responsibilities of Business Opportunity Specialists by providing them a statutory list of duties. Those concerned about variation in 8(a) Program service delivery also note that a 2010 GAO report found a "breakdown in communication between SBA district offices and headquarters … that resulted in inconsistencies in the way district offices delivered the program." In addition, in 2015, GAO indicated that the SBA's overlapping organizational structure may contribute to variation in 8(a) Program service delivery: SBA's organizational structure often results in working relationships between headquarters and field offices that differ from reporting relationships, potentially posing programmatic challenges. District officials work with program offices at SBA's headquarters to implement the agency's programs, but these officials report to regional administrators, who themselves report to the Office of Field Operations. For example, … business opportunity specialists in the district offices work with the Office of Government Contracting and Business Development at SBA headquarters to assist small businesses with securing government contracts but report to district office management. During the 114 th Congress, legislation ( H.R. 4341 ) was introduced to require GAO to review the SBA's Office of Government Contracting and Business Development (GCBD) and make recommendations to address several administrative concerns, including issues related to the SBA's organizational overlap. In a related development, GAO reported that a "skill gap" among BOSs may also contribute to the possibility of variation in the program's service delivery. GAO noted that the SBA's Office of Field Operations (OFO) revised its field office operations in 2012 following a 2010 review of all position descriptions to ensure that the descriptions aligned with the SBA's strategic plan and district office strategic plans. The SBA informed GAO that it undertook this review because district office staff were given new responsibilities after the SBA moved loan processing from district offices to loan processing centers in 2004. Before the review, district office staff had two principal program delivery positions, lender relations specialist and business development specialist. As a result of the review, descriptions for both of these positions were rewritten and the business development position was split into two separate positions, economic development specialist and business opportunity specialist. The skills and competencies for the new position descriptions focused on the change in the district office's function from loan processing to program compliance and community outreach. Staff were retrained for the rewritten positions. The SBA reported that the change in the position descriptions created a "skill gap" because employees who were originally required to have a financial background for loan processing were now required to have different skills, such as a marketing background and interpersonal skills needed for assisting and overseeing 8(a) firms and conducting outreach to small businesses. The SBA informed GAO that the skill gap was particularly pronounced among 885 employees in two job series, GS-1101 and GS-1102, including BOSs, economic development specialists, and procurement staff, and that despite its efforts to address this skill gap through training and offering early retirement and separation incentives in FY2012 and FY2014 in an effort to restructure its personnel, "the competency gap remains." The SBA also noted that its skill gap had been compounded by recent changes in job requirements and new initiatives that require new skill sets for its employees. For example, P.L. 114-92 , the National Defense Authorization Act of FY2016, requires BOSs to obtain federal acquisition certification in contracting as a prerequisite for employment. Arguably, the SBA's relatively recent issuance of a new 300-page SOP (effective September 2016) for the Office of Business Development, which oversees the 8(a) Program, may help to address the reported skill gap. The new SOP provides all SBA staff, including BOSs, specific guidance concerning their roles and responsibilities in 8(a) Program service delivery. Oversight of 8(a) Program Participant's Continuing Eligibility As mentioned previously, two SBA offices, the GCBD and the OFO, share responsibility for overseeing the 8(a) Program. Within GCBD, BOSs assigned to the Office of Certification and Eligibility (OCE) evaluate all 8(a) program applications and conduct continuing eligibility reviews of "high-risk" or "complex" 8(a) firms, including those firms with total 8(a) revenue exceeding $10 million, are part of a joint venture, are party to a mentor-protégé agreement, or are an entity-owned firm such as an Alaska Native Corporation, and those that are requested from district office field staff. However, an SBA OIG audit found that the OCE reviewed the continuing eligibility of less than half of the firms identified as high risk in FY2016 (352 of 859 firms, or 41%) and in FY2017 (350 of 798 firms, or 44%). Within OFO, BOSs in each of the SBA's 68 district offices work directly with their assigned 8(a) firms and, among other duties, conduct annual reviews of those firms' progress toward achieving the targets, objectives, and goals set forth in their business development plan. According to the 8(a) Program's Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) manual, BOSs in each of the SBA's 68 district offices conduct continuing eligibility reviews for all 8(a) firms not reviewed by the GCBD to ensure their compliance with all continuing eligibility requirements during the annual review process. However, in practice, the SBA OIG's audit found that district office BOSs assess continuing eligibility as part of the annual review process for all 8(a) firms, including those deemed to be high risk or complex. The SBA is also required to review the participant's continuing eligibility "upon receipt of specific and credible information alleging that a participant no longer meets the eligibility requirements." Generally, the SBA receives this information from the SBA OIG's Hotline. However, the SBA OIG's audit found that the OCE did not conduct continuing eligibility reviews for any of the 44 OIG Hotline complaints that were referred to the GCBD from October 1, 2015, through May 4, 2017. In addition, GCBD did not inform district office BOSs of complaints filed against firms within their purview. As a result, district office BOSs took no action regarding the complaints. The SBA OIG's audit reviewed the continuing eligibility of two samples of 8(a) firms to determine whether the SBA's continuing eligibility review process "consistently identify ineligible firms enrolled in the program": the 15 individually owned 8(a) firms with the highest set-aside dollars in FY2016 that were scheduled to have continuing eligibility reviews within the first half of FY2017 and 10 individually owned 8(a) firms that were identified as being ineligible in Hotline complaints received between October 1, 2015, and May 4, 2017. The SBA OIG found that "despite OCE and district offices having shared responsibility for assessing 8(a) firms' continuing eligibility, they did not detect that 4 of the 15 individually-owned 8(a) firms we reviewed were ineligible for the 8(a) Program," and "our review of the 10 firms referred by the OIG Hotline revealed that they were all ineligible for the 8(a) program, based on issues such as excessive income and lack of good character." In addition, the SBA OIG found that the SBA had identified eligibility concerns through its annual reviews and continuing eligibility reviews for 6 of the 15 individually owned 8(a) firms the OIG had reviewed, but "did not take timely action to remove these firms from the 8(a) Program or document resolution of eligibility issues." The SBA OIG concluded that 20 of the 25 firms it reviewed should have been removed from the 8(a) Program and made 11 recommendations "to improve the overall management and effectiveness" of the 8(a) Program's continuing eligibility review process. SBA management agreed with seven of the recommendations, partially agreed to the other four recommendations, and indicated that it would conduct continuing eligibility reviews for the firms identified in the SBA OIG's audit as ineligible and take appropriate action. Financial Thresholds for Economic Disadvantaged Status Section 8(a)(6)(A) of the Small Business Act defines economically disadvantaged individuals as "socially disadvantaged individuals whose ability to compete in the free enterprise system has been impaired due to diminished capital and credit opportunities as compared to others in the same business area who are not socially disadvantaged." In determining the degree of diminished credit and capital opportunities, Section 8(a)(6)(A) authorizes the SBA to "consider, but not be limited to, the assets and net worth of such socially disadvantaged individual." As mentioned previously, in 1989, the SBA established by regulation that personal net worth of less than $250,000 at the time of entry into the program (and $750,000 for continuing eligibility) constitutes economic disadvantage. Some Members of Congress have argued that these financial thresholds should be increased or periodically adjusted for inflation. During the 112 th Congress, H.R. 3754 , the Not Too Small to Succeed in Business Act of 2011, would have increased these thresholds to $750,000 for 8(a) Program admission and $2.25 million for continued participation after admission. H.R. 2424 , the Expanding Opportunities for Main Street Act of 2011, would have amended Section 8(a)(6)(A) by inserting after "disadvantaged individual" the following: "For purposes of this section, an individual having a net worth of more than $1,500,000 is not economically disadvantaged." Legislation with provisions similar to those in H.R. 2424 was also introduced during the 113 th Congress ( H.R. 2550 , the Minority Small Business Enhancement Act of 2013, and H.R. 2551 , the Expanding Opportunities for Main Street Act of 2013). Advocates for increasing the program's personal net worth threshold noted that the Department of Transportation (DOT) increased the personal net worth threshold for determining eligibility for the Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (DBE) program in 2011 to account for inflation. The DBE threshold was increased from $750,000 (which was set by DOT in 1999, and was based on the 8(a) Program's $750,000 threshold) to $1.32 million. DBE firms, which are provided special consideration in the awarding of federal transportation contracts, argued that the limit penalized success and imposed "a glass ceiling on the growth and competitiveness of DBE firms." Opponents argued that the $1.32 million limit was too high and would include business owners who were not truly disadvantaged and that raising the limit would favor larger, established, and richer DBEs at the expense of smaller, start-up firms because the larger companies would be able to stay in the program longer. More recently, the SBA's OIG has argued that the SBA's 1989 decision to exclude equity in a primary residence from an individual's net worth calculation "serves as a loophole allowing affluent business owners to shelter wealth in personal real estate, while taking advantage of a program designed to help the socially and economically disadvantaged." Measuring Program Success Pursuant to P.L. 100-656 , the Business Opportunity Development Reform Act of 1988, the SBA is required to "develop and implement a process for the systematic collection of data on the operations of the [8(a)] Program" and to report this data, not later than April 30 of each year, to Congress. The act requires the report to include the following: The average personal net worth of individuals who own and control concerns that were initially certified for program participation during the immediately preceding fiscal year and the dollar distribution of each of these individual's net worth, at $50,000 increments. A description and estimate of the benefits and costs that have accrued to the economy and the federal government in the immediately preceding fiscal year due to the operations of those business concerns that were performing 8(a) contracts. A compilation and evaluation of those business concerns that have exited the program during the immediately preceding three fiscal years, including the number of concerns actively engaged in business operations, those that have ceased or substantially curtailed operations, including the reasons for such actions, and those concerns that have been acquired by other firms or organizations owned and controlled by other than socially and economically disadvantaged individuals. For those businesses that have continued operations after they exited from the program, the SBA Administrator is required to separately detail the benefits and costs that have accrued to the economy during the immediately preceding fiscal year due to their operations. A listing of all program participants during the preceding fiscal year identifying, by state and region, for each firm: the concern's name, the race or ethnicity, and gender of the disadvantaged owners, the dollar value of all contracts received in the preceding year, the dollar amount of advance payments received by each concern pursuant to contracts awarded under Section 8(a), and a description including (if appropriate) an estimate of the dollar value of all benefits and loans received during such year. The total dollar value of 8(a) contracts and options awarded during the preceding fiscal year and such amount expressed as a percentage of total sales of all firms participating in the program during such year; and of firms in each of the nine years of program participation. A description of additional resources or program authorities required to provide the types of services needed over the next two-year period to service the expected portfolio of 8(a) certified firms. The total dollar value of 8(a) contracts and options, at such dollar increments as the SBA Administrator deems appropriate, for each four digit standard industrial classification code under which such contracts and options were classified. The SBA's FY2014 report (the latest one available) indicated that 8(a) firms "contributed an estimated 158,018 jobs to the Nation's economy," and that 2,209 of the 2,288 firms that had exited and completed the program during the three preceding fiscal years (October 1, 2010 through September 30, 2013) were still active, 45 had ceased operations, and 34 did not have data available for determining their status as reported by Dun and Bradstreet. Of the active firms, "two were acquired by another firm or organization owned and controlled by other than socially and economically disadvantages individuals and 144 firms were substantially curtailed within the past three years." In addition, the 2,209 still active firms reported FY2014 revenue of approximately $5.49 billion and provided jobs for approximately 70,330 persons. In 2000, GAO recommended that the SBA augment its data collection activities by periodically surveying a nationwide sample of 8(a) firms. GAO argued that a survey would improve the SBA's ability to determine how well the program is working, further arguing that "at a minimum, the survey should assess whether SBA assistance is meeting the firms' expectations and needs." The SBA currently contracts with a third-party to conduct an annual client satisfaction survey of small businesses that have received management training and technical assistance from Small Business Development Centers, SCORE, and Women Business Centers. The survey's objective is to measure these programs' impact "on the creation, financial development and survival of client firms." The wording of many of that survey's questions, which focus on client satisfaction and the programs' impact on client behavior and economic success, could prove useful should the SBA decide to conduct a nationwide survey of 8(a) firms. Appendix. Comparison of the Requirements Pertaining to Different Types of 8(a) Firms

The Minority Small Business and Capital Ownership Development Program—commonly known as the "8(a) Program"—provides participating small businesses with training, technical assistance, and contracting opportunities in the form of set-aside and sole-source awards. A set-aside award is a contract in which only certain contractors may compete, whereas a sole-source award is a contract awarded, or proposed for award, without competition. In FY2017, 3,421 8(a) firms were awarded more than $27.1 billion in federal contracts, including $8.0 billion in 8(a) set-aside awards and $8.4 billion in 8(a) sole-source awards. Other programs provide similar assistance to other types of small businesses (e.g., women-owned, HUBZone, and service-disabled veteran-owned). 8(a) Program eligibility is generally limited to small businesses "unconditionally owned and controlled by one or more socially and economically disadvantaged individuals who are of good character and citizens of and residing in the United States" that demonstrate "potential for success." Members of certain racial and ethnic groups are presumed to be socially disadvantaged, although individuals who do not belong to these groups may prove they are also socially disadvantaged. To be economically disadvantaged, an individual must have a net worth of less than $250,000 (excluding ownership in the 8(a) firm and equity in his or her primary residence) at the time of entry into the program. This amount increases to $750,000 for continuing eligibility. In determining whether an applicant has good character, the SBA takes into account any criminal conduct, violations of SBA regulations, or debarment or suspension from federal contracting. For a firm to demonstrate potential for success, it generally must have been in business in its primary industry classification for two years immediately prior to applying to the program. However, small businesses owned by Alaska Native Corporations, Community Development Corporations, Indian tribes, and Native Hawaiian Organizations are eligible to participate in the 8(a) Program under somewhat different terms. Each of these terms is further defined by the Small Business Act, Small Business Administration (SBA) regulations, and judicial and administrative decisions. This report examines the 8(a) Program's historical development, key requirements, administrative structures and operations, and the SBA's oversight of 8(a) firms. It also discusses two SBA programs designed to support 8(a) firms, the 7(j) Management and Technical Assistance Program and the 8(a) Mentor-Protégé Program, and provides various program statistics. It concludes with an analysis of the following current 8(a) Program issues: The SBA's decision to address recent declines in the number of program participants by revising and streamlining the program's application process, an action which the SBA's Office of Inspector General (SBA OIG) reports "may erode core safeguards that prevented questionable firms from entering the 8(a) Program." Reported variation in 8(a) Program service delivery. Reported deficiencies in the oversight of 8(a) Program participant's continuing eligibility. Disagreements concerning the financial thresholds used to determine economic disadvantage, including the SBA's decision to exclude equity in a primary residence from the calculation of an individual's net worth. The adequacy of the performance measures used to evaluate the program's effectiveness in meeting its statutory goals.

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Introduction The National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA) requires that states follow certain voter registration requirements for federal elections. NVRA does not set requirements for state or local elections. The stated purposes of NVRA are to establish procedures to increase the number of eligible citizens registered to vote in federal elections; enable enhanced voter participation in federal elections; protect the integrity of the electoral process; and ensure accurate voter registration records. NVRA was not the first piece of federal legislation addressing state electoral activities, but it did create a more significant federal presence in voter registration activities. NVRA may be viewed as an extension of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA) and other federal legislation that sought to create uniformity across state electoral processes in order to expand voter enfranchisement and ensure constitutionally protected voter rights. NVRA is sometimes referred to as the motor-voter bill, since one of its provisions requires that eligible citizens must be able to simultaneously apply for voter registration when they apply within a state for a motor vehicle driver's license or other personal identification document issued by a state department of motor vehicles. In addition to these motor-voter registration opportunities, NVRA requires that states establish mail-based voter registration processes and accept a federal mail-in registration form. States must also provide in-person voter registration opportunities at the designated, residence-based voter registration sites, in accordance with state law, and at designated federal, state, or nongovernmental offices, including state agencies providing public assistance or services to persons with disabilities. In addition to voter registration methods, NVRA included procedural requirements for states to follow when performing voter registration list maintenance or when adding, removing, or modifying records for registered voters. NVRA further required that the Federal Election Commission (FEC) provide guidance to the states for implementing NVRA. NVRA also directed the FEC to publish a biennial election report assessing the impact of the act on federal election administration and offering recommendations for improvements to federal and state procedures, forms, and other matters affected by NVRA. These FEC responsibilities were transferred to the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) following enactment of the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) in 2002. NVRA, as amended by HAVA, provides much of the framework for federal voter registration policy. The first portion of this report provides a brief background on the federal role in voter registration and the passage of NVRA, followed by a discussion of the key components of NVRA. The implementation of NVRA, subsequent modifications to its provisions, and ongoing considerations related to federal voter registration are also discussed. The final sections of this report provide descriptions of types of common legislative proposals addressing voter registration, with a full list of related bills introduced in the 115 th Congress provided in the Appendix . Background and Context for NVRA Passage Many elements of election administration remain under the domain of state and local governments, but the federal government has become more involved in some election aspects since the 1960s. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA) and several subsequent federal laws, including NVRA, reflect congressional initiatives to increase voter participation across the states. Various proposals were introduced in the 1970s and 1980s to create national standards for voter registration, but the enactment of NVRA in 1993 marked the first comprehensive federal policy addressing voter registration. The House and Senate considered measures during multiple Congresses in the 1970s, for example, that would have created a postcard-based national voter registration form administered by the Census Bureau. In the 95 th Congress (1977-1978), congressional attention turned toward creating national standards for same-day voter registration, but neither chamber passed related legislation. Congress considered other voter registration measures between 1983 and 1988, but no proposals appear to have reached the floor in either the House or Senate. Previous versions of NVRA were introduced in the 101 st Congress (1989-1990) and 102 nd Congress (1991-1992) before similar legislation was ultimately signed into law on May 20, 1993. Two laws enacted prior to NVRA, the Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act of 1984 (VAEHA) and the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act of 1986 (UOCAVA), may be viewed as legislative predecessors to NVRA. Primarily, these laws focused on voting access, but they also contained provisions that addressed voter registration. VAEHA and UOCAVA represented extensions of the federal government's role in some electoral activities that had traditionally been the domain of state and local governments. VAEHA required that states make polling places more accessible for persons who are elderly or disabled; provide absentee ballots for handicapped voters with no notarization or medical certification required; and offer voting aids for elderly or disabled individuals to use in federal elections. With regards to voter registration, VAEHA also required that states establish "a reasonable number of accessible permanent registration facilities," and offer registration aids for elderly or handicapped individuals to use in federal elections. UOCAVA required each state to permit uniformed servicemembers, their spouses and dependents, and overseas citizens who do not maintain a residence in the United States to vote absentee in federal elections using a federal write-in absentee ballot or a state absentee ballot approved by the presidential designee and made available at least 60 days before an election. UOCAVA also required states to accept and process any valid voter registration applications received at least 30 days prior to a federal election from military or overseas voters and created an official postcard form states would accept for these individuals containing both a voter registration application and an absentee ballot application. Major Provisions of NVRA NVRA's shorthand name, the motor-voter bill, refers to one of its more well-known provisions—the requirement that states establish procedures for eligible individuals to register to vote in federal elections, or to update their voter registration records, simultaneously with their applications for motor vehicle driver's licenses or for any other form of personal identification provided by the state's department of motor vehicles (DMVs). Under NVRA, states must also establish other in-person voter registration locations, including at federal, state, or nongovernmental offices that primarily provide public assistance or services to persons with disabilities, and at other locations as described in Section 7 of NVRA. In addition to specifying locations for voter registration opportunities, NVRA also contains criteria for states' voter registration forms and requires states to accept a national mail-based registration form created by the FEC. States must also meet certain procedural requirements when adding, removing, or modifying records in their voter registration lists. Today, the EAC provides states with guidance for implementing NVRA and publishes a biennial election report assessing the impact of NVRA on federal election administration and providing recommendations, if necessary, for improvements to federal and state procedures, forms, and other matters affected by NVRA. Voter Registration at Departments of Motor Vehicles (DMVs) Section 5 of NVRA provides that "Each State motor vehicle driver's license application (including any renewal application) submitted to the appropriate State motor vehicle authority under State law shall serve as an application for voter registration with respect to elections for Federal office unless the applicant fails to sign the voter registration application." An applicant submitting a change of address to a state DMV can also designate that the change should be relayed to election officials as an update to his or her voter registration. Voter registration information collected by DMVs must be relayed to election officials no later than 10 days after it is received. If the DMV receives voter registration information within 5 days of the state's voter registration deadline, it must be relayed to election officials no later than 5 days after its receipt. This is the same timeline for application turnaround that NVRA requires for the other voter registration agencies it covers, as discussed in the following section, " Other Voter Registration Agencies ." Proponents of NVRA expected that most voter registration would eventually occur through this type of application. In the years since NVRA was enacted, DMVs have become a popular source for voter registrations. Among the voter registration methods denoted in NVRA and tracked in the biennial NVRA reports, DMVs are consistently the most common source of voter registration applications. The EAC reports that between 2014 and 2016, departments of motor vehicles accounted for a higher proportion of voter registration applications received than any other source of voter registrations designated under NVRA. Table 1 provides information on DMV-based registration and other sources for selected years. Other Voter Registration Agencies In addition to DMVs, under NVRA, states are required to provide opportunities for individuals to register to vote in-person at other locations. These include "the appropriate registration site designated with respect to the residence of the applicant in accordance with state law," as well as at certain federal, state, or nongovernmental offices. Section 7 of NVRA identifies these additional locations as "voter registration agencies." Any office in a state that provides public assistance or administers state-funded programs primarily designed to provide services to persons with disabilities must be designated as voter registration agencies. Recruitment offices for the U.S. armed services are also designated as voter registration agencies. Beyond these required designations, states are also directed to designate other locations, such as public libraries, schools, city or county government offices, unemployment compensation offices, and fishing and hunting license bureaus. The Higher Education Amendments of 1998 further required that colleges and universities in states exempt from NVRA "make a good faith effort" to request and distribute mail-based voter registration forms to enrolled students. Each designated voter registration agency must distribute mail-based voter registration forms; provide assistance to applicants completing the form, unless such assistance is refused by the applicant; and transmit completed applications to the appropriate state election official no later than 10 days after they are received or within 5 days of their receipt if received within 5 days of the state's voter registration deadline. This timeline is the same as NVRA requires for state DMVs that receive voter registration forms. Individuals assisting with registration applications cannot seek to influence the applicant's political preference or party registration; display a political preference or party allegiance; or make any statement or take any action that has the intent or effect of discouraging an applicant from registering to vote or leading the applicant to believe that the availability of other services provided by the agencies is dependent upon the decision to register or not register. Mail-In Voter Registration Section 6 of NVRA further directs states to make available mail-based voter registration applications for federal elections. These mail-based applications can also be used for voters to update a change of address. Section 6 requires states to accept and make available a mail-based application created by the federal government, but also permits states to use a mail-based form of their own creation. NVRA directed the FEC to develop and maintain the mail-based federal voter registration application, but this function was transferred to the EAC following the passage of HAVA, effective in 2004. Mail-based voter registration applications created by the states were required to meet all the criteria specified by Section 9 of NVRA, which are described in the subsequent section, " Voter Registration Form Requirements ." States were required to make mail registration forms available to governmental and private entities for distribution, with an emphasis on making forms available for organized voter registration programs. Under NVRA, state laws could require that voters new to a jurisdiction who registered by mail vote in-person for their first election. If a registrar sends a notice to an individual regarding the disposition of a mail-based voter registration application via nonforwardable postal mail and the notice is returned as undeliverable, the registrar may begin the process of removing the individual from the state's voter list, as detailed in Section 8(d). Voter Registration Form Requirements In addition to how and where states are required to provide voter registration opportunities, NVRA contains requirements for the information presented on and collected by voter registration forms for federal elections. These requirements are presented in Section 9(b) of NVRA, and also serve as the criteria used for the federal, mail-based voter registration application created under NVRA. States are also required to make the FEC mail-based registration form available at governmental and private entities for distribution, with a particular focus on distributing forms to nongovernmental voter registration programs. Instead of listing a number of information fields that must be included on voter registration forms, NVRA minimizes the amount of information an applicant needs to provide by utilizing personal information the applicant provides elsewhere. At state DMVs, for example, the application for registering to vote must be incorporated into the application form for a driver's license and cannot require the applicant to duplicate any information already provided on the driver's license portion of the form. For voter registration on driver's license applications and for state mail-in applications, a form may only request the minimum amount of information necessary to prevent duplicate registrations and enable state election officials to determine the eligibility of the applicant and administer voter registration laws. Voter registration applications under NVRA must include statements listing federal voting eligibility requirements (including citizenship) and require a signature from the applicant, attesting that he or she meets the eligibility criteria. Voter registration forms may not include "any requirement for notarization or other formal authentication." In recent years, the EAC and U.S. Supreme Court have interpreted this to preclude states from requiring proof of U.S. citizenship in order to submit an application for federal voter registration. The forms also include a statement about penalties for submitting a false voter registration application, and a statement asserting that information about declining to register or the office where a citizen registered would be kept confidential. Maintenance and Updates to State Voter Lists As noted above, agencies providing voter registration forms, including DMVs, are required by NVRA to accept completed forms from applicants and transmit the forms to the appropriate state election official within 10 days of receipt. If the completed form is collected by an agency within 5 days of the state's voter registration deadline, the form must be transmitted to state election officials within 5 days of receipt. Under NVRA, once state election officials have received and approved or denied an application, they are required to send each applicant a notice regarding the disposition of his or her application. State election officials are also directed to ensure that any eligible applicant is registered to vote in time for a federal election, as long as the applicant's information was submitted to a voter registration agency or postmarked no later than 30 days before a federal election (or the state's registration deadline, if that is less than 30 days before Election Day). Once a voter is registered, his or her name is not to be removed from the list or roster of eligible voters unless the voter requests removal; has died; has moved out of the jurisdiction; or, as provided by state law, has received a disqualifying criminal conviction or is found to be mentally incapacitated. Voters may not be removed from the registration rolls solely due to nonvoting, or for moving within the same electoral jurisdiction. States may "conduct a general program that makes a reasonable effort" to remove voters from the list due to death or a change of residence. States may also remove a voter from the registration rolls if the registrant has notified the election office that he or she has moved. States may also remove voters from the registration rolls if the registrant does not respond to a notice sent by the registrar (containing a forwardable mail response card with prepaid postage) and fails to vote or appear to vote in two consecutive general elections for federal office. The processes states use to maintain accurate, up-to-date voter registration lists for use in federal elections must be undertaken in a "uniform, nondiscriminatory" fashion and in compliance with the Voting Rights Act of 1965. States could use the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) "National Change of Address" program as one way to help maintain their voter registration rolls. Removal of ineligible voters from the registration rolls must be completed at least 90 days prior to the date of any federal election (general or primary). Beyond these guidelines, NVRA does not specify any particular process states must follow when removing individuals from their registered voter lists. "Fail-Safe" Provisions for Within-Jurisdiction Residence Changes NVRA includes "fail-safe" voting provisions, enabling voters who have moved within a jurisdiction but lack updated registrations to vote on Election Day and to update the state's records. These "fail-safe" provisions are limited to registrants who move within the same election jurisdiction, under the principle that "once registered, a voter should remain on the list of voters so long as the individual remains eligible to vote in that jurisdiction." This situation could arise because voters did not realize their information required an update, or because of technical or bureaucratic mistakes in processing a registrant's updated application. A voter whose residence was formerly covered by one polling place but whose residence is currently covered by another polling place in the same jurisdiction must be allowed to update his or her voting records and vote, either at the voter's former polling place, current polling place, or at a central location within the jurisdiction. Criminal Penalties Section 12 of NVRA establishes criminal penalties for federal election fraud and voter intimidation. No individual may "knowingly and willfully" attempt to intimidate, threaten, or coerce anyone who is attempting to register to vote, assisting with voter registration, voting, or exercising any right under NVRA. Individuals may also be charged for attempting to deprive state residents of a "fair and impartially conducted election process" by procuring or submitting voter registration applications or ballots that are known to be fraudulent according to state law. Individuals committing these acts could be fined in accordance with Title 18 of the U.S. Code and/or imprisoned for up to five years. Records and Reporting Requirements Under NVRA, states are required to keep records pertaining to voter registration list maintenance and to make these records publicly available. NVRA also required the FEC to produce a biennial report "assessing the impact of this Act on the administration of elections for federal office ... including recommendations for improvements in Federal and State procedures, forms, and other matters affected by this Act." Since 2003, these NVRA reports have been produced by the EAC. The biennial NVRA reports are submitted to Congress by June 30 of each odd-numbered year. No further instructions on the content of the reports were provided by NVRA; in practice, the FEC/EAC has chosen to conduct surveys of the states to collect information that it deems necessary to carry out its statutory requirement. The biennial NVRA reports provide statistics and detailed discussion on the voter registration activities of the states for the preceding two-year period under study. This includes information on the total number of registered voters, new registrants, and sources of registrations covered by NVRA (i.e., motor vehicle agencies, in-person, by mail, or other designated state office). The NVRA reports also provide information on the removal of voters from registration lists and reasons for removals. Issues with list maintenance have at times been discussed in these reports, as have recommendations for improvements. Initial NVRA Implementation Many of NVRA's requirements were designed to be implemented through state-level policy changes, if existing state laws were not already in compliance with its provisions. Six states were exempt from NVRA at the time of its enactment because they either had no voter registration requirement or provided voter registration at polling places on Election Day. The other 44 states were tasked with implementing NVRA by January 1, 1995; however, if something in a state's constitution precluded compliance, NVRA allowed for a later enactment date to allow for the state's constitutional amendment process. NVRA provided no federal funding to the states to carry out any of its prescribed requirements. States are, however, eligible to use reduced mailing rates from USPS for voter registration mailings. Each state was required to designate a state officer or employee to serve as the chief state election official and coordinate state responsibilities related to NVRA. NVRA also created specific roles for the FEC and made the Department of Justice (DOJ) responsible for civil enforcement of its provisions. The FEC was responsible for providing information to states about their responsibilities under NVRA; developing a mail-based federal voter registration form; and producing a biennial report to Congress, in consultation with states' chief election officers. Within the FEC, the Office of Election Administration (OEA) carried out its NVRA responsibilities, until the passage of HAVA in 2002 transferred these responsibilities to the EAC. The initial NVRA report from the FEC noted that "[NVRA] is something of an experiment in governance in that the federal responsibilities for its proper implementation are divided between two separate federal agencies," meaning the FEC and DOJ. In early guidance to states regarding NVRA implementation, the FEC stated it "does not have legal authority either to interpret the Act or to determine whether this or that procedure meets the requirements of the Act," noting that such activities would fall under the DOJ's civil enforcement responsibilities. While NVRA was under consideration by Congress, some were concerned about the costs it could impose upon states, since the bill contained a number of requirements for state election officials and other state agencies but no funding to carry them out. As states began to implement NVRA, however, costs were not cited in the FEC reports as a significant impediment, and implementation generally proceeded without many reported complications. In the 1995-1996 NVRA report, for example, the FEC said that the motor vehicle provisions "appeared to be the easiest for States to implement," and that states reported "relatively few problems" with implementing the mail registration provisions. The FEC attributed this, in part, to the fact that 26 of the 43 states responding to the survey had already enacted some form of motor voter registration prior to NVRA, and that 25 of the responding states already had voter registration by mail prior to NVRA. Voter registration rates did increase in the years following the passage of NVRA, as compared to the years immediately preceding its passage. Some have suggested, however, that it is difficult to isolate the particular effect NVRA had on this increase, due to a number of other factors that could lead voters to register or to not register. In its 1993-1994 NVRA report, the FEC noted that statewide computerization of voter registration "greatly facilitates the implementation of NVRA," and that "even larger networks linking motor vehicle, public assistance, vital statistics, and courts to the voter registration system" could further assist with intake and verification of voter records. At the time, FEC found varying degrees of computerized record systems across states, and noted that in some states, the record systems used by different local jurisdictions were incompatible with one another. States were granted some latitude to comply with other provisions in NVRA that were not as strictly specified by the legislation, such as the designation of voter registration agencies and state procedures for voter list maintenance; as a result, the ways in which they approached these provisions varied. As one example, for NVRA's requirement that states designate other offices as voter registration agencies, the FEC's 1995-1996 report found four states had not designated any agencies, and the 21 other states that responded had selected "a wide variety of agencies." Regarding voter list maintenance, the FEC stated that "[a]s one might expect, [the] States covered by this report approached the rather technical and detailed problems of list maintenance quite differently and unevenly." Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002 The Help America Vote Act (HAVA) was enacted in 2002 and serves as another key piece of federal election policy, addressing a number of election administration elements in light of issues revealed during the 2000 presidential election. This section focuses only on the parts of HAVA that affected NVRA or voter registration in federal elections, namely, the computerization of state voter lists; changes to the federal mail-based voter registration form; and transferring the FEC's role to a newly created Election Assistance Commission (EAC). HAVA has many additional components, however, and more comprehensive information on it can be found in CRS Report RS20898, The Help America Vote Act and Election Administration: Overview and Selected Issues for the 2016 Election . In the years preceding HAVA, the FEC's biennial NVRA reports contained a number of recommendations related to the voter registration and list maintenance requirements set forth by NVRA. HAVA incorporated several of these recommendations, some as its own provisions and others as amendments to NVRA. Notably, HAVA established requirements for states to utilize computerized statewide voter registration lists, which the FEC had frequently suggested in its NVRA reports. HAVA also provided funding to help states carry out this requirement and its other objectives, many of which were related to modernizing voting equipment and generally improving federal election administration across all the states. HAVA required four specific additions to the NVRA mail-based voter registration form: (1) a question asking whether the registrant was a citizen, with corresponding answer check boxes; (2) a question asking whether the registrant would be 18 years of age or older by the next election, with corresponding answer check boxes; (3) a statement that if the registrant had answered "no" to either of the preceding questions, that he or she was to stop filling out the form and not register; and (4) a statement alerting the registrant to submit copies of appropriate documentation with his or her application, if he or she is a first-time registrant, and the completed forms are submitted through the mail, or else he or she may be required to provide such documentation when voting for the first time. Prior to HAVA, the FEC's Office of Election Administration (OEA) carried out federal activities related to election administration. HAVA created the Election Assistance Commission, an independent, bipartisan agency, which absorbed the OEA's responsibilities in addition to carrying out other new requirements. The EAC's responsibilities included carrying out payment and grant programs related to federal elections; testing and certifying voting systems; studying election issues; and issuing guidelines and other guidance related to voting systems and implementation of HAVA's requirements, in consultation with election officials and other stakeholders. Biennial Report Recommendations Since HAVA Since the passage of HAVA in 2002, the biennial EAC reports have often contained further recommendations related to voter registration and election administration. Many of these recent recommendations pertain to modernizing data collection and improving data sharing practices within and among states. The recommendations are typically broad-based and use generalized language; they serve only as suggestions to the states, or possibly to Congress, since the EAC lacks the authority to require states to take any action related to voter registration. Table 2 presents a summary of NVRA recommendations contained in the EAC reports since 2004. Voter Registration Sources Since NVRA Table 1 (earlier in report) provides information on the sources of voter registration applications for states covered by NVRA during 1995-1996, 2005-2006, and 2015-2016. These data include new voter registration applications and applications requesting an update or modification for an existing registered voter. Nationwide, DMV offices have remained the most common source among those covered by NVRA for voter registration applications received by state election officials. Mail-based forms are consistently the second-most common source for voter registration applications. The EAC notes that online voter registration has grown in recent years, accounting for 17.4% of new voter registration applications for the 2016 election. For the 2014 election, 6.5% of voter registration applications were submitted online, and for the 2012 election, 5.3% of voter registration applications were submitted online. Legislative Proposals Regarding Voter Registration Bills that address voter registration are routinely introduced in Congress. Table A-1 in the Appendix lists 66 pieces of legislation that were introduced in the 115 th Congress related to voter registration or to other elements of election administration covered by NVRA. Often, these bills sought to expand the ways in which individuals can register to vote or to update the technologies states use to share and store voter registration data. Some of these bills were narrowly tailored to address a particular part of voter registration, whereas other bills proposed broader policies affecting a number of components of election administration. The sections below categorize some of the common types of policy proposals related to NVRA and federal voter registration. Given the variety and quantity of measures typically before Congress, this is not meant to be a comprehensive discussion of all available voter registration policy options. Automatic Voter Registration Legislation ("Opt-Out") Under NVRA, federal voter registration opportunities are made available at a number of state and local government offices and are presented alongside state driver's license applications. Currently, an individual must indicate that he or she wishes to register to vote when applying for a driver's license, or complete a separate voter registration form at other agencies. Some have proposed changing this to an "opt-out" system, where an individual is automatically registered to vote when submitting a driver's license application or other eligible agency form, rather than being given the opportunity to opt in to register to vote through an additional selection. An option for declining to register to vote could be presented on the form itself, or provided to the individual at a later time through a notice mailed by election officials. Automatic voter registration currently occurs in 17 states and the District of Columbia. Proponents argue that automatic voter registration could increase the number of registered voters, particularly among demographic groups that are less likely to be registered, and decrease registration costs. Others have raised concerns that the government should not require citizens to register to vote, and that "opt-out" forms, if sent by mail, may not sufficiently ensure that an individual who wishes not to register can decline registration. Similarly, automatic registration may require more work for state election officials who must sort out eligible and ineligible voter registration applicants. In the 115 th Congress, 14 bills proposed some form of automatic voter registration requirement. Another bill would have provided grants to states for implementing automatic voter registration. Same-Day Voter Registration Nine bills introduced in the 115 th Congress would have required states to provide for same-day voter registration, which would enable a qualified individual to register to vote and cast a ballot simultaneously at a designated polling place. Seventeen states and the District of Columbia currently have some form of same-day voter registration. By combining these two steps, proponents believe same-day voter registration simplifies the process for citizens and can increase registration rates and turnout. The month before an election is often a peak time for political campaigning, but unregistered individuals who are mobilized to participate during this period may be unable to vote if the voter registration deadline has passed; in many jurisdictions, the registration cut-off can be 30 days before Election Day. Others believe that preelection registration deadlines remain necessary for state election officials to sufficiently process individuals' applications. In some places with same-day registration, voters who register on Election Day cast provisional ballots until their information can be verified, but this may create a delay in determining election results. Online (or Electronic) Voter Registration A number of government forms and applications can be submitted on the internet, and some have proposed a federal requirement for online (or electronic) voter registration applications. Currently, 38 states and the District of Columbia allow for online voter registration. Seven bills introduced in the 115 th Congress proposed requiring nationwide availability of online voter registration for federal elections. Proponents believe that online voter registration could increase registration rates, particularly among younger voters, and could serve as an extension of existing accessibility accommodations for individuals with disabilities. Proponents note that online forms can include required fields, which could reduce the number of errors on submitted voter registration applications. Although there are some upfront costs to implement online registration, proponents believe it may be a relatively inexpensive way for state election officials to maintain up-to-date and accurate voter lists. Others, however, have concerns about the ability to confirm applicants' identities and the overall security of online voter registration systems. Without accurate checks on the voter registration process, some believe that it could be easier for individuals to vote illegally. Outreach or Preregistration for Teenagers Under the Twenty-sixth Amendment, individuals must be 18 years old to vote in federal elections, but some proposals related to voter registration seek to reach younger teenagers, usually 16 or 17 years old. Five bills introduced in the 115 th Congress, for example, proposed a preregistration program in which younger individuals could submit, in advance, an application to register to vote; five bills also proposed voter education or participation outreach programs for minors. Currently, each state that requires voter registration and the District of Columbia let individuals under 18 preregister to vote, using a variety of age criteria. Proponents consider these measures a means to help improve the turnout rate for younger voters, which is typically lower than for older voters. By encouraging 18-year-olds to vote in the first election in which they are eligible, some believe that there will be longer-term effects of these policies on voter turnout, as voting becomes a lifelong habit for these individuals. Others, however, are concerned that preregistered individuals are likely to move between the time of their application and the first election they are qualified to vote in, which could render a number of the preregistrations invalid. This could cause some young voters who have moved to mistakenly believe they are eligible to vote in their new jurisdiction without updating their registration information, or create extra costs for state election officials as they seek to update these individuals' records and maintain accurate voter lists. Protecting Voter Information and Voter List Integrity Verification of voter registration data is a continual challenge for state election officials seeking to prevent fraudulent voting. An initial check on a prospective voter's identity occurs when election officials confirm the identity and eligibility of an individual at the time he or she first submits a voter registration application, based on criteria set by state law. Laws requiring individuals to show a form of identification when voting exist in a number of states to prevent ineligible individuals from voting, individuals voting twice, or other forms of voting fraud. Some have proposed requiring photo identification earlier in the process, at the time of a voter's application for registration, to help verify the individual's identity. One bill introduced in the 115 th Congress, for example, proposed that photo identification must accompany any voter registration application. Others believe that voter identification laws may prevent some individuals who are otherwise qualified to vote from participating in elections, if these individuals cannot or do not wish to obtain the necessary identification. A different bill introduced in the 115 th Congress would have prohibited states from requiring photo identification when an individual submits a voter registration application. After an individual's initial application, there are a number of reasons why his or her voter registration information may subsequently change. These reasons may include a name change, moving to a new address, a criminal conviction, mental incapacity, or death. NVRA sets out some processes states must follow for performing voter list maintenance, and one bill introduced in the 115 th Congress would have added criteria to NVRA's voter removal requirements. In the years since NVRA's passage, technological advancements have made it possible for agencies and officials to share and cross-reference records, which can help improve list accuracy but has also raised some concerns about protecting voters' personal information. Three bills in the 115 th Congress, for example, addressed how voter registration information can be used; one of these bills would have also required a record of all requests submitted to voter registration databases. Personally identifiable information, such as full names, addresses, and birthdays, is commonly stored in state voter registration databases, and in related state or federal databases that election officials use to help update their voter registration records within the state. Interstate information sharing systems, such as the Electronic Registration Information Center (ERIC) or the Interstate Voter Registration Crosscheck Program (Crosscheck), are used by some states to compare voter registration records with one another. These systems, proponents argue, can help states identify ineligible voters or individuals who are registered in more than one state. These data-sharing practices, however, raise concerns among some about information security and appropriate use of voters' data, particularly if states choose to use matching systems as the basis for their voter removal processes. Some of the cross-referencing systems states use to identify and remove voters from their registration lists have been criticized for the methodologies they use to create matches. Matches created using voters' names and birthdays, for example, may falsely identify multiple, unique individuals as a single voter registered in different states. ERIC and Crosscheck, however, both request additional data from voter registration files that, if available, states could utilize to better ensure that duplicate registrants are accurately identified. Technology Improvements The enactment of HAVA in 2002 led to a number of election technology upgrades for states, but in many of its subsequent reports, the EAC has continued to recommend that states further modernize and improve the ways in which they collect voter data and maintain their registered voter lists, as summarized in Table 2 . States increasingly use electronic methods to register voters, maintain voter lists, administer voting, and track election results, making cybersecurity an important consideration for election officials. Some considerations involve protecting the personal information of applicants and registered voters from those who seek to use it for other purposes. Additional considerations involve ensuring system reliability during periods of high usage, or near critical statutory deadlines for voter registration or Election Day vote counting. These are familiar cybersecurity concerns, similar to those faced by any government agencies, businesses, or other organizations that store individuals' personal data. Other considerations, however, are more specific to election integrity, such as the concern that voter databases or other election systems may be targeted in attempts to manipulate election results. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) designated federal election infrastructure as a component of U.S. critical infrastructure in January 2017, following a series of cyberattacks on state and local election systems prior to the 2016 election. After evidence of these cyberattacks was discovered in August 2016, DHS and the EAC provided some assistance to state election officials to address security concerns. In September 2017, the Department of Homeland Security notified 21 states that hackers had targeted their election systems ahead of the 2016 election. In many cases, the systems may have been targeted but not successfully breached. Some observers, however, have raised concerns that a successful hack may be difficult to detect. Several bills during the 115 th Congress included measures to protect election systems (including voter registration websites and databases) from hackers or foreign interference. Often, legislative proposals in this area involve technology or cybersecurity upgrades to the software or equipment used by state election officials. For voter registration, these upgrades could involve the websites used for online applications, the databases and/or servers used to store voter list data, and the means by which voter applicant data are shared between agencies or jurisdictions. Establishing best practices or required standards for equipment and data systems used in federal elections are possible ways to initiate technology improvements. The decentralized nature of election administration and the variety of software and database systems in use may present challenges if uniform federal requirements are introduced. Twelve bills introduced in the 115 th Congress proposed improvements to the technology systems states use for voter registration and records. Some proposals included grant programs or other funding to help offset costs to states for implementing these upgrades. Concluding Observations Voter registration has remained a subject of interest to Congress in the years since the enactment of NVRA. Many proposals addressing federal voter registration have been introduced in Congress, but federal policies have remained largely unchanged, with the notable exception of revisions made by HAVA in 2002. Many individuals believe that providing widespread access to voter registration opportunities is a worthy objective and in keeping with protecting the constitutional right to vote. In addition to providing voters with access to registration, state election officials face the continuing challenges of updating and maintaining accurate voter registration lists. Technological advancements in the years since NVRA have made it somewhat easier for election officials to keep up-to-date voter records, but the increased reliance on computer systems has also introduced new challenges regarding data security. Some individuals may also question whether it is necessary to expand existing federal voter registration requirements for states, believing that existing provisions are sufficient, or that the perceived benefits of voter registration policy changes must be weighed against other considerations. It can be challenging, for example, to impose uniform regulations across states, which have each developed their own system of election laws. Many federal policy proposals regarding voter registration tend to mirror initiatives that have already been enacted across several states, which may provide lessons for broader implementation, if enacted. Other proposals may prioritize measures to protect election integrity or other areas of election administration, outside of voter registration. Appendix. Legislation

Historically, most aspects of election administration have been left to state and local governments, resulting in a variety of practices across jurisdictions with respect to voter registration. States can vary on a number of elements of the voter registration process, including whether or not to require voter registration; where or when voter registration occurs; and how voters may be removed from registration lists. The right of citizens to vote, however, is presented in the U.S. Constitution in the Fifteenth, Nineteenth, and Twenty-sixth Amendments. Beginning with the Voting Rights Act (VRA) in 1965, Congress has sometimes passed legislation requiring certain uniform practices for federal elections, intended to prevent any state policies that may result in the disenfranchisement of eligible voters. The National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) was enacted in 1993 and set forth a number of voter registration requirements for states to follow regarding voter registration processes for federal elections. NVRA is commonly referred to as the motor-voter bill, as it required states to provide voter registration opportunities alongside services provided by departments of motor vehicles (DMVs), although NVRA required other state and local offices providing public services to provide voter registration opportunities as well. NVRA also created a federal mail-based voter registration form that all states are required to accept and created criteria for state voter registration forms. Certain procedures states must follow for performing voter registration list maintenance or removing voters from registration lists are also set forth in NVRA. The Federal Election Commission (FEC) provided guidance to state election officials and issued biennial reports to Congress on NVRA implementation and voter registration in each state until these roles were transferred to the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) in 2002. NVRA remains a fundamental component of federal voter registration policy and has not undergone many significant revisions since its enactment, though voter registration remains a subject of interest to Congress. The Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002 enacted a number of election administration measures, several of which were based on recommendations from the FEC's biennial NVRA reports, and affected federal voter registration. These included the computerization of state voter lists; grants to states for election technology upgrades; changes to the federal mail-based voter registration form; and the transfer of the FEC's role in administering NVRA to the newly created EAC. More comprehensive information on HAVA can be found in CRS Report RS20898, The Help America Vote Act and Election Administration: Overview and Selected Issues for the 2016 Election. In the 115th Congress, 66 bills were introduced related to federal voter registration or NVRA. Some of these measures were narrow in scope, whereas others were more comprehensive electoral reforms. Many of these bills sought to expand the ways in which states must allow individuals to register to vote. This can include adding other public service agencies to the list of NVRA voter registration agencies, or requiring online voter registration, same-day voter registration, preregistration of teenagers not yet eligible to vote, or automatic voter registration. A number of other bills reflected ongoing concerns about the technology used to maintain voter registration data and about balancing the efficiency technology provides for citizens and election officials with sufficient cybersecurity protections.

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Overview and Recent Developments Since assuming the throne from his late father on February 7, 1999, Jordan's 57-year-old monarch King Abdullah II bin Al Hussein (hereinafter King Abdullah II) has maintained Jordan's stability and strong ties to the United States. Although commentators frequently caution that Jordan's stability is fragile, the monarchy has remained resilient owing to a number of factors. These include a strong sense of social cohesion, strong support for the government from both Western powers and the Gulf Arab monarchies, and an internal security apparatus that is highly capable and, according to human rights groups, uses vague and broad criminal provisions in the legal system to dissuade dissent. Despite this resilience, Jordanians are becoming increasingly restless over economic conditions, corruption, and lack of political reform. In 2018, real GDP growth was 2.8%, while unemployment stood at 18.5%, and was likely much higher among young workers. Publicized allegations of high-level corruption include cases against several private- and public-sector elites for conspiring to illegally manufacture cigarettes. Weekly protests have been recurring in Amman, though they have not been as large as summer 2018 protests over tax hikes. Additionally, many Jordanians have turned to social media to express their dissatisfaction with the status quo; the kingdom has one of the highest worldwide rates of social media usage among emerging economies. According to one former high-ranking Jordanian official, "Loyalty is overwhelming in Jordan but that doesn't mean there are no pockets here and there that are against even the monarchy. And they are negligible, yes, but through social media they will have a ... big voice." King Abdullah II and his government have developed a multifaceted approach for responding to public discontent. In recent months, the king has made several public appearances without a security detail, probably in an effort to increase his visibility and interaction with the population. After prominent people criticized the response to corruption concerns, Jordan decided to televise the trial of those accused in the cigarette scandal mentioned above—a rarity in Jordan's justice system. The government also has withdrawn controversial amendments to the 2015 cybercrime law. According to Jordanian activists and international nongovernmental organizations, the amendments would have seriously curtailed freedom of expression online. Jordan may be addressing public discontent and bolstering nationalist sentiment at home by stoking tensions with Israel in support of the Palestinian cause. In late 2018, the king announced (via Twitter) that his government would not renew a provision in its 1994 peace treaty with Israel that allowed Israel access to the Jordanian territories of Baqoura and Al Ghumar, which are agricultural areas in northern and southern Jordan, respectively. According to one Jordanian commentator, "Domestically, the King's decision is a much-needed shot in the arm for the government at a time when it is facing public pressure over its unpopular economic policies." Several months later, Jordan expanded the membership of the Islamic Waqf Council (Islamic custodial trust), which Jordan appoints to oversee the administration of Jerusalem's Temple Mount (known by Muslims as the Haram al Sharif or Noble Sanctuary) and its holy sites. The Islamic Waqf Council, which had been made up of 11 individuals with close ties to the monarchy, was expanded to 18, including several officials from the Palestinian Authority. The newly expanded council immediately defied a 16-year Israeli ban on Muslim worship at the Bab al Rahma building on the Temple Mount. Israel responded by arresting worshippers and activists while also temporarily banning several leaders of the council from accessing the Temple Mount. In March 2019, King Abdullah II spoke in the industrial city of Zarqa, where he stated, "To me, Jerusalem is a red line, and all my people are with me.... No one can pressure Jordan on this matter, and the answer will be no. All Jordanians stand with me on Jerusalem." These types of steps for appeasing an increasingly restive public arguably are vital for the government of Jordan, which has limited financial options for addressing discontent. Although the government has continued to work with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on fiscal reforms, public debt has ballooned to 95% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and most of the government's budget is dedicated to salaries, pensions, and debt servicing, leaving few additional options to fund public sector job programs. King Abdullah II recently traveled to the United Kingdom, where UK officials pledged to partially guarantee a $1.9 billion World Bank loan to Jordan. In summer 2018, Gulf countries pledged $2.5 billion to Jordan in combined grants and loans. Country Background Although the United States and Jordan have never been linked by a formal treaty, they have cooperated on a number of regional and international issues for decades. Jordan's small size and lack of major economic resources have made it dependent on aid from Western and various Arab sources. U.S. support, in particular, has helped Jordan deal with serious vulnerabilities, both internal and external. Jordan's geographic position, wedged between Israel, Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, has made it vulnerable to the strategic designs of its powerful neighbors, but has also given Jordan an important role as a buffer between these countries in their largely adversarial relations with one another. Jordan, created by colonial powers after World War I, initially consisted of desert or semidesert territory east of the Jordan River, inhabited largely by people of Bedouin tribal background. The establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 brought large numbers of Palestinian refugees to Jordan, which subsequently unilaterally annexed a Palestinian enclave west of the Jordan River known as the West Bank. The original "East Bank" Jordanians, though probably no longer a majority in Jordan, remain predominant in the country's political and military establishments and form the bedrock of support for the Jordanian monarchy. Jordanians of Palestinian origin comprise an estimated 55% to 70% of the population and generally tend to gravitate toward the private sector due to their alleged general exclusion from certain public-sector and military positions. The Hashemite Royal Family Jordan is a hereditary constitutional monarchy under the prestigious Hashemite family, which claims descent from the Prophet Muhammad. King Abdullah II (age 57) has ruled the country since 1999, when he succeeded to the throne upon the death of his father, the late King Hussein, after a 47-year reign. Educated largely in Britain and the United States, King Abdullah II had earlier pursued a military career, ultimately serving as commander of Jordan's Special Operations Forces with the rank of major general. The king's son, Prince Hussein bin Abdullah (born in 1994), is the designated crown prince. The king appoints a prime minister to head the government and the Council of Ministers (cabinet). On average, Jordanian governments last no more than 15 months before they are dissolved by royal decree. The king also appoints all judges and is commander of the armed forces. Political System and Key Institutions The Jordanian constitution, most recently amended in 2016, gives the king broad executive powers. The king appoints the prime minister and may dismiss him or accept his resignation. He also has the sole power to appoint the crown prince, senior military leaders, justices of the constitutional court, and all 75 members of the senate, as well as cabinet ministers. The constitution enables the king to dissolve both houses of parliament and postpone lower house elections for two years. The king can circumvent parliament through a constitutional mechanism that allows provisional legislation to be issued by the cabinet when parliament is not sitting or has been dissolved. The king also must approve laws before they can take effect, although a two-thirds majority of both houses of parliament can modify legislation. The king also can issue royal decrees, which are not subject to parliamentary scrutiny. The king commands the armed forces, declares war, and ratifies treaties. Finally, Article 195 of the Jordanian Penal Code prohibits insulting the dignity of the king (lèse-majesté), with criminal penalties of one to three years in prison. Jordan's constitution provides for an independent judiciary. According to Article 97, "Judges are independent, and in the exercise of their judicial functions they are subject to no authority other than that of the law." Jordan has three main types of courts: civil courts, special courts (some of which are military/state security courts), and religious courts. In Jordan, state security courts administered by military (and civilian) judges handle criminal cases involving espionage, bribery of public officials, trafficking in narcotics or weapons, black marketeering, and "security offenses." The king may appoint and dismiss judges by decree, though in practice a palace-appointed Higher Judicial Council manages court appointments, promotions, transfers, and retirements. Although King Abdullah II in 2013 laid out a vision of Jordan's gradual transition from a constitutional monarchy into a full-fledged parliamentary democracy, in reality, successive Jordanian parliaments have mostly complied with the policies laid out by the Royal Court. The legislative branch's independence has been curtailed not only by a legal system that rests authority largely in the hands of the monarch, but also by electoral laws designed to produce propalace majorities with each new election. Due to frequent gerrymandering in which electoral districts arguably are drawn to favor more rural progovernment constituencies over densely populated urban areas, parliamentary elections have produced large progovernment majorities dominated by representatives of prominent tribal families. In addition, voter turnout tends to be much higher in progovernment areas since many East Bank Jordanians depend on family/tribal connections as a means to access patronage jobs. The Economy With few natural resources and a small industrial base, Jordan has an economy that depends heavily on external aid, tourism, expatriate worker remittances, and the service sector. Among the long-standing problems Jordan faces are poverty, corruption, slow economic growth, and high levels of unemployment. The government is by far the largest employer, with between one-third and two-thirds of all workers on the state's payroll. These public sector jobs, along with government-subsidized food and fuel, have long been part of the Jordanian government's "social contract" with its citizens. In the past decade, this arrangement between state and citizen has become more strained. When oil prices skyrocketed between 2007 and 2008, the government had to increase its borrowing in order to continue fuel subsidies. The 2008 global financial crisis was another shock to Jordan's economic system, as it depressed worker remittances from expatriates. The unrest that spread across the region in 2011 further exacerbated Jordan's economic woes, as the influx of hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees increased demand for state services and resources. Moreover, tourist activity, trade, and foreign investment decreased in Jordan after 2011 due to regional instability. Finally, Jordan, like many other countries, has experienced uneven economic growth, with higher growth in the urban core of the capital Amman and stagnation in the historically poorer and more rural areas of southern Jordan. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit , Amman is the most expensive Arab city and the 25 th -most expensive city to live in globally. Popular economic grievances have spurred the most vociferous protests in Jordan. Youth unemployment is high, as it is elsewhere in the Middle East, and providing better economic opportunities for young Jordanians outside of Amman is a major challenge. Large-scale agriculture is not sustainable because of water shortages, so government officials are generally left providing young workers with low-wage, relatively unproductive civil service jobs. How the Jordanian education system and economy can respond to the needs of its youth has been and will continue to be one of the defining domestic challenges for the kingdom in the years ahead. 2018 Public Protests and International Response Over the past year, Jordan's efforts to cut spending and raise revenue have faced significant public resistance. In 2016, the IMF and Jordan reached a three-year, $723 million extended fund facility (EFF) agreement that commits Jordan to improving the business environment for the private sector, reducing budget expenditures, and reforming the tax code. As a result, in 2017 Jordan enacted a Value Added Tax (VAT) on common goods to raise revenue in line with IMF-mandated reforms. To comply further with IMF-mandated reforms, the Jordanian government drafted a new tax bill to increase personal income taxes and thus raise government revenue and ease the public debt burden. The draft tax bill would have lowered the minimum taxable income level in order to expand the tax base from 4.5% of workers to 10%. It also would have raised corporate taxes on banks and reclassified tax evasion as a felony rather than a misdemeanor. In late May 2018, as the bill drew closer to passage and after an IMF team visited Jordan to review its economic reform plan, demonstrations began across the country. On May 30, Jordanian unions and professional associations held a massive general strike against the tax bill and were joined by many younger protesters who denounced recent price hikes on fuel and electricity. Days later, King Abdullah II ordered the government to freeze a 5.5% increase in the price of fuel and a 19% increase in electricity prices. For days, protests continued throughout the country, with some protesters calling for parliament to be dissolved and the political system to be reformed. On June 4, Prime Minister Hani Mulki resigned, and King Abdullah II appointed Education Minister and former World Bank economist Omar Razzaz as prime minister. A change in prime minister is considered fairly routine in Jordanian politics, and protesters decried it as an insufficient response to their demands. Large-scale demonstrations continued for two more days, and on June 7 the government announced that it was withdrawing the bill from immediate consideration and sending it back to parliament for revision. On June 11, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia held a summit in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, where they collectively pledged $2.5 billion for Jordan. The aid included a $1 billion deposit at the Central Bank of Jordan. The IMF supported the Jordanian government's decision to revise the tax bill, noting that fiscal reforms should not come at the expense of political stability. This was not the first time that the Jordanian monarchy backtracked on reforms in the face of public pressure. In 1989, 1996, and 2012, Jordanian monarchs responded to mass demonstrations with limited political reforms (new elections and electoral laws, constitutional amendments, anticorruption measures) that did not fundamentally alter the political system. In times of crisis, the government often appeals for Jordanian unity, while calling the opposition divisive or even disloyal. King Abdullah II's turn toward the Gulf for a financial bailout also has precedents. In 2012, at the height of unrest in the Middle East, the Gulf Cooperation Council countries pledged $5 billion to Jordan. In fall 2018, the Jordanian government proposed a new draft tax bill which raises personal and family exemptions for the poorest citizens. The Gulf monarchies also followed through with their $2.5 billion pledge to Jordan, providing (as mentioned above) $1 billion in central bank deposits, $600 million in loan guarantees, $750 million in direct budgetary support (spread over five years), and $150 million for school construction. In December 2018, parliament approved final modifications to the law, and personal income tax rates were adjusted to ensure that the poorest taxpayers were not adversely affected. Beyond the Gulf Arab monarchies, the international community also has increased efforts to boost economic growth in Jordan. In February 2019, the United Kingdom hosted an international donor's conference for Jordan, referred to as The London Initiative 2019. At the conference, donors (UK, France, Japan, and the European Investment Bank) pledged $2.6 billion to Jordan spread over several years. At the conference, the World Bank also announced that pending final approval, it intended to provide $1.9 billion in concessional loans to Jordan over the next two years. Syrian Refugees in Jordan Since 2011, the influx of Syrian refugees has placed tremendous strain on Jordan's government and local economies, especially in the northern governorates of Mafraq, Irbid, Ar Ramtha, and Zarqa. Due to Jordan's low population, it has one of the highest per capita refugee rates in the world. As of March 2019, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that there are 670,238 registered Syrian refugees in Jordan; 83% of all Syrian refugees live in urban areas, while the remaining 17% live in three camps—Azraq, Zaatari, and the Emirati Jordanian Camp (Mrajeeb al Fhood). Another 41,000 refugees are stranded in the desert along the northeastern Jordanian area bordering Syria and Iraq, known as Rukban. Though most of the refugees stranded at Rukban are women and children, a June 2016 IS terrorist attack near the border led Jordanian authorities to close the area, and access to Rukban is sporadic. In 2018, Syrian government forces reestablished control of southern Syria and often have prevented U.N. food shipments from reaching Rukban. Rukban is located within a 35-mile, U.S.-established "de-confliction zone" surrounding U.S. forces based at the At Tanf garrison near the Syrian-Iraqi-Jordanian triborder area. In recent months, Syrian and Russian reports have accused the United States of using refugees stranded at Rukban as "human shields" to protect the U.S. garrison at At Tanf from being attacked. In response, the U.S. Department of Defense issued a statement in March 2019, saying "Despite Syrian and Russian propaganda to the contrary, the United States is not restricting the movement of IDPs into or out of the camp at Rukban. The United States fully supports a process to allow IDPs freedom of movement that is free from coercion and allows for safe, voluntary, and dignified departures for those wishing to leave Rukban." According to the United Nations: Discussions are ongoing with the main parties involved, including the Government of Syria, the Russian Federation, the United States and the Government of Jordan to further clarify the process and to address the concerns that have been raised by people in Rukban. The United Nations continues to reiterate the importance of a carefully planned, principled approach that ensures respect for core protection standards and does not expose vulnerable, and in many cases traumatized, displaced people to additional harm. All movements must be voluntary, safe, well-informed and dignified, with humanitarian access assured throughout. In parallel, the United Nations also continues to strongly advocate for additional humanitarian assistance for those who remain in Rukban. Water Scarcity and Israeli-Jordanian-Palestinian Water Deal Jordan is among the most water-poor nations in the world and ranks among the 10 countries with the lowest rate of renewable fresh water per capita. According to the Jordan Water Project at Stanford University, Jordan's increase in water scarcity over the last 60 years is attributable to an approximate 5.5-fold population increase since 1962, a decrease in the flow of the Yarmouk River due to the building of dams upstream in Syria, gradual declines in rainfall by an average of 0.4 mm/year since 1995, and depleting groundwater resources due to overuse. The illegal construction of thousands of private wells also has led to unsustainable groundwater extraction. The large influx of Syrian refugees has heightened water demand in the north and, according to USAID, "many communities in Jordan have long experienced tensions over water scarcity even before the arrival of 657,433 registered Syrian refugees in the last five years." To secure new sources of fresh water, Jordan has pursued water cooperative projects with its neighbors. On December 9, 2013, Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority signed a regional water agreement (officially known as the Memorandum of Understanding on the Red-Dead Sea Conveyance Project, see Figure 5 ) to pave the way for the Red-Dead Canal, a multibillion-dollar project to address declining water levels in the Dead Sea. The agreement was essentially a commitment to a water swap, whereby half of the water pumped from the Red Sea is to be desalinated in a plant to be constructed in Aqaba, Jordan. Some of this water is to then be used in southern Jordan. The rest is to be sold to Israel for use in the Negev Desert. In return, Israel is to sell fresh water from the Sea of Galilee to northern Jordan and sell the Palestinian Authority discounted fresh water produced by existing Israeli desalination plants on the Mediterranean. The other half of the water pumped from the Red Sea (or possibly the leftover brine from desalination) is to be channeled to the Dead Sea. The exact allocations of swapped water were not part of the 2013 MOU and were left to future negotiations. In 2017, with Trump Administration officials seemingly committed to reviving the moribund Israeli-Palestinian peace process, U.S. officials focused on finalizing the terms of the 2013 MOU. In July 2017, the White House announced that U.S. Special Representative for International Negotiations Jason Greenblatt had "successfully supported the Israeli and Palestinian efforts to bridge the gaps and reach an agreement," with the Israeli government agreeing to sell the Palestinian Authority (PA) 32 million cubic meters (MCM) of fresh water. However, one 2018 report indicated that some Israeli officials may have had misgivings about the project and were seeking to pull out of the deal. According to one unnamed U.S. official cited by the report, "The United States told Israel that the U.S. supports the project and expects Israel to live up to its obligations under the Red-Dead agreement or find a suitable alternative that is acceptable to Israel and Jordan." In January 2019, Israel's Minister for Regional Cooperation Tzachi Hanegbi told Bloomberg News that he expects the Israeli cabinet to approve the Red Sea-Dead Sea project and that Israel and Jordan will each pledge $40 million per year to the project for 25 years. Congress has supported the Red-Dead Sea Conveyance Project. P.L. 114-113 , the FY2016 Omnibus Appropriations Act, specifies that $100 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF) be set aside for water sector support for Jordan, to support the Red Sea-Dead Sea water project. In September 2016, USAID notified Congress that it intended to spend $100 million in FY2016 ESF-Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) assistance on Phase One of the project. U.S. Relations U.S. officials frequently express their support for Jordan. President Trump has acknowledged Jordan's role as a key U.S. partner in countering the Islamic State, as many U.S. policymakers advocate for continued robust U.S. assistance to the kingdom. Annual aid to Jordan has nearly quadrupled in historical terms over the last 15 years. Jordan also hosts U.S. troops. According to President Trump's December 2018 War Powers Resolution Report to Congress, "At the request of the Government of Jordan, approximately 2,795 United States military personnel are deployed to Jordan to support Defeat-ISIS operations, enhance Jordan's security, and promote regional stability." The Trump Administration has enacted changes to long-standing U.S. policies on Israel and the Palestinians, which Palestinians have criticized as unfairly punitive and biased toward Israel, and Jordan has found itself in a difficult political position. While King Abdullah II seeks to maintain strong relations with the United States, the issue of Palestinian rights resonates with much of the Jordanian population; more than half of all Jordanian citizens originate from either the West Bank or the area now comprising the state of Israel. In trying to balance U.S.-Jordanian relations with concern for Palestinian rights, King Abdullah II has refrained from directly criticizing the Trump Administration, while urging the international community to return to the goal of a two-state solution that would ultimately lead to an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Jordan The United States has provided economic and military aid to Jordan since 1951 and 1957, respectively. Total bilateral U.S. aid (overseen by the Departments of State and Defense) to Jordan through FY2017 amounted to approximately $20.4 billion. Jordan also has received hundreds of millions in additional military aid since FY2014 channeled through the Defense Department's various security assistance accounts. Currently, Jordan is the third-largest recipient of annual U.S. foreign aid globally, after Afghanistan and Israel. U.S.-Jordanian Agreement on Foreign Assistance On February 14, 2018, the United States and Jordan signed a new Memorandum of Understanding (or MOU) on U.S. foreign assistance to Jordan. The MOU, the third such agreement between the United and Jordan, commits the United States to provide $1.275 billion per year in bilateral foreign assistance over a five-year period for a total of $6.375 billion (FY2018-FY2022). This latest MOU represents a 27% increase in the U.S. commitment to Jordan above the previous iteration and is the first five-year MOU with the kingdom. The previous two MOU agreements had been in effect for three years. Economic Assistance The United States provides economic aid to Jordan for (1) budgetary support (cash transfer), (2) USAID programs in Jordan, and (3) loan guarantees. The cash transfer portion of U.S. economic assistance to Jordan is the largest amount of budget support given to any U.S. foreign aid recipient worldwide. In November 2018, USAID notified Congress that it intended to obligate a record $745 million in FY2018 ESF (base and OCO) for a cash transfer to Jordan. U.S. cash assistance is provided in order to help the kingdom with foreign debt payments, Syrian refugee support, and fuel import costs (Jordan is almost entirely reliant on imports for its domestic energy needs). According to USAID, ESF cash transfer funds are deposited in a single tranche into a U.S.-domiciled interest-bearing account and are not commingled with other funds. USAID programs in Jordan focus on a variety of sectors including democracy assistance, water conservation, and education (particularly building and renovating public schools). In the democracy sector, U.S. assistance has supported capacity-building programs for the parliament's support offices, the Jordanian Judicial Council, the Judicial Institute, and the Ministry of Justice. The International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute also have received U.S. grants to train, among other groups, the Jordanian Independent Election Commission (IEC), Jordanian political parties, and members of parliament. In the water sector, the bulk of U.S. economic assistance is devoted to optimizing the management of scarce water resources. As mentioned above, Jordan is one of the most water-deprived countries in the world. USAID subsidizes several waste treatment and water distribution projects in the Jordanian cities of Amman, Mafraq, Aqaba, and Irbid. U.S. Sovereign Loan Guarantees (or LGs) allow recipient governments (in this case Jordan) to issue debt securities that are fully guaranteed by the United States government in capital markets, effectively subsidizing the cost for governments of accessing financing. Since 2013, Congress has authorized LGs for Jordan and appropriated $413 million in ESF (the "subsidy cost") to support three separate tranches, enabling Jordan to borrow a total of $3.75 billion at concessional lending rates. Humanitarian Assistance for Syrian Refugees in Jordan The U.S. State Department estimates that, since large-scale U.S. aid to Syrian refugees began in FY2012, it has allocated more than $1.3 billion in humanitarian assistance from global accounts for programs in Jordan to meet the needs of Syrian refugees and, indirectly, to ease the burden on Jordan. According to the State Department, U.S. humanitarian assistance is provided both as cash assistance to refugees and through programs to meet their basic needs, such as child health care, education, water, and sanitation. According to USAID, U.S. humanitarian assistance funds are enabling UNICEF to provide health assistance for around 40,000 Syrians sheltering at the informal Rukban and Hadalat settlements along the Syria-Jordan border berm, including water trucking, the rehabilitation of a water borehole, and installation of a water treatment unit in Hadalat. Military Assistance U.S.-Jordanian military cooperation is a key component in bilateral relations. U.S. military assistance is primarily directed toward enabling the Jordanian military to procure and maintain U.S.-origin conventional weapons systems. According to the State Department, Jordan receives one of the largest allocations of International Military Education and Training (IMET) funding worldwide, and IMET graduates in Jordan include "King Abdullah II, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Vice Chairman, the Air Force commander, the Special Forces commander, and numerous other commanders." Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and DOD Security Assistance FMF overseen by the State Department is designed to support the Jordanian armed forces' multiyear (usually five-year) procurement plans, while DOD-administered security assistance supports ad hoc defense systems to respond to immediate threats and other contingencies. FMF may be used to purchase new equipment (e.g., precision-guided munitions, night vision) or to sustain previous acquisitions (e.g., Blackhawk helicopters, AT-802 fixed-wing aircraft). FMF grants have enabled the Royal Jordanian Air Force to procure munitions for its F-16 fighter aircraft and a fleet of 28 UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters. As a result of the Syrian civil war and U.S. Operation Inherent Resolve against the Islamic State, the United States has increased military aid to Jordan and channeled these increases through DOD-managed accounts. Although Jordan still receives the bulk of U.S. military aid through the FMF account, Congress has authorized defense appropriations to strengthen Jordan's border security. Since FY2015, total DOD security cooperation funding for Jordan has amounted to $887.7 million. Excess Defense Articles In 1996, the United States granted Jordan Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status, a designation that, among other things, makes Jordan eligible to receive excess U.S. defense articles, training, and loans of equipment for cooperative research and development. In the last five years, excess U.S. defense articles provided to Jordan include two C-130 aircraft, HAWK MEI-23E missiles, and cargo trucks.

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is considered a key U.S. partner in the Middle East. Although the United States and Jordan have never been linked by a formal treaty, they have cooperated on a number of regional and international issues over the years. Jordan's strategic importance to the United States is evident given ongoing instability in neighboring Syria and Iraq, Jordan's 1994 peace treaty with Israel, and uncertainty over the trajectory of Palestinian politics. Jordan also is a longtime U.S. partner in global counterterrorism operations. U.S.-Jordanian military, intelligence, and diplomatic cooperation seeks to empower political moderates, reduce sectarian conflict, and eliminate terrorist threats. U.S. officials frequently express their support for Jordan. U.S. support, in particular, has helped Jordan address serious vulnerabilities, both internal and external. Jordan's small size and lack of major economic resources have made it dependent on aid from Western and various Arab sources. President Trump has acknowledged Jordan's role as a key U.S. partner in countering the Islamic State, as many U.S. policymakers advocate for continued robust U.S. assistance to the kingdom. Annual aid to Jordan has nearly quadrupled in historical terms over the last 15 years. The United States has provided economic and military aid to Jordan since 1951 and 1957, respectively. Total bilateral U.S. aid (overseen by the Departments of State and Defense) to Jordan through FY2017 amounted to approximately $20.4 billion. Jordan also hosts over 2,000 U.S. troops. Public dissatisfaction with the economy is a pressing concern for the monarchy. In 2018, widespread protests erupted throughout the kingdom in opposition to a draft tax bill and price hikes on fuel and electricity. Though peaceful, the protests drew immediate international attention because of their scale. Since then, the government has frozen or softened the proposed fiscal measures, but also has continued to work with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on fiscal reforms to address a public debt that has ballooned to 96.4% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). As the Trump Administration has enacted changes to long-standing U.S. policies on Israel and the Palestinians, which the Palestinians have criticized as unfairly punitive and biased toward Israel, Jordan has found itself in a difficult political position. While King Abdullah II seeks to maintain strong relations with the United States, he rules over a country where the issue of Palestinian rights resonates with much of the population; more than half of all Jordanian citizens originate from either the West Bank or the area now comprising the state of Israel. In trying to balance U.S.-Jordanian relations with Palestinian concerns, King Abdullah II has refrained from directly criticizing the Trump Administration on its recent moves, while urging the international community to return to the goal of a two-state solution that would ultimately lead to an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital. The 116th Congress may consider legislation pertaining to U.S. relations with Jordan. On February 18, 2016, President Obama signed the United States-Jordan Defense Cooperation Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-123), which authorizes expedited review and an increased value threshold for proposed arms sales to Jordan for a period of three years. It amended the Arms Export Control Act to give Jordan temporarily the same preferential treatment U.S. law bestows upon NATO members and Australia, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea. S. 28, the United States-Jordan Defense Cooperation Extension Act, would reauthorize the United States-Jordan Defense Cooperation Act (22 U.S.C. 275) through December 31, 2022.

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Introduction The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940 (SSCRA) provided civil protections and rights to individuals based on their service in the U.S. Armed Forces. Congress enacted the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA) in 2003 in response to the increased deployment of Reserve and National Guard military and as a modernization and restatement of the protections and rights previously available to servicemembers under the SSCRA. The SCRA has been amended since its initial passage, and Congress continues to consider amendments from time to time. Most recently, Congress has enacted amendments to extend certain benefits to the spouses of servicemembers. Congress has long recognized the need for protective legislation for servicemembers whose service to the nation compromises their ability to meet obligations and protect their legal interests. For example, Congress tolled all judicial actions during the Civil War, civil and criminal, for persons who "by reason of resistance to the execution of the laws of the United States, or the interruption of the ordinary course of judicial proceedings," were beyond the reach of legal process. During World War I, Congress passed the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1918, which, unlike many state laws of the Civil War era, did not create a moratorium on legal actions against servicemembers, but instead directed trial courts to apply principles of equity to determine the appropriate action to take whenever a servicemember's rights were implicated in a controversy. During World War II, Congress essentially reenacted the expired 1918 statute as the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940, and then amended it substantially in 1942 to take into account the new economic and legal landscape that had developed between the wars. Congress enacted amendments to the SSCRA on several occasions during subsequent conflicts, including in 2002, when the benefits of the SSCRA were extended to certain members of the National Guard. The SCRA is an exercise of Congress's power to raise and support armies and to declare war. The purpose of the act is to provide for, strengthen, and expedite the national defense by protecting servicemembers, enabling them to "devote their entire energy to the defense needs of the Nation." The SCRA protects servicemembers by temporarily suspending certain judicial and administrative proceedings and transactions that may adversely affect their legal rights during military service. The SCRA does not provide forgiveness of all debts or the extinguishment of contractual obligations on behalf of active-duty servicemembers, nor grant absolute immunity from civil lawsuits. Instead, the SCRA provides for the suspension of claims and protection from default judgments against servicemembers. In this way, it seeks to balance the interests of servicemembers and their creditors, spreading the burden of national military service to a broader portion of the citizenry. Courts are to construe the SCRA liberally in favor of servicemembers, but retain discretion to deny relief in certain cases. Many of the SCRA provisions are especially beneficial for Reservists activated to respond to a national crisis, but some provisions are also useful for career military personnel. One measure that affects many who are called to active duty is the cap on interest at an annual rate of 6% on debts incurred prior to a person's entry into active-duty military service. Other measures protect military families from being evicted from rental or mortgaged property ; from cancellation of life insurance ; from taxation in multiple jurisdictions ; from foreclosure of property to pay taxes that are due ; and from losing certain rights to public land. This report provides a section-by-section summary of the SCRA. Title I: General Provisions Definitions—Section 101 (50 U.S.C. § 3911). For the purposes of the SCRA, the following definitions apply: 'Servicemember' —Persons covered by the SCRA include members of the "uniformed services" found in 10 U.S.C. § 101(a)(5), which include the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, and the commissioned corps of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the Public Health Service. 'Military Service' —"Military service" includes "active duty" as defined in 10 U.S.C. § 101(d)(1); National Guard service as service under a call to active service authorized by the President or the Secretary of Defense for a period of more than 30 consecutive days under 32 U.S.C. § 502(f) for purposes of responding to a national emergency declared by the President and supported by federal funds; for officers of the Public Health Service or the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, "active service" (not further defined); and any period during which a servicemember is absent from duty on account of sickness, wounds, leave, or other lawful case. "Active duty" for armed services is defined in 10 U.S.C. § 101(d)(1) as "full-time duty in the active military service of the United States ... [including] full-time training duty, annual training duty, and attendance, while in the active military service, at a school designated as a service school by law or by the Secretary of the military department concerned." "Active military service" is not further defined in Section 101 of Title 10, U.S. Code , although "active service" is given the meaning "service on active duty or full-time National Guard duty," in 10 U.S.C. § 101(d)(3). Under the SSCRA, the definition of "military service" included language referring to "periods of training or education under the supervision of the United States preliminary to induction into military service." Under the SCRA, persons on active duty and attending a service school are covered, while persons attending training prior to entering active duty, such as officer candidates, may not be covered. It is unclear, for example, whether "active military service" under 10 U.S.C. § 101(d) covers training as a member of the Reserve Officer Training Corps or attendance at a military academy. The SCRA does not cover servicemembers who are absent without leave (AWOL). It apparently does not protect individuals who are in a delayed entry status. Nor does it cover personnel entered on the temporary disability retirement list (TDRL). It does not cover civilian contractor employees who are deployed to serve alongside the Armed Forces. 'Period of military service' —A servicemember's "period of military service" begins when she enters military service and ends on the date of release from military service or upon death during military service. 'Dependent' —"Dependent" is defined as a servicemember's spouse or child (as defined for purposes of veterans' benefits, in 38 U.S.C. § 101 ), or another individual for whom the servicemember provided more than one-half of the support in the 180 days prior to an application for relief under the act. This language appears to codify courts' treatment of the term "dependent" as relating to financial dependency rather than strict familial relationships. 'Court' —The term "court" includes federal and state courts and administrative agencies, whether or not a court or agency of record. 'State' —"State" includes commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States and the District of Columbia. 'Secretary Concerned' —With respect to a member of the Armed Forces, "secretary concerned" refers to the meaning in 10 U.S.C. § 101(a)(9) with respect to commissioned officers of the Public Health Service, the Secretary of Health and Human Services; and with respect to commissioned officers of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the Secretary of Commerce. 'Motor Vehicle' —"Motor vehicle" is a vehicle driven or drawn by mechanical power and manufactured primarily for use on public streets, roads, and highways, but does not include a vehicle operated only on a rail line (as defined in 49 U.S.C. § 30102(a)(7)). 'Judgment' —"Judgment" includes any judgment, decree, order, or ruling, final or temporary. Jurisdiction and applicability of act—Section 102 (50 U.S.C. § 3912). The SCRA applies everywhere in the United States, including the District of Columbia, and in any territory "subject to the jurisdiction of" the United States. It applies to any civil judicial or administrative proceeding in any court or agency in any jurisdiction subject to the act; however, it does not apply to criminal proceedings. Protection of persons secondarily liable—Section 103 (50 U.S.C. § 3913). The SCRA extends protection to persons who share a debt with one or more covered servicemembers or have secondary liability as a "surety, guarantor, endorser, accommodation maker, co-maker, or other person who is or may be primarily or secondarily subject to the obligation or liability" at issue. If the SCRA provisions are invoked as to the servicemember, the court has discretion to grant a stay, postponement, or suspension of the proceedings against such persons, or to set aside or vacate a judgment. Whether a court grants such relief appears to be influenced by equitable considerations, including whether the servicemember is able to appear in court, whether the servicemember's presence is necessary for the defense, and whether an unjust forfeiture could otherwise result. If the servicemember is only nominally a party to the suit, as in cases of negligence where the insurance company might be considered the "true defendant," the modern trend is to deny a stay. Courts do not have the discretion to grant a stay to a co-debtor if the servicemember has not been granted a stay. The act added the term "co-maker" to the list of persons who may be entitled to a stay in an action that has been stayed with respect to a servicemember. This effectively codifies courts' interpretations of the previous version of the SCRA. Bail bondsmen who are unable to procure the appearance of the principal due to that person's active-duty service receive protection under the act. In such a case, the court hearing the charge may not enforce the bond during the period of military service of the accused, and has the discretion to return the bail in its entirety to the bail bondsman in the interest of equity and justice. While some courts have interpreted this subsection to allow for no discretion, others have required sureties to make a further showing that the appearance of the principal was in fact prevented due to military service and that the surety made an effort to secure the appearance of the principal in court. Persons who are primarily or secondarily liable on the obligation of a person in military service may waive their rights under the SCRA, but such a waiver must be executed in a separate instrument from that which creates the obligation. If the individual executes the waiver and then enters active military service, the waiver as applied to the individual, or to the dependents of the person, is invalidated. In the event that the waiver is executed after the person receives orders to active duty, but before entering active service, the waiver remains valid. Extension of protections to citizens serving with allied forces—Section 104 (50 U.S.C. § 3914). The SCRA protects citizens of the United States who serve in the Armed Forces of allies of the United States in the prosecution of a war or military action, as long as such service is similar to the service in the U.S. Armed Forces. Notification of benefits—Section 105 (50 U.S.C. § 3915). Military authorities are required to provide servicemembers with written information describing their rights and benefits under the SCRA. Information for members of the Armed Forces and their dependents on rights and protections of the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act—Section 105a (50 U.S.C. § 3916). Military authorities must provide servicemembers with pertinent information on rights and protections available under the SCRA during initial orientation or, in the case of reserve servicemembers, during initial orientation and when mobilized. Additionally, military authorities may provide pertinent information to the adult dependents of servicemembers on the rights and protections available to the servicemembers and dependents. Extension of rights and protections to Reserves ordered to report for military service and to persons ordered to report for induction—Section 106 (50 U.S.C. § 3917). Benefits under Titles I, II, and III of the SCRA are applicable to servicemembers during the period of time between the date they receive their induction or activation orders and the date they report for active duty. The coverage ends in the event the orders to active duty are revoked. Waiver of rights pursuant to written agreement—Section 107 (50 U.S.C. § 3918). Servicemembers may waive some of the benefits of the SCRA by agreeing to modify or terminate a contract, lease or bailment, or an obligation secured by a mortgage, trust, deed, lien, or other security in the nature of a mortgage. In order for the waiver to be effective, it must be executed during or after the servicemember's period of active military service. The written agreement must specify the legal instrument to which the waiver applies and, if the servicemember is not a party to that instrument, the identity of the servicemember concerned. This section extends the protections to servicemembers covered under Section 106 of the act (reservists ordered into active duty and persons ordered to report for induction). Congress amended the SCRA in 2004 to include two additional requirements for a waiver to be effective. The first requirement is that it must be executed separately from the legal instrument to which it applies. The second is that it must be printed in at least 12-point type. Exercise of rights under act not to affect certain future financial transactions—Section 108 (50 U.S.C. § 3919). The SCRA protects servicemembers from any penalty imposed solely due to their invocation of rights. In other words, a lender cannot revoke a covered person's credit card or exercise foreclosure rights because the servicemember requests that the rate of interest be capped at 6% pursuant to the SCRA. The SCRA provides that no stay, postponement, or suspension of any tax, fine, penalty, insurance premium, or other civil obligation or liability applied for, or received by, a person in military service can be the sole basis for any of the following: 1. a determination by a lender (or other person) that the servicemember is unable to pay the civil obligation or liability; 2. a decision by a creditor to deny or to revoke credit; to change the terms of an existing credit arrangement; or to refuse to grant credit in substantially the amount, or on substantially the terms, requested; 3. an adverse creditworthiness report by, or to, a consumer credit information enterprise; 4. an insurer's refusal to sell insurance coverage; 5. an annotation by the creditor or a credit reporting agency to reference the servicemember's reserve or National Guard military status on her credit report; or 6. a change in the terms offered or conditions required for issuance of insurance. Creditors may, however, take adverse action against a servicemember who fails to comply with obligations after they are adjusted by reason of the act. The act does not appear to preclude insurers or creditors from offering different terms or conditions, denying credit, or taking other adverse actions based solely on the servicemember's status in anticipation that the servicemember might later invoke a right under the act. Legal representatives—Section 109 (50 U.S.C. § 3920). Legal representatives, such as attorneys or persons possessing a power of attorney, may assert the benefits of the act when acting on the servicemember's behalf. Title II: General Relief Sections 201 through 208 describe the general relief available in most kinds of court actions. They serve to suspend civil liabilities of military personnel and preserve causes of action either for or against them. Protection of servicemembers against default judgments—Section 201 (50 U.S.C. § 3931). In a civil lawsuit, the failure of the defendant to appear in court may result in the award of a default judgment on behalf of the plaintiff. The SCRA protects servicemembers from default judgments in civil actions when they are unable to appear in court due to military service. An amendment to the act in 2008 added language clarifying that civil lawsuits include child custody proceedings. Before a court can grant a default judgment, a plaintiff must file an affidavit stating that the defendant is not on active duty in military service showing necessary facts to support the affidavit or that the plaintiff was unable to determine whether or not the defendant is in military service. A false affidavit is punishable by imprisonment for up to one year, a fine of up to $1,000, or both. The court, before entering a default judgment, must also appoint an attorney to represent the person on active duty in order to protect her legal rights and interests. However, if the attorney appointed to the case cannot locate the servicemember, actions by the attorney do not waive any defenses or otherwise bind the servicemember. Additionally, if the court is unable to determine if a defendant is in military service, the court may require a bond which may later be used to indemnify the defendant if it is determined that she was in military service and the judgment against the defendant is set aside or vacated in part. Moreover, if a court enters a default judgment against a servicemember, the court may set aside its judgment if the servicemember files a motion within 60 days after leaving active military service and can demonstrate that military service prejudiced her availability to appear in court and that there are meritorious or legal defenses to the suit. This section does not provide a means to challenge judgments resulting from cases in which the servicemember made an appearance before the court. Some courts have found that a communication to the court regarding the servicemember's military status, and the resulting applicability of the SCRA to the suit, constitutes an appearance and bars asserting certain defenses and negates the right to petition to have the judgment overturned. An informal communication, such as a letter or a telegram to the court asking for protection under the SCRA should not be counted as an appearance, but some courts have found that a letter from a legal assistance attorney constitutes an appearance, waiving the servicemember's protection against a default judgment. An appearance by defendant's counsel may also waive protection, unless the counsel was appointed pursuant to this section. Subsection (h) contains a provision to protect the rights of a bona fide purchaser by stating that vacating, setting aside, or reversing any judgment under the SCRA will not impair any right or title acquired by any bona fide purchaser for value under the judgment. Therefore, it may be impossible to recover property that had been attached to satisfy a default judgment, although the servicemember would have the right to damages for the value of the property. Stay of proceedings when servicemember has notice—Section 202 (50 U.S.C. § 3932). A court may stay further proceedings in civil litigation, including any child custody proceeding, where the servicemember's ability to participate in the litigation, as either the plaintiff or the defendant, is materially affected by absence due to military service. It applies to servicemembers who are in military service or within 90 days after termination or release from military service. The court must grant a stay of at least 90 days upon receipt of a qualifying application by the servicemember. The court may also grant a stay with respect to co-defendants who are not themselves protected under the SCRA. In an application for a stay under this section, the servicemember must set forth facts stating the manner in which current military duty requirements materially affect her ability to appear, and state a date when she will be able to appear. Additionally, the servicemember must submit a letter from her commanding officer certifying that leave is not authorized to attend proceedings at that time. While a stay is considered under the SCRA as a reasonable imposition upon an individual citizen on behalf of those discharging their obligations to the common defense, it is not available to shield wrongdoing or lack of diligence or to postpone relief indefinitely, or to be used to stay proceedings in matters where the interests or safety of the general public may be at stake. Courts may deny a stay in cases involving purely legal issues or where the servicemember is not the true party in interest or in which the presence of the individual is not essential. A request for a stay under this section does not constitute an appearance for jurisdictional purposes or a waiver of any substantive or procedural defense. Therefore, a servicemember may apply for relief without waiving the right, for example, to assert that the court has no jurisdiction in the case. Moreover, additional stays may be granted based on continuing material effect of military duty. If additional stays are denied, the court must appoint counsel to represent the servicemember. A servicemember who is unsuccessful in securing a stay under this section is precluded from seeking the protections against default judgments granted under Section 201. This section is inapplicable to Section 301 (protection from eviction or distress). Fines and penalties under contracts—Section 203 (50 U.S.C. § 3933). Whenever an action is stayed by the court pursuant to the SCRA, penalties that would otherwise accumulate against the person for failing to carry out the terms of a contract cannot be imposed for the period the stay remains in effect. Even without a stay, courts have the discretion to reduce or waive any fines or penalties imposed on a servicemember for failure to carry out the terms of a contract, but only if the servicemember's ability to perform those obligations was impaired by military service. This provision would cover penalties such as early termination fees or fines for late payments. Stay or vacation of execution of judgments, attachments, and garnishments—Section 204 (50 U.S.C. § 3934). If a servicemember is materially affected by reason of service from complying with a court judgment or order, the court may, on its own motion, and must, on the application of the servicemember, stay the execution of any judgment or order against the servicemember and vacate or stay an attachment or a garnishment of property, money, or debts in the possession of the person on active duty for actions or proceedings commenced against the servicemember. This section applies to actions brought against the servicemember before or during the period of military service or within 90 days after termination of service. Duration and term of stays; co-defendants not in service—Section 205 (50 U.S.C. § 3935). Stays granted by courts under the SCRA can remain in effect for the entire period of a servicemember's military service plus 90 days, or any part thereof. As a practical matter, however, courts do not look favorably on protracted stays, and expect most military members to make themselves available to participate in proceedings within a reasonable period of time, especially during peacetime if the servicemember is not stationed abroad. With the court's approval, suits against any co-defendants not in military service may proceed even if the suit has been stayed with respect to the person in the military. This section does not apply to Sections 202 (stays for actions for which the defendant has notice) and 701 (anticipatory relief). These sections contain their own rules for determining the maximum length of a stay. Statute of limitations—Section 206 (50 U.S.C. § 3936). This section tolls the time period applicable for bringing any action by a covered servicemember for an amount of time equal to the person's period of military service. There is no discretion for the court to deny the tolling of an action. The time of service is not counted in determining the servicemember's deadline, for example, for exercising the right to redeem real estate that has been sold or forfeited to enforce an obligation, tax, or assessment. The section applies not just to an action or proceeding in a court but also to any federal or state board, commission, or agency, and may be exercised by the servicemember's heirs, executors, administrators, or assigns, regardless of whether the right or cause of action arose prior to or during the person's period of military service. There is no need to show that military service adversely affected the servicemember's ability to meet relevant obligations. The section does not toll the statute of limitations with respect to federal tax laws. Maximum rate of interest on debts incurred before military service—Section 207 (50 U.S.C. § 3937). This section caps the maximum interest charged on any debt incurred by a servicemember individually or with the servicemembers' spouse jointly prior to entering active duty at a rate of interest no higher than six percent (6%) a year, if the servicemember's ability to pay is materially affected by active-duty status. The interest above the 6% cap is to be forgiven by the creditor and does not accrue to be owed after the debtor's release from active duty. The monthly payments of an obligation or liability covered by this section are to be reduced by the amount in excess of the 6%, but the terms of the original obligation are to remain the same. The 6% cap is not automatic. The servicemember must provide written notice to the creditor along with a copy of her military orders or other appropriate indicator of military service not later than 180 days after the servicemember is released from military service. A court may grant a creditor relief from this section if, in the opinion of the court, the ability of the servicemember to pay an interest rate in excess of 6% is not materially affected by the military service. A servicemember who wrongly receives an adverse credit report or has her credit limit reduced or further credit denied after invoking the 6% interest cap provision may seek relief through the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) provisions for "adverse actions" and consumer remedies for "willful or negligent noncompliance by credit reporting agencies upon consumer showing of causal connection between inaccurate credit report and denial of credit or other consumer benefit." Historically, federally guaranteed student loans were not eligible for the 6% interest rate cap. Section 428(d) of the Federal Family Education Loan Program, which addressed the applicability of usury laws to federally guaranteed student loans, excluded these loans from the SCRA interest rate limitation. In 2001, the Higher Education Opportunity Act amended Section 428(d) to permit explicitly application of the SCRA interest rate cap to federally guaranteed student loans. As of August 14, 2008, federally guaranteed student loans are treated like all other debts incurred prior to entering active duty. Loans disbursed prior to enactment of the amendment are not covered and therefore are not subject to the 6% interest rate limitation. Additionally, servicemembers currently on active duty who received student loans prior to entering active duty will not be able to claim the 6% cap, but may be entitled to defer repayment or pursue benefits under other laws. In 2008, the Veterans' Benefits Improvement Act added two new subsections to the SCRA addressing penalties for violation of Section 207. Section 207, as amended, closely mirrors the penalty and preservation of remedies provisions found in other sections of the SCRA. Anyone who violates the maximum interest prohibition may be fined or imprisoned for not more than one year. An individual claiming protection under this section may also be awarded consequential or punitive damages. The 6% cap does not apply to loans made after entry into military service; however, Congress has enacted legislation to protect servicemembers and their dependents from certain practices of so-called payday lenders. Child custody protection—Section 208 (50 U.S.C. § 3938). Added in 2014, Section 208 provides protections to servicemembers in connection with child custody proceedings beyond the stay provisions discussed above. If a court enters a temporary change in custody based solely on the deployment or anticipated deployment of a servicemember, the order must expire no later than the conclusion of a period of time justified by the deployment. The section also prohibits a court from considering deployment or possible deployment of the custodial parent as the sole factor in determining the best interest of the child when contemplating a permanent change in custody. Finally, the section does not create a right to remove the child custody dispute to a federal court; and it does not preempt state law that provides greater protections for deploying servicemembers. Annual notice regarding child custody protection— (50 U.S.C. § 3938a). This provision, added in 2016, requires the secretaries of each military department to ensure that servicemembers receive annually, and prior to deployment, notice of the child custody protections under the SCRA. Title III: Rent, Installment Contracts, Mortgages, Liens, Assignments, Leases, Telephone Service Contracts Sections 301 through 308 provide protections from eviction and loss of other benefits or rights due to the failure of a servicemember to meet payments on rent, loans, mortgages, or insurance policies. Unlike the other parts of the SCRA, the rights described in these sections can be asserted by a servicemember's dependents in their own right. Evictions and distress—Section 301 (50 U.S.C. § 3951). Under this section as it was enacted in 2003, unless a court orders otherwise, a landlord or person with "paramount title" may not evict a servicemember or her dependents from a rented home (such as an apartment, a trailer, or a house occupied as a residence by the servicemember or dependents) if the rent is $2,400 per month or less. Nor can the property be subject to distress without a court order during the servicemember's period of service. Traditionally, the rent ceiling is adjusted annually for inflation, and in 2018 the amount was $3,716.73. In a case where the landlord seeks a court order for the eviction of a servicemember or her dependents, the court is obligated to stay the proceedings for up to three months if the servicemember requests it. In the alternative, the court may adjust the obligation under the lease to preserve the interests of all the parties. Section 202 (stay of proceedings when servicemember has notice) of the act is not applicable to this section. The section provides that anyone who knowingly takes part in an eviction or distress in violation of this section can be punished by imprisonment for up to one year, a fine as provided in Title 18, U.S. Code , or both. Additionally, courts are allowed to grant landlords, or other persons with "paramount title," equitable relief in cases where a stay is granted. For example, a court might reduce the monthly rent for the duration of a servicemember's deployment but require the servicemember to make up the difference over time after her return. If the court orders payment to the landlord, Subsection (d) authorizes the Secretary concerned to make an allotment from the servicemember's military pay to satisfy the terms of the order. Protection under installment contracts for purchase or lease—Section 302 (50 U.S.C. § 3952). Except by court order, no one who has collected a deposit as partial payment for property, where the remainder of the price is to be paid in installments, can repossess the property or cancel the sale, lease, or bailment because of the failure to meet the terms of the contract, if the buyer enters active-duty military service after paying the deposit and subsequently breaches the terms of the contract. A violation of this section is punishable by imprisonment for up to one year, a fine as provided in Title 18, U.S. Code , or both. A court may order the cancellation of the installment sale, mandating the return of the property to the seller as well as the return of paid installments to the buyer, or the court may stay the proceedings, or order such other disposition of the property the court deems equitable. This section does not permit a servicemember unilaterally to terminate a contract, although the servicemember may be able to bring an action under Section 701 for anticipatory relief, as discussed further below. Mortgages and trust deeds—Section 303 (50 U.S.C. § 3953). This section covers servicemembers who, prior to a period of active military service, entered into a property transaction subject to a mortgage, a trust deed, or other security loan. The sale, foreclosure, or seizure of property during a servicemember's period of military service, and one year after, is prohibited unless such action is taken under a court order issued prior to foreclosure on the property, or pursuant to an agreement under Section 107 of the act. A federal appeals court has held that the prohibition on foreclosure bars the charging of fees associated with a notice of foreclosure, even though no foreclosure took place. If the servicemember's ability to comply with the terms of the obligation is materially affected by military service and the servicemember thereby breaches the terms of a mortgage, trust deed, or other loan, the court may adjust the obligation to preserve the interests of all parties, or may stay any proceeding against the servicemember for a period of time as justice and equity require. Property foreclosure or other similar action against a servicemember protected by this section taken without benefit of a court order is punishable by imprisonment of up to one year, a fine as provided by Title 18, U.S. Code , or both. Settlement of stayed cases relating to personal property—Section 304 (50 U.S.C. § 3954). If a court stays an action for foreclosure on property, repossession, or the cancellation of a sales contract against a servicemember, the court can appoint three disinterested persons to appraise the property and, on the basis of the appraisal, order the amount of the servicemember's equity to be paid back to the person on active duty as a condition for allowing the foreclosure, repossession, or cancellation. The court is required to consider whether its action would cause undue hardship to the servicemember's dependents—for example, through loss of use of the property. Termination of residential or motor vehicle leases—Section 305 (50 U.S.C. § 3955). Military persons who live in rental property are allowed to terminate leases to which they are a party early under certain circumstances. This section applies to (1) property leased for a dwelling or for professional, business, or farm use, or other similar purpose, where the person leasing the property later enters active duty in military service, or where the servicemember executes the lease while in military service and thereafter receives military orders for a permanent change of duty station (PCS) or to deploy with a military unit for a period of at least 90 days; and (2) motor vehicle leases for personal or business transportation where the person later enters active military service of not less than 180 days or where the servicemember executes the lease while in military service and thereafter receives PCS orders outside of the continental United States or to deploy with a military unit for at least 180 days. Servicemembers who rent premises are advised to ensure the rental agreement contains a "military" clause to allow for early termination of a lease in case of military orders to deploy. In 2004, this right to terminate leases early was expanded to also apply to joint leases. The added language specifies that any lease terminated pursuant to this section also terminates any obligation a dependent of the lessee may have under the lease. In 2018, the right to terminate leases was extended to include the spouse of a servicemember who dies while in military service or performing full-time National Guard duty, active Guard and Reserve duty, or inactive-duty training. The spouse must exercise the right within one year after the death of the servicemember. The servicemember may terminate a property lease early by delivering by hand, private business carrier, or mailing return receipt requested, a written notice and a copy of her military orders to the lessor or its agent. As for a residential lease, if the lease called for monthly rent, then cancellation takes effect 30 days after the next due date for rent following the day the written notice is sent. For all other property leases, the cancellation is considered effective at the end of the month following the month in which the written notice is sent. Any unpaid rent prior to the effective cancellation must be paid to the landlord on a prorated basis. The servicemember is entitled to a refund of any prepaid rent for time after the lease is canceled within 30 days of the termination of the lease. The 2010 amendment to the act prohibits the lessor from charging an early termination fee, but the servicemember is liable for any taxes, summonses, or other obligation in accordance with the terms of the lease. A court can make adjustments if the landlord petitions the court for an "equitable offset" prior to the date the lease is effectively canceled. To terminate a motor vehicle lease early under this section, the servicemember must return the motor vehicle to the lessor or its agent no later than 15 days after the date of delivery of the written notice. The cancellation is considered effective on the day on which the vehicle is returned to the lessor. The lessor cannot impose early termination fees on a servicemember, but the servicemember is still responsible for taxes, summonses, title and registration fees, and any other obligation and liability under the lease, including reasonable fees for excessive wear, use, and mileage. Anyone who knowingly seizes personal effects, withholds a security deposit, or otherwise interferes with the return of any other property belonging to a person who has lawfully canceled a lease pursuant to this section is subject to punishment. Specifically, anyone who seizes or otherwise interferes with the removal of property in order to satisfy a claim for rent due for any time after the date of the effective cancellation of the lease may be punished by imprisonment for up to one year, a fine as provided in Title 18, U.S. Code , or both. Termination of telephone service contracts, multichannel video programming, and internet access service contracts —Section 305a (50 U.S.C. § 3956). Originally added to the SCRA by the Veterans' Benefits Improvement Act of 2008, this section was replaced in its entirety by the Veterans' Benefits Act of 2010. Under the new Section 305a, a servicemember is able to terminate a contract for telephone exchange service, in addition to the previously covered cellular phone service, in certain circumstances. In 2018, Congress added cable and internet services. To be eligible, the servicemember must receive orders to relocate for a period of at least 90 days to a location that does not support the contract, and the contract must have been entered into prior to receiving the orders. The telephone service provider is required to cancel the contract without assessing an early termination charge and, in the case of a period of relocation less than three years in duration, allow the servicemember to retain the phone number previously terminated. Additionally, dependents of the servicemember may also terminate their cellular telephone service if they accompany the servicemember to an area that does not support the service contract. If the servicemember re-subscribes to the carrier within 90 days of returning from relocation, the service provider is prohibited from charging a reinstatement fee, but may charge ordinary fees for equipment installation or acquisition. A servicemember who terminates any service must return provider-owned equipment to the service provider within ten days after service is disconnected. Protection of life insurance policy—Section 306 (50 U.S.C. § 3957). If a person entering military service has used a life insurance policy as collateral to secure a debt, she is protected from foreclosure on the policy to satisfy the debt unless the assignee first obtains a court order, except where the assignee is the insurance company itself (in which case the debt amounts to a policy loan). A court may refuse to grant the order if it determines that the servicemember's ability to repay is materially affected by military service. This rule applies during the entire time the insured is on active duty plus one year. The rule does not apply in three cases: (1) if the insured gives her written permission to let a creditor make a claim against the policy in order to satisfy the debt involved; (2) if any premiums required under the life insurance policy are due and unpaid (excluding premiums guaranteed under Title IV of this act); or (3) if the person whose life is insured has died. Anyone who knowingly takes or attempts action contrary to this section shall be punished by imprisonment for up to a year, or a fine as provided in Title 18, U.S. Code , or both. Enforcement of storage liens—Section 307 (50 U.S.C. § 3958). A servicemember with property or effects subject to a lien, including liens for storage, repair, or cleaning of property, is protected from foreclosure or enforcement of the lien during the period of military service plus three months unless a court finds that the servicemember's ability to meet the obligation is not materially affected by military service. A court can also stay the proceedings in these types of enforcement actions or order some other disposition of the case it deems equitable to the parties. This section does not affect the scope of Section 303 (mortgages and trust deeds). Anyone who knowingly takes any action contrary to the provisions shall be punished by imprisonment up to one year, a fine as provided by Title 18, U.S. Code , or both. Servicemembers whose property is seized and sold in order to satisfy a lien may recover damages. Extension of protections to dependents—Section 308 (50 U.S.C. § 3959). The benefits of the rules provided under Title III (50 U.S.C. §§ 3951-59) of the SCRA are extended to dependents of active-duty personnel in their own right. A dependent must petition a court for permission to take advantage of those rules, and the court is not required to grant permission if it determines that the ability of the applicant dependent to comply with the terms of the obligation, contract, lease, or bailment has not been materially impaired by the military service of the person upon whom the applicant is dependent. Title IV: Life Insurance Title IV provides relief from insurance premiums and guarantees servicemembers' continued coverage under certain commercial life insurance policies. A servicemember who applies for protection under this title will eventually have to pay all of the premiums due, either to the insurer or to the government, in the event the United States pays the delinquent premiums. In this way, servicemembers may defer payments of insurance premiums without losing coverage. There is no need to show that military service materially affects the servicemember's ability to pay. Definitions—Section 401 (50 U.S.C. § 3971). For the purposes of Title IV of the SCRA, the following definitions apply: 'Policy' — "Policy" includes any individual contract for whole, endowment, universal, or term life insurance (other than group term life insurance), or benefit similar to life insurance that comes from membership in any fraternal or beneficial association that satisfies all of the following conditions: 1. the policy does not include a provision limiting the amount of insurance coverage based on the insured's military service; 2. the policy does not require the insured to pay higher premiums if she is in military service; 3. the policy does not include a provision that limits or restricts coverage if the insured engages in any activity required by military service; and 4. the policy is "in force" (premiums have to be paid on time before any benefit guaranteed by these sections of the law can be claimed) for at least 180 days before the insured enters military service. 'Premium' —"Premium" is the amount specified in the policy to be paid to keep the policy in force. 'Insured' —"Insured" is defined as a servicemember who owns a life insurance policy. 'Insurer' —"Insurer" includes any firm, corporation, partnership, association, or business that can, by law, provide insurance and issue contracts or policies. Insurance rights and protections—Section 402 (50 U.S.C. § 3972). Either the person insured, an insured's legal representative, or, when the insured person is outside the United States, a beneficiary of the insurance policy must apply for protection of a covered policy under the act. The written application must be submitted to the insurer with a copy sent to the Secretary of Veterans Affairs. The total amount of policies covered is limited to the greater of $250,000, or an amount equal to the maximum limit of the Servicemember's Group Life Insurance (SGLI). The maximum limit of SGLI currently is $400,000. Application for insurance protection—Section 403 (50 U.S.C. § 3973). In order to invoke protection for the policies covered under this part of the SCRA, the servicemember, her legal representative, or beneficiary must submit an application in writing identifying the policy and insurer, with an acknowledgment that the insured's rights under the policy are subject to and modified by the provisions of Title IV of this act. The Secretary of Veterans Affairs may require the parties to provide additional information as necessary. The insurer then reports the action to the Department of Veterans Affairs as required by regulation (found in 38 C.F.R. Part 7). By making an application for the protection guaranteed by these sections of the law, the insurer and insured are deemed to have accepted any necessary modifications to the terms of the life insurance policy. Policies entitled to protection and lapse of protections—Section 404 (50 U.S.C. § 3974). The Secretary of Veterans Affairs determines whether a policy is entitled to the protection guaranteed by these sections, and is responsible for notifying the insurer and the insured of that determination. Once the policy is deemed qualified for protection, it may not lapse or otherwise be terminated or be forfeited for the nonpayment of a premium, or interest or indebtedness on a premium. This protection applies during the time the insured person is in military service and for two years after she leaves military service. Policy restrictions—Section 405 (50 U.S.C. § 3975). The approval of the Secretary of Veterans Affairs is necessary for a policyholder to make certain withdrawals and other payments or credits under a policy protected by this part of the SCRA. If such approval is not obtained, rather than paying dividends to the insured or reinvesting them to purchase additional coverage, the insurer must add dividends to the value of the policy to be treated as a credit. The insured is not permitted to take out loans against the policy or cash it in while it is protected without the approval of the Secretary of Veterans Affairs. However, the insured retains the right to modify the designation of beneficiaries. Deduction of unpaid premiums—Section 406 (50 U.S.C. § 3976). If a covered policy matures due to the death of the insured, the insurance company must reduce its settlement with the beneficiaries by the amount of any unpaid premiums (plus interest). If the rate of interest is not specified in the policy, it will be the same rate applied to policy loans in other policies issued at the time when the insured's policy was issued. Deductions must be reported to the Secretary of Veterans Affairs. Premiums and interest guaranteed—Section 407 (50 U.S.C. § 3977). In the event the insured fails to pay any premiums owed on a policy at the time the guarantee period expires and the cash surrender value of the policy is less than the amount due, the insurance company may terminate the policy and the United States will pay the insurance company the difference between the cash surrender value and the amount of the outstanding debt. The amount paid to the insurer becomes a debt owed by the insured to the United States that is not dischargeable in bankruptcy. Any funds collected from the insured are added to appropriations for the payment of guaranteed premiums under this part of the SCRA. If the unpaid premiums do not exceed the policy's cash surrender value, the insurer will treat them as a policy loan. Regulations—Section 408 (50 U.S.C. § 3978). The Secretary of Veterans Affairs is responsible for promulgating regulations to carry out the provisions of Title IV, which are found in 38 C.F.R. Part 7. Review of findings of fact and conclusions of law—Section 409 (50 U.S.C. § 3979). The findings of fact and conclusions of law made by the Secretary in administering these sections are subject to review by the Board of Veterans' Appeals and the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans' Claims. Judicial review is permitted only to the extent provided by chapter 72 of Title 38, U.S. Code , which sets forth the scope of review and procedures to be followed. Title V: Taxes and Public Lands The fifth broad category of provisions of the SCRA provides certain rights regarding public lands and relieves servicemembers from having to pay certain taxes to multiple jurisdictions. It also prevents the attachment of certain personal or real property in order to satisfy tax liens. Taxes respecting personal property, money, credits, and real property—Section 501 (50 U.S.C. § 3991). A servicemember's personal property (including motor vehicles) and real property used by the servicemember as a home, a business, or for agriculture—as long as the property continues to be occupied by the servicemember's family or employees—cannot be sold to collect unpaid taxes or assessments (other than income taxes) without a court order. A court may stay an action to force the sale of property belonging to a person in military service for the collection of unpaid taxes if it finds that the debtor's ability to pay the taxes is materially affected by her military service. In the event a servicemember's property is sold to satisfy tax liabilities, the servicemember has the right to redeem the property for up to six months after the person leaves military service unless a longer period is provided by state or local law. If a servicemember fails to pay a tax or assessment on property covered by this section when due, the amount unpaid and due shall accrue interest at 6%, but no other penalties or interest may be assessed. Additionally, real and personal properties owned jointly by a servicemember and her dependents are covered by this section. However, properties owned through a separate business entity such as a limited liability company may not be covered by this section, even if the servicemember is the sole owner. Rights in public lands—Section 502 (50 U.S.C. § 3992). Servicemembers cannot be deemed to have forfeited any right (including mining and mineral leasing rights) they had for the use of public lands of the United States prior to entering military service based on absence from the land or failure to perform required maintenance or other improvements. Holders of permits and licenses for grazing livestock on public lands who subsequently enter military service may suspend the licenses for the duration of military service plus six months, allowing the servicemember to obtain a reduction or cancellation of fees for the duration of that time. Desert-land entries—Section 503 (50 U.S.C. § 3993). Servicemembers with claims to desert lands prior to entering military service may not have those claims contested or canceled for failing to expend required amounts in improvements annually, or for failing to effect the reclamation of the claim during the period of service or during hospitalization or rehabilitation due to an injury or disability incurred in the line of duty. The protection is in force during and for six months after she leaves military service or is released from hospitalization. An honorably discharged servicemember whose line-of-duty disability prevents her reclamation of land or ability to pay may apply for a patent for the entered or claimed land. To qualify for this protection, notice must be given to the appropriate land office within six months after entering military service. Mining claims—Section 504 (50 U.S.C. § 3994). Certain requirements for maintaining a mining claim are suspended during the holder's period of active military service and for six months thereafter or for the duration of hospitalization due to wounds or disability suffered while in the line of duty. During this period, the mining claim cannot be forfeited due to nonperformance of the requirements of the lease. To qualify for this protection, the servicemember must notify the appropriate claims office of commencement of military service within 60 days after the end of the assessment year in which the service began. Mineral permits and leases—Section 505 (50 U.S.C. § 3995). Any person who holds a permit or a lease under the federal mineral leasing laws who enters military service is allowed to suspend all operations during military service (plus six months), in which case the period of service is not counted as part of the term of the person's permit or license and the holder is not required to pay rentals or royalties during that time. However, to qualify for these privileges, the servicemember has six months after entry into military service to notify the Bureau of Land Management of her entry into service. Perfection or defense of rights—Section 506 (50 U.S.C. § 3996). Nothing in Title V of the SCRA prevents a person in military service from taking any action authorized by law or regulations of the Department of the Interior to assert, perfect, or protect the rights covered in those sections. A servicemember may submit any evidence required to assert this right in the form of affidavits or notarized documents. Affidavits provided pursuant to this section are subject to 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Distribution of information concerning benefits of title—Section 507 (50 U.S.C. § 3997). The Secretary of the Interior is responsible for providing military authorities with information explaining the benefits of this Title (except those pertaining to taxation) as well as related application forms for distribution among servicemembers. Land rights of servicemembers—Section 508 (50 U.S.C. § 3998). Protection of land rights under this Title are extended to servicemembers under the age of 21. Residency requirements related to the establishment of a residence within a limited time will be suspended for six months after release from military service for both the servicemember and her spouse. Regulations—Section 509 (50 U.S.C. § 3999). The Secretary of the Interior has the authority to issue regulations necessary to carry out Title V of the act, other than the sections that concern taxes. Income taxes—Section 510 (50 U.S.C. § 4000). The collection of federal, state, and local income taxes (excluding Social Security (FICA) taxes) a servicemember owes, either before or after entering service, must be deferred during the period of service and for up to six months after release, if her ability to pay the taxes is materially affected by military service. No interest or other penalty may be imposed on a debt deferred under this section. The statute of limitations for paying the debt is tolled for the length of the person's period of service plus nine months. Residence for tax purposes—Section 511 (50 U.S.C. § 4001). In order to prevent multiple state taxation on the property and income of military personnel serving within various tax jurisdictions by reason of military service, this section provides that servicemembers neither lose nor acquire a state of domicile or residence for taxation purposes when they serve at a duty station outside their home state in compliance with military orders. A servicemember who conducts other business while in military service may be taxed by the appropriate jurisdiction for any resulting income. However, a tax jurisdiction cannot include the military compensation earned by nonresident servicemembers to compute the tax liability imposed on the non-military income earned by the servicemember. Spouses of servicemembers neither lose nor acquire a state of domicile or residence for taxation purposes when they are present in any tax jurisdiction solely to be with the servicemember in compliance with the servicemember's orders. However, the guarantee of residency is contingent on the spouse having the same original residence or domicile as the servicemember. As amended in 2018, the section provides that in the tax year during which the marriage takes place, the spouse may elect to use the same residence for tax purposes regardless of the date of marriage. The section further provides that income earned by a spouse while in a duty-station tax jurisdiction, other than her original residence or domicile, solely to be with the servicemember may not be taxed by that tax jurisdiction. Personal property of a servicemember and her spouse will not be subject to taxation by a jurisdiction other than their domicile or residence while stationed at a duty station outside of their home state. However, relief from personal property taxes does not depend on whether the property is taxed by the state of domicile. Property used for business is not exempt from taxation. An Indian servicemember whose legal residence or domicile is a federal Indian reservation will pay taxes only under the laws of the federal Indian reservation and not to the state where the reservation is located. "Tax jurisdiction" is defined to include "a State or a political subdivision of a State," which includes the District of Columbia and any commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States (Section 101(6)). "Taxation" includes licenses, fees, or excises imposed on an automobile that is also subject to licensing, fees, or excise in the servicemember's state of residence. "Personal property" includes intangible and tangible property including motor vehicles. Title VI: Administrative Remedies Title VI provides courts the authority to deny remedies to servicemembers that would abuse the purpose of the SCRA. It also indicates how a servicemember's military and financial status can be established in court, and covers other procedural requirements. Inappropriate use of act—Section 601 (50 U.S.C. § 4011). A court may deny a servicemember the protections of the act with respect to a transfer it finds was made with the intent to exploit the provisions of the act, in order to delay enforcement of the contract, to obtain reduced interest rates, or to avoid obligations with respect to property that was the subject of the transaction. Certificates of service; persons reported missing—Section 602 (50 U.S.C. § 4012). A certificate signed by the Secretary concerned serves as prima facie evidence in an action under the SCRA that the individual is in the military service, the date of induction or discharge, residence at time of induction, rank and rate of pay, and other facts relevant to asserting rights under the SCRA. A servicemember who is missing in action is presumed to continue in military service until she is accounted for or her death has been reported to the Department of Defense or determined by a court or board with the authority to make such determination. Interlocutory orders—Section 603 (50 U.S.C. § 4013). Courts may revoke, modify, or extend any interlocutory orders they issued pursuant to the SCRA. Title VII: Further Relief Title VII of the SCRA provides a means for servicemembers to petition for relief without having to wait until a creditor brings an enforcement action against them. It also treats powers of attorney and provides relief from liability insurance premiums for servicemembers who need to maintain such policies for their civilian occupations. Anticipatory relief—Section 701 (50 U.S.C. § 4021). A servicemember may initiate an action for relief prior to defaulting on any pre-service obligation or liability, including tax obligations, rather than waiting for the creditor to commence proceedings. Dependents do not have independent protection under this section as they do for the provisions of Title III. Courts may grant the following relief: 1. if the obligation involves payments of installments for the purchase of real estate (like a mortgage), the court can stay enforcement of the obligation by adding a period of time, no greater than the period of military service, to the remaining life of the contract, subject to the payment of the balance of principal and accumulated interest that remains unpaid at the termination of the applicant's military service, in equal installments over the duration of the extended life of the contract; and 2. for any other type of obligation, liability, tax, or assessment, the court can stay enforcement, for a period of time equal to the petitioner's period of military service, subject to payment of the balance of principal due plus accumulated interest in equal installments over the duration of the stay. If a stay has been granted under this section, no fine or penalty can be imposed for its duration as long as the servicemember complies with the terms and conditions of the stay. This provision allows servicemembers who are not yet in default on an obligation, but whose ability to make payments is materially affected by military service, to petition the court in effect to rewrite the contract by extending its life, allowing the servicemember to pay down the amount in arrears with equal installments over a longer of period of time. The servicemember must resume making regular payments on the debt after leaving active duty, in addition to the payments to make up for the smaller payments she made while on active duty. Power of attorney—Section 702 (50 U.S.C. § 4022). A valid power of attorney for a person who is declared to be missing in action is automatically extended for the entire period the person remains in a missing status, unless it expressly provides a date of expiration. The extension is limited to documents that designate the servicemember's spouse, parent, or named relative as the servicemember's attorney in fact. The power of attorney must have been executed during the servicemember's military service or before entry into active service but after receiving an order to report for military service or a notification from the Department of Defense that such an order could be forthcoming. Professional liability protection—Section 703 (50 U.S.C. § 4023). Certain persons who, prior to being called to active duty, were furnishing health care, legal, or any other services which the Secretary of Defense determines to be professional services and who had in effect a professional liability (i.e., malpractice) insurance policy may suspend payment of premiums on their liability insurance while they serve on active duty without losing any coverage. The section covers insurance policies that, according to their terms, would not continue to cover claims arising prior to a lapse in coverage unless the insured continues to pay premiums. Definitions — "Profession" is defined in Subsection (i) to include "occupation." Similarly, the expression "professional" includes the term "occupational." Neither "occupation" nor "occupational" is defined. Subsection (i) also defines "active duty," adopting the definition used in Section 101 of Title 10, U.S. Code . However, the provision is further limited to persons called to active duty (other than for training) under 10 U.S.C. §§ 688 (retired members of regular Armed Forces, members of the Retired Reserves, and members of the Fleet Reserve or Fleet Marine Corps Reserve); 12301(a) (activation of Reserves during war or national emergency declared by Congress); 12301(g) (member of Reserve component in captive status); 12302 (Ready Reserve); 12304 (Selected Reserve and certain Individual Ready Reserve members called to active duty other than during war or national emergency); 12306 (Standby Reserve); 12307 (Retired Reserve); and, if any of the preceding sections are invoked, Section 12301(d) (volunteer member of a Reserve component). Suspension of coverage —Professional liability insurance policies covered by this section are suspended from the time the insurer receives a request for protection until the insured requests in writing to have the policy reinstated. In the case of a joint insurance policy, no suspension of coverage is required for the policyholders who are not called to active duty. For example, if several physicians jointly purchase a group policy of malpractice insurance, and only one of them is called to active duty, the coverage of those not called to active duty need not be suspended by the insurer. Premiums —The insurer may not charge premiums for coverage that is suspended. The insurer must either refund any amount already paid for coverage that is suspended or, if the insured professional person chooses, apply the amount toward payment of any premium that comes due after coverage is reinstated. Liability during suspension —The insurer is not obligated to pay any claim that is based on a professional's actions (or inaction) during a period when a policy is suspended. In the case of claims involving obligations imposed by state law on a professional person to assure that her patients or clients will receive professional assistance in her absence to serve on active duty, the section clarifies that the failure of the professional person to satisfy such an obligation will generally be considered to be a breach that occurred before the professional person began active duty. In such a situation, the insurer would be liable for the claim. In the event a claim arises while the patient is receiving alternate care as arranged by the servicemember for patients during her absence, the insurer would not be liable for the claim. Actions against policyholder during suspension of coverage —In the event a malpractice suit (or administrative action) is filed during the period when the insurance is suspended, the litigation will be stayed until the end of the suspension period. The stay applies only where the malpractice is alleged to have occurred before the suspension began, and would thus be covered by the policy. Litigation stayed under this rule is deemed to be filed on the date the suspended insurance is reinstated. The period of any stay granted under this provision is not counted when computing whether or not the relevant statute of limitations has run. In the event that a professional person whose malpractice insurance coverage has been suspended should die during the period of the suspension, any stay of litigation or administrative action against the person under this section is lifted. In addition, the insurer providing the coverage that was suspended is to be liable under the policy just as if the deceased person had died while covered by the policy but before the claim was filed. Reinstatement of coverage —The insurer is required to reinstate the insurance coverage on the date the servicemember transmits a written request for reinstatement, which must occur within 30 days after the covered servicemember is released from active duty. The insurer must notify the policyholder of the due date for payment of any premium required for reinstatement of the policy, and that the premium must be paid within 30 days after the notice is received by the professional person. The section also limits the premium that the insurer can charge for reinstated coverage to the rate that would have applied if the servicemember had not been deployed. The insurer is not allowed to recoup missing premiums by charging higher rates for reinstated coverage. The insurer may charge higher rates for reinstated coverage if it raised the rates for all policyholders with similar coverage, provided that the servicemember would have had to pay a higher premium even if she had not suspended coverage. Health insurance reinstatement—Section 704 (50 U.S.C. § 4024). This section grants servicemembers who were called to military service, as described in § 703(a)(1), the right, upon termination or release from military service, to reinstatement of any health insurance policy that was in effect on the day before the servicemember entered military service, and that terminated at any time during her service. Servicemembers must apply for reinstatement within 120 days of termination or release from active duty. An insurer may not impose new exclusions from coverage or waiting periods for reinstatement of coverage with respect to conditions arising prior to or during the servicemember's period of military service, if such an exclusion or waiting period would not have applied during regular coverage and the condition has not been determined to be a disability incurred in the line of duty under 38 U.S.C. § 105. The section does not apply to employer-sponsored health insurance plans covered by the provisions of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA). Insurance plans covered by USERRA are subject to similar protections under 38 U.S.C. § 4317. In 2006, Congress added language to Section 704 limiting the ability for insurers to charge a servicemember premium increases on a health insurance policy covered by the section. The amount of the premium may not be increased, on a policy being reinstated for the balance of the period for which the coverage would have continued had it not been terminated, above an amount that would have been charged before termination. In the event that the premiums for similarly covered individuals increased during the terminated period, the increased premium may be assessed to the servicemember upon reinstatement of the policy. Guarantee of residency for military personnel and spouses of military personnel—Section 705 (50 U.S.C. § 4025). Military personnel and their spouses are not deemed to have changed their state of residence or domicile for the purpose of voting for any federal, state, or local office, solely because of their absence from the respective state in compliance with military or naval orders. As amended in 2018, the section provides that a spouse may elect to use the same residence regardless of the date of marriage. Business or trade obligations—Section 706 (50 U.S.C. § 4026). The assets of a servicemember are protected from attachments to satisfy business debts for which the servicemember is personally liable, as long as the assets sought to be attached are not held in connection with the business. The obligor would have the right to apply to the court for a modification of the servicemember's relief when warranted by equitable considerations. Title VIII: Civil Liability115 Title VIII provides the Attorney General the authority to bring civil actions against violators of the SCRA. Servicemembers who are aggrieved by a violation can join an action brought by the Attorney General or can initiate their own civil action against a violator. Enforcement by the Attorney General—Section 801 (50 U.S.C. § 4041). This section authorizes the U.S. Attorney General to commence a civil action in U.S. district court for violations of the SCRA by a person who (1) engages in a pattern or practice of violating the act; or (2) engages in a violation that raises an issue of significant public importance. Courts may grant any appropriate equitable or declaratory relief, including monetary damages. Additionally, courts, in order to vindicate the public interest, may assess a civil penalty up to $55,000 for a first violation, and up to $110,000 for subsequent violations. Finally, individuals alleging violations of the SCRA, for which the Attorney General has commenced an action, are authorized to intervene in previously commenced cases as a plaintiff. Private right of action—Section 802 (50 U.S.C. § 4042). In addition to the right to join a previously commenced case, persons aggrieved by a violation of the SCRA have the ability to commence a civil action in their own right. The court may grant appropriate equitable or declaratory relief, including monetary damages. The court is also authorized to award the costs of the action and reasonable attorney fees to an individual who prevails in a civil action under this section. Preservation of remedies—Section 803 (50 U.S.C. § 4043). This section provides that Sections 801 and 802 do not preclude or limit any other remedies available under the law, including consequential or punitive damages for violations of the SCRA.

Congress enacted the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA) in 2003 in response to the increased deployment of Reserve and National Guard military and as a modernization and restatement of the protections and rights previously available to servicemembers under the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940 (SSCRA). The SCRA has been amended since its initial passage, and Congress continues to consider amendments from time to time. Congress has long recognized the need for protective legislation for servicemembers whose service to the nation compromises their ability to meet obligations and protect their legal interests. The SCRA is an exercise of Congress's power to raise and support armies and to declare war. The purpose of the act is to provide for, strengthen, and expedite the national defense by protecting servicemembers, enabling them to "devote their entire energy to the defense needs of the Nation." The SCRA protects servicemembers by temporarily suspending certain judicial and administrative proceedings and transactions that may adversely affect their legal rights during military service. The SCRA does not provide forgiveness of all debts or the extinguishment of contractual obligations on behalf of active-duty servicemembers, nor does it grant absolute immunity from civil lawsuits. Instead, the SCRA provides for the suspension of claims and protection from default judgments against servicemembers. In this way, it seeks to balance the interests of servicemembers and their creditors, spreading the burden of national military service to a broader portion of the citizenry. Some protections are contingent on whether military service materially affects the servicemember's ability to meet obligations, while others are not. Courts are to construe the SCRA liberally in favor of servicemembers, but retain discretion to deny relief in certain cases. The Services are required to provide information to servicemembers explaining their rights under the SCRA. Many of the SCRA provisions are especially beneficial for Reservists activated to respond to a national crisis, but many provisions are also useful for career military personnel. One measure that affects many who are called to active duty is the cap on interest at an annual rate of 6% on debts incurred prior to a person's entry into active-duty military service. Creditors are required to forgive the excess interest and are prohibited from retaliating against servicemembers who invoke the 6% interest cap by submitting adverse credit reports solely on that basis. Other measures protect military families from being evicted from rental or mortgaged property; from cancellation of life insurance and professional liability insurance; from taxation in multiple jurisdictions; from losing domicile for voting and other purposes due to being stationed elsewhere; from losing child custody due to deployment or the possibility of deployment; from foreclosure of property to pay taxes that are due; and from losing certain rights to public land. The SCRA makes it unlawful for lienholders or lessors to foreclose or seize property owned or used by servicemembers without a court order. It also permits servicemembers to prematurely terminate leases and other term contracts without incurring any early termination penalties. Statutes of limitations that might otherwise prevent servicemembers from pursuing remedies in court or before any governmental agency, including state and local entities, are tolled for the duration of the servicemember's military service. Servicemembers may initiate an action in court for relief prior to defaulting on any pre-service obligation or liability, in order to obtain restructuring of loan repayments or other equitable relief without incurring any penalty. Servicemembers may bring an action in court to enforce their rights under the SCRA, or the Attorney General may bring a civil action in U.S. district court for violations of the SCRA by a person who (1) engages in a pattern or practice of violating the act; or (2) engages in a violation that raises an issue of significant public importance.

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Introduction This report provides a comprehensive summary of the federal financial assistance provided to the Gulf Coast states of Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas in response to the widespread destruction that resulted from Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma in 2005 and Hurricanes Gustav and Ike in 2008. The damages caused by the hurricanes are some of the worst in the history of the United States in terms of lives lost and property damaged and destroyed. The federal government played a significant role in the response to the hurricanes and Congress appropriated funds for a wide range of activities and efforts to help the Gulf Coast states recover and rebuild from the storms. In addition, Congress appropriated a significant amount of funds for mitigation activities and projects to reduce or eliminate the impacts of future storms. Though the storms happened over a decade ago, Congress remains interested in the types and amounts of federal assistance that were provided to the Gulf Coast for several reasons. For one, Congress continues to be interested in how the money has been spent, what resources have been provided to the region, and whether the money has reached the people and entities intended to receive the funds. The financial information is also useful for congressional oversight and evaluation of the federal entities that were responsible for response and recovery operations. Similarly, it gives Congress a general idea of the federal assets that are needed and can be brought to bear when catastrophic disasters take place in the United States. As such, the financial information from the storms can help frame the congressional debate concerning federal assistance for current and future disasters. The financial information provided in this report includes a summary of appropriations provided to the Gulf Coast states by Congress in response to the 2005 and 2008 hurricanes. In addition, when available, hurricane-specific and state-specific funding information is provided by federal entity. Background1 The 2005 hurricane season was a record-breaking season for hurricanes and storms. There were 13 hurricanes in 2005, breaking the old record of 12 hurricanes set in 1969. The 2005 season also set a record for the number of category 5 storms (three) in a season. Most of the damaging effects caused by the hurricanes were experienced in the Gulf Coast states of Louisiana, Arkansas, Florida, Mississippi, and Texas. The 2008 hurricane season was also an active hurricane season that caused additional damage in the Gulf Coast. Hurricane Katrina On August 23, 2005, Hurricane Katrina began about 200 miles southeast of Nassau in the Bahamas as a tropical depression. It became a tropical storm the following day. On August 24-25, 2005, the storm moved through the northwestern Bahamas and then turned westward toward southern Florida. Katrina became a hurricane just before making landfall near the Miami-Dade/Broward county line during the evening of August 25, 2005. The hurricane moved southwestward across southern Florida into the eastern Gulf of Mexico on August 26, 2005. Katrina then strengthened significantly, reaching category 5 intensity on August 28. On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina made landfall in southern Plaquemines Parish, LA. The storm affected a broad geographic area—stretching from Alabama, across coastal Mississippi, to southeast Louisiana. Hurricane Katrina was reported as a category 4 storm when it initially made landfall in Louisiana, but was later downgraded to a category 3 storm. Even as a category 3 storm, Hurricane Katrina was one of the strongest storms to impact the U.S. Gulf Coast. The force of the storm was significant. The winds to the east of the storm's center were estimated to be nearly 125 mph (see Figure 1 ). The Gulf Coast has had a history of devastating hurricanes, but Hurricane Katrina was singular in many respects. Approximately 1.2 million people evacuated from the New Orleans metropolitan area. While the evacuation helped to save lives, over 1,800 people died in the storm. In addition, Hurricane Katrina destroyed or made uninhabitable an estimated 300,000 homes and displaced over 400,000 citizens. Economic losses from the storm were estimated to be between $125 billion and $150 billion. Hurricanes Rita and Wilma Two other hurricanes made landfall in the Gulf Coast shortly after Hurricane Katrina that added to recovery costs and impeded recovery efforts. On September 24, 2005, Hurricane Rita made landfall on the Texas and Louisiana border as a category 3 storm. Rita also hit parts of Arkansas and Florida. Hurricane Rita caused widespread property damage to the Gulf Coast; however, there were few deaths or injuries reported. Rita produced rainfalls of 5 to 9 inches over large portions of Louisiana, Mississippi, and eastern Texas, with isolated amounts of 10 to 15 inches. In addition, storm surge flooding and wind damage occurred in southwestern Louisiana and southeastern Texas, with some surge damage occurring in the Florida Keys (see Figure 2 ). On October 24, 2005, Hurricane Wilma made landfall as a category 3 hurricane in Cape Romano, FL. The eye of Hurricane Wilma crossed the Florida Peninsula and then moved into the Atlantic Ocean north of Palm Beach (see Figure 3 ). Hurricane Wilma killed five people in Florida and caused widespread property damage in the Gulf Coast region. Hurricanes Gustav and Ike In 2008, the Gulf Coast was once again affected by storms that caused billions of dollars in additional damage. On September 1, 2008, Hurricane Gustav made landfall near Cocodrie, LA, as a category 2 storm, then swept across the region causing damages in Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, and Texas (see Figure 4 ). Gustav produced rains over Louisiana and Arkansas that caused moderate flooding along many rivers, and is known to have produced 41 tornadoes: 21 in Mississippi, 11 in Louisiana, 6 in Florida, 2 in Arkansas, and 1 in Alabama. Hurricane Ike made landfall as a category 2 storm near Galveston, Texas, on September 13, 2008, with maximum sustained winds of 110 mph. The hurricane weakened as it moved inland across eastern Texas and Arkansas. Hurricane Ike's storm surge devastated the Bolivar Peninsula of Texas, and surge, winds, and flooding from heavy rains caused widespread damage in other portions of southeastern Texas, western Louisiana, and Arkansas and killed 20 people in these areas (see Figure 5 ). Additionally, as an extratropical system over the Ohio Valley, Ike was directly or indirectly responsible for 28 deaths and more than $1 billion in property damage in areas outside of the Gulf Coast. Information Categories and Data Collection Methods The following two sections provide funding data and narratives describing the assistance that was provided to the Gulf Coast in response to the 2005 and 2008 hurricane seasons. Section I presents funding provided to the five Gulf Coast states (Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas) after Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, Wilma, Gustav, and Ike. Funding amounts were compiled by CRS analysts who reviewed legislative texts of supplemental appropriations. The amounts are disaggregated by federal entity and subentity, insofar as possible and applicable. The data are based on the analysts' interpretations of disaster assistance. Some data were excluded from Section I because CRS analysts found that the data either were too ambiguous or covered disasters not limited to the Gulf Coast. Certain amounts pertaining to a range of disasters were included, however, because CRS analysts determined that most of the funds went to the Gulf Coast states. Section II presents funding by federal agency. The amounts reported may reflect expenditures, obligations, allocations, or appropriations. The data in this section are not based solely on those in Section I . Rather, the data in Section II were derived from a variety of authoritative sources, including agency websites, CRS experts who received information directly from agencies, and governmental reports. Section II presents funding information by federal entity and includes a narrative summarizing each agency's disaster assistance efforts. The sections also provide the authorities that authorized the activities that were provided. When possible, funding data are provided in tabular form. It should be noted that the data on appropriations in Section I , Table 1 , are not directly comparable to funding data in Section II . The former were drawn solely from the public laws cited in the source note to Table 1 . The data in Section II were obtained, as cited in each subsection, from a range of published and unpublished sources, and include various fiscal years. Caveats and Limitations Funding data on federal (and nonfederal) assistance are not systematically collected. Given the absence of comprehensive federal information on disaster assistance, the data provided in this report should only be considered as an approximation, and should not be viewed as definitive. In addition to the above, the following caveats apply to this report: It is difficult to identify all of the federal entities that provide disaster relief because many federal entities provide aid through a wide range of programs, not necessarily through those designated specifically as "disaster assistance" programs. Because data on federal (and nonfederal) assistance are not systematically collected, funding data were drawn from a wide range of sources including published and unpublished data that have been collected at different times and under inconsistent reporting methods. Following the exodus of thousands of residents from the Gulf Coast states after Hurricane Katrina in 2005, many other states received federal assistance to cope with the influx of those seeking aid. The aid provided to the states outside the Gulf Coast is not discussed in this report. The appropriations language reviewed for Section I usually designates funds to a federal entity for a range of disasters without identifying how much funding is to be disbursed to each incident. For example, P.L. 110-329 , signed into law on September 30, 2008, provided funds for several disasters that occurred in 2008, including Hurricanes Gustav and Ike, wildfires in California, and the Midwest floods. Determining the funding amounts directed toward each individual disaster is difficult, if not impossible, unless the legislative text specifies these amounts. An additional difficulty occurs in tracking funding at the agency level because appropriations might be made, not to specific entities, but to budget accounts, and then allocated for specified purposes. The degree of transparency in reporting funding levels for disaster relief varies tremendously among federal entities. As an example, Congress requires the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to submit monthly status reports on the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF). The DRF is FEMA's disaster assistance account. The DRF is used to fund existing recovery projects (including reimbursements to other federal agencies for their work) and provide funding for future emergencies and disasters as needed. The DRF reports must detail obligations, allocations, and expenditures for Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma. This requirement has not been extended to other agencies, and scant data exist, particularly on a state-by-state basis, on other federal funding for emergencies and major disasters. Appropriations may be subject to transfers or rescissions after enactment of appropriations statutes. It is possible that such emendations to the initial appropriations have not been identified in this research. In addition to the above caveats, it should also be noted that there may have been funding changes since this report was originally published in 2013 that are not represented in this updated version. In some cases, additional obligations may have been provided and in other cases some funding may have been recouped or otherwise transferred. The funding information in this report should therefore be interpreted as illustrative as opposed to definitive, and used with appropriate caution. Section I: Summary of Gulf Coast Disaster Supplemental Appropriations Table 1 presents data on the appropriations enacted after Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, Wilma, Gustav, and Ike from FY2005 to FY2009, by federal entity and subentity, when possible and applicable. As mentioned earlier, in many cases funding for disaster relief is appropriated for multiple incidents. Therefore, Table 1 may include data on appropriations that also provided funding for non-Gulf Coast incidents. Some appropriations designated for a range of disasters were excluded, however, in an attempt to avoid artificially inflating the amount of funding directed to the Gulf Coast for hurricane relief. Since FY2005, at least 10 appropriations bills have been enacted to address widespread destruction caused by the 2005 and 2008 Gulf Coast hurricanes. These appropriations consisted of eight emergency supplemental appropriations acts, one reconciliation act, and one continuing appropriations resolution. In addition to these statutes that specifically identify the hurricanes or the Gulf Coast states, it is likely that regular appropriations legislation also provided assistance to the Gulf Coast. Because these statutes did not specify that they were providing such assistance, regular appropriations are not included in Table 1 . Section II. Agency-Specific Information on Gulf Coast Hurricane Federal Assistance In the course of this research, CRS identified 11 federal departments, 4 federal agencies (or other entities), and numerous subentities, programs, and activities that supplied roughly $121.7 billion in federal assistance to the Gulf Coast states after the major hurricanes of 2005 (Katrina, Rita, and Wilma) and 2008 (Gustav and Ike). Section II provides information on the most significant programs, or categories of programs, through which the aid was provided. Each narrative contains a summary of activities of each federal entity providing disaster relief. When possible, the information is presented in tabular form and is disaster and state specific. Unless otherwise specified, all figures are stated in nominal dollars. As mentioned earlier, the data in Section II may not correspond to the emergency funds appropriated by Congress for hurricane relief purposes specified in Section I. Reasons for the difference include the following: the tables in Section II present information from a variety of funding measures, including obligations, allocations, and expenditures; some funds made available may have been reallocated or deobligated from other purposes; and money from accounts that did not terminate at the end of a fiscal year (known as no-year accounts) may have been allocated to the Gulf Coast states. Department of Agriculture21 The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) provides a variety of disaster assistance for hurricanes and other natural disasters. For the hurricanes covered in this report, the bulk of the department's funding has been disaster payments to producers who suffered production losses and funding for land rehabilitation programs for cleanup and restoration projects, primarily under P.L. 109-234 and through other authorities. The total USDA budget authority was over $1.0 billion for disaster relief following Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma ( Table 2 ). For these three hurricanes, USDA also paid an additional $112 million in farm disaster benefits to farmers in the Gulf States under various Farm Service Agency indemnity and grant programs, using funds allocated from USDA's "Section 32" Program (see " Farm Service Agency " section below). Hurricane-related support by individual agency for the 2005 and 2008 hurricanes is described in separate sections below. State-specific data are provided where available and are current as of the dates cited. Agricultural Research Service The Agricultural Research Service (ARS) is USDA's chief scientific research agency. Under P.L. 109-234 , USDA received funding for cleanup and salvage efforts at the ARS facility in Poplarville, MS, and the Southern Regional Research Center in New Orleans, LA. Total budget authority was $39 million for the 2005 hurricanes provided under P.L. 109-234 and through reallocations from existing funds. Farm Service Agency The mission of the Farm Service Agency (FSA) is to serve farmers, ranchers, and agricultural partners through the delivery of agricultural support programs. Besides administering general farm commodity programs, FSA administers disaster payments for crop and livestock farmers who suffer losses from natural disasters. Following the 2005 hurricanes, producer benefits were provided under five new programs created by USDA for tropical fruit, citrus, sugarcane, nursery crops, fruits and vegetables, livestock death, feed losses, and dairy production and spoilage losses. These USDA-created programs were the Hurricane Indemnity Program (HIP), Livestock Indemnity Program (LIP), Feed Indemnity Program (FIP), and an Aquaculture Grant Program (AGP). Payments under the previously established Tree Indemnity Program (TIP) were provided to eligible owners of commercially grown fruit trees, nut trees, bushes, and vines producing annual crops that were lost or damaged. Total outlays for 2005 hurricanes to the Gulf States under the aforementioned five programs were $132 million under P.L. 109-234 (see Table 2 ) and $112 million for four programs under "Section 32" (see Table 3 for Section 32 data). Section 32 is a permanent appropriation (originating from P.L. 74-320) that supports a variety of USDA activities, including disaster relief, federal child nutrition programs, and surplus commodity purchases. Following Hurricanes Gustav and Ike in 2008, payments were provided to qualifying producers under five nationwide agricultural disaster programs authorized in the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 ( P.L. 110-246 , 2008 farm bill). Under the largest disaster program, Supplemental Revenue Assistance Payments Program (SURE), the combined payments for Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas totaled $285 million in 2008 for a variety of natural disaster losses, including hurricane damage ( Table 4 ). Payments for these states under the other four programs (three livestock-related programs and the Tree Assistance Program (TAP)) were approximately $66 million. FSA also administered two land rehabilitation disaster programs: (1) the Emergency Forestry Conservation Reserve Program (EFCRP), which compensated private, nonindustrial forest landowners who experienced losses from hurricanes in calendar year 2005, for temporarily retiring their land; and (2) the Emergency Conservation Program (ECP), which provides emergency funding and technical assistance for farmers and ranchers to rehabilitate farmland damaged by natural disasters. For the 2005 hurricanes, Congress provided $82 million in budget authority for EFCRP and $84.7 million in budget authority for ECP. Of the $84.7 million in budget authority for ECP, FSA obligated over $70 million. Previously unobligated funds from 2005 hurricane recovery efforts were reprogrammed in 2009 under P.L. 111-32 to be used for then current disasters, including hurricanes. On July 14, 2009, USDA announced $71 million in ECP funding, which included the 2005 reprogrammed funds, for repairing farmland damaged by natural disasters, including the hurricanes that occurred in 2008. Of the five hurricane-affected states, Texas received the largest allocation ($11 million) to address 2008 hurricane restoration efforts. Food and Nutrition Service30 The Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) administers several programs that are crucial in hurricane relief efforts. These include the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly known as the Food Stamp Program (FSP)), child nutrition programs (e.g., school meals programs), and federally donated food commodities delivered through relief organizations. Existing laws authorize USDA to change eligibility and benefit rules to facilitate emergency aid. Disaster FSP benefits provided approximately $1 billion worth of support directly due to Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, Wilma, Gustav, and Ike. Assistance provided by FSP (now, SNAP) and the child nutrition programs required no additional appropriations because the benefits are treated as entitlements. Other than a small one-time increase in appropriations, in P.L. 109-148 , to replenish some commodity stocks used for hurricane-relief purposes, no significant action was taken for hurricane relief or to pay for commodity distribution costs. This is because funding and federally provided food commodities were generally available without a need for a large appropriation. Natural Resources Conservation Service The Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) assists private land owners with conserving soil, water, and other natural resources. Following natural disasters, NRCS works with FEMA, state and federal agencies, and local units of government to conduct postdisaster cleanup and restoration projects. NRCS administers the Emergency Watershed Protection (EWP) Program, which assists landowners and operators in implementing emergency recovery measures for slowing runoff and preventing erosion to relieve imminent hazards to life and property created by a natural disaster that causes a sudden impairment of a watershed. In the wake of 2005 and 2008 hurricane events, NRCS staff also assessed the demand and requirements for the disposal of animal carcasses, through authority delegated by FEMA. As of November 29, 2012, NRCS had obligated approximately $300 million for disaster relief stemming from these hurricanes. State EWP data for the 2005 and 2008 hurricanes are provided in Table 5 below. Forest Service34 The Forest Service (FS) administers programs for protecting and managing the natural resources of the National Forest System (NFS, primarily national forests and national grasslands) and for assisting states and nonindustrial private forestland owners in protecting and managing the natural resources of nonfederal forestlands. Through its State and Private Forestry (SPF) program, the FS provides financial and technical assistance, typically through state forestry agencies, to nonfederal landowners to restore forests damaged by hurricanes (and other disasters). The state agencies are authorized to use such funds in numerous ways, such as assisting landowners to clear damaged trees and to plant new stands on cleared sites. While emergency and supplemental funding is sometimes enacted for natural disasters (e.g., hurricanes), the funding often is expended through ongoing, existing programs, and commonly cannot be distinguished from regular appropriations for these purposes (i.e., protecting and managing NFS lands and resources and assisting nonfederal landowners in protecting and managing their forests). Funding for the FS to conduct work after a natural disaster can be categorized generally as response efforts and recovery efforts. Response tasks are identified through the National Response Framework (NRF), administered by FEMA, which grants the FS certain responsibilities (e.g., firefighting) to coordinate during a presidentially declared emergency or major disaster. The FS reports it spent approximately $77 million for Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma, respectively, on response efforts in FS region 8 (state-level data were not available). The FS estimates it spent a total of $2.5 million on response efforts for Hurricane Gustav ($1.4 million in Alabama, $0.9 million in Louisiana, $0.1 million in Mississippi, and $0.1 million in Texas). The FS reports it spent a total of $2.1 million on response efforts for Hurricane Ike (all funding spent in Texas). Although the FS does not have the authority for specific programs to grant recovery assistance to states, the FS can use its regular program authorities to assist state and private landowners broadly following a disaster. For example, after a hurricane, the FS may receive supplemental funding under the state and private forestry (SPF) programs appropriation to conduct recovery work via a SPF program. Eight existing FS programs were used to assist the states following Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, Wilma, Gustav, and Ike (see Table 6 ). The FS may also grant funding for the FSA Emergency Forest Restoration Program. FS recovery funding amounts by state for the 2005 hurricanes (Katrina, Rita, and Wilma) and 2008 hurricanes (Gustav and Ike) are provided in Table 7 . Rural Housing Service The Rural Housing Service (RHS) provides loan and grant assistance for single-family and multifamily housing. RHS also administers the Community Facilities loan and grant program to provide assistance to communities for health facilities, fire and police stations, and other essential community facilities. Following the hurricanes, RHS provided housing relief to residents of the affected areas through payment moratoriums of six months, a three-month moratorium on initiating foreclosures under the single family guaranteed homeownership loans, loan forgiveness, loan reamortization, and refinancing. In addition, RHS provided temporary rental assistance to displaced family farm labor housing tenants. Assistance was provided for single-family homeowners (e.g., Section 502 loans), multifamily housing owners (e.g., Section 504 loans), and rental housing assistance (Section 521). Under P.L. 109-234 , total budget authority for RHS programs for the 2005 hurricanes was $128 million. The Disaster Relief and Recovery Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2008 ( P.L. 110-329 ) provided funding for activities under the Rural Development Mission Area for relief and recovery from natural disasters (including hurricanes) during 2008. The act specifically provided $38 million for activities of the Rural Housing Service for areas affected by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Rural Utilities Service The Rural Utilities Service (RUS) is responsible for administering electric, telecommunications, and water assistance programs that help finance the infrastructure necessary to improve the quality of life and promote economic development in rural areas. Hurricane relief included grants for rebuilding, repairing, or otherwise improving water and waste disposal systems in designated disaster areas. Increased technical assistance under the Circuit Rider program was also provided to rural water districts. With the approval of lenders, RUS also suspended preauthorized debit payments for water and waste disposal loan guarantees for six months. Under permanent authority of P.L. 92-419, total budget authority for RUS programs for the 2005 hurricanes was $53 million. Department of Commerce National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration40 The federal government may provide disaster relief to the fishing industry when there is a commercial fishery failure. A commercial fishery failure occurs when fishermen endure hardships resulting from fish population declines or other disruptions to the fishery. Two statutes, the Interjurisdictional Fisheries Act (16 U.S.C. §4107) and the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (16 U.S.C. §1864a and §1864), provide the authority and requirements for fishery disaster assistance. Under both statutes, a request for a fishery disaster determination is generally made by the governor of a state, or by a fishing community, although the Secretary of Commerce may also initiate a review at his or her own discretion. If the Secretary determines that a fishery disaster has occurred, Congress may appropriate funds for disaster assistance, which are administered by the Secretary. Funding is usually distributed as grants to states or regional marine fisheries commissions by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) of the Department of Commerce. Since 2005, Congress has appropriated almost $260 million of hurricane disaster relief to the Gulf of Mexico fishing industry (see Table 8 ). Of this total, $213 million was appropriated for damages and disruptions caused by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita ( P.L. 109-234 and P.L. 110-28 ). Assistance provided for the direct needs of fishermen and related businesses, and supported related fisheries programs such as oyster bed and fishery habitat restoration, cooperative research, product marketing, fishing gear studies, and seafood testing. Many of these activities such as habitat restoration are ongoing management priorities for these fisheries. For damage caused by Hurricanes Gustav and Ike, $47 million was appropriated to restore damaged oyster reefs, remove storm debris, and rebuild fishing infrastructure in Texas and Louisiana ( P.L. 110-329 ). In addition, $85 million was provided to NOAA for scanning, mapping, and removing marine debris; repairing and reconstructing the NOAA Science Center; procuring a replacement emergency response aircraft and sensor package; and other activities ( P.L. 109-234 and P.L. 110-28 ). Economic Development Administration Economic Adjustment Assistance Program41 The Economic Development Administration (EDA) was created with the passage of the Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965 (PWEDA), P.L. 89-136, (42 U.S.C. §3121, et. al) to provide assistance to communities experiencing long-term economic distress or sudden economic dislocation. Among the programs administered by EDA is the Economic Adjustment Assistance (EAA) program. The PWEDA (42 U.S.C. §3149(c)(2)) authorizes EDA to provide EAA funds for disasters or emergencies, in areas with respect to which a major disaster or emergency has been declared under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act for post-disaster economic recovery. In addition to funding disaster-recovery efforts using Emergency Assistance Act (EAA) funds available under its regular appropriation, 42 U.S.C. §3233 authorizes the appropriation of such sums as are necessary to fund EAA disaster recovery activities authorized under 42 U.S.C. §3149(c)(2). Funds appropriated under 42 U.S.C. §3233 may be used to cover up to 100% of the cost of a project or activity authorized under 42 U.S.C. §3149(c)(2). Funds appropriated under a regular appropriations act may be used to cover only 50% of the cost of disaster recovery activities. However, the authorizing statute also grants EDA the authority to increase the federal share of a project's cost to 100%. Disaster Assistance Grants Presidentially declared disasters or emergencies are one of five specific qualifying events eligible for EAA funding assistance. EAA grants are competitively awarded and may be used to help finance public facilities; public services (including job training and counseling) business development (including funding a revolving loan fund (RLF); planning; and technical assistance that support the creation or retention of private sector jobs. Regions submitting an application for EAA disaster assistance must demonstrate a clear connection between the proposed project and disaster recovery efforts. EAA disaster grants can cover 100% of a project's cost. In order to qualify for assistance, the Secretary of Commerce must find that a proposed project or activity will help the area respond to a severe increase in unemployment, or economic adjustment problems resulting from severe changes in economic conditions. EAA regulations also require an area seeking such assistance to prepare or have in place a Comprehensive Economic Development Strategy (CEDS) outlining the nature and level of economic distress in the region, and proposed activities that could be undertaken to support private-sector job creation or retention efforts in the area. Funding Narrative Congress did not provide EAA supplemental appropriations for disaster recovery activities related to Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, or Wilma. However, EDA allocated $24.2 million from its regular appropriations in response to the hurricanes of 2005. In response to Hurricanes Gustav and Ike and other disasters occurring in 2008, Congress appropriated $400 million in EAA disaster supplemental funding when it approved P.L. 110-329 . It also appropriated an additional $100 million in supplemental EAA disaster assistance without limiting it to disasters occurring in a specific year when it passed the Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2008, P.L. 110-252 . Of the $500 million appropriated for EAA disaster grants in 2008, EDA allocated, based on its 2010 annual report to Congress, the latest data available, a total of $63.8 million to 33 recipients in five of the six states identified in this report. Department of Defense (Civil)44 Army Corps of Engineers Civil Works Program The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) is a unique federal agency in the Department of Defense, with military and civilian responsibilities. Under its civil works program, the Corps plans, builds, operates, and maintains a wide range of water resources facilities, including hurricane protection and flood damage reduction projects, and performs emergency actions for flood and coastal emergencies. Table 9 shows, for each Gulf Coast state, the direct appropriations that the Corps received for its water resources work related to the five hurricanes. According to data the Corps provided to CRS, of the total $15.6 billion appropriated, more than $11.2 billion has been obligated. Department of Defense (Military) 45 Military Personnel The Military Personnel accounts fund military pay and allowances, permanent change of station travel, retirement and health benefit accruals, uniforms, and other personnel costs. For the hurricane response efforts, funds have been used primarily to pay per diem to DOD personnel evacuated from affected areas, for the pay and allowances of activated Guard and Reserve personnel supporting the hurricane relief effort, and for increased housing allowances to compensate for housing rate increases in hurricane-affected areas. Military personnel funds obligated by the Alabama, Florida, Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi National Guard are detailed in Table 10 . Data on the obligation of other Military Personnel funds, by state, were not readily available. Operations and Maintenance The Operations and Maintenance (O&M) accounts fund training and operation costs, pay for civilians, maintenance service contracts, fuel, supplies, repair parts, and other expenses. For the hurricane response efforts, funds have been used primarily to repair facilities, establish alternate operating sites for displaced military organizations, repair and replace equipment, remove debris, clean up hazardous waste, repair utilities, evacuate DOD personnel from affected areas, and support the operations of activated Army and Air National Guard units. O&M funds obligated by the Alabama, Florida, Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi National Guard are detailed in Table 10 . Data on the obligation of other O&M funds, by state, were not readily available. Procurement The Procurement accounts generally fund the acquisition of aircraft, ships, combat vehicles, satellites, weapons, ammunition, and other capital equipment. For the hurricane response efforts, $2.85 billion was appropriated, of which $2.5 billion was used primarily to pay for extraordinary shipbuilding and ship repair costs, including not only damage to ships under construction and replacement of equipment and materials, but also additional overhead and labor costs resulting from schedule delays due to the hurricane damage to shipyards, primarily Avondale in New Orleans, Louisiana, and Ingalls in Pascagoula, Mississippi.  These funds also included $140 million to improve the infrastructure at damaged shipyards. Budget authority, obligations, and outlays for procurement, allocated by state for Alabama, Florida, Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi are detailed in Table 10 . Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation The Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) accounts fund modernization efforts by way of basic and applied research, creation of technology-demonstration devices, developing prototypes, and other related costs. For the hurricane response efforts, funds have been used to replace damaged test equipment and repair damaged test facilities. Data allocating RDT&E funds by state were not readily available. Military Construction (MILCON) and Family Housing The MILCON accounts fund the acquisition, construction, installation, and equipment of temporary or permanent public works, military installations, facilities, and real property. The Family Housing Construction accounts fund costs associated with the construction of military family housing (including acquisition, replacement, addition, expansion, extension, and alteration), while the Family Housing O&M accounts fund expenses such as debt payment, leasing, minor construction, principal and interest charges, and insurance premiums on military family housing. For the hurricane response efforts, $1.4 billion was appropriated to finance the planning, design, and construction of military facilities and infrastructure that were damaged or destroyed by hurricane winds and water. Of this, $918 million was dedicated to military operations and training facilities, while an additional $460 million was appropriated for family housing construction and family housing O&M to rebuild destroyed, damaged, or new housing units and a housing office. Budget authority for MILCON and family housing construction allocated to the states of Alabama, Florida, Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi is detailed in Table 10 . Of the $1.4 billion appropriated, $1.2 billion could be allocated to the five specified states, while $167 million was devoted to planning and design activities not associated with specific locations. Management Funds This category includes the Defense Working Capital Fund, the National Defense Sealift Fund, and a commissary fund. For the hurricane response efforts, these funds have been used primarily to rebuild and repair damaged commissaries, replace commissary inventories, and cover transportation and contingency costs of the Defense Logistics Agency. Data allocating these funds by state were not readily available. Other Department of Defense Programs This category includes the Defense Health Program (DHP) and the Office of the Inspector General (OIG). The DHP title funds medical and dental care to current and retired members of the Armed Forces, their family members, and other eligible beneficiaries. For the hurricane response efforts, these funds have been used primarily to pay for costs associated with displaced beneficiaries seeking care from private-sector providers rather than at military health care facilities, to pay the health care costs of activated Guard and Reserve personnel, and to replace medical supplies and equipment. Data allocating DHP funds by state were not readily available. Of the $589,000 appropriated for the OIG, $263,000 was provided to replace and repair damaged equipment in the Inspector General's office in Slidell, LA, and to cover relocation costs. Department of Education48 Elementary and Secondary Education Program Authorities49 Following the Gulf Coast hurricanes, funding to support elementary and secondary schools affected by Hurricane Katrina or Hurricane Rita was provided through three public laws: P.L. 109-148 ($1.4 billion), P.L. 109-234 ($235 million), and P.L. 110-28 ($30 million). P.L. 109-148 created two new programs: (1) Immediate Aid to Restart School Operations ($750 million) and (2) Temporary Impact Aid for Displaced Students ($645 million), which were specifically designed to address needs resulting from the hurricanes. It also added $5 million to the McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act to serve homeless children and youth who had been displaced by the Gulf Coast hurricanes. P.L. 109-234 provided additional funding of $235 million for the Temporary Impact Aid for Displaced Students enacted under P.L. 109-148 . P.L. 110-28 appropriated $30 million for elementary and secondary schools affected by the hurricanes through the Hurricane Educator Assistance program to assist in recruiting, retaining, and compensating staff in those schools. Congress then appropriated an additional $15 million through P.L. 110-329 to provide support to local educational agencies (LEAs) whose enrollment of homeless students increased as a result of hurricanes, including Hurricanes Gustav and Ike, floods, or other natural disasters during 2008. Congress subsequently appropriated $12 million through P.L. 111-117 for the Gulf Coast Recovery Initiative to improve education in areas affected by Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, or Gustav. A brief description of each of these programs and the amount of funding each received is presented below. Table 11 details how much funding various states received under each of the programs. Immediate Aid to Restart School Operations The Immediate Aid to Restart School Operations provided support for LEAs and nonpublic schools in Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Texas to restart school operations, reopen schools, and re-enroll students. P.L. 109-148 provided $750 million for this program. This program is no longer authorized. Temporary Emergency Impact Aid for Displaced Students The Temporary Emergency Impact Aid for Displaced Students program provided federal funding to assist schools in enrolling students who had been displaced by the Gulf Coast hurricanes. Funds were made available to LEAs and schools based on the number of displaced students that enrolled, irrespective of whether the school in which parents chose to enroll their child was a public or nonpublic school. P.L. 109-148 appropriated $645 million for this program. Subsequently, P.L. 109-234 appropriated an additional $235 million for this program, bringing the total program appropriation to $880 million. Portions of the funds appropriated were provided to 49 states and the District of Columbia based on the number of displaced students each enrolled. Louisiana, Texas, and Mississippi received the largest proportion of funds. This program is no longer authorized. Hurricane Educator Assistance Program The Hurricane Educator Assistance Program made federal funding available to Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama to use for recruiting, retaining, and compensating school staff who committed to work for at least three years in public elementary and secondary schools affected by Hurricanes Katrina or Rita. States were required to apply to receive funds, and the funds were allocated based on the number of public elementary and secondary schools that were closed for 19 days or more from August 29, 2005, through December 31, 2005. P.L. 110-28 provided $30 million for these purposes to Louisiana and Mississippi only. This program is no longer authorized. McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act The McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act provides funding to states to ensure that homeless children and youth are provided equal access to a free, appropriate public education in the same manner as provided other children and youth. P.L. 109-148 appropriated $5 million for this program for LEAs serving homeless children and youth who had been displaced by Hurricane Katrina or Hurricane Rita. Eight states received funding under this program, with the largest grants provided to Texas and Louisiana. While the McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act continues to provide funding related to the education of homeless students, the provisions enacted specifically in response to the Gulf Coast hurricanes are no longer authorized. Homeless Education Disaster Assistance55 P.L. 110-329 provided $15 million to LEAs whose enrollment of homeless students increased as a result of hurricanes, floods, or other natural disasters that occurred during 2008 and for which the President declared a major disaster under Title IV of the Stafford Act. ED was required to distribute the funds through the McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act based on demonstrated need. These funds provided assistance to LEAs in Gulf Coast states affected by Hurricanes Gustav and Ike, as well as LEAs affected by natural disasters in other parts of the nation, such as flooding in the Midwest. The majority of the funds were provided to LEAs in Louisiana and Texas. This program is no longer authorized. Gulf Coast Recovery Initiative P.L. 111-117 provided $12 million for competitive awards to LEAs located in counties in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas that were designated by FEMA as counties eligible for individual assistance as a result of damage caused by Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, or Gustav. The funds had to be used to improve education in areas affected by these hurricanes and had to be used for activities such as replacing instructional materials and equipment; paying teacher incentives; modernizing, renovating, or repairing school buildings; supporting charter school expansion; and supporting extended learning time activities. The majority of the funds were provided to LEAs in Louisiana. This program is no longer authorized. Higher Education Program Authorities Appropriations to support institutions of higher education (IHEs) following the Gulf Coast hurricanes of 2005 were provided through P.L. 109-148 ($200 million), P.L. 109-234 ($50 million), and P.L. 110-28 ($30 million). P.L. 110-329 subsequently provided an additional $15 million for IHEs in areas affected by hurricanes, including Hurricanes Gustav and Ike, floods, or other natural disasters in 2008. Table 11 details the amount of funding allocated to various states under these provisions. Hurricane Education Recovery Of the $200 million provided under P.L. 109-148 for higher education, $95 million was specifically appropriated for the Louisiana Board of Regents, and $95 million was specifically appropriated for the Mississippi Institutes of Higher Learning for hurricane education recovery from the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes. Subsequently, P.L. 109-234 and P.L. 110-28 provided additional funds for hurricane education recovery under the Fund for the Improvement of Postsecondary Education (FIPSE), authorized by Title VII of the Higher Education Act, to assist IHEs adversely affected by the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes. Under both laws, funds were provided to help defray the expenses incurred by IHEs that were forced to close, relocate, or reduce their activities due to hurricane damage. Under P.L. 110-28 , IHEs also were permitted to use these funds to make grants to students enrolled at these institutions on or after July 1, 2006. A total of $80 million was provided for IHEs affected by Hurricane Katrina or Hurricane Rita under the FIPSE for hurricane education recovery. The majority of funds appropriated for hurricane education recovery were provided to Mississippi and Louisiana. These activities are no longer authorized. Funds to Assist IHEs Enrolling Displaced Students The remaining $10 million appropriated under P.L. 109-148 for higher education disaster relief was provided to assist IHEs with unanticipated costs associated with the enrollment of students displaced as a result of Hurricane Katrina or Hurricane Rita. Overall, 99 IHEs in 24 states and the District of Columbia received funds related to the enrollment of displaced higher education students. Louisiana and Texas received the largest state grants. This program is no longer authorized. Higher Education Disaster Relief58 P.L. 110-329 provided an additional $15 million for IHEs that were located in an area affected by hurricanes, floods, and other natural disasters that occurred during 2008 and for which the President declared a major disaster under Title IV of the Stafford Act. Funds provided through the Higher Education Disaster Relief program could be used to defray the expenses incurred by IHEs that were forced to close or relocate or whose operations were adversely affected by the natural disaster, and to provide grants to students who attended such IHEs for academic years beginning on or after July 1, 2008. The majority of these funds were provided to Louisiana and Texas for hurricane-related education disaster assistance related to Hurricanes Gustav and Ike. This program is no longer authorized. Funding Summary Following the Gulf Coast hurricanes of 2005, Congress appropriated $1.943 billion for ED to provide support to LEAs, schools, and IHEs in the Gulf Coast region and nationwide that were affected by Hurricane Katrina or Hurricane Rita. Subsequently, FY2009 supplemental appropriations provided an additional $30 million for education-related disaster relief for LEAs and IHEs affected by natural disasters during the 2008 calendar year. Most recently, FY2010 appropriations provided an additional $12 million for LEAs located in specific areas affected by Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, or Gustav. Of the $1.985 billion provided for education-related disaster relief and administered by ED since the Gulf Coast hurricanes, nearly all of these funds ($1.826 billion, 92%) were provided to Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee, and Texas in response to the 2005 and 2008 hurricanes. Table 11 details how much of this funding was allocated to each of these states for each of the programs discussed in this section. Department of Health and Human Services Administration for Children and Families62 Head Start The federal Head Start program, authorized at 42 U.S.C. §9801 et seq., provides comprehensive early childhood development services to low-income children. The program seeks to promote school readiness by enhancing the social and cognitive development of children through the provision of educational, health, nutritional, social, and other services. Federal Head Start funds are provided directly to local grantees (e.g., public and private nonprofit and for-profit agencies) rather than through states. Most children served in Head Start programs are three- and four-year-olds, but services are authorized for children from birth through compulsory school age. In December 2005, Congress appropriated $90 million in supplemental Head Start funds for the costs of serving displaced children and the renovation of Head Start facilities affected by the Gulf Coast hurricanes of 2005. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Administration for Children and Families (ACF) reported awarding approximately $74 million of the total appropriation based on grantee requests; the remaining funds ($16 million) reverted to the U.S. Treasury Department. The majority of the funds awarded to grantees ($72.5 million, or 98% of the $74 million) went to Head Start programs in Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas (see Table 12 ). Social Services Block Grant The Social Services Block Grant (SSBG), permanently authorized by 42 U.S.C. §1397 et seq., is a flexible source of funds that states use to support a wide variety of social services activities, ranging from child care to special services for the disabled. States have broad discretion over the use of SSBG funds, which are typically allocated to states according to a population-based formula. In December 2005, Congress appropriated $550 million in supplemental SSBG funds for necessary expenses related to the consequences of the Gulf Coast hurricanes of 2005. ACF distributed these funds based on the number of FEMA registrants from Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma, as well as the percentage of individuals in poverty in each state. Funds were allocated to all states that took in evacuees, not just the states that were directly affected. The appropriations language expanded potential services for which these funds could be used to include "health services (including mental health services) and for repair, renovation, and construction of health facilities (including mental health facilities)." In September 2008, Congress appropriated $600 million for necessary expenses resulting from major disasters occurring in 2008, including hurricanes, floods, and other natural disasters, as well as expenses resulting from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. ACF reserved a portion of these funds for states affected by major disasters of 2008 and a portion for states facing ongoing needs as a result of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. ACF distributed both sets of funds based on each state's share of FEMA registrants, as well as the overall population for each state. Like the previous supplemental, the 2008 supplemental appropriation again expanded potential services for which SSBG funds could be used, this time to include "health services (including mental health services) and for repair, renovation, and construction of health facilities (including mental health facilities), child care centers, and other social services facilities." Combined, these two supplemental appropriations provided $1.150 billion for the SSBG. According to ACF, the bulk of these funds—$944 million, or 82% of the $1.150 billion—were allocated to Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas (see Table 12 ). Typically, SSBG funds are subject to a two-year expenditure period—meaning that funds must be spent by the end of the fiscal year subsequent to the fiscal year in which they were allotted to states. However, most states had not spent all of their funds from either supplemental within the standard two-year period and, in both cases, Congress passed legislation extending the spending deadline for these supplemental funds. According to data from ACF, states had spent about $521 million (95%) of the 2005 $550 million supplemental before the extended deadline of September 30, 2009. ACF data indicate that states had spent about $522 million (87%) of the 2008 $600 million supplemental before the extended expenditure deadline of September 30, 2011. Unspent funds were to revert to the U.S. Treasury. According to the FY2009 SSBG annual report, states spent supplemental funds on 28 of the 29 SSBG service categories defined in federal regulation, including education and training, counseling services, and health-related services. The FY2009 report indicated that most supplemental funds were spent in the "other services" category, including expenditures for certain construction and renovation costs, as well as costs related to certain health and mental health services. Notably, the FY2009 annual report only includes expenditures from the December 2005 supplemental appropriation. Public Health and Medical Assistance75 DRF-Funded Mission Assignments The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is the coordinating agency for Emergency Support Function 8 (ESF #8), Public Health and Medical Services, under the National Response Framework . The Stafford Act authorizes reimbursements to HHS for many of its emergency or major disaster response activities, including (among others): deployment of operational assets (medical surge and mortuary teams, portable field hospitals, and the Strategic National Stockpile of drugs and medical supplies); disease surveillance; food and water safety activities; and workforce assistance to health departments. Reimbursements to HHS for mission assignments are presented in Table 17 , Table 18 , and Table 19 . DRF-Funded Crisis Counseling Program (CCP) Pursuant to Section 416 of the Stafford Act, the President may provide assistance for the establishment of crisis counseling services in areas affected by declared major disasters. CCP, a program to provide short-term mental health screening, counseling, and referral services in presidentially declared disasters, is jointly administered by FEMA, the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) in HHS, and affected states. Amounts provided to each state for the response to the Gulf Coast hurricanes are displayed in Table 13 . Federal Assistance for Health Care In response to Hurricane Katrina, Congress authorized and appropriated a one-time program of up to $2.1 billion to cover full federal funding of the state match that would normally have been required under the Medicaid and State Children's Health Insurance (CHIP) programs, and the costs of uncompensated care, for eligible individuals from disaster-affected areas. Assistance was provided both to directly affected states and to certain states that hosted evacuees. Funding was also authorized "to restore access to health care in impacted communities," and was provided to stabilize the primary care workforce in three directly affected states: Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi. Outlay amounts are presented in Table 14 . Appropriations to Existing HHS Accounts In response to the 2005 hurricanes, Congress provided, in emergency supplemental appropriations for affected areas, $4 million for communications equipment for community health centers, and $8 million for mosquito abatement in affected states. The amounts obligated from this emergency supplemental funding are presented in Table 15 . Grants from Existing HHS Accounts In some cases, funds available in existing HHS accounts were provided for hurricane relief. For example, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) Emergency Prescription Assistance Program provided up to $2 million in individual assistance for affected counties in Texas following Hurricane Ike. Also, the HHS Office of Minority Health provided $12 million in grants to minority-serving organizations following Hurricane Katrina. Third, SAMHSA Emergency Response Grants (SERG) provided funds to states for mental health and substance abuse services following Hurricane Katrina. Amounts for SERG grants are presented in Table 13 . Administrative Waivers The federal government funds a significant portion of the nation's health care costs, through the Medicare and Medicaid programs, veterans and Indian health care systems, and other activities. In response to the major hurricanes, HHS invoked numerous waiver authorities that allowed state, local, tribal, and private health care providers and facilities affected by the disasters to continue receiving federal health care services and/or reimbursements under altered conditions, such as the use of temporary facilities, the use of volunteer providers, and care provided to individuals not usually eligible. Although these waivers did not provide new funds to disaster-affected areas, they prevented the loss of substantial federal revenues. Several HHS agencies also allowed states to reprogram federal grant funds, including from most of the grants administered by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Public Health Emergency Fund The Secretary of HHS has authority to use a no-year fund for public health emergencies. However, the fund has not had a balance since the 1990s, so it was not available for the response to the 2005 and 2008 hurricanes. Department of Homeland Security84 Federal Emergency Management Agency Authority The Stafford Act authorizes the President to issue major disaster or emergency declarations in response to incidents in the United States that overwhelm state and local governments. Section 403(a)(1) of Stafford authorizes the President to direct federal resources to provide assistance essential to meeting immediate threats to life and property resulting from a major disaster. Section 304 of the Stafford Act authorizes the reimbursement of other agencies from funds appropriated to the DRF for services or supplies furnished under the authority of the Stafford Act. Program Description The primary mission of FEMA is to "reduce the loss of life and property and protect the Nation from all hazards, including natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made disasters, by leading and supporting the Nation in a risk-based, comprehensive emergency management system of preparedness, protection, response, recovery, and mitigation." FEMA provides assistance to states, local governments, tribal nations, individuals and families, and certain nonprofit organizations through the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF). The more significant aid programs authorized under the Stafford Act include the Public Assistance Program (PA); and the Individual and Household Program (IHP), which includes Other Needs Assistance (ONA) and Debris Removal, the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP), and Essential Assistance. P.L. 112-175 requires the FEMA Administrator to provide a report by the fifth day of each month on the DRF which includes DRF funding summaries. The DRF report provides funding information by state for the 2005 and 2008 hurricanes. As shown in Table 16 , the DRF report aggregates funding for Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma. FEMA Mission Assignments by Federal Entity Mission assignments are directives from FEMA (on behalf of the requesting state) to other federal agencies to perform specific work in disaster operations on a reimbursable basis. The mission assignment contains information that is used by FEMA management to evaluate requests for assistance from states, other federal agencies, and internal FEMA organizations. Mission assignments are paid out of the DRF through funds appropriated to FEMA rather than funds appropriated directly to the respective agency. Table 17 contains a list of mission assignment funding by entity for Hurricanes Katrina, Wilma, and Rita. Table 18 contains mission assignment data for Hurricane Gustav and Table 19 contains mission assignment funding for Hurricane Ike. As shown in Tables 1 7 , 1 8 , and 19 , mission assignment funding can be assigned directly to an agency, directly to an agency's program/activity, or both. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)97 Community Development Block Grants Program Authority The Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program was first authorized as Title I of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, P.L. 93-383 , (42 U.S. C. §5301, et al.). Program Description Funds are allocated by formula to states, Puerto Rico, and eligible (entitlement) communities to be used to fund eligible housing, neighborhood revitalization, and economic development activities. After funds are set aside for Indian tribes and insular areas 70% of each year's annual CDBG program appropriation must be allocated to CDBG entitlement communities, including metropolitan cities with populations of 50,000 persons or more, central cities of metropolitan areas, and statutorily defined urban counties. The remaining 30% of appropriated funds are allocated to states for distribution to non-entitlement communities. Eligible activities must meet one of three national objectives. The activity must principally benefit low or moderate income persons; aid in preventing or eliminating slums or blight; or address an imminent threat to the health or welfare of residents of an area, including disaster relief, mitigation, and long-term recovery activities. In addition, a state or entitlement community grantee must certify that it will expend at least 70% of its CDBG allocation over a three-year period on eligible activities principally benefiting low- and moderate-income persons. In addition to allowing a state or entitlement community to fund disaster-recovery efforts under the CDBG's imminent threat national objective using CDBG regular appropriation, Congress has, at its discretion, appropriated additional supplemental CDBG funds in response to presidentially declared disasters. In addition to appropriating funds for disaster recovery activities, the statute authorizing the CDBG program grants the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) the authority to waive or modify program regulations, except those relating to public notice, fair housing, civil rights, labor standards, environmental review, and the program's low- and moderate-income targeting requirement, when CDBG funds are used to respond to presidentially declared major disasters. Funds are allocated to states and communities to cover unmet needs not covered by state and local efforts, private insurers, and standard federal disaster programs administered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Small Business Administration, and the Army Corps of Engineers. As a condition of funding, grantees are required to submit, for HUDs approval, a disaster recovery plan. Funding In the aggregate, the six states identified in Table 20 were awarded a total of $23.971 billion in CDBG disaster relief assistance to fund disaster relief activities in response to the five hurricanes identified in the table. Nearly 60% of this amount was allocated to Louisiana while Mississippi received approximately 30% of the total. Five of the six states included in Table 20 received a total allocation of $19.672 billion in response to the Gulf Coast hurricanes of 2005. Louisiana received the largest share (75%) of this amount followed by Mississippi (28%), Texas (2.5%), Florida (1%), and Alabama (less than 1%). A total of $4.296 billion was awarded to five of six states included in Table 20 to support disaster recovery activities in response to Hurricane Ike. Texas accounted for 71% of the total followed by Louisiana (25%), Tennessee (2%), Florida (1.8%), and Mississippi (less than 1%). Rental Assistance/Section 8 Vouchers The Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher program, authorized at 42 U.S.C. §1437f(o), provides portable rent subsidies that low-income families can use to rent housing units offered by private market landlords. Families with vouchers contribute an income-based payment towards their rent (generally equal to 30% of a family's income), and the federal government, through local public housing authorities (PHAs), pays the landlord the difference between the tenant's contribution and the contract rent for the unit. Congress provided over $555 million to HUD to provide rental assistance (in the form of Section 8 Housing Choice Vouchers) to families displaced by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The first $390 million of that amount was appropriated to HUD to provide temporary rental assistance vouchers to families that were previously assisted by HUD programs, but were displaced by the 2005 hurricanes. Later, HUD was given a mission assignment by FEMA to begin providing rental assistance to all remaining households displaced by the 2005 hurricanes. HUD named this program the Disaster Housing Assistance Program (DHAP), and the cost of the DHAP was covered by FEMA's Disaster Relief Fund. Following Hurricane Ike, FEMA and HUD established another Disaster Housing Assistance Program (DHAP-Ike) for families displaced by that storm, also funded through the DRF under a mission assignment. Following the first appropriation, and establishment of the mission assignments, Congress appropriated $85 million for HUD to fund the cost of ongoing, permanent Section 8 rental assistance vouchers for displaced families whose temporary housing assistance under DHAP-Katrina was expiring. Congress later appropriated an additional $80 million to create new Section 8 rental assistance vouchers in the areas affected by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Table 21 provides the total appropriations for disaster-related rental assistance vouchers. It does not provide allocations by state for all rental assistance funding because that information is not readily available and would be difficult to determine. Most of the funding for rental assistance was not allocated to the local public housing authorities (PHAs) administering the program by state. Rather, it was allocated based on where displaced families were living. For example, a PHA in Texas may have been administering a voucher on behalf of the Housing Authority of New Orleans for a family who was living in New Orleans before the storm, but relocated to Alabama after the storm. The $80 million for new vouchers was allocated to housing authorities and Table 21 provides a breakdown by state for those funds. Supportive Housing The Louisiana Recovery Corporation titled its recovery plan, which was primarily funded with emergency CDBG funding, the "Road Home" program. As shown in Table 21 , Congress appropriated $73 million to HUD for allocation to Louisiana's Road Home program (Supportive Housing) to fund the creation of permanent supportive housing units for the elderly and persons with disabilities. Of that amount, $50 million was appropriated through an existing homeless assistance grant program that serves homeless persons with disabilities (called Shelter Plus Care) (authorized at 42 U.S.C. Chapter 119) and $23 million was appropriated through the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher program. Public Housing Repair Low-rent public housing is federally subsidized housing owned and operated by local PHAs and available to low-income families. Several public housing developments, particularly in New Orleans, suffered severe damage after Hurricane Katrina. As shown in Table 21 , Congress appropriated $15 million in emergency funding to HUD's public housing capital fund (authorized at 42 U.S.C. §1437g), which was allocated to PHAs to aid in the repair of severely damaged public housing in Louisiana. Inspector General As shown in Table 21 , Congress appropriated $7 million for the HUD Inspector General to help fund the cost of enhanced oversight over disaster recovery funding. Department of Justice101 Established by an "Act to Establish the Department of Justice" with the Attorney General at its head, the Department of Justice (DOJ) provides counsel for the government in federal cases and protects citizens through law enforcement. It represents the federal government in all proceedings, civil and criminal, before the U.S. Supreme Court. In legal matters, generally, the department provides legal advice and opinions, upon request, to the President and executive branch department heads. To date, the DOJ has received a total of $287.5 million in supplemental appropriations for departmental expenses related to hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico and to award grants to Gulf Coast states. Table 22 provides a breakdown of how DOJ obligated disaster funding among Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas. Legal Activities Program Authority or Authorities Subtitle A of Title XI of the Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005 ( P.L. 109-162 ) authorized appropriations for the General Legal Activities and U.S. Attorneys accounts. For the General Legal Activities account the act authorized $679.7 million for FY2006, $706.8 million for FY2007, $735.1 million for FY2008, and $764.5 million for FY2009. For the U.S. Attorneys account the act authorized $1.626 billion for FY2006, $1.691 billion for FY2007, $1.795 billion for FY2008, and $1.829 billion for FY2009. Program Description The Legal Activities account includes several subaccounts, including General Legal Activities and the U.S. Attorneys. The General Legal Activities subaccount funds the Solicitor General's supervision of DOJ's conduct in proceedings before the Supreme Court. It also funds several departmental divisions (tax, criminal, civil, environment and natural resources, legal counsel, civil rights, INTERPOL, and dispute resolution). The U.S. Attorneys enforce federal laws through prosecution of criminal cases and represent the federal government in civil actions in all of the 94 federal judicial districts. Funding Narrative Since 2005, Congress has appropriated a total of $17.5 million in supplemental appropriations for this account. This amount included $2.0 million for General Legal Activities and a total of $15.5 million for the U.S. Attorneys. Chapter 8 of Title II of the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror and Hurricane Recovery, 2006 ( P.L. 109-234 ) provided $2 million for General Legal Activities "to investigate and prosecute fraud cases related to hurricanes in the Gulf Coast region." Chapter 8 of Title I of Division B of the Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006 ( P.L. 109-148 ) provided $9 million for the U.S. Attorneys "to support operational recovery from hurricane-related damage in the Gulf Coast region." Chapter 8 of Title II of the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror and Hurricane Recovery, 2006 ( P.L. 109-234 ) provided the U.S. Attorneys with $6.5 million "to investigate and prosecute fraud cases related to hurricanes in the Gulf Coast region." United States Marshals Service Program Authority or Authorities Subtitle A of Title XI of the Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005 ( P.L. 109-162 ) authorized $800.3 million for FY2006, $832.3 million for FY2007, $865.6 million for FY2008, and $900.2 million for FY2009 for the United States Marshals Service (USMS) account. Program Description The federal marshals' service was founded in 1789, making it the oldest federal law enforcement agency. A presidentially appointed U.S. marshal directs the operations of the marshals' services in each of the 94 federal judicial districts. The USMS facilitates the functioning of the federal judicial process by providing protection for judges, attorneys, witnesses, and jurors and providing physical security in courthouses. The USMS is the federal government's primary agency for fugitive investigations. USMS task forces combine the efforts of federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies to locate and arrest fugitives. The Marshals Service also works with international law enforcement agencies to apprehend fugitives who have fled abroad and to apprehend foreign fugitives who have entered the United States. The USMS executes all federal arrest warrants. The USMS manages and sells assets which were seized or forfeited by federal law enforcement agencies. The assets managed and sold by the USMS are assets that represent the proceeds of, or were used to facilitate federal crimes. The Marshals Service is responsible for housing and transporting all federal detainees from the time they are arrested until they are either acquitted or convicted and delivered to their designated federal prison. The USMS operates the Justice Prisoner and Alien Transportation System (JPATS), which transports prisoners between judicial districts, correctional facilities, and foreign countries. The USMS is also responsible for administering the federal witness security program, which provides for the security and safety of government witnesses and their authorized family members, whose lives are in danger as a result of their cooperation with the U.S. government. Funding Narrative Since 2005, Congress has appropriated $9 million in supplemental appropriations for the U.S. Marshal's Service. Chapter 8 of Title I of Division B of the Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006 ( P.L. 109-148 ) provided $9 million for the USMS's salaries and expenses account "to support operational recovery from hurricane-related damage in the Gulf Coast region." Federal Bureau of Investigation Program Authority or Authorities Subtitle A of Title XI of the Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005 ( P.L. 109-162 ) authorized $5.761 billion for FY2006, $5.992 billion for FY2007, $6.231 billion for FY2008, and $6.481 billion for FY2009 for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) account. Program Description The FBI was founded in 1908. Its headquarters is in Washington, DC, and it has 56 field offices located in major cities throughout the United States and its territories and another 380 resident agencies in cities and towns across the nation. In addition, the FBI has more than 60 international offices called "legal attachés" in U.S. embassies worldwide. The FBI is the lead federal investigative agency charged with defending the country against foreign terrorist and intelligence threats; enforcing federal criminal laws; and providing leadership and criminal justice services to federal, state, municipal, tribal, and territorial law enforcement agencies and partners. The FBI focuses on protecting the United States from internal and external threats and investigations that are too large or too complex for state and local authorities to handle on their own. The priorities of the FBI include protecting the United States from terrorist attack; protecting the United States against foreign intelligence operations and espionage; protecting the United States against cyber-based attacks and high-technology crimes; combating public corruption; protecting civil rights; investigating transnational/national criminal organizations and enterprises; investigating major white-collar crime; investigating significant violent crime; and supporting federal, state, local and international partners. The FBI collects and disseminates national crime data through the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR). The FBI also operates several national law enforcement information sharing systems such as the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), the Law Enforcement National Data Exchange (N-Dex), the Next Generation Identification System (NGI), the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS), and the National Crime Information Center (NCIC). Funding Narrative Since 2005, Congress has appropriated $45 million in supplemental appropriations for the FBI. Chapter 8 of Title I of Division B of the Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006 ( P.L. 109-148 ) provided $45 million for the FBI's salaries and expenses account "to support operational recovery from hurricane-related damage in the Gulf Coast region." Drug Enforcement Administration Program Authority or Authorities Subtitle A of Title XI of the Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005 ( P.L. 109-162 ) authorized $1.716 billion for FY2006, $1.785 billion for FY2007, $1.856 billion for FY2008, and $1.930 billion for FY2009 for the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) account. Program Description The DEA was established in 1973 through an executive order issued by President Nixon. The DEA has 226 domestic and 85 foreign offices. The DEA's mission is "to enforce the controlled substances laws and regulations of the United States and bring to the criminal and civil justice system of the United States, or any other competent jurisdiction, those organizations and principal members of organizations, involved in the growing, manufacture, or distribution of controlled substances appearing in or destined for illicit traffic in the United States; and to recommend and support nonenforcement programs aimed at reducing the availability of illicit controlled substances on the domestic and international markets." The DEA's primary responsibilities include investigating major violators of controlled substance laws operating at interstate and international levels; management of a national drug intelligence program in cooperation with federal, state, local, and foreign officials to collect, analyze, and disseminate strategic and operational drug intelligence information; seizure and forfeiture of assets derived from, traceable to, or intended to be used for illicit drug trafficking; enforcement of the provisions of the Controlled Substances Act as they pertain to the manufacture, distribution, and dispensing of legally produced controlled substances; reduction of illicit drugs on the United States market through methods such as crop eradication, crop substitution, and training of foreign officials; and liaison with the United Nations, Interpol, and other organizations on matters relating to international drug control programs. Funding Narrative Since 2005, Congress has appropriated $10 million in supplemental appropriations for this account. Chapter 8 of Title I of Division B of the Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006 ( P.L. 109-148 ) provided $10 million for the DEA's salaries and expenses account "to support operational recovery from hurricane-related damage in the Gulf Coast region." Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives Program Authority or Authorities Subtitle A of Title XI of the Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005 ( P.L. 109-162 ) authorized $923.6 million for FY2006, $960.6 million for FY2007, $999.0 million for FY2008, and $1.039 billion for FY2009 for the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) account. Program Description The ATF enforces federal criminal law related to the manufacture, importation, and distribution of alcohol, tobacco, firearms, and explosives. The ATF's responsibilities were transferred from the Department of the Treasury to the Department of Justice as a part of the Homeland Security Act ( P.L. 107-296 ). The ATF works both independently and through partnerships with industry groups, international, state, and local governments, and other federal agencies to investigate and reduce crime involving firearms and explosives, acts of arson and bombings, and illegal trafficking of alcohol and tobacco products. Funding Narrative Since 2005, Congress has appropriated $20 million in supplemental appropriations for the ATF. Chapter 8 of Title I of Division B of the Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006 ( P.L. 109-148 ) provided $20 million for the ATF's salaries and expenses account "to support operational recovery from hurricane-related damage in the Gulf Coast region." Federal Prison System (Bureau of Prisons) Program Authority Subtitle A of Title XI of the Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005 ( P.L. 109-162 ) authorized $5.066 billion for FY2006, $5.268 billion for FY2007, $5.479 billion for FY2008, and $5.698 billion for FY2009 for the Federal Prison System account. Program Description The Bureau of Prisons (BOP) was established in 1930 to house federal inmates, to professionalize the prison service, and to ensure consistent and centralized administration of the federal prison system. The BOP's mission is to protect society by confining offenders in prisons and community-based facilities that are safe, humane, cost-efficient, and appropriately secure, and that provide work and other self-improvement opportunities for inmates so that they can become productive citizens after they are released. BOP currently operates 118 correctional facilities across the country. Funding Narrative Since 2005, Congress has appropriated $11 million in supplemental appropriations for the BOP. Chapter 8 of Title I of Division B of the Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006 ( P.L. 109-148 ) provided $11 million for the BOP's buildings and facilities account "to repair hurricane-related damage in the Gulf Coast region." Office of Justice Programs Program Authorities Congress has not traditionally authorized appropriations for the Office of Justice Programs (OJP); rather it has authorized appropriations for grant programs administered by the OJP. The funding appropriated by Congress for the OJP under the Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006 ( P.L. 109-148 ) was not appropriated pursuant to any authorized grant program. Congress appropriated funding for OJP's State and Local Law Enforcement assistance account for the OJP to award to states affected by hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico in 2005. The funding appropriated by Congress for the OJP under the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007 ( P.L. 110-28 ) was appropriated pursuant to an authorization for the Byrne Discretionary Grant program. This program was previously authorized under Part B of Subchapter V of Chapter 46 of Title 42 of the U.S. Code. However, the authorization was repealed by Section 1111(b)(1) of the Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005 ( P.L. 109-162 ). Congress continued to appropriate funding for the Byrne Discretionary Grant program until FY2011 when the program's funding was eliminated due to the earmark ban put in place by the 112 th Congress. Program Description The OJP manages and coordinates the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP), Office of Victims of Crime (OVC), Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), and related grant programs. Through its component offices and bureaus, OJP disseminates knowledge and practices across America and provides grants for the implementation of crime fighting strategies. NIJ focuses on research, development, and evaluation of crime control and justice issues. NIJ funds research, development, and technology assistance, as well as assesses programs, policies, and technologies. BJS collects, analyzes, publishes, and disseminates information on crime, criminal offenders, crime victims, and criminal justice operations. BJS also provides financial and technical support to state, local, and tribal governments to improve their statistical capabilities and the quality and the utility of their criminal history records. OJJDP assists local community endeavors to effectively avert and react to juvenile delinquency and victimization. OJJDP seeks to improve the juvenile justice system and its policies so that the public is better protected, youth and their families are better served, and offenders are held accountable. OVC distributes federal funds to victim assistance programs across the country. OVC offers training programs for professionals and their agencies that specialize in helping victims. BJA provides leadership and assistance to local criminal justice programs that improve and reinforce the nation's criminal justice system. BJA's goals are to reduce and prevent crime, violence, and drug abuse and to improve the way in which the criminal justice system functions. Funding Narrative Since 2005, Congress has appropriated $175 million for OJP for grants to assist states affected by hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico. Chapter 8 of Title I of Division B of the Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006 ( P.L. 109-148 ) included $125 million for OJP's State and Local Law Enforcement Assistance account for "necessary expenses related to the direct or indirect consequences of hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico in calendar year 2005." Chapter 2 of Title IV of the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007 ( P.L. 110-28 ) included $50 million under OJP's State and Local Law Enforcement Assistance Account for the Byrne Discretionary Grant program. Language in the law stated that funds provided under this program were to be used for local law enforcement initiatives in the Gulf Coast region related to the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. Congress also required OJP to award the $50 million it received under the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007 based upon each affected state's level of reported violent crime in 2005. Department of Labor133 Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA) Dislocated Worker Activities134 National Dislocated Worker Grants The Employment and Training Administration (ETA) of the Department of Labor administers "federal government job training and worker dislocation programs, federal grants to states for public employment service programs, and unemployment insurance benefits. These services are primarily provided through state and local workforce development systems." The Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA, P.L. 113-128 ), whose programs are administered primarily by ETA, is the primary federal employment and training legislation. WIOA authorizes several job training programs: state formula grants for Adult, Youth, and Dislocated Worker Employment and Training Activities; Job Corps; and other national programs, including Native American Programs, Migrant and Seasonal Farmworker Programs, and a series of competitive grant programs authorized under Section 169 of WIOA. ETA provides funding assistance for disaster relief activities primarily through the Dislocated Worker program, specifically by National Dislocated Worker Grants (DWG). DWGs are authorized under WIOA Section 170 and are for employment and training assistance to workers affected by major economic dislocations, such as plant closures, mass layoffs, or natural disasters. These DWGs are awarded primarily to states and local Workforce Development Boards (WDBs) to provide services for eligible individuals, including dislocated workers, civilian employees of the Departments of Defense or Energy employed at an installation that is being closed within 24 months of eligibility determination, employees or contractors with the Department of Defense at risk of dislocation due to reduced defense expenditures, or certain other members of the Armed Forces. Services include job search assistance and training for eligible workers. In addition, DWG funding may be used to provide direct employment ("disaster relief employment") to individuals for a period of up to 12 months for work related to a disaster. A majority of WIOA funding for the Dislocated Worker program is allocated by formula grants to states (which in turn allocate funds to local entities) to provide training and related services to individuals who have lost their jobs and are unlikely to return to those jobs or similar jobs in the same industry. The remainder of the appropriation is reserved by DOL for a National Reserve account, which in part provides for the DWGs. Funding Narrative The Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006 ( P.L. 109-148 ) provided $125 million in appropriations to ETA to award National Emergency Grants (NEGs) related to the consequences of hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico in calendar year 2005. P.L. 109-148 specified that the appropriations were to remain available until June 30, 2006, and that the funds could be used to replace NEG funds previously obligated to the hurricane-impacted areas. In calendar year (CY) 2006, Alabama received $667,000, Louisiana $36.4 million, Mississippi $46.7 million, and Texas $64.9 million in NEG funding. The total of $148.6 million in NEG funding awarded to the five states, shown in Table 23 , exceeds the $125 million appropriated in P.L. 109-148 . In providing the award amounts and projects, ETA does not distinguish awards by funding source. Thus, some of the funding shown in Table 23 is from the NEG funding in the regular annual WIA National Reserve appropriations. The Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Hurricane Recovery, 2006 ( P.L. 109-234 ) provided $16 million in appropriations to ETA for "necessary expenses related to the consequences of Hurricane Katrina and other hurricanes of the 2005 season, for the construction, rehabilitation, and acquisition of Job Corps centers." P.L. 109-234 specified that the funds were to remain available until expended. Job Corps, which is administered by ETA, is primarily a residential job training program first established in 1964 that provides educational and career services to low-income individuals ages 16 to 24, primarily through contracts administered by DOL with corporations and nonprofit organizations. Most participants in the Job Corps program work toward attaining a high school diploma or a General Educational Development (GED) certificate, with a subset also receiving career technical training. Currently, Job Corps centers operate in 50 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. The $16 million provided in P.L. 109-234 for construction, rehabilitation, and acquisition of Job Corps centers was most likely used for repair of the Gulfport (Mississippi) and New Orleans Job Corps centers, which were damaged during Hurricane Katrina. Department of Transportation139 DOT is the lead support agency under Emergency Support Function #1: Transportation, under the NRF. DOT reports on damage to transportation infrastructure and coordinates alternative transportation services and the restoration and recovery of the transportation infrastructure. At the time that Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma struck, DOT also worked with FEMA in providing and coordinating transportation support, such as evacuation aid and shipping of critical supplies to the disaster area. However, by the time Gustav and Ike struck, DOT had turned over its role in evacuation aid and the shipping of critical supplies to FEMA. During the hurricane response, DOT had only one permanent disaster program, the Federal Highway Administration Emergency Relief Program (ER). Other operating administrations, such as the Federal Aviation Administration and the Federal Transit Administration, also provided disaster assistance. From a budgetary perspective, however, the DOT response to the Gulf Coast hurricanes may be viewed as either DOT funding or as FEMA funding provided to DOT for the mission assignment activities assumed by its operating administrations (see Table 17 , Table 18 , and Table 19 ). Funding by the FHWA, FAA, and FTA is briefly described below, and the cumulative total allocations to the Gulf of Mexico states are provided in Table 24 . Federal Highway Administration: Emergency Relief Program (ER) ER Program Authorities The Federal Highway Administration's Emergency Relief Program (ER) is authorized by Title 23, U.S.C. §125 (Section 120 (e) for federal share payable). Program Description141 The ER program provides funds for the repair and reconstruction of roads on the federal-aid highway system that have suffered serious damage as a result of either (1) a natural disaster over a wide area, such as a flood, hurricane, tidal wave, earthquake, tornado, severe storm, or landslide; or (2) a catastrophic failure from any external cause (for example, the collapse of a bridge that is struck by a barge). Historically, however, the vast majority of ER funds have gone for natural disaster repair and reconstruction. ER Funding for Gulf Coast Hurricane Response ER funding allocations for Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, Wilma, Gustav, and Ike totaled almost $3.2 billion. Of this amount, just over $2.8 billion has been obligated; see Table 24 . Funding provided for hurricane relief includes funds from the program's annual $100 million authorization and from additional sums provided in supplemental or other appropriations acts. ER funds can only be used for roads and bridges on the federal-aid highway system. Repair and reconstruction costs for other damaged roads (mostly local roads and neighborhood streets) may be reimbursed by FEMA. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) FAA has approved $110.5 million for repair and improvements to hurricane-damaged airport and air traffic control infrastructure. Of this amount, $40.6 million was appropriated under the Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act of 2006 ( P.L. 109-148 ). FAA also provided Airport Improvement Program discretionary funds for airport repairs in the Gulf of Mexico states. Federal Transit Administration (FTA) The U.S. Troop Readiness Veterans' Care Katrina Recovery and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act of 2007 ( P.L. 110-28 ) appropriated $35 million for transit relief to the Gulf Coast states. The distribution of this funding across the Gulf Coast states is shown in Table 25 . It is not unusual for FTA to be tasked by FEMA under a mission assignment to provide transit assistance to disaster victims. Table 25 does not include these FEMA-reimbursed costs. Department of Veterans Affairs144 Medical Center in New Orleans The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) administers programs that provide benefits and other services to veterans and their spouses, dependents, and beneficiaries. The VA has three primary organizations to provide these benefits: the Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA), the Veterans Health Administration (VHA), and the National Cemetery Administration (NCA). The VHA provides medical care to eligible veterans and dependents. Hurricane Katrina caused extensive damage to the VA Medical Center in New Orleans. Funding Narrative P.L. 109-148 appropriated additional funds for necessary expenses due to the consequences of the hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico in 2005. Funds were appropriated by category, including $198.3 million for medical services, and $26.9 million for general operating expenses, minor construction, and the National Cemetery Administration. P.L. 109-148 appropriated $367.5 million for major construction, of which $292.5 million was for a new facility in Biloxi, MS, and $75 million was for advance planning and design work to replace the VA Medical Center in New Orleans. The total amount of appropriations authorized for the new Biloxi VA Medical Center was $310 million. This amount included $292.5 million provided in. P.L. 109-148 and $17.5 million in regular appropriations. P.L. 111-212 transferred $6 million in bid savings to the Filipino Veterans Compensation Fund, and $18 million was transferred to New Orleans Medical Center project. Later another $11 million was reprogramed from the working reserve for the new Biloxi VA Medical Center. The total estimated cost of the new Biloxi VA Medical Center is $297 million. While a majority of buildings were completed in December 2011, as of FY2018 some buildings are still under construction. P.L. 109-234 appropriated $585.9 million for major construction by the VA, of which $550 million was for replacing the New Orleans Medical Center. P.L. 112-10 appropriated $310 million for FY2011, and P.L. 112-74 appropriated $60 million for FY2012, for the New Orleans Medical Center. In FY2015 $39.5 million and in FY2016 $50 million were respectively reprogrammed from the working reserve. The total estimated cost of replacing the VA Medical Center in New Orleans is approximately $1.09 billion. The site decision for the new VA Medical Center in New Orleans was announced on November 25, 2008, and a groundbreaking ceremony was held on June 25, 2010. However, VA could not acquire all the land parcels necessary to construct the new medical center until late April 2011. The construction of the new facility began in May 2011. The new medical center was formally opened on November 18, 2016, and activation of various clinics would occur in various phases. Armed Forces Retirement Homes Gulfport Facility The Armed Forces Retirement Home Trust Fund provides funds to operate and maintain the Armed Forces Retirement Homes (AFRH) in Washington, DC (also known as the United States Soldiers' and Airmen's Home), and in Gulfport, MS (originally located in Philadelphia, PA, and known as the United States Naval Home). These two facilities provide long-term housing and medical care for approximately 1,600 needy veterans. The Gulfport campus, encompassing a 19-story living accommodation and medical facility tower, was severely damaged by Hurricane Katrina, and closed at the end of August 2005. Funding Narrative P.L. 109-148 appropriated $65.8 million for the AFRH for expenses necessary because of the Gulf of Mexico hurricanes. Of the $65.8 million, $45 million was for advance planning and design work to replace the Gulfport, MS, facility, which was nearly destroyed by Hurricane Katrina. The facility had almost 600 residents, the majority of whom were transferred to the Washington, DC, facility after the storm. P.L. 109-234 appropriated $176 million for construction of the new Gulfport facility, and consolidated an additional $64.7 million in previously appropriated funds for construction of the new facility. P.L. 110-329 and P.L. 111-117 provided additional funds ($8.0 million and $72.0 million, respectively) for construction and renovation at the Washington, DC, and Gulfport facilities (a breakdown between the facilities for the funding is not available). In October 2010, the new Gulfport facility was completed to which residents returned. Corporation for National and Community Service151 The National Civilian Community Corps (NCCC), authorized under the National and Community Service Act of 1990, as amended, is a residential program for individuals age 18 through 24 that conducts projects related to, among other things, disaster preparedness and relief and recovery efforts. The $10 million in Emergency Supplemental Funds provided for NCCC in P.L. 109-234 was used to support a range of program operations in the Gulf Region, from staff and member payroll and travel to covering communications, equipment, and supply costs. Funding was used in FY2007. Approximately $1.3 million went directly to the National Service Trust, which provides educational awards to NCCC members who complete 10 months of full-time service. The remaining $8.7 million was used to support program operations; it was not used to support a specific project or service. Instead, it was combined with the program's FY2007 appropriation of $26.8 million and allowed NCCC to direct members from all of its campuses to the Gulf Region for the recovery effort. The FY2007 appropriation, combined with the $8.7 million in supplemental funds, was used, among other things, to enable 1,063 members to serve 810,000 hours on 341 relief and recovery projects in the Gulf Region. To support this work, NCCC partnered with numerous national and local organizations, local universities and churches, as well as local and federal government, including (but not limited to) the American Red Cross; Habitat for Humanity; City Year Louisiana; The Salvation Army; Hands On Network; Federal Emergency Management Agency; St. Bernard Parish; Tulane, Xavier, and Dillard Universities; United Way of Acadiana, Louisiana; New Orleans Recovery School District; Christian Contractors Association, Mississippi; Council on Aging, Louisiana; Alliance for Affordable Energy; Arc of Greater New Orleans; Blackbelt and Central Alabama Housing Authority; various Boys and Girls Clubs; Mississippi Commission for Volunteers; and New Orleans Recreation Department. Environmental Protection Agency153 The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) primary responsibilities include the implementation of federal statutes regulating air quality, water quality, pesticides, and toxic substances; the regulation of the management and disposal of solid and hazardous wastes; and the cleanup of environmental contamination. In the case of declared disasters, FEMA may call on EPA to provide assistance to state and local governments, most notably in response to releases of hazardous materials and contaminants from a major disaster or emergency. Hurricane Emergency Response Authorities In addition to the authorities of a Presidential declaration under the Stafford Act, three federal laws authorized the development of the regulations that are embodied in the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP). These regulations serve as EPA's standing authority and plan for response to oil spills and releases of hazardous substances. Section 311 of the Clean Water Act authorizes federal emergency response to oil spills into U.S. waters, onto adjoining shorelines, or that may affect natural resources under the jurisdiction of the United States. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA) amended the response authorities in Section 311 of the Clean Water Act, and established a liability and compensation framework for oil spills. The Comprehensive, Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA, commonly referred to as Superfund) authorizes federal emergency response to releases of hazardous substances into the environment. The President's response authorities under these laws are delegated by executive order to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in the inland zone and to the U.S. Coast Guard in the coastal zone. Other response authorities apply to oil released under certain circumstances not covered by the NCP. EPA also has additional emergency response roles related to protecting water infrastructure under other response plans and authorities if required. EPA is the lead federal agency for the water sector under the National Infrastructure Protection Plan. EPA also has statutory "emergency powers" under the Safe Drinking Water Act to issue orders and commence civil action if a contaminant likely to enter a public water supply system poses a substantial threat to public health, and state or local officials have not taken adequate action. EPA Hurricane Response EPA's primary disaster response role is carried out in accordance with the (NCP) as outlined in the NRF, Emergency Support Function 10 (ESF#10)—Oil and Hazardous Materials Annex. Under ESF#10, EPA is the lead federal agency for inland incidents and those affecting both inland and coastal zones. EPA also has various other response roles under the NRF and may perform a wide array of support functions in responding to a disaster or emergency. In accordance with various ESFs, EPA support to other federal agencies (primarily FEMA and the Army Corps of Engineers) and state and local governments, includes activities necessary to address threats to human health and the environment focusing on impacts to drinking water and wastewater treatment facilities and postdisaster cleanup. EPA also may support the Army Corps of Engineers in its mission under ESF #3—Public Works and Engineering Annex—to remove disaster debris and cleanup of water infrastructure facilities, and to DOE under ESF #12—Energy Annex—in its effort to maintain continuous and reliable energy supplies. In practice, EPA support for this latter function has generally involved waiving environmental requirements applicable to motor vehicle fuel under the Clean Air Act. For example, as part of the federal response to hurricanes in 2005, EPA granted certain waivers under this statute in response to requests from state and local officials when significant disruptions in fuel production or distribution occurred in the wake of these natural disasters. EPA's activities following the 2005 and 2008 hurricanes included retrieval and disposal of orphan (oil) tanks and drums, the collection of household hazardous waste, and the collection of liquid and semiliquid waste. Additionally, EPA and Corps of Engineers staff conducted assessments, providing assistance to state and local government personnel to evaluate damages to public works. Steps involved in actually restoring service include drying out and cleaning engines; testing and repairing waterlogged electrical systems; testing for toxic chemicals that may have infiltrated pipes and plants; restoring pressure (drinking water distribution lines); activating disinfection units; restoring bacteria needed to treat wastes (wastewater plants); and cleaning, repairing, and flushing distribution and sewer lines. EPA also assisted local agencies with contaminated (nonhazardous) debris management activities. Funding Narrative Initially following the 2005 and 2008 hurricanes, EPA conducted assessments and provided assistance to state and local governments using existing programs and regular funding. After the initial period EPA was eligible for reimbursement by FEMA for costs associated with these efforts under a FEMA mission assignment. Funding for EPA's response to Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, Wilma, Gustav, and Ike was primarily through the FEMA mission assignments and interagency agreements with FEMA. EPA indicated that of the $505 million received cumulatively through interagency agreements for its response to the five hurricanes, $497 million was expended. In addition to the mission assignment from FEMA, EPA received a cumulative total of $21 million in emergency supplemental appropriations under P.L. 109-148 enacted December 30, 2005, and P.L. 109-234 , enacted June 15, 2006. Under P.L. 109-148 , EPA received $8 million in emergency supplemental FY2006 appropriations for the Leaking Underground Storage Tank Program (LUST) for necessary expenses to address the most immediate underground storage tank needs in areas affected by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. P.L. 109-234 increased EPA's FY2006 appropriation by an additional $7 million for assessing underground storage tanks that may have leaked in affected areas, and made $6 million available through EPA's Environmental Programs and Management (EPM) appropriations account for increased environmental monitoring, assessment, and analytical support to protect public health during the ongoing recovery and reconstruction efforts related to the consequences of the 2005 hurricane season. EPA provided the cumulative $15 million included in the two supplemental appropriations under the LUST program to Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi in the form of grants for assessment and containment of underground tanks (by statute not to exceed $85,000 per project). EPA reported no allocation of this funding to Florida or Texas. The per-state distribution was determined jointly by EPA and the affected states based on the site evaluation information available at the time. The Alabama Department of Environmental Management (ADEM) indicated completion of site work related to Katrina and initiated a return of unliquidated obligations totaling $364,670. The majority of the $6 million emergency appropriations provided within the EPA Environmental Programs and Management appropriations account was used to fund contractors for analytical and other disaster support and to purchase equipment, including replacement of expended or damaged air monitors, within Louisiana and Mississippi. Funding was also provided for similar purposes in Alabama and Florida. No EPM funding allocation was reported for Texas. EPA provided $1.4 million of the EPM supplemental funding to its Office of Research and Development and Office of Air and Radiation for continued disaster and emergency response support, including analysis in its laboratories and air monitoring, across states affected by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. EPA Regular Appropriations General appropriation funds available to states in the form of grants from EPA may also have been used in the 2005 and 2008 hurricane recovery efforts, in particular, capitalization grants from the Clean Water and the Drinking Water State Revolving Funds (SRFs). The SRFs are funded within the EPA's State and Tribal Assistance Grants (STAG) appropriations account. SRF grant funding is used for local wastewater and drinking water infrastructure projects, such as construction of and modification to municipal sewage treatment plants and drinking water treatment plants, to facilitate compliance with Clean Water Act and Safe Drinking Water Act requirements, respectively. Although, following a presidentially declared emergency, public drinking water and wastewater utilities are eligible for FEMA supplemental federal disaster grant assistance for the repair, replacement, or restoration of disaster damaged facilities, the portions of the annual fiscal year SRF grant allotments to states may have also been used to supplement these projects. EPA allocates annual appropriations for these capitalization grants among the states based on an established formula authorized in the Clean Water Act and based on needs surveys under the Safe Drinking Water Act. States must provide 20% matching funds in order to receive the federal funds. States combine their matching funds with the federal monies to capitalize their SRFs, which they use to issue low-interest or no interest loans to finance local water infrastructure projects in communities. The recipients generally must repay the loan to the issuing state. For FY2006-FY2011, the cumulative total allotment to the five Gulf States examined in this report from Clean Water SRF annual appropriations was $1.20 billion. The cumulative total during the six-year period for the Drinking Water SRF was $1.16 billion. What portion of these funds was used to support projects for infrastructure affected by the five hurricanes is not known. The Federal Judiciary177 The mission of the federal courts is to protect the rights and liberties guaranteed under the Constitution. The courts are charged with interpreting and applying the law to resolve disputes through fair and impartial judgments, and ensuring fairness and equal justice for all citizens of the United States. According to the Budget Office of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Congress appropriated $18 million in emergency judiciary funding for disaster relief in the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. These monies were obligated to (1) reimburse per diem for judges, court staff, and federal public defenders' staff who were on temporary duty assignment, and their dependents; (2) reimburse all judges and court staff who were on temporary duty assignment for travel purposes; (3) pay for furniture, equipment, and security in the temporary locations; and (4) replace furniture and equipment in courts affected by the hurricanes. Table 27 presents the funding provided to Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas, and Florida, as well as the additional funding to the Fifth Circuit. Small Business Administration180 Disaster Assistance Program Authority The Small Business Administration's (SBA's) Disaster Assistance Program is authorized by the Small Business Act (P.L. 85-536, Section 7(b) 72 Stat. 387, as amended). Program Description The SBA's Disaster Assistance Program provides low-interest disaster loans to homeowners, renters, and businesses, as well as to private and nonprofit organizations to repair or replace real estate, personal property, machinery and equipment, inventory, and business assets that have been damaged or destroyed in a declared disaster. The SBA provides three categories of loans: (1) home loans, (2) business loans, and (3) Economic Injury Disaster Loans (EIDLs). Home disaster loans help homeowners and renters repair or replace disaster-related damages to homes or personal property. SBA regulations limit home loans to $200,000 for the repair or replacement of real estate and $40,000 to repair or replace personal property. Business disaster loans help business owners repair or replace disaster-damaged property, including inventory and supplies. Business loans are limited to $2 million. EIDLs provide assistance to small businesses, small agricultural cooperatives, and certain private, nonprofit organizations that have suffered substantial economic injury resulting from a physical disaster or an agricultural production disaster. EIDLs are limited to $2 million. Table 28 lists the number of approved disaster loan applications by state and by type of loan for all five hurricanes. The actual number of loans made may be somewhat lower than the number of loan applications approved, because not all approved loan applications are subsequently accepted by the borrower. Table 29 lists the amount of the approved loans, by state. Cost-Shares and Programmatic Considerations: Hurricanes Katrina, Wilma, Dennis, and Rita182 Administrative and Congressional Waivers of Cost-Shares P.L. 110-28 , the "U.S. Troops Readiness, Veterans Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007," which provided supplemental appropriations legislation for the war in Iraq and disaster recovery from Hurricane Katrina, provided cost-share reductions for disaster assistance provided to the affected states along the Gulf Coast. The reductions provided to Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas were among the largest ever granted. P.L. 110-28 provided a waiver of all state and local cost-shares for four disaster assistance programs that are a part of the Stafford Act. These programs included Section 403 (Essential Assistance), Section 406 (Repair, Restoration, and Replacement of Damaged Facilities), Section 407 (Debris Removal), and Section 408 (Federal Assistance to Individuals and Households). These programs are generally cost-shared in statute at 75% federal and 25% state and local with the possibility, under specified circumstances, for a 90% federal, 10% state and local ratio. Also significant was the cost-share waiver for the Other Needs Assistance Program under Section 408, which had never been waived previously. That section of Stafford states that the "Federal share shall be 75 percent." Section 4501 of P.L. 110-28 , also states in part, the following: (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, including any agreement, the Federal share of assistance, including direct Federal assistance, provided for the States of Louisiana, Mississippi, Florida, Alabama and Texas in connection with Hurricanes Katrina, Wilma, Dennis and Rita under sections 403, 406, 407, and 408 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 USC 5170b, 5172, 5173, and 5174) shall be 100 percent of the eligible costs under such sections. (b) APPLICABILITY 1) IN GENERAL—The federal share provided by subsection (a) shall apply to disaster assistance applied for before the date of enactment of this Act. (2) LIMITATION—In the case of disaster assistance provided under Section 403, 406 and 407 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, the Federal share provided by subsection (a) shall be limited to assistance provided for projects for which a "request for public assistance form" has been submitted. The statutory cost-share waivers were provided for five states. Per capita damage for Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama from Hurricane Katrina, and for Louisiana from Hurricane Rita, had already qualified those states for a decreased state cost-share (from 25% to 10%) through FEMA's regulatory formula based on estimated damage. Congress' inclusion of Florida and Texas may have been an effort to not separate out related damages within a devastating hurricane season. Also, the decision to grant cost-share waivers to Florida and Texas may have been in recognition of the amount of help both states had provided to Mississippi and Louisiana, respectively, in both the provision of emergency management resources and in hosting large numbers of evacuees in the wake of the storms of 2005. The "Limitation" in the legislation was intended to ensure that the projects receiving the waiver were ones already identified by applicants and not newly created projects, or perhaps, projects not necessarily related to the event that were attempting to capitalize on the reduced cost-share provision. The legislation states that a "request for public assistance" submitted prior to enactment of the bill (May 25, 2007) will require no cost-share. Any "requests for public assistance" not submitted prior to the enactment of the bill will be cost-shared at the 90% federal, 10% state and local cost-share for the affected states. This provision appeared to be intended to provide the more generous cost-share to those projects already selected by the state rather than projects that could be developed or submitted based on 100% federal funding. There have been several instances when Congress chose to adjust a state's cost-share by legislation. Prior to large cost-share adjustments made to several FEMA programs as noted above, Congress also legislatively reduced cost-shares for states affected by Hurricane Rita. Concluding Observations and Policy Questions185 This report demonstrates not only the significant amount of assistance the federal government provides for major disasters, but also the wide range of federal programs that are brought to bear to help individuals and communities respond and recover from major disasters, as well as prepare and mitigate against future disasters. Yet, this is only a partial picture of the amounts and types of disaster assistance that have been provided by the federal government on a yearly basis. The research focus for this report was on supplemental appropriations for the 2005 and 2008 Gulf Coast hurricanes. The federal government, however, also annually provides disaster assistance through regular appropriations and continuing resolutions, as well as supplemental appropriations. For example, with respect to the DRF, Congress provided roughly $42 billion in annual appropriations for FY2007 to FY2016 (see Table 30 ). This amount does not include what was provided in annual appropriations for other agencies, nor does it include what was provided through supplemental appropriations. There are indications that expenditures on disaster assistance may increase. In recent years there has been an uptick in the number of declarations issued each year. For example, the average number of major disasters declared per year from 1953 to 2016 was 35.8. However, beginning in the 1990s there has been an uptick in the frequency with which major disasters are declared. During the 1990s the average number of major disaster declarations per year was 45.8, the average number from 2000 to 2009 was 57.1, and the average number from 2010 to 2016 was 58.7 (see Figure 1 ). Thus, while this report provides the most detailed information on federal assistance for the 2005 and 2008 Gulf Coast hurricanes, there is a need for further research on the subject of federal disaster assistance—including the assistance provided in response to disasters in other regions of the United States—to address existing gaps in funding information. This information would be useful because, arguably, congressional oversight and debates concerning disaster relief can be better informed with more accurate data and information on the amounts and types of assistance provided by the federal government to states, localities, and tribal nations. Potential policy methods for addressing gaps in funding information may include requiring the issuance of disaster assistance reports on an annual or quarterly basis from all federal entities that provide significant amounts of disaster assistance; the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to compile a report on an annual or quarterly basis with funding information that details all federal spending for emergencies and major disasters; a standardization of how expenditure data are reported across federal agencies to facilitate cost comparisons; reports to include state-specific as well as disaster-specific information. State-specific information could be used to target mitigation projects; disaster assistance reports to include supplemental as well as regular appropriations data; federal agencies to flag monies used for disaster relief that has been taken from their regular budgets; and disaster assistance reports to contain cost share information as well as detailed information on state expenditures. Potential Methods for Controlling Costs Associated with Major Disasters If the increase in the number of declarations and their associated costs are of concern, in addition to requiring improved data reporting Congress may choose to address the issue through a variety of policy measures. The following sections could be used to frame a potential debate on limiting the number of declarations being issued, limiting the assistance provided after a declaration has been declared, or both. Rationale for Keeping the Disaster Assistance the Same To many, providing relief to disaster victims is an essential role of the government. In their view, the concern over costs is understandable given concerns over the national budget. However, they may argue that the increase in the amount of assistance provided over the past decade is justified because the occurrences of disasters are on the rise (see Figure 6 ). The rise may be due to a number of factors including increases in inclement weather, population growth, and building development. Moreover, proponents of keeping the current system in place may say that providing assistance to disaster-stricken areas is both acceptable and needed to help a state and region's economy recover from a storm that it otherwise may not be able to recover from on its own. Limiting the Number of Major Disaster Declarations Being Issued Others may contend that too many major disasters are being declared and should be limited. The following sections review some policy mechanisms that could be employed to decrease the number of declarations that are being issued. The primary option consists of preventing what may be perceived by some to be marginal incidents from triggering federal assistance. Potential methods to achieve this include changing the definitions of a major disaster in Stafford Act, changing the per capita formula for determining whether a disaster is sufficiently large to warrant federal assistance, or the use of other indicators instead of, or in conjunction with, the per capita formula. Changing the Definition of Major Disaster in the Stafford Act Some argue that the Stafford Act has enhanced presidential declaration authority because the definition of a major disaster in Section 102(2) of Stafford Act is ill-defined. Because of the expansive nature of this definition under the Stafford Act, they assert, there are not many restrictions on the types of major disasters for which the President may issue a declaration. For example, some would argue that snowstorms do not warrant major disaster declarations. Changing the Per Capita Formula One potential method of reducing the number of major disasters being declared is to increase the per capita amount used by FEMA to make major disaster recommendations to the President. A per capita formula based on damages caused by an incident is used by FEMA to make recommendations to the President concerning whether to issue a major disaster declaration. The current per capita amount used by FEMA to make recommendations is $1.43. This amount could be increased (for example, by 10%) to reduce the number of incidents eligible for federal assistance. If increased, Congress might require that the per capita be adjusted annually for inflation. The DHS Inspector General issued a report in May 2012, which noted that FEMA had been using a $1 per capita damage amount since 1986 for determining during its preliminary damage assessment process if it would recommend to the President that the event was beyond the capacity of state and local governments to deal with without federal assistance. The DHS Inspector General also explained that FEMA did not begin adjusting that number for inflation until 1999. The DHS Inspector General pointed out that if the inflation adjustment had been occurring over that 13-year period, from 1986 to 1999, fully 36% fewer disasters would have qualified for a presidential declaration based on that factor. However, it is also useful to understand that the actual public announcement of factors considered for a declaration did not become public until 1999. At the behest of Congress, it was in that year that FEMA began to print the factors that were considered in regulation. Until then, all of that information had been within the "pre-decisional" part of the process in the executive branch. However, in 1999 FEMA began to identify factors considered for both Public and Individual Assistance. That is not to say FEMA was not using the per capita amount in its considerations, only that the process was not widely known or understood as it presently is. As the DHS IG notes, FEMA could have been raising that amount gradually, a process that did not begin until more than a dozen years later. On the other hand, it should also be considered that when FEMA discussed such proposals (e.g., per capita figures gradually increasing) with Congress, the result was a new Section 320 of the Stafford Act that stated the following: No geographic area shall be precluded from receiving assistance under this Act solely by virtue of an arithmetic formula or sliding scale based on income of population. The Use of State Capacity Indicators In 2001, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report on disaster declaration criteria. The GAO report was a comprehensive review of FEMA's declaration criteria factors. GAO recommended that FEMA "develop more objective and specific criteria to assess the capabilities of state and local governments to respond to a disaster" and "consider replacing the per capita measure of state capacity with a more sensitive measure, such as a state's total taxable resources." The state's Total Taxable Resources (TTR) was developed by the Department of the Treasury. GAO reported that TTR: is a better measure of state funding capacity in that it provides a more comprehensive measure of the resources that are potentially subject to state taxation. For example, TTR includes much of the business income that does not become part of the income flow to state residents, undistributed corporate profits, and rents and interest payments made by businesses to out-of-state stock owners. This more comprehensive indicator of state funding capacity is currently used to target federal aid to low-capacity states under the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Service Administration's block grant programs. In the case of FEMA's Public Assistance program, adjustments for TTR in setting the threshold for a disaster declaration would result in a more realistic estimate of a state's ability to respond to a disaster. It could be argued that the use of TTR would conflict with the prohibition against the use of arithmetic formulas established by Congress. However, just as FEMA's per capita measurement is one of several factors considered and not the "sole" determinant of a declaration, GAO stated that TTR would not violate Section 320 because TTR could also be used with other criteria such as those identified in regulations. Thus, some could contend that TTR could fill a similar role with perhaps more accuracy. It may also help reduce federal costs for disaster assistance by denying assistance to marginal incidents that could be otherwise handled by the state. Expert Panels Some have proposed the use of an independent expert panel to review gubernatorial requests for major disaster declarations. Such panels would be comprised of individuals with specialized knowledge in certain subject areas, such as disasters, economics, and public health. The panel would take into account the severity of the incident as well as other factors that might indicate how well the state could respond to and recover from the incident. The panel would then make recommendations to the President whether the circumstances of the incident were worthy of federal assistance based on their assessment. Some might argue that the use of an expert panel would make decisions about whether to provide assistance more objective. Others might argue that the use of a panel may slow down the declaration process and impede the provision of important assets and resources. It may be argued that the panel's recommendation would infringe on the President's authority to issue a declaration. On the other hand, it could also be argued that the President would retain the authority to issue a declaration despite the panel's recommendation. Emergency Loans Another potential method to reduce the number of declarations and the costs of federal disaster assistance would be to create incentives to dissuade states from requesting assistance. One method would be converting some, or all, federal assistance provided through emergency declarations into a loan program. For example, emergency declarations could be altered to provide up to a specified amount (for example, $5 billion dollars) in low interest recovery loans. Under this arrangement a state could elect to handle the incident without federal assistance rather than having to reimburse the federal government for recovery loans. Changes to the Stafford Act The following section discusses some potential changes to the Stafford Act that might limit the number of declarations being issued each year. Repeal of Section 320 As mentioned previously, Section 320 of the Stafford Act restricts the use of an arithmetic or sliding scale to provide federal assistance. Repealing Section 320 would allow formulas that establish certain thresholds that states would have to meet to qualify for assistance. Section 404 Section 404 of the Stafford Act authorizes the President to contribute up to 75% of the cost of an incident toward mitigation measures that reduce the risk of future damage, loss of life, and suffering. Section 404 could be amended to make mitigation assistance contingent on state codes being in place prior to an event. For example, states that have met certain mitigation standards could remain eligible for the 75% federal cost share. States that do not meet the standards would be eligible for a smaller share, such as 50% federal cost share. The amendment may incentivize mitigation work on the behalf of the state and possibly help reduce damages to the extent that a request for assistance is not needed, or the cost of the federal share may be lessened. The amendment could be set to take effect in three years, giving states time to act, or not. Other Potential Amendments to the Stafford Act Other amendments to the Stafford Act could either limit the number of declarations being issued, or the amount of assistance provided to the state by the federal government. The Stafford Act could be amended so that there could be no administrative adjustment of the cost-share. The cost-share could only be adjusted through congressional action. The amendment could be designed to apply immediately. The Stafford Act could be amended so that federal assistance would only be available for states with corollary programs (such as Public Assistance, Individual Assistance, and housing assistance). Establishing these programs at the state level may increase state capacity to handle some incidents without federal assistance. The amendment could be designed to take effect in three years, giving states time to act, or not. The Stafford Act could be amended to discontinue all assistance for snow removal unless directed by Congress. The amendment could be designed to take effect in three years to give states and localities an opportunity to increase snow removal budgets, or not. Reducing the Amount of Assistance Provided Through Declarations Adjust the State Cost Share Most discussions regarding state cost-shares in disaster programs and projects involve ways in which the state amount may be reduced and the federal share increased. Some may contend, however, that the opposite approach should be adopted and efforts should be undertaken to reduce disaster costs by shifting the costs to the state and local level. Currently, state and local governments provide 25% of disaster costs on projects and grants to families and individuals with the federal government assuming, at a minimum, 75% of all costs. There is no statutory limit on the number of people that can be helped following a disaster. Similarly, when assessing damage to state and local infrastructure there is no cap on the amount of federal funds that can be expended to make the repairs or accomplish a replacement. The only limitation is that the damage must be to eligible facilities and that it is disaster-related damage. Given that open-ended commitment by the federal government, some may argue that increasing the state share of 25% to a higher percentage would be warranted given the federal government's fiscal condition. Another option would be to make the cost-share arrangement not subject to administrative adjustment. Disaster Loans As mentioned previously, the assistance provided for emergency declarations could be provided through the form of loans. Similarly, some or all of the assistance provided to the state after a major disaster could be converted to low-interest or no-interest loans. For example, a state may receive the traditional 75% cost share for an incident but be required to reimburse 25% of that funding to the federal government. Loans for disaster recovery could also be incentivized. For instance, states that undertook certain pre-established preparedness mitigation measures could qualify for a larger federal share or a lower interest rate. Policy Questions Congress has always debated the federal role in disaster relief. In recent years the debate has intensified in light of the federal budgetary environment. Policymakers have, or may ask, a number of questions relating to federal expenditures on disaster relief to assist and improve oversight, and to better inform deliberations on legislation designed to assist individuals and communities respond and recover from incidents. Such questions may include the following: To what degree should the federal government be involved in providing disaster assistance? Is the federal government providing enough assistance, or being overly generous in providing financial assistance to states? Was the funding provided for the Gulf Coast storms delivered efficiently and to its intended targets? If not, how can the process be improved without slowing the provision of necessary services and resources? How were funding allocations to each federal entity determined? Was the process accurate, or could it be improved in upcoming disasters? Are there increased instances of fraud, abuse, and waste when large sums of funding are provided for disaster relief? If so, what oversight mechanisms are in place to prevent such occurrences? Is there unnecessary duplication of services and/or efforts given the large number of federal entities involved in disaster relief? The assistance provided by the federal government to the Gulf Coast was provided, in part, by a number of supplemental appropriations. Is it better to provide funding overtime through multiple supplemental appropriations, or to provide the funding once through a single supplemental appropriation? Appendix. Contributing Authors The following authors contributed sections in this report.

This report provides information on federal financial assistance provided to the Gulf States after major disasters were declared in Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas in response to the widespread destruction that resulted from Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma in 2005 and Hurricanes Gustav and Ike in 2008. Though the storms happened over a decade ago, Congress has remained interested in the types and amounts of federal assistance that were provided to the Gulf Coast for several reasons. This includes how the money has been spent, what resources have been provided to the region, and whether the money has reached the intended people and entities. The financial information is also useful for congressional oversight of the federal programs provided in response to the storms. It gives Congress a general idea of the federal assets that are needed and can be brought to bear when catastrophic disasters take place in the United States. Finally, the financial information from the storms can help frame the congressional debate concerning federal assistance for current and future disasters. The financial information for the 2005 and 2008 Gulf Coast storms is provided in two sections of this report: 1. Table 1 of Section I summarizes disaster assistance supplemental appropriations enacted into public law primarily for the needs associated with the five hurricanes, with the information categorized by federal department and agency; and 2. Section II contains information on the federal assistance provided to the five Gulf Coast states through the most significant federal programs, or categories of programs. The financial findings in this report include the following: Congress has appropriated roughly $121.7 billion in hurricane relief for the 2005 and 2008 hurricanes in 10 supplemental appropriations statutes. The appropriated funds have been distributed among 11 departments, 3 independent agencies/entities, numerous subentities, and the federal judiciary. Congress appropriated almost half of the funds ($53.8 billion, or 44% of the total) to the Department of Homeland Security, most of which went to the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) administered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Congress targeted roughly 22% of the total appropriations (almost $27 billion) to the Department of Housing and Urban Development for community development and housing programs. Approximately 20% ($25 billion) was appropriated to Department of Defense entities: $15.6 billion for civil construction and engineering activities undertaken by the Army Corps of Engineers and $9.2 billion for military personnel, operations, and construction costs. FEMA has reported that roughly $5.9 billion has been obligated from the DRF after Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma to save lives and property through mission assignments made to over 50 federal entities and the American Red Cross (see Table 17), $160.4 million after Hurricane Gustav through 32 federal entities (see Table 18), and $441 million after Hurricane Ike through 30 federal entities (see Table 19). In total, federal agencies obligated roughly $6.5 billion for mission assignments after the five hurricanes. The Small Business Administration approved almost 177,000 applications in the region for business, home, and economic injury loans, with a total loan value of almost $12 billion (Table 28 and Table 29). The Department of Education obligated roughly $1.8 billion to the five states for elementary, secondary, and higher education assistance (Table 11). This report also includes a brief summary of each hurricane and a discussion concerning federal to state cost-shares. Federal assistance to states is triggered when the President issues a major disaster declaration. In general, once declared the federal share for disaster recovery is 75% while the state pays for 25% of recovery costs. However, in some cases the federal share can be adjusted upward when a sufficient amount of damage has occurred, or when altered by Congress (or both). In addition, how much federal assistance is provided to states for major disasters is influenced not only by the declaration, but also by the percentage the federal government pays for the assistance. This report includes a cost-share discussion because some of these incidents received adjusted cost-shares in certain areas.

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Introduction The military compensation system is complex and includes an array of cash compensation elements, noncash compensation (benefits), deferred compensation (retirement pay, Thrift Savings Plan, retiree health care, and other retirement benefits), and tax advantages. This report focuses primarily on the cash compensation provided to members of the active component Armed Forces. Other CRS reports cover military retirement and health care. This report uses a question and answer format to highlight key aspects of the military compensation system and to address topics of recurring congressional interest, including the following: Compensation elements and rates. Statutory formulas for increasing compensation elements. Historical increases in basic pay. Comparability with civilian pay. Additional compensation for those serving in Iraq or Afghanistan. Key Questions and Answers 1. How Are Military Personnel Compensated? There are three main ways in which military personnel are compensated: cash compensation, noncash compensation, and deferred compensation. Cash compensation takes a variety of forms and includes basic pay, housing and subsistence allowances, enlistment bonuses, skill proficiency pay, and additional pay for particularly demanding or dangerous duty. Non cash compensation includes various benefits such as medical and dental care, government-provided housing, educational benefits, space-available travel on military aircraft, and access to subsidized grocery stores (commissaries), retail stores (exchanges), and child care centers. The main elements of deferred compensation are retired pay and retiree health care, but commissary and exchange access, space-available travel, and other benefits are also part of this. Servicemembers may also participate in the Thrift Savings Plan (TSP), although until 2018 they generally did not receive matching contributions from the government. However, recent changes to the military retirement system made matching contributions to the Thrift Savings Plan a key component of many servicemembers' deferred compensation starting in 2018. The basic compensation package provided to all servicemembers includes basic pay, a housing allowance (or government-provided housing), a subsistence allowance (or government-provided meals), free medical and dental care for servicemembers, free or low-cost medical and dental care for dependents, paid annual leave, and certain other benefits. Table 1 summarizes the main elements of compensation provided to all servicemembers. Servicemembers may also receive additional cash compensation based on their occupational specialty, duty assignment, and other factors. 2. What Is Regular Military Compensation (RMC)? How Much Do Servicemembers Receive in RMC? When people talk about military pay, they are often only referring to basic pay . Although basic pay is usually the largest component of cash compensation that a servicemember receives, there are other types of military pay that increase it significantly. There are tax benefits as well. Regular Military Compensation is a statutorily defined measure of the cash or in-kind compensation elements that all servicemembers receive every payday. It is widely used as a basic measure of military cash compensation levels and for comparisons with civilian salary levels. Regular Military Compensation (RMC) RMC, as defined in law, is "the total of the following elements that a member of the uniformed services accrues or receives, directly or indirectly, in cash or in kind every payday: basic pay, basic allowance for housing, basic allowance for subsistence, and federal tax advantage accruing to the aforementioned allowances because they are not subject to federal income tax." Though military compensation is structured much differently than civilian compensation, making comparison difficult, RMC provides a more complete understanding of the cash compensation provided to all servicemembers. Therefore, it is usually preferred over simple basic pay when comparing military with civilian compensation, analyzing the standards of living of military personnel, or studying military compensation trends over time. Basic Pay For most servicemembers, basic pay is the largest element of the compensation they receive in their paycheck and typically accounts for about two-thirds of an individual's RMC. All members of the Armed Forces receive basic pay, although the amount varies by pay grade (rank) and years of service (also called longevity). Table 2 provides illustrative examples of basic pay rates. Housing All servicemembers are entitled to either government-provided housing or a housing allowance, known as basic allowance for housing (BAH) for those living within the United States or Overseas Housing Allowance (OHA) for those living outside of the United States. Roughly one-third of servicemembers receive government-provided housing (in the form of barracks, dormitories, ship berthing, or government-owned family housing), with the remainder receiving BAH or OHA to offset the costs of the housing they rent or purchase in the civilian economy or the privatized housing they rent on or near military bases. The proportion of housing costs covered by housing allowances has varied over time. See the section entitled " Basic Allowance for Housing: Increases Are Linked to Increases in Housing Costs " later in this report for more information on this topic. The amount of BAH a servicemember receives is based on three factors: paygrade (rank), geographic location, and whether the servicemember has dependents. Paygrade and dependency status are used to determine the type of accommodation—or "housing profile"—that would be appropriate for the servicemember (for example, one-bedroom apartment, two-bedroom townhouse, or three-bedroom single family home). Geographic location is used to determine the median costs associated with each of these housing profiles. The median costs of these housing profiles are the basis for BAH rates, with some additional adjustments made on the basis of paygrade (that is, an E-7 without dependents will receive more than an E-6 without dependents, even though the appropriate housing profile for both of them is "two bedroom apartment"). As a result of this methodology, BAH rates are much higher in some areas than others, but servicemembers of similar paygrade and dependents status should be able to pay for roughly comparable housing regardless of their duty location. BAH rates are paid to the servicemember at the specified rate, regardless of the actual housing expenses incurred. Table 2 provides illustrative examples of how much BAH servicemembers receive annually. OHA is also based on paygrade, geographic location, and whether the servicemember has dependents, but the manner in which it is calculated is significantly different than BAH. OHA is paid based on the servicemember's reported actual housing expenses, up to a maximum amount that varies by location, plus an allowance for utilities. The amount is reduced if the servicemember resides with one or more "sharers." There is also a fixed one-time allowance to cover certain move-in expenses (such as real estate agents' fees, phone and utility connections, and security improvements). Food Nearly all servicemembers receive a monthly payment to defray their personal food costs. This is known as basic allowance for subsistence (BAS). BAS is provided at a flat rate: In 2019, enlisted personnel receive $369.39 a month, while officers receive $254.39 a month. There have been calls in the past to merge BAS with basic pay to reduce the complexity of military compensation and the need for BAS computations each year. Federal Tax Advantage Certain types of military compensation are not subject to federal income tax, thus generating a tax benefit for servicemembers. The various types of military pay—basic pay, special pay, and incentive pay—are considered part of gross income and are usually subject to federal income tax. Military allowances, on the other hand, are generally not considered part of gross income and are not subject to federal income tax; nor are the various in-kind benefits of the military—for example, government housing, health care, fitness centers, and subsidized grocery stores. , RMC considers only the federal income tax advantage provided by the exemption of BAH and BAS from gross income. The precise value of the federal tax advantage for an individual servicemember will vary depending on his or her unique tax situation. Compensation Elements Not Included in RMC RMC does not include the full array of compensation elements (e.g., special pays and bonuses, reimbursements, educational assistance, deferred compensation, or any estimate of the cash value of nonmonetary benefits such as health care, child care, recreational facilities, commissaries, and exchanges). As the value of these forms of compensation can be very substantial, RMC should not be considered a measure of total military compensation. 3. How Are Each Year's Increases in Basic Pay, BAH, and BAS Computed? Mentions of the "military pay raise" are almost always references to the annual increase in basic pay. The statutory formula for calculating each year's pay raise is discussed below, but b asic pay is only one element of RMC. BAH and BAS are also subject to periodic adjustment, although they typically do not receive as much attention as increases in basic pay. Basic Pay: Increases Are Linked to Increases in the Employment Cost Index (ECI) Section 1009 of Title 37 provides a permanent formula for an automatic annual increase in basic pay that is indexed to the annual increase in the Employment Cost Index (ECI) for "wages and salaries, private industry workers." For 2000-2006, the statute required the military raise to be equal to the ECI increase plus an additional one half percentage point (i.e., if the ECI annual increase were to be 3.0%, the military raise would be 3.5%). For 2007 and onward, the statute required the raise be equal to the ECI, although Congress continued to enact increases above the ECI through 2010. Under subsection (e) of this statute, the President can specify an alternative pay adjustment that supersedes the automatic adjustment. President Obama invoked this option with regard to the 2014-2016 pay raises. Additionally, Congress can pass legislation to specify the annual pay raise which, if enacted, would supersede the automatic adjustment and/or any proposed presidential adjustment. The frequency of such congressional action is discussed below. The automatic adjustment under 37 U.S.C. 1009 is tied to the increase in the ECI from the third quarter of the third preceding year to the third quarter of the second preceding year. For example, in the 12-month period between the quarter which ended in September 2015 and the quarter which ended in September 2016, the ECI increased by 2.4%. Hence the pay raise for 2018, as calculated by the statutory formula, was 2.4%. An illustration of how the formula operates is provided in Figure 1 . This methodology results in a substantial lag between increases in the ECI and increases in basic pay; the lag appears to be related to the stages of the federal budget process. Congress Has Frequently Waived the Automatic Adjustment and Specified the Amount of the Military Pay Raise, Although This Has Become Less Common In Recent Years Despite the statutory formula, which could operate each year without any further action, Congress has frequently waived the automatic adjustment and legislated particular percentage increases. For the pay raises effective in fiscal years 1981 and1982 and calendar years 1984-2010, 2013, and 2017-2018 Congress specified the increase that was to take effect in the annual defense authorization act. Congress specified no percentage increase for 1983, 2011, 2012, 2014-2016, or 2019, thereby allowing the statutory formula or the presidential alternative adjustment to go into effect. The statutory formula is important even when it does not go into effect, as it provides a benchmark around which alternatives are developed and debated. Basic Allowance for Housing: Increases Are Linked to Increases in Housing Costs Basic Allowance for Housing is paid to servicemembers living in the United States who do not choose or are not provided government quarters. By law, the Secretary of Defense sets the BAH rates for localities, known as military housing areas (MHAs), throughout the United States. However, the law requires the Secretary to set the rates "based on the costs of adequate housing determined for the area" and ties this determination to "the costs of adequate housing for civilians with comparable income levels in the same area." As increases in BAH are tied to increases in local housing costs, they are not affected by the annual percentage increase in the ECI. Thus, the average increase in BAH almost always differs from the increase in basic pay. To determine the cost of adequate housing, DOD conducts an annual survey of rental costs in each of the MHAs. DOD employs a contractor to collect rental costs for various types of housing, including apartments, townhouses, and single‐family units of varying bedroom sizes. Costs for utilities are also collected. DOD uses these annual surveys to determine how much housing costs have increased or decreased in each MHA. If costs in a given MHA increase, it adjusts BAH rates for that locality upward accordingly at the start of the next calendar year. If costs in a given MHA decrease, it adjusts the BAH rates downward. However, in the case of a downward adjustment, a "save pay" provision on the BAH statute prevents the decrease from applying to individuals currently assigned to that locality: "So long as a member of a uniformed service retains uninterrupted eligibility to receive a basic allowance for housing within an area of the United States, the monthly amount of the allowance for the member may not be reduced as a result of changes in housing costs in the area or the promotion of the member." Thus, only personnel newly assigned to the area receive the lower payment. Congress has periodically changed the law with regard to the proportion of housing costs covered by BAH or its predecessor, known as Basic Allowance for Quarters (BAQ) and Variable Housing Allowance (VHA). DOD estimated that BAQ+VHA covered about 80% of housing costs in 1996. In 1997, Congress replaced BAQ+VHA with BAH, and subsequently raised BAH rates so that they covered 100% of the cost of adequate housing by 2005. More recently, the FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act allowed the Secretary of Defense to reduce BAH payments by 1% of the national average monthly housing cost, and the FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act extended this authority, authorizing an additional 1% reduction per year through 2019 (for a maximum reduction of 5% under the national monthly average housing cost). DOD has indicated that a save pay provision, discussed above, will apply to these changes. Basic Allowance for Subsistence: Increases Are Linked to Increases in Food Costs BAS is paid at a uniform rate to all eligible enlisted personnel, and at a uniform but lower rate for all eligible officers. By law, BAS is adjusted each year according to a formula that is linked to changes in food prices. The increase is identical to "the percentage increase in the monthly cost of a liberal food plan for a male in the United States who is between 20 and 50 years of age over the preceding fiscal year, as determined by the Secretary of Agriculture each October 1." 4. What Have Been the Annual Percentage Increases in Basic Pay Over the Past 20 Years? What Were Each Year's Major Executive and Legislative Branch Proposals and Actions on the Annual Percentage Increase in Military Basic Pay? The following subsections itemize action on the basic pay increase going back to 1997. Unless otherwise noted, all increases were proposed to be effective on January 1 of the year indicated in bold. The public law number for each year's National Defense Authorization Act is included at the end of each section below, even for those years in which there was no statutory language relevant to the pay raise. For a table that summarizes recent increases in basic pay, see CRS In Focus IF10260, Defense Primer: Military Pay Raise , by Lawrence Kapp. 2019 . Statutory Formula: 2.6 %. Administration request: 2.6 %. The House-passed version of the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) contained no provision to specify the rate of increase in basic pay. Section 601 of the Senate-passed version of the FY2019 NDAA waived the automatic increase in basic pay under the statutory formula of 37 U.S.C. §1009, and set the pay raise at 2.6%. The John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2019 ( P.L. 115-232 ) contained no provision relating to a general increase in basic pay, thereby leaving the automatic adjustment of 37 U.S.C. 1009 in place. Final increase: 2. 6 % across-the-board . 2018. Statutory Formula: 2.4 %. Administration request: 2.1 %. Section 601 of the House-passed version of the FY2018 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) required the statutory formula increase (2.4%) to go into effect, "notwithstanding any determination made by the President under subsection (e) of such section with respect to an alternative pay adjustment.... " Section 601 of the Senate-passed version of the FY2018 NDAA waived the automatic increase in basic pay under the statutory formula of 37 U.S.C. §1009, and set the pay raise at 2.1%. On August 31, 2017, President Trump sent a letter to congressional leaders invoking his authority under 37 U.S.C. 1009(e) to set the pay raise at 2.1%. However, Section 601 of the enacted version of the FY2018 NDAA ( P.L. 115-91 ) specified the statutory formula increase (2.4%) would go into effect, superseding the President's alternative adjustment. Therefore, basic pay for all servicemembers increased by 2.4% on January 1, 2018. Final increase : 2. 4 % across-the-board ( P.L. 115-91 ) . 2017. Statutory Formula: 2.1 %. Administration request: 1 .6 %. Section 601 of the House version of the FY2017 NDAA ( H.R. 4909 ) required the statutory formula increase (2.1%) to go into effect, "notwithstanding any determination made by the President under subsection (e) of such section with respect to an alternative pay adjustment.... " Section 601 of the Senate version of the FY2017 NDAA ( S. 2943 ) waived the automatic increase in basic pay under the statutory formula of 37 U.S.C. §1009, and set the pay raise at 1.6%. On August 31, 2016, the President sent a letter to congressional leaders invoking his authority under 37 U.S.C. 1009(e) to set the pay raise at 1.6%. However, Section 601 of the final version of the FY2017 NDAA set the pay raise at 2.1%, and President Obama signed this bill into law on December 23, 2016. This statutory adjustment supplanted the President's alternative pay adjustment. Therefore, basic pay for all servicemembers increased by 2.1% on January 1, 2017. Final increase : 2.1% across-the-board ( P.L. 114-328 ) . 2016. Statutory Formula: 2.3 %. Administration request: 1 .3 %. The House version of the FY2016 NDAA ( H.R. 1735 ) contained no provision to specify the rate of increase in basic pay, although the report accompanying it stated that the committee supported a 2.3% increase. The Senate version ( H.R. 1735 ) contained a provision that waived the automatic adjustment of 37 U.S.C. §1009 and set the pay increase at 1.3%, but excluded generals and admirals. On August 28, the President exercised his authority to specify an alternative adjustment, setting the increase at 1.3%. No general pay raise provision was included in the final version of the NDAA, thereby leaving in place the 1.3% increase specified by President Obama. However, Section 601 of the FY2016 NDAA prevented the pay increase from applying to generals and admirals. Final increase : 1.3% across-the-board, excluding generals and admirals ( P.L. 114-92 ). 2015. Statutory Formula: 1.8 %. Administration request: 1 .0 %. The House version of the FY2015 NDAA contained no statutory provision to specify the rate of increase in basic pay, although the report accompanying it stated that the committee supported a 1.8% increase; it also included a provision to prevent general and flag officers from receiving any increase in basic pay in 2015. The Senate committee-reported version contained a provision waiving the automatic adjustment of 37 U.S.C. 1009 and setting the pay increase at 1.0% for servicemembers, but excluded generals and admirals. On August 29, President Obama sent a letter to Congress invoking 37 U.S.C. 1009(e) to set the pay raise for 2015 at 1.0%. No general pay raise provision was included in the final version of the NDAA, thereby leaving in place the 1.0% increase specified by President Obama. However, Section 601 of the FY2015 NDAA prevented the pay increase from applying to generals and admirals. Final increase : 1% across-the-board, excluding generals and admirals ( P.L. 113-291 ). 2014. Statutory Formula: 1. 8 %. Administration request: 1. 0 %. The House version of the FY2014 NDAA contained no provision to specify the rate of increase in basic pay, while the Senate committee-reported bill specified an increase of 1.0%. On August 30, President Obama sent a letter to Congress invoking 37 U.S.C. 1009(e) to set the pay raise for 2014 at 1.0%. No provision was included in the final version of the NDAA, thereby leaving in place the 1.0% increase specified by the President. Final increase : 1% across-the-board ( P.L. 113-66 ). 2013. Statutory Formula: 1. 7 %. Administration request: 1. 7 %. The House version of the FY2013 NDAA supported a 1.7% across-the-board pay raise. The Senate bill contained no statutory language. The final bill specified a 1.7% increase. Final increase : 1 .7 % across-the-board ( P.L. 112-239 ). 2012. Statutory Formula: 1.6%. Administration request: 1.6%. The House version of the FY2012 NDAA supported a 1.6% across-the-board pay raise, equal to the ECI. Both the Senate-reported bill and the final version were silent on the pay raise issue. As a result, the statutory formula became operative with an automatic January 1, 2012, across-the-board raise equal to 1.6%. Final increase : 1.6% across-the-board ( P.L. 112-81 ). 2011. Statutory formula: 1.4%. Administration request : 1.4%. The House version of the FY2011 NDAA supported a 1.9% across-the-board pay raise, 0.5% above the ECI. Both the Senate-reported bill and the final bill were silent on the pay raise issue. As a result, the statutory formula became operative with an automatic across-the-board raise of 1.4%; equal to the ECI. Final increase : 1.4% across-the-board ( P.L. 111-383 ). 2010. Statutory formula: 2.9%. Administration request: 2.9%. The FY2010 NDAA specified a 3.4% increase. Final increase : 3.4% across-the- board ( P.L. 111-84 ). 2009. Statutory formula: 3.4%. Administration request: 3.4%. The FY2009 NDAA specified a 3.9% increase. Final increase : 3.9% across -the-board ( P.L. 110-417 ). 2008. Statutory formula: 3.0%. Administration request: 3.0% across-the-board. The presidential veto of the initial FY2008 NDAA resulted in a 3.0% pay raise taking effect on January 1, 2008 (statutory formula). The final version of the NDAA, signed into law on January 28, specified that basic pay be increased by 3.5% retroactive to January 1. Final increase : 3.5 % across -the-board ( P.L. 110-181 ). 2007. Statutory formula: 2.2%. The statutory formula for 2007 was based solely on the ECI and not a rate 0.5% higher than the ECI that had been specified for 2000-2006. Administration request: 2.2%. The NDAA specified a minimum 2.2% increase, with greater increases for certain pay cells. Final increase : 2.2% across-the- board but with an additional April 1, 2007 , targeted pay raise that would be as high as 8.3% for some warrant officers and range from 2.5 % for E-5s to 5.5 % for E-9s ( P.L. 109-364 ). 2006. Statutory formula: 3.1%. Administration request: 3.1% across-the-board. The NDAA specified a 3.1% increase. Final increase : 3.1% across-the- board ( P.L. 109-163 ). 2005. Statutory formula: 3.5%. Administration request: 3.5%. The NDAA specified a 3.5% increase. Final increase : 3.5% across-the-board ( P.L. 108-375 ). 2004. Statutory formula: 3.7%. Administration request: Average 4.1%; minimum 2.0%; maximum of 6.5%. The NDAA specified a 3.7% minimum increase, with greater increases for certain pay cells. Final increase : 3.7% minimum, 4.15% average, 6.25% maximum for some senior NCOs ( P.L. 108-136 ). 2003. Statutory formula: 4.1%. Administration request: minimum 4.1%; average 4.8%; between 5.0% and 6.5% for some mid-level and senior noncommissioned officers, warrant officers, and mid-level commissioned officers. The NDAA specified increases identical to the Administration request. Final increase: I dentical to the Administration request ( P.L. 107-314 ). 2002. Statutory formula: 4.6%. Administration request: numerous figures for the "Administration request" were mentioned in the pay raise debate, depending on when and which agency produced the figures. In general, however, they all proposed increases of at least 5% and no more than 15% (the latter applying only to a very few individuals), depending on pay grade and years of service; the average increase was 6.9%. The NDAA specified a 5% minimum increase, with greater increases for certain pay cells. Final increase: Between 5 and 10%, depending on pay grade and years of service ( P.L. 107-107 ). 2001. Statutory formula: 3.7%. Administration request : 3.7%. The FY2001 NDAA specified a 3.7% minimum increase of 3.7%, with greater increases for certain pay cells . The NDAA specified a 3.7% minimum increase, with greater increases for certain pay cells. Final increase: 3.7% across-the-board, effective January 1, 2001, plus additional raises of between 1.0 and 5.5% for mid -grade officer and enlisted personnel , to be effective July 1, 2001 ( P.L. 106-398 ). 2000. Statutory formula: 4.8% (based on the change to the statutory formula; the original statutory formula would have led to a proposed raise of 3.8%). Administration request: 4.4% on January 1, 2000, plus increases averaging an additional 1.4% for mid-grade officer and enlisted personnel, effective July 1, 2000. The NDAA specified a 4.8% minimum increase, with greater increases for certain pay cells. Final increase: 4.8% on January 1, 2000, plus increases averaging an additional 1.4% for mid-grade officer and enlisted personnel, effective July 1, 2000 ( P.L. 106-65 ). 1999. Statutory formula : 3.1%. Administration request : 3.6%. The House approved 3.6%, or whatever percentage increase was approved for federal GS civilians, whichever was higher. The Senate approved 3.6%. The final version accepted the House provision. Final increase : 3.6%, as GS civilians also received 3.6% ( P.L. 105-261 ). 5. What Is an "Adequate" Level of Military Pay? Since the end of the draft in 1973, the "adequacy" of military pay has tended to become an issue for Congress if it appears that the military services are having trouble recruiting enough new personnel, or keeping sufficient career personnel, of requisite quality; or the standard of living of career personnel is perceived to be less fair or equitable than that of demographically comparable civilians (in terms of age, education, skills, responsibilities, and similar criteria). The first issue is an economic inevitability in some periods. In the absence of a draft, the services must compete in the labor market for new military personnel, and—a fact often overlooked—have always had to compete in the labor market to retain the more experienced individuals who make up the career force. When unemployment is low, employment opportunities in the civilian world abound and military recruiting is more difficult. When unemployment is high, military service becomes a more attractive alternative, and military recruiting is easier. From 2010 to 2017, recruiting and retention in the Armed Forces were quite strong, hence weakening the case for compensation increases based on competition with the civilian economy and generating discussion of possible compensation cuts and/or restructuring. However, the strong recruiting and retention results in those years were due in part to a civilian economy still recovering from recession and to force reductions in the Air Force, Marine Corps, and Army, which generated lower recruiting and retention goals. Congress approved active duty end-strength increases for all four Services in FY2018. Subsequently, the Army did not meet its FY2018 recruiting goal and senior defense officials have testified that a strong economy has made it more challenging for them to recruit new personnel. If recruiting problems were to become more widespread, increased advocacy for compensation increases could well occur. The second situation is frequently stated in moral or ethical terms. Proponents of this viewpoint argue that, even if quantitative indexes of recruiting and retention appear to be satisfactory, the crucial character of the military's mission of national defense, and its acceptance of the professional ethic that places mission accomplishment above survival, demands certain enhanced levels of compensation. However, the compensation increases that occurred in the 2000s have led many analysts to conclude that military compensation is currently quite robust in comparison to civilian counterparts. 6. Is There a "Pay Gap" Between Military and Civilian Pay? Do Military Personnel Make More or Less Than Their Civilian Counterparts? The issue of a military-civilian "pay gap" raises several additional questions: How can the existence of a gap be determined and the gap be measured? Is there a gap and, if so, are civilians or military personnel being paid more? How much more? If there is a gap, does that in itself require action? A wide range of studies over the past several decades have attempted to compare military and civilian (both federal civil service and private sector) compensation. In general, the markedly different ways in which civilian public and private sector compensation and benefit systems are structured, compared to those of the Armed Forces, make it difficult to validate any generalizations about whether there is a "gap" between military and civilian pay. Measuring and Confirming a "Gap" It is difficult to find a common index or indicator to compare the dollar values of military and civilian compensation. First, military compensation includes numerous separate components, whose receiving population and taxability vary widely. Which of these, if any, should be included in a military-civilian pay comparison? Furthermore, total military compensation includes a wide range of noncash benefits—health care, commissary access, recreational facilities—as well as a unique deferred compensation package. Few civilians work in organizations where analogous benefits are provided. Attempts to facilitate a comparison by assigning a cash value to noncash benefits almost always founder on the large number of debatable assumptions that must be made to generate such an estimate. Second, it is also difficult to establish a comparison between military ranks and pay grades on the one hand and civilian jobs on the other. The range of knowledge, supervision, and professional judgment required of military personnel and civilians performing similar duties in a standard peacetime industrial or office milieu may be roughly equivalent. However, when the same military member's job in the field and in combat is concerned, comparisons become difficult. Third, generally speaking, the conditions of military service are frequently much more arduous than those of civilian employment, even in peacetime, for families as well as military personnel themselves. This aspect of military service is sometimes cited as a rationale for military compensation being at a higher level than it otherwise might be. On the other hand, the military services all mention travel and adventure in exotic places as a positive reason for enlistment and/or a military career, so it may be misleading to automatically assume that this is always a liability. Thus, it can be difficult to make direct comparisons between military and civilian occupations. As noted by the Congressional Budget Office: Comparing compensation in the military and civilian sectors can be problematic. One obvious limitation is that such comparisons cannot easily account for different job characteristics. Many military jobs are more hazardous, require frequent moves, and are less flexible than civilian jobs in the same field. Members of the armed forces are subject to military discipline, are considered to be on duty at all times, and are unable to resign, change jobs at will or negotiate pay. Military personnel also receive extensive training, paid for by the government. Family support programs are generally more available in the military compared with civilian employers. Intangible rewards, such as a shared sense of purpose, may be higher among military personnel as well. Quantifying those elements among military and civilian personnel is extremely difficult. Fourth, differing methodologies for calculating compensation can yield different results. For example, comparing the percentage increase in pay over different time periods can produce widely varying rates of increase. Likewise, when indexes of compensation include different elements (for example, basic pay versus RMC), the results will typically diverge as well. Finally, the level of specificity used in a pay comparison can lead to differing results, especially when the comparison is between private sector and federal pay, both civil service and military. For instance, Army colonels may, according to some indexes, be paid roughly as much as federal civil service GS-15s, or as much as private sector managers with certain responsibilities. However, if the pay comparisons focus on those occupational specialties that are highly paid in the private sector—health care, information technology, and some other scientific and engineering skills are examples—the comparison may not be as favorable. Other common subcategories for comparison—such as age, gender, years in the labor force, and educational levels—can also produce differing results. Estimates of a Military-Civilian Pay Gap Various comparisons of military and civilian compensation exist which illustrate a gap that favors civilian pay levels, refute the existence of such a gap, or show that the pay gap favors the military. Some of these reports lack precision in identifying what aspects of military pay were compared with civilian pay, which indexes were used to make the comparison, or the length of time covered by the comparison. One method of estimation, which indicates there is a pay gap in favor of civilians, asserts that rough pay parity existed between civilian and military personnel in 1982, but that increases since then in military basic pay have generally not kept up with increases in civilian pay (as measured by the ECI). As a result, a pay gap of about 13% in 1999 was gradually eliminated by 2011 due to above-ECI increases in basic pay. It reappeared in 2014 with military pay estimated to be 2.6% lower than civilian pay in 2018. However, using the same starting date (1982) but considering RMC rather than just basic pay, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) came to a much different conclusion in 2010. In congressional testimony, a CBO analyst answered the question "Is there a 'gap' between civilian and military pay raises over the past few decades," as follows: The answer depends on how narrowly military cash pay is defined. One common method of comparison is to calculate the cumulative difference between increases in military and civilian pay using military basic pay, a narrow measure of cash compensation that does not include, for example, tax-free allowances for housing and food. Applying that method would indicate that cumulatively, civilian pay rose by about 2 percent more than military pay between 1982 and the beginning of 2010. But that measure does not encompass the full scope of military cash compensation. Using a broader measure that includes cash allowances for housing and food indicates that the cumulative increase in military compensation has exceeded the cumulative increase in private-sector wages and salaries by 11 percent since 1982. That comparison excludes the value of noncash and deferred benefits, which would probably add to the cumulative difference, because benefits such as military health care have expanded more rapidly than corresponding benefits in the private sector. Another approach to estimating a pay gap attempts to compare actual compensation levels of military personnel to civilians with similar education and experience, rather than comparing rates of compensation increase over time. For example, the 9 th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (QRMC), published in 2002, compared the RMC of junior enlisted personnel to the earnings of civilian high school graduates, middle grade NCOs with civilians with some college education, and senior enlisted personnel with civilians who are college graduates. It compared the RMC of officers to the earnings of civilians with bachelors or advanced degrees in professional or managerial occupations. Based on a separate body of research, it argued that "pay at around the 70 th percentile of comparably educated civilians has been necessary to enable the military to recruit and retain the quantity and quality of personnel it requires" and pointed out those groups of military personnel that fell short of this compensation goal. Congress approved several rounds of pay table reform to address situations where servicemembers fell below the 70% mark. Additionally, general increases in basic pay higher than the rate of increase in the ECI (2000-2010) and the elimination of "out-of-pocket" housing expenses by 2005 pushed servicemember RMC up substantially in relation to civilian compensation. According to the 11 th QRMC, by 2009 military compensation had substantially exceeded this goal: In 2009, average RMC for enlisted members exceeded the median wage for civilians in each relevant comparison group—those with a high school diploma, those with some college, and those with an associate's degree. Average RMC for the enlisted force corresponded to the 90 th percentile of wages for civilians from the combined comparison groups. For officers, average RMC exceeded wages for civilians with a bachelor's or graduate-level degree. Average RMC for the officer force corresponded to the 83 rd percentile of wages for the combined civilian comparison groups. Since that time, Congress and the executive branch have made efforts to slow the growth of military compensation. Recent initiatives have included presidentially directed increases in basic pay below the ECI for 2014-2016 and statutory authority for DOD to reduce BAH payments by 1% of the national average monthly housing cost per year from 2015 to 2019 (for a maximum reduction of 5% of the national monthly average housing cost). In 2018, RAND published a report that compared RMC in 2016 to civilian pay levels, and compared those results to those generated by the 11 th QRMC in 2009. Using a similar, though not identical, methodology the RAND report found that RMC had remained well above the 70 th percentile of comparability educated civilians: The 11 th QRMC, using 2009 data, placed RMC at the 90 th percentile of civilian pay for enlisted and the 83 rd for officers. Our percentiles for 2016—the 84 th for enlisted and 77 th for officers—are somewhat lower than those of the 11 th QRMC. Although the estimates differ, both estimates show relatively high percentiles, yet methodological differences contribute to the discrepancy. Taking into account the somewhat different methodology used by RAND in 2018, its authors conclude "overall RMC percentiles for 2016 for enlisted personnel and officers were virtually the same as for 2009." If There Is a Pay Gap, Does It Matter? Some have suggested that the emphasis on a pay gap, whether real or not, is an inappropriate guide to arriving at sound policy. They argue that the key issue is, or should be, not comparability of military and civilian compensation, but the competitiveness of the former. Absent a draft, the Armed Forces must compete in the labor market for new enlisted and officer personnel. The career force by definition has always been a "volunteer force," and thus has always had to compete with civilian opportunities, real or perceived. Given these facts, some ask what difference it makes whether military pay is much lower, the same, or higher than that of civilians? If the services are having recruiting difficulties, then pay increases might be appropriate, even if the existing "gap" favors the military. Conversely, if military compensation is lower than equivalent civilian pay, and if the services are doing well in recruiting and retaining sufficient numbers of qualified personnel, then there might be no reason to raise military pay. The 11 th QRMC voiced similar sentiments when it argued the following: A comparison between military and civilian wages does not, by itself, determine if military pay is at the optimal level. As previously noted, other factors are also at play including: recruiting and retention experiences and outlook; unemployment in the civilian economy; political factors, such as a wartime environment or risk of war; and the expected frequency and duration of overseas deployments. But the relative standing of military compensation provides context to help make decisions about RMC and other elements of the compensation system, such as those studied by the QRMC. 7. What Additional Benefits Are Available for Military Personnel Serving in Iraq and Afghanistan? Members of the Armed Forces serving in Iraq or Afghanistan are entitled to various additional forms of compensation, described below. Those serving in nearby countries are often eligible as well. Hostile Fire/Imminent Danger Pay Military personnel serving in Iraq or Afghanistan are eligible for Hostile Fire Pay (HFP) or Imminent Danger Pay (IDP). HFP is paid at the rate of $225 per month; IDP is paid at an equivalent rate, but on a daily basis ($7.50 per day). The purpose of this pay is to compensate servicemembers for physical danger. An individual can collect either Hostile Fire Pay or Imminent Danger Pay, not both simultaneously. Iraq and Afghanistan are designated imminent danger locations; any servicemember in these locations is entitled to IDP by virtue of their presence. Certain areas surrounding these countries were formerly designated as imminent danger locations, but DOD revoked this designation in 2014. For a list of all imminent danger locations, see the DOD Financial Management Regulations. Hardship Duty Pay Military personnel serving for over 30 days in Iraq, Afghanistan, and certain surrounding countries are eligible for Hardship Duty Pay (HDP). HDP is compensation for the exceptional demands of certain duty. In the case of Iraq and Afghanistan, it is compensation for the austere living conditions of the location. The rate for HDP in Iraq and Afghanistan is $100 per month. Family Separation Allowance Military personnel serving in Iraq, Afghanistan, and surrounding areas may be eligible for Family Separation Allowance (FSA). FSA provides a special pay for those servicemembers with dependents who are separated from their families for more than 30 days. The purpose of this pay is to "partially reimburse, on average, members of the uniformed services involuntarily separated from their dependents for the reasonable amount of extra expenses that result from such separation, and to reimburse members who must maintain a home in the United States for their dependents and another home overseas for themselves for the average expenses of maintaining the overseas home." To be eligible for this allowance, U.S. military personnel must be separated from their dependents for 30 continuous days or more; but once the 30-day threshold has been reached, the allowance is applied retroactively to the first day of separation. The authorizing statute for FSA sets the rate at $250 per month. Per Diem for Incidental Expenses Military personnel using military facilities and serving in Iraq and Afghanistan receive per diem equivalent to $105 per month to cover incidental expenses. The rate is the same for all personnel. Combat Zone Tax Exclusion One of the more generous benefits for many of those serving in Iraq or Afghanistan, and certain surrounding areas, is the "combat zone tax exclusion." Military personnel serving in direct support of operations in these combat zones are also eligible for the combat zone tax exclusion, as are those "hospitalized as a result of wounds, disease, or injury incurred while serving in a combat zone." For enlisted personnel and warrant officers, this means that all compensation for active military service in a combat zone is free of federal income tax. For commissioned officers, their compensation is free of federal income tax up to the maximum amount of enlisted basic pay plus any imminent danger pay received. While this benefit applies only to federal income tax, almost all states have provisions extending the benefit to their state income tax as well. In addition, military personnel who qualify for a reenlistment or retention bonus while stationed in a combat zone do not have to pay federal income tax on the bonus (though commissioned officers are still subject to the cap mentioned above). The amounts involved can be substantial, often in the tens of thousands of dollars, and occasionally over $100,000. Savings Deposit Program Another benefit available to those deployed to a combat zone is eligibility for the Savings Deposit Program. This program allows servicemembers to earn a guaranteed rate of 10% interest on deposits of up to $10,000, which must have been earned in the designated areas. The deposit is normally returned to the servicemember, with interest, within 90 days after he or she leaves the eligible region, although earlier withdrawals can sometimes be made for emergency reasons. 8. What Benefits Are Available to the Survivors of Military Personnel Killed in Iraq or Afghanistan? Currently, the survivors (typically, spouses and children) of military personnel who die on active duty, whether serving in combat zones or not, are eligible for a number of monetary and other benefits. These generally include the following: A death gratuity of $100,000, payable within a few days of the death to assist families in dealing with immediate expenses. Servicemembers' Group Life Insurance (SGLI) of up to $400,000. Disbursement of unpaid pay and allowances. One year of government housing or BAH. Three years of TRICARE coverage at the active duty dependent rate, followed by coverage at the retiree dependent rate (children remain covered as active duty family members until age 21, or until age 23 if enrolled in school full-time). Commissary and Exchange access. Burial expenses. One or more survivor benefit annuities (Social Security Survivor Benefits, DOD Survivor Benefit Plan , and/or Veterans Affairs Dependency and Indemnity Compensation; receipt of more than one annuity may require offsets between the annuities). Note, however, that each type of benefit described above has its own eligibility criteria. Survivors may, or may not, qualify for a given benefit based on their unique circumstances. For more detailed information on who qualifies for a given benefit, see the Department of Defense's A Survivor's Guide to Benefits .

From the earliest days of the republic, the federal government has compensated members of the Armed Forces for their services. While the original pay structure was fairly simple, over time a more complex system of compensation has evolved. The current military compensation system includes cash payments such as basic pay, special and incentive pays, and various allowances. Servicemembers also receive noncash benefits such as health care and access to commissaries and recreational facilities, and may qualify for deferred compensation in the form of retired pay and other retirement benefits. This report provides an overview of military compensation generally, but focuses on cash compensation for current servicemembers. Since the advent of the all-volunteer force in 1973, Congress has used military compensation to improve recruiting, retention, and the overall quality of the force. Congressional interest in sustaining the all-volunteer force during a time of sustained combat operations led to substantial increases in compensation in the decade following the attacks of September 11, 2001. Subsequently, in the earlier part of the 2010s, concerns over government spending generated congressional and executive branch interest in slowing the rate of growth in military compensation. Initiatives to slow compensation growth included presidentially directed increases in basic pay below the rate of increase for the Employment Cost Index (ECI) for 2014-2016 and statutory authority for the Department of Defense (DOD) to reduce Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) payments by 1% of the national average monthly housing cost per year from 2015 to 2019 (for a maximum reduction of 5% under the national monthly average housing cost). Some have raised concerns about the impact of personnel costs on the overall defense budget, arguing that they decrease the amount of funds available for modernizing equipment and sustaining readiness. Others argue that robust compensation is essential to maintaining a high-quality force that is vigorous, well-trained, experienced, and able to function effectively in austere and volatile environments. The availability of funding to prosecute contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan mitigated the pressure to trade off personnel, readiness, and equipment costs, but the current budgetary environment appears to have brought these trade-offs to the fore again. DOD spends about $100,000-$110,000 per year to compensate the average active duty servicemember—to include cash, benefits, and contributions to retirement programs—although some estimates of compensation costs are substantially higher. However, gross compensation figures do not tell the full story, as military compensation relative to civilian compensation is a key factor in an individual's decision to join or stay in the military. Thus, the issue of comparability between military and civilian pay is an often-discussed topic. Some analysts and advocacy groups have argued that a substantial "pay gap" has existed for decades—with military personnel earning less than their civilian counterparts—although they generally concede that this gap is fairly small today. Others argue that the methodology behind this "pay gap" is flawed and does not provide a suitable estimate of pay comparability. Still others believe that military personnel, in general, are better compensated than their civilian counterparts. The Department of Defense takes a different approach to pay comparability. The 9th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (QRMC), published in 2002, argued that compensation for servicemembers should be around the 70th percentile of wages for civilian employees with similar education and experience. According to the 11th QRMC, published in 2012, regular military compensation for officers was at the 83rd percentile of wages for civilian employees with similar education and experience, and at the 90th percentile for enlisted personnel. A 2018 RAND report concluded that these overall percentiles were nearly the same in 2016.

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Overview On February 12, 2018, the Trump Administration submitted to Congress its FY2019 budget request, which included $41.86 billion of base (or enduring) funds for the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS). Of that amount, $13.26 billion would have been for State operations, international broadcasting, and related agencies and $28.60 billion for foreign operations. Comparing the request with the FY2018 actual SFOPS funding levels, the FY2019 request represented a 23.3% decrease in SFOPS funding. The proposed State and related agency funding would have been 18.7% below FY2018 funding levels, and the foreign operations funding would have been reduced by 25.2%. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P.L. 116-6 ), signed into law on February 15, included a total of $54.377 billion for SFOPS accounts, a 0.3% decrease over the FY2018 funding level and about 30% more than the Administration's request. An account-by-account comparison of the SFOPS request with the FY2018 actual funding and FY2019 enacted appropriation is provided in Appendix A . International Affairs 150 function funding levels are detailed in Appendix B . A chart depicting the components of the SFOPS appropriations bill is in Appendix C . A glossary is provided in Appendix D . Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 The appropriations process for FY2019 was shaped by the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA, H.R. 1892 , P.L. 115-123 ), which Congress passed on February 9, 2018. The act raised the overall revised discretionary spending limits set by the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA, P.L. 112-25 ) from $1.069 trillion for FY2017 to $1.208 trillion for FY2018 and to $1.244 trillion for FY2019. The BBA increased FY2019 defense funding levels by $85 billion, from $562 billion to $647 billion, and nondefense funding (including SFOPS) by $68 billion, from $529 billion to $597 billion. It also extended direct spending reductions from FY2021 in the original BCA through FY2027, as amended. Enduring vs. Overseas Contingency Operations Request Every year since FY2012, the Administration has distinguished SFOPS spending as either enduring (base) funds or those to support overseas contingency operations (OCO). The OCO designation gained increased significance with enactment of the BCA, which specified that emergency or OCO funds do not count toward the spending limits established by the act. In early years of requesting OCO funds, the Obama Administration described OCO requests for "extraordinary, but temporary, costs of the Department of State and USAID in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan." Syria and other countries were added in later years, and the Trump Administration expanded OCO use in its first budget request in FY2018 to be available for longer-term, core activities and more countries. For FY2019, because the BBA raised spending limits, the Administration did not seek foreign affairs OCO funds, but requested the entire SFOPS budget within base funds. The final legislation, P.L. 116-6 , included $8.0 billion designated as OCO, or about 15% of enacted SFOPS funding. For funding trends, see Table 1 . Congressional Action House and Senate SFOPS Legislation . FY2019 SFOPS legislation was introduced and approved by the full appropriations committee in each chamber. The House legislation, H.R. 6385 , included total SFOPS funding of $54.18 billion, 0.6% lower than FY2018 funding and 29% more than requested. The Senate proposal, S. 3108 , would have provided $54.602 billion for SFOPS accounts, which is about 0.1% more than FY2018 funding and 30% more than requested. Neither bill received floor consideration in its respective chamber. Continuing Resolutions . On September 28, 2018, the President signed into law P.L. 115-245 , legislation which included the Continuing Appropriations Act, 2019 (CR) to continue funding for SFOPS accounts (among seven other appropriations that were not completed by the start of FY2019) at a prorated 2018 funding level through December 7, 2018. Funds designated as OCO in 2018 appropriations continued to be so designated for SFOPS in the CR. On December 3, 2018, Congress and the Administration extended funding through December 21, 2018 by enacting P.L. 115-298 . After December 21, funding lapsed and a partial shutdown of the government occurred. On January 25, an agreement was reached to continue funding for SFOPS and other appropriations that had lapsed through February 15, at the FY2018 level ( P.L. 116-5 ). Enacted Legislation . On February 14 Congress passed, and the President later signed into law, a full year appropriation ( P.L. 116-6 , Division F) that included $54.38 billion in total SFOPS funding, a 0.3% decrease from the FY2018 funding level and about 30% more than the Administration's request. Of that total, $16.46 billion was for State Department operations and related agencies; $37.92 billion for foreign operations accounts. About 14.7%, or $8.0 billion, was designated as OCO. Key Issues for Congress Department of State and Related Agency Funding6 Overview The State Department sought to cut funding for the Department of State and Related Agency category by 19% in FY2019 from FY2018 funding levels, to $13.26 billion. Conversely, both the House and Senate committee bills sought to maintain funding near previous fiscal year levels. The House committee bill would have increased funding in this category to $16.38 billion, or 0.4% above the FY2018 funding level. The Senate committee bill would have raised funding to $16.34 billion, around $40 million less than the House committee bill and approximately 0.1% more than the FY2018 funding level. Similar to the House and Senate committee bills, the FY2019 enacted appropriation ( P.L. 116-6 ) maintained funding for the State Department and Related Agency category slightly above FY2018 funding level. It provided $16.46 billion for this category, or 0.9% more than the F2018 level. The State Department's request sought to fund the entirety of this category through base (or enduring) funding. Following passage of the BBA and the resulting increase in discretionary spending cap levels for FY2018 and FY2019, the State Department moved the $3.69 billion request for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) in this category into the base budget request. Both the House and Senate committee bills sought to retain OCO funding within the Department of State and Related Agency category. The House committee bill would have provided $3.03 billion for OCO, or around 28% less than the FY2018 figure of $4.18 billion. The Senate committee bill would have provided $4.11 billion, which constituted about 2% less than FY2018 level. While the House committee bill would have afforded approximately $1.08 billion less for OCO than the Senate committee bill, the House committee bill provided around $1.12 billion more in enduring funding ($13.35 billion) than the Senate committee bill ($12.23 billion). As with the House and Senate committee bills, P.L. 116-6 retained OCO funding for the Department of State and Related Agency category. The law provided a total of $4.37 billion for OCO, or 4.5% more than the FY2018 funding level. While the law provided more for OCO than either the Senate or House committee bills, it provided less in enduring funding ($12.09 billion). Areas where the State Department's proposed cuts were focused included the diplomatic security accounts (the Worldwide Security Protection programmatic allocation within the Diplomatic Programs account and, separately, the Embassy Security, Construction, and Maintenance account), Contributions to International Organizations, and Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities. In most cases, P.L. 116-6 , in a manner similar to the House and Senate committee bills, maintained annual budget authority for these accounts closer to the FY2018 funding levels than the Administration requested (see following sections for more detailed analysis). The State Department also requested $246.2 million to implement the Leadership and Modernization Impact Initiative, which serves as the implementation phase of the department's "Redesign" efforts. While neither the House nor the Senate committee bill directly addressed the Impact Initiative, both included provisions enabling Congress to conduct oversight of any broader reorganization efforts at the department. The enacted legislation, P.L. 116-6 , took the same approach. Table 3 provides an overview of proposed changes to selected accounts within the State Department and Related Agency category. Diplomatic Programs Under the State Department's budget request, the Diplomatic Programs account, which is the State Department's principal operating appropriation, would have declined by 11% from the FY2018 funding level of $8.82 billion, to $7.81 billion. According to the State Department, this account provides funding for "core people, infrastructure, security, and programs that facilitate productive and peaceful U.S. relations" with foreign governments and international organizations. The House and Senate committee bills would have provided $8.80 billion and $8.92 billion, respectively, for Diplomatic Programs. For FY2019 enacted, P.L. 116-6 provided $9.17 billion, or 4% more than the FY2018 funding level and 17% more than the State Department's request. In Section 7081 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 ( P.L. 115-31 ), Congress authorized the establishment of a new "Consular and Border Security Programs" (CBSP) account into which consular fees shall be deposited for the purposes of administering consular and border security programs. As a result, consular fees retained by the State Department to fund consular services will be credited to this new account. The State Department thus requested that Congress rename the former Diplomatic and Consular Programs account "Diplomatic Programs." However, because many consular fees are generated and retained by the State Department to administer consular programs, they do not comprise part of the department's annual appropriations and therefore do not count against overall funds appropriated annually for this account. The FY2019 enacted legislation, P.L. 116-6 , authorized the renaming of Diplomatic and Consular Programs to Diplomatic Programs, as did the House and Senate committee bills. Personnel The Diplomatic Programs account provides funds for a large share of U.S. direct hire positions, including but not limited to State Department Foreign Service and Civil Service officers. Although the Trump Administration lifted the federal hiring freeze upon issuance of OMB M-17-22 on April 12, 2017, the State Department elected to keep its own hiring freeze in place. The Department of State released guidance in May 2018 lifting the hiring freeze and allowing the department to increase staffing to December 31, 2017 levels. Some Members of Congress expressed concern with the hiring freeze and the continued impacts of perceived personnel shortages at the Department of State. Both the House and Senate committee bills, and the committee reports accompanying those bills, included oversight provisions pertaining to State Department personnel levels. In this vein, Section 7073 of P.L. 116-6 required that no appropriated funds may be used to expand or reduce the size of the State Department and USAID's Civil Service, Foreign Service, eligible family member, and locally employed staff workforce from the on-board levels as of December 31, 2017 without consultation with the Committees on Appropriations and Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committees on Appropriations and Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives. Section 7073 also required the Secretary of State to submit reports to Congress, beginning 60 days after enactment of the law, and every 60 days thereafter until September 30, 2020, regarding the State Department's on-board personnel levels, hiring, and attrition of the Civil Service, Foreign Service, eligible family member, and locally employed staff workforce. These reports were also required to include a hiring plan for maintaining Foreign Service and Civil Service personnel numbers at not less than December 31, 2017, levels through FY2019. Among other personnel-related provisions, the joint explanatory statement accompanying this law noted that keeping personnel at these levels reflected "minimum necessary hiring" and encouraged the Secretary of State to work with Congress to increase hiring above such levels as appropriate. Diversity The Human Resources funding category within Diplomatic Programs provides funding for the Charles B. Rangel International Affairs and Thomas R. Pickering Foreign Affairs fellowship programs to promote greater diversity in the Foreign Service, as authorized by Section 47 of the State Department Basic Authorities Act (P.L. 84-885). While Congress required the State Department to expand the number of fellows participating in the Rangel and Pickering programs by 10 apiece pursuant to Section 706 of the Department of State Authorities Act, 2017 ( P.L. 114-323 ), it has provided the department the discretion to fund these programs at levels it deems appropriate from monies appropriated for Human Resources. P.L. 116-6 , like the House and Senate committee bills, continued to provide such discretion to the State Department. In addition, the House committee report indicated support for department efforts to increase diversity in hiring, including through the Rangel and Pickering programs. It also encouraged the Secretary of State to explore more opportunities to further the goal of increasing workforce diversity. The Senate committee report recommended the continued expansion of the department's workforce diversity programs and directed that qualified graduates of the Rangel and Pickering programs shall be inducted into the Foreign Service. While neither P.L. 116-6 nor the accompanying joint explanatory statement addressed the Rangel and Pickering programs specifically or Foreign Service diversity more generally, the joint explanatory statement did not negate any of the language in the House and Senate committee reports. Overseas Programs The Diplomatic Programs account also provides funding for a number of overseas programs. These include programs carried out by the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations and the department's regional bureaus. Activities of the department's Bureau of Medical Services, which is responsible for providing health care services to U.S. government employees and their families assigned to overseas posts, are also funded through this account. Public diplomacy programs are among the overseas programs funded through Diplomatic Programs, which include the Global Engagement Center's (GEC's) countering state disinformation (CSD) program. According to the State Department, planned CSD activities, for which $20 million was requested, included "coordinating U.S. government efforts in specific sub-regions; enhancing the capacity of local actors to build resilience against disinformation, including thwarting attacks on their IT systems; providing attribution of adversarial disinformation; and convening anti-disinformation practitioners, journalists, and other influencers to exchange best practices, build networks, and generate support for U.S. efforts against disinformation." The House committee report registered concern regarding "foreign propaganda and disinformation that threatens United States national security, especially as carried out by China, Russia, and extremists groups" and asserted that the GEC "is expected to use a wide range of technologies and techniques to counter these campaigns," consistent with its statutory mandate. The Senate committee report recommended up to $75.4 million for the GEC, including up to $40 million for countering foreign state propaganda and disinformation. The joint explanatory statement accompanying for the FY2019-enacted legislation ( P.L. 116-6 ) included up to $55.4 million for the GEC and up to $20 million for CSD, a funding level for CSD identical to the department's request. Section 1284 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 ( P.L. 115-232 ) authorized the Department of Defense (DOD) to transfer not more than $60 million to the GEC for each of FY2019 and FY2020; DOD has previously transferred funds to the GEC under similar authorities. Diplomatic Security The State Department's FY2019 budget request sought to provide approximately $5.36 billion for the department's key embassy security accounts: $3.70 billion for the Worldwide Security Protection (WSP) programmatic allocation within the Diplomatic Programs account and $1.66 billion for the Embassy Security, Construction, and Maintenance (ESCM) account. The House committee bill would have provided $3.76 billion for WSP and $2.31 billion for ESCM, for a total funding level of $6.07 billion for these accounts. While the House bill would have funded the ESCM account exclusively through the base budget, it would have provided approximately $2.38 billion of overall funding for WSP through OCO. The Senate committee bill would have provided $3.82 billion for WSP and $1.92 billion for ESCM, for a total funding level of $5.74 billion. As with the House committee measure, the Senate committee bill would have funded the ESCM account with base budget funds only. For WSP, the Senate committee measure, like the House committee bill, would provide $2.38 billion of total account funds through OCO. The FY2019 enacted appropriations provided a total of $4.10 billion for WSP and $1.98 billion for ESCM, for a total funding level of $6.08 billion in budget authority for these accounts. Like the House and Senate committee bills, P.L. 116-6 funded ESCM exclusively through the base budget. Of the $4.10 billion provided for WSP in the law, $2.63 billion was done so through OCO. Had the Administration's request been enacted, it would have marked a decline of 2% for WSP and 28% for ESCM relative to the FY2018 figures of approximately $3.76 billion and $2.31 billion, respectively. The enacted legislation provided 9% more funding for WSP and 15% less for ESCM relative to FY2018 levels. Over the past several years, Congress has provided no-year appropriations for both WSP and ESCM, thereby authorizing the State Department to indefinitely retain appropriated funds beyond the fiscal year for which they were appropriated. As a result, the department has carried over large balances of unexpired, unobligated funds each year that it is authorized to obligate for programs within both accounts when it deems appropriate to do so. For example, for FY2018, the State Department carried over more than $7.6 billion in previously appropriated funds for ESCM. Both the House and Senate committee bills would have continued this practice with respect to WSP, and the Senate committee bill would have continued with respect to ESCM, as well. The House committee bill, if enacted, would have provided that all funds appropriated for ESCM remained available until September 30, 2023, rather than indefinitely. P.L. 116-6 provided no-year appropriations for WSP. For ESCM, the law stipulated that while funds for worldwide security upgrades and for purposes of acquisition and construction would remain available until expended, all other monies within this account (such as funds for preserving, maintaining, repairing, and planning for real property that State Department owns) would remain available only until September 30, 2023. Worldwide Security Protection The Worldwide Security Protection (WSP) allocation within the Diplomatic Programs account supports the Bureau of Diplomatic Security's (DS's) implementation of security programs located at over 275 overseas posts and 125 domestic offices of the State Department, including a worldwide guard force protecting overseas diplomatic posts, residences, and domestic offices. The State Department revisited previous assumptions for funding for the U.S. security presence, which prompted it to ask for a rescission of $301.20 million for WSP OCO funds provided through the Further Continuing and Security Assistance Appropriations Act, 2017 (SAAA) ( P.L. 114-254 ). State Department officials noted that this funding was "intended to support diplomatic reengagements in Syria, Libya, and Yemen that were predicated on different security and political conditions." The department maintained that this proposed cancellation was based on evolving security and political conditions, and would not affect DS operations. While neither the House nor the Senate committee bill included a rescission, P.L. 116-6 provided for a rescission of $301.2 million of SAAA funds appropriated for Diplomatic Programs and designated them more generally for OCO. Embassy Security, Construction, and Maintenance The Embassy Security, Construction, and Maintenance (ESCM) account funds the Bureau of Overseas Building Operations (OBO), which is responsible for providing U.S. diplomatic and consular missions overseas with secure, safe, and functional facilities. The State Department's request included $869.54 million to provide its share of what it maintains is the $2.20 billion in annual funding that the Benghazi Accountability Review Board (ARB) recommended for the Capital Security Cost Sharing (CSCS) and Maintenance Cost Sharing (MCS) programs (the remainder of the funding is provided through consular fee revenues and contributions from other agencies). These programs are used to fund the planning, design, and construction of new overseas posts and the maintenance of existing diplomatic facilities. The House committee report maintained that funds the House bill made available for ESCM would allow for the State Department's CSCS and MCS contributions, when combined with those from other agencies and consular fees, to exceed the ARB's annual recommended funding and support " the accelerated multi-year program to construct new secure replacement facilities for the most vulnerable embassies and consulates." The Senate committee bill stipulated that of funds made available for ESCM by it and prior acts making appropriations for SFOPS, not less than $1.02 billion shall be made available for the department's FY2019 CSCS and MCS contributions; the joint explanatory statement accompanying P.L. 116-6 indicated that Congress provided the same amount for this purpose for FY2019. In FY2019, OBO intended to fund four CSCS projects and one MCS project (see Table 4 ). The House committee report noted concern with the cost of new embassy and consulate compound projects, including ongoing projects in Beirut, Lebanon; Mexico City, Mexico; New Delhi, India; Erbil, Iraq; and Jakarta, Indonesia. Like Section 7004(h) of the House bill, as noted in the joint explanatory statement accompanying P.L. 116-6 , Congress mandated that the State Department provide more detailed reports regarding the costs of these projects than previously required. The State Department maintained that the "construction of a new U.S. Embassy facility in Jerusalem is a high priority for the Administration ... planning and interagency coordination for the Jerusalem Embassy move is ongoing and the department intends to realign CSCS project funding, as necessary, to execute this project." It later attached a timeframe to its intent, and the United States opened a new U.S. embassy in Jerusalem in May 2018. This new embassy is located in a building that housed consular operations of the former U.S. Consulate General in Jerusalem. The State Department has said that one of its next steps would be to construct an embassy annex to the current building, while also considering options for a permanent embassy over the long term. The department could choose to draw upon the unexpired, unobligated funds previously appropriated by Congress to the ESCM account for any construction expenses related to interim and permanent embassy facilities in Jerusalem. The Senate committee report requires the Secretary of State to "regularly inform the Committee" on the status of plans for a permanent New Embassy Compound in Jerusalem. Neither P.L. 116-6 nor its joint explanatory statement addresses this issue or negates the Senate committee report language. International Organizations The State Department's FY2019 budget request included a combined request of $2.29 billion for the Contributions to International Organizations (CIO) and Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA) accounts, a 20% reduction from the FY2018 funding levels for these accounts. The CIO account is the source for funding for annual U.S. assessed contributions to 45 international organizations, including the United Nations and its affiliated organizations and other international organizations, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The State Department's FY2019 request for CIO totaled approximately $1.10 billion. Following passage of the BBA, the department increased its request for CIO by approximately $100 million to fund a higher U.S. contribution to the U.N. regular budget at a rate of 20% of the overall U.N. budget (the U.S. assessment is 22%). According to the department, U.N. assessments of U.S. contributions to the United Nations and its affiliated agencies exceeded the request for funds to pay these contributions. Therefore, if the department's request was enacted, the United States may have accumulated arrears to some organizations. The Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA) account provides U.S. funding for U.N. peacekeeping missions around the world that the State Department says "seek to maintain or restore international peace and security." The State Department's FY2019 request for CIPA totaled $1.20 billion. According to the department, this request "reflects the Administration's commitment to seek reduced costs by reevaluating the mandates, design, and implementation of peacekeeping missions and sharing the funding burden more fairly among U.N. members." Under this request, no U.S. contribution would have exceeded 25% of all assessed contributions for a single operation, which is the cap established in Section 404(b) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 ( P.L. 103-236 ). The State Department maintained that it expected that the "unfunded portion of U.S. assessed expenses will be met through a combination of a reduction in the U.S. assessed rate of contributions, reductions in the number of U.N. peacekeeping missions, and significant reductions in the budgets of peacekeeping missions across the board." The department also requested that Congress provide two-year funds for CIPA (in other words, that Congress make funds available for both the fiscal year for which the funds were appropriated and the subsequent fiscal year) "due to the demonstrated unpredictability of the requirements in this account from year to year and the nature of multi-year operations that have mandates overlapping U.S. fiscal years." The House committee bill would have provided $1.36 billion for CIO and $1.59 billion for CIPA, for a combined total of $2.95 billion for these accounts, which was 29% higher than the department's request and 4% higher than the FY2018 funding levels. The Senate committee bill would have provided $1.44 billion for CIO and $1.68 billion for CIPA, for a combined total of $3.12 billion. This figure was 36% higher than the department's request and 9% higher than the FY2018 level. The Senate committee bill included a provision not present in recent appropriations laws mandating that funds appropriated for CIO "are made available to pay not less than the full fiscal year 2019 United States assessment for each respective international organization." With regard to CIPA, both the House and Senate committee reports noted that appropriated monies were intended to support an assessed peacekeeping cost at the statutory level of 25% rather than the U.N. assessed rate for the United States of 28.4%. Both committee reports called on the department to review peacekeeping missions for cost savings and work to renegotiate rates of assessment. For FY2019, P.L. 116-6 provided $1.36 billion for CIO and $1.55 billion for CIPA, for a total of $2.91 billion—slightly less than both the House and Senate committee bills. This figure was still 2% higher than the FY2018 figure and 27% higher than the department's request. While the law did not include the aforementioned Senate committee bill provision regarding payment of full U.S. assessments for organizations funded through the CIO account, the law's joint explanatory statement noted that it assumed the payment of the full United States assessment for each relevant organization (with some exceptions, including organizations from which the United States has withdrawn) and required the Secretary of State to consult with the Committees on Appropriations with respect to any decision not to provide the full assessment for any such organization. With respect to CIPA, the joint explanatory statement noted that sufficient funds are provided for contributions to peacekeeping missions at the statutory level of 25%. The enacted legislation, like the House and Senate committee bills, provided a share of CIPA funds as two-year funds, as requested by the department. Leadership and Modernization Impact Initiative The State Department requested $246.2 million for FY2019 to implement the Leadership and Modernization Impact Initiative (hereinafter, the Impact Initiative). The Impact Initiative constitutes the implementation phase of the State Department's "Redesign" project. Former Secretary Tillerson initiated the redesign in 2017 to implement Executive Order 13781 and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Memorandum M-17-22, which aim to "improve the efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability of the executive branch." The Impact Initiative constitutes 16 keystone modernization projects in three focus areas: Modernizing Information Technology and Human Resources Operations; Modernizing Global Presence, and Creating and Implementing Policy; and Improving Operational Efficiencies (see Table 5 ). According to the State Department, these focus areas and modernization projects are derived from the results of the listening tour that former Secretary Tillerson launched in May 2017, which included interviews conducted with approximately 300 individuals that the department said comprised a representative cross-section of its broader workforce, and a survey completed by 35,000 department personnel that asked them to discuss the means they use to help complete the department's mission and obstacles they encounter in the process. Of the $246.2 million requested, $150.0 million was requested from the IT Central Fund (which is funded through funds appropriated by Congress to the Capital Investment Fund account and, separately, expedited passport fees) and $96.2 million from the D&CP account to implement modernization projects. Proceeds from the IT Central Fund were intended to implement projects focused on IT, including modernizing existing IT infrastructure, systems, and applications based on a roadmap to be created in FY2018 and centralizing management of all WiFi networks. Funds from the D&CP account were intended to implement modernization projects focusing on Human Resources issues, including leadership development, management services consolidation, data analytics, and workforce readiness initiatives. Like the House and the Senate committee bills and reports, neither P.L. 116-6 nor the joint explanatory statement accompanying the law specifically mentioned the Impact Initiative by name. However, both the law and the joint explanatory statement included provisions explicitly prohibiting the Department of State from using appropriated funds to implement a reorganization without prior consultation, notification, and reporting to Congress (for example, see Section 7073 of P.L. 116-6 ). Like the Senate committee bill, P.L. 116-6 stated that no funds appropriated for SFOPs may be used to "downsize, downgrade, consolidate, close, move, or relocate" the State Department's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration. Foreign Assistance50 Overview Foreign operations accounts, together with food aid appropriated through the Agriculture appropriations bill, constitute the foreign aid component of the international affairs budget. These accounts fund bilateral economic aid, humanitarian assistance, security assistance, multilateral aid, and export promotion programs. For FY2019, the Administration requested $28.60 billion for foreign aid programs within the international affairs (function 150) budget, about 28% less than the FY2018 actual funding level. None of the requested funds were designated as OCO. The FY2019 enacted appropriation provided $37.92 billion for foreign operations account, including $3.63 billion designated as OCO. Together with food aid accounts in the Agriculture appropriation, total enacted foreign aid within the international affairs budget was $39.85 billion, or 0.7% below the FY2018 actual funding level and 39% above the FY2019 request. Table 6 shows foreign aid funding by type for FY2017 and FY2018 actual, and the FY2019 request, committee-approved legislation, and enacted legislation. Account Mergers and Eliminations . The Administration aimed to simplify the foreign operations budget in part by channeling funds through fewer accounts and eliminating certain programs. These account mergers and eliminations were also proposed in the FY2018 budget request Under bilateral economic assistance, the Development Assistance (DA), Economic Support Fund (ESF), Assistance to Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia (AEECA) and Democracy Fund (DF) accounts were zero funded in the FY2019 request. Programs currently funded through these accounts would have been funded through a new Economic Support and Development Fund (ESDF) account. The proposed funding level for ESDF, $5.063 billion, was more than 36% below the FY2018 funding for the accounts it would have replaced. Fifteen countries that received DA, ESF, or AEECA in FY2017 would no longer have received funding from these accounts or from ESDF under the FY2019 request. Within multilateral assistance, the International Organizations & Programs (IO&P) account, which funds U.S. voluntary contributions to many U.N. entities, including UNICEF, U.N. Development Program, and UN Women, would also have been zeroed out. Budget documents suggested that some unspecified activities currently funded through IO&P could have received funding through the ESDF or other accounts. Related to humanitarian assistance, the P.L. 480 Title II food aid account in the Agriculture appropriation would have been zero-funded and all food assistance would have been funded through the International Disaster Assistance (IDA) account, which would have nevertheless declined by about 17% from FY2018 actual funding (see " Humanitarian Assistance " section below). The Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA) account would have been subsumed into the Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) account. Closeout of Inter-American Foundation and U.S.-Africa Development Foundation . The FY2019 request proposed to terminate the Inter-American Foundation (IAF) and the U.S.-Africa Development Foundation (ADF), independent entities that implement small U.S. assistance grants, often in remote communities. The Administration proposed to consolidate all small grant programs aimed at reaching the poor under USAID, as a means of improving their integration with larger development programs and U.S. foreign policy objectives, as well as improving efficiency. Funds were requested for IAF and ADF only for the purposes of an orderly closeout. Development Finance Institution . The Administration requested, for the first time in FY2019, the consolidation of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and USAID's Development Credit Authority (DCA) into a new standalone Development Finance Institution (DFI). The request called for $96 million for administrative expenses and $38 million for credit subsidies for DFI, but assumed that these expenses would be more than offset by collections, resulting in a net income of $460 million (based on OPIC's projected offsetting collections). In addition, $56 million in ESDF funds would have been used to support DFI activities. The Administration sought congressional authority for the new standalone entity, which it described as a means of incentivizing private sector investment in development and improving the efficiency of U.S. development finance programs. Both the House and Senate committee bills, as well as the enacted FY2019 appropriation, rejected these account changes, with the exception of the elimination of the ERMA account, which the House bill eliminated and the Senate and final bill funded with $1 million. All the FY2019 SFOPS legislation, including P.L. 116-6 , used the same bilateral account structure used for FY2018, not a new ESDF, and funded IAF and ADF at the FY2018 levels. Prior to enactment of the final FY2019 SFOPS appropriation, Congress passed the BUILD Act ( P.L. 115-254 ), which authorized the establishment of a new International Development Finance Corporation (IDFC), consistent with the Administration's DFI proposal. The IDFC is expected to become operational near the end of FY2019, and P.L. 116-6 made FY2019 appropriations for OPIC and DCA using the same account structure as in prior years, but authorized $5 million in the OPIC noncredit account to be used for transition costs. Top Foreign Assistance Recipients Top Country Recipients . Under the FY2019 request, top foreign assistance recipients would not have changed significantly, continuing to include strategic allies in the Middle East (Israel, Egypt, Jordan) and major global health and development partners in Africa (see Table 7 ). Israel would have seen an increase of $200 million from FY2017, reflecting a new 10-year security assistance Memorandum of Understanding. Zambia and Uganda would both have seen an 11% increase. All other top recipients would have seen reduced aid in FY2019 compared with FY2017 (comprehensive FY2018 country allocations were not yet available), though unallocated global health and humanitarian funds (added to the request after passage of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018) may have changed these totals. Figure 1 and Table 7 show the requested FY2019 foreign operations budget allocations by region and country. Under the FY2019 request, foreign assistance for every region would have been reduced compared to FY2018 funding. The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and Sub-Saharan Africa would continue to be the top regional recipients, together comprising nearly 80% of aid allocated by region ( Figure 2 ). Proposed cuts ranged from 61% in Europe and Eurasia to 2% in the MENA. Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa would have declined by 31%, aid to East Asia and Pacific by approximately half (51%), aid to South and Central Asia by about 4%, and aid to Western Hemisphere by 35%. The House bill ( H.R. 6385 ) and accompanying report did not provide comprehensive country and regional allocations, but did specify aid levels for some countries and regional programs, including Israel ($3.300 billion), Egypt ($1.457 billion), Jordan ($1.525 billion), Ukraine ($441 million), the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America ($595 million), and the Countering Russian Influence Funds ($250 million). The Senate bill ( S. 3108 ) and report specified aid allocations for several countries and regional programs, including Israel ($3.300 billion), Egypt ($1.082 billion), Jordan ($1.525 billion), Iraq ($429 million), West Bank & Gaza ($286 million), Afghanistan ($698 million), Pakistan ($271 million), Colombia ($391 million), Ukraine $426 million), U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America ($515 million) and the Countering Russian Influence Fund ($300 million). The enacted legislation, P.L. 116-6 , and the accompanying explanatory statement, specified FY2019 aid levels for several countries, including Israel ($3.300 billion), Egypt ($1.419 billion), Jordan ($1.525 billion), Iraq ($407 million), Colombia ($418 million), Mexico ($163 million), and Ukraine ($446 million), as well as for the U.S. Strategy for engagement in Central America ($528 million) and the Countering Russian Influence Fund ($275 million). Budget Highlights The budget submission did not identify any new foreign assistance initiatives. The FY2019 request called for decreases in foreign aid funding generally while continuing to prioritize the aid sectors that have long made up the bulk of U.S. foreign assistance: global health, humanitarian, and security assistance. Global Health The Administration requested $6.70 billion for global health programs in FY2019. This was a 23% reduction from the FY2018 funding level, yet global health programs would have increased slightly as a proportion of the foreign aid budget, from 22% of total aid in FY2018 to 23% in the FY2019 request, due to deeper proposed cuts elsewhere. HIV/AIDS programs, for which funding would have been cut about 27% from FY2018 actual levels, would have continued to make up the bulk (69%) of global health funding, as they have since the creation of the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) in 2004. Family planning and reproductive health services (for which the Administration proposed no funding for FY2018) would have received $302 million, a 42% reduction from FY2018 funding. Assistance levels would have been reduced for every health sector compared to FY2018, including maternal and child health (-25%), tuberculosis (-31%), malaria (-11%), neglected tropical diseases (-25%), global health security (-0.1%, funded through a proposed repurposing of FY2015 Ebola emergency funds), and nutrition (-37%). The House committee bill included $8.69 billion for global health programs, the same as FY2018 funding. While total funding would remain the same, the House proposal would have reduced funding for family planning and reproductive health by about 12% compared to FY2018, while slightly increasing funding for polio, nutrition, and maternal and child health, and more than doubling funding for global health security and emerging threats. The Senate committee bill would have funded global health programs $8.792 billion, 1.2% above the FY2018 level. No subsectors would have received reduced funding and allocations for tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS, family planning, nutrition, neglected tropical diseases and vulnerable children would all have increased slightly. While both bills included long-standing language preventing the use of appropriated funds to pay for abortions, the House bill, but not the Senate bill, also included a provision prohibiting aid to any foreign nongovernmental organizations that "promotes or performs" voluntary abortion, with some exceptions, regardless of the source of funding for such activities. P.L. 116-6 provides $8.84 billion for global health programs for FY2019, a 1.7% increase over FY2018 funding. Every health subsector was funded at the same or slightly higher level than in FY2018. Humanitarian Assistance The Trump Administration's FY2019 budget request for humanitarian assistance totaled $6.358 billion, which was roughly 32% less than FY2018 actual funding ($9.37 billion) and about 22% of the total FY2019 foreign aid request. The request included $2,800.4 million for the Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) account (-17% from FY2018) and $3,557.4 million for the International Disaster Assistance (IDA) account (-17%) ( Figure 2 ). As in its FY2018 request, the Administration proposed to eliminate the Food for Peace (P.L. 480, Title II) and Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA) accounts, asserting that the activities supported through these accounts can be more efficiently and effectively funded through the IDA and MRA accounts, respectively. (Congress did not adopt the proposed changes to Food for Peace for FY2018, appropriating $1.716 billion for the account through the Agriculture appropriation, but did appropriate only $1 million for ERMA, a 98% reduction from FY2017 funding.) The Administration also sought authority to transfer and merge IDA and MRA base funds (current authority only applies to OCO-designated funds). The Administration described its IDA request as focused "on crises at the forefront of U.S. security interests, such as Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Nigeria, Somalia, and South Sudan." The MRA request focused on "conflict displacement in Afghanistan, Burma, Iraq, Somalia, South Sudan, Syria and Yemen," as well as strengthening bilateral relationships with "key refugee hosting countries such as Kenya, Turkey, Jordan, Ethiopia and Bangladesh." Consistent with last year, the request suggested that the proposed funding reduction assumes that other donors will shoulder an increased share of the overall humanitarian assistance burden worldwide. The House committee bills proposed $9.145 billion for humanitarian assistance accounts, about 2% less than FY2018 funding. The total included $1.5 billion for Food for Peace from the Agriculture appropriation but would not have funded the ERMA account. The Senate committee bills proposed $9.534 billion for humanitarian assistance, about 2% more than FY2018 funding. The total included $1.716 billion for Food for Peace and $1 million for the ERMA account. Neither bill included language authorizing broad transfers and mergers between the IDA and MRA base funding account, though both bills include provisions allowing for the transfer and merger of funds from several accounts, including IDA and MRA, as an extraordinary measure in response to a severe international infectious disease outbreak. As in FY2018, Congress did not adopt the significant humanitarian aid changes proposed by the Administration. P.L. 116-6 provided a total of $9.534 billion for humanitarian assistance in FY2019, almost level with FY2018 funding (-0.5%), of which about 21% was designated as OCO. This total included $3.434 billion in MRA funds, $1 million for ERMA, and $4.385 billion for IDA in the SFOPS division of the bill, as well as $1.716 billion for Food for Peace in the Agriculture division. Security Assistance The FY2019 security assistance request within foreign operations accounts totaled $7.304 billion, a 19% reduction from the FY2018 actual funding level and about 26% of the total foreign aid request. Consistent with recent years, 63% of the entire security assistance request was for FMF aid to Israel and Egypt. However, six countries were identified in the request as joint Department of Defense (DOD) and State Department security sector assistance priorities: Philippines, Vietnam, Ukraine, Lebanon, Tunisia, and Colombia. The International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account would have been reduced by about 36% from FY2018 actual levels, Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related (NADR) by 21%, and International Military Education and Training (IMET) by about 14%. In each of these cases, the Administration described the proposed reductions as concentrating resources where they offer the most value and U.S. national security impact. As in the FY2018 request, the Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) account, which supports most non-U.N. multilateral peacekeeping and regional stability operations, including U.S. training and equipment for African militaries and funding for the U.N. Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS), would have seen the biggest reduction (-46%) under the FY2019 request. This is because Administrations generally request UNSOS funds through the CIPA account, while Congress usually funds the office through the PKO account. The Foreign Military Financing (FMF) account would have been reduced by 13% compared to FY2018, with specific allocations for 11 countries and a proposed $75 million Global Fund to be allocated flexibly. This was a notable change from the FY2018 FMF request, in which funds were allocated to four countries and a larger global fund, and from FY2018-enacted funding, for which allocations were specified for more than 20 countries. The House committee bill would have provided $9.274 billion for security assistance, a 3% increase over FY2018 funding, with funding increases proposed for the INCLE (+7%) and FMF (+4%) accounts and a reduction proposed for the PKO account (-9%). Consistent with the request, and in contrast to recent year appropriations, no security assistance funding in the House committee bill was designated as OCO. The Senate committee bill included $8.789 billion for security assistance programs, a 2.6% total decrease from FY2018 funding. The INCLE account would have increased by 2.6% while the FMF and PKO accounts would be reduced by 3% and 11%, respectively. About 16% of the security assistance funding in the Senate bill was designated as OCO. In the final FY2019 appropriation, P.L. 116-6 , security assistance funding totaled $9.153 billion, a 1.4% increase from FY2018. Of the total, $555 million within the PKO and FMF accounts (6% of total security funding) was designated as OCO. Funding provided for most accounts was similar to FY2018 levels, with the exception of INCLE, which increased by 9.4% in part to support increased efforts to address the flow of illegal opioids, and PKO, for which funding decreased by about 9.2%. Economic Development Assistance Bilateral economic development assistance is the broad category that includes programs focused on education, agricultural development and food security, good governance and democracy promotion, microfinance, environmental management, and other sectors. While the majority of this aid is implemented by USAID, it also includes the programs carried out by the independent Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), Peace Corps, Inter-American Foundation and the U.S.-Africa Development Foundation. Excluding global health assistance, bilateral economic development assistance in the Administration's FY2019 request totaled $6.354 billion, a 33% reduction from FY2018 funding levels. Proposed FY2019 allocations for key sectors, compared with FY2018 levels prescribed in legislation, included the following: food security, $518 million (-48% from FY2018); democracy promotion programs, $1,235 million (-47% from FY2018); and education, $512 million (-51% from FY2018). The Administration requested $800 million for MCC and $396 million for Peace Corps, representing cuts of 12% and 3%, respectively. As discussed above, the budget request also proposed to merge I-AF and USADF into USAID, and requested only small amounts of funding to close out their independent activities. The House committee bill would have provided $9.383 billion for economic development assistance and specified allocations for several development sectors, including education ($1.035 billion), conservation programs ($360 million), food security and agricultural development ($1.001 million), microenterprise and microfinance ($265 million), water and sanitation ($400 million) and democracy programs ($2.4 billion). The Senate committee bill would have provided $9.764 billion for economic development activities and specifies allocations for education ($750 million), environment and renewable energy ($943 million), food security and agricultural development ($1.001 billion), small and micro credit ($265 million), water and sanitation ($435 million), and democracy programs ($2.4 billion), among others. Both the House and Senate bills would have funded the I-AF, USADF, Peace Corp, and MCC at the FY2018 funding level, and both bills explicitly rejected the Administration's proposal to merge I-AF and USADF into USAID. The enacted appropriation for FY2019, P.L. 116-6 , provided about $9.239 billion for nonhealth economic development aid. Minimum allocations specified for key sectors included $1.035 billion for education (basic and higher), $285 million for biodiversity conservation, $125 million for sustainable landscapes, $1.001 billion for food security and agricultural development, $265 million to support micro and small enterprises, $67 million to combat trafficking in persons, and $435 million for water and sanitation programs. The independent agencies were all funded at the same level as in FY2018. Appendix A. State Department, Foreign Operations, and Related Agencies Appropriations, by Account Appendix B. International Affairs Budget The International Affairs budget, or Function 150, includes funding that is not in the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriation: foreign food aid programs (P.L. 480 Title II Food for Peace and McGovern-Dole International Food for Education and Child Nutrition programs) are in the Agriculture Appropriations, and the Foreign Claim Settlement Commission and the International Trade Commission are in the Commerce, Justice, Science appropriations. In addition, the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriation measure includes funding for certain international commissions that are not part of the International Affairs Function 150 account. Appendix C. SFOPS Organizational Chart Appendix D. Glossary

The Trump Administration submitted to Congress its FY2019 budget request on February 12, 2018. The proposal included $41.86 billion for the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS). Of that amount, $13.26 billion was for State Department operations, international broadcasting, and related agencies, and $28.60 billion for foreign operations. With the enactment of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA; P.L. 115-123, February 9, 2018), which raised discretionary spending limits set by the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 112-25), the Administration's FY2019 foreign affairs funding request was entirely within enduring (base) funds; no Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding was included the SFOPS request for the first time since FY2012. The FY2019 request would have represented a 23.3% decrease in SFOPS funding compared with FY2018 actual funding levels. The proposed State and related agency funding would have been 18.7% below FY2018 funding and the foreign operations funding would have been reduced by 25.2%. In the State and related programs budget, cuts were proposed for several accounts, including the diplomatic security accounts, contributions to international organizations, and contributions for international peacekeeping activities. In the foreign operations budget, cuts would have been applied across all accounts, with disproportionately large cuts proposed for humanitarian assistance, multilateral assistance, and funding for bilateral development programs focused on agriculture, education, and democracy promotion. Both the House and Senate appropriations committees approved FY2019 SFOPS bills that included funding at higher levels than the Administration requested and closer to FY2018 funding. H.R. 6385, approved by the House appropriations committee on June 20, 2018, would have funded SFOPS accounts at $54.177 billion. S. 3108, approved by the Senate appropriations committee on June 21, 2018, would have provided $54.602 billion for SFOPS accounts. FY2019 began with seven appropriations bills, including SFOPS, unfinished. Congress and the President approved continuing resolutions to fund the affected federal agencies through December 21, 2018 at the FY2018 level (P.L. 115-245, Division C and P.L. 115-298). After December 21, a partial shutdown of the government, including SFOPS funded agencies, occurred. On January 25, 2019, an agreement was reached to continue funding for SFOPS and other appropriations that had lapsed through February 15, at the FY2018 level (P.L. 116-5). On February 14, Congress passed, and the President later signed into law, a full year omnibus appropriation that included SFOPS funding (P.L. 116-6, Division F). P.L. 116-6 included a total of $54.377 billion for SFOPS accounts in FY2019, a 0.3% decrease from the FY2018 funding level and about 30% more than the Administration's request. Of that enacted total, $8.0 billion, or 14.7%, was designated as OCO. This report provides an account-by-account comparison of the FY2019 SFOPS request, House and Senate SFOPS legislation and the final FY2019 SFOPS appropriation to FY2018 funding in Appendix A. The International Affairs (function 150) budget in Appendix B provides a similar comparison. This report will not be further updated unless there is further congressional activity on FY2019 appropriations.

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T his report examines the President's authority to terminate the United States' international obligations under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) without further action from Congress. It also examines whether the NAFTA Implementation Act, the primary federal statute that implements the agreement in domestic law, would remain in effect if the President successfully terminated U.S. obligations under the agreement. In analyzing these issues, the report focuses on three related questions: (1) whether, under international law, the President may terminate U.S. international obligations under NAFTA without congressional approval; (2) whether, under domestic law, the President, relying on constitutional or statutory authority, may terminate U.S. international obligations under NAFTA unilaterally; and (3) whether the NAFTA Implementation Act would remain in effect if the President successfully terminated U.S. international obligations under the agreement. Brief Background on NAFTA NAFTA is an international trade agreement among the United States, Canada, and Mexico that became effective on January 1, 1994. The agreement includes market-opening provisions that remove tariff and nontariff barriers to trade, as well as other rules affecting trade in areas such as agriculture, customs procedures, foreign investment, government procurement, intellectual property protection, and trade in services. The United States approved NAFTA as a congressional-executive agreement by a majority vote of each house of Congress, rather than as a treaty ratified by the President after Senate approval by a two-thirds majority vote. It was not a self-executing agreement; rather, implementing legislation was required to provide domestic legal authorities with the power to enforce and comply with the agreement's provisions. Congress approved and implemented NAFTA in domestic law in the NAFTA Implementation Act. Although many U.S. obligations under NAFTA were already implemented in domestic law prior to Congress's enactment of the NAFTA Implementation Act, Congress delegated rulemaking authority to the President and various federal agencies in the Act so that they could further implement NAFTA in domestic law by promulgating executive orders, proclamations, or regulations. The NAFTA implementing legislation contemplates certain limited changes to certain provisions of NAFTA (e.g., certain rules of origin) in accordance with NAFTA's rules for minor amendments to the text of the agreement and limited congressional delegations of authority to the President to implement such changes in U.S. law. On May 18, 2017, U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Ambassador Robert Lighthizer notified Congress that the Administration intended to renegotiate NAFTA. More than a year later, following the conclusion of the negotiations, President Trump signed a proposed replacement for NAFTA, the United States-Mexico-Canada Free Trade Agreement (USMCA), along with his counterparts from Canada and Mexico. The new agreement addressed a variety of issues, including changes to rules of origin for automotive trade; intellectual property rights protections; digital trade; limitations on the scope of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) provisions; and certain provisions on agricultural trade. President Trump has at times suggested that he will withdraw the United States from NAFTA unilaterally if Congress does not approve the USMCA. The President's Unilateral Termination of U.S. NAFTA Obligations Analyzed Under International Law International law does not itself prohibit the President from unilaterally terminating the United States' obligations under NAFTA. NAFTA is a legally binding agreement under international law. In other words, NAFTA is a "treaty" under international law, a term that has a more expansive meaning than the same term when used in U.S. domestic practice. In this regard, it is important to distinguish "treaty" in the context of international law, in which "treaty" and "international agreement" are synonymous terms for all binding agreements, and "treaty" in the context of domestic American law, in which "treaty" may more narrowly refer to a particular subcategory of binding international agreements that receive the Senate's advice and consent. Part V of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention), which the United States has not ratified but considers to reflect, in many aspects, customary international law, provides rules for withdrawal of a party from a binding international agreement. Article 54 of the Vienna Convention provides that "termination of a treaty or the withdrawal of a party may take place . . . in conformity with the provisions of the treaty . . . ." Article 2205 of NAFTA, which Congress approved in the NAFTA Implementation Act, provides that a "Party may withdraw from this Agreement six months after it provides written notice of withdrawal to the other Parties. If a Party withdraws, the Agreement shall remain in force for the remaining Parties." NAFTA does not address whether, in the context of the United States' withdrawal from the agreement, the term "Party" includes both the President and Congress acting together to accomplish withdrawal. In addition, neither the other provisions of the agreement, the context in which they appear, nor the subsequent practice of the NAFTA parties sheds light on the issue. In the absence of language to the contrary in NAFTA Article 2205, the Vienna Convention applies. Article 67 of the Vienna Convention provides that: Any act of declaring invalid, terminating, withdrawing from or suspending the operation of a treaty pursuant to the provisions of the treaty . . . shall be carried out through an instrument communicated to the other parties. If the instrument is not signed by the Head of State, Head of Government or Minister for Foreign Affairs, the representative of the State communicating it may be called upon to produce full powers [i.e., a document showing that the representative has authority to terminate the agreement on behalf of the state]. It thus appears that if the President (i.e., the "head of state" for the United States) communicated a notice of withdrawal from NAFTA to Canada and Mexico, and such notice became effective at least six months later, it would terminate the United States' obligations under the agreement as a matter of international law. The withdrawal process under international law, however, may not account for the unique statutory, constitutional, and separation-of-powers principles related to withdrawal under U.S. domestic law, as discussed below. The President's Unilateral Termination of U.S. NAFTA Obligations Analyzed Under Domestic Law If the President sought to terminate U.S. international obligations under NAFTA, an injured business or other party with standing to bring a lawsuit might seek an injunction from a U.S. federal court directing the executive branch to refrain from issuing a notice terminating U.S. obligations under NAFTA or a declaration from the court that such issuance is unlawful. It is difficult to predict how a court might resolve such a challenge, as U.S. courts have uniformly avoided answering whether the U.S. Constitution authorizes the President to terminate an international pact without express congressional approval. Instead, courts have left the executive and legislative branches to resolve disagreements over the termination power through the political process. While no court has considered a case involving a trade agreement approved as a congressional-executive agreement under Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) procedures, there is a significant possibility that a court would dismiss such a case for lack of jurisdiction. Congress could signal that it disputes the Executive's termination of U.S. NAFTA obligations to a court by enacting a law or resolution with a veto-proof majority opposing or purporting to block such action. If Congress passed such an act or resolution and the Executive still terminated NAFTA in direct derogation of that act or resolution, the legal paradigm governing the separation-of-powers analysis might shift. To resolve certain separation-of-powers conflicts, the Supreme Court typically applies the approach set forth in Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer , which states that the President's constitutional powers often "are not fixed but fluctuate, depending on their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress." Justice Jackson's opinion sets forth a tripartite framework for evaluating the constitutional powers of the President. The President's authority is (1) at a maximum when acting pursuant to authorization by Congress; (2) in a "zone of twilight" when Congress and the President "may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain," and Congress has not spoken on an issue; and (3) at its "lowest ebb" when taking measures incompatible with the will of Congress. Although Congress has not enacted a law or resolution prohibiting the President from terminating NAFTA unilaterally, such action could place the President's authority at the "lowest ebb." In that scenario, the President may act in contravention of the will of Congress only in matters involving exclusive presidential prerogatives that are "at once so conclusive and preclusive" that they "disabl[e] the Congress from acting upon the subject." Members of the executive branch have suggested that treaty termination is part of the President's plenary powers, but one could plausibly advance the counterargument that the legislative branch plays a shared role in the termination process, especially in matters that implicate Congress's enumerated powers, such as international trade. Assuming that a federal court found a case challenging the President's termination of NAFTA to be justiciable, it would likely evaluate the President's authority to take such action. Because Congress has not enacted a resolution or legislation disapproving of unilateral NAFTA termination, in order to terminate NAFTA without further congressional action, either (1) the President must possess plenary constitutional authority to terminate U.S. international obligations under NAFTA, or (2) Congress must have authorized the President to take such action through legislation. Does the President Have Plenary Constitutional Authority to Terminate U.S. International Obligations Under NAFTA? Although the Constitution establishes a procedure whereby the Executive has the power to make treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate, it is silent as to how the United States may withdraw from treaties or congressional-executive agreements. Scholars have also noted that the framers of the Constitution never directly addressed the power to terminate treaties (or congressional-executive agreements) in the Federalist Papers , the Constitutional Convention debates, or the debates of the state ratifying conventions. In the absence of guidance from the text or original meaning of the Constitution, a court considering whether the President has the constitutional authority to terminate U.S. international obligations under NAFTA without congressional approval would likely turn to other methods of constitutional interpretation. As discussed below, applying relevant methods of interpretation does not provide a clear answer as to whether the President possesses plenary constitutional authority to terminate U.S. obligations under NAFTA. Structuralism One method of constitutional interpretation, known as structuralism, draws inferences from the design of the Constitution, including the relationships among the three branches of the federal government (commonly called separation of powers). In this vein, Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution specifically gives Congress the authority to impose duties on imports of products from other countries and to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations." By contrast, although the President may possess constitutional authority to negotiate trade agreements and communicate a notice of withdrawal from an agreement to trading partners, Article II gives the President no specific power over international commerce or trade. The manner in which the Constitution apportions power over international commerce, granting such power specifically to Congress, suggests that the President may simply lack authority to terminate U.S. international obligations under NAFTA, which addresses commercial matters, without further congressional action. The Supreme Court, however, has interpreted Article II of the Constitution as granting the President the "vast share of responsibility" for conducting foreign relations. This authority includes, but also extends beyond, specific Article II powers to appoint ambassadors with advice and consent of the Senate; submit treaties to the Senate; ratify treaties; and act as the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. Courts and scholars generally accept that such authority includes the exclusive authority to negotiate treaties and international agreements and make official communications with foreign states. Because terminating the United States' NAFTA obligations implicates foreign relations and, more specifically, communication of a notice of withdrawal to foreign sovereigns (i.e., Canada and Mexico), one could argue that the design of the Constitution provides the President with independent power to terminate NAFTA unilaterally. Nonetheless, the President's preeminent role in communicating with foreign powers does not necessarily imply that he has authority to terminate a trade agreement without congressional consent. Historical Practice Long-established historical practices of the political branches may also be relevant to whether the President can terminate NAFTA unilaterally. In some cases, the United States has withdrawn from international legal agreements pursuant to the joint action of the political branches. However, beginning at the turn of the 20th century, the President has sometimes withdrawn unilaterally from an international agreement without the consent of Congress. Thus, general historical practice involving the termination of international agreements has been inconsistent, and therefore it may not be particularly helpful in resolving questions about the President's power to terminate trade agreements unilaterally. Defining the relevant historical practice more narrowly provides little guidance, as well. Historical experience with the suspension of modern free trade agreements (FTAs)—those subsequently approved and implemented in domestic law as congressional-executive agreements by a majority vote in both houses of Congress under Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) procedures—is limited. In fact, no U.S. FTA approved as a congressional-executive agreement under these procedures has been terminated. In the single instance involving suspension rather than termination of an FTA, Congress amended the act implementing the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement preceding NAFTA to suspend certain provisions in the act while allowing others to continue to operate. Although this historical practice concerns suspension of an FTA rather than termination, a court could interpret it to suggest that Congress may have a role in terminating U.S. international obligations under NAFTA. However, because it is a single instance and involves suspension rather than termination of an agreement, a court could also find it to provide little guidance on the President's authority in this context. Pragmatism The practical consequences of a court concluding that the President possesses the power to terminate a trade agreement unilaterally may also be relevant. Generally, a pragmatic approach to constitutional interpretation weighs the future costs and benefits of an interpretation to society or the political branches, selecting the interpretation that may lead to the perceived best outcome. However, it is difficult to predict which set of pragmatic arguments a court would find most persuasive. On the one hand, one could argue that the President should possess an exclusive power of unilateral termination because (1) the nation must have a "single policy" regarding which international trade agreements remain in effect, and (2) additional pronouncements from Congress on the issue could result in confusion for the United States and its trading partners. One might also arguably justify a unilateral termination power on the grounds that the United States needs a means to make decisive, quick, and clear decisions on withdrawal from NAFTA or other FTAs, particularly when another party has breached the agreement, and that it would make it easier for the President to threaten NAFTA partners with U.S. withdrawal from the agreement as a means of leverage to obtain concessions from them during renegotiation of the agreement. On the other hand, one could instead argue that a unilateral termination power would improperly allow a single actor (i.e., the President) to eliminate an international commercial agreement. In addition, the President's use of such a power could be viewed to undermine the United States' ability to make convincing international commitments in the realm of trade as well as other areas. Has Congress Granted the President Authority to Terminate U.S. NAFTA Obligations? Notwithstanding whether the President has plenary constitutional authority to terminate NAFTA, the President could terminate NAFTA without first seeking congressional approval if Congress has already given the Executive such authorization either expressly or by implication. It is unclear whether a court would find that Congress has implicitly approved of unilateral presidential termination of NAFTA obligations. Congress has enacted a detailed statutory framework for the negotiation, legislative consideration, and implementation of free trade agreements under Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) procedures. During the past few decades, Congress and the President have used this legal framework to conclude and implement 14 free trade agreements with 20 countries, including NAFTA. Given this extensive framework for legislative approval and implementation of trade agreements, a court might find it unlikely that Congress implicitly authorized the President to withdraw from NAFTA without further congressional action. On the other hand, the fact that Congress enacted a comprehensive statutory framework for entering into trade agreements, but not withdrawing from them, may indicate that Congress was not as concerned with the President's termination of U.S. obligations under the agreements. Nonetheless, some commentators have argued that Congress has specifically authorized the President to terminate U.S. international obligations under NAFTA. In particular, these commentators have pointed to Sections 125 and 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, an act that, among other things, sets up the procedure for Congress's consideration of trade agreement implementing legislation, as potentially providing such authority. The following subsections of this report therefore analyze whether Sections 125 and 301 grant the President this termination authority. Section 125 of the Trade Act of 1974 Some commentators have argued that Section 125(a) of the Trade Act of 1974 authorizes the President to terminate U.S. NAFTA commitments. Congress specifically made this subsection applicable to NAFTA in the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, the Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) legislation for NAFTA. Section 125(a), titled "Termination and Withdrawal Authority," which specifically addresses withdrawal from FTAs, provides the following: (a) Grant of authority for termination or withdrawal at end of period specified in agreement Every trade agreement entered into under [the Trade Act of 1974] shall be subject to termination, in whole or in part, or withdrawal, upon due notice, at the end of a period specified in the agreement. Such period shall be not more than 3 years from the date on which the agreement becomes effective. If the agreement is not terminated or withdrawn from at the end of the period so specified, it shall be subject to termination or withdrawal thereafter upon not more than 6 months' notice. If the President were to invoke Section 125(a) as authority for terminating U.S. international obligations under NAFTA, his actions might be challenged in federal court as exceeding the statutory authority delegated to him. Because no court has yet interpreted Section 125(a), the scope of the President's power under this provision would be an issue of first impression. In deciding whether Section 125(a) authorizes the President to terminate U.S. obligations under NAFTA, the court might consider several principles of statutory interpretation. First, a court would likely consider the ordinary meaning of the text. In this vein, the title of subsection (a) may provide some guidance. The title "Grant of authority for termination or withdrawal at end of period specified in agreement" may suggest that Congress's purpose in enacting Section 125(a) was to "grant" the President the authority to terminate the agreement in accordance with the withdrawal provision in NAFTA Article 2205 without the need for further legislation. However, the Supreme Court has stated that statutory headings and titles "are not meant to take the place of the detailed provisions of the text" and that the title of an act "cannot enlarge or confer powers." Although the title of subsection (a) may provide limited interpretive aid, it does not specify which political actor has withdrawal authority. Thus, it is unlikely that a court would view it as conferring authority on the President to terminate U.S. obligations under NAFTA. Turning to the text of Section 125(a), the provision states that agreements like NAFTA "shall be subject to termination." The relevant dictionary definition of "subject" is "contingent on or under the influence of some later action." To say that NAFTA is "subject to" termination means that it is capable of later being terminated but says nothing about which political actor(s) must terminate the agreement. This reading is supported by the canon of statutory construction that "Congress . . . does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions—it does not . . . hide elephants in mouseholes." It seems unlikely that Congress would have "hidden" a delegation of authority to the President to terminate NAFTA in a vaguely worded provision. Rather, the ordinary meaning of Section 125(a) appears to require only that the text of the NAFTA agreement contain a provision allowing for its termination. Legislative history materials appear to confirm this reading of Section 125(a). These materials suggest that Section 125(a)'s purpose was to ensure that trade agreements entered into by the President contained language providing for termination or withdrawal at the end of a certain time period. This reading is suggested by the House Committee on Ways and Means report on a predecessor to Section 125, Section 2(b) of the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act. Congress enacted that law to authorize the President to negotiate reciprocal agreements reducing barriers to international trade during the Great Depression in order to stimulate the domestic economy. The House committee report stated the following: The final provision of the bill under consideration deals with the amount of time during which a foreign trade agreement with another country may run. The provision is that such agreement must be terminable at the end of not more than 3 years. If it is not terminated at that time it must thereafter be terminable at any time upon not more than 6 month[s'] notice. The committee reports thus suggest that Section 125(a)'s purpose was to ensure that the trade agreements that the President entered into would be subject to termination or terminable . Under this reading, Section 125(a) does not appear to delegate authority to the President to terminate those agreements unilaterally by delivering notice of withdrawal to trading partners. Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 One scholar has argued that Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 authorizes the President to terminate U.S. obligations under NAFTA. Section 301 provides that the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), a federal agency within the Executive Office of the President, must take certain specified trade actions "subject to the specific direction, if any, of the President regarding any such action" when it finds, after conducting an investigation and following other procedures, that: (A) the rights of the United States under any trade agreement are being denied; or (B) an act, policy, or practice of a foreign country—(i) violates, or is inconsistent with, the provisions of, or otherwise denies benefits to the United States under, any trade agreement, or (ii) is unjustifiable and burdens or restricts United States commerce. Section 301 also provides the USTR with discretion to take "all appropriate and feasible" trade actions specifically authorized under subsection (c) when it finds that "an act, policy, or practice of a foreign country is unreasonable or discriminatory and burdens or restricts United States commerce, and . . . action by the United States is appropriate." Section 301(c) provides a list of actions that the USTR may or must take in response to the unfair foreign trade practices. As relevant here, that list authorizes USTR to: (A) suspend, withdraw, or prevent the application of, benefits of trade agreement concessions to carry out a trade agreement with the foreign country [that is the subject of the Section 301 investigation]; (B) impose duties or other import restrictions on the goods of, and, notwithstanding any other provision of law, fees or restrictions on the services of, such foreign country for such time as the Trade Representative determines appropriate . . . Notably, the list of actions in Section 301(c) does not explicitly include authorization for the Executive to deliver a notice of withdrawal from a trade agreement to U.S. trading partners and thereby terminate U.S. obligations under the agreement. Rather, as discussed further below, the legislative history of this provision, as recounted in committee reports, indicates that Congress merely intended the provision to provide the President broad authority to take action against unfair foreign trade practices by imposing various barriers to trade under domestic law, including by suspending or terminating individual trade concessions. The text and legislative history do not appear to suggest that Section 301(c) more broadly authorizes the USTR to terminate a trade agreement. However, as discussed below, the Executive might exercise the authority in Section 301 to establish significant barriers to trade with Canada and Mexico. Accordingly, if the USTR were to interpret Section 301(c) as authorizing it to terminate a trade agreement, it would appear that its actions would fall outside of the statutory authority delegated to the agency. It should be noted that courts reviewing specific USTR actions under Section 301 have in the past accorded "substantial deference to decisions of the Trade Representative implicating the discretionary authority of the President in matters of foreign relations," including the USTR's selection of a remedy following a Section 301 investigation. But the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which reviews the USTR's actions under Section 301, has held that, under the Administrative Procedure Act, "[t]he judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction and must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent." Furthermore, a court may hold agency action unlawful when there has been "a clear misconstruction of the governing statute" or "action outside delegated authority." Because the text and legislative history of Section 301 indicate that Congress merely intended the provision to furnish the Executive with broad authority to take action against unfair foreign trade practices by imposing various barriers to trade under domestic law, it seems unlikely that a court would accord deference to a USTR interpretation that Section 301 authorizes the President to deliver notice of termination to Canada or Mexico. Presidential Authority to Impose Barriers to Trade with NAFTA Parties Under Sections 125 and 301 Although neither Section 125 nor Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 appears to authorize the Executive to terminate U.S. international obligations under NAFTA, these statutory provisions appear to grant broad authority to the executive branch to impose barriers to trade on goods and services from Canada and Mexico under domestic law. For example, the text and legislative history of Section 125(b)-(f) suggest that Congress intended to provide the President with broad authority to terminate various presidential proclamations implementing a trade agreement in domestic law (e.g., proclamations implementing tariff reductions) and to impose trade barriers in order to, for example, respond to a breach of the agreement by another party. And the text and legislative history of Section 301, as recounted in committee reports, indicate that the provision was intended to provide the Executive with broad authority to effect the temporary suspension or withdrawal of individual trade concessions accorded by the United States to the goods and services of trading partners while a trade agreement remained in effect. Although such provisions appear to furnish the executive branch with broad authority to suspend or terminate individual trade concessions, the Executive's actions under these provisions could be subject to challenge before international and domestic tribunals. For example, the Executive's imposition of trade barriers pursuant to such authorities may place the United States in breach of its obligations under other international agreements, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements. If a dispute proceeded to a WTO panel, and the panel rendered an adverse decision against the United States, the United States would be expected to remove the offending measure, generally within a reasonable period of time, or face the possibility of paying compensation to the complaining member or being subject to sanctions. Such sanctions might include the complaining member imposing higher duties on imports of selected products from the United States. However, a WTO Member could begin to impose its own duties on selected U.S. exports without awaiting the outcome of a dispute settlement proceeding. In addition, a domestic court might consider whether, in exercising authority under Section 125, the President acted within the scope of his delegated powers as defined by the terms of the statute, or whether the President's actions were proportional to the circumstances cited to justify them. As a further example, a federal court could review USTR's Section 301 actions under the Administrative Procedure Act to determine whether they are "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." A reviewing court might consider, for example, whether the USTR's Section 301 actions involved "a clear misconstruction of the governing statute," "a significant procedural violation," or "action outside delegated authority." Whether the NAFTA Implementation Act Would Remain in Effect After Termination of U.S. NAFTA Obligations The NAFTA Implementation Act, the primary federal statute that implements NAFTA in domestic law, would likely remain in effect if the President successfully terminated the United States' international obligations under NAFTA unilaterally. Under Supreme Court precedent, the repealing of statutes generally must conform to the same bicameral and presentment process set forth in Article I that is used to enact new legislation. For example, in Clinton v. City of New York , the Supreme Court struck down the Line Item Veto Act (LIVA), a law that authorized the President, within five days of signing a bill into law, to make partial cancellation of certain tax and spending provisions in the law if the President determined certain criteria were met. The Court held that the LIVA violated the bicameralism and presentment requirements of the Constitution because the President could effectively repeal acts of Congress without going through the regular legislative process involving House and Senate passage of legislation and presentment of it to the President for his signature or veto. Nonetheless, the Court has recognized Congress's authority to enact contingent legislation that provides for the alteration of a law's effect based on a condition that arises after the law is enacted. It should be noted that Sections 109(b) and 415 of the NAFTA Implementation Act contain language that could be read to effect the repeal of certain provisions of the NAFTA Implementation Act under specific circumstances. Specifically, section 109(b) states the following: (b) TERMINATION OF NAFTA STATUS—During any period in which a country ceases to be a NAFTA country, sections 101 through 106 shall cease to have effect with respect to such country. Section 415(a) provides similar language with respect to certain provisions addressing dispute settlement in antidumping and countervailing duty cases in Title IV of the NAFTA Implementation Act: IN GENERAL—Except as provided in subsection (b)[, which contains transitional provisions], on the date on which a country ceases to be a NAFTA country, the provisions of this title (other than this section) and the amendments made by this title shall cease to have effect with respect to that country. The NAFTA Implementation Act defines "NAFTA country" as those countries (i.e., Canada and Mexico) (1) to which the agreement is in force and (2) to which the United States "applies the Agreement." The text and legislative history of Sections 109(b) and 415 of the NAFTA Implementation Act indicate that Congress intended these sections to trigger automatic termination of certain provisions of the Act with respect to Canada or Mexico when either country withdrew from NAFTA but the United States remained a party. However, it is unclear what language in either of these provisions would afford the President the authority to terminate the agreement without such conduct by Canada or Mexico. Moreover, interpreting Sections 109(b) and 415 to provide for the automatic termination of certain provisions in the NAFTA Implementation Act when the President unilaterally terminates U.S. NAFTA obligations under international law would appear to violate a key canon of statutory construction that holds that if one plausible reading of a statute would raise questions about the statute's constitutionality, a court should look for another, "fairly possible" reading that would avoid the constitutional issue. Interpreting Sections 109(b) and 415 to authorize the President to terminate portions of the NAFTA Implementation Act by withdrawing the United States from NAFTA would raise the question of whether Congress's delegation of such authority to the President violates separation-of-powers principles by contravening the Presentment Clause of the Constitution, which, as noted above, requires that legislation be passed by Congress and presented to the President for his signature or veto in order to become law. Accordingly, a more likely reading of Sections 109(b) and 415 would likely be that certain provisions of the NAFTA Implementation Act cease to have effect with respect to Canada or Mexico if either country withdraws from NAFTA but the United States remains a party. Therefore, absent further congressional action, the United States' withdrawal from NAFTA alone appears unlikely to trigger Sections 109(b) and 415 or render the NAFTA Implementation Act ineffective. Notably, even if the NAFTA Implementation Act remains in effect, other provisions of federal law (e.g., Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974) may grant the President or a federal agency authority to restrict trade with Canada or Mexico. As noted, such actions would likely be subject to judicial review on various grounds.

NAFTA is an international trade agreement among the United States, Canada, and Mexico that became effective on January 1, 1994. The agreement includes market-opening provisions that remove tariff and nontariff barriers to trade, as well as other rules affecting trade in areas such as agriculture, customs procedures, foreign investment, government procurement, intellectual property protection, and trade in services. Congress approved and implemented NAFTA in domestic law in the NAFTA Implementation Act (P.L. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057). On May 18, 2017, U.S. Trade Representative Ambassador Robert Lighthizer notified Congress that the Administration intended to renegotiate NAFTA. More than a year later, following the conclusion of the negotiations, President Trump signed a proposed replacement for NAFTA, the United States-Mexico-Canada Free Trade Agreement (USMCA), along with his counterparts from Canada and Mexico. President Trump has at times suggested that he will withdraw the United States from NAFTA unilaterally if Congress does not approve the USMCA. This report examines the President's authority to terminate the United States' international obligations under NAFTA without further action from Congress. It also examines whether the NAFTA Implementation Act, the primary federal statute that implements the agreement in domestic law, would remain in effect if the President successfully terminated U.S. obligations under the agreement. In analyzing these issues, the report focuses on three related questions: (1) whether, under international law, the President may terminate U.S. international obligations under NAFTA without congressional approval; (2) whether, under domestic law, the President, relying on constitutional or statutory authority, may terminate U.S. international obligations under NAFTA unilaterally; and (3) whether the NAFTA Implementation Act would remain in effect if the President successfully terminated U.S. international obligations under the agreement. With regard to the first question, under international law, the President appears to be able to terminate the United States' international obligations under NAFTA without congressional approval by delivering six months' notice of withdrawal to Canada and Mexico, provided such notice later becomes effective (e.g., assuming that a court does not enjoin the Executive from issuing the notice or declare such issuance unlawful). The answer to the second question is less clear, however, and would require a reviewing court to confront several complicated issues of first impression, including the scope of the President's constitutional authority and statutory authority to terminate an international agreement. Justiciability questions may prevent a court from definitively answering the constitutional questions, leaving the resolution of the President's constitutional authority to the political process. With regard to the statutory question, while legal commentators have raised various arguments with respect to the President's domestic legal authority to terminate U.S. NAFTA international obligations unilaterally, it does not appear that any statute expressly affords the President with the authority to terminate NAFTA on his own. It is unclear whether Congress's enactment of an extensive legal framework providing for legislative consideration, approval, and implementation of trade agreements indicates that Congress did not intend to authorize the President implicitly to withdraw from NAFTA without further congressional action. Nonetheless, as explained below, provisions of federal law such as Sections 125 and 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 may provide the Executive with broad authority to suspend individual trade concessions granted to NAFTA countries and thereby establish barriers to trade with Canada and Mexico. At the same time, the Executive's use of such authority would, however, likely be subject to review on various grounds by domestic or international tribunals. Finally, whether the NAFTA Implementation Act would remain in effect after termination of U.S. obligations under NAFTA would be informed by Supreme Court precedent generally requiring the repeal of statutes to conform to the same bicameral process set forth in Article I of the Constitution that is used to enact new legislation. Accordingly, as an initial matter, it would appear that the President lacks authority to terminate the domestic effect of the NAFTA Implementation Act without going through the full legislative process for repeal. Thus, the Act appears to remain in effect unless Congress has, consistent with the Constitution, delegated to the President authority to terminate its provisions or made such provisions "self-terminating."

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Introduction The Clean Water Act (CWA) authorizes the principal federal program to aid municipal wastewater treatment plant construction and related eligible activities. Congress established this program in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (P.L. 92-500) (although prior versions of the act had authorized less ambitious grants assistance since 1956). Title II of P.L. 92-500 authorized grants to states for wastewater treatment plant construction under a program administered by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Federal funds were provided through annual appropriations under a state-by-state allocation formula contained in the act itself. States used their allotments to make grants to cities to build or upgrade wastewater treatment plants, supporting the overall objectives of the act: restoring and maintaining the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation's waters. The federal share of project costs, originally 75% under P.L. 92-500, was reduced to 55% in 1981. By the mid-1980s, there was considerable policy debate between Congress and the Administration over the future of the act's construction grants program and, in particular, the appropriate federal role in funding municipal water infrastructure projects. Through FY1984, Congress had appropriated nearly $41 billion under this program, representing the largest nonmilitary public works programs since the Interstate Highway System. The grants program was a target of budget cuts in the Reagan Administration, which sought to redirect budgetary priorities in part to sort out the appropriate roles of federal, state, and local governments in a number of domestic policy areas, including water pollution control. The Administration's rationale included several points: The original intent of the program to address the backlog of sewage treatment needs had been virtually eliminated by the mid-1980s. Most remaining projects (such as small, rural systems) were believed to pose little environmental threat and were not appropriate federal responsibilities. State and local governments, in the Administration's view, were fully capable of running construction programs and have a clear responsibility to construct treatment capacity to meet environmental objectives that were primarily established by states. Thus, the Reagan Administration sought a phaseout of the act's construction grants program by 1990. Many states and localities supported the idea of phasing out the grants program, since many were critical of what they viewed as burdensome rules and regulations that accompanied the federal grant money. However, they sought a longer transition and ample flexibility to set up long-term financing to promote state and local self-sufficiency. Congress's response to this debate was contained in 1987 amendments to the act ( P.L. 100-4 , the Water Quality Act of 1987). It authorized $18 billion over nine years for sewage treatment plant construction, through a combination of the Title II grants program and a new State Water Pollution Control Revolving Funds program—hereinafter the clean water state revolving fund (CWSRF) program. Under the new program, in CWA Title VI, federal grants would be provided as seed money for state-administered loans to build sewage treatment plants and, eventually, other water quality projects. Cities, in turn, would repay loans to the state, enabling a phaseout of federal involvement while the state built up a source of capital for future investments. Under the amendments, the CWSRF program was phased in beginning in FY1989 (in FY1989 and FY1990, appropriations were split equally between Title II and Title VI grants) and entirely replaced the previous Title II program in FY1991. The intention was that states would have flexibility to set priorities and administer funding, while federal aid would end after FY1994. The CWSRF authorizations for appropriations provided in the 1987 amendments expired in FY1994, but pressure to extend federal funding has continued, in part because, although Congress has appropriated $98 billion in CWA Title II and Title VI wastewater infrastructure assistance since 1972, funding needs remain high: According to the most recent formal estimate by EPA and states (prepared in 2016), an additional $271 billion nationwide is needed over the next 20 years for all types of projects eligible for funding under the act. Congress has continued to appropriate funds, and continued to assist states and localities in meeting wastewater infrastructure needs and complying with CWA requirements. In 1996, Congress established a parallel program under the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) to help communities finance projects needed to comply with federal drinking water regulations. Funding support for drinking water occurred for several reasons. First, until the 1980s, the number of drinking water regulations was fairly small, and public water systems often did not need to make large investments in treatment technologies to meet those regulations. Second, good quality drinking water traditionally has been available to many communities at relatively low cost. By comparison, essentially all communities have had to construct or upgrade sewage treatment facilities to meet the requirements of the CWA. Over time, drinking water circumstances changed, as communities grew, and commercial, industrial, agricultural, and residential land-uses became more concentrated, thus resulting in more contaminants reaching drinking water sources. Moreover, as the number of federal drinking water standards has increased, many communities have found that their water may not be as good as once thought and that additional treatment technologies are required to meet the new standards and protect public health. Between 1986 and 1996, for example, the number of regulated drinking water contaminants grew from 23 to 83, and EPA and the states expressed concern that many of the nation's 52,000 small community water systems were likely to lack the financial capacity to meet the rising costs of SDWA compliance. According to the most recent EPA-state survey (issued in 2018), future funding needs for projects to treat and deliver public drinking water supplies in the United States are $473 billion over the next 20 years. Congress responded to these concerns by enacting the 1996 SDWA Amendments ( P.L. 104-182 ), which authorized a drinking water state revolving loan fund (DWSRF) program to help systems finance projects needed to comply with SDWA regulations and to protect public health. This program, fashioned after the CWSRF program, authorizes EPA to make grants to states to capitalize DWSRFs which states then use to make loans to public water systems. Appropriations for the program were authorized at $599 million for FY1994 and $1 billion annually for FY1995 through FY2003. Capitalization grants for DWSRF programs were provided for the first time in FY1997. Although the authorizations for appropriations expired in FY2003, Congress continued to provide funding for the program in annual appropriations, totaling $23 billion through FY2019. America's Water Infrastructure Act of 2018 (AWIA; P.L. 115-270 ), enacted on October 23, 2018, reauthorized appropriations for the DWSRF at $1.17 billion in FY2019, $1.30 billion in FY2020, and $1.95 billion in FY2021. The first section of this report includes a table that summarizes the history of appropriations for both wastewater and drinking water infrastructure programs. The next section discusses several historical developments in water infrastructure funding. The last section contains a detailed chronology of congressional activity regarding wastewater and drinking water infrastructure funding for each fiscal year since the 1987 CWA amendments. Summary of Water Infrastructure Appropriations Table 1 summarizes funding for the wastewater and drinking infrastructure programs since enactment of the 1987 CWA amendments ( P.L. 100-4 ). Funding for these EPA programs is contained in the appropriations act providing funds for the Department of the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies. Within the portion of the bill that funds EPA, wastewater treatment assistance was first specified in an account called Construction Grants, which was subsequently renamed State Revolving Funds/Construction Grants, and then renamed Water Infrastructure. Since FY1996, this account has been titled State and Tribal Assistance Grants (STAG). The STAG account now includes all water infrastructure funds and management grants provided to assist states in implementing air quality, water quality, and other media-specific environmental programs. The FY1996 appropriation was the first to include both water infrastructure and other state environmental grants; the latter previously were included in EPA's general program management account. Amounts shown in Table 1 include funds for CWA Title II grants, CWSRF grants, drinking water SRF grants, special project grants (discussed below), and the Water Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (WIFIA) program. Congress first provided appropriations to cover the subsidy costs of this program in FY2017, as discussed in the detailed chronology section below. Table 1 does not include funds for consolidated state environmental management grants. These grants include funding for a wide range of environmental programs, which have changed over time. In recent years, the categorical grants have included funding for water, air, and waste programs. The categorical grant programs most closely related to water infrastructure issues include grants for states' nonpoint source management programs (CWA Section 319) and states' pollution control programs (CWA Section 106). Funding levels for the environmental management state grants are discussed below in the appropriations chronology section. As an additional comparison, Figure 1 illustrates the total EPA water infrastructure appropriations (for clean water and drinking water assistance combined) between FY1986 and FY2019 in both nominal dollars (i.e., not adjusted for inflation) and constant (2018) dollars (i.e., adjusted for inflation). Historical Funding Developments This section discusses several historical developments of note regarding appropriations for EPA's water infrastructure programs. Special Purpose Project Grants The practice of earmarking a portion of the construction grants/SRF account for specific wastewater treatment and other water quality projects began with the FY1989 appropriations. The practice increased to the point of representing a significant portion of appropriated funds (31% of the total water infrastructure appropriation in FY1994, for example, but less in subsequent years: 2.5% in FY2009 and 5% in FY2010). The number of projects receiving these earmarked funds also increased: from 4 in FY1989 to 319 in FY2010. Beginning in FY2000, the larger total number of earmarked projects resulted in more communities receiving such grants, but at the same time receiving smaller amounts of funds. Thus, while a few communities received individual earmarked awards of $1 million or more, the average size of earmarked grants shrank: $18.1 million in FY1995, $4.9 million in FY1999, $1.08 million in FY2006, and $586,000 in FY2010. (Conference reports on the individual appropriations bills, noted in the later discussion in this report, provide some detail on projects funded in this manner.) The effective result of earmarking was to reduce the amount of funds provided to states to capitalize their SRF programs. Between FY1989 and FY2010, approximately 10% of the total water infrastructure appropriations ($7.4 billion) went to earmarked project grants. Interest groups representing state water quality program managers and administrators of infrastructure financing programs criticized the practice of earmarked appropriations. They contended that earmarking undermined the intended purpose of the state funds—promoting water quality improvements nationwide. Many state officials preferred funds to be allocated more equitably, not based on what they viewed largely as political considerations, and they preferred for state environmental and financing officials to retain responsibility to set actual spending priorities. Further, they argued that the special projects funding would diminish the level of seed funding to SRFs, delaying the time when SRFs would be financially self-sufficient. The practice of earmarking was criticized because designated projects were arguably receiving more favorable treatment than other communities' projects: They were generally eligible for 55% federal grants (and were not required to repay 100% of the funded project cost, as is the case with a loan through an SRF), and the practice circumvented the standard process of states determining the priority by which projects will receive funding. It also meant that the projects were generally not reviewed by the CWA authorizing committees. This was especially true after FY1992, when special purpose grant funding was designated for types of projects not authorized in the Clean Water Act or the Safe Drinking Water Act. Members of Congress intervened for a specific community for a number of reasons. In some cases, the communities may have been unsuccessful in seeking state approval to fund the project under an SRF loan or other program. For some, the cost of a project financed through a state loan was deemed unacceptably high, because repaying the loan would result in increased user fees that ratepayers felt would have been unduly burdensome. In the early years of this congressional practice, special purpose grant funding originated in the House version of the EPA appropriations bill, while the Senate, for the most part, resisted earmarking by rejecting or reducing amounts and projects included in House-passed legislation. Therefore, special purpose grant funding on several occasions was an issue during the House-Senate conference on the appropriations bill. Beginning in FY1999, however, both the House and Senate proposed earmarked projects in their respective versions of the EPA appropriations bill, with the final total number of projects and dollar amounts determined by conferees. The Clean Water Act Title II grants program effectively ended when authorizations for it expired after FY1990. One result of earmarking special purpose grants in appropriations bills was to continue grants as a method of funding wastewater treatment construction long after FY1990. This practice led Congress to provide EPA grants for drinking water system projects, which had not previously been available. However, as discussed in the next section, general opposition to congressional earmarking stopped the practice after FY2011. Local Cost Share on Special Purpose Grants The federal percentage share and local match required on special purpose grants varied depending on the project and the year of funding. For example, in the early projects (FY1989), the 1987 CWA amendments specified the federal cost shares, which ranged from 75% to 85%. In FY1992 and FY1993, the appropriations acts specified that funds were provided "as grants under title II," resulting in a requirement for local communities to provide a 45% share of project costs. After FY1993, the appropriations acts themselves were the authority for the special purpose projects grants. In the FY1995 appropriation bill, which also directed allocation of funds appropriated in FY1994 to several needy cities, Congress addressed the issue of federal and local cost shares in report language accompanying the bill, but not in the appropriation act itself. The conferees are in agreement that the agency should work with the grant recipients on appropriate cost-share arrangements. It is the conferees' expectation that the agency will apply the 45% local cost share requirement under Title II of the Clean Water Act in most cases. In the FY1996 appropriations, both the act and accompanying reports were silent on federal/local cost share and applicability of Title II requirements. Because of that, EPA officials planned to require only a 5% local match for most of the special purpose grants in that bill, which is the standard matching requirement for other EPA noninfrastructure grants. Under the agency's rules, the local match could include in-kind services, as well as funding toward the project. In the FY1997 appropriations, Congress included report language as it had in FY1995 concerning federal and local cost share requirements. The conferees are in agreement that the Agency should work with the grant recipients on appropriate cost-share agreements and to that end the conferees direct the Agency to develop a standard cost-share consistent with fiscal year 1995. The FY1998 and FY1999 appropriations included neither bill nor report language on this point. However, language in the House and Senate Appropriations Committees' reports on the FY1998 and FY1999 bills directed EPA to work with grant recipients on appropriate cost-share arrangements. For FY2000, Congress included explicit report language concerning the local match. The conferees agree that the $331,650,000 provided to communities or other entities for construction of water and wastewater treatment facilities and for groundwater protection infrastructure shall be accompanied by a cost-share requirement whereby 45 percent of a project's cost is to be the responsibility of the community or entity consistent with long-standing guidelines for the Agency. These guidelines also offer flexibility in the application of the cost-share requirement for those few circumstances when meeting the 45 percent requirement is not possible. Similar report language concerning local cost-share requirements accompanied the conference reports on the appropriations bills from FY2001 through FY2005. Beginning with FY2004, Congress specified in the appropriations legislation that the local share of project costs shall be not less than 45%. Similarly, beginning with the FY2003 appropriations legislation, Congress also specified that, except for those limited instances in which an applicant meets the criteria for a waiver of the cost-share requirement, the earmarked grant shall provide no more than 55% of an individual project's cost, regardless of the amount appropriated. The practice of earmarking special project water infrastructure grants continued to change. First, in FY2007, Congress applied a one-year moratorium on earmarks in all appropriations bills. For the next three years, special project grants were allowed in appropriations bills—including EPA's—but again in FY2011, no special project funding was provided for congressional projects. Following the 2010 midterm election and during subsequent months while FY2011 appropriations were under consideration (discussed below), the general issue of congressional earmarks of specific projects had become highly controversial because of the overall growing number of them, concern over the influence of special interests on spending decisions, and lack of congressional oversight. In response, President Obama said he would veto any legislation containing earmarks, the House extended the ban on earmarks under the Republican Conferences rules, and the chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee announced a moratorium on earmarks for FY2011 and FY2012. Thus, the FY2011 full-year appropriations measure contained no congressionally directed special project funds for water infrastructure projects in the EPA STAG account. However, it did include funds requested by the President: $10 million for Alaska Native Villages and $10 million for U.S.-Mexico border projects. The FY2012 full-year appropriations measure also contained no special project funding in the EPA STAG account. The FY2012 bill did include funds for Alaska Native and Rural Villages ($10 million) and for U.S.-Mexico border projects ($5 million). The moratorium on congressional earmarks has continued. The FY2013 full-year appropriations measure ( P.L. 113-6 ) contained no special project funding in the STAG account. As with other recent bills, however, it did include funds for Alaska Native and Rural Villages ($9.5 million) and for U.S.-Mexico border projects ($4.7 million). Similarly, the moratorium on earmarks continued in FY2014 and FY2015; P.L. 113-76 contained no special project funding in the STAG account for FY2014, but did include funds for Alaska Native and Rural Villages ($10 million) and for U.S.-Mexico border projects ($5 million). The FY2015 funding bill, P.L. 113-235 , was the same as FY2014. The FY2016, FY2017, and FY2018 appropriations acts ( P.L. 114-113 , P.L. 115-31 , and P.L. 115-141 , respectively) included $20 million for Alaska Native and Rural Villages and $10 million for U.S.-Mexico border projects. The FY2019 appropriations act provided $25 million for Alaska Native and Rural Villages and $15 million for U.S.-Mexico border projects. President Trump's FY2020 budget request proposes to eliminate funding for the U.S.-Mexico border program and decrease funding for the Alaska Native and Rural Villages to $3 million. Additional Subsidization Although the CWSRF and DWSRF have largely functioned as loan programs, both allow the implementing state agency to provide "additional subsidization" under certain conditions. Since its amendments in 1996, the SDWA has authorized states to use up to 30% of their DWSRF capitalization grants to provide additional assistance, such as forgiveness of loan principal or negative interest rate loans, to help disadvantaged communities (as determined by the state). In 2018, AWIA increased that percentage to 35% and conditionally required states to provide at least 6% of their annual grants as additional subsidization. Congress amended the CWA in 2014, adding similar provisions to the CWSRF program. In addition, appropriations acts in recent years have required states to use minimum percentages of their allotted funds to provide additional subsidization. This trend began with the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 ( P.L. 111-5 ), which required states to use at least 50% of their funds to "provide additional subsidization to eligible recipients in the form of forgiveness of principal, negative interest loans or grants or any combination of these." Subsequent appropriation acts have included similar conditions, with varying percentages of subsidization. The FY2016, FY2017, FY2018, and FY2019 appropriations acts included an identical condition, requiring 10% of the CWSRF grants and 20% of the DWSRF grants to be used "to provide additional subsidy to eligible recipients in the form of forgiveness of principal, negative interest loans, or grants (or any combination of these)." Noninfrastructure Grants The 1987 CWA amendments authorized federal grants to assist states in implementing programs to manage water pollution from nonpoint sources such as farm and urban areas, construction, forestry, and mining sites. Because of competing demands for funding, it was difficult for Congress to fund this grant program and other water quality initiatives in the 1987 act. Appropriators did fund Section 319 grants in EPA's general program management account (abatement, control, and compliance) in FY1990, FY1991, and FY1992 but well below authorized levels. In the FY1993 act, appropriators moved funding into the SRF/construction grants account, thereby providing a degree of protection from competing priorities. In FY1996, Congress included all state grants for management of environmental programs in a single consolidated grants appropriation. In doing so, Congress endorsed a Clinton Administration proposal for a more flexible approach to state grants, a key element of EPA's efforts to improve the federal-state partnership in environmental programs. In more recent years, Congress has provided specific funding amounts for certain programs within the categorical grants appropriation. Appropriations Chronology This section summarizes, in chronological order, congressional activity to fund items in the STAG account since the 1987 CWA amendments. FY1986, FY1987 The authorization period covered by P.L. 100-4 was FY1986-FY1994. By the time the amendments were enacted, FY1986 was over, as was a portion of FY1987. Thus, appropriations for those two years only indirectly reflected the policy and program changes for later years that were contained in P.L. 100-4 . For FY1986, Congress appropriated a total of $1.8 billion, consisting of $600 million approved in December 1985 (while Congress was beginning to debate reauthorization legislation that eventually was enacted as P.L. 100-4 in January 1987) and $1.2 billion more in July 1986. For FY1987, while debate on CWA reauthorization continued, President Reagan requested $2.0 billion, consistent with his legislative proposal to terminate the grants program by FY1990. In October 1986, Congress appropriated $2.4 billion ( P.L. 99-500 / P.L. 99-591 ). However, only $1.2 billion of that amount was released immediately, pending enactment of a reauthorization bill, which was then in conference. Following enactment of the Water Quality Act of 1987, remaining FY1987 funds were released as part of a supplemental appropriations bill ( P.L. 100-71 ). Conferees on that measure agreed, however, to shift $39 million of the remaining unreleased grant funds to other priority water quality activities authorized in P.L. 100-4 . The final total of construction grant monies was $2.361 billion. FY1988 For FY1988 the President again requested $2.0 billion. In December 1987, Congress approved legislation providing FY1988 appropriations ( P.L. 100-202 , the omnibus continuing resolution to fund EPA and other federal agencies). In it, Congress appropriated $2.304 billion for construction grants. Final action on the EPA budget and other funding bills had been delayed by budget-cutting talks between Congress and the White House. Reduced construction grants funding was one of many spending cuts required to implement a congressional-White House "summit agreement" on the budget. The final construction grants appropriation was less than funding levels that had been included in separate versions of a bill passed by the House and Senate before the budget summit, $2.4 billion. FY1989 For FY1989, President Reagan requested $1.5 billion, or 35% below FY1988 appropriations and 37.5% less than the authorized level of $2.4 billion for FY1989. In separate versions of an EPA appropriations bill, the House and Senate voted to provide $1.95 billion and $2.1 billion respectively. The final figure, in P.L. 100-404 , was $1.95 billion, which included $68 million for special projects in four states. Thus, the actual amount provided for grants was $1.882 billion. That total was divided equally between the previous Title II grants program and new Title VI SRF program, as provided in the authorizing language of P.L. 100-4 . The FY1989 legislation was the first to include earmarking of funds for specified projects or grants in EPA's construction grants account, an action that continued in subsequent years, as discussed above. All of the projects funded in the 1989 legislation were ones that had been authorized in provisions of the Water Quality Act of 1987 (WQA, P.L. 100-4 ). The designated projects were in Boston (authorized in Section 513 of the WQA, to fund the Boston Harbor wastewater treatment project), San Diego/Tijuana (Section 510, to fund an international sewage treatment project needed because of the flow of raw sewage from Tijuana, Mexico, across the border), Des Moines, IA (Section 515, for sewage treatment plant construction), and Oakwood Beach/Redhook, NY (Section 512 of the WQA, to relocate natural gas distribution facilities that were near wastewater treatment works in New York City). FY1990 For FY1990, President Reagan's budget requested $1.2 billion in wastewater treatment assistance, or 50% less than the authorized level and 38.5% less than the FY1989 enacted amount of $1.95 billion. Further, the Reagan budget proposed that the $1.2 billion consist of $800 million in Title VI monies and $400 million in Title II grants, contrary to provisions of the CWA directing that appropriations be equally divided between the two grant programs, as in FY1989. President Bush's revised FY1990 budget, presented in March 1989, made no changes from the Reagan budget in this area. In acting on this request, Congress agreed to provide $2.05 billion, including $46 million for three special projects (Boston, San Diego/Tijuana, and Des Moines), leaving a total of $1.002 billion each for Titles II and VI ( P.L. 101-144 ). Title II funds were reduced by $6.8 million, however, due to funds earmarked for a specific project in South Carolina. Although these amounts were appropriated, all funds in the bill were reduced by 1.55% (or, a $31.8 million reduction from the construction grants account) to provide funds for the federal government's antidrug program. Final FY1990 appropriations were altered again by passage of the FY1990 Budget Reconciliation measure and implementation of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act (the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act), which established procedures to reduce budget deficits annually, resulting in a zero deficit by 1993. For each fiscal year that the deficit was estimated to exceed maximum targets established in law, an automatic spending reduction procedure was triggered to eliminate deficits in excess of the targets through "sequestration," or permanent cancellation of budgetary resources. Thus, to meet budget reduction mandates and, in particular, deficit reduction targets under the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act (the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act), additional funding cuts were included in P.L. 101-239 , the Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, affecting construction grants funding and all other accounts not exempted from Gramm-Rudman procedures. P.L. 101-239 provided that the "sequestration" procedures under the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act would be allowed to apply for a portion of FY1990 (for 130 days, or 35.6% of the year), providing an additional automatic spending reduction in EPA and other agencies' programs subject to the act. As a result of these reductions, funding for wastewater treatment aid in FY1990 totaled $1.98 billion, or $30 million more than in FY1989. The total included $53 million for special projects in San Diego, Boston, Des Moines, and Honea Path/Ware Shoals, SC, $960 million for Title II grants, and $967 million for Title VI grants. The combined reductions amounted to 3.4% less than the amount agreed to by conferees on P.L. 101-144 (i.e., $2.05 billion), before subtracting funds for antidrug programs and accounting for effects of the Gramm-Rudman partial-year sequester. FY1991 For FY1991, President Bush requested $1.6 billion in funding for wastewater treatment assistance. This total included $15.4 million for the San Diego project authorized in Section 510 of the Water Quality Act of 1987, to fund construction of an international sewage treatment project. The remainder, $1.584 billion, would be only for capitalization grants under Title VI of the act, as the 1987 legislation provides for no new Title II grants after FY1990. In acting on EPA's appropriations for FY1991 ( P.L. 101-507 ), Congress agreed to provide $2.1 billion in wastewater treatment assistance. Beginning in FY1991, all appropriated funds are utilized for capitalization grants under Title VI of the act (as provided in the Water Quality Act of 1987); funding for the traditional Title II grants program was no longer available. The enacted level included several earmarkings: $15.7 million for San Diego (Section 510 of the WQA), $20 million for Boston Harbor (Section 513 of the WQA), and $16.5 million for a new Water Quality Cooperative Agreement Program under Section 104(b)(3) of the act. The President's budget had requested $16.5 million to support state permitting, enforcement, and water quality management activities, especially to offset the reductions in aid to states due to elimination of state management setasides from the previous Title II construction grants program. Congress agreed to the level requested, but provided it as a portion of the wastewater treatment appropriation, rather than as part of EPA's general program management appropriation, as in the President's request. As a result of these earmarkings, $2.048 billion was provided for Title VI grants. FY1992 For FY1992, President Bush requested $1.9 billion in wastewater treatment funds, or $100 million more than authorized under the Water Quality Act of 1987 for Title VI grants in FY1992. However, out of the $1.9 billion total, the President's request sought $1.5 billion for Title VI SRF grants and $400 million as grants under the expired Title II construction grants program for the following coastal cities: Boston, San Diego, New York, Los Angeles, and Seattle. Two of the five designated projects had been authorized in the 1987 CWA amendments; the other three did not have explicit statutory authorization. Also, $16.5 million was requested for Water Quality Cooperative Agreement grants to the states. In acting on the request in November 1991, Congress provided total wastewater funds of $2.4 billion ( P.L. 102-139 ). The total was allocated as follows: $1,948.5 million for SRF capitalization grants, $16.5 million for Section 104(b)(3) grants, $49 million for the special project in San Diego-Tijuana (Section 510 of the Water Quality Act), $46 million to the Rouge River (MI) National Wet Weather Demonstration Project, and $340 million as construction grants under title II of the Clean Water Act for several other special projects—the Back River Wastewater Treatment Plant (Baltimore), Maryland, the Boston Harbor project, New York City, Los Angeles, San Diego (a wastewater reclamation project), and Seattle. This appropriation bill was the first to include special purpose grant funding for several projects not specifically authorized in the Clean Water Act or amendments to that law. FY1993 For FY1993, President Bush requested $2.484 billion for state revolving funds/construction grants (now called the water infrastructure account). The requested total included $340 million to be targeted for 55% construction grants to six communities: Boston, New York, Los Angeles, San Diego, Seattle, and Baltimore. In addition, the President requested that $130 million be directed toward a Mexican Border Initiative, consisting of $65 million for construction of the international treatment plant at San Diego (to address the Tijuana sewage problem), $15 million for projects at Nogales, AZ, and New River, CA, and $50 million as 50% grants for colonias in Texas. The President also requested $16.5 million for Section 104(b)(3) grants. Along with these special project and grant amounts, the request sought $2.014 billion for SRF assistance. Final action on FY1993 funding occurred on September 25, 1992 ( P.L. 102-389 ). It provided an appropriation of $2.55 billion, but $622.5 million of this amount was reserved for special projects and other grants. The bill provided $50 million in CWA Section 319 grants and $16.5 million in Section 104(b)(3) grants out of the SRF amount. It included $556 million for the following special purpose grants: the international treatment plant at San Diego (Tijuana—Section 510 of the WQA, with bill language capping funding for that project at $239.4 million), plus projects in Boston; New York; Los Angeles; San Diego; Seattle; Rouge River, MI; Baltimore; Ocean County, NJ; Atlanta; and for colonias in Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico. The final SRF grant amount under the bill was $1.928 billion. Early in 1993, President Clinton requested that Congress approve "economic stimulus and investment" spending, in the form of supplemental FY1993 appropriations. Both his original proposal and a subsequent modified proposal included additional SRF grant funds, but neither of the bills enacted by Congress in response to these requests ( P.L. 103-24 , P.L. 103-50 ) provided additional SRF funds. FY1994 For FY1994, the Clinton Administration requested $2.047 billion for water infrastructure. The funds in this request were $1.198 billion to capitalize State Revolving Funds, $150 million for Mexican border project grants, and $100 million for a single hardship community (Boston). The request also included $599 million to capitalize new state drinking water revolving funds. The final version of the FY1994 legislation ( P.L. 103-124 ) provided $2.477 billion for water infrastructure/state revolving funds. Of this total amount, $599 million was to be reserved for drinking water SRFs, if authorization legislation were enacted; $80 million was for Section 319 grants; $22 million was for Section 104(b)(3) grants; and $58 million was for Tijuana/San Diego—Section 510 of the WQA. This resulted in an appropriation of $1.718 billion for clean water SRFs. In addition, the final bill provided that $500 million be used to support water infrastructure financing in economically distressed/hardship communities. Under the bill, these funds were not available for spending until May 31, 1994, and were set aside until projects were authorized in the CWA for this purpose. Thus, the bill as enacted provided $1.218 billion immediately for clean water SRFs, with the expectation that $500 million more would be available for financing hardship community projects after May 31, 1994. FY1995 For FY1995, President Clinton requested $2.65 billion for water infrastructure consisting of $1.6 billion for CWA SRFs, $100 million for Section 319 nonpoint source management grants to states, $52.5 million for a grant to San Diego for a wastewater project pursuant to Section 510 of the WQA, $47.5 million for other Mexican border projects, $50 million to the state of Texas for colonias projects, and $100 million for grants under Title II for needy cities (intended for Boston). The request included $700 million for drinking water SRFs, pending enactment of authorizing legislation. The President's budget also requested $21.5 million for Section 104(b)(3) grants/cooperative agreements. Final agreement on FY1995 funding was contained in P.L. 103-327 , enacted in September 1994, which provided a total of $2.962 billion for water infrastructure financing. Of the total, $22.5 million was for grants under Section 104(b), $100 million for Section 319 grants, $70 million for Public Water System Supervision program grants (grants to states under the Safe Drinking Water Act to support state implementation of delegated drinking water programs), $52.5 million for the Section 510 project in San Diego, and $700 million for drinking water SRFs (contingent upon enactment of authorization legislation). The remaining $2.017 billion was for CWA projects. Of this amount, $1.235 billion was for clean water SRF grants to states under Title VI of the CWA. The remaining $781.8 million (39% of this amount, 26% of the total appropriation) was designated for 45 specific, named projects in 22 states. The earmarked amounts ranged in size from $200,000 for Southern Fulton County, PA, to $100 million for the city of Boston. Finally, the conferees included bill language concerning release of the $500 million in FY1994 needy cities money (because the authorizing committees of Congress had not acted on legislation to authorize specific projects, as had been intended in P.L. 103-124 ) as follows: $150 million to Boston, $50 million for colonias in Texas, $10 million for colonias in New Mexico, $70 million for a New York City wastewater reclamation facility, $85 million for the Rouge River project, $50 million for the city of Los Angeles, $50 million for the county of Los Angeles, and $35 million for Seattle, WA. FY1996 In February 1995, President Clinton submitted the Administration's budget request for FY1996. It requested $2.365 billion for water infrastructure funding consisting of $1.6 billion for clean water state revolving funds, $500 million for drinking water state revolving funds, $150 million to support Mexico border projects under the U.S.-Mexican Border Environmental Initiative and NAFTA, and $100 million for special need/economically distressed communities (not specified in the request, but presumed to be intended for Boston), plus $15 million for water infrastructure needs in Alaska Native Villages. In February 1995, congressional appropriations committees began considering legislation to rescind previously appropriated FY1995 funds, as part of overall efforts by the 104 th Congress to shape the budget and federal spending. These efforts resulted in passage in July 1995 of P.L. 104-19 , which rescinded $16.5 billion in total funds from a number of departments, agencies, and programs. In the water infrastructure area, it rescinded $1,077,200,000 from prior year appropriations including the $3.2 million for a project in New Jersey (it had mistakenly been funded twice in P.L. 103-327 ) and $1,074,000,000 in other water infrastructure appropriations. Although not contained in bill language, it was understood that the larger rescinded amount consisted solely of drinking water SRF funds (leaving $1.235 billion for FY1995 clean water SRF funds, $778.6 million for earmarked wastewater projects—both amounts as originally appropriated—and $225 million in FY1994-FY1995 drinking water SRF funds that had not yet been authorized). It took until April 1996 for Congress and the Administration to reach agreement on FY1996 appropriations for EPA as part of omnibus legislation ( P.L. 104-134 ) that consolidated five appropriations bills not yet enacted due to disagreements over funding levels and policy. Agreement came as the fiscal year was more than one-half over. Before that, however, congressional conferees reached agreement in November 1995 on FY1996 legislation for EPA ( H.R. 2099 , H.Rept. 104-353 ). Conferees agreed to provide $2.323 billion for a new account titled State and Tribal Assistance Grants (STAG), consisting of infrastructure assistance and state environmental management grants for 16 categorical programs that had previously been funded in a separate appropriations account. The total included $1.125 billion for clean water SRF grants, $275 million in new appropriations for drinking water SRF grants, and $265 million for special purpose project grants. Report language provided that the drinking water SRF money also included $225 million from FY1995 appropriations rescinded in P.L. 104-19 . The drinking water SRF money would be available upon enactment of SDWA reauthorization legislation that would authorize a drinking water SRF program; otherwise, it would revert to clean water SRF grants if the SDWA were not reauthorized by June 30, 1996. This made the total potentially available for drinking water SRF grants $500 million. The November 1995 agreement on H.R. 2099 included $658 million for consolidated state environmental grants. In doing so, Congress endorsed an Administration proposal for a more flexible approach to state grants, a key element of EPA's efforts to improve the federal-state partnership in environmental programs. In lieu of traditional grants provided separately to support state air, water, hazardous waste, and other programs, consolidated grants are intended to reduce administrative burdens and improve environmental performance by allowing states and tribes to target funds to meet their specific needs and integrate their environmental programs, as appropriate. Congress's support was described in accompanying report language. The conferees agree that Performance Partnership Grants are an important step to reducing the burden and increasing the flexibility that state and tribal governments need to manage and implement their environmental protection programs. This is an opportunity to use limited resources in the most effective manner, yet at the same time, produce the results-oriented environmental performance necessary to address the most pressing concerns while still achieving a clean environment. Including state environmental grants in the same account with water infrastructure assistance reflected Congress's support for enhancing the ability of states and localities to implement environmental programs flexibly and support for EPA's ability to provide block grants to states and Indian tribes. The H.R. 2099 conference agreement also included legislative riders intended to limit or prohibit EPA from spending money to implement several environmental programs. The Administration opposed the riders. The House and Senate approved this bill in December, but President Clinton vetoed it, because of objections to spending and policy aspects of the legislation. With no full-year funding in place from October 1995 to April 1996, EPA and the programs it administers (along with agencies and departments covered by four other appropriations bills not yet enacted) were subject to a series of short-term continuing resolutions, some lasting only a day, some lasting several weeks. In March 1996, the House and Senate began consideration of an omnibus appropriations bill to fund EPA and other agencies for the remainder of FY1996, finally reaching agreement in April on a bill ( H.R. 3019 ) enacted as P.L. 104-134 . Congress agreed to provide $2.813 billion for a new account titled STAG, consisting of state grants and infrastructure assistance, as in H.R. 2099 , the vetoed measure. The total was divided as follows: $1.3485 billion for clean water SRF grants (including $50 million for impoverished communities), $500 million in new appropriations for drinking water SRF grants, $150 million for Mexico-border project grants and Texas colonias , as requested, $15 million for Alaska Native Villages, as requested, $141.5 million for 17 special purpose project grants, and $658 million for consolidated state environmental grants, which states could use to administer a range of delegated environmental programs. Report language provided that the drinking water SRF money also included $225 million from FY1995 appropriations that remained available after the rescissions in P.L. 104-19 , for a total of $725 million. The drinking water SRF money was contingent upon enactment of legislation authorizing an SRF program under the Safe Drinking Water Act by August 1, 1996; otherwise, it would revert to clean water SRF grants. The final agreement ( P.L. 104-134 ) included several of the legislative riders from previous versions of the legislation, including riders related to drinking water and clean air, but dropped others strongly opposed by the Administration. Funds within the STAG account were redistributed after Congress passed Safe Drinking Water Act amendments in August 1996. Enactment of the amendments ( P.L. 104-182 ) occurred on August 6—after the August 1 deadline in P.L. 104-134 that would have made $725 million available for drinking water SRF grants in FY1996. Thus, the previously appropriated $725 million reverted to clean water SRF grants, making the FY1996 total for those grants $2.0735 billion. FY1997 While debate over the FY1996 appropriations was continuing, in March 1996, President Clinton submitted the details of a FY1997 budget. For water infrastructure and state and tribal assistance, the request totaled $2.852 billion consisting of $1.35 billion for clean water SRF grants (the request included language that would authorize states the discretion to use this SRF money either for clean water or drinking water projects), $165 million for U.S.-Mexico border projects, Texas colonias , and Alaska Native Village projects, $113 million for needy cities projects, $550 million for drinking water infrastructure SRF funding, contingent upon enactment of authorizing legislation, and $674 million for state performance partnership consolidated management grants, which could address a range of environmental programs. In response to the Administration's request, in June 1996 the House approved legislation ( H.R. 3666 ) providing FY1997 funding for EPA. In the STAG account, the House approved $2.768 billion, $84 million less than requested but on the whole endorsing the budget request. The total provided the following: $1.35 billion for clean water SRF grants, as requested; $165 million, as requested, for U.S.-Mexico Border projects, Texas colonias , and Alaska Native Village projects; $450 million for drinking water SRF funding, contingent upon authorization; $674 million for state performance partnership consolidated management grants; and $129 million for seven special purpose grants. In July, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported its version of H.R. 3666 . The committee approved $2.815 billion for this account, consisting of $1.426 billion for clean water SRF grants; $550 million for drinking water SRF grants, contingent upon authorization; $165 million, as requested, for U.S.-Mexico border projects, Texas colonias , and Alaska Native Village projects; and $674 million for consolidated state grants. The committee rejected the provision of the House-passed bill providing $129 million for special purpose grants, including funds for Boston and New Orleans requested by the Administration, saying in report language that earmarking is provided at the expense of state revolving funds and does not represent an equitable distribution of grant funds ( S.Rept. 104-318 ). During debate on H.R. 3666 in September, the Senate adopted an amendment to reduce the FY1997 appropriation for clean water SRF grants by $725 million in order to fund the new drinking water SRF program. This action was intended to restore funds to the drinking water program which had been lost when Safe Drinking Water Act amendments were not enacted by August 1, 1996. Thus, the Senate-passed bill provided $701 million for clean water SRF grants and $1.275 billion for drinking water SRF grants for FY1997. Other amounts in the account were unchanged. The conference report on H.R. 3666 ( H.Rept. 104-812 ) was approved by the House and Senate on September 24, 1996. President Clinton signed the bill September 26 ( P.L. 104-204 ). It reflected compromise of the House- and Senate-passed bills, providing the following amounts within the STAG account ($2.875 billion total): $625 million for clean water SRF grants, $1.275 billion for drinking water SRF grants, $165 million, as requested, for U.S.-Mexico border projects, Texas colonias , and Alaska Native Village projects, $136 million for 18 specific wastewater, water, and groundwater project grants (the 7 specified in House-passed H.R. 3666 , plus 11 more; the bill provided funds for each of the needy cities projects requested by the Administration, but in lesser amounts), and $674 million for consolidated state grants, which could support implementation of a range of environmental programs. The allocation of clean water and drinking water SRF grants was consistent with the Senate's action to restore funds to the drinking water program after enactment of the Safe Drinking Water Act amendments in early August. Subsequently, Congress passed a FY1997 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations bill to cover agencies and departments for which full-year funding had not been enacted by October 1, 1996 ( P.L. 104-208 ). It included additional funding for several EPA programs, as well as $35 million (on top of $40 million provided in P.L. 104-204 ) for the Boston Harbor cleanup project. FY1998 President Clinton presented the Administration's budget request for FY1998 in February 1997. For water infrastructure and state and tribal assistance, the request totaled $2.793 billion, consisting of $1.075 billion for clean water SRF grants, $725 million for drinking water SRF grants, $715 million for consolidated state environmental grants, and $278 million for special project grants. House and Senate committees began activities on FY1998 funding bills somewhat late in 1997, due to prolonged negotiations between Congress and the President over a five-year budget plan to achieve a balanced budget by 2002. After appropriators took up the FY1998 funding bills in June, the House passed EPA's appropriation in H.R. 2158 ( H.Rept. 105-175 ) on July 15. In the STAG account, the House approved $3.019 billion, consisting of $1.25 billion for clean water SRF grants ($600 million more than FY1997 levels and $175 million more than requested by the President), $750 million for drinking water SRF grants ($425 million less than FY1997 levels, but $25 million more than the request), $750 million for state environmental assistance grants, and $269 million for special projects. The latter included funds for the special projects requested by the Administration but at reduced levels ($149 million total for these projects), plus $120 million in special project grants for 21 other communities. The Senate passed a separate version of an FY1998 appropriations bill on July 22, 1997 ( S. 1034 , S.Rept. 105-53 ). It provided $3.047 billion for the STAG account, consisting of $1.35 billion for clean water SRF grants, $725 million for drinking water SRF grants, $725 million for state environmental assistance grants, and $247 million for special project grants. The Senate bill provided the amounts requested by the Administration for U.S.-Mexico border projects, Texas colonias , and Alaska Native Village projects (but no special funds for others requested by the President), plus $82 million for 18 special project grants for other communities identified in report language. Conferees reached agreement on FY1998 funding in early October 1997 ( H.R. 2158 , H.Rept. 105-297 ). The final version passed the House on October 8 and passed the Senate on October 9. President Clinton signed the bill October 27 ( P.L. 105-65 ). As enacted, it provided $3.213 billion for the STAG account, consisting of $1.35 billion for clean water SRF grants, $725 million for drinking water SRF grants, $745 million for consolidated state environmental assistance grants (which could address a range of environmental programs), and $393 million for 42 special purpose project and special community need grants for construction of wastewater, water treatment and drinking water facilities, and groundwater protection infrastructure. It included the following amounts for grants requested by the Administration: $75 million for U.S.-Mexico border projects, $50 million for Texas colonias , $50 million for Boston Harbor wastewater needs, $10 million for New Orleans, $3 million for Bristol County, MA, and $15 million for Alaska Native Village projects. The final bill also provided funds for all of the special purpose projects included in the separate House and Senate versions of the legislation, plus three projects not included in either earlier version. Bill language was included in P.L. 105-65 to allow states to cross-collateralize clean water and drinking water SRF funds, that is, to use the combined assets of amounts appropriated to State Revolving Funds as common security for both SRFs, which conferees said is intended to ensure maximum opportunity for states to leverage these funds. Senate committee report language also said that the conference report on the 1996 Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments had stated that bond pooling and similar arrangements were not precluded under that legislation. The appropriations bill language was intended to ensure that EPA does not take an unduly narrow interpretation of this point which would restrict the states' use of SRF funds. On November 1, 1997, President Clinton used his authority under the Line Item Veto Act ( P.L. 104-130 ) to cancel six items of discretionary budget authority provided in P.L. 105-65 . The President's authority under this act took effect in the 105 th Congress; thus, this was the first EPA appropriations bill affected by it. The cancelled items included funding for one of the special purpose grants in the bill, $500,000 for new water and sewer lines in an industrial park in McConnellsburg, PA. Reasons for the cancellation, according to the President, were that the project had not been requested by the Administration; it would primarily benefit a private entity and is outside the scope of EPA's usual mission; it is a low priority use of environmental funds; and it would provide funding outside the normal process of allocating funds according to state environmental priorities. However, in June 1998, the Supreme Court struck down the Line Item Veto Act as unconstitutional, and in July the Office of Management and Budget announced that funding would be released for 40-plus cancellations made in 1997 under that act (including those cancelled in P.L. 105-65 ) that Congress had not previously overturned. (For additional information, see CRS Report RL33635, Item Veto and Expanded Impoundment Proposals: History and Current Status , by Virginia A. McMurtry.) FY1999 President Clinton's budget request for FY1999, presented to Congress in February 1998, requested $2.9 billion for the STAG account, representing 37% of the $7.9 billion total requested for EPA programs. The total included $1.075 billion for clean water SRF grants, $775 million for drinking water SRF grants, $115 million for water infrastructure projects along the U.S.-Mexico border projects and in Alaska Native Villages, $78 million for needy cities projects, and $875 million for consolidated state environmental grants (which could address a range of environmental programs). Legislative action on the budget request occurred in mid-1998. Both houses of Congress increased amounts for water infrastructure financing, finding the Administration's request for clean water and drinking water SRF grants, as well as special project funding, not adequate. First, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported its version of an EPA spending bill in June 1998 ( S. 2168 , S.Rept. 105-216 ). This bill, passed by the Senate July 17, provided $3.2 billion for the STAG account, consisting of $1.4 billion for clean water SRF grants, $800 million for drinking water SRF grants, $105 million for U.S.-Mexico and Alaska Native Village projects, $100 million for 39 other special needs infrastructure grants, and $850 million for state performance partnership/categorical grants. As in FY1998, the committee included bill language allowing states to cross-collateralize their clean water and drinking water state revolving funds, making the language explicit for FY1999 and thereafter. Second, the House passed its version of EPA's funding bill ( H.R. 4194 , H.Rept. 105-610 ) on July 29. This bill provided $3.2 billion for the STAG account, consisting of $1.25 billion for clean water SRF grants, $775 million for drinking water SRF grants, $70 million for U.S.-Mexico and Alaska Native Village projects, $253.5 million for 49 other special needs infrastructure grants (including nine projects also funded in the Senate bill), and $885 million for state environmental management grants (a 20% increase above FY1998 amounts for these state grants). Conferees resolved differences between the two versions in October 1998 ( H.R. 4194 , H.Rept. 105-769 ). The conference agreement provided $3.4 billion for the STAG account, consisting of $1.35 billion for clean water SRF grants, $775 million for drinking water SRF grants, $80 million for U.S.-Mexico and Alaska Native and Rural Village projects, $301.8 million for 80 other special needs project grants, and $880 million for state and tribal environmental program grants (which could address a range of environmental programs). The House and Senate approved the agreement on October 7 and 8, respectively, and President Clinton signed the bill into law on October 21 ( P.L. 105-276 ). Additional funding was provided in the Omnibus Consolidated and Supplemental Appropriations Act, FY1999 ( P.L. 105-277 ). This bill, which provided full-year funding for agencies and departments covered by seven separate appropriations measures, directed $20 million more in special needs grants for the Boston Harbor wastewater infrastructure project, on top of $30 million that was included in P.L. 105-276 . FY2000 For FY2000, beginning on October 1, 1999, the Administration requested $2.638 billion for water infrastructure assistance and state environmental grants. The total, $370 million less than the FY1999 appropriation for this account, consisted of $800 million for clean water SRF grants, $825 million for drinking water SRF grants, $128 million for Mexican border and special project grants, and $885 million for consolidated state environmental grants (which could address a range of environmental programs). The request included one SRF policy issue. The Administration asked the appropriators to grant states the permission to set aside up to 20% of FY2000 clean water SRF monies in the form of grants for local communities to implement nonpoint source pollution and estuary management projects. Under the Clean Water Act, SRFs may only be used to provide loans. Some have argued that some types of water pollution projects which are eligible for SRF funding may not be suitable for loans, as they may not generate revenues which can be used to repay the loan to a state. This new authority, the Administration said, would allow states greater flexibility to address nonpoint pollution problems. Critics of the proposal said that making grants from an SRF would reduce the long-term integrity of a state's fund, since grants would not be repaid. Some Members of Congress and stakeholder groups were particularly critical of the budget request for clean water SRF grants, $550 million (40%) less than the FY1999 level. Critics said the request was insufficient to meet the needs of states and localities for clean water infrastructure. In response, EPA acknowledged that several years prior the Clinton Administration had made a commitment to states that the clean water SRF would revolve at $2 billion annually in the year 2005. Because of loan repayments and other factors, EPA said, the overall fund will be revolve at $2 billion per year in the year 2002, even with the 20% grant setaside included in the FY2000 request. According to EPA, the $550 million decrease from 1999 would have only a limited impact on SRFs and would still allow the agency to meet its long-term capitalization goal of providing an average amount of $2 billion in annual assistance. The House and Senate passed their respective versions of an EPA appropriations bill ( H.R. 2684 ) in September 1999. The conference committee report resolving differences between the two versions ( H.Rept. 106-379 ) was passed by the House on October 14 and the Senate on October 15 and was signed by the President on October 20 ( P.L. 106-74 ). The final bill provided $7.6 billion overall for EPA programs, including $3.47 billion for the STAG account. Within that account, the bill included $1.35 billion for clean water SRF grants, $820 million for drinking water SRF grants, $885 million for categorical state grants (which generally support state and tribal implementation and could address a range of environmental programs), $80 million for U.S.-Mexico border and Alaska Rural and Native Village projects, and $331.6 million for 141 other special needs water and wastewater grants specified in report language. The final bill did not approve the Administration's request to allow states to use up to 20% of clean water SRF monies as grants for nonpoint pollution and estuary management projects. Subsequent to enactment of the EPA funding bill, Congress passed the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2000 with funding for five other agencies ( P.L. 106-113 ), which included provisions requiring a government-wide cut of 0.38% in discretionary appropriations. The bill gave the President some flexibility in applying this across-the-board reduction. Details of the reduction were announced at the time of the release of the FY2001 budget. EPA's distribution of the rescission resulted in a total reduction of $16.3 million for 139 of the special needs water and wastewater projects identified in P.L. 106-74 . These projects were reduced 4.9% below enacted levels. The agency did not reduce funds for the two projects that had been included in the President's FY2000 budget request (Bristol County, MA, and New Orleans, LA) or for the United States-Mexico border and the Alaska Rural and Native Villages programs. EPA also reduced funds for the clean water SRF (enacted at $1.35 billion) by 0.3%, for a final funding level of $1.345 billion. The appropriation level was not reduced for the drinking water SRF or consolidated state grants. FY2001 The President's budget for FY2001 requested a total of $2.9 billion for water infrastructure assistance and state environmental grants. For the second year in a row, President Clinton requested $800 million for the clean water SRF program, a $545 million reduction from the FY2000 level. The request included $825 million for the drinking water SRF program, $100 million for U.S.-Mexico border project grants, $15 million for Alaska Native Villages projects, two needy cities grants totaling $13 million (Bristol County, MA, and New Orleans, LA), plus $1.069 billion for consolidated state environmental grants (which could address a range of environmental programs). The budget included a policy request similar to one in the FY2000 budget, which Congress rejected. The FY2001 budget sought flexibility for states to set aside up to 19% of clean water SRF monies in the form of grants for local communities to implement nonpoint source pollution and estuary management projects. The House approved its version of EPA's funding bill ( H.R. 4635 , H.Rept. 106-674 ) on June 21, 2000. For the STAG account, H.R. 4635 provided $3.2 billion ($273 million more than requested, but $288 million below the FY2000 level). The total in the STAG account consisted of $1.2 billion for clean water SRF grants, $825 million for drinking water SRF grants, $1.068 billion (the budget request) for categorical state grants, and $85 million for U.S.-Mexico border and Alaska Rural and Native Villages projects. Beyond these, however, the House-passed bill included no funds for other special needs grants. The Senate approved its version of the funding bill ( S.Rept. 106-410 ) on October 12, 2000. For the STAG account, the Senate-passed bill provided $3.3 billion, consisting of $1.35 billion for clean water SRF grants, $820 million for drinking water SRF grants, $955 million for categorical state grants, $85 million for U.S.-Mexico border and Alaska Rural and Native Village projects, and $110 million for special needs water and wastewater grants. In October, the House and Senate approved EPA's funding bill for FY2001 ( H.Rept. 106-988 ), providing $1.35 billion for clean water SRF grants (the same level enacted for FY2000) and $825 million for drinking water SRF grants. The enacted bill included $110 million in grants for water infrastructure projects in Alaska Rural and Native Villages and U.S.-Mexico border projects and an additional $336 million for 237 other specified project grants throughout the country. The bill also provided $1,008 million for state categorical program grants ($60 million less in total than requested), which states could use to address a range of environmental programs. Total funding for the STAG account was $3.6 billion. Congress disapproved the Administration's policy request concerning use of clean water SRF monies for nonpoint source project grants. President Clinton signed the bill October 27, 2000 ( P.L. 106-377 ). Subsequently, in December, Congress provided $21 million more for five more special project water infrastructure grants (in addition to the $336 million in P.L. 106-377 ) as a provision of H.R. 4577 , the FY2001 Consolidated Appropriations Act ( P.L. 106-554 ). Also in that legislation, Congress enacted the Wet Weather Water Quality Act, authorizing a two-year, $1.5 billion grants program to reduce wet weather flows from municipal sewer systems. The provision was included in Section 112, Division B, of P.L. 106-554 . FY2002 In April 2001, the Bush Administration presented its budget request for FY2002. The Administration requested a total of $2.1 billion for clean water infrastructure funds, consisting of $823 million for drinking water SRF grants, $850 million for clean water SRF grants (compared with $1.35 billion appropriated for FY2001), and $450 million for the new program of municipal sewer overflow grants under legislation enacted in December, the Wet Weather Water Quality Act. However, that act provided that sewer overflow grants are only available in years when at least $1.35 billion in clean water SRF grants is appropriated. Subsequently, Administration officials said they would request that Congress modify the provision linking new grant funds to at least $1.35 billion in clean water SRF grants. The Bush budget requested no funds for special earmarked grants, except for $75 million to fund projects along the U.S.-Mexico border and $35 million for projects in Alaska Native Villages (both are the same amounts provided in FY2001). In response, some Members of Congress and outside groups criticized the budget request, saying that it did not provide enough support for water infrastructure programs. The President's budget also requested $1.06 billion for state categorical program grants, which generally support state and tribal administration of a range of environmental programs. The House passed its version of FY2002 funding for EPA on July 30 ( H.R. 2620 , H.Rept. 107-159 ). The House-passed bill provided a total of $2.4 billion for water infrastructure funds, consisting of $1.2 billion for clean water SRF grants, $850 million for drinking water SRF grants, $200 million for special project grants (individual projects were unspecified in the report accompanying H.R. 2620 ), $75 million for U.S.-Mexico border projects, and $30 million for Alaska Rural and Native Villages. The House bill provided no separate funds for the new wet weather overflow grant program, which the Administration had requested. Including $1.08 billion for state categorical program grants, total STAG account funding in the bill was $3.44 billion, about $150 million higher than the President's request. The Senate passed its version of this appropriations bill on August 2 ( S. 1216 , S.Rept. 107-43 ). Like the House, the Senate rejected separate funding for wet weather overflow grants, and the Senate increased clean water SRF grant funding to the FY2001 level. The Senate-passed total for the STAG account was $3.49 billion, including $1.35 billion for clean water SRF grants, $850 million for drinking water SRF grants, $140 million for special needs infrastructure grants specified in accompanying report language, $75 million for U.S.-Mexico border projects, $30 million for Alaska Rural and Native Villages, and $1.03 billion for state categorical program grants. Resolution of this and other appropriations bills in fall 2001 was complicated by congressional attention to general economic conditions and responses to the September 11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Nevertheless, the House and Senate gave final approval to legislation providing EPA's FY2002 funding ( H.R. 2620 , H.Rept. 107-272 ) on November 8, and President Bush signed the bill on November 26 ( P.L. 107-73 ). The final bill did not include separate funds for the new sewer overflow grant program requested by the Administration, which both the House and Senate had rejected, but it did include $1.35 billion for clean water SRF grants, $850 million for drinking water SRF grants, $344 million for 337 earmarked water infrastructure project grants specified in report language, and the requested $75 million for U.S.-Mexico border projects and $30 million for Alaska Rural and Native Villages. The bill included total STAG funding of $3.7 billion. FY2003 President Bush presented the Administration's FY2003 budget request in February 2002, asking Congress to appropriate $2.185 billion for EPA's water infrastructure programs (compared with $2.659 billion appropriated for FY2002). The FY2003 request sought $1.212 billion for clean water SRF grants, $850 million for drinking water SRF grants, and $123 million for a limited number of special projects (especially in Alaska Native Villages and in communities on the U.S.-Mexico border). The Administration proposed to eliminate funds for unrequested infrastructure project spending that Congress had earmarked in the FY2002 law, which totaled $344 million. Also, the Administration requested no funds for the municipal sewer overflow grants program enacted in 2000. Some Members of Congress criticized the request level for clean water SRF capitalization grants, which was $138 million below the FY2002 enacted amount. In August 2002, the Senate Appropriations Committee approved an FY2003 funding bill for EPA that would provide $1.45 billion for clean water SRF grants, $100 million more than the FY2002 level ( S. 2797 , S.Rept. 107-222 ). In addition, the Senate committee bill included $875 million for drinking water SRF grants, $140 million for special needs infrastructure grants specified in report language, $45 million for Alaska Rural and Native Village project grants, $75 million for U.S.-Mexico border projects, and $1.134 billion for state categorical program grants, which could address a range of environmental programs. The House Appropriations Committee approved its version of an FY2003 funding bill with $1.3 billion for the clean water SRF program ( H.R. 5605 , H.Rept. 107-740 ) in October. This bill also included $850 million for drinking water SRF grants, $227.6 million for special needs infrastructure grants enumerated in report language, $35 million for Alaska Rural and Native Village project grants, $75 million for U.S.-Mexico border projects, and $1.173 billion for state categorical program grants, which could address a range of environmental programs. Neither appropriations committee included funds for the sewer overflow grant program authorized in 2000 (the Administration did not request FY2003 funds for these grants). Due to complex budgetary disputes during the year, final action did not occur before the 107 th Congress adjourned in November 2002, and it extended into 2003, more than five months after the start of the fiscal year. Congress and the President reached agreement on funding levels for EPA and other nondefense agencies in an omnibus appropriations act ( P.L. 108-7 ; H.J.Res. 2 , H.Rept. 108-10 ), which the President signed on February 20. The EPA portion of the enacted bill included $1.34 billion for clean water SRF grants, $844 million for drinking water SRF grants, and $413 million more for 489 special water infrastructure project grants to individual cities specified in conference report language, plus projects in Alaska Native Villages and communities on the U.S.-Mexico border. It also provided a total of $1.14 billion for categorical state grants, which generally support states and tribal implementation of a range of environmental programs. FY2004 On February 3, 2003, before completion of the FY2003 appropriations, President Bush submitted his budget request for FY2004. It requested a total of $1.798 billion for water infrastructure funds, consisting of $850 million for clean water SRF grants, $850 million for drinking water SRF grants, and $98 million for priority projects (especially in Alaska Native Villages and in communities on the U.S.-Mexico border). As in previous years, the Administration requested no funds for congressionally earmarked project grants for individual communities. Some Members of Congress and interest groups criticized the request for clean water SRF grants ($490 million below the FY2003 enacted level), but Administration officials responded by saying that the request reflected a commitment to fund this program at the $850 million level through FY2011. Funding at that level and over that long-term period, plus repayments of previous SRF loans made by states, would be expected to increase the revolving levels of the overall program from $2.0 billion to $2.8 billion per year, the Administration said. The President's budget also requested $1.2 billion for categorical state grants, which could address a range of environmental programs. On July 25, the House approved H.R. 2861 ( H.Rept. 108-235 ), providing FY2004 appropriations for EPA. As passed, the bill included $1.2 billion for clean water SRF grants, $850 million for drinking water SRF grants, $203 million for earmarked water infrastructure project grants, and $75 million in grants for high-priority projects in Alaska Native Villages and along the U.S.-Mexico border. Senate action on its version of a funding bill for EPA ( S.Rept. 108-143 ) occurred on November 18. The Senate-passed bill provided $1.35 billion for clean water SRF grants, $850 million for drinking water SRF grants, $130 million for targeted infrastructure project grants, plus $95 million in grants for projects in Alaska Native Villages and along the U.S.-Mexico border. As with the previous year's appropriations, Congress did not enact legislation providing FY2004 funds for EPA before the beginning of the new fiscal year; thus EPA programs were covered by a series of continuing resolutions (CRs). The last of these CRs ( P.L. 108-135 ) extended FY2003 funding levels through January 31, 2004. On December 8, 2003, the House passed legislation providing full-year funding for EPA and other agencies that lacked enacted appropriations ( H.R. 2673 ). The conference report on this bill ( H.Rept. 108-401 ) provided $1.34 billion for clean water SRF grants, $845 million for drinking water SRF grants, and $425 million in grants for 520 earmarked grants in listed communities, Alaska Native Villages, and U.S.-Mexico border projects. The Senate approved the conference report on January 22, 2004, and President Bush signed the legislation January 23 ( P.L. 108-199 ). FY2005 The FY2005 EPA appropriation for water infrastructure funds was the lowest total for these programs since FY1997 (the first year in which Congress provided both clean water and drinking water SRF capitalization grants, as well as earmarked project grants). The decline was due primarily to a reduction in funding for the clean water SRF program from an average of $1.35 billion since FY1998 to $1.09 billion. President Bush's FY2005 budget, presented February 2, 2004, requested a total of $3.0 billion for water infrastructure assistance and state environmental program grants. It included $850 million for clean water SRF grants, $850 million for drinking water SRF grants, $94 million for priority projects (primarily in Alaska Native Villages and along the U.S.-Mexico border), and $1.25 billion for categorical grants, which could address a range of environmental programs. As in recent budgets, the Administration requested no funds for congressionally earmarked project grants. Anticipating that critics likely would focus on the clean water SRF request ($492 million below the FY2004 level), in its budget documents the Administration said that the request included funding for the clean water SRF at $850 million annually through 2011, which, together with loan repayments, state matches, and other funding sources, would result in a long-term average revolving level of $3.4 billion. Likewise, the budget anticipated funding the drinking water SRF program at the same $850 million annually through 2011, resulting in a long-term average revolving level of $1.2 billion. House and Senate Appropriations committees began review of the EPA budget request in March. On September 9, 2004, the House Appropriations Committee reported FY2005 funding for EPA in a bill that included the Administration's requested level of $850 million for clean water SRF grants, $850 million for drinking water SRF grants, and earmarked grants for priority water infrastructure projects totaling $393.4 million ( H.R. 5041 , H.Rept. 108-674 ). On September 21, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported its version of this bill ( S. 2825 , S.Rept. 108-353 ), which included $1.35 billion for clean water SRF grants, $850 million for drinking water SRF grants, and $217 million for earmarked project grants. Final action on the FY2005 appropriation did not occur before the start of the fiscal year. On November 20, the House and Senate passed H.R. 4818 ( H.Rept. 108-792 ), the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, an omnibus appropriations bill comprising nine appropriations measures, including funding for EPA. The bill provided total funding for EPA of $8.1 billion, a decrease from the $8.4 billion approved in FY2004, but $340 million more than was requested by the President in February. One of the most controversial items in the final bill was a $251 million decrease for clean water SRF grants from the FY2004 level, although the $1.09 billion total was $241 million more than in the President's budget. The final measure also included $843 million for drinking water SRF capitalization grants; $401.7 million for 669 earmarked grants in listed communities, Alaska Native Villages, and U.S.-Mexico border projects; and $1.14 billion for categorical state grants, which generally support state and tribal administration of a range of environmental programs. The $2.34 billion total for water infrastructure programs and projects was $542 million more than was requested by the President, but $276 million less than Congress appropriated for FY2004. President Bush signed the legislation December 8, 2004 ( P.L. 108-447 ). FY2006 The FY2006 appropriation for water infrastructure funds marked the second consecutive year in which Congress appropriated less funding for these programs, providing lower levels both for clean water SRF capitalization grants and for earmarked project grants than in FY2005. President Bush presented the FY2006 budget request in February 2005. Overall for EPA, it sought 5.6% less than Congress had appropriated for FY2005. The Administration's deepest cuts affecting EPA were proposed for the STAG account. The budget requested $730 million for clean water SRF grants (33% below FY2005 appropriated funding and 45.6% below the FY2004 level), $850 million for drinking water SRF grants (a slight increase from the FY2005 level), $69 million for priority projects (primarily in Alaska Native Villages and along the U.S.-Mexico border), and $1.2 billion for state categorical grants, which could address a range of environmental programs. As in previous years, the Administration requested no funds for congressionally earmarked water infrastructure projects. Advocates for the SRF programs (especially state and local government officials) contended that cuts to the clean water program would impair their ability to carry out needed municipal wastewater treatment plant improvement projects. Administration officials responded that the proposed SRF reductions for FY2006 were because Congress had boosted funds above the FY2005 request level. These officials said that the Administration planned to invest $6.8 billion in the clean water SRF program between FY2004 and FY2011, after which federal funding was expected to end, and the state SRFs were expected to have an annual revolving level of $3.4 billion. If Congress appropriated more than requested in any given year (as occurred in FY2005), they said, that target would be met sooner, leading to reduced requests for the SRF in subsequent years until a planned phaseout in FY2011. On May 19, 2005, the House passed H.R. 2361 , providing FY2006 funding for EPA. As passed, it provided $850 million for clean water SRF grants ($120 million more than the President's request), $850 million for drinking water SRF grants, and $269 million for earmarked water infrastructure grants. During debate, the House rejected two amendments to increase clean water SRF funding. On June 29, the Senate passed its version of H.R. 2361 , providing $1.1 billion for clean water SRF grants, $850 million for drinking water SRF grants, and $290 million for earmarked project grants. The House bill required that $100 million of the SRF funding come from balances from expired contracts, grants, and interagency agreements from various EPA appropriation accounts. The Senate bill, in contrast, called for a $58 million rescission of unobligated amounts associated with grants, contracts, and interagency agreements in various accounts, but did not specify that such monies go to SRF funding. Conferees resolved differences between the bills ( H.Rept. 109-188 ), and the House and Senate approved the measure in July; the President signed it into law on August 2 ( P.L. 109-54 ). As enacted, the bill provided $900 million for clean water SRF grants; $850 million for drinking water SRF grants; $285 million for 259 earmarked grants in listed communities, Alaska Native Villages, and along the U.S.-Mexico border; and $1.13 billion for categorical state grants, which could address a range of environmental programs. The final bill required an $80 million rescission from expired grants, contracts, and interagency agreements in various EPA accounts (not just the STAG account) not obligated by September 1, 2006. It did not direct the rescinded funds to be applied to the clean water SRF, as proposed by the House. The $2.03 billion total in the bill for EPA water infrastructure programs and projects was $386 million more than was requested by the President, but $301 million less than Congress appropriated for FY2005. Further, the funding amounts specified in P.L. 109-54 were reduced slightly. First, a provision of P.L. 109-54 , Section 439, mandated an across-the-board rescission of 0.476% for any discretionary appropriation in that bill. Second, in December 2005 Congress enacted P.L. 109-148 , the FY2006 Department of Defense Appropriations Act, and Section 3801 of that bill mandated a 1% across-the-board rescission for discretionary accounts in any FY2006 appropriation act (except for discretionary authority of the Department of Veterans Affairs). As a result of these two rescissions, the final levels for the STAG account were $887 million for clean water SRF grants; $838 million for drinking water SRF grants; $281 million for 259 earmarked grants in listed communities, Alaska Native Villages, and along the U.S.-Mexico border; and $1.11 billion for categorical state grants, which could address a range of environmental programs. FY2006 EPA water infrastructure programs and projects thus total $2.0 billion. On October 28, President Bush requested that Congress rescind $2.3 billion from 55 "lower-priority federal programs and excess funds," including $166 million from clean water SRF monies. In the end, Congress did not endorse the specific request to reduce clean water SRF appropriations. The two rescissions resulting from P.L. 109-54 and P.L. 109-148 totaled a $13.2 million reduction from the $900 million specified in the EPA appropriations act. FY2007 President Bush presented the Administration's FY2007 budget request in February 2006, asking Congress to appropriate $1.570 billion for EPA's water infrastructure programs. The FY2007 request sought $687.6 million for clean water SRF grants, $841.5 million for drinking water SRF grants, and $40.6 million for special projects in Alaska Native Villages, Puerto Rico, and along the U.S.-Mexico border. When the 109 th Congress adjourned in December 2006, it had not completed action on appropriations legislation to fund EPA (or on nine other appropriations bills covering the majority of domestic discretionary agencies and departments) for the fiscal year that began October 1, 2006, thus carrying over this legislative activity into the 110 th Congress. In December 2006, Congress enacted a continuing resolution, P.L. 109-383 (the third such continuing resolution since the start of the fiscal year on October 1), providing funds for EPA and the other affected agencies and departments until February 15, 2007. The President's FY2007 budget request for clean water SRF capitalization grants was 22% less than the FY2006 appropriation for these grants and 37% below the FY2005 funding level. The request for drinking water SRF grants was essentially the same as in recent years ($4 million more than FY2006, $1.7 million less than FY2005). As in recent budgets, the Administration proposed no funding for congressionally designated water infrastructure grants, but, as noted above, it did seek a total of $40.6 million for Administration priority projects. Advocates of the clean water SRF program (especially state and local government officials) again contended, as they have for several recent years, that the cuts would impair their ability to carry out needed municipal wastewater treatment plant improvement projects. Administration officials responded that cuts for the clean water SRF in FY2007 were necessary because Congress boosted funds above the requested level in FY2005 and FY2006. On May 18, 2006, the House passed H.R. 5386 ( H.Rept. 109-465 ), providing the requested level of $687.6 million for clean water SRF grants and $841.5 million for drinking water SRF grants. The Senate Appropriations Committee approved the same funding levels for these grant programs when it reported H.R. 5386 on June 29 ( S.Rept. 109-275 ), but the Senate did not act on this measure before the 109 th Congress adjourned in December. Before adjournment, Congress enacted a continuing resolution (CR), P.L. 109-383 (the third such CR since the start of the fiscal year on October 1), providing funds for EPA and the other affected agencies and departments until February 15, 2007. Funding levels provided under this CR followed a "lowest level" concept for individual programs; that is, programs were funded at the lowest level under either House-passed FY2007 appropriations, Senate-passed appropriations, or the FY2006 funding. For clean water SRF grants, the resulting appropriation through mid-February was $687.6 million, as in House-passed H.R. 5386 . For drinking water SRF grants, the appropriation level through mid-February was $837.5 million, the FY2006-enacted level. The CR included funds for congressionally earmarked water infrastructure project grants totaling $200 million, as in House-passed H.R. 5386 . Returning to these issues in 2007, in mid-February, Congress passed H.J.Res. 20 , a continuing appropriations resolution that provides funding for EPA and the other affected agencies through the end of FY2007. As passed, this full-year resolution held most programs and activities at their FY2006 appropriated levels. However, clean water SRF capitalization grants were one of the few programs that received a funding increase under the resolution: these grants received $1.08 billion ($197 million more than in FY2006, and $396 million more than the President requested for FY2007). The resolution further prohibited project grants for congressional earmarks, but not for special project grants requested in the President's budget. The action to ban earmarks in FY2007 occurred when leaders in the 110 th Congress sought to finish up appropriations actions that were unresolved at the end of the 109 th Congress, and at the same time the newly elected Congress moved to adopt rules and procedures to reform the congressional earmarking process for the future. (Water infrastructure project earmarks totaled $281 million in EPA's FY2006 appropriation.) President Bush signed H.J.Res. 20 on February 15, 2007 ( P.L. 110-5 ). The final FY2007 amounts provided in P.L. 110-5 were $1.084 billion for clean water SRF capitalization grants, $837.5 million for drinking water SRF capitalization grants, $83.75 million for Alaska Native Village and U.S.-Mexico border project grants requested by the Administration, and $1.11 billion for categorical state grants, which could be used to administer a range of environmental programs. FY2008 President Obama presented his FY2008 budget request to Congress on February 5, 2007, before finalization of the FY2007 appropriations. The budget sought $687.6 million for clean water SRF grants, the same amount requested for FY2007; $842.2 million for drinking water SRF grants; $25.5 million for special project grants for Alaska Native Villages and the U.S.-Mexico border region; and $1.065 billion for categorical state grants, which could address a range of environmental programs. In June 2007, the House passed H.R. 2643 , providing FY2008 appropriations for EPA. This bill included $1.125 billion for clean water SRF grants, $842.2 million for drinking water SRF grants, plus $175.5 million for 143 congressionally designated water infrastructure project grants. The Senate Appropriations Committee approved companion legislation ( S. 1696 ) that similarly included higher funding levels for several water quality programs. The Senate committee's bill provided less funding for clean water SRF grants than the House bill ($887 million), the same amount for drinking water SRF grants, and slightly more for congressionally designated water infrastructure project grants ($180 million). The Senate did not take up S. 1696 . By October 1, the start of FY2008, Congress had not enacted any appropriations bills for FY2008, and Congress enacted several short-term continuing appropriations resolutions to temporarily fund EPA and other government agencies until final agreement, which occurred in December 2007. Full-year funding for EPA's water infrastructure programs was included in the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2008 (Division F, Title II), signed by the President December 26, 2007 ( P.L. 110-161 ). The final FY2008 amounts provided in this legislation were $689.1 million for clean water SRF capitalization grants ($1.5 million more than requested by the Administration), $829.0 million for drinking water SRF capitalization grants ($13.2 million less than requested), $177.2 million for 282 earmarked grants in listed communities, Alaska Native Villages, and U.S.-Mexico border projects ($151.7 million more than requested), and $1.078 billion for categorical state grants ($13.3 million more than requested), which could address a range of environmental programs. FY2009 President Obama presented his FY2009 budget request to Congress on February 6, 2008. The budget sought $555 million for clean water SRF grants, $134 million less than Congress appropriated for FY2008; $842.2 million for drinking water SRF grants, $13 million more than was appropriated for FY2008; $25.5 million for special project grants for Alaska Native Villages and the U.S.-Mexico border region, $18.8 million less than was appropriated for FY2008; and $1.057 billion for categorical state grants, which could address a range of environmental programs. As in past years, the budget requested no funds for other earmarked grants. In June 2008, a House Appropriations subcommittee approved a bill with FY2009 funding for EPA, but no further action occurred before the start of the fiscal year. At the end of September 2008, Congress and the President agreed to legislation providing partial-year funding for EPA and most other agencies and departments. This bill, the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Resolution Act, 2009 ( P.L. 110-329 ), provided funding through March 6, 2009, at FY2008 funding levels. A second short-term continuing resolution was enacted on March 6 ( P.L. 111-6 ), while Congress was finishing consideration of a full-year omnibus FY2009 appropriations bill that the President signed on March 11 ( P.L. 111-8 ). The omnibus bill provided $689 million in regular appropriations for clean water SRF grants, $829 million for drinking water SRF grants—both at the same levels as were appropriated in FY2008—and $1.094 billion for categorical state grants, which support administration of a range of environmental programs. The omnibus appropriations act also includes $183.5 million for earmarked water infrastructure grants. FY2009 Supplemental Appropriations, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act In February 2009, Congress responded to the nation's economic crisis by enacting the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA, P.L. 111-5 ), legislation providing FY2009 supplemental appropriations to a number of government programs. Part of the philosophy underlying the legislation was the concept of using federal investments to make accelerated investments in the nation's public infrastructure in order to create jobs while also meeting infrastructure needs. To that end, the legislation included $4.0 billion for clean water SRF capitalization grants (for total FY2009 funds of $4.689 billion) and $2.0 billion for drinking water SRF capitalization grants (for total FY2009 funds of $2.829 billion). The supplemental SRF funds were available for obligation through FY2010, but under the legislation, states were to give preference when awarding funds to activities that can start and finish quickly, with a goal that at least 50% of the funds go to activities that can be initiated within 120 days of enactment. States were to give priority to wastewater projects that could proceed to construction within 12 months of enactment, and funds for projects that were not under contract or under construction by February 12, 2010, would be reallocated by EPA to other states. Further, the legislation required states to reserve at least 20% of the SRF capitalization grant funds for a Green Project Reserve, that is, projects intended to achieve improved energy or water efficiency. It also specified that all assistance agreements made in whole or in part with funds appropriated under the ARRA must comply with prevailing wage requirements of the Davis-Bacon Act. FY2010 President Obama presented his Administration's FY2010 budget request on May 7, 2009. For EPA as a whole, the budget sought $10.5 billion, a 38% increase above levels enacted in EPA's regular FY2009 appropriations ( P.L. 111-8 ). The bulk of the increase in the President's budget was for water infrastructure assistance, which would receive 157% above FY2009 levels (excluding ARRA supplemental funds). The request included $2.4 billion for clean water SRF capitalization grants; $1.5 billion for drinking water SRF capitalization grants; $20 million for Alaska Native Village and U.S.-Mexico border projects; and $1.111 billion for state categorical grants (1.5% above FY2009 levels), which generally support state administration of environmental programs. Congress provided FY2010 appropriations for EPA in P.L. 111-88 , passed by the House and Senate in October 2009 and signed into law on October 30. In this measure, Congress provided the following: $2.1 billion for clean water SRF capitalization grants; $1.387 billion for drinking water SRF capitalization grants; $186.7 million for 319 congressionally earmarked special project grants, including assistance for Alaska Native Villages and U.S.-Mexico border projects; and $1.116 billion for state categorical environmental grants, which could address a range of environmental programs. The FY2010 appropriations act included some restrictions that Congress also had specified in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, discussed above, namely a requirement that 20% of SRF capitalization grant assistance be used for "green" infrastructure and also that Davis-Bacon Act prevailing wage rules shall apply to construction of wastewater or drinking water projects carried out in whole or in part with assistance from the SRF. FY2011 President Obama presented the FY2011 budget request in February 2010. For EPA as a whole, the budget sought $10.02 billion in discretionary budget authority, a 3% decrease from levels enacted for EPA in FY2010. The largest component of the reduced request, compared with FY2010, was $200 million less for grants to capitalize clean water and drinking water SRF programs. In explaining the request, EPA budget documents noted that even with a slight reduction, the budget "continues robust funding for the SRFs." As in past years, the President requested no funds for congressionally designated water infrastructure projects. The request included $2.0 billion for clean water SRF capitalization grants; $1.287 billion for drinking water SRF capitalization grants; $20 million for Alaska Native Village and U.S.-Mexico border projects; and $1.277 billion for state categorical grant programs (14% higher than the FY2010 enacted amount), which could address a range of environmental programs. Congress took only limited action on FY2011 funding for EPA before the start of the new fiscal year on October 1, 2010: a House Appropriations subcommittee approved a bill in July, but no further action followed. At the end of September, the House and Senate passed a continuing resolution to extend FY2010 funding levels for EPA and other federal agencies and departments until December 3, 2010, because no FY2011 appropriations bills had been enacted by October 1. President Obama signed the continuing resolution (CR) on September 30 ( P.L. 111-242 ). This bill was followed by six more short-term CRs before Congress came to final resolution of FY2011 spending on April 14, 2011, enacting a bill to provide funding for EPA and all other federal agencies and departments through September 30 ( P.L. 112-10 ). The final bill reduced overall funding for EPA 15% below the FY2010 level. The enacted bill included $1.522 billion for clean water SRF capitalization grants; $963.1 million for drinking water SRF capitalization grants; $19.96 million for Alaska Native Village and U.S. Mexico-border projects; and $1.254 billion for state categorical grant programs, which generally support implementation of a range of environmental programs. FY2012 Policymakers began to consider the budget for FY2012 before finalizing the funding levels for FY2011. The President submitted the Administration's FY2012 budget request on February 14, 2011. It sought $9 billion total for EPA, a decrease of $1.3 billion from the FY2010 enacted level, but 3% higher than the FY2011 enacted level. The President's request included $1.55 billion for clean water SRF capitalization grants, $990 million for drinking water SRF capitalization grants, $20 million for Alaska Native Village and U.S.-Mexico border assistance, and $1.2 billion for state categorical grants, which could address a range of environmental programs. For several days in July 2011, the House debated H.R. 2584 , providing FY2012 appropriations for EPA, but did not take final action on the bill before the August recess. As reported, the bill provided $7.3 billion for EPA, 17% less than FY2011 funds and 19% less than the President's FY2012 request. It reduced funds for the clean water SRF capitalization grants to $689 million and $829 million for drinking water SRF capitalization grants (the same levels provided in FY2008), while including no funds for congressionally designated special projects (i.e., earmarks). The reported bill also provided $1.002 billion for state categorical grants, which could address a range of environmental programs. There was no action on this bill in the Senate. Final congressional action on FY2012 appropriations for EPA and most other federal agencies and departments did not occur until the end of December 2011, enacted in an omnibus appropriations act, P.L. 112-74 . The enacted bill included $1.466 billion for clean water SRF capitalization grants (3.7% below FY2011); $917.9 million for drinking water SRF capitalization grants (4.7% below FY2011); $14.976 million for Alaska Native Village and U.S.-Mexico border projects; and $1.089 billion for state categorical grants, which could address a range of environmental programs. FY2013 President Obama presented the Administration's FY2013 budget request in February 2012. It sought $8.34 billion overall for EPA, or 4.7% below the level enacted for FY2012. The request included $1.175 billion for clean water SRF capitalization grants, $850 million for drinking water SRF capitalization grants, $20 million for Alaska Native Village and U.S.-Mexico border assistance, and $1.2 billion for state categorical grants, which could address a range of environmental programs. The total amount requested for SRF capitalization grants is 15% below the FY2012 enacted level, reflecting a 20% reduction for the clean water program and a 7.4% reduction for the drinking water program. The House Appropriations Committee approved legislation providing FY2013 funds for EPA in July 2012 ( H.R. 6091 ). As reported, the bill provided $689 million for clean water SRF capitalization grants (the same level provided in FY2008), $829 million for drinking water SRF capitalization grants, $994 million for state categorical grants, and no funds for Alaska Native Village or U.S.-Mexico border projects. The House did not take up H.R. 6091 , nor did the Senate act on an EPA appropriations bill (although the Senate Appropriations Committee released a draft bill in September 2012). Prior to the start of FY2013 on October 1, 2012, Congress passed and the President signed a continuing resolution bill providing funding for government agencies and departments through March 27, 2013 ( P.L. 112-175 ). This measure funded the government generally at FY2012 levels plus a 0.6% increase. Final action on FY2013 appropriations occurred in the Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013 ( P.L. 113-6 ). Funding enacted in this bill included $1.452 billion for clean water SRF capitalization grants; $908.7 million for drinking water SRF capitalization grants; $15 million for Alaska Native Village and U.S.-Mexico border assistance; and $1.1 billion for state categorical grants, which generally support state and tribal implementation of a range of environmental programs. However, these amounts were reduced under the March 1, 2013, sequester order of the President, which reduced affected accounts by 5.0%, and by an across-the-board rescission of 0.2% necessary to avoid exceeding the FY2013 discretionary spending limits in law. After these reductions, available FY2013 funding was approximately $1.38 billion for the clean water SRF capitalization grants, $860 million for drinking water SRF capitalization grants, $14 million for Alaska Native Village and U.S.-Mexico border assistance, and $1.0 billion for state categorical grants. FY2014 President Obama presented the Administration's FY2014 budget in April 2013. It sought $8.15 billion overall for EPA, including $1.095 billion for clean water SRF capitalization grants, $817 million for drinking water SRF capitalization grants, $15 million for Alaska Native Village and U.S.-Mexico border projects, and $1.136 billion for state categorical grants. The total amount requested for SRF capitalization grants was 19% below the FY2013 enacted level. In mid-2013, the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies drafted a bill (unnumbered) that would have reduced overall funding for EPA by 34% from the FY2013 enacted level, including an 83% reduction for clean water SRF capitalization grants (the bill would have provided $250 million) and a 65% reduction for drinking water SRF capitalization grants ($350 million was included in the bill). According to subcommittee documents, the reduction was appropriate because, despite recent federal support, little progress has been made to reduce the known water infrastructure gap. The full committee did not complete markup of this bill. The Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies drafted an alternative bill that would have maintained funding for the clean water SRF program at $1.45 billion and funding for the drinking water SRF program at $907 million. There was no further action on this bill. Congress did not reach final agreement on FY2014 appropriations before the start of the fiscal year on October 1, but did agree to a short-term continuing appropriations measure ( P.L. 113-46 ), which provided funding through January 15, 2014. Final action on appropriations for EPA and all other federal agencies and departments occurred as part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014 ( H.R. 3547 , P.L. 113-76 ), signed by the President on January 17, 2014. This bill provides $1.45 billion for clean water SRF capitalization grants (5% more than FY2013 funds and 32% higher than the President's FY2014 budget request) and $907 million for drinking water SRF capitalization grants (5% more than FY2013 funds and 11% higher than the President's FY2014 budget request). The bill also provides $15 million for Alaska Native Village and U.S.-Mexico border assistance, and $1.0 billion for state categorical grants, which generally support state and tribal implementation of a range of environmental programs. FY2015 President Obama presented the Administration's FY2015 budget on March 4, 2014. It sought $7.89 billion overall for EPA, including $1.018 billion for clean water SRF capitalization grants, $757 million for drinking water SRF capitalization grants, $15 million for Alaska Native Village and U.S.-Mexico border projects, and $1.13 billion for state categorical grants. The total amount requested for SRF capitalization grants was 25% below the FY2014 enacted level. Final full-year appropriations were enacted as part of the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, enacted in December 2014 ( P.L. 113-235 ). The legislation provided the same water infrastructure funding levels as in FY2014: $1.45 billion for clean water SRF capitalization grants and $907 million for drinking water SRF capitalization grants. As with the FY2014 appropriations, the bill provided $15 million for Alaska Native Village and U.S.-Mexico border assistance and $1.0 billion for state categorical grants, which could address a range of environmental programs. FY2016 The Administration's FY2016 budget requested $8.6 billion overall for EPA. The request included $1.116 billion for clean water SRF capitalization grants, $1.186 billion for drinking water SRF capitalization grants (31% higher than the FY2016 appropriation), $15 million for Alaska Native Village and U.S.-Mexico border projects, and $1.162 billion for state categorical grants, which generally support state and tribal implementation of a range of environmental programs. Although the House and Senate Appropriations Committees reported bills to provide FY2016 appropriations for EPA, final appropriations action for EPA and other agencies occurred as part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, signed by the President December 18, 2015 ( P.L. 114-113 ). The bill provided $1.394 billion for clean water SRF capitalization grants ($55 million less than FY2015, but $278 million above the President's request), $863 million for drinking water SRF capitalization grants ($44 million below the FY2015 level, and $323 million less than the President's request), and $30 million for Alaska Native Village and U.S.-Mexico border water infrastructure projects. It also provided $1.06 billion for state categorical grants. FY2017 President Obama presented the Administration's FY2017 budget in February 2016, requesting $8.3 billion in total for EPA ($127 million above the FY2016 enacted budget). The request for EPA included $979.5 million for clean water SRF capitalization grants ($424 million less than the FY2016 enacted level), $1.02 billion for drinking water SRF capitalization grants ($157 million above the FY2016 amount), $22 million for Alaska Native Village and U.S.-Mexico border projects, and $1.158 billion for state categorical grants, which generally support state and tribal implementation of environmental programs. During congressional hearings on the EPA request, many Members criticized the requested 30% decrease in funds for clean water SRF capitalization grants. This criticism was reflected to some degree in appropriations bills the Appropriations Committees subsequently approved that include EPA funding. In July 2016, the House passed H.R. 5538 , FY2017 Interior and Environment Appropriations Act; it included $1.0 billion for clean water SRF grants, $1.07 billion for drinking water SRF grants, and $1.06 billion for state categorical grants. The Senate Appropriations Committee reported a companion bill, S. 3068 , in June. It included $1.35 billion for clean water SRF grants, $1.02 billion for drinking water SRF grants, and $1.09 billion for state categorical grants. The Senate did not take up this bill. Congress did not reach final agreement on an EPA funding bill before the start of FY2017. However, on September 28, the House and Senate passed a 10-week continuing resolution that extended FY2016 funding levels, minus a 0.496% across-the-board reduction, through December 9, 2016 ( P.L. 114-223 ). A second continuing resolution, passed in December 2014, extended FY2016 funding levels, minus a 0.1901% across-the-board reduction, from December 10, 2016, through April 28, 2017 ( P.L. 114-254 ). The Obama Administration's FY2017 budget submission also included a $15 million request to allow EPA to begin making water infrastructure project loans under a program that Congress enacted in 2014, the Water Infrastructure Financing and Investment Act, or WIFIA. P.L. 114-254 included the first appropriation, $20 million, for EPA to do so. The FY2017 final appropriations act (discussed below) provided an additional $8 million for EPA's WIFIA program (and $2 million for EPA to administer the program). Final full-year appropriations were enacted as part of the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2017, signed by President Trump on May 5, 2017 ( P.L. 115-31 ). The act provided the same level of funding for water infrastructure as FY2016: $1.394 billion for clean water SRF capitalization grants ($414 million above President Obama's request), $863 million for drinking water SRF capitalization grants ($158 million less than President Obama's request), and $30 million for Alaska Native Village and U.S.-Mexico border water infrastructure projects. It also provided $1.07 billion for state categorical grants, which support a range of environmental programs. The Continuing and Security Assistance Appropriations Act, 2017 ( P.L. 114-254 ), included an additional $100 million in DWSRF funding to assist Flint, MI, as authorized in the Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation (WIIN) Act ( P.L. 114-322 ). FY2018 The Trump Administration's FY2018 budget request proposed $8.6 billion overall for EPA. The request included $1.394 billion for clean water SRF capitalization grants and $863 million for drinking water SRF capitalization grants (the same amounts as the FY2017 appropriation). The request proposed $597 million for state categorical grants, a 44% reduction compared to FY2017 levels. Much of this reduction came from the elimination of funding for nonpoint source grants (CWA Section 319) and reduction of grant funding for water pollution control (CWA Section 106). In addition, the President's budget request proposed to eliminate funding for Alaska Native Village and U.S.-Mexico border projects. Similar to the previous fiscal year, Congress did not reach final agreement on an EPA funding bill before the start of FY2018. EPA and other federal departments and agencies operated under multiple continuing resolutions generally at FY2017 enacted levels (minus across-the-board rescissions). Final full-year appropriations were enacted as part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, signed by President Trump on March 23, 2018 ( P.L. 115-141 ). EPA's STAG account (Division G, Title II) included $1.394 billion for the clean water SRF and $863 million for the drinking water SRF program (the same amounts appropriated for FY2017, less $100 million for the DWSRF provided to assist Flint, MI). Division G, Title IV (General Provisions), Section 430, included an additional $600 million ($300.0 million each) within the STAG account for both SRF programs. P.L. 115-141 also provided $63 million for the WIFIA program, more than doubling the FY2017 appropriation. The act provided $20 million for Alaska Native Village projects and $10 million U.S.-Mexico border projects. It also provided $1.08 billion for state categorical grants, which support a range of environmental programs. In addition, the act provided the first appropriations for three programs authorized in the WIIN Act ( P.L. 114-322 , Title II, the Water and Waste Act of 2016): $10 million to help public water systems serving small or disadvantaged communities meet SDWA requirements; $20 million to support lead reduction projects, including lead service line replacement; and $20 million to establish a voluntary program for testing for lead in drinking water at schools and child care programs. FY2019 The Trump Administration's FY2019 budget request proposed $6.15 billion overall for EPA. The request included $1.394 billion for clean water SRF capitalization grants and $863 million for drinking water SRF capitalization grants (the same amounts requested in FY2018). The request included $20 million for the WIFIA program: $17 million to cover subsidy costs, which EPA estimated would allow the agency to lend approximately $2 billion (EPA Budget Justification), and $3 million for administrative costs. In addition, the request proposed $597 million for state categorical grants and $3 million for Alaska Native Village projects. The request proposed to eliminate funding for nonpoint source grants (CWA Section 319), reduce grant funding for water pollution control (CWA Section 106), and eliminate funding for U.S.-Mexico border water infrastructure projects. At the beginning of FY2019, EPA operated under the terms and conditions of multiple continuing resolutions (Division C of P.L. 115-245 ; P.L. 115-298 ; and P.L. 116-5 ). A "partial government shutdown" began on December 22, 2018, during which EPA operated under its shutdown contingency plans. Final full-year appropriations were enacted as part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2019 ( P.L. 116-6 ), signed by President Trump on February 15, 2019. FY2019 appropriations were provided in two titles of P.L. 116-6 . Title II included $1.394 billion for the CWSRF, $864.0 million for the DWSRF, and $10.0 million for WIFIA. Title IV included an additional $600.0 million ($300.0 million each) for both SRF programs and an additional $58.0 million for WIFIA. Title IV of P.L. 116-6 included $65.0 million within the EPA STAG account for grants authorized in the WIIN Act ( P.L. 114-322 ): $25 million to help public water systems serving small or disadvantaged communities meet SDWA requirements, $15 million to support lead reduction projects (including lead service line replacement), and $25 million to establish a voluntary program for testing for lead in drinking water at schools and child care programs. In addition, the act provided $25 million for Alaska Native Village projects and $15 million U.S.-Mexico border projects. It also provided $1.08 billion for state categorical grants, which support a range of environmental programs. FY2020 The Trump Administration's FY2020 budget request proposed $6.07 billion overall for EPA. The request included $1.120 billion for CWSRF capitalization grants; $863 million for drinking water SRF capitalization grants; $25 million for the WIFIA program: $20 million to cover subsidy costs, which EPA estimated would allow the agency to lend over $2 billion (EPA Budget Justification), and $5 million for administrative costs; $3 million for Alaska Native Village projects; $10 million for testing for lead in drinking water at schools and child care programs; $61 million for sewer overflow control grants; $154 million for water pollution control grants (CWA Section 106); and $580 million for state categorical grants, which support a range of environmental programs. The Administration's request proposed to eliminate funding for the following: nonpoint source grants, U.S.-Mexico border water infrastructure projects, drinking water grants for small and disadvantage communities, and lead reduction project grants.

The principal federal program to aid municipal wastewater treatment plant construction is authorized in the Clean Water Act (CWA). Established as a grant program in 1972, it now capitalizes state loan programs through the clean water state revolving loan fund (CWSRF) program. Since FY1972, appropriations have totaled $98 billion. In 1996, Congress amended the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA, P.L. 104-182) to authorize a similar state loan program for drinking water to help systems finance projects needed to comply with drinking water regulations and to protect public health. Since FY1997, appropriations for the drinking water state revolving loan fund (DWSRF) program have totaled $23 billion. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) administers both SRF programs, which annually distribute funds to the states for implementation. Funding amounts are specified in the State and Tribal Assistance Grants (STAG) account of EPA annual appropriations acts. The combined appropriations for wastewater and drinking water infrastructure assistance have represented 25%-32% of total funds appropriated to EPA in recent years. Prior to CWA amendments in 1987 (P.L. 100-4), Congress provided wastewater grant funding directly to municipalities. The federal share of project costs was generally 55%; state and local governments were responsible for the remaining 45%. The 1987 amendments replaced this grant program with the SRF program. Local communities are now often responsible for 100% of project costs, rather than 45%, as they are required to repay loans to states. The greater financial burden of the act's loan program on some cities has caused some to seek continued grant funding. Although the CWSRF and DWSRF have largely functioned as loan programs, both allow the implementing state agency to provide "additional subsidization" under certain conditions. Since its amendments in 1996, the SDWA has authorized states to use up to 30% of their DWSRF capitalization grants to provide additional assistance, such as forgiveness of loan principal or negative interest rate loans, to help disadvantaged communities. America's Water Infrastructure Act of 2018 (AWIA; P.L. 115-270) increased this proportion to 35% while conditionally requiring states to use at least 6% of their capitalization grants for these purposes. Congress amended the CWA in 2014, adding similar provisions to the CWSRF program. In addition, appropriations acts in recent years have required states to use minimum percentages of their allotted SRF grants to provide additional subsidization. Final full-year appropriations were enacted as part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2019 (P.L. 116-6), on February 15, 2019. The act provided $1.694 billion for the CWSRF and $1.163 billion for the DWSRF program, nearly identical to the FY2018 appropriations. The FY0219 act provided $68 million for the WIFIA program, a $5 million increase from the FY2018 appropriation. Compared to the FY2019 appropriation levels, the Trump Administration's FY2020 budget request proposes to decrease the appropriations for the CWSRF, DWSRF, and WIFIA programs by 34%, 26%, and 63%, respectively.

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T he Senior Community Service Employment Program (SCSEP) authorizes the Department of Labor (DOL) to make grants to support part-time community service employment opportunities for eligible individuals who are age 55 or over and have limited employment prospects. Participation in the program is temporary, with the goal of transitioning participants to unsubsidized employment. In FY2019, appropriations for the SCSEP program were $400 million and supported approximately 41,000 positions. SCSEP appropriations accounted for approximately 20% of total Older Americans Act funding in FY2019. Authorization, Administration, and Terminology SCSEP is authorized by Title V of the Older Americans Act of 1965, as amended (OAA; 42 U.S.C. 3056 et seq.) Since enactment of the OAA, Congress has reauthorized and amended the act numerous times. Most recently, the Older Americans Act Reauthorization Act of 2016 ( P.L. 114-144 ) authorized appropriations for OAA programs for FY2017 through FY2019, and made other changes to the act. Prior to the 2016 OAA reauthorization, the OAA Amendments of 2006 ( P.L. 109-365 ) reauthorized all programs under the act through FY2011. Although the authorizations of appropriations under the OAA expired at the end of FY2011, Congress continued to appropriate funding for OAA-authorized activities through FY2016. Grants under the program are administered by the Employment and Training Administration (ETA) at the Department of Labor (DOL). (References to the Secretary in this report refer to the Secretary of Labor, unless otherwise specified.) SCSEP is the only OAA program administered by DOL. Other OAA programs are administered by the Administration for Community Living (ACL) at the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). SCSEP is supported by discretionary appropriations under the DOL-HHS appropriations bill. SCSEP programs operate on DOL's program year (PY), which operates nine months behind the fiscal year. Activities in a given program year are supported by funding from the corresponding fiscal year. For example, PY2017 ran from July 1, 2017, through June 30, 2018, and was supported by FY2017 appropriations. Programs administered under Title V of the OAA may also be referred to as the Community Service Employment for Older Americans (CSEOA) programs. DOL uses the CSEOA and SCSEP terminology interchangeably. Grant Structure and Funding Formulas From its total appropriation, the OAA establishes three reservations: (1) up to 1.5% for DOL-selected pilots, demonstration, and evaluation projects; (2) a fixed percentage of 0.75% for the territories of Guam, American Samoa, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the Northern Mariana Islands; and (3) a portion determined by the Secretary for activities that support eligible individuals who are American Indian and Pacific Islander/Asian American. The remaining funds are allocated to formula grants. Title V supports formula grants to both national organizations ("national grantees") and state agencies ("state grantees"). National grantees are typically nonprofit organizations that operate in more than one state. State grantees are state government agencies. State grantee agencies are typically housed in a state's workforce unit or aging unit. In PY2018, approximately 78% of funds for formula grants ($298 million) were distributed among national grantees. There are about 15-20 national grantee organizations, including AARP and the National Council on Aging. About 22% of PY2018 funds for grants ($84 million) were allocated to state agencies. Both national grantees and state grantees subgrant funds to partner organizations that work with host agencies that provide the actual employment (see Figure 1 ). Funding Formula and Hold Harmless Provision The OAA specifies that in years where funds available for formula grants exceed the "funds necessary to maintain the fiscal year 2000 level of activities supported by grantees," the excess funds are allotted using a series of formulas that are directly correlated to the number of persons age 55 and over in the state and inversely correlated to the per capita income of the state. Thus, the formulas favor states with larger populations of persons age 55 or over and states with lower per capita incomes. The law contains hold harmless provisions that specify that in years where funds are less than their FY2000 level, funds are awarded proportionately "to maintain their fiscal year 2000 level of activities." The last year in which funds were allocated using the formula was PY2010. Since then, funding for grants has consistently been below the FY2000 level (see Table 1 ). As such, specific grant levels have varied but each state's relative share of grants funds has been proportionate to its FY2000 levels and a consistent share of the funding has been allocated to national grantees in each state as well as each state agency. The OAA defines a state's allotment (and corresponding hold harmless share of funding) as the sum of the allotment for national grants in the state and the grant to the state agency. The proportion of each state's total funding that comes from grants to national organizations versus grants to the state agency varies somewhat. State Plans and Integration with WIOA9 As a condition of receiving SCSEP funds, each state's governor must develop and submit a state plan to DOL. The plan can be an independent document or part of a combined plan with the state's activities under the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA), the primary federal workforce development legislation authorizing workforce services for the broader population. Whether the SCSEP plan is independent or part of a combined plan, it must provide information on individuals in the state who will be eligible for the program as well as the localities most in need of services. The plan must be developed in consultation with the state WIOA agency, national grantees operating in the state, and other stakeholders. The state plan must describe how the activities under SCSEP will be coordinated with activities under WIOA and how the state will minimize duplication between Title V and WIOA. Responsibilities of Host Agencies and Activities of Participants Grantees that receive funds directly from DOL typically allocate funds to subgrantees and/or host agencies that provide the actual work site placements and part-time community service employment. Recruitment and Participant Eligibility Host agencies are responsible for recruiting program participants. To be eligible for the program, a prospective participant must be age 55 or older, unemployed, and a member of a family with income of not more than 125% of the poverty level ($15,613 for a family size of one in 2019). Statute specifies that priority will be given to prospective participants who demonstrate additional barriers to employment. Specifically, an individual may receive priority if the individual is 65 years of age or older; has a disability; has limited English proficiency or low literacy skills; resides in a rural area; is a veteran; has low employment prospects; has failed to find employment after utilizing services provided under Title I of the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act; or is homeless or at risk for homelessness. As is the case with other DOL programs, eligible veterans receive priority of service in the SCSEP program. Participant Employment and Related Activities The OAA allows host agencies to employ program participants part-time in a variety of community service activities, including (but not limited to) social, health, welfare, and educational services as well as conservation and community beautification activities. Some participants may be employed at senior centers and other facets of the Aging Network established by the OAA, such as an Area Agency on Aging. Program participants are paid by the host agency. Participants must earn the highest of (1) the federal minimum wage, (2) the prevailing minimum wage in the state or locality in which the participant works, or (3) the prevailing rate for individuals employed in similar occupations by the same employer. Title V of the OAA does not establish a definition for "part-time" and federal policy does not limit the number of hours participants can work. In establishing the cost per authorized position, however, Title V establishes a formula that includes the federal minimum wage "multiplied by the number of hours equal to the product of 21 hours and 52 weeks." As part of program orientation, the subgrantee or host agency is responsible for assessing the participant, including the participant's skills, interests, needs, and potential for unsubsidized employment. Using information from this assessment, the grantee works with the participant to develop an individual employment plan (IEP) that includes a post-service objective (including employment, if appropriate) and the timeline for achievement of that objective. In addition to employment, grantee organizations may also provide training and supportive services. These services can include (but are not limited to) costs of transportation, health and medical services, special job-related or personal counseling, and work-related incidentals such as eyeglasses or work shoes. Individual participants are typically limited to an aggregate maximum of 48 months of participation in the program. Grantees are required to manage programs such that the average duration of participation for all participants does not exceed 27 months. This cap may be increased to an average of 36 months in certain circumstances such as high unemployment in the service area. SCSEP participants are not federal employees. Regulations specify that grantees are responsible for determining whether or not a participant qualifies as an employee of the grantee, subgrantee, or host agency under applicable laws. Financial Responsibilities of Grantees Grantees must match SCSEP grants such that federal funds account for no more than 90% of the project cost. DOL may waive match requirements in cases of emergency or disaster projects or projects in economically depressed areas. At least 75% of federal grants must be used to pay wages and legally required benefits for program participants. In limited cases, this requirement may be reduced to 65% if the program allocates a certain portion of funds to training and supportive services. In most circumstances, grantees may not use more than 13.5% of their federal grant for administrative expenses. Performance Accountability Federal law establishes six core indicators for CSEOA grantees. Three of the six CSEOA indicators focus on unsubsidized employment and earnings after participation in the program. The performance indicators are 1. hours (in the aggregate) of community service employment; 2. the percentage of project participants who are in unsubsidized employment during the second quarter after exit from the project; 3. the percentage of project participants who are in unsubsidized employment during the fourth quarter after exit from the project; 4. the median earnings of project participants who are in unsubsidized employment during the second quarter after exit from the project; 5. indicators of effectiveness in serving employers, host agencies, and project participants; and 6. the number of eligible individuals served, including the number of participating individuals with demonstrated barriers to employment. Indicators 2-4 are largely based on the performance accountability indicators for the general workforce programs under WIOA. Indicators 1, 5, and 6 do not have direct analogues in the WIOA performance accountability system. The current performance accountability measures were established by the Older Americans Act Reauthorization Act of 2016 ( P.L. 114-144 ). Grantees started reporting performance under these metrics beginning in PY2018, starting July 1, 2018. Grantees negotiate expected performance levels with DOL. Negotiating performance levels at the grantee level allows the expected performance levels to reflect the types of participants a particular grantee serves or the environment in which it operates (e.g., the grantee serves a disproportionate number of high-need participants or operates in an area with a high rate of unemployment.) Performance accountability is assessed at the level of the grantee (i.e., the entity that receives funding directly from DOL). Grantees are responsible for oversight of subgrantees and host agencies. Regulations establish that performance is measured as a percentage of the negotiated level of performance. For example, if a grantee negotiates a performance rate of 50% of participants in unsubsidized employment in the second quarter after exit and 48% of the program participants subsequently meet that standard, the grantee has reached 96% of its agreed-upon level of performance. Performance in the range of 80% to 100% constitutes meeting the core level of performance. If a national or state grantee fails to meets its negotiated level of performance, the grantee must receive technical assistance from DOL and submit a corrective action plan. If a national grantee fails to meet expected levels of performance for four consecutive years, the grantee may not compete in the subsequent grant competition. If a state grantee fails to meet the expected levels of performance for three consecutive program years, the state must conduct a competition to award its formula funds to a new grantee. Program Data and Reports DOL makes available several reports with SCSEP participation data. Data are reported by program year. Reports currently made available by DOL include the following: Aggregate and Individual Performance Reports . These reports include the performance of each national grantee and state agency relative to the negotiated levels of performance. Nationwide Quarterly Progress . These reports include total participation as well as data on demographics and participants' demonstrated barriers to employment. Service to Minority Individuals . These reports include information on the participation and outcomes of minorities for each grantee. The reports are required under Section 515 of the OAA.

The Senior Community Service Employment Program (SCSEP) authorizes the Department of Labor (DOL) to make grants to support part-time community service employment opportunities for eligible individuals age 55 or over. In FY2019, appropriations for SCSEP programs were $400 million and supported approximately 41,000 positions. DOL may also refer to the SCSEP program as Community Service Employment for Older Americans (CSEOA) SCSEP is authorized by Title V of the Older Americans Act (OAA). The Older Americans Act Reauthorization Act of 2016 (P.L. 114-144) authorized appropriations for OAA programs for FY2017 through FY2019. In FY2019, SCSEP appropriations accounted for about 20% of the funding under the OAA. The bulk of SCSEP appropriations support two primary grant streams: one to national nonprofit organizations and one to state agencies. In the most recent program year, approximately 78% of formula grant funds were allocated to national grantees and about 22% were allocated to state grantees. Both the national organizations and state grantees subgrant funds to host agencies that provide the actual community service employment opportunities to participants. Host agencies are responsible for recruiting eligible participants. To be eligible for the program, prospective participants must be at least age 55, low-income, and unemployed. Federal law requires host agencies to give preference to prospective participants who demonstrate additional barriers to employment such as having a disability or being at risk of homelessness. Program participants work part-time in community service jobs, including employment at schools, libraries, social service organizations, or senior-serving organizations. Program participants earn the higher of minimum wage or the typical wage for the job in which they are employed. An individual may typically participate in the program for a cumulative total of no more than 48 months. During orientation, participants receive an assessment of their skills, interests, capabilities, and needs. This assessment informs the development of an individual employment plan (IEP). A participant's IEP is updated throughout their participation in the program. Grantees are subject to a performance accountability system. Performance metrics generally relate to participants' unsubsidized employment and earnings after exiting the program. In addition to outcome-based metrics, grantees are also assessed on participants' total number of hours of service and whether the grantee served participants with barriers to employment. Grantees that do not meet negotiated levels of performance may become ineligible for subsequent grants.

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Overview During the Vietnam War, the U.S. military conducted Operation Ranch Hand, a program that sprayed an estimated 18-20 million gallons of herbicides—including approximately 11-12 million gallons of Agent Orange —over about 12,000 square miles of southern Vietnam between 1961 and 1971. A contaminant of the manufacture of Agent Orange (as well as two other herbicides used, Agent Pink and Agent Purple) was 2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin (TCDD), a developmental toxicant and a probable human carcinogen according to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Environmental surveys conducted in Vietnam have identified a number of dioxin "hot spots," including the airbases at Bien Hoa, Danang, and Phu Cat, that are contaminated with TCDD well above internationally acceptable levels (see Figure 1 ). In addition, the A Luoi (or A Shau) Valley, south of Quang Tri and west of Danang, was considered an important segment of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, a key supply route used by North Vietnamese forces and their allies, and was therefore heavily sprayed. The former U.S. military base in the A Luoi Valley has been identified as another "hot spot." In recent years, U.S. response to the environmental damage and health problems caused by Agent Orange and its associated dioxin in Vietnam has been viewed as helping to advance bilateral relations between the two nations. After a meeting with President Tran Dai Quang in May 2016, President Obama stated the following: With regard to security, the United States will continue to do our part to address the painful legacy of war.... We'll continue to help remove unexploded landmines and bombs. And now that our joint effort to remove dioxin—Agent Orange—from Danang Airport is nearly complete, the United States will help in the cleanup at Bien Hoa Air Base. The joint statement issued after that meeting included the following statements: Vietnam welcomed cooperation leading to the successful conclusion of the first phase of dioxin remediation at Danang International Airport, with the final phase underway. The United States committed to partnering with Vietnam to make a significant contribution to the clean-up of dioxin contamination at Bien Hoa Air Base. The Trump Administration has continued the past commitment to provide assistance to Vietnam to address the Agent Orange/dioxin issue. Following their meeting in May 2017 in Washington, DC, President Trump and Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc released a joint statement, which stated: The two sides committed to work together to address war legacy issues, including through such joint efforts as dioxin remediation, taking note of the progress that has been made at Da Nang Airport and intent to discuss continued collaboration at Bien Hoa Airport, and the removal of unexploded ordnances. On November 10, 2017, Under Secretary of State Thomas Shannon and Senior Lieutenant General Nguyen Phuong Nam held a ceremony to celebrate the completion of the environmental remediation of Danang Airport. On January 23, 2018, the two governments signed a Memorandum of Intent (MOI) to begin the process of dioxin decontamination of Bien Hoa. From 2007 to the present, Congress has appropriated a total of $254.8 million for the environmental remediation of Agent Orange/dioxin and health and disability programs in areas of Vietnam sprayed with Agent Orange or otherwise contaminated by dioxin. Starting with the 112 th Congress, the legislation has appropriated separate amounts for these two purposes, generally with more funds appropriated for environmental remediation than for health and disability programs. All of the amounts appropriated by Congress are subject to the provisions of Section 653(a) (22 U.S.C. §2413(a)) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (P.L. 87-195; 22 U.S.C. §2151 et seq.). As a consequence, the actual amount available for such assistance may be less than the amount specified in the various laws and their accompanying reports. In addition, the 115 th Congress, under Section 1052 of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 ( P.L. 115-232 ), authorized the Secretary of Defense to transfer "not more than $15,000,000" in FY2019 to the Secretary of State, for use by USAID, "to be used for the Bien Hoa dioxin cleanup in Vietnam." Any funds transferred are to be taken from the Department of Defense's "Operation and Maintenance, Defense-wide" account. The appropriated funds for environmental remediation generally have been allocated under the State Department's Economic Support Fund account (ESF), while the funds for health and disability programs have been allocated under the Development Assistance account (DA). In general, the funds appropriated under both accounts have been made available for two fiscal years. The State Department has delegated responsibility for the administration and obligation of the appropriated funds to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). To date, most of the environmental remediation effort has been focused on the cleanup of the Danang airport, while the funds appropriated for health and disability programs have been used primarily for disability support programs in Danang and other parts of Vietnam. The cleanup of Danang airport has been completed, and U.S. and Vietnamese officials have made arrangements for joint dioxin removal operations at the airbase in Bien Hoa. In addition, the two governments are discussing the appropriate manner to address health and disability problems among Vietnamese nationals that may be attributable to dioxin exposure. The programs and projects funded by the appropriated funds have been administered by the State Department and USAID, in cooperation with various ministries and agencies within the Vietnamese government. In 1999, Vietnam's central government created the Office of the National Steering Committee on Overcoming Consequences of Agent Orange/Dioxin in Vietnam (Office 33, or Committee 33), an interministerial body, to oversee and coordinate its government's policy on Agent Orange and dioxin. Office 33 includes representatives from Vietnam's Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MONRE, where Office 33 is administratively located); Ministry of Finance (MOF); Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA); Ministry of Health (MOH); Ministry of Labour, Invalids, and Social Affairs (MOLISA); Ministry of National Defence (MND); Ministry of Planning and Investment (MOPI); and Vietnam Academy of Science and Technology (VAST). Congressional interest has generally focused on two issues. The first issue is determining the amount to allocate for the environmental remediation of dioxin "hot spots" in Vietnam and health and disability programs in areas of Vietnam sprayed with Agent Orange or otherwise contaminated by dioxin. The second issue is oversight to ascertain if the State Department and USAID are effectively and appropriately obligating and expending the available funds. In particular, Congress has paid attention to the rate at which USAID has obligated the funds Congress appropriated for use on health and disability activities. Congressional Appropriations Since 2007 The appropriation of funds explicitly to address the Agent Orange/dioxin issue in Vietnam started in May 2007, when the 110 th Congress passed the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007 ( P.L. 110-28 ). That act appropriated $3 million "for the remediation of dioxin contaminated sites in Vietnam, and to support health programs in communities near those sites." After more than a year of internal consultation, the State Department decided that the administration and obligation of the $3 million would be handled by USAID, setting a precedent for the handling of future appropriations for Agent Orange/dioxin assistance to Vietnam. The 111 th Congress in three separate pieces of legislation appropriated a total of $18 million for dioxin cleanup in Vietnam and related health services (see Table 1 ). In March 2009, the 111 th Congress appropriated $3 million for Agent Orange/dioxin remediation and health care assistance in the vicinity of the Danang "hot spot" in the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 ( P.L. 111-8 ). In December 2009, Congress passed the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 ( P.L. 111-117 ), which included $3 million for dioxin cleanup and related health services in Vietnam. In July 2010, Congress included $12 million "to support the remediation of dioxin contamination at the Danang Airport, which poses extreme risks to human health and welfare, and related health activities" in the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2010 ( P.L. 111-212 ). In addition, the State Department and USAID allocated $1.9 million in Development Assistance funds for FY2010 for environmental remediation at Danang airport. The conference report accompanying P.L. 112-74 also endorsed language in a Senate report associated with an earlier reported to Senate version of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2012 ( S. 1601 ) directing USAID, in consultation with the Senate Appropriations Committee, the Department of State, the Government of Vietnam, and "other interested parties," to develop a "comprehensive, multiyear plan" for Agent Orange-related activities in Vietnam within 180 days after the enactment of the law. The 113 th Congress continued to appropriate funds for the environmental remediation of Agent Orange/dioxin in Vietnam and related health services. The Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013 ( P.L. 113-6 ), which superseded P.L. 112-175 , renewed the appropriation levels contained in P.L. 112-74 for FY2013, subject to sequestration requirements. Similarly, P.L. 113-46 and P.L. 113-73 renewed appropriations for FY2014 until being superseded by the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014 ( P.L. 113-76 ), which appropriated $22.0 million for environmental remediation and $7.0 million for "health and disability programs in areas sprayed with Agent Orange or otherwise contaminated by dioxin." Section 7043(h) of the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 ( P.L. 113-235 ) states the following: Funds appropriated by this Act under the heading "Economic Support Fund" shall be made available for remediation of dioxin contaminated sites in Vietnam and may be made available for assistance for the Government of Vietnam, including the military, for such purposes, and funds appropriated under the heading "Development Assistance" shall be made available for health/disability activities in areas sprayed with Agent Orange or otherwise contaminated with dioxin. The act's accompanying "Explanatory Statement" specifies that $7.5 million is to be provided under "Development Assistance" for "Vietnam health/disability programs" and $15.0 million is to be provided under "Economic Support Fund" for "Vietnam (Environmental remediation of dioxin)." In Section 7043(g) of P.L. 114-113 , the 114 th Congress appropriated funds under the Economic Support Fund for "remediation of dioxin contaminated sites in Vietnam" and under Development Assistance for "health and disability programs in areas sprayed with Agent Orange and otherwise contaminated with dioxin, to assist individuals with severe upper or lower body mobility impairment and/or cognitive or developmental disabilities." S.Rept. 114-79 , which accompanied P.L. 114-113 , provided "not less than $25 million" for environmental remediation and $7 million for "health/disability programs in areas sprayed with Agent Orange or otherwise contaminated by dioxin, to address the mobility, psycho-social, vocational, and other needs of persons with severe upper and lower body mobility impairment and/or cognitive or developmental disabilities." The report continued with the statement, "In order to minimize administrative costs and maximize impact in the field, the Committee intends that, to the maximum extent practicable, health/disability funds shall be implemented by Vietnamese organizations and entities." Funding for FY2017 was included in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 ( P.L. 115-31 ). Section 7043(h) states: (1) DIOXIN REMEDIATION—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, of the funds appropriated by this Act under the heading `Economic Support Fund', not less than $20,000,000 shall be made available for activities related to the remediation of dioxin contaminated sites in Vietnam and may be made available for assistance for the Government of Vietnam, including the military, for such purposes. (2) HEALTH AND DISABILITY PROGRAMS—Of the funds appropriated by this Act under the heading 'Development Assistance', not less than $10,000,000 shall be made available for health and disability programs in areas sprayed with Agent Orange and otherwise contaminated with dioxin, to assist individuals with severe upper or lower body mobility impairment and/or cognitive or developmental disabilities. The act permits, for the first time since the United States has funded dioxin environmental remediation in Vietnam, the provision of assistance to the Government of Vietnam. It also reiterates that health and disability programs are to be in areas sprayed with Agent Orange or otherwise contaminated with dioxin. In March 2018, the 115 th Congress appropriated in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 ( P.L. 115-141 ) "not less than $20 million" for "activities related to the remediation of dioxin contaminated sites in Vietnam." The act also provided that the funds "may be made available for assistance for the Government of Vietnam, including the military, for such purposes." In addition, the act appropriated "not less than $10 million" for "health and disability programs in areas sprayed with Agent Orange and otherwise contaminated with dioxin, to assist individuals with severe upper or lower body mobility impairment or cognitive or developmental disabilities." In February 2019, 116 th Congress appropriated in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P.L. 116-6 ) "not less than $20,000,000" for "activities related to the remediation of dioxin contaminated sites in Vietnam and may be made available for assistance for the Government of Vietnam, including the military, for such purposes." The Act also appropriated "not less than $12,500,000 … for health and disability programs in areas sprayed with Agent Orange and otherwise contaminated with dioxin, to assist individuals with severe upper or lower body mobility impairment or cognitive or developmental disabilities." USAID Obligations The State Department has designated USAID as the responsible agency for the obligation of the appropriated funds for Agent Orange/dioxin-related activities in Vietnam . Table 2 lists the amounts USAID has obligated of funds appropriated over FY2007 to FY2017 by type of activity, implementing partner, and fiscal year. As of May 2018, USAID has obligated 81% of the $127 million appropriated for FY2011-FY2017 for environmental remediation projects, and 63.5% of the $44.3 million appropriated for FY2011-FY2017 for health- and disability-related services. Of the $21 million appropriated for FY2007-FY2011 for either environmental remediation or health- and disability-related services, USAID has obligated $20.3 million, or 96.9%. The manner in which USAID has obligated the appropriated funds has, at times, been an issue with Congress. While the rate of obligations for environmental remediation activities generally has not been a matter of concern, how USAID has obligated appropriations for health and disability activities has drawn some congressional attention. The two main concerns about the health and disability obligations are the seemingly slower pace of utilization (when compared to the environmental remediation funds), and the types of programs being funded. Since Congress began appropriating funds specifically for Agent Orange/dioxin-related activities in Vietnam in FY2007, it generally has designated that the health and disability services are to be provided in locations near Agent Orange/dioxin-contaminated areas. The $3 million appropriated in FY2007 in P.L. 110-28 was "to support health programs in communities near those sites," according to the accompanying Senate report. The joint committee print accompanying P.L. 111-8 stipulated that "$3,000,000 is provided to continue environmental remediation of dioxin contamination at the Danang Airport and related health activities in nearby communities in Vietnam." H.Rept. 112-331 , which accompanied P.L. 112-74 , stated, "The conferees recommend not less than $5,000,000 under this heading be made available for health/disability activities in areas in Vietnam that were targeted with Agent Orange or remain contaminated with dioxin." It is unclear if the State Department and USAID have in all cases obligated these funds in accordance with this locational guidance. Based on the information provided by USAID, funds for health- and disability-related services in FY2007-FY2009 were obligated to programs in Danang. However, for FY2010 to FY2013, the appropriated health and disability funds were largely obligated to Development Alternatives, Inc. (DAI) for a disability support program that was designed to "broadly address the needs and improve the lives of persons with disabilities," without explicit reference to Agent Orange/dioxin "hot spots." According to USAID, this three-year program ended in January 2016. Following consultations with the Ministry of Labour, Invalids, and Social Affairs (MOLISA), Congress, and other interested parties, as of FY2014, USAID reportedly returned to directly obligating funds for health- and disability-related services in smaller amounts and increased its outreach to Vietnamese nongovernmental organizations. This shift to smaller direct program funding is reflected in Table 1 . For more about USAID's disability programs in Vietnam, see " Disability Programs " below. Danang Airport Environmental Remediation Project One of the main activities financed by congressional appropriations related to Agent Orange/dioxin in Vietnam is the environmental remediation project at Danang Airport. Since its beginnings in 2008, when the U.S. and Vietnamese governments started plans for the environmental remediation of Danang airport, the project has experienced delays in implementation, unexpected increases in the amount of material requiring decontamination, and rising costs. While USAID's initial intent was to complete the project by October 2013, a November 2014 U.S. government audit indicated that the estimated completion date for the project was March 31, 2017. The decontamination was completed in August 2017. During the life of the project, the amount of material to be decontaminated rose from an estimated 61,700 cubic meters (m 3 ) to approximately 90,000 m 3 , plus an additional 60,000 m 3 of "lower risk material." The estimated cost of the project increased from $33.7 million to over $110 million. The joint military/civilian airport in Danang was a major operational hub for the U.S. military's Operation Ranch Hand. One study of Danang airbase found soil concentrations of "TCDD toxic equivalents" (TEQ) of up to 365 parts per billion (ppb)—365 times the international maximum level of 1.0 ppb . Seventeen out of the 23 soil samples taken at Danang airbase exceeded the international maximum standard. Work on the project began in December 2009, when the State Department and Vietnam's Ministry of Natural Resources and the Environment (MONRE) signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) setting the framework for implementing environmental health and remediation programs in Danang. The MOU designated USAID and Office 33 as the implementing agencies. According to a State Department press release, the MOU covered $6.0 million in funds appropriated in FY2007 and FY2009. Among the activities included in the MOU was a grant to CDM International, Inc., in association with Hatfield Associates, to design an environmentally sound engineering approach to dioxin containment at Danang airport. In June 2010, USAID completed an Environmental Assessment (EA) of Danang airport that recommended the use of thermal desorption to decontaminate an estimated 61,700 m 3 of contaminated material in six separate "hotspots" at the airport. The EA estimated that the decontamination would take two years to complete at a cost of $33.7 million, but noted that implementation would present "challenges" that could increase the cost by 50%. USAID and Vietnam's Ministry of National Defence (MND) signed a Memorandum of Intent in Hanoi on December 30, 2010, with the goal of starting the remediation project in the summer of 2011 and completing the project by October 2013. The Prime Minister approved the remediation of Danang airport by in-pile thermal desorption (IPTD) in February 2011, and MND approved the project in April 2011. USAID posted a Request for Proposals (RFP #486-11-028) in May 2011 for bids on the project. In July 2012, USAID awarded two contracts for the environmental remediation of Danang airport by IPTD. CDM Smith, a U.S. firm headquartered in Massachusetts, was granted $8.37 million for project oversight and construction management. Tetra Tech, Inc., headquartered in California, was awarded $17 million for the excavation and construction components of the project. A ceremony to launch the Danang airport environmental remediation project was held at Danang airport on August 9, 2012; onsite work began on August 20, 2012. An internal USAID audit of the remediation project conducted in November 2014 indicated that six contracts have been awarded for the environmental assessment and remediation project at Danang airport, plus an assessment of Bien Hoa airbase (see Table 3 ). Three of the awarded contracts correspond to the amounts provided by USAID in Table 2 , but three do not, probably reflecting work beyond FY2013. The thermal desorption of the contaminated soil was done in two phases, due to the amount of material involved. The gradual heating of Phase 1, which involved the treatment of approximately 45,000 m 3 of soil contained in an area 70 meters wide and 100 meters long (about the size of a football field) and 8 meters (26 feet) high, began in April 2014. The cooling down of Phase 1 started in April 2015, after soil sampling revealed that more than 95% of the dioxin had been removed. Excavation for Phase 2, which involved the draining of three small lakes and the removal of the exposed lake beds, began in January 2015. The treatment of 45,000 m 3 of Phase 2 soil began in November 2016, and was completed in August 2017. Progress on the decontamination of Danang airport was delayed by several factors. Weather during Vietnam's rainy season (September to December) hampered progress on the excavation of soil and the construction of the thermal treatment area. Soil testing following the drainage of the small lakes determined more soil and sediment would require decontamination than previously estimated. The secondary treatment facility was shut down in July 2014 to change the filtering system. It also took more time than anticipated to raise the ambient temperature of the Phase 1 soil to the target 335°C. USAID's Office of Inspector General conducted an internal audit of the environmental remediation project in November 2014, and noted several potential risks that could delay the project and, by extension, raise its overall cost, including the problems associated with inclement weather and cooling the treated soil. The audit particularly noted the lack of a formal risk management plan to address some of the project risks identified by USAID and the project's contractors, and recommended that a formal risk management plan be implemented. The audit also cited CDM for providing inaccurate performance data and not fulfilling its obligations to provide training to Vietnamese officials, and recommended that more training be provided and better data documentation procedures be adopted. USAID agreed with all of the audit's recommendations. On November 7, 2018, the two governments held a ceremony to mark the completion of the Danang Airport environmental remediation project. The completed project took more than twice as long and cost more than three times as much as initially projected by USAID. According to Pham Quang Vu, head of Vietnam's Air Force and Air Defense Military Science Division, the higher cost and greater time was due to underestimating the contamination at the airport, indicating that 162,500 cubic meters of soil—not 72,900 cubic meters—were contaminated. Anthony Kolb, chief of USAID's environmental remediation unit, stated that the dioxin had percolated three meters deeper than expected. Disability Programs USAID has, in general, utilized the funds Congress appropriated for health/disability activities in areas sprayed with Agent Orange or otherwise contaminated with dioxin as part of its overall program to provide support for persons with disabilities in Vietnam, regardless of the cause of the disability or proximity to Agent Orange "hot spots." According to USAID, starting in 1989 with a program financed by the Leahy War Victims Fund, the U.S. government has provided over $60 million in assistance to disabled Vietnamese, regardless of the cause of the disability. This assistance includes funds specifically appropriated for health services in areas located near Agent Orange/dioxin-contaminated sites and other sources of developmental or health assistance. Between FY2007 and FY2010, the State Department and USAID utilized the funds appropriated for health services for grants to various agencies to offer programs to improve the quality of life for persons with disabilities in Danang. A December 2010 USAID assessment of these grants noted the "many accomplishments" of these programs, but also noted that the three-year time period was "very short for meeting program objectives." In 2012, USAID approved a three-year, nationwide Persons with Disability Support Program (PDSP) to be jointly implemented with Development Alternatives, Inc. (DAI) and Vietnam Assistance for the Handicapped (VNAH). The request for applications (RFA) for the project indicated that the program was intended to "build on the accomplishments of the previous USAID assistance to people with disabilities (PWD) living in communities in Danang, as well as include additional relevant public health activities." The project's geographic focus was to be primarily in Danang, and "to some extent other areas, proposed by the Recipient, where there is a high disability burden, the need is the greatest, and in regions where dioxin hot spots are located." The RFA specifically calls for a needs assessment to be conducted in Bien Hoa and Phu Cat. Funding for PDSP was initially set at $9 million. As part of PDSP's cooperative agreement, DAI was to award grants to local partners and organizations providing assistance to persons with disabilities, including health services, rehabilitation therapy, vocational training, and community awareness. In addition, USAID provided assistance to VNAH to work on disability policy and legal framework needs of the Government of Vietnam. The PDSP program was headquartered in Danang, and initially operated in the provinces of Binh Dinh, Danang, and Dong Nai—where the three dioxin "hot spots" of Phu Cat, Danang, and Bien Hoa (respectively) are located. According to a June 2015 USAID update, the PDSP program has been extended to the provinces of Quang Nam, Tay Ninh, and Thua Thien-Hue. According to the Aspen Institute, all three provinces were heavily sprayed with Agent Orange during the Vietnam War, but have not been identified as "hot spots." A USAID summary of the program after two years reported that "nearly US$900,000 in grants to 14 local partners and organizations" had been awarded. In June 2014, USAID adopted a new approach to the provision of assistance to persons with disabilities in Vietnam. According to the USAID statement, one of the key objectives of USAID assistance to Vietnam is to foster expanded opportunities to vulnerable populations, such as persons with disabilities. To that end, USAID aims "to address key challenges for persons with disabilities through provision of direct assistance to improve health, independence, and participation in economic and social life." In addition to continuing to support changes in Vietnam's disability policies, USAID will finance the provision of physical, occupational, and speech therapies to persons with disabilities, as well as provide training to Vietnamese practitioners and technicians in the delivery of such services. Target areas for these programs are to be locations "where disability prevalence and poverty rates are high." Among the identified locations are the provinces of Binh Dinh, Binh Phuoc, Dong Nai, Quang Nam, Tay Ninh, Thai Binh, and Thua Thien-Hue. All these provinces have been identified by the Aspen Institute as heavily sprayed areas, except Thai Binh. USAID, in consultation with various Vietnamese agencies, will directly administer the new approach. Bien Hoa Airbase With the environmental cleanup of Danang airport completed, the two governments have begun jointly to explore undertaking a similar cleanup of the dioxin "hot spot" located at the Bien Hoa airbase. Bien Hoa airbase was the airport used for the most Agent Orange spraying missions during the war, and is where the most herbicide was stored and used by the U.S. military. One study of soil samples from the Bien Hoa airbase found a sample with a TEQ concentration at over 1,000 ppb—higher than typical samples at the Danang airbase, and 1,000 times higher than the international limit. The Vietnamese government has already conducted some mitigation measures to contain the dioxin contamination at Bien Hoa. A passive landfill (in which the contaminated soil is left untreated) containing 43,000 m 3 of contaminated soil excavated from the herbicide storage area was completed in 2009. However, the airbase has several other distinct dioxin "hot spots" that have not been addressed, according to a study conducted by a private consulting firm, Hatfield Consultants, hired by Office 33. The study also determined that contaminated soil had spread from the "hot spots" into nearby lakes, ponds, creeks, and drainage ditches, increasing the amount of soil and sediment that will require treatment. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has been working with Office 33 and MONRE for five years to map out the dioxin contamination at Bien Hoa airbase, and develop a master plan for dioxin remediation. According to their joint investigation, released in 2014, approximately 250,000 m 3 of soil would require decontamination with an estimated cost of at least $250 million. In September 2013, USAID contracted CDM International Inc. to conduct an environmental assessment of the Bien Hoa airbase to examine a number of dioxin remediation alternatives. CDM International Inc. partnered with Hatfield Consulting on the project. In May 2016, USAID released the final environmental assessment report. The report determined that an estimated 408,500 to 495,300 m 3 of contaminated soils and sediments are located on or nearby the airbase, or about four to five times as much as is being treated at Danang airport. Five different treatment methods were considered, ranging from containment to in-pile thermal desorption (as was used in Danang). The estimated costs of the five methods ranged from $137 million (for containment in a landfill) to $794 million (using incineration and ex situ thermal treatment). The report noted, however, that these estimated costs may vary from 40% less to 75% more than the stated amounts, expanding the possible range to between $82 million and $1.4 billion. According to USAID, over $3.7 million has been obligated so far to assess the possible environmental remediation of Bien Hoa Airbase. In September 2017, Vietnam's Ministry of National Defence announced work on infrastructure construction for the dioxin decontamination of Bien Hoa airport. The construction, with a reported budget of $11.8 million, included demining operations, road construction, and removing facilities from contaminated areas. On January 23, 2018, USAID and Vietnam's Ministry of National Defence signed a memorandum of intent (MOI) to begin the decontamination of Bien Hoa airport. U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam Daniel J. Kritenbrink reportedly said at the MOI signing ceremony, "The United States looks forward to working with the Ministry of National Defence on this important initiative, deepening our partnership further, and building a prosperous future for both our countries." The MOI commits the two nations to work together to design a remediation program for the Bien Hoa airport. USAID and the Ministry of National Defence signed a five-year, $183 million nonrefundable aid agreement on May 11, 2018, for the decontamination of Bien Hoa airport. At the time of the signing of the agreement, the project was projected to take 10 years at an estimated cost of $390 million. Approximately 500,000 cubic meters of soil, or nearly 50 hectares (123 acres) of land, are to be decontaminated. In September 2018, the Ministry of National Defence signed a memorandum of understanding with the Japanese general contractor, Shimizu Corporation, to construct a decontamination factory at Bien Hoa airport. The factory reportedly will decontaminate the soil by a filtered sponge technique, and be capable of decontaminating 40 tons of soil per hour. The new technique is expected to cost about half as much as the in-pile thermal desorption used at Danang airport. U.S. Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis visited Bien Hoa airport on October 17, 2018. During his tour of the former Agent Orange storage site, Secretary Mattis reportedly said, "We had promised to help … so this is America keeping her promise to remediate some of the past." He also reportedly stated prior to the visit, "I just want to get eyes on [the site] so when I go back and talk to Congress, I can tell them my impression with actually having seen the site." Issues Before Congress Congressional interest in Agent Orange/dioxin in Vietnam has largely been focused on two issues. The first issue is determining the appropriate amount and type of assistance to provide to address the environmental damage and the health effects of dioxin contamination in Vietnam. The second issue is oversight of how such assistance has been utilized by the State Department and USAID. Funding Assistance Congress and the Obama Administration demonstrated a common interest in providing assistance to address the environmental remediation of Agent Orange and dioxin in Vietnam; the Trump Administration has indicated its support for the Agent Orange projects in Vietnam. The State Department regularly has requested funding for decontamination of dioxin "hot spots" in Vietnam in its budget request to Congress. As described above, Congress has generally appropriated funds for health and disability services for persons residing in areas sprayed by Agent Orange and otherwise contaminated with dioxin. The State Department and USAID have utilized those funds for various programs for persons with disabilities regardless of the cause. In many, but not all, cases, those programs were conducted in locations near known Agent Orange "hot spots." President Obama's budget requests to Congress did not include funding requests explicitly for health and disability assistance programs for areas sprayed with Agent Orange or otherwise contaminated with dioxin. The Obama Administration budget requests were for disability programs and/or "vulnerable groups." The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P.L. 116-6 ) continues the past practice of designating funds for health and disability services for places contaminated with Agent Orange/dioxin. Section 7043(h)(2) of the act, states Of the funds appropriated by this Act under the heading 'Development Assistance', not less than $12,500,000 shall be made available for health and disability programs in areas sprayed with Agent Orange and otherwise contaminated with dioxin, to assist individuals with severe upper or lower body mobility impairment or cognitive or developmental disabilities. The Victims of Agent Orange Relief Act of 2019 ( H.R. 326 ) would "direct the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to provide assistance for individuals affected by exposure to Agent Orange, and for other purposes." Section 3 would require the Secretary of State to "provide assistance to address the health care needs of covered individuals. Such assistance shall include the provision of medical and chronic care services, nursing services, vocational employment training, and medical equipment." "Covered individuals" is defined as Vietnamese residents affected by health issues related to their exposure to Agent Orange between January 1, 1961, and May 7, 1975, or is "the child or descendant of an individual" who was exposed to Agent Orange during the designated time period. Under Section 3, the Secretary of State would also be required to provide assistance "to repair and rebuild substandard homes in Vietnam for covered individuals and the families of covered individuals." Section 4 would require the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to "identify and provide assistance to support research relating to health issues of individuals affected by Agent Orange." Section 3 also would require the Secretary of State to provide assistance to "institutions in Vietnam that provide health care for covered individuals," and to "remediate those geographic areas of Vietnam that the Secretary determines contain high levels of Agent Orange." The section further states, "the Secretary of State shall give priority to heavily sprayed areas, particularly areas that served as military bases where Agent Orange was handled, and areas where heavy spraying and air crashes resulted in harmful deposits of Agent Orange." Section 8 states, "Not later than 30 days after the last day of each fiscal quarter beginning on or after 18 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and the Secretary of Veterans Affairs shall each submit to Congress a report on the implementation of the provisions of this Act applicable to such Secretary during the immediately preceding fiscal quarter." Oversight of Assistance Beyond determining the level of funding for environmental remediation and the provision of health services to Agent Orange/dioxin-contaminated locations in Vietnam, Congress has overseen the utilization of appropriated funds. With regard to environmental remediation, congressional oversight has focused on the rising cost of the cleanup effort at Danang airport, and the potential implications for funding for the proposed cleanup of Bien Hoa. With regard to USAID's provision of related health services, congressional oversight has focused on what some Members perceive to be a slow pace at which available funds are being obligated and changes in USAID's approach to administering those funds. As noted above, the estimated total cost of the environmental remediation of Danang airport rose from $33.7 million in 2010 to $116 million. Members could point to cost overruns at Danang airport when Congress looks ahead to possibly funding a similar environmental remediation project at Bien Hoa airport, where a USAID study indicated that approximately 500,000 m 3 of soil—about four to five times the amount at Danang—is contaminated. Although the Danang airport cleanup experienced rising costs and delays, USAID was able to keep the project going and the funding flowing. USAID has not been as successful in utilizing the funds provided for health services to areas contaminated with Agent Orange/dioxin. According to information provided by USAID, 63.5% of the funds appropriated in FY2011 to FY2017 have been obligated. In addition, USAID's approach to utilizing health services funds has shifted from direct obligation by USAID, to establishing a cooperative agreement to administer the funds, and back again to direct obligation by USAID. Some observers question whether the health services funds are being used effectively, and in accordance with congressional priorities. The specific language in Section 7043(h)(2) of Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P.L. 116-6 ) and H.R. 326 regarding health and/or disability assistance to Vietnam may in part reflect congressional dissatisfaction with State Department and USAID management of previously appropriated funds. Appendix. Text of Public Laws Appropriating Funds for Environmental Remediation and Health and Disability Services in Vietnam Congress has included language in legislation indicating that it is appropriating funds for environmental remediation and health and disability services in Vietnam. The precise amounts appropriated, however, in most cases have been stipulated in either an accompanying report or explanatory statement. The table below provides the relevant text in the public law, as well as the associated language in the accompanying report or explanatory statement.

U.S. assistance to Vietnam for the environmental and health damage attributed to a dioxin contained in Agent Orange and other herbicides sprayed over much of the southern portion of the country during the Vietnam War remains a major bilateral issue. Between fiscal years (FY) 2007 and 2019, Congress appropriated nearly $255 million to address these two issues. In addition, the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (P.L. 115-232) authorized the transfer of up to $15 million to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) for the dioxin cleanup of the Bien Hoa Airbase. Most of the appropriated funds have been used by USAID for the environmental cleanup of Danang airport, one of the major airbases used for storing and spraying the herbicides between 1961 and 1971. A lesser amount of the appropriated funds have been used by USAID for assistance to Vietnam's persons with disabilities, generally, but not always in the vicinity of Danang or other dioxin-contaminated areas. Congressional interest in Agent Orange/dioxin in Vietnam has largely been focused on two issues. The first issue is determining the appropriate amount and type of assistance to provide to address the environmental damage and the health effects of dioxin contamination in Vietnam. The second issue is oversight of how such assistance has been utilized by the State Department and USAID. In November 2017, the United States and Vietnam completed the environmental remediation of approximately 90,000 cubic meters (118,000 cubic yards) of contaminated soil and 60,000 cubic meters (78,000 cubic yards) of lower risk materials at Danang airport by a process known as in-pile thermal desorption (IPTD). Restoration and project closure operations were completed in November 2018. The project took six years, with an estimated overall cost of $116 million. Field studies have identified a number of other areas in Vietnam contaminated with the dioxin associated with Agent Orange, including the airports near Bien Hoa and Phu Cat, as well as sections of the A Luoi Valley. In January 2018, U.S. and Vietnamese governments signed a memorandum of intent (MOI) to begin the cleanup of the Bien Hoa airport. According to a USAID study, the environmental cleanup of Bien Hoa airport could cost an estimated $137 million to $794 million, depending on what form of remediation is used. The provision of health-related assistance to areas contaminated with Agent Orange/dioxin has raised questions about how USAID has utilized appropriated funds. By May 2017, USAID had obligated less than two-thirds of the appropriated funds for FY2011-FY2017. The funds have generally been used for disability assistance programs regardless of the cause of the disability, rather than for both health and disability programs targeting populations residing near Agent Orange/dioxin "hot spots." While the obligations for environmental remediation activities generally have not been a matter of congressional concern, how USAID has obligated appropriations for health and disability activities has drawn some attention. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6) appropriated "not less than $20 million" for environmental remediation and "not less than $12.5 million … for health and disability programs in areas sprayed with Agent Orange and otherwise contaminated with dioxin." The Victims of Agent Orange Relief Act of 2019 (H.R. 326) would require the Secretary of State to provide assistance to individuals in Vietnam with health issues related to exposure to Agent Orange, as well as "to institutions in Vietnam that provide health care for covered individuals." The act would also require the Secretary of State to provide assistance "to remediate those geographic areas of Vietnam that the Secretary determines contain high levels of Agent Orange."

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Introduction The Office of Advocacy (Advocacy) is an "independent" office within the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) that is responsible for advancing "the views and concerns of small businesses before Congress, the White House, federal agencies, the federal courts, and state and local policymakers as appropriate." The Chief Counsel for Advocacy (Chief Counsel) directs the office and is appointed by the President from civilian life with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Chief Counsel and Advocacy support the development and growth of American small businesses by "intervening early in federal agencies' regulatory development processes on proposals that affect small entities and providing Regulatory Flexibility Act compliance training to federal agency policymakers and regulatory development officials; producing research to inform policymakers and other stakeholders on the impact of federal regulatory burdens on small businesses, to document the vital role of small businesses in the economy, and to explore and explain the wide variety of issues of concern to the small business community; and fostering a two-way communication between federal agencies and the small business community." Advocacy has 55 staff members and received an appropriation of $9.120 million for FY2019. Advocacy's responsibilities have expanded over time, and legislation has been introduced in recent Congresses to increase its authority still further. For example, during the 115 th Congress, the House passed H.R. 5 , the Regulatory Accountability Act of 2017 (Title III, Small Business Regulatory Flexibility Improvements Act), by a vote of 238-183. The bill would have, among other provisions, revised and enhanced requirements for federal agency notification of the Chief Counsel prior to the publication of any proposed rule; expanded the required use of small business advocacy review panels from three federal agencies to all federal agencies, including independent regulatory agencies; empowered the Chief Counsel to issue rules governing federal agency compliance with the RFA; specifically authorized the Chief Counsel to file comments on any notice of proposed rulemaking, not just when the RFA is concerned; and transferred size standard determinations for purposes other than the Small Business Act and the Small Business Investment Act of 1958 from the SBA's Administrator to the Chief Counsel. During the 113 th Congress, these provisions were included in H.R. 2542 , the Regulatory Flexibility Improvements Act of 2013, and were later included in H.R. 2804 , the Achieving Less Excess in Regulation and Requiring Transparency Act of 2014 (ALERRT Act of 2014), which the House passed on February 27, 2014, and in H.R. 4 , the Jobs for America Act (of 2014), which the House passed on September 18, 2014. During the 114 th Congress, these provisions were included in H.R. 527 , the Small Business Regulatory Flexibility Improvements Act of 2015, which was passed by the House on February 5, 2015. More recently, S. 83 , the Advocacy Empowerment Act of 2019, would empower the Chief Counsel to issue rules governing federal agency compliance with the RFA. In addition, during the 114 th Congress, S. 2847 , the Prove It Act of 2016, which was reported by the Senate Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship, would have authorized the Chief Counsel to request the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB's) Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) to review any federal agency certification that a proposed rule, if promulgated, will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities and, as a result, is not required to submit a regulatory flexibility analysis of the rule. If it is determined that the proposed rule would, if promulgated, have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities, the federal agency would then be required to perform both an initial and a final regulatory flexibility analysis for the rule. The bill was reintroduced during the 115 th Congress ( S. 2014 , the Prove It Act of 2017). This report examines Advocacy's origins and the expansion of its responsibilities over time; describes its organizational structure, funding, functions, and current activities; and discusses recent legislative efforts to further enhance its authority. Advocacy's Origins The Small Business Act of 1953 (P.L. 83-163, as amended) authorized the SBA and directed the agency to "aid, counsel, assist, and protect, insofar as is possible, the interests of small-business concerns." The SBA provided this advocacy function primarily through its administration of small business loan guaranty programs, contracting assistance programs, and management and training programs. The SBA Administrator serves as the lead advocate for small businesses within the federal government. Office of Chief Counsel for Advocacy During the early 1970s, several small business organizations indicated at congressional hearings that they were not wholly satisfied with the SBA's advocacy efforts, especially in achieving regulatory relief for small businesses. Congress responded to these concerns by approving legislation ( P.L. 93-386 , the Small Business Amendments of 1974) authorizing the SBA Administrator to create an Office of Chief Counsel for Advocacy and to appoint a Chief Counsel for Advocacy. The Chief Counsel was to serve as a focal point for the agency's advocacy efforts. P.L. 93-386 provided the Chief Counsel five duties: 1. serve as a focal point for the receipt of complaints, criticisms, and suggestions concerning the policies and activities of the Administration and any other federal agency that affects small businesses; 2. counsel small businesses on how to resolve questions and problems concerning the relationship of the small business to the federal government; 3. develop proposals for changes in the policies and activities of any agency of the federal government that will better fulfill the purposes of the Small Business Act and communicate such proposals to the appropriate federal agencies; 4. represent the views and interests of small businesses before other federal agencies whose policies and activities may affect small businesses; and 5. enlist the cooperation and assistance of public and private agencies, businesses, and other organizations in disseminating information about the programs and services provided by the federal government, which are of benefit to small businesses, and information on how small businesses can participate in or make use of such programs and services. The SBA created the Office of Chief Counsel for Advocacy in October 1974, and designated each of the SBA's regional, district, and branch office directors as the advocacy director for their area. The Office of Chief Counsel was placed under the Office of Advocacy, Planning and Research, which was headed by an Assistant Administrator. Anthony Stasio, a long-time, career manager within the SBA, was named the first Chief Counsel. Three deputy advocate positions were subsequently created and staffed: deputy advocate for Advisory Councils, deputy advocate for Government Relations, and deputy advocate for Small Business Organizations. The SBA's Office of Chief Counsel for Advocacy was fully operational as of March 1, 1975. An "Independent" Office of Advocacy As the Office of Advocacy began operations, several small business organizations lobbied Congress to provide the Chief Counsel greater independence from the SBA's Administrator. They argued that the SBA's Administrator reports to the White House and is subject to the OMB Director's influence. In their view, OMB, at that time, was more attuned to promoting the interests of large businesses than it was to promoting the interests of small businesses. Congress responded to these concerns by passing P.L. 94-305 , to amend the Small Business Act and Small Business Investment Act of 1958. Enacted on June 4, 1976, Title II of the act enhanced the Chief Counsel's authority by requiring the Office of Advocacy to be established as a separate, stand-alone office within the SBA and by requiring the Chief Counsel to be appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. P.L. 94-305 also retained Advocacy's five duties as identified in P.L. 93-386 ; specified that one of Advocacy's primary functions was to examine the role of small business in the American economy and the problems faced by small businesses and to recommend specific measures to address those problems; empowered the Chief Counsel, after consultation with and subject to the approval of the SBA Administrator, to employ and fix the compensation of necessary staff, without going through the normal competitive procedures directed by federal law and the Office of Personnel Management; specified that the Chief Counsel could obtain expert advice and other services, and hold hearings; directed each federal department, agency, and instrumentality to furnish the Chief Counsel with reports and information deemed by the Chief Counsel as necessary to carry out his or her functions; ordered the Chief Counsel to provide Congress, the President, and the SBA with information concerning his or her activities; and authorized to be appropriated $1 million for Advocacy, with any appropriated funds remaining available until expended. It was at this time that the word independent began to be used to describe the Chief Counsel and the Office of Advocacy. However, Advocacy remained a part of the SBA and subject to the sitting Administration's influence. For example, at that time, Advocacy's budget was provided through the SBA's salaries and expenses account, which was approved by the SBA Administrator; Advocacy's annual staffing allotment was subject to the SBA Administrator's approval; and some senior staff within Advocacy were vetted by the White House personnel office prior to hiring. Advocacy's Regulatory Oversight Role Expanded Advocacy's duties were further expanded following enactment of P.L. 96-354 , the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA, as amended). The RFA establishes in law the principle that government agencies must analyze the effects of their regulatory actions on small entities−small businesses, small nonprofits, and small governments−and consider alternatives that would be effective in achieving their regulatory objectives without unduly burdening these small entities. Advocacy has the responsibility of overseeing and facilitating federal agency compliance. The RFA's sponsors argued that federal agencies should be required to examine the impact of regulations on small businesses because federal regulations tend to be "uniform in design, permit little discretion in their implementation, and place a disproportionate burden upon small businesses, small organizations and small governmental bodies." As Alfred Dougherty Jr., director of the Federal Trade Commission's Bureau of Competition, testified at a congressional hearing: First, even if actual regulatory costs are equal between competing large and small firms, small firms have fewer units of output over which to spread such costs and must include in the price of each unit a larger component of regulatory cost. Second, where small firms have smaller actual regulatory costs than large firms (as is generally the case), small firms remain at a competitive disadvantage because they are unable to take advantage of the "economies of scale" of regulatory compliance. Large firms generally already have extensive "in-house" data compilation and reporting systems and specialized staff accountants, lawyers and managers whose primary function is regulatory compliance. Small firms, by comparison, must either hire additional personnel or purchase expensive consulting services in order to acquire the necessary regulatory expertise. Economist Milton Kafoglis, a member of the President Jimmy Carter's Council on Wage and Price Stability, testified that There seem to be clear economies of scale imposed by most regulatory endeavors. Uniform application of regulatory requirements thus seems to increase the size [of the] firm that can effectively compete. The cost curve of the firm is shifted upward … [with] the small firms' cost curve shifting more than that of the dominant firms [thus] the share of the dominant firm will increase while that of small firms will decrease. As a result, industrial concentration will have increased. This … suggests that the "small business" [regulatory] problem goes beyond mere sympathy for the small businessman, but strikes at the heart of the established national policy of maintaining competition and mitigating monopoly. As discussed below, the RFA requires federal agencies to assess the impact of their forthcoming regulations on s mall entities , which the act defines as small businesses, small governmental jurisdictions, and certain small not-for-profit organizations. The Chief Counsel is responsible for monitoring and reporting agencies' compliance with the act's provisions. The Chief Counsel also reviews and comments on proposed regulations and may appear as amicus curiae (i.e., friend of the court) in any court action to review a rule. Advocacy's Independent Status Enhanced P.L. 111-240 , the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, further enhanced Advocacy's independence by ending the practice of including Advocacy's budget in the SBA's Salaries and Expenses' Executive Direction account. Instead, the President is required to provide a separate statement of the amount of appropriations requested for Advocacy, "which shall be designated in a separate account in the General Fund of the Treasury." The Small Business Jobs Act also requires the SBA Administrator to provide Advocacy with "appropriate and adequate office space at central and field office locations, together with such equipment, operating budget, and communications facilities and services as may be necessary, and shall provide necessary maintenance services for such offices and the equipment and facilities located in such offices." In recognition of its enhanced independence and separate appropriations account, Advocacy, for the first time, issued its own congressional budget justification document and annual performance report as part of the Obama Administration's FY2013 budget request. That document was presented in a new appendix accompanying the SBA's congressional budget justification document and annual performance report. Advocacy has continued to issue its own budget justification document in each of the Administration's subsequent budget requests. Current Organizational Structure and Funding As mentioned previously, Advocacy currently has 55 staff members: 4, including the Chief Counsel, in the Office of the Chief Counsel; 16 in the Office of Interagency Affairs (regulatory staff); 9 in the Office of Economic Research; 6 in the Office of Information; 13 in the Office of Regional Affairs (regional advocates); and 7 in the Administrative Support Branch. The Office of Advocacy's organizational chart is presented below, with its anticipated staffing level. Advocacy received an appropriation of $9.120 million for FY2019. Staff salaries and benefits account for about 95% of Advocacy's budget, with the remainder used for economic research grants and direct expenses, such as subscriptions, travel, training, and office supplies. Advocacy and Federal Regulations Advocacy is responsible for monitoring and reporting on federal agency compliance with the RFA (5 U.S.C. §§601-612) and Executive Order 13272, Proper Consideration of Small Entities in Agency Rulemaking (August 13, 2002). Advocacy also comments on proposed rules and participates in small business advocacy review panels, among other activities. The RFA As mentioned previously, the RFA (as amended) requires federal agencies to assess the impact of their forthcoming regulations on small entities, which the act defines as including small businesses, small governmental jurisdictions, and certain small not-for-profit organizations. According to Advocacy, the RFA does not seek preferential treatment for small entities, require agencies to adopt regulations that impose the least burden on small entities, or mandate exemptions for small entities. Rather, it requires agencies to examine public policy issues using an analytical process that identifies, among other things, barriers to small business competitiveness and seeks a level playing field for small entities, not an unfair advantage. Under the RFA, Cabinet departments and independent agencies as well as independent regulatory agencies must prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis at the time certain proposed and final rules are issued. The analysis must describe, among other things, (1) the reasons why the regulatory action is being considered; (2) the small entities to which the proposed rule will apply and, where feasible, an estimate of their number; (3) the projected reporting, recordkeeping, and other compliance requirements of the proposed rule; and (4) any significant alternatives to the rule that would accomplish the statutory objectives while minimizing the impact on small entities. However, these analytical requirements are not triggered if the head of the issuing agency certifies that the proposed rule would not have a "significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities." The RFA does not define significant economic impact or substantial number of small entities . As a result, federal agencies have substantial discretion regarding when the act's analytical requirements are initiated. In addition, the RFA's analytical requirements do not apply to final rules for which the agency does not publish a proposed rule. The RFA also requires federal agencies to publish a "regulatory flexibility agenda" each April and October in the Federal Registe r , listing regulations that the agency expects to propose or promulgate which are likely to have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities; provide their regulatory flexibility agenda to the Chief Counsel and to small businesses or their representatives; retrospectively review rules that have or will have a significant impact within 10 years of their promulgation to determine whether they should be continued without change or should be amended or rescinded to minimize their impact on small entities; and ensure that small entities have an opportunity to participate in the rulemaking process. In addition, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) are required to convene a small business advocacy review panel (sometimes referred to as SBREFA panels) whenever they are developing a rule that is anticipated to have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. These panels consist of a representative or representatives from the rulemaking agency, OMB's Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), and the Chief Counsel. Information and advice from small entity representatives are solicited to assist the panel in understanding the ramifications of the proposed rule. The panel must be convened and complete its report, with recommendations, within a 60-day period. Finally, the RFA encourages the issuing agency to modify the proposed rule or initial regulatory flexibility analysis as appropriate, based on the information received from the panel. The RFA also requires the Chief Counsel to monitor and report at least annually on agencies' compliance with the act. The Chief Counsel accomplishes this primarily by reviewing and commenting on proposed regulations and by participating in small business advocacy review panels. In addition, the Chief Counsel may appear as amicus curiae (i.e., friend of the court) in any court action to review a rule. Executive Order 13272 Executive Order 13272, Proper Consideration of Small Entities in Agency Rulemaking (August 13, 2002), requires federal agencies to make information publicly available concerning how they will comply with the RFA's statutory mandates. It also requires federal agencies to send to Advocacy copies of any draft regulations that may have an impact on a substantial number of small entities. Agencies must send these draft regulations to Advocacy at the same time the draft rules are sent to OIRA for review, or at a reasonable time prior to their publication in the Federal Register . Agencies must consider Advocacy's comments on the proposed rule and must address these comments in the final rule published in the Federal Register . Executive Order 13272 requires Advocacy to notify federal agencies concerning how to comply with the RFA, which is accomplished primarily through Advocacy's periodic publication of A Guide for Government Agencies: How to Comply with the Regulatory Flexibility Act and through Advocacy's compliance training program; report annually on federal agency compliance with the executive order, which is accomplished primarily through Advocacy's annual publication of Report on the Regulatory Flexibility Act ; and train federal regulatory agencies in how to comply with the RFA, which is accomplished through Advocacy's compliance training program. Advocacy's Regulatory Activities Advocacy provided 17 official public comment letters to 20 federal agencies on a variety of proposed rules in FY2018. It also hosted 23 roundtable discussions in 16 states on proposed rules and regulatory topics. These roundtable discussions provided stakeholders an opportunity to share their views concerning the impact of proposed rules. Advocacy also provided training on RFA compliance to 132 federal officials at 6 rule-writing agencies. Each year, Advocacy provides an estimate of the regulatory cost savings its activities provide to small businesses in the form "of foregone capital or annual compliance costs that otherwise would have been required in the first year of a rule's implementation." These estimates are based primarily on estimates from the federal agencies promulgating the rules, and, in some instances, from industry estimates. Estimating the costs and benefits of federal regulations is methodologically challenging. For example, researchers must determine the baseline for measurement (i.e., what effects would have occurred in the absence of the regulation) and many regulatory cost estimates are based on aggregating the results of regulatory studies conducted years earlier. These studies often use different methods and vary in quality, making conclusions drawn from them problematic. Some observers, including OMB, doubt whether an accurate measure of total regulatory costs and benefits is possible. Moreover, in the case of Advocacy, estimating regulatory cost savings from its activities is even more challenging because it is nearly impossible to determine what changes to these regulations would have been made during the review and comment period if Advocacy did not exist. Advocacy reported that its intervention in rules that were made final resulted in regulatory cost savings on behalf of small businesses of $255.3 million in FY2018. Producing and Promoting Research on Small Businesses Advocacy's Office of Economic Research "assembles and uses data and other information from many different sources to develop data products that are as timely and actionable as possible." These products typically relate "to the role that small businesses play in the nation's economy, including the availability of credit, the effects of regulations and taxation, the role of firms owned by women, minority and veteran entrepreneurs, factors that influence entrepreneurship, innovation and other issues of concern to small businesses." In addition to sponsoring and conducting research on small business, Advocacy maintains web pages with links to state economic profiles, which are compiled annually by Office of Advocacy staff and provide information concerning small businesses in the state, such as number of small businesses in the state, the number of people employed by those small businesses in the state, and various demographic information concerning the small business owners in the state; firm size economic data, which are compiled by Advocacy staff from the U.S. Bureau of the Census and the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and provide information concerning various owner and business characteristics, such as the number of firms, number of establishments, employment, and annual payroll by the employment size of the business and by location and industry; quarterly economic bulletins, which are authored by Advocacy staff to examine trends in small business employment and lending; research projects which have been authored by Office of Advocacy staff, either by choice or by congressional mandate, and by others sponsored by Advocacy; fact sheets, which are authored by Office of Advocacy staff, covering various topics, such as gender differences in financing, the availability of health insurance among small businesses, and credit card financing; issue briefs, which are authored by Advocacy staff, covering various topics, such as veteran business owners and access to capital for women- and minority-owned businesses; and major sources of data collected by the federal government concerning small business. Advocacy also provides funding to the Census Bureau to support the generation of business data by firm size; publishes "The Small Business Advocate," a newsletter summarizing Advocacy's research endeavors, which has more than 36,000 online subscribers; and publishes "The Small Business Economy," an annual report on the status of small businesses and their role in the national economy. Advocacy's Research Activities Advocacy published 20 contract and internal research and data reports in FY2018. These reports covered a variety of issues, including crowdfunding, the regulatory development process, nonemployer businesses, and state rankings by small business economic indicators. In addition, Advocacy's economic research staff sponsored six "Small Business Economic Research Forums." These forums provide economists and researchers an opportunity "to discuss a key economic topic" and help "to keep Advocacy's staff up-to-date on the latest data and research from other agencies and researchers." Promoting Small Business Outreach As mentioned previously, Advocacy engages in outreach activities related to its role with the RFA. For example, in FY2016, Advocacy participated in seven small business advocacy review panels (one with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, two with the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, and four with the Environmental Protection Agency) and one in FY2018 (with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration). In each case, Advocacy provided outreach to small business owners interested in sharing their views concerning the agency's proposed rule. Advocacy also regularly sponsors roundtable discussions, conferences, and symposia to provide small business owners an opportunity to share their views on issues of concerns to them. For example, Advocacy's regional advocates regularly "interact directly with small businesses, small business trade associations, governors and state legislatures to educate them about the benefits of regulatory flexibility and testify at state-level legislation hearings on small business issues when requested to do so." Regional advocates also "work closely with the ten Regional Fairness Boards in their respective regions to develop information for the SBA's National Ombudsman, as provided for by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act and alert businesses in their respective regions about regulatory proposals that could affect them." The Chief Counsel also meets regularly with business organizations and trade associations, and participates in Advocacy roundtable discussions, conferences, and symposia. Advocacy's economists provide economic presentations at academic conferences, trade association meetings, think tank events, and other government-sponsored events. Advocacy's Outreach Activities Advocacy's regional advocates participated in 523 outreach events in FY2018. Advocacy's economists also made 18 presentations to academic, media, or other small business policy-related audiences. Current Congressional Issues As has been discussed, Advocacy's responsibilities have expanded over time. During the 115 th Congress, H.R. 5 , the Regulatory Accountability Act of 2017 (Title III, Small Business Regulatory Flexibility Improvements Act) was passed by the House. The bill would have increased Advocacy's authority still further. Specifically, H.R. 5 would have revised and enhanced requirements for federal agency notification of the Chief Counsel prior to the publication of any proposed rule; expanded the required use of small business advocacy review panels from three federal agencies to all federal agencies, including independent regulatory agencies; empowered the Chief Counsel to issue rules governing federal agency compliance with the RFA; specifically authorized the Chief Counsel to file comments on any notice of proposed rulemaking, not just when the RFA is concerned; and transferred size standard determinations for purposes other than the Small Business Act and the Small Business Investment Act of 1958 from the SBA's Administrator to the Chief Counsel. Arguments for Expanding Advocacy's Authority Advocates of expanding Advocacy's authority and role under the RFA argue that legislation is necessary to "close loopholes [in the RFA] and more effectively reduce the disproportionate burden that over-regulation places on small entities, thereby enhancing job creation and hastening economic recovery." They argue that recent regulatory expansions and the future threat of further excessive federal regulation—such as under the waves of regulation occurring to implement the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act—have created immense regulatory burdens and uncertainty for the economy, chilling job creation, investment and economic growth and suppressing America's economic freedom and standing among the world's economies. These effects are particularly burdensome on small businesses—and since start-up firms are the source of net job creation in the U.S. economy it is only logical that the impact of these effects on small businesses contributes substantially to the economy's inability to create sufficient levels of new jobs. Advocates of expanding the Office of Advocacy's authority also note that the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has found that the lack of a uniform definition for the terms significant economic impact , and substantial number of small entities contributes to inconsistent compliance with the RFA across federal agencies. They argue that GAO's findings are further evidence that the RFA needs to be amended. Arguments Against Expanding Advocacy's Authority Opponents of expanding Advocacy's authority and role under the RFA argue that the provisions being advocated are part of an "ongoing attack on federal regulation," presented under the guise of "pro-small business rhetoric, which will erect significant barriers to rulemaking that will hinder the promulgation of critical public health and safety protections." They argue that these provisions are (1) based on the false premise that regulatory costs stifle economic growth and job creation; (2) threatens public health and safety by severely undermining federal agency rulemaking; (3) imposes additional duties on agencies while failing to provide for any additional resources to meet such burdens, and (4) allows more opportunities for industry to delay or defeat proposed rulemakings. Opponents also argue that these provisions do nothing to alleviate the purported burden on small entities of complying with federal regulations. In fact, it includes no provision that offers assistance to small entities, whether through subsidies, government guaranteed loans, preferential tax treatment for small firms, or fully funded compliance assistance offices. Instead, the bill merely aggrandizes the power of the SBA's Office of Advocacy and of the professional lobbying class in Washington. Concluding Observations The SBA's Office of Advocacy is a relatively small office with a relatively large mandate—to represent the interests of small business in the regulatory process, produce and promote small business economic research, and facilitate small business outreach across the federal government. It faces several challenges. First, Advocacy is generally recognized as being an independent office, but it is housed within the SBA and remains subject to its influence through (1) its proximity to the agency and its organizational culture; (2) the budgetary process, which provides the SBA Administrator a role, albeit recently reduced, in determining Advocacy's budget; and (3) the sheer size of the SBA (more than 5,000 employees and an annual budget exceeding $700 million) relative to Advocacy which, given their statutorily overlapping missions as advocates for small businesses, makes it more difficult than would otherwise be the case for stakeholders to recognize Advocacy as the definitive voice for small businesses. Second, Chief Counsels tend to have relatively short tenures (three years, eight years, one year, seven years, six years, four years, and one year). When they leave office, there have often been delays in naming a successor, creating continuity problems for Advocacy. For example, the position was filled on an interim basis by Claudia Rodgers, a long-time Advocacy senior staff member, from January 2015 (following Winslow Sargeant's departure) until Darryl L. DePriest's Senate confirmation on December 10, 2015. DePriest left office in January 2017. Major L. Clark, III, previously Assistant Chief Counsel for Procurement Policy for Advocacy, is currently filling the Chief Counsel's position on an interim basis. Chief Counsels leave office for various reasons, such as a change in Administration or for more lucrative positions in the private sector. Third, one of Advocacy's primary functions is to monitor and report on federal agency compliance with the RFA, provide comments on proposed rules, and train federal regulatory officials to assist them in complying with the RFA's provisions. However, as GAO has noted, the RFA does not define significant economic impact or substantial number of small entities , two key terms for triggering Advocacy's role under the RFA. The lack of clarity concerning these key terms makes it difficult for Advocacy to objectively determine agency compliance with the RFA and also makes it more difficult for Advocacy to train federal regulatory officials in how to come into compliance with the act. GAO and others have recommended that Congress clarify the meaning of these terms. However, the RFA's original authors purposely decided not to provide a precise definition for these terms. They argued that the varying missions and constituencies served by federal agencies necessitated the provision of discretion to allow federal agencies to "determine what is significant to their programs and particular constituencies." Fourth, Advocacy is subject to criticism from those who believe that it should be more aggressive in preventing federal regulations (i.e., from those who generally oppose federal regulations, especially regulations related to environmental issues and health care reform) and from those who believe that it should be less aggressive in this regard (i.e., from those who generally view federal regulations favorably, especially in addressing environmental and workplace safety issues). Thus, Advocacy often finds itself involved in ideological and partisan disputes concerning the outcome of federal regulatory policies for which it does not have the final say. Finally, Advocacy's relatively limited budget restricts its ability to produce and promote economic research on small businesses and to engage in outreach activities, particularly outreach activities not directly related to its RFA role. It could be argued that Advocacy does not need additional resources for these endeavors because the SBA engages in these same activities. Once again, this reflects the challenges the Office of Advocacy faces as an independent office operating within a much larger federal agency with an overlapping mission.

The Office of Advocacy (Advocacy) is an "independent" office within the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) that advances "the views and concerns of small businesses before Congress, the White House, federal agencies, the federal courts, and state and local policymakers as appropriate." The Chief Counsel for Advocacy (Chief Counsel) directs the office and is appointed by the President from civilian life with the advice and consent of the Senate. Advocacy is a relatively small office with a relatively large mandate—to represent the interests of small business in the regulatory process, provide Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) compliance training to federal regulatory officials, produce and promote small business economic research to inform policymakers and other stakeholders concerning the impact of federal regulatory burdens on small businesses and the role of small businesses in the economy, and facilitate small business outreach across the federal government. This report examines Advocacy's origins and the expansion of its responsibilities over time; describes its organizational structure, funding, functions, and current activities; and discusses recent legislative efforts to further enhance its authority. For example, during the 115th Congress, the House passed H.R. 5, the Regulatory Accountability Act of 2017 (Title III, Small Business Regulatory Flexibility Improvements Act), which would have expanded Advocacy's responsibilities. It would have revised and enhanced requirements for federal agency notification of the Chief Counsel prior to the publication of any proposed rule; expanded the required use of small business advocacy review panels from three federal agencies to all federal agencies, including independent regulatory agencies; empowered the Chief Counsel to issue rules governing federal agency compliance with the RFA; specifically authorized the Chief Counsel to file comments on any notice of proposed rulemaking, not just when the RFA is concerned; and transferred size standard determinations for purposes other than the Small Business Act and the Small Business Investment Act of 1958 from the SBA's Administrator to the Chief Counsel. The House passed similar legislation during the 114th Congress (H.R. 527). The analysis suggests that Advocacy faces several challenges. Advocacy, generally recognized as being an independent office, is housed within the much larger SBA which, given their statutorily overlapping missions as advocates for small businesses, makes it more difficult for stakeholders to recognize Advocacy as the definitive voice for small businesses. Chief Counsels tend to have relatively short tenures, creating continuity problems for Advocacy. The RFA does not define significant economic impact or substantial number of small entities, two key terms for triggering Advocacy's role under the RFA. The lack of clarity concerning these key terms makes it difficult for Advocacy to objectively determine agency compliance with the RFA and to train federal regulatory officials in how to come into compliance with the act. Advocacy often finds itself involved in ideological and partisan disputes concerning the outcome of federal regulatory policies for which it does not have the final say. Advocacy's ability to produce and promote economic research on small businesses and to engage in outreach activities, particularly outreach activities not directly related to its RFA role, is constrained by its relatively limited budgetary resources.

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Overview The Select Committee on the Modernization of Congress is the most recent effort of the House of Representatives to examine its internal procedures and operations through the use of a specialized committee, commission, or party conference or caucus group. The original Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress was constituted during the 79 th Congress (1945-1946) for the purpose of strengthening the role of Congress and its committees in the lawmaking process. In 1965, Congress reincarnated this joint committee to suggest additional changes in how the two chambers operate, and the committee was reconstituted during the 102 nd and 103 rd Congresses (1991-1994). While these efforts were bicameral in nature, other examinations of congressional operations, such as that being undertaken by this panel, have been focused primarily on the House. Establishment and Duration On January 4, 2019, the House established the Select Committee on the Modernization of Congress by adopting Title II of H.Res. 6 , the House rules package for the 116 th Congress (2019-2020), on a 418-12 vote. The stated purpose of the select committee is "to investigate, study, make findings, hold public hearings, and develop recommendations on modernizing Congress." The select committee's authorization ends on February 1, 2020, and any activities beyond that date would require additional authorization. Membership of the Select Committee Twelve Members have been appointed by the Speaker to the select committee in accordance with H.Res. 6 , six of whom were appointed on the recommendation of the minority leader. The committee's authorizing resolution further requires the membership of the committee to include two freshman Members, two Members from the Committee on Rules, and two Members from the Committee on House Administration. The membership of this committee differs from that of other committees in three key ways: 1. Party ratios on committees generally reflect the overall party balance in the chamber. The select committee, however, is composed of an equal number of Democrats and Republicans (like the House Ethics Committee). 2. Service on the select committee does not count toward the committee membership limitations in House Rule X. 3. Members of the select committee are appointed by the Speaker based in part on recommendations of the minority leader. By comparison, placement on a standing committee generally occurs on the basis of a three-step process: first, recommendations of a party's steering committee are made; second, each party must approve those recommendations; third, committee assignment resolutions ratifying each party's selections are adopted on the House floor. On January 4, 2019, Speaker Pelosi selected Representative Derek Kilmer (WA) to serve as chair of the Select Committee on the Modernization of Congress. On January 29, 2019, the Speaker appointed the five additional Democratic Members: Emanuel Cleaver (MO), Suzan DelBene (WA), Zoe Lofgren (CA), Mark Pocan (WI), and Mary Gay Scanlon (PA). On February 11, Republican Leader Kevin McCarthy recommended the six GOP Members: Tom Graves (vice chair, GA), Rob Woodall (GA), Susan Brooks (IN), Rodney Davis (IL), Dan Newhouse (WA), and William Timmons (SC). Committee Rules and Procedures Section two of the select committee's authorizing resolution (Title II of H.Res. 6 ) created a set of procedures specific to the select committee that will help guide the committee's work during its year-long operation. These rules supplement House Rules X and XI, which govern most committee procedure that applies to the select committee, with certain exceptions. No legislative jurisdiction was delegated to the committee—introduced measures will not be referred to it. The committee has the broad responsibility to study House operations with an eye toward modernizing the conduct of its business. In particular, the committee is charged with investigating the following seven areas: 1. rules to promote a more modern and efficient Congress; 2. procedures, including the schedule and calendar; 3. policies to develop the next generation of leaders; 4. staff recruitment, diversity, retention, and compensation and benefits; 5. administrative efficiencies, including purchasing, travel, outside services, and shared administrative staff; 6. technology and innovation; and 7. the work of the House Commission on Congressional Mailing Standards (Franking Commission). Building on the requirements of H.Res. 6, the select committee by a unanimous vote agreed to additional rules of procedure at its first meeting, held on March 12, 2019. The committee established its regular meeting day (the first Tuesday of each month), quorum requirements for various committee activities, and how the committee intends to conduct its questioning of invited witnesses. It takes two Members to make a quorum for a hearing, one-third for a markup (for instance, of any report the committee might release), and a majority "actually present" to issue a report. Committee rules also incentivize on-time arrival at a hearing with "early-bird" rules allowing Members present at the start to question witnesses before late-arrivers. The chair (Representative Kilmer) and vice chair (Representative Graves) are provided five minutes each to make opening statements, and the chair may recognize others to make opening statements as well. Committee rules place an overall time limit of 10 minutes for opening statements. Questioning witnesses occurs under the five-minute rule, and any committee member may submit to the chair "questions for the record" (written questions to witnesses who appeared) within 10 business days of a hearing. Although the committee is not authorized to issue subpoenas to compel the attendance of witnesses or the production of documents, it "may recommend subpoenas and depositions and submit such recommendations to the relevant standing committee." Funding and Staffing On March 26, 2019, the Committee on House Administration reported H.Res. 245 , a resolution to fund House standing and select committees during the 116 th Congress, which the House agreed to the following day. This resolution authorized $487,500 for expenditures of the select committee during the course of its investigation. With operations of the select committee scheduled to end on February 1, 2020, all but $37,500 of this amount has been reserved for use during the first session of the 116 th Congress (2019). Prior to the adoption of H.Res. 245 , the select committee was provided with interim funding. In addition, pursuant to H.Res. 6 , the select committee may use the services of House staff. Hearings Consistent with its mandate, the committee's first hearing (March 12) was held for the purpose of receiving testimony from Members themselves regarding any suggested improvements to congressional operations. Thirty-five Members testified before the committee to present their own reform ideas spanning a wide range of subjects—for instance, changes to the standing rules, family-friendly adjustments to the House schedule, additional resources to support the work of Congress, and ways to delegate more policymaking responsibilities to individual Members. The committee's next three hearings (held on March 27, May 1, and May 10) included testimony from Capitol Hill practitioners, former Members, scholars, and others on a number of proposals the committee might consider in making its own recommendations. Additional hearings and other meetings are likely to be convened throughout calendar year 2019, and information on current and upcoming activities of the committee can be found on its official website. Publication of Final Report H.Res. 6 states that the select committee "shall submit a final report to the House." The final report is to include the committee's findings and any policy recommendations it might have. Documents produced by House committees generally require a majority of the committee with a quorum present to support their publication. In the case of the select committee, a higher threshold of two-thirds is required to publish its final report. Given that the committee is composed of six Members from each party, some amount of bipartisan support will be needed to publish the final report. If all committee members are present for this vote, support from at least 8 of the 12 would be needed to meet the two-thirds threshold. Public Availability of Committee Records and Their Disposition House rules generally require committees to make their proceedings and written documents available to the public within a specified period of time. The select committee is not excepted from this obligation. As specified in Committee Rule 6, "documents reflecting the proceedings of the Committee shall be made publicly available ... not more than 24 hours after each meeting has adjourned." After the committee's work is concluded, any records it produced during the course of its investigation will be distributed to the relevant standing committee(s) as designated by the Speaker, and any recommendations offered by the committee in its final report must be made public within 30 days of its submission to the House. CRS Experts List The below CRS experts are available to answer inquiries from congressional clients concerning the topics specified.

On January 4, 2019, the House established the Select Committee on the Modernization of Congress by adopting Title II of H.Res. 6, the House rules package for the 116th Congress (2019-2020), on a 418-12 vote. The purpose of the select committee as stated in its authorizing resolution is "to investigate, study, make findings, hold public hearings, and develop recommendations on modernizing Congress." Twelve Members, six from each party, have been selected by their leadership to serve on the select committee during its year-long investigation. The committee's authorizing resolution requires its membership to include two Members from the freshman class of the 116th Congress, two Members of the Rules Committee, and two Members of the Committee on House Administration. Funding for the select committee in the amount of $487,500 was provided through House adoption of H.Res. 245 on March 27, 2019. The committee has held four hearings to date, with additional meetings likely. Committee operations are scheduled to end on February 1, 2020. Any final report of the committee will be made public. Publication of the final report will require approval from at least two-thirds of the committee. Given that both parties are equally represented on the committee, some amount of bipartisan support will be needed to approve and publish the final report.

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Introduction Foreign assistance is one of the tools the United States employs to advance U.S. interests in Latin America and the Caribbean. The focus and funding levels of aid programs change along with broader U.S. policy goals. Current aid programs reflect the diverse needs of the countries in the region (see Figure 1 for a map of Latin America and the Caribbean). Some countries receive the full range of U.S. assistance as they struggle with political, socioeconomic, and security challenges. Others have made major strides in consolidating democratic governance and improving living conditions; these countries no longer receive traditional U.S. development assistance but typically receive some U.S. support to address security challenges, such as transnational crime. Congress authorizes and appropriates foreign assistance to the region and conducts oversight of aid programs and the executive branch agencies charged with managing them. The Trump Administration has proposed significant reductions in foreign assistance expenditures to shift resources to other budget priorities. The Administration also is reassessing the objectives of U.S. foreign assistance efforts, including those in Latin America and the Caribbean. However, Congress would have to approve any shifts in aid funding levels or priorities. This report provides an overview of U.S. assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean. It examines historical and recent trends in aid to the region; the Trump Administration's FY2019 budget request for aid administered by the State Department, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Inter-American Foundation; and FY2019 foreign aid appropriations legislation. It also analyzes how the Administration's efforts to scale back assistance could affect U.S. policy in Latin America and the Caribbean. Trends in U.S. Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean The United States has long been a major contributor of foreign assistance to countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. Between 1946 and 2017, the United States provided the region with more than $88 billion ($181 billion in constant 2017 dollars) of assistance. U.S. assistance to the region spiked in the early 1960s following the introduction of President John F. Kennedy's Alliance for Progress, an anti-poverty initiative that sought to counter Soviet and Cuban influence in the aftermath of Fidel Castro's 1959 seizure of power in Cuba. After a period of decline, U.S. assistance to the region increased again following the 1979 assumption of power by the leftist Sandinistas in Nicaragua. Throughout the 1980s, the United States provided considerable support to Central American governments battling leftist insurgencies to prevent potential Soviet allies from establishing political or military footholds in the region. U.S. aid flows declined in the mid-1990s, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Central American conflicts (see Figure 2 ). U.S. foreign assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean began to increase once again in the late 1990s and remained on a generally upward trajectory through 2010. The higher levels of assistance were partially the result of increased spending on humanitarian and development assistance. In the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch in 1998, the United States provided extensive humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to several countries in Central America. The establishment of the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief in 2003 and the Millennium Challenge Corporation in 2004 also provided a number of countries in the region with new sources of U.S. assistance. In addition, the United States provided significant assistance to Haiti in the aftermath of a massive earthquake in 2010. Increased funding for counternarcotics and security programs also contributed to the rise in U.S. assistance. Beginning with President Bill Clinton and the 106 th Congress in FY2000, successive Administrations and Congresses provided substantial amounts of foreign aid to Colombia and its Andean neighbors to combat drug trafficking in the region and end Colombia's long-running internal armed conflict. Spending received another boost in FY2008, when President George W. Bush joined with his Mexican counterpart to announce the Mérida Initiative, a package of U.S. counter-drug and anti-crime assistance for Mexico and Central America. In FY2010, Congress and the Obama Administration split the Central American portion of the Mérida Initiative into a separate Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) and created a similar program for the countries of the Caribbean known as the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI). U.S. assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean began to decline again in FY2011. Although the decline was partially the result of reductions in the overall U.S. foreign assistance budget in the aftermath of the U.S. recession, it also reflected changes in the region. Due to stronger economic growth and more effective social policies, the percentage of people living in poverty in Latin America fell from 45% in 2002 to 30% in 2017. Some nations, such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Uruguay, are now in a position to provide technical assistance to other countries in the region. Other nations, such as Bolivia and Ecuador, have expelled U.S. personnel and opposed U.S. assistance projects, leading to the closure of USAID offices. Collectively, these changes have resulted in the U.S. government concentrating foreign assistance resources in fewer countries and sectors. Aid levels have rebounded since FY2014, largely due to a renewed focus on Central America in response to recent migration trends, but appropriations remain below the FY2008-FY2013 average. Trump Administration's FY2019 Foreign Assistance Budget Request5 The Trump Administration requested $1.1 billion for Latin America and the Caribbean through foreign assistance accounts managed by the State Department and USAID in FY2019. That amount would have been $581 million, or 34%, less than the estimated $1.7 billion of assistance Congress appropriated for the region in FY2018 (see Table 1 ). The Administration also proposed eliminating the Inter-American Foundation—a small, independent U.S. foreign assistance agency that promotes grassroots development in Latin America and the Caribbean—and consolidating its programs into USAID. The proposed reductions for the region were slightly greater than the 28% reduction proposed for the global foreign aid budget. Congress ultimately did not adopt many of the Administration's proposed cuts (see " Legislative Developments ," below). Foreign Assistance Categories and Accounts7 About $515.9 million (46%) of the Administration's proposed FY2019 foreign aid budget for Latin America and the Caribbean was requested through a new Economic Support and Development Fund (ESDF). The ESDF foreign assistance account would have consolidated aid that currently is provided through the Development Assistance (DA) and Economic Support Fund (ESF) accounts to support democracy, the rule of law, economic reform, education, agriculture, and natural resource management. Whereas the DA account is often used for long-term projects to foster broad-based economic progress and social stability in developing countries, the ESDF account, like the ESF account, would focus more on countries and programs that are deemed critical to short-term U.S. security and strategic objectives. The FY2019 request included $296.4 million (36%) less funding for the ESDF account than was provided to the region through the DA and ESF accounts combined in FY2018. Another $151.4 million (14%) of the Administration's FY2019 request for the region would have been provided through the two Global Health Programs (GHP) accounts. This amount includes $119.2 million requested through the State Department GHP account for HIV/AIDS programs and $32.2 million requested through the USAID GHP account to support maternal and child health, nutrition, and malaria programs. Under the FY2019 request for the region, funding for the State Department GHP account would have declined by $17.5 million (13%) and funding for the USAID GHP account would have declined by $31.2 million (49%) compared with the FY2018 estimate. The remaining $442.9 million (40%) of the Administration's FY2019 request for Latin America and the Caribbean would have supported security assistance programs, including the following: $390 million requested through the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account for counter-narcotics and civilian law enforcement efforts and projects intended to strengthen judicial institutions. INCLE funding for the region would have declined by $152.2 million (28%) compared with the FY2018 estimate. $21.9 million requested through the Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR) account, which funds efforts to counter global threats, such as terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and humanitarian demining programs. NADR funding would have declined by $1.7 million (7%) compared with the FY2018 estimate. $11.1 million requested through the International Military Education and Training (IMET) account to train Latin American and Caribbean military personnel. IMET funding would have declined by $1.5 million (12%) compared with the FY2018 estimate. $20 million requested through the Foreign Military Financing account to provide U.S.-made defense equipment to Colombia. FMF funding would have declined by $66 million (77%) compared with the FY2018 estimate. Major Country and Regional Programs The Trump Administration's FY2019 foreign assistance request would have reduced funding for nearly every country and regional program in Latin America and the Caribbean (see Table 2 ). Some of the most notable reductions that the Administration proposed are discussed below. The FY2019 request included $435.5 million to continue the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America, which would have been a $191 million (30%) cut compared with the FY2018 estimate. The strategy is designed to address the underlying conditions driving irregular migration from the Central America to the United States by promoting good governance, economic prosperity, and improved security in the region. The request included $252.8 million for CARSI (-21%), $45.7 million for El Salvador (-21%), $69.4 million for Guatemala (-42%), $65.8 million for Honduras (-18%), and $1.8 million combined for Belize, Costa Rica, and Panama (-82%). It did not include any democracy assistance to support civil society groups in Nicaragua; such assistance totaled $10 million in FY2018. Colombia would have remained the single largest recipient of U.S. assistance in Latin America and the Caribbean under the Administration's FY2019 request; however, aid would have fallen to $265.4 million—a $125.8 million (32%) reduction compared with the FY2018 estimate. Colombia has received significant amounts of U.S. assistance to support counternarcotics and counterterrorism efforts since FY2000. The FY2019 request included funds to support implementation of the Colombian government's peace accord with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC); it sought to foster reconciliation within Colombian society, expand state presence to regions historically under FARC control, and support rural economic development in marginalized communities. The request also included funds to support Colombia's drug eradication and interdiction efforts. Haiti, which has received high levels of aid for many years as a result of its significant development challenges, would have remained the second-largest recipient of U.S. assistance in the region in FY2019 under the Administration's request. U.S. assistance increased significantly after a massive earthquake struck Haiti in 2010 but has gradually declined from those elevated levels. The Administration's FY2019 request would have provided $170.5 million to Haiti to improve food security, increase economic opportunity, promote good governance, and address health challenges (particularly HIV/AIDS). This would have been a $13.9 million (8%) cut compared with the FY2018 estimate. Mexico would have received $78.9 million of assistance under the FY2019 request, which would have been a $73.8 million (48%) cut compared with the FY2018 estimate. Mexico traditionally had not been a major U.S. aid recipient due to its middle-income status, but it began receiving larger amounts of counternarcotics and anti-crime assistance through the Mérida Initiative in FY2008. The Administration's FY2019 request for Mexico included funds to strengthen the rule of law; secure borders and ports; and combat transnational organized crime, including opium poppy cultivation and heroin production. The FY2019 request included $36.2 million for the CBSI, which would have been a $21.5 million (37%) cut compared with the FY2018 estimate. The CBSI funds maritime and aerial security cooperation, law enforcement capacity building, border and port security, justice-sector reform, and crime prevention programs in the Caribbean. Inter-American Foundation In addition to the proposed reductions to State Department and USAID-managed assistance for the region, discussed above, the Trump Administration's FY2019 budget request proposed eliminating the Inter-American Foundation (IAF) and consolidating its programs into USAID. The IAF is an independent U.S. foreign assistance agency established through the Foreign Assistance Act of 1969 ( 22 U.S.C. §290f ). Congress created the agency after conducting a comprehensive review of previous assistance efforts and determining that programs at the government-to-government level had largely failed to promote social and civic change in the region despite fostering economic growth. With annual appropriations of $22.5 million in recent years, the IAF provides grants and other targeted assistance directly to the organized poor to foster economic and social development and to encourage civic engagement in their communities. The IAF is active in 20 countries in the region—including eight countries in which USAID no longer has a presence—and has focused particularly on migrant-sending communities in Central America since 2014. The Trump Administration asserted that merging the IAF's small grants programs into USAID would "better integrate them with USAID's existing global development programs, more cohesively serve U.S. foreign policy objectives, and increase organizational efficiencies through reducing duplication and overhead." The FY2019 request included $3.5 million to conduct an orderly IAF closeout and $20 million under USAID's Latin America and Caribbean Regional program to continue providing small grants to poor and remote communities throughout the region (see Table 3 ). Opponents of the merger noted that Congress specifically created the IAF as an alternative to other U.S. agencies. They argued that USAID would not be able to maintain the IAF's distinct model and flexibility, which have allowed it to invest in innovative projects and work with groups that otherwise would be unable or unwilling to partner with the U.S. government. Legislative Developments On February 15, 2019, nearly four and a half months into the fiscal year, President Trump signed into law the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P.L. 116-6 ). Division F of the act—the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2019—includes funding for foreign assistance programs in Latin America and the Caribbean. The measure was preceded by three short-term continuing resolutions ( P.L. 115-245 , P.L. 115-298 , and P.L. 116-5 ), which funded foreign assistance programs at the FY2018 level, and a 35-day lapse in appropriations from December 22, 2018, to January 25, 2019. Although the House and Senate Appropriations Committees had approved their FY2019 foreign assistance appropriations measures ( H.R. 6385 and S. 3108 , respectively) in June 2018, neither bill received floor consideration prior to the end of the 115 th Congress. P.L. 116-6 and the accompanying joint explanatory statement do not specify foreign assistance appropriations levels for every Latin American and Caribbean nation. Nevertheless, the amounts designated for key U.S. initiatives in Central America, Colombia, and Mexico significantly exceed the Administration's request (see Table 4 ). Central America. According to the joint explanatory statement, the act provides $527.6 million to continue implementation of the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America. That amount is $92 million more than the Administration requested but $99 million less than Congress appropriated for the initiative in FY2018. Unlike previous years, the measure provides the Secretary of State with significant flexibility to decide how to allocate the funds among the nations of the region. The joint explanatory statement notes that the Secretary of State should take into account the political will of Central American governments, including their demonstrated commitment to implement reforms "to reduce illegal migration and reduce corruption and impunity." Colombia. The act provides "not less than" $418.3 million for Colombia, which is nearly $153 million more than the Administration requested and $27 million more than Congress appropriated in FY2018. The joint explanatory statement notes that the additional funding for FY2019, appropriated through the INCLE account, is intended to "bolster Colombia's drug eradication and interdiction efforts and enhance rural security." Mexico . According to the joint explanatory statement, the act provides $162.7 million for Mexico. That amount is nearly $84 million more than the Administration requested and $10 million more than Congress appropriated for Mexico in FY2018. The additional funding for FY2019 is intended to support security and rule-of-law efforts, such as "programs to assist the Government of Mexico in securing its borders and reducing poppy cultivation and heroin and synthetic drug production." Venezuela. The act provides "not less than" $17.5 million for programs to promote democracy and the rule of law in Venezuela. The joint explanatory statement notes that the legislation also includes assistance for Venezuelan refugees and migrants who have been forced to leave the country. Inter-American Foundation. The act provides $22.5 million for the IAF, which is the same amount Congress appropriated for the agency in FY2018. The joint explanatory statement designates an additional $10 million, appropriated through the DA account, as a transfer to the IAF to carry out programs in Central America. Implications for U.S. Policy The Trump Administration's efforts to scale back U.S. foreign assistance could have significant implications for U.S. policy in Latin America and the Caribbean in the coming years. In particular, they could accelerate U.S. efforts to transition countries in the region away from traditional development assistance and toward other forms of bilateral engagement. They also could result in the Department of Defense (DOD) taking on a larger role in U.S. security cooperation with the region. Moreover, many argue the Administration's proposed foreign assistance cuts, combined with other U.S. policy shifts and the region's growing economic ties with other countries, such as China, could contribute to a relative decline in U.S. influence in Latin America and the Caribbean. Aid Transitions Over the past three decades, many Latin American and Caribbean countries have made major strides in consolidating democratic governance and improving living conditions for their citizens. As nations have achieved more advanced levels of development, the U.S. government has reduced the amount of assistance it provides to them while attempting to sustain long-standing relationships through other forms of engagement. Budget cuts often have accelerated this process by forcing U.S. agencies to refocus their assistance efforts on fewer countries. In the mid-1990s, for example, budget constraints compelled USAID to close its field offices in Argentina, Belize, Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay. Similarly, budget cuts in the aftermath of the 2007-2009 U.S. recession contributed to USAID's decision to close its field offices in Guyana and Panama. The Trump Administration's desire to reduce foreign assistance funding could contribute to a new round of aid transitions. The FY2019 budget request would have zeroed out traditional development assistance for Brazil, Jamaica, and Nicaragua, and would have reduced it significantly for several other countries in the region. Although it appears as though many of those reductions were not enacted in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P.L. 116-6 ), the Administration may push for further cuts in the coming years. The Administration's National Security Strategy, released in December 2017, asserts that the United States "will shift away from a reliance on assistance based on grants to approaches that attract private capital and catalyze private sector activity." Likewise, USAID has begun to reorient all of its country partnerships around the concept of "self-reliance," placing a greater emphasis on supporting countries' abilities to plan, finance, and implement solutions to their own development challenges. Some development experts caution that such transitions should be done in a strategic manner to ensure that partner countries are able to sustain the progress that has been made with past U.S. investments and to prevent ruptures in bilateral relations that could be exploited by competing powers or compromise U.S. interests. These experts argue that successful transitions require careful planning and close coordination across the U.S. government, as well as with partner-country governments, local stakeholders, and other international donors. In their view, a timeline of three to five years, at a minimum, is necessary for the transition process. A decision to no longer appropriate new foreign aid funds for a given country would not necessarily lead to an abrupt end to ongoing U.S. assistance programs. In recent years, Congress has appropriated most aid for Latin America and the Caribbean through foreign assistance accounts that provide the State Department and USAID with up to two fiscal years to obligate the funds and an additional four years to expend them. As a result, U.S. agencies often have a pipeline of previously appropriated funds available to be expended on assistance programs. If aid transitions do occur, the United States could remain engaged with its partners in the region in several ways. As large-scale development programs are closed out, the U.S. government could use smaller, more nimble programs, such as those managed by the IAF, to maintain its presence in remote areas and continue to build relationships with local leaders. As grant assistance is withdrawn, the U.S. government could help partner countries mobilize private capital by entering into trade and investment agreements or by providing loan guarantees and technical assistance through the newly authorized U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (IDFC). As former aid recipients look to share their development expertise with other nations, the U.S. government could enter into trilateral cooperation initiatives to jointly fund and implement programs in third countries that remain priorities for U.S. assistance. Congress has demonstrated an interest in influencing the pace and shape of aid transitions. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 ( P.L. 115-141 ) directed the USAID Administrator to submit a report to Congress describing the conditions and benchmarks under which aid transitions may occur, the actions required by USAID to facilitate such transitions, descriptions of the associated costs, and plans for ensuring post-transition development progress. The report, submitted in October 2018, notes that USAID has selected 17 publicly available, third-party metrics to help the agency assess the relative self-reliance of every country. If, after taking into account additional country-specific information, the agency determines a country is ready to transition, USAID is to begin an in-depth, consultative assessment process to consider potential models for continued partnership. The results of that process are to inform an implementation plan that will lay out the activities, resources, and sequencing needed to ensure a successful transition. Jamaica is one of two countries worldwide that USAID is using to test the new strategic transition process. Congress could require USAID to provide additional information as the agency continues to develop its framework for strategic transitions and moves forward with the pilot project in Jamaica. For example, in the 115 th Congress, H.R. 6385 would have required the USAID Administrator to regularly consult with Congress and development stakeholders on "efforts to transition nations from assistance recipients to enduring diplomatic, economic, and security partners." Changes in Security Cooperation The Trump Administration's approach toward Latin America and the Caribbean has focused heavily on U.S. national security objectives. For example, the Administration described the FY2019 foreign assistance request for the region as an effort to "break the power of transnational criminal organizations and networks; shut down the illicit pathways used to traffic humans, drugs, money and weapons; and address the underlying causes that contribute to outmigration." The Administration's FY2019 budget proposal, however, would have reduced State Department-managed security assistance to the region (INCLE, NADR, IMET, and FMF) by 33% compared with the FY2018 estimate. Some analysts have noted that any cuts to State Department-managed security assistance programs in Latin America and the Caribbean could be offset by increased support from DOD. Congress has authorized DOD to provide a wide range of security assistance to foreign nations (referred to as security cooperation by DOD) including many activities that overlap with those traditionally managed by the State Department. For example, 10 U.S.C. §333 authorizes DOD, with the concurrence of the State Department, to train and equip foreign security forces for counterterrorism operations, counter-weapons of mass destruction operations, counter-illicit drugs operations, counter-transnational organized crime operations, and maritime and border security operations, among other purposes. Given the number of security challenges the United States faces around the globe, however, it is unclear whether DOD would devote increased funding to security cooperation in Latin America and the Caribbean. As a result of a provision (10 U.S.C. §381) enacted as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2017 ( P.L. 114-328 ), DOD is required to submit formal, consolidated budget requests for security cooperation efforts, including the specific countries or regions where they are to take place, "to the extent practicable." For FY2019, DOD requested $55.1 million for security cooperation in the areas of responsibility of U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Southern Command, which encompass the Latin American and Caribbean region. That amount would be slightly less than the estimated $58.6 million DOD obligated for security cooperation in the region in FY2018. Both of those figures exclude funds for drug interdiction and counter-drug activities, which account for the vast majority of DOD security cooperation funding for Latin America and the Caribbean. In FY2017 (the most recent year for which data are available), DOD obligations for drug interdiction and counter-drug activities in the region totaled $210.8 million. The exclusion of drug interdiction and counter-drug activities and the lack of country-by-country data in DOD's FY2019 security cooperation request make it difficult to assess the scope of DOD's planned activities in the region and the extent to which those activities may overlap with State Department security assistance programs. This lack of information may hinder congressional efforts to establish budget priorities and shape the relative balance of U.S. assistance in Latin America and the Caribbean. It also may weaken Congress's ability to incentivize policy changes in recipient nations as State Department-managed assistance withheld to comply with legislative conditions could be replaced with less transparent DOD support. DOD asserts that "in the long-term" it intends to include "some budgeting figures by country." Congress could use legislation to clarify the breadth of information it expects to receive from DOD in its annual security cooperation budget requests. Potential Decline in U.S. Influence Although the relative importance of foreign assistance in U.S. relations with Latin American and Caribbean nations has declined since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. government continues to use assistance to advance key policy initiatives in the region. In recent years, U.S. assistance has supported efforts to reduce illicit drug production and end the long-running internal conflict in Colombia, combat transnational organized crime in Mexico, and address the root causes that drive unauthorized migration to the United States from Central America. This assistance has enabled the U.S. government to influence partner countries' policies, including the extent to which they dedicate resources to activities that they otherwise may not consider top priorities. Some analysts and Latin American officials view the Administration's efforts to cut foreign aid as part of a broader trend of U.S. disengagement from the region. They note that President Trump withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement and imposed tariffs on several Latin American nations, has been slow to fill diplomatic posts in the region, and was the first U.S. president in 25 years to skip the triennial Summit of the Americas. They contend that this has created a leadership vacuum in the region that other powers have begun to fill. For example, some analysts warn that China, which has provided more than $140 billion in state-backed finance to Latin American and Caribbean nations since 2005, has begun to leverage its significant commercial ties into other forms of power that could come at the expense of the United States. Others note that it may not be a zero-sum game and that the region's increased ties with China do not necessarily portend a loss of U.S. influence. Research suggests that foreign aid can influence perceptions of U.S. leadership, which have declined significantly in Latin America and the Caribbean over the past two years. In 2018, 31% of the region approved of "the job performance of the leadership of the United States," an 18-point decline compared to 2016. Consistently high disapproval ratings could constrain Latin American and Caribbean leaders' abilities to support Trump Administration initiatives and conclude agreements with the United States. Many in Congress also have expressed concerns that significant foreign assistance cuts could weaken U.S. influence around the world. In H.Rept. 115-829 , for example, the House Appropriations Committee asserted that "the magnitude of the reductions proposed for United States diplomatic and development operations and programs in the fiscal year 2019 request would be counterproductive to the economic and security interests of the nation and would undermine our relationships with key partners and allies." Similarly, in S.Rept. 115-282 , the Senate Appropriations Committee asserted that the "proposed reduction to the International Affairs budget…reinforces the perception that the United States is retreating from its preeminent role as the world's superpower." These concerns may have influenced Congress's decision not to adopt many of the Administration's proposed foreign assistance cuts for FY2019. Appendix A. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean by Account and Country or Regional Program: FY2017 Appendix B. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean by Account and Country or Regional Program: FY2018 Estimate Appendix C. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean by Account and Country or Regional Program: FY2019 Request

The United States provides foreign assistance to Latin American and Caribbean nations to support development and other U.S. objectives. U.S. policymakers have emphasized different strategic interests in the region at different times, from combating Soviet influence during the Cold War to promoting democracy and open markets since the 1990s. The Trump Administration has sought to reduce foreign aid significantly and refocus U.S. assistance efforts in the region to address U.S. domestic concerns, such as irregular migration and transnational crime. FY2019 Budget Request For FY2019, the Trump Administration requested $1.1 billion for Latin America and the Caribbean through foreign assistance accounts managed by the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). That amount would have been $581 million, or 34%, less than the estimated $1.7 billion of U.S. assistance the region received in FY2018. The proposal would have cut funding for every type of assistance and nearly every Latin American and Caribbean nation. The Trump Administration also proposed eliminating the Inter-American Foundation—a small, independent U.S. foreign assistance agency that promotes grassroots development in the region—and consolidating its programs into USAID. The Administration's efforts to scale back U.S. assistance could have significant implications for U.S. policy in Latin America and the Caribbean. Faced with potential cuts, U.S. agencies could accelerate efforts to transition countries in the region away from traditional development assistance toward other forms of bilateral engagement. Reductions in State Department-managed security assistance could lead to the Department of Defense taking on a larger role in U.S. security cooperation. Moreover, many argue that reductions in foreign aid, combined with other policy shifts, could contribute to a relative decline in U.S. influence in the region. Legislative Developments President Trump signed into law the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6), on February 15, 2019. Division F of the act—the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2019—includes funding for foreign assistance programs in Latin America and the Caribbean. The measure was preceded by three short-term continuing resolutions (P.L. 115-245, P.L. 115-298, and P.L. 116-5), which funded foreign assistance programs at the FY2018 level, and a 35-day lapse in appropriations from December 22, 2018, to January 25, 2019. Although the House and Senate Appropriations Committees had approved their FY2019 foreign assistance appropriations measures (H.R. 6385 and S. 3108, respectively) in June 2018, neither bill received floor consideration prior to the end of the 115th Congress. P.L. 116-6 and the accompanying joint explanatory statement do not specify appropriations levels for every Latin American and Caribbean nation. Nevertheless, the amounts designated for key U.S. initiatives in Central America, Colombia, and Mexico significantly exceed the Administration's request. The act provides $527.6 million to continue implementation of the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America, which is $92 million more than the Administration requested but $99 million less than Congress appropriated for the initiative in FY2018. at least $418.3 million to support the peace process and security and development efforts in Colombia, which is $153 million more than the Administration requested and $27 million more than Congress appropriated for Colombia in FY2018. $162.7 million to support security and rule-of-law efforts in Mexico, which is $84 million more than the Administration requested and $10 million more than Congress appropriated for Mexico in FY2018.

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Introduction U.S. foreign intelligence relations are a component of U.S. international relations that involve cooperation between a U.S. and a foreign state or non-state intelligence service over an area of mutual interest. This cooperation may include simple liaison to discuss or exchange information, raw data, or finished intelligence. Intelligence liaison leverages the relative strengths of the interested intelligence services to provide tactical, operational, or strategic insight and perspective to provide warning of attack, corroboration of national sources, or additional, possibly unique, intelligence that the other service lacks. Other forms of cooperation include basing rights to enhance the range of U.S. collection coverage, joint operations and collection from the sovereign territory of a foreign state, and training to improve the capacity and professionalism of a foreign intelligence service. In areas of the world where the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) has few national intelligence assets, cooperative relations with a foreign intelligence service based in the region can effectively increase the range of U.S. intelligence coverage by using the partner's source network and linguistic, political, and cultural expertise. Although the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) provides the policy and criteria, and conducts oversight for all IC element intelligence relationships with foreign intelligence services, the IC elements themselves have the statutory authority to enter into agreements with foreign counterparts. Normally every relationship is formalized through a memorandum of understanding (MOU) or other written agreement. This report provides a historic perspective of traditional and nontraditional foreign intelligence partnerships with the U.S. It also discusses their risks and benefits in the context of the broader public discussion over the sorts of relationships the United States should have with various actors in the international community. In many—but not all—instances, intelligence relations with a foreign partner may be viewed as an approximate reflection of the strategic condition of the relationship between the U.S. and that partner generally. They indicate shared interests and a degree of trust in the professional ability of the partner to provide credible intelligence while protecting sources and maintaining security about the nature and extent of the relationship. In discussing risk, this report emphasizes the risk to the United States. However, foreign partners also bear risk (e.g., relying too heavily on U.S. intelligence, or having their sensitive sources compromised). Congress has a vested interest in understanding the nature and scope of the IC's relations with foreign intelligence services. Congress has expressed both confidence in the value of these relationships and reservations. When the IC reduced national intelligence collection resources in the 1970s and the 1990s and the IC became heavily dependent upon intelligence obtained from foreign partners, Congress intervened to rebalance national intelligence collection with collection from foreign partners. Congress was also critical of deficiencies in the IC's ability to assess independently the credibility of foreign intelligence sources, one of whom fabricated reporting on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, one reason cited by the Bush Administration for invading Iraq in 2003. Most recently, Congress has expressed interest in the vulnerability of foreign intelligence partners' telecommunications technology to penetration by hostile intelligence services. Background and Historical Context The United States has cultivated intelligence liaison relations with foreign partners through (1) the exchange of information, raw data, or finished intelligence; (2) basing rights for conducting intelligence operations, or privileges to host technical intelligence equipment; (3) burden sharing in the collection and reporting on issues of mutual interest; (4) joint covert action, collection, or exploitation operations; and (5) training. Most are bilateral. The relationship with the United Kingdom is among the oldest and the best known. The IC also has multilateral relationships, with NATO member states, Five Eyes partners (United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand), and the intelligence organizations supporting coalition partners in operational theaters such as Iraq and Afghanistan. U.S. IC relationships with foreign intelligence partners have developed in parallel with global IC coverage, as well as the growing number of interests the U.S. shares with foreign partners; it is also generally recognized that intelligence partnerships can provide mutual benefits for national security. IC foreign partnerships have developed as consequences of the most pressing challenges for U.S. national security over the past century: two world wars, the Cold War, and post-9/11 counter-terrorism operations. Although the U.S. has periodically shared intelligence with adversaries involving a narrow range of mutual interests, this type of exchange represents the exception to the norm. More typically, most intelligence sharing takes place with allied countries or U.S. affiliated non-state actors within relationships that have been shaped by decades of shared experience in war and peace. U.S. intelligence exchange relationships with foreign partners, therefore, often reflect the high level of trust and professional confidence the U.S. IC places in partnerships with particular foreign allies' intelligence services, involving a broad range of overlapping national security, political, and economic interests. A fundamental assumption, supported by decades of experience, is that building and maintaining these partnerships enhances U.S. national security by providing some benefit that the U.S. would otherwise lack: access to otherwise inaccessible or hostile targets, corroboration of sources, cultural or linguistic expertise, the capacity to conduct joint assessments, providing indications and warning of an attack, obtaining basing rights, or jointly planning and conducting covert operations or intelligence collection. Early Years The earliest efforts by the United States to formally cooperate with foreign partners in intelligence took place during World War I, when the British and French provided training, advice, and tactical intelligence exchanges with the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) under General John Pershing. At the time, the United States had only an incipient intelligence capability. The British, in contrast, had had a national intelligence service since 1909 when the Secret Service Bureau was established to address growing concerns about a perceived threat posed by imperial Germany. The United States forged closer intelligence ties with allied governments in the years leading up to World War II and during the war itself. The UK and U.S. navies began sharing naval intelligence in the 1930s. The first formal arrangement, involving signals intelligence, was reached in October 1942 when the U.S. Navy and British Government Code and Cypher School (GC & CS) at Bletchley Park signed the Holden Agreement. That agreement enabled collaboration on Japanese, German, and Italian signals intelligence targets that included a division of labor between each side for more streamlined, integrated technical collection and analysis. The British-U.S. communication intelligence agreement (BRUSA Agreement) signed in 1943 between GC & CS and the U.S. War Department—representing the Army as well as the Navy signals intelligence capabilities—superseded the Holden Agreement. This agreement also provided for a division of labor similar to the Holden Agreement, whereby the United States had responsibility for collection of signals intelligence targeting the Japanese (an operation called Magic), and the British had responsibility for collection of signals intelligence on German and Italian targets (referred to as Ultra). This collaboration proved pivotal in the Allies establishing information dominance during the war. Cold War Shared interests during the Cold War influenced the next period in the evolution of U.S. foreign intelligence partnerships. U.S. intelligence relations with traditional allies solidified as one of multiple areas of security cooperation based on a shared perception of the threat posed by the Soviet Union. The UKUSA Agreement of March 1946 superseded the BRUSA Agreement and other U.S.-UK signals intelligence agreements from WWII that had focused exclusively on targeting the Axis powers. The UKUSA Agreement added the State Department, the Army, and Navy on the U.S. side of the board overseeing the partnership. The agreement provided for an expanded exchange of signals intelligence-related products and services concerning targets involving "any country … excluding only the U.S., the British Commonwealth of Nations, and the British Empire." Canada, Australia, and New Zealand were formally included as "collaborating" partners in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Subsequently, in a separate agreement, the United States and United Kingdom formally established standards for the protection of classified information involved in exchanges. Before the establishment of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in 1942 with the encouragement and assistance of the United Kingdom, the United States had no foreign intelligence collection or covert action capability to compare to the capabilities of Britain's Secret Intelligence Service (MI6). The WWII experience of OSS personnel and the investment the United States made in national intelligence (including establishing the CIA in 1947), enabled the U.S. to influence the organization and development of other nations' intelligence agencies; these agencies have since become close bilateral partners. One example is the establishment of the West German Federal Intelligence Service, the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND). In 1946 the former head of the eastern branch of the Nazi German intelligence, Reinhard Gehlen, who was responsible for intelligence targeting the Soviet Union, negotiated terms for establishing an intelligence organization in occupied postwar Germany with the United States. During the war, Gehlen had developed extensive agent networks, and had later copied and concealed for safekeeping voluminous amounts of intelligence on the Soviet Union that he knew would be valuable to the United States. Using this leverage, Gehlen, following his surrender, was able to obtain U.S. support for an autonomous German intelligence organization for collecting and analyzing intelligence on the Soviet Union and other communist states that would become part of a reconstituted German government. The Gehlen Organization, as it was known, became the BND in 1956 and has remained a close, albeit independent, partner of the United States IC. Similarly, the United States was influential in the early years of the Mossad, Israel's human intelligence agency. The Mossad, like the Gehlen organization, provided the United States a means to acquire information on the Soviet Union that the United States could not otherwise collect through national sources, as Israel was able to draw upon its eastern European émigré population's extensive contacts in the Soviet Union. The CIA, in turn, was able to offer training to Mossad agents. U.S. relations with the intelligence organizations of Japan, Egypt, pre-revolutionary Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan were also influenced by mutual concern over the threat from the Soviet Union. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, in particular, contributed to the CIA's forming closer ties to Saudi Arabia's General Intelligence Directorate (GID) and Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency in an effort to provide funding and other covert assistance to the Mujahideen. Post-Cold War After the Cold War, former communist countries that had long been allied with the Soviet Union became NATO allies and intelligence partners of the United States (i.e., Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia (now the Czech Republic and Slovakia), Bulgaria, Romania, and the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania). Initially, there was some ambivalence about these new partnerships. On one hand, the history of Soviet influence over Warsaw Pact intelligence organizations suggested the reconstituted intelligence agencies of the eastern European NATO states could pose a counterintelligence risk of Russian penetration and result in greater restraint in intelligence sharing. On the other hand, by virtue of these services' extensive experience with the Soviets Union, they might prove more capable of providing for themselves protections against Russian penetration. These services offered not only a presumable wealth of perspective on and access to post-communist Russia, but also support for the U.S. in other areas of the world where they had had operational experience, extensive contacts, or were commitment to supporting NATO or U.S.-led military coalition operations. In some cases (e.g., the Polish presence in Iraq), part of the motivation may have been simply to gain western or NATO experience and prove their worth as a reliable ally and intelligence partner. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the U.S. IC expanded its foreign intelligence liaison relationships as a major component of counterterrorist strategy. Working with intelligence partners in the war on terror is broadly viewed as essential to protecting the U.S. homeland and the allied states who share western values that make them attractive targets for al Qa'ida, and the so-called Islamic State. These relationships include nontraditional partners, in addition to allies: non-state organizations (such as Kurdish groups in northern Iraq and Syria) and traditional adversaries such as Russia. The CIA has solidified many of these partnerships through the establishment of a network of Counterterrorist Intelligence Centers (CTIC) around the world to facilitate sharing intelligence on terrorism, such as indications and warning of an attack, with a host-nation government to effect the killing or capture of high-value targets. The Counterterrorist Center (CTC) at CIA headquarters manages the CTICs overseas. The National Security Agency (NSA) is also represented in the CTICs, underscoring the importance of signals intelligence (and the corresponding foreign partnerships) to counterterrorist operations. Simultaneously, the U.S. IC has found that nontraditional partners remain loyal to their own interests and internal dynamics despite heavy inducement by the U.S. While these partnerships have proven valuable in certain circumstances, they are not all completely beneficial to the U.S. Each period in the evolution of U.S. intelligence relations with foreign partners—Pre-World War II, World War II, the Cold War, Post-Cold war —has enabled the United States to strengthen ties to traditional allies, while presenting challenges from necessary yet incompletely reliable partners. The post-Cold War has been marked by a concerted effort to forge or strengthen ties with allies old and new, and to expand the scope of counterterrorism coverage by initiating or increasing the frequency of intelligence exchanges with nontraditional intelligence partners. Policy and Legal Authorities Policy and authorities for initiating and managing ties between the IC and foreign intelligence services, and specifying the roles and responsibilities of personnel supporting these relationships, are found in statute, executive orders, and intelligence directives. Intelligence Community Directive (ICD)-403, Foreign Disclosure and Release of Classified National Intelligence, states U.S. Government policy on disclosure of U.S. intelligence to foreign state or non-state intelligence entities: U.S. intelligence is a national asset to be conserved and protected and will be shared with foreign entities only when consistent with U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives and when an identifiable benefit can be expected to accrue to the U.S. It is the policy of the U.S. Government to share intelligence with foreign governments whenever it is consistent with U.S. law and clearly in the national interest to do so, and when it is intended for a specific purpose and general limited in duration. ICD-403 also requires that determinations to disclose or release U.S. intelligence should take into account the professional ability of a foreign intelligence service to protect the classified intelligence from subsequent compromise posing a risk to U.S. national security. However, In exceptional cases, there may be a benefit to U.S. interests to disclose or release intelligence to foreign entities under conditions where the recipient's safeguards are likely to be inadequate. In such cases, the anticipated benefits must outweigh the potential damage of a likely compromise. Intelligence Community Policy Guidance 403.1 (ICPG-403.1) further expounds policy in ICD-403 by providing criteria for disclosing or releasing classified intelligence to a foreign intelligence entity. Its guidance pertains to classified U.S. intelligence only, which does not include other classified information , such as defense, military, or diplomatic information that is not intelligence. Disclosure or release of classified intelligence is appropriate when it: is consistent with U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives; can be expected to result in an identifiable, commensurate benefit to the U.S.; supports a U.S. diplomatic, political, economic, military, or security policy or treaties; and aids U.S. intelligence or counterintelligence activities. An intelligence sharing agreement is often formalized in a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the U.S. IC element and its foreign intelligence counterpart. There are hundreds of these agreements between the IC and foreign intelligence services. They are not legally binding and are generally classified. This can present challenges for congressional oversight. As one observer of the Intelligence Community remarked, "The near invisibility of liaison arrangements to oversight by elected officials is problematic. Oversight mechanisms have not kept pace with global issues." For military exchanges that include other types of classified information as well as intelligence, the Department of Defense (DOD) uses General Security of Military Information Agreements (GSOMIA) that detail the level of classification for the exchange and the categories of information that can be exchanged. Whether an MOU or GSOMIA, these agreements provide formal frameworks for intelligence relationships that can be fundamental to broader security relationships (legal enforceability notwithstanding). Roles and Responsibilities The DNI has the statutory authority to "oversee the coordination between elements of the Intelligence Community and the intelligence or security services of foreign governments or international organizations on all matters involving intelligence related to the national security or involving intelligence acquired through clandestine means." Assistant DNI for Partner Engagement (ADNI/PE) supports the DNI in carrying out his/her statutory responsibilities, which include: Entering into intelligence and counterintelligence arrangements with foreign governments and international organizations; Formulating policies concerning these arrangements; Aligning and synchronizing foreign intelligence and counterintelligence relationships among IC elements "to further United States national security, policy, and intelligence objectives;" Establishing, with the concurrence of departments and agencies concerned, joint procedures to coordinate and synchronize intelligence activities conducted by an IC element or funded by the National Intelligence Program (NIP), with activities that involve foreign intelligence and security services. The Director of the CIA (D/CIA) is responsible for implementing the DNI's foreign intelligence engagement policy and coordinating foreign intelligence relationships. These responsibilities are specified in Executive Order (EO) 12333, United States Intelligence Activities : CIA has the authority "under the direction and guidance of the DNI … to coordinate the implementation of intelligence and counterintelligence relationships between elements of the IC and the intelligence or security services of foreign governments or international organizations." This authority is reiterated in ICD-310, Coordination of Clandestine Human Source and Human-Enabled Foreign Intelligence Collection and Counterintelligence Activities o utside the United States . Overseas, the U.S. ambassador or Chief of Mission is responsible for "the direction, coordination, and supervision of all Government executive branch employees" in a country … who shall be kept "fully and currently informed with respect to all activities and operations of the Government within that country." In other words, the U.S. ambassador has authority over United States intelligence activities within that country. The actual management of intelligence programs and activities in a U.S. embassy, however, falls to the CIA Chief of Station (COS), who is to ensure the Chief of Mission is kept appropriately informed. ICD-402, Director of National Intelligence Representatives , buttresses the CIA's responsibility to coordinate the implementation of policy for the IC's foreign intelligence relationships by assigning to the CIA's Chiefs of Station responsibility as the DNI's representatives in the locations or organizations where they are assigned. In each foreign country, therefore, the COS has day-to-day management and oversight of not only CIA but all liaison relationships by any IC element, with state or non-state foreign intelligence organizations. Subject to DNI policy and DCI/COS management and guidance, each element of the IC has the statutory authority to conduct relations with foreign intelligence services particular to the element's capability and operational or analytical focus. The National Security Agency (NSA), for example, has the statutory authority to conduct foreign cryptologic liaison relations; the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and military service intelligence organizations have the authority to conduct defense intelligence liaison relationships with their foreign defense or military intelligence counterparts. ICD-403 specifies the roles and responsibilities of officials making decisions involving the disclosure or release of classified intelligence to a foreign intelligence entity. Each IC element has a Senior Foreign Disclosure and Release Authority (SFDRA), who is a senior official with responsibility for the organization's foreign disclosure and release program. The SFDRA, in turn, designates Foreign Disclosure and Release Officer(s) (FDRO) with the authority to approve or deny requests for disclosure or release of intelligence that originated with that IC element, or coordinate with the FDROs of another organization to request disclosure or release of intelligence that originated with that other IC element and has dissemination control markings. Under ICD-403, the DNI may authorize disclosures or releases of classified intelligence requested by the National Security Council or under circumstances that are not otherwise provided for in policy. The DNI is also the final arbiter in resolving any disputes on what can be disclosed or released. Foreign Intelligence Service Collection on U.S. Persons Among the more sensitive aspects of U.S. relations with any given foreign intelligence partner—and of interest to Congress—are instances of any such partner providing to the IC information on U.S. persons. This may occur unprompted as a result of routine collection or a bulk data transfer, or at the request of the United States, subject to approval by specifically designated, trained individuals. In instances when the United States requests intelligence on U.S. persons from a foreign intelligence service, there must be probable cause to believe that U.S. persons are involved in terrorism, espionage, other illicit activities, or are themselves the target of hostile foreign intelligence services that may threaten U.S. national security. Counterintelligence collected by a foreign intelligence partner (to support its own internal national security) and shared with the United States that includes information on U.S. persons requires special handling. In these instances, the IC must follow the A ttorney General Guidelines for implementing Executive Order (EO) 12333 on properly requesting, obtaining, and handling the information in order to adhere to privacy and civil liberties protections. Information is authorized and handled according to whether it was obtained by standard or special collection techniques. Standard collection techniques involve authorization for an IC element to request, receive, and document routinely acquired information or records on a U.S. person. This can include requests made of a foreign intelligence service for information on U.S. persons abroad that exists in their files, or requests of a foreign intelligence service to use their assets to collect information targeting a U.S. person abroad using standard collection techniqu es . Officials with the authority to authorize standard collection techniques include a Chief of Station, Chief of Installation, or Chief of Base, the Deputy Director of the CIA for Operations (DDO), the Associate Deputy Director of CIA for Operations (ADDO), the Chief or Deputy Chiefs of Operations in a CIA Mission Center, a first, second, or third in command of a DO Division or DO Center, or supervisory personnel who are designed by these officials. Standard collection techniques may also include occasions when an IC element obtains unevaluated bulk data, such as a hard drive, from a foreign intelligence service that may contain information on U.S. persons collected by routine, unexceptional means. In these instances, "specifically designated officials must document the purpose of the collection activity, how the data was acquired, what steps were taken to limit the collection to the smallest subset containing the information necessary to achieve the purpose of the collection, and further determine how sensitive the acquired data is so that appropriate controls regarding access, querying, and retention may be imposed." Special collection techniques are defined as techniques conducted outside the United States targeting a U.S. person that would require a warrant for the same techniques conducted by the FBI inside the United States. They include, for example, physical search, search of nonpublic telephone records, and electronic surveillance. Both the authorization and handling of this kind of information is more restricted than for standard collection techniques . Special collection techniques require exceptional handling as outlined in the A ttorney General Guidelines implementing EO 12333 . For authorization of special collection techniques —including requests for special collection on U.S. persons by a foreign intelligence service—requests must be forwarded through the agency's General Counsel for concurrence and approval by the Director of the CIA or a designee, the U.S. Attorney General, and, where applicable, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. A foreign intelligence partner may provide to its counterpart(s) in the United States intelligence on U.S. persons acquired by special collection techniques without it being specifically requested by the U.S. counterpart. This would involve occasions where the foreign partner may want to alert U.S. IC or law enforcement officials of serious counterintelligence concerns in the course of a collection activity employing special collection techniques targeting a mutual adversary such as Russia or China. Exceptional handling is required when information is collected by special collection techniques that involves U.S. persons, and subsequently shared with the U.S., whether or not it is specifically requested by the United States. Benefits of Foreign Intelligence Liaison A former member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence remarked recently that foreign intelligence services provide the United States some of its most significant intelligence. Two examples are readily apparent. Following 9/11, then-French President Jacques Chirac directed the French intelligence services (the DGSE and DGSI) to share counterterrorist intelligence with the United States "as if they were your own service." Similarly, on September 12, 2001, the day after the attacks, the senior leadership of the British intelligence services (MI5 and MI6) visited their counterparts in Washington, DC, to offer their assistance. The U.S. IC also benefits from intelligence liaison with traditional adversaries, and non-state actors (e.g., Kurdish organizations), on areas of mutual interest. Intelligence and Information Sharing Intelligence sharing or collaboration can be defined as "the liaison or collaboration between [intelligence] bodies responsible for the collection, analysis and/or dissemination of information in the field of national security and defense." Sharing finished intelligence derived from multiple sources provides less risk of revealing information of any particular source and is thus more typical of many bilateral or multilateral intelligence relationships. The sharing or exchange of raw data or unfinished intelligence takes place either where there is sufficient trust between partners to provide the necessary security from compromise of collection sources and methods (as there is between the U.S. and Five Eyes partners, plus France, Germany, Norway, and Japan, among others), or it can also occur in situations where there is an immediate need to provide perishable information—such as indications and warning of an impending terrorist attack—that may take precedence over the risk of revealing a source. The exchange of intelligence or information among the United States and intelligence partners is a daily occurrence treated with great sensitivity. Intelligence sharing may help to corroborate U.S. national sources in addition to possibly providing unique information. Intelligence and information exchanges may involve secure conferencing, phone calls, or, among the closest partnerships, automated data exchange. Attachés belonging to the Defense Attaché Service (DAS) of the Department of Defense or attachés representing other departments, such as the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security, also regularly conduct exchanges with their host-country counterparts. Indications and Warning (I&W) Foreign intelligence relationships that provide indications and warning (I&W) of an impending attack or serious threat to the national security of the partner country may take place by means of sharing proprietary intelligence of a partner agency, or collecting intelligence through a joint operation. Among the instances that have become part of the public record are these. In 1962, a human intelligence asset of the CIA and British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS, also known as MI6), Soviet GRU Colonel Oleg Penkovsky, provided details of the Soviet nuclear weapons capabilities and nuclear missile sites in Cuba. The information Penkovsky provided during the Cuban Missile Crisis enabled President Kennedy to understand he had three days before the Soviet intermediate range nuclear missiles would be fully operational. It was a warning that the CIA credited as "altering the course of the Cold War." In February 2006, GCHQ (the UK signals intelligence counterpart of the U.S. National Security Agency) shared with the United States information from intercepted communications between two Al Qa'ida operatives in Pakistan and the United Kingdom, respectively, indicating their plans to bomb civilian aircraft. Subsequently, the CIA was able to share this information with Pakistan's Inter-Service Intelligence agency leading to the ISI's apprehension of the lead Al Qa'ida planner. In 2010, Saudi Arabia, once reluctant to share intelligence with the United States on Al Qa'ida, obtained perishable indications of a sophisticated Al Qa'ida plot to attack cargo planes en route to the United States. The Saudis provided the information to U.S., British, German, and Emirati officials who were able to intercept the bombs and prevent the attack. In December 2017, acting on a tip from the CIA, Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) was able to break up a plot by an Islamic State-linked terrorist cell to bomb Kazan Cathedral and other prominent sites in St. Petersburg, Russia. Burden Sharing, Expanded Coverage, and Time-Sensitive Contingency Response Burden sharing, or a division of labor between the personnel and resources of the IC and foreign intelligence partners, is possible with the most trusted, most capable allied intelligence services. The early collaboration between the United States and United Kingdom during the Second World War, which resulted in the success of the Magic and Ultra operations, has continued to the present day with the integration of personnel and burden sharing or "divisions of effort" involving signals intelligence (SIGINT) target areas. The integration is so close that U.S. and British customers/consumers of their products often do not know which country generated the intelligence they are reading/reviewing/consuming. Similarly, U.S. reliance on Japanese signals intelligence coverage of the western Pacific enabled the United States, through receipt of Japanese intercepts of communications between Russian ground controllers and fighter pilots, to pinpoint the cause of the shoot-down of Korean Air Lines Flight 007 in 1983. Following the end of the Cold War, the United States embarked on a deliberate strategy to benefit from a perceived peace dividend . This amounted to relying on foreign partners for intelligence coverage of areas of the world where the United States either did not have access or did not want to expend the resources and effort to establish coverage. Foreign intelligence relationships can provide the benefit of second-hand understanding of issues and areas of the world where the United States may lack national intelligence assets. Moreover, since 9/11, the IC has had to rapidly expand its liaison relationships with state and non-state foreign intelligence organizations for time-sensitive contingency support of fluid counterterrorism operations. Yet there is a risk of over-reliance on foreign partnerships, as a joint congressional inquiry found, when they are not balanced by national intelligence capabilities. Joint Intelligence Operations Joint operations may be conducted when the United States and a foreign partner intelligence service contribute complementary abilities in intelligence collection or covert action to achieve a common objective. For example, one partner may be able to provide access to a source of information, and the other the technical capacity to exploit the information for intelligence value. In 1949, at the beginning of the Cold War, the British Secret Intelligence Service was able to tap the communications cables of the Soviet command center during its post-war occupation of Austria. The CIA joined the operation due to its technical ability to read the enciphered messages that the SIS intercepted. Because of the close link of covert action to national security policy, deliberations over conducting joint covert action operations with a foreign partner may affect U.S. policy decisions and outcomes. In 1953 the British lobbied the Eisenhower Administration for a joint covert action operation that resulted in the overthrow of the elected Iranian government of Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh. Similarly, the British argued against the United States embarking upon covert action in the 1950s to destabilize Soviet bloc governments in Europe. Basing Rights/Hosting Equipment Intelligence relations are often part of broader security arrangements with U.S. partners who may provide privileges to base operational and intelligence personnel and equipment in geographic proximity to both the target area and intelligence personnel and facilities of the allied partner. Host-country partners provide political clearance that enables the United States to establish intelligence facilities, and may also provide various degrees of infrastructure support. This has been true of many close U.S. allies, such as Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and South Korea. Other partners that have provided basing rights have risked more politically in doing so (e.g., Turkey, Pakistan, Iran [under the Shah], Iraq, and Afghanistan). During the Cold War, Pakistan permitted the United States to maintain a signals intelligence site in the country, and permitted the CIA to conduct reconnaissance flights from Pakistani airfields. In Iran, in return for significant amounts of military aid, the Shah's government permitted two U.S. signals intelligence sites in the north of the country that enabled the IC to collect missile telemetry from the Soviet missile test facility at Tyuratam. U.S. intelligence liaison relationships, which expanded significantly after 9/11, included a multilateral facility in France for collaboration on counterterrorist intelligence. Multilateral intelligence sharing—Five Eyes excepted—can sometimes be cited as providing products and services at a level of the least trusted member of the multilateral arrangement. The facility in France, however, which also included representation from the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, and Australia, underscored the significant level of cooperation by the French in orchestrating counterterrorist collaboration among allied intelligence services to successfully target terrorists outside of Iraq and Afghanistan. U.S. drone facilities in Djibouti, Pakistan, and elsewhere, have contributed to elimination of certain terrorist threats, and have benefited from support from the host-country intelligence services, despite—in the case of Pakistan—opposition to the U.S. presence by many of the local population. The CIA drone operations in Pakistan successfully targeted members of the Haqqani Network, the Afghan Taliban, and the Pakistani Taliban, among others. From Djibouti, drone strikes have been conducted over Yemen and Somalia with the assistance of the French and permission of the Djiboutian government. Diplomatic Back Channel The IC has been used for a diplomatic back channel to foreign governments when there may be few alternatives to reliably communicate important information between heads of state. Generally this involves countries with which the United States does not have diplomatic relations. In these situations, the foreign intelligence services are often closely linked to the head of state and exercise influence similar to that of the foreign ministry. Using intelligence services as a diplomatic back channel may be necessary to convey a personal message, clarify intentions, or diffuse tension. One instance that has become public involves the intelligence ties between the CIA, North Korea's Reconnaissance General Bureau, and South Korea's National Intelligence Service. This channel between IC counterparts, begun in 2009 during the Obama Administration, has been used by senior IC officials to send or receive personal communications between the U.S. President and the North Korean leader. Risks and Obstacles There is a variety of risks and obstacles to U.S. intelligence relationships with foreign partners. They result from policy differences, differences in assumptions about a threat, failure to respect human rights, lapses in security, espionage, and legal and informal limits each side may place upon the other. The strongest, most enduring relationships have weathered differences in policy or lapses in security that have led to temporary setbacks in intelligence cooperation. More formidable to overcome are obstacles to intelligence sharing resulting from fundamental differences in values. Training Bilateral intelligence training of foreign partners' intelligence services can provide certain advantages to the United States, but can also create noteworthy risks. In its earliest years, the United States, as has been noted, benefited from the assistance of British and French mentors of the fledgling U.S. Military Intelligence Division (MID) during the First World War. Since the CIA's creation, training in intelligence collection and analysis has become a means by which the agency and other IC elements have established and maintained ties to foreign partners. This report cites elsewhere the efforts by the United States to build the German and Israeli intelligence services. Among many other examples of the IC reinforcing strategic ties to foreign partners through intelligence training are U.S. support in training Iran's Ministry of State Security (SAVAK) and Egypt's General Intelligence Directorate (GID). Yet subsequent problems in U.S. relations with these countries and others like them underscore the inherent risks of anticipating the second- and third-order effects of establishing close intelligence ties to fragile and unstable foreign governments. The Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS) provides a similar example of both the benefits and risks of intelligence-training relationships with foreign partners. This organization, established with the CIA's support, was one factor—among others—in turning the tide against the Sunni insurgency of 2004-2008. However, it also became caught up in Iraq's Shia-Sunni sectarian conflict and linked to a proxy fight for influence in Iraq between the United States and Iran. Iran reportedly was involved in an assassination campaign against the Sunni-dominant INIS, 209 of whose officers were reportedly killed from 2004-2009. This was partly a consequence of a rivalry with Iraq's Shia-dominant—and unofficial—intelligence organization within the Ministry of State for National Security, operating under Iran's influence and aligned with Iraq's then-Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Ethics and Human Rights Historically, adhering to internationally sanctioned standards for ethics and human rights has challenged the United States IC and its foreign intelligence partners, especially in times of crisis. While the United States can benefit from intelligence shared by authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and elsewhere, these regimes have relatively few restraints against obtaining information by harsh interrogation, or even torture. As articulated by one scholar, Authoritarian regimes can employ, among other things, relatively extensive population control measures and invasive intelligence collection methods, can readily obtain information superiority, and are under relatively little pressure to use minimum force. A lack of control and accountability over an authoritarian foreign intelligence partner employing such methods can undermine the credibility of the information obtained. Political backing for such methods can also produce the same effect. For the U.S., even the perception of engaging in an intelligence liaison relationship with a foreign partner with a poor human rights record can leave the United States vulnerable to criticism. The policy of the IC, as described by a former director of the CIA, is to refrain from exchanging intelligence with regimes that abuse human rights: We, the U.S. government, and we, CIA, are very, very clear in terms of the types of behaviors and actions that we will not tolerate …. We, CIA, have not only threatened to cut off relations with some of those liaison partners [when] we have information that they practice [abuses of human rights], we have cut off relations. So I think we need to keep the pressure on them …. The navigation of the shoals that stand between these governments today and a thriving democracy are significant. And I think we have to help them navigate it. However, the U.S. IC itself has leveraged foreign intelligence partnerships to commit ethical abuses, including the well-documented use of so-called black sites overseas. Six days after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, President George W. Bush signed a memorandum of notification (MON) that granted the CIA a number of counterterrorism authorities, including to "undertake operations designed to capture and detain persons who pose a continuing, serious threat of violence of death to U.S. persons and interests or who are planning terrorist activities." Subsequently, DCI George Tenant ordered the agency's Deputy Director of Operations and the Director of the Counterterrorism Center to assume authority for the capture and detention of terrorists. The CIA conducted detentions and interrogations at various secret black sites abroad where CIA personnel, including contract interrogators, employed what has been termed "enhanced interrogation techniques" as authorized by the Department of Justice. In its study of the program, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) reported ten detention sites abroad. Media sources have indicated as many as nine more sites. Although the landmark 2006 Supreme Court ruling Hamdan vs Rumsfeld effectively ended the "enhanced interrogation techniques" the CIA employed at the time, and contributed ultimately to the closure of the black sites by 2009, the program proved an embarrassment to the CIA, and complicated the IC's counterterrorism intelligence engagements with foreign partners. Challenges Vetting Sources, Security Lapses, and Espionage U.S. intelligence agencies' often long-standing ties to foreign intelligence services have been tested by sharing of uncorroborated information and improper source vetting. Germany and Jordan are close intelligence partners of the United States. Both, however, provide examples of the risk of accepting information or intelligence from partner-controlled, improperly vetted sources. The now-discredited information of a German Federal Intelligence Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst or BND) source codenamed Curveball, alleging Iraq was in possession of weapons of mass destruction, influenced the 2003 U.S. decision to invade Iraq. Although the lessons learned from this historic failure to properly vet a foreign intelligence source have reduced the risk of repetition, any intelligence organization can fall victim to accepting unreliable information from an otherwise trusted foreign partner. Further, some foreign partners could render their controlled sources' information unreliable through use of duress or torture. In December 2009, a source under control of Jordan's General Intelligence Directorate (GID), Humam Khalil al-Balawi, blew himself up at a CIA facility at Forward Operating Base Chapman in Khost, Afghanistan, killing seven CIA agents. Al-Balawi, who had claimed to be the physician to Ayman al-Zawahiri, then-deputy to Osama bin Laden, was in fact working for al-Qa'ida. At the time, however, he offered the prospect that he could assist the CIA in locating al-Qa'ida's senior leadership. A subsequent CIA assessment of the circumstances that led to the attack concluded that al-Balawi "was not fully vetted" despite having previously provided information to the U.S. and Jordan that had been verified. In a statement outlining corrective measures resulting from the attack, then-CIA Director Leon Panetta determined, in part, that the agency needed to "more carefully manage information sharing with other intelligence services." The intelligence partnership with Britain has also proven vulnerable to the problems of vetting employees or sources of a foreign intelligence agency. The most notorious instance involved five British graduates of Cambridge University (the Cambridge Five ), serving in senior positions in MI6 while engaging in espionage as agents of the Soviet Union in the 1940s and 1950s. One of the five, Kim Philby, served for a time as First Secretary (Chief of Station-equivalent) of the British embassy in Washington, DC. Problems with espionage and violations of security have also affected the U.S. IC. Some close partners have brought U.S. citizens under control as sources for intelligence on the U.S. These include the cases of Jonathan Pollard and Robert Kim spying on behalf of Israel and South Korea, respectively. Another dimension of the risk to intelligence sharing with foreign partners involves advances in technology. Recently, the Trump Administration expressed concern over the potential decision of a foreign intelligence partner to purchase 5G telecommunications infrastructure that could be vulnerable to penetration by a hostile foreign intelligence service or a company controlled by a hostile foreign intelligence service. The United States Ambassador to Germany, in a letter to the German Minister for Economic Affairs, reportedly warned against Germany purchasing 5 th -generation technology (5G) telecommunications equipment from China's Huawei Technologies Co., suggesting that doing so might require the United States, out of concern for security, to cut back on intelligence sharing between the United States and its long-standing ally. The proposed Intelligence Authorization Act of Fiscal Years 2018 and 2019 ( S. 245 ) would require the head of an IC element entering into an agreement with a foreign intelligence service to consider the vulnerability of the foreign service's telecommunications infrastructure to an adversary of the United States. Limited Cooperation or Lack of Reciprocation Limited cooperation or a lack of reciprocation can occasionally afflict even the closest intelligence foreign intelligence relationships. Close partners generally work through these challenges. Policy differences may create more persistent obstacles. Intelligence sharing may be more limited with foreign intelligence services that do not share western democratic values or that have a fundamentally different perspective of the global environment. Non-Five Eyes allies have occasionally expressed frustration with bilateral intelligence ties that are evidently not as close as those of each of the Five Eye countries to the United States. Sometimes these limitations are structural; intelligence sharing agreements (MOUs and GSOMIAs) generally define the limits of what can be disclosed or released. This may result in either partner placing restrictions on what is shared on an issue of mutual national security interest. These structured exchanges may result in overly-general assessments that contribute little to policy-makers' understanding of an issue. Another limitation affecting cooperation on counterterrorist-related intelligence involves the more restrictive privacy protections of some countries compared to those of the United States. This was true in Europe prior to the terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels in 2015 and 2016, respectively. European allies' stricter privacy laws prevented their processing and sharing with the United States air passenger name request (PNR) data that could be important to preventing a terrorist attack. Since the attacks in Paris and Brussels, however, the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) and European Union (EU) have partially addressed U.S. concerns by adopting measures to improve tracking and interception of PNR data; these measures are intended to facilitate the sharing of perishable intelligence indicators of terrorist travel. In situations involving fundamentally different values and assumptions about the global environment, the United States and a foreign partner may limit the intelligence they are willing to share. Describing the long-standing U.S. strategic intelligence relationship with Saudi Arabia, for example, one scholar noted, The [Saudi] Kingdom in general was often slow to recognize the threat of terrorism and reluctant to cooperate with the United States. After the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing, the Saudi government did not share vital information with U.S. intelligence. Many of the causes linked to the global jihadist movement, like the fighting in Kashmir and Chechnya, enjoyed wide legitimacy within the Kingdom, and citizen support for these conflicts seemed to pose no direct threat to Saudi security. In instances where intelligence relations with foreign entities are part of a larger relationship, the benefit to each side might not be directly reciprocated. A foreign partner, for example, may leverage a capability in intelligence, such as human intelligence access to a difficult target, in order to extract benefits from the United States in other areas of the bilateral relationship, such as military assistance. In one example, Pakistan for years benefited from a relationship with U.S. intelligence that was part of a broader cooperative relationship in defense, counterterrorism, governance, and development. This relationship survived despite strong American objections to indications of Pakistan's support for the Afghan Taliban, Haqqani Network, and other Islamist militant groups, and Pakistan's objections to alleged U.S. violations of its sovereignty. In January 2018 the Trump Administration announced a major policy decision to suspend security aid to Pakistan. Pakistan retaliated by terminating its counterterrorism intelligence cooperation with the United States. The IC also has (or has had) intelligence liaison relationships with adversaries such as Russia, China, Syria, and Libya. There has been benefit in doing so over a relatively narrow range of mutual interests. However, the apparent benefit of exchanging intelligence with adversaries, such as on counterterrorism, is typically weighed alongside the risks. There is a danger of exposing U.S. intelligence sources and methods to a traditional adversary. Furthermore, intelligence liaison about a particular issue—over time—may risk exposing U.S. sources and methods to the foreign agency, as well as exposing knowledge of corruption connected to that government. Serious policy differences also can reduce or negate the benefits of sharing intelligence. In the case of Syria, both Russia and the U.S. have an interest in resolving the conflict. However, Russia's broader strategic objectives oppose those of the United States. Over-Reliance on the Capabilities of a Foreign Partner Although foreign intelligence partnerships may have the benefit of expanding the reach of U.S. intelligence in areas where the U.S. lacks collection assets, they also may pose a risk of the IC relying too heavily on a partner's unique access and capabilities. In the 1970s, the IC's reliance on Iran's SAVAK intelligence organization contributed to the U.S. failure to comprehend developments leading up to the overthrow of the Shah. More recently, Congress, in a Joint Inquiry into the conditions leading up to 9/11, the congressional intelligence committees cited the "excessive reliance on foreign liaison services," as a factor contributing to the failure of the IC to develop its own human intelligence sources that could penetrate Al Qa'ida. Lacking access to senior, high level al-Qa'ida leadership, the [Intelligence] Community relied on secondhand, fragmented and often questionable human intelligence information, a great deal of which was obtained from volunteers or sources obtained through the efforts of foreign liaison. The dispersed character of terrorists and terrorist organizations is such that it would be difficult to expect the IC to have an optimal number of U.S.-recruited human intelligence sources in place everywhere they might be needed. There will always be an inherent risk in relying on foreign partners in areas where the United States has not had the time, resources, or capacity to develop its own assets. However, a greater risk was arguably incurred by the U.S. intelligence community in its deliberate, resource-driven strategy of leveraging foreign partnerships during the 1990s. Conclusion U.S. foreign intelligence relationships may be easily overlooked in discussions of the importance and inherent risks of cooperation with state and non-state actors in the international community. Little is publicly known about them, in particular how they are structured and how they contribute to U.S. national security. The benefits of these relationships to the United States are weighed against their potential hazards, including outright failure. Congress's role in providing oversight here is different than its oversight of intelligence in other respects. With the exception of covert action with foreign partners (which is covered by oversight provisions in statute), congressional oversight of U.S. foreign intelligence relationships can be especially challenging due to the passive, low-profile character of sharing intelligence, and Congress's inability to penetrate the internal dynamics of a foreign intelligence service. Nonetheless, these relationships will remain an integral, daily aspect of intelligence activities supporting U.S. national security objectives, and thus Congress has a vested interest in conducting oversight of them.

From its inception, the United States Intelligence Community (IC) has relied on close relations with foreign partners. These relationships often reflect mutual security interests and the trust each side has of the other's credibility and professionalism. They are generally strategic and cover a range of national security priorities involving national defense, emerging threats, counterterrorism, counter-proliferation, treaty compliance, cybersecurity, economic and financial security, counter-narcotics, and piracy. U.S. intelligence relations with foreign counterparts offer a number of benefits: indications and warning of an attack, expanded geographic coverage, corroboration of national sources, accelerated access to a contingency area, and a diplomatic backchannel. They also present risks of compromise due to poor security, espionage, geopolitical turmoil, manipulation to influence policy, incomplete vetting of foreign sources, over-reliance on a foreign partner's intelligence capabilities, and concern over a partner's potentially illegal or unethical tradecraft. Because intelligence failures involving a foreign partner sometimes become public, the risks to the IC of cooperating with a foreign intelligence service are more easily understood. Nevertheless, the persistent cultivation of intelligence relations with foreign partners suggests that the IC remains confident that the benefits outweigh the risks. These benefits are not always widely recognized due to their sensitivity and the potential for compromising the scope and details of what amounts to intelligence collection. The best known of these intelligence relationships are the decades-long ties to America's closest allies, who have shared history, values, and similar perspectives on national security threats. Such ties are often one component of a broader security cooperation arrangement. Less well known are liaison relationships with U.S. adversaries over a particular issue of mutual concern, or relations with non-state foreign intelligence organizations such as Kurdish groups. Regardless of the partner, the U.S. Intelligence Community's aim is to enhance national intelligence resources and capabilities and to further U.S. national security by better understanding the threat environment and thereby enabling informed strategic planning, better policy decisions, and successful military operations. Thus, U.S. foreign intelligence relationships can be an overlooked component of public discussion of various aspects of international cooperation. Foreign intelligence agencies with ties to U.S. intelligence have often escaped the reach of congressional oversight. Yet Congress, at various times, has been interested in both the benefits and the risks of foreign intelligence relationships to U.S. national security. While sometimes extolling the value intelligence foreign partners can provide, Congress has also been critical of occasions when the IC has become too dependent on such partners at the expense of IC investment in its own intelligence capabilities. Congress has also been concerned with the IC's ability to independently assess the credibility of foreign intelligence sources, as well as the vulnerability of a foreign intelligence partner's telecommunications infrastructure to compromise by a hostile foreign intelligence service. Of particular sensitivity to Congress has been the poor record of human rights by certain foreign intelligence agencies and the potential for foreign intelligence partners to collect and share with the United States information on U.S. persons. This report uses publicly available, unclassified sources as the basis of its research, and does not reference information in the public domain that was unlawfully disclosed.

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Introduction The nation's air, land, and marine transportation systems are designed for accessibility and efficiency, two characteristics that make them vulnerable to attack. The difficulty and cost of protecting the transportation sector from attack raises a core question for policymakers: how much effort and resources to put toward protecting potential targets versus pursuing and fighting terrorists. While hardening the transportation sector against terrorist attack is difficult, measures can be taken to deter terrorists. The focus of debate is how best to implement and finance a system of deterrence, protection, and response that effectively reduces the possibility and consequences of terrorist attacks without unduly interfering with travel, commerce, and civil liberties. For all modes of transportation, one can identify four principal policy objectives that would support a system of deterrence and protection: (1) ensuring the trustworthiness of the passengers and the cargo flowing through the system; (2) ensuring the trustworthiness of the transportation workers who operate and service the vehicles, assist the passengers, or handle the cargo; (3) ensuring the trustworthiness of the private companies that operate in the system, such as the carriers, shippers, agents, and brokers; and (4) establishing a perimeter of security around transportation facilities and vehicles in operation. The first three policy objectives are concerned with preventing an attack from within a transportation system, such as occurred on September 11, 2001. The concern is that attackers could once again disguise themselves as legitimate passengers (or shippers or workers) to get in position to launch an attack. The fourth policy objective is concerned with preventing an attack from outside a transportation system. For instance, terrorists could ram a bomb-laden speedboat into an oil tanker, as was done in October 2002 to the French oil tanker Limberg , or they could shoot a shoulder-fired missile at an airplane taking off or landing, as was attempted in November 2002 against an Israeli charter jet in Mombasa, Kenya. Achieving all four of these objectives is difficult at best, and in some modes, is practically impossible. Where limited options exist for preventing an attack, policymakers are left with evaluating options for minimizing the consequences of an attack, without imposing unduly burdensome requirements. Aviation Security1 Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Congress took swift action to create the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) within the U.S. Department of Transportation and gave it control over all airline passenger and baggage screening functions and deployment of armed air marshals on commercial passenger flights. In 2003, TSA was transferred to the newly formed Department of Homeland Security (DHS). To this day, the federal role in airport screening remains controversial. While airports are allowed to opt out of federal screening, alternative private screening under TSA contracts has been limited to 22 airports out of approximately 450 commercial passenger airports where passenger screening is required. Congress has sought to ensure that optional private screening remains available for those airports that want to pursue this option. The TSA Modernization Act, incorporated into the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 ( P.L. 115-254 ), includes language directing TSA to streamline the contracting process for private screening at airports, and directs TSA to look into the feasibility of modifying the program to allow individual airport terminals, instead of entire airports, to switch over to screening by private contractors. Proposals seeking more extensive reforms of passenger screening have not been extensively debated. Rather, aviation security legislation has largely focused on specific mandates to comprehensively screen for explosives and carry out background checks and threat assessments. Despite the extensive focus on aviation security for more than a decade, a number of challenges remain, including effectively screening passengers, baggage, and cargo for explosives threats; developing effective risk-based methods for screening passengers and others with access to aircraft and sensitive areas; incorporating biometrics into the passenger screening process to verify identities; exploiting available intelligence information and watchlists to identify individuals who pose potential threats to civil aviation; implementing effective systems, regulations, and international agreements to assess risk and conduct risk-based screening of air cargo shipments worldwide; effectively deterring and responding to security threats in public areas of airports and at screening checkpoints; developing effective strategies for addressing aircraft vulnerabilities to shoulder-fired missiles and other standoff weapons; and addressing the potential security implications of unmanned aircraft operations in domestic airspace and developing effective countermeasures to protect critical infrastructure, including airports and aircraft, from attacks using drones. Explosives Screening Strategy for the Aviation Domain Prior to the 9/11 attacks, explosives screening in the aviation domain was limited in scope and focused on selective screening of checked baggage placed on international passenger flights. Immediately following the 9/11 attacks, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA; P.L. 107-71 ) mandated 100% screening of all checked baggage placed on domestic passenger flights and on international passenger flights to and from the United States. In addition, the Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act of 2007 ( P.L. 110-53 ) mandated the physical screening of all cargo placed on passenger flights. Unlike passenger and checked baggage screening, TSA does not routinely perform physical inspections of air cargo. Rather, TSA satisfies this mandate through the Certified Cargo Screening Program. Under the program, manufacturers, warehouses, distributors, freight forwarders, and shippers carry out screening inspections using TSA-approved technologies and procedures both at airports and at off-airport facilities in concert with certified supply-chain security measures and chain-of-custody standards. Internationally, TSA works with other governments, international trade organizations, and industry to assure that all U.S.-bound air cargo shipments carried aboard passenger aircraft meet the requirements of the mandate. Additionally, TSA works closely with Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to carry out risk-based targeting of cargo shipments, including use of the CBP Advance Targeting System-Cargo (ATS-C), which assigns risk-based scores to inbound air cargo shipments to identify shipments of elevated risk. Originally designed to combat drug smuggling, ATS-C has evolved over the years, particularly in response to an October 2010 cargo aircraft bomb plot that originated in Yemen, to assess shipments for explosives threats or other terrorism-related activities. CBP and TSA continue to pilot test the Air Cargo Advance Screening (ACAS) system, initiated in 2010, under which freight forwarders and airlines voluntarily submit key data elements of cargo manifests for predeparture vetting. P.L. 115-254 requires TSA to establish an air cargo security division and review and improve the Known Shipper Program and Certified Cargo Screening Program to enhance their effectiveness and address any identified vulnerabilities. The act also requires U.S. Customs and Border Protection to work with TSA to establish a formal ACAS program for inbound international cargo modelled on the long-running ACAS pilot program. It directs TSA to examine the feasibility of expanding the use of computed tomography to air cargo and examine other emerging screening technologies that may enhance air cargo screening. Given the focus on the threats to aviation posed by explosives, a significant focus of TSA acquisition efforts has been on explosives screening technologies. The Transportation Security Acquisition Reform Act ( P.L. 113-245 ) required TSA to develop a five-year technology investment plan and mandated formal justifications and certifications that technology investments are cost-beneficial. The act also required tighter inventory controls and processes to ensure efficient utilization of procured technologies. P.L. 115-254 requires TSA to update this plan annually to accompany its budget request. The act also requires TSA to establish an innovation task force to work with industry to identify, cultivate, and accelerate the development and implementation of innovative transportation security technologies. A major thrust of TSA's acquisition and technology deployment strategy is improving the capability to detect concealed explosives and bomb-making components carried by airline passengers. The October 31, 2015, downing of a Russian passenger airliner departing Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, reportedly following the explosion of a bomb aboard the aircraft, renewed concerns over capabilities to detect explosives in baggage and cargo and monitoring of airport workers with access to aircraft, particularly overseas. In response to a 2009 incident aboard a Northwest Airlines flight, the Obama Administration accelerated deployment of Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) whole body imaging devices and other technologies at passenger screening checkpoints. This deployment responded to the 9/11 Commission recommendation to improve the detection of explosives on passengers. In addition to AIT, next generation screening technologies for airport screening checkpoints include advanced technology X-ray systems for screening carry-on baggage, bottled liquids scanners, cast and prosthesis imagers, shoe scanning devices, and portable explosives trace detection equipment. The use of AIT has raised a number of policy questions. Privacy advocates have objected to the intrusiveness of AIT, particularly when used for primary screening. To allay privacy concerns, TSA eliminated the use of human analysis of AIT images and does not store imagery. In place of human image analysts, TSA has deployed automated threat detection capabilities using automated targeting recognition (ATR) software. Another concern raised about AIT centered on the potential medical risks posed by backscatter X-ray systems, but those systems are no longer in use for airport screening, and current millimeter wave systems emit nonionizing millimeter waves generally not considered harmful. More recently, the effectiveness of AIT and ATR has been brought into question. In 2015, the DHS Office of Inspector General completed covert testing of passenger screening checkpoint technologies and processes and consistently found failures in technology and procedures coupled with human error that allowed prohibited items to pass into secure areas. Even prior to the revelations of weaknesses in passenger checkpoint screening technologies and procedures, the use of AIT was controversial. Past legislative proposals specifically sought to prohibit the use of whole body imaging for primary screening (see, for example, H.R. 2200 , 111 th Congress). Primary screening using AIT is now commonplace at larger airports, but checkpoints at many smaller airports have not been furnished with AIT equipment and other advanced checkpoint detection technologies. This raises questions about TSA's long-range plans to expand AIT to ensure more uniform approaches to explosives screening across all categories of airports. Through FY2018, TSA deployed about 960 AIT units. It has not planned for procurements beyond this level, although many smaller airports are not equipped with this capability. TSA plans to manage this risk to a large extent through risk-based passenger screening measures, primarily through increased use of voluntary passenger background checks under the PreCheck trusted traveler program. However, this program, likewise, is not available at many smaller airports: Currently, the program's incentive of expedited screening is offered at fewer than half of all commercial passenger airports. The FAA Extension, Safety, and Security Act of 2016 ( P.L. 114-190 ) directed TSA to initiate a demonstration program at three to six large airports to examine passenger checkpoint reconfigurations that increase efficiencies and reduce vulnerabilities, and a separate demonstration program at three airports to develop and test next-generation screening system prototypes designed to expedite passenger handling. P.L. 115-254 instructs TSA to continue operation of its systems integration facility at Washington Reagan National Airport for testing and evaluating advanced transportation security screening technologies, and to ensure timely assessments of new screening technologies. It also directs TSA to promote a diverse security technology industry to better enable small business innovators to develop and commercialize new transportation security technologies. The act requires TSA to formally establish its innovation task force to accelerate the development of innovative transportation security technologies and capabilities. The act also directs DHS to conduct a review to determine whether the Transportation Security Laboratory in Atlantic City, NJ, whose core mission is to perform research, development, and validation of explosives detection and mitigation technologies, should be managed by TSA or by another DHS entity. The laboratory was originally transferred to TSA from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), but has been in the hands of the DHS Science and Technology Directorate for more than a decade. Risk-Based Passenger Screening TSA has initiated a number of risk-based screening initiatives to focus its resources and apply directed measures based on intelligence-driven assessments of security risk. These include PreCheck; modified screening procedures for children 12 and under; and a program for expedited screening of known flight crew and cabin crew members. Programs have also been developed for modified screening of elderly passengers similar to those procedures put in place for children. PreCheck is modeled on CBP programs such as Global Entry, SENTRI, and NEXUS. Under the program, participants vetted through a background check process are processed through expedited screening lanes where they can keep shoes on and keep liquids and laptops inside carry-on bags. As of December 2018, PreCheck expedited screening lanes were available at more than 200 airports. The cost of background checks under the PreCheck program is recovered through application fees of $85 per passenger for a five-year membership. TSA's goal is to process 50% of passengers through PreCheck expedited screening lanes, thus reducing the need for standard security screening lanes, but it has struggled to increase program membership. One concern raised over the PreCheck program is the lack of biometric authentication to verify participants at screening checkpoints. A predecessor test program, the Registered Traveler program, which used private vendors to issue and scan participants' biometric credentials, was scrapped by TSA in 2009 because it failed to show a demonstrable security benefit. In 2016, biometric identity authentication was reintroduced at 13 airports under a private trusted traveler program known as Clear. Participants in Clear, which is separate from PreCheck and not operated or funded by TSA, use an express lane to verify identity using a fingerprint or iris scan rather than interacting with a TSA document checker. Previously, the extensive use of a program called "managed inclusion" to route selected travelers not enrolled in PreCheck through designated PreCheck expedited screening lanes also raised objections. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that TSA had not fully tested its managed inclusion practices, and recommended that TSA take steps to ensure and document that testing of the program adheres to established evaluation design practices. TSA phased out the managed inclusion program in the fall of 2015. Since September 2015, TSA behavior detection officers and explosives trace detection personnel no longer direct passengers not enrolled in PreCheck to expedited screening lanes, but pre-assessments using canine teams have continued at some major airports. Questions remain regarding whether PreCheck is fully effective in directing security resources to unknown or elevated-risk travelers. Nonetheless, it has improved screening efficiency. TSA has estimated annual savings in direct screener workforce costs totaling $110 million as a result of PreCheck and other risk-based initiatives. A study suggested that considerably greater efficiency gains might be realized if TSA could double the annual number of PreCheck screenings, which would require increasing the number of PreCheck-eligible travelers to about 15 to 20 million. PreCheck expansion was addressed in recent legislation, and oversight of TSA efforts to expand PreCheck may be a specific topic of interest during the 116 th Congress. Language in P.L. 115-254 directs TSA to work with at least two private-sector entities to expand PreCheck enrollment options and forge at least two agreements for marketing the program, setting enrollment targets of 7 million by the end of FY2019, 10 million by the end of FY2020, and 15 million by the end of FY2021. The act also directs TSA to explore cost-effective options for conducting recurrent background checks of program participants, although this could raise concerns over impacts on enrollments if procedures for recurrent checks impose additional burdens on participants. The act requires TSA to ensure that PreCheck expedited screening lanes are open and available to program participants during peak and high-volume travel times and take steps to provide expedited screening at standard screening lanes when PreCheck lanes are not available. It also instructs TSA to ensure that only trusted traveler program members and members of the Armed Forces are permitted to use PreCheck screening lanes. P.L. 115-254 also directs TSA and CBP to work together on the deployment of biometric technologies for the entry-exit program for international travelers and other uses. According to the TSA Biometrics Roadmap, TSA also plans to integrate biometrics technology for identity verification of PreCheck travelers, and seeks to eventually expand the voluntary use of biometrics to all domestic air travelers. Plans for increased use of biometrics raise privacy and data-protection concerns that may be of particular interest to congressional oversight committees. In addition to passenger screening, TSA, in coordination with participating airlines and labor organizations representing airline pilots, has developed a known crewmember program to expedite security screening of airline flight crews. In July 2012, TSA expanded the program to include flight attendants. TSA has also developed a passenger behavior detection program to identify potential threats based on observed behavioral characteristics. TSA initiated early tests of its Screening Passengers by Observational Techniques (SPOT) program in 2003. By FY2012, the program deployed almost 3,000 behavior detection officers at 176 airports, at an annual cost of about $200 million. Questions remain regarding the effectiveness of the behavioral detection program, and privacy advocates have cautioned that it could devolve into racial or ethnic profiling. While some Members of Congress have sought to shutter the program, Congress has not moved to do so. For example, H.Amdt. 127 (113 th Congress), an amendment to the FY2014 DHS appropriations measure that sought to eliminate funding for the program, failed to pass a floor vote. Congress also has not taken specific action to revamp the program, despite the concerns raised by GAO and the DHS Office of Inspector General. P.L. 115-254 directed TSA to utilize risk-based strategies in deploying federal air marshal teams on international and domestic flights. However, a more controversial TSA initiative using air marshals to shadow passengers whose behavioral profiles based on past itineraries indicated they might pose an elevated security risk was reportedly shuttered in December 2018 after media reports and some Members of Congress raised concerns over the privacy implications of the program. The Use of Terrorist Watchlists in the Aviation Domain Airlines were formerly responsible for checking passenger names against terrorist watchlists maintained by the government. Following at least two instances in 2009 and 2010 in which such checks failed to identify individuals who may pose a threat to aviation, TSA took responsibility for checking passenger names under the Secure Flight program. In November 2010, DHS announced that 100% of passengers flying to or from U.S. airports are being vetted using the Secure Flight system. Secure Flight vets passenger name records against a subset of the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB). On international flights, Secure Flight operates in coordination with the use of watchlists by CBP's National Targeting Center-Passenger, which relies on the Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) and other tools to vet both inbound and outbound passenger manifests. In addition to flights of U.S. and foreign airlines, all inbound and outbound international flights using chartered and private aircraft must transmit passenger and crew manifests to CBP at least one hour prior to departure. In addition to these systems, TSA conducts risk-based analysis of passenger data carried out by the airlines through use of the Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS). In January 2015, TSA gave notification that it would start incorporating the results of CAPPS assessments, but not the underlying data used to make such assessments, into Secure Flight, along with each passenger's full name, date of birth, and PreCheck traveler number (if applicable). These data are used within the Secure Flight system to perform risk-based analyses to determine whether passengers receive expedited, standard, or enhanced screening at airport checkpoints. P.L. 115-254 removed statutory references to CAPPS, replacing them with references to the Secure Flight Program to clarify that these various passenger vetting elements are fully encompassed under Secure Flight. The act also directed TSA to conduct and publicly disseminate a review of its privacy impact assessment of the Secure Flight Program. Central issues surrounding the use of terrorist watchlists in the aviation domain that may be considered during the 116 th Congress include the speed with which watchlists are updated as new intelligence information becomes available; the extent to which all information available to the federal government is exploited to assess possible threats among passengers and airline and airport workers; the ability to detect identity fraud or other attempts to circumvent terrorist watchlist checks; the adequacy of established protocols for providing redress to individuals improperly identified as potential threats; and the adequacy of coordination with international partners. In addition, there has been a growing interest in finding better ways to utilize watchlists to prevent terrorist travel, particularly travel of radicalized individuals seeking to join forces with foreign terrorist organizations such as the Islamic State (IS). Language in P.L. 114-190 directed TSA to assess whether recurrent fingerprint-based criminal background checks could be carried out in a cost-effective manner to augment terrorist watchlist checks for PreCheck program participants. Additionally, the act directed TSA to expand criminal background checks for certain airport workers. Perimeter Security, Access Controls, and Worker Vetting Airport perimeter security, access controls, and credentialing of airport workers are generally responsibilities of airport operators. There is no common access credential for airport workers. Rather, each airport separately issues security credentials to airport workers. These credentials are often referred to as Security Identification Display Area (SIDA) badges, and they convey the level of access that an airport worker is granted. TSA requires access control points to be secured by measures such as posted security guards or electronically controlled locks. Additionally, airports must implement programs to train airport workers to challenge anyone not displaying proper identification. Airports may also deploy surveillance technologies, access control measures, and security patrols to protect airport property from intrusion, including buildings and terminal areas. Such measures are paid for by the airport, but must be approved by TSA as part of an airport's overall security program. State and local law enforcement agencies with jurisdiction at the airport are generally responsible for patrols of airport property, including passenger terminals. They also may patrol adjacent properties to deter and detect other threats to aviation, such as shoulder-fired missiles (see " Mitigating the Threat of Shoulder-Fired Missiles to Civilian Aircraft "). TSA requires security background checks of airport workers with unescorted access privileges to secure areas at all commercial passenger airports and air cargo facilities. Background checks consist of a fingerprint-based criminal history records check and security threat assessment, which include checking employee names against terrorist database information. Certain criminal offenses committed within the past 10 years, including aviation-specific crimes, transportation-related crimes, and other felony offences, are disqualifying. Airports must collect applicant biographical information and fingerprints to submit to TSA to process background checks. Many airports use a service known as the Transportation Security Clearinghouse to coordinate the processing of background check applications. P.L. 114-190 directed TSA to update the eligibility criteria and disqualifying criminal offenses for SIDA access credentials based on other transportation vetting requirements and knowledge of insider threats to security. The law proposes that TSA expand the criminal history look-back period from the current 10 years to 15 years, and that individuals be disqualified if they have been released from prison within 5 years of their application. The statute directs TSA to establish a formal waiver process for individuals denied credentials. It also calls for full implementation of recurrent vetting of airport workers with SIDA access credentials using the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI's) Rap Back service to identify disqualifying criminal offences. Language in P.L. 115-254 requires TSA to provide congressional oversight committees with data on the number of airport workers being continuously vetted though the Rap Back service. It also directs TSA to identify means of using homeland security and intelligence resources to educate TSA personnel on means to better mitigate insider threats. The law also requires TSA to establish a centralized database of individuals who have had security access or aircraft-operator credentials revoked for failing to comply with aviation security requirements. P.L. 114-190 directed TSA to conduct random physical inspections of airport workers at SIDA access points and in SIDA areas. P.L. 115-254 clarifies that TSA-led random inspections of aviation workers be targeted, strategic, and focused on providing the greatest level of security effectiveness, rather than being "random" in the true sense of the word. The law also directs TSA to continue its covert testing of employee access controls and provide measures of the effectiveness of such operations to airport operators, and as appropriate, to airlines. The act also establishes more stringent standards for individuals applying for SIDA access, requiring that such individuals provide their social security number in order to strengthen vetting effectiveness. Explosives Screening Technology and Canines Explosives screening technologies at passenger screening checkpoints primarily consist of the AIT whole body imaging systems; advanced technology X-ray imagers for carry-on items; and explosives trace detection systems used to test swab samples collected from individuals or carry-on items for explosives residue. TSA began introducing Computed Tomography (CT) scanning technology at passenger screening checkpoints in FY2018 on a trial basis, and plans to expand the use of CT technology for scanning carry-on items throughout FY2019, with an aim of deploying more than 150 units at 14 major airports. TSA asserts that CT technology offers automated capabilities to help improve detection of explosives and other threats. TSA concedes, however, that the introduction of CT technology, at least initially, will require more resources to clear increased numbers of false alarms compared to X-ray technology, and seeks to increase screener numbers at those airports where CT will be deployed to minimize these impacts on passenger screening. P.L. 115-254 directs TSA to proceed with these CT pilot programs and also to examine the feasibility of using CT technology to screen cargo carried on passenger aircraft. The act also directs TSA to assess other emerging screening technologies that may be used to enhance air cargo screening. For checked baggage screening, TSA utilizes a combination of CT-based explosives detection systems and chemical trace detection technology. TSA deploys either high-speed (greater than 900 bags per hour), medium-speed (400 to 900 bags per hour), or reduced-size (100 to 400 bags per hour) CT-based systems, depending on airport needs and configurations. TSA is also funding the development of new algorithms to more reliably detect homemade explosives threats in checked baggage and reduce false positives. TSA pays for or reimburses airports for modifying baggage-handling facilities and installing new inspection systems to accommodate explosives detection technologies. The TSA's National Explosives Detection Canine Team Program trains and deploys canines and handlers at transportation facilities to detect explosives. The program includes approximately 370 TSA teams and 675 state and local law enforcement teams trained by TSA under partnership agreements. More than 350 of the TSA teams are dedicated to passenger screening at 46 airports. Following airport bombings in Brussels, Belgium, and Istanbul, Turkey, in 2016, there has been interest in increasing deployments of canine teams in nonsterile areas of airport terminals. P.L. 114-190 authorized TSA to provide training to foreign governments in airport security measures including the use of canine teams. The act also directed TSA to utilize canine teams to minimize passenger wait times and maximize security effectiveness of checkpoint operations. P.L. 115-254 directs TSA to establish a working group to assess ways to support a decentralized, nonfederal domestic breeding program for explosives detection canines and to modernize canine breeding, medical, technical, and training standards. It further instructs TSA to develop guidance for the procurement and deployment of third-party domestic canines to enhance public area security at transportation hubs, including airports. Large hub airports that do not have their full allocation of explosives detection canine teams would be able to directly acquire canines from TSA-approved third-party sources, but canines procured in this manner would be trained by TSA personnel. Additionally, the act directs TSA to issue standards for the primary screening of air cargo by private entities using dogs and handlers not owned or employed by TSA. Protecting Public Areas of Airports Incident response at airports is primarily the responsibility of airport operators and state or local law enforcement agencies, with TSA acting as a regulator in approving an airport's comprehensive security program. Federal law enforcement may also be involved in developing and reviewing response plans, but will typically not have a lead role in event response. However, federal law enforcement may assume a lead investigative role following a security incident, particularly if the event is determined to be an act of terrorism. P.L. 115-254 directs TSA to establish a working group to collaborate with public and private stakeholders to develop nonbinding recommendations for enhancing security in public areas of transportation facilities. The act also directs TSA to increase funding under the law enforcement reimbursable program for airports to increase the presence of law enforcement officers in public areas to provide visible deterrents to terrorists, including in baggage claim and ticketing areas and on airport access roads, as well as at screening checkpoints. On November 1, 2013, a lone gunman targeting TSA employees fired several shots at a screening checkpoint at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX), killing one TSA screener and injuring two other screeners and one airline passenger. In a detailed postincident action report, TSA identified several proposed actions to improve checkpoint security, but did not support proposals to arm certain TSA employees or provide screeners with bulletproof vests, and did not recommend mandatory law enforcement presence at checkpoints. The Gerardo Hernandez Airport Security Act of 2015 ( P.L. 114-50 ), named in honor of the TSA screener killed in the LAX incident and enacted in September 2015, requires airports to adopt plans for responding to security incidents and to create a mechanism for sharing information among airports regarding best practices for airport security incident planning, management, and training. It also requires TSA to identify ways to expand the availability of funding for checkpoint screening law enforcement support through cost savings from improved efficiencies mainly achieved through implementing PreCheck expedited screening protocols. TSA partially reimburses local law enforcement agencies for support at screening checkpoints, and P.L. 115-254 directs TSA to increase funding for the reimbursable program to expand protection of public areas of airports as well as screening checkpoints. Foreign Last Point of Departure Airports TSA regulates foreign air carriers that operate flights to the United States to enforce requirements regarding the acceptance and screening of passengers, baggage, and cargo carried on those aircraft. As part of this regulation, TSA inspects foreign airports from which commercial flights proceed directly to the United States. Officials known as Transportation Security Administration Representatives (TSARs) assess country compliance with international standards for aviation security and plan and coordinate U.S. airport risk analysis and assessments of foreign airports. TSARs also administer and coordinate TSA response to terrorist incidents and threats to U.S. citizens and transportation assets and interests overseas. Fifteen foreign last point of departure airports (eight in Canada, two in the Bahamas, one in Bermuda, one in Aruba, two in Ireland, and one in Abu Dhabi) have Customs and Border Protection (CBP) preclearance facilities where passengers are admitted to the United States prior to departure. Passengers arriving on international flights from these preclearance airports deplane directly into the airport sterile area upon arrival at the U.S. airport of entry, where they can board connecting flights or leave the airport directly, rather than being routed to customs and immigration processing facilities. CBP has announced its intention to expand customs preclearance to additional countries and airports. While agreements to offer preclearance at airports in Stockholm, Sweden, and Punta Cana, Dominican Republic, were finalized in 2016, preclearance operations at these airports have not yet been established. Plans to offer preclearance at other airports are still being negotiated. Assessing screening measures at preclearance airports is a particular priority for TSA. TSA is also working to increase checked baggage preclearance processing so checked baggage does not have to be rescreened by TSA at the U.S. airport of entry, which has been the practice. Language in P.L. 114-190 requires TSA to conduct security risk assessments at all last point of departure airports, and authorizes the donation of security screening equipment to such airports to mitigate security vulnerabilities that put U.S. citizens at risk. P.L. 115-254 mandates that any such donated screening equipment be restored to original commercial settings and must not contain TSA-specific security standards or algorithms. Recipients of donated screening equipment must satisfactorily demonstrate that they are capable of properly maintaining it and must ensure that, once the equipment is retired from service, it does not get into the hands of terrorists or otherwise compromise security. The act also directs DHS, in coordination with the Department of State, to review and improve international aviation security standards and dissemination and implementation processes for security directives and emergency amendments to security requirements issued to domestic and foreign air carriers. It instructs TSA to work with the International Civil Aviation Organization to raise minimum standards for aviation security. P.L. 115-254 also directs TSA to work with FAA to track public charter flights between the United States and Cuba, and to brief congressional oversight committees on aviation security measures at Cuban airports that have air service to the United States. Mitigating the Threat of Shoulder-Fired Missiles to Civilian Aircraft The terrorist threat posed by small man-portable shoulder-fired missiles was brought into the spotlight soon after the 9/11 terrorist attacks by the November 2002 attempted downing of a chartered Israeli airliner in Mombasa, Kenya. Since then, Department of State and military initiatives have sought bilateral cooperation and voluntary reductions of shoulder-fired missiles, formally referred to as man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), worldwide. The most visible DHS initiative to address the threat was the multiyear Counter-MANPADS program carried out by the DHS Science & Technology Directorate. The program concluded in 2009 with extensive testing and FAA certification of two systems capable of protecting airliners against heat-seeking missiles. The systems have not been deployed on commercial airliners in the United States, however, due largely to high acquisition and life-cycle costs. U.S. airlines have not voluntarily invested in these systems for operational use, and argue that the costs for such systems should be borne, at least in part, by the federal government. MANPADS are mainly seen as a security threat to civil aviation overseas, but a MANPADS attack in the United States could have a considerable impact on the airline industry. While major U.S. airports have conducted vulnerability studies, efforts to reduce vulnerabilities to potential MANPADS attacks face significant logistic challenges. While Congress has not formally debated the issue since the conclusion of the DHS program in 2009, any future terrorist attempts to use standoff weapons, including shoulder-fired missiles, to attack civilian aircraft could quickly escalate this to a major national security priority. Security Issues Regarding the Operation of Unmanned Aircraft The proliferation of civilian drones, also known as unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), raises potential security risks, including the possibility that terrorists could use a drone to carry out an attack against a ground target. It is also possible that drones themselves could be targeted by terrorists or cybercriminals seeking to tap into sensor data transmissions or to cause mayhem by hacking or jamming command and control signals. Two principal concerns are that drones could be used to attack critical infrastructure or high-profile targets and that unauthorized drone operations in close proximity to airports could disrupt air transportation. The 116 th Congress may have a particular interest in policies and technologies to mitigate safety and security threats posed by unmanned aircraft. Terrorists could potentially use drones to carry out small-scale attacks using explosives, or as platforms for chemical, biological, or radiological attacks. In September 2011, the FBI disrupted a homegrown terrorist plot to attack the Pentagon and the Capitol with large model aircraft packed with high explosives. Widely publicized drone incidents include an unauthorized flight at a political rally in Dresden, Germany, in September 2013 that came in close proximity to German Chancellor Angela Merkel; a January 2015 crash of a small hobby drone on the White House lawn in Washington, DC; a series of unidentified drone flights over landmarks and sensitive locations in Paris, France, in 2015; and drone sightings around London Gatwick and Heathrow airports in December 2018 that grounded numerous airline flights. These incidents have raised additional concerns about safety and security threats posed by small unmanned aircraft. Domestically, there have been numerous reports of drones flying in close proximity to airports and manned aircraft, in restricted airspace, and over stadiums and outdoor events. In September 2017, a hobby drone collided with a National Guard Black Hawk helicopter assigned to patrol the skies over New York harbor during a meeting of the United Nations General Assembly, causing damage to one of the helicopter's rotor blades. Numerous other safety incidents involving drones have been reported in the United States and abroad, but few have been tied to terrorism. However, ISIS is known to have used drones in conflict zones to conduct reconnaissance and drop explosives. While the payload capacities of small unmanned aircraft would likely limit the damage a terrorist attack using conventional explosives could inflict, drone attacks using chemical, biological, or radiological weapons could be more serious. Regulations for small unmanned aircraft used for commercial purposes require TSA to carry out security threat assessments of certificated operators as it does for civilian pilots. However, this requirement does not apply to recreational users, who are already permitted to operate small drones at low altitudes. Moreover, while FAA has issued general guidance to law enforcement regarding unlawful UAS operations, it is not clear that law enforcement agencies have sufficient training or technical capacity to respond to this potential threat. Technology may help manage security threats posed by unmanned aircraft. Integrating tracking mechanisms as well as incorporating "geo-fencing" capabilities, designed to prevent flights over sensitive locations or in excess of certain altitude limits, into unmanned aircraft systems may help curtail unauthorized flights. Language in P.L. 114-190 directed FAA to establish a pilot program to detect and mitigate unmanned aircraft operations in the vicinity of airports and other critical infrastructure. Additionally, the act directed FAA to develop an air traffic management system for small UASs that could include measures to detect and deter security threats posed by UASs. The National Defense Authorization Act for FY2017 ( P.L. 114-328 ) authorized the Armed Forces and the Department of Energy to take necessary actions to mitigate threats posed by a UAS to certain security-related facilities in the United States. The act authorizes the military to detect, monitor, and track UASs; issue warnings to operators; disrupt control of a UAS, including interrupting or jamming control signals; seize or take control of the UAS; confiscate the unmanned aircraft; or use reasonable force to disable or destroy the UAS. P.L. 115-254 more broadly authorizes the Department of Justice and DHS to take similar defensive actions to protect people, facilities, or assets from credible threats posed by UASs. The act also expands the mission of the Coast Guard to include carrying out protective measures to safeguard its facilities and assets, including Coast Guard vessels and aircraft, from threats posed by unmanned aircraft. P.L. 115-254 also directs FAA to coordinate with the various agencies authorized to engage in counter-unmanned aircraft (C-UAS) activities to review standards, policies, and practices with respect to maintaining safety for airspace users, protecting individuals and property on the ground, and not interfering with avionics, navigation, and air traffic control systems. Additionally, the review is to assess the adequacy of those agencies' coordination with FAA regarding C-UAS operations, the adequacy of training for personnel operating C-UAS systems, information sharing regarding airspace authorizations, and best practices for consistent C-UAS operations. The act directs FAA to work with the Department of Defense (DOD), DHS, and other relevant agencies to ensure that technologies developed to mitigate risks posed by an errant or hostile UAS do not adversely impact safe airport operations and air traffic and air navigation services. The act also directs FAA to work with DOD to streamline deployment of C-UAS and requires FAA to develop a comprehensive strategy for identifying and responding to public safety threats posed by UASs. It also requires FAA to implement a pilot program using remote detection capabilities to identify UASs in order to carry out enforcement actions against UAS operators not in compliance with applicable aviation laws and regulations. P.L. 115-254 establishes a formal prohibition against civilians arming unmanned aircraft with dangerous weapons. Additionally, the act establishes criminal penalties for flying a drone over the White House grounds, the Vice President's residence, sites where the President or other individuals protected by the Secret Service are visiting, or other buildings or grounds hosting a special event of national significance. It also establishes criminal penalties for using a drone in a manner that interferes with wildfire suppression efforts or related law enforcement or emergency response activities. Aviation Cybersecurity There is growing concern over cybersecurity threats to aircraft, air traffic control systems, and airports. Executive Order 13636 provides broad guidance for DHS to work with FAA to identify cybersecurity risks, establish voluntary cybersecurity measures, and share information on cybersecurity threats within the broader cybersecurity framework. Additionally, 49 U.S.C. §44912 specifically directs TSA to periodically review threats to civil aviation with a particular focus on specified threats, including the potential disruption of civil aviation service resulting from a cyberattack. TSA has indicated that its approach to cybersecurity thus far has not been through regulation, but rather through voluntary collaboration with industry. Under this framework, TSA formed the Transportation Systems Sector Cybersecurity Working Group, which created a cybersecurity strategy for the transportation sector in 2012. Also, in coordination with the FBI and industry partners, TSA launched the Air Domain Intelligence Integration Center and an accompanying analysis center in 2014 to share information and conduct analysis of cyberthreats to civil aviation. In recognition of those threats, FAA has developed a software assurance policy for all FAA-owned and FAA-controlled information systems. However, according to an April 2015 GAO report, while FAA has taken steps to protect air traffic control systems from cyberthreats, it faces continuing challenges in mitigating cyberthreats, particularly as it transforms air traffic control systems under its NextGen modernization initiative. While FAA has adopted an evolving framework to address the cybersecurity of its systems, a January 2018 GAO report warned that new aircraft tracking technologies that will transform air traffic control in the coming years under NextGen have unmitigated cybersecurity vulnerabilities, including vulnerabilities to jamming, hacking, and spoofing of signals, that could compromise air traffic operations as well as pose a threat to national security and military aircraft operations. For systems onboard aircraft, FAA requires cybersecurity to be addressed in the existing airworthiness certification process. Large commercial aircraft and aviation systems manufacturers now typically collaborate with software security companies to attain high levels of assurance for software embedded in avionics equipment. Despite efforts to design aircraft systems to be resilient to cyberthreats, in April 2015 TSA and the FBI issued warnings that the increasing interconnectedness of these systems makes them vulnerable to unauthorized access and advised airlines to look out for individuals trying to tap into aircraft electronics and for evidence of tampering or network intrusions. FAA separately addresses cybersecurity of government-owned air traffic control systems and certified aircraft systems. However, GAO has cautioned that FAA's current approach to cybersecurity does not adequately address the interdependencies between aircraft and air traffic systems, and consequently may hinder efforts to develop a comprehensive and coordinated strategy. While it identified no easy fix, GAO recommended that FAA develop a comprehensive cybersecurity threat model, better clarify cybersecurity roles and responsibilities, improve management security controls and contractor oversight, and fully incorporate National Institute of Standards and Technology information security guidance throughout the system life cycle. Language in P.L. 114-190 mandated development of a comprehensive strategic framework for reducing cybersecurity risks to the national airspace system, civilian aviation, and FAA information systems. P.L. 115-254 directs FAA to review and update the framework to address known cybersecurity risks to the aviation system and short-term and long-term objectives for addressing these risks. The act also directs FAA to address cybersecurity in the certification of aircraft avionics systems and component software, and the cybersecurity of systems and technologies relating to the air traffic control system. The act also directs FAA to develop an integrated cybersecurity testbed for air traffic control modernization technologies. It orders a National Academy of Sciences study to develop recommendations on how to increase the size, quality, and diversity of FAA's cybersecurity workforce. P.L. 115-254 directs TSA to implement the framework for improving critical infrastructure cybersecurity developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology to manage cybersecurity risks and conduct cybersecurity vulnerability assessments, including cybersecurity evaluations of the PreCheck program as well as transportation worker credentialing programs that contain data on individuals. The act also directs TSA to coordinate with international counterparts to harmonize validation processes, allowing reciprocal recognition of security and screening technology approvals that comply with agreed-upon standards relating to performance as well as information security and cybersecurity. The act also directs DHS to review global aviation security standards and practices, including assessments of the cybersecurity risks of security screening equipment. In November 2018, TSA released a new cybersecurity roadmap providing a broad framework for how it will work with transportation industry and government stakeholders to address cybersecurity risks, including risks to aviation. The specific roles of TSA and FAA in regulating cybersecurity, particularly in areas such as aircraft and avionics certification and air traffic control, which have historically been FAA responsibilities, may be a specific topic for congressional oversight during the 116 th Congress. Transit and Passenger Rail Security37 Bombings of and shootings on passenger trains in Europe and Asia have illustrated the vulnerability of passenger rail systems to terrorist attacks. Passenger rail systems—primarily subway systems—in the United States carry about five times as many passengers each day as do airlines, over many thousands of miles of track, serving stations that are designed primarily for easy access. The increased security efforts around air travel have led to concerns that terrorists may turn their attention to "softer" targets, such as transit or passenger rail. A key challenge Congress faces is balancing the desire for increased rail passenger security with the efficient functioning of transit systems, the potential costs and damages of an attack, and other federal priorities. The volume of ridership and number of access points make it impractical to subject all rail passengers to the type of screening all airline passengers undergo. Consequently, transit security measures tend to emphasize managing the consequences of an attack. Nevertheless, steps have been taken to try to reduce the risks of an attack as well. These include vulnerability assessments; emergency planning; emergency response training and drilling of transit personnel (ideally in coordination with police, fire, and emergency medical personnel); increasing the number of transit security personnel; installing video surveillance equipment in vehicles and stations; and conducting random inspections of bags, platforms, and trains. The challenges of securing rail passengers are dwarfed by the challenge of securing bus passengers. There are some 76,000 buses carrying 19 million passengers each weekday in the United States. Some transit systems have installed video cameras on their buses, but the number and operating characteristics of transit buses make them all but impossible to secure. In contrast with the aviation sector, where TSA provides security directly, security in surface transportation is provided primarily by the transit and rail operators and local law enforcement agencies. TSA's main roles are oversight, coordination, intelligence sharing, training, and assistance. However, it provides some operational support through its Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) teams, which conduct operations with local law enforcement officials, including periodic patrols of transit and passenger rail systems to create "unpredictable visual deterrents." Several presidential Administrations have sought to reduce the size of the VIPR program, the value of which has yet to be demonstrated, but Congress has sought to increase the size of the program. Congressional efforts to promote the security of passenger rail and transit include providing grants to service providers, requiring those providers considered to be high-risk targets (by DHS) to have security plans approved by DHS, and requiring DHS to conduct security background checks and immigration status checks on all transit and railroad frontline employees. According to TSA, its three primary objectives for reducing risk in transit are to increase system resilience by protecting high-risk/high-consequence assets (i.e., critical tunnels, stations, and bridges); expand visible deterrence activities (i.e., canine teams, passenger screening teams, and antiterrorism teams); and engage the public and transit operators in the counterterrorism mission. TSA surface transportation security inspectors conduct assessments of transit systems (and other surface modes) through the agency's Baseline Assessment for Security Enhancement (BASE) program. The agency has also developed a security training and security exercise program for transit. TSA's program for securing surface transportation is known as Risk Mitigation Activities for Surface Transportation (RMAST). The intent of the RMAST program is to focus TSA's limited surface security resources on high-risk entities and locations. However, GAO reported in 2017 that TSA had not identified or prioritized high-risk entities for the RMAST program to focus on. The surface transportation inspector program has been a focus of congressional interest. Issues of concern to Congress have included whether the inspectors promoted from screening passengers at airports have sufficient expertise in surface transportation security; the administrative challenge of having the surface inspectors managed by airport-based federal security directors who themselves typically have no surface transportation experience; and the security value of the tasks performed by surface inspectors. The number of surface inspectors declined from 404 in FY2011 to 222 (full-time equivalent positions) in FY2018. TSA attributed the decrease to efficiencies achieved through focusing efforts on the basis of risk. However, in 2017 GAO reported that surface transportation inspectors were spending more time on the surface transportation mode that TSA had identified as the lowest risk than on the one identified as the highest risk. Surface inspection field offices are located near airports, and surface inspectors may spend a significant portion of their time on tasks related to aviation safety, but TSA does not have complete information on the extent to which surface inspectors are tasked to work on aviation security. GAO reported in 2014 that lack of guidance to TSA's surface inspectors resulted in inconsistent reporting of rail security incidents and that TSA had not consistently enforced the requirement that rail agencies report security incidents, resulting in poor data on the number and types of incidents. GAO also found that TSA did not have a systematic process for collecting and addressing feedback from surface transportation stakeholders regarding the effectiveness of its information-sharing effort. In a 2015 hearing, GAO testified that TSA had put processes in place to address these issues. DHS provides grants for security improvements for public transit, passenger rail, and occasionally other surface transportation modes under the Transit Security Grant Program. The vast majority of the funding goes to public transit providers. CRS estimates that, on an inflation-adjusted basis, funding for this program has declined 84% since 2009, when Congress allocated $150 million in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, in addition to routine appropriations (see Table 1 ). In a 2012 report, GAO found potential for duplication among four DHS state and local security grant programs with similar goals, one of which was the public transportation security grant program. Despite this finding, Congress has not supported consolidation of the programs, though appropriators have expressed concern that grant programs have not focused on areas of highest risk and that significant amounts of previously appropriated funds have not yet been awarded to recipients. In P.L. 114-50 , Congress directed TSA to ensure that all passenger transportation providers it considers as having high-risk facilities have in place plans to respond to active shooters, acts of terrorism, or other security-related incidents that target passengers. Port and Maritime Security49 The bulk of U.S. overseas trade is carried by ships, and thus the economic consequences of a maritime terrorist attack could be significant. In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. Customs Service (now Customs and Border Protection, CBP) and the Coast Guard realized that they needed to "push the borders out"—that is, they needed to begin screening vessels and cargo before they reached a U.S. port. While the previous screening methods that occurred at U.S. ports were sufficient to intercept other illicit cargo (e.g., drug smuggling) they could be too late in the case of intercepting a terrorist bomb. Thus, Customs instituted the "24-hour rule," requiring importers to submit shipment information to Customs a day before the shipment arrived at the overseas port of loading rather than submitting this information within days of its arrival at a U.S. port. Customs analyzes this information and other intelligence to flag shipments it believes are higher risk or have an unknown risk. Under the Container Security Initiative, those riskier shipments are examined by imaging machines or possibly unloaded before being loaded on a vessel. (It is practically impossible to examine shipping containers once they are aboard a vessel or while the ship is at sea.) Similarly, the Coast Guard recognized the need to extend terrorist screening beyond U.S. ports. It required ships to announce and report their intended arrival four days before entering a U.S. harbor. The Coast Guard examines the vessel's particulars, its crew, and past history to evaluate the security risk. The Coast Guard pushed for establishing international standards for port security at the International Maritime Organization so that overseas ports sending cargo to the United States would abide by the same security regulations as U.S. ports. The Coast Guard also visits foreign ports to assess their security measures. In addition to pushing the borders out, these agencies have instituted multiple layers of security that cover the four main elements of maritime transportation: ports, vessels, cargo, and workers. CBP's Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) program identifies a series of practices that importers are to follow that are designed to cover a shipper's entire supply chain—from the overseas point of origin to final delivery in the United States. For instance, C-TPAT includes procedures and independent checks when loading a shipping container and applying the seal on its doors to prevent tampering while in route. In addition to container inspection equipment installed at overseas ports, CBP has installed radiation portal monitors at each truck exit gate in U.S. ports. The Coast Guard requires vessel owners, port authorities and their terminal operators to submit security plans that describe their access control measures, drills and exercises to respond to a security incident, and other measures to secure their facilities. The Coast Guard recognizes that U.S. ports vary greatly in terms of their geographies and types of cargo they handle. The port security plans allow the industry to develop plans specific to their vulnerabilities. An important goal of the Coast Guard is "maritime domain awareness"—knowledge of the varied legitimate vessel activity taking place in a harbor (cargo, fishing, recreational) so as to spot any abnormal or suspicious activity. One aspect of this is requiring many vessels to be equipped with Automatic Identification Systems (transponders). The Coast Guard, along with TSA, has also instituted a port worker background check for longshoremen, truck drivers, vessel crews, and others that need access to port terminals. A Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) card must be obtained from the TSA and renewed every five years. Congress authorized much of the Coast Guard's role in maritime security in the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA; P.L. 107-295 ) and CBP's role in the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 (SAFE Port Act; P.L. 109-347 ). Congress modified these maritime security programs in Division J of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 ( P.L. 115-254 ). Two aspects of maritime security that have drawn attention recently are cybersecurity and the use of drones for coastal surveillance. The development of electronic navigation ("e-navigation"), involving the replacement of paper charts with electronic charts (already commonplace) or the replacement of channel marker buoys with virtual aids to navigation (in progress), could create vulnerabilities to cyberattack. In June 2017, a cyberattack on Maersk Line, the largest container carrier, prevented the carrier from taking bookings and required it to close its U.S. terminals for two to three days. A less severe attack affected COSCO Shipping in July 2018. P.L. 115-254 incorporated cybersecurity as a required element in MTSA security plans for terminal and vessel operators. The Coast Guard has provided guidance for vessels and ports to address cyber vulnerabilities, and has incorporated cybersecurity into existing enforcement and compliance programs. The Coast Guard has added cybersecurity training to the requirements for mariner licensing and for port security officer qualifications. Greater use of unmanned aircraft systems potentially offers significant efficiencies in performing various Coast Guard missions, including coastal surveillance. Congress has provided funding for the use of drones aboard national security cutters. The Coast Guard has tested both hand-held drones and larger drone aircraft to extend the surveillance range of its patrol vessels. Since 2015, the Coast Guard has been testing UASs in the Arctic for missions such as surveying ice conditions, marine environmental monitoring, marine safety, and search and rescue. The unmanned aircraft being tested each summer can be launched from land or a Coast Guard cutter. The Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2018 ( P.L. 115-282 , §812) requests a study by the National Academy of Sciences as to how drones could be used to enhance the Coast Guard's maritime domain awareness. The act also allows the Coast Guard to lease but not design its own large UASs if funding is provided for design and construction of Offshore Patrol Cutters (§304).

The nation's air, land, and marine transportation systems are designed for accessibility and efficiency, two characteristics that make them vulnerable to terrorist attack. While hardening the transportation sector is difficult, measures can be taken to deter terrorists. The enduring challenge facing Congress is how best to implement and finance a system of deterrence, protection, and response that effectively reduces the possibility and consequences of terrorist attacks without unduly interfering with travel, commerce, and civil liberties. Transportation security has been a major policy focus since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In the aftermath of those attacks, the 107th Congress moved quickly to pass the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA; P.L. 107-71), creating the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and mandating that security screeners employed by the federal government inspect airline passengers, their baggage, and air cargo. Despite the extensive focus on aviation and transportation security over the past decade, a number of challenges remain, including developing and deploying effective biometric capabilities to verify the identities of transportation workers and travelers; developing effective risk-based approaches to vetting and screening transportation workers accessing secured areas of airports and other sensitive areas of transportation networks; developing cost-effective solutions to screen air cargo and freight without impeding the flow of commerce; and coordination among state, local, and federal homeland security and law enforcement personnel to effectively deter and respond to criminal and terrorist acts targeting public areas of transportation facilities. The FAA Extension, Safety, and Security Act of 2016 (P.L. 114-190) and the TSA Modernization Act (P.L. 115-254, Division K) included provisions intended to improve screening technologies, streamline the passenger screening process, mandate more rigorous background checks of airport workers, strengthen airport access controls, increase passenger checkpoint efficiency and operational performance, and enhance security in public areas of airports and at foreign airports where flights depart for the United States. Oversight of TSA actions to implement these mandates may be an area of particular interest in the 116th Congress. Particular topics may include the evolution of screening technologies and assessments of emerging screening technology solutions; the expansion of canine teams for transportation security; the expansion of the PreCheck program to expedite screening of known travelers; the use of biometrics and associated data security and privacy concerns; implementing effective approaches, regulations, and international agreements to conduct risk-based screening of air cargo shipments worldwide; protecting public areas of airports; and developing effective countermeasures to protect critical infrastructure, including airports and aircraft, from attacks using drones. Bombings of passenger trains in Europe and Asia in the past few years illustrate the vulnerability of passenger rail systems to terrorist attacks. Passenger rail systems—primarily subway systems—in the United States carry about five times as many passengers each day as do airlines, over many thousands of miles of track, serving stations that are designed primarily for easy access. Transit security issues of recent interest to Congress include the quality of TSA's surface transportation inspector program. The bulk of U.S. overseas trade is carried by ships, and thus the economic consequences of a maritime terrorist attack could be significant. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Coast Guard have implemented security screening procedures that effectively "push the borders out"—that is, they begin screening vessels and cargo before they reach a U.S. port. Two aspects of maritime security that have drawn attention recently are cybersecurity and the use of drones for coastal surveillance.

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Introduction FY2019 is the fourth year in a row that Congress has enacted a special provision to allow for the issuance of H-2B visas beyond the annual statutory cap of 66,000 in response to high levels of demand for the visa. For FY2016, Congress exempted certain H-2B workers from the statutory cap. For the three past fiscal years, Congress has authorized the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to make additional H-2B visas available subject to certain conditions. For FY2017 and FY2018, DHS used this authority to make an additional 15,000 H-2B visas available each year. For FY2019, DHS is making an additional 30,000 H-2B visas available. H-2B Nonagricultural Worker Visa The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952, as amended, enumerates categories of aliens, known as nonimmigrants, who are admitted to the United States for a temporary period of time and a specific purpose. Nonimmigrant visa categories are identified by letters and numbers, based on the sections of the INA that established them. Among the major nonimmigrant visa categories is the "H" category for temporary workers. Included in this category is the H-2B visa for temporary nonagricultural workers. The H-2B program allows for the temporary admission of foreign workers to the United States to perform nonagricultural labor or services of a temporary nature if unemployed U.S. workers are not available. H-2B workers perform a wide variety of jobs. Top H-2B occupations in recent years have included landscape laborer, groundskeeper, forest worker, housekeeper, and amusement park worker. By regulation, participation in the H-2B program is limited to designated countries, and DHS publishes a list of eligible countries each year. Bringing workers into the United States under the H-2B program is a multiagency process involving the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL), DHS, and the Department of State (DOS). The program itself is administered by DHS's U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and DOL's Employment and Training Administration (ETA). DOL's Wage and Hour Division (WHD) also has certain concurrent enforcement responsibilities. The H-2B program currently operates under regulations issued by DHS in 2008 on H-2B requirements, DHS and DOL jointly in 2015 on H-2B employment, and DHS and DOL jointly in 2015 on H-2B wages. For work to qualify as temporary under the H-2B visa, the employer's need for the duties to be performed by the worker must "end in the near, definable future" and must be a one-time occurrence, a seasonal need, a peak load need, or an intermittent need. The employer's need for workers generally must be for a period of one year or less, but in the case of a one-time occurrence, can be for up to three years. In order to bring H-2B workers into the United States, an employer must first receive labor certification from DOL. An interim final rule on H-2B employment that was issued jointly by DHS and DOL in April 2015 establishes a new registration requirement as a preliminary step in the labor certification process; once it is implemented, prospective H-2B employers would demonstrate their temporary need to DOL through this registration process before submitting a labor certification application. (As of the date of this report, however, DOL continues to make determinations about temporary need during the processing of labor certification applications.) At the same time that the employer submits the labor certification application to DOL, the employer must submit a job order to the state workforce agency (SWA) serving the area of intended employment. The job order is used to recruit U.S. workers. The employer also must conduct its own recruitment. In order to grant labor certification to an employer, DOL must determine that (1) there are not sufficient U.S. workers who are qualified and available to perform the work, and (2) the employment of foreign workers will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of U.S. workers who are similarly employed. To prevent an adverse effect on U.S. workers, H-2B employers must offer and provide required wages and benefits to H-2B workers and workers in "corresponding employment." H-2B employers must pay their workers the highest of the prevailing wage rate or the federal, state, or local minimum wage. They must provide a "three-fourths guarantee"; that is, they must guarantee to offer workers employment for at least three-fourths of the contract period. H-2B employers also must pay worker visa fees and certain worker transportation costs. H-2B employers are not required to provide health insurance coverage. After receiving labor certification, a prospective H-2B employer can submit an application, known as a petition, to DHS to bring in foreign workers. If the foreign workers are already in the United States, the employer can request a change of status to H-2B status on the petition. In the typical case, however, the workers are abroad. If the petition is approved, they can visit a U.S. embassy or consulate to apply for H-2B nonimmigrant visas from DOS. If the visa applications are approved, the workers are issued visas that they can use to apply for admission to the United States at a port of entry. H-2B workers can be accompanied by eligible spouses and children, who are issued H-4 visas. An alien's total period of stay as an H-2B worker may not exceed three consecutive years. An H-2B alien who has spent three years in the United States may not seek an extension of stay or be readmitted to the United States as an H-2B worker until he or she has been outside the country for at least three months. The INA grants enforcement authority with respect to the H-2B program to DHS, but allows for the delegation of that authority to DOL. DHS has delegated that authority to DOL, and now DOL's WHD has responsibility for enforcing compliance with the conditions of an H‐2B petition and temporary labor certification. Seafood Industry Staggered Entry Provision As part of the labor certification process, prospective H-2B employers must accurately indicate the starting and ending dates of their period of need for H-2B workers. According to the supplementary information to the 2015 DHS-DOL interim final rule on H-2B employment: "An application with an accurate date of need will be more likely to attract qualified U.S. workers to fill those open positions, especially when the employer conducts recruitment closer to the actual date of need." If within a season an employer has more than one date of need for workers to perform the same job, the employer must file a separate labor certification application for each date of need. The employer is not allowed to stagger the entry of H-2B workers based on one date of need. There is an exception to this prohibition on the staggered entry of H-2B workers, however, that applies to employers in the seafood industry. First enacted as part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, and subsequently incorporated into the 2015 DHS-DOL interim final rule on H-2B employment, this provision permits an employer with an approved H-2B petition to bring in the H-2B workers under that petition any time during the 120 days beginning on the employer's starting date of need. In order to bring in the workers between day 90 and day 120, though, the employer must conduct additional U.S. worker recruitment. This provision has been reenacted in DOL appropriations acts for each year from FY2015 through FY2019. Numerical Limitations The H-2B program is subject to an annual statutory numerical limit. Under the INA, as amended by the Immigration Act of 1990, the total number of aliens who may be issued H-2B visas or otherwise provided with H-2B nonimmigrant status in any fiscal year may not exceed 66,000. Also, since FY2006 there has been a cap of 33,000 on the number of aliens subject to H-2B numerical limits who may enter the United States on an H-2B visa or be granted H-2B status during the first six months of a fiscal year. This INA amendment, enacted as part of the REAL ID Act of 2005, effectively divided the annual H-2B cap of 66,000 into two semiannual caps of 33,000, respectively covering work in the first and second halves of the fiscal year. Certain categories of H-2B workers are exempt from the cap, including the following: current H-2B workers seeking an extension of stay, change of employer, or change in the terms of employment; H-2B workers previously counted toward the cap in the same fiscal year; fish roe processors, fish roe technicians, and/or supervisors of fish roe processing; and H-2B workers performing labor in the U.S. territories of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) and/or Guam until December 31, 2029. As noted, spouses and children who are accompanying H-2B workers are issued H-4 visas and, as such, are not counted against the H-2B cap. Special H-2B Cap-Related Provisions Legislation has been regularly introduced in Congress concerning the H-2B cap. Several measures have been enacted since 2005 to provide for the issuance of H-2B visas, or the granting of H-2B status, beyond the statutory cap. The enacted provisions have been of two main types. Returning Worker Exemption The INA was amended during the 109 th Congress to add a provision establishing a temporary exemption from the H-2B statutory cap for certain H-2B returning workers. The provision, initially in effect for FY2005 and FY2006, exempted from the cap H-2B returning workers who had been counted against the cap in any one of the three prior fiscal years. This H-2B returning worker provision was subsequently extended for FY2007, and expired at the end of that fiscal year. An H-2B returning worker exemption of the same type was reinstated for FY2016. It provided that an H-2B returning worker who had been counted against the statutory cap in FY2013, FY2014, or FY2015 would not be counted again in FY2016. Multiple bills were introduced in the 115 th Congress to enact temporary or permanent H-2B returning worker exemptions from the statutory cap. At least one H-2B returning worker bill has been introduced in the 116 th Congress as of the date of this report. Provision Authorizing Additional H-2B Visas For FY2017 and FY2018, a different type of H-2B cap-related provision was enacted by the 115 th Congress. For each of these years, provisions in year-end omnibus appropriations laws authorized DHS to make additional H-2B visas available beyond the statutory cap after consultation with DOL and "upon the determination that the needs of American businesses cannot be satisfied" with available U.S. workers. Under these provisions, the number of additional aliens who could receive H-2B visas each year was limited to "not more than the highest number of H–2B nonimmigrants who participated in the H–2B returning worker program in any fiscal year in which returning workers were exempt from such numerical limitation." The FY2019 Consolidated Appropriations Act includes a provision of the same type for FY2019. Using the same language as the FY2017 and FY2018 provisions, the FY2019 provision authorizes DHS, after consultation with DOL and "upon the determination that the needs of American businesses cannot be satisfied" with available U.S. workers, to make additional H-2B visas available for FY2019 up to a maximum of "the highest number of H–2B nonimmigrants who participated in the H–2B returning worker program in any fiscal year in which returning workers were exempt from such numerical limitation." As discussed below, the DHS-DOL rule implementing this provision limits the additional visas to H-2B returning workers. FY2017 Provision In July 2017, DHS and DOL jointly published a final rule to implement the FY2017 provision. The rule temporarily amended DHS regulations on the H-2B visa to state that for FY2017, DHS "has authorized up to an additional 15,000 aliens who may receive H–2B nonimmigrant visas." In the supplementary information to the rule, DHS explained that the statutory provision applied only to H-2B workers entering the United States on visas and not to aliens in the United States who were seeking a change of status to H-2B status. The statutory definition of the maximum authorized number (i.e., "the highest number of H–2B nonimmigrants who participated in the H–2B returning worker program in any fiscal year") can be interpreted in different ways, as DHS acknowledged in the supplementary information to the rule. However, the agency determined that 64,716 was the most appropriate maximum number of additional H-2B visas authorized under the special FY2017 provision, this being "the number of beneficiaries covered by H–2B returning worker petitions that were approved for FY 2007." The supplementary information to the rule included the following explanation for limiting the FY2017 numerical increase to 15,000: Most recently, in FY 2016, 18,090 returning workers were approved for H–2B petitions, despite Congress having reauthorized the returning worker program with more than three-quarters of the fiscal year remaining. Of those 18,090 workers authorized for admission, 13,382 were admitted into the United States or otherwise acquired H–2B status.... [T]he Secretary, in consideration of the statute's reference to returning workers, determined that it would be appropriate to use these recent figures as a basis for the maximum numerical limitation under section 543. This rule therefore authorizes up to 15,000 additional H–2B visas (rounded up from 13,382) for FY 2017. In addition, in implementing the statutory provision, DHS decided to limit eligibility for the additional H-2B workers to certain U.S. businesses. Under the FY2017 rule, the prospective H-2B employer must submit to DHS, along with the H-2B petition, a new attestation form evidencing that without the ability to employ all of the H–2B workers requested on the petition ... its business is likely to suffer irreparable harm (that is, permanent and severe financial loss). FY2018 Provision In May 2018, DHS and DOL jointly published a final rule to implement the FY2018 H-2B cap-related provision. The FY2018 rule, which is similar to the FY2017 rule, temporarily amended DHS H-2B regulations to state that for FY2018, DHS had authorized the issuance of up to 15,000 additional H–2B visas. In supplementary information to the FY2018 rule, DHS explained its decision to authorize up to 15,000 additional visas despite the fact that all 15,000 additional visas authorized in FY2017 were not used. Out of a maximum of 15,000 supplemental H–2B visas for FY 2017, a total of 12,294 beneficiaries were approved for H–2B classification.... [T]he Secretary has determined that it is appropriate to authorize 15,000 additional visas again, as employers will have a longer period in which to submit their petitions due to the earlier publication date of this rule, thereby allowing for the possibility of more petitions being filed this fiscal year than in FY 2017. The FY2018 rule also included the same language as the FY2017 rule requiring an employer petitioning for supplemental visas to submit an attestation along with the H-2B petition evidencing that without the ability to employ all the requested H–2B workers the employer's business would likely suffer irreparable harm. FY2019 Provision In May 2019, DHS and DOL jointly published a final rule to implement the FY2019 provision. The FY2019 rule temporarily amends DHS H-2B regulations to state that for FY2019, DHS has authorized the issuance of up to 30,000 additional H–2B visas. As it did in the supplementary information to the FY2017 and FY2018 rules, DHS clarifies in the supplementary information to the FY2019 rule that the FY2019 provision only authorizes DHS to increase the number of H-2B visas; it does not cover individuals in the United States who change to H-2B status. As a result, DHS states that the supplemental cap is limited to workers who obtain visas abroad and then seek admission to the United States. The supplementary information to the FY2019 rule, consistent with the supplementary information to the FY2017 and FY2018 rules, indicates that the most appropriate maximum number of additional H-2B visas authorized under the statutory provision is 64,716. DHS explains its decision to allow 30,000 supplemental visas as follows: In setting the number of additional H–2B visas to be made available during FY 2019, DHS considered this number [i.e., 64,716], overall indications of increased need, and the time remaining in FY 2019, and determined that it would be appropriate to limit the supplemental cap to approximately half of the highest number for returning workers, or up to 30,000. Like its FY2017 and FY2018 predecessors, the FY2019 rule requires an employer petitioning for supplemental visas to submit an attestation along with the H-2B petition evidencing that without the ability to employ all the requested H–2B workers the employer's business would likely suffer irreparable harm. In addition, the FY2019 rule imposes a limitation not applicable under the FY2017 and FY2018 rules. Under the FY2019 rule, an employer may request supplemental visas only for H-2B workers "who have been issued an H–2B visa or otherwise granted H–2B status in Fiscal Years 2016, 2017, or 2018." DHS offers the following rationale for limiting the additional visas to H-2B returning workers: Such workers (i.e., those who recently participated in the H–2B program) have previously obtained H– 2B visas and therefore been vetted by DOS, would have departed the United States after their authorized period of stay as generally required by the terms of their nonimmigrant admission, and therefore may obtain their new visas through DOS and begin work more expeditiously. The supplementary information to the rule highlights the importance, in particular, of returning workers' proven "willingness to return home after they have completed their temporary labor or services or their period of authorized stay." It states: The returning workers condition therefore provides a basis to believe that H–2B workers under this cap increase will likely return home again after another temporary stay in the United States. That same basis does not exist for non-returning workers, not all of whom have a track record of returning home. Although the returning worker requirement limits the flexibility of employers, the requirement provides an important safeguard, which DHS deems paramount. Implementation of H-2B Numerical Limits USCIS is responsible for implementing numerical limits on temporary worker visas (including the H-2B visa), which it does at the petition receipt stage. Under DHS regulations: When calculating the numerical limitations ... USCIS will make numbers available to petitions in the order in which the petitions are filed. USCIS will make projections of the number of petitions necessary to achieve the numerical limit of approvals, taking into account historical data related to approvals, denials, revocations, and other relevant factors. USCIS will monitor the number of petitions (including the number of beneficiaries requested when necessary) received and will notify the public of the date that USCIS has received the necessary number of petitions (the "final receipt date").... If the final receipt date is any of the first five business days on which petitions subject to the applicable numerical limit may be received (i.e., if the numerical limit is reached on any one of the first five business days that filings can be made), USCIS will randomly apply all of the numbers among the petitions received on any of those five business days. In one recent fiscal year, the final receipt date announced by USCIS ended up being too early. For FY2015, USCIS announced on April 2, 2015, that March 26, 2015, was the final receipt date for new H-2B petitions. The agency had accepted about 3,900 H-2B petitions for FY2015 through March 26, 2015, which it believed was sufficient to reach the annual 66,000 cap. In early June 2015, however, USCIS announced that it would reopen the H-2B cap for the second half of FY2015 and accept additional petitions for new H-2B workers. It offered the following public explanation: USCIS continues to work in collaboration with DOS to monitor the issuance of H-2B visas and has determined that as of June 5, 2015, DOS received fewer than the expected number of requests for H-2B visas. A recent analysis of DOS H-2B visa issuance and USCIS petition data reveals that the number of actual H-2B visas issued by DOS is substantially less than the number of H-2B beneficiaries seeking consular notification listed on cap-subject H-2B petitions approved by USCIS. In light of this new information, USCIS has determined that there are still available H-2B visa numbers remaining for the second half of the FY15 cap. Following a brief reopening, USCIS announced that June 11, 2015, was the final receipt date for new H-2B worker petitions for FY2015. FY2018 Until FY2018, the final receipt date for H-2B petitions had never fallen within the first five days of filing and, thus, the random selection process (lottery) described in the regulatory provision in the preceding section had never been required. As described below, that changed with petition filings by employers seeking to hire H-2B workers for the second half of FY2018, which began on April 1, 2018. DOL was also impacted by the high level of employer demand for H-2B workers for the second half of FY2018 since an employer must receive labor certification from DOL before filing an H-2B petition. DOL Labor Certification Applications In accordance with H-2B regulations, January 1, 2018, was the first date that employers could submit H-2B temporary labor certifications to DOL requesting a work start date of April 1, 2018. On January 1, 2018, DOL received about 4,498 applications requesting an April 1, 2018, start date; those applications covered 81,008 workers. In response, DOL announced a process change. It indicated in a Federal Register notice that it would not begin releasing certified H–2B applications, which employers need in order to petition USCIS for H-2B workers (see " H-2B Nonagricultural Worker Visa "), until February 20, 2018, and on that date, it would issue such certified applications in order of receipt. DOL offered the following explanation for adopting this procedure: This process change will allow employers who filed promptly on January 1, 2018, sufficient time to meet regulatory requirements, including the recruitment and hiring of qualified and available U.S. workers, thus preserving the sequential order of filing that took place on January 1, 2018, to the extent possible. DHS Petitions On March 1, 2018, USCIS announced that in the first five business days of accepting H-2B petitions for the second half of FY2018, it had received petitions requesting about 47,000 H-2B workers subject to the statutory cap. It further reported that it had conducted a lottery on February 28, 2018, to randomly select a sufficient number of these petitions to meet the statutory cap. As discussed, on May 31, 2018, USCIS published a final rule authorizing the issuance of up to 15,000 additional H–2B visas for FY2018. In the first five business days of accepting petitions under this supplemental cap, USCIS received petitions for more beneficiaries than the number of H-2B visas available. As a result, it conducted a second FY2018 H-2B lottery on June 7, 2018, to randomly select a sufficient number of petitions to meet the supplemental cap. FY2019 Employer demand for H-2B visas and associated temporary labor certifications for the second half of FY2019 reached new heights. DOL Labor Certification Applications January 1, 2019, was the first day that employers could file H-2B labor certification applications for the second half of FY2019. On January 2, 2019, DOL announced that due to high demand its iCERT online application filing system had "experienced a system disruption" on January 1, 2019, that prevented some employers from submitting their H-2B certification applications: "Within the first five minutes of opening the semi-annual H-2B certification process on January 1, 2019, the U.S. Department of Labor iCERT system had an unprecedented demand for H-2B certifications with more than 97,800 workers requested in pending applications for the 33,000 available visas." When the system re-opened on January 7, 2019, it "handled the submission of approximately 4,749 H-2B applications covering more than 87,900 workers positions for an April 1, 2019, start date of work within the first one hour of operation." This experience led DOL to announce additional process changes for FY2020, as described below. DHS Petitions On February 19, 2019, the first day of accepting H-2B petitions for the second half of FY2019, USCIS announced that it had received petitions for more H-2B workers than there were remaining H-2B numbers under the FY2019 cap. On February 21, 2019, USCIS conducted a lottery to randomly select a sufficient number of petitions to meet the cap. FY2020 In February 2019, in light of its experience with H-2B submissions in January 2019 and the unanticipated "burdens" placed on "its electronic filing system, network infrastructure, and staff resources," DOL announced new H-2B temporary labor certification application processing changes for FY2020. It indicated that beginning with H-2B certification applications for the first half of FY2020, it would randomly order and assign for processing all applications submitted within designated groups. The first group would consist of applications requesting the earliest start date of work (e.g., October 1, 2019, for the first half of FY2020) and filed during the first three calendar days of the filing period (which begins on July 3, 2019, for the first half of FY2020). DOL maintains that this new process "balances employers' interest in utilizing the H-2B program with OFLC's [DOL's Office of Foreign Labor Certification's] interest in ensuring that access to its filing system is equitable and occurs with no user disruption." DOL is seeking comments on these changes and plans for the new procedures to take effect on July 3, 2019. Numbers Granted H-2B Status In any year, most, but not all, foreign nationals who obtain H-2B status acquire that status through admission to the United States on H-2B visas. Those who obtain H-2B status but are not issued visas include H-2B workers who are admitted to the United States without visas (mostly Canadians) and individuals who change to H-2B status while in the United States. USCIS data are available on the latter group. These data show that between FY2009 and FY2017, the number of individuals who were approved for a change of status to H-2B status ranged from about 110 (in FY2017) to about 470 (in FY2010). H-2B Visa Issuances Figure 1 provides data on H-2B visa issuances from FY1992 through FY2018. These data offer one way to measure the growth of the H-2B program over the years. As explained above, the visa application and issuance process occurs after DOL has granted labor certification and DHS has approved the visa petition. As illustrated in Figure 1 , the number of H-2B visas issued generally increased from FY1992 until FY2007, when H-2B visa issuances reached a highpoint of 129,547 (see the Appendix for yearly visa issuance data). H-2B visa issuances fell after FY2007 with the start of the economic recession, but, as shown in Figure 1 , they have generally been increasing since FY2009. In FY2005-FY2007 and FY2016-FY2018, as discussed, temporary provisions established exceptions to the statutory annual cap of 66,000. In some other years in which visa issuances surpassed 66,000, it seems reasonable to assume that the H-2B cap was exceeded given the magnitude of the numbers. Conclusion With employer demand for H-2B visas exceeding supply, H-2B admissions and the statutory cap are once again receiving attention from policymakers. While previous Congresses considered broad immigration reform bills that included proposals for new temporary worker programs to address any perceived shortfalls in the supply of foreign workers, any legislative efforts to address the numerical limitations on nonagricultural guest workers in the near term seem likely to be focused on the existing H-2B program. Appendix. H-2B Visa Issuances

The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952, as amended, enumerates categories of foreign nationals, known as nonimmigrants, who are admitted to the United States for a temporary period of time and a specific purpose. One of these nonimmigrant visa categories—known as the H-2B visa—is for temporary nonagricultural workers. The H-2B visa allows for the temporary admission of foreign workers to the United States to perform nonagricultural labor or services of a temporary nature if unemployed U.S. workers are not available. Common H-2B occupations include landscape laborer, housekeeper, and amusement park worker. The H-2B program is administered by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's (DHS's) U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and the U.S. Department of Labor's (DOL's) Employment and Training Administration. DOL's Wage and Hour Division also has certain concurrent enforcement responsibilities. The H-2B program currently operates under regulations issued by DHS in 2008 on H-2B requirements, by DHS and DOL jointly in 2015 on H-2B employment, and by DHS and DOL jointly in 2015 on H-2B wages. Bringing workers into the United States under the H-2B program is a multiagency process involving DOL, DHS, and the Department of State (DOS). A prospective H-2B employer must apply to DOL for labor certification. Approval of a labor certification application reflects a finding by DOL that there are not sufficient U.S. workers who are qualified and available to perform the work and that the employment of foreign workers will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of U.S. workers who are similarly employed. If granted labor certification, an employer can file a petition with DHS to bring in the approved number of H-2B workers. If the petition is approved, a foreign worker overseas who the employer wants to employ can go to a U.S. embassy or consulate to apply for an H-2B nonimmigrant visa from DOS. If the visa application is approved, the worker is issued a visa that he or she can use to apply for admission to the United States at a port of entry. H-2B workers can be accompanied by eligible spouses and children. By law, the H-2B visa is subject to an annual numerical cap. Under the INA, the total number of individuals who may be issued H-2B visas or otherwise provided with H-2B nonimmigrant status in any fiscal year may not exceed 66,000. USCIS is responsible for implementing the H-2B cap, which it does at the petition receipt stage. Spouses and children accompanying H-2B workers are not counted against the H-2B cap. In addition, certain categories of H-2B workers are exempt from the cap. Among these categories are current H-2B workers who are seeking an extension of stay, change of employer, or change in the terms of their employment. Employer demand for H-2B workers has varied over the years. In recent years, demand has exceeded supply, and special provisions have been enacted to make additional H-2B visas available. For FY2016, a temporary statutory provision exempted certain H-2B workers from the cap. It applied to H-2B workers who had been counted against the cap in any one of the three prior fiscal years and would be returning as H-2B workers in FY2016. For FY2017, FY2018, and FY2019, a different type of H-2B cap-related provision authorized DHS to issue additional H-2B visas (above the cap) subject to specified conditions.

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Introduction In January 2019, the House agreed to H.Res. 6 , a resolution "Adopting the Rules of the House of Representatives for the One Hundred Sixteenth Congress." This report summarizes amendments to House rules affecting committee procedure in the 116 th Congress (2019-2020) as provided for in H.Res. 6 . The report also describes separate orders contained in the resolution that relate to committee procedure, including the establishment of the Select Committee on the Climate Crisis and the Select Committee on the Modernization of Congress. Separate orders have the same force and effect as House rules and are commonly included in the House rules package resolution. In the 116 th Congress, rules changes that affect all House committees concern committee membership and organization, hearings and markups, and committee oversight and investigations. Changes that affect specific committees include modifications to the names, jurisdiction, or procedure of certain House committees. General Committee Procedure Committee Chairs, Membership, and Organization Committee Chairmanship Limits In the 116 th Congress, H.Res. 6 struck clause 5(c)(2) of Rule X, which stated that a Member could not serve as chair of the same standing committee or subcommittee for more than three consecutive Congresses (disregarding any service of less than a full session), except on the Committee on Rules. This amendment enables Members to serve an unrestricted number of terms as chairs, as was the case before the 104 th Congress (1995-1996) and during the 111 th Congress (2009-2010). Allowing Delegates and the Resident Commissioner to Serve on Joint Committees H.Res. 6 amended clause 3(b) of Rule III to make clear that the Delegates and the Resident Commissioner from Puerto Rico may be appointed to joint committees. The rule previously mentioned only service by the Delegates and the Resident Commissioner on select and conference committees. House rules first afforded membership to standing committees to Delegates in 1871 and to the Resident Commissioner in 1904. House rules were amended in the 93 rd Congress (1973-1974) to allow the Delegates and Resident Commissioner, effective in the subsequent Congress, to be appointed to conference committees on legislation reported from committees on which they served. Chamber rules were amended in 1979 (96 th Congress) to authorize their appointment to select committees. In the 103 rd Congress (1993-1994), the House expanded eligibility to encompass all conference committees. The 116 th Congress rules provide the Delegates and the Resident Commissioner with equal status as Members on standing, select, joint, and conference committees. Service of Indicted Members on Committees H.Res. 6 amended clause 10 of Rule XXIII, adding a provision that calls on any Member, Delegate, or the Resident Commissioner who has been indicted or formally charged with a felony offense that is punishable by at least two years in prison to resign from committee assignments and party caucus or conference leadership positions. Such individuals should submit their resignations from any party leadership position and any type of House or joint committee or subcommittee thereof "unless or until" they are acquitted or the charges are dismissed or reduced to less than a felony. Rule XXIII comprises the House's Code of Official Conduct, which was first adopted in 1968 by H.Res. 1099 (90 th Congress). In the 116 th Congress, the new language added to clause 10, subparagraph (b), supplements an existing provision written into the rule in 1975 (94 th Congress) that states that a Member, Delegate, or Resident Commissioner should refrain from committee business if the individual is convicted of a crime and may be sentenced to imprisonment. Note that clause 10 language uses the word should as opposed to shall or must . The Democratic Caucus and Republican Conference could recommend the removal of a party member from a committee assignment if the Member does not voluntarily resign. The House could then vote on a privileged resolution to remove the member. Rules of Committees The rules package gave committees a longer period in which to adopt and publish committee rules of procedure. In the 116 th Congress, each committee has 60 days, rather than 30 days, to "make its rules publicly available in electronic form and submit such rules for publication in the Congressional Record " after the chair is elected in an even-numbered year. H.Res. 6 amended clause 2(a)(2) of Rule XI, striking the number 30 and replacing it with 60. According to the Rules Committee's summary of H.Res. 6, the "change is intended to grant committees adequate time to organize, as some committees do not have a full complement of members at the start of a Congress." Hearing and Markup Procedure Requiring Committee Hearing and Markup on Bills and Joint Resolutions In a separate order, the rules package requires that, during the 116 th Congress, after March 1, 2019, certain lawmaking measures must be reported and be subject to related committee hearings and a markup prior to floor consideration. Otherwise, "it shall not be in order" to consider them on the House floor. This requirement applies to bills and joint resolutions considered under the terms of a special rule reported by the Rules Committee—excluding measures that continue appropriations, contain an emergency designation, or are listed on the Consensus Calendar and are designated for consideration. According to the separate order, a lawmaking measure is not to be considered "pursuant to a special order of business [special rule] reported by the Committee on Rules" if it has not been reported by a committee. If it has been reported, the committee report accompanying the bill or joint resolution is to include a list of related committee and subcommittee hearings and a designation of at least one such hearing that was used to develop or consider the measure. Bills and joint resolutions brought to the House floor under the terms of a rule from the Rules Committee are generally measures that Members want to debate at length or amend on the floor due to their complexity, controversy, or policy importance. Measures considered under special rules include appropriations bills, tax legislation, and significant reauthorization bills. Under the separate order, these types of bills and joint resolutions are to go through the committee hearing and markup process before being considered by the full chamber. However, special rules often include "waivers" for all or certain types of points of order against consideration of a bill. Member Day Hearing Requirement H.Res. 6 includes a separate order that requires standing committees to hold a "Member Day Hearing" during the first session of the 116 th Congress. This new requirement does not apply to the Committee on Ethics, and it allows the Committee on Rules to hold its Member Day Hearing in the second session of the Congress "in order to receive testimony on proposed changes to the standing rules for the next Congress." According to the Rules Committee summary of H.Res. 6, Member Day Hearings allow Members, Delegates, and the Resident Commissioner, "whether or not they are a member of the committee," to speak before a committee on proposed legislation within the committee's jurisdiction. Committee Markup Notice H.Res. 6 amended clause 2(g) of Rule XI to modify the three-day notification requirement for committee markup meetings. Under paragraph (3)(A) of this clause, the chairs of committees "shall announce the date, place, and subject matter" to consider and markup legislation. As in previous Congresses, markups may not occur earlier than the third day on which Members have been given notice thereof. In the 116 th Congress, subparagraph (3)(A)(ii) specifies that the third day is the "third calendar day," rather than the "third day," and that the notification period excludes "Saturdays, Sundays, or legal holidays except when the House is in session on such a day." Thus, the revised provision is designed to guarantee Members at least three workdays' notice before a committee meets to mark up legislation. Committee Oversight, Activities and Investigations Committee Oversight Plans Oversight plans include a committee's intentions, during a Congress, to review federal laws, regulations, court decisions, programs, and agencies within their jurisdictions. From the 104 th through the 114 th Congresses (1995-2016), standing committees were required to adopt and submit an oversight plan. In the 115 th Congress, House rules required committees to submit authorization and oversight plans. H.Res. 6 amended clause 2(d) of Rule X to restore the previous requirement for committee oversight plans. The amendment also altered some procedures regarding oversight plans. In the 115 th Congress, each standing committee—except Appropriations, Ethics, and Rules—was required to hold an open meeting, not later than February 15 th in odd-number years, in which the committee marked up and adopted an authorization and oversight plan. Each committee had to submit its plan to the Committees on Oversight and Government Reform (now Oversight and Reform), House Administration, and Appropriations. By March 31, the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform was to report the various plans to the House as well as any recommendations about them. Under the rules change adopted in the 116 th Congress, the same standing committees are required to submit oversight plans. In contrast to the 115 th Congress, however, full committees do not mark up and adopt the plans in open meetings. Instead, the chair prepares the plan "in consultation with the ranking member." The chair then provides a copy to committee members "at least seven calendar days" before submitting it to the Committee on Oversight and Reform and the Committee on House Administration by March 1 of the first session of Congress, along with any "supplemental, minority, additional, or dissenting views submitted by a member of the committee." The completed plans no longer must be submitted to the Appropriations Committee. Pursuant to clause 2(d), the House Committee on Oversight and Reform shall, after consulting with the majority leader and the minority leader, "report to the House," by not later than April 15 in the first session, the various oversight plans. As in earlier Congresses, the Committee on Oversight and Reform is to also include "any recommendations ... to ensure the most effective coordination of oversight plans." In sum, in the 116 th Congress, chairs are given the prerogative to develop oversight plans, as opposed to the full standing committee, but are to include any dissenting views of committee members. The deadline is extended for submitting the plans to the Committee on Oversight and Reform and the Committee on House Administration (from February 15 to March 1) and for Oversight and Reform to report the plans to the full House (from March 1 to April 15). The resolution removed the role of the Appropriations Committee in the review of such plans. Activity Reports The 116 th rules package made a technical change to the list of items required to be included in the activity reports that committees must adopt by January 2 of each odd-numbered year. H.Res. 6 amended clause 1(d)(2) of Rule XI to remove authorization from the phrase authorization and oversight plans . In the 115 th Congress, committee activity reports were required to summarize the authorization and oversight plans previously submitted by the committees. The amended clause brought the committee activity reports requirement in line with the 116 th Congress requirement for oversight plans described in the previous section of this report. Deposition Authority The rules package included a separate order that authorized the chairs of all standing House committees, except for the Rules Committee, and the chair of the Select Intelligence Committee to order the "taking of depositions, including pursuant to subpoena, by a member or counsel of such committee." D epositions are to be ordered in consultation w ith the ranking minority member and are subject to regulations issued by the Committee on Rules and printed in the Congressional Record . These provisions are identical to those of a separate order adopted in the 115 th Congress, except the 116 th Congress version does not include the requirement that "at least one member of the committee shall be present at each deposition" unless the witness or the committee waived the requirement. Thus, according to the Rules Committee summary of H.Res. 6, "Members, Delegates, and the Resident Commissioner may participate in all such depositions, but their presence is not required." Committee on Oversight and Reform Designating Committee on Oversight and Reform The 116 th Congress r ules package amended House rules to re - designate the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform as the Committee on Oversight and Reform. H.Res. 6 struck each occurrence of "Committee on Oversight and Government Reform" in the Rules and replaced it with "Committee on Oversight and Reform." In previous Congresses, the committee operated under different names. In 1927, the committee was established as the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, consolidating 11 separate committees that investigated such expenditures. In 1953, the House changed its name to the Committee on Government Operations. Following a change in House majority to the Republican Party in 1995, the committee assumed the jurisdictions of the Committee on the Post Office and Civil Service and the Committee on the District of Columbia, which were abolished, and was designated the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight. Since then, it has also operated under the name Government Reform (106 th -111 th Congresses), Oversight and Government Reform (112 th -115 th Congresses), and now Oversight and Reform (116 th Congress). Oversight over the Executive Office of the President Clause 3 of Rule X assigns special oversight functions to some House committees. H.Res. 6 amended clause 3 of Rule X to include language emphasiz ing the Commi ttee on Oversight and Reform's responsibility to oversee presidential activities. Clause 3(i) provides the committee' s oversight mandate : "The Commi ttee on Oversight and Reform shall review and study on a continuing basis the operation of Government activities at all levels." Previously, 3(i) concluded, "with a view to determining their economy and efficiency." As amended by H.Res. 6, the clause 3 provision states that the committee is to review and study "Government activities at all levels, including the Executive Office of the President." According to the summary of the rules package issued by the Rules Committee, the amendment "clarifies the Committee on Oversight and Reform's existing special oversight authority over all operations of government." Oversight and Reform Committee Depositions H.Res. 6 s truck an existing provision from clause 4 of Rule X that required a member of the Committee on Oversight and Reform to be present when the committee t akes a dep osition unless the deponent waived the requirement. As amended, c lause 4 (c) , now authorize s committee counsel to take a de position without a committee member in attendance , a standard that was previously in force during the 111 th Congress (2009-2010) . The deposition rules change is similar to the separate order described in the "Deposition Authority" section of this report. The separate order, however, applies to several committees, while the rules amendment affects only the Committee on Oversight and Reform. The amended rule will be printed in the House Manual for the 116 th Congress. Separate orders are not printed in the House Manual . Committee on Education and Labor Designating Committee on Education and Labor The 116 th rules package re-designated the Committee on Education and the Workforce, changing the committee's name to the Committee on Education and the Labor. H.Res. 6 strikes Workforce from clauses 1 and 3 of Rule X and inserts Labor . Since its establishment in 1867 (40 th Congress), the committee has operated under several names: Education and Labor (40 th -47 th , 80 th -103 rd , 110 th -111 th , and 116 th -present); Education (48 th -79 th ); Economic and Educational Opportunities (104 th ); and Education and the Workforce (105 th -109 th and 112 th -115 th ). In its recent history, the committee has been designated the Committee on Education and the Workforce under Republican leadership and the Committee on Education and Labor under Democratic leadership. Education and Labor Jurisdiction Clarification H.Res. 6 a dded two subparagraphs to clause 1(e) of Rule X to specify that the Committee on Education and Labor's jurisdiction includes the "organization, administration, and general management" of the Department of Education and the Department of Labor. These subparagraphs were added to the existing provisions establishing the committee's jurisdiction over federal education and labor programs, standards, and disputes. According to the Rules Committee , t he amendment clarifies the committee' s "existing jurisdiction" concerning the departments' general management. Committee on Ethics Empaneling Investigative Subcommittee of the Committee on Ethics The 116 th rules package includes a separate order directing the Committee on Ethics to form an investigative subcommittee in cases where a Member, Delegate, or the Resident Commissioner is indicted on a criminal charge. This separate order stated that the text of H.Res. 451 (110 th Congress, 2007-2008) will apply in the 116 th Congress. H.Res. 451 instructed the Ethics Committee (then called the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct) to empanel an investigative subcommittee to review the allegations whenever a Member of the House of Representatives, including a Delegate or Resident Commissioner to the Congress, is indicted or otherwise formally charged with criminal conduct in a court of the United States or any state not later than 30 days after the date of such indictment or charge. If the committee chooses not to empanel, it is to submit a report to the House describing the reasons for not empaneling an investigative subcommittee as well as the actions, if any, the committee took in response to the allegations. Considering Criminal Trial Evidence in Ethics Investigation H.Res. 6 amended clause 3(p) of Rule XI to allow the Committee on Ethics to consider certain criminal trial evidence in ethics investigations of Members, Delegates, and the Resident Commissioner. The new language authorizes the full committee or an investigative subcommittee thereof, if the respondent is convicted for a crime that "is related to the subject of the investigation," to "take into evidence the trial transcript or exhibits admitted into evidence at a criminal trial." As referenced in the previous section of this report, "Empaneling Investigative Subcommittees of the Committee on Ethics," a 116 th Congress separate order instructed the Committee on Ethics to form an investigative subcommittee in response to the criminal indictment or charging of a Member, Delegate, or the Resident Commissioner in federal or state court. As amended, clause 3(p) enables investigative subcommittees formed under the terms of this separate order, or established in another manner, to consider trial evidence following a conviction. The full Ethics Committee may also receive trial evidence regarding a Member, Delegate, or Resident Commissioner under investigation. Committee on the Budget Committee Membership Limits H.Res. 6 removed term limits for members of the Committee of the Budget. In previous Congresses, committee members could serve for a set number of terms as specified in clause 5 of Rule X. In the 115 th Congress, the limit was no more than "four Congresses in a period of six successive Congresses." That number could be extended if the Member served as the chair or ranking member of the committee. Now, under House rules, Members, Delegates, and the Resident Commissioner may serve as committee members or as the chair or ranking member regardless of the number of terms they have previously served in those positions. However, the rules of the Democratic Caucus, 116 th Congress, state that no members of the caucus, with some exceptions, may serve as a member of the Budget Committee during more than three out of five successive Congresses. Committee on Rules Recorded Votes in Rules Committee Reports The 116 th r ules package allow s the Committee on Rules to file its committee reports without the inclusion of record ed votes taken in the committee . As stated in c lause 3 of Rule XIII , committee reports are to include "the total number of votes cast for and against, and the names of members voting for and against" reporting a measure or amendments offered to a measure. In previous Congres ses, clause 3(b) clarified that this requirement did not apply to the Committee on Ethics. H.Res. 6 inserted an additional exception for the Committee on Rules: The requirement to include recorded vote information applies "only to the maximum extent practicable to a report by the Committee on Rules on a rule, joint rule, or the order of business." According to the Rules Committee, the change reflects that committee's "constricted timeframe" for preparing written reports. Prior to the rules change, the reporting requirement in clause 3 could potentially delay the floor consideration of special orders of business (special rules) reported by the Rules Committee and, consequently, lead to the delay of the consideration of measures considered under the terms of special rules. Committee on Financial Services Additional Subcommittee H.Res. 6 included a separate order that provided the Committee on Financial Services with more flexibility to establish subcommittees. The separate order states that the committee can have "not more than seven subcommittees" during the 116 th Congress. Clause 5(d) of Rule X limits each committee to establishing not more than five subcommittees. Subsequent subdivisions of the rule, however, provide exceptions to this limit. For instance, a committee that has a Subcommittee on Oversight may have six subcommittees, the Appropriations Committee may have 13 subcommittees, and other named committees may have not more than seven subcommittees. Separate orders may provide additional exceptions for specific Congresses. The H.Res. 6 separate order also stated that the Committee on Agriculture may not have more six subcommittees. The Agriculture exception, however, existed in the previous two Congresses. The Financial Services exception is new to the 116 th Congress. In the 115 th Congress, the Financial Services had six subcommittees, including one on Oversight and Investigations. At the start of the 116 th Congress, the committee re-established a Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, and it established a new Subcommittee on Diversity and Inclusion. Had it reestablished the five other subcommittees from the 115 th Congress, Financial Services would have had seven subcommittees, necessitating an exception to clause 5 of Rule X. However, the committee combined the jurisdiction of two subcommittees from the previous Congress (Monetary Policy and Trade; Terrorism and Illicit Finance) to form a National Security, International Development and Monetary Policy Subcommittee. Accordingly, as of this writing, in the 116 th Congress, Financial Services has established six subcommittees, although it is allowed seven subcommittees pursuant to the separate order. Select Committee on the Climate Crisis H.Res. 6 e stablished a Select Committee on the Climate Crisis . The select committee's "sole authority" is to "investigate, study, make findings, and develop recommendations on policies, strategies, and innovations" to reduce pollution and "other activities that contribute to the climate crisis." The select committee does not have the legislative authority to report bills or resolutions or the legal authorit y to issue subpoena s or take depositions . However, it c an submit subpoena and deposition recommendations to relevant standing committees , hold public hearings in support of its investigative functions , and otherwise function under the r ules governing standing committees . The select committee shall be composed of 15 Members, Delegates, or the Resident Commissioner. The Speaker is to appoint the members, with six members selected at the recommendation of the minority leader. The Speaker is to designate a chair and, upon the minority leader's recommendation, a vice chair. The membership must possess certain attributes: At least two members are to be serving their first terms in Congress, at least two are to be members of the Committee on Rules, and at least two are to be members of the Committee on House Administration. H.Res. 6 requires the select committee to submit policy recommendations to the relevant standing committees by March 31, 2020, and report to the House its investigations, detailed findings, and policy recommendations by December 31, 2020. The policy recommendations and report are to be made publicly available in "widely accessible formats" not later than 30 days following the March 31 and December 31, 2020, dates of completion. Select Committee on the Modernization of Congress Title II of H.Res. 6 establishes a Select Committee on the Modernization of Congress to recommend improvements to the work and operation of Congress. The select committee's "sole authority" is to "investigate, study, make findings, hold public hearings, and develop recommendations on modernizing Congress." Such recommendations could include new rules to "promote a more modern and efficient Congress;" new scheduling procedures; policies to "develop the next generation of leaders;" policies to recruit, retain, and provide for a diverse staff; policies to make congressional administration more efficient; policies on technology and innovation; and new procedures regarding the House Commission on Congressional Mailing Standards (commonly known as the "Franking Commission"). The select committee's membership is to include two Members, Delegates, or the Resident Commissioner appointed by the Speaker. At least two members must be serving in their first term, at least two members must be members of the Committee on Rules, and at least two members must be members on the Committee of House Administration. The select committee is bipartisan in composition. Half of the members are appointed on the recommendation of the minority leader. The Speaker designates the chair and, on the recommendation of the minority leader, the vice chair. The select committee does not have legislative jurisdiction or authority to take legislative action on bills or resolutions, and it does not have subpoena or deposition authority. However, it may submit legislative, subpoena, and deposition recommendations to the relevant standing committees. And, like standing committees, the committee was required to have a Member Day hearing at the start of 116 th Congress. H.Res. 6 requires the select committee to provide an interim status report every 90 days. This interim report must include transcripts of committee proceedings, itemized expenditures, and a proposed plan of activity for the next 90 days. With the "votes of not fewer than 2/3 of its members," the select committee is also authorized to submit additional reports from "time to time" that provide the results of investigations, detailed findings, and policy recommendations. The select committee is to submit its final report, with the "votes of not fewer than 2/3 of its members," at the end of the first session of the 116 th Congress. This report is to include detailed findings and policy recommendations. The select committee is also to submit policy recommendations to the relevant standing committees. All committee reports are to be made available to the general public within 30 calendar days of their submittal to Congress or a committee. The select committee is to terminate on February 1, 2020. Upon its termination, the select committee's records are to be transferred to relevant standing committees, as determined by the Speaker.

As agreed to in the House, H.Res. 6, a resolution adopting the rules of the House of Representatives, provided amendments to the rules, as well as separate orders, that affect committee procedure in the 116th Congress (2019-2020). Several of these changes apply to general committee procedure, while others concern specific committees, such as modifications to the names, jurisdiction, or procedures of certain House committees. The rules package also established, during the 116th Congress, two new select committees. H.Res. 6 made several changes to committee membership and organization. Most significantly, it removed the committee chair term limits that were in effect during each Congress from the 104th through the 115th Congresses (1995-2018), excluding the 111th Congress (2009-2010). H.Res. 6 added a provision to Rule XXIII that calls on any Member, Delegate, or the Resident Commissioner who has been indicted or formally charged with certain felony offenses to refrain from committee business. It clarified that Delegates and the Resident Commissioner may serve on joint committees, and it lengthened from 30 days to 60 days the period in which to adopt and publish committee rules at the start of a Congress. In a separate order, the 116th Congress rules package established a requirement that certain legislative measures must be reported and be subject to a committee hearing and markup prior to their consideration on the floor. This requirement applies, with some exceptions, to measures that are raised under the terms of a special rule reported from the Rules Committee. Another separate order requires most standing committees to hold a Member Day Hearing during the first session of the 116th Congress, affording any Member the opportunity to speak on proposed legislation within the committee's jurisdiction. H.Res. 6 clarified the notification requirement for committee markup meetings. As amended, clause 2 of Rule XI provides Members at least three workdays to prepare for an upcoming markup, as opposed to the less specific requirement that markups may not occur before the "third day" after a chair announces the meeting. H.Res. 6 altered procedures concerning committee oversight. The 115th Congress House rules requirement that committees prepare and submit "authorization and oversight plans" was replaced with the requirement that chairs develop oversight plans in consultation with the ranking member. In addition, a separate order now allows committee counsel to take depositions without the presence of a committee member. Amendments to the House standing rules changed two committees' names and clarified their jurisdictions. The Committee on Education and the Workforce became the Committee on Education and Labor, a name it held in some previous Congresses. As amended, Rule X specified that the committee's jurisdiction includes the general management of the Department of Education and the Department of Labor. The Committee on Oversight and Government Reform was re-designated the Committee on Oversight and Reform. The rules changes clarified that the Committee on Oversight and Reform's existing jurisdiction over the review and study of all government activities includes "the Executive Office of the President." A separate order directed the Committee on Ethics to empanel an investigative subcommittee to review allegations whenever a Member, Delegate, or the Resident Commissioner is indicted on a criminal charge. H.Res. 6 amended clause 3 of Rule XI to allow the Committee on Ethics, or an investigative subcommittee thereof, to consider trial evidence in ethics investigations of Members, Delegates, and the Resident Commissioner. Another separate order enabled the Committee on Financial Services to establish as many as seven subcommittees, as opposed to the six subcommittees allowed under the rules, while an amendment to clause 3 of Rule XIII exempted the Rules Committee from the requirement that committee reports must include recorded votes taken in committee. The rules changes also removed membership term limits to the Committee on the Budget. However, the rules of the Democratic Caucus and Republican Conference may continue to limit the number of terms that Members may serve on the Budget Committee. Finally, the rules package established, for the 116th Congress, the Select Committee on the Climate Crisis and the Select Committee on the Modernization of Congress. The committees are to "investigate, study, make findings, hold public hearings, and develop recommendations." By the end of the 116th Congress, they are to report their findings and policy recommendations to the relevant standing committees and publish them in a publicly available format.

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Introduction U.S. Sanctions on Russia: A Key Policy Tool Many observers consider sanctions to be a central element of U.S. policy to counter Russian malign behavior. This includes Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2014, election interference and cyberattacks, human rights abuses, illicit trade with North Korea, support to the government of Syria, and use of a chemical weapon. The United States also employs sanctions in an effort to deter further objectionable activities by Russia (e.g., expanding the war in Ukraine or launching new attacks in neighboring countries). Most Members of Congress support a robust use of sanctions amid concerns about Russia's international behavior and geostrategic intentions. Most Russia-related sanctions implemented by the United States have been levied in response to Russia's 2014 invasion of Ukraine. These sanctions are based on national emergency authorities granted the office of the President in the National Emergencies Act (NEA; P.L. 94-412 ; 50 U.S.C. 1621) and International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA; P.L. 95-223 ; 50 U.S.C. 1701) and exercised by President Barack Obama in 2014 in a series of executive orders (EOs 13660, 13661, 13662, 13685). The Obama and Trump Administrations have used these EOs to impose sanctions on approximately 650 Russian individuals and entities. The executive branch also has used a variety of EOs and legislation to impose sanctions on Russian individuals and entities in response to a number of other concerns. Legislation that established specifically Russia-related sanctions includes the following: The Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012 ( P.L. 112-208 , Title IV; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note). Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014, as amended (SSIDES; P.L. 113-95 ; 22 U.S.C. 8901 et seq.). Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014, as amended (UFSA; P.L. 113-272 ; 22 U.S.C. 8921 et seq.). Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017, as amended (CRIEEA; P.L. 115-44 , Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act [CAATSA], Title II; 22 U.S.C. 9501 et seq.). The last of these, CRIEEA, codifies Ukraine-related and cyber-related EOs, strengthens sanctions authorities from the 2014 Ukraine-related EOs and legislation, and identifies several new sanctions targets, both possible new categories of designees and additional objectionable behavior. It also establishes congressional review of any action the President takes to ease or lift a variety of sanctions. Russia Sanctions and the Trump Administration The Trump Administration's pace in implementing sanctions, particularly primary and secondary sanctions under CRIEEA, has raised some questions in Congress about the Administration's commitment to holding Russia responsible for its malign behavior. Administration officials contend they are implementing a robust set of sanctions on Russia, including new CRIEEA requirements. As of the start of 2019, the Trump Administration has made 29 designations based on new sanctions authorities in CRIEEA, relating to cyberattacks (§224, 24 designations), human rights abuses (§228, amending SSIDES, 3 designations), and arms sales (§231, 2 designations). The Administration has not made designations under new CRIEEA authorities related to pipeline development, corrupt privatization deals, or support to Syria (§§232-234), nor has it made other designations under SSIDES or UFSA, as amended by CRIEEA (§§225-228), related to weapons transfers abroad, gas export cutoffs, special oil projects, corruption, and sanctions evasion. Some Members of Congress have called on the President to make more designations based on CRIEEA's mandatory sanctions provisions. The Trump Administration has made many Russia-related designations under sanctions authorities that predate CRIEEA, however. These authorities include Ukraine-related and cyber-related EOs codified by CRIEEA, as well as EOs related to weapons proliferation, North Korea, Syria, transnational crime, and international terrorism. The Administration also has made designations based on earlier legislation, such as the Sergei Magnitsky Act; the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (22 U.S.C. 2656 note); the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act, as amended (INKSNA; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note); and the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (CBW Act; 22 U.S.C. 5601 et seq.). The United States has imposed most Ukraine-related sanctions on Russia in coordination with the European Union (EU). As the invasion of Ukraine progressed in 2014, the Obama Administration argued that EU support for sanctions was crucial, as the EU has more extensive trade and investment ties with Russia than does the United States. Many view U.S.-EU cooperation in imposing sanctions as a tangible indication of U.S.-European solidarity, frustrating Russian efforts to drive a wedge between transatlantic partners. Since 2017, the efforts of Congress and the Trump Administration to tighten U.S. sanctions unilaterally have prompted some degree of concern in the EU about U.S. commitment to sanctions coordination and U.S.-EU cooperation on Russia and Ukraine more broadly. How Effective Are Sanctions on Russia? The United States (and, in response to certain activities, the EU and others) has imposed sanctions on Russia mainly to pressure Russia to withdraw from Crimea and eastern Ukraine; to cease malicious cyber activity against the United States, its allies, and partners; to deter and, in some instances, take punitive steps in response to human rights abuses and corruption; to abide by the Chemical Weapons Convention; and to halt Russia's support to the Syrian and North Korean regimes. Many observers have debated the degree to which sanctions promote change in Russia's behavior. With respect to Ukraine, Russia has not reversed its occupation and annexation of Crimea, nor has it stopped fostering separatism in eastern Ukraine. On the contrary, it has extended military operations. After Russia opened a bridge to Crimea over the Kerch Strait, the waterway connecting the Black Sea to the Sea of Azov, it stepped up its interference with commercial traffic traveling to and from ports in eastern Ukraine. On November 25, 2018, Russian coast guard vessels forcibly prevented three Ukrainian naval vessels from transiting the Kerch Strait, fired on them as they sought to leave the area, and detained and imprisoned their crew members. At the same time, Russia has signed two agreements that recognize the entire occupied region in eastern Ukraine as part of Ukraine, and Russian-led separatist military operations have been limited to areas along the perimeter of the current conflict zone. Russia has not expanded its military aggression to other states. With respect to other malign activities, the relationship between sanctions and Russian behavior is difficult to determine. Sanctions in response to Russia's malicious cyber-enabled activities, human rights abuses, corruption, use of a chemical weapon, weapons proliferation, and support to Syria and North Korea are relatively limited and highly targeted. The extent to which such sanctions might be expected to change Russian behavior is unclear. To the extent that Russia does change its behavior, other factors besides sanctions could be responsible. If Russia does not change its behavior in response to sanctions, this may be for a number of reasons. Russian policymakers may be willing to incur the cost of sanctions, whether on the national economy or on their own personal wealth, in furtherance of Russia's foreign policy goals. Sanctions also might have the unintended effect of boosting internal support for the Russian government, whether through appeals to nationalism ("rally around the flag") or through Russian elites' sense of self-preservation. Finally, sanctions may be targeting individuals that have less influence on Russian policymaking than the United States assumes. Furthermore, the economic impact of sanctions may not be consequential enough to affect Russian policy. Most Russia-related sanctions do not broadly target the Russian economy or entire sectors. Rather, they consist of broad restrictions against specific individuals and entities, as well as narrower restrictions against wider groups of Russian companies. Overall, more than four-fifths of the largest 100 firms in Russia (in 2017) are not directly subject to any U.S. or EU sanctions, including companies in a variety of sectors, such as transportation, retail, services, mining, and manufacturing. Although Russia faced several economic challenges in 2014-2015, including its longest recession in almost 20 years, the 2014 collapse in global oil prices had a larger impact than sanctions. Russia's economy strengthened in 2016 and 2017, as oil prices rose. The sanctions' relatively low impact on the Russian economy is by design. The Obama Administration and the EU intended for Ukraine-related sanctions, which account for most U.S. and global Russia-related sanctions, to have a limited and targeted economic impact. They sought to target individuals and entities responsible for offending policies and/or associated with key Russian policymakers in a way that would get Russia to change its behavior while minimizing collateral damage to the Russian people or to the economic interests of the countries imposing sanctions. Moreover, some sanctions were intended to put only long-term pressure on the Russian economy, by denying oil companies access to Western technology to modernize their industry or locate new sources of oil. The full economic ramifications of these restrictions potentially have yet to materialize. There is some evidence that U.S. sanctions on Russia can have broad economic effects if they are applied to economically significant targets, although doing so may create instability in global financial markets. April 2018 sanctions on Rusal, a global aluminum firm, had broad effects that rattled Russian and global financial markets. The sanctions on Rusal marked the first time the United States and the EU imposed full blocking sanctions on a top-20 Russian firm and the first time the Treasury Department appeared prepared to implement CRIEEA-mandated secondary sanctions. In December 2018, however, the Treasury Department announced its intention to remove sanctions on Rusal, pending 30 days for congressional review, on the basis of an agreement that would require Kremlin-connected billionaire Oleg Deripaska, who is subject to sanctions, to relinquish his control over the firm (for more, see " The Section 241 "Oligarch" List ," below). About the Report This report provides a comprehensive overview of the use of sanctions in U.S. foreign policy toward Russia. It is compartmentalized, however, so that readers primarily interested in a particular issue, for example sanctions in response to Russia's use of a chemical weapon, may find the relevant information in a subsection of the report. The report first provides an overview of U.S. sanctions authorities and tools, particularly as they apply to Russia. It next describes various sanctions regimes that the executive branch has used to impose sanctions on Russian individuals and entities or that are available for this purpose, addressing authorities, tools, targets, and historical context. Third, the report briefly discusses countersanctions that Russia has introduced in response to U.S. and other sanctions. Fourth, it addresses the evolution of U.S. coordination with the European Union on Russia sanctions policy, and similarities and differences between U.S. and EU sanctions regimes. Finally, the report assesses the economic impact of sanctions on Russia at the level of the national economy and individual firms. Use of Economic Sanctions to Further Foreign Policy and National Security Objectives Economic sanctions provide a range of tools Congress and the President may use to seek to alter or deter the objectionable behavior of a foreign government, individual, or entity in furtherance of U.S. national security or foreign policy objectives. Scholars have broadly defined economic sanctions as "coercive economic measures taken against one or more countries [or individuals or entities] to force a change in policies, or at least to demonstrate a country's opinion about the other's policies." Economic sanctions may include limits on trade, such as overall restrictions or restrictions on particular exports or imports; the blocking of assets and interest in assets subject to U.S. jurisdiction; limits on access to the U.S. financial system, including limiting or prohibiting transactions involving U.S. individuals and businesses; and restrictions on private and government loans, investments, insurance, and underwriting. Sanctions also can include a denial of foreign assistance, government procurement contracts, and participation or support in international financial institutions. Sanctions that target third parties—those not engaged in the objectionable activity subject to sanctions but engaged with the individuals or entities that are—are popularly referred to as secondary sanctions . Secondary sanctions often are constructed to deter sanctions evasion, penalizing those that facilitate a means to avoid detection or that provide alternative access to finance. The United States has applied a variety of sanctions in response to objectionable Russian activities. Most Russia-related sanctions, including most sanctions established by executive order (see " Role of the President ," below), do not target the Russian state directly. Instead, they consist of designations of specific individuals, entities, and vessels on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN) of the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). Sanctions block the U.S.-based assets of those designated as SDNs and generally prohibit U.S. individuals and entities from engaging in transactions with them. In addition, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security and Attorney General, is tasked with denying entry into the United States or revoking visas granted to designated foreign nationals. Sanctions in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine also consist of sectoral sanctions . Often, sectoral sanctions broadly apply to specific sectors of an economy. In the case of Russia-related sanctions, sectoral sanctions have a narrower meaning; they apply to specific entities in Russia's financial, energy, and defense sectors that OFAC has identified for inclusion on the Sectoral Sanctions Identifications (SSI) List. These sectoral sanctions prohibit U.S. individuals and entities from engaging in specific kinds of transactions related to lending, investment, and/or trade with entities on the SSI List, but they permit other transactions. Another major category of Russia-related sanctions consists of a presumption of denial to designated end users for export licenses. The Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) places entities subject to export restrictions on the Entity List (Supplement No. 4 to Part 744 of the Export Administration Regulations). Role of the President The President, for a variety of reasons related to constitutional construction and legal challenges throughout U.S. history, holds considerable authority when economic sanctions are used in U.S. foreign policy. If Congress enacts sanctions in legislation, the President is to adhere to the provisions of the legislation and is responsible for determining the individuals and entities to be subject to sanctions. The President also often has the authority to be the sole decisionmaker in initiating and imposing sanctions. The President does so by determining, pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), that there has arisen an "unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States." The President then declares that a national emergency exists, as provided for in the National Emergencies Act (NEA), submits the declaration to Congress, and establishes a public record by publishing it in the Federal Register . Under a national emergency, the President may further invoke the authorities granted his office in IEEPA to investigate, regulate, or prohibit transactions in foreign exchange, use of U.S. banking instruments, the import or export of currency or securities, and transactions involving property or interests in property under U.S. jurisdiction. President Obama invoked NEA and IEEPA authorities to declare that Russia's 2014 interference in Ukraine constituted a threat to the United States. On that basis, he declared the national emergency on which most Ukraine-related sanctions are based. President Obama and President Trump also have used the NEA and IEEPA to declare national emergencies related to cyber-enabled malicious activities and election interference. Role of Congress Congress influences which foreign policy and national security concerns the United States responds to with sanctions by enacting legislation to authorize, and in some instances require, the President to use sanctions. Congress has taken the lead in authorizing or requiring the President (or executive branch) to use sanctions in an effort to deter weapons proliferation, international terrorism, illicit narcotics trafficking, human rights abuses, regional instability, cyberattacks, corruption, and money laundering. Legislation can define what sanctions the executive branch is to apply, as well as the conditions that need to be met before these sanctions may be lifted. One limitation on the role of Congress in establishing sanctions originates in the U.S. Constitution's bill of attainder clause. Congress may not enact legislation that "legislatively determines guilt and inflicts punishment upon an identifiable individual without provision of the protections of a judicial trial." In other words, Congress may enact legislation that broadly defines categories of sanctions targets and objectionable behavior, but it is left to the President to "[determine] guilt and [inflict] punishment"—that is, to populate the target categories with specific individuals and entities. Sanctions Implementation In the executive branch, several agencies have varying degrees of responsibility in implementing and administering sanctions. Primary agencies, broadly speaking, have responsibilities as follows: Department of the Treasury's OFAC designates SDNs to be subject to the blocking of U.S.-based assets; prohibits transactions; licenses transactions relating to exports (and limits those licenses); restricts access to U.S. financial services; restricts transactions related to travel, in limited circumstances; and identifies entities for placement on the SSI List as subject to investment and trade limitations. Department of State restricts visas, arms sales, and foreign aid; implements arms embargos required by the United Nations; prohibits the use of U.S. passports to travel, in limited circumstances; and downgrades or suspends diplomatic relations. Department of Commerce's BIS restricts licenses for commercial exports, end users, and destinations. Department of Defense restricts arms sales and other forms of military cooperation. Department of Justice investigates and prosecutes violations of sanctions and export laws. U.S. Russia-Related Sanctions The United States imposes sanctions on Russia in accordance with several laws and executive orders. In 2012, the United States introduced a new sanctions regime on Russia in response to human rights abuses. In 2014, the United States introduced an extensive new sanctions regime on Russia in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. In 2016, the United States imposed sanctions on Russian individuals and entities for election interference. In 2017, Congress introduced and the President signed into law legislation that strengthened existing sanctions authorities and established several new sanctions in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, malicious cyber-enabled activities, human rights abuses, and corruption. The United States also has imposed sanctions on Russian individuals and entities in response to the use of a chemical weapon, weapons proliferation, trade with North Korea in violation of U.N. Security Council requirements, support for the Syrian government, transnational crime, and terrorism. For an overview of Russia-related sanctions authorities and designations, see Appendix B . Sergei Magnitsky Act and the Global Magnitsky Act In December 2012, Congress passed and the President signed into law the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012 (hereinafter the Sergei Magnitsky Act). This legislation bears the name of Sergei Magnitsky, a Russian lawyer and auditor who died in prison in November 2009 after uncovering massive tax fraud that allegedly implicated government officials. The act entered into law as part of a broader piece of legislation related to U.S.-Russia trade relations (see text box entitled "Linking U.S.-Russia Trade to Human Rights," below). The Sergei Magnitsky Act requires the President to impose sanctions on those he identifies as having been involved in the "criminal conspiracy" that Magnitsky uncovered and in his subsequent detention, abuse, and death. The act also requires the President to impose sanctions on those he finds have committed human rights abuses in Russia against individuals fighting to expose the illegal activity of government officials or seeking to exercise or defend internationally recognized human rights and freedoms. The Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act ( P.L. 114-328 , Title XII, Subtitle F; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note) followed in 2016. This act authorizes the President to apply globally the sanctions authorities aimed at the treatment of whistleblowers and human rights defenders in Russia in the 2012 act. The Global Magnitsky Act also authorizes the President to impose sanctions against government officials and associates around the world responsible for acts of significant corruption. Of the 49 individuals designated pursuant to the Sergei Magnitsky Act, 38 are directly associated with the alleged crimes that Magnitsky uncovered and his subsequent ill-treatment and death. OFAC has designated another nine individuals, all from Russia's Chechnya region, for human rights violations and killings in that region and for the 2004 murder of Paul Klebnikov, the American chief editor of the Russian edition of Forbes . Two designations target the suspected killers of former Russian spy Alexander Litvinenko in London in 2006. In December 2017, President Trump issued EO 13818 to implement the Global Magnitsky Act, in the process expanding the target for sanctions to include those who commit any "serious human rights abuse" around the world, not just human rights abuse against whistleblowers and human rights defenders. At the same time, the Administration issued the first 13 designations under the act; among them were two Russian citizens designated for their alleged participation in high-level corruption. Ukraine-Related Executive Orders and Legislation Most OFAC designations of Russian individuals and entities have been in response to Russia's 2014 invasion and annexation of Ukraine's Crimea region and Russia's subsequent fostering of separatist conflict in eastern Ukraine. In 2014, the Obama Administration said it would impose increasing costs on Russia, in coordination with the EU and others, until Russia "abides by its international obligations and returns its military forces to their original bases and respects Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity." The United States has imposed Ukraine-related sanctions on more than 650 individuals, entities, and vessels (see Table 1 and Table B-1 ). In addition to Treasury-administered sanctions, the Department of Commerce's BIS denies export licenses for military, dual-use, or energy-related goods to designated end users, most of which also are subject to Treasury-administered sanctions. The basis for these Ukraine-related sanctions is a series of four executive orders (EOs 13660, 13661, 13662, and 13685) that President Barack Obama issued in 2014. Two of President Obama's Ukraine-related EOs target specific objectionable behavior. EO 13660 provides for sanctions against those the President determines have undermined democratic processes or institutions in Ukraine; undermined Ukraine's peace, security, stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity; misappropriated Ukrainian state assets; or illegally asserted governmental authority over any part of Ukraine. EO 13685 provides for sanctions against those the President determines have conducted business, trade, or investment in occupied Crimea. The other two EOs provide for sanctions against a broader range of targets. EO 13661 provides for sanctions against any Russian government officials, those who offer them support, and those operating in the Russian arms sector. EO 13662 provides for sanctions against individuals and entities that operate in key sectors of the Russian economy, as determined by the Secretary of the Treasury. Specially Designated Nationals OFAC established four SDN lists based on the four Ukraine-related EOs: two lists for those found to have engaged in specific activities related to the destabilization and invasion of Ukraine, and two lists for broader groups of targets. As of the start of 2019, OFAC has placed more than 365 individuals, entities, and vessels on the four Ukraine-related SDN lists (see Table 1 and Table B-1 ). OFAC has drawn on EO 13660 to designate individuals and entities for their role in destabilizing and invading Ukraine. Designees mainly include former Ukrainian officials (including ex-President Viktor Yanukovych and a former prime minister), de facto Ukrainian separatist officials in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, Russian-based fighters and patrons, and associated companies or organizations. OFAC has drawn on EO 13685 to designate primarily Russian or Crimea-based companies and subsidiaries that operate in occupied Crimea. OFAC has drawn on EO 13661 and EO 13662 to designate a wider circle of Russian government officials, members of parliament, heads of state-owned companies, and other prominent businesspeople and associates, including individuals the Treasury Department has considered part of Russian President Vladimir Putin's "inner circle." It also has designated related entities. Among the designated government officials and heads of state-owned companies are Russia's minister of internal affairs, Secretary of the Security Council, directors of the Foreign Intelligence Service and National Guard Troops; the chairs of both houses of parliament; and the chief executive officers of state-owned oil company Rosneft, gas company Gazprom, defense and technology conglomerate Rostec, and banks VTB and Gazprombank. OFAC also has designated several politically connected Russian billionaires (whom the Treasury Department refers to as oligarchs) under EO 13661 and, as of April 2018, EO 13662. Designees include 11 of Russia's wealthiest 100 individuals, including 2 of the top 10, as estimated by Forbes . Of these 11 billionaires, 7 were designated in April 2018. The entities OFAC has designated include holdings owned or controlled by SDNs. These holdings include Bank Rossiya, which the Treasury Department has described as the "personal bank" of Russian senior officials; other privately held banks and financial services companies (e.g., SMP Bank and the Volga Group); private aluminum company Rusal; gas pipeline construction company Stroygazmontazh; construction company Stroytransgaz; electric company EuroSibEnergo; and vehicle manufacturer GAZ Group. Designated entities also include several defense and arms firms, such as the state-owned United Shipbuilding Corporation, Almaz-Antey (air defense systems and missiles), Uralvagonzavod (tanks and other military equipment), NPO Mashinostroyenia (missiles and rockets), and several subsidiaries of the state-owned defense and hi-tech conglomerate Rostec, including the Kalashnikov Group (firearms). Sectoral Sanctions Identifications Prior to April 2018, OFAC used EO 13662 solely as the basis for identifying entities for inclusion on the SSI List. Individuals and entities under U.S. jurisdiction are restricted from engaging in specific transactions with entities on the SSI List, which OFAC identifies as subject to one of four directives under the EO. SSI restrictions apply to new equity investment and financing (other than 14-day lending) for identified entities in Russia's financial sector (Directive 1); new financing (other than 60-day lending) for identified entities in Russia's energy sector (Directive 2); and new financing (other than 30-day lending) for identified entities in Russia's defense sector (Directive 3). A fourth directive prohibits U.S. trade with identified entities related to the development of Russian deepwater, Arctic offshore, or shale projects that have the potential to produce oil and, amended as a result of requirements enacted in CRIEEA in 2017, such projects worldwide in which those entities have an ownership interest of at least 33% or a majority of voting interests. As of the start of 2019, OFAC has placed 13 Russian companies and their subsidiaries and affiliates on the SSI List. The SSI List includes major state-owned companies in the financial, energy, and defense sectors; it does not include all companies in those sectors. The parent entities on the SSI List, under their respective directives, consist of the following: Four large state-owned banks (Sberbank, VTB Bank, Gazprombank, Rosselkhozbank) and VEB, which "acts as a development bank and payment agent for the Russian government"; State-owned oil companies Rosneft and Gazpromneft, pipeline company Transneft, and private gas producer Novatek; State-owned defense and hi-tech conglomerate Rostec; and For restrictions on transactions related to deepwater, Arctic offshore, or shale oil projects, Rosneft and Gazpromneft, private companies Lukoil and Surgutneftegaz, and state-owned energy company Gazprom (Gazpromneft's parent company). Ukraine-Related Legislation In addition to issuing four Ukraine-related executive orders in 2014, President Obama signed into law the Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act (SSIDES) on April 3, 2014, and the Ukraine Freedom Support Act (UFSA) on December 18, 2014. SSIDES was introduced in the Senate on March 12, 2014, six days after President Obama issued the first Ukraine-related EO, declaring a national emergency with respect to Ukraine. The President signed UFSA into law the day before he issued his fourth Ukraine-related EO, prohibiting trade and investment with occupied Crimea. CRIEEA, which President Trump signed into law on August 2, 2017, amended SSIDES and UFSA (for more on CRIEEA, see " Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 ," below). Both SSIDES and UFSA expanded upon the actions the Obama Administration took in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. President Obama, however, did not cite SSIDES or UFSA as an authority for designations or other sanctions actions. In November 2018, President Trump cited SSIDES, as amended by CRIEEA (Section 228), to designate two individuals and one entity for serious human rights abuses in territories forcibly occupied or controlled by Russia. President Trump has not cited UFSA as an authority for any sanctions designations. Sanctions authorities in SSIDES and UFSA overlap with steps taken by the President in issuing executive orders under emergency authorities. Many individuals and entities OFAC designated for their role in destabilizing Ukraine, for example, could have been designated pursuant to SSIDES. Similarly, some of the individuals OFAC designated in April 2018 as "oligarchs and elites who profit from [Russia's] corrupt system" potentially could have been designated pursuant to the authority in SSIDES that provides for sanctions against those responsible for significant corruption. In addition, Russian arms exporter Rosoboronexport, subject to sanctions under UFSA, is subject to sanctions under other authorities (see " Weapons Proliferation "). SSIDES and UFSA contain additional sanctions provisions that the executive branch could use. These include sanctions against Russian individuals and entities for corruption, arms transfers to Syria and separatist territories, and energy export cutoffs. They also include potentially wide-reaching secondary sanctions against foreign individuals and entities that facilitate significant transactions for Russia-related designees, help them to evade sanctions, or make significant investments in certain oil projects in Russia (for details, see text box entitled "Sanctions in Ukraine-Related Legislation" below). Cyber-Related Executive Orders and Legislation The executive branch draws on national emergency authorities to impose sanctions for a range of malicious cyber-enabled activities, including activities the United States has attributed to the Russian government. On April 1, 2015, President Obama issued EO 13694, invoking national emergency authorities to declare that "the increasing prevalence and severity of malicious cyber-enabled activities originating from, or directed by persons located … outside the United States, constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat." EO 13694 targeted those who (1) engage in cyberattacks against critical infrastructure, (2) for financial or commercial gain, or (3) to significantly disrupt the availability of a computer or network. Although the President declared the national emergency relating to malicious cyber-enabled activities in April 2015, he did not announce the first designations until December 2016. On December 28, 2016, President Obama issued EO 13757, which amended EO 13694 to establish sanctions against those engaged in "tampering with, altering, or causing a misappropriation of information with the purpose or effect of interfering with or undermining election processes or institutions." Under the amended EO, OFAC designated four individuals and five entities for election-related malicious cyber activities. These designees included Russia's leading intelligence agency (Federal Security Service, or FSB), military intelligence (Main Intelligence Directorate, or GRU), and four GRU officers. In addition, OFAC designated two individuals for financial-related malicious cyber-enabled activities. In March 2018, the Trump Administration designated 13 individuals and 3 entities for election-related malicious cyber activities. These designees included the Internet Research Agency (IRA), the Russian "troll factory" that the Department of Justice's Special Counsel's Office indicted for crimes related to U.S. election interference in February 2018, as well as 12 of its employees, its alleged financial backer, and two of the financier's companies, all of which were also indicted. In June and August 2018, OFAC designated five individuals and seven entities that the Treasury Department referred to as FSB enablers. One of these entities, Divetechnoservices, "procured a variety of underwater equipment and diving systems for Russian government agencies" and "was awarded a contract to procure a submersible craft." The Treasury Department noted that Russia "has been active in tracking undersea communications cables, which carry the bulk of the world's telecommunications data." In December 2018, OFAC designated two individuals and four entities for cyber-enabled election interference. According to the Treasury Department, these designees were "related to Project Lakhta, a broad Russian effort that includes the IRA, which has sought to interfere in political and electoral systems worldwide" and has the same financial backers as the IRA. The designees included a Project Lakhta employee whom the Department of Justice charged in September 2018 for conspiracy to defraud the United States related to Project Lakhta's efforts "to interfere in the U.S. political system, including the 2018 midterm election." Designees also included four entities that represent themselves as media outlets and the head of one of these entities. CRIEEA, enacted in August 2017, codified EO 13694, as amended, and, in Section 224, enlarged the scope of cyber-related activities subject to sanctions to include a range of activities conducted on behalf of the Russian government that undermine "cybersecurity against any person, including a democratic institution, or government" (for more on CRIEEA, see " Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 ," below). In March 2018, the Trump Administration designated, pursuant to Section 224, the FSB, GRU, and four GRU officers, all of which OFAC previously had designated under EO 13694, as well as two other GRU officers, for the 2017 "NotPetya" ransomware attack that targeted Ukraine and spread to other countries. In June 2018, OFAC designated one more entity under this authority. In December 2018, OFAC designated 13 GRU officers for undermining cybersecurity under Section 224. OFAC designated nine of the officers for cyber-related election interference and four for cyber-enabled operations against the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) and/or the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). All of these officers also have been indicted by the Department of Justice for related crimes. In addition, OFAC designated two GRU officers for the "attempted assassination" in the United Kingdom of former Russian military intelligence officer Sergei Skripal and his daughter through the use of a lethal nerve agent (for more, see " Use of a Chemical Weapon ," below). Although the attempted assassination was not cyber-related, OFAC used Section 224 to designate these officers as agents of the previously designated GRU. Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 On August 2, 2017, President Trump signed the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act of 2017 (CAATSA), which includes as Title II the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 (CRIEEA). CRIEEA codifies Ukraine-related and cyber-related EOs (discussed above), strengthens sanctions authorities from Ukraine-related EOs and legislation, and establishes several new sanctions. It also establishes congressional review of any action the President takes to ease or lift a variety of sanctions. As of the start of 2019, the Trump Administration has made 29 designations based on new sanctions authorities in CRIEEA, relating to cyberattacks (§224, 24 designations), human rights abuses (§228, amending SSIDES, 3 designations), and arms sales (§231, 2 designations). The Administration has not made designations under other new CRIEEA authorities related to pipeline development, questionable privatization deals, and support to Syria (§§232-234), nor has it made other designations under SSIDES or UFSA as amended by CRIEEA (§§225-228) related to weapons transfers abroad, certain oil projects, corruption, and sanctions evasion. Some Members of Congress have called on the President to make more designations based on CRIEEA's mandatory sanctions provisions. Trump Administration designations pursuant to CRIEEA include the following (some of which are discussed in more detail above, in " Ukraine-Related Executive Orders and Legislation " and " Cyber-Related Executive Orders and Legislation "): On March 15, 2018, OFAC made its first designations under new CRIEEA authorities in response to actions taken to undermine cybersecurity (§224). OFAC designated two entities and six individuals responsible for a 2017 global ransomware attack. Separately, OFAC made 16 designations for election-related cyber-enabled activities pursuant to EO 13694 (which was codified by CRIEEA). On April 6, 2018, OFAC imposed sanctions on 7 politically connected Russian billionaires (referred to by the Treasury Department as oligarchs), 12 companies they own or control, and 17 government officials. OFAC made these designations under the Ukraine-related EOs codified by CRIEEA. OFAC has made four other rounds of designations under these Ukraine-related EOs: on June 20, 2017 (before CRIEEA entered into law), when it designated as SDNs or placed on the SSI List 58 individuals and entities; on January 26, 2018, when it designated or placed on the SSI List 42 individuals and entities; on November 8, 2018, when it designated 9 individuals and entities; and on December 19, 2018, when it designated 1 individual. On June 11 and August 21, 2018, OFAC designated five individuals and seven entities it referred to as FSB enablers for malicious cyber-enabled activities pursuant to EO 13694. OFAC also designated one of these entities pursuant to Section 224 of CRIEEA. On September 20, 2018, the Administration imposed its first secondary sanctions pursuant to Section 231 of CRIEEA, against those engaged in "significant transactions" with the Russian defense or intelligence sectors. OFAC designated the Equipment Development Department of China's Central Military Commission, as well as its director, for taking delivery of 10 Su-35 combat aircraft in December 2017 and S-400 surface-to-air missile system-related equipment in 2018. On November 8, 2018, OFAC designated two individuals and one entity for committing serious human rights abuses in Russian-occupied regions of Ukraine pursuant to SSIDES, as amended by CRIEEA, Section 228. On December 19, 2018, OFAC designated two individuals and four entities for cyber-enabled election interference pursuant to EO 13694. OFAC also designated 15 individuals pursuant to Section 224 of CRIEEA for cyber-related election interference and/or cyberattacks against WADA or the OPCW, as well as for the attempted assassination in the UK of a former Russian intelligence officer and his daughter. As of the start of 2019, the Administration has not imposed sanctions under other CRIEEA authorities (§§225-228, 232-234). The Administration could use these authorities to target the following: significant foreign investment in deepwater, Arctic offshore, or shale oil projects within Russia (§225, amending UFSA); foreign financial institutions that facilitate certain transactions for Russia's defense or energy sectors, or for those subject to Ukraine-related sanctions (§226, amending UFSA); those who engage in significant corruption (§227, amending UFSA); sanctions evaders and foreign persons that facilitate significant transactions for those subject to Russia-related sanctions (§228, amending SSIDES); investment in Russia's energy export pipelines (§232); investment (or facilitating investment) that contributes to the privatization of Russia's state-owned assets "in a manner that unjustly benefits" government officials and associates (§233); and any foreign person who supports or facilitates Syria's acquiring or developing a variety of advanced or prohibited weapons and defense articles, including weapons of mass destruction (§234). Issues Related to CRIEEA Implementation The Trump Administration's pace in implementing sanctions, particularly primary and secondary sanctions under CRIEEA, has raised some questions in Congress about the Administration's commitment to holding Russia responsible for its malign activities. Administration officials contend they are implementing a robust set of Russia-related sanctions, including new CRIEEA requirements. When President Trump signed CAATSA (with CRIEEA as Title II) into law in August 2017, his signing statement noted that the legislation was "significantly flawed" and "included a number of clearly unconstitutional provisions." He said he would implement the legislation "in a manner consistent with the President's constitutional authority to conduct foreign relations." In the first few months of 2018, some Members of Congress expressed concern about the absence of new designations pursuant to CRIEEA's new authorities. Resolutions were introduced in the Senate, on February 12, 2018, and the House, on February 26, 2018, calling on the President to exercise relevant mandatory sanctions authorities under CRIEEA in response to Russia's "continued aggression in Ukraine and forcible and illegal annexation of Crimea and assault on democratic institutions around the world, including through cyber attacks." On March 15, 2018, OFAC made its first designations, related to cyberattacks, under CRIEEA's new authorities. The Administration might not invoke various CRIEEA authorities for a number of reasons. First, the Administration might cite only a relevant executive order, for example, and not legislation with corresponding authority or requirements. Second, sanctions provisions have different evidentiary requirements, which could lead the Administration to choose one over another; it also might be easier to later remove a designation made under one authority than under another. Third, investigations can take time; if OFAC has not made a designation, it may still be investigating activity that is potentially subject to sanctions. Finally, the Administration may seek to use a particular authority to deter objectionable activity; if that deterrence effort is successful, it may need to make only a few (or no) designations based on that authority. Section 231 Sanctions on Transactions with Russia's Defense and Intelligence Sectors Congress and the Administration have worked to align their positions on one of CRIEEA's new authorities, Section 231, which imposes sanctions on individuals and entities that engage in significant transactions, including arms purchases, with Russia's defense and intelligence sectors. In October 2017, the State Department issued initial guidance regarding Section 231 sanctions. It indicated it would examine "a wide range of factors ... in looking at any individual case" to determine whether a "significant transaction" had occurred. These factors "may include, but are not limited to, the significance of the transaction to U.S. national security and foreign policy interests, in particular whether it has a significant adverse impact on such interests; the nature and magnitude of the transaction; and the relation and significance of the transaction to the defense or intelligence sector of the Russian government." A senior State Department official said the State Department would "take a close look around the world at transactions and dealings that we think may fall within the scope of this sanctions provision, and we're going to look at really robust engagement ... and talk to partners and allies about where we find transactions that may be problematic." In October 2017, the Administration fulfilled a Section 231 requirement to "specify the persons that are part of, or operate for or on behalf of, [Russia's] defense and intelligence sectors." The State Department emphasized that the 39 entities on the list were not subject to sanctions but that secondary sanctions could be imposed on individuals and entities "that are determined to knowingly engage in a significant transaction with a person specified in the Guidance on or after the date of enactment of the Act." In January 2018, the Administration indicated that the threat of Section 231 sanctions was having an effect without making any designations. State Department spokesperson Heather Nauert said the State Department estimated that Section 231 had led "foreign governments [to abandon] planned or announced purchases of several billion dollars in Russian defense acquisitions." In February 2018, then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson reiterated that "we've been advising countries around the world as to what the impact on their relationship and purchases that they might be considering with Russia, and many have reconsidered those and have decided to not proceed with those discussions." In August 2018, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Wess Mitchell said that "the chilling effect" of Section 231 had led to some $8 billion to $10 billion in "foreclosed arms deals." At the same time, the Administration sought greater flexibility with regard to Section 231 sanctions. As originally enacted, Section 231 allowed the President to waive the application of sanctions for national security reasons or to "further the enforcement of this title," but only if the President certified that Russia had "made significant efforts to reduce the number and intensity of cyber intrusions." In addition, the President could delay the imposition of sanctions, if the President certified that an individual or entity was "substantially reducing the number of significant transactions" it makes with Russia's defense or intelligence sector. In April 2018, then-Secretary of Defense James Mattis asked Congress to consider introducing a more "flexible [national security] waiver authority." Otherwise, he said, "we prevent ourselves from acting in our own best interest and place an undue burden on our allies and partners." In July 2018, Secretary Mattis wrote to the chairpersons of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees to request the introduction of a limited national security waiver that "would enable allied nations to simultaneously sustain their current force while they move to a closer security relationship with the U.S." In so doing, the United States would be able to support those "whose goal is to end reliance on Russian weapons sales…. Failure to provide waiver relief would deny the U.S. a very effective tool to undermine Russian influence in many areas of the world." In response to Secretary Mattis's request, Congress amended Section 231 in the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 ( P.L. 115-232 , §1294). The amendment provides for a national security waiver that does not require congressional review but does require the President to certify a transaction would not (1) be with an entity that directly participated in or facilitated cyber intrusions, (2) endanger the United States' multilateral alliances or ongoing operations, (3) increase the risk of compromising U.S. defense systems, or (4) negatively impact defense cooperation with the country in question. The President also must certify that the country is taking steps to reduce the share of Russian-produced arms and equipment in its total inventory or is cooperating with the United States on other matters critical to U.S. national security. As of the start of 2019, the Administration has not used this waiver authority. On September 20, 2018, OFAC made its first designations pursuant to Section 231 against the Equipment Development Department of China's Central Military Commission, as well as its director, for taking delivery from Russia of 10 Su-35 combat aircraft in December 2017 and S-400 surface-to-air missile system-related equipment in 2018. In September 2018, the State Department also expanded and formalized the list of individuals and entities it considers part of Russia's defense and intelligence sectors. Now referring to this list as the List of Specified Persons, the State Department indicated that "any person who knowingly engages in a significant transaction with any of these persons is subject to mandatory sanctions under CRIEEA section 231." The State Department again expanded the list in December 2018. The Section 241 "Oligarch" List CRIEEA, in Section 241, required the Administration to submit a report to Congress that includes "an identification of any indices of corruption" among "the most significant senior foreign political figures and oligarchs in the Russian Federation, as determined by their closeness to the Russian regime and their net worth." The Section 241 requirement neither authorizes nor requires the President to impose sanctions on individuals included in the report. The Treasury Department submitted this report in unclassified form with a classified annex in January 2018. The unclassified report drew on publicly available lists of political figures and wealthy Russians, without assessments of their closeness to the regime or "indices of corruption." According to the Treasury Department, the classified annex contains an "extremely thorough analysis" of information pertaining, among other things, to "links to corruption, and international business affiliations of the named Russian persons." Many observers speculated that the list—or a more tailored version, possibly based on information from the classified annex—might serve as the basis for new designations. In January 2018 testimony to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Secretary of the Treasury Steven Mnuchin indicated that "we intend to now use that report and that intelligence to go forward with additional sanctions." On April 6, 2018, OFAC designated several politically connected Russian billionaires (whom the Treasury Department referred to as oligarchs), companies owned or controlled by these individuals, and government officials. OFAC made these designations under Ukraine-related authorities codified by CRIEEA. The Treasury Department, however, suggested the designations were in the spirit of CRIEEA's new authorities, as they were "in response to worldwide malign activity" and not just Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The Treasury Department added that "Russian oligarchs and elites who profit from [a] corrupt system will no longer be insulated from the consequences of their government's destabilizing activities." The designation of Rusal, a leading global producer of aluminum, attracted global attention. The move marked the first time OFAC designated one of Russia's 20 largest companies. International attention also focused on the fact that designating Rusal opened the door to the possible imposition of wide-ranging secondary sanctions, mandated by CRIEEA, on foreign individuals and entities that facilitate significant transactions on behalf of designees. Rusal's designation made foreign banks and firms reluctant to engage in transactions with the firm. The Trump Administration appears to have been responsive to international concerns regarding Rusal's designation. On April 23, 2018, the Administration provided a six-month wind-down period for transactions with Rusal that it has repeatedly prolonged and indicated it would remove sanctions against the firm if Kremlin-connected billionaire Oleg Deripaska, who is subject to sanctions, divested and ceded control (since his control was the justification for Rusal's designation in the first place). On December 19, 2018, the Treasury Department announced that an agreement on eliminating Deripaska's control of Rusal's parent company had been reached and, accordingly, notified Congress it intended to terminate sanctions on Rusal and two related companies in 30 days. Pursuant to CRIEEA, Congress has authority to review this action and to prevent its implementation, if Congress passes a joint resolution of disapproval by a veto-proof majority within 30 days. Other Sanctions Programs The United States imposes economic sanctions on Russian individuals and entities in response to a variety of other objectionable activities. These activities include the use of a chemical weapon, weapons proliferation, trade with North Korea in violation of U.N. Security Council requirements, support for the Syrian government, transnational crime, and terrorism. Use of a Chemical Weapon On August 6, 2018, Secretary of State Michael Pompeo determined that in March 2018 the Russian government used a chemical weapon in the United Kingdom in contravention of international law (see text box entitled "U.S. Determination of Russia's Use of a Chemical Weapon," below). This finding triggered the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (CBW Act). The CBW Act requires the President (who, in 1993, delegated CBW Act authorities to the Secretary of State) to terminate arms sales; export licenses for U.S. Munitions List items; foreign military financing; and foreign assistance, other than that which addresses urgent humanitarian situations or provides food, agricultural commodities, or agricultural products. The act also requires the President to deny credit, credit guarantees, or other financial assistance from the U.S. government, including Export-Import Bank programs, and to deny export licenses for goods controlled for national security reasons (the Commodity Control List). The act requires the imposition "forthwith" of these sanctions upon determining that a chemical weapon has been used. On August 27, 2018, Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation Christopher Ford announced the establishment of these sanctions. However, he invoked national security waiver authority to allow for the continuation of foreign assistance, exports related to government space cooperation and commercial space launches, and export licensing for national security-sensitive goods and technology in specific categories related to civil aviation safety, deemed exports or reexports on a case-by-case basis, wholly owned U.S. subsidiaries operating in Russia, and commercial end users for commercial purposes. Within three months after the initial determination (in this case, early November 2018), the CBW Act also requires the President to take further economic and diplomatic punitive steps unless he can determine and certify to Congress that Russia "is no longer using chemical or biological weapons in violation of international law or using lethal chemical or biological weapons against its own nationals," "has provided reliable assurances that it will not in the future engage in any such activities, and" "is willing to allow on-site inspections by United Nations observers or other internationally recognized, impartial observers, or other reliable means exist, to ensure" that Russia is not using chemical or biological weapons in violation of international law or against its own nationals. If the President does not certify on all these terms, he, in consultation with Congress, is required to oppose support to Russia in international financial institutions; prohibit U.S. banks from making loans or providing credit to the Russian government, other than those related to the purchase of food or other agricultural commodities or products; prohibit exports to Russia of all other goods and technology, except food and other agricultural commodities and products; restrict importation into the United States of articles that are of Russia-origin growth, product, or manufacture; downgrade or suspend diplomatic relations; and set in motion the suspension of foreign air carriers owned or controlled by Russia "to engage in foreign air transportation to or from the United States." As of the start of 2019, the Secretary of State had not levied a new round of sanctions, nor had the President determined that Russia meets the three conditions needed to avert sanctions. On November 6, 2018, the State Department informed Congress that it "could not certify that Russia met the required conditions" and intends "to proceed in accordance with the terms of the CBW Act, which directs the implementation of additional sanctions." In September 2018 testimony to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, then-Assistant Secretary of State Manisha Singh said "we intend to impose a very severe second round of sanctions under the CBW. The global community will not tolerate behavior such as we have seen from Russia, especially in poisoning and killing its own citizens." The CBW Act authorizes the President to waive sanctions if he finds it essential to U.S. national security interests to do so and notifies Congress at least 15 days in advance. The President also may waive sanctions if he finds "that there has been a fundamental change in the leadership and policies of the government of that country, and if the President notifies the Congress at least 20 days before the waiver takes effect." CBW-related sanctions remain in place for at least a year. They may be removed only after the President determines and certifies to Congress that the three conditions stated above have been met and that Russia is making restitution to those affected by the use of the chemical weapon. Weapons Proliferation Several laws require the President to impose sanctions on those he determines have engaged in trade in weapons of mass destruction or advanced conventional weapons. Restrictions cover a range of activities but generally include a one- to two-year cutoff of procurement contracts with the U.S. government and restrictions on import and export licensing. Restrictions also may include a denial of U.S. foreign aid, sales of defense articles and defense services subject to U.S. export control for national security and foreign policy purposes (U.S. Munitions List items), and export licenses for dual-use goods and services (Commerce Control List). Pursuant to the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act, as amended (INKSNA), Russian state-owned arms exporter Rosoboronexport and six other Russian defense entities are denied most U.S. government procurement contracts, export licenses, and trade in U.S. Munitions List-controlled goods and services. Weapons proliferation sanctions against Rosoboronexport are in addition to Ukraine-related sectoral sanctions imposed on the agency in December 2015 and its designation in April 2018 as an SDN for providing support to the Syrian government. Restrictions against entering into government contracts and other transactions with Rosoboronexport have been stated in annual Defense appropriations acts since 2013. The prohibitions against transactions with Rosoboronexport do not apply to contracts related to the maintenance or repair of Mi-17 helicopters purchased by the United States "for the purpose of providing assistance to the security forces of Afghanistan, as well as for the purpose of combating terrorism and violent extremism globally." They also do not apply to procurement related to the purchase or maintenance of optical sensors that "improve the U.S. ability to monitor and verify Russia's Open Skies Treaty compliance." In October 2012, the Department of Commerce's BIS imposed restrictions on 119 Russian individuals and entities, and 45 others from 11 other countries, for suspected involvement in procurement and delivery of items to Russia for military-related and other governmental or related end uses in violation of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations. BIS periodically has imposed restrictions on other Russian individuals and entities for suspected violations of the EAR with respect to exports to Russia for military and other purposes. In December 2017, BIS imposed export-licensing restrictions on two entities for producing a ground-launched cruise missile system and associated launcher in violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. Support to North Korea The U.N. Security Council, beginning in 2006, has required its member states to curtail a range of diplomatic, finance, trade, and exchange relations with North Korea. The Security Council took action in response to North Korea's withdrawal from the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, its testing of nuclear weapons, and its efforts to develop missile delivery systems. Security Council resolutions also have drawn attention to North Korea's abuse of diplomatic privileges and immunities, money laundering, bulk cash smuggling, disruption of regional stability, and disregard for the human rights conditions of its civilian population. To meet the United States' U.N. obligations, and to implement requirements enacted in the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (P.L. 114-122; 22 U.S.C. 9201 et seq.), as amended by the Korean Interdiction and Modernization of Sanctions Act (Title III, CAATSA), the President has issued a series of executive orders to block assets, transactions, and travel of designated North Korean individuals and entities. These sanctions also apply to other foreign individuals and entities that engage in trade or support North Korean designees. In June and August 2017, OFAC designated a Russian oil company and its subsidiary, three Russian individuals, and two Singapore-based companies those individuals control under EO 13722 (March 2016) for trade in petroleum with North Korea. OFAC also designated two Russian entities and two related individuals for sanctions pursuant to EO 13382 (June 2005) for providing supplies and procuring metals to a North Korean company designated in 2009 for its weapons of mass destruction programs. In August and September 2018, OFAC designated four more entities and six vessels for facilitating trade with North Korea. On August 3, 2018, OFAC designated a Russian bank under EO 13810 (September 2017) for "facilitating a significant transaction on behalf of an individual designated for weapons of mass destruction-related activities." According to the Treasury Department, the bank has had a commercial relationship with North Korean entities since at least 2009. On August 21, 2018, OFAC designated two Russian shipping companies and six vessels under EO 13810 for involvement "in the ship-to-ship transfer of refined petroleum products with North Korea-flagged vessels, an activity expressly prohibited by the U.N. Security Council." On September 13, 2018, OFAC designated under EO 13722 and EO 13810 a Russia-based front company for a China-based information technology company that "in reality ... is managed and controlled by North Koreans" and facilitates the exportation of information technology workers from North Korea. Support to Syria In a series of executive orders dating back to 2004, the President has sought to block trade and transactions with the government of Syria and its supporters. The U.S. government has imposed these sanctions in response to Syria's past occupation of Lebanon, support of international terrorism, pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them, undermining of international efforts to stabilize Iraq, and escalating violence against its own people. In April 2018, OFAC designated Russia's state-owned arms exporter Rosoboronexport and an associated bank pursuant to EO 13582 (August 2011) for providing material support and services to the government of Syria. Previously, during the Obama Administration, OFAC designated two other banks, which have since had their licenses revoked, and 12 related individuals pursuant to EO 13582 (in May 2014, November 2015, and December 2016). Transnational Crime Russian individuals and entities are subject to sanctions for activities related to transnational crime. OFAC currently designates at least 15 Russian individuals and 6 entities for their roles in transnational criminal organizations (TCOs). In December 2017, OFAC designated as a TCO the "Thieves-in-Law," which it characterized as "a Eurasian crime syndicate that has been linked to a long list of illicit activity across the globe." OFAC also designated 10 individuals (Russian nationals and others) and 2 entities as TCOs for their relation to the Thieves-in-Law; these designees included 6 individuals that OFAC previously had designated in July 2011, during the Obama Administration, as part of a related TCO, the Brothers' Circle. In December 2017, OFAC delisted the Brothers' Circle and several related individuals and entities, when it designated the Thieves-in-Law. Terrorism Russian individuals and entities are subject to sanctions related to global terrorism. OFAC has designated at least 2 entities and 12 affiliated individuals, in Russia or as fighters abroad, as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs). The Caucasus Emirate, a terrorist and insurgent group in Russia's North Caucasus region, was established in 2007. OFAC listed its founder, Doku Umarov, as an SDGT in 2010 (he was killed in 2013). OFAC designated the Caucasus Emirate itself in May 2011. In 2015, the Islamic State recognized as its local affiliate the Caucasus Province (Vilayet), which reportedly was established by insurgents previously affiliated with the Caucasus Emirate. OFAC designated the Caucasus Province as an SDGT in September 2015. Restrictions on U.S. Government Funding As in past years, FY2018 and FY2019 appropriations restrict assistance to the Russian government. The Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P.L. 115-245 , Division A), prohibits the use of defense funding to make a loan or loan guarantee to Rosoboronexport or any of its subsidiaries (§8103). For FY2018, the Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2018 ( P.L. 115-141 , Division D), prohibits funds to Russia from its Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Account (§305(a)). For the same year, the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2018 (Division K), requires country notification procedures to be invoked for foreign aid to Russia (§7015(f)). This act also prohibits funds from being made available to Russia's central government (§7070), a restriction in place since FY2015. The State Department's 2018 Trafficking in Persons Report identifies Russia as a Tier 3 nation that fails to meet minimum standards for the elimination of human trafficking. The designation requires limits on aid and U.S. support in the international financial institutions. In December 2018, under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, as amended ( P.L. 105-292 , 22 U.S.C. 6401 et seq.), Secretary of State Pompeo included Russia for the first time on the Special Watch List identifying "governments that have engaged in or tolerated severe violations of religious freedom." The Special Watch List was established in 2016 to publicly name foreign governments whose treatment of religious freedoms has deteriorated over the past year. Naming to the Special Watch List serves as a warning that the United States could be considering designating the foreign nation as a Country of Particular Concern (CPC) in the coming year. If Russia were to be designated a CPC, it would become subject to diplomatic and economic sanctions that could range from private demarches to prohibitions on export licensing, procurement contracts, and transactions through U.S. financial institutions. Russian Countersanctions The Russian government has responded to U.S. and other sanctions by imposing a variety of retaliatory measures, also known as countersanctions. The day the Senate passed the Sergei Magnitsky Act in December 2012, the Russian government announced new restrictions on imported beef, pork, and poultry that, within a few months, led to a major decline in U.S. meat imports to Russia. Several days after President Obama signed the act into law, the Russian parliament voted to ban U.S. adoptions of Russian children. It also introduced a visa ban against U.S. citizens whom Russia characterized as being involved in human rights violations or crimes against and persecution of Russian citizens. The day after OFAC issued its first designations under the Sergei Magnitsky Act in April 2013, the Russian government issued a list of U.S. citizens prohibited from entering Russia. Russia also imposed countersanctions in response to Ukraine-related sanctions. These measures included additional travel prohibitions and a ban on the import of agricultural products from countries that had imposed sanctions on Russia. Russia imposed countersanctions related to CRIEEA in anticipation of the act being signed into law. The day after Congress passed the legislation in July 2017, and while the bill awaited the President's signature, the Russian government ordered a reduction of U.S. mission personnel in Russia to no more than 455, which it said was equal to the number of Russian personnel in the United States. It also suspended U.S. use of storage and resort facilities in Moscow. Some observers viewed these measures as a response to CRIEEA but also, belatedly, to the Obama Administration's December 2016 decision to declare certain Russian diplomatic personnel persona non grata and to deny access to two Russian government-owned compounds. In response, on August 31, 2017, the Trump Administration closed Russia's Consulate General in San Francisco, a chancery annex in Washington, DC, and a consular annex that functioned as a trade office in New York City. In March 2018, in response to a nerve agent attack on British citizen and former Russian military intelligence officer Sergei Skripal and his daughter, the Trump Administration expelled 60 Russian diplomats and closed the Russian consulate in Seattle. In response, Russia expelled 60 U.S. diplomats and closed the U.S. Consulate General in St. Petersburg. After the United States' imposition of new designations of Russian government officials and politically connected billionaires and their holdings in April 2018, President Putin signed into law an act authorizing, but not requiring, restrictions related to trade with the United States and other unfriendly states, as well as foreign access to Russian public procurement and privatization. U.S. and EU Coordination on Sanctions Like the United States, the EU has imposed sanctions—or restrictive measures in EU parlance—against Russia since 2014 for its annexation of Ukraine's Crimea region and its subsequent fostering of separatism in eastern Ukraine. The EU imposed Ukraine-related sanctions largely in cooperation with the United States. EU sanctions are similar, although not identical, to U.S. sanctions. Many in the EU welcomed efforts by Congress in 2017 to ensure that the Trump Administration maintained U.S. sanctions on Russia. At the same time, new sanctions that Congress introduced in CRIEEA raised some concerns in Europe about the continued alignment of U.S.-EU sanctions and cooperation on Ukraine policy more broadly. Unlike the United States, the EU has not imposed sanctions on Russian individuals or entities for actions related to human rights violations, malicious cyber activity, corruption, transnational crime, or support to Syria or North Korea. However, the March 2018 nerve agent attack in the United Kingdom on former Russian intelligence officer Sergei Skripal and his daughter helped spur the EU to agree to a broad new sanctions regime targeting individuals and entities involved in the development and use of chemical weapons. A degree of momentum also appears to be building within the EU for new EU-wide restrictive measures against people and organizations that carry out cyberattacks, as well as human rights violations. Imposing EU sanctions requires the unanimous agreement of all 28 EU member states. Most EU sanctions are imposed for a defined period of time (usually six months or a year) to incentivize change and provide the EU with flexibility to adjust the sanctions as warranted. Unanimity among EU member states also is required to renew (i.e., extend) EU sanctions. U.S. and EU Sanctions Cooperation Since the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis in early 2014, the United States and the EU have pursued similar policies—including those related to sanctions—aimed at supporting Ukraine's political transition and restoring its territorial integrity. U.S.-EU cooperation in imposing sanctions on Russia and coordination on other political and diplomatic responses to the Ukraine conflict largely have been viewed as a high point in transatlantic relations and have helped prevent Russia from driving a wedge between the United States and Europe. In the first half of 2014, Ukraine-related sanctions that the United States and the EU imposed focused mostly on denying visas and freezing assets of Russian and Ukrainian government officials and pro-Russian separatists. The United States then imposed its first round of sectoral sanctions on July 16, 2014. At the time, many in the EU were hesitant to impose sectoral sanctions on Russia; they worried that doing so might hinder a peaceful resolution to the conflict and negatively affect the EU's extensive trade and investment relations with Russia. Some EU countries dependent on Russian oil and gas supplies also feared that stronger sanctions could prompt Russia to cut off energy exports in retaliation. On July 17, 2014, the day after President Obama imposed the first U.S. sectoral sanctions on Russia, separatists in eastern Ukraine downed Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 with a missile supplied by the Russian military. This event, along with the intensifying conflict and continued Russian intransigence, changed the political calculus in Europe on sanctions. European officials and publics were particularly dismayed when the separatists prohibited access to the MH17 crash site and delayed recovery of the remains of the 298 victims, including over 200 EU citizens. By the end of July 2014, the EU expanded its list of individuals and entities subject to asset freezes and visa bans and joined the United States in imposing sanctions on selected companies in Russia's financial, defense, and energy sectors. Both the United States and the EU further tightened their sectoral sanctions in September 2014. U.S.-EU coordination sought to close as many gaps as possible between the two sanction regimes to send a unified message to Russia, maximize the effectiveness of sanctions, and make compliance for financial firms and multinational companies easier. President Obama asserted that the combined U.S.-EU measures would "have an even bigger bite" than U.S. sanctions alone. Although EU sectoral sanctions largely mirror those imposed by the United States, they represent a carefully crafted compromise among EU member states. Agreeing on sectoral sanctions was difficult for the EU, given that the union's 28 member states have varying economic interests and historical relations with Russia. EU member states sought to draft certain provisions in ways to protect some national economic interests. For example, Germany and other member states dependent on Russian gas supplies were eager to preserve their energy ties to Russia. Consequently, the EU decided to apply lending and investment restrictions only in the oil sector, not to Gazprom or other companies in the Russian gas sector. The EU also applied restrictions on the sale of energy exploration equipment, technology, and services only to oil, not gas, development projects. Finally, the EU designed sectoral sanctions in a way that would share potential economic burdens across all member states. The EU has tied lifting its sanctions on Russia to the full implementation of the Minsk peace agreements for Ukraine and asserts that it is committed to maintaining sanctions until this goal is achieved. At the same time, questions persist in some EU countries about the sanctions' effectiveness, especially amid concerns that sanctions could be hindering EU relations with Russia on other global priorities and harming European business interests. The EU sanctions (and Russian countersanctions) have come with financial costs for certain industries in some EU member states, including Germany, Finland, and the Baltic states. Some European officials have periodically floated ideas about restructuring the sanctions. Others firmly reject suggestions to relax or recalibrate EU sanctions and have urged the Trump Administration to uphold U.S. sanctions on Russia. U.S. and EU Ukraine-Related Sanctions Compared EU sanctions in response to Russia's annexation of Crimea and destabilization of eastern Ukraine consist of three measures: Restrictive measures on individuals and entities in Russia and Ukraine believed to be involved in the annexation of Crimea and destabilization of eastern Ukraine. Designees are subject to asset freezes and, for individuals, visa bans. As of the start of 2019, the EU has designated 164 individuals and 44 entities (Council Decision 2014/145/CFSP, March 17, 2014). Economic sanctions targeting Russia ' s finance, defense, and energy sectors ( sectoral sanctions). The EU requires its member states to impose lending and investment restrictions on five major state-controlled Russian banks, three defense firms, and three energy companies, as well as their subsidiaries outside the EU. The sanctions also ban the import and export of arms; the sale of dual-use goods and technology to Russian military end users and nine mixed companies; and sales of equipment, technology, and services for oil-development projects related to deepwater, Arctic offshore, and shale exploration (Council Decision 2014/512/CFSP, July 31, 2014). Restrictions on economic relations with Ukraine's occupied Crimea region. The EU has banned EU individuals and EU-based companies from importing goods, exporting certain goods and technologies, and providing tourism services in Ukraine's Crimea region. The EU also has restricted trade and investment in certain economic sectors and infrastructure projects (Council Decision 2014/386/CFSP, June 23, 2014). In addition, in response to the political upheaval in Ukraine in early 2014 and in an effort to bolster Ukraine's political transition, the EU imposed restrictive measures on individuals identified as responsible for the misappropriation of Ukrainian state funds or for the abuse of office causing a loss of Ukrainian public funds. The EU hoped to prevent the transfer of such funds outside of Ukraine and to facilitate their recovery. As of the start of 2019, the EU has frozen assets of and imposed visa bans on 13 former Ukrainian officials, including ex-Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych and others who served in his government (Council Decision 2014/119/CFSP, March 5, 2014). Sanctions Targeting Individuals and Entities As of the start of 2019, the United States has designated as Ukraine-related SDNs—subject to asset freezes, prohibitions on transactions, and, for individuals, travel bans—209 individuals, 158 entities, and 2 vessels. In its equivalent sanctions programs, the EU has designated 177 individuals and 44 entities. Both the United States and the EU have designated a number of high-ranking Russian officials and other individuals close to President Putin. The U.S. and EU lists of designated individuals and entities are not identical. Various legal and political reasons account for some of the differences in the U.S. and EU designations. The EU has imposed sanctions on more individuals and entities directly related to the fighting in Ukraine—military officials, insurgents, and battalions—than has the United States. The United States has specifically designated more companies operating in Crimea and entities affiliated with other designated individuals and entities, whereas the EU provides for blanket restrictions on Crimea-related activities and against affiliated individuals and entities. The EU is unable to impose restrictive measures on some individuals who hold dual citizenship with EU countries. Since 2014, several individuals have been removed from the EU sanctions list. Unlike the United States, which requires a decedent's survivors to petition for removal, the EU removes individuals from its sanctions list due to death. In addition, some designees have successfully petitioned for their removal. Sectoral Sanctions EU and U.S. restrictions against lending and/or investments with entities in specific sectors mostly overlap and target a handful of key companies and their subsidiaries in the financial, defense, and energy sectors, including exports and services related to deepwater, Arctic offshore, or shale oil projects in Russia (see Table C-1 ). The manners in which the United States and the EU employ this measure differ somewhat and have changed over time. As of the start of 2019, the United States specifically identifies 13 Russian companies and 276 of their subsidiaries and affiliates as subject to sectoral sanctions. The EU, for its part, identifies 11 entities (and majority-owned subsidiaries outside the EU) as subject to sectoral sanctions. The United States has explicitly identified several companies, including Gazprom, with which sales of equipment, technology, and services for certain oil projects are prohibited; by contrast, the EU has not named specific companies to which these prohibitions apply. In addition, the EU does not impose sanctions on such oil projects worldwide, as CRIEEA does. EU and U.S. policies are comparable in restricting most arms trade with and dual-use exports to Russia, but the EU applied arms-trade sanctions to future contracts only. The EU decision to allow existing arms sales and service contracts with Russia to continue was largely at the insistence of France (which had an existing $1.2 billion contract to sell two Mistral helicopter carriers to Russia) and some Central European countries that rely on Russian companies to service their Soviet-era weapons systems. Analysts suggest, however, that the arms-trade sanctions—and ongoing concern about Russian actions in Ukraine and Russian military resurgence—prompted EU members to reevaluate some existing weapons system sales and licenses. Although not required to do so under the terms of the EU sanctions, France canceled the sales contract with Russia for the Mistral helicopter carriers. Germany also canceled a preexisting contract to supply Russia with a $155 million combat simulation center. Central and Eastern European countries have been advancing plans to phase out Russian-origin military equipment and replace it with more modern U.S. and European equipment. The EU and the United States also addressed the issue of existing sales and service contracts on energy development projects differently. The EU allowed for the continuation of existing contracts and agreements, in certain cases with authorization at the national level. The United States generally prohibited, other than a brief wind-down period, the continuation of existing contracts and agreements, unless otherwise authorized by OFAC. This difference led, for instance, to Eni (an Italian energy company) continuing its deepwater exploration in the Black Sea in partnership with Russian state-controlled oil company Rosneft; by contrast, ExxonMobil withdrew from certain joint ventures with Rosneft in 2018 after failing in April 2017 to secure a waiver from the Treasury Department to move forward with its own oil exploration project in the Black Sea. Neither the United States nor the EU has employed sectoral sanctions that broadly target Russia's gas sector or state-controlled gas company Gazprom. Reports suggest that as the United States and EU worked to develop sanctions on Russia in 2014, they agreed to avoid measures that could harm the other's interests, including in relation to the production and supply of Russian gas. As discussed above, many EU countries dependent on Russian gas supplies were particularly worried about sanctions that could impede the flow of Russian gas and harm relations with Russia in this area. The United States and EU do apply financial restrictions to two Gazprom subsidiaries (Gazpromneft, its oil production and refining subsidiary, and Gazprombank, a financial institution), and the U.S. restrictions on deepwater, Arctic offshore, and shale oil projects also specifically apply to Gazprom. In addition, the United States applies lending restrictions to Novatek, a private Russian gas company. Neither the United States nor the EU has applied sanctions targeting gas production or trade. Implications of CRIEEA Given the previously close U.S.-EU coordination on Ukraine-related sanctions, many in the EU were dismayed by certain provisions in CRIEEA as the draft legislation evolved in 2017. European leaders and EU officials recognized that the main intent of CRIEEA was to codify and strengthen sanctions on Russia, including many with parallels in EU legislation. They also were concerned, however, that some of the initial provisions were drafted without regard for the EU's role as a U.S. partner and had the potential to negatively affect EU economic, business, and energy interests. For example, the German and Austrian governments were concerned about the possible effects of a provision authorizing (but not requiring) sanctions on individuals or entities that engage in trade or make investments (with a value of $1 million, or $5 million in aggregate over 12 months) that enhance Russia's ability to construct energy export pipelines. This provision had the potential to establish new secondary sanctions on German, Austrian, and other European energy companies through their financing of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, a Gazprom-run project to increase the amount of Russian gas delivered to Germany and other parts of Europe via the Baltic Sea. Some in Europe also objected to what they viewed as a unilateral imposition of sanctions. Those of this view worried that new U.S. sanctions could complicate the delicate political consensus on the EU's own sanctions and weaken U.S.-EU cooperation on Ukraine. Others warned that codifying U.S. sanctions could reduce flexibility in negotiations with Moscow on resolving the conflict in Ukraine. Finally, many in the EU were troubled that CRIEEA's introduction of more general secondary sanctions against those who engage in significant transactions with U.S. designees could impact European business partners of Russian companies, even if those companies were not on the EU's own sanctions list. EU concerns were accommodated to some degree by language inserted in CRIEEA specifying that the President should "continue to uphold and seek unity" with European partners on sanctions (§212) and that new U.S. sanctions on pipeline ventures would not be imposed without coordinating with U.S. allies (§232). Following CRIEEA's enactment, the European Commission (the EU's executive) expressed overall satisfaction that "European interests can thus be taken into account in the implementation of any [U.S.] sanctions." At the same time, some in Europe remain wary that implementation of new U.S. sanctions could affect European energy projects. The European Commission has cautioned that the EU is prepared to take "appropriate steps" if U.S. sanctions disadvantage EU companies trading with Russia in the energy sector. The EU has not elaborated publicly on what such "appropriate steps" might be, and the EU hopes to avoid the need for these measures. In October 2017, the Trump Administration published guidance noting that pipeline-related sanctions in CRIEEA, Section 232, would not apply to existing projects (i.e., those initiated before August 2, 2017). The guidance also reasserted that the United States would not impose any such sanctions without coordination with U.S. allies. Some European officials and experts are skeptical of the Trump Administration's commitment to consult the EU and its member states ahead of imposing new sanctions, especially amid broader European concerns about whether the Administration regards the EU as a partner or a competitor. Those of this view point, for example, to the Trump Administration's April 6, 2018, designation of several Russian billionaires and the companies they control. Some media reports suggested the Trump Administration issued these designations without significant prior consultations with the EU or leading European governments. In particular, the designation of Rusal, a leading global producer of aluminum and the raw material alumina, had potentially significant implications for Europe's aluminum and manufacturing sectors. Concern that the Administration would enforce CRIEEA's secondary sanctions against European firms that have commercial and financial dealings with Rusal (whose facility in Ireland supplies many European aluminum producers) effectively halted such transactions. The U.S. announcement also led to a rise in the price of alumina. European officials warned that sanctions on Rusal could lead to plant closures, job losses, and the supply and production chains of key European industries, ranging from the makers of aluminum cans and foil to automobile and aerospace companies. The Trump Administration appears to have been responsive to subsequent European entreaties (and those of other international partners, such as Brazil) regarding the difficulties posed for them by Rusal's designation. Treasury Secretary Mnuchin indicated that the "impact on our partners and allies" contributed to a U.S. decision to extend the wind-down period for transactions with Rusal. In December 2018, the Treasury Department announced its intention to terminate sanctions against Rusal and two related companies (see " The Section 241 "Oligarch" List ," above). Some analysts have noted that the United States and the EU continue to coordinate other Ukraine-related sanctions. In January 2018, for example, the Trump Administration designated three individuals (including a Russian deputy energy minister) and one entity under Ukraine-related authorities that the EU had sanctioned in April 2017 for their involvement in supplying occupied Crimea with gas turbines. German company Siemens originally sold the turbines for use in Russia; the EU determined that the transfer of the turbines to Crimea was in breach of contractual provisions covering the original sale by Siemens and in contravention of EU prohibitions on the supply of key equipment for certain infrastructure projects in Crimea. Potential New EU Sanctions Beyond Ukraine, the EU and many member states are concerned about a range of other Russian activities, including use of a chemical weapon, cyber threats, and human rights abuses. In October 2018, the EU approved a new legal framework that is to allow it to impose restrictive measures on individuals and entities involved in the development and use of chemical weapons, regardless of their nationality or location. Authorized sanctions include travel bans and asset freezes. Although this measure is not aimed at Russia specifically, observers largely view the March 2018 Skripal attack as providing impetus for the new sanctions framework. The EU has not yet named individuals or entities subject to these new sanctions, but many analysts expect the two Russian intelligence officers accused of carrying out the Skripal attack will be among those ultimately designated. Analysts also expect that any new EU-wide sanctions for cyber activities would not be aimed at Russia specifically but could be used against Russian individuals and entities who are believed to be engaged in malicious cyber activities. In October 2018, EU leaders directed that "work on the capacity to respond to and deter cyberattacks through EU restrictive measures should be taken forward." Press reports indicate that such sanctions likely would consist of travel bans and asset freezes, although the EU has not yet put forward a specific proposal. Some European leaders and EU officials—including some members of the European Parliament—have called for an "EU Magnitsky Act" to impose sanctions on Russians complicit in human rights abuses, money-laundering activities, and other "antidemocratic" activities. Since 2016, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have passed their own national versions of the Sergei Magnitsky Act or Global Magnitsky Act. In May 2018, the UK Parliament approved a so-called Magnitsky amendment to its new Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act that expands UK authorities to sanction individuals, companies, or states that commit gross human rights violations. Press reports indicate that Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands are considering similar national "Magnitsky" legislation. The Netherlands also has proposed that the EU should develop a new sanctions regime that could target individuals accused of human rights abuses worldwide, regardless of their nationality. Media reports suggest that the Netherlands has refrained from naming its proposal for a new EU human rights sanctions regime after Sergei Magnitsky in an effort to ensure the necessary EU consensus. Dutch officials reportedly assess that some EU member states may be hesitant to support such a regime if it were named for Magnitsky because of concerns that it would prompt a negative Russian reaction. Other experts note that the motivations for developing an EU-wide human rights sanctions regime go beyond concerns about Russia and have been prompted by the killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi. Following the Skripal attack, some UK parliamentarians and analysts began calling for additional financial sanctions on Russia, including possibly banning financial clearinghouses from selling Russian sovereign debt. UK Prime Minister Theresa May reportedly agreed to look into imposing such a ban on the City of London, but experts note that any such sanctions likely would be more effective if imposed by the EU, given that key European clearinghouses are not incorporated in the UK and would not be affected by unilateral UK sanctions. Many analysts are skeptical, however, that the EU would be able to achieve the required unanimity to impose such additional EU-wide sanctions on Russian financial activity. Some analysts also suggest that the UK's expected departure from the EU in March 2019 may diminish the prospects for any further EU sanctions targeting Russia's sovereign debt. Economic Impact of Sanctions on Russia The Russian Economy Since 2014 It is difficult to disentangle the impact of sanctions imposed on Russia, particularly those related to its invasion of Ukraine, from fluctuations in the global price of oil, a major export and source of revenue for the Russian government. In 2014 and 2015, Russia faced serious economic challenges and entered a two-year recession ( Figure 1 ), its longest in almost 20 years. Investor sentiment collapsed, resulting in capital flight, a collapse in the value of the ruble, and inflation ( Figure 1 and Figure 2 ). The Russian government and many Russian firms (including firms not subject to sanctions) were broadly shut out of capital markets. The government's budget deficit widened, and it tapped reserves to finance spending, defend the value of the ruble, and recapitalize banks affected by sanctions. Between the end of 2013 and May 2015, Russia's foreign exchange reserves fell by about one-third. Oil prices began to rise in 2016. Although they have not reached pre-2014 levels, the uptick helped to stabilize Russia's economy. The rate of economic contraction slowed, inflation fell, and the value of the ruble stabilized ( Figure 1 ). The Russian government and non-sanctioned Russian entities resumed some access to international capital markets, capital outflows slowed, and foreign direct investment into Russia rebounded ( Figure 2 ). At the same time, 2016 was a difficult fiscal year; the Russian government relied heavily on funding from one of its sovereign wealth funds and was forced to partially privatize Rosneft, the prized state-owned oil company, to raise funds. Russia continues to face long-term economic challenges relating to adverse demographic changes and limited progress on structural reforms. Its reserve holdings remain well below their peak levels. In addition, sanctions continue to constrain the ability of some Russian firms, particularly in the banking sector, to access financing ( Figure 2 ). However, the Russian economy is notably stronger than in 2014-2015. In 2017, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) commended Russian authorities for their effective policy response, which, along with higher oil prices, helped the economy exit its two-year recession. One expert noted "the fear of economic destabilization that has permeated the country since its 2014 invasion of Crimea—which was met with crippling sanctions from the West—has all but evaporated." Estimates of the Broad Economic Impact Some statistical studies estimate the precise impact of sanctions relative to other factors, particularly large swings in oil prices. These studies suggest that sanctions may have had a negative but modest impact. One survey of research on the economic impact of sanctions and oil prices concluded that sanctions had a relatively smaller impact on Russian gross domestic product (GDP) than oil prices. Likewise, in November 2014, Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov estimated the annual cost of sanctions to the Russian economy at $40 billion (2% of GDP), compared to $90 billion to $100 billion (4% to 5% of GDP) lost due to lower oil prices. Similarly, in 2015, Russian economists estimated that sanctions would decrease Russia's GDP by 2.4% by 2017 but that this effect would be 3.3 times lower than the effect of the oil price shock. Another analysis found that oil prices, not sanctions, drove changes in the value of the ruble. Russian officials and businesspeople subject to sanctions, who at times have harshly criticized the sanctions, have made public statements that appear to support these conclusions. For example, in November 2016, Putin argued that sanctions were "severely harming Russia" in terms of access to international financial markets but that the impact was not as severe as the harm from the decline in energy prices. Likewise, in July 2017, Alexei Kudrin, an economic adviser to Putin, argued that U.S. sanctions were curbing economic growth in Russia and preventing the country from regaining its status as a leading economic power. He contended, however, that a robust structural reform package could lift growth to 3%-4% and offset the effects of sanctions. In May 2018, Arkady Rotenberg, a billionaire businessman close to Putin, said the Ukraine-related sanctions "did create certain difficulties, but we've overcome them, and these difficulties made us unite." Factors Influencing the Broad Economic Impact Russia's economic recovery in 2016-2017 occurred while sanctions remained in place and, in some instances, were tightened. As a result, some have questioned why the sanctions have not had a greater economic impact. A key factor is that the Obama Administration, the EU, and other international counterparts designed Ukraine-related sanctions, which account for most of the implemented U.S. and global Russia sanctions, to have a limited and targeted economic impact. The sanctions do not broadly prohibit economic activity with Russia. They were intended to be "smart sanctions" that targeted individuals and entities responsible for offending policies and/or were associated with key Russian policymakers but inflicted minimal collateral damage on the Russian people or on the economic interests of countries imposing sanctions. As a result, the Ukraine-related sanctions target specific Russian individuals and firms. In some cases, they prohibit only specific types of transactions. Overall, more than four-fifths of the largest 100 firms in Russia (in 2017) are not directly subject to any U.S. sanctions, including companies in a variety of sectors, such as railway, retail, autos, services, mining, and manufacturing ( Table D-1 ). According to one independent Russian polling firm, 78% of individuals polled in April 2018 reported that they were largely unaffected by Western sanctions. More than half of the U.S. SDN sanctions that block assets and restrict transactions target individuals, not firms. Such sanctions may be consequential for the specific individuals involved and may send important political messages, but they are unlikely to have broader effects on Russia's economy. SDN sanctions on entities are mainly limited to businesses controlled by designated individuals, companies that operate in Crimea, and several defense and arms firms. Of the 100 largest firms in Russia, 7 are subject to full blocking (SDN) sanctions ( Table D-1 ). In contrast, the sectoral (SSI) sanctions target large Russian companies, affecting 7 of Russia's 10 largest companies. However, they limit a specific set of transactions relating to debt, equity, and/or certain long-term oil projects ( Table D-1 ). In terms of debt (and, in some cases, equity) restrictions, the sanctions were intended to restrict the access of major Russian financial, energy, and defense firms to international markets. Many major Russian firms had borrowed heavily from international investors. Restricting their access to new financing from western capital markets was intended to disrupt their ability to refinance (rollover) existing debts. As their debts matured, this would force firms to make large repayments or scramble for alternative sources of financing. The sectoral sanctions restricting certain oil projects sought to put long-term pressure on the Russian government by denying Russian oil companies access to Western technology to modernize their industry or locate new sources of oil. In 2016, a State Department official explained that sanctions were not designed to push Russia "over the economic cliff" in the short run but to exert long-term economic pressure on the country. By design, the full economic ramifications of restrictions on oil projects may have yet to materialize fully. The IMF estimated that lower capital accumulation and technological transfers resulting from sanctions could reduce Russia's output in the longer term by up to 9%; in contrast, it estimated the short-term impact of the sanctions as much smaller, between 1.0% and 1.5%. Impact on Russian Firms and Sectors Even if the economic effects on Russia's economy as a whole may have been modest, the impact on specific firms and sectors may be more significant. Several anecdotal examples illustrate the sanctions' impact on the firm and sector levels: Russian banks have been reluctant to provide financial services in Crimea over the threat of sanctions. Rostec, a major state-owned defense conglomerate, saw profits drop in 2014 from a loss in foreign investment caused by sanctions. Some Western oil service companies, a valuable source of expertise and equipment for Russian oil companies, limited their operations in Russia following sanctions. Exxon canceled its involvement in a joint venture with Rosneft over U.S. sanctions. Sanctions reportedly forced Rosneft to suspend an oil project in the Black Sea. The Russian government has encouraged wealthy Russians to repatriate offshore funds, citing the need for financing in the face of sanctions. Workers in Rusal's hometown have expressed concerns about their jobs following U.S. sanctions. Alfa Bank, Russia's largest privately held bank (and not under U.S. sanctions), announced in January 2018 that it was winding down its business with Russian defense firms, many of which are subject to SDN sanctions. Using statistical models, one study uses firm-level data to assess the impact of U.S. and European sanctions in 2014 on Russian firms. Based on data from between 2012 and 2016, it finds that sanctioned firms on average lost about one-quarter of their operating revenues, over one-half of their asset values, and about one-third of their employees relative to their non-sanctioned peers. The authors argue that the findings suggest the sanctions effectively targeted firms with relatively minimal collateral damage to other Russian firms. The study estimates the average effects on sanctioned firms and provides only a snapshot of the sanctions' effects. Some sanctioned firms did worse than average; other sanctioned firms did well. For example, the ruble-denominated profits of Sberbank (the largest bank in Russia), Rostec (a major defense conglomerate), and Novatek (an independent natural gas producer) are higher today than when sectoral sanctions were imposed in 2014 (see Table D-2 ). Factors Influencing the Impact on Firms and Sectors Some firms have weathered the sanctions better than others have. This discrepancy may be attributable to a number of factors. First, the extent to which sanctions interrupted economic transactions varies across sanction targets. It is not clear to what extent some sanctioned targets, including Russian intelligence services, the Night Wolves (a motorcycle club), or the Eurasian Youth Union, engage in significant economic transactions with the United States or in the U.S. financial system. If the transactions are limited, the sanctions are more symbolic than disruptive of economic activity. Additionally, the limited design of the sectoral sanctions did not necessarily result in a rapid disruption in business operations, particularly as oil prices picked up. Despite sanctions, Russian energy firms largely have been able to carry on business as normal. Russian oil production has reached record highs, despite restrictions on access to Western technology for certain oil exploration projects. Second, the Russian government has implemented various measures to support some sanctioned firms. For example, Sberbank benefited from substantial central bank purchases of its new debt, which it can no longer sell in U.S. and European capital markets due to sanctions. The Russian government strategically granted contracts to sanctioned firms; it provided sanctioned Bank Rossiya the sole contract to service the $36 billion domestic wholesale electricity market, granted the contract to build a bridge linking the Russian mainland with annexed Crimea to a sanctioned construction company (Stroygazmontazh), and selected a sanctioned bank (VTB) to be the sole manager of the government's international bond sales. In December 2014, the government launched a bank recapitalization program worth about 1.2% of GDP to support large and regional banks directly or indirectly affected by the sanctions, as well as provided regulatory forbearance and increased deposit insurance. The central bank also helped sanctioned banks access foreign currency. The Russian government increased its orders from its defense industry firms in 2014, offsetting sales lost from the sanctions. It is also repurposing a nationalized bank, Promsvyazbank, to finance Russia's defense industry in response to financing challenges created by sanctions. In addition, Promsvyazbank extended a new credit line to the Renova Group, owned by billionaire Viktor Vekselberg, to support the firm within weeks after it and its owner came under U.S. sanction in April 2018. More government support may be forthcoming. For example, the head of Novatek, an independent natural gas producer subject to financing restrictions, reportedly has requested government assistance funding the creation of deepwater drilling equipment to replace U.S. imports. The government is creating a department within the Finance Ministry to liaise with sanctioned businesses, study their challenges, and draft government proposals for support. Although it is difficult to find a precise quantitative estimate of the extent to which the Russian government has used resources to shield firms from sanctions, such support shifts the cost of sanctions from the targeted firms to the government. Third, some Russian firms have minimized the sanctions' impact by forging alternative economic partnerships. For example, sanctions had the potential to jeopardize Russia's military modernization program, but Russia ultimately found alternative suppliers, particularly from China, South Korea, and Southeast Asia. Additionally, independent gas company Novatek secured alternative financing from China to proceed with a natural gas project in the Artic. Gazprom secured a $2 billion loan from the Bank of China, the largest loan from a single bank in Gazprom's history. More generally, Russian energy firms have concluded a number of corporate agreements with Chinese and Saudi companies following the imposition of sanctions. However, the extent to which Russia can successfully execute a "pivot to China" and other non-Western sources of financing, investment, and trade should not be overstated. Public Chinese banks seem more willing to engage than private Chinese banks, and business transactions are complicated by other geopolitical considerations, such as Russia's reluctance to join China's new development bank, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, or participate in Asian forums, such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit. Eager to attract investment, Russian firms also appear to be offering better investment deals to Chinese investors to circumvent financing problems caused by sanctions, suggesting that alternative financing has not been a full substitute for Western capital. Finally, CRIEEA's introduction of a policy option to impose secondary sanctions against third parties that engage in significant transactions with sanctioned Russian individuals and firms, and with Russia's defense and intelligence sectors, means that these alternatives remain risky and uncertain. Outlook Debates about the effectiveness of U.S. and other sanctions on Russia continue in Congress, in the Administration, and among other stakeholders. After more than four years of escalating sanctions, Russia has not reversed its occupation and annexation of Ukraine's Crimea region, nor has it stopped fostering separatism in eastern Ukraine. On the contrary, it has extended military operations to the Black Sea and the Azov Sea bordering Ukraine and Russia. The United States and its allies have documented multiple instances of Russian cyber-enabled malicious activities. They also have determined that Russian agents used a lethal nerve agent to attack an opponent in the United Kingdom. In addition, Russia remains an influential supporter of the Syrian government. Nonetheless, many observers argue that sanctions help to restrain Russia or that the imposition of sanctions is an appropriate foreign policy response regardless of immediate effect. Since the introduction of sanctions, multiple reports suggest Russian government officials and their supporters pay close attention to sanctions developments and express concern about their real and potential impact. Observers also note that sanctions have led the Russian government to make policy adjustments, including diverting resources to affected businesses and sectors. There exists a wide range of options moving forward. Some argue it is necessary to introduce more sanctions on Russia, including more comprehensive and/or more targeted sanctions. Others contend that the Administration should first focus on fully implementing the range of existing sanctions authorized by law. Some observers stress the need to coordinate new sanctions with Europeans and other allies. Others are skeptical that sanctions can produce desired changes in Russian behavior, especially without also using other foreign policy tools. Some express concerns that sanctions, particularly those that are imposed unilaterally, hurt U.S. businesses and cede economic opportunities to firms in other countries. In the 115 th Congress, several bills were introduced to increase the use of sanctions to address Russia's malign activities. Members of Congress may continue to debate the establishment and implementation of U.S. sanctions on Russia in the 116 th Congress. Potential new sanctions on Russia in legislation range widely. In the 115 th Congress, they included measures to expand the types of targeted individuals, entities, and sectors ( S. 3336 , H.R. 6437 , S. 2313 / H.R. 4884 , H.R. 5428 , H.R. 5216 ); expand the range of prohibited transactions, including with regard to Russian sovereign debt ( S. 3336 , H.R. 6437 , S. 2313 / H.R. 4884 , H.R. 6423 , H.R. 5428 ); make mandatory previously discretionary secondary sanctions on Russian pipeline investment ( S. 3229 , H.R. 6384 ); expand the scope of sanctions in response to malicious cyber-enabled activities ( H.R. 5576 / S. 3378 ); determine whether the government of Russia supports acts of international terrorism (which would expand sanctions on Russia) ( S. 3336 , S. 2780 , H.R. 6573 , H.R. 6475 ); and expand congressional review procedures to the Sergei Magnitsky Act ( S. 3336 , S. 3275 ) . Appendix A. Legislative Abbreviations and Short Titles CAATSA: Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act ( P.L. 115-44 ) CBW Act: Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 ( P.L. 102-182 , Title III; 22 U.S.C. 5601 et seq.) CRIEEA: Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017, as amended ( P.L. 115-44 , Title II; 22 U.S.C. 9501 et seq.) Global Magnitsky Act: Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act ( P.L. 114-328 , Title XII, Subtitle F; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note) IEEPA: International Emergency Economic Powers Act ( P.L. 95-223 ; 50 U.S.C. 1701) INKSNA: Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act, as amended ( P.L. 106-178 , 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) NEA: National Emergencies Act ( P.L. 94-412 ; 50 U.S.C. 1621) Sergei Magnitsky Act: The Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012 ( P.L. 112-208 , Title IV; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note) SSIDES: Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014, as amended ( P.L. 113-95 ; 22 U.S.C. 8901 et seq.) UFSA: Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014, as amended ( P.L. 113-272 ; 22 U.S.C. 8921 et seq.) Appendix B. U.S. Sanctions on Russia Appendix C. U.S. and EU Sectoral Sanctions Appendix D. Russian Firms and U.S. Sanctions

Many observers consider sanctions to be a central element of U.S. policy to counter Russian malign behavior. Most Russia-related sanctions implemented by the United States have been levied in response to Russia's 2014 invasion of Ukraine. In addition, the United States has imposed sanctions on Russia in response to human rights abuses, election interference and cyberattacks, weapons proliferation, illicit trade with North Korea, support to Syria, and use of a chemical weapon. The United States also employs sanctions to deter further objectionable activities. Most Members of Congress support a robust use of sanctions amid concerns about Russia's international behavior and geostrategic intentions. Ukraine-related sanctions are mainly based on four executive orders (EOs) the President introduced in 2014. In addition, Congress passed and the President signed into law two acts establishing sanctions in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine: the Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014 (SSIDES; P.L. 113-95/H.R. 4152) and the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 (UFSA; P.L. 113-272/H.R. 5859). In 2017, Congress passed and the President signed into law the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 (CRIEEA; P.L. 115-44/H.R. 3364, Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act [CAATSA], Title II). This legislation codifies Ukraine-related and cyber-related EOs, strengthens existing Russia-related sanctions authorities, and identifies several new targets for sanctions. It also establishes congressional review of any action the President takes to ease or lift a variety of sanctions. Additional sanctions on Russia may be forthcoming. On August 6, 2018, the United States determined that in March 2018 the Russian government used a chemical weapon in the United Kingdom in contravention of international law. In response, the United States launched an initial round of sanctions on Russia, as required by the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (CBW Act; P.L. 102-182/H.R. 1724, Title III). The law requires a second, more severe round of sanctions in the absence of Russia's reliable commitment to no longer use such weapons. The United States has imposed most Ukraine-related sanctions on Russia in coordination with the European Union (EU). Since 2017, the efforts of Congress and the Trump Administration to tighten U.S. sanctions on Russia have prompted some degree of concern in the EU about U.S. commitment to sanctions coordination and U.S.-EU cooperation on Russia and Ukraine more broadly. The EU continues to consider the possibility of imposing sanctions in response to Russia's use of a chemical weapon in the United Kingdom, human rights abuses, and cyberattacks. Debates about the effectiveness of U.S. and other sanctions on Russia continue in Congress, in the Administration, and among other stakeholders. Russia has not reversed its occupation and annexation of Ukraine's Crimea region, nor has it stopped fostering separatism in eastern Ukraine. On the contrary, it has extended military operations to the Black Sea and the Azov Sea bordering Ukraine and Russia. With respect to other malign activities, the relationship between sanctions and Russian behavior is difficult to determine. Nonetheless, many observers argue that sanctions help to restrain Russia or that their imposition is an appropriate foreign policy response regardless of immediate effect. In the 115th Congress, several bills were introduced to increase the use of sanctions in response to Russia's malign activities. The 116th Congress may continue to debate the role of sanctions in U.S. foreign policy toward Russia.

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Introduction The President's budget for FY2020 consists of a multivolume set of materials issued by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The materials contain information on new budget proposals, summ ary tables, detailed financial information on individual programs and accounts, economic analysis, historical data, explanations of the budget processes, and supporting documents. Every year the President submits these materials to Congress at the start of the budget cycle for the next fiscal year. The President's submission is required on or after the first Monday in January, but no later than the first Monday in February (31 U.S.C. §1105(a)). However, incoming presidential Administrations do not generally release multivolume budget sets in February. This year the President released the budget submission, in two installments, on March 11, and March 18, 2019. Other budget-related documents include the annual Economic Report of the President , issued by the Council of Economic Advisors, and the Budget and Economic Outlook , an annual publication issued by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). Details on these publications are included in this report. The President's Budget Documents, FY2020 Both OMB and the Government Publishing Office (GPO) provide internet access to the main and supporting budget documents, spreadsheet files, the public budget database, and budget amendments and supplementals proposed by the President; see http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget and https://www.govinfo.gov/app/collection/BUDGET , respectively. OMB provides additional summary table information on agency budgets and key issues in the form of fact sheets, available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/fact-sheets/ . Information on purchasing print copies of these documents appears below, along with a brief description of the contents of each document. The Budget of the U.S. Government, FY2020 The annual budget volume contains information, charts, and graphs pertaining to the President's new budget proposals and overviews of government activities by topic (e.g., "Modernizing Government" and "A Budget for a Better American") within the FY2020 Budget volume. Summary Tables (pp. 105-139) contain projections of budget baselines, receipts, and outlays; deficits; debt; discretionary spending; and economic projections from FY2019 to FY2029. Federal programs that have been recommended by the Administration for termination or reduction are detailed in the document entitled Major Savings and Reforms , available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/msar-fy2020.pdf . (GPO stock number 041-001-00731-8, 150 pages, $22) The Budget of the U.S. Government, FY2020 (CD-ROM) The FY20 20 Budget CD-ROM contains the full content of the budget documents and most supporting documents for the budget in PDF files. Some data files are also included in spreadsheet format. The CD-ROM provides software to search, display, and print. (GPO stock number and ordering information not yet available) Analytical Perspectives, Budget of the United States Government, FY2020 This volume includes economic, accounting, and crosscutting analyses of government programs and activities designed to highlight specific subject areas. It also includes information on federal receipts and collections, analysis of federal spending, detailed information on federal borrowing and debt, baseline or current service estimates, and other technical presentations. Chapter 17, "Aid to State and Local Governments," contains a series of tables (pp. 231-247) that provide selected grant and other federal assistance data by state. The FY2020 Analytical Perspectives volume contains supplemental materials including tables showing the budget by agency and account and by function, subfunction, and program. The supplemental materials also include data on direct and guaranteed loan transactions of the federal government. The supplemental material is available on a CD-ROM, in the printed document, or on the GPO website at https://www.govinfo.gov/app/collection/BUDGET . (GPO stock number 041-001-00732-6, $52, 360 pages) Appendix, Budget of the United States Government, FY2020 Designed primarily for the use of the House and Senate appropriations committees, the Appendix contains more detailed financial information on individual programs and appropriations accounts than any of the other budget documents submitted by the President. In many presidential budget submissions, the volume often provides the following information for agencies: proposed text of the appropriation language, budget schedules for each account, new legislative proposals, explanations of the work to be performed and the funds needed, and proposed general provisions applicable to the appropriations of entire agencies or groups of agencies. Typically, elements within this information are distinguished by varying font, so that, for example, proposed appropriations (italics) and prior year funding (brackets and no italics) can be compared at a glance: For expenses necessary for the administration of the Department of Justice, [$111,500,000] $125,896,000 , of which not to exceed $4,000,000 for security and construction of Department of Justice facilities shall remain available until expended. ( Department of Justice Appropriations Act, 2016 ) Note that the FY2020 budget appendix does not pair prior year funding figures with proposed appropriations. (GPO stock number 041-001-00733-4, $82, 1,3 20 pages) Historical Tables, Budget of the United States Government, FY2020 These detailed tables cover budget deficit/surplus, outlays, receipts, discretionary and mandatory spending, federal debt, federal employment, payments for individuals, spending by function and agency, and grants to states and local governments. These tables provide some data from 1940 (or earlier) and estimates through FY2024. Historical data are adjusted by OMB to be consistent with data in the FY2020 budget and to provide comparability over time. This year the Historical Tables are available online in spreadsheet and PDF instead of print. The Historical Tables are available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/historical-tables/ . Economic Report of the President, 2019 This year's annual Economic Report of the President was submitted by the Council of Economic Advisers and transmitted to Congress in March 2019. It presents the Administration's economic policies and contains the annual report of the Council of Economic Advisers. It also presents an overview of the nation's economic progress using text and extensive data appendices. Appendix B of the Economic Report includes current and historical statistics on major aspects of economic activity (pp. 625-705). Statistics include national income and expenditures, government finance, population, employment, wages, productivity, prices, debt measures, corporate finance, and international statistics. The report is also available from the GPO website at https://www.govinfo.gov/app/collection/ERP/ . A searchable database of the Economic Report of the President for each year from 1995 to the present is also available at this site. Spreadsheet files from Appendix B of the report can be accessed at the link above . (GPO stock number and ordering information not yet available) Mid-Session Review OMB issues revised estimates of budget receipts, outlays, and budget authority in the Mid-Session Review . This annual document is typically released in the summer following the President's budget submission. The FY2020 document is not currently available, but should be available in the summer on the OMB website . (GPO stock number and ordering information not yet available) Agency Budget Justifications After the President's budget documents are released, Congress begins to hold hearings on agency budget requests. Agencies must submit their budget justifications to the appropriations subcommittees holding the hearings. Budget justifications generally contain more detailed descriptions of an agency's proposals and programs than are provided in the President's budget documents. As mandated by OMB in Section 22.6 of the 2006 edition of Circular A-11 and subsequent editions, executive agencies are required to post their congressional budget justification materials on the internet within two weeks of transmittal to Congress. Typically, Administration budget requests appear along with actual numbers for the previous fiscal year. The content and structure of these submissions may vary and some materials may not correspond exactly with the data and information provided to Congress in other fiscal years. A short overview on the agency budget justification request can be found within CRS Report RS20268, Agency Justification of the President's Budget , by Michelle D. Christensen. Additional Comparative Budget Data by Agency and Account Supporting Documents OMB produces a number of additional documents that further examines certain budgetary categories, including the Federal Credit Supplement , which provides summary information on certain federal loan and loan guarantee programs through a series of detailed tables; Object Class Analysis , a report on the federal government's obligations as broken out by object classifications; and Balances of Budget Authority , which provides data on unobligated balances carried forward to the start of the next fiscal year. All three documents are available online at https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/supplemental-materials/ . Public Budget Database, FY2020 OMB also maintains a publicly accessible database in Excel and comma delimited format called the Public Budget Database . This resource provides account level detail data on budget authority for the years FY1976 to FY2024, and budget outlays and budget receipts for FY1962 to FY2024. This resource is available on the GPO FY2020 budget website at https://www.govinfo.gov/app/collection/BUDGET/ . A user's guide in PDF format is also available on this site by clicking on the expandable tab for the document. Congressional Budget Office Analysis of the President's FY2020 Budget This report provides an analysis of the President's budgetary proposals and CBO's updated baseline budget projections. The FY2020 report should be forthcoming. (GPO ordering information is currently not available.) Budget and Economic Outlook: FY2019-FY2029 CBO's baseline budget projections typically span 11 fiscal years in its reports. The Budget and Economic Outlook includes separate chapters on the economic outlook, outlays, and receipts. This document is typically released in January, and it usually includes discussions on current economic conditions. The FY2019 report is available on the CBO website at https://www.cbo.gov/publication/54918 . CBO issues an annual summer update of the Budget and Economic Outlook with adjusted projections. This document and other budget and economic information, including CBO's monthly budget review are available at http://www.cbo.gov/topics/budget . (GPO stock number 052-070-07759-0, $30, 176 pages) GPO Ordering Information Printed copies of budget documents are available for purchase from GPO by the following methods: online at the GPO website, at http://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/budget-economy/federal-budgets-year ; by telephone, [phone number scrubbed] or [phone number scrubbed]; by fax, [phone number scrubbed]; or, by mail using the GPO order form (check or money order), addressed to U.S. Government Publishing Office, P.O. Box 979050, St. Louis, MO 63197-9000. Depository Libraries Budget documents are often available for reference use at large public or university libraries, or any library participating in the Federal Library Depository Program. Addresses of the depository libraries can be obtained through a local library; from GPO's Customer Services department, [phone number scrubbed] or [phone number scrubbed]; or online from the GPO website at https://www.gpo.gov/askgpo/ . Websites on Budget Legislation Congressional Staff The Congressional Research Service (CRS) has developed (for Members of Congress and their staffs) web pages covering the budget and appropriations process. Appropriations and Budget Analysis. For CRS products on appropriations status, jurisdictions, processes, current appropriations bills, and other budget-related resources, Members and congressional staff can access the CRS website http://www.crs.gov/iap/appropriations . The CRS Appropriations Status Table, a table which tracks the progress of major actions related to appropriations bills, is available at http://www.crs.gov/AppropriationsStatusTable/Index . CRS Products on the Federal Budget Process. Explanations of budget concepts, terminology, congressional and executive budget process, congressional budget timetable, budget resolutions and reconciliation, the authorization and appropriations process, entitlements and discretionary spending, the Budget Enforcement Act, sequestration, and surpluses/deficits are available from the CRS website . Public Use The public may access Congress.gov, the legislative website produced by the Library of Congress . The site includes a Status of Appropriations Legislation for the current year and several previous fiscal years, which include links to bills, committee and conference reports, and votes for the 12 regular, and any supplemental, appropriations bills. The Congress.gov Status Table of Appropriations is available at https://www.congress.gov/resources/display/content/Appropriations+and+Budget . A public version of the CRS Appropriations Status Table is available at https://crsreports.congress.gov/AppropriationsStatusTable .

Every year the President submits a series of volumes to Congress containing the President's proposed budget for the coming fiscal year. The President's submission is required on or after the first Monday in January, but no later than the first Monday in February (31 U.S.C. §1105(a)). This year the President released the budget submission, in two installments, on March 11, and March 18, 2019. This report provides brief descriptions of the FY2020 budget volumes and related documents, together with internet addresses, Government Publishing Office (GPO) stock numbers, and prices for obtaining print copies of these publications. It also explains how to find the locations of government depository libraries, which can provide both printed copies for reference use and internet access to the online versions. This report will be updated as events warrant. Please note that neither the Congressional Research Service (CRS) nor the Library of Congress (LOC) distributes print copies of the budget documents.

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Introduction Budget justifications are detailed written materials, data, and supporting documents provided by federal agencies that expand upon and support the President's yearly budget submission to Congress. In form and content, the justifications may vary by agency. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) provides yearly instructions to agencies for producing materials to be included in the President's budget submission and agency budget justifications. Each summer, OMB issues these instructions as part of a document entitled, Circular No. A-11: Preparation, Submission, and Execution of the Budget . The release of budget justifications occurs soon after the release of the President's annual budget submission and in advance of congressional hearings on agency budget requests. Agencies submit budget justifications to the appropriations subcommittees to support agency testimony and inform congressional deliberations. Beginning with the FY2008 executive budget cycle, agencies have also been required to post their congressional budget justification materials on the internet within two weeks of transmittal to Congress. Online Access to Budget Justifications Website links to FY2020 budget justification documents for each of the 15 executive departments and 9 selected independent agencies are provided below. The organization of the materials on agency websites can vary, therefore brief guidance for navigating to FY2020-specific materials is provided below the links as appropriate. In addition, links to historical information from prior fiscal years may also appear or be available through the cited websites. Executive Departments Department of Agriculture https://www.obpa.usda.gov/explan_notes.html Th e webs ite i ncludes links to historical budget justification materials back to FY2008. Department of Commerce https://www.commerce.gov/about/budget-and-performance/FY-2020-congressional-bureau-justification Historical Department of Commerce budget justification materials back to FY2009 and Budget in Brief documents . http://www.osec.doc.gov/bmi/budget/default.htm Department of Defense http://comptroller.defense.gov/Budget-Materials/ Th e webs ite includes an index of links to historical Department of Defense budget justification materials back to FY1998 in the banner section at the top of the site . Department of Education https://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/budget20/index.html Historical Department of Education budget justifica tion materials back to FY2011 . https://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/news.html?src=rt Department of Energy https://www.energy.gov/cfo/downloads/fy-2020-budget-justification Historical Department of Energy budget justifica tion materials back to FY2005 ; scroll to the bottom of the website . https://www.energy.gov/cfo/listings/budget-justification-supporting-documents Department of Health and Human Services https://www.hhs.gov/about/budget/index.html Historical Department of Health and Human Services budget justification materials back to FY2009 are available toward the bottom of the website. Department of Homeland Security https://www.dhs.gov/dhs-budget Historical Department of Homeland Security budget justification materials back to FY2010 and budget-related materials back to FY2003 are available toward the bottom of the website. Department of Housing and Urban Development https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/cfo/reports/fy20_CJ Historical Department of Housing and Urban Development budget justification materials back to FY1998. https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/cfo/budget . Department of the Interior https://www.doi.gov/budget/appropriations/2020 Historical Department of the Interior budget justifica tion materials back to FY2001 . https://www.doi.gov/budget/appropriations/ . Department of Justice https://www.justice.gov/doj/fy-2020-congressional-budget-submission Historical Department of Justice budget justification materials back to FY2015. http://www.justice.gov/doj/budget-and-performance . Department of Labor https://www.dol.gov/general/budget Historical DOL budget justification materials back to FY2008; under "Past Budgets" heading. https://www.dol.gov/general/aboutdol Department of State https://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/ebs/index.htm Historical Department of State budget justifica tion materials back to FY2015 are available on the same site . Department of Transportation https://www.transportation.gov/budget Historical Department of Transportation budget justification materials back to FY2009; under "Budget Estimates" heading. https://www.transportation.gov/mission/budget/dot-budget-and-performance-documents Department of the Treasury https://www.treasury.gov/about/budget-performance/Pages/cj-index.aspx Historical Department of the Treasury budget justification materials back to FY2007 and budget-related materials back to FY2007 are available by scrolling down on the website. Department of Veterans Affairs https://www.va.gov/budget/products.asp Historical Department of Veterans Affairs budget justification materials back to FY2008 are available toward the bottom of the website. Selected Independent Agencies Environmental Protection Agency https://www.epa.gov/planandbudget/fy-2020-justification-appropriation-estimates-committee-appropriations FY2019 EPA (prior year) budget justification materials. https://www.epa.gov/planandbudget/fy-2019-justification-appropriation-estimates-committee-appropriations Other historical EPA budget justification materials back to FY2011; toward the bottom of the website under "Justification of Appropriations for Committee on Appropriations" heading. https://www.epa.gov/planandbudget/archive National Aeronautics and Space Administration https://www.nasa.gov/news/budget/index.html Historical NASA budget justification materials back to FY2004 and selected materials back to FY1997 are available toward the bottom of the website under "Previous Years' Budget Requests" heading. Agency for International Development https://www.usaid.gov/results-and-data/budget-spending/cong r essional-budget-justification/fy2020 Historical AID budget justification materials back to FY2001. https://www.usaid.gov/results-and-data/budget-spending/congressional-budget-justification General Services Administration https://www.gsa.gov/reference/reports/budget-performance/annual-budget-requests Previous GSA budget justification materials back to FY2006 are also available on the website. National Science Foundation https://www.nsf.gov/about/budget/fy2020/index.jsp Historical NSF budget justification materials back to FY1996. https://www.nsf.gov/about/budget/ Nuclear Regulatory Commission https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1100/v35/ Historical NRC budget justification materials back to FY2011. https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1100/ Office of Personnel Management https://www.opm.gov/about-us/budget-pe r formance/budgets/#url=Congressional-Budget-Justification Historical budget justification materials back to FY2007 are also available on th e website. Small Business Administration https://www.sba.gov/document/report—congressional-budget-justification-annual-performance-report This site also has links by fiscal year to annual budget justification and performance report materials back to FY2010 . Social Security Administration https://www.ssa.gov/budget/ Historical budget justification materials back to FY20 08 are available via the tabs at the top of th e website. Additional Information Policy analysis for each of the 12 regular appropriations bills is available via the Congressional Research Service (CRS) Appropriations Status Table by clicking on the corresponding CRS report for each bill at http://www.crs.gov/AppropriationsStatusTable/Index . Additional budget submissions to Congress for subagencies or quasi-government agencies may also be available online. A more extensive listing of federal agencies and offices is available in the current U.S. Government Manual at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GOVMAN-2018-12-03/pdf/GOVMAN-2018-12-03.pdf .

This report provides a convenient listing of online FY2020 agency budget justification submissions for all 15 executive branch departments and 9 selected independent agencies. In most cases, budget justifications contain more detailed descriptions of the proposals and programs that are provided in the President's budget submissions. This report will be updated to reflect the current budget justifications submissions for the forthcoming fiscal year.

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Background Navy's Authority and Process for Naming Ships Authority for Naming Ships Names for Navy ships traditionally have been chosen and announced by the Secretary of the Navy, under the direction of the President and in accordance with rules prescribed by Congress. For most of the 19 th century, U.S. law included language explicitly assigning the Secretary of the Navy the task of naming new Navy ships. The reference to the Secretary of the Navy disappeared from the U.S. Code in 1925. The code today (10 U.S.C. §8662) is silent on the issue of who has the authority to name new Navy ships, but the Secretary of the Navy arguably retains implicit authority, given the location of Section 8662 in subtitle C of Title 10, which covers the Navy and Marine Corps. Process for Selecting Names In discussing its name-selection process, the Naval History and Heritage Command—the Navy's in-house office of professional historians—cites the above-mentioned laws and states the following: As with many other things, the procedures and practices involved in Navy ship naming are as much, if not more, products of evolution and tradition than of legislation. As we have seen, the names for new ships are personally decided by the Secretary of the Navy. The Secretary can rely on many sources to help him reach his decisions. Each year, the Navy History and Heritage Command (NHHC) compiles primary and alternate ship name recommendations and forwards these to the Chief of Naval Operations by way of the chain of command. These recommendations are the result of research into the history of the Navy and by suggestions submitted by service members, Navy veterans, and the public. Ship name source records at NHHC reflect the wide variety of name sources that have been used in the past, particularly since World War I. Ship name recommendations are conditioned by such factors as the name categories for ship types now being built, as approved by the Secretary of the Navy; the distribution of geographic names of ships of the fleet; names borne by previous ships that distinguished themselves in service; names recommended by individuals and groups; and names of naval leaders, national figures, and deceased members of the Navy and Marine Corps who have been honored for heroism in war or for extraordinary achievement in peace. In its final form, after consideration at the various levels of command, the Chief of Naval Operations signs the memorandum recommending names for the current year's building program and sends it to the Secretary of the Navy. The Secretary considers these nominations, along with others he receives, as well as his own thoughts in this matter. At appropriate times, he selects names for specific ships and announces them. While there is no set time for assigning a name, it is customarily done before the ship is christened. The ship's sponsor─the person who will christen the ship─is also selected and invited by the Secretary. In the case of ships named for individuals, an effort is made to identify the eldest living direct female descendant of that individual to perform the role of ship's sponsor. For ships with other name sources, it is customary to honor the wives of senior naval officers or public officials. A July 2012 Navy report to Congress on the Navy's policies and practices for naming ships (see next section) states the following: Once a type/class naming convention [i.e., a general rule or guideline for how ships of a certain type or class are to be named] is established, Secretaries can rely on many sources to help in the final selection of a ship name. For example, sitting Secretaries can solicit ideas and recommendations from either the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) or the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC), or both. They can also task the Naval Heritage and History Command to compile primary and alternate ship name recommendations that are the result of research into the history of the Navy's battle force or particular ship names. Secretaries also routinely receive formal suggestions for ship names from concerned citizens, active and retired service members, or members of Congress. Finally, Congress can enact provisions in Public Law that express the sense of the entire body about new ship naming conventions or specific ship names. Regardless of the origin of the recommendations, however, the final selection of a ship's name is the Secretary's to make, informed and guided by his own thoughts, counsel, and preferences. At the appropriate time—normally sometime after the ship has been either authorized or appropriated by Congress and before its keel laying or christening—the Secretary records his decision with a formal naming announcement. July 2012 Navy Report to Congress On July 13, 2012, the Navy submitted to Congress a 73-page report on the Navy's policies and practices for naming ships. The report was submitted in response to Section 1014 of the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act ( H.R. 1540 / P.L. 112-81 of December 31, 2011). The executive summary of the Navy's report is reprinted here as Appendix A . Overview of Naming Rules for Ship Types Evolution Over Time Rules for giving certain types of names to certain types of Navy ships have evolved over time. Attack submarines, for example, were once named for fish, then later for cities, and most recently for states, while cruisers were once named for cities, then later for states, and most recently for battles. State names, to cite another example, were given to battleships, then later to nuclear-powered cruisers and ballistic missile submarines, and are now being given to attack submarines. The Naval History and Heritage Command states the following: "How will the Navy name its ships in the future? It seems safe to say that the evolutionary process of the past will continue; as the fleet itself changes, so will the names given to its ships. It seems equally safe, however, to say that future decisions in this area will continue to demonstrate regard for the rich history and valued traditions of the United States Navy." The July 2012 Navy report to Congress states that "US Navy ship-naming policies, practices, and 'traditions' are not fixed; they evolve constantly over time." The report also states that "Just as [ship] type naming conventions change over time to accommodate technological change as well as choices made by Secretaries, they also change over time as every Secretary makes their own interpretation of the original naming convention." Exceptions There have been numerous exceptions to the Navy's ship-naming rules, particularly for the purpose of naming a ship for a person when the rule for that type of ship would have called for it to be named for something else. The July 2012 report to Congress cites exceptions to ship naming rules dating back to the earliest days of the republic, and states that "a Secretary's discretion to make exceptions to ship-naming conventions is one of the Navy's oldest ship-naming traditions." The report argues that exceptions made for the purpose of naming ships for Presidents or Members of Congress have occurred frequently enough that, rather than being exceptions, they constitute a "special cross-type naming convention" for Presidents and Members of Congress. This CRS report continues to note, as exceptions to basic class naming rules, instances where ships other than aircraft carriers have been named for Presidents or Members of Congress. Some observers have perceived a breakdown in, or corruption of, the rules for naming Navy ships. Such observers might cite, for example, the three-ship Seawolf (SSN-21) class of attack submarines— Seawolf (SSN-21), Connecticut (SSN-22), and Jimmy Carter (SSN-23)—which were named for a fish, a state, and a President, respectively, reflecting no apparent class naming rule. The July 2012 Navy report to Congress states the following: "Current ship naming policies and practices fall well within the historic spectrum of policies and practices for naming vessels of the Navy, and are altogether consistent with ship naming customs and traditions." Rules for Ship Types Now Being Procured or Recently Procured For ship types now being procured for the Navy, or recently procured for the Navy, naming rules (and exceptions thereto) are summarized below. The July 2012 Navy report to Congress discusses current naming rules (and exceptions thereto) at length. Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBNs) On December 14, 2016, the Navy named the first of its 12 planned next-generation ballistic missile submarines Columbia (SSBN-826), in honor of the District of Columbia. The 12 planned boats are consequently now referred to as Columbia -class or SSBN-826 class boats. The Navy has not stated what the naming rule for these ships will be. Given the selection of Columbia as the name of the lead ship, possibilities for the naming rule include (but are not necessarily limited to) cities, capital cities, or states and federal districts and territories. It is also possible that the name Columbia will turn out to be an exception to the naming rule for the class. The current USS Columbia (SSN-771)—a Los Angeles (SSN-688) class attack submarine that was named for Columbia, SC; Columbia, IL; and Columbia, MO —entered service in 1995 and will reach the end of its 33-year expected service life in 2028, at about the time that construction of SSBN-826 is scheduled to be completed. If the service life of SSN-771 is extended for several years, it would remain in service after the commissioning of SSBN-826. This would create an issue to be resolved, since 10 U.S.C. §8662(a) states, "Not more than one vessel of the Navy may have the same name." One possible step for resolving such an issue would be to change the name of SSBN-826 to something else, such as District of Columbia —a step that could be viewed as somewhat similar to the below-discussed instance in which the name of the Los Angles-class submarine SSN-705 was changed from Corpus Christi to City of Corpus Christi (see " Congressional Responses to Announced Navy Ship-Naming Decisions " below). Attack Submarines (SSNs) Virginia (SSN-774) class attack submarines are being named for states. An exception occurred on January 8, 2009, when then-Secretary of the Navy Donald Winter announced that SSN-785 would be named for former Senator John Warner. Another exception occurred on January 9, 2014, when then-Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus announced that SSN-795, the second of the two Virginia-class boats procured in FY2015, would be named for Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, who served for many years as director of the Navy's nuclear propulsion program. As of May 6, 2019, the Navy has announced names for all Virginia-class boats through SSN-801, the second of two Virginia-class boats procured in FY2018. A total of 30 Virginia-class boats have been procured through FY2019, of which 26 have been named for states. (Two were named for people and the two procured in FY2019 have not yet been named.) The Navy's shipbuilding plan calls for procuring three additional Virginia-class boats in FY2020 and two per year FY2021 and subsequent years. The 26 state-named Virginia-class boats procured through FY2018, together with the additional Virginia-class boats planned for procurement in FY2020 and subsequent years and the 17 existing state-named Ohio (SSBN-726) class SSBNs and cruise missile submarine (SSGNs), could make for a total of more than 50 boats starting around FY2022. Thus, starting around FY2022, the Navy might run out of state names for Virginia-class boats, and consequently might need to either amend the Virginia-class naming rule or begin making a series of exceptions to the rule. Aircraft Carriers (CVNs) The July 2012 Navy report to Congress states that "while carrier names are still 'individually considered,' they are now generally named in honor of past US Presidents." Of the 14 most recently named aircraft carriers (those with hull numbers 67 through 80), 10 have been named for U.S. Presidents and 2 for Members of Congress. The Navy is currently procuring Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) class carriers. On January 16, 2007, the Navy announced that CVN-78, the lead ship in the CVN-78 class, would be named for President Gerald R. Ford. On May 29, 2011, the Navy announced that CVN-79, the second ship in the class, would be named for President John F. Kennedy. On December 1, 2012, the Navy announced that CVN-80, the third ship in the class, would be named Enterprise . The Navy made the announcement on the same day that it deactivated the 51-year-old aircraft carrier CVN-65, also named Enterprise . CVN-80 is the ninth Navy ship named Enterprise . CVN-80 was procured in the FY2018 budget, which Congress considered in 2017. If CVN-80, like most Navy ships, had been named at about the time of procurement, or later, rather than in 2012, it would have been named by the current Secretary of the Navy, Richard Spencer. The July 2012 Navy report to Congress, which was produced when Ray Mabus was the Secretary of the Navy, states that Secretary [of the Navy Ray] Mabus values the ability to consider [aircraft] carrier names on an individual, case‐by‐case basis, for two reasons. First, it will allow a future Secretary to name a future fleet aircraft carrier for someone or something other than a former President. Indeed, Secretary Mabus has a particular name in mind. With the scheduled decommissioning of USS Enterprise (CVN 65), perhaps the most famous ship name in US Navy history besides USS Constitution will be removed from the Naval Vessel Register. Secretary Mabus believes this circumstance could be remedied by bestowing the Enterprise's storied name on a future carrier. Prior to the naming of CVN-80, the most recent carrier that was not named for a President or Member of Congress was the second of the 14 most recently named carriers, Nimitz (CVN-68), which was procured in FY1967. Destroyers (DDGs) In General Destroyers traditionally have been named for famous U.S. naval leaders and distinguished heroes. The July 2012 Navy report to Congress discusses this tradition and states more specifically that destroyers are being named for deceased members of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, including Secretaries of the Navy. Exceptions since 2012 (all of which involve Arleigh Burke [DDG-51] class destroyers) include the following: On May 7, 2012, the Navy announced that it was naming DDG-116 for a living person, Thomas Hudner. On May 23, 2013, the Navy announced that it was naming DDG-117 for a living person, Paul Ignatius, and that it was naming DDG-118 for the late Senator Daniel Inouye, who served in the U.S. Army during World War II. On March 31 and April 5, 2016, it was reported that the Navy was naming DDG-120 for a living person, former Senator Carl Levin. On July 28, 2016, the Navy announced that it was naming DDG-124 for a living person, Harvey C. Barnum Jr. On July 11, 2018, Secretary of the Navy Richard Spencer announced that the Navy was expanding the name of the destroyer John. S. McCain (DDG-56) to include a living person, Senator John S. McCain III (for additional discussion, see the next section below). On May 6, 2019, the Navy announced that it was naming DDG-133 for a living person, former Senator Sam Nunn, who had served in the Coast Guard from 1959 to 1960, and in the Coast Guard Reserve from 1960 until 1968 (for additional discussion, see the section following the next section). As of May 6, 2019, the Navy had announced names for all DDG-51 class destroyers procured through DDG-131, the second of three DDG-51s procured in FY2019, and DDG-133, one of three DDG-51s requested for procurement in FY2020. July 11, 2018, Expansion of DDG-56's Name to Include Senator McCain On July 11, 2018, Secretary of the Navy Richard Spencer announced that the Navy was expanding the name of the destroyer John. S. McCain (DDG-56), originally named for Admiral John S. "Slew" McCain (1884-1945) and his son, Admiral John S. "Jack" McCain, Jr. (1911-1981), to also include Senator John S. McCain III, the grandson of Admiral John S. McCain and the son of Admiral John S. McCain, Jr. DDG-56 was procured in FY1989 and was commissioned into service on July 2, 1994. John S. McCain III served as a Member of the House of Representatives from 1983 to 1987, and as a Senator from 1987 to 2018. Among his committee chairmanships, he was the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee from January 3, 2015, until his death on August 25, 2018. He was the Republican Party candidate for President in 2008. May 6, 2019, Naming of DDG-133 for former Senator Sam Nunn On May 6, 2019, the Navy announced that it was naming DDG-133 for former Senator Sam Nunn. Nunn served in the Coast Guard from 1959 to 1960, and in the Coast Guard Reserve from 1960 until 1968. He was a Senator from 1972 to 1997. During his time in the Senate, he was, among other things, the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee from January 1987 to January 1995. Frigates (FFG[X]s) The Navy in 2017 initiated a new program, called the FFG(X) program, to build a class of 20 guided-missile frigates (FFGs). The Navy wants to procure the first FFG(X) in FY2020, the second in FY2021, and the remaining 18 at a rate of two per year in FY2022-FY2030. As of May 6, 2019, the Navy had not announced a naming rule for this planned new class of ships. Previous classes of U.S. Navy frigates, like Navy destroyers, were generally named for naval leaders and heroes. Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs) Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs) were at first named for U.S. mid-tier cities, small towns, and other U.S. communities. The naming rule was later adjusted to regionally important U.S. cities and communities. An exception occurred on February 10, 2012, when the Navy announced that it was naming LCS-10 for former Representative Gabrielle Giffords. Another exception occurred on February 23, 2018, when President Trump, in a press conference with Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull, announced that an LCS would be named Canberra , in honor of HMAS Canberra (D33), an Australian cruiser named for the capital city of Australia that fought alongside U.S. Navy forces World War II and was scuttled after being damaged by Japanese attack in the Battle of Savo Island on August 9, 1942. The Navy has identified the LCS to be named Canberra as LCS-30. A previous U.S. Navy ship, the gun cruiser Canberra (CA-70), which served from 1943 to 1947 and again from 1956 to 1970, was similarly named in honor of HMAS Canberra . There is also a current HMAS Canberra (L02), an amphibious assault ship (i.e., helicopter carrier) that entered service in 2014 and now serves as the flagship of the Australian navy. The situation of LCS-30 and L02 sharing the same name will presumably not violate 10 U.S.C. §8662(a)—which states that "not more than one vessel of the Navy may have the same name"—because 10 U.S.C. §8662 is a statute governing the naming of U.S. Navy ships and L02 is not a U.S. Navy ship. As of May 6, 2019, the Navy had posted or announced names for all LCSs up through LCS-30, plus LCS-32, LCS-34, LCS-36, and LCS-38. The Navy also announced on October 9, 2018, that one additional LCS would be named for Cleveland, OH, but the Navy did not specify which LCS would receive this name. A total of 35 LCSs have been procured through FY2019. In addition to LCSs 1-30, 32, 34, 36, and 38, the Navy has identified the 35 th LCS as LCS-31. As of May 6, 2019, this ship was listed by the Navy as having no name. The Navy does not want to procure any more LCSs beyond the 35 that have been procured. If no additional LCSs are procured beyond the 35 that have been procured, LCS-31 will be the last LCS to be named. Given the Navy's October 9, 2018, announcement that one additional LCS would be named for Cleveland, OH, it is possible the Navy will name LCS-31 for Cleveland. Amphibious Assault Ships (LHAs) Amphibious assault ships (LHAs), which look like medium-sized aircraft carriers, are being named for important battles in which U.S. Marines played a prominent part, and for famous earlier U.S. Navy ships that were not named for battles. The Navy announced on June 27, 2008, that the first LHA-6 class amphibious assault ship, LHA-6, would be named America , a name previously used for an aircraft carrier (CV-66) that served in the Navy from 1965 to 1996. The Navy announced on May 4, 2012, that LHA-7, the second ship in the class, LHA-7, would be named Tripoli , the location of famous Marine battles in the First Barbary War. The Navy reaffirmed this name selection with a more formal announcement on May 30, 2014. On November 9, 2016, the Navy announced that the third ship in the class, LHA-8, will be named Bougainville , the location of a famous World War II campaign in the Pacific. Amphibious Ships (LPDs) San Antonio (LPD-17) class amphibious ships are being named for major U.S. cities and communities (with major being defined as being one of the top three population centers in a state), and cities and communities attacked on September 11, 2001. An exception occurred on April 23, 2010, when the Navy announced that it was naming LPD-26, the 10 th ship in the class, for the late Representative John P. Murtha. Another exception occurred on May 2, 2018, when the Navy announced that it was naming LPD-29, the 13 th ship in the class, for Navy Captain Richard M. McCool, Jr., who received the Medal of Honor for his actions in World War II and later served in the Korean and Vietnam wars. As of May 6, 2019, the Navy had not announced a name for LPD-30, which was funded in FY2018, and which is to be the first of a new version, or flight, of the LPD-17 class design called the LPD-17 Flight II design. Oilers (TAOs) On January 6, 2016, then-Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus announced that the Navy's new oilers will be named for "people who fought for civil rights and human rights," and that the first ship in the class, TAO-205, which was procured in FY2016, will be named for Representative John Lewis. The ships in this class consequently are now referred to as John Lewis (TAO-205) class ships. The Navy wants to procure a total of 20 John Lewis-class ships. On July 28, 2016, it was reported that the Navy would name the second through sixth ships in the class (i.e., TAOs 206 through 210) for Harvey Milk, Earl Warren, Robert F. Kennedy, Lucy Stone, and Sojourner Truth, respectively. All these names were later posted by the Navy for these ships. Dry Cargo and Ammunition Ships (TAKEs) The Navy's 14 Lewis and Clark (TAKE-1) class cargo and ammunition ships were named for famous American explorers, trailblazers, and pioneers. The Navy announced on October 9, 2009, that the 13 th ship in the class was being named for the civil rights activist Medgar Evers. The Navy announced on May 18, 2011, that the 14 th ship in the class would be named for civil rights activist Cesar Chavez. Expeditionary Fast Transports (EPFs) Expeditionary Fast Transports (EPFs), which until May 2011 were being procured by the Army as well as by the Navy, were at first named for American traits and values. In December 2009, the naming rule for EPFs was changed to small U.S. cities. At some point between December 2010 and October 2011, it was adjusted to small U.S. cities and counties. As of May 6, 2019, the Navy had posted names for all EPFs through EPF-12, which was procured in FY2016. A 13 th EPF was funded by Congress in FY2018, and a 14 th was funded by Congress in FY2019. Expeditionary Transport Docks (ESDs) and Expeditionary Sea Bases (ESBs) The Navy's two Expeditionary Transport Docks (ESDs 1 and 2) and its Expeditionary Sea Bases (ESB 3 and higher) are being named for famous names or places of historical significance to U.S. Marines. Two of these ships have been named for living persons—ESD-2, which was named John Glenn , and ESB-4, which was named for Hershel "Woody" Williams. On November 4, 2017, Secretary of the Navy Richard Spencer announced that the third ESB (ESB-5), which was procured in FY2016, would be named for Marine Corps Vietnam veteran and Medal of Honor recipient Lance Corporal Miguel Keith. This was Spencer's first announced naming of a Navy ship. A fourth ESB (ESB-6) was procured in FY2018, and a fifth (ESB-7) was procured in FY2019. Navy plans calls for procuring a total of six ESBs. Towing, Salvage, and Rescue Ships (TATSs) On March 12, 2019, the Navy announced that that TATS-6, the first ship in a new class of towing, salvage, and rescue ships (TATSs), would be named Navajo, "in honor of the major contributions that the Navajo people have made to the armed forces," and that ships in this class will be named for prominent Native Americans or Native American tribes. Aspects of Navy Ship Names State Names Not Used in a Long Time—Particularly Kansas It has been a long time since ships named for certain states were last in commissioned service with the Navy as combat assets. While there is no rule requiring the Navy, in selecting state names for ships, to choose states for which the most time has passed since a ship named for the state has been in commissioned service with the Navy as a combat asset, advocates of naming a ship for a certain state may choose to point out, among other things, the length of time that has transpired since a ship named for the state has been in commissioned service with the Navy as a combat asset. In its announcement of April 13, 2012, that the Navy was naming the Virginia class attack submarines SSNs 786 through 790 for Illinois, Washington, Colorado, Indiana, and South Dakota, respectively, the Department of Defense stated, "None of the five states has had a ship named for it for more than 49 years. The most recent to serve was the battleship Indiana, which was decommissioned in October 1963." The July 2012 Navy report to Congress states the following: "Before deciding on which names to select [for the five submarines], [then-]Secretary [of the Navy Ray] Mabus asked for a list of State names that had been absent the longest from the US Naval Register...." In its announcement of November 19, 2012, that the Navy was naming the Virginia class attack submarine SSN-791 for Delaware, the Department of Defense quoted then-Secretary Mabus as saying, "It has been too long since there has been a USS Delaware in the fleet...." A Navy News Service article about the Navy's September 18, 2014, announcement that the Virginia class attack submarine SSN-792 was being named for Vermont stated that "This is the first ship named for Vermont since 1920[,] when the second USS Vermont was decommissioned." A Navy News Service article about the Navy's October 10, 2014, announcement that the Virginia class attack submarine SSN-793 was being named for Oregon stated that the previous USS Oregon "was a battleship best known for its roles in the Spanish American War when it helped destroy Admiral Cervera's fleet and in the Philippine-American War; it performed blockade duty in Manila Bay and off Lingayen Gulf, served as a station ship, and aided in the capture of Vigan." A Navy News Service article about the Navy's January 19, 2016, announcement that the Virginia-class attack submarine SSN-801 was being named for Utah stated, "The future USS Utah will be the second naval vessel to bear the name; the first, a battleship designated BB-31, was commissioned in 1911 and had a long, honorable time in service.... While conducting anti-gunnery exercises in Pearl Harbor, BB-31 was struck by a torpedo and capsized during the initial stages of the Japanese attack [on December 7, 1941]. She was struck from the Navy record Nov. 13, 1944 and received a battle star for her service in World War I." The Navy's naming announcements for Virginia-class submarines have reduced the group of states for which several decades had passed since a ship named for the state had been in commissioned service with the Navy as a combat asset, and for which no ship by that name is currently under construction. This group used to include Illinois, Delaware, Vermont, Oregon, and Montana, but Virginia-class attack submarines have now been named for these states. (See the Virginia-class attack submarine naming announcements of April 13, 2012; November 19, 2012; September 18, 2014; October 10, 2014; and September 2, 2015, respectively.) As shown in Table 1 , the three states for which the most time now appears to have passed since a ship named for the state has been in commissioned service with the Navy as a combat asset, and for which no ship by that name is currently under construction, are Kansas, Arizona, and Oklahoma. As of May 6, 2019, it has been more than 97 years since the decommissioning on December 16, 1921, of the battleship Kansas (BB-21), the most recent ship named for the state of Kansas that was in commissioned service with the Navy as a combat asset. As discussed earlier in the section on rules for naming SSNs, starting around FY2022, the Navy might run out of state names for Virginia-class boats, and consequently might need to either amend the Virginia-class naming rule or begin making a series of exceptions to the rule. Ships Named for Living Persons The Navy historically has only rarely named ships for living persons, meaning (throughout this CRS report) persons who were living at the time the name was announced. The Navy stated in February 2012 that The Navy named several ships for living people (ex. George Washington, Ben Franklin, etc.) in the early years of our Republic. The Naval History and Heritage Command (NHHC) believes that the last ship to be named by the Navy in honor of a living person prior to [the aircraft carrier] CARL VINSON (CVN-70) was the brig JEFFERSON (launched in April 1814). Between 1814 and November 18, 1973, when President Nixon announced the naming of CARL VINSON, NHHC does not believe that any ships had been named for a living person by the Navy as NHHC does not have records that would indicate such. The July 2012 Navy report to Congress, noting a case from 1900 that was not included in the above passage, states that the practice of naming ships in honor of deserving Americans or naval leaders while they are still alive can be traced all the way back to the Revolutionary War. At the time, with little established history or tradition, the young Continental Navy looked to honor those who were fighting so hard to earn America's freedom. Consequently, George Washington had no less than five ships named for him before his death; John Adams and James Madison, three apiece; John Hancock, two; and Benjamin Franklin, one. The practice of naming ships after living persons was relatively commonplace up through 1814, when a US Navy brig was named in honor of Thomas Jefferson. However, after the War of 1812, with the US Navy older and more established, and with the list of famous Americans and notable naval heroes growing ever longer, the practice of naming ships after living persons fell into disuse. Indeed, the only exception over the next 150 years came in 1900, when the Navy purchased its first submarine from its still living inventor, John Philip Holland, and Secretary of the Navy John D. Long named her USS Holland (SS 1) in his honor.... [In the early 1970s], however, Department of the Navy leaders were considering the name for CVN 70. Secretary of the Navy John Warner knew the 93 rd Congress had introduced no less than three bills or amendments (none enacted) urging that CVN 70 be named for in honor of Carl Vinson, who served in the House for 50 years and was known as the "Father of the Two-Ocean Navy." Although Secretary Warner felt Congressman Vinson was more than worthy of a ship name, the former Congressman was still alive. Naming a ship for this giant of naval affairs would therefore violate a 160-year old tradition. After considering the pros and cons of doing so, Secretary Warner asked President Richard Nixon's approval to name CVN 70 for the 90-year old statesman. President Nixon readily agreed. Indeed, he personally announced the decision on January 18, 1974.... In hindsight, rather than this decision being a rare exception, it signaled a return to the Continental Navy tradition of occasionally honoring famous living persons with a ship name. Since then, and before the appointment of current Secretary [now then-Secretary] of the Navy Ray Mabus, Secretaries of the Navy have occasionally chosen to follow this new, "old tradition," naming ships in honor of still living former Presidents Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and Gerald R. Ford; Secretary of the Navy Paul Nitze; Navy Admirals Hyman G. Rickover, Arleigh Burke, and Wayne E. Meyer; Senators John C. Stennis and John Warner; and famous entertainer Bob Hope. Moreover, it is important to note that three of these well-known Americans—Gerald R. Ford, John C. Stennis, and Bob Hope—were so honored after Congress enacted provisions in Public Laws urging the Navy to do so. By its own actions, then, Congress has acknowledged the practice of occasionally naming ships for living persons, if not outright approved of it. In other words, while naming ships after living persons remains a relatively rare occurrence—about three per decade since 1970—it is now an accepted but sparingly used practice for Pragmatic Secretaries [of the Navy] of both parties. For them, occasionally honoring an especially deserving member of Congress, US naval leader, or famous American with a ship name so that they might end their days on earth knowing that their life's work is both recognized and honored by America's Navy-Marine Corps Team, and that their spirit will accompany and inspire the Team in battle, is sometimes exactly the right thing to do. As shown in Table 2 , since the naming of CVN-70 for Carl Vinson in 1974, at least 21 U.S. military ships have been named for persons who were living at the time the name was announced. Eight of the 21 were announced between January 2012 and March 2016, including three announced in 2012 and four announced in 2016. In four of the six most-recent instances, the ships were named for current or former Members of Congress. The most recent instance occurred on May 6, 2019, when the Navy announced that it was naming the destroyer DDG-51 for former Senator Sam Nunn. (For further discussion of that naming action, see the earlier section on names for destroyers.) Ships Named for Confederate Officers A June 15, 2017, blog post states the following: Four [past U.S. Navy] ships have been named for Confederate officers: the [ballistic missile submarine/attack submarine] USS Robert E. Lee (SSBN-601[/SSN-601]) [commissioned 1960; decommissioned 1983], the [ballistic missile submarine] USS Stonewall Jackson (SSBN-634) [commissioned 1964; decommissioned 1995], the [submarine tender] USS Hunley (AS-31) [commissioned 1962; decommissioned 1994], and the [submarine tender] USS Dixon (AS-37) [commissioned 1971; decommissioned 1995]. H. L. Hunley built the Confederate submarine that sank with him on board before it engaged in combat. A subsequent Confederate submarine was built and named for him. Commanded by George Dixon, the CSS Hunley carried out the world's first submarine attack when it struck the [sloop-of-war] USS Housatonic in February1864. Currently in the fleet is the [Ticonderoga (CG-47) class Aegis cruiser] USS Chancellorsville (CG-62) [commissioned 1989], named for Lee's greatest victory over the U.S. Army. Chancellorsville also was the battle in which Gen. Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson was mortally wounded by friendly fire. The purpose of erecting monuments and naming U.S. ships after Confederates—enemies of the United States—seems to be to recognize their perceived status as noble warriors rather than to remember the cause for which they waged war: the dissolution of the United States to preserve the "peculiar institution" of human slavery. This view of history is not shared by millions of Americans who see the monuments to Confederates as glorifying, even justifying the "lost cause" and the enslavement of humans. Other ships have been named for enemies [of the United States], probably because they were considered "noble warriors" too. [The ballistic missile submarine] USS Tecumseh (SSBN-628) [commissioned 1964; decommissioned 1993] and [the harbor tug] USS Osceola (YTB-129) [commissioned 1938; sold for scrapping 1973] were named after American Indian leaders who fought wars against the United States. Regarding the Chancellorsville , the Navy states that the cruiser is The first U.S. Navy ship named for a Civil War battle fought just south of the Rappahannock and Rapidan Rivers in Virginia (1–5 May 1863). Gen. Robert E. Lee, CSA, who led the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia, held Gen. Joseph Hooker, USA, who commanded the Union Army and Department of the Potomac, in position while Lt. Gen. Thomas J. Jackson, CSA, enveloped the Union right flank, surprising and rolling up the Federal's right. Lee's victory, combined with the urgent need to relieve pressure on Vicksburg, Miss., prompted the South's thrust into Pennsylvania that summer, resulting in the pivotal Battle of Gettysburg. An August 16, 2017, press report states the following: As America churns through a bloody debate over the place Confederate monuments occupy in the modern day United States, a Navy cruiser named in honor of a Confederate Civil War victory is unlikely to see its named changed, a service official said Wednesday [August 16]. The guided-missile cruiser Chancellorsville [CG-62] was commissioned in 1989 and derives its name from an 1863 battle considered to be the greatest victory of Confederate Gen. Robert E. Lee.... But a Navy official speaking on the condition of anonymity Wednesday said that even though the Chancellorsville is named after a Confederate victory, the name comes from a battle, not an individual, and soldiers on both sides died. The week-long battle resulted in major casualties for both sides—13,000 Confederates and 17,000 Union troops, according to the National Parks [sic: Park] Service. The Navy official did say, however, that there remains a chance the ship's crest could be altered. The predominance of gray in the ship's crest speaks to "General Robert E. Lee's spectacular military strategies and his dominance in this battle," according to the ship's website. An inverted wreath also memorializes the Confederacy's second-best known general, Stonewall Jackson, who was mortally wounded in the battle. While the rupture of the country during the Civil War is reflected in the crest, it also features Jackson's order to "press on." "Maybe that is worth re-looking at or redoing," the official said. "There's a fine line." Ships Named Several Years Before They Were Procured In recent years, the Navy on a few occasions has announced names for ships years before those ships were procured. Although announcing a name for a ship years before it is procured is not prohibited, doing so could deprive a future Secretary of the Navy (or, more broadly, a future Administration) of the opportunity to select a name for the ship. It could also deprive Congress of an opportunity to express its sense regarding potential names for a ship, and create a risk of assigning a name to a ship that eventually is not procured for some reason, a situation that could be viewed as potentially embarrassing to the Navy. As noted earlier, the July 2012 Navy report to Congress states the following: At the appropriate time—normally sometime after the ship has been either authorized or appropriated by Congress and before its keel laying or christening—the Secretary records his decision with a formal naming announcement. At the end of the above passage, there is a footnote (number 3) in the Navy report that states the following: Although there is no hard and fast rule, Secretaries most often name a ship after Congress has appropriated funds for its construction or approved its future construction in some way—such as authorization of either block buys or multi-year procurements of a specific number of ships. There are special cases, however, when Secretaries use their discretion to name ships before formal Congressional approval, such as when Secretary John Lehman announced the namesake for a new class of Aegis guided missile destroyers would be Admiral Arleigh Burke, several years before the ship was either authorized or appropriated. In connection with the quoted footnote passage immediately above, it can be noted that the lead ship of the DDG-51 class of destroyers was named for Arleigh Burke on November 5, 1982, about two years before the ship was authorized and fully funded. Recent examples of Navy ships whose names were announced more than two years before they were procured include the following: The destroyer Zumwalt (DDG-1000). On July 4, 2000, President Bill Clinton announced that DDG-1000, the lead ship in a new class of destroyers, would be named Zumwalt in honor of Admiral Elmo Zumwalt Jr., the Chief of Naval Operations from 1970 to 1974, who had died on January 2, 2000. At the time of the naming announcement, Congress was considering the Navy's proposed FY2001 budget, under which DDG-1000 was scheduled for authorization in FY2005, a budget that Congress would consider in 2004, which was then about four years in the future. The aircraft carrier Enterprise (CVN-80). As noted earlier, on December 1, 2012, the Navy announced that CVN-80, the third Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) class aircraft carrier, would be named Enterprise . At the time of the announcement, CVN-80 was scheduled for procurement in FY2018, the budget for which Congress was to consider in 2017, which was then more than four years in the future. (CVN-80 was in fact procured in FY2018.) The ballistic missile submarine ( SSBN-826 ) Columbia . As noted earlier, on July 28, 2016, it was reported that the first Ohio replacement ballistic missile submarine (SSBN-826) will be named Columbia in honor of the District of Columbia. This ship is scheduled for procurement in FY2021, the budget for which Congress is to consider in 2020, which in July 2016 was about four years in the future. Three John Lewis (TAO- 205) class oilers. As noted earlier, on July 28, 2016, it was reported that the Navy would name the second through sixth John Lewis (TAO-205) class oilers (i.e., TAOs 206 through 210) for Harvey Milk, Earl Warren, Robert F. Kennedy, Lucy Stone, and Sojourner Truth, respectively. In 2016, these five ships were scheduled for procurement in FY2018, FY2019, FY2020, FY2021, and FY2022, respectively, the budgets for which Congress has considered or will consider in 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, and 2021, respectively. Thus, using the procurement dates that were scheduled in 2016, the name for TAO-208 ( Robert F. Kennedy ) was announced about three years before it was to be procured, the name for TAO-209 ( Lucy Stone ) was announced about four years it was to be procured, and the name for TAO-210 ( Sojourner Truth ) was announced about five years before it was to be procured. As discussed in the CRS report on the TAO-205 class program, the first six ships in the TAO-205 class are being procured under a block buy contract that Congress authorized as part of its action on the FY2016 defense budget. The procurement of each ship under this contract remains subject to the availability of appropriations for that purpose. Public's Role in Naming Ships Members of the public are sometimes interested in having Navy ships named for their own states or cities, for earlier U.S. Navy ships (particularly those on which they or their relatives served), for battles in which they or their relatives participated, or for people they admire. Citizens with such an interest sometimes contact the Navy, the Department of Defense, or Congress seeking support for their proposals. An October 2008 news report, for example, suggested that a letter-writing campaign by New Hampshire elementary school students that began in January 2004 was instrumental in the Navy's decision in August 2004 to name a Virginia-class submarine after the state. The July 2012 Navy report to Congress states the following: In addition to receiving input and recommendations from the President and Congress, every Secretary of the Navy receives numerous requests from service members, citizens, interest groups, or individual members of Congress who want to name a ship in honor of a particular hometown, or State, or place, or hero, or famous ship. This means the "nomination" process is often fiercely contested as differing groups make the case that "their" ship name is the most fitting choice for a Secretary to make. Members of the public may also express their opposition to an announced naming decision. The July 2012 Navy report to Congress cites and discusses five recent examples of ship-naming decisions that were criticized by some observers: the destroyer DDG-1002 (named for President Lyndon Johnson), the Littoral Combat Ship LCS-10 (named for former Representative Gabrielle Giffords), the amphibious ship LPD-26 (named for late Representative John P. Murtha), the auxiliary ship TAKE-13 (named for Medgar Evers), and the auxiliary ship TAKE-14 (named for Cesar Chavez). Congress's Role in Naming Ships Overview of Congressional Influence on Navy Ship-Naming Decisions Congress has long maintained an interest in how Navy ships are named, and has influenced or may have influenced pending Navy decisions on the naming of certain ships, including but not limited to the following: One source states that "[the aircraft carriers] CVN 72 and CVN 73 were named prior to their start [of construction], in part to preempt potential congressional pressure to name one of those ships for Admiral H.G. Rickover ([instead,] the [attack submarine] SSN 709 was named for the admiral)." There was a friendly rivalry of sorts in Congress between those who supported naming the aircraft carrier CVN-76 for President Truman and those who supported naming it for President Reagan; the issue was effectively resolved by a decision announced by President Clinton in February 1995 to name one carrier (CVN-75) for Truman and another (CVN-76) for Reagan. One press report suggests that the decision to name CVN-77 for President George H. W. Bush may have been influenced by a congressional suggestion. Section 1012 of the FY2007 John Warner National Defense Authorization Act ( H.R. 5122 / P.L. 109-364 of October 17, 2006), expressed the sense of the Congress that the aircraft carrier CVN-78 should be named for President Gerald R. Ford. The Navy announced on January 16, 2007, that CVN-78 would be named Gerald R. Ford . In the 111 th Congress, H.Res. 1505 , introduced on July 1, 2010, expressed the sense of the House of Representatives that the Secretary of the Navy should name the next appropriate naval ship in honor of John William Finn. The measure was not acted on after being referred to the House Armed Services Committee. On February 15, 2012, the Navy announced that DDG-113, an Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyer, would be named John Finn . Section 1012 of the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act ( H.R. 1540 / P.L. 112-81 of December 31, 2011) expressed the sense of Congress that the Secretary of the Navy is encouraged to name the next available naval vessel after Rafael Peralta. On February 15, 2012, the Navy announced that DDG-113, an Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyer, would be named Rafael Peralta . The July 2012 Navy report to Congress states that every Secretary of the Navy, regardless of point of view [on how to name ships], is subject to a variety of outside influences when considering the best names to choose. The first among these comes from the President of the United States, under whose direction any Secretary works... Secretaries of the Navy must also consider the input of Congress.... Given the vital role Congress plays in maintaining the Navy-Marine Corps Team, any Secretary is sure to respect and consider its input when considering ships names. Sometimes, the Secretary must also balance or contend with differences of opinion between the President and Congress. The Navy suggests that congressional offices wishing to express support for proposals to name a Navy ship for a specific person, place, or thing contact the office of the Secretary of the Navy to make their support known. Congress may also pass legislation relating to ship names (see below). Congressional Responses to Announced Navy Ship-Naming Decisions Examples of Legislation Congress can pass legislation regarding a ship-naming decision that has been announced by the Navy. Such legislation can express Congress's views regarding the Navy's announced decision, and if Congress so desires, can also suggest or direct the Navy to take some action. The following are three examples of such legislation: S.Res. 332 of the 115 th Congress is an example of a measure that appears to reflect support for an announced Navy ship-naming decision. This measure, introduced in the Senate on November 15, 2017, and considered and agreed to without amendment and with a preamble by unanimous consent the same day, summarizes the military career of Hershel "Woody" Williams and commemorates the christening of ESB-4, an expeditionary sea base ship named for Williams (see " Legislative Activity in 115th and 116th Congress .") H.Res. 1022 of the 111 th Congress is an example of a measure reflecting support for an announced Navy ship-naming decision. This measure, introduced on January 20, 2010, and passed by the House on February 4, 2010, congratulates the Navy on its decision to name a naval ship for Medgar Evers. H.Con.Res. 312 of the 97 th Congress is an example of a measure that appears to reflect disagreement with an announced Navy ship-naming decision. This measure expressed the sense of Congress that the Los Angeles (SSN-688) class attack submarine Corpus Christi (SSN-705) should be renamed, and that a nonlethal naval vessel should instead be named Corpus Christi . (Los Angeles-class attack submarines were named for cities, and SSN-705 had been named for Corpus Christi, TX.) H.Con.Res. 312 was introduced on April 21, 1982, and was referred to the Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on April 28, 1982. On May 10, 1982, the Navy modified the name of SSN-705 to City of Corpus Christi . USS Portland (LPD-27) On April 12, 2013, then-Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus announced that LPD-27, a San Antonio (LPD-17) class amphibious ship, would be named for Portland, OR. LPD-27 is to be the third Navy ship to bear the name Portland. The first, a cruiser (CA-33), was named for Portland, ME. It was commissioned into service in February 1933, decommissioned in July 1946, and maintained in reserve status until struck from the Navy list in March 1959. The second, an amphibious ship (LSD-37), was named for both Portland, ME, and Portland, OR. It was commissioned into service in October 1970, decommissioned in October 2003, and stricken from the Naval Vessel Register in March 2004. An April 18, 2013, press release from Senator Angus King stated that "U.S. Senators Susan Collins and Angus King today sent a letter to Ray Mabus, the Secretary of the Navy, asking that the USS Portland [LPD-27], a new San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock ship named after the city of Portland, Oregon, also be named in honor of Portland, Maine, consistent with the long history and tradition of U.S. Navy ships bestowed with the name USS Portland." In reply, the Navy sent letters dated April 24, 2013, to Senators Collins and King that stated the following in part: In addition to [the ballistic missile submarine] USS MAINE (SSBN 743), Secretary [of the Navy Ray] Mabus recently honored the state of Marine through his naming of [the expeditionary fast transport ship] USNS MILLINOCKET (JHSV 3) [now called T-EPF 3] which was christened last weekend and will proudly represent our Nation as part of the fleet for decades to come. The Secretary of the Navy has tremendous appreciation for the state of Maine, its citizens and the incredible support provided by them to our Navy and our Nation. However, Oregon is the only state in our Nation that does not currently have a ship in the fleet named for the state, its cities or communities. Secretary Mabus named LPD 27 after Portland, Oregon, to correct that oversight and acknowledge the support and contributions made by the men and women of Portland and Oregon. As noted elsewhere in this report, on October 10, 2014, the Navy announced that it was naming the Virginia-class attack submarine SSN-793 for Oregon. A May 21, 2016, Navy blog post about the ship's christening states that "LPD-27 will be the third Navy ship named Portland, honoring both the Oregon seaport and Maine's largest city." That statement is not correct, as the Navy confirms that LPD-27 is named solely for Portland, OR. A July 5, 2017, Navy News Service report states correctly that "LPD 27 is named for the city of Portland, Oregon, and follows the World War II heavy cruiser CA 33 and the amphibious ship LSD 37 as the third U.S. Navy ship to bear the name Portland." LPD-27 is scheduled to be commissioned in Portland, OR, on April 21, 2018. Legislation on Future Navy Ship-Naming Decisions Table 3 shows past enacted provisions going back to the 100 th Congress regarding future ship-naming decisions. All of these measures expressed the sense of the Congress (or of the Senate or House) about how a future Navy ship should be named. Table 4 shows past examples of proposed bills and amendments regarding future ship-naming decisions going back to the 93 rd Congress. Some of these measures expressed the sense of the Congress about how a Navy ship should be named, while others would mandate a certain name for a ship. Although few of these measures were acted on after being referred to committee, they all signaled congressional interest in how certain ships should be named, and thus may have influenced Navy decisions on these matters. Legislative Activity in 115th and 116th Congresses S.Con.Res. 10 of 115th Congress (Expressing Sense of Congress That Next SSN be Named Los Alamos) Senate S.Con.Res. 10 of the 115 th Congress was introduced in the Senate on March 21, 2017; no further actions for the measure are listed at Congress.gov. The text of S.Con.Res. 10 as introduced was as follows: CONCURRENT RESOLUTION Expressing the sense of Congress that the Secretary of the Navy should name the next nuclear powered submarine of the United States Navy the "USS Los Alamos". Whereas the people of Los Alamos and the Navy have a 74-year relationship that continues from the Manhattan Project through the creation of a nuclear Navy and into the current ocean-borne leg of the strategic nuclear triad of the United States; Whereas the contributions of the people of Los Alamos and surrounding communities allowed the Navy to keep its offensive edge from World War II, through the Cold War, continuing to the emerging conflicts as of the date of adoption of this resolution; Whereas Captain "Deke" Parsons was one of the first residents of Los Alamos and, along with Laureate Ramsey, oversaw the safe delivery, assembly and loading of the nuclear bomb that led to the surrender of Japan in World War II; Whereas the people of Los Alamos and surrounding communities played a critical role in designing the nuclear portion of the first nuclear weapon to enter the arsenal of the Navy, known as the Regulus, along with atomic depth bombs, torpedoes, rockets, and even next generation weapon systems like the B61–12 precision-guided nuclear bomb; Whereas the people of Los Alamos designed the warheads that armed the first generation Trident submarine-launched ballistic missiles of the Navy and the follow-on Trident II missile warheads used by the Navy; Whereas the research into nuclear energy conducted by Los Alamos during World War II advanced the technical basis for the development of the nuclear propulsion systems of the Navy used aboard Los Angeles, Seawolf, Ohio, and Virginia Class submarines along with multiple naval aircraft carriers today; Whereas the people of Los Alamos and Los Alamos National Laboratory host United States Naval Academy midshipmen every year to provide hands-on scientific and engineering experience working to solve real world challenges in national security, thereby directly contributing to the development of future Navy leadership; Whereas the people of Los Alamos carry the solemn responsibility to assess the sea-based nuclear deterrent carried aboard Navy fleet ballistic missile submarines; Whereas naming a submarine Los Alamos will recognize and continue to forge the longstanding relationship between the Navy and Los Alamos; Whereas the year 2018 will mark the 75th anniversary of Los Alamos National Laboratory; and Whereas the distinctive service and contributions from the people of Los Alamos to the Navy merits naming a vessel that embodies the heritage, service, fidelity, and achievements of the residents of Los Alamos and surrounding communities in partnership with the United States Navy: Now, therefore, be it Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That it is the sense of the Congress that the Secretary of the Navy should name the next nuclear powered submarine of the United States Navy as the "USS Los Alamos". Appendix A. Executive Summary of July 2012 Navy Report to Congress This appendix reprints the executive summary of the July 2012 Navy report to Congress on the Navy's policies and practices for naming its ships. The text of the executive summary is as follows: Executive Summary This report is submitted in accordance with Section 1014 of P.L. 112-81 , National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2012, dated 31 December 2011, which directs the Secretary of Defense to submit a report on "policies and practices of the Navy for naming vessels of the Navy." As required by the NDAA, this report: Includes a description of the current policies and practices of the Navy for naming vessels of the Navy, and a description of the extent to which theses policies and practices vary from historical policies and practices of the Navy for naming vessels of the Navy, and an explanation for such variances; Assesses the feasibility and advisability of establishing fixed policies for the naming of one or more classes of vessels of the Navy, and a statement of the policies recommended to apply to each class of vessels recommended to be covered by such fixed policies if the establishment of such fixed policies is considered feasible and advisable; and Identifies any other matter relating to the policies and practices of the Navy for naming vessels of the Navy that the Secretary of Defense considers appropriate. After examining the historical record in great detail, this report concludes: Current ship naming policies and practices fall well within the historic spectrum of policies and practices for naming vessels of the Navy, and are altogether consistent with ship naming customs and traditions. The establishment of fixed policies for the naming of one or more classes of vessels of the Navy would be highly inadvisable. There is no objective evidence to suggest that fixed policies would improve Navy ship naming policies and practices, which have worked well for over two centuries. In addition, the Department of the Navy used to routinely publish lists of current type naming rules for battle force ships, and update it as changes were made to them. At some point, this practice fell into disuse, leading to a general lack of knowledge about naming rules. To remedy this problem, the Naval History and Heritage Command will once again develop and publish a list of current type naming rules to help all Americans better understand why Secretaries of the Navy choose the ship names they do. This list will be updated as required.

Names for Navy ships traditionally have been chosen and announced by the Secretary of the Navy, under the direction of the President and in accordance with rules prescribed by Congress. Rules for giving certain types of names to certain types of Navy ships have evolved over time. There have been exceptions to the Navy's ship-naming rules, particularly for the purpose of naming a ship for a person when the rule for that type of ship would have called for it to be named for something else. Some observers have perceived a breakdown in, or corruption of, the rules for naming Navy ships. On July 13, 2012, the Navy submitted to Congress a 73-page report on the Navy's policies and practices for naming ships. For ship types now being procured for the Navy, or recently procured for the Navy, naming rules can be summarized as follows: The first Ohio replacement ballistic missile submarine (SSBN-826) has been named Columbia in honor of the District of Columbia, but the Navy has not stated what the naming rule for these ships will be. Virginia (SSN-774) class attack submarines are being named for states. Aircraft carriers are generally named for past U.S. Presidents. Of the past 14, 10 were named for past U.S. Presidents, and 2 for Members of Congress. Destroyers are being named for deceased members of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, including Secretaries of the Navy. The Navy has not yet announced a naming rule for its planned new class of FFG(X) frigates, the first of which the Navy wants to procure in FY2021. Previous classes of U.S. Navy frigates, like Navy destroyers, were generally named for naval leaders and heroes. Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs) are being named for regionally important U.S. cities and communities. Amphibious assault ships are being named for important battles in which U.S. Marines played a prominent part, and for famous earlier U.S. Navy ships that were not named for battles. San Antonio (LPD-17) class amphibious ships are being named for major U.S. cities and communities, and cities and communities attacked on September 11, 2001. John Lewis (TAO-205) class oilers are being named for people who fought for civil rights and human rights. Expeditionary Fast Transports (EPFs) are being named for small U.S. cities. Expeditionary Transport Docks (ESDs) and Expeditionary Sea Bases (ESBs) are being named for famous names or places of historical significance to U.S. Marines. Navajo (TATS-6) class towing, salvage, and rescue ships are being named for prominent Native Americans or Native American tribes. Since 1974, at least 21 U.S. military ships have been named for persons who were living at the time the name was announced. The most recent instance occurred on May 6, 2019, when the Navy announced that it was naming the destroyer DDG-51 for former Senator Sam Nunn. Members of the public are sometimes interested in having Navy ships named for their own states or cities, for older U.S. Navy ships (particularly those on which they or their relatives served), for battles in which they or their relatives participated, or for people they admire. Congress has long maintained an interest in how Navy ships are named, and has influenced the naming of certain Navy ships. The Navy suggests that congressional offices wishing to express support for proposals to name a Navy ship for a specific person, place, or thing contact the office of the Secretary of the Navy to make their support known. Congress may also pass legislation relating to ship names. Measures passed by Congress in recent years regarding Navy ship names have all been sense-of-the-Congress provisions.

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Historical Background Since 1952, when a cabal of Egyptian Army officers, known as the Free Officers Movement, ousted the British-backed king, Egypt's military has produced four presidents; Gamal Abdel Nasser (1954-1970), Anwar Sadat (1970-1981), Hosni Mubarak (1981-2011), and Abdel Fattah el Sisi (2013-present). In general, these four men have ruled Egypt with strong backing from the country's security establishment. The only significant and abiding opposition has come from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, an organization that has opposed single party military-backed rule and advocated for a state governed by a vaguely articulated combination of civil and Shariah (Islamic) law. Egypt's sole departure from this general formula took place between 2011 and 2013, after popular demonstrations sparked by the "Arab Spring," which had started in neighboring Tunisia, compelled the military to force the resignation of former President Hosni Mubarak in February 2011. During this period, Egypt experienced tremendous political tumult, culminating in the one-year presidency of the Muslim Brotherhood's Muhammad Morsi. When Morsi took office on June 30, 2012, after winning Egypt's first truly competitive presidential election, his ascension to the presidency was supposed to mark the end of a rocky 16-month transition period. Proposed time lines for elections, the constitutional drafting process, and the military's relinquishing of power to a civilian government had been constantly changed, contested, and sometimes even overruled by the courts. Instead of consolidating democratic or civilian rule, Morsi's rule exposed the deep divisions in Egyptian politics, pitting a broad cross-section of Egypt's public and private sectors, the Coptic Church, and the military against the Brotherhood and its Islamist supporters. The atmosphere of mutual distrust, political gridlock, and public dissatisfaction that permeated Morsi's presidency provided Egypt's military, led by then-Defense Minister Sisi, with an opportunity to reassert political control. On July 3, 2013, following several days of mass demonstrations against Morsi's rule, the military unilaterally dissolved Morsi's government, suspended the constitution that had been passed during his rule, and installed an interim president. The Muslim Brotherhood and its supporters declared the military's actions a coup d'etat and protested in the streets. Weeks later, Egypt's military and national police launched a violent crackdown against the Muslim Brotherhood, resulting in police and army soldiers firing live ammunition against demonstrators encamped in several public squares and the killing of at least 1,150 demonstrators. The Egyptian military justified these actions by decrying the encampments as a threat to national security. Overview As Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al Sisi consolidates his power amid a continuing macroeconomic recovery, Egypt is poised to play an increasingly active role in the region, albeit from a more independent position vis-a-vis the United States than in the past. Although Egyptian relations with the Trump Administration are solid, and Egypt has relied on the International Monetary Fund (IMF) program to guide its economic recovery, Egypt seems committed to broadening its international base of support. The United States plays a key role in that international base, but Egypt also has other significant partners, including the Arab Gulf states, Israel, Russia, and France. The Egyptian government blames American criticism of its human rights record for preventing closer U.S.-Egyptian ties. From the U.S. perspective, some Members of Congress, U.S. media outlets, and advocacy groups document how Egyptian authorities have widened the scope of a crackdown against dissent, which initially was aimed at the Muslim Brotherhood but has evolved to encompass a broader range of political speech. Egypt's parliament is currently considering whether to adopt a package of draft constitutional amendments that would extend presidential term limits and executive branch control over the judiciary. If Egypt's 2019 constitutional amendments are approved, President Sisi will attain unprecedented power in the political system over the military and the judiciary and, if reelected, will have the potential to remain in office until 2034. He has inserted his older brother and oldest son into key security and intelligence positions while stymying all opposition to his rule and criticism of his government. This consolidation of power and crackdown against dissent has taken place during a period of steady economic growth, which has not benefitted wide swaths of the population. The state has enacted a series of austerity measures to reduce debt in compliance with IMF-mandated reforms. In the year ahead, economists anticipate gross domestic product (GDP) growth of 5.3%, driven by an expansion in tourism and natural gas production. Nevertheless, Egyptians continue to endure double-digit inflation stemming in part from the 2016 flotation of the currency, tax increases, and reductions in food and fuel subsidies. While it is difficult to ascertain how dissatisfied the public is with rising prices, President Sisi has responded to criticisms of his economic policies, stating: "The path of real reform is difficult and cruel and causes a lot of suffering.... But there is no doubt that the suffering resulting from the lack of reform is much worse." The IMF has praised the Egyptian government's record of reform implementation, while also highlighting the need for private sector growth "that will absorb the rapidly growing labor force and ensure that the benefits are perceived more widely." After several years of observers seeing Egypt as more inwardly focused, several recent developments suggest an increasingly active foreign policy. In January 2019, Egypt hosted an international forum on Mediterranean gas which included European and Arab countries together with Israel. A month later, President Sisi was elected head of the African Union for a year-long term. In February 2019, Egypt hosted the first-ever European Union- Arab summit in Sharm el Sheikh, where officials discussed terrorism, migration, and the need for greater European-Arab cooperation to counter a perceived growing Chinese and Russian interest in the Middle East. Domestic Developments Personnel moves and other developments in Egypt highlight apparent efforts by President Sisi to consolidate power with the help of political allies, including colleagues from Egypt's security establishment. In June 2018, Sisi reshuffled his cabinet, making key changes to the defense and interior ministries, among other appointments. Sisi appointed Mohamed Ahmed Zaki, former head of the Republican Guard, as defense minister and Mahmoud Tawfik, former head of the National Security Service, as interior minister. According to one account, Sisi may have been rewarding Zaki for his role in arresting former Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi in 2013. In July 2018, parliament passed Law 161 of 2018, providing judicial immunity to senior military commanders for military acts committed during the two-and-a-half-year period beginning with the military coup of July 2013. The new law grants immunity to senior commanders while potentially keeping high-ranking officers on reserve duty for life, making them ineligible to run for president. In order for a senior commander to be prosecuted under this new law, a case would have to be first authorized by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), which President Sisi appoints. According to one analysis, the law deters senior officers from challenging President Sisi (for example, some challenges occurred during the run-up to the 2018 presidential election), thereby acting "as a guarantor of President Sisi's authoritarian rule, setting the stage for him to remain president for life." Per the 2014 Egyptian constitution (article 140), President Sisi, who was reelected in April 2018, may only serve two four-year terms in office (current term ends in 2022). However, his supporters have proposed a set of amendments to the constitution which, if approved by parliament and public referendum, have the potential to make President Sisi eligible for an additional two six-year terms when his current term ends in 2022. Other proposed changes to the constitution include granting the president the authority to appoint all chief justices of Egyptian judicial bodies, and the public prosecutor; requiring that at least one-quarter of the seats in the parliament be allocated to women and reducing the number of the seats in the House of Representatives from 596 to 450; and establishing an upper house of parliament (Senate) consisting of 250 members, two-thirds of whom would be elected and one-third of whom would be appointed by the president. Democracy, Human Rights, and Religious Freedom President Sisi has come under repeated international criticism for an ongoing government crackdown against various forms of political dissent and freedom of expression. Certain practices of Sisi's government, the parliament, and the security apparatus have been contentious. According to the U.S. State Department's report on human rights conditions in Egypt in 2017: The most significant human rights issues included arbitrary or unlawful killings by the government or its agents; major terrorist attacks; disappearances; torture; harsh or potentially life-threatening prison conditions; arbitrary arrest and detention; including the use of military courts to try civilians; political prisoners and detainees; unlawful interference in privacy; limits on freedom of expression, including criminal "defamation of religion" laws; restrictions on the press, internet, and academic freedom; and restrictions on freedoms of assembly and association, including government control over registration and financing of NGOs [nongovernmental organizations]. LGBTI persons faced arrests, imprisonment, and degrading treatment. The government did not effectively respond to violence against women, and there were reports of child labor. Select international human rights, democracy, and development monitoring organizations provide the following rankings for Egypt globally: Other human rights issues of potential interest to Congress may include the 2013 convictions of American, European, and Egyptian civil society representatives; the controversial 2017 NGO law; the detention of American citizens in Egypt; and the treatment of Coptic Christians, discussed in the following sections. "Case 173" In 2013, an Egyptian court convicted and sentenced 43 individuals from the United States, Egypt, and Europe, including the Egypt country directors of the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI), for spending money from organizations that were operating in Egypt without a license and for receiving foreign funds (known as Case 173 or the "foreign funding case"). Some lawmakers had protested that those individuals were wrongfully convicted and had requested that the Egyptian government and judiciary resolve the matter. In 2018, a retrial began and, on December 20, 2018, the individuals were acquitted of all charges. In January 2019, U.S. Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo traveled to Cairo, where he remarked: "I was happy to see our citizens, wrongly convicted of improperly operating NGOs here, finally be acquitted. And we strongly support President Sisi's initiative to amend Egyptian law so that this does not happen again. More work certainly needs to be done to maximize the potential of the Egyptian nation and its people. I'm glad that America will be a partner in those efforts." However, Case 173 remains active, as the judiciary has imposed asset freezes and travel bans on several Egyptian civil society activists. NGO Law In May 2017, President Sisi signed Law 70 of 2017 on Associations and Other Foundations Working in the Field of Civil Work. The parliament had passed this bill six months earlier, and both the passage and signing drew widespread international condemnation. The new law (which replaced a 2002 NGO law) requires NGOs to receive prior approval from internal security before accepting foreign funding. It also restricts the scope of permitted NGO activities and increases penalties for violations, including possible imprisonment for up to five years. However, the government did not issue implementing regulations for the new NGO law. At Egypt's November 2018 World Youth Forum in Sharm el Sheikh, President Sisi announced plans to amend Law 70. According to Sisi, "I want to reassure those who are listening to me inside Egypt and outside of Egypt, that in Egypt, we are keen that the law becomes balanced and achieves what is required of it to regulate the work of these groups in a good way. This is not just political talk." Since then, Egypt's Ministry of Social Solidarity has held multiple rounds of talks with local NGOs aimed at determining which articles of the law need to be amended. A draft proposal is expected to be ready in the spring of 2019, when it will be sent to parliament for consideration. Detention of American Citizens in Egypt The detention of American citizens in Egypt has continued to strain U.S.-Egyptian relations. Some Members of Congress are concerned about the case of 53-year-old New York resident Mustafa Kassem, who was detained by authorities in 2013 and sentenced to 15 years in prison in a mass trial in September 2018. These lawmakers insist that Kassem, who has been on a limited hunger strike, was wrongfully arrested and convicted, and they have sought Trump Administration support in securing his release from the government of Egypt. In January 2018, Vice President Pence raised Kassem's case directly with President Sisi in a meeting in Cairo, saying "I told him we'd like to see those American citizens restored to their families and restored to our country." Coptic Christians Since taking office, President Sisi has publicly called for greater Muslim-Christian coexistence and national unity. In January 2019, he inaugurated Egypt's Coptic Cathedral of Nativity in the new administrative capital east of Cairo saying, "This is an important moment in our history.... We are one and we will remain one." Despite these public calls for improved interfaith relations in Egypt, the minority Coptic Christian community continues to claim that they face professional and social discrimination, along with occasional sectarian attacks by terrorists and vigilantes. Coptic Christians have also voiced concern about state regulation of church construction. They have long demanded that the government reform long-standing laws (with two dating back to 1856 and 1934, respectively) on building codes for Christian places of worship. Article 235 of Egypt's 2014 constitution mandates that parliament reform these building code regulations. In 2016, parliament approved a church construction law (Law 80 of 2016) that expedited the government approval process for the construction and restoration of Coptic churches, among other structures. Although Coptic Pope Tawadros II welcomed the law, others claim that it continues to be discriminatory. According to Human Rights Watch , "the new law allows governors to deny church-building permits with no stated way to appeal, requires that churches be built 'commensurate with' the number of Christians in the area, and contains security provisions that risk subjecting decisions on whether to allow church construction to the whims of violent mobs." The Economy For 2019, the IMF projects 5.3% GDP growth for the Egyptian economy, noting that the outlook remains "favorable, supported by strong policy implementation." In 2016, the IMF and Egypt reached a three-year, $12 billion loan agreement, $10 billion of which has been disbursed as of March 2019. Key sources of foreign exchange (tourism and remittances) are up and unemployment is at its lowest level since 2011. In line with IMF recommendations, the government has taken several steps to reform the economy, including depreciating the currency, reducing fuel subsidies, enacting a value-added tax (VAT), and providing cash payments to the poor in lieu of subsidizing household goods (though many food subsidies continue). Egypt's energy sector also is contributing to the economy's rebound. Egypt is the largest oil producer in Africa outside of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the third-largest natural gas producer on the continent following Algeria and Nigeria. In December 2017, an Egyptian and Italian partnership began commercial output from the Zohr natural gas field (est. 30 trillion cubic feet of gas), the largest ever natural gas field discovered in the Mediterranean Sea (see Figure 3 ). The Egyptian government also has repaid debts owed to foreign energy companies, allowing for new investments from BP and BG Group. Egypt is attempting to position itself as a regional gas hub, whereby its own gas fields meet domestic demand while imported gas from Israel and Cyprus can be liquefied in Egypt and reexported. Israeli and Egyptian companies have bought significant shares of an unused undersea pipeline connecting Israel to the northern Sinai Peninsula (see Figure 4 ). The pipeline will be used to transport natural gas from Israel to Egypt for possible reexport, as part of an earlier 10-year, $15 billion gas deal between the U.S. Company Noble Energy, its Israeli partner Delek, and the Egyptian company Dolphinus Holdings. In January 2019, Egypt convened the first ever Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF), a regional consortium consisting of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, Cyprus, Greece, and Italy, intended to consolidate regional energy policies and reduce costs. Despite Egypt's positive economic outlook, significant challenges remain. Inflation remains over 11%, making the cost of goods high for many Egyptians. In addition, while the fiscal deficit may be decreasing, Egypt's overall public and foreign debt have grown significantly in recent years and remain high, leading the government to allocate resources (nearly 38% of Egypt's budget) toward debt-service payments and away from spending on health and education. Economists forecast that total public debt will reach 84.8% of GDP and external debt 32% of GDP ($101.7 billion) in 2019. Some observers assert that Egypt's recent economic reforms, while successful in the short term, have not addressed deeper structural impediments to growth. For example, Egypt's industrial sector is heavily dependent upon imports and, as the economy expands, the demand for foreign currency increases. According to Bloomberg , "this means, the more the economy grows, the greater the pressure on dollar reserves. It doesn't help that these were built up almost entirely through foreign borrowing, pushing Egypt's foreign debt from $55 billion in 2016 to $92 billion in late 2018. It won't be long before the country's finances are once again in crisis." Many experts argue that to sustain growth over the long term, Egypt requires dramatic expansion of the nonhydrocarbon private sector. For decades, Egypt's military has played a key role in the nation's economy as a food producer and low-cost domestic manufacturer of consumable products; however, due to political sensitivities, the extent of its economic power is rarely quantified. Egypt's military is largely economically self-sufficient. It produces what it consumes (food and clothes) and then sells surplus goods for additional revenue. Egyptian military companies have been the main beneficiaries of the massive infrastructure contracts Sisi has commissioned. Moreover, military-owned manufacturing companies have expanded into new markets, producing goods (appliances, solar panels, some electronics, and some medical equipment) that are cheaper than either foreign imports or domestically produced goods made by the private sector. Terrorism and Islamist Militancy in Egypt President Sisi, who led the 2013 military intervention and was elected president in mid-2014, came to power promising not only to defeat violent Salafi-Jihadi terrorist groups militarily, but also to counter their foundational ideology, which President Sisi and his supporters often attribute to the Muslim Brotherhood. President Sisi has outlawed the Muslim Brotherhood while launching a more general crackdown against a broad spectrum of opponents, both secular and Islamist. While Egypt is no longer beset by the kind of large-scale civil unrest and public protest it faced during the immediate post-Mubarak era, it continues to face terrorist and insurgent violence, both in the Sinai Peninsula and in the rest of Egypt. Sinai Peninsula Terrorists based in the Sinai Peninsula (the Sinai) have been waging an insurgency against the Egyptian government since 2011. While the terrorist landscape in Egypt is evolving and encompasses several groups, the Islamic State's Sinai Province affiliate (IS-SP) is known as the most lethal. Since its affiliation with the Islamic State in 2014, IS-SP has attacked the Egyptian military continually, targeted Coptic Christian individuals and places of worship, and occasionally fired rockets into Israel. In October 2015, IS-SP targeted Russian tourists departing the Sinai by planting a bomb aboard Metrojet Flight 9268, which exploded midair, killing all 224 passengers and crew aboard. Two years later, on November 24, 2017, IS-SP gunmen launched an attack against the Al Rawdah mosque in the town of Bir al Abed in northern Sinai. That attack killed at least 305 people, making it the deadliest terrorist attack in Egypt's modern history. Combating terrorism in the Sinai is particularly challenging due to an array of factors, including the following: Geograph y : The peninsula's interior is mountainous and sparsely populated, providing militants with ample freedom of movement. Demograph y and Culture : The Sinai's northern population is a mix of Palestinians and Bedouin Arab tribes whose relationship to the state is filled with distrust. Sinai Bedouin have faced discrimination and exclusion from full citizenship and access to the economy. In the absence of development, a black market economy based primarily on smuggling has thrived, further contributing to the popular portrayal of Bedouin as outlaws. State authorities charge that the Sinai Bedouin seek autonomy from the central government, while residents insist on obtaining basic rights, such as property rights, full citizenship, and access to government services such as education and health care. Econom ics : Bedouins claim that Egypt has underinvested in northern Sinai, channeling development toward southern tourist destinations that cater to foreign visitors. Northern Sinai consists of mostly flat desert terrain inhospitable to large-scale agriculture without significant investment in irrigation. For decades, the Egyptian state has claimed to follow successive Sinai development plans. However, Egyptian governance and development of the Sinai has been hampered by corruption. Diploma cy : The 1979 Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty limits the number of soldiers that Egypt can deploy in the Sinai, subject to the parties' ability to negotiate changes as circumstances necessitate. Egypt and Israel mutually agree upon any short-term increase of Egypt's military presence in the Sinai. Since Israel returned control over the Sinai to Egypt in 1982, the area has been partially demilitarized, and the Sinai has served as an effective buffer zone between the two countries. The Multinational Force and Observers, or MFO, are deployed in the Sinai to monitor the terms of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty (see Figure 5 ). Egypt and Israel reportedly continue to cooperate in countering terrorism in the Sinai. In a televised interview, President Sisi responded to a question on whether Egyptian-Israeli military cooperation was the closest it has ever been, saying "That is correct. The [Egyptian] Air Force sometimes needs to cross to the Israeli side. And that's why we have a wide range of coordination with the Israelis." One news account suggests that Israel, with Egypt's approval, has used its own drones, helicopters, and aircraft to carry out more than 100 covert airstrikes inside Egypt against militant targets. In order to counter IS-SP in northern Sinai, the Egyptian armed forces and police have declared a state of emergency, imposed curfews and travel restrictions, and erected police checkpoints along main roads. Authorities also have limited domestic and foreign media access to the northern Sinai, declaring it an active combat zone and unsafe for journalists. According to Jane's Defence Weekly , Egypt may be upgrading an old air base in the Sinai (Bir Gifgafa), where it could deploy Apache attack helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles for use in counterterrorism operations. While an increased Egyptian military presence in the Sinai may be necessary to stabilize the area, many observers have argued that military means alone are insufficient. These critics say that force should be accompanied by policies to reduce the appeal of antigovernment militancy by addressing local political and economic grievances. According to one account: Sinai residents are prohibited from joining any senior post in the state. They cannot work in the army, police, judiciary, or in diplomacy. Meanwhile, no development projects have been undertaken in North Sinai the past 40 years. The villages of Rafah and Sheikh Zuwayed have no schools or hospitals and no modern system to receive potable water. They depend on rainwater and wells, as if it were the Middle Ages. Egyptian counterterrorism efforts in the Sinai appear to have reduced the frequency of terrorist attacks somewhat. In February 2018, the military launched an offensive campaign, dubbed "Operation Sinai 2018." During the campaign, the military deployed tens of thousands of troops to the peninsula and was able to eliminate several senior IS-SP leaders. One report suggests that unlike previous military operations against militants in the Sinai, this time the Egyptian military armed progovernment tribesmen to assist conventional forces in combating IS-SP. According to one analysis, the military's recent campaign has "to some degree, restricted the militants' movements, destroyed a number of hideouts, and most importantly eliminated several trained and influential elements." However, as in previous major operations, once the military reduces its presence in northern Sinai, terrorist groups may reconstitute themselves. In March 2019, CENTCOM Commander General Joseph L. Votel testified before Congress, stating that the "Egyptian Armed Forces have more effectively fought ISIS in the Sinai and are now taking active measures to address the underlying issues that give life to—to these violent extremist groups and are helping to contain the threat." Beyond the Sinai: Other Egyptian Insurgent Groups Outside of the Sinai, either in the western desert near the Libya border or other areas (Cairo, Nile Delta, Upper Egypt), small nationalist insurgent groups, such as Liwa al Thawra (The Revolution Brigade) and Harakat Sawaed Misr (Arms of Egypt Movement, referred to by its Arabic acronym HASM), have carried out high-level assassinations of military/police officials and bombings of infrastructure. According to one expert, these insurgent groups are comprised mainly of former Muslim Brotherhood activists who have splintered off from the main organization to wage an insurgency against the government. On January 31, 2018, the U.S. State Department designated Liwa al Thawra and HASM as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs) under Section 1(b) of Executive Order (E.O.) 13224. The State Department noted that some of the leaders of both groups "were previously associated with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood." Terrorist attacks against key sectors of the economy continue. In December 2018, a bus carrying a group of Vietnamese tourists to the pyramids in Giza hit a roadside bomb killing 4 people and injuring 11 others. No group claimed responsibility for the attack. In February 2019, a terrorist detonated a suicide bomb he was carrying while being pursued by police, killing himself and two officers near Cairo's popular Khan el Khalili market and famous Al Azhar Mosque. Egypt's Foreign Policy Israel and the Palestinians Egypt and Israel have continued to find specific areas in which they can cooperate. In 2018, Israeli and Egyptian companies entered into a decade-long agreement by reaching a $15 billion natural gas deal, according to which Israeli off-shore natural gas will be exported to Egypt for liquefaction before being exported elsewhere (see " The Economy " above). While people-to-people relations remain cold, Israel and Egypt continue to cooperate against Hamas in the Gaza Strip. In mid-November 2018, Egyptian mediation between Israel and Hamas helped calm tensions after an Israeli raid inside Gaza escalated tensions. Egypt reportedly continues to broker indirect Israel-Hamas talks aimed at establishing a long-term cease-fire. Egypt is opposed to Islamist groups wielding political power across the Middle East, and opposes Turkish and Qatari support for Hamas. On the Egyptian-Gaza border, Egypt has tried to thwart arms tunnel smuggling into Gaza and has accused Palestinian militants in Gaza of aiding terrorist groups in the Sinai. In order to weaken Hamas's rule in Gaza, Egypt has sought to restore a Palestinian Authority (PA) presence in Gaza by reconciling it with the PA. Though Egypt has helped broker several agreements aimed at ending the West Bank-Gaza split, Hamas still effectively controls Gaza. Egypt controls the Rafah border crossing into Gaza, the only non-Israeli-controlled entryway into the Strip, which it periodically closes for security reasons. Control over the Rafah border crossing provides Egypt with some leverage over Hamas, though Egyptian authorities use it carefully in order not to spark a humanitarian crisis on their border. Gulf Arab Monarchies Egypt's relations with most Gulf Arab monarchies are strong. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Kuwait have provided billions of dollars in financial assistance to Egypt's military-backed government since 2013. Saudi Arabia also hosts nearly 3 million Egyptian expatriates who work in the kingdom, providing a valuable source of remittances for Egyptians back home. From 2013 onward, Emirati companies have made significant investments in the Egyptian economy. Egypt transferred sovereignty to Saudi Arabia over two islands at the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba—Tiran and Sanafir—that had been under Egyptian control since 1950, in a move that sparked rare public criticism of President Sisi. In June 2017, Egypt joined other Gulf Arab monarchies in boycotting Qatar. In Yemen, Egypt is officially part of the Saudi-led coalition against Houthi forces, though its contribution to the war effort has been minimal. Libya The Egyptian government supports Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar and the Libyan National Army (LNA) movement, which controls most of eastern Libya. Haftar's politics closely align with President Sisi's, as both figures hail from the military and broadly oppose Islamist political forces. From a security standpoint, Egypt seeks the restoration of order on its western border, which has experienced occasional terrorist attacks and arms smuggling. From an economic standpoint, thousands of Egyptian guest workers were employed in Libya's energy sector prior to unrest in Libya in 2011, and Egypt seeks their return to Libya and a resumption of the vital remittances those workers provided the Egyptian economy. Diplomatically, Egypt has tried to leverage its close ties to Haftar and the LNA in order to play the role of mediator between the LNA and Fayez al Sarraj, the Chairman of the Presidential Council of Libya and Prime Minister of the U.N.-backed Government of National Accord. Egypt's policy toward Libya also is closely aligned with other foreign backers of the LNA, including France and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Reportedly, the three countries are working in concert to strengthen the position of Haftar in order to facilitate the eventual reunification of the Libyan army. A 2019 LNA offensive into southern Libya has placed additional pressure on the Government of National Accord and may complicate U.S.-backed efforts by the United Nations to facilitate a national dialogue, constitutional referendum, and elections in 2019. Egypt and the Nile Basin Countries To Egypt's south, the government is embroiled in regional disputes with Nile Basin countries, such as Ethiopia, which is nearing completion of the $4.2 billion Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, a major hydroelectric project. Egypt argues that the dam, once filled, will limit the flow of the Nile River below Egypt's agreed share. However, many analysts expect that Egypt will address the dispute by increasing water-use efficiency and investing in desalination, rather than using its military to bomb the dam. Reduced Nile flow into Egypt may exacerbate existing water shortages and cause short-term political problems for the Egyptian government, which faces extensive domestic water needs. In February 2019, President Sisi assumed the one-year chairmanship of the African Union, during which he is expected to promote closer relations with fellow African states. Egypt and Russia Egypt and Russia, close allies in early years of the Cold War, have again strengthened bilateral ties under President Sisi, who has promised to restore Egyptian stability and international prestige. His relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin has rekindled, in the words of one observer, "a romanticized memory of relations with Russia during the Nasser era." President Sisi first turned to Russia during the Obama Administration, when U.S.-Egyptian ties were strained, and Egypt seemed intent on signaling its displeasure with U.S. policy. Since 2014, Egypt and Russia have improved ties in a number of ways, including through arms deals. Reportedly, Egypt is upgrading its aging fleet of legacy Soviet MiG-21 aircraft to a fourth generation MiG-29M variant with additional deliveries to Egypt in 2018 (first delivered in April 2017). Egypt also has purchased 46 standard Ka-52 Russian attack helicopters for its air force. Egypt reportedly also has purchased the naval version of the Ka-52 for use on Egypt's two French-procured Mistral-class helicopter dock vessels (see below), and the S-300VM surface-to-air missile defense system from Russia. In August 2018, Egyptian Defense Minister Mohamed Zaki visited Russia, where he attended a Russian arms exhibition. Additionally, Egypt and Russia reportedly have expanded their cooperation on nuclear energy. In 2015, Egypt reached a deal with Russian state energy firm Rosatom to construct a 4,800-megawatt nuclear power plant in the Egyptian Mediterranean coastal town of Daba'a, 80 miles northwest of Cairo. Russia is lending Egypt $25 billion over 35 years to finance the construction and operation of the nuclear power plant (this will cover 85% of the project's total costs). The contract also commits Russia to supply the plant's nuclear fuel for 60 years and transfer and store depleted nuclear fuel from the reactors. As Egyptian and Russian foreign policies have become more closely aligned in conflict zones such as eastern Libya, bilateral military cooperation has expanded. One report suggests that Russian Special Forces based out of an airbase in Egypt's western desert (Sidi Barrani) may be aiding General Haftar. In November 2017, Egypt and Russia signed a draft agreement governing the use of each other's air space. While Egyptian-Russian ties have grown warmer in recent years, they are not without complications. In the aftermath of an October 2015 terrorist attack against a Russian passenger jet departing from Sharm El Sheikh, visits to Egypt by Russian tourists, previously the country's largest source of tourists, dropped significantly. Russian commercial aircraft have resumed direct flights to Cairo but not to Sharm El Sheikh. Egypt and Russia also engaged in a trade dispute in 2016 over Russian wheat imports. Egypt is the largest global importer of wheat, and the largest export market for Russian wheat. France Aside from Russia, France stands out as a non-U.S. country with which President Sisi has sought to build a diplomatic and military procurement relationship. In the last five years, as French-Egyptian ties have improved, Egypt has purchased major air and naval defense systems from French defense contractors, including the following: Four Gowind Corvettes (produced by Naval Group)—This deal was signed in July 2014. As part of the French-Egyptian arrangement, some of the Corvette construction has taken place at the Alexandria Shipyard in Egypt. One FREMM multi-mission Frigate (produced by Naval Group)—Named the Tahya Misr (Long Live Egypt), this vessel was delivered to Egypt in 2015. This ship has participated in an annual joint French-Egyptian naval exercise, known as Cleopatra. In February 2015, Egypt purchased 24 Rafale multirole fighters (produced by Dassault Aviation). Under the initial agreement, Egypt and France may enter into a new procurement agreement for 12 additional Rafale fighters. According to the manufacturer, the Rafale has flown in combat in Afghanistan, Libya, Mali, Iraq, and Syria and is used by Egypt, Qatar, and India. In 2018, French officials said that the United States would not permit France to export the SCALP air-launched land-attack cruise missile used on the Rafale to Egypt under the International Trade in Arms Regulation (ITAR) agreement. The United States may have been concerned over the transfer of sensitive technology to Egypt. Two Mistral-class Helicopter Carriers (produced by Naval Group)—In the fall of 2015, France announced that it would sell Egypt two Mistral-class Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) vessels (each carrier can carry 16 helicopters, 4 landing craft, and 13 tanks) for $1 billion. The LHDs (ENS Anwar El Sadat and ENS Gamal Abdel Nasser ) were delivered in 2016. In 2017, Egypt announced that it would purchase Russian 46 Ka-52 Alligator helicopters, which can operate on the LHDs. In January 2019, French President Emmanuel Macron paid a three-day visit to Egypt, where he raised human rights issues in public and with Egyptian authorities and civil society representatives. According to Macron, "I can't see how you can pretend to ensure long-term stability in this country, which was at the heart of the Arab Spring and showed its taste for freedom, and think you can continue to harden beyond what's acceptable or justified for security reasons." Trump Administration Policy toward Egypt President Trump has praised the Egyptian government's counterterrorism efforts while his Administration has worked to restore high-level diplomatic engagement, joint military exercises, and arms sales. Many commentators initially expected President Trump to bring the United States and Egypt closer together, and that largely has been the case. The Administration has withheld some foreign assistance for policy reasons on at least one occasion, however, and the United States has not had an ambassador in Cairo since June 30, 2017. As evidence of improved bilateral ties, the U.S. Defense Department notified Congress in November 2018 of a major $1 billion sale of defense equipment to Egypt, consisting of 10 AH-64E Apache Attack Helicopters, among other things. The Egyptian Air Force already possesses 45 less advanced versions of the Apache that were acquired between 2000 and 2014. In January 2019, U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo delivered a major policy speech at the American University in Cairo, where he stated: "And as we seek an even stronger partnership with Egypt, we encourage President Sisi to unleash the creative energy of Egypt's people, unfetter the economy, and promote a free and open exchange of ideas. The progress made to date can continue." U.S. officials have not yet publicly criticized efforts by supporters of President Sisi to advance amendments to the constitution (see above) to extend the possibility of Sisi's continued presidency. Human rights advocates have called for Western governments to withhold assistance to Egypt if the amendments are approved. According to Human Rights Watch , "Al-Sisi's government is encouraged by the continued silence of its allies, and if the US, UK, and France want to avoid the destabilizing consequences of entrenching authoritarian rule in Egypt, they should act now." On February 22, 2019, a bipartisan group of national security experts called on U.S. officials to "express strong concern about the amendments to the Egyptian constitution now moving through a rapid approval process." Egypt's poor record on human rights and democratization has sparked regular criticism from U.S. officials and some Members of Congress. Since FY2012, Members have passed appropriations legislation that withholds the obligation of FMF to Egypt until the Secretary of State certifies that Egypt is taking various steps toward supporting democracy and human rights. With the exception of FY2014, lawmakers have included a national security waiver to allow the Administration to waive these congressionally mandated certification requirements under certain conditions. Over the last year, the Administration has obligated several tranches of FMF to Egypt, including the following: In September 2018, the Administration obligated $1 billion in FY2018 FMF. Per Section 7041(a)(3)(A) of P.L. 115-141 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2018, $300 million in FMF remains withheld from obligation until the Secretary of State certifies that Egypt is taking various steps toward supporting democracy and human rights. In previous acts, the amount withheld had been $195 million. FY2018 FMF for Egypt remains available to be expended until September 30, 2019. In August 2018, the Administration waived the certification requirement in Section 7041(a)(3)(B) of P.L. 115-31 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2017, allowing for the obligation of $195 million in FY2017 FMF, which occurred in September 2018. However, according to one report, Senator Patrick Leahy has placed a hold on $105 million in FY2017 FMF and is seeking more information on the plight of detained Egyptian-American Moustafa Kassem. In January 2018, the Administration notified Congress of its intent to obligate $1.039 billion in FY2017 FMF out of a total of $1.3 billion appropriated for FY2017. It chose not to obligate $65.7 million in FY2017 FMF. The remaining $195 million had been withheld until a national security waiver was issued in August 2018 (see above). For FY2019, the President requested a total of $1.381 billion in foreign assistance for Egypt, the same amount requested for the previous year. Nearly all of the requested funds for Egypt are for the FMF account. For FY2020, the request is nearly identical from previous years, as the President is seeking a total of $1.382 billion in bilateral assistance for Egypt. The FY2019 Omnibus ( P.L. 116-6 ) provides the following for Egypt: a total of $1.419 billion in bilateral U.S. foreign assistance for Egypt, of which $1.3 billion is in FMF, $112.5 million in ESF, $3 million in NADR, $2 million in INCLE, and $1.8 million in IMET; and a reauthorization of ESF to support future loan guarantees to Egypt; P.L. 116-6 sets the following conditions for Egypt: As in previous years, it requires that funds may only be made available when the Secretary of State certifies that the government of Egypt is sustaining the strategic relationship with the United States and meeting its obligations under the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty. As in previous years, the act withholds ESF that "the Secretary determines to be equivalent to that expended by the United States Government for bail, and by nongovernmental organizations for legal and court fees, associated with democracy-related trials in Egypt until the Secretary certifies and reports to the Committees on Appropriations that the Government of Egypt has dismissed the convictions issued by the Cairo Criminal Court on June 4, 2013, in Public Prosecution Case No. 1110 for the Year 2012 and has not subjected the defendants to further prosecution or if convicted they have been granted full pardons ." This last condition (bolded) was added in 2019 to account for the acquittal of the 43 foreign defendants in Case 173 (see above). As in previous years, the FY2019 Omnibus also includes a limitation on ESF, stating that no FY2018 ESF or prior-year ESF "may be made available for a contribution, voluntary or otherwise, to the Civil Associations and Foundations Support Fund, or any similar fund, established pursuant to Law 70 on Associations and Other Foundations Working in the Field of Civil Work [informally known as the NGO law]." As in previous years, the act also includes a provision that withholds $300 million of FMF funds until the Secretary of State certifies that the Government of Egypt is taking effective steps to advance, among other things, democracy and human rights in Egypt. The Secretary of State may waive this certification requirement, though any waiver must be accompanied by, among other things, an assessment of the Government of Egypt's compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 2270 and other such resolutions regarding North Korea. There has been some concern in the Administration and Congress over Egypt's alleged weapons procurement from North Korea in recent years. P.L. 115-245 , the Department of Defense (DOD) and Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education Appropriations Act, 2019 and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2019, specifies that the Secretary of Defense may provide Egypt with funds from the Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund (CTEF) to enhance its border security. To date, Egypt has not received security assistance from DOD-managed accounts. Appendix. Background on U.S. Foreign Assistance to Egypt Overview Between 1946 and 2016, the United States provided Egypt with $78.3 billion in bilateral foreign aid (calculated in historical dollars—not adjusted for inflation). The 1979 Peace Treaty between Israel and Egypt ushered in the current era of U.S. financial support for peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors. In two separate memoranda accompanying the treaty, the United States outlined commitments to Israel and Egypt, respectively. In its letter to Israel, the Carter Administration pledged to "endeavor to take into account and will endeavor to be responsive to military and economic assistance requirements of Israel." In his letter to Egypt, former U.S. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown wrote the following: In the context of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, the United States is prepared to enter into an expanded security relationship with Egypt with regard to the sales of military equipment and services and the financing of, at least a portion of those sales, subject to such Congressional review and approvals as may be required. All U.S. foreign aid to Egypt (or any foreign recipient) is appropriated and authorized by Congress . The 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty is a bilateral peace agreement between Egypt and Israel, and the United States is not a legal party to the treaty. The treaty itself does not include any U.S. aid obligations, and any assistance commitments to Israel and Egypt that could be potentially construed in conjunction with the treaty were through ancillary documents or other communications and were—by their terms—subject to congressional approval (see above). However, as the peace broker between Israel and Egypt, the United States has traditionally provided foreign aid to both countries to ensure a regional balance of power and sustain security cooperation with both countries. In some cases, an Administration may sign a bilateral "Memorandum of Understanding" (MOU) with a foreign country pledging a specific amount of foreign aid to be provided over a selected time period subject to the approval of Congress. In the Middle East, the United States has signed foreign assistance MOUs with Israel and Jordan. Currently, there is no U.S.-Egyptian MOU specifying a specific amount of total U.S. aid pledged to Egypt over a certain time period. Congress typically specifies a precise allocation of most foreign assistance for Egypt in the foreign operations appropriations bill. Egypt receives the bulk of foreign aid funds from three primary accounts: Foreign Military Financing (FMF), Economic Support Funds (ESF), and International Military Education and Training (IMET). The United States offers IMET training to Egyptian officers in order to facilitate U.S.-Egyptian military cooperation over the long term. Military Aid and Arms Sales Overview Since the 1979 Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty, the United States has provided Egypt with large amounts of military assistance. U.S. policymakers have routinely justified this aid to Egypt as an investment in regional stability, built primarily on long-running military cooperation and sustaining the treaty—principles that are supposed to be mutually reinforcing. Egypt has used U.S. military aid through the FMF to (among other things) purchase major U.S. defense systems, such as the F-16 fighter aircraft, the M1A1 Abrams battle tank, and the AH-64 Apache attack helicopter. Realigning Military Aid from Conventional to Counterterrorism Equipment For decades, FMF grants have supported Egypt's purchases of large-scale conventional military equipment from U.S. suppliers. However, as mentioned above, the Obama Administration announced that future FMF grants may only be used to purchase equipment specifically for "counterterrorism, border security, Sinai security, and maritime security" (and for sustainment of weapons systems already in Egypt's arsenal). It is not yet clear how the Trump Administration will determine which U.S.-supplied military equipment would help the Egyptian military counter terrorism and secure its land and maritime borders. Overall, some defense experts continue to view the Egyptian military as inadequately prepared, both doctrinally and tactically, to face the threat posed by terrorist/insurgent groups such as Sinai Province. According to a former U.S. National Security Council official, "they [the Egyptian military] understand they have got a problem in Sinai, but they have been unprepared to invest in the capabilities to deal with it." To reorient the military toward unconventional warfare, the Egyptian military needs, according to one assessment, "heavy investment into rapid reaction forces equipped with sophisticated infantry weapons, optics and communication gear ... backed by enhanced intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance platforms. In order to transport them, Egypt would also need numerous modern aviation assets." Special Military Assistance Benefits for Egypt In addition to substantial amounts of annual U.S. military assistance, Egypt has benefited from certain aid provisions that have been available to only a few other countries. For example Early Disbursal and Interest - Bearing Account : Between FY2001 and FY2011, Congress granted Egypt early disbursement of FMF funds (within 30 days of the enactment of appropriations legislation) to an interest-bearing account at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Interest accrued from the rapid disbursement of aid has allowed Egypt to receive additional funding for the purchase of U.S.-origin equipment. In FY2012, Congress began to condition the obligation of FMF, requiring the Administration to certify certain conditions had been met before releasing FMF funds, thereby eliminating their automatic early disbursal. However, Congress has permitted Egypt to continue to earn interest on FMF funds already deposited in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program provides one means by which the United States can advance foreign policy objectives—assisting friendly and allied nations through provision of equipment in excess of the requirements of its own defense forces. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) manages the EDA program, which enables the United States to reduce its inventory of outdated equipment by providing friendly countries with necessary supplies at either reduced rates or no charge. As a designated "major non-NATO ally," Egypt is eligible to receive EDA under Section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act and Section 23(a) of the Arms Export Control Act. Economic Aid Overview Over the past two decades, U.S. economic aid to Egypt has been reduced by over 90%, from $833 million in FY1998 to a request of $75 million for FY2019. Beginning in the mid to late 1990s, as Egypt moved from an impoverished country to a lower-middle-income economy, the United States and Egypt began to rethink the assistance relationship, emphasizing "trade not aid." Congress began to scale back economic aid both to Egypt and Israel due to a 10-year agreement reached between the United States and Israel in the late 1990s known as the "Glide Path Agreement," which gradually reduced U.S. economic aid to Egypt to $400 million by 2008. U.S. economic aid to Egypt stood at $200 million per year by the end of the George W. Bush Administration, whose relations with then-President Hosni Mubarak suffered over the latter's reaction to the Administration's democracy agenda in the Arab world. During the final years of the Obama Administration, distrust of U.S. democracy promotion assistance led the Egyptian government to obstruct many U.S.-funded economic assistance programs. According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) reported hundreds of millions of dollars ($460 million as of 2015) in unobligated prior year ESF funding. As these unobligated balances grew, it created pressure on the Obama Administration to reobligate ESF funds for other purposes. In 2016, the Obama Administration notified Congress that it was reprogramming $108 million of ESF that had been appropriated for Egypt in FY2015 but remained unobligated for other purposes. The Administration claimed that its actions were due to "continued government of Egypt process delays that have impeded the effective implementation of several programs." In 2017, the Trump Administration also reprogrammed FY2016 ESF for Egypt. U.S. economic aid to Egypt is divided into two components: (1) USAID-managed programs (public health, education, economic development, democracy and governance); and (2) the U.S.-Egyptian Enterprise Fund. Both are funded primarily through the Economic Support Fund (ESF) appropriations account.

Historically, Egypt has been an important country for U.S. national security interests based on its geography, demography, and diplomatic posture. Egypt controls the Suez Canal, which is one of the world's most well-known maritime chokepoints, linking the Mediterranean and Red Seas. Egypt, with its population of more than 100 million people, is by far the most populous Arabic-speaking country. Although it may not play the same type of leading political or military role in the Arab world as it has in the past, Egypt may retain some "soft power" by virtue of its history, media, and culture. Cairo plays host both to the 22-member Arab League and Al Azhar University, which claims to be the oldest continuously operating university in the world and has symbolic importance as a leading source of Islamic scholarship. Additionally, Egypt's 1979 peace treaty with Israel remains one of the most significant diplomatic achievements for the promotion of Arab-Israeli peace. While people-to-people relations remain cold, the Israeli and Egyptian governments have increased their cooperation against Islamist militants and instability in the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip. Personnel moves and possible amendments to the Egyptian constitution highlight apparent efforts by President Sisi to consolidate power with the help of political allies, including colleagues from Egypt's security establishment. President Sisi has come under repeated international criticism for an ongoing government crackdown against various forms of political dissent and freedom of expression. The Egyptian government has defended its human rights record, asserting that the country is under pressure from terrorist groups seeking to destabilize Arab nation-states. The Trump Administration has tried to normalize ties with the Sisi government that were generally perceived as strained under President Obama. In January 2019, U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo delivered a major policy speech at the American University in Cairo, where he stated, "And as we seek an even stronger partnership with Egypt, we encourage President Sisi to unleash the creative energy of Egypt's people, unfetter the economy, and promote a free and open exchange of ideas." The United States has provided significant military and economic assistance to Egypt since the late 1970s. Successive U.S. Administrations have justified aid to Egypt as an investment in regional stability, built primarily on long-running cooperation with the Egyptian military and on sustaining the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. All U.S. foreign aid to Egypt (or any recipient) is appropriated and authorized by Congress. Since 1946, the United States has provided Egypt with over $83 billion in bilateral foreign aid (calculated in historical dollars—not adjusted for inflation). Annual appropriations legislation includes several conditions governing the release of these funds. All U.S. military aid to Egypt finances the procurement of weapons systems and services from U.S. defense contractors. For FY2019, Congress has appropriated $1.4 billion in total bilateral assistance for Egypt, the same amount it provided in FY2018. For FY2020, the President is requesting a total of $1.382 billion in bilateral assistance for Egypt. Nearly all of the U.S. funds for Egypt come from the FMF account (military aid). In November 2018, the U.S. Defense Department notified Congress of a major $1 billion sale of defense equipment to Egypt, consisting of 10 AH-64E Apache Attack Helicopters, among other things. Beyond the United States, President Sisi has broadened Egypt's international base of support to include several key partners, including the Arab Gulf states, Israel, Russia, and France. In the last five years, as French-Egyptian ties have improved, Egypt has purchased major air and naval defense systems from French defense companies.

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Introduction This report identifies selected current major trade issues for U.S. agriculture that may be of interest to the 116 th Congress. It provides background on individual trade issues and attempts to bring perspective on the significance of each for U.S. agricultural trade. Each trade issue summary concludes with an assessment of its current status. The report begins by examining a series of overarching issues. These issues include U.S. agricultural trade and its importance to the agricultural sector, a brief description of the trade policy being pursued by the Trump Administration and its ramifications for U.S. agricultural exports, the Administration's actions to mitigate the economic impact on agriculture from retaliatory actions by trading partners against its trade policies, and the implications for U.S. agriculture of the U.S. withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement. The report then reviews a number of ongoing trade disputes and trade negotiations while also examining a series of narrower trade issues of importance to the agricultural sector. The format for these more focused trade issues is similar, consisting of background and perspective on the issue at hand and an assessment of their current status. Overview of U.S. Agricultural Trade1 U.S. agricultural exports have long been a bright spot in the U.S. balance of trade, with exports exceeding imports in every year since 1960. In recent years, the value of farm exports have experienced a downturn from the record level recorded in FY2014. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) forecasts U.S. agricultural exports in FY2019 at $141.5 billion (see Figure 1 ). If realized, this total would represent a decline from FY2018, when exports totaled $143 billion. Exports in FY2018 were $3 billion above the FY2017 total but almost $11 billion below the peak of $152.3 billion in FY2014. The decline in the value of farm exports since FY2014 initially reflected lower market prices for bulk commodities, such as soybeans and corn. Agricultural prices and U.S. exports of certain bulk commodities such as soybeans were further affected in 2018 by retaliatory tariffs imposed on selected U.S. agricultural imports by China, Canada, Mexico, the European Union (EU), and Turkey. The retaliatory tariffs were in response to the Trump Administration's imposition of Section 301 tariffs on certain imports from China and Section 232 tariffs on U.S. imports of steel and aluminum. U.S. agricultural imports are forecast to total $128 billion in FY2019, slightly up from $127.6 billion in FY2018, resulting in an agricultural trade surplus of $13.5 billion. This would be below the surplus of $15.8 billion in FY2018 and below the record high in nominal dollars of $43.1 billion in FY2014. Agricultural exports are important both to farmers and to the U.S. economy. During the calendar years 2017 and 2018, the value of U.S. agricultural exports accounted for 8% and 9% of total U.S. exports, respectively, and 5% of total U.S. imports, according to the U.S. Census data. As for the contribution of U.S. agricultural exports to the overall U.S. economy, USDA's Economic Research Service (ERS) estimates that in 2017 each dollar of U.S. agricultural exports stimulated an additional $1.30 in business activity. Moreover, that same year, U.S. agricultural exports generated an estimated 1,161,000 full-time civilian jobs, including 795,000 jobs outside the farm sector. With the productivity of U.S. agriculture growing faster than domestic demand, farmers and agriculturally oriented firms rely on export markets to sustain prices and revenue. Within the agricultural sector itself, the importance of exports account for around 20% of total farm production by value. Export markets are a major outlet for many farm commodities, absorbing over one-half of U.S. output for cotton and about half of total U.S. production for wheat, soybeans, and some specialty crops. Within the overall mix of agricultural exports, soybeans, corn, other feed crops, and wheat continue to rank at or near the top of the list of farm exports by volume. The high-value product (HVP) category—which includes such products as live animals, meat, dairy products, fruits and vegetables, nuts, fats, hides, manufactured feeds, sugar products, processed fruits and vegetables, and other processed food products—comprises the largest share of exports in value terms. In FY2018, the HVP share of the value of U.S. agricultural exports represented 66% of the total. All U.S. states export agricultural commodities, but a minority of states account for a majority of farm export sales. In calendar year 2017, the 10 leading agricultural exporting states based on value—California, Iowa, Illinois, Texas, Minnesota, Nebraska, Kansas, Indiana, North Dakota, and Missouri—accounted for 57% of the total value of U.S. agricultural exports that year. Status : In December 2018, Congress reauthorized major agricultural export promotion programs through FY2023 with the passage of the so-called 2018 farm bill ( P.L. 115-334 ). Title III of the farm bill includes provisions covering export credit guarantee programs, export market development programs, and international science and technical exchange programs that are designed to develop agricultural export markets in emerging economies. Trump Administration Trade Policy11 In establishing policy for U.S. participation in international trade, the Trump Administration has placed increased emphasis on trade deficits, which it views as an indicator of "unfair" foreign trade practices, with potential implications for U.S. industry and jobs. With the objective of reducing trade deficits, the Administration's trade policy has focused on withdrawing from or renegotiating existing trade agreements that the Administration views as being "unfair;" initiating new bilateral agreements; and responding to the trade practices of U.S. trade partners (whether geopolitical ally or adversary) that it views as unfair, illegal, or threatening to U.S. industry, with punitive trade actions. The punitive actions have included the imposition of Section 232 tariffs on U.S. imports of steel and aluminum and Section 301 tariffs on U.S. imports of products from China. The direction of the Administration's trade policy—for example, withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement with Japan and 10 other Pacific-facing nations and engaging in trade disputes with important agricultural trading partners that have resulted in retaliatory tariffs on U.S. agricultural products—has coincided with market share losses for certain U.S. agricultural exports. The Trump Administration has taken the position that current trade agreements to which the United States is a party and where the U.S. has a trade deficit or where the Administration perceives that the United States is being treated unfairly must be renegotiated or the United States will withdraw from them. Furthermore, the Administration questions the benefits of multi-party agreements, viewing them in some instances as improper vehicles for achieving meaningful negotiations. The Administration has also threatened to withdraw from the World Trade Organization (WTO) if it fails to undergo certain reforms. In January 2017, the Trump Administration withdrew from the TPP, which was subsequently concluded by the remaining TPP signatories under a modified framework renamed the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) in March 2018. Under U.S. initiative, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was renegotiated as the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). USMCA was signed by the leaders of the three nations in November 2018 but requires legislative ratification to enter into force. In contrast to the Trump Administration's view of regional or multilateral negotiations, the Administration believes that greater potential gains can be achieved under bilateral negotiations where two countries can negotiate directly in the absence of group consensus. The Administration has sought to update some existing bilateral trade agreements and open new bilateral negotiations: The Administration negotiated selected modifications to the U.S.-South Korea free trade agreement. The Administration has notified Congress of its intent to begin negotiations under Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) with trading partners including Japan, the EU, and the United Kingdom (UK). The Administration is currently engaged in bilateral trade negotiations with China in an attempt to resolve the current trade dispute that has resulted in retaliatory tariffs on a wide range of U.S. agricultural products. Status : The Administration's trade policy actions have in some cases resulted in retaliatory tariffs against U.S. agricultural product exports, while the status of new agreements with several important agricultural trading partners, such as Canada and Mexico, remains uncertain. U.S. agricultural exports continue to be subject to retaliatory tariffs imposed by trading partners in response to the Administration's imposition of Section 232 tariffs on steel and aluminum and Section 301 tariffs on China. The signed USMCA awaits consideration by Congress and ratification by Canada and Mexico. Numerous stakeholders have raised concerns that U.S. agriculture will lose export market shares to competitors due to U.S. withdrawal from TPP and its absence from CPTPP. Some stakeholders wonder whether agriculture will be prioritized in all planned bilateral negotiations. The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) had indicated that it may pursue negotiations with Japan in stages, declaring that the automobiles sector will be a priority. At the same time, both President Trump and the Secretary of Agriculture have stated that U.S.-Japan negotiations would occur in stages with a "very quick" deal on agriculture. However, the Japanese economy minister has stated that the United States and Japan would not reach an agreement in any one sector before other sectors. Elsewhere, the EU negotiating mandate for conducting trade negotiations with the United States articulates that a key EU goal is "a trade agreement limited to the elimination of tariffs for industrial goods only, excluding agricultural products." As for the UK, it cannot formally negotiate or conclude a new trade agreement with the United States until it exits the EU. Retaliatory Tariffs on U.S. Agricultural Exports32 On March 23, 2018, the Trump Administration applied a 25% tariff to certain U.S. steel imports and a 10% tariff to certain U.S. aluminum imports under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. This action followed Department of Commerce (DOC) investigations that determined that current imports threaten U.S. national security. Citing objections to China's policies on intellectual property, technology, and innovation, the Administration also implemented three rounds of tariff increases under Section 301 on a total of $250 billion worth of Chinese products. Canada, China, Mexico, the EU, and Turkey—whose exports were affected by the steel and aluminum tariffs—retaliated with tariffs on imports of a range of U.S. agricultural and food products and other goods. India has proposed retaliatory tariffs on a number of U.S. agricultural products, but it has delayed implementation pending ongoing negotiations with the Trump Administration. In all, the retaliatory tariffs imposed by these trading partners have targeted more than 800 U.S. agricultural and food products. Exports of those products to these five trading partners amounted to $26.9 billion in calendar year 2017, or about 18% of global U.S. agricultural and food product exports of $150.8 billion that year. Retaliatory tariffs by China affect 99% of U.S. agricultural products exported to China. With a combination of Section 301 and Section 232 retaliations, China has levied retaliatory tariffs ranging from 5% to 50%, in addition to existing most-favored nation (MFN) tariffs, on more than 800 U.S. food and agricultural products that were worth about $20.6 billion in calendar year 2017. The products, subject to retaliatory tariffs, span all agricultural and food categories, including grains, meat and animal products, fruits and vegetables, seafood, and processed foods. The U.S. agricultural imports into China with the largest loss of markets since the tariffs were imposed in 2018, compared with 2017, are soybeans, cotton, sorghum, and hides and skins. Canada has levied retaliatory tariffs of 10% on more than 20 U.S. agricultural and food products that are otherwise duty free under NAFTA. U.S. exports most affected by these tariffs are roasted coffee, ketchup, various beverage waters, licorice and toffee, and orange juice. U.S. exports of the products subject to Canada's retaliatory tariffs were valued at $2.6 billion in 2017. Mexico has placed retaliatory tariffs of 15%-25% on a range of U.S. products that are otherwise duty free under NAFTA. U.S. exports to Mexico of these products amounted to approximately $2.5 billion in 2017. U.S. exports of cheese and pork have been the commodities most affected by Mexico's retaliatory tariffs as measured by reduced exports in 2018 compared with 2017. The EU has levied a 25% tariff on certain U.S. exports of prepared vegetables and legumes, grains, fruit juice, peanut butter, and whiskey, which together amounted to $1 billion in sales in 2017. Turkey has imposed retaliatory tariffs on U.S. tree nuts, rice, prepared foods, whiskey, and unmanufactured tobacco. U.S. exports of these products to Turkey totaled $250 million in 2017. A study from Purdue University found that the retaliatory tariffs could result in a reduction of U.S. agricultural exports by as much as $8 billion annually (in inflation adjusted values) after the markets have adjusted in the near future. The study also projects that the reduction in U.S. agricultural exports could lower agricultural land prices and result in the reallocation of 45,000 farm, ranch, and processing workers. Additionally, the authors suggest that U.S. soybean producers would see the most change in the wake of tariff retaliation, with exports potentially falling by 21% and land prices declining by about 18%. The impact estimated by the model would be affected over time by other policy shocks and technological and population changes that are not accounted for in the model. A recent United Nations study states that extended imposition of retaliatory tariffs will erode U.S. market share in favor of export competitors in the longer term. Status : U.S. agricultural exports continue to face retaliatory tariffs in response to the Administration's 2018 trade actions. The USDA forecasts U.S. agricultural exports for FY2019 at $141.5 billion compared with $143.4 billion in FY2018, reflecting its expectation that increased trade with other regions that are not involved in the tariff dispute will partially offset tariff-related trade losses, particularly with China. U.S. agricultural exports to China are forecast to decline in FY2019 by over $7 billion from $16 billion in FY2018. The United States and China are engaged in bilateral discussions to resolve the current trade dispute. USMCA—the proposed successor to NAFTA—does not address the Section 232 tariffs that led Canada and Mexico to impose retaliatory tariffs. Representatives of the U.S. business community, agriculture interest groups, other congressional leaders, and Canadian and Mexican government officials have stated that the Section 232 tariff issues must be resolved before USMCA enters into force. USDA's Trade-Aid Package in Response to Trade Retaliation38 On July 24, 2018, Secretary of Agriculture Sonny Perdue announced that the USDA would take several temporary actions to assist farmers in response to trade-related consequences from what the Administration characterized as "unjustified retaliation" against several U.S. agricultural products in 2018. Specifically, the Secretary said that the USDA would authorize up to $12 billion in financial assistance—referred to as a trade aid package—for certain agricultural commodities using the authority provided under Section 5 of the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) Charter Act (15 U.S.C. §714c). The Secretary initially stated that there would be no further trade-related financial assistance beyond this $12 billion package. However, on May 10, 2019, Secretary Perdue tweeted that the White House had directed USDA to work on a new aid package. The 2018 trade aid package includes (1) a Market Facilitation Program (MFP) of direct payments (valued at up to $10 billion) to producers of commodities most affected by the trade retaliation, (2) a Food Purchase and Distribution Program to partially offset lost export sales of affected commodities ($1.2 billion), and (3) an Agricultural Trade Promotion program to expand foreign markets ($200 million). The largest component of the trade aid package, the MFP, provides direct financial assistance to producers of commodities that are most impacted by actions of foreign governments resulting in the loss of traditional exports. Affected commodities include soybeans, corn, cotton, sorghum, wheat, hogs, dairy, fresh sweet cherries, and shelled almonds. USDA announced MFP per-unit payment rates to be applied to certified production of eligible commodities in 2018. USDA's Farm Service Agency administers the MFP. Eligible participants had to sign up for payments from September 2018 to February 2019. They also had to meet additional criteria, including being "actively engaged in farming," having an average adjusted gross income of less than $900,000, meeting conservation compliance provisions, and certifying their 2018 production with USDA by May 1, 2019. USDA determined the MFP per-unit payment rate based on the estimated "direct trade damage"—the difference in expected trade value for each affected commodity with and without the retaliatory tariffs. The estimated "trade damage" for each affected commodity was then divided by the crop's production in 2017 to derive a per-unit payment rate. Indirect effects—such as any decline in market prices for affected commodities that were used domestically rather than exported—were not included in the payment calculation. Based on 2017 production data, USDA estimated that approximately $9.6 billion would be distributed in MFP payments to eligible producers, with over three-fourths ($7.3 billion) of MFP payments provided to soybean producers. By linking MFP commodity payments only to the trade loss associated with each named MFP commodity, the payment formula favored commodities that relied more heavily on export markets than on domestic markets. Soybean growers and most farm-advocacy groups have generally been supportive of the payments, but some commodity groups—most notably associations representing corn, wheat, milk, and specialty crops—argued that the MFP payment formulation was inadequate to fully compensate their industries. For example, the National Corn Growers Association states that the 2018 trade disputes lowered corn prices by $0.44 per bushel for a potential total loss of $6.3 billion. Similarly, the National Association of Wheat Growers estimates a $0.75 per bushel decrease in domestic wheat prices that resulted in nearly $2.5 billion in lost value, while the National Milk Producers Federation has calculated that the retaliatory tariffs resulted in a $1.10 per hundredweight decline in domestic milk prices and over $1.2 billion in losses for milk producers based on milk futures prices. Similarly, many specialty crop groups contend that their tariff-related export losses were not fully compensated by the trade aid programs. To this point, a 2018 study by researchers at the University of California-Davis stated that, in California alone, specialty crops may suffer trade-related losses of over $3.3 billion on their 2018 production. Status: In March 2019, USDA estimated that a total of $8.7 billion in outlays would be made available under the MFP program, including $5.2 billion in 2018 and $3.5 billion in 2019. The large volume of payments could attract international attention about whether they are consistent with WTO rules and commitments on domestic support. The trade aid package raises a number of potential questions. For instance, if the United States and China do not reach an agreement in their ongoing tariff-driven trade negotiations, should another trade aid package, or some alternative compensatory measure, be provided in 2019, and possibly beyond? If MFP payments are to be repeated in the future, should USDA revise its payment formulation to provide a broader distribution of payments across the U.S. agricultural sector? U.S. Withdrawal from Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)47 The TPP was concluded on October 4, 2015, among 12 countries: the United States, Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam. The agreement had not yet entered into force when President Trump signed an executive order withdrawing the United States from TPP on January 23, 2017. On March 8, 2018, the remaining 11 countries concluded a revised agreement—the CPTPP. On December 30, 2018, the CPTPP entered into force among the first six countries to ratify the agreement—Canada, Australia, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, and Singapore. On January 14, 2019, the CPTPP entered into force for Vietnam. With the United States, the TPP would have become the world's largest trade agreement, covering 40% of the global economy and providing comprehensive market access through the elimination and reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers. The TPP provisions would have significantly increased the overseas markets to which U.S. farm and food products would have preferential access. The CPTPP provisions are based on the TPP. The agricultural provisions of the CPTPP seek to liberalize trade through lower tariffs, expanded tariff-rate quotas (TRQs), and agreements for reducing non-tariff barriers, including laws and regulations pertaining to products of agricultural biotechnology. In 2016, the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) had assessed the potential economic benefits from TPP ratification, projecting that by 2032 U.S. agricultural exports would be higher by $7.2 billion, or 2.6%, under TPP than without the agreement. Most of the increase in U.S. exports would have been concentrated in Japan (up $3.6 billion) and Vietnam (up $3.3 billion). CPTPP countries represent a major component of U.S. farm and food trade, providing markets for 42% of U.S. farm exports between 2015 and 2018 while also supplying 52% of U.S. agricultural imports. By one estimate, U.S. absence from CPTPP will lead to a decline in U.S. agricultural exports of about $1.8 billion (1.2% of FY2018 U.S. agricultural exports of $143 billion) per year. The combination of U.S. absence from CPTPP, retaliatory tariffs on U.S. farm and food exports, and the possibility of the United States withdrawing entirely from NAFTA—as President Trump has threatened in the absence of USMCA ratification—could lead to a potential annual drop in U.S. agricultural exports of $21.8 billion, according to a study commissioned by the Farm Foundation. As the CPTPP agreement is relatively new, the possible range of impact on U.S. agriculture is uncertain because of limited studies that are available. A broad cross-section of agricultural groups and food and agribusiness interests are concerned about losing potential export markets given U.S. absence from CPTPP. Under CPTPP, for example, Japanese tariffs on wheat imports will face a 50% reduction by 2025, which will put U.S. wheat exports to Japan at a competitive disadvantage. Similarly, the U.S. dairy industry estimates that by 2027, almost half of the U.S. dairy exports to Japan are likely to be replaced by dairy products from CPTPP and other countries with preferential trading agreements with Japan. Japan has historically accounted for more than a quarter of the total value of U.S. beef and pork exports. The U.S. share of Japan's imports of these commodities is expected to decline, because CPTPP competitors receive more favorable access to the Japanese market for beef and pork. U.S. Meat Export Federation states that annual beef export losses could reach $550 million by 2023 and more than $1.2 billion by 2028. Annual U.S. pork export losses are estimated to exceed $600 million by 2023 and reach $1 billion by 2028. USDA officials and representatives of the U.S. wheat and barley industries assert that U.S. wheat and barley exports are rapidly losing market share in Japan to CPTPP member countries and the EU. Status : U.S. agricultural exports appear to be at an increasing disadvantage in the CPTPP member country markets as these countries have begun to expand market access and reduce tariffs on imported products from CPTPP signatory countries. On October 16, 2018, under the TPA procedures, the Trump Administration gave Congress its official 90-day advance notification of intent to enter into trade negotiations with Japan, a CPTPP member country. In view of the Trump Administration's expressed objectives to "achieve fairer, more balanced trade," including in auto trade, stakeholders are uncertain about the prospects of reaching a quick deal with Japan. At the same time, both President Trump and the Secretary of Agriculture have stated that U.S.-Japan negotiations would occur in stages with a "very quick" deal on agriculture. However, the Japanese economy minister has stated that the United States and Japan would not reach an agreement in any one sector before other sectors. Agricultural Trade Issues with Canada and Mexico Since 2002, Canada has been the United States' top agricultural export market, with U.S. agricultural exports averaging over $20 billion between FY2016 and FY2018. In FY2018, Canada accounted for 14% of the total value of U.S. agricultural exports to all destinations. Mexico has been the third-largest market for U.S. agricultural exports since FY2010. U.S. agricultural exports to Mexico averaged over $18 billion between FY2016 and FY2018, accounting for 13% of the total value of U.S. agricultural exports to all destinations in FY2018. U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA)61 On September 30, 2018, the Trump Administration announced an agreement with Canada and Mexico, USMCA, which it is promoting as a replacement for the NAFTA. Under NAFTA, all agricultural tariffs were phased out to zero except for certain products traded between the United States and Canada. These included U.S. imports from Canada of dairy products, peanuts, peanut butter, cotton, sugar, and sugar-containing products and Canadian imports from the United States of dairy products, poultry, eggs, and margarine. Quotas that once governed bilateral trade in these commodities were redefined as TRQs to comply with WTO commitments. Under a TRQ, a lower tariff rate is levied on import quantities within the quota amount, while a higher tariff rate is imposed on quantities in excess of the quota. The United States and Mexico agreement under NAFTA did not exclude any agricultural products from trade liberalization. The proposed USMCA would expand upon the agricultural provisions of NAFTA. All food and agricultural products that have zero tariffs under NAFTA would remain at zero under USMCA. Under USMCA, market access would be expanded for the agricultural products traded between Canada and the United States that were exempt from tariff elimination under NAFTA. Canada agreed to create new U.S.-specific TRQs for U.S. dairy products and to replace the existing NAFTA poultry TRQs with new USMCA TRQs. All U.S. exports within the set TRQ volume limit would be subject to zero tariffs rates, but U.S. over-quota exports would still face the higher levels of tariffs currently in place under Canada's WTO commitment. The United States, in turn, agreed to improve access for imports of Canadian dairy, sugar, peanuts, and cotton. Canada and the United States also agreed to grade each other's like varieties of wheat as if they were produced domestically, a long-standing request of the U.S. wheat industry. Under USMCA, provisions are made for textiles and apparel to promote greater use of North American origin products, which may support domestic U.S. cotton production. Also, each country would offer the same treatment for distributing another USMCA country's spirits, wine, beer, and other alcoholic beverages as it would its own products. USMCA's Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) chapter calls for greater transparency in SPS rules and improved regulatory alignment among the three countries. Under USMCA, the United States, Canada, and Mexico agreed to provide procedural safeguards for recognition of new geographic indications, which are place names used to identify products that come from certain regions or locations. The agricultural chapter of USMCA also lays out provisions for addressing the products of agricultural biotechnology, an issue NAFTA does not address. In April 2019, USITC released its report that provides an assessment of the likely effects of USMCA on the overall U.S. economy and its component sectors. Because NAFTA has already eliminated duties on most goods and reduced most non-tariff barriers, USITC's quantitative assessment includes changes that are not easily quantifiable. These provisions of trade negotiations were excluded from past USITC quantitative analyses. The provisions included in USMCA assessment by USITC—such as intellectual property rights, future commitments to open flows of data, and strengthening labor standards and rights—may reduce uncertainty in future trading regimes. Uncertainty reducing provisions are part of most free-trade agreements, including NAFTA, even if past assessments excluded them in the analyses. The USITC report finds that U.S. agricultural exports would increase by 1.1% in year 6 of USMCA implementation compared to its 2017 baseline export levels. In inflation-adjusted dollars, U.S. dairy exports to NAFTA countries would increase by $314.5 million (7.1%), and U.S. poultry exports would increase by $183.5 million (1%) compared to exports in 2017. A 2018 study commissioned by the Farm Foundation performs an economy-wide analysis, but the analysis takes into consideration only the changes in agricultural tariffs and TRQs proposed under USMCA. The market access changes are introduced as shocks into a multi-region, economy-wide model. The impacts of these changes are analyzed after the economy has adjusted to the shocks after full implementation of USMCA—year 6. The adjustment process can include changes in production and consumption structure, including production costs and changes in the volume of agricultural outputs. This study estimates, in 2014 dollars, a net increase in annual U.S. agricultural exports of $450 million under USMCA, or about 1% of U.S. agricultural exports under NAFTA—$41 billion in FY2014. It projects the export losses from the retaliatory tariffs imposed by Canada and Mexico in response to U.S. Section 232 tariffs on steel and aluminum imports to be $1.8 billion per year (in 2014 dollars), which would more than offset the projected export gain of $450 million from USMCA. These losses include changes in production decisions and volumes resulting from higher production costs. This study does not consider changes in other sectors of the economy that would result from the implementation of USMCA provisions in these other sectors. Moreover, the impact estimated by the model would be affected over time by other policy shocks and technological and population changes that are not accounted for in the model. According to an updated version of the Farm Foundation study, under the possible scenario of a complete withdrawal from NAFTA without ratification of USMCA, tariffs on U.S. exports to Canada and Mexico would be expected to return to the higher WTO MFN rates. Under this scenario, the study finds that, in 2014 dollars, U.S. agricultural and food exports to Canada and Mexico would decline by about $12 billion annually. A study conducted by researchers at the International Monetary Fund assesses the potential impacts of USMCA on North America as a region taking into consideration the following provisions of the proposed USMCA: (1) higher vehicle and auto parts regional value content requirement; (2) new labor value content requirement for vehicles; (3) stricter rules of origin for USMCA textile and apparel trade; (4) agricultural trade liberalization that increases U.S. access to Canadian supply-managed markets and reduces U.S. barriers on Canadian dairy, sugar and sugar products, and peanuts and peanut products; and (5) trade facilitation measures. The results describe a medium-term adjustment five to seven years after full implementation of USMCA—year 6. By this time, labor and capital would have been reallocated among sectors, but new investment spending would not yet have increased productive capacity. The study compares base period with what may happen five to seven years after full implementation of USMCA. This study finds that increasing higher regional vehicle and labor requirements would contribute to an economic loss for all three USMCA countries, with a decline in the production of vehicles and parts, shifts toward greater sourcing of both vehicles and parts from outside of the region, and higher prices for consumers. Regarding agricultural provisions of USMCA, the report highlights that Canada would stand to gain more than the United States. The study also highlights that the trade facilitation provisions of USMCA would potentially provide the largest gain to the region. Another researcher reiterates the findings of the International Monetary Fund study that the new domestic content provisions in USMCA would increase input costs for U.S. farmers who would end up paying more for trucks and machinery. As few studies have analyzed the potential impacts of USMCA, the diversity in the findings regarding the impacts from the implementation of USMCA is limited. Stakeholder groups have expressed mixed responses to USMCA. A broad coalition representing more than 200 U.S. companies and industry associations has advocated for USMCA's approval. The American Farm Bureau Federation, which is the largest general farm organization, expressed satisfaction that USMCA not only locks in market opportunities previously developed but also builds on those trade relationships in several key areas. On the other hand, the National Farmers Union and the Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy have expressed concern that the proposed agreement does not go far enough to institute a fair trade framework that benefits family farmers and ranchers. Status: The proposed USMCA does not enter into force unless approved by the U.S. Congress and ratified by Canada and Mexico. A report by USITC that assesses the impact of USMCA on U.S. economy was submitted to Congress on April 18, 2019. The timeline for congressional approval of USMCA would likely be governed by the TPA procedures established under the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015 ( P.L. 114-26 ) but would not be initiated until the President submits the draft implementing bill to Congress. Some policymakers have stated that the path to ratifying USMCA by Congress is uncertain, in part because the three countries have yet to resolve disputes over U.S. Section 232 tariffs on imports of steel and aluminum and over the retaliatory tariffs that Canada and Mexico have imposed on U.S. agricultural products. Senator Chuck Grassley is reported to have called on the Trump Administration to lift tariffs on steel and aluminum imports from Canada and Mexico before Congress begins considering legislation to implement USMCA. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi has reportedly stated that she wants "stronger enforcement language" and that USMCA talks should be reopened to tighten enforcement provisions for labor and environmental protections. For more information, see CRS Report R45661, Agricultural Provisions of the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement . U.S. Dairy Exports to Canada78 The Canadian dairy sector limits production, sets prices, and restricts imports. Canadian imports of dairy products are restricted through TRQs, with over-quota tariffs in excess of 200% for some products. Although Canada is the second-largest market for U.S. dairy product exports, U.S. exports would likely be higher but for Canadian import restrictions. In recent years, U.S. milk producers began exporting increased quantities of ultra-filtered (UF) milk to Canada. UF milk is a high-protein liquid product made by separating and concentrating certain milk components (such as protein and fat) for use as ingredients in dairy products, such as cheese, yogurt, and ice cream. U.S. UF milk found a market among Canadian cheese makers in 2008 after Canada revised its compositional standards for cheese. This revision significantly reduced the use of several milk products that U.S. processors had been supplying to Canadian food manufacturers, including milk protein concentrates and dried protein products. In recent years, growing demand for butterfat in Canada resulted in increased Canadian milk production and, consequently, surplus supplies of skim milk. To address the surplus, Canada adopted the Class 7 milk price classification in 2017 (Class 6 in Ontario). Milk classified as Class 7 comprises skim milk components—primarily milk protein concentrates (MPC) and skim milk powder (SMP)—used to process dairy products. Prices for Class 7 products were set at low levels. Once the Class 7 regime was implemented, Canadian skim milk products became cheaper. Canada expanded global exports of SMP with the consequence that U.S. producers lost exports of high-protein UF milk to Canadian cheese and yogurt processors. According to USDA, the value of U.S. UF milk exports to Canada peaked at nearly $107 million in 2015 but declined after the Class 7 regime was implemented in 2017 to $49 million in 2017 and $32 million in 2018. At the same time, Canada's exports of SMP more than tripled in 2017 to $133 million, compared with $42 million in 2016 before the Class 7 price regime was implemented. Eliminating Canada's Class 7 pricing regime became a priority for the U.S. dairy industry when NAFTA renegotiations commenced in 2017. Status : Under USMCA, Canada agreed to eliminate the Class 7 pricing regime six months after USMCA enters into force. Canada also agreed to reclassify Class 7 products according to their end use and base its selling price on a formula that takes into consideration the USDA reported nonfat dry milk price. Also under the agreement, Canada would be required to monitor its exports of MPC, SMP, and infant formula and report at the harmonized tariff schedule level monthly. Although Canada would maintain its milk supply management system under USMCA, it would expand TRQs for U.S. exports of milk, cheese, cream, skim milk powder, condensed milk, yogurt, and several other dairy products. U.S. dairy products within the USMCA TRQs would enter Canada duty free, while U.S. exports above the TRQ quantities would be subject to the existing higher over-quota tariffs. Likewise, the United States would establish TRQs for imports of Canadian dairy products. In total, under USMCA Canada would grant the United States duty-free access to nearly 17,000 metric tons (MT) of dairy products the first year of the agreement, 100,000 MT in the sixth year, and 109,000 MT in year 19. The USMCA quota is specific to the United States and would be in addition to the 93,648 MT of WTO global quota, which is available under NAFTA to exports from the United States as well as to exports from other WTO member countries. For more information, see CRS In Focus IF11149, Dairy Provisions in USMCA . U.S.-Canada Dispute Regarding the Sale of Wine in Grocery Stores82 In Canada, the authority to import and distribute alcohol rests with the provincial governments. Starting in 2015, British Columbia (BC) initiated a series of policies and regulations that provide BC wine exclusive access to retail channels and grocery store shelves, while imported wine maybe sold in grocery stores only through a "store within a store" physically separated from the main retail outlet and with separate cash registers. Overall, the U.S.-based Wine Institute reports that Canada is the leading export market for California wine—the leading wine producing state in the United States—accounting for $444 million in sales in 2017. Status: In January 2017, the Obama Administration initiated trade enforcement action against Canada at the WTO regarding Canada's BC wine measures. Subsequent actions by the Trump Administration, in September 2017, led to the United States requesting formal consultations with Canada regarding BC wine measures. USTR states that "discriminatory regulations implemented by British Columbia are unfairly keeping U.S. wine off of grocery store shelves" and that the measures are inconsistent with Canada's commitments and obligations under the WTO. The Canadian wine industry estimates that wine imports account for nearly 70% of the Canadian wine market. It also points out that the BC Vintners Quality Alliance has been issuing store licenses for the industry since the 1980s. The United States reiterated its concerns as part of a second complaint issued in this case in July 2018. Argentina, Australia, New Zealand, and the EU have requested to join the consultation. The proposed USMCA addresses U.S. concerns about Canada's BC wine measures as part of a side letter to the proposed agreement. As outlined in the side letter, Canada would modify certain measures that provide preferential grocery store shelf space to wines produced within the province and "implement any changes no later than November 1, 2019." Other North American Trade Issues The proposed USMCA does not address all the issues that restrict U.S. agricultural exports to Mexico and Canada, nor does it include all of the changes sought by U.S. agricultural interest groups. For instance, Southeastern U.S. produce growers have been seeking changes to trade remedy laws to address imports of seasonal produce. Import Competition of Seasonal Produce from Mexico91 Mexico's production of some fruits and vegetables—tomatoes, peppers, cucumbers, berries, and melons—has increased in recent years in part due to Mexico's investment in large-scale greenhouse production facilities and other types of technological innovations. Greenhouse production in Mexico continues to rise, with 2018 estimates of nearly 57,500 acres of produce grown under protection, up from an estimated 9,000 acres in 2017. USDA researchers reported that Mexico is the largest foreign supplier of U.S. imports of vegetables and fruits (excluding bananas). Representatives of the Florida Fruit and Vegetable Association (FFVA) claim that Mexico's investment in produce production is supported by government subsidies and should be addressed through countervailing duties (CVD) on U.S. imports of these products. They further state that these exports enter the United States at prices below the cost of production and should be countered by higher antidumping (AD) duties. FFVA also believes that Mexico's labor cost advantage in fruit and vegetable production gives Mexico a competitive advantage over U.S. produce growers. In general, trade concerns have centered on tomatoes, peppers, and berries. One of the Trump Administration's initial agriculture-related objectives in the renegotiation of NAFTA included a proposal to establish new rules for seasonal and perishable products, such as fruits and vegetables. The proposal would have established a separate domestic industry provision for perishable and seasonal products in AD and CVD proceedings, making it easier for a group of regional producers to initiate an injury case and to prove injury, thereby implementing CVD or AD duties to be levied on the imported products responsible for the injury. This could protect certain U.S. seasonal fruit and vegetable products in some regions by making it easier to initiate trade remedy cases. USITC has previously reviewed trade remedy cases involving perishable agricultural products that have proven difficult to settle. Some Members of Congress supported including seasonal protections as part of NAFTA's renegotiation. Others opposed including such protections, contending that seasonal production complements rather than competes with U.S. growing seasons, while still others worried it could open the door to an "uncontrolled proliferation of regional, seasonal, perishable remedies against U.S. exports." Most U.S. food and agricultural sectors, including some fruit and vegetable producer groups, opposed including seasonal protections as part of the renegotiation. Some worried that efforts to push for seasonal protections would derail the renegotiation. Others claimed that such efforts would favor a few "politically-connected, wealthy agribusiness firms from Florida" at the expense of others in the U.S. produce industry and at the expense of both consumers and growers in other fruit and vegetable producing states, such as California. The Agricultural Technical Advisory Committee for Trade in Fruits and Vegetables (F&V ATAC) supported not including provisions in the NAFTA renegotiation, acknowledging that including such protections would generate "significant opposition from Mexican and Canadian negotiators, in addition to raising concern by many in the U.S. agricultural community, including many in the fruit and vegetable industry." In January 2018, F&V ATAC passed a resolution supporting the withdrawal of the seasonal and perishable trade remedy proposal from the U.S. negotiating objectives. Status: The proposed USMCA that might replace NAFTA does not include changes to U.S. trade remedy laws to address seasonal produce trade. As a result, some in Congress have taken additional steps to try to address this issue. Bills were introduced in both the House and Senate in the 115 th Congress as part of the Agricultural Trade Improvement Act of 2018 ( S. 3510 ; H.R. 7015 ). These bills would have provided for CVD and AD procedures for seasonal producers and defined core seasonal industry in U.S. trade remedy laws, among other changes. These two bills were reintroduced in the 116 th Congress but renamed "Defending Domestic Produce Production Act of 2019" ( S. 16 ; H.R. 101 ). Current law generally requires that an injury case be supported by at least 50% of the domestic industry. The House and Senate bills would allow regional groups representing less than 50% of nationwide seasonal growers to initiate an injury investigation. Such changes could make it easier for a group of regional producers to initiate trade remedy cases. Withdrawal of the U.S.-Mexico Tomato Suspension Agreement109 The U.S.-Mexico Tomato Suspension Agreement is an agreement between DOC and signatory producers/exporters of fresh tomatoes grown in Mexico that suspends the U.S. AD investigation into whether Mexican fresh tomatoes were sold into the U.S. market at less than fair value. Fresh tomatoes imported from Mexico have been governed by suspension agreements since 1996. The first suspension agreement on fresh tomatoes from Mexico became effective in November 1996. The Mexican signatory growers and the United States entered into new agreements in 2002 and 2008. The most recent agreement became effective in March 2013. Under the current agreement, the signatories agree to suspend the AD investigation and monitor compliance with the agreement. The basis for the suspension agreement was a commitment by each signatory producer/exporter to sell tomatoes at or above the stated reference price in order to eliminate the injurious effects of exports of fresh tomatoes to the United States. Analysis commissioned by the Fresh Produce Association of the Americas (FPAA) found that terminating the agreement could "reduce the supply of tomatoes in the US market, and raise prices paid by consumers in the U.S., particularly during the winter tomato season (October-June)." The agreement sets different floor prices for Mexican fresh tomatoes during the summer and winter and specifies prices for open field/adapted-environment and controlled-environment production. These price floors cover all types of fresh or chilled tomatoes from Mexico, including common round, cherry, grape, plum, pear, and greenhouse tomatoes. The agreement does not cover tomatoes that are for processing. In early 2018, DOC initiated consultations with the Mexican tomato growers and exporters to negotiate possible revisions to the 2013 agreement. In addition, DOC initiated its five-year sunset review of the suspended AD investigation and published the preliminary and final results of its analysis in late 2018. DOC's analysis indicated that dumping of fresh tomatoes was likely to occur or recur and calculated weighted-average dumping margins of up to 188%. In November 2018, the Florida Tomato Exchange requested that the United States withdraw from the suspension agreement, eliminate the reference prices, and resume the related initial 1996 AD investigation. Several Members of Congress in both the House and the Senate have expressed support for withdrawing from the suspension agreement. Among the groups that oppose withdrawal are the FPAA and other groups representing Mexican growers and exporters as well as businesses, various associations, and local and county governments. Status: On May 7, 2019, the United States terminated the 2013 Suspension Agreement on Fresh Tomatoes from Mexico but said it plans to continue negotiations regarding a possible revised agreement. DOC initially announced its intention to withdraw from the agreement in February 2019 following its periodic review of the agreement, which concluded that Mexican fresh tomatoes have been sold into the U.S. market at less than fair value. Without a suspension agreement, an AD order could be issued if USITC makes a determination of financial injury to U.S. growers. Reportedly, the DOC and Mexico have been unable to develop a revised agreement that is acceptable to both sides, despite ongoing negotiations since early 2018. In April 2019, Mexico's tomato growers proposed to eliminate a price distinction between winter and summer season tomatoes and increase the reference price for USDA-certified organic tomatoes. The government of Mexico has expressed its disappointment about the U.S. decision. U.S.-Mexico Sugar Suspension Agreements123 In December 2014, DOC signed suspension agreements with the government of Mexico and Mexican sugar producers and exporters that prevented the imposition of CVD and AD on U.S. imports of Mexican sugar. This was a consequence of U.S. government determinations that Mexican sugar was being subsidized by the government of Mexico and was being sold into the U.S. market at less than fair value. The suspension agreements limit Mexico's sugar exports to the United States to the residual of U.S. needs for domestic human use in a given marketing year after subtracting U.S. production and imports from other countries. The agreements establish minimum reference prices for Mexican sugar that are above U.S. sugar program loan levels for domestically produced sugar. Another provision limits the share of Mexican sugar that can enter the United States as refined sugar. After the suspension agreements took effect, a number of stakeholders in the U.S. sugar market asserted that the suspension agreements had not worked as intended and had not entirely eliminated the injury caused by the subsidization and dumping of Mexican sugar. One widely held criticism was that cane refiners who were dependent on imports of raw cane from Mexico had received an inadequate share of sugar from Mexico. Another criticism leveled at the agreements was that Mexican exporters were not always adhering to limits on the share of Mexican sugar imports that are refined sugar as compared with raw sugar nor to the specified minimum reference prices. In November 2016, the American Sugar Coalition—representing sugar cane and sugar beet producers and sugar processors, refiners, and workers—called on DOC to withdraw from the agreements, an action that could have caused AD and CVD duties to be imposed on Mexican sugar. Imperial Sugar Company, a U.S. cane refiner, also advocated for withdrawal. The Sweetener Users Association, which represents sugar-using businesses, recommended renegotiating the agreements to address their shortcomings and warned that terminating them would virtually eliminate Mexican sugar from the U.S. market. In November 2016, DOC issued results of a preliminary administrative review. In it, the DOC concluded that the agreements may not have entirely redressed the injury, and that certain import transactions may not have adhered to the terms in the agreements. Status: In June 2017, the United States and Mexico agreed to amendments to the suspension agreements. Under the amendments, effective October 1, 2017, the price of imported Mexican raw sugar was increased from $0.2225 per pound to $0.23 per pound. The price of imported refined sugar was increased from $0.26 per pound to $0.28 per pound. The maximum share of refined sugar imports was limited to 30%, with raw sugar imports constituting at least 70% of the total, compared with 53% and 47%, respectively, under the 2014 agreement. The agreement also requires that imported raw sugar be loaded in bulk and free flowing—that is, not packaged. Any raw sugar imports that are packaged would be counted toward the refined sugar allotment. In addition, if USDA determines that the United States requires additional sugar imports to meet its needs, Mexico would be awarded the first opportunity to fill the need. For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10693, Amended Sugar Agreements Recast U.S.-Mexico Trade . Other Major Trade Issues Several other trade issues may be of interest to Congress. A key objective of U.S. trade negotiations has been to establish a common framework for approval, trade, and marketing of the products of agricultural biotechnology. Among other high-profile issues, geographical indications are increasingly becoming an agricultural trade issue. In addition, U.S. farm and food interests continue to see potential market expansion opportunities in Cuba, but interested exporters regard a prohibition on private U.S. financing as a major obstacle to this end. On the import side of the trade ledger, in March 2019, the United States initiated its review of the Generalized System of Preference (GSP), which provides duty-free tariff treatment for certain products imported from developing countries. Agricultural Biotechnology128 Agricultural biotechnology refers primarily to the commercial use of recombinant DNA techniques to genetically modify or bioengineer plants and animals so that they have certain desired characteristics, primarily herbicide tolerance and pest resistance. More recently, the term has also come to encompass a range of new genetic technologies involving genomic editing (e.g., CRISPR-Cas9) rather than recombinant DNA techniques alone. U.S. soybean, corn, cotton, and sugar beet producers have rapidly adopted genetically engineered (GE) varieties of these crops since commercialization began in the mid-1990s. The United States is the leading country in cultivating GE crops, accounting for more than 40% of total acres growing GE crops worldwide. Elsewhere in the world, the adoption and cultivation of GE crops by both producers and consumers has been mixed. In the EU, for example, the European Commission (EC) may approve of GE products for import and marketing, but individual member states may maintain bans. GE crop production in the EU accounts for about 1% of crop acreage—about 325,000 acres—all in a single variety of pest-resistant GE corn: MON810. This particular variety is cultivated predominantly in Spain and Portugal. Eighteen EU member states ban cultivation of GE crops and/or have specific rules on the trade of GE seeds. EU officials have been cautious in permitting GE products to be cultivated within the EU, but EU-approved varieties of GE commodities can be imported. All GE-derived food and feed imported to the EU must be labeled as such. The EU's regulatory framework regarding biotechnology is generally regarded as one of the most stringent worldwide. Many U.S. producers assert that EU labeling and traceability regulations for approving GE crops have effectively limited certain U.S. agricultural exports to the EU. The EU's approval process for GE products—effectively a de facto moratorium since 1998—has been a source of dispute since 2003 and continues to be a contentious issue in the current U.S.-EU agricultural trade negotiations. While the EU as a policymaking entity generally supports GE production, public opinion remains strongly opposed to GE food and crops in most EU member states. This opposition in the EU has also been an important factor in the acceptance of GE crops in lesser developed countries. Most African countries have largely followed the EU in restricting or banning the cultivation of GE crops. The U.S. Secretary of Agriculture stated that the United States will not regulate plants created through genomic editing so long as they are developed without using a plant pest as the donor or vector and are not plant pests themselves. In contrast, the EU Court of Justice ruled that organisms obtained by mutagenesis are genetically modified organisms (GMOs) and are in principle within the scope of the GMO Directive, which governs the deliberate release of GMOs into the environment. The EU Court considers that the risks posed by new mutagenesis techniques such as gene editing (CRISPR-Cas9) to be similar to crops created from transgenesis, wherein GE crops have genetic material introduced from other organisms. China's reluctance to approve GE crops or GE imports is a source of frustration for U.S. agricultural interests. While GE crops are technically banned from China, U.S.-developed GMOs appear to be grown in China without authorization despite Chinese laws banning their cultivation. In September 2016, China agreed to improve its agricultural biotechnology approval process. That commitment did not include specific details, although China stated that they are committed to review eight long-pending applications of agricultural biotechnology in a "timely, ongoing, and science-based manner." On January 8, 2019, the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs announced approval of five new biotech traits in imported crops for processing, the first new approvals since June 2017. At the same time, the ministry amended the regulations on safety assessment, import approval, and labeling of agricultural GMOs without notifying the changes to the WTO nor soliciting comments from stakeholders. With respect to the proposed USMCA, the agreement specifically includes provisions to improve transparency in approving and bringing to market products of agricultural biotechnology, something NAFTA did not cover. USMCA provisions cover crops produced with all biotechnology methods, including recombinant DNA and gene editing. Trade negotiations concerning agricultural biotechnology also involve labeling issues and other provisions that address the unintended presence of GE products in non-GE shipments. As the United States implements its new "bioengineered food disclosure" standard, it may raise concerns among some trading partners—particularly the EU. The food disclosure standard, for example, will not mandate labeling of highly refined ingredients from any GE crop if "no modified genetic material" is detectable. This provision would exclude food products, for example, containing high-fructose corn syrup, refined soybean oil, and sugar from sugar beets. Status: A key objective of U.S. trade negotiations, such as the U.S.-EU agricultural trade negotiations and U.S. negotiations with China, has been to establish a common framework for GE approvals. This includes labeling practices consistent with the U.S. guidelines and harmonized regulatory procedures concerning GE presence in products that are consistent with the Codex Alimentarius Commission Annex on Food Safety Assessment in Situations of Low-Level Presence of Recombinant-DNA Plant Material in Food . The proposed USMCA specifically includes provisions to improve transparency in approving and bringing to market products of agricultural biotechnology. For other negotiations, U.S. objectives on agricultural biotechnology, for the most part, remain aspirational. Additionally, the United States believes that U.S. export opportunities are being impaired due to EU pressure on lesser developed countries to adopt EU SPS measures that ban GE products. Geographical Indications (GIs)140 GIs are geographical names that act to protect the quality and reputation of a distinctive product originating in a certain region. The term GI is most often applied to wines, spirits, and agricultural products. Some food producers benefit from the use of GIs by giving certain foods recognition for their distinctiveness, thereby differentiating them in the marketplace. In this manner, GIs can be commercially valuable. GIs may also be eligible for relief from acts of infringement or unfair competition. While the use of GIs may protect consumers from deceptive or misleading labels, they also have the potential to impair trade when the use of names that are considered common or generic in one market are protected in another. Examples of registered or established GIs include Parmigiano Reggiano cheese and Prosciutto di Parma ham from the Parma region of Italy, Toscano olive oil from the Tuscany region of Italy, Roquefort cheese from France, Champagne from the region of the same name in France, Irish whiskey, Darjeeling tea, Florida oranges, Idaho potatoes, Vidalia onions, Washington State apples, and Napa Valley wines. GIs—along with other types of intellectual property such as patents, copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets—are an example of intellectual property rights (IPR). The use of GIs has become a contentious international trade issue, particularly for U.S. wine, cheese, and sausage makers. In general, some consider GIs to be protected intellectual property, while others consider them to be generic or semi-generic terms. For example, in the United States, feta is considered the generic name for a type of cheese. However, it is protected as a GI in Europe. As such, feta cheese produced in the United States may not be exported for sale in the EU, since only feta produced in countries or regions currently holding GI registrations may be sold commercially. Laws and regulations governing GIs differ markedly between the United States and EU, which further complicates this issue. In addition, registered products often fall under GI protections in certain third-country markets, and some EU GIs have been trademarked in some non-EU countries. This has become a concern for U.S. agricultural exporters following a series of recently concluded trade agreements among the EU and Canada, Japan, South Korea, South Africa, and other countries that in many cases are also trading partners of the United States. As a result, Canada has agreed to recognize a list of 143 EU GIs in Canada, and Japan has agreed to recognize 71 EU GIs in Japan. More than 4,500 product names are registered and protected in the EU for foods, wine, and spirits originating in both EU member states and other countries. The EU's GI program remains a contentious issue for many in the U.S. Congress, particularly among Members with dairy constituencies. Some have long expressed their concerns about EU protections for GIs, which they claim are being misused to create market and trade barriers. A 2019 study commissioned by the U.S. dairy industry forecasts declining U.S. cheese exports due to expanding restrictions on the use of generic terms such as parmesan, asiago, and feta cheese. However, some U.S. agricultural industry groups are trying to create a system similar to the EU GI system for U.S. products to promote certain distinctive American agricultural products as part of the American Origin Products Association, which represents certain U.S. potato, maple syrup, ginseng, coffee, and chile pepper producers and certain U.S. winemakers, among other regional producer groups, and seeks to work with federal authorities to "create of a list of qualified U.S. distinctive product names, which correspond to the GI definition." Status: GIs are included among other IPR issues in the current U.S. trade agenda. The proposed USMCA protects common names and limits the ability to register new GIs that some producers regard as common (generic) names. USMCA includes a side letter between the U.S. and Mexico regarding the use of 33 cheese names. GIs have been an active area of debate between the United States and EU in previous trade negotiations. GIs continue to be a trade issue for USTR, and the United States is working "to advance U.S. market access interests in foreign markets and to ensure that GI-related trade initiatives of the EU, its Member States, like-minded countries, and international organizations, do not undercut such market access," stating that the EU's GI agenda "significantly undermines the scope of trademarks and other [intellectual property] rights held by U.S. producers and imposes barriers on market access for American-made goods that rely on the use of common names." Previously, USDA officials have indicated that the United States would likely not agree to EU demands to reserve certain food names for EU producers and have expressed concerns about the EU's system of protections for GIs. GIs are also included in the United States' IPR negotiating objectives for the U.S.-EU and U.S.-Japan trade negotiations. U.S. Farm Trade with Cuba152 The U.S. embargo on trade and financial transactions with Cuba dates from 1962. The sanctions on Cuba were partially eased in 2000 with regard to U.S. exports of agricultural products with the enactment of the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 ( P.L. 106-387 ). The law allows for one-year export licenses for selling agricultural commodities to Cuba but without the availability of U.S. government assistance, foreign assistance, export assistance, credits, or credit guarantees to finance the trade. The law also denies exporters of agricultural goods access to U.S. private commercial financing or credit, although U.S. private export financing is permitted for all other authorized export trade to Cuba. Moreover, all agricultural product transactions must be conducted on a cash-in-advance basis or with financing from third countries. Cuba received almost $5.7 billion, in nominal dollars, in U.S. agricultural products from FY2001 to FY2018. U.S agricultural exports to Cuba peaked in FY2008, reaching $658 million. Major exports during the earlier years included poultry, corn, soybeans, wheat, rice, and feed and fodder products including soybean meal and distillers grains. Since FY2008, U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba declined partly due to negligible exports of rice, wheat, cotton, beef, pork, and distillers grains. Shipments of U.S. farm products to Cuba amounted to $230 million in FY2018, down from $266 million in FY2017. A USDA attaché report on Cuba contends that the decline in U.S. market share in Cuba "is largely attributable to a decrease in bulk commodity exports from the United States in light of favorable credit terms offered by key competitors." The same report concluded that lifting U.S. restrictions on travel and capital flow to Cuba, and enabling USDA to conduct market development and credit guarantee programs in Cuba, would help the United States recapture its market share in Cuba. A 2016 USITC report noted that Cuba imports 70%-80% of its food needs, which amount to some $2 billion per year. Given the price competitiveness and logistical advantages of key U.S. agricultural products compared with export competitors, ITC indicated that U.S. agricultural exports could expand significantly—to about $800 million within five years—if the remaining U.S. restrictions on trade with Cuba were removed. The report identified corn, wheat, rice, and dairy products (particularly milk powder) as the commodities that could see the greatest dollar increase in exports over the near term. The same report observed that U.S. agricultural suppliers view prohibitions on providing credit on food and agricultural product sales and U.S. restrictions on travel to Cuba as key obstacles to increasing U.S. farm exports to the island nation. USDA also maintains that Cuba would likely develop comparative advantages in the production and export of certain citrus and tropical fruit, vegetables, tropical plants, and cut flowers. Some agricultural interests in Florida have expressed concern about potentially subsidized competition from Cuba and exposing U.S. agriculture to invasive pests and diseases. Sugar trade could be an area that would require negotiations. The United States is a major sugar importer, and Cuba is a sugar exporter. Should the embargo be further eased, Cuba may wish to export sugar to the United States. The United States tightly manages sugar imports, so any access for Cuba to export sugar to the U.S. market would have to be negotiated. Status: In December 2014, President Obama announced a major shift away from a sanctions-based policy with Cuba toward a policy of engagement. President Obama acknowledged that he did not have the authority to lift the embargo because it is codified into Section 102(h) of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, P.L. 104-114 . Removing the overall economic embargo would require amending or repealing that law as well as other statutes—such as the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 (Title XVII of P.L. 102-484 ) and the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act ( P.L. 106-387 )—that include provisions impeding normal economic relations with Cuba. In 2017, the Trump Administration introduced new sanctions and partially rolled back some of the Obama Administration's efforts to normalize relations, including adding restrictions on transactions with companies controlled by the Cuban military and the elimination of individual people-to-people travel. On March 4, 2019, the Administration allowed lawsuits to go forward against some 200 Cuban entities operated by the Cuban military, intelligence, or security services for trafficking in confiscated property. Amid this policy shift toward Cuba, the 2018 farm bill ( P.L. 115-334 ) permits funding to be used to operate two U.S. agricultural export promotion programs in Cuba—the Market Access Program and the Foreign Market Development Cooperator Program. For more on U.S. agricultural trade with Cuba, see CRS Report R44119, U.S. Agricultural Trade with Cuba: Current Limitations and Future Prospects . For information on U.S. policy toward Cuba, see CRS Report R44822, Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 115th Congress and CRS In Focus IF10045, Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview . Generalized System of Preferences (GSP)159 The GSP provides duty-free tariff treatment for certain products from designated developing countries. U.S. agricultural imports under GSP totaled $2.4 billion in 2018, accounting for about 15% of the value of total U.S. GSP imports. Leading agricultural imports (based on value) include processed foods and food processing inputs, beverages and drinking waters, processed and fresh fruits and vegetables, sugar and sugar confectionery, olive oil, fresh fruits, and miscellaneous food preparations and inputs for further processing. In 2018, the six leading GSP countries—Thailand, India, Turkey, Indonesia, Brazil, and Argentina—accounted for nearly 70% of all GSP-eligible U.S. agricultural imports. In recent years, a debate has emerged over the limits of eligibility for GSP treatment. Over the past decade, GSP has been extended through a series of short-term extensions—most recently until December 31, 2020 ( P.L. 115-141 ). This latest extension made certain technical modifications related to GSP imports and required USTR to submit an annual report to Congress on its efforts to ensure that GSP countries are meeting the eligibility criteria for the program. Members of Congress have expressed a range of views on whether to include emerging market developing countries (e.g., India, Brazil) as GSP beneficiaries or limit the program to least-developed countries. Some GSP beneficiary countries have become ineligible to participate in the U.S. program. For example, in 2014, Russia's GSP status was terminated, and in 2017, Seychelles, Uruguay, and Venezuela were graduated out of the program because it was determined they had become "high income" countries. Argentina's GSP eligibility was suspended in 2012 but was reinstated in 2017. In early 2018, USTR initiated a series of actions regarding GSP as part of its ongoing review of specific country practices. USTR's review is in response to concerns about the countries' compliance under the program but is also part of its GSP country eligibility assessment and petition process. Some of the countries subject to USTR's review are actively exporting to the United States under GSP, including India, Indonesia, and Turkey. Combined, these three countries accounted for an estimated $800 million in 2018, or about one-third of the value of all GSP-eligible agricultural imports to the United States. The interagency Trade Policy Staff Committee, chaired by USTR, reviews and revises the lists of eligible products annually, generally on the basis of petitions received from beneficiary countries or interested parties requesting that additional products be added or removed. When a country's petition for product eligibility is approved, the product becomes GSP-eligible for all GSP-beneficiary developing countries (or only for least developed countries if so designated). Based on previous reviews, opinions within the U.S. agricultural industry are often mixed, reflecting both support for and opposition to the current program. Status: USTR initiated its current annual GSP product and country review in March 2019 and announced its intention to terminate GSP designations for Turkey and India "because they no longer comply with the statutory eligibility criteria." Press reports suggest that continued U.S. GSP eligibility is a top priority for India, while other reports suggest that Turkey views U.S. GSP review standards as being in violation of WTO rules. Action by USTR to terminate GSP designations for Turkey and India could increase trade tensions between the United States and these two trading partners, potentially affecting future trade relations and U.S. agricultural exports. Some in Congress have expressed opposition to the Administration's stated intent to terminate India's designation as a GSP beneficiary. A survey of companies conducted by the Coalition for GSP suggests that terminating India's and Turkey's GSP beneficiary status could adversely affect U.S. businesses, including some food and agricultural companies, through higher tariffs for some imported products and ingredients. U.S.-EU Agricultural Trade Issues The EU has historically been one of the top U.S. agricultural export markets, currently ranking as the fourth-largest buyer of U.S. agricultural products. U.S. agricultural exports to the EU totaled $12.7 billion in FY2018 and for FY2019 is forecast to reach $13.4 billion. Tree nuts, soybeans, and alcoholic beverages are among the top U.S. exports to the EU based on value. The EU is also a major supplier of U.S. agricultural products. The United States imported $23.7 billion worth of agricultural products in FY2018, and USDA forecasts imports of $24 billion in FY2019. Processed agricultural products such as wine and beer, essential oils, cheese, and other consumer-oriented food products are the top U.S. purchases from the EU. Based on the value of agricultural trade, the U.S. agricultural trade deficit with the EU was $11 billion in FY2018 and is projected to be $10.6 billion in FY2019. U.S.-EU Agricultural Trade Negotiations172 The United States and the EU are the world's largest mutual trade and investment partners. Although this trading relationship is largely harmonious, the EU was among those U.S. trading partners that placed retaliatory tariffs on some U.S. products in response to Section 232 tariffs imposed by the Trump Administration on U.S. imports of steel and aluminum. Effective in June 2018, the EU imposed tariffs of 25% on U.S. exports of prepared vegetables and legumes, grains, fruit juice, peanut butter, and whiskey, among other products. These tariffs affect about $1 billion in U.S. agricultural exports to the EU, or about 8% of total U.S.-EU agricultural trade in recent years. In July 2018, the Trump Administration and the EC issued a joint statement announcing that they were forming an executive working group that will seek to reduce transatlantic barriers to trade, including eliminating non-auto industrial tariffs and non-tariff barriers. In October 2018, USTR officially notified Congress of the Administration's intention to start negotiations. The WTO reports that the simple average WTO MFN tariff applied to agricultural products entering the United States was 5.1% in 2014, compared to an average of 12.2% for products entering the EU. Including all products imported under an applied tariff or a TRQ, USDA reports that the calculated average rate across all U.S. agricultural imports is roughly 12%, well below the EU's average of 30%. Restrictive TRQs on EU imports of agricultural products are an issue for U.S. exporters. In 2013, the Obama Administration engaged in negotiations with the EU as part of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP) with the goal of concluding a "comprehensive and high standard" agreement within two years. T-TIP's last negotiating round was in October 2016, and negotiations were largely paused for both sides to evaluate progress. Underlying regulatory and administrative differences between the United States and the EU on issues of food safety, public health, and IPR for some types of agricultural products have been areas of contention in these negotiations. The United States and the EU have engaged in a series of long-standing disputes involving agricultural products and certain SPS standards. These include, for example, delays in reviews of biotech products (limiting U.S. exports of grain and oilseed products), prohibitions on growth hormones in beef production and certain antimicrobial and pathogen reduction treatments (limiting U.S. meat and poultry exports), and complex certification requirements (limiting U.S. exports of processed foods, animal products, and dairy products). Other EU regulations of concern to U.S. exporters include the arguable lack of a science-based focus in establishing SPS measures, difficulty meeting food safety standards and securing product certification, the perceived lack of cohesive labeling requirements, and stringent testing requirements that appear to be implemented often inconsistently among EU member nations. Some U.S. agricultural producers also oppose EU policies on GIs. (See section " Geographical Indications (GIs) .") Status: In January 2019, USTR announced its negotiating objectives for a U.S.-EU trade agreement following a public comment period and a hearing involving several leading U.S. agricultural trade associations. These include agricultural policies—both market access and non-tariff measures such as TRQ administration and other regulatory issues. Among regulatory issues, key U.S. objectives include harmonizing regulatory processes and standards to facilitate trade, including SPS standards, and establishing specific commitments for trade in products developed through agricultural biotechnologies. The U.S. objectives also include addressing GIs by protecting generic terms for common use. U.S. agricultural interests generally support including agriculture as part of the U.S. negotiating objectives for a U.S.-EU trade agreement. Several Members of Congress support this position and are opposed to the EU's decision to exclude agricultural policies in their negotiating mandate. A letter to USTR from a bipartisan group of 114 House Members states that "an agreement with the EU that does not address trade in agriculture would be, in our eyes, unacceptable." Senate Finance Committee Chairman Chuck Grassley has reiterated, "Bipartisan members of the Senate and House … have voiced their objections to a deal without agriculture, making it unlikely that such a deal would pass Congress." The EU, however, has indicated that it is planning for a more limited negotiation that does not include agricultural products and policies. In late January 2019, the EC published a progress report confirming that its joint agenda does not include agriculture, since it "is a sensitivity for the EU side." The EU negotiating mandate states that a key EU goal is "a trade agreement limited to the elimination of tariffs for industrial goods only, excluding agricultural products." Separately, the EU has taken certain measures to avoid escalating agricultural trade tensions with the United States, for example, by increasing imports of U.S. soybeans as a source of biofuels and by proposing to lift a ban on certain pest-resistant American grapes in EU wine production, among other measures. At the same time, the EU has announced that it would retaliate against "unlawful subsidies given" to Boeing by imposing increased tariffs on imports of U.S. food products such as frozen fish, fruits, wine, liquors, and ketchup. U.S.-EU Dispute over U.S. Olive Imports189 In 2018, the United States concluded an injury investigation regarding ripe olives imported from Spain based on complaints from two California-based olive producers. In June 2018, DOC announced its affirmative final determinations in the AD and CVD investigations. In the AD investigation, DOC found that Spanish ripe olives were being sold in the United States at less than fair value and calculated dumping margins ranging from about 17% to 25% on imports of ripe olives from Spain. In the CVD investigation, DOC determined that Spanish ripe olive producers and exporters were subsidized at rates ranging from about 8% to 27%. In July, USITC determined that U.S. producers were materially injured by imports of ripe olives from Spain. Given these determinations, AD and CVD duty orders on U.S. Spanish ripe olive imports were issued and became effective on August 1, 2018. Status: In January 2019, the EU requested WTO dispute consultations with the United States concerning U.S. AD and CVD duties imposed on imported ripe olives from Spain. The EU position is that these measures are inconsistent with the U.S. commitments under the WTO. USTR states that "the EU's case is without merit" and that it intends to "fight it very aggressively." AD/CVD duties levied against ripe olives from Spain have reportedly already cost the Spanish olive industry an estimated $27 million in lost exports. U.S.-EU Beef Hormone Dispute196 The United States and the EU have engaged in a long-standing trade dispute over the EU's ban on hormone-treated meat. The EU adopted restrictions on livestock production in the early 1980s, limiting the use of natural hormones to therapeutic purposes, banning the use of synthetic hormones, and prohibiting imports of animals and meat from animals that have been administered the hormones. In response, the United States suspended trade concessions with the EU in 1999 by imposing retaliatory tariffs of 100% ad valorem on selected food products from EU countries. Despite an ongoing series of WTO dispute settlement proceedings and decisions, the United States and the EU continue to disagree on a range of legal and procedural issues, as well as the scientific evidence and consensus affirming the safety of hormone-treated beef. Many in the United States perceive EU's action and the use of SPS measures and non-tariff barriers as disguised protectionism intended to unjustifiably restrict and discriminate against product exports from certain countries. In January 2009, USTR announced its intent to make changes to the list of EU products subject to increased tariffs under the dispute, including changes to the EU countries and products affected, with additional tariffs on some products. The EU claimed that this action constituted an "escalation" of the dispute. In May 2009, following a series of negotiations, the United States and the EU signed a memorandum of understanding that phased in certain changes over the next several years, and the United States suspended its retaliatory tariffs for imported EU products under the dispute. As part of the 2009 memorandum, the EU granted market access to U.S. exports of beef raised without growth promotants as part of its High-Quality Beef (HQB) TRQ. The EU's HQB quota is currently set at 45,000 MT annually and assessed a customs tariff of 20%. However, the HQB quota remains open to other beef exporting nations, which effectively limits the ability for U.S. beef producers to fully benefit under the quota. According to USTR and the U.S. beef industry, most of the HQB quota has been filled by countries other than the United States, and the EU has been unwilling to consider an allocation that would reserve a significant part of the HQB quota for the United States. In December 2016, USTR proposed reinstating retaliatory tariffs on EU products under the dispute. In February 2017, USTR convened a hearing to review this possible retaliatory action. To date, the United States has not imposed retaliatory tariffs connected to the U.S.-EU beef hormone dispute. Status: The EU continues to impose bans and restrictions on meat produced using hormones, beta agonists, and other growth promotants, and it allows only imports of beef produced without hormones subject to the EU's HQB quota. The United States maintains that scientific evidence demonstrates that meat produced using hormones, beta agonists, and other growth promotants is safe for consumers. The United States continues to seek a U.S.-specific allocation of the EU's HQB import quota. In late 2018, the EU agreed to review its existing HQB quota and renegotiate its quota with the United States with the expectation that a revised HQB agreement would be implemented in early 2019. In March 2019, press reports indicated that the U.S. and EU had reached an "agreement in principle" for reallocating the EU's HQB quota, which could provide the United States a share of EU's annual quota. If realized, such an agreement could result in additional market access to the EU for U.S. beef certified as produced without hormones. U.S.-EU Dispute over Pathogen Reduction Treatments (PRTs)207 In January 2009, the United States escalated a long-running dispute with the EU over its refusal to accept imports of U.S. poultry that are subject to certain pathogen reduction treatments (PRTs). PRTs are antimicrobial rinses that have been approved for use by the USDA in poultry production to reduce the amount of microbes on meat. Meat and poultry products processed with PRTs are judged safe by the United States and also by European food safety authorities. However, the EU prohibits the use of PRTs and the importation of poultry treated with these substances. The EU generally opposes such chemical interventions and asserts that its own poultry producers follow much stricter production and processing rules that are more effective in reducing microbiological contamination than simply washing poultry products. In general, EU consumer groups argue that the use of such treatments compensates for poor hygiene in the supply chain. The United States requested WTO consultations with the EU on the matter, a prerequisite first step toward the establishment of a formal WTO dispute settlement panel. A WTO panel was subsequently established in November 2009, but this case has not moved forward. In 2013, USDA submitted an application for the approval of peroxyacetic acid as a PRT for poultry. Although the EU initially put forward a proposal to authorize the PRT, the EU withdrew its proposal in December 2015, citing the European Food Safety Authority's (EFSA) opinion of insufficient evidence of peroxyacetic acid's efficacy against campylobacter. EFSA cleared lactic acid for reducing pathogens on beef carcasses, cuts, and trimmings in 2011. In 2013, the EU lifted its ban on the use of lactic acid in beef PRTs on beef carcasses, half-carcasses, and beef quarters in the slaughterhouse. In 2017, the National Pork Producers Council submitted an application to EFSA to approve organic lactic and acetic acid for use on pork carcasses and cuts. EFSA's panel report, issued in October 2018, concluded that use of the treatments do not pose a safety concern provided that the substances comply with the EU specifications for food additives and that their use is efficacious compared to untreated meat. However, EFSA raised questions about whether lactic and acetic acid were more efficacious than water treatment for certain applications. Status: The United States continues to maintain that PRTs are a "critical tool during meat processing that helps further the safety of products being placed on the market" and continues to seek approval of certain PRTs for beef, pork, and poultry. To date, however, the United States and the EU have not been able to agree on a number of issues related to veterinary equivalency, and the EU continues to prohibit any substance other than water to remove contamination from animal products unless the EU approves the substance. EU Regulation of Edible Gelatin and Collagen215 In December 2018, USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) responded to the WTO notification of a new EU regulation, 2017/625, concerning new requirements for gelatin and collagen entering the EU for human consumption. In FY2018, the U.S. exported over $199 million worth of raw materials to the EU for the production of gelatin and collagen that were intended for human consumption. APHIS and industry trade groups have objected to the EU's new requirement, which would be enforceable as of December 14, 2019. U.S. animal byproduct exports to the EU follow an EU regulation in force since 2011 that provides detailed rules for trade in animal byproducts. The current regulation allows APHIS to make changes to the list of eligible U.S. animal byproduct facilities that are authorized to export to the EU. The new EU regulation would require all U.S. animal byproduct exporters to register their establishments in the EU Trade Control Expert System (TRACES). APHIS contends that the TRACES registration process is cumbersome in that it could take more than a month to add a new facility or to amend an existing approval, creating delays that could potentially impede trade. Currently, the EU recognizes only U.S. meat intended for human consumption overseen by the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) of USDA as equivalent to EU-produced products. As a result, many FSIS-inspected establishments are already listed in TRACES. However, not all animal byproduct facilities in the United States are overseen by FSIS, and these may not already be listed on TRACES. Some raw materials intended for collagen or gelatin products may have originated from FSIS-inspected establishments, but processed products and animal feeds may be overseen by U.S. Food and Drug Administration or other federal agencies. The new EU proposed regulation would eventually allow many of these facilities to be listed in TRACES. Under the current EU Regulation 142/2011 Chapter 8 Health Certificate, APHIS is the recognized oversight authority for U.S. exports. The EU's proposed 2017 regulation Model Certificate would require that APHIS be present at all times during the loading of animal byproducts into a container. U.S. trade associations have expressed the view that the EU-specific certificate requirements are not consistent with guidance provided by Codex Alimentarius—the international food standards organization that sets guidelines to protect public health and ensure fair practices in the food trade. Instead, they allege that the EU requirements are unnecessarily restrictive and would have "the effect of closing the EU market to the majority of U.S. hides and skins exported for the purposes of edible gelatin and collagen production." Status: In December 2018, APHIS submitted comments to the WTO in response to the proposed EU 2017 draft regulation. APHIS "requests that the EU delay the proposed implementation date to allow for competent authorities [USDA] to adequately prepare for implementation and provide the EU additional time to clarify its requirements." Officials at APHIS await an official response from the EU. Issues Related to Livestock Trade In 2018, exports of U.S. livestock and products totaled $29.6 billion, while imports totaled $16.5 billion. Foreign demand for U.S. animals and products supports prices of domestic livestock, poultry, and dairy products, while imports help to meet U.S. consumer demand for a variety of livestock and dairy products. U.S. producers in the livestock sector look to the U.S. government to negotiate market access agreements, monitor international trading policies, and settle trade disputes, including restrictions that certain countries impose on U.S. exports in response to animal disease concerns. Export Bans on U.S. Meat and Poultry222 In 2019, the USDA forecasts that exports of meat and poultry products will represent about 17% of U.S. domestic production. Periodically, foreign countries impose export bans on U.S. meat products in response to an outbreak of certain animal diseases. The bans are disruptive for livestock producers and meat exporters, are often inconsistent with internationally accepted protocols, and vary in terms of how broadly and how long trading partners apply them. For example, bans were imposed on U.S. beef exports because of the discovery of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE, or mad cow disease) in 2003. An outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) at the end of 2014 and early 2015 in U.S. turkey and egg-laying flocks triggered export bans on poultry products by more than 30 countries. The bans on U.S. broiler meat exports were imposed for various periods of time even though the HPAI outbreaks were not in areas in close proximity of commercial broiler production. The World Organization for Animal Health (known as OIE) has established trade protocols when disease outbreaks occur in countries that export meat and poultry products. According to OIE, in most cases total export bans are not recommended or needed when there is a BSE or HPAI discovery or outbreak in exporting countries. In 2013, the OIE determined that the United States is at "negligible risk" for BSE, meaning that U.S. surveillance and safeguard systems are strong. For HPAI, USDA, in collaboration with states, has implemented increased flock biosecurity and has a system in place to rapidly contain and eradicate an outbreak of HPAI. Over the years, while some foreign markets imposed total bans on U.S. beef exports following the 2003 BSE incident, other export markets for U.S. beef imposed specific conditions for imports of U.S. beef. For example, Japan and South Korea—two importers of U.S. beef—require that imported U.S. beef be produced from cattle under 30 months of age. China did not lift its ban on U.S beef exports until 2017 and included an age restriction when it did. Regarding poultry, some foreign markets imposed total bans on poultry exports during the HPAI outbreak, while other markets imposed export bans only from the regions affected by the outbreak, consistent with the recommended OIE protocol. As the United States demonstrated that the outbreak was contained and then eliminated, most of these bans were lifted. Status: China lifted the ban on U.S. beef in 2017 but restricts imports of U.S. beef to cattle under 30 months of age, similar to other countries that maintain age restrictions. The OIE guidelines do not include age restrictions for countries with the "negligible risk" status. China also requires that U.S. exporters of beef to China participate in the USDA Agricultural Marketing Service export verification program, which verifies that U.S. suppliers are meeting importing country requirements. In 2017 and 2018, the U.S. shipped about 10,000 MT of beef to China, representing 0.5% total U.S. beef exports. China continues to ban U.S. exports of poultry meat because of the HPAI outbreak and has been unwilling to accept regionalization—the internationally accepted principle that export bans be applied only to areas affected by an animal disease outbreak. In 2018, the United States and South Korea reached an agreement accepting regionalization in the event of an HPAI outbreak in the United States instead of imposing nationwide bans. U.S. Meat and Poultry Imports230 Currently, 33 countries are eligible to export meat and poultry to the United States. Before the United States authorizes imports of meat or poultry, APHIS conducts risk assessments of any foreign animal diseases that could pose a threat to U.S. animal health. Also, FSIS must determine if a foreign meat or poultry inspection system provides an "equivalent" level of sanitation and protection of public health as the U.S. system. Foreign governments document how inspection systems are regulated, and FSIS conducts onsite audits of foreign facilities. FSIS also conducts equivalency verification and periodic audits of countries already approved to export meat and poultry to the United States. Imports of Chicken from China In August 2013, FSIS confirmed that China's poultry processing inspection system was equivalent to the U.S. poultry inspection system. This determination allowed China to export processed (cooked) poultry meat that is sourced raw from the United States or from countries eligible to export poultry to the United States. In March 2016, FSIS recommended that the process of verifying equivalency for China's poultry slaughter inspection system move forward. In August 2017, FSIS released an audit report confirming that China's poultry processing system remained equivalent. To date, USDA has not issued a final rule on equivalency for China's poultry slaughter system. These actions were the culmination of a process that began in 2005, when China requested that USDA evaluate its poultry inspection system. Congress halted the process in FY2006, when appropriations provisions prohibited FSIS from expending funds to evaluate China's poultry inspection system. The process resumed in FY2010 on the condition that FSIS provide Congress with regular reports on the equivalency process. The possibility that the United States could import poultry meat from China has alarmed some food safety advocates and some Members of Congress because of concerns about relatively lax food safety enforcement in China for both domestically consumed products and exports. Testimony presented during a Congressional-Executive Commission on China hearing highlighted concerns regarding China's food safety. Status: In response to concern about China's record on food safety, Section 749 of Division B of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P.L. 116-6 ), prohibits USDA from using any funds to purchase Chinese raw or processed poultry products for feeding programs, including the school lunch and school breakfast programs. Section 753 of Division B of the FY2019 appropriations act prohibits USDA from finalizing the proposed rule to allow the importation of slaughtered Chinese poultry. In 2017, the United States imported about 500 pounds of processed poultry meat from China but did not import any processed poultry meat in 2018. If Congress were to lift the appropriations prohibition on finalizing the China poultry slaughter rule, China would still be restricted to sending only cooked/processed products because of APHIS restrictions on uncooked/processed products due to the presence of animal diseases in China, such as avian influenza. Fresh Beef Imports from Brazil and Argentina The United States restricts or prohibits the importation of animals or animal products (including meat) from countries where highly infectious animal diseases exist in order to protect U.S. herds. Fresh beef imports from Brazil and Argentina have been prohibited or restricted because of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) in the two countries. U.S. beef imports from Brazil and Argentina have mostly been limited to fully cooked/processed product. Argentina was approved to export fresh beef to the United States from 1997 to 2001,\ until the United States halted exports after an Argentine FMD outbreak in 2001. In December 2013, APHIS proposed a rule that would allow fresh beef imports from 13 regions in Brazil. In August 2014, APHIS proposed a separate rule to allow fresh beef imports from Patagonia and northern Argentina. In July 2015, APHIS released final rules to allow the import of fresh beef from these regions of Brazil and Argentina. USDA risk assessments determined that, under certain circumstances, fresh beef could be safely imported from Brazil and Argentina without threatening the FMD-free status of the United States. Some livestock industry stakeholders, such as the National Cattlemen's Beef Association and the National Farmers Union, have expressed opposition to allowing fresh beef from Brazil and Argentina because neither country is considered to be free of FMD. FMD was eradicated in the United States in 1929, and any introduction of the disease back into the United States could be economically devastating for the livestock industry. In 2013, the Department of Homeland Security estimated that the cost of an FMD outbreak in the United States could exceed $50 billion. In May 2015, FSIS found that Brazil's beef inspection system would provide an equivalent level of food safety as the U.S. system. In August 2016, USDA announced that Brazil was approved to ship fresh beef to the United States, and the first shipments arrived the following month. In June 2017, USDA suspended imports of fresh beef from Brazil after FSIS found problems with re-inspected Brazilian beef at the U.S. port of entry. According to USDA, FSIS was re-inspecting 100% of Brazilian fresh beef imports and refused entry to 11% of shipments, well above the 1% refusal rate for other beef imports. In November 2018, FSIS announced that the Argentine beef inspection system was equivalent, and the country could export fresh beef to the United States again. FSIS also announced that within six months of the November 2018 equivalency determination, the agency would undertake additional onsite audits of Argentina's raw beef inspection system. Status : The United States continues to suspend its approval of fresh beef imports from Brazil. The United States imported about 10,000 MT of fresh Brazilian beef since September 2016, when U.S. imports began, until shipments were suspended in June 2017. In a step to allow U.S. beef imports from Brazil to resume, President Trump and President Bolsonaro of Brazil issued a joint statement during President Bolsonaro's March 2019 visit in which the United States agreed to "expeditiously schedule" an audit of Brazil's beef inspection system once FSIS is "satisfied with Brazil's food safety documentation." The United States imported nearly 1,100 pounds of fresh beef from Argentina in December 2018. Argentina holds a 20,000 MT ton duty-free TRQ allotment for beef shipments to the United States. Trade Restrictions on Ractopamine Use246 Ractopamine, an animal drug that increases animal weight gain and meat yield, is approved by FDA for use in U.S. cattle, hog, and turkey production. It is also approved for use in countries such as Canada, Japan, Mexico, and South Korea, but many other countries ban the use of ractopamine in meat production. In 2012, the Codex Alimentarius—the international food standards organization that sets guidelines to protect public health and ensure fair practices in the food trade—set maximum residue levels for ractopamine in beef and pork. However, several of the largest markets for U.S. meat exports have restricted imports of meat produced with ractopamine, despite U.S. adherence to the residue standards established by Codex. The USTR, in its "2019 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers," states that the EU, China, Taiwan, and Thailand continue to restrict U.S. meat exports produced with ractopamine. According to FSIS, U.S. meat exports—particularly pork—may be shipped to markets with ractopamine restrictions if the exported product is raised without ractopamine and is certified through USDA's Never Fed Beta Agonists Program. U.S. exports to markets that have ractopamine restrictions are subject to increased certification and testing costs, potentially affecting competitiveness and dampening market opportunities. Status : USDA and the USTR continue to engage with trading partners to encourage them to accept international standards on the use of ractopamine. Country-of-Origin Labeling (COOL)249 In March 2009, USDA implemented a final rule to implement country-of-origin labeling (COOL) to provide consumers information on the origin of fresh fruits and vegetables, fish, shellfish, peanuts, pecans, macadamia nuts, ginseng, and ground and muscle cuts of beef, pork, lamb, chicken, and goat. The rules were required by the 2002 farm bill ( P.L. 107-171 ) as amended by the 2008 farm bill ( P.L. 110-246 ). In 2009, Canada and Mexico challenged U.S. COOL in the WTO, arguing that COOL reduced the value and number of cattle and hogs shipped to the U.S. market, thus violating WTO trade commitments. In 2011, the WTO found that COOL treated imported livestock less favorably than U.S. livestock and did not provide complete information to consumers on the origin of meat products. The United States appealed the WTO ruling, but the Appellate Body upheld the findings. USDA issued a revised COOL rule in May 2013, which required that production steps—born, raised, and slaughtered, by origin country—be included on meat labels, but in 2014 the WTO found that the revised COOL regulations still violated U.S. WTO obligations by discriminating against imported livestock. In December 2015, the WTO authorized Canada and Mexico to retaliate against $1 billion worth of products imported from the United States. In December 2015, Congress repealed the COOL requirements for beef and pork and ground beef and pork in Section 759 of Division A of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 ( P.L. 114-113 ). USDA then issued a final rule that removed beef and pork from COOL regulations, thus settling the trade dispute. Even so, Canada and Mexico retain their rights granted by the WTO to retaliate if the United States should implement laws or regulations that violate the WTO findings on U.S. COOL for beef and pork. Status : Following the repeal of COOL for beef and pork, several state legislatures—including Wyoming, South Dakota, Montana, and Colorado—have considered bills that would require COOL on meat sold within the state, but thus far none has been enacted. The Ranchers-Cattlemen Action Legal Fund United Stockgrowers of America and the Cattle Producers of Washington sued USDA to restore COOL for beef and pork in June 2017. In June 2018, the district court in eastern Washington ruled in favor of USDA because the plaintiffs had missed "the applicable statute of limitations time period and because the regulations follow Congress's clear intent." In June 2018, the Organization for Competitive Markets and the American Grassfed Association petitioned FSIS to change its "Product of USA" label. The organizations state that foreign meat is imported into the United States, minimally processed, and then sold as "Product of USA" meat. The petition requests that FSIS change its Food Standards and Labeling Policy Book to clarify that the ingredients in a product must be of domestic origin to have a "Product of USA" label. To date, FSIS has not responded to this request. WTO and U.S. Agriculture The 164-member WTO oversees and administers multilateral trade rules, serves as a forum for trade liberalization negotiations, and resolves trade disputes through its Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). As a signatory member of the WTO, the United States has committed to abide by WTO rules and disciplines, including those that govern domestic farm policy. The WTO's general rules concerning subsidy disciplines, trade behavior, and market access concessions apply to all members. 2018 Farm Bill and WTO Compliance255 Two developments in 2018 have created some uncertainty about whether the United States will remain in compliance with rules and spending limits for domestic support programs that it has agreed to in the WTO. These developments are farm program changes under both the 2018 farm bill ( P.L. 115-334 ) and a new USDA direct payment program—the MFP—implemented in 2018 under other statutory authorities in response to foreign trade retaliation targeting U.S. agricultural products. The outcome will depend on market conditions, but the potential for non-compliance would be heightened if market prices for major commodity crops were to weaken and lower prices were to generate farm program payments above current USDA projections. In general, the farm program changes enacted in the 2018 farm bill incrementally shift farm safety net outlays away from decoupled programs that do not tie crop support payments to production and toward coupled programs that are potentially more market distorting. This resulted from the addition of a new, albeit temporary, coupled support program (the MFP) and, in the 2018 farm bill, from raising support levels for existing coupled programs and from removing several of the coupled programs from individual farm payment limit requirements. Direct farm support payments may occur under: One of the revenue-support programs authorized by the farm bill—the Market Assistance Loan (MAL), Agricultural Risk Coverage (ARC), Price Loss Coverage (PLC), and Dairy Margin Coverage (DMC) programs; A program authorized by the Secretary of Agriculture using authority under the CCC Charter to make payments in support of U.S. agriculture—two such programs are the Cotton Ginning Cost Share (CGCS) program and the MFP; or One of the four disaster assistance programs—the Livestock Forage Disaster Program (LFP), Livestock Indemnity Program (LIP), Tree Assistance Program (TAP), and Emergency Assistance for Livestock, Honeybees, and Farm-Raised Fish Program (ELAP). In a change from previous policy, the 2018 farm bill excluded payments made under MAL, LIP, TAP, and ELAP from annual individual payment limits. DMC, like its predecessor—the Margin Protection Program—operates without any farm payment limit. The absence of a limit on benefits received by an individual farmer under these programs represents the potential for unlimited, fully coupled USDA farm support outlays that would count against U.S. domestic support limits agreed to under U.S. WTO commitments. MAL payments are coupled directly to actual production (subject to a producer's participation choice). DMC payments are made on a producer-selected share of a historical production base that is adjusted upward for annual growth in national average milk production. Milk producers must participate in the program to receive the annual base adjustment. Thus DMC payments are treated as coupled. The 2018 farm bill raised support levels for both dairy producers under the DMC and for several program crops under MAL, including barley, corn, grain sorghum, oats, extra-long-staple cotton, rice, soybeans, dry peas, lentils, and small and large chickpeas. Higher support levels increase the potential for higher payments during a market downturn. Such payments count against the market-distorting spending limit. Furthermore, coupled payments can influence producer production choices in favor of those farm activities expected to receive larger support payments. If such payments are noticeably large relative to the commodity's farm value and result in surplus production that moves into international markets, then they could attract the attention of competitor nations. Such spillovers, if measurably harmful to foreign export competitors or producers, could lead to challenges under the WTO's dispute settlement process. Of the direct payment programs, ARC and PLC are partially decoupled from producer behavior: Payments are made to a portion (85%) of historical base acres irrespective of actual plantings. Because of this they are notified as non-product specific and have been excluded from counting against WTO spending limits under a special "de minimis" exclusion, which allows minimum amounts of domestic support even if they are market distorting. Most of the other direct support programs—MAL, DMC, LFP, LIP, TAP, and ELAP—count against the United States' annual market-distorting "amber box" payment limit of $19.1 billion. CGCS and MFP are special cases. The United States has yet to notify spending under either of these programs to the WTO, so their exact WTO spending classification is currently unknown. However, because their payments are coupled directly to specific commodities, they could well be included with other market-distorting payments subject to the spending limit. To the extent that producers expect payments under these programs to recur, they can become market distorting and subject to potential WTO challenge. Secretary Perdue has, however, stated that MFP was a one-time assistance and would not be extended beyond the package announced in July 2018. CGCS outlays were $326 million in 2016 and $216 million in 2018. Actual outlays under MFP are estimated at $5.2 billion in 2018 and $3.5 billion in 2019. The U.S. sugar program does not rely on direct payments from USDA. Instead, USDA provides indirect price support via MAL loans to processors at statutorily fixed prices (which were raised slightly by the 2018 farm bill) while limiting the amount of sugar supplied for food use in the U.S. market. In its 2015 notification of domestic support to the WTO (the most recent notification year), USDA notified the implicit cost of the sugar program at $1.5 billion. The federally subsidized crop insurance program was largely unchanged by the 2018 farm bill. Annual USDA premium subsidies—which have averaged $6.4 billion per year since 2011—count against the U.S. trade-distorting spending limit of $19.1 billion. Payments under U.S. conservation programs are deemed generally non-market distorting and are notified as "green box" payments, which are not subject to any spending limit. Status: Most recent studies suggest that, for U.S. program spending to exceed the $19.1 billion cumulative spending limit, even with the addition of large MFP payments and higher MAL and DMC support levels, a combination of events would have to occur that would broadly depress commodity prices. Perhaps more relevant to U.S. agricultural trade is the concern that, because the United States plays such a prominent role in most international markets for agricultural products, any distortion resulting from U.S. policy would be both visible and potentially vulnerable to challenge under WTO rules. U.S. Challenges of Farm Support Spending of WTO Members266 The United States was a major force behind the establishment of the WTO in 1995 and the rules and procedures governing its DSU. The United States has frequently used DSU, often successfully. Since the summer of 2017, the United States has blocked the appointment of new DSU Appellate Body (AB) jurists, which has limited the ability of the system to hear dispute cases. The AB currently has three jurists (the minimum number to hear a case) out of a total of seven positions. In December 2019, the terms of two of the three will expire, potentially leaving the AB unable to function if no new jurists are appointed. Status: Since the inception of the WTO in 1995, the United States has brought to it 46 cases on agriculture. Of these cases, 34 were fully or partially decided in favor of the United States by the WTO panel hearing the case. Most recently, the WTO ruled in favor of the United States against China over Chinese domestic support policies for its agricultural sector and over China's administration of its market access policies. The United States has notified the WTO on a similar domestic support case against India. However, if no new members are appointed to the WTO AB, then pending U.S. cases may be unable to move forward toward a ruling. U.S. Challenges of China's Agricultural Domestic Support In September 2016, USTR filed a dispute settlement case (DS511) at the WTO over Chinese domestic support policies for its agricultural sector that USTR alleged were inconsistent with WTO rules and commitments. Furthermore, USTR contended that China's policies had distorted international trade in wheat, rice, and corn and that government support payments were in excess of China's WTO spending limits. In December 2016, USTR requested that WTO establish a dispute settlement panel to examine China's domestic support levels for these crops, a request that was fulfilled in January 2017. In its challenge, USTR contended that the level of support that China provided for rice, wheat, and corn had exceeded—by nearly $100 million from 2012 through 2015—the level to which China had committed to when it joined the WTO. USTR also asserted that China's price support for domestic production had been above the world market prices since 2012, thereby creating an incentive for Chinese farmers to increase production of the subsidized crops, which in turn displaced imports from the United States and elsewhere. When China acceded to the WTO in 2001, some of its domestic support policies—including market price support and certain producer payments and input subsidies linked to production—became subject to an annual spending limit of 8.5% of each product's value based on China's domestic prices. Since all of China's domestic production was potentially eligible for the above-market support prices—and on the assumption that all domestic producers had incorporated the high support levels into their production decisions—USTR stated that the correct measure of total support should be based on the total production of wheat, rice, and corn in the provinces and regions where the support programs operated. However, USTR asserted that China reported the subsidies only on the smaller quantities purchased by the government. USTR also argued that China's fixed external reference price for wheat, rice, and corn should be based on the three-year averages of 1986-1988 world prices, as specified in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture. In contrast, China had used the much higher 1996-1998 prices, which had resulted in smaller price gap calculations. Finally, the United States and China disagreed on whether to measure the level of market price support for milled or unmilled rice and the appropriate conversion factor between the two. Status: On February 28, 2019, the WTO dispute settlement body (DSB) found that China had exceeded its domestic support limits for wheat and rice in each year between 2012 and 2015 and therefore was not in compliance with its WTO commitment. The panel agreed with China's reference price calculations based on 1996-1998 prices because these years had been used in China's WTO accession documentation. The panel disagreed with China's methodology of calculating domestic support taking into consideration only the purchases made by the government. The DSB panel made recommendations for calculation of reference prices and domestic support for China in order to comply with its WTO commitments. The DSB panel did not make a ruling on corn because, following the 2015 harvest, China made changes to its calculations of corn prices that were found to be less market distorting than the method used prior to 2015. If neither the United States nor China appeals the report, the findings and recommendations in the report would be adopted within 60 days of public circulation. China recently stated that it will not appeal the WTO ruling. U.S. Challenges of China's Agricultural Market Access Policy276 On December 15, 2016, USTR filed another WTO dispute settlement case (DS517) against China, alleging that China's administration of its TRQs for wheat, rice, and corn are unclear and that China had failed to fill the within-quota commitments, thus undermining U.S. exports. While China announced on an annual basis the opening of TRQs, USTR stated that China's application criteria and procedures were unclear and that China did not provide meaningful information on how it actually administered the TRQs. When China joined the WTO in 2001, it agreed to create TRQs to allow imports of wheat, rice, and corn. Imports within the set quota volume would be levied a lower within-quota tariff rate, while imports beyond the set quota amount would be levied at a higher tariff rate. Under China's WTO commitments, by 2004, the wheat TRQ would reach 9.6 million metric tons, rice 5.4 million metric tons, and corn 7.2 million metric tons. The in-quota tariffs for all three commodities are 1%, while the over-quota tariffs are set at 65%. Despite the low within-quota tariff, China's TRQs for wheat, rice, and corn have never been filled even when imported grains were priced lower and were more competitive than domestic grains. According to prices reported by China's Ministry of Agriculture, during 2014-2016, the import prices were lower by about 30-40% for wheat, 25-35% for rice, and 15-35% for corn. USTR states that China's TRQ administration appears to restrict imports and fails to provide sufficient information to permit the processing of quota application and importation. Status: On September 22, 2017, a WTO DSB panel was established on "China—Tariff Rate Quotas for Certain Agricultural Products" (DS517). On April 18, 2019, the WTO ruled in favor of the United States, stating that "China's administration of its TRQs for wheat, rice and corn were inconsistent with its obligations under the WTO to administer TRQs on a transparent, predictable and fair basis." The WTO recommends that China make changes to make its TRQ administration to conform with its WTO obligations. U.S. Challenges of India's Domestic Agricultural Support In May 2018, the United States challenged India's domestic agricultural support notifications at the WTO, charging that India had under-notified spending on its market price support for rice and wheat for the marketing years 2010/11 through 2013/14. The United States alleged that India's market price support for wheat and rice exceeded its allowable levels of trade distorting domestic support under the WTO. In November 2018, the United States also challenged India's domestic support for cotton, stating that it exceeded its allowable level under its WTO commitments. At about the same time, Australia, Brazil, and Guatemala challenged India's level of domestic support for sugar, charging that India had violated its WTO commitment levels. In February 2019, the United States further challenged India stating that it had substantially underreported its market price support for chickpeas, pigeon peas, black matpe (a type of black lentil), mung beans, and lentils. According to USTR, when calculated using the WTO Agreement on Agriculture methodology, India's market price support for each of these pulses has exceeded the allowable levels of trade-distorting domestic support under India's WTO commitments. Status: The United States' challenge to India's domestic support for rice and wheat was raised at the May 2018 WTO Committee on Agriculture (COA) meeting. USTR raised the issue concerning India's cotton price support during the November 2018 COA meeting, and the challenge against India's domestic support for pulses was raised at the February 2019 COA meeting. USTR raised these issues at the COA to alert India and other WTO members that the United States is aware and concerned about India's underreporting of its domestic agricultural subsidies. USTR intends to continue challenging India's domestic support for agriculture at upcoming COA meetings and, if necessary, could pursue these concerns through WTO's dispute settlement mechanism.

Sales of U.S. agricultural products to foreign markets absorb about one-fifth of U.S. agricultural production, thus contributing significantly to the health of the farm economy. Farm product exports, which totaled $143 billion in FY2018 (see chart below), make up about 9% of total U.S. exports and contribute positively to the U.S. balance of trade. The economic benefits of agricultural exports also extend across rural communities, while overseas farm sales help to buoy a wide array of industries linked to agriculture, including transportation, processing, and farm input suppliers. Congress has traditionally displayed a keen interest in agricultural trade issues given their importance to farmers and ranchers and to the overall economy. A major area of interest for the 116th Congress has been the loss of overseas export market shares for agricultural products due to the direction of the Trump Administration's trade policy, which places increased emphasis on reducing the overall U.S. trade deficit. In March 2018, the Trump Administration imposed Section 232 tariffs on U.S. imports of steel and aluminum from most countries and additional Section 301 tariffs on a number of imports from China. Following these actions, Canada, China, Mexico, the European Union (EU), and Turkey imposed retaliatory tariffs on more than 800 U.S. agricultural and food product exports. In response, USDA authorized $12 billion in short-term assistance to the affected agricultural producers and commodities under its Market Facilitation Program to help mitigate the economic impact on farmers. A number of policy developments undertaken by the Trump Administration in bilateral and regional trade agreements may affect agricultural markets as well. On the Administration's initiative, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has been renegotiated and signed as the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). This agreement is subject to legislative ratification by Canada and Mexico and approval by U.S. Congress. President Trump withdrew the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in January 2017. In March 2018, the remaining 11 countries concluded a revised version of TPP, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). Signatories of CPTPP have begun to reduce tariffs and provide greater agricultural market access for imports from CPTPP signatory countries, actions that could potentially erode U.S. agricultural market shares in the region. At the bilateral level, the Trump Administration has notified Congress of its intent to begin trade negotiations with Japan (a CPTPP member), the EU, and the United Kingdom. At the global level, and at the initiative of the United States, the World Trade Organization (WTO) recently ruled that China has subsidized its agricultural production beyond the level permitted under its WTO obligations and that China's administration of its agricultural market access policies are inconsistent with its WTO obligations. The United States has also filed a counter notification against India at the WTO stating that India has underreported its agricultural domestic subsidies. Several other agricultural trade issues may be of interest to Congress. For example, the proposed USMCA does not address all the issues that restrict U.S. agricultural exports to Mexico and Canada, and Southeastern U.S. produce growers have been seeking changes to trade remedy laws to address imports of seasonal produce. A key objective of U.S. trade negotiations continues to be the establishment of a common framework for approval, trade, and marketing of the products of agricultural biotechnology. U.S. farm and food interests see the potential for market expansion opportunities in Cuba, but a prohibition on private U.S. financing is generally viewed as a major obstacle to this end. Moreover, the United States has announced its intention to withdraw eligibility for the Generalized System of Preference (GSP)—which provides duty-free tariff treatment for certain products from developing countries—from Turkey and India. On another front, U.S. exports of beef, pork, and chicken continue to face bans and trade restrictions over disease outbreaks even though the bans are inconsistent with international trade protocols, among which are China's ongoing bans on imports of U.S. beef and poultry and restrictions imposed by several foreign markets on U.S. ractopamine-fed pork.

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A private bill is one that provides benefits to specified individuals (including corporate bodies). Individuals sometimes request relief through private law when administrative or legal remedies are exhausted, but Congress seems more often to view private legislation as appropriate when no other remedy is available and when enactment would, in a broad sense, afford equity. From 1817 through 1971, most Congresses enacted hundreds of private laws, but since then the number has declined significantly as Congress has expanded administrative discretion to deal with many of the situations that tended to give rise to private bills. Since 2007, four private laws have been enacted. Private provisions are also occasionally included in public legislation. The Senate considers private bills using the same procedures that are used to consider other legislation. Subjects of Private Bills No House rule defines what bills qualify as private, but most private bills have official titles stating them to be "for the relief of" named individuals. House Rule XII, clause 4, prohibits the introduction or consideration of private bills for granting pensions, constructing certain bridges, correcting military or naval records, or settling claims eligible for action under the Tort Claims Act ( U.S. Code , Title 28). Subjects of contemporary private bills (and House committees receiving referral of those bills) include the following: Immigration (e.g., residency status, visa classification): Judiciary Domestic claims against the government: Judiciary Foreign claims against the government: Foreign Affairs Patents and copyrights: Judiciary Vessel documentation: Transportation and Infrastructure Taxation (e.g., income tax liability, tariff exemptions): Ways and Means Public lands (e.g., sales, claims, exchanges, mineral leases): Natural Resources Veterans' benefits: Veterans' Affairs Civil Service status: Oversight and Reform Medical (e.g., drug approvals, HMO enrollment requirements): Energy and Commerce Military decorations: Armed Services Introduction of Private Bills Private bills are introduced and referred in the same way as other measures. They are commonly introduced by the Member who represents the individual to be benefitted. Seldom are companion bills introduced in both chambers. Although House Rule XII, clause 7, permits no cosponsors on private bills, cosponsors have occasionally appeared on private bills that attract broad interest. Committee Consideration Immigration and claims matters have long been the most common subjects of private bills. The Committee on the Judiciary refers these to its Subcommittee on Immigration and Citizenship, which handles them routinely under established committee rules. It generally takes no action on a private bill unless its sponsor submits specified documentation and requests a hearing. The sponsor is generally the only witness at such a hearing. The subcommittee makes available to Member offices information on what documentation it requires and the kinds of bills on which it is likely to take favorable action. It usually declines to report a bill if its records show few precedents for favorable House action in similar cases. Panels that handle other kinds of private legislation have no similarly institutionalized procedures. Floor Consideration House Rule XV, clause 5, establishes special procedures for the consideration of private bills. When reported, private bills go on a dedicated calendar, the Private Calendar (House Rule XIII, clause 1). On the first Tuesday of each month, the Speaker is to direct the Clerk to call the bills and resolutions that are pending on the Private Calendar. Each bill is called up automatically in the order in which it was reported and placed on the Calendar. The bills are considered under a hybrid set of procedures known as "the House as in Committee of the Whole," meaning that there is no period of general debate, but debate and amendment may occur under the five-minute rule. Usually, however, no debate occurs, and private measures are disposed of by voice vote. At his or her discretion, the Speaker may also, on any other day of the month, call up for consideration a bill or resolution that has been pending on the Private Calendar for at least seven days, providing he or she has given two legislative days' notice of his or her intention to do so. During the call of the Private Calendar, if two Members object to the consideration of any bill, it is automatically recommitted. During a Congress, each party is to appoint official "objectors" who are responsible for examining bills on the Private Calendar and objecting to those they deem inappropriate. Sometimes, a member of a subcommittee dealing with immigration or claims has served simultaneously as an official objector. In practice, instead of objecting, objectors may ask that a bill be passed "over, without prejudice," which gives sponsors an opportunity to discuss concerns with them informally before the next calendar call. If a private bill is recommitted, the committee may re-report it as a paragraph of an omnibus private bill, which has priority for consideration under Rule XV. At this stage, the substance of each original private bill may be defeated by majority vote by means of a motion to strike the paragraph out of the omnibus bill. Otherwise, each paragraph may be amended only by reducing amounts of money or providing limitations. After an omnibus private bill is passed, it is broken up again into separate bills for further action. In recent practice, committees seldom re-report private measures once they are recommitted, and the House does not appear to have considered an omnibus private bill in decades. The House has sometimes considered private bills using other parliamentary mechanisms, such as the Suspension of the Rules procedure or by unanimous consent. Further Proceedings Further proceedings on private bills follow the general lawmaking process. Presidents have vetoed private bills, sometimes by pocket veto. Otherwise, Congress may override the veto in the same way as with public measures. Either house of Congress may also, by resolution, refer a private claims bill to the Court of Claims for a recommendation from a trial commissioner. These recommendations are requested occasionally and are strictly advisory, but they are often followed when requested.

A private bill is one that provides benefits to specified individuals (including corporate bodies). Individuals sometimes request relief through private law when administrative or legal remedies are exhausted, but Congress seems more often to view private legislation as appropriate when no other remedy is available and when enactment would, in a broad sense, afford equity. From 1817 through 1971, most Congresses enacted hundreds of private laws, but since then, the number has declined significantly as Congress has expanded administrative discretion to deal with many of the situations that tended to give rise to private bills. Since 2007, four private laws have been enacted. Private provisions are also occasionally included in public legislation. The Senate considers private bills using the same procedures that are used to consider other legislation.

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Introduction The National Institutes of Health (NIH) is the primary agency of the federal government charged with performing and supporting biomedical and behavioral research. It has major roles in training biomedical researchers and disseminating health information. The NIH mission is "to seek fundamental knowledge about the nature and behavior of living systems and the application of that knowledge to enhance health, lengthen life, and reduce illness and disability." As of FY2018, NIH was the largest single public funder of biomedical research in the world. Congress maintains a high level of interest in NIH for a variety of reasons. NIH funds extramural researchers in every state, and widespread constituencies contact Congress about funding for particular diseases and levels of research support in general. NIH is the largest and most visible contributor to the federal biomedical research effort; it represents about half of federal spending for non-Department of Defense research and development (R&D) and about one-fifth of total federal R&D funding. It has the largest budget of the eight health-related agencies that make up the Public Health Service (PHS) within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). In FY2018, discretionary appropriations to NIH constituted about 40% of all HHS discretionary budget authority. NIH-funded research has contributed to major scientific advances. To date, 156 NIH-funded researchers have received Nobel Prizes for their work. NIH-funded research has led to major medical innovations such as treatments for heart disease, cancer, and HIV/AIDs. Such advances have been credited with helping increase life expectancy and prevent millions of deaths. However, in light of the high cost of new medical innovations, some question whether NIH priorities are too focused on research that leads to new treatments rather than on disease prevention or improving the value of medical care. The allocation of NIH research dollars is a major source of debate. NIH has seen periods of both low and high funding growth. From FY1998 to FY2003, Congress doubled the NIH budget over a five-year period, from $13.7 billion to $27.1 billion. The agency then saw low funding growth or cuts from FY2004 to FY2015. From FY2016 through FY2019, Congress provided NIH with funding increases of over 5% each year, increasing funding from $30.3 billion in FY2015 to $39.3 billion in FY2019. Under President Trump's budget request for FY2020, NIH would be provided a program level of $34.3 billion—a 12.6% reduction from the FY2019 program level. Some members of the scientific community have cited funding variability and uncertainty as a hindrance for advancing biomedical research. They have called for steady and predictable funding growth to support the multiyear nature of research. Others have questioned whether universities and other research institutions are too reliant on NIH funding and if institutions should diversify their funding sources or use institutional funds to pay for research. Aside from funding, other potential issues of for many in Congress and the research community may include allocating funding across disease types, areas of human health, and types of research; addressing congressional priorities and concerns, while ensuring the scientific merit and quality of NIH-funded research; helping new and early-stage investigators obtain their first independent research grants; maintaining the United States' role as a leader in biomedical research; balancing the public and private sectors' relative roles in biomedical research. This report provides background and analysis on NIH organization, mission, budget, and history; outlines the agency's major responsibilities; and discusses some of the issues facing Congress as it works to guide and monitor the nation's investment in medical research. Background on NIH History NIH traces its roots to 1887, when a one-room Laboratory of Hygiene was established at the Marine Hospital in Staten Island, NY. Relocated to Washington, DC, in 1891, and renamed the Hygienic Laboratory, it operated for its first half century as an intramural research lab for the Public Health Service. Congress designated the research laboratory the National Institute of Health in 1930 (P.L. 71-251). It moved to donated land in the Maryland suburbs in 1938. By 1948, several new institutes and divisions had been created, and the agency became the National Institutes of Health (P.L. 80-655). Congress has continued to create new institutes and centers, most recently in 2011 with the establishment of the National Center for Advancing Translational Sciences (NCATS, P.L. 112-74 ; see Table 2 ). NIH now occupies a 322-acre main campus in Bethesda, MD, and several off-campus sites, including locations in Maryland, North Carolina, Montana, Arizona. Organizational Structure Today, NIH is a large and complex organization. NIH consists of the Office of the Director and 27 components—20 research institutes, three research centers, the National Library of Medicine (NLM), and three other support centers: the Clinical Center, the Center for Information Technology, and the Center for Scientific Review (for details, see Table 2 ). The Office of the Director (OD) sets overall policy for NIH and coordinates the programs and activities of all NIH components, particularly transinstitute research initiatives and issues. The individual institutes and centers (ICs) may focus on particular diseases (i.e., The National Cancer Institute), areas of human health and development (i.e., The National Institute on Aging), scientific fields (i.e., National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences), or biomedical professions and technology (i.e., National Institute of Biomedical Imaging and Bioengineering). Each IC plans and manages its own research programs in coordination with OD. Congress provides separate appropriations to 24 (all 20 institutes, NLM, and the 3 research centers) of the 27 ICs, to OD, and to a buildings and facilities account (see " Budget "). The institutes, NLM, and the three research centers have the authority to award research grants; the three operational support centers do not award research grants. Under President Trump's FY2020 budget request, the activities of the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) would be consolidated into NIH as the National Institute for Research on Safety and Quality (NIRSQ), forming a 28 th IC. The creation of a new NIH institute would require an amendment to the Public Health Service Act (PHSA) Section 401(d), which specifies that "[i]n the National Institutes of Health, the number of national research institutes and national centers may not exceed a total of 27" (see discussion in " NIH Reform Act of 2006 "). President Trump's FY2019 and FY2018 budget requests also proposed consolidating AHRQ and other HHS institutes into NIH; however, Congress did not adopt these proposals. NIH's large and decentralized organizational structure has been an issue of concern. There are costs and complexities of administering an agency made of 27 ICs, each with its own mission, budget, staff, review office, and other organizational apparatus. The resulting fragmentation may create research duplication or gaps, and might adversely affect NIH's ability to respond appropriately to new scientific and public health challenges. A number of laws have addressed administration and priorities at NIH, including the NIH Reform Act of 2006 and the 21 st Century Cures Act. NIH Reform Act of 2006 In 2003, Congress requested that the National Academy of Sciences (NAS, now called the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine) study the structure and organization of NIH. The NAS report was released in 2003: Enhancing the Vitality of the National Institutes of Health: Organizational Change to Meet New Challenges . The 2003 NAS report found that "the most common mechanism of origin of the institutes has been the congressional mandate responding to the health advocacy community." The first institute was the National Cancer Institute (NCI) established in 1937. "From the middle 1940s to 1974, health advocates were successful in persuading Congress to establish additional institutes, often against the wishes of administrations, which generally opposed creation of new categorical institutes." Health advocacy "groups have continued the long established pattern of pushing for creation of named entities at NIH to create focal points for developing more research funding for particular diseases. That has often resulted in the establishment by Congress of a named program at the office level. Through continued pressure, offices may then be elevated to centers and, in some cases, to institute status." The 2003 NAS report noted challenges with NIH's large and decentralized organizational structure, but said that any proposals for changing the number of ICs or OD program offices should be subject to a public evaluation process. Many of the recommendations in the 2003 NAS report were incorporated into the NIH Reform Act of 2006 ( P.L. 109-482 ). The law enhanced the authority of the NIH Director's Office to perform strategic planning, provided for trans-NIH initiatives by enacting the Common Fund into law and required strategic planning for the Fund. It established the Division of Program Coordination, Planning, and Strategic Initiatives (DPCPSI) within the Office of the Director and moved a number of individual program offices (coordinating research on AIDS, women's health, behavioral and social sciences, and disease prevention) in OD to DPCPSI. The law established the Council of Councils to advise the NIH Director on the policies and activities of DPCPSI and to participate in developing proposals for trans-NIH research. The law requires a biennial report from the Director to Congress assessing the state of biomedical research and reporting in detail on the research activities of NIH, including strategic planning and initiatives, and summaries of research in a number of broad areas. The Reform Act required the creation of a comprehensive electronic reporting system to catalogue research activities in specific disease, health areas, or by other congressionally-mandated categories from all of the ICs in a standardized format. Information from the tracking system assists the Director and DPCPSI in planning trans-NIH research initiatives that cannot be handled within individual ICs. The reporting system, called Research Portfolio Online Reporting Tools (RePORT), "provides access to reports, data, and analyses of NIH research activities, including information on NIH expenditures and the results of NIH-supported research." The Reform Act did not contain any provisions on specific diseases or fields of research, nor did it eliminate or consolidate any existing ICs. However, it did provide certain authorities to HHS and NIH officials for making organizational changes to NIH. It also created the Scientific Management Review Board (SMRB) to provide advice on the use of those organizational authorities. SMRB is charged with formally and publicly reviewing NIH organizational structure at least once every seven years. SMRB may recommend restructuring but the number of ICs is capped at the current 27. The law set out time frames for the Director to take action on such recommendations, and provided for review by Congress. As required by the Reform Act, SMRB has conducted public reviews of NIH's organizational structure and processes. In its first report on organizational change and effectiveness at the agency in 2010, SMRB "recognized that a far reaching overhaul of the NIH structure is neither advisable nor feasible." Instead, SMRB proposed a framework for considering and evaluating potential organizational changes at NIH. Since the first report, SMRB has issued evaluations of specific research areas or ICs at NIH, with recommendations for organizational change. SMRB also issued a report in 2014 on assessing the value of biomedical research, and a report in 2015 on streamlining the NIH grant process. 21 st Century Cures Act—Administrative Reforms The 21 st Century Cures Act (P.L. 114-255), enacted in 2016, introduced a number of administrative reforms at NIH. The act newly requires the NIH Director to develop and make publicly available an NIH-wide Strategic Plan every six years (the first to be developed within two years of enactment). The Strategic Plan is expected to provide direction to the biomedical investments made by NIH, facilitate IC collaboration, leverage scientific opportunity, and advance biomedicine (for more information about the 2016-20 NIH-Wide Strategic Plan, see " NIH Process in Setting Research Priorities .") The act also changed the biennial report of the NIH Director to Congress to a triennial requirement. Other reforms include efforts to reduce administrative burden at NIH, such as by exempting NIH researchers from requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act. The act also introduced accountability measures such as five-year terms and other requirements for IC Directors, and efforts to prevent and eliminate duplicative research across the agency. The 21 st Century Cures Act also introduced a number of new programs and research efforts at NIH, as detailed in the " 21st Century Cures Act " section of this report. Authority NIH derives its statutory authority from the Public Health Service Act (PHSA) of 1944, as amended (42 U.S.C. §§201-300mm-61). Section 301 of the PHSA (42 U.S.C. §241) grants the Secretary of HHS broad permanent authority to conduct and sponsor research. In addition, Title IV, "National Research Institutes" (42 U.S.C. §§281-290b), authorizes in greater detail various activities, functions, and responsibilities of the NIH Director and the ICs. All of the ICs are covered by specific provisions in the PHSA, but they vary considerably in the amount of detail included in the statutory language. Authorization of Appropriations In 2016, the 21 st Century Cures Act ( P.L. 114-255 ) amended the PHSA (Section 402A), authorizing appropriations for NIH in FY2018 ($34,851,000,000), FY2019 ($35,585,871,000), and FY2020 ($36,472,442,775) to carry out activities authorized in Title IV of the PHSA. The previous major NIH reauthorization was the NIH Reform Act of 2006 ( P.L. 109-482 ). The NIH Reform Act authorized total funding levels for NIH appropriations for FY2007 through FY2009. Overall authority for NIH, or explicit authorization of individual ICs, has lapsed at times. However, NIH continued to receive annual appropriations, with authority provided by PHSA Section 301 and the annual appropriations acts. The current authorization of appropriations for NIH is set to expire at the end of FY2020. NIH Research Activities NIH research spans all fields of biomedical and behavioral research, from basic investigation of biological mechanisms to testing new therapeutics in clinical research. The ICs sponsor two categories of research: extramural research , performed by nonfederal scientists using NIH grant or contract money, and intramural research , performed by federal NIH scientists in the NIH-operated laboratories and Clinical Center. In both the extramural and intramural programs, the research projects are largely investigator-initiated. NIH also supports a range of extramural and intramural research training programs to prepare young investigators for research careers, and it engages in a number of information dissemination activities to reach various audiences. Funding for research makes up most of NIH spending. Figure 1 shows the breakdown of NIH obligations by mechanism. Displaying budget data by mechanism reveals the balance between extramural (e.g., research grants, research centers, and R&D contracts) and intramural funding, as well as the relative emphasis on support of individual investigator-led research (e.g., research grants and intramural research) versus funding of contracted projects (e.g., R&D contracts). Types of Research at the NIH According to NIH, the agency conducts and supports the "full continuum" of biomedical and behavioral research to understand the causes and mechanisms of disease, and then translates that knowledge into clinical practice and health interventions. NIH defines the continuum of research as follows (see Figure 1 ): Basic research involves studying the fundamental mechanisms of biology and behavior. Preclinical translational research involves developing and testing new diagnostics, therapeutics, and preventive measures. This research is conducted using laboratory animals, cell cultures, samples of human or animal tissues, computer modeling, or other approaches. Clinical research is conducted with human subjects. Clinical research can include (1) clinical trials of diagnostics, therapeutics, and preventive measures, as well as any basic or other research conducted with patients; (2) epidemiological and behavioral studies; and (3) outcomes research and health services research. Postclinical translational research investigates the best methods to enhance access to and the implementation of newly discovered biomedical interventions. Clinical and community practice involves translating new biomedical research discoveries into widespread clinical and community practice. It includes NIH's effort to ensure that scientific findings are communicated rapidly and clearly to the public. NIH reports that about half of its funding is for basic research. NIH emphasizes that the research continuum is not linear. Progress in research may involve moving back and forth between different stages. For instance, a failed clinical trial on a therapeutic for a given disease may lead to new questions that then require more basic research to make progress in treating that disease. Extramural Research NIH extramural research funding makes up more than 80% of the overall NIH budget and supports 300,000 scientists and research personnel affiliated with over 2,500 universities, academic health centers, hospitals, and independent research institutions in every state and around the world. Extramural awards include research grants, research and development contracts, training awards, and a few smaller categories. Within the large "research grants" category, the bulk of the funding goes for research project grants (RPGs) awarded to individual investigators and small teams, mostly at universities and medical centers. Other types of grants are provided to groups of researchers who work in collaborative programs or in multidisciplinary centers that focus on particular diseases or areas of research, often called "centers of excellence." Data on awards and recipients by state, by congressional district, by type of institution, and by subject of the research, are available on the NIH website. Peer Review Process for Extramural Funding Scientists who wish to compete for NIH extramural research funding, whether for totally new proposals or for renewal of previous grant awards, submit detailed plans in their grant applications describing the research they plan to undertake. All NIH grant, fellowship, and cooperative agreement applications undergo review through a two-tiered system of peer review, a competitive and committee-based process to evaluate the applications. The peer review system is pursuant to Section 492 of PHSA (42 U.S.C. §289a), and federal regulations (42 C.F.R. §52). The first stage of peer review assesses the application on scientific and technical merit. In the second stage, the NIH IC makes a funding decision—weighing the project's scientific merit against the IC's research priorities (see Figure 3 ). Grant applications may be either investigator-initiated or in response to a specific Funding Opportunity Announcement for targeted research. Most applications are investigator-initiated, meaning that a scientist or group of scientists generates an original research project idea and then submits a grant application through an NIH-wide submission process. Some applications are submitted in response to solicitations by ICs for research areas the ICs wish to target and/or for which they have set aside funding, called program announcements (PAs) or requests for applications (RFAs), broadly referred to as Funding Opportunity Announcements (FOAs). In the first stage of peer review, the applications are received by the NIH Center for Scientific Review (CSR). CSR then assigns each application that meets basic requirements to both a potential awarding IC and an associated Scientific Review Group (SRG) of the IC. The potential awarding IC is the one whose mission best aligns with the objectives of the research project. Applications responding to FOAs are usually reviewed by SRGs within the IC with funding authority, as specified in the FOA. An SRG is a peer-review committee composed of 12 to 22 scientists who are experts in the relevant fields of research. No more than one-fourth of the members of any SRG may be federal employees. Peer reviewers are expected to disclose conflicts of interest and may not participate in evaluations of grant applications where they have conflicts of interest. In FY2018, over 26,000 individuals participated in over 2,600 NIH peer review meetings. The SRG is responsible for evaluating a grant proposal on the basis of scientific merit and potential impact of the research. After discussing the application, each member gives the application a final score, and an overall impact score is determined from the average of members' final scores. The application is also given a percentile ranking, based on how the overall impact score compares to other applications reviewed by the SRG in the past year. In the second stage, the funding decisions are refined by the National Advisory Councils or Boards of the potential awarding ICs. Advisory Councils and Boards are composed of scientific and lay representatives. These groups examine applications recommended for funding, place their impact scores and percentile rankings in the context of the IC's research priorities, and then make recommendations for final funding decisions. Many ICs establish a "payline," or percentile cutoff for applications that get funded, though ICs may prioritize applications outside of the payline based on other considerations. The IC director then makes final funding decisions. Section 2033 of the 21 st Century Cures Act ( P.L. 115-255 ) added a new requirement that the IC Director weigh the Advisory Board or Council's advice against the IC's mission and research priorities, the NIH-Wide Strategic Plan, and programs or projects funded by other ICs on similar topics before awarding a research grant. Awards NIH awards numerous types of research grants, administered by each IC. The most common and well-known type of grant is the R01 Research Project Grant, which is awarded for three to five years to conduct a research project. Other grants may be shorter-term exploratory grants that limit funding to two years or less. Because of the multiyear grants, in any given year, about three-fourths of the grantees are in "noncompeting," or "continuation," status. "Noncompeting" grantees have already applied and been awarded NIH funding for multiple years. Each year, a noncompeting grantee has to submit a project report to the IC that supplied the funding, but the grantee does not have to compete for the second, third, and fourth year of funding—the IC considers the award a budgetary commitment (although it is still subject to appropriations). Prior to the expiration of the award, the grantee may choose to compete for a renewal of the project. According to one IC, reviewing a new application can take up to eight weeks from submission to the final funding decision. In FY2018, in addition to making over 11,000 new and competing renewal awards, NIH made almost 26,000 noncompeting awards and over 2,000 small business awards, for a total of over 39,000 research project grants (RPG). The average annual cost of an RPG award was about $519,000 in FY2018, including both direct and indirect costs. The direct costs, averaging 72.3% of the total award in FY2018, cover project-specific expenses, while the indirect costs, averaging 27.7%, pay for facility and administration costs (i.e., overhead) of the institution where the research is conducted. Issues and Reforms in the Peer Review and Grant Award Process Some critics of the NIH peer review and grant award process contend that it is cumbersome, biased, and ineffective at identifying promising research project proposals. Others have defended the peer review system as a rigorous and competitive process that has been honed over many years. To evaluate the process, the NIH requested an SMRB report on the peer review and award process. In its 2015 report, SMRB recommendations included fast-tracking high-scoring and high-priority applications, increasing the pool of peer reviewers, reviewing administrative processes to improve efficiency, and piloting innovative methods of peer review. In addition, the NIH Strategic Plan 2016-20 includes ways to improve the peer review process by testing and validating new approaches "including asynchronous, electronic reviews and two- or three-stage 'editorial board' models," along with measures to compare the performance of each SRG. Grants Compliance and Oversight Congress has enacted many requirements for NIH-funded research, including requirements related to human subjects protections, use of animals, and others. Based on federal laws and regulations, NIH maintains an updated "Grants Policy Statement" on all terms and conditions of NIH grant awards. Grantees are also informed of specific award requirements in their "Notice of Award." Grant awards are made to institutions, not to specific researchers. Therefore, both NIH and recipient institutions share responsibility in grant compliance and oversight of researchers. For instance, Institutional Review Boards and Institutional Animal Care and Use Committees at grantee institutions are responsible for ensuring the ethical use of human subjects and animals in research. The NIH Division of Grants Compliance and Oversight (DGCO) provides training and resources to grantees and institutions to ensure compliance. The division also conducts site visits and reviews as needed. Intramural Research The NIH intramural research program (IRP), at about $4.0 billion in FY2018, accounts for approximately 11% of the total NIH budget. It includes about 1,100 principal investigators and 6,000 trainees ranging from high school students to postdoctoral and clinical fellows in NIH-operated laboratories. Other IRP personnel include administrative support staff, guest researchers, and contractors. Intramural research takes place at the 322-acre main campus in Bethesda, MD, and several off-campus sites, including locations in Maryland, North Carolina, Montana, Arizona. Almost all of the ICs have an intramural research program, but the size, structure, and activities of the programs vary greatly. As with extramural funding, most intramural research proposals are investigator-initiated. However, NIH sets the direction for its intramural research program by hiring scientists of targeted expertise, through allocating resources to certain laboratories and programs, and through external reviews. Each intramural scientist is evaluated by an external Board of Scientific Counselors from their IC every four years to review their work and research portfolio. Each IC's intramural research program is reviewed by an external panel every 10 years, concerning the entire research portfolio and impact of the research. Some intramural scientists work in the Clinical Center, which houses both basic research laboratories and clinics for scientists involved with patient care in clinical research studies. The Clinical Center is the nation's largest hospital devoted to clinical research. Along with scientists, the Clinical Center employs over 1,000 nurses and allied health professionals to support its work. Most ICs with intramural research programs fund research at the center. This arrangement facilitates interdisciplinary collaboration and the direct clinical application of new knowledge derived from basic research. Research Training As stated by the agency, "NIH's ability to ensure that it remains a leader in scientific discovery and innovation is dependent upon a pool of creative, diverse, and highly talented researchers." Research training activities are designed to support every stage of a biomedical research career (see "Stages of a Research Career" below) in both the extramural and intramural research programs. Programs range from summer internships for high school students to mentoring programs for independent investigators. Predoctoral and postdoctoral training opportunities are available through a variety of training grants, fellowships, and loan repayment programs. The largest extramural program is called the Ruth L. Kirschstein National Research Service Awards (NRSA) program, authorized by PHSA Section 487, which supports pre- and postdoctoral research training awards to both institutions and individuals. In 2015, NIH supported more than 15,600 graduate and postdoctoral students at universities, teaching hospitals, and research centers. Information Dissemination NIH has important roles in translating the knowledge gained from biomedical research into medical practice and useful health information for the general public. The individual ICs carry out many relevant activities, such as sponsoring seminars, meetings, and consensus development conferences to inform health professionals of new findings; answering thousands of telephone, mail, and online inquiries; publishing physician and patient education materials on the internet and in print; supporting information clearinghouses and running public information campaigns on various diseases; making specialized databases available; and fostering partnerships for educating clinicians and other healthcare professionals on the latest science. Budget At $39 billion for FY2019, NIH's budget is much larger than those of other PHS agencies such as the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), Indian Health Service (IHS), and the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA). About 40% of all discretionary HHS funding is provided to NIH. Moreover, NIH represents about half of federal spending for non-Department of Defense research and development (R&D) and about one-fifth of total federal R&D funding. NIH has seen periods of high and low budget increases. Prior to 2004, Congress had doubled the NIH program level over a five-year period from its FY1998 base of $13.7 billion to the FY2003 level of $27.1 billion. Subsequently, NIH experienced a decade of stagnant growth in the agency's budget. Congress provided budget increases generally around 1%-3.2% from FY2004 to FY2015, often lower than the rate of inflation for biomedical research, which resulted in reduced purchasing power for the agency. In some years, (FY2006, FY2011, and FY2013) funding for the agency decreased in nominal dollars. Starting in FY2016 through FY2019, Congress provided NIH with funding increases of over 5% each year, increasing the program level from $30.3 billion in FY2015 to $39.3 billion in FY2019. In inflation-adjusted FY2019 dollars, the NIH program level remains 9% below the 2003 level. Under President Trump's FY2020 budget request, NIH would be provided a program level of $34.3 billion—a 12.6% reduction from the FY2019 program level. In inflation-adjusted FY2020 dollars, this proposed FY2020 program level would be 22.6% below the peak 2003 level. See Figure 4 for a visualization of NIH budget trends from FY1994 to FY2020. Sources of Funding NIH receives funding from mostly discretionary budget authorities and one mandatory budget authority. The total NIH budget is called the "program level." Discretionary funding for NIH comes primarily from the annual Labor-HHS-Education (LHHS) appropriations bill, which funds the agency through 27 separate accounts, including the 24 ICs with research grant-awarding authority. An additional small amount for environmental research and training related to the Superfund program comes from the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies (Interior-Environment) appropriations bill for the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences (NIEHS). Those two sources constitute NIH's discretionary budget authority. The NIH "program level" takes into account other funds that are added to or transferred from the agency. In FY2019, NIH received mandatory funds ($150 million in FY2019) for Special Diabetes Programs for Type 1 Diabetes under PHSA Section 330B (42 U.S.C §254c-2). The type 1 diabetes program was most recently reauthorized by the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 ( P.L. 115-123 ), which provided $150 million for each of FY2018 and FY2019 for the Special Diabetes Program for type I diabetes to the NIH. NIH also receives funds from a "program evaluation" transfer authorized by PHSA Section 241 (42 U.S.C. §238j). NIH and other PHS agencies (funded through LHHS appropriations) are subject to this budget "tap," which has been used to fund not only program evaluation activities, but also programs such as NLM, the National Center for Health Statistics in CDC, and the entire discretionary budget of the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. These and other uses of the evaluation tap by the appropriators have the effect of redistributing appropriated funds among PHS agencies. Although the PHSA provision limits the tap to no more than 1% of eligible appropriations, in recent years annual LHHS appropriations bills have specified a higher amount (2.5% for FY2019 in P.L. 115-245 ), and have typically directed specific amounts of funding from the tap for transfer to a number of HHS programs. The assessment has the effect of redistributing appropriated funds for specific purposes among PHS and other HHS agencies. NIH, with the largest budget among the PHS agencies, has historically been the largest "donor" of program evaluation funds. Until recently, it had been a relatively minor recipient. In FY2019, NIH received $1.15 billion in funds subject to the evaluation tap through P.L. 115-245 . Under President Trump's FY2020 budget request, NIH would receive $741 million in funding subject to the evaluation tap. Budget Formulation The NIH budget request that Congress receives from the President each February for the next fiscal year reflects both recent history and professional judgments about the future, because it needs to support both ongoing research commitments and new initiatives. The request is formulated through a lengthy process that starts more than a year before in the ICs. The budget then evolves over a number of months as it moves from the ICs to NIH, then to HHS, and finally to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). At each stage, IC and NIH needs are weighed in the context of the larger budget. Eventually, Congress is called upon to make similar judgments. As a continuing process, IC leaders, with input from the scientific community, define the most important and promising areas in their respective fields. They consider whether their existing research portfolio needs rebalancing, and they decide on possible new initiatives for the coming budget year. An annual budget retreat in May brings together the IC leaders with top NIH management to discuss policies and priorities under various budget scenarios. They might consider, for example, what the different emphases in their programs would be if the appropriation turned out to be a certain percentage decrease, a flat budget, or an increase. The presentations and discussions allow NIH management to develop the budget request it will submit to HHS, taking into account the estimated funding amount needed to support the "commitment base" of continuing awards, the funding desired for unsolicited new research proposals, the new initiatives that the Director wants to incorporate, and guidance from the department about the request (e.g., there might be an instruction to pay no inflation increases on grants). At the HHS level, NIH's request is considered in the context of the overall department budget, resulting in a notice back to NIH on the department's allowance. There are usually appeals and adjustments made before the final HHS budget goes to OMB. The process of submission, passback, and appeals is repeated as OMB considers the entire federal budget and tells HHS what amounts and policy approaches are approved for incorporation into the President's final budget that will be sent to Congress. Once the budget is made public, all agency comments about the request are expected to support the President's proposed levels. Private Funding from the Foundation for the NIH The Foundation for the National Institutes of Health (FNIH) is a 501(c)(3) charitable organization that raises private funding and manages public-private partnerships to support NIH's mission. FNIH was established in 1990 by P.L. 101-613 and began operations in 1996. FNIH supports research projects and programs, education and training, conferences and events, and other support activities for NIH, such as drug donations to the clinical center. Pursuant to PHSA Section 499 (42 U.S.C. §290b), there are terms and restrictions on activities, requirements for the board of directors, reporting requirements, and other requirements for FNIH. In its history, FNIH has raised over $1 billion in support of NIH's mission. By the end of 2017, FNIH had raised over $555 million in multiyear funding commitments for over 100 programs: $541 million for research projects, $8.7 million for education and seminars, $3.2 million for capital projects, and $2.8 million for events. Setting NIH Research Priorities NIH funds research on hundreds of diseases, conditions, and areas of human health. NIH funding is highly competitive—20.9% of all grant applications were funded in FY2018. NIH and Congress face trade-offs in allocating funding in a fair manner that balances the scientific merit of proposals with meeting the diverse health needs of the population. Funding decisions are especially difficult because science is a process of discovery—even experts cannot always predict which proposals will lead to breakthroughs. Historic tensions have included whether to designate funding for specific diseases and areas of research or to allow untargeted funding for the most meritorious proposals identified through the peer review process; balancing funding for basic scientific research with applied research; whether funding should go to certain ethically contentious research areas, such as embryonic stem cell research; how to fund research on the most pervasive diseases and conditions while also funding research on rare diseases; and how to allocate funding among established and successful scientists while enabling new scientists to enter the field. Historically, Congress allowed NIH ICs, for the most part, to fund research based on their own internal prioritization process, which involves scientific experts, patient advocates, and others. In recent years, Congress has provided more direction to NIH funding in both appropriations report language and legislation. The following sections summarize (1) congressional involvement in NIH research priorities, including recent major efforts, legislation, and research restrictions, and (2) NIH internal processes for setting research priorities through strategic planning and advisory groups. NIH is not the only federal agency that supports biomedical and health-related research. The Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and others also support medical research programs. In FY2019, the NIH program level was $39.3 billion, the VA appropriation for medical research was $779 million, and the DOD's Defense Health Program's Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) account received $2.18 billion, including $1.47 billion for the Congressionally Directed Medical Research program (CDMRP). A 2016 National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM) report examined duplication and coordination of research funded by NIH, DOD, and VA. The report found that some formal mechanisms helped reduce duplication, such as interagency coordinating committees, common grant portals, and assessing other funding sources in grant application review. However, the agencies each lack comprehensive information about the other agencies' activities, which "limits their ability to identify potential areas of duplication." In addition, other agencies support health-related research, such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the Agency for Healthcare Quality and Research (AHRQ). Although the below discussion focuses on research priorities at NIH, Congress may consider how to prioritize and coordinate funding for medical and health-related research across the federal government. Congressional Involvement in NIH Research Priorities Congress's primary role in NIH research priorities is through annual appropriations to the IC accounts. From time to time, Congress addresses NIH research priorities through legislation authorizing specific programs, such as the 21 st Century Cures Act ( P.L. 114-255 ) and through restrictions and other requirements for research. Appropriators have traditionally avoided specifying dollar amounts for particular disease areas, fields of research, or mechanisms of funding in both report and bill text, aside from the level of the IC accounts. Generally, specific amounts are appropriated to each IC, and then funding is awarded through competitive grants, contracts, or to intramural researchers. In recent years, report language accompanying appropriations acts and laws such as the 21 st Century Cures Act ( P.L. 114-255 ) have included more specified funding amounts for research areas and programs. For example, the report accompanying the FY2019 LHHS conference appropriations bill ( H.Rept. 115-952 , pp. 529-530) directed specific funding increases for the following at NIH: Alzheimer's disease research, antibiotic resistant bacteria research, universal flu vaccine development, opioids-related research, and the Institutional Development Awards (IDeA) program. The 21 st Century Cures Act, passed in 2016, authorized specific appropriations for four innovation projects (as described in the " 21 st Century Cures Act " section of this report). Other laws that have directed funding to specific research areas include the Gabriella Miller Kids First Research Act ( P.L. 113-94 ), which authorizes $12.6 million for each of FY2014-FY2023 for pediatric research, and mandatory appropriations of $150 million for research on type 1 diabetes, authorized by PHS Act §330B and extended most recently by the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 ( P.L. 115-123 ) for FY2018 and FY2019. Alzheimer's Disease Research Changes in congressional practice have occurred most notably with research funding for Alzheimer's disease. From FY2001 through FY2014, Congress provided broad directives to NIH in report language, encouraging the agency to prioritize Alzheimer's disease and to increase resources toward its research through the National Institute on Aging (NIA). The explanatory statement accompanying the FY2014 omnibus included the following language: In keeping with longstanding practice, the House and Senate Appropriations Committees do not recommend a specific amount of NIH funding for this purpose or for any other individual disease. Doing so would establish a dangerous precedent that could politicize the NIH peer review system. Nevertheless, in recognition that Alzheimer's disease poses a serious threat to the Nation's long-term health and economic stability, the agreement expects that a significant portion of the recommended increase for NIA should be directed to research on Alzheimer's. The exact amount should be determined by the scientific opportunity of additional research on this disease and the quality of grant applications that are submitted for Alzheimer's relative to those submitted for other diseases. The explanatory statement for the FY2015 omnibus included similar language but noted that the agreement provided a $25 million increase for Alzheimer's disease research at NIA; still, it did not direct NIH to reserve a specific total dollar amount. Then, in a significant departure from past precedent, the explanatory statements to the appropriations measures for each of FY2016 through FY2018 directed NIH to reserve a specific amount for Alzheimer's disease research. The conference report accompanying the FY2019 LHHS Appropriations Act continues this trend. The change in congressional practice was driven by the National Plan to Address Alzheimer's Disease, first announced in 2012. Established by the National Alzheimer's Project Act (NAPA; P.L. 111-375 ), the National Plan includes "Prevent and Effectively Treat Alzheimer's Disease and Related Dementias by 2025" as the first of five key goals. To help meet this goal, NIH began to publish an annual bypass budget in FY2015 to estimate funding needs for Alzheimer's disease research, starting for FY2017. A bypass budget, also known as a professional judgement budget, is a budget proposal submitted directly by NIH to Congress to estimate research funding needs based on scientific opportunity, rather than as determined by the regular budget and appropriations process (detailed in " Budget Formulation "). The bypass budget was mandated by the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, of 2015 ( P.L. 113-235 ), which specified that the NIH Director submit an annual independent Alzheimer's research budget request directly to Congress, pursuant to the National Alzheimer's Plan. To determine its bypass budget proposal, NIH has convened research summits starting in 2012, and has worked across its ICs to determine recommendations and funding needs for Alzheimer's disease research. To meet its research goals, NIH has used targeted FOAs to solicit research proposals related to Alzheimer's disease from scientists. Alzheimer's disease research represents an area of major congressional involvement in directing large amounts of research funding toward a specific disease. A Science magazine article from August 2018, asserts that the large increase in funding for Alzheimer's disease research has affected the NIH and the scientific community in an unprecedented way: Such a dramatic increase in research funding for a disease has no precedent at NIH aside from the War on Cancer, an effort launched in 1971, and an explosion of AIDS funding in the late 1980s. With the largesse come logistical challenges. Overworked NIH staff are scrambling to review and process thousands of grant proposals, including those for this year's [FY2018] $414 million bolus—a sum that equals the entire budget of some smaller NIH institutes—which Congress approved in March. NIA, which oversees the new funds, doesn't just want to plump up existing Alzheimer's labs, says Director Richard Hodes. The institute is also luring investigators ... from other fields to bring in fresh ideas. Many are answering the call. "Nearly everyone I know is putting the words 'Alzheimer's disease' in their grants in an effort to tap into the money," says Matt Kaeberlein of the University of Washington in Seattle, who studies aging. Even with the windfall of funding, many in the scientific community are skeptical of meeting the goal to prevent and treat Alzheimer's disease by 2025. Many potential cures for Alzheimer's diseases have failed in recent clinical trials. According to a 2016 study, a few drugs have been approved that help relieve some of the symptoms of Alzheimer's disease, but they have a "modest" clinical effect. The authors determined that only a few drug candidates in the clinical trial pipeline could potentially meet the 2025 deadline. While the funding has helped accelerate the scientific understanding of Alzheimer's disease, some members of the scientific community worry that the attention on Alzheimer's disease research may detract from research on other diseases like cancer. Others argue that accelerating Alzheimer's disease research and drug development is ultimately beneficial, regardless of whether the 2025 goal is met. Research Restrictions From time to time, Congress has placed restrictions on NIH research. Current restrictions for FY2019 relate to research advocating or promoting gun control, payment for abortions, human embryo research, promoting legalization of controlled substances, and others. In the past, members of the research community have been unsettled by congressional attempts to cancel funding for specific existing peer-reviewed grants. The targeted studies have tended to be in fields of behavioral research, including some in mental health and human sexuality research. Sponsors and supporters of such amendments to the LHHS appropriations bills say that NIH should not be devoting scarce resources to research studies whose value they question. Researchers, however, including NIH leadership, have expressed alarm at what they view as an assault on the peer review system, saying that such studies were funded because of their technical merit and the important research questions they addressed. Perhaps the most prominent example is the restriction on federal funding of research on human embryonic stem cells. Although President Barack Obama signed an executive order in March 2009 that reversed the nearly eight-year-old George W. Bush Administration restriction on federal funding for human embryonic stem cell research, funding for some aspects of such research is still limited by a provision in the annual LHHS appropriations bill—the so-called Dickey-Wicker amendment. Cures Acceleration Network The Cures Acceleration Network (CAN) allows NIH to award large grants of up to $15 million per year (that require a 1:3 matching ratio), and other flexible awards, to "advance the development of high-need cures and reduce significant barriers between research discovery and clinical trials." CAN grant recipients can be public or private entities, including institutions of higher education, pharmaceutical companies, and disease advocacy organizations. Authorizing language for the Cures Acceleration Network was provided in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148 ), enacted in March 2010. Subsequent legislation ( P.L. 112-74 ) assigned CAN to NIH's National Center for Advancing Translational Science (NCATS). ACA authorized $500 million for CAN in FY2010 and such sums as necessary for subsequent fiscal years; however, CAN is to be funded via a specific appropriation and cannot be funded using the general NIH appropriation or other funds appropriated under the PHSA. Congress has designated up to the following amounts for CAN in its appropriations to NCATS: $10 million in FY2012; $40 million in FY2013; $9.8 million in FY2014; $9.8 million in FY2015; $25.8 million in each of FY2016, FY2017, and FY2018, respectively; and $80 million in FY2019. The actual program level for CAN may be lower than the maximum amount authorized by Congress for each fiscal year, though actual funding levels are available only for some, but not all, fiscal years. CAN authorizing language states that the NIH Director determines which medical products (drugs, devices, biological products, or combination products) are "high need cures," based on (1) their ability to diagnose, prevent, or treat harm from a disease or condition, and (2) the lack of market incentives for their adequate or timely development. NIH then makes awards to public or private research entities, including medical centers, biotechnology or pharmaceutical companies, and patient advocacy groups in order to accelerate the development of such high-need cures. CAN is directed to conduct and support revolutionary advances in basic research and to facilitate FDA review for CAN-funded cures, as specified. A CAN Review Board advises the Director on the activities of CAN and on significant barriers to the translation of basic science into clinical applications. The CAN Review Board submits reports to HHS regarding any barrier identified. The Director is required to respond to such recommendations in writing. Advocacy groups, such as the Parkinson's Action Network and the Council for American Medical Innovation, have voiced strong support for the creation of CAN. Others, however, have concerns about providing federal funds to industry without measures to ensure that taxpayers receive a return on the investment, such as through reasonable prices on resulting products. In the summer of 2018, the Cures Acceleration Network was actively supporting three programs: (1) tissue chip for drug screening, (2) biomedical data translator, and (3) 3-D tissue bioprinting. The programs are aimed at using emerging technology, such as modelling human organs on microchips or using novel computational methods with patient biomedical data, for innovating either drug development or disease diagnosis. 21st Century Cures Act The 21 st Century Cures Act ( P.L. 114-255 ; hereinafter referred to as the "Cures Act") was signed into law on December 13, 2016. This law authorizes $4.8 billion for NIH over a 10-year period (FY2017-FY2026), with varying amounts allocated each fiscal year (see Table 1 ). The following is a summary of provisions in Title I of the Cures Act that authorized funding for new programs at NIH, and provisions in Title II that established or amended other programs. Title I of the Cures Act, Section 1001 establishes the "NIH Innovation Account" to which specified amounts are authorized to be transferred for each of FY2017 through FY2026 (see Table 1 ) for the purpose of carrying out the following four NIH Innovation Projects: The Precision Medicine Initiative (PMI) All of Us Research Program ($1.5 billion for FY2017 through FY2026), which is collecting clinical, environmental, lifestyle, and genetic data from more than 1 million participants over many years. The Brain Research through Advancing Innovative Neurotechnologies (BRAIN) Initiative ($1.5 billion for FY2017 through FY2026), which uses new technology to understand how individual cells and the neural circuits they form interact in time and space—scientific understanding that may help treat, cure, or prevent brain-related disorders. The Beau Biden Cancer Moonshot ($1.8 billion for FY2017 through FY2023), which aims to accelerate progress in cancer research by enhancing data access and facilitating collaborations. The Regenerative Medicine project ($30 million for FY2017 through FY2020), which supports clinical research using adult stem cells, in coordination with FDA. To date, amounts authorized for the Innovation Projects have been fully appropriated. The first round of funding was provided by Section 194 of the Further Continuing and Security Assistance Appropriations Act, 2017 (CR, P.L. 114-254). The CR appropriated $352 million in the NIH Innovation account for necessary expenses to carry out the four NIH Innovation Projects as described in Section 1001(b)(4) of the Cures Act. The second round of funding ($496 million) was provided by the FY2018 omnibus (P.L. 115-141). The third round of funding ($711 million) is provided by the FY2019 Consolidated Defense, LHHS, and Continuing Resolution Appropriations Act (P.L. 115-245). Under President Trump's FY2020 budget request, NIH would be provided the full $492 million authorized by the Cures Act for FY2020. Title II of the Cures Act addresses the NIH in numerous ways, including administrative reforms and new programs. Among new programs in Title II, the Next Generation Initiative (NGI) was established to coordinate NIH programs related to retaining and recruiting new researchers. As a part of NGI, NIH is required to use findings from a National Academies report to make reforms to existing programs (see " NIH Initiatives to Recruit and Retain a Research Workforce "). Title II also includes reforms to ensure inclusion in biomedical research, as related to race/ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, and age. Finally, Title II extends NCATS's authority to support clinical trial activities, consolidates existing NIH intramural loan repayment programs, specifies administrative requirements for PMI and ClinicalTrials.gov, and establishes a working group to make recommendations to enhance the rigor and reproducibility of NIH-funded scientific research, among other provisions. NIH Process in Setting Research Priorities Each NIH IC has separate research priorities, which are specified in statutory authority in varying levels of detail. IC research priorities are broadly captured by their mission statements. ICs establish research priorities through strategic planning, annual planning, and periodically reviewing and assessing their research portfolios. Each IC has an advisory council that makes recommendations for IC research priorities and funding decisions. The IC advisory councils are made up of both scientific and public representatives, who may have expertise, interest, and other affiliations relevant to the IC's mission. According to the agency, decision-makers at NIH seek advice from many groups when setting research priorities, including scientific researchers and professional science societies; patient organizations and voluntary health associations; IC Advisory Councils; Congress and the Administration; the Advisory Committee to the NIH Director; the SMRB; and NIH staff. For many years, each IC has undergone a periodic strategic planning process to determine its funding priorities among the research areas in its broadly defined mission. The IC strategic planning processes are conducted pursuant to PHSA Section 402(b)(5), which specifies that the NIH Director "shall ensure that scientifically based strategic planning is implemented in support of research priorities as determined by the agencies of the National Institutes of Health."  The Cures Act ( P.L. 114-255 ) amended PHSA Section 402 to require an NIH-Wide Strategic Plan, in part to facilitate IC collaboration and coordination. In the first NIH-Wide Strategic Plan 2016-2020, the NIH specifies its agency-wide process for setting research priorities. As stated in the Strategic Plan, "The process of setting NIH's research priorities must balance the opportunities presented by the best science, public health needs, and the unique ability of NIH to address challenges in human health that would otherwise go unmet." In its Strategic Plan, the NIH reaffirmed its commitment to a transparent and evidence-based process for funding decisions that prioritized the four principles listed below. NIH does not specify percentages or funding amounts for any of the four principles: Enhance the nimbleness needed to meet public health needs and capitalize upon scientific opportunity, using new portfolio analysis tools. Incorporate burden of disease as an important, but not sole, factor. Take advantage of opportunities presented by rare diseases to advance research. Consider the value of permanently eradicating a disease. The NIH-Wide Strategic Plan is designed to complement the strategic plans of the individual ICs. The agency seeks to better identify areas of research overlap and gaps across its portfolios, including by comparing the portfolio of each IC with another to assess if resources are optimally allocated. In addition, the Strategic Plan also stated that NIH would take leadership in "developing and validating the methodologies that are needed to evaluate scientific investments." According to NIH, the Strategic Plan was developed with "input from hundreds of stakeholders and scientific advisers, and in collaboration with leadership and staff of NIH's Institutes, Centers, and Offices." The NIH Reform Act of 2006 ( P.L. 109-482 ) enhanced the authority of the NIH Director's Office to perform strategic planning, especially facilitating and funding transdisciplinary, cross-institute research initiatives. The Reform Act also created a special office, the Division of Program Coordination, Planning, and Strategic Initiatives (DPCPSI). It "identifies important areas of emerging scientific opportunity or rising public health challenges to assist in the acceleration of research investments in these areas." The Office of Strategic Coordination within DPCPSI manages the NIH Common Fund, which supports large complex research efforts that involve the collaboration of two or more research institutes or centers. The Office of Strategic Coordination works with staff and leadership across NIH to identify and promote NIH-wide scientific opportunities that receive Common Fund support. Balancing New and Existing Funding Commitments Because of variation in annual appropriations, NIH cannot support the same number of research projects from year to year. In years of large funding increases, the agency may proportionally increase research awards. When funding is cut the agency may limit the number of research grants awarded. Given that most grants are multiyear grants that have "non-competing" status during the duration of the project, much of NIH funding is committed even before appropriations are finalized (though these grant renewals remain "subject to appropriations"). Reductions in NIH purchasing power may lead to reductions in "competing" grants awarded, or grants for new research projects—potentially creating a more competitive environment for new NIH awards. Figure 5 shows NIH research project grant (RPG) numbers and success rates for new grant applications annually from FY2003 to FY2018. NIH supported about the same total number of RPGs each year from FY2003 to FY2008, but it supported fewer RPGs after FY2008 and has only started to increase the annual number of RPGs awarded in FY2016. Concurrently, the average cost of an RPG has increased from $337.8 thousand in 2003 to $518.0 thousand in 2018. To maintain existing funding commitments, NIH mostly maintained the number of noncompeting grants from year to year, while cutting back on awarding competing project grants from FY2009 to FY2015—grants that fund new research projects. Success rates for grant applications, or the percentage of applications that received funding, has also varied from year to year—likely due to a combination of decreased purchasing power as well as an increasing pool of applicants. As shown in Figure 5 , the success rate for new grant applications was 30% in FY2003, fell to a low of 17% in FY2013, and rose to 21% in FY2018. The decrease in purchasing power—22% lower in FY2013 than in FY2003—may have curtailed NIH's ability to support new projects, and therefore reduced the proportion of grant applicants who received funding. In addition, though the number of competing grants awarded by NIH in FY2016 returned to above FY2007 levels, the success rate for applicants was lower in FY2016-FY2018 than prior to FY2007. The decline in success rates therefore also reflects a growing pool of investigators who are competing for NIH funding. In FY2003, NIH received 34,710 applications for RPGs, which rose to 49,581 applications in FY2013 and then to 54,834 in FY2018. The number of applications rose by 58% between FY2003 and FY2018. The average success rate at NIH reflects varying success rates for applications to different ICs. Success rates for the various ICs in FY2018 range from 10.3% for the National Institute of Nursing Research (NINR) and 10.7% for the National Institute on Minority Health and Health Disparities (NIMHD), at the low end, to 34.8% for the National Center for Advancing Translational Sciences (NCATS) and 33.3% for the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA), at the high end. Science editor-in-chief, Jeremy Berg argues that variation in funding from year to year may affect scientific progress: Such fluctuations have important consequences. Outstanding applications that would have been funded one year go unsupported the next year, so that potentially ground-breaking research may be missed for arbitrary reasons of timing. Low success rates result in scientists spending more time writing and reviewing proposals instead of conducting research. Investigators, particularly those at vulnerable career stages, can become demoralized by the apparently capricious nature of funding decisions. Members of the scientific community have called for steady, predictable annual growth in NIH funding; a long-term strategy for federal research investment; and greater increases in federal funding for biomedical research. Some argue that research institutions and universities have become too reliant on NIH funding. In 2017, federal dollars made up about 60% of all funding to higher education institutions for "biological and biomedical sciences research," and 53% of all funding for "health sciences" research. One commentary, published in 2018, explored how universities rely on NIH funding for researchers' salaries and laboratory facilities. During the doubling period of NIH funding from 2000 to 2004, universities rapidly increased square footage of laboratory space and hired more scientists—possibly assuming future increases in NIH funds to support their growth. The growth in laboratories heightened the need and competition for NIH grants. According to the author, universities have switched to mostly financing researchers' salaries with grant funds in the past few decades. In the 1970s, universities paid about 75% of researchers' salaries; in 2014, many researchers received, on average, 65% of their salary from grants (based on available evidence; many universities do not share salary data). As a result of reliance on competitive grant funding, researchers are spending increasing amounts of their time writing grant applications rather than conducting science. The author argues that universities should commit more of their "hard money," or institutional funds, for research salaries and facilities to ensure the sustainability of biomedical research. NIH Director Francis Collins alluded to this issue in a January 2010 interview, stating that universities are "becoming too reliant on NIH money, allowing faculty members to obtain all their income from federal research grants." Dr. Collins indicated that when faculty members run multiple research projects at the same time, "that turns that investigator into a grant-writing machine perhaps more than a doing-of-science machine." However, he said, any new restrictions on NIH grants "would have to be phased in over a fairly long period of time because many universities and faculty members would find that quite disruptive." President Trump's FY2018, FY2019, and FY2020 budget proposals have included initiatives designed to "stretch available grant dollars." The FY2018 budget proposal would cap the indirect costs that could be covered by NIH grants (facilities and administrative—or F&A—costs) at 10% of the total grant award to reduce the overall cost of an RPG. Over the previous 10 years, approximately 28% of grants were used to cover F&A costs. Both the House and Senate Appropriations Committees rejected the proposal to cap F&A costs. The report accompanying H.R. 3358 ( H.Rept. 115-244 ) stated that the Trump Administration's proposed cap on indirect (F&A) costs was "misguided and would have a devastating impact on biomedical research across the country." The FY2019 budget request proposed capping the percentage of an investigator's salary that can be paid with grant funds at 90%. It also proposed capping investigator salaries at $152,000, a 19% reduction from the current $187,000 limit. In the report accompanying H.R. 6470 , the House Appropriations Committee stated that it did not include the general provision in the budget request to limit the percentage of a researcher's salary that may be paid for using NIH grant funds, as the impact of such a change is unclear. The report stated, "The Committee requests an analysis of the projected impact of such a policy change on the number and average cost of NIH grants, as well as on academic institutions, in the fiscal year 2020 Congressional Justification" The FY2020 budget request, again, included the proposal to cap the percentage of an investigator's salary that can be paid with grant funds at 90%. In the requested analysis published in the FY2020 Congressional Justification, NIH stated that "no previous research examines the impact of reducing the salary cap on the number of grants and the average cost per grant." NIH noted that a salary cap reduction in FY2011 did not reduce the average cost of NIH grants and that the number of NIH grants awarded decreased, though other factors may have affected grant numbers and average costs. NIH also noted that an unintended consequence of the policy could be that institutions will have to make up for the rest of researchers' salaries, which "may limit the number of applicants with sufficient resources to participate in Federally-funded research." NIH Initiatives to Recruit and Retain a Research Workforce NIH is concerned about retaining and attracting new scientists for biomedical research careers. In the past two decades, early-stage scientists have received a declining percentage of NIH grants and have spent more time in low-paid postdoctoral training positions. The number of traditional faculty positions in biomedical research has declined, while the number of postdoctoral positions has increased, creating a highly competitive and pessimistic outlook for obtaining traditional academic research positions. A 2018 National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine (NASEM) report stated that, "these obstacles to success have created a research career path that is increasingly unattractive in terms of pay, duration, culture, risk-taking, and future job prospects." A relatively large portion of NIH funding goes to older and more established researchers. Between 1998 and 2014, the proportion of NIH-funded investigators over the age of 65 increased from 5% to 12%, while those younger than 50 declined from 54% to 39%. The average age at which an investigator first obtained an independent grant increased by more than five years between 1990 and 2016. During that time, the average age at which a new investigator first obtained a R01 grant (independent research project grant) increased from 36 years for PhDs and 38 years for MDs, to 42 years for PhDs and 45 years for MDs, respectively. Another analysis from the NIH Office of Extramural Research also found that the percentage of the NIH workforce made up of new investigators and early-stage investigators had declined between 2009 and 2016. In addition, the success rate for new investigators fell from 40% in 1962 to 27% in 2013. A 2018 GAO analysis found that "extramural investigators who had received at least one large NIH research grant during fiscal years 2013 through 2017 were more likely to receive such grants in subsequent application cycles than investigators who had not yet received such grants." According to a 2017 study, a minority of highly funded researchers have received an increasing percentage of NIH grants in recent years. In 2015, the top 10% of NIH grant winners by total award received 37% of NIH funding, an increase from the 32% received in 1985, but down from a peak of 40% of total funding in 2010. In contrast, the bottom 40% of principal investigators received 12% of total funding in 2015, down from 16% in 1985. Of note, 2010 and 2015 were years of low funding growth, and therefore NIH might have been expected to make fewer new grant commitments to new investigators in these years, in order to sustain funding for ongoing research. In addition, the authors of the study described a lack of mobility for investigators. They concluded that researchers who start at the top tend to remain there, while researchers receiving a lower portion of funding remain poorly funded. Scientists in the top 20% of funding have more publications and citations, which may help explain grant success. As previously mentioned, the 21 st Century Cures Act ( P.L. 114-255 ) established the Next Generation of Researchers Initiative (NGRI) within the office of the NIH Director. This initiative is intended to provide opportunities for earlier independence while enhancing workforce diversity. Superseding previous policy on early-stage investigators, it requires the NIH Director to develop new policies and programs that promote opportunities for new researchers to receive funding, enhance training, and encourage workforce diversity. NIH has faced challenges in attempting to implement NGRI. In May 2017, NIH proposed to cap funding for highly funded investigators through a measure termed the Grant Support Index (GSI) to free up funding to early-stage investigators and others who receive less funding. Some members of the scientific community strongly opposed the GSI, arguing that it represented a move away from a merit-based system of allocating funding, would discourage collaboration and training, and was based on flawed analysis. Others argued that the highly funded researchers and institutions who would be affected by the policy could afford to diversify their funding sources. Ultimately, NIH cancelled the proposal after facing criticism at a Council of Councils meeting. As an alternative to GSI, in August 2017 NIH announced the official policy for the NGRI, which called on ICs to prioritize awards that fund early stage investigators (ESI) and early established investigators (EEIs). The policy defined ESIs as those who had completed training within 10 years and were gaining their first independent research award, and EEIs as those who had completed training within 10 years and who were at risk of losing NIH support or were supported only one active award. Through NGRI, NIH would free up "substantial funds" from its base budget to support ESIs and EEIs. NIH announced the program would start with $210 million in FY2017 and increase to $1.1 billion in five years, pending funding availability. NGRI was established to complement existing grant award opportunities that support ESIs and EEIs, such as the New Innovator Award and the Early Independence Award. Under NGRI, ICs would develop evidence-based strategies to increase and retain ESIs/EEIs, and NIH would track their outcomes. NIH again faced criticism that the program would prioritize ESIs and EEIs at the expense of established investigators, and that the rules for who qualified to be an ESI or EEI were too strict. NIH revised the policy to eliminate the EEI category, instead prioritizing investigators at risk of losing funding regardless of age, and to be "flexible" in designating who qualified for ESI status. NIH has established a working group to advise NIH on NGRI policy development. Despite apparent challenges, NIH Director Francis Collins stated at an August 2018 congressional hearing that the agency expects to fund more early-stage investigators than ever—1,100 researchers—with their first grant in 2018 as a result of NGRI. The FY2020 budget request included further details about NIH plans for NGRI. NIH stated that it regularly collects data and evaluates outcomes on NIH-funded trainees and their transition to an independent career. In addition, the FY2020 budget request would provide $100 million in dedicated funding for NGRI, and the request stated: in response to an advisory committee recommendation and a recent report from the National Academy of Sciences, NIH is creating a new pathway for applications from early-stage investigators that does not require preliminary data and continues to provide a separate review of applications. NIH is also lengthening the window for early-stage eligibility to 11 years with additional flexibility due to significant life events. As referred to in the above quote, in 2018, NASEM published a report that identified policy reforms to better support the next generation of biomedical researchers. NIH was directed to fund the report through the FY2016 LHHS Appropriations Act ( P.L. 114-113 , Division H), and is required by the Cures Act to consider its recommendations and submit a report on actions taken to Congress in 2020. In the 2018 report, the NASEM committee found that while reductions in NIH purchasing power have constrained grant funding available to early-stage investigators, universities and research institutions have been slower to make reforms and less responsive to the needs of early-stage investigators than NIH. For instance, many universities and research institutions may provide inadequate career counseling or job opportunities for new researchers. The NASEM committee therefore recommended policies that hold universities and research institutions accountable alongside the NIH in supporting ESIs, and preparing them for diverse and nonacademic careers. The committee also made recommendations for Congress to create a council on ongoing challenges in biomedical research, and for NIH to strengthen its programs for ESIs, among many others. Workforce Diversity at NIH Apart from age and experience, other inequalities also persist in grant funding, such as by gender and race/ethnicity. NIH has found that women and racial and ethnic minorities make up a larger portion of new and early-stage investigators than experienced investigators, and generally make up a larger portion of the applicant pool than the awardee pool for grants. There is also less representation of women and minorities among faculty positions in the biomedical sciences. On average, women scientists are awarded smaller grant sizes than those awarded to men. One study found that from 1991 to 2010, while women made up half of all PhDs awarded in the biomedical sciences, one-third of first-time NIH research grants were awarded to women investigators. However, after winning their first grant, women were as likely as male scientists to win another grant. The researchers attributed these findings to women dropping out of an academic research career at a higher rate than men in early stages of their career. NIH has found that women tend to get their first grant award at a later age than men; however, the age differences between genders appears to have narrowed in recent years. From 2002 to 2016, there was a 7.5% to 10.5% gap in funding rates between scientists from underrepresented minority groups compared to those from majority groups. A 2018 GAO analysis of NIH data from 2013 to 2017 found that 17% of investigators from underrepresented racial groups—African Americans, American Indians/Alaska Natives, and Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islanders combined—who applied for large grants received them, compared to 24% of Hispanic or Latino applicants, 24% of Asian applicants, and 27% of white applicants. In addition, the percentage of underrepresented minorities in the NIH grant applicant pool increased from 2002 to 2016. GAO noted that NIH has taken steps to support a diverse workforce, such as by hiring a Chief Officer of Scientific Workforce Diversity, who then created a workforce diversity strategic plan. GAO found that although NIH has developed initiatives for diversity, these programs have not been evaluated and that the programs do not have adequate performance measures to track their success. NIH diversity initiatives have included bias training for the intramural hiring committees, training and fellowship opportunities targeted at underrepresented groups, and ongoing career development, such as mentoring and conferences, for scientists from underrepresented groups. U.S. vs. Global Research While the United States remains the lead funder of research and development, other countries—particularly China—have increased public funding for research in recent years. A 2015 study compared investment in biomedical research in the United States and in other developed countries. It found that U.S. government research funding declined from 57% (2004) to 49% (2011) of the global total, as did that of U.S. companies (50% to 41%), with the total U.S. (public plus private) share of global research funding declining from 57% to 44%. Asian countries (China, Japan, South Korea, India and, Singapore) increased investment from $28 billion (2004) to $52.4 billion (2011). China, in particular, almost quadrupled funding on medical research, from $2 billion in 2007 to $8.4 billion in 2012. Globally, the United States continues to be the top supporter of research and development. NIH is the top nonindustry (governmental or philanthropic) single funder of health research in the world. The growth in international biomedical research can lead to certain benefits shared globally—such as a larger pool of scientists across the world contributing to new knowledge and medical innovations. However, more research and development in other countries also means more competition for U.S. industries. In 2011, the United States led the world in publication of biomedical research articles—accounting for 33% of articles published. However, in 2011, China was the leader in life science patent applications—filing 30% of such patents globally. The United States followed with 24% of life science patents. Academic scientists often seek partnerships with colleagues or recruit students from other countries to advance their work. Yet, as new discoveries are translated to commercial products, such partnerships could complicate the economic development goals of public investment in research. Some Members of Congress have expressed concern over the investments being made by other countries in biomedical research. In Section 809, "Policy Statement on Medical Discovery, Development, Delivery and Innovation," H.Con.Res. 27 found that the "United States leadership role is being threatened, however, as other countries contribute more to basic research from both public and private sources" and that the "Organisation for Economic Development and Cooperation [sic] predicts that China, for example, will outspend the United States in total research and development by the end of the decade." The growth in global biomedical research funding has contributed to a surge in research produced outside of the United States, as well as increasing collaboration between U.S. and international institutions. A study of articles published from 2004 to 2013 in PubMed (a database of biomedical research literature based at the U.S. National Library of Medicine) found that published research funded by non-U.S. government sources had increased significantly during that period. Publications authored by European and Asian authors had increased at a higher rate than those by American authors. Collaboration between U.S. and international institutions has also grown in the past few decades. A study of cardiovascular research publications found that cross-border collaboration increased from 1992 to 2012, with the United States having the highest number of cross-border collaborations. NIH actively encourages international collaboration through some of its grant opportunities. A congressional hearing in August 2018 raised the issue of undue foreign influence in U.S. biomedical research. NIH Director Francis Collins announced an investigation of research institutions for undue foreign influence in three key areas: First, failure by some researchers at NIH-funded institutions to disclose substantial contributions of resources from other organizations, including foreign governments, which threatens to distort decisions about the appropriate use of NIH funds. Second, diversion of intellectual property and grant applications [that] are produced by NIH-supported biomedical research to other entities, including other countries. And third, failure by some peer reviewers to keep information on grant applications confidential, including in some instances disclosure to foreign entities or other attempts to influence funding decisions. Dr. Collins also announced a working group of university leaders to develop methods and policies that mitigate undue foreign influence. Despite the presence of bad actors, Collins stressed the important role that foreign scientists have played in U.S.-funded research and reasserted the NIH's commitment to "preserve the vibrancy of the diverse workforce." In a December 2018 report, the working group identified a Chinese research training program that facilitates the transfer of U.S. intellectual property to the Chinese government. Some participants from the program have received NIH funding, though they represent a small portion of foreign researchers in the United States. The report makes recommendations to educate institutions about disclosing and monitoring international ties, and to enhance cybersecurity to prevent information breaches. Other federal agencies, such as the Department of State, Department of Justice (DOJ), and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), are also actively monitoring, investigating, and issuing guidance and/or new policies related to foreign theft of intellectual property from U.S. academic and research institutions. Balancing Federal and Industry Support of Research NIH basic research is valued as a source of new and improved treatment and prevention measures, but it may also be used as a basis for policy decisions, economic development, and potentially new commercial products. The primary rationale for a federal government role in funding basic research is that private firms do not perform enough such research relative to the needs of society. The federal government may also invest in research to advance national and economic security for the nation. There are competing views about what roles the federal government and private industry should play in biomedical research and development (R&D). In traditional economics terms, science—especially basic science—is viewed as a public good: scientific knowledge may have widespread benefits that are difficult for an individual firm to "capture," and society may not produce enough of it through industry alone. In the traditional economic view, the public sector should fund basic research, while private firms will concentrate on applied research and product development. However, the line between basic and applied research is blurred. There is some concern that, given the size of federal research funding, some of the federal funding could possibly "crowd out private-sector investment in R&D"—meaning that absent public investment, industry would fund more research. On the other hand, one 2019 economic analysis found no evidence that NIH funding crowded out private sector R&D funding. Economist Mariana Mazzucato argues that the U.S. government has played a more directive role in strategically accelerating innovation in technologies and industries through research and development, including in pharmaceuticals and biotechnologies. Mazzucato argues that federal efforts have been a driving force behind "high risk" innovation. Others view the public and private sector's respective roles in pharmaceutical research and development as a necessary collaboration, given the scientific complexity of current medical innovations. Academic and industry partnerships are increasingly common, with public sector institutions contributing to the early discovery phases of new medical advancements, and the private sector conducting more late-stage product development and clinical trials. The correct balance of federal and industry contributions to biomedical innovation is difficult to determine, and a source of debate. In recent years, both NIH and industry have shifted their allocation of R&D investments. A 2015 study showed that industry shifted from funding less basic and translational research to spending more on clinical trials. From 2004 to 2011, the pharmaceutical industry increased spending by 36% for phase 3 clinical trials (late-stage clinical trials required to prove drug safety and efficacy), while it decreased spending by 4% for preclinical research activities (prehuman research; includes basic and applied) in the same period. According to the authors, "[t]his shift toward clinical research and development reflects increasing costs, complexity, and length of clinical trials but may also reflect a de-emphasis of early discovery efforts by the U.S. pharmaceutical industry." In recent years, NIH has also shifted to spending a slightly larger percentage on applied research compared to basic research—in FY2017, NIH allocated 48.8% of its research budget authority for applied research (as opposed to basic research), compared to 41.2% in FY2002. Thus, NIH may be shifting to spending more on research than was previously funded by the industry. One analysis found that in 2015, industry accounted for 67.4% of all U.S. expenditures on medical and health research, followed by the federal government (27%) and universities (5%). Some argue that federal support of basic research not only stimulates industry spending on applied research and development (R&D) through scientific discoveries that expand industry R&D opportunities, but also stimulates industry R&D by training many of the researchers that are hired by industry. The training provided by NIH programs "enhances the productivity and profitability of the companies' R&D investments." In contrast, NIH funding may indirectly affect the number of researchers available for the private sector, which can indirectly affect the salaries of these researchers. Many refer to the combination of federal and industry support for biomedical research as a "biomedical ecosystem," or the "biomedical research enterprise." Public-Private Partnerships One approach that the NIH has taken to stretch funding dollars and boost innovative research is to engage in public-private partnerships. Such partnerships include the Accelerating Medicines Partnership between the NIH, the FDA, 12 biopharmaceutical companies, and 13 nonprofit organizations to transform the way diagnostics and therapeutics are developed "by jointly identifying and validating promising biological targets for therapeutics." Another partnership, the Biomarkers Consortium, aims to identify promising biomarkers for disease and treatment and includes the NIH, FDA, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), the Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO), and over 30 other companies and nonprofit organizations. Public-private partnerships are facilitated by the Foundation for the National Institutes of Health (FNIH). Two recent controversies have invoked scrutiny of NIH's public-private partnerships. In March 2018, the New York Times published an investigative report about scientists and NIH officials who solicited funding from members of the alcohol industry to support a large clinical trial about the health benefits of moderate alcohol consumption. The industry's donations to the study would have been channeled through the FNIH. After the article was published, NIH conducted an investigation and subsequently shut down the study in June 2018. In addition, in April 2018, NIH cancelled a planned opioids research partnership with dozens of pharmaceutical companies aimed at finding new therapies for addiction and pain as a part of the Helping to End Addiction Long-term (HEAL) Initiative. The cancellation occurred after NIH faced criticism and a working group subsequently recommended to avoid "reputational and ethical risks" created by receiving funds from certain drug makers, who were involved in litigation for their role in the opioid crisis. NIH has continued to fund the initiative with federal dollars only, and without cash contributions from industry members. As a result of the controversies, members of the biomedical research community have called for the NIH to change its practices around public-private partnerships. In the Journal of the American Medical Association , two observers argued that NIH should issue standard guiding principles for public-private partnerships and should have full transparency about funding sources on all relevant webpages and materials. They also argued that NIH should limit undue influence and bias of the industry in research design and protocols. Another observer argued that NIH should broadly limit industry involvement in research because of the subtle ways industry may influence research—by funding certain types of studies or researchers that may favor their industry. In a December 2018 New York Times editorial, one medical researcher argued that while industry bias in scientific research is important to address, many forms of bias exist in science and therefore advocated for "open science," where researchers' methods, data, funding, and affiliations are maximally transparent. At an August 2018 Senate hearing, NIH Director Francis Collins defended NIH's use of public-private partnerships: "It brings around the same table scientists from both public and private sectors who design together what the research ought to be, building on the strengths of both groups and it advances the cause of science more rapidly than might otherwise have been." He noted, however, that NIH should be careful when the funder has a "vested interest in a particular outcome of the study." The FNIH is small in the context of NIH's large portfolio. In FY2017, the total revenues for FNIH were $64 million, including in-kind contributions. Federal funding of over $30 billion per year therefore dwarfs private contributions to the FNIH. However, private sector funding and influence has increased in the larger biomedical research context. A study found that from 1988 to 2008, the proportion of industry-funded studies in three prominent American medical journals had doubled, from 17% to 40% of all studies. Moving forward, NIH may continue to define its relationship with the private sector in advancing biomedical research. Publicly Funded Research and Pharmaceutical Drug Development NIH is involved, both directly and indirectly, in pharmaceutical drug development. NIH funding directly contributes to pharmaceutical development when NIH-funded scientists develop a chemical compound or other invention that is patented and then licensed to the pharmaceutical industry. NIH also funds a limited amount of clinical research on new or existing pharmaceuticals to assess drug safety and effectiveness for FDA approval. Since over 50% of NIH funding supports basic research, NIH funded research is, to a greater extent, indirectly involved—by generating scientific knowledge and innovations that aid in pharmaceutical development. For example, important basic advances in research, such as recombinant DNA, can lead to the development of whole new classes of drugs. NIH also supports the education and training of biomedical scientists, some of whom then work for the pharmaceutical industry. It is therefore difficult to quantify and assign credit for the role of NIH funding in the development of a given drug. Drugs with a patent held by NIH or NIH-funded researchers represent a small portion of all FDA-approved drugs. An invention may be patented if it is "any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof" that is novel, useful, and nonobvious, and the inventor is the first person to file a patent application. NIH-funded researchers may discover drug candidates that are then patented by or licensed to the pharmaceutical industry. According to a 2011 study by Sampat and Lichtenberg, 9% of the new drugs (i.e., new molecular entities) approved by the FDA from 1988 to 2005 were based on a patent held by either a government agency or a nongovernmental institution that had received government support. NIH makes up a large portion of all government funding for medical research in the United States; therefore many of the drugs in the Sampat and Lichtenberg study were likely developed with NIH funding (although the authors did not specify whether NIH funded the research). However, in 2012, Rai and Sampat noted that federal funding can go unreported on patent applications, despite requirements to report such information. Therefore more drugs may have been developed with federal funding than is accounted for through patent information. A study by Ashley J. Stevens et al. published in 2011 explored the contribution of publicly funded research to the discovery of new drugs. The Stevens study found that of the 1,541 drugs approved by FDA from 1990 through 2007, 143, or 9.3%, resulted from work conducted in public sector research institutions, including all universities, research hospitals, nonprofit research institutes, and federal laboratories in the United States. Of the 1,541 total drug applications, FDA granted priority review to 348 applications, and 66 of these (19%) resulted from publicly funded research. The authors stated that "viewed from another perspective, 46.2% of the new-drug applications from PSRIs [public-sector research institutions] received priority reviews, as compared with 20.0% of applications that were based purely on private-sector research, an increase by a factor of 2.3." An FDA designation of priority review is for "the evaluation of applications for drugs that, if approved, would be significant improvements in the safety or effectiveness of the treatment, diagnosis, or prevention of serious conditions when compared to standard applications." According to the authors, their data "suggest that PSRIs tend to discover drugs that are expected to have a disproportionately important clinical effect." Some studies have focused on the public sector's role in developing the most innovative drugs. A 2015 study focused solely on the public sector's role in "transformative" drug development from 1984 to 2009. The researchers defined a transformative drug as both innovative and having a groundbreaking effect on patient care. They identified transformative drugs by surveying physicians from the top 30 U.S. academic medical centers. The researchers then focused on 21 transformative drugs and 5 drug classes and followed their development history through FDA documentation and interviews with scientists and drug developers. They found that most of these transformative drugs originated in academic and/or publicly funded institutions that conceptualized therapeutic approaches through basic research, and were then further developed by industry partners for clinical testing. Another study analyzing case histories of the same set of transformative drugs, published in 2016, concluded that only 4 out of 26 transformative drugs identified were developed by one sector alone—either public or private. Although the public sector conducted most of the basic science activities to develop the drugs, the private sector accounted for most of the drug development activities in bringing the drugs to market. The authors estimated that total NIH funding would need to increase by 2.5 times to maintain the current level of drug development without industry support. However, the authors did not appear to account for potential revenues to NIH if the agency produced the drugs. Rather than directly leading to a new drug, NIH-funded researchers are more often indirectly involved in drug development by producing scientific research and innovations that contribute to the knowledge base and available methods for the pharmaceutical industry. For instance, the methodology used by the Stevens et al. 2011 study "excluded the role of PSRIs in the development of platform technologies that have contributed to the development of whole new classes of drugs." These platform technologies enabled the development of many of the products approved by FDA during the period evaluated in the study. The platform technologies were excluded "because the PSRI scientists who developed the platforms generally did not use them to develop specific drug candidates." For example, the following platform technologies were developed with public funds and were excluded from the study: recombinant DNA technology (Cohen-Boyer patents); bacterial production methods for recombinant DNA (Riggs-Itakura patents); production and chimerization methods for antibodies (Cabilly patents); methods to produce glycosylated recombinant proteins in mammalian cells (Axel patents); and methods of gene silencing with the use of small interfering RNAs (Mello-Fire patents). These platform technologies have enabled the development of entirely new classes of drugs, such as the production of synthetic insulin and growth hormones using recombinant DNA technology, and antibody drugs using Cabilly patents. Without these underlying scientific innovations, the result may have been a vastly different economic outlook for the pharmaceutical industry. A few studies have aimed to ascertain the total impact of NIH funding on drug development. A 2018 study by Cleary et al. on the broad impact of NIH funding on drug development found that public funding contributed to every new molecular entity (NME) approved by the FDA from 2010 to 2016. The study, which looked at peer-reviewed literature and public data on NIH grant funding, determined that funding from NIH was "directly or indirectly associated with every one of 210 NMEs approved from 2010-2016." Almost a third (29%) of the publications identified were directly associated with NIH-funded projects. The analysis in this study captured basic research, in addition to applied research on NMEs. The study found that up to 20% of the NIH budget allocation from 2000 to 2016, or about $100 billion, "was associated with published research that directly or indirectly contributed to NMEs approved from 2010-2016." The authors concluded that their results suggest that "the NIH contribution to research associated with new drug approvals is greater than previously appreciated." A 2019 study by Azoulay et al. used a new economic method to measure the impact of NIH research funding on private industry, particularly on patenting by private-sector firms. The study determined that NIH investments in a particular research area increase subsequent private sector patenting in that area—a $10 million increase in NIH funding for a research area results in 2.7 additional patents. Alternatively phrased, one private sector patent results from every two to three NIH grants. Though the authors faced difficulty measuring the economic value of such patents, they stated that, "one rough calculation suggests that $1 dollar in NIH funding generates around $2.34 in drug sales." NIH-funded research has contributed to the development of new pharmaceutical drugs, largely by supporting and conducting the science that underpins the industry. In light of high list prices for certain branded drugs, some question whether the American public is getting an adequate return on taxpayer investment in biomedical research. Others argue that pharmaceutical drug development is an increasingly expensive endeavor, and therefore requires significant research and development contributions from both the public and private sector. NIH contributions to drug development is one component of a larger debate about the role of federal funding and policies (including health care finance, regulatory, and tax policy) in the development, price, and profitability of pharmaceutical drugs. Concluding Observations With over $39 billion in funding for FY2019, NIH is a significant contributor to the U.S. and global biomedical research enterprise. Congress may consider how to allocate funding, introduce reforms, and provide oversight to NIH in a way that maximizes benefits to taxpayers through science-driven improvements to health, quality of life, and medical care. NIH has well-established internal processes for allocating research funding through scientific peer review and advisory committees. Congress may consider how to oversee these internal mechanisms; address gaps, duplication, and needs in the research portfolio; and provide funding in a manner that maintains the sustainability and productivity of research. Finally, Congress may consider how to help NIH support new and early-stage scientists, maintain its role as a global leader in biomedical research, and balance the public and private sector's role in research and innovation.

The National Institutes of Health (NIH), under the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), is the primary federal agency charged with performing and supporting biomedical and behavioral research. In FY2018, NIH used its over $34 billion budget to support more than 300,000 scientists and research personnel working at over 2,500 institutions across the United States and abroad, as well as to conduct biomedical and behavioral research and research training at its own facilities. The agency consists of the Office of the Director, in charge of overall policy and program coordination, and 27 institutes and centers, each of which focuses on particular diseases or research areas in human health. A broad range of research is funded through a highly competitive system of peer-reviewed grants and contracts. The Public Health Service Act (PHSA) provides the statutory basis for NIH programs, and funding levels are mostly provided through the annual appropriations process. In December 2016, Congress introduced major reforms and programs at the NIH through the 21st Century Cures Act (P.L. 114-255). Prior to 2016, the last time Congress addressed NIH with comprehensive legislation was in December 2006, when it passed the NIH Reform Act (P.L. 109-482). Congress also gives direction to NIH through appropriations report language, but usually not through budget line items or earmarks. Historically, Congress has accepted, for the most part, the scientific and public health priorities established by the agency through its planning and grant-making activities that involve members of the scientific community and the general public. NIH has seen periods of both low and high funding growth. From FY1998 to FY2003, Congress doubled the NIH budget from $13.7 billion to $27.1 billion. The agency then saw low funding growth or cuts from FY2004 to FY2015. Starting in FY2016, Congress provided NIH with funding increases of over 5% each year, raising the program level from $30.3 billion in FY2015 to $39.3 billion in FY2019. Under President Trump's budget request for FY2020, NIH would be provided a program level of $34.3 billion—a 12.6% reduction from the FY2019 program level. NIH officials and scientific observers have cited funding variability and uncertainty as a challenge for the agency. Along with funding uncertainty, other challenges facing the agency and the research enterprise include allocating funding across disease types, areas of human health, and types of research; addressing congressional priorities and concerns, while ensuring the scientific merit and quality of NIH-funded research; helping new and early-stage scientists obtain their first independent research grants; balancing the public and private sectors' relative roles in biomedical research. NIH is the largest single public funder of biomedical research in the world, yet other countries—particularly China—have increased their funding levels for such research. Some Members of Congress have voiced concern about the position of U.S. biomedical research compared with other countries. A January 2015 study found that the total U.S. (public and private) share of global biomedical research funding declined from 57% in 2004 to 44% in 2011, while countries in Asia increased investment into biomedical research from $28 billion (2004) to $52.4 billion (2011), with especially large increases in China (analysis included Japan, China, India, Singapore and South Korea). Globally, the United States continues to be the top supporter of both public and industry medical research.

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T he federal government has no juvenile justice system of its own. Rather, juvenile justice is administered by the states. The federal government, though, seeks to influence states' juvenile justice systems through the administration of grant programs and the provision of funds. This report provides a brief overview of funding for the juvenile justice-related grant programs administered by the Department of Justice's (DOJ's) Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP). Juvenile Justice Legislation and Grant Programs A number of federally funded juvenile justice grant programs are authorized by the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 (JJDPA, P.L. 93-415 ). Since its enactment, the JJDPA has been revised by several key amendments, including a significant reorganization in 2002 (by the 21 st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act; P.L. 107-273 ). Its grant programs were most recently amended and reauthorized by the Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 2018 ( P.L. 115-385 ). The JJDPA as originally enacted had three main components: (1) it established OJJDP to coordinate and administer federal juvenile justice efforts; (2) it created grant programs to assist states with their juvenile justice systems; and (3) it promulgated core mandates to which states must adhere in order to be eligible for certain grant funding. Although the JJDPA has been amended several times over the past 40 years, it continues to feature these three components. The JJDPA has been the primary channel through which the federal government has provided juvenile justice funding to states. However, other programs also administered by OJJDP have contributed to overall federal juvenile justice funding. The following section outlines various juvenile justice grant programs, including those authorized by the JJDPA. Grants noted in this section have been congressionally authorized at some point in time and have received an appropriation at least once since FY2010. Congress has also provided appropriations for programs that it has not authorized; these programs are not discussed in this section, but they are included in Table 1 , which outlines funding for juvenile justice programs since FY2010. State Formula Grant Program The JJDPA authorizes OJJDP to make formula grants to states for the planning, establishment, operation, coordination, and evaluation of projects that develop more effective juvenile delinquency programs and improve juvenile justice systems. Funds are allocated annually based on each state's proportion of people under the age of 18. States must adhere to certain core mandates to receive their funding. The Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 2018 ( P.L. 115-385 ) amended and reauthorized this program through FY2023. Developing, Testing, and Demonstrating Promising New Initiatives and Programs (Challenge Grants) The JJDPA authorizes OJJDP to make grants to state, local, and tribal governments and nongovernmental organizations for programs to develop, test, or demonstrate promising new initiatives that may prevent, control, or reduce juvenile delinquency. The Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 2018 ( P.L. 115-385 ) amended and reauthorized this program through FY2023. Of note, this grant program has not received an appropriation since FY2010. Title V Incentive Youth Promise Grants for Local Delinquency Prevention The JJDPA authorizes OJJDP to make grants to states, which are then transmitted through subgrants to units of local government (or nonprofits in partnership with units of local government) for delinquency prevention programs for juveniles who have come into contact with, or are at risk to come into contact with, the juvenile justice system. The Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 2018 ( P.L. 115-385 ) amended and reauthorized this program through FY2023. The JJDPA also authorizes OJJDP to make grants to eligible Indian tribes to support delinquency prevention programs for at-risk youth or those who have come into contact with the juvenile justice system. Traditionally, Congress dedicates amounts from the total appropriation for the Title V program for specific programs and purposes areas (e.g., the Tribal Youth program or preventing gang violence). Victims of Child Abuse Act Grants The Victims of Child Abuse Act of 1990 (Title II of the Crime Control Act of 1990, P.L. 101-647 ) authorizes OJJDP to fund technical assistance, training, and administrative reforms for state juvenile and family courts to improve the way they handle cases of child abuse and neglect. This program was most recently reauthorized in the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization Act of 2013 ( P.L. 113-4 ). Its authorization of appropriations expired in FY2018, but it has continued to receive funding. Juvenile Mentoring Program The Juvenile Mentoring Program was authorized by the Incentive Grants for Local Delinquency Prevention Programs Act ( P.L. 102-586 ). Grants under this program are awarded to local educational agencies (in partnership with public or private agencies) to establish and support mentoring programs to reduce delinquent behavior, improve scholastic performance, and reduce school dropouts. The program has continued to receive appropriations even though its authorization was repealed ( P.L. 107-273 ). Juvenile Accountability Block Grants Congress initially established the Juvenile Accountability Block Grant (JABG) program by appropriating funding for it in the FY1998 Department of Justice Appropriations Act ( P.L. 105-119 ). Congress subsequently authorized the JABG program through P.L. 107-273 . Although the authorization for the JABG program is not a part of the JJDPA, it nevertheless is administered by OJJDP. The JABG program authorizes the Attorney General to make grants to states and units of local government to strengthen their juvenile justice systems, including holding juveniles accountable for their actions. Authorization for this program expired in FY2009, but Congress continued to provide appropriations through FY2013. Juvenile Justice Appropriations Congress appropriates funding for programs authorized by the JJDPA as well as for other non-JJDPA grant programs through the Juvenile Justice Programs account in the annual Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act. Figure 1 shows total appropriations for juvenile justice programs from FY2002 through FY2019. Overall funding for juvenile justice programs, which had typically been above $500 million, peaked at $565 million in FY2002. From FY2002 to FY2007, however, overall funding fell by 38% to $348 million. The majority of this reduction came from cuts to the JABG program. Appropriations for JABG fell from a high of $250 million in FY2002 to $49 million in FY2007. From FY2007 to FY2010, total funding for juvenile justice programs increased by almost 22% to $424 million, with funding for JJDPA programs increasing by 27% to $331 million over this same period. This was the largest juvenile justice appropriation since FY2003. Funding for juvenile justice programs again began to decline in FY2011, and that decline generally continued through FY2017. From FY2010 to FY2017, total funding for juvenile justice programs decreased by nearly 42%, from $424 million to $247 million. Contributing to this drop, Congress eliminated funding for the Challenge Grants in FY2011 and for the JABG program in FY2014. During this time period, however, Congress also started appropriating funding for programs that had not previously been funded under the Juvenile Justice Programs account (including funding for missing and exploited children programs, child abuse training programs for judicial personnel and practitioners, and grants and technical assistance in support of a National Forum on Youth Violence Prevention). After appropriating a low of $247 million for juvenile justice programs in FY2017, Congress increased funding in both FY2018 and FY2019. Congress increased funding for juvenile justice programs to nearly $283 million for FY2018, and it included funds for a new Opioid Affected Youth Initiative. Congress most recently appropriated $287 million for juvenile justice programs for FY2019—the largest appropriation since the $424 million in FY2010. Historically, Congress has set aside funding from the Title V grant for gang prevention activities; however, for FY2019 Congress did not delineate funding for this purpose. It also did not include funding for community-based violence prevention, an administratively established initiative that had received appropriations since FY2010. Policymakers did, though, set aside money for an initiative serving children exposed to violence. Historical Appropriations by Program Table 1 provides a breakdown of funding for the Juvenile Justice Programs account by program for the 10-year period from FY2010 to FY2019. Appropriations for specific programs in the Juvenile Justice Programs account can vary from year to year. For example, starting in FY2012, Congress moved funding for missing and exploited children programs from the Justice Assistance account to the Juvenile Justice Programs account. In addition, Congress sometimes provides funding for programs as a specific line item in the Juvenile Justice Programs account, but in other years funding for those programs is provided as a set-aside from another program in the account. For example, the Community Based Violence Prevention Initiative and the Competitive Grants Focusing on Girls in the Juvenile Justice System Program have received line item appropriations in some fiscal years and have been funded by set-asides from the Title V Incentive Grants Program in other years. By contrast, some programs have consistently been funded through set-asides from the Title V program (e.g., tribal youth and gang prevention grants).

Although juvenile justice has always been administered by the states, the federal government has played a role in this area through the administration of grant programs. Congress has influenced juvenile justice by authorizing and funding grant programs administered by the Department of Justice's (DOJ's) Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP). The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (JJDPA; P.L. 93-415), enacted in 1974, was the first comprehensive juvenile justice legislation passed by Congress. The JJDPA authorized a series of grant programs designed to support state juvenile justice systems and prevent juvenile delinquency. Since its enactment, the JJDPA has undergone several key amendments, including a significant reorganization in 2002 (by the 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act; P.L. 107-273). Its grant programs were most recently amended and reauthorized by the Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-385). Funding for programs authorized by the JJDPA, as well as for other non-JJDPA grant programs that are administered by OJJDP, is provided through the Juvenile Justice Programs account in the annual Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies appropriations act. After the restructuring of juvenile justice grant programs in 2002, total funding for these programs began to decline. This decline generally continued through FY2007, after which funding for these programs started to increase. For FY2010, Congress provided $424 million for juvenile justice programs—the largest appropriation since FY2003. Juvenile justice funding then generally declined again from FY2010 through FY2017. After appropriating a low of $247 million for juvenile justice programs in FY2017, Congress increased funding for both FY2018 and FY2019. Through the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6), Congress appropriated $287 million for juvenile justice programs for FY2019—the largest appropriation since the $424 million in FY2010.

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Introduction Section 420 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act ( P.L. 93-288 , hereinafter the Stafford Act) authorizes the President to "declare" a Fire Management Assistance Grant (FMAG). The current FMAG system was established by regulation in October of 2001. These grants provide federal assistance for fire suppression activities. This authority has been delegated to the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA's) Regional Administrators. Once issued, the FMAG declaration authorizes various forms of federal assistance such as the provision of equipment, personnel, and grants to state, local, and tribal governments for the control, management, and mitigation of any fire on certain public or private forest land or grassland that might become a major disaster. This federal assistance requires a cost-sharing component such that state, local, and tribal governments are responsible for 25% of the expenses. This report discusses the most frequently asked questions received by the Congressional Research Service on FMAGs. It addresses questions regarding how FMAGs are requested, how requests are evaluated using thresholds, and the types of assistance provided under an FMAG declaration. Declaration Process How are FMAGs Requested? FMAGs can be requested by a state when the governor determines that a fire is burning out of control and threatens to become a major disaster. At that point, a request for assistance can be submitted to FEMA. Typically, requests are submitted to the FEMA Regional Administrator. Requests can be submitted any time—day or night—and can be submitted by telephone to expedite the process. Telephone requests must be followed by written confirmation within 14 days of the phone request. Can a Tribal Leader Request an FMAG Declaration? Under the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of 2013 (SRIA, Division B of P.L. 113-2 ), tribes are equivalent to states in their ability to request a major disaster declaration, an emergency declaration, or a request for an FMAG declaration. Note that some tribal land holdings are administered by the federal government and, therefore, receive fire suppression support through the National Interagency Fire Center (NIFC). The NIFC supports interagency "wildland" firefighting efforts on federal lands by the U.S. Forest Service, National Weather Service, National Park Service, Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and FEMA's U.S. Fire Administration. Unlike FMAGs, such support generally does not require tribes to reimburse firefighting costs (FMAGs require the state to pay a 25% cost-share). In addition, tribes with their own fire suppression resources may receive reimbursement from BIA for their costs related to fire suppression on tribal lands. What Information Needs to Be Included in the FMAG Request? The FMAG request should include cost estimates to support the request as well as information about the fire including the size of the fire(s) in acres or square miles, the population of the community (or communities) threatened, the number of persons evacuated (if applicable), weather conditions, and the degree to which state and local resources are committed to this fire and other fires in federal, state, and/or local jurisdictions. The verbal request must be followed up with a completed "Request for Fire Management Assistance Declaration" (FEMA form 078-0-1) and the "Principal Advisor's Report" (FEMA form 078-0-2). How Is FMAG Assistance Determined? The following criteria are used to evaluate wildfires and make a determination whether to issue an FMAG: the threat to lives and property including critical facilities, infrastructures, and watershed areas; the availability of state and local fire resources; high fire danger conditions based on nationally accepted indices such as the National Fire Danger Ratings System; and the potential economic impacts of the fire. In addition, FEMA has developed fire cost thresholds that are typically updated on an annual basis. There are two types of fire cost thresholds used to help determine if a state or tribal nation is eligible for fire assistance: (1) individual thresholds for a single fire, and (2) cumulative thresholds for multiple fires. Cumulative thresholds are applied to multiple fires burning simultaneously, or the accumulation of multiple fires in a single fire season. Threshold amounts vary by state (see Table 1 ). Taking Pennsylvania as an example, generally, a single fire would need to meet or exceed $927,274 in damages for Pennsylvania to be eligible for an FMAG declaration. In contrast, the formula for the cumulative fire threshold for a given state is one of two amounts—$500,000 or the amount of that state's individual fire threshold multiplied by three, whichever is greater. Returning to the Pennsylvania example, the sum of three individual fire thresholds equals $2,781,822. Since that amount is larger than $500,000, cumulative fire damages in Pennsylvania must meet or exceed $2,781,822 to be eligible for assistance. In contrast, the individual fire threshold for Alaska is $100,000, but the cumulative threshold is $500,000, not the sum of three individual fire thresholds ($300,000). Can Denials for FMAG Assistance Be Appealed? If FEMA denies the request for assistance, the state has one opportunity to appeal the denial. The appeal must be submitted in writing to the Regional Administrator no later than 30 days from the date of the denial letter. The appeal should contain any additional information that strengthens the original request for assistance. The Regional Administrator will review the appeal, prepare a recommendation, and forward the appeal package to the FEMA Headquarters Office. The FEMA Headquarters Office will notify the state of its determination in writing within 90 days of receipt of the appeal (or receipt of additional requested information). The state may request a time extension to submit the appeal. The request for an extension must be submitted in writing to the Regional Administrator no later than 30 days from the date of the denial letter. The request for an extension must include a justification for the need for an extension. The FEMA Headquarters Office will notify the state in writing whether the extension request is granted or denied. Does an FMAG Exclude the Possibility of an Emergency or Major Disaster Declaration Under the Stafford Act? No, an emergency or major disaster can be declared after an FMAG declaration has been issued. However, the emergency or major disaster declaration must be initiated by a separate request for assistance by the state or tribal government. Funding How Are FMAGs Funded? FMAGs are funded through FEMA's Disaster Relief Fund (DRF), the main account FEMA uses to provide disaster assistance. The DRF is a no-year account—unused funds from the previous fiscal year are carried over to the next fiscal year. Funds in the DRF fall into two categories. The first category is for disaster relief costs associated with major disasters under the Stafford Act. This category reflects the impact of the Budget Control Act ( P.L. 112-25 , BCA), which allows appropriations to cover the costs incurred as a result of major disasters to be paid through an "allowable adjustment" to the discretionary spending limits. The second category is colloquially known as "base funding." Base funding includes activities not tied to major disasters under the Stafford Act. Base funding is scored as discretionary spending that counts against the discretionary spending limits, whereas FMAGs are funded through the DRF's base funding category. Can FMAGs Still Be Issued If the DRF Balance Is Low? The decision to issue a FMAG declaration is not contingent on the DRF balance. Similarly, FMAGs do not reduce the amount of funding available for major disasters. When the DRF balance was low in the past, FEMA used its "immediate needs funding" (INF) policy until supplemental appropriations were passed to replenish the DRF. Under INF, long-term projects (such as mitigation work) are put on hold and only activities deemed urgent are funded. FMAGs would most likely fall into the category of events with an "urgent" need. Under the INF policy, FEMA also delays interagency reimbursements, and recovers funds from previous years in order to stretch its available funds. What Are the Cost-Share Requirements for FMAGs? As with many other Stafford Act disaster assistance grant programs (Public Assistance, Hazard Mitigation Grant assistance, Other Needs Assistance) the cost-share for FMAGs is based on a federal share of 75% of eligible expenses. The grantee (the state) and subgrantees (local communities) assume the remaining 25% of eligible costs. Does FEMA Advance Funds to States or Reimburse States for Completed Work? Under the FMAG process, FEMA reimburses grantees for eligible activities they have undertaken. The state application for specific grant funds must be submitted within 90 days after the FMAG is granted. That time frame permits the state to gather all information and supporting data on potentially eligible spending to include in their grant application package. The package must also stipulate that the fire cost threshold was met. Following submission of the grant application FEMA has 45 days to approve or deny the application. FMAG Assistance What Types of Assistance Are Provided Under an FMAG Declaration? FMAG assistance is similar in some basic respects to other FEMA assistance. For example, FMAGs will not replicate or displace the work of other federal agencies, nor will FEMA pay straight-time salaries for public safety forces, though it will reimburse overtime expenses for the event. Other eligible expenses can include costs for equipment and supplies (less insurance proceeds); mobilization and demobilization; emergency work (evacuations and sheltering, police barricading and traffic control, arson investigation); prepositioning federal, out-of-state, and international resources for up to 21 days when approved by the FEMA Regional Administrator; personal comfort and safety items for firefighter health and safety; field camps and meals in lieu of per diem; and/or the mitigation, management, and control of declared fires burning on comingled federal land, when such costs are not reimbursable by another federal agency. Is Mitigation Funding Included in an FMAG Declaration? Until recently, only major disaster declarations made statewide hazard mitigation grants available. Division D of P.L. 115-254 (Disaster Recovery Reform Act, hereinafter DRRA) amended the Stafford Act to make hazard mitigation available for FMAG declarations as well. Under Section 404 of the Stafford Act as amended by DRRA, mitigation grants from the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) are provided to states and tribes on a sliding scale based on the percentage of funds spent for FMAG assistance. For states and federally recognized tribes with a FEMA-approved Standard State or Tribal Mitigation Plan, the formula provides for up to 15% of the first $2 billion of estimated aggregate amounts of disaster assistance, up to 10% for amounts between $2 billion and $10 billion, and 7.5% for amounts between $10 billion and $35.333 billion. Interaction with Other Federal Agencies How Are FMAGs Different from Other Types of Federal Fire Assistance? FEMA assistance through FMAGs is a direct relationship with the states to assist the state in fighting the fire on state lands. FMAGs are employed so a disaster declaration may not be necessary. The Forest Service and other federal agencies do provide other types of assistance related to wildfire management, such as postfire recovery assistance, or assistance planning and mitigating the potential risk from future wildfires. Most of these programs provide financial and technical assistance to state partners. In addition, other USDA agencies administer various other programs to provide disaster recovery assistance to nonfederal forest landowners, including the Emergency Forest Restoration Program and the Emergency Watershed Program. Can FMAG Assistance Be Provided in Conjunction with Assistance from the Forest Service, or Is It Considered a Duplication of Benefits? This depends on the type of assistance being provided by the Forest Service. FMAG assistance is not generally available in conjunction with emergency suppression assistance from the Forest Service, or any other federal agency engaged in suppression operations. FMAGs provide assistance for suppression operations on nonfederal lands, whereas suppression operations on federal lands are the responsibility of the federal agency with jurisdiction. Limited exceptions may occur for declared fires on lands in which the ownership is comingled federal and nonfederal, and the costs incurred by the eligible entity are not entitled to any other type of federal reimbursement. However, FMAGs may be provided in conjunction with other Forest Service assistance programs, such as any technical and financial assistance provided through the agency's state and volunteer fire assistance programs or state and private forestry office. FMAG and other federal assistance may potentially occur in conjunction when there is a cooperative agreement between federal, state, and other governmental or tribal partners to coordinate emergency wildfire protection and response activities. The cooperative agreement often delineates different geographic areas where the state government is responsible for initial suppression operations, regardless of land ownership, and vice versa, where the federal government may be responsible for providing suppression operations in lands under nonfederal ownership. The cooperative agreements (sometimes referred to as "fire compacts") specify how costs are to be apportioned among the partners, including provisions allowing for reimbursement, in accordance with applicable federal and state statutes. In the circumstance where a state (or other eligible entity) conducted suppression operations on federal land and the costs were not reimbursable, an FMAG may potentially be applied for and used to cover eligible costs. Do FMAGs Assist with Fires on Federal Lands? No, most fires that begin on federal land are the responsibility of the federal agency that owns or manages the land, and are not eligible to receive FMAG assistance. There are some exceptions, however. For example, FMAGs may be available to assist with declared fires that occur in areas with a mix of federal and nonfederal land, if the state has a responsibility for suppression activities under a cooperative agreement with the applicable federal agency, and those costs are not reimbursable under another federal statute.

Section 420 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (P.L. 93-288, hereinafter the Stafford Act) authorizes the President to "declare" a Fire Management Assistance Grant (FMAG). In the interest of saving time, the authority to make the declaration has been delegated to the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA's) Regional Administrators. Once issued, the FMAG declaration authorizes various forms of federal fire suppression assistance such as the provision of equipment, personnel, and grants to state, local, and tribal governments for the control, management, and mitigation of any fire on certain public or private forest land or grassland that might become a major disaster. This federal assistance requires a cost-sharing component such that state, local, and tribal governments are responsible for 25% of the expenses. This report answers frequently asked questions about FMAGs. This report will be updated as events warrant.

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Introduction Timber harvesting on federal lands is a long-standing activity which sometimes generates controversy. Most timber harvesting on federal lands occurs on lands directed to provide a regular output of multiple uses under current law. Determining the proportions of these uses, in whole and on individual lands, is challenging for land management agencies. Often at issue is the appropriate use of federal lands for timber harvesting under these policies, including what amount of timber harvesting should occur and what constitutes proper balance among timber harvesting and other uses. Congress has authorized timber harvesting on certain federal lands under specified circumstances. Most timber harvesting on federal lands occurs on two land systems. The majority of harvests occur on the National Forest System (NFS), which is managed by the Forest Service (FS) within the Department of Agriculture (USDA). Harvests also occur on the public lands managed by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) within the Department of the Interior (DOI). The FS manages 144.9 million acres of forest, while the BLM manages 37.6 million acres of forest (see Figure 1 ). Together, FS and BLM forest comprises 76% of federal forest area and 23% of all forest in the United States. Within their respective forest, the FS has 96.1 million acres of timberlands, and the BLM has 6.1 million acres of timberlands. The United States has 765.5 million acres of forest, of which 514.4 million acres is timberland and 57% is private. The United States has 57.0 million acres of woodland. Timber harvesting is the physical cutting and removal of trees or parts of trees from a given forested site. Harvested timber , or cut and removed trees, is the raw material for items made of wood, such as lumber, plywood, paper, and other products. Timber harvesting may occur on private, federal, or non-federal publicly owned lands, and may be conducted by the landowner or by another entity they allow to do so. Most timber harvesting in the United States is conducted on private lands: in 2011, 88% of timber harvests were conducted on private lands, and in 2012, 90% of wood and paper products in the United States originated on private lands. FS and BLM conduct timber sales as the most general way to allow timber harvesting on their respective lands, although they may allow harvesting in other ways. A timber sale is a formal process whereby an entity may purchase a contract to cut and remove specified timber. FS and BLM receive revenue from the sale of the contract. Information on timber harvesting in this report, such as harvested volume, harvested value, and other statistics, derives from FS and BLM data and may include timber harvested through timber sales or other means. Both FS and BLM timber sale planning and implementation proceed under similar principles of achieving multiple use and sustained yield. Both agencies conduct timber harvesting for various purposes. Both plan long-term timber management by designating areas that can support sustainable timber harvest and calculating yields that can be taken without permanent impairment. In the short term, both agencies create plans for timber sales, determine the value of offered timber and specify what timber may be cut, and conduct sales in a competitive manner open to the public. Timber harvesting may also occur on two other federal land systems, the National Park System, managed by the National Park Service, and the National Wildlife Refuge System (NWRS), managed by the Fish and Wildlife Service (both agencies are within DOI). In the case of the National Park System, the Secretary may dispose of timber to control insects and diseases or to conserve natural or historic resources. In the case of the NWRS, the Secretary of the Interior may permit timber harvesting to achieve desired fish and wildlife habitat conditions. On both systems, timber harvesting is rare, and harvested volumes are small. This report provides an overview of timber harvesting on FS and BLM lands. The report describes general statutory authorities and regulations, planning activities, timber sales, and trends in the volume and value of timber harvested, first from FS lands, and then for BLM lands. It concludes with a discussion of issues Congress has debated concerning timber harvesting and federal lands. The National Forest System The National Forest System comprises nearly 193 million acres. It is made up of 154 national forests, national grasslands, and other units such as research and experimental areas. Approximately 75% of national forest acreage is located in 15 states. As discussed, the NFS contains 144.9 million acres of forest and woodland, of which 66% are considered timberland. Statutory Authorities for Harvesting Timber Most of the lands contained in the modern Forest Service were reserved from the public lands in the late 19 th and early 20 th centuries, in what were first called "forest reserves". The forest reserves were initially managed by the DOI and later moved to the USDA and the Forest Service. Through the Organic Administration Act, Congress specified that the purpose of these forests was to "improve and protect the forest within the reservation … and to furnish a continuous supply of timber for the use and necessities of the citizens of the United States," in addition to protecting water flows. The act authorized timber sales of "dead, matured or large growth of trees" and set out procedures for conducting them. Congress expanded the purposes for the national forests, and developed management goals to achieve those purposes, through the Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act of 1960 (MUSYA). Congress added the provision of fish and wildlife habitat, recreation, energy and mineral development, and livestock grazing as official purposes of the national forests, in addition to timber harvesting and watershed protection. To supply these activities, management of the forests' resources is to be organized for multiple uses in a "harmonious and coordinated" manner that considers the combination of uses that best meets the needs of the American people, not that necessarily yields the largest dollar return or output. The act also directs a sustained yield of products and services, meaning high-level regular output in perpetuity without impairing the lands' productivity. Planning, Sale Process, and Revenues Congress has directed FS to engage in long-term land use and resource management. Plans set the framework for land management, uses, and protection. They are developed through an interdisciplinary process with opportunities for public participation. FS uses these plans to guide implementation of site-specific activities. In the case of timber, plans describe where timber harvesting may occur and include measures of sustainable timber harvest levels, and are used to guide implementation of individual sales. These sales generate revenues. Congress has specified various uses for these revenues. Congress directed the Forest Service to conduct long-term planning and management through the passage of the National Forest Management Act of 1976 (NFMA). NFMA requires the FS to prepare a land and resource management plan—often called a "forest plan"—for each NFS unit. These plans are to be revised at least every 15 years. The FS has issued regulations to implement the planning requirement—often called "planning rules"—and to establish the procedures for developing, amending, and revising forest plans. The first planning rule was issued in 1979 and later revised; the current rule dates from 2012. Forest planning and implementation generally proceed as described below. Forest Service timber planning and administration proceed under general FS planning procedures. Forest plans guide management of the plan area by specifying objectives, standards, and guidelines for resources and activities. They contain certain components required by statute, such as components addressing provision of outdoor recreation, range, wildlife, fish, and timber. Among the most general required components addressing timber are requirements to identify areas and quantities for timber harvesting. The FS must identify lands that may be not suited for timber production . All other lands in the NFS unit are considered suitable for timber production. The plan must contain the allowable sale quantity, the measure of timber that can be removed annually without impairing future yield, although FS also considers other measures of sustainable yield in planning over various time horizons. The allowable sale quantity informs the amount of timber that can be removed annually over a ten-year plan period. Plans are required to be developed with public participation and in accordance with various other administrative and environmental statutes, such as the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Forest plans may consider harvesting for various purposes—for example, to produce timber or to achieve and maintain desired resource conditions, such as habitat improvement, fire risk reduction, and sanitation. If the forest plan identifies lands as suitable for timber production, the plan must address timber harvesting on those lands. If the forest plan considers timber harvesting for purposes other than producing timber, it must delineate areas where such activities may occur. These areas may be identified by forest type, geographic area, or other criteria. FS conducts timber sales to achieve the objectives in the forest plan. FS establishes a sale schedule and timber sale project plan, which may include more than one timber sale. The plan estimates volume offered, acreage, and harvest methods for the relevant sales. Site-specific timber harvests must also comport with NEPA and relevant statutes, including any requirement for site-specific environmental analysis and review. Prior to an individual sale, FS marks and appraises the timber to be offered. FS may designate timber in one of three ways: physical marking, a written description of specific trees for harvest (called description ) , or a written description of desired post-harvest stand characteristics (called prescription ). FS creates a sale package, including a prospectus, sample contract, and other required documentation; some requirements are site-specific. FS advertises the package at an appraised starting price. Interested parties may bid on the package. A contract is awarded to the highest bidder provided legal conditions are met. The winning bidder conducts the timber harvest according to the terms—such as timeline, harvest method, and road construction conditions—specified in the contract. Timber harvests must generally be completed in 3 years, with a maximum term of 10 years. Timber sales generate revenue, and disposition of this revenue depends on several factors. Congress has established several funds for FS to retain and use timber sale receipts. Depending on the type of sale, among other factors, FS may be required to make certain deposits to these funds. If any portion of receipts are not required to be deposited, FS may distribute receipts among funds at their discretion, including depositing all revenue in a single fund. The money in these funds may be used by the FS for a variety of purposes, sometimes without further appropriation (i.e., as mandatory appropriations). See Table A-1 for a list of these funds. A more detailed discussion of revenue levels, expenditures, and issues related to FS timber revenue funds is outside the scope of this report. Timber Harvests from the NFS Timber harvesting is one of many authorized uses of the NFS. The amount of timber harvested from the NFS, and its relative proportion of total U.S. timber supply, has fluctuated over time. This section provides an overview of timber volume harvested from the NFS, and value of those harvests, along with some economic and historical factors which may have contributed to observed changes. The volume of timber harvested from the national forests (and their precursors, the forest reserves) increased slowly from 1898 until the 1940s. Most demand for wood was met by private timberlands; by 1940, for example, FS lands supplied 2% of U.S. timber supply. In the post-World War II era, timber harvest volume from the NFS grew (see Figure 2 ). The timber supply from private forestry was unable to keep pace with the increased demand, due in part to high harvest levels during WWII. In the 1950s, the FS began to raise harvest limits. Harvests rose from 1-3 billion board feet (abbreviated BBF) annually in the early 1940s to more than 10 BBF in some years of the 1960s and 1970s. According to historical data from one source, harvest from the NFS rose from 9% of total U.S. harvest in 1952 to 16% in 1962 and 1970, and 15% in 1976. Harvest volume declined from the mid-1970s to the early 1980s. Harvest on FS lands shifted to more marginal timberlands; in part, clear-cutting in the previous decades had reduced tree volume available for harvest in productive areas. This period also coincided with recessions in 1980 and 1982, which may have reduced demand. Timber harvests rose from the early 1980s to the early 1990s, sometimes reaching levels of over 12 BBF per year. These timber harvests coincided with the 1986 U.S. peak in per capita consumption of wood products, driven in part by an increase in housing starts following the 1982 recession. In 1986, timber harvests from the NFS were 13% of total U.S. timber harvests. In the early 1990s, harvested timber volume began a sustained decrease. In 1991, the NFS supplied 11% of total U.S. harvested timber, and in 1997, the NFS supplied 5% of total U.S. harvested timber. In 2011, NFS supplied 2% of U.S. wood and paper products. Numerous interrelated factors, including statutory, administrative, biological, and market influences, may have contributed to this decline. The effect of each individual factor is not settled, as is the effect of each factor over time. These factors occurred at varying points in time and may not coincide directly with observed harvest level changes. Some sources have noted that statutory changes added complexity to forest management and increasing litigation frequency, while also increasing transparency and public participation. Other sources have noted changing management priorities. Others have noted decreasing domestic demand, volatile prices, and the prevalence of less valuable timber due to high harvest levels in previous decades. The listing of the northern spotted owl ( Strix occidentalis caurina) under the Endangered Species Act in 1990 is often discussed in regard to declining timber harvest levels. Harvested volumes have consistently been between 2 BBF and 3 BBF annually from FY2004 onward. In FY2018, approximately 2.8 BBF were harvested from FS lands. Although the national timber market in the United States was affected by the 2008 housing market collapse and the subsequent decline in demand, timber volumes harvested from FS experienced relatively little change in volume, for unclear reasons. In FY2018 dollars, harvest values from approximately FY2000 onward are similar to harvest values in the early 1940s. Harvest values generally increased from the early 1940s to a peak of approximately $3.4 billion (FY2018 dollars) in FY1979, before a decline through FY1982. They rose again thereafter, reaching another peak of approximately $2.6 billion (FY2018 dollars) in FY1989, before again declining. Values from FY2001 onward have generally been between approximately $100 million and $300 million in FY2018 dollars. In FY2018, cut value was approximately $188.8 million. FS harvest value declined during the recession and housing collapse of 2008. Harvest value may vary due to quality, species, and age class of offered timber and timber market conditions, and is correlated with volume harvested. Geographic Distribution of Timber Harvests from NFS Lands FS harvest volume differs by region; these differences mirror the major production regions in private forestry (see Figure 3 ). FS Region 6 (the Pacific Northwest), Region 8 (the Southeast), and Region 9 (the North), are the three largest producing regions in both private and public forestry. In general, harvest volume and value by region is a function of many complex factors, including the dominant timber type, age class, and condition; the suitability of FS sites for harvest operations; the legal limitations on land uses; and the status of the local forest products industry. Bureau of Land Management Lands The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) administers about 246 million surface acres of federal lands, almost entirely located in twelve western states. As noted, about 37.6 million acres of BLM lands are forest; of that, 16% is considered timberland. The Oregon and California (O&C) lands, which comprise approximately 2.6 million acres, contain 2.4 million acres of forest (see " Statutory Authorities for Harvesting Timber ," below, for a description of the O&C lands). The transfer of the forest reserves to FS administration in the early 1900s reduced the amount of forest land and timberland under BLM management today. Statutory Authorities for Harvesting Timber The modern BLM was formed in 1946 to manage the public domain lands. At its formation, BLM had no general authority to harvest timber on those lands. Congress authorized BLM to dispose of forest materials through the Materials Act of 1947. Congress later elaborated BLM's management responsibilities with the passage of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA). Like the MUSYA's mandate for the FS, FLPMA requires BLM to manage the public lands for multiple use and sustained yield in a "harmonious and coordinated" manner that considers the combination of uses that best meets the needs of the American people, not necessarily yields the largest dollar return or output. The act directs a sustained yield of renewable resources, meaning high-level regular output in perpetuity without impairing the lands' productivity. The O&C lands are lands in western Oregon managed according to their own establishing statutes, mostly by BLM. FS manages 492 thousand acres of the O&C lands, or 18% of this total area. The lands consist of several areas, the Oregon and California lands and the Coos Bay Wagon Road (CBWR) lands, which were revested to the federal government following violation of grant terms. They are usually referred to collectively as "O&C lands" and often grouped for legislative purposes. BLM or FS's mandate to sell timber on the O&C lands derives directly from the O&C lands' establishing statute. The O&C Act directs that O&C lands be managed for sustained yield of permanent forest production, watershed protection, recreation, and contributing to the economic stability of local communities and industries. Planning, Sale Process, and Receipts Congress has directed BLM to engage in long-term land use and resource management planning . Plans set the framework for land management, uses, and protection. They are developed through an interdisciplinary process with opportunit ies for public participation. BLM uses these plans to guide implementation of site-specific activities. In the case of timber, plans describe where timber harvesting may occur and include measures of sustainable timber harvest levels . They are used to guide execution of individual sales , which generate revenues. Congress has specified various uses for these revenues. BLM timber planning and administration follow general BLM land use planning procedures. Through FLPMA, Congress directs BLM to develop, maintain, and revise plans for managing public lands. BLM issued the first regulations to implement the planning requirement in 1979, and subsequently revised them; the current BLM planning rule dates from 2005. Plans must be developed with public participation and in accordance with various other administrative and environmental statutes (e.g., NEPA). Under BLM's planning rule, resource management plans remain in effect indefinitely. They are to include monitoring and evaluation standards, and are to be amended or revised when circumstances warrant. The planning rule directs BLM to identify indicators that describe the desired forest outcomes in the plan area. BLM is to identify a suite of management actions to achieve those outcomes, including identifying sustained yield areas, areas that could support long-term timber harvest. BLM personnel determine a harvest level for these areas that can be maintained without permanent impairment; this harvest level is known as the allowable sale quantity . Allowable sale quantity is measured for a ten-year period. In addition, BLM generally makes annual forest product sale plans. These plans contain estimates of sale volume, acreage, and permitted harvest methods for any sales proposed for the year. Site-specific timber harvests must comport with NEPA and relevant statutes, including any additional requirement for site-specific analysis and review. To conduct an individual sale within the plan, BLM designates the timber for sale and appraises the value of the timber. BLM timber may be designated by physical marking or by enclosing timber in a sale boundary. BLM prepares a sale contract, along with a prospectus describing the sale. The sale is advertised at an appraised starting price. Interested parties may bid on the contract. A contract is awarded to the highest bidder provided legal conditions are met. The winning bidder conducts the timber harvest according to the terms specified in the contract, such as timeline and harvest method. Timber harvests must generally be completed in three years, but may be extended under certain circumstances. Timber sales generate revenues, and disposition of these revenues depends on a number of factors. Congress has established several funds for timber sale revenues. Depending on the type of sale and the originating lands, BLM may be required to make certain deposits to these funds. If any portion of revenues are not required to be deposited, BLM may allocate those revenues among funds at its discretion, including depositing all revenues in a single account. Some funds are permanently appropriated to BLM and may be used without further congressional action (i.e. as mandatory appropriations). See Table A-2 for a list of these funds. A more detailed discussion of funding levels, expenditures, and issues related to BLM timber revenue funds is outside the scope of this report. Timber Harvests from BLM Lands Timber harvesting is one of many authorized uses of BLM lands. Long-term historical data regarding BLM timber harvesting is unavailable. Other data on past timber program activity show that BLM timber harvesting may have changed over time. This section provides data on timber offered for sale, timber sold, and timber harvested from BLM lands at various points in time, along with some economic and historical factors which may have contributed to observed changes. Data on cut timber volume from BLM lands is available from FY1994 onward (see Figure 4 ). While complete historical cut data is unavailable prior to FY1994, some data exists about past sales (see Table 1 ). The intermittent nature of this data challenges drawing conclusions about larger trends in these periods, especially in the missing decades. In addition, these data refer to either timber sold or timber offered for sale, which differs from volume of timber cut. However, as an approximate comparison, the data show that the volumes sold prior to FY1990 are large compared to recent volumes offered for sale. Observers confirmed a decline in public domain timber offered for sale beginning in 1991, though the investigation did not consider the O&C lands. Volumes harvested from BLM lands were between 100 and 260 MMBF from FY1995 to FY2000 and from FY2004 to FY2018 (see Figure 4 ). Harvests were lower in FY1994 and between FY2001 and FY2003. Harvested volumes have shown a generally increasing trend since FY2001, with the largest recently recorded harvest in FY2015 (about 258 MMBF). Like the NFS, harvests from BLM lands during the recession and housing market collapse of 2008 experienced relatively little change in volume, for unclear reasons. In FY2018, BLM harvested about 178 MMBF. Data on cut timber value from BLM lands is available from FY1996 onward (see Figure 4 ). Total value of harvests has declined since FY1996. Harvest values have generally increased since the low value of approximately $15.4 million in FY2001, and have been between $20 million and $50 million since FY2011 (FY2018 dollars). In FY2018, cut value was $41.3 million. Like the FS, BLM harvest value during the recession and housing market collapse of 2008 declined, but the relative change was small compared to the decreases of the late 1990s. Harvest value may vary due to the quality, species, and age class of offered timber as well as timber market conditions, and is correlated with harvested volume. BLM harvest values per unit of timber are higher than FS values per unit, due to the dominant timber type harvested from BLM lands, among other factors. Geographic Distribution of Timber Harvests on BLM Lands Most timber harvests on BLM lands are conducted on the O&C lands. From FY2014 to FY2018, the average harvested volume from O&C lands was 93% of the average total volume. The large proportion of volume harvested from O&C lands reflects the forest cover and type, dominant use for forest production, and the size of the forest industry in the Pacific Northwest. As with the NFS, in general, BLM harvest volume and value is a function of many complex factors, including the dominant timber type, age class, and condition; the suitability of sites for harvest operations; legal limitations on land uses; and the status of the local forest products industry. Issues for Congress Management of federal lands for multiple uses and sustained yield is challenging, including balancing timber harvesting with other uses. Timber production from federal lands is driven by a complex interaction of environmental factors, market forces, and land management policies. Under current law, efforts to change harvest levels must comport with the provision of a sustained yield of multiple uses. Congress has sometimes considered legislation to prioritize or exclude some uses in a limited manner—in certain geographic regions, for example—but has not changed these fundamental management concepts since their enactment in the 1960s and 1970s. The public often expresses preferences for uses of federal forests, including with respect to timber harvesting. Some may support timber harvesting generally, and believe the current levels of production are sufficient. Others may wish to see the levels of production increased or decreased, depending on their perspective. Those who support timber harvesting on federal lands may cite benefits to the local timber industry, a belief that harvesting is part of the core mission of federal forests, or a belief that timber harvesting is a tool for improving forest health conditions, among other reasons. Proponents of timber harvesting on federal lands may also emphasize the role of timber harvesting in some forest-adjacent rural economies. Others may oppose timber harvesting due to concerns about ecological or human impacts: for example, they may cite beliefs that timber sales have detrimental impacts on environmental quality, fish and wildlife habitat, forest character, recreation and tourism, or cultural and aesthetic values. Opponents may also contend that conducting timber sales favors the timber industry over other interests. In addition to the themes identified above, Congress may also debate other issues related to federal timber harvests that are not discussed in detail in this report. For example, these include issues related to the disposition and use of timber sale revenues; the relationship between timber harvest planning and statutes such as NEPA and the Endangered Species Act (ESA); and special harvest authorities, among others. Appendix. Timber Receipt Funds The following tables list and describe the funds that receive timber sale revenues; the funds' statutory authority is also shown. A detailed discussion of funding levels, expenditures, and issues related to these funds is outside the scope of this report.

Congress has granted some federal land management agencies the authority to sell timber from federal lands. Two agencies, the Forest Service (FS) and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), conduct timber sales as an authorized use. Together, the FS and the BLM manage 76% of federal forest area. FS manages 144.9 million acres, while BLM manages 37.6 million acres. The other major federal land management agencies, the National Park Service (NPS) and the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), rarely conduct timber sales. Lands managed by the FS, the National Forest System (NFS), are managed under a multiple use-sustained yield model pursuant to the Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act of 1960 (MUSYA). This statute directs FS to balance multiple uses of their lands and ensure a sustained yield of those uses in perpetuity. Congress, through the National Forest Management Act (NFMA), has directed FS to engage in long-term land use and resource management planning. Plans set the framework for land management, uses, and protection; they are developed through an interdisciplinary process with opportunities for public participation. In the case of timber, they describe where timber harvesting may occur and include measures of sustainable timber harvest levels. FS uses these plans to guide implementation of individual sales, which generate revenue. Congress has specified various uses for this revenue. Timber harvest on FS lands has varied over time. FS harvest volumes in the 1940s were around 1-3 billion board feet per year. Annual harvest volumes rose from the 1950s through the 1980s, sometimes exceeding 10 billion board feet. Annual harvested volumes decreased in the early 1990s and have remained between 1.8 and 2.8 billion board feet since FY2003. The total dollar value of FS timber harvests generally rose from the early 1940s to over $3 billion in FY1979. Total value has been between $100 million and $300 million since FY2001. From FY2014 to FY2018, the greatest average annual harvest volume on FS lands was from Oregon and Washington. BLM lands are managed under a multiple use-sustained yield model pursuant to the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA). This statute directs BLM to balance multiple uses of their lands and ensure a sustained yield of those uses in perpetuity. Congress has directed BLM to engage in long-term land use and resource management planning through FLPMA. Plans set the framework for land management, uses, and protection; they are developed made through an interdisciplinary process with opportunities for public participation. In the case of timber, they describe where timber harvesting may occur and contain measures of sustainable timber harvest levels. The FS and the BLM use these plans to guide implementation of individual sales, which generate revenue. Congress has specified various uses for this revenue. Although trends in timber activities on BLM lands are challenging to infer from the available data, volumes sold in the past appear to be larger than recent volumes offered for sale. Harvested volumes for the BLM have been between 100 and 260 million board feet annually from FY1995 onward, except in FY1994 and between FY2001-FY2003. Total harvest values have declined since the mid-1990s, and have generally been between $20 million and $50 million annually since FY2011. From FY2014 to FY2018, the greatest average annual harvest volume from BLM lands was from Oregon and Washington. Congress has debated the appropriate balance of timber harvesting and other uses on federal lands. Determining the proportions of these uses, in whole and on individual lands, is challenging for land management agencies. Preferences for certain balances of these uses often stem from values about federal forests' purposes, such as consideration of economic, environmental, or recreational values. Debate has also centered on the relationship of timber harvesting levels to forest health, including whether changing harvest levels is a desirable forest management tool. Congress has granted some federal land management agencies the authority to sell timber from federal lands. Two agencies, the Forest Service (FS) and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), conduct timber sales as an authorized use. Together, the FS and the BLM manage 76% of federal forest area. FS manages 144.9 million acres, while BLM manages 37.6 million acres. The other major federal land management agencies, the National Park Service (NPS) and the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), rarely conduct timber sales. Lands managed by the FS, the National Forest System (NFS), are managed under a multiple use-sustained yield model pursuant to the Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act of 1960 (MUSYA). This statute directs FS to balance multiple uses of their lands and ensure a sustained yield of those uses in perpetuity. Congress, through the National Forest Management Act (NFMA), has directed FS to engage in long-term land use and resource management planning. Plans set the framework for land management, uses, and protection; they are developed through an interdisciplinary process with opportunities for public participation. In the case of timber, they describe where timber harvesting may occur and include measures of sustainable timber harvest levels. FS uses these plans to guide implementation of individual sales, which generate revenue. Congress has specified various uses for this revenue. Timber harvest on FS lands has varied over time. FS harvest volumes in the 1940s were around 1-3 billion board feet per year. Annual harvest volumes rose from the 1950s through the 1980s, sometimes exceeding 10 billion board feet. Annual harvested volumes decreased in the early 1990s and have remained between 1.8 and 2.8 billion board feet since FY2003. The total dollar value of FS timber harvests generally rose from the early 1940s to over $3 billion in FY1979. Total value has been between $100 million and $300 million since FY2001. From FY2014 to FY2018, the greatest average annual harvest volume on FS lands was from Oregon and Washington. BLM lands are managed under a multiple use-sustained yield model pursuant to the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA). This statute directs BLM to balance multiple uses of their lands and ensure a sustained yield of those uses in perpetuity. Congress has directed BLM to engage in long-term land use and resource management planning through FLPMA. Plans set the framework for land management, uses, and protection; they are developed made through an interdisciplinary process with opportunities for public participation. In the case of timber, they describe where timber harvesting may occur and contain measures of sustainable timber harvest levels. The FS and the BLM use these plans to guide implementation of individual sales, which generate revenue. Congress has specified various uses for this revenue. Although trends in timber activities on BLM lands are challenging to infer from the available data, volumes sold in the past appear to be larger than recent volumes offered for sale. Harvested volumes for the BLM have been between 100 and 260 million board feet annually from FY1995 onward, except in FY1994 and between FY2001-FY2003. Total harvest values have declined since the mid-1990s, and have generally been between $20 million and $50 million annually since FY2011. From FY2014 to FY2018, the greatest average annual harvest volume from BLM lands was from Oregon and Washington. Congress has debated the appropriate balance of timber harvesting and other uses on federal lands. Determining the proportions of these uses, in whole and on individual lands, is challenging for land management agencies. Preferences for certain balances of these uses often stem from values about federal forests' purposes, such as consideration of economic, environmental, or recreational values. Debate has also centered on the relationship of timber harvesting levels to forest health, including whether changing harvest levels is a desirable forest management tool.

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Introduction The Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) requires that the nation's transportation fuel supply contains renewable fuels. This mandate—established in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct05; P.L. 109-58 ) and expanded in the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA; P.L. 110-140 )—requires the use of renewable fuel, although it does not explicitly require the production of that fuel. Obligated parties, such as refiners or importers of gasoline or diesel fuel, are responsible for complying with the RFS requirements. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) administers the mandate, which is an amendment to Clean Air Act (CAA) provisions governing the regulation of fuels. The statutory renewable fuel volume increases annually until 2022, with EPA determining the volume after 2022 within certain limitations. In general, EPA has the authority to waive the RFS requirements, in whole or in part, if certain conditions outlined in statute prevail. The RFS is a complex and highly technical policy initiative. It deals with multiple sectors of the economy and requires the use of some advanced renewable fuel production technologies that have yet to reach maturity. The RFS also incorporates thresholds for greenhouse gas emission reduction. This complexity is exacerbated by multiple stakeholders with differing perspectives on what the RFS should accomplish, how it should be implemented, and whether it should exist, which leads to debate about the RFS and its future. Congressional debate about the RFS is expected to continue with special attention to how EPA administers the program. As Congress continues its oversight of the RFS, it may be useful to understand the RFS waiver authority granted to EPA. This report discusses the waiver provisions of the RFS, including the modification-of-applicable-volumes ("reset") section. RFS Requirements EPAct05 established a renewable fuel program requiring that transportation fuel sold or introduced into commerce in the United States, on an annual average basis, contain a specified amount of renewable fuel. The RFS mandate, as amended by EISA, calls for the consumption of 9 billion gallons of total renewable fuel in 2008, ascending to 36 billion gallons in 2022, with EPA determining the annual volume after 2022. The statute identifies four categories of renewable fuels that must be used to meet the mandate. However, these four categories can be aggregated into two major categories: unspecified biofuel (mainly cornstarch ethanol) and advanced biofuel (e.g., cellulosic biofuel, biomass-based diesel, and other advanced biofuels), shown in Figure 1 . Over time, the growth in the RFS transitions from biofuels that, in practice, are made mostly from food and feed crops to biofuels made from nonfood and nonfeed crops. For instance, in 2022, the statute requires that advanced biofuels constitute close to 60% of the 36 billion gallon mandate and unspecified biofuels constitute about 40%. RFS Annual Volume Reduction Deadlines Congress gave the EPA Administrator waiver authority to adjust the renewable fuel volumes specified in statute given certain conditions (e.g., inadequate domestic renewable fuel supply). The EPA Administrator is required to set the standards by November 30 of the preceding year (e.g., under statute the 2020 standard is required to be finalized by November 30, 2019). Further, when the EPA Administrator reduces the cellulosic biofuel volume, the Administrator also may reduce the total renewable fuel and total advanced biofuel volumes by the same or a lesser volume. For biomass-based diesel, the statute specifies volumes for four years (2009-2012) and requires EPA to announce the remaining annual biomass-based diesel volume "14 months before the first year for which such applicable volume will apply" (e.g., the 2021 biomass-based diesel standard is required to be finalized by November 2019). Current RFS Requirements EPA issued the final 2019 standards (and the 2020 standard for biomass-based diesel) in November 2018. The RFS statutory requirements and the EPA requirements for 2014 through 2019 are provided in Table 1 . RFS Waiver Provisions The RFS provisions of the CAA contains a set of waiver provisions. The provisions contain three separate waivers—a general waiver, a cellulosic biofuel waiver, and a biomass-based diesel waiver—that the EPA Administrator may use to waive, in whole or in part, the volume of renewable fuel mandated by statute. The waivers referred to in this report should not be confused with small refinery exemptions. If a waiver is issued, it expires after one year (60 days for the biomass-based diesel waiver), unless the Administrator renews the waiver. Additionally, starting in 2016, the waiver provision allows for a modification of applicable volumes. The waivers and the modification of applicable volumes are described in further detail in the following sections of this report. General Waiver The RFS statute gives the EPA Administrator the authority to waive the overall RFS requirements, in whole or in part, if domestic renewable fuel supply is inadequate to meet the mandate, or implementation of the requirement would severely harm the economy or environment of a state, a region, or the United States. The Administrator may issue the general waiver at his or her discretion or if petitioned by a state or fuel provider. In those instances in which the Administrator receives a petition for a waiver, the Administrator has 90 days after receipt of the petition to approve or disapprove it. Prior to making a decision, the Administrator is required to consult with the Secretary of Agriculture and Secretary of Energy and to allow for public notice and the opportunity for comment. If a general waiver is granted, any adjustment applies to the total national renewable fuel requirement. Thus, EPA may not issue a general waiver for an individual state or supplier within a state. Cellulosic Biofuel Waiver CAA Section 211(o) obligates the EPA Administrator to reduce the cellulosic biofuel mandate when the projected production capacity for a given year is less than what is identified in statute. The law does not require the EPA Administrator to consult with the Secretary of Agriculture or the Secretary of Energy when issuing a cellulosic biofuel waiver, or to give public notice and opportunity for comment. However, the Administrator must base the projection on the U.S. Energy Information Administration estimate provided under the applicable percentages provision. Although it is not required by the statute to do so, EPA has consulted with federal agencies, industry, and others when the agency has considered issuance of a cellulosic biofuel waiver. EPA also has provided opportunity for public comment. The Administrator must set the new required amount at the "projected available volume during that calendar year" by November 30 of the preceding year. Should the Administrator reduce the cellulosic biofuel volume, the Administrator also may reduce the volumes of advanced biofuel and renewable fuel by the same or lesser volume. When the Administrator issues a cellulosic biofuel waiver, the Administrator must offer cellulosic biofuel waiver credits for obligated parties to purchase for that compliance year in lieu of using actual cellulosic biofuel. Biomass-Based Diesel Waiver The RFS statutory provisions give the EPA Administrator authority to reduce the amount of biomass-based diesel required for up to 60 days if the Administrator determines that there are significant market circumstances (including feedstock disruptions) "that would make the price of biomass-based diesel fuel increase significantly." If these market circumstances continue past the initial 60-day period, the Administrator may issue another waiver for an additional 60 days. The Administrator is to consult with the Secretaries of Energy and Agriculture prior to issuing such a waiver. If the Administrator issues a biomass-based diesel waiver, the Administrator also may reduce the volumes of advanced biofuel and renewable fuel by the same or lesser volume. To date, EPA has not used the biomass-based diesel waiver authority. Modification of Applicable Volumes The last section of the waiver provision is the modification-of-applicable-volumes section, referred to by some as the "reset" section for the RFS. This section requires that the EPA Administrator modify the applicable volumes of the RFS in future years starting in 2016 if certain conditions are met. Specifically, it provides that, starting in 2016, the EPA Administrator shall modify the applicable volumes of the RFS for subsequent years if the Administrator waives the renewable fuel mandate, the advanced biofuel mandate, the cellulosic biofuel mandate, or the biomass-based diesel mandate by at least 20% for two consecutive years or by at least 50% for a single year. This reset section does not state what the modified amount must be. Rather, it requires that the Administrator determine the applicable volumes—in coordination with the Secretaries of Energy and Agriculture—based on a review of program implementation thus far and analysis of certain factors (e.g., the impact of the production and use of renewable fuels on the environment). RFS Waiver Authority Use EPA has repeatedly used its cellulosic biofuel waiver authority to reduce the cellulosic biofuel volume required, and, since 2014, to also reduce both the advanced biofuel and total renewable fuel volume required. In November 2018, EPA announced that it used the cellulosic biofuel waiver to reduce the applicable total renewable fuel, advanced biofuel, and cellulosic biofuel volume requirements for 2019. According to the agency, the "13.0 billion gallons specified in the statute for advanced biofuel cannot be reached in 2019 … primarily due to the expected continued shortfall in cellulosic biofuel." The EPA Administrator issued a general waiver for prior final rules (which covered 2014 through 2016) and repeatedly issued cellulosic biofuel waivers for 2010 through 2018. The Administrator used the waivers for 2014, 2015, and 2016 to reduce the total renewable fuel (including a lowering of the unspecified biofuel mandate), advanced biofuel, and cellulosic biofuel volume requirements. The Administrator has not granted a biomass-based diesel waiver. RFS Waiver Impacts Waiver authority is intended, in part, to assist EPA with implementation of the RFS. One of EPA's program tasks is to use the waiver authority, when required, to determine the annual final standard, and to announce that final standard by the statutory deadline. The challenge of projecting advanced biofuel production, political pressure from some stakeholders, and other factors may have contributed to past delays in issuing final standards under the waiver authority. Such delays could lead to difficulty for obligated parties who have to demonstrate program compliance and for renewable fuel producers who are interested in producing the required fuel. For 2016 through 2019, EPA has issued the final rule according to the statutory schedule. There are three stakeholders that generally have had distinct views about the impacts of the waiver authority: the advanced biofuel industry, the conventional biofuel industry, and the petroleum industry. Some advanced biofuel advocates assert that granting of waivers, in conjunction with other factors, could weaken confidence in renewable fuel markets and the chosen technologies, specifically cellulosic biofuel. Advanced biofuel production, particularly cellulosic biofuel production, has not been produced at the levels called for in the statutory provisions by relatively large margins. Some conventional biofuel advocates have not always been content with EPA's proposals to use the waiver authority to reduce conventional biofuel volumes. Conventional biofuel production has remained in line with what the statutory provisions require. Some in the petroleum industry assert that the waiver authority is an option that addresses the use of more ethanol than can be used by certain vehicles (i.e., the blend wall) or supported by existing infrastructure. While perspectives about EPA's use of the waiver authority vary among stakeholders, the waivers have provided EPA with the flexibility to establish volume requirements that have been attained. Impacts of RFS Modification of Applicable Volumes The 2019 final rule has triggered the reset section of the waiver provision for total renewable fuel. Previous final rules had already triggered a reset for both advanced biofuels and cellulosic biofuels. EPA reports that in early 2019 it will issue a rulemaking that proposes to "reset" the cellulosic biofuel, advanced biofuel, and total renewable fuel volume targets for the years 2020-2022. Many have questions and concerns about how EPA may implement the reset section (the modification-of-applicable-volumes section of the RFS). This section requires the EPA Administrator to modify the applicable volumes of the RFS in its entirety starting in 2016 if certain conditions are met. It is not clear how EPA may carry out this action . The Administrator has the discretion to set the modified amounts. Depending on how the reset is applied, there could be interest in its impact on public and private investment for biofuels. There might also be interest in the reset's potential impact on the transition of the program from mostly conventional biofuel to mostly advanced biofuel by 2022. Additionally, there may be interest about whether a reset could address the concerns expressed by some obligated parties (i.e., refiners) about high compliance costs. Going forward, reset implementation could have implications for the entire fuel industry, given the potential for EPA to reduce the applicable volumes or maintain ambitious targets.

The Clean Air Act requires that transportation fuels contain a minimum volume of renewable fuel. This renewable fuel standard (RFS) was established by the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct05; P.L. 109-58) and amended by the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA; P.L. 110-140). The RFS includes scheduled volume mandates that grow each year (starting with 9 billion gallons in 2008 and ascending to 36 billion gallons in 2022). The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which is responsible for administering the RFS, determines the annual volume after 2022. Within the overall RFS, there are submandates for advanced biofuels, including cellulosic biofuel, biomass-based diesel, and other advanced biofuels. EPA has the authority to waive the RFS requirements, in whole or in part, if certain conditions outlined in statute prevail. More specifically, the statute identifies a general waiver for the overall RFS and waivers for two types of advanced biofuel: cellulosic biofuel and biomass-based diesel. Statute requires EPA to announce each year's standards by November 30 of the previous year, except for biomass-based diesel, which must be announced 14 months before the year for which the applicable volume is to apply. Further, the final section of the waiver provision—which some refer to as the "reset" section—requires a permanent modification of applicable volumes of the RFS starting in 2016 and carried forward, if certain conditions are met. In several instances, EPA has used, has proposed to use, or has been petitioned to use its waiver authority when implementing the RFS. In November 2018, EPA announced in its final rule for 2019 for the RFS that it was using the cellulosic biofuel waiver authority to reduce the cellulosic biofuel, advanced biofuel, and total renewable fuel volume requirements. EPA's use of the cellulosic biofuel waiver authority is not new. EPA has repeatedly issued a waiver, reducing the volume required for cellulosic biofuel. For the last few years, the use of the cellulosic biofuel waiver led EPA to also reduce the total advanced biofuel volume requirement. For various reasons (e.g., technology issues, financial support, policy uncertainty), the U.S. cellulosic biofuel industry has been unable, by a wide margin, to produce the volume amounts identified in statute. The 2019 final RFS program rule issued by EPA triggers the RFS "reset" section of the waiver provision for total renewable fuel. The reset was triggered in previous final rules for both advanced biofuel and cellulosic biofuel. It is unclear what impact the use of the reset section will have on RFS standards in future years. EPA reports it will issue a rulemaking in early 2019 that proposes to reset the cellulosic biofuel, advanced biofuel, and total renewable fuel volume targets for the years 2020-2022. A possible issue for Congress is whether the waiver authority and the reset provisions are sufficient options for EPA to address the statutory advanced biofuel volume shortfalls—shortfalls that may have been more than what Congress envisioned when it expanded the RFS in 2007. Another issue is how the Administration might apply the reset provision, and if it would contribute to uncertainty for industry, financiers, and other interested parties.

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Introduction1 Some time ago, a federal prosecutor referred to the mail and wire fraud statutes as "our Stradivarius, our Colt 45, our Louisville Slugger … and our true love." Not everyone shares the prosecutor's delight. Commentators have argued that the statutes "have long provided prosecutors with a means by which to salvage a modest, but dubious, victory from investigations that essentially proved unfruitful." Federal judges have also expressed concern from time to time, observing that the "mail and wire fraud statutes have 'been invoked to impose criminal penalties upon a staggeringly broad swath of behavior,' creating uncertainty in business negotiations and challenges to due process and federalism." Nevertheless, mail and wire fraud prosecutions have brought to an end schemes that bilked victims of millions, and sometimes billions, of dollars. The federal mail and wire fraud statutes outlaw schemes to defraud that involve the use of mail or wire communications. Both condemn fraudulent conduct that may also come within the reach of other federal criminal statutes. Both may serve as racketeering and money laundering predicate offenses. Both are punishable by imprisonment for not more than 20 years; for not more than 30 years, if the victim is a financial institution or the offense is committed in the context of major disaster or emergency. Both entitle victims to restitution. Both may result in the forfeiture of property. Elements The mail and wire fraud statutes are essentially the same, except for the medium associated with the offense—the mail in the case of mail fraud and wire communication in the case of wire fraud. As a consequence, the interpretation of one is ordinarily considered to apply to the other. In construction of the terms within the two, the courts will frequently abbreviate or adjust their statement of the elements of a violation to focus on the questions at issue before them. As treatment of the individual elements makes clear, however, there seems little dispute that conviction requires the government to prove (1) the use of either mail or wire communications in the foreseeable furtherance, (2) of a scheme and intent to defraud another of either property or honest services, (3) involving a material deception. Use of Mail or Wire Communications The wire fraud statute applies to anyone who "transmits or causes to be transmitted by wire, radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign commerce any writings ... for the purpose executing [a] ... scheme or artifice." The mail fraud statute is similarly worded and applies to anyone who "... for the purpose of executing [a] ... scheme or artifice ... places in any post office ... or causes to be delivered by mail ... any ... matter." The statutes require that a mailing or wire communication be in furtherance of a scheme to defraud. The mailing or communication need not be an essential element of the scheme, as long as it "is incident to an essential element of the scheme." A qualifying mailing or communication, standing alone, may be routine, innocent, or even self-defeating, because "[t]he relevant question at all times is whether the mailing is part of the execution of the scheme as conceived by the perpetrator at the time, regardless of whether the mailing later, through hindsight, may prove to have been counterproductive." The element may be satisfied by mailings or communications "designed to lull the victim into a false sense of security, postpone inquiries or complaints, or make the transaction less suspect." The element may also be satisfied by mailings or wire communications used to obtain the property that is the object of the fraud. A defendant need not personally have mailed or wired a communication; it is enough that he "caused" a mailing or transmission of a wire communication in the sense that the mailing or transmission was the reasonable foreseeable consequence of his intended scheme. Scheme to Defraud The mail and wire fraud statutes "both prohibit, in pertinent part, 'any scheme or artifice to defraud[,]' or to obtain money or property 'by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises," or to deprive another of the right to honest services by such means. From the beginning, Congress intended to reach a wide range of schemes to defraud, and has expanded the concept whenever doubts arose. It added the second prong—obtaining money or property by false pretenses, representations, or promises—after defendants had suggested that the term "scheme to defraud" covered false pretenses concerning present conditions but not representations or promises of future conditions. More recently, it added 18 U.S.C. § 1346 to make it clear the term "scheme to defraud" encompassed schemes to defraud another of the right to honest services. Even before that adornment, the words were understood to "refer 'to wronging one in his property rights by dishonest methods or schemes,' and 'usually signify the deprivation of something of value by trick, deceit, chicane or overreaching.'" As a general rule, the crime is done when the scheme is hatched and an attendant mailing or interstate phone call or email has occurred. Thus, the statutes are said to condemn a scheme to defraud regardless of its success. It is not uncommon for the courts to declare that to demonstrate a scheme to defraud the government needs to show that the defendant's "communications were reasonably calculated to deceive persons of ordinary prudence and comprehension." Even a casual reading, however, might suggest that the statutes also cover a scheme specifically designed to deceive a naïve victim. Nevertheless, the courts have long acknowledged the possibility of a "puffing" defense, and there may be some question whether the statutes reach those schemes designed to deceive the gullible though they could not ensnare the reasonably prudent. In any event, the question may be more clearly presented in the context of the defendant's intent and the materiality of the deception, a focus on the scheme's creator rather than its victim. Defrauding or to Obtain Money or Property . The mail and wire fraud statutes speak of schemes to defraud or to obtain money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses. The Supreme Court has said that the phrase "to defraud" and the phrase "to obtain money or property" do not represent separate crimes, but instead the phrase "obtain money or property" describes what constitutes a scheme to defraud. In later look-alike offenses, Congress specifically numerated the two phrases. The bank fraud statute, for example, applies to "whoever knowingly executes … a scheme or artifice – (1) to defraud a financial institution; or (2) to obtain any of the money, funds, credits, assets, securities, or other property owned by … a financial institution, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses …" It left the mail and wire fraud statutes, however, unchanged. The mail and wire fraud statutes clearly protect against deprivations of tangible property. They also protect certain intangible property rights, but only those that have value in the hands of the victim of a scheme. "To determine whether a particular interest is property for purposes of the fraud statutes, [courts] look to whether the law traditionally has recognized and enforced it as a property right." Materiality Neither the mail nor the wire fraud statute exhibits an explicit reference to materiality. Yet materiality is an element of each offense, because at the time of the statutes' enactment, the word "defraud" was understood to "require[] a misrepresentation or concealment of [a] material fact." Thus, other than in an honest services context, a "scheme to defraud" for mail or wire fraud purposes must involve a material misrepresentation of some kind. "A misrepresentation is material if it is capable of influencing the intended victim." Intent Again, other than in the case of honest services, "'intent to defraud' requires an intent to (1) deceive, and (2) cause some harm to result from the deceit. A defendant acts with the intent to deceive when he acts knowingly with the specific intent to deceive for the purpose of causing pecuniary loss to another or bringing about some financial gain to himself." A defendant has a complete defense if he believes the deceptive statements or promises to be true or otherwise acts under circumstances that belie an intent to defraud. Yet, a defendant has no defense if he blinds himself to the truth. Nor is it a defense if he intends to deceive but feels his victim will ultimately profit or be unharmed. Honest Services Some time ago, the Supreme Court held in McNally v. United States that the protection of the mail fraud statute, and by implication the protection of the wire fraud statute, did not extend to "the intangible right of the citizenry to good government." Soon after McNally , Congress enlarged the mail and wire fraud protection to include the intangible right to honest services, by defining the "term 'scheme or artifice to defraud' [to] include[s] a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right to honest services." Lest the expanded definition be found unconstitutionally vague, the Court in Skilling v. United States limited its application to cases of bribery or kickbacks. The Court in Skilling supplied only a general description of the bribery and kickbacks condemned in the honest-services statute. Subsequent lower federal courts have often looked to the general federal law relating to bribery and kickbacks for the substantive elements of honest services bribery. In this context, bribery requires "a quid pro quo—a specific intent to give … something of value in exchange for an official act." And an "official act" means no more than an officer's formal exercise of governmental power in the form of a "decision or action on a 'question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy'" before him. The definition of the word "kickback" quoted by the Court in Skilling has since been reassigned, and the courts have cited the dictionary definition on occasion. Except for the elements of a scheme to defraud in the form of a bribe and a kickback, honest services fraud, as an adjunct of the mail and wire fraud statutes, draws its elements and the sanctions that attend the offense from the mail and wire fraud statutes. Aiding and Abetting, Attempt, and Conspiracy Attempting or conspiring to commit mail or wire fraud or aiding and abetting the commission of those offenses carries the same penalties as the underlying offense. "In order to aid and abet another to commit a crime it is necessary that a defendant in some sort associate himself with the venture, that he participate in it as in something that he wishes to bring about, that he seek by his action to make it succeed." "Conspiracy to commit wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1349 requires a jury to find that (1) two or more persons agreed to commit wire fraud and (2) the defendant willfully joined the conspiracy with the intent to further its unlawful purpose." As a general rule, a conspirator is liable for any other offenses that a co-conspirator commits in the foreseeable furtherance of the conspiracy. Such liability, however, extends only until the objectives of the conspiracy have been accomplished or the defendant has withdrawn from the conspiracy. Where attempt has been made a separate offense, as it has for mail and wire fraud, conviction ordinarily requires that the defendant commit a substantial step toward the completion of the underlying offense with the intent to commit it. It does not, however, require the attempt to have been successful. Unlike conspiracy, a defendant may not be convicted of both the substantive offense and the lesser included crime of attempt to commit it. Sentencing Mail and wire fraud are each punishable by imprisonment for not more than 20 years and a fine of not more than $250,000 (not more than $500,000 for organizations), or fine of not more than $1 million and imprisonment for not more than 30 years if the victim is a financial institution or the offense was committed in relation to a natural disaster. It is also subject to a mandatory minimum two-year term of imprisonment if identify theft is used during and in furtherance of the fraud. Conviction may also result in (1) probation, (2) a term of supervised release, (3) a special assessment, (4) a restitution order, and/or (5) a forfeiture order. Supervised Release and Special Assessments . Supervised release is a form of parole-like supervision imposed after a term of imprisonment has been served. Although imposition of a term of supervised release is discretionary in mail and wire fraud cases, the Sentencing Guidelines recommend its imposition in all felony cases. The maximum supervised release term for wire and mail fraud generally is three years—five years when the defendant is convicted of the mail or wire fraud against a financial institution that carries a 30-year maximum term of imprisonment. Release will be subject to a number of conditions, violation of which may result in a return to prison for not more than two years (not more than three years if the original crime of conviction carried a 30-year maximum). There are three mandatory conditions: (1) commit no new crimes; (2) allow a DNA sample to be taken; and (3) submit to periodic drug testing. The court may suspend the drug testing condition, although it is under no obligation to do so even though the defendant has no history of drug abuse and drug abuse played no role in the offense. Most courts will impose a standard series of conditions in addition to the mandatory condition of supervised release. The Sentencing Guidelines recommend that these include the payment of any fines, restitution, and special assessments that remain unsatisfied. Defendants convicted of mail or wire fraud must pay a special assessment of $100. Restitution . Restitution is ordinarily required of those convicted of mail or wire fraud. The victims entitled to restitution include those directly and proximately harmed by the defendant's crime of conviction, and "in the case of an offense that involves as an element a scheme, conspiracy, or pattern of criminal activity," like mail and wire fraud, "any person directly harmed by the defendant's conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern." Forfeiture . Property that constitutes the proceeds of mail or wire fraud is subject to confiscation by the United States. It may be confiscated pursuant to either civil forfeiture or criminal forfeiture procedures. Civil forfeiture proceedings are conducted that treat the forfeitable property as the defendant. Criminal forfeiture proceedings are conducted as part of the criminal prosecution of the property owner. Related Criminal Provisions The mail and wire fraud statutes essentially outlaw dishonesty. Due to their breadth, misconduct that constitutes mail or wire fraud may constitute a violation of one or more other federal criminal statutes as well. This overlap occurs perhaps most often with respect to (1) crimes for which mail or wire fraud are elements ("predicate offenses") of another offense; (2) fraud proscribed under jurisdictional circumstances other than mail or wire use; and (3) honest services fraud in the form of bribery or kickbacks. Predicate Offense Crimes Some federal crimes have as an element the commission of some other federal offense. The money laundering statute, for example, outlaws laundering the proceeds of various predicate offenses. The racketeering statute outlaws the commission of a pattern of predicate offenses to operate a racketeering enterprise. Mail and wire fraud are predicate racketeering and money laundering predicate offenses. RICO . The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) provisions outlaw acquiring or conducting the affairs of an enterprise, engaged in or whose activities affect interstate commerce, through loan sharking or the patterned commission of various other predicate offenses. The racketeering-conduct and conspiracy-to-engage-in-racketeering-conduct appear to be the RICO offenses most often built on wire or mail fraud violations. The elements of the RICO conduct offense are (1) conducting the affairs; (2) of an enterprise; (3) engaged in activities in or that impact interstate or foreign commerce; (4) through a pattern; (5) of racketeering activity. "Racketeering activity" means, among other things, any act that is indictable under either the mail or wire fraud statutes. As for pattern, a RICO pattern "requires at least two acts of racketeering activity. The racketeering predicates may establish a pattern if they [were] related and … amounted to, or threatened the likelihood of, continued criminal activity.'" The pattern of predicate offenses must be used by someone employed by or associated with a qualified enterprise to conduct or participate in its activities. "Congress did not intend to extend RICO liability … beyond those who participated in the operation and management of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity." Nevertheless, "liability under § 1962(c) is not limited to upper management … An enterprise is operated not just by upper management but also by lower rung participants." The enterprise may be either any group of individuals, any legal entity, or any group "associated in fact." "Nevertheless, 'an association-in-fact enterprise must have at least three structural features: a purpose, relationships among those associated with the enterprise and longevity sufficient to permit those associates to pursue the enterprise's purpose.'" Moreover, qualified enterprises are only those that "engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce." Penalties : Imprisonment for not more than 20 years and a fine of not more than $250,000 (not more than $500,000 for organizations). Money Laundering . Mail and wire fraud are both money laundering predicate offenses by virtue of their status as RICO predicates. The most commonly prosecuted federal money laundering statute, 18 U.S.C. §1956, outlaws, among other things, knowingly engaging in a financial transaction involving the proceeds generated by a "specified unlawful activity" (a predicate offense) for the purpose (1) of laundering the proceeds (i.e., concealing their source or ownership), or (2) of promoting further predicating offenses. To establish the concealment offense, the government must establish that "(1) [the] defendant conducted, or attempted to conduct a financial transaction which in any way or degree affected interstate commerce or foreign commerce; (2) the financial transaction involved proceeds of illegal activity; (3) [the] defendant knew the property represented proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, [such as mail or wire fraud]; and (4) [the] defendant conducted or attempted to conduct the financial transaction knowing the transaction was designed in whole or in part to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity." To prove the promotional offense, "the Government must show that the defendant: (1) conducted or attempted to conduct a financial transaction; (2) which the defendant then knew involved the proceeds of unlawful activity; (3) with the intent to promote or further unlawful activity." Nothing in either provision suggests that the defendant must be shown to have committed the predicate offense. Moreover, simply establishing that the defendant spent or deposited the proceeds of the predicate offense is not enough without proof of an intent to promote or conceal. Penalties : Imprisonment for not more than 20 years and a fine of not more than $500,000. Merely depositing the proceeds of a money laundering predicate offense does not alone constitute a violation of Section 1956. It is enough for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957, however, if more than $10,000 is involved. Section 1957 uses Section 1956's definition of specified unlawful activities. Thus, mail and wire fraud violations may serve as the basis for the prosecution under Section 1957. "Section 1957 differs from Section 1956 in two critical respects: It requires that the property have a value greater than $10,000, but it does not require that the defendant know of [the] design to conceal [or promote] aspects of the transaction or that anyone have such a design." Penalties: Imprisonment for not more than 10 years and a fine of not more than $250,000 (not more than $500,000) for organizations. Fraud Under Other Jurisdictional Circumstances This category includes the offenses that were made federal crimes because they involve fraud against the United States or because they are other frauds that share elements with the mail and wire fraud. The most prominent are the proscriptions against defrauding the United States by the submission of false claims, conspiracy to defraud the United States, and material false statements in matters within the jurisdiction of the United States. Bank fraud, health care fraud, securities and commodities fraud, and fraud in foreign labor contracting are all Chapter 63 companions of mail and wire fraud. Defrauding the United States — False Claims . Section 287 outlaws the knowing submission of a false claim against the United States. "To prove a false claim, the government must prove that (1) [the defendant] 'made and presented' to the government a claim, (2) 'the claim was false, fictitious, or fraudulent,' (3) [the defendant] knew the claim was false, fictitious, or fraudulent, and (4) 'the claim was material' to the government." Penalti es : Imprisonment for not more than five years and a fine of not more than $250,000 (not more than $500,000 for organizations). Conspiracy to Defraud the U nited S tates . The general conspiracy statute has two parts. It outlaws conspiracies to violate the laws of the United States. More relevant here, it also outlaws conspiracies to defraud the United States. "To convict on a charge under the 'defraud' clause, the government must show that the defendant (1) entered into an agreement (2) to obstruct a lawful government function (3) by deceitful or dishonest means and (4) committed at least one overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy." Thus, the "fraud covered by the statute reaches any conspiracy for the purpose of impairing, obstructing or defeating the lawful functions of any department of the Government" by "deceit, craft or trickery, or at least by means that are dishonest." Unlike mail and wire fraud, the government need not show that the scheme was designed to deprive another of money, property, or honest services; it is enough to show that the scheme is designed to obstruct governmental functions. Penalties : Imprisonment for not more than five years and a fine of not more than $250,000 (not more than $500,000 for organizations). False Statements . Section 1001 outlaws knowingly and willfully making a material false statement on a matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the federal government. A matter is material for purposes of Section 1001 when "it has a natural tendency to influence, or is capable of influencing, the decision of" the individual or entity to whom it is addressed. A matter is within the jurisdiction of a federal entity "when it has the power to exercise authority in a particular matter" and federal jurisdiction "may exist when false statements [are] made to state or local government agencies receiving federal support or subject to federal regulation." Penalties : Imprisonment for not more than five years and a fine of not more than $250,000 (not more than $500,000 for organizations). Fraud Elsewhere in Chapter 63. Chapter 63 contains four other fraud proscriptions in addition to mail and wire fraud: bank fraud, health care fraud, securities and commodities fraud, and fraud in foreign labor contracting. Each relies on a jurisdictional base other than use of the mail or wire communications. Bank Fraud . The bank fraud statute outlaws (1) schemes to defraud a federally insured financial institution, and (2) schemes to falsely obtain property from such an institution. To establish the bank-property scheme to defraud offense, "the Government must prove: (1) the defendant knowingly executed or attempted to execute a scheme or artifice to defraud a financial institution; (2) the defendant did so with the intent to defraud a financial institution; and (3) the financial institution was federally insured." As for the bank-custody offense, "the government must prove (1) that a scheme existed to obtain moneys, funds, or credit in the custody of a federally-insured bank by fraud; (2) that the defendant participated in the scheme by means of material false pretenses, representations, or promises; and (3) that the defendant acted knowingly." Penalties : Imprisonment for not more than 30 years and a fine of not more than $1 million. Health Care Fraud . The health care fraud provision follows the pattern of other Chapter 63 offenses. It condemns schemes to defraud. The schemes it proscribes include honest services fraud in the form of bribery and kickbacks. Attempts and conspiracies to violate its prohibitions carry the same penalties as the complete offense it describes. It is often prosecuted along with other related offenses. Parsed to its elements, the section declares, "[a] Whoever [b] knowingly and willfully [c] executes or attempts to execute [d] a scheme or artifice (1) to defraud any health care benefit program, or (2) to obtain, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, any money or property owned by, or under the custody or control of, any health care benefit program [e] in connection with the delivery of or payment for health care benefits, items, or services shall be …" Penalties : A fine of not more than $250,000 (not more than $500,000 for organizations) and (1) if death results, imprisonment for life or any term of years; (2) if serious bodily injury results, imprisonment for 20 years; (3) otherwise, imprisonment for not more than 10 years. Securities and Commodities Fraud . Section 1348, the securities and commodities fraud prohibition, continues the progression of separating its defrauding feature from its obtaining-property feature. The elements of defrauding offense "are (1) fraudulent intent, (2) a scheme or artifice to defraud, and (3) a nexus with a security." To prove a violation of Section 1348(2), the government must establish that the defendant (1) executed, or attempted to execute, a scheme or artifice; (2) with fraudulent intent; (3) in order to obtain money or property; (4) by material false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises. Penalties : Imprisonment for not more than 25 years and fines of not more than $250,000 (not more than $500,000 for organizations). Fraud in Foreign Labor Contracting . "The substantive offense of fraud in foreign labor contracting [under 18 U.S.C. § 1351] occurs when someone: (1) recruits, solicits, or hires a person outside the United States, or causes another person to do so, or attempts to do so; (2) does so by means of materially false or fraudulent pretenses, representations or promises regarding that employment; and (3) acts knowingly and with intent to defraud." The offense occurs outside the United States when related to a federal contract or U.S. presence abroad. Penalties : Imprisonment for not more than five years and a fine of not more than $250,000 (not more than $500,000 for an organization). Honest Services Fraud (Bribery and Kickbacks) Elsewhere After the Supreme Court's 2010 decision in Skillin g v. United States , honest services mail and wire fraud consists of bribery and kickback schemes furthered by use of the mail or wire communications. Mail and wire fraud aside, the principal bribery and kickback statutes include 18 U.S.C. §§ 201(b)(1) (bribery of federal officials), 666 (bribery relating to federal programs), 1951 (extortion under color of official right); 15 U.S.C §§ 78dd-1 to 78dd-3 (foreign corrupt practices); and 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (Medicare/Medicaid anti-kickback). Bribery of Federal Officials . Conviction for violation of Section 201(b)(1) "requires a showing that something of value was corruptly ... offered or promised to a public official ... or corruptly ... sought ... or agreed to be received by a public official with intent ... to influence any official act ... or in return for 'being influenced in the performance of any official act." The hallmark of the offense is a corrupt quid pro quo, "a specific intent to give or receive something of value in exchange for an official act." The public officials covered include federal officers and employees, those of the District of Columbia, and those who perform tasks for or on behalf of the United States or any of its departments or agencies. The official acts that constitute the objective of the corrupt bargain include any decision or action relating to any matter coming before an individual in his official capacity. Penalti es : Imprisonment for up to 15 years, a fine of up to $250,000 (up to $500,000 for an organization). Bribery and Fraud Related to Federal Programs . Section 666 outlaws both (1) fraud and (2) bribery by the faithless agents of state, local, tribal or private entities—that receive more than $10,000 in federal benefits—in relation to a transaction of $5,000 or more. "A violation of Section 666(a)(1)(A) requires proof of five elements. The government must prove that: (1) a defendant was an agent of an organization, government, or agency; (2) in a one-year period that organization, government, or agency received federal benefits in excess of $10,000; (3) a defendant … obtained by fraud … ; (4) … property owned by, or in the care, custody, or control of, the organization, government, or entity; and (5) the value of that property was at least $5,000." "A person is guilty under § 666[(a)(1)(B)] if he, being an agent of an organization, government, or governmental agency that receives federal-program funds, corruptly solicits or demands for the benefit of any person, or accepts or agrees to accept, anything of value from any person, intending to be influenced or rewarded in connection with any business, transaction, or series of transactions of such organization, government, or agency involving anything of value of $5,000 or more." Penalties : Imprisonment for not more than 10 years and a fine of not more than $250,000 (not more than $500,000 for organizations). Hobbs Act . The Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, outlaws obtaining the property of another under "color of official right," in a manner that has an effect on interstate commerce. Conviction requires the government to prove that the defendant "(1) was a government official; (2) who accepted property to which she was not entitled; (3) knowing that she was not entitled to the property; and (4) knowing that the payment was given in return for officials acts: (5) which had at least a de minimis effect on commerce." Conviction does not require that the public official sought or induced payment: "the government need only show that a public official has obtained a payment to which he was not entitled, knowing that the payment was made in return for official acts." Penalties : Imprisonment for not more than 20 years and a fine of not more than $250,000 (not more than $500,000 for an organization). Foreign Corrupt Practices . The bribery provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) are three: 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(trade practices by issuers), 78dd-2 (trade practices by domestic concerns), and 78dd-3 (trade practices by others within the United States). Other than the class of potential defendants, the elements of the three are comparable. They "make[] it a crime to: (1) willfully; (2) make use of the mail or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce; (3) corruptly; (4) in furtherance of an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of any money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of the giving of anything of value to; (5) any foreign official; (6) for purposes of [either] influencing any act or decision of such foreign official in his official capacity [or] inducing such foreign official to do or omit to do any act in violation of the lawful duty of such official [or] securing any improper advantage; (7) in order to assist such [corporation] in obtaining or retaining business for or with, or directing business to, any person." None of the three proscriptions apply to payments "to expedite or to secure the performance of a routine governmental action," and each affords defendants an affirmative defense for payments that are lawful under the applicable foreign law or regulation. Penalties : Imprisonment for not more than five years and a fine of not more than $100,000 (not more than $2 million for organizations). Medicare Kickbacks . The Medicare/Medicaid kickback prohibition in 42 U.S.C. 1320a-7b(b) outlaws "knowingly and willfully [offering or paying], soliciting [or] receiving, any remuneration (including any kickback) ... (A) to induce the referral of [, or (B) the purchase with respect to] Medicare [or] Medicaid beneficiaries ... any item or service for which payment may be made in whole or in part under the Medicare [or] Medicaid programs...." Penalties : Imprisonment for not more than five years and a fine of not more than $25,000.

The mail and wire fraud statutes are exceptionally broad. Their scope has occasionally given the courts pause. Nevertheless, prosecutions in their name have brought to an end schemes that have bilked victims out of millions, and sometimes billions, of dollars. The statutes proscribe (1) causing the use of the mail or wire communications, including email; (2) in conjunction with a scheme to intentionally defraud another of money or property; (3) by means of a material deception. The offenses, along with attempts or conspiracies to commit them, carry a term of imprisonment of up to 30 years in some cases, followed by a term of supervised release. Offenders also face the prospect of fines, orders to make restitution, and forfeiture of their property. The mail and wire fraud statutes overlap with a surprising number of other federal criminal statutes. Conduct that supports a prosecution under the mail or wire fraud statutes will often support prosecution under one or more other criminal provision(s). These companion offenses include (1) those that use mail or wire fraud as an element of a separate offense, like racketeering or money laundering; (2) those that condemn fraud on some jurisdictional basis other than use of the mail or wire communications, like those that outlaw defrauding the federal government or federally insured banks; and (3) those that proscribe other deprivations of honest services (i.e., bribery and kickbacks), like the statutes that ban bribery of federal officials or in connection with federal programs. Among the crimes for which mail or wire fraud may serve as an element, RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act) outlaws employing the patterned commission of predicate offenses to conduct the affairs of an enterprise that impacts commerce. Money laundering consists of transactions involving the proceeds of a predicate offense in order to launder them or to promote further predicate offenses. The statutes that prohibit fraud in some form or another are the most diverse of the mail and wire fraud companions. Congress modeled some after the mail and wire fraud statutes, incorporating elements of a scheme to defraud or obtain property by false pretenses into statutes that outlaw bank fraud, health care fraud, securities fraud, and foreign labor contracting fraud. Congress designed others to protect the public fisc by proscribing false claims against the United States, conspiracies to defraud the United States by obstructing its functions, and false statements in matters within the jurisdiction of the United States and its departments and agencies. Federal bribery and kickback statutes populate the third class of wire and mail fraud companions. One provision bans offering or accepting a thing of value in exchange for the performance or forbearance of a federal official act. Another condemns bribery of faithless agents in connection with federally funded programs and activities. A third, the Hobbs Act, outlaws bribery as a form of extortion under the color of official right. The fines, prison sentences, and other consequences that follow conviction for wire and mail fraud companions vary considerably, with fines from not more than $25,000 to not more than $2 million and prison terms from not more than five years to life.

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Overview of the Federal Communications Commission The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is an independent federal agency, with its five members appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by the Senate. It was established by the Communications Act of 1934 (1934 Act, or "Communications Act") and is charged with regulating interstate and international communications by radio, television, wire, satellite, and cable. The mission of the FCC is to ensure that the American people have available, "without discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex, a rapid, efficient, Nationwide, and worldwide wire and radio communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges." The 1934 Act is divided into titles and sections that describe various powers and concerns of the commission. Title I—FCC Administration and Powers. The 1934 Act originally called for a commission consisting of seven members, but that number was reduced to five in 1983. Commissioners are appointed by the President and approved by the Senate to serve five-year terms; the President designates one member to serve as chairman. Title II—Common carrier regulation, primarily telephone regulation, including circuit-switched telephone services offered by cable companies. Common carriers are communication companies that provide facilities for transmission but do not originate messages, such as telephone and microwave providers. The 1934 Act limits FCC regulation to interstate and international common carriers, although a joint federal-state board coordinates regulation between the FCC and state regulatory commissions. Title III—Broadcast station requirements. Much existing broadcast regulation was established prior to 1934 by the Federal Radio Commission, and most provisions of the Radio Act of 1927 were subsumed into Title III of the 1934 Act. Title IV—Procedural and administrative provisions, such as hearings, joint boards, judicial review of the FCC's orders, petitions, and inquiries. Title V—Penal provisions and forfeitures, such as violations of rules and regulations. Title VI—Cable communications, such as the use of cable channels and cable ownership restrictions, franchising, and video programming services provided by telephone companies. Title VII—Miscellaneous provisions and powers, such as war powers of the President, closed captioning of public service announcements, and telecommunications development fund. FCC Leadership The FCC is directed by five commissioners appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate for five-year terms (except when filling an unexpired term). The President designates one of the commissioners to serve as chairperson. Three commissioners may be members of the same political party as the President and none can have a financial interest in any commission-related business. Ajit Pai, Chair (originally sworn in on May 14, 2012; designated chairman by President Trump in January 2017 and confirmed by the Senate for a second term on October 2, 2017); Michael O'Rielly (sworn in for a second term on January 29, 2015); Brendan Carr (sworn in on August 11, 2017); Jessica Rosenworcel (sworn in on August 11, 2017); and Geoffrey Starks (sworn in on January 30, 2019). FCC Structure The day-to-day functions of the FCC are carried out by 7 bureaus and 10 offices. The current basic structure of the FCC was established in 2002 as part of the agency's effort to better reflect the industries it regulates. The seventh bureau, the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, was established in 2006, largely in response to Hurricane Katrina. The bureaus process applications for licenses and other filings, analyze complaints, conduct investigations, develop and implement regulatory programs, and participate in hearings, among other things. The offices provide support services. Bureaus and offices often collaborate when addressing FCC issues. The bureaus hold the following responsibilities: Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau—Develops and implements consumer policies, including disability access and policies affecting Tribal nations. The Bureau serves as the public face of the Commission through outreach and education, as well as responding to consumer inquiries and informal complaints. The Bureau also maintains collaborative partnerships with state, local, and tribal governments in such critical areas as emergency preparedness and implementation of new technologies. In addition, the Bureau's Disability Rights Office provides expert policy and compliance advice on accessibility with respect to various forms of communications for persons with disabilities. Enforcement Bureau—Enforces the Communications Act and the FCC's rules. It protects consumers, ensures efficient use of spectrum, furthers public safety, promotes competition, resolves intercarrier disputes, and protects the integrity of FCC programs and activities from fraud, waste, and abuse. International Bureau—Administers the FCC's international telecommunications and satellite programs and policies, including licensing and regulatory functions. The Bureau promotes pro-competitive policies abroad, coordinating the FCC's global spectrum activities and advocating U.S. interests in international communications and competition. The Bureau works to promote high-quality, reliable, interconnected, and interoperable communications infrastructure on a global scale. Media Bureau—Recommends, develops, and administers the policy and licensing programs relating to electronic media, including broadcast, cable, and satellite television in the United States and its territories. Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau—Develops and implements policies and programs to strengthen public safety communications, homeland security, national security, emergency management and preparedness, disaster management, and network reliability. These efforts include rulemaking proceedings that promote more efficient use of public safety spectrum, improve public alerting mechanisms, enhance the nation's 911 emergency calling system, and establish frameworks for communications prioritization during crisis. The Bureau also maintains 24/7 operations capability and promotes Commission preparedness to assist the public, first responders, the communications industry, and all levels of government in responding to emergencies and major disasters where reliable public safety communications are essential. Wireless Telecommunications Bureau—Responsible for wireless telecommunications programs and policies in the United States and its territories, including licensing and regulatory functions. Wireless communications services include cellular, paging, personal communications, mobile broadband, and other radio services used by businesses and private citizens. Wireline Competition Bureau—Develops, recommends, and implements policies and programs for wireline telecommunications, including fixed (as opposed to mobile) broadband and telephone landlines, striving to promote the widespread development and availability of these services. The Bureau has primary responsibility for the Universal Service Fund which helps connect all Americans to communications networks. The offices hold the following responsibilities: Administrative Law Judges—Composed of one judge (and associated staff) who presides over hearings and issues decisions on matters referred by the FCC. Communications Business Opportunities—Promotes competition and innovation in the provision and ownership of telecommunications services by supporting opportunities for small businesses as well as women and minority-owned communications businesses. Economics and Analytics—Responsible for expanding and deepening the use of economic analysis into Commission policymaking, for enhancing the development and use of auctions, and for implementing consistent and effective agency-wide data practices and policies. The Office also manages the FCC's auctions in support of and in coordination with the FCC's Bureaus and Offices. In January 2019, the FCC voted along party lines to eliminate the Office of Strategic Planning and Policy Analysis and replace it with the Office of Economics and Analytics. Engineering and Technology—Advises the FCC on technical and engineering matters. This Office develops and administers FCC decisions regarding spectrum allocations and grants equipment authorizations and experimental licenses. General Counsel—Serves as the FCC's chief legal advisor and representative. Inspector General—Conducts and supervises audits and investigations relating to FCC programs and operations. Legislative Affairs—Serves as the liaison between the FCC and Congress, as well as other federal agencies. Managing Director—Administers and manages the FCC. Media Relations—Informs the media of FCC decisions and serves as the FCC's main point of contact with the media. Workplace Diversity—Ensures that FCC provides employment opportunities for all persons regardless of race, color, sex, national origin, religion, age, disability, or sexual orientation. Additionally, an FCC Secretary serves to preserve the integrity of the FCC's records, oversee the receipt and distribution of documents filed by the public through electronic and paper filing systems, and give effective legal notice of FCC decisions by publishing them in the Federal Register and the FCC Record . FCC Strategic Plan The current FCC Strategic Plan covers the five-year period FY2018-FY2022. The plan outlines four goals: Closing the Digital Divide—Broadband is acknowledged as being critical to economic opportunity, but broadband is unavailable or unaffordable in many parts of the country. The FCC is to seek to help close the digital divide, bring down the cost of broadband deployment, and create incentives for providers to connect consumers in hard-to-serve areas. Promoting Innovation—Fostering a competitive, dynamic, and innovative market for communications services is a key priority for the FCC. The FCC plans to promote entrepreneurship, expand economic opportunity, and remove barriers to entry and investment. Protecting Consumers and Public Safety—Serving the broader public interest is the FCC's core mission. The FCC plans to work to combat unwanted and unlawful robocalls, make communications accessible for people with disabilities, and protect public safety (e.g., ensuring delivery of 9-1-1 calls, restoring communications after disasters). Reforming the FCC's Processes—One of the chairman's top priorities has been to implement process reforms to make the work of the FCC more transparent, open, and accountable to the public. The FCC plans to modernize and streamline its operations and programs to improve decisionmaking, build consensus, and reduce regulatory burdens. The FCC has identified performance objectives associated with each strategic goal. Commission management annually develops targets and measures related to each performance goal to provide direction toward accomplishing those goals. Targets and measures are published in the FCC's Performance Plan, and submitted with the commission's annual budget request to Congress. Results of the commission's efforts to meet its goals, targets, and measures are found in the FCC's Annual Performance Report published each February. The FCC also issues a Summary of Performance and Financial Results every February, providing a concise, citizen-focused review of the agency's accomplishments. FCC Operations: Budget, Authorization, and Reporting to Congress Since the 110 th Congress, the FCC has been funded through the House and Senate Financial Services and General Government (FSGG) appropriations bill as a single line item. Previously, it was funded through what is now the Commerce, Justice, Science appropriations bill, also as a single line item. The FCC annually collects and retains regulatory fees to offset costs incurred by the agency and to carry out its functions. Since 2009 the FCC's budget has been derived from regulatory fees collected by the agency rather than through a direct appropriation. The fees, often referred to as "Section (9) fees," are collected from license holders and certain other entities (e.g., cable television systems). The regulatory fees do not apply to governmental entities, amateur radio operator licensees, nonprofit entities, and certain other non-commercial entities. The FCC is authorized to review the regulatory fees each year and adjust them to reflect changes in its appropriation from year to year. The Commission originally implemented the Regulatory Fee Collection Program by rulemaking on July 18, 1994. The most recent regulatory fee order was released by the Commission on August 29, 2018. The FCC's budgets from FY2010 to FY2020 are in Figure 1 . Availability of Regulatory Fees On March 23, 2018, the Repack Airwaves Yielding Better Access for Users of Modern Services Act of 2018 (the "RAY BAUM'S Act" or "2018 Act") became law as part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 ( P.L. 115-141 ). The 2018 Act requires the FCC to transfer all excess collections for FY2018 and prior years to the General Fund of the U.S. Treasury for the sole purpose of deficit reduction. The 2018 Act also requires the Commission to transfer any excess collections in FY2019 and in subsequent years to the General Fund of the U.S. Treasury for the sole purpose of deficit reduction. On October 1, 2018, the Commission transferred over $9 million in excess collections from FY2018 as well as approximately $112 million in excess collections from FY2017 and prior years to the General Fund of the U.S. Treasury. FCC FY2020 Budget For FY2020, the FCC has requested $335,660,000 in budget authority from regulatory fee offsetting collections. This is $3,950,000 less than the authorization level of $339,610,000 included in the 2018 FCC Reauthorization in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018. The FY2020 FCC request also represents a decrease of $3,340,000, or about 1.0%, from the FY2019 appropriated level of $339,000,000. The FCC requested $132,538,680 in budget authority for the spectrum auctions program. For FY2019, Congress appropriated a cap of $130,284,000 for the spectrum auctions program, which included additional funds to implement the requirements of the 2018 Act that mandated significant additional work for the FCC related to the TV Broadcaster Relocation Fund. The Commission's FY2020 budget request of $132,538,680 for this program would be an increase of $2,254,680, or 1.7%, over the FY2019 appropriation. This level of funding is intended to enable the Commission to continue its efforts to: reimburse full power and Class A stations, multichannel video programming distributors, Low Power TV, TV translator, and FM stations for reasonable costs incurred as a result of the Commission's incentive auction; make more spectrum available for 5G; and educate consumers affected by the reorganization of broadcast television spectrum. To date, the Commission's spectrum auctions program has generated over $114.6 billion for government use; at the same time, the total cost of the auctions program has been less than $2.0 billion, or less than 1.7% of the total auctions' revenue. FCC Authorization Through the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 ( P.L. 115-141 ), the FCC was reauthorized for the first time since 1990 (FCC Authorization Act of 1990, P.L. 101-396 ). FCC Reporting to Congress The FCC publishes four periodic reports for Congress. Strategic Plan. The Strategic Plan is the framework around which the FCC develops its yearly Performance Plan and Performance Budget. The FCC submitted its current four-year Strategic Plan for 2018-2022 in February 2018, in accordance with the Government Performance and Results Modernization Act of 2010, P.L. 111-352 . Performance Budget. The annual Performance Budget includes performance targets based on the FCC's strategic goals and objectives, and serves as the guide for implementing the Strategic Plan. The Performance Budget becomes part of the President's annual budget request. Agency Financial Report. The annual Agency Financial Report contains financial and other information, such as a financial discussion and analysis of the agency's status, financial statements, and audit reports. Annual Performance Report. At the end of the fiscal year, the FCC publishes an Annual Performance Report that compares the agency's actual performance with its targets. All of these reports are available on the FCC website, https://www.fcc.gov/about/strategic-plans-budget . Activity in the 116th Congress One FCC-related hearing has been held in the 116 th Congress. On April 3, 2019, the House Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on Financial Services and General Government held a hearing on the FY2020 FCC budget. The hearing addressed issues including 5G deployment, federal preemption of state and local tower siting requirements, merger reviews, robocalls, and net neutrality. No bills that would affect the operation of the FCC have been introduced in the 116 th Congress. Trends in FCC Regulation: Defining the Public Interest The FCC operates under a public interest mandate first laid out in the 1927 Radio Act (P.L. 632, 69 th Congress), but how this mandate is applied depends on which of two regulatory philosophies is relied upon to interpret it. The first seeks to protect and benefit the public at large through regulation, while the second seeks to achieve the same goals through the promotion of market efficiency. Additionally, Congress granted the FCC wide latitude and flexibility to revise its interpretation of the public interest standard to reflect changing circumstances, and the agency has not defined it in more concrete terms. These circumstances, paired with changes in FCC leadership, have led to significant changes over time in how the FCC regulates the broadcast and telecommunications industries. This evolution can be illustrated in changes to the agency's strategic goals under former Chairman Tom Wheeler to current Chairman Ajit Pai, which, in turn, led to the repeal in 2017 of the FCC's 2015 net neutrality rules and to changes in the agency's structure in 2019. FCC Strategic Goals The FCC's strategic goals are set forth in its quadrennial Strategic Plan. How these goals change from one plan to the next can illustrate how the priorities of the commission change over time, especially when there is a change in the political majority of the commission and therefore, the political party of the chairman. Table 1 outlines the strategic goals of Chairman Wheeler in the FY2015-FY2018 Strategic Plan compared to those of Chairman Pai in the FY2018-FY2022 Strategic Plan. Chairman Wheeler was a proponent of protecting and benefitting the public through regulation. His support of this regulatory philosophy can be seen in the language used in the strategic goals, such as the "rights of users" and the "responsibilities of network providers." Another example can be seen in the following language: "The FCC has a responsibility to promote the expansion of these networks and to ensure they have the incentive and the ability to compete fairly with one another in providing broadband services." On the other hand, Chairman Pai speaks about protecting and benefitting the public through the promotion of market incentives and efficiency. His support of this regulatory philosophy can be seen in the language used in the strategic goals, such as "reducing regulatory burdens" and ensuring that "regulations reflect the realities of the current marketplace, promote entrepreneurship, expand economic opportunity, and remove barriers to entry and investment." The use of this particular language may seem somewhat vague, but within the context of the net neutrality debate, discussed below, and the replacement of the Office of Strategic Planning and Policy Analysis with the Office of Economics and Analytics, those words take on more specific meaning, each intending to support the policy agenda of the Chairman. Net Neutrality Net neutrality is arguably the highest profile issue illustrating the two regulatory philosophies described above. Chairman Pai had long maintained that the FCC under Chairman Wheeler had overstepped its bounds, expressing confidence that the 2015 Wheeler-era net neutrality rules would be undone, calling them "unnecessary regulations that hold back investment and innovation." Although the net neutrality debate originated in 2005, the 2015 Open Internet Order, implemented under the leadership of Chairman Wheeler, and the 2017 Order overturning those rules, promulgated under Chairman Pai, are the most recent. These two orders can be used to illustrate the contrast between the regulatory philosophies of the two chairmen: Some policymakers contend that more proscriptive regulations, such as those contained in the FCC's 2015 Open Internet Order (2015 Order), are necessary to protect the marketplace from potential abuses which could threaten the net neutrality concept. Others contend that existing laws and the current, less restrictive approach, contained in the FCC's 2017 Restoring Internet Freedom Order (2017 Order), provide a more suitable framework. Net neutrality continues to be a highly politicized issue, with most FCC action being approved along party lines. FCC Structure In January 2019, the FCC voted along party lines to eliminate the Office of Strategic Planning and Policy Analysis and replace it with a new Office of Economics and Analytics. The Office of Strategic Planning and Policy Analysis (OSP) was created in 2005, replacing the Office of Plans and Policy. OSP had been charged with "providing advice to the chairman, commissioners, bureaus, and offices; developing strategic plans; identifying the agency's policy objectives; and providing research, advice, and analysis of advanced, novel, and nontraditional communications issues." It had also been the home of the Chief Economist and Chief Technologist. The new Office of Economics and Analytics is "responsible for expanding and deepening the use of economic analysis into FCC policy making, for enhancing the development and use of auctions, and for implementing consistent and effective agency-wide data practices and policies." This new office reflects the goals in the current strategic plan: We will modernize and streamline the FCC's operations and programs to … reduce regulatory burdens…. A key priority [is to] … ensure that the FCC's actions and regulations reflect the realities of the current marketplace … and remove barriers to entry and investment. Concluding Observations As the FCC continues to conduct its business into the future, the changing regulatory philosophies of the FCC chairmen may continue to drive how the FCC defines its long-term, strategic goals. This, in turn, may affect how the agency structures (and restructures) itself and how it decides regulatory questions, including a continued review of net neutrality. Congress may determine that the public interest standard should remain more static, rather than fluctuating dramatically depending on the regulatory philosophy of the chairman. No legislation on this topic has been introduced in Congress, signaling to some observers that it intends to continue allowing the FCC to define it. Appendix. FCC-Related Congressional Activity—115th Congress Table A-1 . Senate and House hearings in the 115 th Congress regarding the operation of the FCC are detailed in Table A-2 and Table A-3 , respectively. Links to individual hearing pages are included in these tables.

The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is an independent federal agency established by the Communications Act of 1934 (1934 Act, or "Communications Act"). The agency is charged with regulating interstate and international communications by radio, television, wire, satellite, and cable. The mission of the FCC is to make available for all people of the United States, "without discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex, a rapid, efficient, Nationwide, and worldwide wire and radio communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges." The FCC operates under a public interest mandate first laid out in the 1927 Radio Act (P.L. 632, 69th Congress), but how this mandate is applied depends on how "the public interest" is interpreted. Some regulators seek to protect and benefit the public at large through regulation, while others seek to achieve the same goals through the promotion of market efficiency. Additionally, Congress granted the FCC wide latitude and flexibility to revise its interpretation of the public interest standard to reflect changing circumstances and the agency has not defined it in more concrete terms. These circumstances, paired with changes in FCC leadership, have led to significant changes over time in how the FCC regulates the broadcast and telecommunications industries. The FCC is directed by five commissioners appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate for five-year terms. The President designates one of the commissioners as chairperson. Three commissioners may be members of the same political party of the President and none can have a financial interest in any commission-related business. The current commissioners are Ajit Pai (Chair), Michael O'Rielly, Brendan Carr, Jessica Rosenworcel, and Geoffrey Starks. The day-to-day functions of the FCC are carried out by 7 bureaus and 10 offices. The current basic structure of the FCC was established in 2002 as part of the agency's effort to better reflect the industries it regulates. The seventh bureau, the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, was established in 2006. The bureaus process applications for licenses and other filings, manage non-federal spectrum, analyze complaints, conduct investigations, develop and implement regulatory programs, and participate in hearings, among other things. The offices provide support services. Bureaus and offices often collaborate when addressing FCC issues. Beginning in the 110th Congress, the FCC has been funded through the House and Senate Financial Services and General Government (FSGG) appropriations bill as a single line item. Previously, it was funded through what is now the Commerce, Justice, Science appropriations bill, also as a single line item. Since 2009 the FCC's budget has been derived from regulatory fees collected by the agency rather than through a direct appropriation. The fees, often referred to as "Section (9) fees," are collected from license holders and certain other entities. The FCC is authorized to review the regulatory fees each year and adjust them to reflect changes in its appropriation from year to year. Most years, appropriations language prohibits the use by the commission of any excess collections received in the current fiscal year or any prior years. For FY2020, the FCC has requested $335,660,000 in budget authority from regulatory fee offsetting collections. The FCC also requested $132,538,680 in budget authority for the spectrum auctions program.

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Introduction1 Some time ago, a federal prosecutor referred to the mail and wire fraud statutes as "our Stradivarius, our Colt 45, our Louisville Slugger … and our true love." Not everyone shared the prosecutor's delight. Commentators have argued that the statutes "have long provided prosecutors with a means by which to salvage a modest, but dubious, victory from investigations that essentially proved unfruitful." Federal judges have also expressed concern from time to time, observing that the "mail and wire fraud statutes have 'been invoked to impose criminal penalties upon a staggeringly broad swath of behavior,' creating uncertainty in business negotiations and challenges to due process and federalism." Nevertheless, mail and wire fraud prosecutions have brought to an end schemes that bilked victims of millions, and sometimes billions, of dollars. The federal mail and wire fraud statutes outlaw schemes to defraud that involve the use of mail or wire communications. Both condemn fraudulent conduct that may also come within the reach of other federal criminal statutes. Both may serve as racketeering and money laundering predicate offenses. Both are punishable by imprisonment for not more than 20 years; for not more than 30 years, if the victim is a financial institution or the offense is committed in the context of major disaster or emergency. Both entitle victims to restitution. Both may result in the forfeiture of property. Background The first of the two, the mail fraud statute, emerged in the late 19 th century as a means of preventing "city slickers" from using the mail to cheat guileless "country folks." But for penalty increases and amendments calculated to confirm its breadth, the prohibition has come down to us essentially unchanged. Speaking in 1987, the Supreme Court noted that "the last substantive amendment to the statute ... was the codification of the holding of Durland ... in 1909." Congress did amend it thereafter to confirm that the mail fraud statute and the wire fraud statute reached schemes to defraud another of the right to honest services and to encompass the use of commercial postal carriers. The wire fraud statute is of more recent vintage. Enacted as part of the Communications Act Amendments of 1952, it was always intended to mirror the provisions of the mail fraud statute. Since its inception, changes in the mail fraud statute have come with corresponding changes in the wire fraud statute in most instances. Elements The mail and wire fraud statutes are essentially the same, except for the medium associated with the offense—the mail in the case of mail fraud and wire communication in the case of wire fraud. As a consequence, the interpretation of one is ordinarily considered to apply to the other. In construction of the terms within the two, the courts will frequently abbreviate or adjust their statement of the elements of a violation to focus on the questions at issue before them. As treatment of the individual elements makes clear, however, there seems little dispute that conviction requires the government to prove the use of either mail or wire communications in the foreseeable furtherance of a scheme and intent to defraud another of either property or honest services involving a material deception. Use of Mail or Wire Communications The wire fraud statute applies to anyone who "transmits or causes to be transmitted by wire, radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign commerce any writings ... for the purpose of executing [a] ... scheme or artifice." The mail fraud statute is similarly worded and applies to anyone who "... for the purpose of executing [a] ... scheme or artifice ... places in any post office ... or causes to be delivered by mail ... any ... matter." The statutes require that a mailing or wire communication be in furtherance of a scheme to defraud. The mailing or communication need not be an essential element of the scheme, as long as it "is incident to an essential element of the scheme." A qualifying mailing or communication, standing alone, may be routine, innocent or even self-defeating, because "[t]he relevant question at all times is whether the mailing is part of the execution of the scheme as conceived by the perpetrator at the time, regardless of whether the mailing later, through hindsight, may prove to have been counterproductive." The element may be satisfied by mailings or communications "designed to lull the victim into a false sense of security, postpone inquiries or complaints, or make the transaction less suspect." The element may also be satisfied by mailings or wire communications used to obtain the property which is the object of the fraud. A defendant need not personally have mailed or wired a communication; it is enough that he "caused" a mailing or transmission of a wire communication in the sense that the mailing or transmission was the reasonable foreseeable consequence of his intended scheme. Scheme to Defraud The mail and wire fraud statutes "both prohibit, in pertinent part, 'any scheme or artifice to defraud[,]' or to obtain money or property 'by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises," or deprive another of the right to honest services by such means. From the beginning, Congress intended to reach a wide range of schemes to defraud, and has expanded the concept whenever doubts arose. It added the second prong—obtaining money or property by false pretenses, representations, or promises—after defendants had suggested that the term "scheme to defraud" covered false pretenses concerning present conditions but not representations or promises of future conditions. More recently, it added 18 U.S.C. § 1346 to make it clear the term "scheme to defraud" encompassed schemes to defraud another of the right to honest services. Even before that adornment, the words were understood to "refer 'to wronging one in his property rights by dishonest methods or schemes,' and 'usually signify the deprivation of something of value by trick, deceit, chicane or overreaching.'" As a general rule, the crime is done when the scheme is hatched and an attendant mailing or interstate phone call or email has occurred. Thus, the statutes are said to condemn a scheme to defraud regardless of its success. It is not uncommon for the courts to declare that to demonstrate a scheme to defraud the government needs to show that the defendant's "communications were reasonably calculated to deceive persons of ordinary prudence and comprehension." Even a casual reading, however, might suggest that the statutes also cover a scheme specifically designed to deceive a naïve victim. Nevertheless, the courts have long acknowledged the possibility of a "puffing" defense, and there may be some question whether the statutes reach those schemes designed to deceive the gullible though they could not ensnare the reasonably prudent. In any event, the question may be more clearly presented in the context of the defendant's intent and the materiality of the deception. Defrauding or to Obtain Money or Property The mail and wire fraud statutes speak of schemes to defraud or to obtain money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses. The Supreme Court has said that the phrase "to defraud" and the phrase "to obtain money or property" do not represent separate crimes, but instead the phrase "obtain money or property" describes what constitutes a scheme to defraud. In later look-alike offenses, Congress specifically numerated the two phrases. The bank fraud statute, for example, applies to "whoever knowingly executes … a scheme or artifice — (1) to defraud a financial institution; or (2) to obtain any of the money, funds, credits, assets, securities, or other property owned by … a financial institution, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses …" It left the mail and wire fraud statutes, however, unchanged. The mail and wire fraud statutes clearly protect against deprivations of tangible property. They also protect certain intangible property rights, but only those that have value in the hands of the victim of a scheme. "To determine whether a particular interest is property for purposes of the fraud statutes, [courts] look to whether the law traditionally has recognized and enforced it as a property right." Materiality Neither the mail nor the wire fraud statute exhibits an explicit reference to materiality. Yet materiality is an element of each offense, because at the time of the statutes' enactment, the word "defraud" was understood to "require[] a misrepresentation or concealment of [a] material fact." Thus, other than in an honest services context, a "scheme to defraud" for mail or wire fraud purposes must involve a material misrepresentation of some kind. "A misrepresentation is material if it is capable of influencing the intended victim." Intent Again, other than in the case of honest services, "'intent to defraud' requires an intent to (1) deceive, and (2) cause some harm to result from the deceit. A defendant acts with the intent to deceive when he acts knowingly with the specific intent to deceive for the purpose of causing pecuniary loss to another or bringing about some financial gain to himself." A defendant has a complete defense if he believes the deceptive statements or promises to be true or otherwise acts under circumstances that belie an intent to defraud. Yet, a defendant has no defense if he blinds himself to the truth. Nor is it a defense if he intends to deceive but feels his victim will ultimately profit or be unharmed. Honest Services The Supreme Court held in McNally v. United States that the protection of the mail fraud statute, and by implication the protection of the wire fraud statute, did not extend to "the intangible right of the citizenry to good government." Soon after McNally , Congress enlarged the mail and wire fraud protection to include the intangible right to honest services, by defining the "term 'scheme or artifice to defraud' [to] include[s] a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right to honest services." Lest the expanded definition be found unconstitutionally vague, the Court in Skilling v. United States limited its application to cases of bribery or kickbacks. The Court in Skilling supplied only a general description of the bribery and kickbacks condemned in the honest-services statute. Subsequent lower federal courts have often looked to the general federal law relating to bribery and kickbacks for the substantive elements of honest services bribery. In this context, bribery requires "a quid pro quo—a specific intent to give … something of value in exchange for an official act." And an "official act" means no more than an officer's formal exercise of governmental power in the form of a "decision or action on a 'question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy'" before him. The definition of the word "kickback" quoted by the Court in Skilling has since been reassigned, and the courts have cited the dictionary definition on occasion. Except for the elements of a scheme to defraud in the form of a bribe and a kickback, honest services fraud, as an adjunct of the mail and wire fraud statutes, draws its elements and the sanctions that attend the offense from the mail and wire fraud statutes. Aiding and Abetting, Attempt, and Conspiracy Attempting or conspiring to commit mail or wire fraud or aiding and abetting the commission of those offenses carries the same penalties as the underlying offense. "In order to aid and abet another to commit a crime it is necessary that a defendant in some sort associate himself with the venture, that he participate in it as in something that he wishes to bring about, that he seek by his action to make it succeed." "Conspiracy to commit wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1349 requires a jury to find that (1) two or more persons agreed to commit wire fraud and (2) the defendant willfully joined the conspiracy with the intent to further its unlawful purpose." As a general rule, a conspirator is liable for any other offenses that a co-conspirator commits in the foreseeable furtherance of the conspiracy. Such liability, however, extends only until the objectives of the conspiracy have been accomplished or the defendant has withdrawn from the conspiracy. Where attempt has been made a separate offense, as it has for mail and wire fraud, conviction ordinarily requires that the defendant commit a substantial step toward the completion of the underlying offense with the intent to commit it. It does not, however, require the attempt to have been successful. Unlike conspiracy, a defendant may not be convicted of both the substantive offense and the lesser included crime of attempt to commit it. Sentencing A mail and wire fraud are punishable by imprisonment for not more than 20 years and a fine of not more than $250,000 (not more than $500,000 for organizations), or fine of not more than $1 million and imprisonment for not more than 30 years if the victim is a financial institution or the offense was committed in relation to a natural disaster. It is also subject to a mandatory minimum two-year term of imprisonment if identify theft is used during and in furtherance of the fraud. Conviction may also result in probation, a term of supervised release, a special assessment, a restitution order, and/or a forfeiture order. Sentencing Guidelines Sentencing in federal court begins with the federal Sentencing Guidelines. The Guidelines are essentially a scorekeeping system. A defendant's ultimate sentence under the Guidelines is determined by reference first to a basic guideline, which sets a base "offense level." Offense levels are then added or subtracted to reflect his prior criminal record as well as the aggravating and mitigating circumstances attending his offense. One of two basic guidelines applies to mail and wire fraud. Section 2C1.1 applies to mail or wire fraud convictions involving corruption of public officials. Section 2B1.1 applies to other mail or wire fraud convictions. Both sections include enhancements based on the amount of loss associated with the fraud. After all the calculations, the final offense level determines the Guidelines' recommendations concerning probation, imprisonment, and fines. The Guidelines convert final offense levels into 43 sentencing groups, which are in turn each divided into six sentencing ranges based on the defendant's criminal history. Thus, for instance, the recommended sentencing range for a first-time offender (i.e., one with a category I criminal history) with a final offense level of 15 is imprisonment for between 18 and 24 months. A defendant with the same offense level 15 but with a criminal record placing him in criminal history category VI, would face imprisonment from between 41 and 51 months. The Guidelines also provide offense-level-determined fine ranges for individuals and organizations. As a general rule, sentencing courts may place a defendant on probation for a term of from 1 to 5 years for any crime punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of less than 25 years. The Guidelines, however, recommend "pure" probation, that is, probation without any term of incarceration, only with respect to defendants with an offense level of 8 or below, i.e., levels where the sentencing range is between zero and six months. Once a court has calculated the Guidelines' recommendations, it must weigh the other statutory factors found in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) before imposing a sentence. Appellate courts will uphold a sentence if the sentence is procedurally and substantively reasonable. A sentence is reasonable procedurally if it is free of procedural defects, such as a failure to accurately calculate the Guidelines' recommendations and to fully explain the reasons for the sentence selected. A sentence is reasonable substantively if it is reasonable in light of circumstances that a case presents. Supervised Release and Special Assessments Supervised release is a form of parole-like supervision imposed after a term of imprisonment has been served. Although imposition of a term of supervised release is discretionary in mail and wire fraud cases, the Sentencing Guidelines recommend its imposition in all felony cases. The maximum supervised release term for wire and mail fraud generally is three years—five years when the defendant is convicted of the mail or wire fraud against a financial institution that carries a 30-year maximum term of imprisonment. Release will be subject to a number of conditions, violation of which may result in a return to prison for not more than two years (not more than three years if the original crime of conviction carried a 30-year maximum). There are three mandatory conditions: (1) commit no new crimes; (2) allow a DNA sample to be taken; and (3) submit to periodic drug testing. The court may suspend the drug testing condition, although it is under no obligation to do so even though the defendant has no history of drug abuse and drug abuse played no role in the offense. Most courts will impose a standard series of conditions in addition to the mandatory condition of supervised release. The Sentencing Guidelines recommend that these include the payment of any fines, restitution, and special assessments that remain unsatisfied. Defendants convicted of mail or wire fraud must pay a special assessment of $100. Restitution Restitution is ordinarily required of those convicted of mail or wire fraud. The victims entitled to restitution include those directly and proximately harmed by the defendant's crime of conviction, and "in the case of an offense that involves as an element a scheme, conspiracy, or pattern of criminal activity," like mail and wire fraud, "any person directly harmed by the defendant's conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern." Forfeiture Property that constitutes the proceeds of mail or wire fraud is subject to confiscation by the United States. It may be confiscated pursuant to either civil forfeiture or criminal forfeiture procedures. Civil forfeiture proceedings are conducted that treat the forfeitable property as the defendant. Criminal forfeiture proceedings are conducted as part of the criminal prosecution of the property owner. Related Criminal Provisions The mail and wire fraud statutes essentially outlaw dishonesty. Due to their breadth, misconduct that constitutes mail or wire fraud may constitute a violation of one or more other federal criminal statutes as well. This overlap occurs perhaps most often with respect to (1) crimes for which mail or wire fraud are elements ("predicate offenses") of another offense; (2) fraud proscribed under jurisdictional circumstances other than mail or wire use; and (3) honest services fraud in the form of bribery or kickbacks. Predicate Offense Crimes Some federal crimes have as an element the commission of some other federal offense. The money laundering statute, for example, outlaws laundering the proceeds of various predicate offenses. The racketeering statute outlaws the patterned commission of a series of predicate offenses in order to operate a racketeering enterprise. Mail and wire fraud are racketeering and money laundering predicate offenses. RICO The Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO) provisions outlaw acquiring or conducting the affairs of an enterprise, engaged in or whose activities affect interstate commerce, through loan sharking or the patterned commission of various other predicate offenses. The racketeering-conduct and conspiracy-to-engage-in-racketeering-conduct appear to be the RICO offenses most often built on wire or mail fraud violations. The elements of the RICO conduct offense are (1) conducting the affairs; (2) of an enterprise; (3) engaged in activities in or that impact interstate or foreign commerce; (4) through a pattern; (5) of racketeering activity. To prove a RICO conspiracy, the government must prove: "(1) that two or more persons agreed to conduct or to participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of an enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity; (2) that the defendant was a party to or a member of that agreement; and (3) that the defendant joined the agreement or conspiracy knowing of its objective to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of the enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity." "Racketeering activity" means, among other things, any act that is indictable under either the mail or wire fraud statutes. As for pattern, a RICO pattern "requires at least two acts of racketeering activity. The racketeering predicates may establish a pattern if they [were] related and … amounted to, or threatened the likelihood of, continued criminal activity.'" The pattern of predicate offenses must be used by someone employed by or associated with a qualified enterprise to conduct or participate in its activities. "Congress did not intend to extend RICO liability . . . beyond those who participated in the operation and management of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity." Nevertheless, "liability under § 1962(c) is not limited to upper management … An enterprise is operated not just by upper management but also by lower rung participants." The enterprise may be either any group of individuals, any legal entity, or any group "associated in fact." "Nevertheless, 'an association-in-fact enterprise must have at least three structural features: a purpose, relationships among those associated with the enterprise and longevity sufficient to permit those associates to pursue the enterprise's purpose.'" Moreover, qualified enterprises are only those that "engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce." RICO violations are punishable by imprisonment for not more than 20 years and a fine of not more than $250,000 (not more than $500,000 for organizations). The crime is one for which restitution must be ordered when one of the predicate offenses is mail or wire fraud. RICO has one of the first contemporary forfeiture provisions, covering property and interests acquired through RICO violations. As noted earlier, any RICO predicate offense is by virtue of that fact a money laundering predicate. RICO violations create a cause of action for treble damages for the benefit of anyone injured in their business or property by the offense. Money Laundering Mail and wire fraud are both money laundering predicate offenses by virtue of their status as RICO predicates. The most commonly prosecuted federal money laundering statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1956, outlaws, among other things, knowingly engaging in a financial transaction involving the proceeds generated by a "specified unlawful activity" (a predicate offense) for the purpose (1) of laundering the proceeds (i.e., concealing their source or ownership), or (2) of promoting further predicating offenses. To establish the concealment offense, the government must establish that "(1) [the] defendant conducted, or attempted to conduct a financial transaction which in any way or degree affected interstate commerce or foreign commerce; (2) the financial transaction involved proceeds of illegal activity; (3) [the] defendant knew the property represented proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, [such as mail or wire fraud]; and (4) [the] defendant conducted or attempted to conduct the financial transaction knowing the transaction was designed in whole or in part to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity." To prove the promotional offense, "the Government must show that the defendant: (1) conducted or attempted to conduct a financial transaction; (2) which the defendant then knew involved the proceeds of unlawful activity; (3) with the intent to promote or further unlawful activity." Nothing in either provision suggests that the defendant must be shown to have committed the predicate offense. Moreover, simply establishing that the defendant spent or deposited the proceeds of the predicate offense is not enough without proof of an intent to promote or conceal. Either offense is punishable by imprisonment for not more than 20 years and a fine of not more than $500,000. Property involved in a transaction in violation of Section 1956 is subject to civil and criminal forfeiture. Merely depositing the proceeds of a money laundering predicate offense, like mail or wire fraud, does not alone constitute a violation of Section 1956. It is enough for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957, however, if more than $10,000 is involved. Section 1957 uses Section 1956's definition of specified unlawful activities. Thus, mail and wire fraud violations may serve as the basis for the prosecution under Section 1957. "Section 1957 differs from Section 1956 in two critical respects: It requires that the property have a value greater than $10,000, but it does not require that the defendant know of [the] design to conceal aspects of the transaction or that anyone have such a design." Violations are punishable by imprisonment for not more than 10 years and a fine of not more than $250,000 (not more than $500,000) for organizations. The property involved in a violation is subject to forfeiture under either civil or criminal procedures. Fraud Under Other Jurisdictional Circumstances This category includes the offenses that were made federal crimes because they involve fraud against the United States, or because they are other frauds that share elements with the mail and wire fraud. The most prominent are the proscriptions against defrauding the United States by the submission of false claims, conspiracy to defraud the United States, and material false statements in matters within the jurisdiction of the United States. Bank fraud, health care fraud, securities and commodities fraud, and fraud in foreign labor contracting are mail and wire fraud look-alikes. Defrauding the United States False Claims Section 287 outlaws the knowing submission of a false claim against the United States. "To prove a false claim, the government must prove that (1) [the defendant] 'made and presented' to the government a claim, (2) 'the claim was false, fictitious, or fraudulent,' (3) [the defendant] knew the claim was false, fictitious, or fraudulent, and (4) 'the claim was material' to the government." The offense carries a sentence of imprisonment for not more than five years and a fine of not more than $250,000 (not more than $500,000 for organizations). The crime is one for which restitution must be ordered. There is no explicit authority for confiscation of property tainted by the offense, but either a private individual or the government may bring a civil action for treble damages under the False Claims Act. Section 287 offenses are neither RICO nor money laundering predicate offenses. Nevertheless, a defendant who presents his false claim by mail or email may find himself charged under both Section 287 and either the mail or wire fraud statutes. Conspiracy to Defraud the United States The general conspiracy statute has two parts. It outlaws conspiracies to violate the laws of the United States. More relevant here, it also outlaws conspiracies to defraud the United States. "To convict on a charge under the 'defraud' clause, the government must show that the defendant (1) entered into an agreement (2) to obstruct a lawful government function (3) by deceitful or dishonest means and (4) committed at least one overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy." Thus, the "fraud covered by the statute reaches any conspiracy for the purpose of impairing, obstructing or defeating the lawful functions of any department of the Government" by "deceit, craft or trickery, or at least by means that are dishonest." Unlike mail and wire fraud, the government need not show that the scheme was designed to deprive another of money, property, or honest services; it is enough to show that the scheme is designed to obstruct governmental functions. Conspiracy to defraud the United States is punishable by imprisonment for not more than five years and a fine of not more than $250,000 (not more than $500,000 for organizations). It is neither a RICO nor a money laundering predicate offense. It is an offense for which restitution must be ordered. There is no explicit authority for confiscation of property tainted by the offense. False Statements Section 1001 outlaws knowingly and willfully making a material false statement on a matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the federal government. A matter is material for purposes of Section 1001 when "it has a natural tendency to influence, or [is] capable of influencing, the decision of" the individual or entity to whom it is addressed. A matter is within the jurisdiction of a federal entity "when it has the power to exercise authority in a particular matter," and federal jurisdiction "may exist when false statements [are] made to state or local government agencies receiving federal support or subject to federal regulation." A violation of Section 1001 is punishable by imprisonment for not more than five years and a fine of not more than $250,000 (not more than $500,000 for organizations). It is neither a RICO nor a money laundering predicate offense. It is an offense for which restitution must be ordered. There is no explicit authority for confiscation of property tainted by the offense, unless the offense relates to the activities of various federal financial receivers and conservators. Moreover, in a situation where the offense involves the submission of a false claim, either a private individual or the government may bring a civil action for treble damages under the False Claims Act. Fraud Elsewhere in Chapter 63 Chapter 63 contains four other fraud proscriptions in addition to mail and wire fraud: bank fraud, health care fraud, securities and commodities fraud, and fraud in foreign labor contracting. Each relies on a jurisdictional base other than use of the mail or wire communications. Bank Fraud The bank fraud statute outlaws (1) schemes to defraud a federally insured financial institution, and (2) schemes to falsely obtain property from such an institution. To establish the bank- property scheme to defraud offense, "the Government must prove: (1) the defendant knowingly executed or attempted to execute a scheme or artifice to defraud a financial institution; (2) the defendant did so with the intent to defraud a financial institution; and (3) the financial institution was federally insured." As for the bank-custody offense, "the government must prove (1) that a scheme existed to obtain moneys, funds, or credit in the custody of a federally-insured bank by fraud; (2) that the defendant participated in the scheme by means of material false pretenses, representations, or promises; and (3) that the defendant acted knowingly." Violation of either offense is punishable by imprisonment for not more than 30 years and a fine of not more than $1 million. Bank fraud is both a RICO and a money laundering predicate offense. Conviction also requires an order for victim restitution. Property constituting the proceeds of a violation is subject to forfeiture under either civil or criminal procedure. Health Care Fraud The health care fraud provision follows the pattern of other Chapter 63 offenses. It condemns schemes to defraud. The schemes it proscribes include honest services fraud in the form of bribery and kickbacks. Attempts and conspiracies to violate its prohibitions carry the same penalties as the complete offense it describes. It is often prosecuted along with other related offenses. Parsed to its elements, the section declares: [a] Whoever [b] knowingly and willfully [c] executes or attempts to execute [d] a scheme or artifice (1) to defraud any health care benefit program, or (2) to obtain, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, any money or property owned by, or under the custody or control of, any health care benefit program [e] in connection with the delivery of or payment for health care benefits, items, or services shall be … Section 1347's penalty structure is somewhat distinctive. General violations are punishable by imprisonment for not more than 10 years and fines of not more than $250,000. Should serious bodily injury result, however, the maximum penalty is increased to imprisonment for not more than 20 years; should death result, the maximum penalty is imprisonment for life or any term of years. Section 1347 offenses are neither money laundering nor RICO predicate offenses, and proceeds of a violation of Section 1347 are not subject to confiscation. Victims, however, are entitled to restitution. Securities and Commodities Fraud Section 1348, the securities and commodities fraud prohibition, continues the progression of separating its defrauding feature from its obtaining-property feature. The elements of defrauding offense "are (1) fraudulent intent, (2) a scheme or artifice to defraud, and (3) a nexus with a security." To prove a violation of Section 1348(2), the government must establish that the defendant (1) executed, or attempted to execute, a scheme or artifice; (2) with fraudulent intent; (3) in order to obtain money or property; (4) by material false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises. A conviction for mail fraud or wire fraud, or both, sometimes accompanies a conviction for securities fraud under Section 1348. Under either version of Section 1348, offenders face imprisonment for not more than 25 years and fines of not more than $250,000 (not more than $500,000 for organizations). The offense s are neither money laundering nor RICO predicate offense s . Victim restitution must be ordered upon conviction, but forfeiture is not authorized. Fraud in Foreign Labor Contracting "The substantive offense of fraud in foreign labor contracting [under 18 U.S.C. § 1351] occurs when someone: (1) recruits, solicits, or hires a person outside the United States, or causes another person to do so, or attempts to do so; (2) does so by means of materially false or fraudulent pretenses, representations or promises regarding that employment; and (3) acts knowingly and with intent to defraud." The offense occurs outside the United States when related to a federal contract or U.S. presence abroad. The offense is a RICO predicate offense and consequently a money laundering predicate offense as well. A restitution order is required at sentencing, but forfeiture is not authorized. Honest Services Fraud Elsewhere After the Supreme Court's 2010 decision in Skillin g v. United States , honest services mail and wire fraud consists of bribery and kickback schemes furthered by use of the mail or wire communications. Mail and wire fraud aside, the principal bribery and kickback statutes include 18 U.S.C. §§ 201(b)(1) (bribery of federal officials), 666 (bribery relating to federal programs), 1951 (extortion under color of official right); 15 U.S.C §§ 78dd-1 to 78dd-3 (foreign corrupt practices); and 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (Medicare/Medicaid anti-kickback). Bribery of Federal Officials Conviction for violation of Section 201(b)(1) "requires a showing that something of value was corruptly ... offered or promised to a public official ... or corruptly ... sought ... or agreed to be received by a public official with intent ... to influence any official act ... or in return for 'being influenced in the performance of any official act." The hallmark of the offense is a corrupt quid pro quo, "a specific intent to give or receive something of value in exchange for an official act." The public officials covered include federal officers and employees, those of the District of Columbia, and those who perform tasks for or on behalf of the United States or any of its departments or agencies. The official acts that constitute the objective of the corrupt bargain include any decision or action relating to any matter coming before an individual in his official capacity. Section 201 punishes bribery with imprisonment for up to 15 years, a fine of up to $250,000 (up to $500,000 for an organization), and disqualification from future federal office or employment. Section 201 is a RICO predicate offense and consequently also a money laundering predicate offense. The proceeds of a bribe in violation of Section 201 are subject to forfeiture under either civil or criminal procedure. Bribery and Fraud Related to Federal Programs Section 666 outlaws both (1) fraud and (2) bribery by the faithless agents of state, local, tribal, or private entities—that receive more than $10,000 in federal benefits—in relation to a transaction of $5,000 or more. "A violation of Section 666(a)(1)(A) requires proof of five elements. The government must prove that: (1) a defendant was an agent of an organization, government, or agency; (2) in a one-year period that organization, government, or agency received federal benefits in excess of $10,000; (3) a defendant … obtained by fraud … ; (4) … property owned by, or in the care, custody, or control of, the organization, government, or entity; and (5) the value of that property was at least $5,000." "A person is guilty under § 666[(a)(1)(B)] if he, being an agent of an organization, government, or governmental agency that receives federal-program funds, corruptly solicits or demands for the benefit of any person, or accepts or agrees to accept, anything of value from any person, intending to be influenced or rewarded in connection with any business, transaction, or series of transactions of such organization, government, or agency involving anything of value of $5,000 or more." Agents are statutorily defined as "person[s] authorized to act on behalf of another person or a government and, in the case of an organization or government, includes a servant or employee, and a partner, director, officer, manager, and representative." The circuits appear divided over whether the government must establish a quid pro quo as in a Section 201 bribery case. The government, however, need not establish that the tainted transaction involves federal funds. Violations of Section 666 are punishable by imprisonment for not more than 10 years and a fine of not more than $250,000 (not more than $500,000 for organizations). Section 666 offenses are money laundering predicate offenses. Section 666 offenses are not among the RICO federal predicate offenses, although bribery in violation of state felony laws is a RICO predicate offense. The proceeds of a bribe in violation of Section 666 are subject to forfeiture under either civil or criminal procedure. Hobbs Act The Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, outlaws obtaining the property of another under "color of official right," in a manner that has an effect on interstate commerce. Conviction requires the government to prove that the defendant "(1) was a government official; (2) who accepted property to which she was not entitled; (3) knowing that she was not entitled to the property; and (4) knowing that the payment was given in return for officials acts: (5) which had at least a de minimis effect on commerce." Conviction does not require that the public official sought or induced payment: "the government need only show that a public official has obtained a payment to which he was not entitled, knowing that the payment was made in return for official acts." Hobbs Act violations are punishable by imprisonment for not more than 20 years and a fine of not more than $250,000 (not more than $500,000 for an organization). Hobbs Act violations are RICO predicate offenses and thus money laundering predicates as well. The proceeds of a Hobbs Act violation are subject to forfeiture under either civil or criminal procedure. Foreign Corrupt Practices The bribery provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) are three: 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 (trade practices by issuers), 78dd-2 (trade practices by domestic concerns), and 78dd-3 (trade practices by others within the United States). Other than the class of potential defendants, the elements of the three are comparable. They make[] it a crime to: (1) willfully; (2) make use of the mail or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce; (3) corruptly; (4) in furtherance of an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of any money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of the giving of anything of value to; (5) any foreign official; (6) for purposes of [either] influencing any act or decision of such foreign official in his official capacity [or] inducing such foreign official to do or omit to do any act in violation of the lawful duty of such official [or] securing any improper advantage; (7) in order to assist such [corporation] in obtaining or retaining business for or with, or directing business to, any person. None of the three proscriptions apply to payments "to expedite or to secure the performance of a routine governmental action," and each affords defendants an affirmative defense for payments that are lawful under the applicable foreign law or regulation. Violations are punishable by imprisonment for not more than five years and by a fine of not more than $100,000 (not more than $2 million for organizations). Foreign Corrupt Practices Act violations are not RICO predicate offenses, but they are money laundering predicates. The proceeds of a violation are subject to forfeiture under either civil or criminal procedure. Medicare Kickbacks The Medicare/Medicaid kickback prohibition in 42 U.S.C. 1320a-7b(b) outlaws "knowingly and willfully [offering or paying], soliciting [or] receiving, any remuneration (including any kickback) ... (A) to induce the referral of [, or (B) the purchase with respect to] Medicare [or] Medicaid beneficiaries ... any item or service for which payment may be made in whole or in part under the Medicare [or] Medicaid programs...." Violations are punishable by imprisonment for not more than five years and by a fine of not more than $25,000. Section 1320a-7b kickback violations are money laundering, but not RICO, predicate offenses. The proceeds of a violation are subject to forfeiture under either civil or criminal procedure. Statutory Text 18 U.S.C. 1341 (Mail Fraud) (Text) Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange, alter, give away, distribute, supply, or furnish or procure for unlawful use any counterfeit or spurious coin, obligation, security, or other article, or anything represented to be or intimated or held out to be such counterfeit or spurious article, for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, places in any post office or authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or deposits or causes to be deposited any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by any private or commercial interstate carrier, or takes or receives therefrom, any such matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail or such carrier according to the direction thereon, or at the place at which it is directed to be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, any such matter or thing, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. If the violation occurs in relation to, or involving any benefit authorized, transported, transmitted, transferred, disbursed, or paid in connection with, a presidentially declared major disaster or emergency (as those terms are defined in section 102 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5122)), or affects a financial institution, such person shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both. 18 U.S.C. 1343 (Wire Fraud) (Text) Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of wire, radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. If the violation occurs in relation to, or involving any benefit authorized, transported, transmitted, transferred, disbursed, or paid in connection with, a presidentially declared major disaster or emergency (as those terms are defined in section 102 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act ( 42 U.S.C. 5122 )), or affects a financial institution, such person shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both. 18 U.S.C. 1346 (Honest Services) (Text) For the purposes of this chapter, the term "scheme or artifice to defraud" includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services. 18 U.S.C. 1349 (Attempt and Conspiracy) (Text) Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense under this chapter shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy.

The mail and wire fraud statutes are exceptionally broad. Their scope has occasionally given the courts pause. Nevertheless, prosecutions in their name have brought to an end schemes that have bilked victims out of millions, and sometimes billions, of dollars. The statutes proscribe (1) causing the use of the mail or wire communications, including email; (2) in conjunction with a scheme to intentionally defraud another of money or property; (3) by means of a material deception. The offenses, along with attempts or conspiracies to commit them, carry a term of imprisonment of up to 30 years in some cases, followed by a term of supervised release. Offenders also face the prospect of fines, orders to make restitution, and forfeiture of their property. The mail and wire fraud statutes overlap with a surprising number of other federal criminal statutes. Conduct that supports a prosecution under the mail or wire fraud statutes will often support prosecution under one or more other criminal provision(s). These companion offenses include (1) those that use mail or wire fraud as an element of a separate offense, like racketeering or money laundering; (2) those that condemn fraud on some jurisdictional basis other than use of the mail or wire communications, like those that outlaw defrauding the federal government or federally insured banks; and (3) those that proscribe other deprivations of honest services (i.e., bribery and kickbacks), like the statutes that ban bribery of federal officials or in connection with federal programs. Among the crimes for which mail or wire fraud may serve as an element, RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act) outlaws employing the patterned commission of predicate offenses to conduct the affairs of an enterprise that impacts commerce. Money laundering consists of transactions involving the proceeds of a predicate offense in order to launder them or to promote further predicate offenses. The statutes that prohibit fraud in some form or another are the most diverse of the mail and wire fraud companions. Congress modeled some after the mail and wire fraud statutes, incorporating elements of a scheme to defraud or obtain property by false pretenses into statutes that outlaw bank fraud, health care fraud, securities fraud, and foreign labor contracting fraud. Congress designed others to protect the public fisc by proscribing false claims against the United States, conspiracies to defraud the United States by obstructing its functions, and false statements in matters within the jurisdiction of the United States and its departments and agencies. Federal bribery and kickback statutes populate the third class of wire and mail fraud companions. One provision bans offering or accepting a thing of value in exchange for the performance or forbearance of a federal official act. Another condemns bribery of faithless agents in connection with federally funded programs and activities. A third, the Hobbs Act, outlaws bribery as a form of extortion under the color of official right. The fines, prison sentences, and other consequences that follow conviction for wire and mail fraud companions vary considerably, with fines from not more than $25,000 to not more than $2 million and prison terms from not more than five years to life.

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Introduction Rwanda has achieved a rare degree of political stability, public safety, and economic growth in a sub-region plagued by armed conflicts and humanitarian crises. Government programs to improve health, agricultural output, private investment, and gender equality have received international plaudits and donor support. Rw anda's development and security gains are particularly remarkable in the wake of the 1994 genocide, in which extremist members of the ethnic Hutu majority orchestrated a three-month killing spree targeting the minority Tutsi community, along with members of the tiny indigenous Twa ethnic group and Hutus who opposed the massacres. The ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) seized power in mid-1994, stopping the genocide. Since then, President Paul Kagame has been widely viewed as the architect of Rwanda's development "miracle" and of its autocratic political model. He has repeatedly won reelection by wide margins, most recently in 2017 (see " Politics "). The United States and Rwanda have cultivated close ties since the mid-1990s, underpinned by U.S. aid in support of Rwanda's ambitious socioeconomic development initiatives and participation in international peacekeeping. Over the past decade, U.S. officials and some Members of Congress have continued to promote U.S.-Rwanda partnership on shared objectives, while voicing concerns regarding Rwanda's authoritarian political system and its periodic support for rebel groups in neighboring countries. Congress has held multiple hearings examining these and related issues, and has enacted restrictions on aid to Rwanda if it is found to be supporting rebel groups (see " U.S. Relations and Aid " ). In late 2017, then Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Donald Yamamoto testified to Congress that U.S.-Rwandan relations were "close but complex," acknowledging democracy shortfalls and human rights concerns. President Trump met with President Kagame at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, in January 2018, and expressed appreciation for bilateral economic ties, Rwanda's contributions to peacekeeping operations, and Kagame's pursuit of African Union (AU) institutional reforms as then-chairman of the institution. In line with the Administration's broad proposals to decrease foreign aid worldwide, it has advocated cuts to funding for Rwanda, including health and development aid. In 2018, President Trump also suspended Rwanda's trade benefits under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA, reauthorized via P.L. 114-27 ) in response to Rwanda's allegedly protectionist policies, in the context of the Administration's skepticism toward nonreciprocal trade preference programs. International perspectives on Rwanda tend to be polarized. Kagame's supporters assert that he is a visionary and that Rwanda represents an extraordinary post-conflict success story. To some, Rwandan voters' support for Kagame is easily explained: "he has kept them from killing each other ... [and] has also given them a sense of hope and pride." Others argue that restrictions on political and civil rights may ultimately undermine Rwanda's hard-won stability, and that limits on civil liberties may mask ethnic, political, and social tensions. Given evident constraints on free expression, some observers argue that "we simply don't know ... what Rwandans want from their political leaders." Some critics separately have questioned the reliability of Rwanda's development statistics—a key justification for donor aid. Critics also posit that the ruling party's reportedly extensive involvement in the economy may be stifling independent private sector growth. Kagame has dismissed external criticism as inaccurate, irrelevant, neocolonialist, and/or morally vacuous given the international community's failure to halt the genocide. Politics The RPF-led government has pursued rapid economic development and social transformation while effectively suppressing political dissent and public discussion of ethnic identity. President Kagame, leader of the RPF and a former military intelligence figure and rebel commander, is widely viewed as the country's preeminent decision-maker. He first ascended to the presidency in an internal party election in 2000, and has won reelection with over 90% of the popular vote in every subsequent contest (in 2003, 2010, and 2017). An RPF-led coalition holds the majority of seats in parliament; nearly all remaining seats are held by parties that refrain from directly criticizing the RPF or Kagame. The State Department has noted concerns with aspects of each election conducted under RPF rule, such as apparent procedural irregularities, a lack of transparency in vote tabulation, media restrictions, and legal challenges, threats, or criminal prosecutions targeting opposition candidates and parties. Public criticism of the government is rare; human rights advocates assert that "years of state intimidation and interference" have weakened the capacity of local civil society or media outlets to act as a check on state power. Over the years, political opponents have been jailed, fled the country, or died under murky circumstances. Laws criminalizing genocide ideology and denial, along with state security charges, have been wielded against opposition figures, journalists, and other government critics. Some researchers have described pervasive official surveillance and involvement in citizens' daily lives, part of an apparent effort to ensure rapid implementation of development initiatives, mobilize support for the RPF, suppress criminal activity, and monitor potential opposition activity, ethnic tensions, or security threats. Kagame has defended Rwanda's political system as rooted in popular support, asserting that "imposing a style of democracy without understanding the context, culture or norm of a country is ignorant." Rwandan officials generally reject allegations of abusing human rights, while asserting that restrictions on civil liberties are necessary to prevent ethnic violence in a fragile post-conflict setting. Some Rwandans, including journalists and civil society actors, agree. Kagame would have been subject to a constitutional two-term limit on the presidency in 2017, but a new constitution approved in 2015 via referendum—with a reported 98% of the vote—exempted the sitting president, allowing him to run for a third term. He won with 99% of the vote. After Kagame's current term expires, the presidential term is to be shortened to five years per the new constitution; Kagame could then run for two more consecutive terms, thus potentially remaining in office until 2034. He has denied any intention to do so, stating that he is preparing Rwanda for an unspecified future leadership transition. Tolerance of opposition voices seems to have increased slightly since Kagame's reelection in 2017, although a significant shift in the contours of Rwandan politics appears unlikely. Two prominent opposition figures were released from jail in 2018. Diane Rwigara, a vocal Kagame critic (and daughter of a well-known businessman and Tutsi genocide survivor) who was jailed on charges of forgery and inciting insurrection shortly after seeking to run for president in 2017, was acquitted following international advocacy on her behalf, including from some Members of Congress. Victoire Ingabire, who had sought to run against Kagame in 2010 and was serving a prison sentence for alleged genocide denial and seeking to form an armed group, received a presidential pardon. So did several other members of Ingabire's FDU-Inkingi party ("United Democratic Forces-Pillar"), which remains illegal. Several other FDU-Inkingi supporters remain in prison; others have been killed in unclear circumstances. Also in 2018, the Democratic Green party, a relatively independent opposition movement (and not affiliated with Rwigara or Ingabire), won two seats in parliament after competing for the first time in legislative elections. The Green party was not granted legal registration in time to run candidates in the 2013 legislative vote; its presidential candidate, Frank Habineza, won less than 1% in the 2017 presidential vote. The party's deputy leader was killed in unclear circumstances prior to the 2010 presidential election, soon after the party was founded in 2009. The RPF's political leadership appears to have narrowed from a diverse set of actors in the 1990s to an apparently small circle around the president. Over the years, various top RPF officials and military officers have faced criminal charges, some on national security grounds, or have fled the country. In 2010, several prominent RFP defectors formed an exiled opposition movement, the Rwandan National Congress (RNC). Some members have been the target of armed attacks or apparent assassinations in foreign countries, including several in South Africa. President Kagame has denied state involvement, while assailing the individuals in question as traitors. Human Rights The State Department's 2018 human rights report on Rwanda cites forced disappearances, alleged extrajudicial killings, arbitrary detention, and torture by state security forces ("including asphyxiation, electric shocks, mock executions"), noting "impunity" involving civilian officials and some members of the security forces. The report also documents political prisoners, threats and violence against journalists, censorship, and "substantial interference" with freedoms of assembly and association, along with "restrictions on political participation." It further finds that "the government continued to monitor homes, movements, telephone calls, email, other private communications, and personal and institutional data," often using extrajudicial means and/or embedded informants. Human Rights Watch has reported patterns of arbitrary detention and torture of Rwandans accused or suspected of supporting the RNC, Ingabire's political movement, or the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), a militia founded in DRC by perpetrators of the genocide. The organization also has accused Rwandan security forces of killing petty criminals extra-judicially, allegations that Rwanda's National Commission for Human Rights (NCHR) has rejected. Rwanda has expelled international researchers working for Human Rights Watch; in 2018, a local employee was temporarily detained incommunicado. In 2018, the government shuttered thousands of churches and dozens of mosques, citing safety violations or other regulatory concerns, and proposed stricter registration requirements for religious groups. One expert asserted that these moves targeted non-denominational places of worship (i.e., not affiliated with Roman Catholicism or established Protestant denominations) because they "are harder to control because they don't report to a central hierarchy." Regional Security Rwanda is a top peacekeeping troop contributor in Africa; U.N. officials and donors value its military professionalism and commitment to civilian protection. As chair of the AU in 2018, President Kagame also sought to bolster the financial sustainability of African-led stability operations. At the same time, Rwanda has a history of unilateral military intervention in DRC, and reportedly has periodically provided support to rebel groups in DRC and Burundi. Its reasons for doing so may reflect a mix of national security concerns (e.g., a desire to counter DRC-based armed groups led by individuals implicated in the 1994 genocide), ethnic solidarity with the Tutsi minority in Burundi and persecuted communities of Rwandan descent in DRC, and economic motivations linked to resource smuggling in DRC. In 2012-2013, Rwanda faced acute international criticism and cuts to donor aid—including from the United States and European countries—for providing support to a DRC-based insurgent group known as the M23. The M23 originated as a rebellion among members of a previous Rwandan-backed armed group, and was the latest in a series of Rwandan-backed rebellions originating among communities of Rwandan descent in eastern DRC since in the late 1990s. In 2015 and 2016, reports suggested Rwandan involvement in the recruitment and training of Burundian refugees for a rebellion against the government of Burundi, again prompting donor criticism. Credible reports of direct Rwandan involvement in regional conflicts have since diminished, although the country's relations with DRC remain volatile. Tensions with Burundi also have endured, with Rwanda accusing Burundian authorities of stoking ethnic tensions while Burundi has accused Rwanda of espionage and interference. Relations with sometimes-ally Uganda also have soured in recent years. Rwandan officials, including President Kagame, have openly accused Uganda of backing Rwandan armed dissidents (apparently referring to the RNC) as well as the FDLR, while Ugandan officials have accused Rwanda of espionage. Ongoing insecurity and illicit resource extraction in eastern DRC remain flashpoints for regional tensions and spillover of conflicts. In late 2018, U.N. DRC sanctions monitors reported that the RNC was mobilizing armed combatants in DRC's South Kivu province, with apparent Burundian support. Some researchers posit that Rwanda-Uganda friction is rooted in competition over access to DRC minerals; U.N. DRC sanctions investigators reported in 2018 that "gold sourced in high-risk and conflict areas [of DRC] was exported illegally to Uganda and Rwanda." The Economy and Development Donor aid, political stability, low corruption, and pro-investor policies have enabled high economic growth rates (4-9% annually) over the past decade. Rwanda remains one of the world's poorest countries, although it ranks higher than many other sub-Saharan African countries on the 2018 U.N. Human Development Index (at 158 out of 189 countries assessed). About 75% of Rwandans are engaged in agriculture, many for subsistence; the country is nonetheless reliant on food imports, in part due to having the highest population density in continental Africa. The government seeks to transform the economy into one that is services-oriented and middle-income, launching programs to expand internet access, improve education, and increase domestic energy production. Key growth sectors include tourism, coffee, tea, tin mining, construction, and an emerging financial services sector. The government also aims to turn Rwanda into a regional trade, logistics, and conference hub. It has invested in the construction of new business class hotels and a convention center in Kigali, a planned new airport, and an expansion of the national airline RwandAir—which is pursuing U.S. federal approval for direct flights between Kigali and the United States. Much investment has been concentrated in Kigali, which has received international plaudits for its clean and safe streets. Rwanda was ranked 29 out of 190 on the World Bank's 2019 Doing Business report, the only low-income country and one of only two African countries (along with Mauritius) in the top 50. Rwanda's continual improvements in the annual rankings reflect its efforts to reduce bureaucratic red-tape, protect property rights, improve access to credit, expand the supply of reliable electricity, and ensure contract enforcement. The State Department has nonetheless documented various challenges for foreign investors, including "payment delays with government contracts," inconsistent adherence to incentives offered by the Rwanda Development Board, infringements on property rights, and "competition from state-owned and ruling party-aligned businesses." Human development gains since the genocide have been dramatic in relative terms. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), from 1990 and 2016, life expectancy increased from 48 to 66 years; the child (under five) mortality rate fell from 152 to 42 deaths per 1,000 live births; and the maternal mortality rate decreased from 1,300 to 290 deaths per 100,000 live births. Through a donor-backed national community-based health insurance system, Rwanda provides near-universal health coverage for basic primary care, with the cost fully or partially subsidized based on income level. As of 2015, about 39% of Rwandans reportedly lived below the poverty line, compared to 56% in 2006 and 78% in 1994. Some researchers have questioned the reliability of Rwanda's poverty statistics, noting that they are based on household-level survey data and may be subject to interference; the World Bank has rejected some of this criticism, asserting that Rwanda's official statistical methodology "is technically sound." U.S. Relations and Aid In 1998, President Bill Clinton delivered a speech in Kigali in which he expressed remorse for not having intervened more forcefully to end mass killings in 1994, and pledged that the United States would do better in the future. Those remarks arguably set the tone for a relationship defined, in part, by a sense of guilt among U.S. policymakers about the genocide and admiration for the RPF's role in stopping it. U.S. support for the RPF-led government has continued across successive Administrations and across partisan lines, with the executive branch and Congress working together to provide substantial aid to support Rwanda's development efforts and peacekeeper deployments. Yet, over the past decade, executive branch officials and some Members of Congress increasingly have criticized Rwanda's involvement in regional conflicts and expressed concern with its domestic political and human rights conditions. After meeting with President Kagame in Davos in January 2018, President Trump praised the United States' "great relationships" with Rwanda, including bilateral trade, and stated that "the job they've done is absolutely terrific." In September 2017 congressional testimony, then Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Yamamoto praised Rwanda's "remarkable gains" in health and development and characterized the country as "a major contributor to regional peace and security," while asserting that "Rwanda's record in the areas of human rights and democracy, while improved in some areas, remains a concern." He called on the government "to take steps toward a democratic transition of power." Regarding Rwanda's 2017 presidential election, the State Department stated that "we are disturbed by irregularities observed during voting and reiterate long-standing concerns over the integrity of the vote-tabulation process." In response to Member questions at the September 2017 hearing, Ambassador Yamamoto affirmed that "we are unable to assess this election as free and fair." At his Senate confirmation hearing in late 2017, the U.S. Ambassador-designate to Rwanda described his four top policy goals as the following: continuing the United States' "development partnership" with Rwanda, promoting U.S. business and economic ties, supporting Rwanda's continued peacekeeping role, and advancing "democratic ideals." President Trump suspended duty-free treatment of Rwandan apparel exports to the United States under AGOA in 2018, as noted above, citing Rwandan protectionist policies. The suspension came after the Administration initiated an out-of-cycle review of Rwanda's eligibility in 2017. In addition to concerns about trade barriers, Ambassador Yamamoto testified in 2017 that U.S. officials had also "raised concerns ... regarding harassment of political opposition leaders and [non-governmental organizations] as well as restrictions on media freedom with the context of AGOA eligibility." The impact may be largely symbolic: in 2017, U.S. imports from Rwanda totaled $44 million, of which $5 million were under AGOA. U.S. exports to Rwanda totaled $64 million that year. U.S. bilateral aid to Rwanda aims to promote economic growth, food security, health, and military professionalism. The State Department has drawn on additional regionally- and centrally-managed funds to provide military aid to build Rwanda's peacekeeping capabilities, including under the African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership (APRRP) initiative, launched under President Obama in 2014. (The Trump Administration has not requested new appropriations in support of APRRP, but has continued to implement funds allocated in prior years.) APRRP was conceived to complement the State Department's Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), in which Rwanda also participates. The United States also provides humanitarian assistance for international organizations caring for Congolese and Burundian refugees in Rwanda. Legislative Restrictions on Security Assistance Successive Congresses have enacted foreign aid appropriations measures restricting certain types of U.S. military aid to Rwanda if it is found to be supporting rebel movements in neighboring countries. Citing such provisions, as well as the Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008 (CSPA, Title IV of P.L. 110-457 ), the Obama Administration suspended certain types of military aid—namely, Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International Military Education and Training (IMET)—citing Rwandan support for rebels in DRC and, later, Burundi. Military aid in support of Rwanda's peacekeeping capabilities was exempted from such restrictions via a combination of legislative provisions (e.g., §1208[f] of P.L. 113-4 , the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, which excepts peacekeeping aid from child soldiers-related restrictions) and executive branch waivers. The executive-legislative branch interplay under the Obama and Trump Administrations (to date) is detailed below. FY2012-FY2013: The Obama Administration invoked a provision of the FY2012 appropriations act ( P.L. 112-74 , §7043(a) of Division I), extended into FY2013 via continuing resolutions, to suspend FMF for Rwanda, citing its support for the M23 rebellion in DRC. The provision stated that FMF could be made available for Rwanda or Uganda "unless" the Secretary of State had "credible information" that either government was supporting armed groups in DRC. FY2014: The Obama Administration continued to suspend FMF, consistent with a provision in that year's appropriations act ( P.L. 113-76 , §7042(l) of Division K) restricting such funds unless Rwanda was "taking steps to cease" support to certain armed groups in DRC. It also designated Rwanda under CSPA in connection with the M23's reported use of child soldiers, and applied that act's prohibition on various other forms of military aid, including IMET. FY2015: The appropriations act prohibited FMF for Rwanda unless the Secretary of State certified to Congress that the government was "implementing a policy to cease" support to armed groups in DRC ( P.L. 113-235 , §7042[l] of Division J). The Obama Administration had not requested FMF for Rwanda in its budget proposal, and none was provided. The State Department again designated Rwanda under CSPA, but President Obama waived the act's aid prohibitions, citing the end of the M23 insurgency—thus allowing IMET, for example, to resume. FY2016: The State Department did not designate Rwanda under CSPA, and that year's appropriations act ( P.L. 114-113 ) did not restrict security assistance for Rwanda. The Obama Administration did not request or provide FMF funds for Rwanda, in any case. IMET continued. FY2017: The Obama Administration (in mid-2016) designated Rwanda under CSPA in connection with its reported support for Burundian rebel groups' recruitment of child soldiers. President Obama waived CSPA restrictions on IMET and several other types of security aid, however, and no FMF funding was requested for Rwanda or provided. The appropriations act restricted certain types of IMET programs for any country in Africa's Great Lakes region unless the Secretary of State certified that it was "not facilitating or otherwise participating in destabilizing activities in a neighboring country" ( P.L. 115-31 , §7042(a) of Division J). The State Department provided some IMET funds for Rwanda, but once the act passed into law, did not support activities that would have been prohibited in such a scenario. FY2018 -FY2019 to date : Appropriations measures have continued to restrict certain types of IMET programs for any country in the Great Lakes region until the Secretary of State determines and reports that it is "not facilitating or otherwise participating in destabilizing activities in a neighboring country, including aiding and abetting armed groups" (most recently, P.L. 116-6 §7042(a) of Division F). The Trump Administration has not designated Rwanda under CSPA. It also has not requested or provided FMF for Rwanda. Issues for Congress and Outlook Congress has shaped U.S. policy and assistance to Rwanda through its authorization and appropriation of U.S. assistance, and through oversight and Member engagement. In 2012-2013, and again in 2015-2016, the application of legislative restrictions on U.S. security assistance—along with other donor criticism and aid suspensions—appeared to contribute to a decrease in Rwandan support for the M23 in DRC and may conceivably have dissuaded Rwanda from intervening more heavily in Burundi. Members may seek to derive lessons from this sequence of events as they consider pending appropriations bills and/or any future legislative proposals regarding U.S. aid to Rwanda. With regard to Rwanda's domestic conditions, questions remain around how the United States can best support the country's continued stability and growth, including whether continued U.S. support for Rwanda's development efforts can or should be premised on evidence of greater respect for political pluralism or individual liberties.

Rwanda, a small landlocked country in central Africa's Great Lakes region, has seen rapid development and security gains since about 800,000 people—mostly members of the ethnic Tutsi minority—were killed in the 1994 genocide. The ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) ended the genocide by seizing power in mid-1994 and has been the dominant force in Rwandan politics ever since. The Rwandan government has won donor plaudits for its efforts to improve health, boost agricultural output, encourage foreign investment, and promote women's empowerment. Yet, analysts debate whether Rwanda's authoritarian political system—and periodic support for rebel groups in neighboring countries—could jeopardize the country's stability in the long-run, or undermine the case for donor support. President Paul Kagame, in office since 2000, won reelection to another seven-year term in 2017 with nearly 99% of the vote, after the adoption of a new constitution that effectively exempted him from term limits through 2034. Kagame's overwhelming margin of victory may reflect popular support for his efforts to stabilize and transform Rwandan society, as well as a political system that involves constraints on opposition activity and close government scrutiny of citizen behavior. In response to external criticism, Kagame has generally denied specific allegations of abusing human rights while asserting that restrictions on civil and political rights are necessary to prevent the return of ethnic violence. The United States and Rwanda have cultivated close ties since the mid-1990s, underpinned by U.S. development aid and support for Rwanda's robust participation in international peacekeeping. Congress has helped shape U.S. engagement through its appropriation of foreign aid and other legislative initiatives, along with oversight and direct Member outreach to Rwandan officials. Over the past decade, successive Administrations and Congress have continued to support U.S. partnership with Rwanda on development and peacekeeping, while criticizing the government's human rights record and periodic role in regional conflicts. Congress has notably enacted provisions in aid appropriations legislation restricting U.S. military aid to Rwanda if it is found to be supporting rebel groups in neighboring countries. The Obama Administration temporarily applied such restrictions, along with others pursuant to separate child soldiers legislation, citing Rwandan support for rebels in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Burundi. There have been fewer reports of Rwandan support for rebel groups in recent years. After meeting with President Kagame in early 2018, President Trump expressed appreciation for U.S.-Rwandan economic ties, Rwanda's contributions to peacekeeping, and Kagame's pursuit of African Union institutional reforms. In line with the Administration's proposals to decrease foreign aid worldwide, its FY2020 budget request would provide $117 million in bilateral aid to Rwanda, a 28% decrease from FY2018 levels. U.S. peacekeeping-related military assistance for Rwanda has drawn on regionally- and centrally-managed funds, and is not reflected in these totals. The Administration has also suspended Rwanda's eligibility for trade benefits under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA, reauthorized under P.L. 114-27), in response to alleged market barriers to U.S. exports of used clothing.

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R ecent high-profile data breaches and privacy violations have raised national concerns over the legal protections that apply to Americans' electronic data. While some concern over data protection stems from how the government might utilize such data, mounting worries have centered on how the private sector controls digital information, the focus of this report. Inadequate corporate privacy practices and intentional intrusions into private computer networks have exposed the personal information of millions of Americans. At the same time, internet connectivity has increased and varied in form in recent years, expanding from personal computers and mobile phones to everyday objects such as home appliances, "smart" speakers, vehicles, and other internet-connected devices. Americans now transmit their personal data on the internet at an exponentially higher rate than the past. Along with the increased connectivity, a growing number of "consumer facing" actors (such as websites) and "behind the scenes" actors (such as data brokers and advertising companies) collect, maintain, and use consumers' information. While this data collection can benefit consumers—for instance, by allowing companies to offer them more tailored products—it also raises privacy concerns, as consumers often cannot control how these entities use their data. As a consequence, the protection of personal data has emerged as a major issue for congressional consideration. Despite the increased interest in data protection, the legal paradigms governing the security and privacy of personal data are complex and technical, and lack uniformity at the federal level. The Supreme Court has recognized that the Constitution provides various rights protecting individual privacy, but these rights generally guard only against government intrusions and do little to prevent private actors from abusing personal data online. At the federal statutory level, while there are a number of data protection statutes, they primarily regulate certain industries and subcategories of data. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) fills in some of the statutory gaps by enforcing the federal prohibition against unfair and deceptive data protection practices. But no single federal law comprehensively regulates the collection and use of personal data. In contrast to the "patchwork" nature of federal law, some state and foreign governments have enacted more comprehensive data protection legislation. Some analysts suggest these laws, which include the European Union's (EU's) General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and state laws such as the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), will create increasingly overlapping and uneven data protection regimes. This fragmented legal landscape coupled with concerns that existing federal laws are inadequate has led many stakeholders to argue that the federal government should assume a larger role in data protection policy. However, at present, there is no consensus as to what, if any, role the federal government should play, and any legislative efforts at data protection are likely to implicate unique legal concerns such as preemption, standing, and First Amendment rights, among other issues. This report examines the current U.S. legal landscape governing data protection, contrasting the current patchwork of federal data protection laws with the more comprehensive regulatory models in the CCPA and GDPR. The report also examines potential legal considerations for the 116th Congress should it consider crafting more comprehensive federal data protection legislation. The report lastly contains an Appendix , which contains a table summarizing the federal data protection laws discussed in the report. Origins of American Privacy Protections The Common Law and the Privacy Torts Historically, the common law in the United States had little need to protect privacy—as one commentator has observed, "[s]olitude was readily available in colonial America." Although common law had long protected against eavesdropping and trespass, these protections said little to nothing about individual rights to privacy, per se. Over time, gradual changes in the technological and social environment caused a shift in the law. In 1890, Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren published a groundbreaking article in the Harvard Law Review entitled The Right to Privacy . Reacting to the proliferation of the press and advancements in technology such as more advanced cameras, the article argued that the law should protect individuals' "right to privacy" and shield them from intrusion from other individuals. The authors defined this emergent right as the "right to be let alone." Scholars have argued that this article created a "revolution" in the development of the common law. In the century that followed Brandeis's and Warren's seminal article, most states recognized the so-called "privacy torts"—intrusion upon seclusion, public disclosure of private facts, false light or "publicity," and appropriation. These torts revolve around the central idea that individuals should be able to lead, "to some reasonable extent, a secluded and private life." The Supreme Court described this evolution of privacy tort law as part of a "strong tide" in the twentieth century toward the "so-called right of privacy" in the states. Despite this "strong tide," some scholars have argued that these torts, which were developed largely in the mid-twentieth century, are inadequate to face the privacy and data protection problems of today. Furthermore, some states do not accept all four of these torts or have narrowed and limited the applicability of the torts so as to reduce their effectiveness. As discussed in greater detail below, state common law provides some other remedies and protections relevant to data protection, via tort and contract law. However, while all of this state common law may have some influence on data protection, the impact of this judge-made doctrine is unlikely to be uniform, as courts' application of these laws will likely vary based on the particular facts of the cases in which they are applied and the precedents established in the various states. Constitutional Protections and the Right to Privacy As reflected in the common law's limited remedies, at the time of the founding, concerns about privacy focused mainly on protecting private individuals from government intrusion rather than on protecting private individuals from intrusion by others. Accordingly, the Constitution's Bill of Rights protects individual privacy from government intrusion in a handful of ways and does little to protect from non-governmental actors. Some provisions protect privacy in a relatively narrow sphere, such as the Third Amendment's protection against the quartering of soldiers in private homes or the Fifth Amendment's protection against self-incrimination. The most general and direct protection of individual privacy is contained in the Fourth Amendment, which states that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . ." For more than 100 years, the Fourth Amendment was generally read to prohibit only entry into private places rather than to provide general right to privacy. However, alongside the developments in the common law, constitutional law evolved over time to place a greater emphasis on protecting an individual's personal privacy. In particular, in 1967, the Supreme Court in Katz v. United States explained that the Fourth Amendment, while not creating a general "right to privacy," nonetheless protected "people, not places," and guarded individual privacy against certain types of governmental intrusion. This principle has continued to evolve over time, and has come to protect, to some extent, individuals' interest in their digital privacy. For example, in the 2018 case of Carpenter v. United States , the Supreme Court concluded that the Fourth Amendment's protection of privacy extended to protecting some information from government intrusion even where that information was shared with a third party. In Carpenter , the Court concluded that individuals maintain an expectation of privacy, protected by the Fourth Amendment, in the record of their movements as recorded by their cellular provider. Carpenter distinguished earlier cases which had relied upon the principle that information shared with third parties was generally not subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny, concluding that "an individual maintains a legitimate expectation of privacy in the record of his physical movements as captured through [his cellular phone]." The Court's holding means that, in the future, the government must obtain a warrant supported by probable cause to obtain this information. The Fourth Amendment thus provides a limited bulwark against government intrusion into digital privacy. In addition to the protection provided by the Fourth Amendment, in the 1960s and 1970s, the Court concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of "liberty" implied the existence of a more general right of privacy, protecting individuals from government intrusion even outside the "search and seizure" context. In the 1977 case Whalen v. Roe , the Supreme Court explained that this constitutional right of privacy "in fact involve[s] at least two different kinds of interests. One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and another is the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions." The second of these interests relates primarily to individual rights concerning the "intimacies of [persons'] physical relationship," as well as the right to abortion, and has little connection to data protection. However, the first of the interests listed in Whalen could potentially relate to data protection. This interest, the right to avoid certain disclosures, has come to be known as the right to "informational privacy." Despite its broad expression in Whalen , every Supreme Court case to consider the informational privacy right has rejected the constitutional claim and upheld the government program alleged to have infringed on the right. In Whalen itself, physicians and patients challenged a New York law that required the recording of the names and addresses of all persons who had obtained certain drugs for which there was both a lawful and unlawful market. Although the Court acknowledged that the statute "threaten[ed] to impair . . . [the plaintiffs'] interest in the nondisclosure of private information," the Court observed that the disclosures were an "essential part of modern medical practice" and the New York law had protections in place against unwarranted disclosure that showed a "proper concern" for the protection of privacy. Together, the Court found these factors sufficient to uphold the law. In the wake of Whalen and Nixon v. Administrator of General Services —a case decided the same year as Whalen that also considered the right to informational privacy—courts have struggled to articulate the precise contours of the right. The most recent Supreme Court case to consider the right to informational privacy, NASA v. Nelson , went so far as to suggest that the right might not exist, "assuming without deciding" that the right existed in the course of rejecting the constitutional claim challenge to a government background check program for hiring. Despite the Supreme Court's lack of clarity about the right to informational privacy, "most federal circuit courts" recognize the right to various extents. All of the constitutional rights involving privacy, like the common law privacy torts, focus on public disclosure of private facts. This focus limits their potential influence on modern data privacy debates, which extends beyond the disclosure issue to more broadly concern how data is collected, protected, and used. Perhaps more importantly, whatever the reach of the constitutional right to privacy, the "state action doctrine" prevents it from being influential outside the realm of government action. Under this doctrine, only government action is subject to scrutiny under the Constitution, but purely private conduct is not proscribed, "no matter how unfair that conduct may be." As a result, neither the common nor constitutional law provides a complete framework for considering many of the potential threats to digital privacy and consumer data. Rather, the most important data protection standards come from statutory law. Federal Data Protection Law Given the inherent limitations in common law and constitutional protections, Congress has enacted a number of federal laws designed to provide statutory protections of individuals' personal information. In contrast with the scheme prevalent in Europe and some other countries, rather than a single comprehensive law, the United States has a "patchwork" of federal laws that govern companies' data protection practices. These laws vary considerably in their purpose and scope. Most impose data protection obligations on specific industry participants—such as financial institutions, health care entities, and communications common carriers—or specific types of data, such as children's data. Other laws, however, supplement the Constitution's limited privacy protections and apply similar principles to private entities. The Stored Communications Act (SCA), for instance, generally prohibits the unauthorized access or disclosure of certain electronic communications stored by internet service providers. Lastly, some laws prohibit broad categories of conduct that, while not confined to data protection, limit how companies may handle personal data. Most notably, the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act) prohibits "unfair or deceptive acts or practices." As some scholars have pointed out, the FTC has used its authority under the FTC Act to develop norms and principles that effectively fill in the gaps left by other privacy statutes. These laws are organized below, beginning with those most narrowly focused on discrete industries and moving toward more generally applicable laws. In light of its gap-filling function, this section lastly discusses the FTC Act—along with the Consumer Financial Protection Act (CFPA), which covers similar types of conduct. The Appendix to this report contains a table summarizing the federal data protection laws discussed. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) imposes several data protection obligations on financial institutions. These obligations are centered on a category of data called "consumer" "nonpublic personal information" (NPI), and generally relate to: (1) sharing NPI with third parties, (2) providing privacy notices to consumers, and (3) securing NPI from unauthorized access. First, unless an exception applies, GLBA and its implementing regulations prohibit financial institutions from sharing NPI with non-affiliated third parties unless they first provide the consumers with notice and an opportunity to "opt-out." Furthermore, financial institutions are prohibited altogether from sharing account numbers or credit card numbers to third parties for use in direct marketing. Second, financial institutions must provide "clear and conspicuous" initial and annual notices to customers describing their privacy "policies and practices." These notices must include, among other things, the categories of NPI collected and disclosed, the categories of third parties with which the financial institution shares NPI, and policies and practices with respect to protecting the confidentiality and security of NPI. Third, GLBA and its implementing regulations (often referred to as the "Safeguards Rule" ) require financial institutions to maintain "administrative, technical, and physical safeguards" to "insure the security and confidentiality" of "customer" (as opposed to "consumer") NPI, and to protect against "any anticipated threats or hazards" or "unauthorized access" to such information. Financial institutions regulated by federal banking agencies are further required to implement a program for responding to the unauthorized access of customer NPI. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), FTC, and federal banking agencies share civil enforcement authority for GLBA's privacy provisions. However, the CFPB has no enforcement authority over GLBA's data security provisions. Under the data security provisions, federal banking regulators have exclusive enforcement authority for depository institutions, and the FTC has exclusive enforcement authority for all non-depository institutions. GLBA does not specify any civil remedies for violations of the Act, but agencies can seek remedies based on the authorities provided in their enabling statutes, as discussed below. GLBA also imposes criminal liability on those who "knowingly and intentionally" obtain or disclose "customer information" through false or fraudulent statements or representations. Criminal liability can result in fines and up to five years' imprisonment. GLBA does not contain a private right of action that would allow affected individuals to sue violators. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has enacted regulations protecting a category of medical information called "protected health information" (PHI). These regulations apply to health care providers, health plans, and health care clearinghouses (covered entities), as well as certain "business associates" of such entities. The HIPAA regulations generally speak to covered entities': (1) use or sharing of PHI, (2) disclosure of information to consumers, (3) safeguards for securing PHI, and (4) notification of consumers following a breach of PHI. First, with respect to sharing, HIPAA's privacy regulations generally prohibit covered entities from using PHI or sharing it with third parties without patient consent, unless such information is being used or shared for treatment, payment, or "health care operations" purposes, or unless another exception applies. Covered entities generally may not make treatment or services conditional on an individual providing consent. Second, with respect to consumer disclosures, covered entities must provide individuals with "adequate notice of the uses and disclosures of [PHI] that may be made by the covered entity, and of the individual's rights and the covered entity's legal duties with respect to [PHI]." These notices must be provided upon consumer request, and covered entities maintaining websites discussing their services or benefits must "prominently post" the notices on their websites. Furthermore, an individual has the right to request that a covered entity provide him with a copy of his PHI that is maintained by the covered entity. In some cases, an individual may also request that the covered entity provide information regarding specific disclosures of the individual's PHI, including the dates, recipients, and purposes of the disclosures. Third, with respect to data security, covered entities must maintain safeguards to prevent threats or hazards to the security of electronic PHI. Lastly, HIPAA regulations contain a data breach notification requirement, requiring covered entities to, among other things, notify the affected individuals within 60 calendar days after discovering a breach of "unsecured" PHI. Violations of HIPAA's privacy requirements can result in criminal or civil enforcement. HHS possesses civil enforcement authority and may impose civil penalties, with the amount varying based on the level of culpability. The Department of Justice has criminal enforcement authority and may seek fines or imprisonment against a person who, in violation of HIPAA's privacy requirements, "knowingly" obtains or discloses "individually identifiable health information" or "uses or causes to be used a unique health identifier." HIPAA does not, however, contain a private right of action that would allow aggrieved individuals to sue alleged violators. Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) covers the collection and use of information bearing on a consumer's creditworthiness. FCRA and its implementing regulations govern the activities of three categories of entities: (1) credit reporting agencies (CRAs), (2) entities furnishing information to CRAs (furnishers), and (3) individuals who use credit reports issued by CRAs (users). In contrast to HIPAA or GLBA, there are no privacy provisions in FCRA requiring entities to provide notice to a consumer or to obtain his opt-in or opt-out consent before collecting or disclosing the consumer's data to third parties. FCRA further has no data security provisions requiring entities to maintain safeguards to protect consumer information from unauthorized access. Rather, FCRA's requirements generally focus on ensuring that the consumer information reported by CRAs and furnishers is accurate and that it is used only for certain permissible purposes. With respect to accuracy, CRAs must maintain reasonable procedures to ensure the accuracy of information used in "consumer reports." CRAs must further exclude adverse information, such as "accounts placed in collection" or civil judgements, from consumer reports after a certain amount of time has elapsed. Furnishers must similarly establish reasonable policies and procedures to ensure the accuracy of the information reported to CRAs and may not furnish to a CRA any consumer information if they have reasonable cause to believe that information is inaccurate. Consumers also have the right to review the information CRAs have collected on them to ensure such information is accurate. CRAs must disclose information contained in a consumer's file upon the consumer's request, as well as the sources of the information and the identity of those who have recently procured consumer reports on the consumer. Should a consumer dispute the accuracy of any information in his file, CRAs and furnishers must reinvestigate the accuracy of the contested information. In addition to the accuracy requirements, under FCRA consumer reports may be used only for certain permissible purposes such as credit transactions. Accordingly, a CRA may generally furnish consumer reports to a user only if it "has a reason to believe" the user intends to use it for a permissible purpose. Likewise, users may "use or obtain a consumer report" only for a permissible purpose. Along with the permissible purpose requirement, users must further notify consumers of any "adverse action" taken against the consumer based on the report. Adverse actions include refusing to grant credit on substantially the terms requested, reducing insurance coverage, and denying employment. The FTC and the CFPB share civil enforcement authority over FCRA, with each agency possessing enforcement authority over entities subject to their respective jurisdictions. In addition to government enforcement, FCRA provides a private right of action for consumers injured by willful or negligent violations of the Act. Consumers bringing such actions for negligent violations of the Act may recover actual damages, attorney's fees, and other litigation costs. For willful violations, consumers may recover either actual damages or statutory damages ranging from $100 to $1,000, attorney's fees, other litigation costs, and "such amount of punitive damages as the court may allow." FCRA also imposes criminal liability on any individual who knowingly and willfully obtains consumer information from a CRA under false pretenses and on any officer or employee of a CRA who knowingly and willfully provides consumer information to a person not authorized to receive that information. The Communications Act The Communications Act of 1934 (Communications Act or Act), as amended, established the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and provides a "comprehensive scheme" for the regulation of interstate communication. Most relevant to this report, the Communications Act includes data protection provisions applicable to common carriers, cable operators, and satellite carriers. Common Carriers The Telecommunications Act of 1996 amended the Communications Act to impose data privacy and data security requirements on entities acting as common carriers. Generally, common carrier activities include telephone and telegraph services but exclude radio broadcasting, television broadcasting, provision of cable television, and provision of broadband internet. The privacy and security requirements imposed on entities acting as common carriers are primarily centered on a category of information referred to as "customer proprietary network information (CPNI)." CPNI is defined as information relating to the "quantity, technical configuration, type, destination, location, and amount of use of a telecommunications service subscribed to by any customer of a telecommunications carrier," and is "made available to the carrier by the customer solely by virtue of the carrier-customer relationship." Section 222(c) of the Communications Act and the FCC's implementing regulations set forth carriers' obligations regarding CPNI. These provisions cover three main issues. First, carriers must comply with certain use and disclosure rules. Section 222(c) imposes a general rule that carriers may not "use, disclose, or permit access to" "individually identifiable" CPNI without customer approval, unless a particular exception applies. Before a carrier may solicit a customer for approval to use or disclose their CPNI, it must notify customers of their legal rights regarding CPNI and provide information regarding the carrier's use and disclosure of CPNI. Second, carriers must implement certain safeguards to ensure the proper use and disclosure of CPNI. These safeguards must include, among other things, a system by which the "status of a customer's CPNI approval can be clearly established" prior to its use, employee training on the authorized use of CPNI, and "reasonable measures" to discover and protect against attempts to gain unauthorized access to CPNI." Lastly, carriers must comply with data breach requirements. Following a "breach" of customers' CPNI, a carrier must disclose such a breach to law enforcement authorities no later than seven days following a "reasonable determination of the breach." After it has "completed the process of notifying law enforcement," it must notify customers whose CPNI has been breached. In addition to the CPNI requirements, the Communications Act contains three other potentially relevant data privacy and security provisions pertaining to common carriers. First, Section 222(a) of the Act states that carriers must "protect the confidentiality of proprietary information" of "customers." Second, Section 201(b) of the Act declares unlawful "any charge, practice, classification, and regulation" in connection with a carrier's communication service that is "unjust or unreasonable." Lastly, Section 202(a) provides that it shall "be unlawful for any common carrier to make any unjust or unreasonable discrimination in charges, practices, classification, regulations, facilities, or services . . . ." In a 2016 rule, which was subsequently overturned pursuant to the Congressional Review Act, the FCC attempted to rely on these three provisions to regulate a broad category of data called "customer proprietary information" (customer PI). While customer PI is not defined in the statute, the FCC's 2016 rule defined it broadly to include CPNI, as well as other "personally identifiable information" and the "content of communications." The FCC reasoned that Section 222(a) imposes a general duty, independent from Section 222(c), on carriers to protect the confidentiality of customer PI. It further maintained that Sections 201(b) and 202(a) provide independent "backstop authority" to ensure that no gaps are formed in commercial data privacy and security practices, similar to the FTC's authority under the FTC Act. However, given that Congress overturned the 2016 rule, the FCC may be prohibited under the CRA from relying on these three provisions to regulate data privacy and security. Under the CRA, the FCC may not reissue the rule in "substantially the same form" or issue a "new rule that is substantially the same" as the overturned rule "unless the reissued or new rule is specifically authorized by a law enacted after the date of the joint resolution disapproving the original rule." The FCC is empowered to enforce civil violations of the Communications Act's provisions, including its common carrier provisions. The FCC may impose a "forfeiture penalty" against any person who "willfully or repeatedly" violates the Act or the FCC's implementing regulations. The Communications Act further imposes criminal penalties on those who "willfully and knowingly" violate the statute or the FCC's implementing regulations. Along with its general civil and criminal provisions, the Communications Act provides a private right of action for those aggrieved by violations of its common carrier provisions; in such actions, plaintiffs may seek actual damages and reasonable attorney's fees. Cable Operators and Satellite Carriers In addition to common carriers, the Communications Act imposes a number of data privacy and security requirements on how "cable operators" and "satellite carriers" (i.e., covered entities) treat their subscribers' "personally identifiable information" (PII). These requirements relate to: (1) data collection and disclosure; (2) subscribers' access to, and correction of, their data; (3) data destruction; (4) privacy policy notification; and (5) data security. First, covered entities must obtain the "prior written or electronic consent" of a subscriber before collecting the subscriber's PII or disclosing it to third parties. There are several exceptions to this consent requirement. Among other things, covered entities may collect a subscriber's PII in order to obtain information necessary to render service to the subscriber, and they may disclose a subscriber's PII if the disclosure is necessary to "render or conduct a legitimate business activity" related to the service they provide. Second, covered entities must provide subscribers, at "reasonable times and a convenient place," with access to all of their PII "collected and maintained," and they must further provide subscribers a reasonable opportunity to correct any error in such information. Third, covered entities are obligated to destroy PII if it is "no longer necessary for the purpose for which it is was collected" and there are "no pending requests or orders for access to such information." Fourth, covered entities must provide subscribers with a privacy policy notice at the "time of entering into an agreement" for services and "at least once a year thereafter." These notices must describe, among other things: (1) the nature of the subscriber's PII that has been, or will be, collected, (2) the nature, frequency, and purpose of any disclosure of such information and the types of persons to whom the disclosure is made, and (3) the times and place at which the subscriber may have access to such information. Lastly, the Communications Act imposes a general data security requirement on covered entities; they must "take such actions as are necessary to prevent unauthorized access to [PII] by a person other than the subscriber" or the covered entity. The Communications Act provides a private right of action for "[a]ny person aggrieved by any act" of a covered entity in violation of these requirements. In such actions, a court may award actual damages, punitive damages, and reasonable attorneys' fees and other litigation costs. Additionally, covered entities violating these provisions may be subject to FCC civil enforcement and criminal penalties that, as previously noted, are generally applicable to violations of the Communications Act. Video Privacy Protection Act The Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA) was enacted in 1988 in order to "preserve personal privacy with respect to the rental, purchase, or delivery of video tapes or similar audio visual materials." The VPPA does not have any data security provisions requiring entities to maintain safeguards to protect consumer information from unauthorized access. However, it does have privacy provisions restricting when covered entities can share certain consumer information. Specifically, the VPPA prohibits "video tape service providers" —a term that includes both digital video streaming services and brick-and-mortar video rental stores —from knowingly disclosing PII concerning any "consumer" without that consumer's opt-in consent. The VPPA provides several exceptions to this general rule. In particular, video tape service providers may disclose PII to "any person if the disclosure is incident to the ordinary course of business." Providers may also disclose PII if the disclosure solely includes a consumer's name and address and does not identify the "title, description, or subject matter of any video tapes or other audio visual material," and the consumer has been provided with an opportunity to opt out of such disclosure. The VPPA does not empower any federal agency to enforce violations of the Act and there are no criminal penalties for violations, but it does provide for a private right of action for persons aggrieved by the Act. In such actions, courts may award actual damages, punitive damages, preliminary and equitable relief, and reasonable attorneys' fees and other litigation costs. Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA) creates privacy protections for student education records. "Education records" are defined broadly to generally include any "materials which contain information directly related to a student" and are "maintained by an educational agency or institution." FERPA defines an "educational agency or institution" to include "any public or private agency or institution which is the recipient of funds under any applicable program." FERPA generally requires that any "educational agency or institution" (i.e., covered entities) give parents or, depending on their age, the student (1) control over the disclosure of the student's educational records, (2) an opportunity to review those records, and (3) an opportunity to challenge them as inaccurate. First, with respect to disclosure, covered entities must not have a "policy or practice" of permitting the release of education records or "personally identifiable information contained therein" without the consent of the parent or the adult student. This consent requirement is subject to certain exceptions. Among other things, covered entities may disclose educational records to (1) certain "authorized representatives," (2) school officials with a "legitimate educational interest," or (3) "organizations conducting studies" for covered entities "for the purpose of developing, validating, or administering predictive tests, administering student aid programs, and improving instructions." Covered entities may also disclose the information without consent if it constitutes "directory information" and the entity has given notice and a "reasonable period of time" to opt out of the disclosure. Second, in addition to the disclosure obligations, covered entities must not have a "policy of denying" or "effectively prevent[ing]" parents or an adult student from inspecting and reviewing the underlying educational records. Covered entities must further "establish appropriate procedures" to grant parents' review requests "within a reasonable period of time, but in no case more than forty-five days after the request has been made." Lastly, covered entities must provide an "opportunity for a hearing" to challenge the contents of the student's education records as "inaccurate, misleading, or otherwise in violation of the privacy rights of students." Covered entities must further "provide an opportunity for the correction or deletion of any such inaccurate, misleading or otherwise inappropriate data contained therein and to insert into such records a written explanation of the parents respecting the content of such records." Parents or adult students who believe that their rights under FERPA have been violated may file a complaint with the Department of Education. FERPA authorizes the Secretary of Education to "take appropriate actions," which may include withholding federal education funds, issuing a "cease and desist order," or terminating eligibility to receive any federal education funding. FERPA does not, however, contain any criminal provisions or a private right of action. Federal Securities Laws While federal securities statutes and regulations do not explicitly address data protection, two requirements under these laws have implications for how companies prevent and respond to data breaches. First, federal securities laws may require companies to adopt controls designed to protect against data breaches. Under Section 13(b)(2)(B) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), public companies and certain other companies are required to "devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances" that "transactions are executed in accordance with management's general or specific authorization," and that "access to assets is permitted only in accordance with management's general or specific authorization." In a recent report, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) suggested that, in order to comply with this requirement, companies should consider "cyber-related threats" when formulating accounting controls. The report discussed the SEC's investigation of companies that wrongly transferred millions of dollars in response to fraudulent emails, generally noting that "companies should pay particular attention to the obligations imposed by Section 13(b)(2)(B)" in light of the "risks associated with today's ever expanding digital interconnectedness." Second, federal securities laws may require companies to discuss data breaches when making required disclosures under securities laws. The Exchange Act, Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act), and their implementing regulations require certain companies to file a number of disclosures with the SEC. Specifically, the Securities Act requires companies issuing securities in a public offering to file detailed statements registering the offering (registration statements), and the Exchange Act requires public companies to file periodic reports on an annual, quarterly, and ongoing basis. These filings must contain certain categories of information, such as a description of the most significant factors that make investing in the company speculative or risky (known as "risk factors") and a description of any "events, trends, or uncertainties that are reasonably likely to have a material effect on its results of operations, liquidity, or financial condition . . . ." Further, when making these filings, or any other statements in connection with the purchase or sale of a security, companies are required to include any "material" information necessary to make the statements made therein "not misleading." In interpretive guidance issued in February 2018, the SEC indicated that, pursuant to these obligations, companies may be required to disclose in their filings cyber incidents such as data breaches. The SEC can enforce violations of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act, including the accounting controls requirement and the disclosure requirements, through civil actions filed in court or administrative "cease and desist" proceedings. The SEC may seek civil penalties, disgorgement, and injunctive relief (in civil actions) or a cease and desist order (in administrative proceedings). Furthermore, under both the Exchange Act and the Securities Act, individuals aggrieved by a company's misrepresentation or omission of a material fact in connection with the purchase or sale of a security may sue the company for actual damages incurred by the individual. There is not, however, a private right of action for violations of the Exchange Act's accounting controls requirement. Lastly, in addition to civil enforcement, both the Securities Act and the Exchange Act impose criminal liability; any person who "willfully" violates the acts or their implementing regulations may be subject to fines and imprisonment. Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) The Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) and the FTC's implementing regulations regulate the online collection and use of children's information. Specifically, COPPA's requirements apply to: (1) any "operator" of a website or online service that is "directed to children," or (2) any operator that has any "actual knowledge that it is collecting personal information from a child" (i.e., covered operators). Covered operators must comply with various requirements regarding data collection and use, privacy policy notifications, and data security. First, COPPA and the FTC's implementing regulations prohibit covered operators from collecting or using "personal information" from children under the age of thirteen without first obtaining parental consent. Such consent must be "verifiable" and must occur before the information is collected. Second, covered operators must provide parents with direct notice of their privacy policies, describing their data collection and sharing policies. Covered operators must further post a "prominent and clearly labeled link" to an online notice of its privacy policies at the home page of its website and at each area of the website in which it collects personal information from children. Lastly, covered operators that have collected information from children must establish and maintain "reasonable procedures" to protect the "confidentiality, security, and integrity" of the information, including ensuring that the information is provided only to third parties that will similarly protect the information. They must also comply with certain data retention and deletion requirements. Under COPPA's safe harbor provisions, covered operators will be deemed to have satisfied these requirements if they follow self-regulatory guidelines the FTC has approved. COPPA provides that violations of the FTC's implementing regulations will be treated as "a violation of a rule defining an unfair or deceptive act or practice" under the FTC Act. Under the FTC Act, as discussed in more detail below, the FTC has authority to enforce violations of such rules by seeking penalties or equitable relief. COPPA also authorizes state attorneys general to enforce violations affecting residents of their states. COPPA does not contain any criminal penalties or any provision expressly providing a private right of action. Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) was enacted in 1986, and is composed of three acts: the Wiretap Act, the Stored Communications Act (SCA), and the Pen Register Act. Much of ECPA is directed at law enforcement, providing "Fourth Amendment like privacy protections" to electronic communications. However, ECPA's three acts also contain privacy obligations relevant to non-governmental actors. ECPA is perhaps the most comprehensive federal law on electronic privacy, as it is not sector-specific, and many of its provisions apply to a wide range of private and public actors. Nevertheless, its impact on online privacy practices has been limited. As some commentators have observed, ECPA "was designed to regulate wiretapping and electronic snooping rather than commercial data gathering," and litigants attempting to apply ECPA to online data collection have generally been unsuccessful. The Wiretap Act applies to the interception of a communication in transit. A person violates the Act if, among other acts, he "intentionally intercepts . . . any wire, oral, or electronic communication." The Wiretap Act defines an "electronic communication" broadly, and courts have held that the term includes information conveyed over the internet. Several thresholds must be met for an act to qualify as an unlawful "interception." Of particular relevance are three threshold issues. First, the communication must be acquired contemporaneously with the transmission of the communication. Consequently, there is no "interception" where the communication in question is in storage. Furthermore, the acquired information must relate to the "contents" of the communication, defined as information concerning the "substance, purport, or meaning of that communication." As a result, while the Act applies to information like the header or body of an email, the Act does not apply to non-substantive information automatically generated about the characteristics of the communication, such as IP addresses. Third, individuals do not violate the Wiretap Act if they are a "party to the communication" or received "prior consent" from one of the parties to the communication. The party-to-the-communication and consent exceptions have been subject to significant litigation; in particular, courts have often relied on the exceptions to dismiss suits alleging Wiretap Act violations due to online tracking, holding that websites or third-party advertisers who tracked users' online activity were either parties to the communication or received consent from a party to the communication. The SCA prohibits the improper access or disclosure of certain electronic communications in storage. With respect to improper access, a person violates the SCA if he obtains an "electronic communication" in "electronic storage" from "a facility through which an electronic communication service is provided" by either: (1) "intentionally access[ing] [the facility] without authorization" or (2) "intentionally exceed[ing] an authorization." Although the statute does not define the term "facility," most courts have held that the term is limited to a location where network service providers store communications. However, courts have differed over whether a personal computer is a "facility." Most courts have excluded personal computers from the reach of the SCA, but some have disagreed. With respect to improper disclosure, the SCA generally prohibits entities providing "electronic communication services" or "remote computing services" from knowingly divulging the contents of a communication while holding the communication in electronic storage. Similar to the Wiretap Act, the SCA's access and disclosure prohibitions are subject to certain exceptions. In particular, individuals do not violate the SCA if they are the sender or intended recipient of the communication or when a party to the communication consents to the access or disclosure. As with the Wiretap Act, courts have relied on these two exceptions to dismiss suits under the SCA related to online tracking. The Pen Register Act prohibits the installation of a "pen register" or "trap and trace device" without a court order. A pen register is a "device or process" that "records or decodes" outgoing "dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information," and a trap and trace device is a "device or process" that "captures the incoming . . . dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling information." In contrast to the Wiretap Act, the Pen Register Act applies to the capture of non-content information, as the definitions of pen registers and trap and trace devices both exclude any device or process that captures the "contents of any communication." Furthermore, the Pen Register Act prohibits only the use of a pen register or trap and trace device and does not separately prohibit the disclosure of non-content information obtained through such use. The statute does, however, have several exceptions similar to those contained in the Wiretap Act and SCA. Among other things, providers of an electronic or wire communication service will not violate the Act when they use a pen register or trap and trace device in order to "protect their rights or property" or "where the consent of the user of that service has been obtained." The Wiretap Act and the SCA both provide for private rights of action. Persons aggrieved by violations of either act may bring a civil action for damages, equitable relief, and reasonable attorney's fees. For actions under the Wiretap Act, damages are the greater of: (1) actual damages suffered by the plaintiff, or (2) "statutory damages of whichever is the greater of $100 a day for each day of violation or $10,000." For actions under the SCA, damages are "the sum of the actual damages suffered by the plaintiff and the profits made by the violator," provided that all successful plaintiffs are entitled to receive at least $1,000. Violations of the Wiretap Act and SCA are also subject to criminal prosecution and can result in fines and imprisonment. In contrast, the Pen Register Act does not provide for a private right of action, but knowing violations can result in criminal fines and imprisonment. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) was originally intended as a computer hacking statute and is centrally concerned with prohibiting unauthorized intrusions into computers, rather than addressing other data protection issues such as the collection or use of data. Specifically, the CFAA imposes liability when a person "intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains . . . information from any protected computer." A "protected computer" is broadly defined as any computer used in or affecting interstate commerce or communications, functionally allowing the statute to apply to any computer that is connected to the internet. Violations of the CFAA are subject to criminal prosecution and can result in fines and imprisonment. The CFAA also allows for a private right of action, allowing aggrieved individuals to seek actual damages and equitable relief, such as an injunction against the defendant. As with ECPA, internet users have attempted to use this private right of action to sue companies tracking their online activity, arguing that companies' use of tracking devices constitutes an unauthorized access of their computers. In this vein, CFAA is theoretically a more generous statute than ECPA for such claims because it requires authorization from the owner of the computer (i.e., the user), rather than allowing any party to a communication (i.e., either the user or the website visited by the user) to give consent to the access. In practice, however, such claims have typically been dismissed due to plaintiffs' failure to meet CFAA's damages threshold. Specifically, as a threshold to bring a private right of action, a plaintiff must show damages in excess of $5,000 or another specific type of damages such as physical injury or impairment to medical care. Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act) The FTC Act has emerged as a critical law relevant to data privacy and security. As some commentators have noted, the FTC has used its authority under the Act to become the "go-to agency for privacy," effectively filling in gaps left by the aforementioned federal statutes. While the FTC Act was originally enacted in 1914 to strengthen competition law, the 1938 Wheeler-Lea amendment revised Section 5 of the Act to prohibit a broad range of unscrupulous or misleading practices harmful to consumers. The Act gives the FTC jurisdiction over most individuals and entities, although there are several exemptions. For instance, the FTC Act exempts common carriers, nonprofits, and financial institutions such as banks, savings and loan institutions, and federal credit unions. The key provision of the FTC Act, Section 5, declares unlawful "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" (UDAP) "in or affecting commerce." The statute provides that an act or practice is "unfair" only if it "causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition." While the statute does not define "deceptive," the FTC has clarified in guidance that an act or practice is to be considered deceptive if it involves a material "representation, omission, or practice that is likely to mislead [a] consumer" who is "acting reasonably in the circumstances." Under the FTC Act, the agency may enact rules defining specific acts or practices as UDAPs, often referred to as "trade regulation rules" (TRRs) or "Magnuson-Moss" rulemaking. However, to enact TRRs the FTC must comply with several procedures that are not required under the notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures set forth in Section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which are the default rulemaking procedures for federal agencies. Among other things, these additional procedures require the FTC to publish an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM), give interested persons an opportunity for an informal hearing, and issue a statement accompanying the rule regarding the "prevalence of the acts or practices treated by the rule." Consequently, the FTC rarely uses its TRR rulemaking authority and has not enacted any TRRs regarding data protection. Rather, as discussed further below, the agency largely uses enforcement actions to signal the types of acts and practices it considers to be impermissible UDAPs. The FTC has brought hundreds of enforcement actions against companies alleging deceptive or unfair data protection practices. Most of these actions result in companies entering into consent decrees requiring the companies to take certain measures to prevent any further violations. While these consent decrees are not legally binding on those who are not a party to them, they are significant because they reflect the type of practices that the FTC views as "unfair" or "deceptive." Indeed, some scholars view the principles arising from them as a type of "common law of privacy." Given the uniquely important role FTC enforcement plays in the U.S. data protection landscape, it is worth noting the types of data protection practices the FTC has viewed as "unfair" or "deceptive." Perhaps the most settled principle of the FTC's "common law of privacy" is that companies are bound by their data privacy and data security promises. The FTC has taken the position that companies act deceptively when they gather, use, or disclose personal information in a way that contradicts their posted privacy policy or other statements, or when they fail to adequately protect personal information from unauthorized access despite promises that that they would do so. In addition to broken promises, the FTC has alleged that companies act deceptively when they make false representations in order to induce disclosure of personal information. For example, in FTC v. Sun Spectrum Commc'ns Org., Inc. , the FTC alleged that several telemarketers acted "deceptively" by misrepresenting themselves as a credit card company and requesting personal information from individuals, ostensibly for the purpose of providing non-existent credit cards to the individuals. The FTC has further maintained that companies act deceptively when their privacy policies or other statements provide insufficient notice of their privacy practices. For instance, in In the Matter of Sears Holdings Management Co. , the FTC alleged that Sears acted deceptively by failing to disclose the extent to which downloadable software would monitor users' internet activity, merely telling users that it would track their "online browsing." Along with "deceptive claims," the FTC has also alleged that certain data privacy or data security practices may be "unfair." Specifically, the FTC has maintained that it is unfair for a company to retroactively apply a materially revised privacy policy to personal data that it collected under a previous policy. The FTC has also taken the position that certain default privacy settings are unfair. In the case FTC v. Frostwire , for example, the FTC alleged that a peer-to-peer file sharing application had unfair privacy settings because, immediately upon installation, the application would share the personal files stored on users' devices unless the users went through a burdensome process of unchecking many pre-checked boxes. With respect to data security, the FTC has more recently maintained that a company's failure to safeguard personal data may be "unfair," even if the company did not contradict its privacy policy or other statements. While at least one court has agreed that such conduct may be "unfair" under the FTC Act, a recent U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit case, LabMD v. FTC , suggests that any FTC cease and desist order based on a company's "unfair" data security measures must allege specific data failures and specific remedies. In LabMD , the court noted that the FTC's order "contain[ed] no prohibitions" but "command[ed] [the company] to overhaul and replace its data-security program to meet an indeterminable standard of reasonableness." The court concluded that such an order was unenforceable, reasoning that the order "effectually charge[d] the district court [enforcing the order] with managing the overhaul." The court further suggested that penalizing a company for failing to comply with an imprecise standard "may constitute a denial of due process" because it would not give the company fair notice of the prohibited conduct. Ultimately, while LabMD did not decide whether inadequate data security measures may be "unfair" under the FTC Act, the decision is nevertheless a potentially significant limitation on the FTC's ability to remedy such violations of the statute. LabMD is also a notable case because it adds to the relatively sparse case law on the FTC Act's "unfair or deceptive" prohibition. As mentioned, the large majority of the FTC enforcement actions are settled, with parties entering into consent decrees. To the extent FTC allegations are contested, the FTC may either commence administrative enforcement proceedings or civil litigation against alleged violators. In an administrative enforcement proceeding, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) hears the FTC's complaint and may issue a cease and desist order prohibiting the respondent from engaging in wrongful conduct. In civil litigation, the FTC may seek equitable relief, such as injunctions or disgorgement, when a party "is violating, or is about to violate," the FTC Act. The FTC may only seek civil penalties, however, if the party has violated a cease and desist order, consent decree, or a TRR. The FTC Act does not provide a private right of action, and it does not impose any criminal penalties for violations of Section 5. Consumer Financial Protection Act (CFPA) Similar to the FTC Act, the CFPA prohibits covered entities from engaging in certain unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts. Enacted in 2010 as Title X of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, the CFPA created the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) as an independent agency within the Federal Reserve System. The Act gives the CFPB certain "organic" authorities, including the authority to take any action to prevent any "covered person" from "committing or engaging in an unfair, deceptive, or abusive act or practice" (UDAAP) in connection with offering or providing a "consumer financial product or service." The CFPB's UDAAP authority under the CFPA is very similar to the FTC's UDAP authority under the FTC Act; indeed, the CFPA contains the same definition of "unfair" as in the FTC Act, and the CFPB has adopted the FTC's definition of "deceptive" acts or practices. However, there are several important differences. First, the CFPA's UDAAP prohibition includes "abusive" practices, as well as unfair or deceptive ones. An act or practice is abusive if it either (1) "materially interferes with the ability of a consumer to understand a term or condition of a consumer financial product or service" or (2) "takes unreasonable advantage of" a consumer's (a) lack of understanding, (b) inability to protect her own interest in selecting or using a consumer financial product or service, or (c) reasonable reliance on a covered person to act in her interest. While abusive conduct may also be unfair or deceptive, abusiveness is a separate standard that may cover additional conduct. Second, the CFPA prohibits UDAAPs only in connection with offering or providing a "consumer financial product or service." A product or service meets this standard if it is one of the specific financial product or services listed in the CFPA and is offered or provided to consumers primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. Lastly, the CFPA applies only to "covered persons" or "service providers." The statute defines "covered persons" as persons who offer or provide a consumer financial product or service, and it defines "service providers" as those who provide a "material service" to a "covered person" in connection with offering or providing a consumer financial product or service. As some commentators have noted, the CFPB could follow in the FTC's footsteps and use its UDAAP authority to regulate data protection. However, the CFPB has generally been inactive in the data privacy and security space. Indeed, to date, it has brought only one such enforcement action, which involved allegations that an online payment platform, Dwolla, Inc., made deceptive statements regarding its data security practices and the safety of its online payments system. To the extent it does use its authority, the CFPB has some powerful procedural advantages in comparison with the FTC. In particular, the CFPB can enact rules identifying and prohibiting particular UDAAP violations through the standard APA rulemaking process, whereas the FTC must follow the more burdensome Magnuson-Moss rulemaking procedures. Regarding enforcement, the CFPA authorizes the CFPB to bring civil or administrative enforcement actions against entities engaging in UDAAPs. Unlike the FTC, the CFPB can seek civil penalties in all such enforcement actions, as well as equitable relief such as disgorgement or injunctions. However, as with the FTC Act, the CFPA does not provide a private right of action that would allow adversely affected individuals to sue companies violating the Act. The statute also does not impose any criminal penalties for UDAAP violations. State Data Protection Law Adding to the complex federal patchwork of data protection statutes are the laws of the fifty states. First and foremost, major regulators of privacy and data protection in the states include the courts, via tort and contract law. With respect to tort law, in addition to the "privacy" causes of action that developed at the state level during the early 20th century (discussed above), negligence and other state tort law claims serve as a means to regulate businesses that are injured from data security issues or otherwise fail to protect their customers from foreseeable harm. Contracts, implied contracts, and other commercial causes of action can also form important bulwarks for privacy. The common law, however, is not perfect: it is subject to variability from state to state, and within states, from judge to judge and jury to jury. In addition to the common law, most states have their own statutory framework which may affect data protection and the use of data by private entities. For example, many states have a consumer protection law, sometimes prohibiting unfair or deceptive practices, often referred to as "little FTC Acts." These laws, like the FTC Act, are increasingly being used to address privacy matters. In addition, each state has passed a data breach response law, requiring some form of response or imposing liability on companies in the event of a breach of their data security. While an examination of every state data security law is beyond the scope of this report, at least one state has undertaken a general and ambitious effort to regulate data security. Specifically, the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), enacted in 2018, has captured significant attention. The California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) The CCPA's Scope Unlike the federal patchwork provisions, neither the method of data collection nor the industry that the business operates in limits the potential application of the CCPA. Instead, the CCPA applies to any company that collects the personal information of Californians, is for-profit, does business in California, and satisfies a basic set of thresholds. Analysts have suggested that these thresholds are low enough that the law could reach a considerable number of even "relatively small" businesses with websites accessible in California. The CCPA also does not distinguish between the sources of the data that comes within its scope. Rather, the CCPA regulates all "personal information," which, by the CCPA's definition, covers nearly any information a business would collect from a consumer. The law does not require the presence of any individual identifier, such as a name or address, for data to fall within the meaning of personal information. Rather, the CCPA broadly defines personal information as "information that identifies, relates to, describes, or is capable of being associated with, or could reasonably be linked, directly or indirectly, with a particular consumer or household." Following this definition, the CCPA provides some telling illustrations of what constitutes personal information, including any "electronic network activity [such as] browsing history, search history, and information regarding a consumer's interaction with an Internet Web site, application, or advertisement" and "inferences drawn from any of" this information. The CCPA's Provisions and Requirements The CCPA provides consumers with three main "rights." The first of these is a " right to know " the information that businesses have collected or sold about them. This right requires that businesses must, in advance of any collection, "inform [by mail or electronically] consumers as to the categories of personal information to be collected and the purposes" to which the information will be put. Second, the CCPA provides consumers with the " right to opt out " of the sale of a consumer's information. Under the new law, businesses must inform consumers of this right, and if a consumer so affirmatively opts out, the business cannot again sell the consumer's information unless the consumer subsequently provides the business express authorization. Finally, the CCPA gives consumers the right, in certain circumstances, to request that a business delete any information collected about the consumer (i.e., " right to delete "). Under the law, a business that receives such a request must delete the information collected and direct its "service providers" to do the same. Remedies, Liabilities, and Fines The primary means to enforce the CCPA are actions brought by the California Attorney General. According to the statute, businesses that fail to provide the protections required by the CCPA and fail to cure those violations within 30 days are liable for civil penalties of up to $7,500 per violation. Penalties or settlements collected under the CCPA are to be deposited with the newly created Consumer Privacy Fund, the funds for which are used only to offset costs incurred in connection with the administration of the CCPA. While the CCPA provides for a private cause of action, allowing for individual and class action lawsuits against businesses, this cause of action is only available in the case of a consumer whose "nonencrypted or nonredacted personal information" is subject to "unauthorized access and exfiltration, theft, or disclosure" as a result of a failure to "implement and maintain reasonable security procedures." Further, such actions can be brought only if a consumer provides a business with 30 days' written notice and provides the business with opportunity to cure the violation, unless the consumer suffered actual pecuniary damages. The statute does not specify how a business could "cure" a violation of this type. Consumers may obtain damages under this section of no less than $100 and no more than $750 "per incident," or actual damages, whichever is greater, as well as injunctive relief. The CCPA and the 116th Congress Statements by some Members of Congress during Congressional hearings have already noted the CCPA's likely importance to future federal legislative efforts. Further, some outside commentators have argued explicitly that the CCPA should be preempted by a future federal law. These statements may be motivated by the likely fact that, if left intact, the California law could shape industry and consumer concerns both inside and outside California. First, the law is likely to be the "first in a long line of similar pieces of legislation," all of which may model themselves after the CCPA, or will have to respond to its impact. Second, even though the statute is the product of a single state, its broad jurisdictional reach would bring companies throughout the United States and from around the world into its sweep. These factors combined are likely to make the CCPA important to federal legislators. Furthermore, some of the provisions of the California law could form a model for future federal regulation—although along those lines, another potential model it has to compete with is Europe's GDPR. The EU's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) In addition to U.S. states like California, some foreign nations have enacted comprehensive data protection legislation. The EU, in particular, has long applied a more wide-ranging data protection regulatory scheme. Whereas privacy principles in the U.S. Constitution focus on government intrusions into private life and U.S. data privacy statutes generally are sector-specific, European privacy regulations have generally concerned any entity's accumulation of large amounts of data. As a result, foundational EU treaties provide individuals with a general right to "protection of personal data" from all potential interferences. The objective of the EU's most recent data privacy legislation—the GDPR—is to safeguard this right to personal data protection, while ensuring that data moves freely within the EU. European Data Privacy Laws and the Lead-Up to the GDPR Beginning in the 1970s, individual European countries began enacting broad, omnibus national statutes concerning data protection, privacy, and information practices. Although these domestic laws shared certain features, their differing data privacy and protection standards occasionally impeded the free flow of information between European countries. As a consequence, the EU attempted to harmonize its various national privacy laws by adopting an EU-wide data privacy and protection initiative—the 1995 Directive on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data (Data Protection Directive). While the Data Protection Directive applied on an EU-wide basis, EU law authorized each member-nation to implement the directive's requirements into the country's national law. By 2012, the European Commission—the executive body of the EU —came to view differing implementations of the Data Protection Directive at the national level as problematic. The Commission concluded that a single regulation should be developed in order to eliminate the fragmentation and administrative burdens created by the directive-based system. The Commission also sought to bring EU law up to date with developments in technology and globalization that changed the way data is collected, accessed, and used. In pursuit of these goals, the EU developed and adopted the GDPR, which replaced the 1995 Data Protection Directive and went into effect on May 25, 2018. GDPR Provisions and Requirements Scope and Territorial Reach The GDPR regulates the processing of personal data that meet its territoriality requirements, discussed below. Processing includes collection, use, storage, organization, disclosure or any other operation or set of operations performed on personal data, unless an exception applies. Personal data is defined as any information relating to an identified or identifiable person, and it can include names, identification numbers, location data, IP addresses, cookies, and any other information through which an individual can be directly or indirectly identified. The GDPR applies different requirements for controllers and processors of personal data. In general, a controller determines the purposes and means of processing personal data, and a processor is responsible for processing data on behalf of a controller. From a territorial perspective, the GDPR applies to organizations that have an "establishment" in the EU and that process personal data in the context of the activities of that establishment. The GDPR does not define "establishment," but states that it "implies the effective and real exercise of activity through stable arrangements." In a pre-GDPR case, the Court of Justice of the European Union stated that the concept of establishment under the 1995 Data Protection Directive extended "to any real and effective activity—even a minimal one—exercised through stable arrangements." Entities that meet the establishment requirement are subject to the GDPR even if their data processing activities take place outside the EU. The GDPR also applies to non-EU-established entities that offer goods or services to individuals in the EU or monitor individuals' behavior in the EU. Because many businesses with an online presence offer goods and services to EU individuals, the GDPR applies to many businesses outside the EU. Key Principles The GDPR lays out seven guiding principles for the processing of personal data. While these principles are not "hard and fast rules" themselves, they inform the interpretation of the GDPR and its more concrete requirements, discussed below. Bases for Processing and Consent Requirements The GDPR requires data controllers and processors to have a lawful basis to process personal data. The regulation delineates six possible legal bases: (1) consent; (2) performance of contract; (3) compliance with a legal obligations; (4) protection of the "vital interests" (i.e., the life) of the data subject or another individual; (5) tasks carried out in the public interest (e.g., by a government entity); and (6) the "legitimate interests" of the controller or a third party, unless the fundamental rights and freedom of the data subject override those interests. Commentators describe the "legitimate interests" category as the most flexible and as the potential basis for a host of common activities, such as processing carried out in the normal course of business, provided that the processing is not unethical, unlawful, or otherwise illegitimate. When data processing is premised on consent, the consent must be freely given, specific, informed, and unambiguous, and it can be withdrawn at any time. Additional consent requirements and restrictions apply to especially sensitive data, such as children's information and data that reveals ethnic origins, political opinions, religious beliefs, union status, sexual orientation, health information, and criminal histories. Individual Rights and Corresponding Obligations The GDPR provides a series of rights to individuals and corresponding obligations for data controllers, unless an exception applies. Data Governance and Security The GDPR requires organizations to implement a range of measures designed to ensure and demonstrate that they are in compliance with the regulation. When proportionate in relation to the processing activities, such measures may include adopting and implementing data protection policies and taking a "data protection by design and default" approach whereby the organization implements compliance measures into all stages of data processing. Measures may also include the following: establishing GDPR-conforming contracts with data processors; maintaining records of processing activities; conducting impact assessments on personal data use that is likely to risk individual rights and freedoms; appointing a data protection officer; and adhering to relevant codes of conduct and compliance certification schemes. The GDPR also requires controllers and processors to implement technical and organizational measures to ensure a level of data security that is "appropriate to the risk" presented by the data processing. In implementing data security measures, organizations must consider the "state of the art, the costs of implementation," the nature, scope, and context, and purposes of processing, and the likelihood and potential severity of an infringement on individual rights if data security were to be violated. The GDPR does not impose a "one-size-fits-all" requirement for data security, and security measures that are "appropriate" (and therefore mandatory) will depend on the specific circumstances and risks. For example, a company with an extensive network system that holds a large amount of sensitive or confidential information presents greater risk, and therefore must install more rigorous data security protections than an entity that holds less data. When appropriate, organizations should consider encryption and pseudonymization —the processing of personal data such that the data can no longer be attributed to a specific individual. Security measures should ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and resilience of processing systems; be able to restore access to personal data in the event of an incident; and include a process for testing security effectiveness. Data Breach Notifications In the event of a personal data breach, the GDPR requires controllers to notify the designated EU government authority "without undue delay" and no later than 72 hours after learning of the breach, unless the breach is "unlikely to result in a risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons." For example, whereas a company must report the theft of a customer database that contains information that could be used for future identity fraud given the high level of risk to individuals, it may not need to report the loss of more innocuous data, such as a directory of staff office phone numbers. When notification to the government is required, the notification must describe the nature and likely consequences of the breach, identify measures to address the breach, and identify the employee responding to the incident. When data processors experience a breach, they must notify the controller without undue delay. In addition to governmental notification, controllers must notify the individuals whose data has been compromised if the breach is likely to result in a "high risk to the rights and freedoms" of individuals. The "high risk" threshold is higher than the threshold for notifying the government authority, but it could met in circumstances when individuals may need to take steps to protect themselves from the effects of a data breach. According to the United Kingdom's data protection regulatory authority, for example, a hospital that disclosed patient medical records as a result of a data breach may present a "high risk" to individuals, but a university that accidentally deleted, but was able to re-create, an alumni contact information database may not meet the mandatory individual reporting threshold. Notification to the individual must describe the breach in clear and plain language and contain at least the same information as provided in the governmental notifications. Notification to the individual is not required in the following cases: the controller implemented appropriate technical and organizational protection measures, such as encryption, that will render the data unintelligible; the controller took subsequent measures that will ensure that the high risk to individual rights and freedom are no longer likely to materialize; or individual notifications would involve disproportionate efforts, in which case the controller must provide public notice of the breach. Regardless of whether notification is required, controllers must document all data breaches so that government supervisory authorities can verify compliance at a later date. Data Transfer Outside the EU The EU has long regulated the transfer of data from EU member states to foreign countries, and the GDPR continues to restrict such international data transfers. Like the 1995 Data Protection Directive, the GDPR authorizes data transfer from within the EU to a non-EU country if the receiving country ensures an adequate level of protection for personal data. To meet this requirement, the non-EU country must offer a level of protection that is "essentially equivalent to that ensured" by the GDPR. If the European Commission previously made an adequacy decision under the Data Protection Directive's legal framework, that decision remains in force under the GDPR. U.S. and EU officials previously developed a legal framework—the U.S.-EU Privacy Shield—for protecting transatlantic data flow into the United States. Under the Privacy Shield framework, U.S.-based organizations self-certify to the International Trade Administration in the Department of Commerce that they will comply with the framework's requirements for protecting personal data by complying with, among other provisions, notice requirements, data retention limits, security requirements, and data processing purpose principles. In 2016, the European Commission concluded that the Privacy Shield framework provided adequate protections under the Data Protection Directive. That adequacy determination continues to apply under the GDPR, although the European Commission annually reviews whether the Privacy Shield framework continues to provide an adequate level of protection. In the absence of an adequacy decision from the European Commission, the GDPR permits data transfers outside the EU when (1) the recipient of the data has itself established appropriate safeguards , and (2) effective legal remedies exist for individuals to enforce their data privacy and protection rights. Appropriate safeguards include: a legally binding agreement between public authorities or bodies; binding corporate rules; standard contract clauses adopted by the European Commission; and approved codes of conduct and certification mechanisms. U.S. companies that do not participate in Privacy Shield often must rely on standard contract clauses to be able to receive data from the EU. The GDPR also identifies a list of circumstances in which data may be transferred outside the EU even without appropriate safeguards or an adequacy decision. These circumstances include, among other reasons, when: an individual has provided informed consent; transfer is necessary for the performance of certain contracts involving the data subject; or the transfer is necessary for important reasons of public interests. Remedies, Liability, and Fines One of the most commented-upon aspects of the GDPR is its high ceiling for administrative fines. For the most serious infractions of the GDPR, regulatory bodies within individual EU countries may impose fines up to 20 million euro (approximately $22 million) or 4% of global revenue, whichever is higher, for certain violations of the GDPR. The GDPR also provides tools for individuals to enforce compliance with its terms. Individuals whose personal data is processed in a way that does not comport with the GDPR may lodge a complaint with regulatory authorities. Individuals also have the right to an "effective judicial remedy" (i.e., to pursue a lawsuit) against the responsible data processor or controller, and individuals may obtain compensation for their damages from data processors or controllers. The GDPR and the 116th Congress The GDPR may be relevant to the 116th Congress' consideration of data protection initiatives in several ways. Because the GDPR applies to U.S. companies that offer goods and services to individuals in the EU, many U.S. companies have developed new data protection practices in an effort to comply with its requirements. Other businesses reported that they withdrew from the European market rather than attempt to obtain compliance GDPR. For those companies that remained in the European market, some have stated that they will apply their GDPR-compliant practices on a company-wide basis rather than changing their model only when doing business in the EU. Consequently, the GDPR already directly impacts the data protection practices of some U.S. companies. The GDPR also has served as a prototype for comprehensive data protection legislation in other governments. For example, commentators have described China's Personal Information Security Specification, which defines technical standards related to the collection, storage, use, transfer, and disclosure of personal information, as modeled on the GDPR. And the CCPA includes elements similar to the GDPR, such as an enumeration of individual rights related to data privacy. If this trend continues, GDPR-like data protection laws may become more commonplace internationally. Finally, some argue that Congress should consider enacting comprehensive federal data protection legislation similar to the GDPR. As discussed below, however, other observers and some officials in the Trump Administration have criticized the GDPR, describing the regulation as overly prescriptive and likely to result in negative unintended consequences. Regardless of the merits of these positions, the GDPR may remain a focal point of discussion in the debate over whether the United States should develop a more comprehensive data protection policy. The Trump Administration's Proposed Data Privacy Policy Framework Although some commentators argue that the federal government should supplement the current patchwork of federal data protection laws with more comprehensive legislation modeled on the CCPA or GDPR, some Trump Administration officials have criticized these legislative approaches and questioned whether they will improve data privacy outcomes. The Administration has argued that many comprehensive data privacy models have resulted in "long, legal, regulator-focused privacy policies and check boxes, which only help a very small number of users[.]" Rather than pursuing a prescriptive model in which the government defines (or prescribes) data protection rules, the Trump Administration advocates for what it describes as an outcome-based approach whereby the government focuses on the "outcomes of organizational practices, rather than on dictating what those practices should be." In September 2018, the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) in the Department of Commerce issued a request for public comments on the Trump Administration's efforts to develop an outcome-based approach to advancing consumer privacy that also protects prosperity and innovation. According to NTIA, changes in technology have led consumers to conclude that they are losing control over their personal information, while at the same time that foreign and state privacy laws have led to a fragmented regulatory landscape that disincentives innovation. Accordingly, NTIA is attempting to develop a set of "user-centric" privacy outcomes and goals that would underpin the protections that should be produced by any federal actions related to consumer privacy. NTIA's proposed policy focuses on a set of outcomes that the Trump Administration seeks to achieve: In addition to identifying desired outcomes, NTIA's request for public comments states that the Trump Administration is in the process of developing "high-level goals for Federal action" related to data privacy. NTIA's proposed privacy framework shares certain elements of prescriptive legal regimes like the GDPR and CCPA. Common features include a right to withdraw consent to certain uses of personal data; accountability for third-party vendors and servicers; and a right to access, amend, complete, correct, or delete personal data. But NTIA's request for public comments does not specifically describe how the Trump Administration intends to accomplish its outcomes and goals. Instead, it states that NTIA "understand[s] that there is considerable work to be done to achieve" the identified objectives. The comment period closed on November 9, 2018, and NTIA received input from more than 200 individuals and entities. Considerations for Congress The debate over whether Congress should consider federal legislation regulating data protection implicates numerous legal variables and options. "Data protection" itself is an expansive concept that melds the fields of data privacy (i.e., how to control the collection, use, and dissemination of personal information) and data security (i.e., how to protect personal information from unauthorized access or use and respond to such unauthorized access or use). There is no single model for data protection legislation in existing federal, state, or foreign law. For example, some state laws focus solely on data security or address a particular security concern, such as data breach notifications. Other state laws isolate a single privacy-related issue, such as the transparency of data brokers—companies that aggregate and sell consumers' information, but that often do not have a direct commercial relationship with consumers. Recent data protection laws such as the CCPA and GDPR appear to indicate a trend toward combining data privacy and security into unified legislative initiatives. These unified data protection paradigms typically are structured on two related features: (1) an enumeration of statutory rights given to individuals related to their personal information and (2) the creation of legal duties imposed on the private entities that possess personal information. The specific list and nature of rights and duties differ depending on the legislation, and some have proposed to define new rights in federal legislation that do not have a clear analog in existing state or foreign law. Consequently, at present, there is no agreed-upon menu of data protection rights and obligations that could be included in federal legislation. Although data protection laws and proposals are constantly evolving, some frequently discussed legal rights include: the right to know what personal data is being collected, used, and disseminated, and how those activities are occurring; the right to control the use and dissemination of personal data, which may include the right to opt out or withhold consent to the collection or sharing of such data; the right to review personal data that has been collected and to delete or correct inaccurate information; the right to obtain a portable copy of personal data; the right to object to improper activities related to personal data; and the right to learn when a data breach occurs; Commonly discussed obligations for companies that collect, use, and disseminate personal data include rules defining: how data is collected from individuals; how companies use data internally; how data is disseminated or disclosed to third parties; what information companies must give individuals related to their data; how data is kept secure; when breaches of security must be reported; the accuracy of data; and reporting requirements to ensure accountability and compliance. Whether to enact federal data protection legislation that includes one or more of these rights and obligations has been the subject of a complex policy debate and multiple hearings in recent Congresses. Part of the legislative debate concerns how to enforce such rights and obligation and raises questions over the role of federal agencies, state attorneys general, and private citizen suits. In addition, some elements of the data protection proposals and models could implicate legal concerns and constitutional limitations. While the policy debate is outside the scope of this report, the following sections discuss legal considerations relevant to federal data protection proposals that the 116th Congress may choose to consider. These sections begin by analyzing legal issues related to the internal structure and definition of data protection-related rights and obligations and then move outward toward an examination of external legal constraints. Prescriptive Versus Outcome-Based Approach A primary conceptual point of debate concerning data protection legislation is whether to utilize the so-called "prescriptive" method or an "outcome-based" approach to achieve a particular law's objectives. Under the prescriptive approach, the government defines data protection rules and requires regulated individuals and entities to comply with those rules. Both the GDPR and CCPA use a prescriptive approach, and some legislation proposed in the 116th Congress would use this method by delineating certain data protection requirements. The Trump Administration, however, has argued that a prescriptive approach can stymie innovation and result in compliance checklists without providing measurable privacy benefits. As an alternative methodology, the Administration advocated for what it described as an outcome-based approach whereby the government focuses on the outcomes of organizational practices, rather than defining the practices themselves. Some federal information technology laws, such as the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA), use an outcome-oriented approach to achieve federal objectives, although agency implementation of such laws may become prescriptive in nature. The Administration has not specified how it intends to achieve its desired data protection goals without prescribing data protection rules, but additional direction appears to be forthcoming, according to the NTIA's request for public comment. Defining Protected Information and Addressing Statutory Overlap Another issue that may be considered in crafting federal data protection policy is how to define the contours of the data that the federal government proposes to protect or the specific entities or industries that it proposes to regulate. The patchwork of existing data protection statutes define protected information in a variety of ways, many of which depend on the context of the law. For example, HIPAA is limited to "protected health information" and GLBA governs "financial information" that is personally identifiable but not publicly available. By contrast, GDPR and CCPA regulate all "personal" information—a term defined in both laws as information that is associated with a particular individual or is capable of being associated with an individual. Some federal data proposals would apply a similar scope to those of the GDPR and CCPA. If enacted, such broad data protection laws have the potential to create multiple layers of federal data protection requirements: (1) general data protection requirements for "personal" information and (2) sector-specific requirements for data regulated by the existing "patchwork" of data protection laws. Other legislative proposals have sought to avoid dual layers of regulations by stating that the proposed data protection requirements would not apply to individuals or entities covered by certain existing federal privacy laws. Agency Enforcement Agency enforcement is another key issue to consider when crafting any future federal data protection legislation. As discussed, under the current patchwork of federal data protection laws, there are multiple federal agencies responsible for enforcing the myriad federal statutory protections, such as the FTC, CFPB, FCC, and HHS. Of these agencies, the FTC is often viewed—by industry representatives, privacy advocates, and FTC commissioners themselves —as the appropriate primary enforcer of any future national data protection legislation, given its significant privacy experience. There are, however, several relevant legal constraints on the FTC's enforcement authority. First, the FTC generally lacks the ability to issue fines for first-time offenses. In UDAP enforcement actions, the FTC may issue civil penalties only in certain limited circumstances, such as when a person violates a consent decree or a cease and desist order. Consequently, the FTC often enters into consent decrees addressing a broad range of conduct, such as a company's data security practices, seeking penalties for violations of those decrees. However, as the LabMD case discussed earlier in this report suggests, if the FTC imposes penalties based on imprecise legal standards provided in a rule or order, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment may constrain the agency's authority. Second, the plain text of the FTC Act deprives the FTC of jurisdiction over several categories of entities, including banks, common carriers, and nonprofits. Third, the FTC generally lacks authority to issue rules under the APA's notice-and-comment process that is typically used by agencies to issue regulations. Rather, the FTC must use a more burdensome—and, consequently, rarely used—process under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. As some FTC Commissioners and commentators have noted, these legal limitations may be significant in determining the appropriate federal enforcement provisions in any national data security legislation. While Congress may not be able to legislate around constitutional constraints, future legislation could address some of these limitations—for instance, by allowing the FTC to seek penalties for first-time violations of rules, expanding its jurisdictions to include currently excluded entities, or providing the FTC notice-and-comment rulemaking authority under the APA. These current legal constraints on FTC authority may also be relevant in determining whether national legislation should allow private causes of action or enforcement authority for state attorneys general, as some commentators have suggested that private causes of action and enforcement by state attorneys general are essential supplements to FTC enforcement. Private Rights of Action and Standing Legislation involving privacy may propose to allow individuals to seek private remedy for violations in the courts. Congress may seek to establish a private right of action allowing a private plaintiff to bring an action against a third party based directly on that party's violation of a public statute. As it has done with many sector-specific privacy laws, Congress, in a data protection statute, could provide not only for this right, but also for specific remedies beyond compensatory damages, such as statutory damages or even treble damages for injured individuals. However, it may be very difficult to prove that someone has been harmed in a clear way by many of the violations that might occur under a hypothetical data protection and privacy regime. Victims of data breaches and other privacy violations, generally speaking, do not experience clear and immediate pecuniary or reputational harm. This obstacle might threaten not only a consumer's ability to obtain monetary relief, but also could run up against the limits of the federal courts' "judicial power" under Article III of the U.S. Constitution. Article III extends the judicial power of the federal courts to only "cases" and "controversies." As part of that limitation, the Supreme Court has stated that courts may adjudicate a case only where a litigant possesses Article III standing. A party seeking relief from a federal court must establish standing. Specifically, the party must show that he has a genuine stake in the relief sought because he has personally suffered (or will suffer): (1) a concrete, particularized and actual or imminent injury; (2) that is traceable to the allegedly unlawful actions of the opposing party; and (3) that is redressable by a favorable judicial decision. These requirements, particularly the requirement of "imminence," form significant barriers for lawsuits based on data protection. Imminence, according to the Supreme Court in Clapper v. Amnesty International , requires that alleged injury be " certainly impending " to constitute injury-in-fact. Speculation and assumptions cannot be the basis of standing. This reasoning has caused courts to dismiss data breach claims where plaintiffs cannot show actual misuse of data, but can only speculate that future thieves may someday cause them direct harm. These requirements are constitutional in nature and apply regardless of whether a statute purports to give a party a right to sue. This constitutional requirement limits Congress' ability to use private rights of action as an enforcement mechanism for federal rights, as the recent Supreme Court case Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins illustrates. Spokeo involved a Federal Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) lawsuit brought by Thomas Robins against a website operator that allowed users to search for particular individuals and obtain personal information harvested from a variety of databases. Robins alleged that Spokeo's information about him was incorrect, in violation of the FCRA requirement that consumer reporting agencies "follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy" of consumer reports. As discussed earlier in this report, FCRA provides for a private right of action making any person who willfully fails to comply with its requirements liable to individuals for, among other remedies, statutory damages. The lower court understood that Robins did not specifically allege any actual damages he had suffered, such as the loss of money resulting from Spokeo's actions. Nonetheless, the court concluded that the plaintiff had standing to seek statutory damages because his injury was sufficiently particular to him—FCRA had created a statutory right for Robins and his personal interest was sufficient for standing. The Supreme Court disagreed with the lower court, however, explaining that the lower court had erred by eliding the difference between Article III's "concreteness" and "particularization" requirements. Specifically, the Court concluded that a plaintiff must demonstrate a concrete injury separate from a particularized injury, meaning that plaintiffs must show that their injury "actually exist[s]." While tangible injuries, like monetary loss, are typically concrete, a plaintiff with an "intangible injury" must show that it is "real" and not "abstract" in order to demonstrate concreteness. For example, the Spokeo Court suggested that the mere publication of an incorrect zip code, although it could violate FCRA, would not be a sufficiently concrete injury for standing purposes. As a result, the Court remanded the case to the lower court to determine if the injury alleged in the case was both particularized and concrete. Spokeo does not eliminate Congress' role in creating standing where it might not otherwise exist. The Supreme Court explained that the concreteness requirement is "grounded in historical practice" and, as a result, Congress' judgment on whether an intangible harm is sufficiently concrete can be "instructive." However, as Spokeo explained, Congress cannot elevate every privacy violation to the status of a concrete injury. Both before and after Spokeo , the lower courts have resolved standing disputes in lawsuits involving privacy and data protection, where parties argue about whether particular injuries are sufficiently concrete for purpose of Article III. Congress can possibly resolve some of these disputes by elevating some otherwise intangible injuries to concrete status. But Spokeo illustrates that there may be a residuum of harmless privacy violations for which Congress cannot provide a judicial remedy. Preemption Another legal issue Congress may need to consider with respect to any federal program involving data protection and privacy is how to structure the federal-state regime—that is, how to balance whatever federal program is enacted with the programs and policies in the states. Federal law, under the Supremacy Clause, has the power to preempt or displace state law. As discussed above, there are a host of different state privacy laws, and some states have begun to legislate aggressively in this area. The CCPA in particular represents a state law that is likely to have a national effect. Ultimately, unless Congress chooses to occupy the entire field of data protection law, it is likely that the state laws will end up continuing to have a role in this area. Further, given that the states are likely to continue to experiment with legislation, the CCPA being a prime example, it is likely that preemption will be a highly significant issue in the debate over future federal privacy legislation. As the Supreme Court has recently explained, preemption can take three forms: "conflict," "express," and "field." Conflict preemption requires any state laws that conflict with a valid federal law to be without effect. Conflict preemption can occur when it is impossible for a private party to simultaneously comply with both federal and state requirements, or when state law amounts to an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes of Congress. Express preemption occurs when Congress expresses its intent in the text of the statute as to which state laws are displaced under the federal scheme. Finally, field preemption occurs when federal law occupies a 'field' of regulation "so comprehensively that it has left no room for supplementary state legislation." Ultimately, the preemptive scope of any federal data protection legislation will turn on the "purpose" of Congress and the specific language used to effectuate that purpose. If Congress seeks to adopt a relatively comprehensive system for data protection, perhaps the most obvious means to preempt a broad swath of state regulation would be to do so "expressly" within the text of the statute by including a specific preemption provision in the law. For example, several existing federal statutes expressly preempt all state law that "relate to" a particular subject matter. The Supreme Court has held that this "related to" language encompasses any state law with a "connection with, or reference to" the subject matter referenced. Similar language can be used to displace all state laws in the digital data privacy sphere to promote a more uniform scheme. Congress could alternatively take a more modest approach to state law. For example, Congress could enact a data protection framework that expressly preserves state laws in some ways and preempts them in others. A number of federal statutes preempt state laws that impose standards "different from" or "in addition to" federal standards, or allow the regulator in charge of the federal scheme some authority to approve certain state regulations. These approaches would generally leave intact state schemes parallel to or narrower than the federal scheme. For example, a statute could permit a state to provide for additional liability or different remedies for violation of a federal standard. Congress could do the same with federal data protection legislation, using statutory language to try to ensure the protection of the provisions of state law that it sought to preserve. First Amendment Although legislation on data protection could take many forms, several approaches that would seek to regulate the collection, use, and dissemination of personal information online may have to confront possible limitations imposed by the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The First Amendment guarantees, among other rights, "freedom of speech." Scholars have split on how the First Amendment should be applied to proposed regulation in the data protection sphere. In one line of thinking, data constitutes speech, and regulation of this speech, even in the commercial context, should be viewed skeptically. Other scholars have argued that an expansive approach would limit the government's ability to regulate ordinary commercial activity, expanding the First Amendment beyond its proper role. This scholarly debate informs the discussion, but does not provide clear guidance on how to consider any particular proposed regulation. The Supreme Court has never interpreted the First Amendment as prohibiting all regulation of communication. Instead, when confronting a First Amendment challenge to a regulation, a court asks a series of questions in order to determine whether a particular law or rule runs afoul of the complicated thicket of case law that has developed in this area. The first question courts face when considering a First Amendment challenge is whether the challenged regulation involves speech or mere non-expressive conduct. As the Supreme Court has explained, simply because regulated activity involves "communication" does not mean that it comes within the ambit of the First Amendment. Where speech is merely a "component" of regulated activity, the government generally can regulate that activity without inviting First Amendment scrutiny. For example, "a law against treason…is violated by telling the enemy the Nation's defense secrets," but that does not bring the law within the ambit of First Amendment scrutiny. Assuming the regulation implicates speech rather than conduct, it typically must pass First Amendment scrutiny. However, not all regulations are subject to the same level of scrutiny. Rather, the Court has applied different tiers of scrutiny to different types of regulations. For example, the Court has long considered political and ideological speech at the "core" of the First Amendment—as a result, laws which implicate such speech generally are subject to strict scrutiny. Pursuant to this standard, the government must show that such laws are narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. By contrast, the Court has historically applied less rigorous scrutiny to laws regulating "commercial speech." Commercial speech is subject to a lower level of scrutiny known as the Central Hudson test, which generally requires the government to show only that its interest is "substantial" and that the regulation "directly advances the governmental interest asserted" without being "more extensive than necessary to serve that interest." These principles have provided general guidance to lower courts in deciding cases that intersect with data protection, but implicit disagreements between these courts have repeatedly demonstrated the difficulty in striking the balance between First Amendment interests and data-protection regulation. For example, in 2001 in Trans Union Corp. v. FTC , the D.C. Circuit upheld an FTC order that prohibited Trans Union from selling marketing lists containing the names and addresses of individuals. The court assumed that disclosing or using the marketing lists was speech, not conduct, but concluded that the FTC's restrictions on the sale of the marketing lists generally concerned "no public issue," and, as such, was subject to "reduced constitutional protection." The court derived its "no public issue" rule from the Supreme Court's case law on defamation, which generally views speech that is solely in the private interest of the speaker as being subject to lower First Amendment protection from defamation suits than speech regarding matters of a public concern. Applying this "reduced constitutional protection" to the context of Trans Union's marketing lists, the court determined that the regulations were appropriately tailored. While the Trans Union court did not cite to Central Hudson , other courts have gone on to apply similar reasoning to uphold data protection laws from constitutional challenge under the ambit of Central Hudson 's commercial speech test. In contrast with the relatively lenient approach applied to a privacy regulation in Trans Union , in U.S. West v. FCC , the Tenth Circuit struck down FCC regulations on the use and disclosure of Consumer Proprietary Network Information (CPNI). The regulations stated that telecommunications carriers could use or disclose CPNI only for the purpose of marketing products to customers if the customer opted in to this use. The court determined that these provisions regulated commercial speech because they limited the ability of carriers to engage in consumer marketing. Applying Central Hudson , the court held that although the government alleged a general interest in protecting consumer privacy, this interest was insufficient to justify the regulations. The panel ruled that the regulations did not materially advance a substantial state interest because the government failed to tie the regulations to specific and real harm, supported by evidence. The court also concluded that a narrower regulation, such as a consumer opt-out, could have served the same general purpose. After the Tenth Circuit's decision in U.S. West , the FCC responded by making minor changes to its regulations, maintaining some elements of the opt-in procedure for the use of CPNI and reissuing them with a new record. After this reissuance, the D.C. Circuit considered these modified-but-similar regulations in a 2009 case. In that case, the D.C. Circuit upheld the regulations without attaching much significance to the FCC's changes, and apparently implicitly disagreeing with the Tenth Circuit about both the importance of the privacy interest at stake and whether the opt-in procedure was proportional to that interest. The Supreme Court's first major examination of the First Amendment in this context came in 2011. That year, the Court decided Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc. , a case that is likely to be critical to understanding the limits of any future data protection legislation. In Sorrell , the Court considered the constitutionality of a Vermont law that restricted certain sales, disclosures, and uses of pharmacy records. Pharmaceutical manufacturers and data miners challenged this statute on the grounds that it prohibited them from using these records in marketing, thereby imposing what they viewed to be an unconstitutional restriction on their protected expression. Vermont first argued that its law should be upheld because the "sales, transfer, and use of prescriber-identifying information" was mere conduct and not speech. The Court explained that, as a general matter, "the creation and dissemination of information are speech within the meaning of the First Amendment," and thus there was "a strong argument that prescriber identifying information is speech for First Amendment purposes." Ultimately, however, the Court stopped short of fully embracing this conclusion, merely explaining that it did not matter whether the actual transfer of prescriber-identifying information was speech because the law nonetheless impermissibly sought to regulate the content of speech—the marketing that used that data, as well as the identities of speakers—by regulating an input to that speech. As the Court explained, the Vermont law was like "a law prohibiting trade magazines from purchasing or using ink." Second, Vermont argued that, even if it was regulating speech, its regulations passed the lower level of scrutiny applicable to commercial speech. The Court disagreed. The Court explained that the Vermont law enacted "content- and speaker-based restrictions on the sale, disclosure and use of prescriber identifying information" because it specifically targeted pharmaceutical manufacturers and prohibited certain types of pharmaceutical marketing. As the Court stated in a previous case, "[c]ontent-based regulations are presumptively invalid" because they "raise[] the specter that the Government may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace." Further, the Sorrell Court observed that the legislature's stated purpose was to diminish the effectiveness of marketing by certain drug manufacturers, in particular those that promoted brand-name drugs, suggesting to the Court that the Vermont law went "beyond mere content discrimination, to actual viewpoint discrimination." As a result, the Court concluded that some form of "heightened scrutiny" applied. Nevertheless, the Court reasoned that, even if Central Hudson 's less rigorous standard of scrutiny applied, the law failed to meet that standard because its justification in protecting physician privacy was not supported by the law's reach in allowing prescriber-identifying information's use "for any reason save" marketing purposes. Most of the lower courts outside the data protection and privacy context that have considered Sorrell have held that Sorrell 's reference to "heightened scrutiny" did not override the Central Hudson test in commercial speech cases, even where those cases include content- or speaker- based restrictions. Others, however, have held that content- and speaker-based restrictions must comport with something more rigorous than the traditional Central Hudson test, but it is not clear what this new standard requires or where it leads to a different outcome than Central Hudson . As a result, while Sorrell 's impact on privacy and data protection regulation has been considered by a few courts, no consensus exists on the impact it will have. However, a few commentators have observed that the case will likely have an important effect on the future of privacy regulation, if nothing else, by having all but concluded that First Amendment principles apply to the regulation of the collection, disclosure, and use of personally identifiable information as speech, not conduct. With respect to such future regulation, policymakers will likely want, at the minimum, to meet the Central Hudson requirement of ensuring that any restrictions on the creation, disclosure or use of information are justified by a substantial interest and that the regulations are no more extensive than necessary to further that interest. To illustrate, the Court in Sorrell identified HIPAA as a permissible "privacy" regulation because it allowed "the information's sale or disclosure in only a few narrow and well-justified circumstances." This dictum suggests that Congress is able to regulate in the data protection sphere as long as it avoids the pitfalls of the law in Sorrell . However, it may not always be easy to determine whether any given law involves speaker or content discrimination. In Sorrell itself, for instance, three dissenting Justices argued that the content and speaker discrimination that took place under the Vermont law was inevitable in any economic regulation. As a result, resolving these issues as data privacy legislation becomes more complex is likely to create new challenges for legislators. Conclusion The current legal landscape governing data protection in the United States is complex and highly technical, but so too are the legal issues implicated by proposals to create unified federal data protection policy. Except in extreme incidents and cases of government access to personal data, the "right to privacy" that developed in the common law and constitutional doctrine provide few safeguards for the average internet user. Although Congress has enacted a number of laws designed to augment individual's data protection rights, the current patchwork of federal law generally is limited to specific industry participants, specific types of data, or data practices that are unfair or deceptive. This patchwork approach also extends to certain state laws. Seeking a more comprehensive data protection system, some governments—such as California and the EU—have enacted wide-ranging laws regulating many forms of personal data. Some argue that Congress should consider creating similar protections in federal law, but others have criticized the EU's and California's approach to data protection. Should the 116th Congress consider a comprehensive federal data protection program, its legislative proposals may involve numerous decision points and legal considerations. An initial decision point is the scope and nature of any legislative proposal. There are numerous data protection issues that could be addressed in any future legislation, and different possible approaches for addressing those issues (such as using a "prescriptive" or "outcome-based" approach). Other decision points may include defining the scope of any protected information and determining the extent to which any future legislation should be enforced by a federal agency. Further, to the extent Congress wants to allow individuals to enforce data protection laws and seek remedies for the violations of such laws in court, it must account for Article III's standing requirements. Under the Supreme Court's 2016 Spokeo Inc. v. Robins decision, plaintiffs must experience more than a "bare procedural violation" of a federal privacy law to satisfy Article III and to sue to rectify a violation of that law. Federal preemption also raises complex legal questions—not only of whether to preempt state law, but what form of preemption Congress should employ. Finally, from a First Amendment perspective, Supreme Court jurisprudence suggests that while some "privacy" regulations are permissible, any federal law that restricts protected speech, particularly if it targets specific speakers or content, may be subject to more stringent review by a reviewing court. Appendix. Summary of Federal Data Protection Laws

Recent high-profile data breaches and other concerns about how third parties protect the privacy of individuals in the digital age have raised national concerns over legal protections of Americans' electronic data. Intentional intrusions into government and private computer networks and inadequate corporate privacy and cybersecurity practices have exposed the personal information of millions of Americans to unwanted recipients. At the same time, internet connectivity has increased and varied in form in recent years. Americans now transmit their personal data on the internet at an exponentially higher rate than in the past, and their data are collected, cultivated, and maintained by a growing number of both "consumer facing" and "behind the scenes" actors such as data brokers. As a consequence, the privacy, cybersecurity and protection of personal data have emerged as a major issue for congressional consideration. Despite the rise in interest in data protection, the legislative paradigms governing cybersecurity and data privacy are complex and technical, and lack uniformity at the federal level. The constitutional "right to privacy" developed over the course of the 20th century, but this right generally guards only against government intrusions and does little to shield the average internet user from private actors. At the federal statutory level, there are a number of statutes that protect individuals' personal data or concern cybersecurity, including the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Children's Online Privacy Protection Act, and others. And a number of different agencies, including the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau (CFPB), and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), enforce these laws. But these statutes primarily regulate certain industries and subcategories of data. The FTC fills in some of the statutory gaps by enforcing a broad prohibition against unfair and deceptive data protection practices. But no single federal law comprehensively regulates the collection and use of consumers' personal data. Seeking a more fulsome data protection system, some governments—such as California and the European Union (EU)—have recently enacted privacy laws regulating nearly all forms of personal data within their jurisdictional reach. Some argue that Congress should consider creating similar protections in federal law, but others have criticized the EU and California approaches as being overly prescriptive and burdensome. Should the 116th Congress consider a comprehensive federal data protection law, its legislative proposals may involve numerous decision points and legal considerations. Points of consideration may include the conceptual framework of the law (i.e., whether it is prescriptive or outcome-based), the scope of the law and its definition of protected information, and the role of the FTC or other federal enforcement agency. Further, if Congress wants to allow individuals to enforce data protection laws and seek remedies for the violations of such laws in court, it must account for standing requirements in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. Federal preemption also raises complex legal questions—not only of whether to preempt state law, but what form of preemption Congress should employ. Finally, from a First Amendment perspective, Supreme Court jurisprudence suggests that while some privacy, cybersecurity, or data security regulations are permissible, any federal law that restricts protected speech, particularly if it targets specific speakers or content, may be subject to more stringent review by a reviewing court.

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Introduction Since 2002, Canada has been the United States' top agricultural export market. Mexico was the second-largest export market until 2010, when China displaced Mexico as the second-leading market with Mexico becoming the third-largest U.S. agricultural export market. In FY2018, U.S. agricultural exports t otaled $143 billion, of which Canada and Mexico jointly accounted for about 27%. USDA's Economic Research Service estimates that in 2017 each dollar of U.S. agricultural exports stimulated an additional $1.30 in business activity in the United States. That same year, U.S. agricultural exports generated an estimated 1,161,000 full-time civilian jobs, including 795,000 jobs outside the farm sector. U.S. agricultural exports to Canada and Mexico are an important part of the U.S. economy, and the growth of these markets is partly the result of the North American market liberalization under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). On September 30, 2018, the Trump Administration announced an agreement with Canada and Mexico for a U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) that would possibly replace NAFTA. NAFTA entered into force on January 1, 1994, following the passage of the implementing legislation by Congress ( P.L. 103-182 ). NAFTA was structured as three separate bilateral agreements: one between Canada and the United States, a second between Mexico and the United States, and a third between Canada and Mexico. Provisions of the Canada-U.S. Trade Agreement (CUSTA), which went into effect on January 1, 1989, continued to apply under NAFTA (see Table 1 ). CUSTA opened up a 10-year period for tariff elimination and agricultural market integration between the two countries. The agricultural provisions agreed upon for CUSTA remained in force as provisions of the new NAFTA agreement. While tariffs were phased out for almost all agricultural products, NAFTA (in accordance with the original CUSTA provisions) exempted certain products from market liberalization. These exemptions included U.S. imports from Canada of dairy products, peanuts, peanut butter, cotton, sugar, and sugar-containing products and Canadian imports from the United States of dairy products, poultry, eggs, and margarine. Canada liberalized its agricultural sector under NAFTA, but liberalization did not include its dairy, poultry, and egg product sectors, which continued to be governed by domestic supply management policies and are protected from imports by high over-quota tariffs. Quotas that once governed bilateral trade in these commodities were redefined, under NAFTA, as tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) to comply with the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA), which took effect on January 1, 1995. A TRQ is a quota for a volume of imports at a favorable tariff rate, which was set at zero under NAFTA. Imports beyond the quota volume face higher over-quota tariff rates. The United States and Mexico agreement under NAFTA did not exclude any agricultural products from trade liberalization. Numerous restrictions on bilateral agricultural trade were eliminated immediately upon NAFTA's implementation, while others were phased out over a 14-year period. Remaining trade restrictions on the last handful of agricultural commodities (such as U.S. exports to Mexico of corn, dry edible beans, and nonfat dry milk and Mexican exports to the United States of sugar, cucumbers, orange juice, and sprouting broccoli) were removed upon the completion of the transition period in 2008. Under NAFTA, Mexico eliminated all the tariffs and quotas that formerly governed agricultural imports from the United States. In addition to directly improving market access, NAFTA set guidance and standards on other policies and regulations that facilitated the integration of the North American agricultural market. For example, NAFTA included provisions for rules of origin, intellectual property rights, foreign investment, and dispute resolution. NAFTA's sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) provisions made a significant contribution toward the expansion of agricultural trade by harmonizing regulations and facilitating trade. Because NAFTA entered into force before URAA, NAFTA's SPS agreement is considered to have provided the blueprint for URAA's SPS agreement. Regarding trade in agricultural products, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USITC) asserts that USMCA would build upon NAFTA to make "important improvements in the agreement to enable food and agriculture to trade more fairly, and to expand exports of American agricultural products." For USMCA to enter into force, Congress would need to ratify the agreement. It must also be ratified by Canada and Mexico. The timeline for congressional approval of USMCA would likely occur under the Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) timeline established under the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015 ( P.L. 114-26 ). At various times, President Trump has stated that he intends to withdraw from NAFTA. Some observers have suggested that delays in congressional action on USMCA could make it harder for Canada to consider USMCA approval this year because of upcoming parliamentary elections in October 2019. Provisions of USMCA USMCA seeks to expand upon the agricultural provisions of NAFTA by further reducing market access barriers and strengthening provisions to facilitate trade in North America. An important change in USMCA compared to NAFTA is that the United States agreement with Canada would expand TRQs for imports of U.S. agricultural products into Canada. Other important changes from NAFTA include the agreement between the three countries—Canada, Mexico, and the United States—to further harmonize trade in products of agricultural biotechnology and apply the same health, safety, and marketing standards to agricultural and food imports from USMCA partners as for domestic products. Expansion of Market Access Provisions As agreed upon by the leaders of the United States, Canada, and Mexico, all food and agricultural products that have zero tariffs under NAFTA would remain at zero under USMCA. Under USMCA, agricultural products exempted from tariff elimination under the agreement signed between the United States and Canada would be phased out for further market liberalization. Canada currently employs a supply management regime that includes TRQs on imports of dairy and poultry under its NAFTA and World Trade Organization (WTO) market access commitments. Under NAFTA, U.S. dairy has access into the Canadian market under Canada's WTO commitment provisions. For poultry, NAFTA TRQs were established in accordance with the original CUSTA provisions as a percentage of Canada's domestic production. When Canada joined the WTO in 1995, it committed to provide poultry market access at the level that is the greater of its commitment under the WTO or under NAFTA. For chicken meat, the NAFTA TRQ, set at 7.5% of the previous year's domestic production, is higher than the WTO TRQ set at 39,844 metric tons. Canada's chicken meat NAFTA TRQ was 90,100 metric tons in 2018, and the estimate is 95,000 metric tons for 2019. Both the poultry and dairy TRQs under NAFTA are global rather than specific to U.S. imports. The WTO dairy TRQs often have specific allocations for individual countries. For example, the bulk of Canada's WTO cheese quota is allocated to the European Union (EU), and the entire WTO powdered buttermilk TRQ is allocated to New Zealand. Overall, Canada's TRQs appear to have restricted imports of dairy, poultry, and egg products, as the imported volumes for these products have regularly equaled or exceeded their set quota limits. Under USMCA, Canada agreed to increase market access specifically to U.S. exporters of dairy products via new TRQs that are separate from Canada's existing WTO commitments. These additional TRQs apply only to the United States. For chicken meat and eggs, the USMCA replaces the NAFTA commitment with U.S.-specific TRQs. For turkey and broiler hatching eggs and chicks, Canada's NAFTA commitment would be replaced with a minimum access commitment under USMCA, which is not specific to U.S. imports but applies to imports from all origins. While USMCA would expand TRQs for U.S. exports, U.S. over-quota exports would still face the steep tariffs that currently exist under Canada's WTO commitment. The United States, in turn, agreed to improve access to Canadian dairy products, sugar, peanuts, and cotton. The United States would increase TRQs for Canadian dairy, sugar, and sweetened products. Tariffs on cotton and peanut imports into the United States from Canada would be phased out and eliminated five years after the agreement would take effect. As for U.S.-Mexico trade in agricultural products, under NAFTA, Mexico eliminated all the tariffs and quotas that formerly governed agricultural imports from the United States, and the proposed USMCA provides for no further market access changes for imports by Mexico of U.S. agricultural products. The proposed changes in the market access regime for U.S. agricultural exports to Canada under USMCA are summarized in Table 2 . Canada's import restrictions on U.S. dairy products was a high-profile issue for the United States in the USMCA negotiations, so it is noteworthy that under USMCA, Canada agreed to reduce certain barriers to U.S. dairy exports, a key demand of U.S. dairy groups. For one, Canada would make changes to its milk pricing system that sets low prices for Canadian skim milk solids, which is believed to have undercut U.S. exports. Six months after USMCA goes into effect, Canada would eliminate its Class 7 milk price (which includes skim milk solids and is designated as Class 6 in Ontario) and would set its price for skim milk solids based on a formula that takes into account the U.S. nonfat dry milk price. In the future, the United States and Canada would notify each other if either introduces a new milk class price or changes an existing price for a class of milk products. Under USMCA, Canada would maintain its dairy supply management system, but the TRQs would be increased each year for U.S. exports of milk, cheese, cream, skim milk powder, condensed milk, yogurt, and several other dairy categories. While existing in-quota tariffs for U.S. dairy exports to Canada are mostly zero, the over-quota rates can be as high as 200%-300%. USMCA includes provisions on transparency for the implementation of TRQs, such as providing advance notice of changes to the quotas and making public the details of quota utilization rates so that exporters could monitor the extent to which the quotas are filled. While WTO TRQs are available to U.S. dairy product exporters under the current NAFTA provisions, the new TRQs proposed by Canada under USMCA would expand the access that U.S. dairy products would have into Canada. Large portions of Canada's WTO TRQs are allocated to other countries, such as cheese to the EU and powdered buttermilk to New Zealand. Thus, USMCA TRQs would open additional market opportunities for U.S. dairy exports to Canada. For example, the 64,500 metric ton fluid milk TRQ currently provided under NAFTA is available only for cross-border shoppers, but USMCA would allow up to 85% of the proposed new fluid milk TRQ, which would reach 50,000 metric tons by year 6, to U.S. commercial dairy processors. In response to another concern raised by the U.S. dairy industry, Canada agreed to cap its global exports of skim milk powder and milk protein concentrates and to provide information regarding these volumes to the United States. USMCA includes a requirement that the United States and Canada meet five years after the implementation of the agreement—and every two years after that—to determine whether to modify the dairy provisions of the agreement. Under USMCA, Canada has proposed to replace its NAFTA commitments for poultry and eggs with new TRQs. Under USMCA, the duty-free quota for chicken meat would start at 47,000 metric tons on the agreement's entry into force and would expand to 57,000 metric tons in year six. It would then continue to increase by 1% per year for the next 10 years ( Table 2 ). The United States would also have access to Canada's WTO chicken quota available to imports from all origins of 39,844 metric tons. Under USMCA, Canada's TRQ for imports of U.S. eggs would be phased in over six equal installments, reaching 10 million dozen by year six and then increasing by 1% per year for the next 10 years. The annual TRQ for turkey and broiler hatching eggs and chicks would be set by formulas based on Canadian production (see Table 2 ). The TRQs for turkey and broiler-hatching eggs and chicks are USMCA minimum global access commitments based on the greater of Canada's anticipated current year production or its WTO commitment volume. Improved Agricultural Trading Regime Under USMCA, several key provisions would further expand the Canadian and Mexican market access to U.S. agricultural producers. With the exception of the wheat grading provision between Canada and Mexico, the following provisions, which aim to improve the trading regime, apply to all three countries: Wheat . Canada and the United States have agreed that they shall accord "treatment no less favorable than it accords to like wheat of domestic origin with respect to the assignment of quality grades." Currently, U.S. wheat exports to Canada are graded as feed wheat, which generally commands a lower price. Under USMCA, U.S. wheat exports to Canada would receive the same treatment and price as equivalent Canadian wheat if there is a predetermination that the U.S. wheat variety is similar to a Canadian variety. Canada maintains a list of registered wheat varieties, but the United States does not have a similar list. U.S. wheat exporters would first need to have U.S. varieties approved and registered in Canada before they would be able to benefit from this equivalency provision. According to some stakeholders, this process can be onerous and take several years. Cotton . The addition of a specific textile and apparel chapter to the proposed USMCA may support U.S. cotton production. The chapter promotes greater use of North American–origin textile products such as sewing thread, pocketing, narrow elastics, and coated fabrics for certain end items. Spirits, wine, beer, and other alcoholic beverages . Each country must treat the distribution of another USMCA country's spirits, wine, beer, and other alcoholic beverages as it would its own products. The agreement also establishes new rules governing the listing requirements for a product to be sold in a given country with specific limits on cost markups of alcoholic beverages imported from USMCA countries. SPS provisions . USMCA's SPS chapter calls for greater transparency in SPS rules and regulatory alignment among the three countries. It would establish a new mechanism for technical consultations to resolve SPS issues. SPS provisions provide for increasing transparency in the development and implementation of SPS measures; advancing science-based decisionmaking; improving processes for certification, regionalization and equivalency determinations; conducting systems-based audits; improving transparency for import checks; and promoting greater cooperation to enhance compatibility of regulatory measures. Geographical indicatio ns (GIs) . The United States, Canada, and Mexico agreed to provide procedural safeguards for recognition of new GIs, which are place names used to identify products that come from certain regions or locations. USMCA would protect the GIs for food products that Canada and Mexico have already agreed to in trade negotiations with the EU and would lay out transparency and notification requirements for any new GIs that a country proposes to recognize. The agreement also details a process for determining whether a food name is common or is eligible to be protected as a GI. In a side letter accompanying the agreement, Mexico confirmed a list of 33 terms for cheese that would remain available as common names for U.S. cheese producers to use in exporting cheeses to Mexico. The list includes some terms that are protected as GIs by the EU, such as Edam, Gouda, and Brie. USMCA provisions would protect certain U.S., Canadian, and Mexican spirits as distinctive products. Under the proposed agreement, products labeled as Bourbon Whiskey and Tennessee Whiskey must originate in the United States. Similar protections would exist for Canadian Whiskey, while Tequila and Mezcal would have to be produced in Mexico. In a side letter accompanying the agreement, the United States and Mexico further agree to protect American Rye Whiskey, Charanda, Sotol, and Bacanora. Protections for proprietary food formulas . USMCA signatories agree to protect the confidentiality of proprietary formula information in the same manner for domestic and imported products. The agreement would also limit such information requirements to what is necessary to achieve legitimate objectives. Biotechnology . The agricultural chapter of USMCA lays out provisions for trade in products created using agricultural biotechnology, an issue that was not covered under NAFTA. USMCA provisions for biotechnology cover crops produced with all biotechnology methods, including recombinant DNA and gene editing. USMCA would establish a Working Group for Cooperation on Agricultural Biotechnology to facilitate information exchange on policy and trade-related matters associated with the products of agricultural biotechnology. The agreement also outlines procedures to improve transparency in approving and bringing to market agricultural biotech products. It further outlines procedures for handling shipments containing a low-level presence of unapproved products. While USMCA addresses a number of issues that restrict U.S. agricultural exports to Mexico and Canada, it does not include all of the changes sought by U.S. agricultural groups. For instance, the agreement does not include changes to trade remedy laws to address imports of seasonal produce as requested by Southeastern U.S. produce growers. It also does not address nontariff barriers to market access for U.S. fresh potatoes in Mexico and Canada. Canada's Standard Container Law (part of the Fresh Fruits and Vegetable Regulations of the Canadian Agricultural Products Act) prohibits the importation of U.S. fresh potatoes to Canada in bulk quantities (over 50 kilograms). Finally, the agreement does not address the removal of retaliatory tariffs on U.S. agricultural exports imposed by Canada and Mexico in response to U.S. Section 232 tariffs on steel and aluminum. Some U.S. agriculture stakeholders have expressed concern that the potential benefits of implementing USMCA would be outweighed by the retaliatory tariffs imposed on U.S. agricultural exports by Canada and Mexico. U.S. Agricultural Trade with Canada and Mexico Since 2002, Canada and Mexico have been two of the top three export markets for U.S. agricultural products (competing with Japan until 2009, when China moved into the top three). In recent years, the two countries have jointly accounted for about 40% of the total value of U.S. agricultural exports. Intraregional trade in North America has increased substantially since the implementation of CUSTA and NAFTA and in the wake of Mexico's market-oriented agricultural reforms, which started in the 1980s ( Figure 1 ). The value of total U.S. agricultural product exports to Canada and Mexico rose from under $7 billion at the start of CUSTA in FY1990 to almost $10 billion at the start of NAFTA in FY1994 and peaked at $41 billion in FY2014. The lower level of exports since FY2014 is partly due to a drought-related decline in livestock production in parts of the United States; increased Canadian production of corn, rapeseed, and soybeans; increased use of U.S. corn as ethanol feedstock; growth in U.S. export markets outside of NAFTA; and increased competition from outside of NAFTA. Since mid-2018, U.S. exports of certain products have been adversely affected by the imposition of retaliatory tariffs by Canada and Mexico in response to the Trump Administration's application of a 25% tariff on all U.S. steel imports and a 10% tariff on all U.S. aluminum imports under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. Similar to the growth in U.S. agricultural exports, U.S. imports of agriculture and related products from Canada and Mexico grew from about $6 billion in FY1990 to $8 billion in FY1994, and U.S. agricultural exports continued to increase after NAFTA came into force on January 1, 1994, reaching $48 billion in FY2018. For FY2019, USDA projects that total U.S. agricultural exports to Canada and Mexico will to decline to $41.2 billion, while U.S. imports from those countries are projected at $49.6 billion. U.S. Agricultural Exports to Canada and Mexico Table 3 presents U.S. agricultural exports to Canada for selected years since 1990, the year after the implementation of CUSTA. The other years in the table include 1995 (the year following the start of NAFTA), 2009 (the year following the full implementation of NAFTA), and the last three years with complete fiscal year data: 2016, 2017, and 2018. U.S. agricultural exports to Canada averaged over $20 billion between FY2016 and FY2018 period ( Table 3 ) and accounted for 14% of the total value of U.S. agriculture exports in FY2018. While the overall value of U.S. agricultural exports to Canada has increased under NAFTA, U.S. exports of consumer-ready food products registered the greatest increase, accounting for almost 80% of the value of all U.S. agricultural exports to Canada in FY2018. Canada accounted for 24% of the value of total U.S. consumer-ready food product exports to all destinations in FY2018. In FY2018, Canada accounted for 72% of the total value of U.S. fresh vegetable exports to all destinations, 54% of nonalcoholic beverage exports to all destinations, 51% of snack food exports to all destinations, 33% of total exports of fresh fruit, 33% of live animal exports, and 26% of total U.S. wine and beer exports to all destinations. Canada is also an important market for bulk agricultural commodities, and Canadian imports of U.S. corn, soybeans, rice, pulses, and wheat have increased since the implementation of NAFTA. Table 4 provides a summary of key U.S. agricultural exports to Mexico for selected years since FY1990. Total U.S. agricultural exports to Mexico grew from $2.7 billion in FY1990 to $3.7 billion in FY1995 after NAFTA came into force, reaching $18.8 billion in FY2018. Grains and meats account for the largest share of exports, but growth has been strong among most products including dairy, prepared food, fruit, tree nuts, sugars and sweeteners, wine and beer, and distillers dry grains. Between FY2016 and FY2018, U.S. agricultural exports to Mexico averaged over $18 billion, accounting for 13% of the total value of U.S. agricultural exports to all destinations in FY2018 ( Table 4 ). Consumer-ready products as a group account for a significant share of U.S. exports to Mexico at 13% of the total value of U.S. agricultural exports in FY2018. Mexico is also a major U.S. export market for a number of bulk agricultural commodities, meat, and dairy products. In FY2018, Mexico accounted for 25% of the total value of U.S. corn exports to all destinations, 24% of the total value of U.S. dairy exports, 22% each of the total value of U.S. pork and poultry exports, 12% of the total value of U.S. wheat exports, and 8% of the total value of U.S. soybeans exports to all destinations. U.S. Imports from Canada and Mexico U.S. agricultural imports from Canada and Mexico have increased in value from $26 billion in FY2009—the first full year since the complete market liberalization under NAFTA in 2008—to over $48 billion in FY2018 ( Table 5 ). Major U.S. imports from Canada include snack foods, meats, and processed fruit and vegetable products. U.S. purchases of hogs and cattle from Canada had increased since NAFTA began, but these imports have declined since FY2016. North American market dynamics and the prevailing hog cycle dynamics in the NAFTA countries have affected live animal trade patterns in recent years. Similarly, U.S. coarse grain imports from Canada have also declined in recent years, likely the result of larger U.S. feed grain supplies. U.S. imports from Mexico mostly consist of fresh fruit and vegetables, alcoholic beverages, snack foods, and processed fruit and vegetable products. Economic Effects of NAFTA versus USMCA Many studies have assessed the effects of NAFTA on agriculture and the possible effects if NAFTA were to be terminated. It is difficult to isolate the effects of NAFTA from the market liberalization begun under CUSTA and from Mexico's unilateral trade liberalization measures in the 1980s and early 1990s, which included joining the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1986. Nevertheless, NAFTA is credited with facilitating trade in North America by reducing tariffs and other market access barriers and by providing a stable and improved trading environment in the region. Studies conducted by USDA indicate that U.S. agricultural exports to Canada and Mexico have been higher than they would have been in the absence of NAFTA. One such study concluded that NAFTA particularly expanded trade in those commodities that underwent the most significant reductions in tariff and nontariff barriers, including U.S. exports to Canada of wheat products, beef and veal, and cotton and U.S. exports to Mexico of rice, cattle and calves, nonfat dry milk, cotton, processed potatoes, apples, and pears. An October 2018 study commissioned by the Farm Foundation examines the potential economic benefits associated with (1) USMCA compared with the provisions provided under NAFTA, (2) USMCA in an environment with prevailing retaliatory tariffs on U.S. agricultural products in response to U.S. tariff increases on imports of steel and aluminum, and (3) the effect of a complete U.S. withdrawal from USMCA/NAFTA. The methodology used by the study assumes that each of the three trade policy scenarios would need to remain in place for at least three to five years or until the market equilibrium stabilizes following the initial policy shock. Thus, the estimated effects from the study can be considered as the long-run impacts. The study considers only proposed changes under USMCA to market access for U.S. agricultural exports to Canada, such as changes in TRQs and tariff rates. It does not consider other changes proposed for agriculture or for other sectors such as manufacturing and automobiles. The study's conclusions under these three scenarios follow. 1. Comparing USMCA to NAFTA, the study estimates that USMCA would generate a net increase in annual U.S. agricultural exports to Canada of $450 million—about 1% of current U.S. exports under NAFTA. This estimated increase would reflect increases in exports of dairy products (+$280 million) and meat (+$210 million), which would be partially offset by a decline in exports of other agricultural products (-$40 million). 2. Under the scenario where USMCA would enter into force but the retaliatory tariffs imposed by Canada and Mexico on U.S. agricultural exports would remain in place, the study projects U.S. agricultural export losses from the retaliatory tariffs of $1.8 billion annually, which would more than offset the projected gains of $450 million from USMCA ratification. 3. Under the scenario of a U.S. withdrawal from NAFTA without USMCA ratification, tariffs on U.S. exports to Canada and Mexico would be expected to return to the higher WTO most-favored-nation (MFN) rates, the highest level of applied tariffs rates under WTO commitments. In this circumstance, the study finds that U.S. agricultural and food exports to Canada and Mexico would decline by about $12 billion, or 30% of the value of U.S. agricultural exports to these markets in FY2018. This loss is expected to be partially offset by an increase of $2.6 billion in U.S. exports to other countries for a net loss in export revenues of $9.4 billion. A loss of this order would represent a decline of 24% compared with the total value of U.S. agricultural exports to these countries in FY2018. To date, similar studies assessing the effect of USMCA on U.S. agriculture as a whole are not available. U.S. Agricultural Stakeholders on USMCA Individual commodity groups have stated that they expect to benefit from market access gains. For example, the National Turkey Federation stated that USMCA would expand market access resulting in a 29% increase in U.S. turkey exports to Canada. A broad coalition of U.S. agricultural stakeholders is advocating for USMCA's approval, contending that the proposed agreement would further expand market access for U.S. agriculture. Most leading agriculture commodity groups have expressed their support for USMCA. The U.S. wheat industry states that although challenges remain in further opening commerce for U.S. wheat farmers near the border with Canada, USMCA retains tariff-free access to imported U.S. wheat for long-time flour milling customers in Mexico. The American Farm Bureau Federation expressed satisfaction that the USMCA not only locks in market opportunities previously developed but also builds on those trade relationships in several key areas. On the other hand, other farm sector stakeholders, such as the National Farmers Union and the Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy , have expressed concern that the proposed agreement does not go far enough to institute a fair trade framework that benefits family farmers and ranchers . Some agricultural market observers question whether the benefits to U.S. agriculture of USMCA over NAFTA will be more than incremental. Critics also point out that most U.S. agricultural exports currently enjoy zero tariffs under NAFTA and that the main market access gain under USMCA is through limited quota increases. A researcher for the International Food Policy Research Institute recently concluded that farm production costs would be expected to increase because of domestic content provisions in the agreement in tandem with the new U.S. tariffs on steel and aluminum imports. Upon signing of the USMCA on November 30, 2018, President Trump stated, "This new deal will be the most modern, up-to-date, and balanced trade agreement in the history of our country, with the most advanced protections for workers ever developed." Regarding agriculture, Secretary Perdue echoed the sentiments expressed by most of the agricultural commodity groups: "The new USMCA makes important specific changes that are beneficial to our agricultural producers. We have secured greater access to the Mexican and Canadian markets and lowered barriers for many of our products. The deal eliminates Canada's unfair Class 6 and Class 7 milk pricing schemes, opens additional access to U.S. dairy into Canada, and imposes new disciplines on Canada's supply management system. The agreement also preserves and expands critical access for U.S. poultry and egg producers and addresses Canada's discriminatory wheat grading process to help U.S. wheat growers along the border become more competitive." Outlook for Proposed USMCA The proposed USMCA would have to be approved by Congress and ratified by Mexico and Canada before entering into force. On August 31, 2018, pursuant to TPA, President Trump provided Congress a 90-day notification of his intent to sign a free trade agreement with Canada and Mexico. On January 29, 2019—60 days after an agreement was signed, and as required by TPA—U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer submitted to Congress changes to existing U.S. laws that would be needed to bring the United States into compliance with the proposed USMCA. A report by the USITC on the possible economic impact of TPA is not expected to be completed until April 20, 2019, due to the 35-day government shutdown. The report has been cited by some Members of Congress as key to their decisions on whether to support the agreement. Some policymakers have stated that the path to ratifying USMCA by Congress is uncertain partially because the three countries have yet to resolve disputes over tariffs on U.S. imports of steel and aluminum, as well as retaliatory tariffs that Canada and Mexico have imposed on U.S. agricultural products. The conclusion of the proposed USMCA did not resolve these tariff disputes. On January 30, 2019, Senator Chuck Grassley called on the Trump Administration to lift tariffs on steel and aluminum imports from Canada and Mexico before Congress begins considering legislation to implement the USMCA. Representatives of the U.S. business community, agriculture interest groups, other congressional leaders, and Canadian and Mexican government officials have also stated that these tariff issues must be resolved before the USMCA enters into force. Other Members of Congress have raised issues regarding labor and environmental provisions of USMCA. Speaker Pelosi has stated that she wants "stronger enforcement language" and that the USMCA talks should be reopened to tighten enforcement provisions for labor and environmental protections. Some trade observers believe that delays in congressional action on USMCA could make it harder for Canada to consider USMCA approval this year because of upcoming parliamentary elections in October 2019.

On September 30, 2018, the Trump Administration announced the conclusion of the renegotiations of the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the proposed United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). If approved by Congress and ratified by Canada and Mexico, USMCA would modify and possibly replace NAFTA, which entered into force January 1, 1994. NAFTA provisions are structured as three separate bilateral agreements: one between Canada and the United States, a second between Mexico and the United States, and a third between Canada and Mexico. Under NAFTA, bilateral agricultural trade between the United States and Mexico was liberalized over a transition period of 14 years beginning in 1994. NAFTA provisions on agricultural trade between Canada and the United States are based on commitments under the Canada-U.S. Trade Agreement (CUSTA), which granted full market access for most agricultural products with the exception of certain products. The agricultural exceptions under NAFTA include Canadian imports from the United States of dairy products, poultry, eggs, and margarine and U.S. imports from Canada of dairy products, peanuts, peanut butter, cotton, sugar, and sugar-containing products. The proposed USMCA would expand market access for U.S. exports of dairy, poultry, and eggs to Canada and enhance NAFTA's Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) provisions. It would also include new provisions for trade in agricultural biotechnology products, add provisions governing Geographical Indications (GIs), add protection for proprietary food formulas, and require USMCA countries to apply the same regulatory treatment to imported alcoholic beverages and wheat as those that govern their domestic products. Since 2002, Canada has been the United States' top agricultural export market, and Mexico was the second-largest export market until 2010, when it became the third-largest market as China became the second-largest agricultural export market for the United States. U.S. agricultural exporters are thus keen to keep and grow the existing export market in North America. If the United States were to potentially withdraw from NAFTA, as mentioned several times by President Trump, U.S. agricultural exporters could potentially lose at least a portion of their market share in Canada and Mexico if the proposed USMCA does not enter into force. If the United States withdraws from NAFTA, U.S. agricultural exports to Canada and Mexico would likely face World Trade Organization (WTO) most-favored-nation tariffs—the highest rate a country applies to WTO member countries. These tariffs are much higher than the zero tariffs that U.S. exporters currently enjoy under NAFTA for most agricultural exports to Canada and Mexico. The proposed USMCA would need to be approved by the U.S. Congress and ratified by Canada and Mexico before it could enter into force. Some Members of Congress have voiced concerns about issues such as labor provisions and intellectual property rights protection of pharmaceuticals. Other Members have indicated that an anticipated assessment by the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) will be key to their decisions on whether to support the agreement. Canada, Mexico, and some Members of Congress have expressed concern about other ongoing trade issues with Canada and Mexico, such as antidumping issues related to seasonal produce imports and the recent U.S. imposition of a 25% duty on all steel imports and a 10% duty on all aluminum imports. Both the Canadian and the Mexican governments have stated that USMCA ratification hinges in large part upon the Trump Administration lifting the Section 232 tariffs on imported steel and aluminum. Similarly, some Members of Congress have stated that the Administration should lift tariffs on steel and aluminum imports in order to secure the elimination of retaliatory tariffs on agricultural products before Congress would consider legislation to implement USMCA.

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Introduction Since the late 1700s, Congress has expressed public gratitude to individuals and groups by awarding medals and other similar decorations. The first Congressional Gold Medals were issued by the Continental Congress. Since that time, Congress has awarded gold medals to express public gratitude for distinguished contributions, dramatize the virtues of patriotism, and perpetuate the remembrance of great events. This tradition of authorizing individually struck gold medals bearing the portraits or actions of honorees is rich with history. Although Congress has approved legislation stipulating specific requirements for numerous other awards and decorations, there are no permanent statutory provisions specifically relating to the creation of Congressional Gold Medals. When such an award has been deemed appropriate, Congress has, by special action, provided for the creation of a personalized medal to be given in its name. Early Practices The first Congressional Gold Medals were issued by the Continental Congress. As initially conceived, Congressional Gold Medals were awards "imbued with the conviction that only the very highest achievements [were] entitled to such a distinction, and that the value of a reward is enhanced by its rarity!" At that time, the Continental Congress concluded there was no better way to honor "and preserve the memory of illustrious characters and splendid events than medals—whether we take into consideration the imperishable nature of the substance whence they are formed, the facility of multiplying copies, or the practice of depositing them in the cabinets of the curious." The first gold medals were struck in Paris under the direction of Colonel David Humphrey. Following a long-standing historical practice, Congress commissioned gold medals as tributes for what were considered to be the most distinguished achievements. Silver and bronze medals, and ceremonial swords, were awarded for less eminent, but still notable, accomplishments. However, only the gold medal has been continuously awarded to the present day. The first Congressional Gold Medal was authorized on March 25, 1776, for George Washington, then commander of the Continental Army, for his "wise and spirited conduct" in bringing about British evacuation of Boston. During the next 12 years, the Continental Congress authorized an additional six gold medals for Revolutionary military leaders. Table 1 lists the Congressional Gold Medals issued by the Continental Congress, the year, the awardee, and the reason the medal was authorized. The gold medal conferred upon Major Henry "Light Horse Harry" Lee for his "remarkable prudence" and "bravery" during the surprise raid of Paulus Hook, NJ, was the first to be struck in the United States. 19th Century Recipients Following the ratification of the Constitution, the first two Congressional Gold Medals were given in 1800 to Captain Thomas Truxtun for his gallant effort during the action between the U.S. frigate Constellation and the French ship La Vengeance and in 1805 to Commodore Edward Preble for gallantry and good conduct during the War with Tripoli. After those medals were awarded, Congress issued gold medals primarily for military achievements in the War of 1812 and the Mexican War. All told, 27 gold medals were awarded for the War of 1812, and a series of medals were awarded for expeditions led by Major General Zachary Taylor and Major General Winfield Scott in the Mexican War. General Taylor received three Congressional Gold Medals, while General Scott received one. In 1854, Congress began to broaden the scope of activities that merited a Congressional Gold Medal. This change was prompted by Commander Duncan N. Ingraham of the USS St. Louis 's rescue of Martin Koszta from illegal seizure and imprisonment about the Austrian war-brig Hussar . Subsequently, gold medals were issued to several individuals recognized for nonmilitary heroic activities or their work in specific fields. For example, in 1864 Cornelius Vanderbilt was honored for donating a steamship to the United States; in 1867 Cyrus W. Field was praised for his work in the laying of the transatlantic cable; and Private George F. Robinson was awarded for saving Secretary of State William H. Seward from an assassination attempt. At this time, Congress also established the Medal of Honor as a military award and increasingly focused the Congressional Gold Medal as an award for individuals and events. 20th and 21st Century Recipients In the 20 th and 21 st centuries, Congress continued to broaden the scope of Congressional Gold Medals to include recognition of excellence in such varied fields as the arts, athletics, aviation, diplomacy, entertainment, exploration, medicine, politics, religion, and science. Several of the following individuals were the first in their specialties to be awarded gold medals: Composer George M. Cohan (1936) was the first entertainer to receive a gold medal, for his patriotic songs "Over There" and "A Grand Old Flag." Wilbur and Orville Wright (1909) were the first aeronautical or space pioneers to receive a gold medal, for their achievements in demonstrating to the world the potential of aerial navigation. Lincoln Ellsworth (1926) was the first explorer honored, for his polar flight in 1925 and transpolar flight in 1926. Major Walter Reed and his associates (1928) were the first scientists honored, for discovering the cause and means of transmission of yellow fever in 1921. Vice President Alben W. Barkley (1949) was the first political honoree. In the late 20 th and early 21 st centuries, numerous other individuals have been honored for a variety of contributions including civil rights activism and humanitarian contributions. For a complete list of Congressional Gold Medal recipients since 1776, see the Appendix . Authorizing Congressional Gold Medals Once a Congressional Gold Medal bill is introduced, it is typically referred to the House Committee on Financial Services or the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. The process for considering legislation varies between the House and Senate. House of Representatives In the House, there are currently no chamber or committee rules regarding the procedures for gold medal bills. In some past Congresses, the House Financial Services Committee had adopted a committee rule that prohibited its Domestic Monetary Policy and Technology Subcommittee from holding a hearing on commemorative medal legislation—including Congressional Gold Medals—"unless the legislation is cosponsored by at least two-thirds of the members of the House." Informal practices regarding cosponosrship requirements, however, may still exist. Senate In the Senate, the Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee in the 116 th Congress requires that at least 67 Senators cosponsor any Congressional Gold Medal bill before being considered by the committee. This committee rule presumably does not formally preclude committee consideration of a House bill referred to it. The committee rule also does not prevent the Senate from considering or passing gold medal legislation. Referred bills may be brought to the floor without committee consideration; in other cases, a bill may avoid being referred to committee at all. In current practice, many enacted gold medal bills receive no formal committee consideration. Rather, the Senate often discharges the committee of the bill by unanimous consent; however, it appears that this discharge practice only occurs after the requisite number of cosponsors sign on to a Senate bill. Other Statutory Limitations Although Congress has approved legislation stipulating requirements for numerous other awards and decorations, there are no permanent statutory provisions specifically relating to the creation of Congressional Gold Medals. When a Congressional Gold Medal has been deemed appropriate, Congress has, by legislative action, provided for the creation of a medal on an ad hoc basis. Additionally, there is no statutory limit on the number of Congressional Gold Medals that may be struck in a given year. Sample Congressional Gold Medal Language Congressional Gold Medal legislation generally has certain features, including findings that summarize the subject's history and importance; specifications for awarding the medal; instructions, if any, for the medal's design and striking; permission to mint and sell duplicates; and certification that medals are minted pursuant to existing requirements for national medals (5 U.S.C. §5111). Findings Congressional Gold Medal legislation typically includes a section of findings. These often include historical facts about the people or groups being awarded the medal. For example, the legislation to authorize the Congressional Gold Medal to the World War II members of the "Doolittle Tokyo Raiders" stated the following: Medal Presentation, Design, and Striking Congressional Gold Medal legislation typically includes a section that provides details on the presentation, design, and striking of the medal. For example, the legislation to authorize the Congressional Gold Medal to the Foot Soldiers who participated in Bloody Sunday, Turnaround Tuesday, or the final Selma to Montgomery Voting Rights March in March of 1965 stated the following: Additionally, this section can contain specific instructions to the Smithsonian, when it is the recipient of the physical gold medal, on its display and availability to be loaned to other institutions. For example, the legislation authorizing the American Fighter Aces Congressional Gold Medal stated the following: Duplicate Medals Gold medal legislation also generally authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to strike and sell duplicate medals in bronze. The duplicates are generally sold in two sizes: 1.5 inches and 3 inches. Duplicates are sold at a price which allows the U.S. Mint to cover the cost of striking the gold medal. For example, legislation authorizing the 65 th Infantry Regiment, known as the Borinqueneers, Congressional Gold Medal stated the following: Status of Medals Gold medal legislation generally contains a statement that these awards are considered as national medals for the purpose of the U.S. Mint's statutory requirements for producing medals. For example, legislation authorizing the Montford Point Marines Congressional Gold Medal stated the following: Authorization of Appropriations; Proceeds In some cases, authorizing legislation includes language authorizing appropriations for a Congressional Gold Medal. In these examples, Congress has authorized a specific sum from the United States Mint Public Enterprise Fund to pay for the cost of the medal. In cases where the authorization of appropriations is provided, a provision requiring that proceeds from the sale of duplicates be deposited in the same Fund is generally included. For example, legislation authorizing the Women Airforce Service Pilots Congressional Gold Medal stated the following: Design of Medals Congressional Gold Medal designs vary for each issuance. In general, the authorizing legislation provides that the Secretary of the Treasury "shall strike a gold medal with suitable emblems, devices, and inscriptions, to be determined by the Secretary." When designing a Congressional Gold Medal, the Secretary consults with the Citizens Coinage Advisory Commission (CCAC) and the U.S. Commission of Fine Arts (CFA) before determining the final design. Citizens Coinage Advisory Commission Established by P.L. 108-15 , the CCAC advises the Secretary of the Treasury on theme and design of all U.S. coins and medals. For Congressional Gold Medals, the CCAC advises the Secretary "on any theme or design proposals relating to ... Congressional Gold Medals." The CCAC consists of 11 members appointed by the Secretary of the Treasury, with four persons appointed upon the recommendation of the congressional leadership (one each by the Speaker of the House, the House minority leader, the Senate majority leader, and the Senate minority leader). The CCAC meets several times each year to consider design suggestions for coins and medals. For each coin considered, the CCAC provides advice to the Secretary "on thematic, technical, and design issues related to the production of coins." Recommendations are then published to the committee's website, at http://www.ccac.gov . U.S. Commission of Fine Arts In tandem with recommendations received from the CCAC, the U.S. Mint also seeks a recommendation from the U.S. Commission of Fine Arts. Established in 1910, the CFA advises "upon the location of statues, fountains, and monuments in the public squares, streets, and parks in the District of Columbia; the selection of models for statues, fountains, and monuments erected under the authority of the Federal Government; the selection of artists; and questions of art generally when required to do so by the President or a committee of Congress." This includes review of commemorative coins when they are presented by the U.S. Mint and the issuance of recommendations for a coin's design. For example, in March 2014, the U.S. Mint presented several alternative designs for the First Special Service Force Congressional Gold Medal. In a letter to the U.S. Mint, the CFA provided recommendations on the design for the gold medal. CFA's letter stated the following: U.S. Mint After receiving advice from the CCAC and the CFA, the Secretary of the Treasury, through the U.S. Mint, finalizes the coin's design and schedules it for production. Figure 1 shows the final design of two Congressional Gold Medals: the New Frontier Gold Medal for Neil Armstrong, Michael Collins, Buzz Aldrin, and John Glenn; and the Jack Nicklaus Gold Medal. Issues for Congress As Members of Congress contemplate introducing legislation, and the House or the Senate potentially consider Congressional Gold Medal measures, there are several issues that could be considered. These can be divided into issues for individual Members of Congress with respect to individual Congressional Gold Medals, and issues for Congress as an institution. Individual issues include choices Members may make about which people or groups might be honored and whether specific design elements might be specified statutorily. Institutional issues might include committee or chamber rules on the consideration of Congressional Gold Medals and creating standards for the issuance of gold medals. Individual Considerations Individuals and Groups Honored Some Congressional Gold Medals have honored individuals (e.g., Arnold Palmer, Muhammad Yunus), some discrete groups of individuals (e.g., General of the Army George Catlett Marshall and Fleet Admiral Ernest Joseph King, Ruth and Billy Graham), and some larger groups (e.g., military units such as Women Airforce Service Pilots ["WASP"], Monuments Men). In choosing whom or what to recognize, Members of Congress generally evaluate whether they believe that the individual's or group's activities merit recognition by Congress. Congressional Gold Medals are "the highest civilian honor award program ... [to] honor national achievement in patriotic, humanitarian, and artistic endeavors." There are no specific criteria to determine whether or not an individual or group meets those lofty goals. Instead, each individual or group is judged on their merits by Congress should the legislation be considered. Specification of Design Elements Congressional Gold Medal authorizations generally do not specify design elements. Instead, they direct the Secretary of the Treasury to "strike a gold medal with suitable emblems, devices, and inscriptions to be determined by the Secretary." Should Congress want to specify particular design elements, they might be included in the authorizing legislation. This would provide the Secretary of the Treasury with congressional intent on what should be incorporated into the gold medal design. Similar statutory specificity is sometimes included in commemorative coin legislation. Such specification, however, could serve to limit design choices for the gold medal and might alter the cost structure of striking the award, if the required element diverges from standard practices. Location of Medal Awarded to Groups Congressional Gold Medal legislation for groups generally provides that only a single gold medal is struck and specifies where it will be located after it is formally awarded. In many cases, the gold medal is given to the Smithsonian for appropriate display and where it can be made available for research. In other cases, the gold medal is provided to an organization that represents the honored group. Since most gold medal legislation contains a provision on the medal's location, a Member of Congress can help determine where the medal will be located. Institutional Consideration Requirements for Legislative Considerations As discussed above under " Authorizing Congressional Gold Medals ," neither the House nor Senate rules provide any restrictions specifically concerning consideration of Congressional Gold Medal legislation on the House or Senate floor. In the 116 th Congress, the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs requires that at least 67 Senators must cosponsor any Senate Congressional Gold Medal bill before being considered by the committee. Currently, the House Financial Services Committee has not adopted any specific rules concerning committee consideration of Congressional Gold Medal legislation, although it has required a minimum number of cosponsors in past Congresses for committee consideration. As demonstrated by the discontinuation of the House Financial Services Committee rule requiring a minimum number of cosponsors for committee gold medal legislation, committee rules can be changed from Congress to Congress. Should the committee want to place requirements on its consideration of gold medal legislation, the Financial Services Committee could readopt its former rule, or something similar. Adopting committee rules to require a minimum number of cosponsors might encourage bill sponsors to build support among Representatives for gold medal bills. Such a minimum requirement, however, could potentially limit the number or type of gold medal bills the committee considers. Since only the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs has a rule that imposes a formal qualification on the potential committee consideration of gold medal legislation, the possible path forward for a bill can be different within each chamber. Should the House, the Senate, or both want to adopt similar language for committee or chamber consideration of gold medal legislation, such language could be incorporated into future committee rules, into House and Senate Rules, or into law. Taking steps to formally codify the gold medal consideration process might provide sponsors with a single process for award consideration, which could make it easier for gold medal bills to meet minimum requirements for consideration across both the House and Senate. Such codification could also limit congressional flexibility and might result in fewer proposals or authorizations to comply with new standards. Statutory Standards Currently, there is no statutory limit to the number of Congressional Gold Medals that can be authorized. Should Congress want to place a limit on the number of gold medals awarded, standards could be adopted to provide a maximum number of gold medals authorized in any year or Congress. Congress has previously adopted similar standards for commemorative coins—only two coins may be minted in any given calendar year. Legislation to place a limit on the number of gold medals authorized has previously been introduced and considered in the House. During the 109 th Congress (2005-2006), H.R. 54 passed the House and would have restricted the Secretary of the Treasury from striking "more than 2 congressional gold medals for presentation ... in any calendar year." Introduced by Representative Michael Castle, the stated purpose of the legislation was to "maintain the prestige of the medal by limiting the number that may be awarded each year," and to "clarify that recipients are individuals and not groups." Passage of the measure, he argued, would "ensure the future integrity and true honor of the award." H.R. 54 did not receive further consideration in the Senate. While proponents of a limit on the number of gold medals issued might make arguments similar to those made by Representative Castle, opponents believe that Congress should reserve the right to authorize as many gold medals as it deems necessary, without consideration of the number struck in any calendar year. Representative Joseph Crowley in opposing the legislation told his House colleagues, "We are rushing to act on an issue that does not represent a problem." "Who that received this medal in the past," he asked, "was not worthy of it?" Further, Crowley argued that "there are occasions when more than one person is justified to receive the medal for their honorable actions in tandem with others." He continued by emphasizing that had this bill already been law, "Congress would not have been able to issue" a Congressional Gold Medal "to the Little Rock Nine," to "President and Mrs. Reagan," or to "Martin Luther King and Coretta Scott King." Concluding Observations Congressional Gold Medals have long been an important way for Congress to express public gratitude for important historical events and achievements. Congressional Gold Medals, which have been issued since the American Revolution, are "the highest civilian honor award program ... [to] honor national achievement in patriotic, humanitarian, and artistic endeavors." In recent years, the number of gold medals awarded has "soared from four or five per decade for most of its history to an average of almost twenty in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s." Each Congress, legislation to award Congressional Gold Medals is introduced. In the 113 th Congress (2013-2014), 52 bills were introduced, 34 in the House and 18 in the Senate, to award a gold medal. In the 114 th Congress (2015-2016), 52 bills were introduced, 38 in the House and 14 in the Senate. In the 115 th Congress (2017-2018), 55 bills were introduced, 33 in the House and 22 in the Senate. Based on the number of measures offered in both chambers, some Members of Congress clearly feel it is important to recognize individuals and groups for their patriotic, humanitarian, and artistic achievements. Several considerations appear important when Members decide to introduce gold medal legislation. These include who should be honored, how many medals should be awarded in a given Congress, and whether specific design elements should be prescribed for the medal design. As Congress continues to consider legislation to award future gold medals, these considerations and others will likely be important factors for issuing the award. Appendix. Summary of Congressional Gold Medals Awarded: 1776-2018

Senators and Representatives are frequently asked to support or sponsor proposals recognizing historic events and outstanding achievements by individuals or institutions. Among the various forms of recognition that Congress bestows, the Congressional Gold Medal is often considered the most distinguished. Through this venerable tradition—the occasional commissioning of individually struck gold medals in its name—Congress has expressed public gratitude on behalf of the nation for distinguished contributions for more than two centuries. Since 1776, this award, which initially was bestowed on military leaders, has also been given to such diverse individuals as Sir Winston Churchill and Bob Hope, George Washington and Robert Frost, Joe Louis and Mother Teresa of Calcutta. Congressional gold medal legislation generally has a specific format. Once a gold medal is authorized, it follows a specific process for design, minting, and awarding. This process includes consultation and recommendations by the Citizens Coinage Advisory Commission (CCAC) and the U.S. Commission of Fine Arts (CFA), pursuant to any statutory instructions, before the Secretary of the Treasury makes the final decision on a gold medal's design. Once the medal has been struck, a ceremony will often be scheduled to formally award the medal to the recipient. In recent years, the number of gold medals awarded has increased, and some have expressed interest in examining the gold medal awarding process. Should Congress want to make such changes, several individual and institutional options might be available. The individual options include decisions made by Members of Congress as to what individual or groups might be honored; potential specification of gold medal design elements; and where gold medals for groups might be housed once the award is made. The institutional options could include House, Senate, or committee rules for the consideration of gold medal legislation and whether statutory standards on the number of gold medals issued per year or per Congress might be established for gold medals.

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Introduction Illegal aliens have exploited asylum loopholes at an alarming rate. Over the last five years, DHS has seen a 2000 percent increase in aliens claiming credible fear (the first step to asylum), as many know it will give them an opportunity to stay in our country, even if they do not actually have a valid claim to asylum. —Department of Homeland Security (DHS) press release, December 20, 2018 The increased number of Central Americans petitioning for asylum in the United States is not because more people are "exploiting" the system via "loopholes," but because many have credible claims…. There is no recorded evidence by any U.S. federal agency showing that the increased number of people petitioning for asylum in the United States is due to more people lying about the dangers they face back in their country of origin. —Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) commentary, March 14, 2018 These statements and the conflicting views about asylum seekers underlying them suggest why the asylum debate has become so heated. Policymakers have faced a perennial challenge to devise a fair and efficient system that approves legitimate asylum claims while deterring and denying illegitimate ones. Changes in U.S. asylum po licy and processes over the years can be seen broadly as attempts to strike the appropriate balance between these two goals. Periods marked by increasing levels of asylum-seeking pose particular challenges and may elicit a variety of policy responses. Faced with an influx of Central Americans seeking asylum at the southern U.S. border, the Trump Administration has put forth policies to tighten the asylum system (see, for example, the " 2018 Interim Final Rule " and " DHS Migrant Protection Protocols " sections of this report); these policies typically have been met with court challenges. This report explores the landscape of U.S. asylum policy through an analysis of current asylum processes, available data, legislative and regulatory history, recent legislative and presidential proposals, and selected policy questions. What is Asylum? In common usage, the word asylum often refers to protection or safety. In the immigration context, however, it has a narrower meaning. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952, as amended, provides for the granting of asylum to an alien who applies for such relief in accordance with applicable requirements and is determined to be a refugee . The INA defines a refugee, in general, as a person who is outside his or her country of nationality and is unable or unwilling to return to, or to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution based on one of five protected grounds: race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. Asylum can be granted by the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS's) U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) or the Department of Justice's (DOJ's) Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), depending on the type of application filed (see " Asylum Application Process "). The INA distinguishes between applicants for refugee status and applicants for asylum by their physical location. Refugee applicants are outside the United States, while applicants for asylum are physically present in the United States or at a land border or port of entry. After one year as a refugee or asylee (a person granted asylum), an individual can apply to be become a U.S. lawful permanent resident (LPR). Overview of Current Asylum Provisions With some exceptions, aliens who are in the United States or who arrive in the United States, regardless of immigration status, may apply for asylum. This summary describes the asylum process for an adult applicant. As discussed in the next section of the report, asylum may be granted by a USCIS asylum officer or an EOIR immigration judge. There are no numerical limitations on asylum grants. In order to receive asylum, an alien must establish that he or she meets the INA definition of a refugee, among other requirements. Certain aliens, such as those who are determined to pose a danger to U.S. security, are ineligible for asylum. An asylum applicant who is not otherwise eligible to work in the United States may apply for employment authorization 150 days after filing a completed asylum application and may receive such authorization 180 days after the application filing date. An alien who has been granted asylum is authorized to work in the United States and may receive approval to travel abroad. A grant of asylum does not expire, but it may be terminated under certain circumstances, such as if an asylee is determined to no longer meet the INA definition of a refugee. After one year of physical presence in the United States as an asylee, an alien may be granted LPR status, subject to certain requirements. There are no numerical limitations on the adjustment of status of asylees to LPR status. Special asylum provisions apply to certain aliens without proper documentation who are determined to be subject to a streamlined removal process known as expedited removal. To be considered for asylum, these aliens must first be determined by a USCIS asylum officer to have a credible fear of persecution. Those determined to have a credible fear may apply for asylum during standard removal proceedings. (See " Inspection of Arriving Aliens .") Asylum Application Process Applications for asylum are either defensive or affirmative. A different set of procedures applies to each type of application. Affirmative Asylum An asylum application is affirmative if an alien who is physically present in the United States (and not in removal proceedings) submits an application for asylum to DHS's USCIS. An alien may file an affirmative asylum application regardless of his or her immigration status, subject to applicable restrictions. There is no fee to apply for asylum. Figure 1 shows the number of new affirmative asylum applications filed with USCIS since FY1995, the year filings reached their historical high point. The years included in this figure and in the subsequent figures and tables differ due to the availability of data from the relevant agencies. The data displayed in Figure 1 are for applications, not individuals; an application may include a principal applicant and dependents. Figure 1 reflects the impact of various factors. For example, reforms in the mid-1990s, which made the asylum system more restrictive, contributed to the decline in applications in the earlier years shown. A contributing factor to the application increases in the later years depicted in Figure 1 was the influx of unaccompanied alien children from Central America seeking asylum. (See Appendix A for underlying data and data on the top 10 nationalities filing affirmative asylum applications.) The INA prohibits the granting of asylum until the identity of the asylum applicant has been checked against appropriate records and databases to determine if he or she is inadmissible or deportable, or ineligible for asylum. As part of the affirmative asylum process, applicants are scheduled for fingerprinting appointments. The fingerprints are used to confirm the applicant's identity and perform background and security checks. Asylum applicants are interviewed by USCIS asylum officers. In scheduling asylum interviews, the USCIS Asylum Division is currently giving priority to applications that have been pending for 21 days or less. According to USCIS, "Giving priority to recent filings allows USCIS to promptly place such individuals into removal proceedings, which reduces the incentive to file for asylum solely to obtain employment authorization." Under DHS regulations, the asylum interview is to be conducted in "a nonadversarial manner." The applicant may bring counsel or a representative to the interview, present witnesses, and submit other evidence. After the interview, the applicant or the applicant's representative can make a statement. USCIS Decisions on Affirmative Asylum Applications An asylum officer's decision on an application is reviewed by a supervisory asylum officer, who may refer the case for further review. If an asylum officer ultimately determines that an applicant is eligible for asylum, the applicant receives a letter and form documenting the grant of asylum. If the asylum officer determines that an applicant is not eligible for asylum and the applicant has immigrant status, nonimmigrant status, or temporary protected status (TPS), the asylum officer denies the application. If the asylum officer determines than an applicant is not eligible for asylum and the applicant appears to be inadmissible or deportable under the INA, however, DHS regulations direct the officer to refer the case to an immigration judge for adjudication in removal proceedings. In those proceedings, the immigration judge evaluates the asylum claim independently as a defensive application for asylum. Figure 2 presents data on affirmative asylum applications considered by USCIS since FY2009. It shows four separate outcome categories. Closures are cases administratively closed for reasons such as abandonment or lack of jurisdiction. A closure in one fiscal year in Figure 2 could have been refiled or reopened in a subsequent year. Figure 2 shows that a majority of cases were referred to an immigration judge each year. These referrals included both applicants who were interviewed by USCIS and applicants who were not (e.g., they did not appear for the interview). (See Table B-1 for underlying data and additional detail. ) Defensive Asylum An asylum application is defensive when the applicant is in standard removal proceedings in immigration court and requests asylum as a defense against removal. Figure 3 provides data on defensive asylum applications filed since FY2009. The data include both cases that originated as defensive cases as well as cases that were first filed as affirmative applications with USCIS, as described in the preceding section. (See Table C-1 for underlying data and additional detail.) There are different ways that an alien can be placed in standard removal proceedings. An alien who is living in the United States can be charged by DHS with violating immigration law. In such a case, DHS initiates removal proceedings when it serves the alien with a Notice to Appear before an immigration judge. Another way to be placed in standard removal proceedings relates to the statutory expedited removal and credible fear screening provisions discussed more fully below (see " Inspection of Arriving Aliens "). Under the INA, an individual who is determined by DHS to be inadmissible to the United States because he or she lacks proper documentation or has committed fraud or willful misrepresentation of facts to obtain documentation or another immigration benefit (and thus is subject to expedited removal) and expresses the intent to apply for asylum or a fear of persecution is to be interviewed by an asylum officer to determine if he or she has a credible fear of persecution. Credible fear of persecution means that "there is a significant possibility, taking into account the credibility of the statements made by the alien in support of the alien's claim and such other facts as are known to the officer, that the alien could establish eligibility for asylum." If the alien is found to have a credible fear, the asylum officer is to refer the case to an immigration judge for a full hearing on the asylum request during removal proceedings. Figure 4 provides data on USCIS credible fear findings since FY1997. For each year, it shows the number of credible fear cases referred to and completed by USCIS and the outcomes of the completed cases. Closed cases are cases in which a credible fear determination was not made. (See Table B-2 and Table B-3 for underlying data and additional detail.) EOIR Decisions on Defensive Asylum Applications During a removal proceeding, an attorney from DHS's Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) presents the government's case for removing the alien, the alien or their representative may present evidence on the alien's behalf and cross examine witnesses, and an immigration judge from EOIR determines whether the alien should be removed. An immigration judge's removal decision is generally subject to administrative and judicial review. Figure 5 presents data on EOIR decisions in defensive asylum cases since FY2009. (See Appendix D for underlying data and data for defensive cases that began with a credible fear claim. ) Figure 5 shows a sharp drop in administrative closures since FY2016. Administrative closing "allows the removal of cases from the immigration judge's calendar in certain circumstances" but "does not result in a final order" in the case; cases that are administratively closed can be reopened. Administrative closure has been used, for example, when an alien has a pending application for relief from another agency. In May 2018, Attorney General Jeff Sessions ruled that immigration judges and the BIA do not have general authority to administratively close cases. Evolution of U.S. Asylum Policy The INA, as originally enacted, did not contain refugee or asylum provisions. Language on the conditional entry of refugees was added by the INA Amendments of 1965. The 1965 act authorized the conditional entry of aliens, who were to include those who demonstrated to DOJ's Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) that (i) because of persecution or fear of persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion they have fled (I) from any Communist or Communist-dominated country or area, or (II) from any country within the general area of the Middle East, and (ii) are unable or unwilling to return to such country or area on account of race, religion, or political opinion, and (iii) are not nationals of the countries or areas in which their application for conditional entry is made. In 1968, the United States acceded to the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (Protocol). The Protocol incorporated the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Convention), which the United States had not previously been a party to, and expanded the Convention's definition of a refugee. The Convention had defined a refugee in terms of events occurring before January 1951. The Protocol eliminated that date restriction. It also provided that the refugee definition would apply without geographic limitation, while allowing for some exceptions. With the changes made by the Protocol, a refugee came to be defined as a person who "owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country." The Protocol retained other elements of the Convention, including the latter's prohibition on refoulement (or forcible return), a fundamental asylum concept. Specifically, the Convention prohibited states from expelling or returning a refugee "to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion." In the 1970s, INS issued regulations that established procedures for applying for asylum in the United States and for adjudicating asylum applications. For example, a 1974 rule provided that an asylum applicant could include his or her spouse and unmarried minor children on the application and that INS could deny or approve an asylum application as a matter of discretion. Refugee Act of 1980 Despite the U.S. accession to the 1967 U.N. Protocol, the INA did not include a conforming definition of a refugee or a mandatory nonrefoulement provision until the enactment of the Refugee Act of 1980. As noted, the 1965 conditional entry provisions incorporated a refugee definition that was limited by type of government and geography. A 1999 INS report explained a goal of the Refugee Act as being "to establish a politically and geographically neutral adjudication for both asylum status and refugee status, a standard to be applied equally to all applicants regardless of country of origin." The definition of a refugee, as added to the INA by the 1980 act, reads, in main part: (A) any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality ... and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. (This first part of the definition of a refugee has not changed since enactment of the Refugee Act.) Asylum Process As explained by INS Acting Commissioner Doris Meissner at a 1981 Senate hearing, the primary focus of the Refugee Act of 1980 was the refugee process. According to Meissner's written testimony, "The asylum process was looked upon as a separate and considerably less significant subject." In keeping with this secondary status, the asylum provisions added by the 1980 act to the INA (as INA §208) comprised three short paragraphs. The first directed the Attorney General to establish asylum application procedures for aliens physically present in the United States or arriving at a land border or port of entry, regardless of immigration status, and gave the Attorney General discretionary authority to grant asylum to aliens who met the newly added INA definition of a refugee. The second paragraph allowed for the termination of asylum status if the Attorney General determined that the alien no longer met the INA definition of a refugee due to "a change in circumstances" in the alien's home country. The third paragraph provided for the granting of asylum status to the spouse and children of an alien granted asylum. Adjustment of Status Separate language in the Refugee Act added a new Section 209 to the INA on refugee and asylee adjustment of status. Adjustment of status is the process of acquiring LPR status in the United States. The asylee provisions granted the Attorney General discretionary authority to adjust the status of an alien who had been physically present in the United States for one year after being granted asylum and met other requirements, subject to an annual numerical limit of 5,000. Withholding of Deportation The Refugee Act amended an INA provision on withholding of deportation, making it consistent with the nonrefoulement language in the Convention. The INA provision in effect prior to the enactment of the Refugee Act "authorized" the Attorney General to withhold the deportation of an alien in the United States (other than an alien involved in Nazi-related activity) to "any country in which in his opinion the alien would be subject to persecution on account of race, religion or political opinion." The Refugee Act revised this language to prohibit the Attorney General from deporting or returning any alien to a country where the Attorney General determines the alien's life or freedom would be threatened because of the alien's race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. It also added exclusions beyond the one for participation in Nazi-related activity. Specifically, the new provision made an alien ineligible for withholding if the alien had participated in the persecution of another person based on race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion; the alien had been convicted of a "particularly serious crime" and thus was a danger to the United States; there existed "serious reasons for considering that the alien had committed a serious nonpolitical crime outside the United States," or there existed "reasonable grounds" for considering the alien a danger to national security. (For subsequent changes to this provision, see " Withholding of Removal .") 1980 Interim Regulations INS published interim regulations in June 1980 to implement the Refugee Act's provisions on refugee and asylum procedures. The asylum regulations included the following: INS district directors had jurisdiction over all requests for asylum except for those made by aliens in exclusion or deportation proceedings. An alien whose application for asylum was denied by the district director could renew the asylum request in exclusion or deportation proceedings. The applicant had the burden of proof to establish eligibility for asylum. The asylum applicant would be examined in person by an immigration officer or an immigration judge. The district director (or the immigration judge) would request an advisory opinion on the asylum application from the Department of State's (DOS's) Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (BHRHA). The district director could grant work authorization to an asylum applicant who filed a "non-frivolous" application. The district director's decision on an asylum application was discretionary. The district director would deny an asylum application for various reasons, including that the alien had been firmly resettled in another country; the alien had participated in the persecution of another person based on race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion; the alien had been convicted of a "particularly serious crime" and thus was a danger to the United States; there existed "serious reasons for considering that the alien had committed a serious non-political crime outside the United States;" or there existed "reasonable grounds" for considering the alien a danger to national security. An initial grant of asylum was for one year and could be extended in one-year increments. Asylum status could be terminated for various reasons, including changed conditions in the asylee's home country. 1990 Final Rule There was much discussion and debate about asylum in the 1980s, as related legislation and regulations were proposed, court cases were litigated, and the number of applications increased. In addition, in a 1983 internal DOJ reorganization, EOIR was established as a separate DOJ agency to administer the U.S. immigration court system. It combined the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) with the INS immigration judge function. With the creation of EOIR, the immigration courts became independent of INS. It was not until July 1990 that INS published a final rule to revise the 1980 interim regulations on asylum procedures. According to the supplementary information to the 1990 rule, the asylum policy established by the rule reflected two core principles: "A fundamental belief that the granting of asylum is inherently a humanitarian act distinct from the normal operation and administration of the immigration process; and a recognition of the essential need for an orderly and fair system for the adjudication of asylum claims." The 1990 final rule created the position of asylum officer within INS to adjudicate asylum applications. As described in the supplementary information to a predecessor 1988 proposed rule, asylum officers were intended to be "a specially trained corps" that would develop expertise over time, with the expected result of greater uniformity in asylum adjudications. Under the 1990 rule, asylum applications filed with the district director were to be forwarded to the asylum officer with jurisdiction in the district. Under the 1990 rule, comments on asylum applications by DOS—a standard part of the adjudication process under the 1980 interim regulations—became optional. (In an earlier, related development, DOS announced that as of November 1987 it would no longer be able to provide an advisory opinion on every asylum application due to budget constraints and would focus on those cases where it thought it could provide input not available from other sources. ) The 1990 rule distinguished between asylum claims based on actual past persecution and on a well-founded fear of future persecution. To establish a well-founded fear of future persecution, the rule required, in part, that an applicant establish that he or she fears persecution in his or her country based on one of the five protected grounds and that "there is a reasonable possibility of actually suffering such persecution" upon return. The rule further detailed the "burden of proof" requirements for asylum applicants. It provided that the applicant's own testimony alone may be sufficient to prove that he or she meets the definition of a refugee. It also stated that an applicant could show a well-founded fear of persecution on one of the protected grounds without proving that he or she would be persecuted individually, if the applicant could establish "that there is a pattern or practice" of persecution of similarly situated individuals in his or her home country and that he or she is part of such a group. The 1990 rule provided that a grant of asylum to a principal applicant would be for an indefinite period. It also provided that the grant of asylum to a principal applicant's spouse and children would be indefinite, unless the principal's asylum status was revoked. Under the 1990 rule, an application for asylum was also to be considered an application for withholding of deportation; in cases of asylum denials, the asylum officer was required to decide whether the applicant was entitled to withholding of deportation. A 1987 proposed rule would have made asylum officers' decisions on asylum and withholding of deportation applications binding on immigration judges. That change was not retained in the 1990 final rule, however, which preserved immigration judges' role in adjudicating asylum and withholding of deportation claims in exclusion or deportation proceedings. Regarding eligibility for withholding of deportation, the 1990 rule stated, in part, "The applicant's life or freedom shall be found to be threatened if it is more likely than not that he would be persecuted on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." The 1990 rule directed the asylum officer to grant an undetained asylum applicant employment authorization for up to one year if the officer determined that the application was not frivolous; frivolous was defined as "manifestly unfounded or abusive." The employment authorization could be renewed in increments of up to one year. The asylum officer had to provide an applicant with a written decision on an asylum or withholding of deportation application, and had to provide an explanation in the case of a denial. The 1990 rule also granted specified officials in INS and DOJ the authority to review the decisions of asylum officers but did not grant applicants any right to appeal to these officials. Acts of 1990 and 1994 The Immigration Act of 1990 and the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 made several changes to the asylum-related provisions in the INA. The 1990 act amended INA §209 to increase the annual numerical limitation on asylee adjustment of status from 5,000 to 10,000. It also added new language to INA §208, making an alien who had been convicted of a crime categorized as an aggravated felony under the INA ineligible for asylum. The 1994 act further amended INA §208 to state that an asylum applicant was not entitled to employment authorization except as provided at the discretion of the Attorney General by regulation. 1994 Final Rule In March 1994, INS published a proposed rule to streamline its asylum procedures that included a number of controversial provisions. The agency characterized the problem the proposal sought to address as follows: "The existing system for adjudicating asylum claims cannot keep pace with incoming applications and does not permit the expeditious removal from the United States of those persons who[se] claims fail." The 1994 final rule, published in December 1994, made fundamental changes to the asylum adjudication process. Under the rule, INS asylum officers were no longer to deny asylum applications filed by aliens who appeared to be excludable or deportable, or to consider applications for withholding of deportation from such applicants, with limited exceptions. Instead, officers were to either grant such applicants asylum or immediately refer their claims to immigration judges, where the claims would be considered as part of exclusion or deportation proceedings. Asylum officers were to continue to issue approvals and denials in cases of asylum applications filed by aliens with a legal immigration status. The 1994 rule also made changes to the employment authorization process for asylum applicants that were intended to "discourage applicants from filing meritless claims solely as a means to obtain employment authorization." Under the rule, an alien had to wait 150 days after his or her complete asylum application had been received to apply for employment authorization. INS then had 30 days to adjudicate that employment authorization application. (These 150-day and 30-day time frames remain in regulation. ) According to the supplementary information accompanying the rule, the goal was to make a decision on an asylum application before the end of 150 days: "The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) would strive to complete the adjudication of asylum applications, through the decision of an immigration judge, within this 150-day period." Some of the provisions in the proposed rule were not adopted in the final rule. These included proposals to make asylum interviews discretionary and to charge fees for asylum applications and initial applications for employment authorization. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act and Implementing Regulations The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996 significantly amended the INA's asylum provisions and made a number of other changes to the INA relevant to asylum policy. Many of the IIRIRA changes remain in effect. One set of changes, which had broad implications for the immigration system generally, concerned the INA grounds of exclusion. Applicable to aliens outside the United States, these provisions enumerated classes of aliens who were ineligible for visas and were to be excluded from admission. IIRIRA amended these provisions and replaced the concept of an excludable alien with that of an inadmissible alien—the latter being a person who, whether outside or inside the United States, has not been lawfully admitted to the country. In general, with the enactment of IIRIRA, an alien became ineligible for a visa or admission if he or she was described in the reconfigured grounds of inadmissibility. Asylum Provisions IIRIRA added restrictions to the general policy set forth in the 1980 Refugee Act and incorporated into the INA that an alien who is present in the United States or who arrives in the United States, regardless of immigration status, can apply for asylum. In general, under the IIRIRA amendments, which remain in effect, an alien is not eligible to apply for asylum unless the alien can show that he or she filed the application within one year of arriving in the United States. An alien is also generally ineligible to apply if he or she has previously had an asylum application denied. There is an exception to both restrictions if an alien can show "changed circumstances which materially affect the applicant's eligibility for asylum," and an additional exception to the time limit requirement if the alien can show "extraordinary circumstances" related to the filing delay . IIRIRA also made an alien ineligible to apply for asylum if the Attorney General determined that the alien could be removed, pursuant to a bilateral or multilateral agreement, to a safe third country where the alien would be considered for asylum or equivalent temporary protection (see " Safe Third Country Agreements "). IIRIRA amended the INA to authorize, but not require, the Attorney General to impose fees on asylum applications and related applications for employment authorization. Among other new asylum provisions it added to the INA were a requirement to check the identity of applicants against "all appropriate records or databases maintained by the Attorney General and by the Secretary of State" and a permanent bar to receiving any immigration benefits for aliens who knowingly file frivolous asylum applications after being notified of the consequences for doing so. IIRIRA also put asylum processing-related time frames in statute, including a requirement that "in the absence of exceptional circumstances," administrative adjudication of an asylum application be completed within 180 days after the filing date. All these provisions are still in statute. IIRIRA modified and codified some existing and prior asylum regulations. It amended an existing INA provision on employment authorization by adding language prohibiting an asylum applicant who is not otherwise eligible for employment authorization from being granted such authorization earlier than 180 days after filing the asylum application. It further amended the INA asylum provisions to add grounds for denying asylum. Similar to the mandatory denial language in the 1980 interim regulations, these grounds included an applicant's conviction for a "particularly serious crime," "serious reasons for believing the alien has committed a serious nonpolitical crime outside the United States," "reasonable grounds" for considering the alien a danger to national security, and the applicant's firm resettlement in another country prior to arrival in the United States. IIRIRA also added, as a new asylum denial ground, being inadmissible to the United States on certain terrorist-related grounds. In addition, IIRIRA provided that the Attorney General could establish additional ineligibilities for asylum by regulation that were consistent with the INA asylum provisions. These IIRIRA amendments remain a part of the INA, although the provision on terrorist-related grounds of inadmissibility has been revised. IIRIRA amended the INA language on termination of asylum to state that the granting of asylum "does not convey a right to remain permanently in the United States." It also added new termination grounds to the existing ground of no longer meeting the INA definition of a refugee. IIRIRA provided that asylum could be terminated if the Attorney General determined that the asylee met one of the grounds for denying asylum noted in the preceding paragraph. Among IIRIRA's other new grounds for terminating asylum was a determination by the Attorney General, analogous to the "safe third country" determination described above, that the alien could be removed, pursuant to a bilateral or multilateral agreement, to a safe third country where the alien would be eligible for asylum or equivalent temporary protection. The IIRIRA asylum termination provisions remain part of the INA. Definition of a Refugee IIRIRA amended the INA definition of a refugee to cover individuals subject to "coercive population control." It provided that for purposes of meeting the definition of a refugee, an individual who had been forced to have an abortion or undergo sterilization or had been persecuted for resistance to a coercive population control program would be considered to have been persecuted on the basis of political opinion. Similarly, an individual with a well-founded fear that he or she would be forced to undergo a procedure or would be persecuted for resistance to a coercive population control program would be considered to have a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of political opinion. This language remains part of the INA definition of a refugee. Inspection of Arriving Aliens IIRIRA amended the INA provisions on the inspection of aliens by immigration officers to establish a new immigration enforcement mechanism known as expedited removal. In general, under expedited removal an alien who is determined by an immigration officer to be inadmissible to the United States because the alien lacks proper documentation or has committed fraud or willful misrepresentation of facts to obtain documentation or another immigration benefit may be removed from the United States without any further hearings or review, unless the alien indicates either an intention to apply for asylum or a fear of persecution. Under the INA, as amended by IIRIRA, this expedited removal procedure was to be applied to all arriving aliens , a term that includes aliens arriving at a U.S. port of entry. (An exception for Cuban citizens arriving at U.S. ports of entry by aircraft is no longer in effect. ) It also could be applied to any (or all) aliens in the United States, as designated by the Attorney General at his or her discretion, if an alien has not been admitted or paroled into the United States and "has not affirmatively shown, to the satisfaction of an immigration officer, that the alien has been physically present in the United States continuously for the 2-year period immediately prior to the date of the determination of inadmissibility." Using this statutory authority, the application of expedited removal has been expanded to classes of aliens beyond arriving aliens (see " Implementing Regulations "). Under the IIRIRA amendments, an alien who is subject to expedited removal and expresses the intent to apply for asylum or a fear of persecution is to be interviewed by an asylum officer to determine if the alien has a credible fear of persecution. (Special procedures apply to aliens arriving in the United States at a U.S.-Canada land port of entry in accordance with a U.S.-Canada agreement; see " Safe Third Country Agreements .") Under the INA, credible fear of persecution means that "there is a significant possibility, taking into account the credibility of the statements made by the alien in support of the alien's claim and such other facts as are known to the officer, that the alien could establish eligibility for asylum." If an alien is found to have a credible fear, the asylum officer is to refer the case to an immigration judge for full consideration of the asylum request during standard removal proceedings. If an alien is found not to have a credible fear, the alien may request that an immigration judge review the negative finding. To ultimately receive asylum, however, an alien must meet the higher standard of showing past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution. Withholding of Removal As part of a larger set of changes to the INA replacing the concept of deportation with removal, IIRIRA added a withholding of removal provision (INA §241(b)(3)) to replace the existing INA withholding of deportation provision. The new withholding of removal provision stated, and continues to state, in main part, that "the Attorney General may not remove an alien to a country if the Attorney General decides that the alien's life or freedom would be threatened in that country because of the alien's race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." The IIRIRA provision retained language on ineligibility for withholding that had been enacted in 1980. It also included language on treatment of aggravated felonies for purposes of ineligibility for withholding of removal. The IIRIRA amendments on ineligibility for withholding of removal remain in current law. Some of the same ineligibility grounds apply to applicants for withholding of removal and applicants for asylum. As noted, however, asylum is also subject to a second set of restrictions, under which certain individuals are ineligible to apply for this form of relief. These restrictions include the requirement to apply for asylum within one year after arrival in the United States. Withholding of removal is not subject to an analogous set of restrictions. Another difference between withholding of removal and asylum concerns adjustment to LPR status. The INA provides for the adjustment of status of aliens granted asylum but not those granted withholding of removal (for further comparison of withholding of removal and asylum, see " Implementing Regulations ," below). Implementing Regulations In March 1997, DOJ issued an interim rule, effective April 1, 1997, to amend existing regulations to implement the IIRIRA provisions on asylum, withholding of removal, expedited removal, and other immigration procedures. In December 2000, DOJ published a final rule on asylum procedures, which addressed jurisdiction, asylum application procedures, and withholding of removal, among other issues. The December 2000 rule included language on eligibility for asylum and eligibility for withholding of removal under INA §241(b)(3). Regarding eligibility for asylum based on a well-founded fear of future persecution, the 2000 regulations stated, in part, "An applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution if: (A) The applicant has a fear of persecution in his or her country of nationality … on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion; (B) There is a reasonable possibility of suffering such persecution if he or she were to return to that country." This language was similar to that in the 1990 rule. Unlike the earlier rule, however, the 2000 regulations also provided that an applicant would not be considered to have a well-founded fear of persecution if he or she could relocate within his or her home country "if under all the circumstances it would be reasonable to expect the applicant to do so." Regarding eligibility for withholding of removal under INA §241(b)(3) based on a future threat to one's life or freedom, the 2000 regulations, like the earlier 1990 regulations on withholding of deportation, stated that an applicant could demonstrate a future threat "if he or she can establish that it is more likely than not that he or she would be persecuted on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion upon removal to that country." As with the regulations on asylum eligibility, the 2000 regulations on eligibility for withholding of removal provided that an applicant could not demonstrate a threat to life or freedom upon a finding that the applicant could avoid the threat by relocating within his or her home country if it were reasonable to expect him or her to do so. The December 2000 regulations on eligibility for asylum and withholding of removal under INA §241(b)(3) remain in effect. Comparing the above-cited standards for providing these two forms of relief in cases involving claims of future persecution, the threshold for granting withholding of removal ( more likely than not ) is higher than that for granting asylum ( reasonable possibility ). Regarding expedited removal, DOJ stated in the supplementary information to the March 1997 interim rule that for the time being, it would only apply the expedited removal provisions to arriving aliens (i.e., aliens arriving at ports of entry and certain others). At the same time, it reserved "the right to apply the expedited removal procedures to additional classes of aliens within the limits set by the statute, if, in the [INS] Commissioner's discretion, such action is operationally warranted." Beginning in 2002, DOJ and then DHS, which assumed primary responsibility for immigration under the Homeland Security Act, acted to apply the expedited removal procedures to additional classes of aliens. In November 2002, DOJ extended expedited removal to aliens arriving by sea who are not admitted or paroled and who have not been continuously present in the United States for the prior two years. In August 2004, DHS authorized the placing in expedited removal proceedings of aliens who are present in the United States without having been admitted or paroled, and are found inadmissible due to lack of proper documentation or to commission of fraud or willful misrepresentation to obtain documentation or another immigration benefit, in certain circumstances. These circumstances were that the aliens "are encountered by an immigration officer within 100 air miles of the U.S. international land border" and "have not established to the satisfaction of an immigration officer that they have been physically present in the United States continuously for the fourteen-day (14-day) period immediately prior to the date of encounter." Convention Against Torture Protection and Implementing Regulations Separate from asylum and withholding of removal under the INA, protection from removal is available to aliens in the United States who are more likely than not to be tortured in the country of removal, in accordance with the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Convention Against Torture, or CAT), which entered into force for the United States in November 1994. Under Article 3 of the CAT, "No State Party shall expel, return ("refouler") or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture." Under current DHS and DOJ regulations, torture is defined, in part, as "any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person … when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity." In February 1999, DOJ published an interim rule establishing procedures to implement U.S. obligations under Article 3 of the CAT in the removal process. These regulations have since been revised. DHS regulations set forth procedures for handling cases in which an alien subject to expedited removal expresses a fear of torture. In a process analogous to that for aliens subject to expedited removal who express a fear of persecution, DHS regulations provide that such an alien is to be interviewed by an asylum officer to determine if he or she has a credible fear of torture. To establish a credible fear of torture, an alien must show that "there is a significant possibility that he or she is eligible for" protection under the CAT. Eligibility for CAT protection, unlike for asylum, does not require the showing of a nexus between the torture claim and a protected ground (such as race). If the asylum officer makes an affirmative credible fear finding, the officer is to refer the case to an immigration judge for full consideration of the CAT application during standard removal proceedings. If the officer makes a negative finding, the alien may request a review of that determination by an immigration judge. If during removal proceedings the immigration judge determines that "the alien is more likely than not to be tortured in the country of removal," the alien is entitled to CAT protection. That protection is to be granted in the form of either withholding of removal or deferral of removal depending on the circumstances of the case. The February 1999 CAT rule also established another screening process—for reasonable fear of persecution or torture. Modeled on but separate from the credible fear of persecution or torture screening processes, reasonable fear screening applies to certain aliens who are not eligible for asylum (these are aliens ordered removed under INA §238(b) for the commission of certain criminal offenses or aliens whose deportation, exclusion, or removal is reinstated under INA §241(a)(5)). Under current DHS and DOJ regulations, if an alien in this category expresses a fear of returning to the country of removal, USCIS is to make a reasonable fear determination, subject to review by an immigration judge. To establish a reasonable fear of persecution, an alien must establish "a reasonable possibility that he or she would be persecuted on account of his or her race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion"; this is the same standard used to establish eligibility for asylum. To establish a reasonable fear of torture, an alien must establish "a reasonable possibility that he or she would be tortured in the country of removal." If the alien receives a positive reasonable fear finding, the case is referred to an immigration judge to determine whether the alien is eligible for withholding of removal under INA §241(b)(3) or withholding of removal or deferral of removal under the CAT. DHS and DOJ regulations further state, however, that the granting of such withholding of removal or deferral of removal would not prevent the United States from removing the alien to a third country. Post-1996 Statutory Provisions While the IIRIRA amendments to the INA asylum provisions remain largely in place, subsequent laws have made further changes to the INA provisions. For example, the Real ID Act of 2005 amended the INA language on the conditions for granting asylum to add "burden of proof" provisions, which had previously been in regulations. These burden of proof provisions remain in law. They require an asylum applicant to show that "race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion was or will be at least one central reason for persecuting the applicant" to meet the definition of a refugee. The provisions further set forth standards for making determinations about an applicant's credibility and about the need for corroborating evidence to sustain an applicant's burden of proof. In addition, among its other asylum-related provisions, the Real ID Act eliminated the annual caps on asylee adjustment of status. The 2008 William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) added language to the INA asylum provisions that addressed asylum applications by unaccompanied alien children in the United States. This new language made certain statutory restrictions on applying for asylum inapplicable to these children and provided that a USCIS asylum officer would have initial jurisdiction over any asylum application filed by an unaccompanied child, even if the child was in removal proceedings. 2018 Interim Final Rule On November 9, 2018, DHS and DOJ jointly issued an interim final rule to govern "asylum claims in the context of aliens who are subject to, but contravene, a suspension or limitation on entry into the United States through the southern border with Mexico that is imposed by a presidential proclamation or other presidential order." That same day, President Donald Trump issued a proclamation to suspend immediately the entry into the United States of aliens who cross the Southwest border between ports of entry (see " Presidential Action "). According to the supplementary information accompanying the interim rule, the rule would serve to "channel inadmissible aliens to ports of entry, where such aliens could seek to enter and would be processed in an orderly and controlled manner." The interim rule, which is not in effect due to legal challenges, would bar an alien who enters the United States in contravention of the proclamation from eligibility for asylum. Under the rule, an asylum officer would make a negative credible fear of persecution determination in the case of such an alien. As explained in the supplementary information to the rule, however, aliens who enter the United States at the Southwest border without inspection would continue to be eligible for consideration for forms of protection from removal other than asylum—namely, withholding of removal under INA §241(b)(3) and protections under the CAT . The interim final rule addresses eligibility for asylum and screening procedures for aliens who enter the United States in contravention of the proclamation. Regarding claims for withholding of removal under the INA or withholding or deferral of removal under the CAT, the rule establishes that such claims would be assessed under the reasonable fear standard (see " Convention Against Torture Protection and Implementing Regulations "). The supplementary information includes the following summary of the two-stage screening protocol the rule would institute: Aliens determined to be ineligible for asylum by virtue of contravening a proclamation, however, would still be screened, but in a manner that reflects that their only viable claims would be for statutory withholding or CAT protection…. After determining the alien's ineligibility for asylum under the credible-fear standard, the asylum officer would apply the long-established reasonable-fear standard to assess whether further proceedings on a possible statutory withholding or CAT protection claim are warranted. This rule is being challenged in federal court. On December 19, 2018, a federal district court judge in California granted a nationwide preliminary injunction against it. DHS Migrant Protection Protocols On December 20, 2018, DHS announced the Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP), under which "individuals arriving in or entering the United States from Mexico—illegally or without proper documentation—may be returned to Mexico for the duration of their immigration proceedings." The U.S. government notified the Mexican government about the MPP that same day. The MPP is separate and distinct from a safe third country agreement (see " Safe Third Country Agreements "). The DHS press release announcing the Migrant Protection Protocols characterized them as "historic measures" to address the "illegal immigration crisis." In the words of the press release: Aliens trying to game the system to get into our country illegally will no longer be able to disappear into the United States, where many skip their court dates. Instead, they will wait for an immigration court decision while they are in Mexico. 'Catch and release' will be replaced with 'catch and return.' In doing so, we will reduce illegal migration by removing one of the key incentives that encourages people from taking the dangerous journey to the United States in the first place. This will also allow us to focus more attention on those who are actually fleeing persecution. According to DHS, the U.S. government will invoke INA §235(b)(2)(C), which permits the return of certain aliens arriving in the United States on land from a foreign contiguous territory to that foreign territory pending standard removal proceedings. An alien potentially subject to this return provision under the INA is an applicant for admission who "is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted" and thus is "detained for a [standard removal] proceeding." INA §235(b)(2)(C) is explicitly inapplicable to aliens who are determined to be subject to expedited removal. On January 28, 2019, USCIS and DHS's Customs and Border Protection (CBP) issued memoranda on MPP implementation. The CBP memorandum announced that the agency would begin implementing the MPP that day. According to the memorandum, "MPP implementation will begin at the San Ysidro port of entry [in California], and it is anticipated that it will be expanded in the near future." Also on January 28, 2019, CBP issued "MPP Guiding Principles," which included the following: "To implement the MPP, aliens arriving from Mexico who are amenable to the process … and who in an exercise of discretion the officer determines should be subject to the MPP process, will be issued [a] Notice to Appear (NTA) and placed into Section 240 removal proceedings. They will then be transferred to await proceedings in Mexico." Among the aliens identified as " not amenable to MPP" in the CBP guiding principles document are unaccompanied alien children, citizens or nationals of Mexico, aliens processed for expedited removal, and aliens who are more likely than not to face persecution or torture in Mexico. The MPP is in effect as of the date of this report, but it remains unclear how DHS is making decisions about which aliens to process under the protocols. The MPP is being challenged in federal court. Recent Legislative and Presidential Action Legislation in the 115th Congress Asylum-related legislation was considered in the 115 th Congress. Two immigration bills that were the subjects of unsuccessful House floor votes in June 2018—the Securing America's Future Act of 2018 ( H.R. 4760 ) and the Border Security and Immigration Reform Act of 2018 ( H.R. 6136 )—contained similar provisions on asylum. A third asylum-related House bill (the Asylum Reform and Border Protection Act of 2017 ( H.R. 391 )) that included some of the same provisions as the above measures was ordered to be reported by the House Judiciary Committee. In addition, the House and the Senate acted on several other measures containing more limited language on asylum. H.R. 4760 and H.R. 6136 H.R. 4760 and H.R. 6136 , as considered on the House floor, included various provisions related to asylum. Both bills would have amended the INA "safe third country" asylum provision, under which an alien is ineligible to apply for asylum if it is determined that he or she can be removed to a safe country "pursuant to a bilateral or multilateral agreement" (see " Safe Third Country Agreements "). H.R. 4760 and H.R. 6136 would have eliminated the "pursuant to a bilateral or multilateral agreement" language. Both bills would have added a new provision to the INA stating that an alien's asylum status would be terminated if the alien returned to his or her home country (from which the alien sought refuge in the United States) absent changed country conditions. Both bills would have given DHS discretionary authority to waive this provision in individual cases. H.R. 4760 also included an exception to this provision for certain Cubans. Both bills would have amended the INA provisions on frivolous asylum applications (see " Frivolous or Fraudulent Asylum Claims "). Current INA provisions make an alien permanently ineligible for immigration benefits if he or she knowingly files a frivolous asylum application after receiving notice of the consequences for doing so. The bills would have changed the notification process. They would have required that a written notice appear on the asylum application advising the applicant of the consequences of filing a frivolous application. The bills would also have added language to the INA explaining that an application is frivolous if "it is so insufficient in substance that it is clear that the applicant knowingly filed the application solely or in part to delay removal from the United States, to seek employment authorization as an applicant for asylum" or "any of the material elements are knowingly fabricated." H.R. 4760 and H.R. 6136 also would have changed the INA definition of credible fear of persecution, which an alien in expedited removal has to show to be able to pursue an asylum claim. The bills would have added a new requirement to the definition—that "it is more probable than not that the statements made by, and on behalf of, the alien in support of the alien's claim are true." The bills would also have required audio or audio/visual recording of expedited removal and credible fear interviews. H.R. 391 H.R. 391 , as ordered to be reported by the House Judiciary Committee, would have amended the INA provisions on safe third country removals, termination of asylum upon return to the home country, frivolous asylum applications, and credible fear similarly to H.R. 4760 and H.R. 6136 . In addition, this bill would have made a number of other changes to the asylum-related language in the INA. Among its asylum-related provisions, H.R. 391 would have clarified the INA definition of a refugee (which asylum applicants also have to satisfy), specifically the "membership in a particular social group" ground. It would have defined particular social group , which is not currently defined in statute, to mean a group that is "defined with particularity," is "socially distinct," and has members who share "a common immutable characteristic." H.R. 391 would have explicitly provided that the "membership in a particular social group" ground would cover individuals who fail or refuse "to comply with any law or regulation that prevents the exercise of the individual right of that person to direct the upbringing and education of a child of that person (including any law or regulation preventing homeschooling)." At the same time, the bill sought to prohibit the application of this ground to asylum cases involving criminal gang membership or activity. H.R. 391 also included language related to the INA asylum provisions that enumerate certain determinations about an alien that preclude the granting of asylum. One of these determinations is that the alien was "firmly resettled in another country" before coming to the United States and requesting asylum. H.R. 391 would have considered the "firmly resettled" criterion to be satisfied "by evidence that the alien can live in such country (in any legal status) without fear of persecution." Other Bills Other bills that saw action in the 115 th Congress included more limited language on asylum. For example, the Criminal Alien Gang Member Removal Act ( H.R. 3697 ), as passed by the House, would have added a new item to the INA list of determinations that preclude the granting of asylum. It would have made an alien ineligible for asylum if he or she was inadmissible or deportable based on new INA criminal gang membership or criminal gang-related activity grounds that the bill would have established. Under H.R. 3697 , such an alien would also have been exempt from the INA restriction on removing an alien to a country where his or her life or freedom would be threatened based on race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. Asylum-related provisions similar to those in H.R. 3697 were included in two other measures—the Michael Davis, Jr. and Danny Oliver in Honor of State and Local Law Enforcement Act ( H.R. 2431 ), as ordered to be reported by the House Judiciary Committee, and the SECURE and SUCCEED Act ( S.Amdt. 1959 to H.R. 2579 ), which failed on a Senate floor vote in February 2018. In addition, these two measures would have made further changes to the INA's asylum-related provisions. They would have made aliens ineligible for asylum if they were inadmissible on a broader array of terrorist-related grounds and would have exempted aliens who were inadmissible on this larger set of terrorist grounds from the general INA restriction on removing an alien to a country where his or her life or freedom would be threatened. H.R. 2431 and S.Amdt. 1959 would also have amended the INA provisions on asylee adjustment of status to LPR status. Current INA provisions generally require that applicants for adjustment be admissible to the United States as immigrants, but they grant the Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney General broad authority to waive applicable inadmissibility provisions for humanitarian purposes. While there were significant differences among the asylee adjustment of status amendments in S.Amdt. 1959 and H.R. 2431 , both measures would have limited existing DHS/DOJ inadmissibility waiver authority and added new deportability-related requirements to the INA asylee adjustment of status provisions. Presidential Action Citing constitutional and statutory authority, President Trump issued a presidential proclamation on November 9, 2018, to immediately suspend the entry into the United States of aliens who cross the Southwest border between ports of entry. The proclamation indicates that its entry suspension provisions will expire 90 days after its issuance date or on the date that the United States and Mexico reach a bilateral safe country agreement, whichever is earlier. Also on November 9, 2018, DHS and DOJ jointly issued an interim final rule to bar an alien who enters the United States in contravention of the proclamation from eligibility for asylum. The proclamation and the rule are being challenged in federal court (see " 2018 Interim Final Rule "). On February 7, 2019, President Trump renewed the proclamation with the issuance of a new proclamation with the same name. Selected Policy Issues Asylum is a complex area of immigration law and policy. Much of the recent debate surrounding it has focused on efforts by the Trump Administration to tighten the asylum system. Several key policy considerations about asylum are highlighted below. Some, such as the grounds for granting asylum, have been long-standing issues for policymakers, while others, such as safe third country agreements, have been garnering attention more recently. Asylum Backlog There has been much discussion about an increasing backlog of asylum applications. The term asylum backlog may suggest that there is a single queue of pending asylum cases. In fact, as discussed above, USCIS and EOIR separately adjudicate affirmative asylum cases and defensive asylum cases, respectively. ( Backlog as used in this report is synonymous with pending caseload .) The numbers of pending USCIS affirmative asylum applications and EOIR defensive asylum cases have varied over the years, impacted by factors including international developments, changes to U.S. immigration laws, and agency resources. In the case of affirmative applications, there have been significant fluctuations in the size of the backlog over the history of the asylum program. Since FY2009, however, backlogs of both USCIS affirmative asylum applications and EOIR cases have increased annually. At the end of FY2009, there were about 6,000 pending affirmative asylum applications at USCIS ; that number stood at about 320,000 at the end of FY2018. During this same period, the number of pending cases before EOIR increased from about 224,000 at the end of FY2009 to about 786,000 at the end of FY2018. Not all the EOIR cases necessarily involve an asylum claim, however. According to EOIR, as of June 18, 2018, it had about 720,000 pending cases, and some 325,000 of those (about 45%) included asylum applications. A variety of arguments are made for prioritizing the reduction of the asylum backlog. These include the need to preserve the integrity of the asylum process and to provide protection in a timely manner to legitimate asylum seekers. More controversial arguments for addressing the backlog center on the perceived need to eliminate an incentive for unauthorized aliens without valid asylum claims to enter the United States and file frivolous applications (see " Frivolous or Fraudulent Asylum Claims "). Regarding the affirmative asylum backlog, USCIS described its January 2018 decision to interview more recent asylum applications before older filings as "an attempt to stem the growth of the agency's asylum backlog." There is debate about whether this is an effective and judicious strategy. While some point to signs that this processing change is reducing the backlog, others argue that it is a wrongheaded approach and that USCIS should instead be dedicating more resources to adjudicating asylum cases. Those in the latter group argue that individuals with older, valid asylum claims will face even longer waits for relief under the last in-first out system. DHS efforts to reduce the asylum backlog are also impacting other humanitarian admissions programs. According to the report Proposed Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 2019 , "DHS in FY 2017 and FY 2018 shifted a significant proportion of its refugee officers to processing affirmative asylum applications and conducting credible fear and reasonable fear screenings. This reduced the number of refugee interviews that could be conducted abroad in those years." The report also indicates that the Administration plans to "continue to shift some refugee officers to assist the Asylum Division" in FY2019 to address the asylum backlog. Regarding the backlog of immigration court cases, the director of EOIR testified at an April 2018 Senate hearing that the agency was addressing challenges that had contributed to the backlog. In his prepared testimony, he cited the challenges of "declining case completions, protracted hiring times for new immigration judges, and the continued use of paper files." In June 2018 remarks at EOIR, Attorney General Sessions characterized the large and growing backlog of immigration court cases as unacceptable and outlined steps being taken to reduce it. In his prepared remarks, he asked each EOIR judge to complete at least 700 cases annually, which he described as "about the average." He said, "Setting this expectation is a rational management policy to ensure consistency, accountability, and efficiency in our immigration court system." He also explained that additional immigration judges were being hired and that DOJ was working with DHS to "deploy judges electronically and by video-teleconference." Some question whether the approach being taken by DOJ to reduce the EOIR backlog—particularly the annual case completion goal—is advisable and will succeed. For example, Ashley Tabaddor, president of the National Association of Immigration Judges, has expressed concern about the ability of immigration judges to adjudicate asylum cases within the time frame dictated by that yearly goal. Grounds for Asylum The INA definition of a refugee identifies five persecution grounds as the bases for receiving refugee status or asylum: race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, and political opinion. It provides no definitions of these terms. As noted, however, it does state that an individual who has been forced to have an abortion or undergo sterilization or has been persecuted for resistance to a coercive population control program is to be considered to have been persecuted on the basis of political opinion. Legislation considered in the 115 th Congress would have further amended the INA refugee definition to provide that an individual who has been persecuted for failure to comply with or resistance to any law or regulation that prevents homeschooling is to be considered to have been persecuted on the basis of membership in a particular social group (see " H.R. 391 "). In June 2018, Attorney General Sessions issued a decision regarding the adjudication of asylum claims based on the "membership in a particular social group" ground. In the past, asylum had been granted to certain victims of domestic violence based on a finding of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of "membership in a particular social group." Attorney General Sessions vacated a Board of Immigration Appeals' 2016 decision in one of these cases and remanded the case to the immigration judge for further proceedings, arguing that the appropriate legal standards had not been applied. He reached the following conclusion about asylum cases involving private criminal activity (footnotes excluded): Generally, claims by aliens pertaining to domestic violence or gang violence perpetrated by non-governmental actors will not qualify for asylum. While I do not decide that violence inflicted by non-governmental actors may never serve as the basis for an asylum or withholding application based on membership in a particular social group, in practice such claims are unlikely to satisfy the statutory grounds for proving group persecution that the government is unable or unwilling to address. The mere fact that a country may have problems effectively policing certain crimes—such as domestic violence or gang violence—or that certain populations are more likely to be victims of crime, cannot itself establish an asylum claim. The decision further noted that because claims by aliens pertaining to domestic violence or gang violence perpetrated by nongovernmental actors generally will not qualify for asylum, they would also generally not meet the threshold for a finding of a credible fear of persecution (see " Inspection of Arriving Aliens "). In July 2018, USCIS issued a policy memorandum to provide guidance to its asylum officers in light of the Attorney General's decision. Highlighting required findings about the home government in cases involving private violence, the memorandum stated: Few gang-based or domestic-violence claims involving particular social groups defined by the members' vulnerability to harm may merit a grant of asylum or refugee status—or pass the "significant possibility" test in credible fear screenings …—because an applicant must prove, or establish a significant possibility that, his or her government is unable or unwilling to protect him or her…. Again, the home government must either condone the behavior or demonstrate a complete helplessness to protect victims of such alleged persecution. Following issuance of the Attorney General's decision, immigration advocates expressed worry that the decision and the related USCIS policy memorandum could have wide-sweeping consequences, particularly for asylum seekers from Central America. In a letter to the New York Times , a counsel with the Tahirih Justice Center, which advocates for immigrant women and girls fleeing gender-based violence, wrote, "As a result of that ruling, and the subsequent policy guidance, immigration officers may now feel emboldened to deny asylum to women fleeing domestic violence, even under the most life-threatening circumstances." On December 19, 2018, a federal district court judge in Washington, DC, ruled on a case challenging the policies regarding credible fear of persecution determinations set forth in former Attorney General Sessions' decision and the USCIS policy memorandum. The judge permanently enjoined the U.S. government from continuing some of the new policies. S ome who a re concerned about the potential impact of the former Attorney General's decision on women seeking asylum have discussed the possibility of amending the underlying INA definition of a refugee to explicitly address gender-based asylum claims. Among the l egislative options that have been put forward a re to add "gender" to the list of persecution gro unds or "to define the phrase ' particular social group' by amending the law to include a non-exclusive list of (currently) common gender-based asylum claims, including domestic violence." Credible Fear of Persecution Threshold Separate from the 2018 decision by former Attorney General Sessions and the related USCIS policy memorandum discussed in the preceding section, the credible fear of persecution threshold has been a focus of attention recently as the number of individuals being screened for and found to have a credible fear has grown. Individuals who are found to have a credible fear may remain in the United States while their court case proceeds. As noted, the INA asylum provisions define credible fear of persecution to mean "there is a significant possibility, taking into account the credibility of the statements made by the alien in support of the alien's claim and such other facts as are known to the officer, that the alien could establish eligibility for asylum." House bills considered in the 115 th Congress would have added a new requirement to this definition—that "it is more probable than not that the statements made by, and on behalf of, the alien in support of the alien's claim are true." USCIS Director Francis Cissna has endorsed a tightening of the credible fear of persecution standard. In prepared testimony for a May 2018 House hearing on border security, he stated, "The simple reality is that those who wish to gain access to or remain in the United States know they can likely effect that access and then delay their removal by simply saying the 'magic words' of 'fear' or 'asylum.' The standard for credible fear screenings at the border has been set so low that nearly everyone meets it." Others disagree that the credible fear standard should be raised. In a 2018 policy brief, the American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA) argues that "the lower threshold for credible fear determinations is necessary precisely because asylum seekers arriving at the border are typically detained, traumatized, and have limited access to counsel and documentation to support their claims." Frivolous or Fraudulent Asylum Claims There have been concerns about frivolous asylum applications since the establishment of the U.S. asylum program. As noted, the 1980 interim regulations made reference to "non-frivolous" applications, and IIRIRA amended the INA to permanently bar an individual who knowingly files a frivolous asylum application from receiving immigration benefits. Under current regulations, an asylum application is considered "frivolous" for purposes of the INA benefit bar "if any of its material elements is deliberately fabricated." These regulations also provide that for purposes of the bar, "a finding that an alien filed a frivolous asylum application shall not preclude the alien from seeking withholding of removal." The issue of frivolous asylum claims was highlighted by Attorney General Sessions in 2017 remarks, in which he described the asylum system as being "subject to rampant abuse and fraud." He further said, "And as this system becomes overloaded with fake claims, it cannot deal effectively with just claims." Similarly, in his May 2018 House testimony, USCIS Director Cissna stated, "The integrity of our entire immigration system is at risk because frivolous asylum applications impede our ability to help people who really need it." Several House bills considered in the 115 th Congress sought to tighten language in the INA on frivolous asylum claims. In his May 2018 testimony, USCIS Director Cissna called for legislation to address the problem of frivolous claims that would, among other provisions, "impos[e] and enforce[e] penalties for the filing of frivolous asylum applications." A key point of contention in the current debate about frivolous or fraudulent asylum claims is the scope of the problem. According to a researcher at the immigration-restrictionist Center for Immigration Studies, "Most asylum claims nowadays, whether in Europe or the United States, are not genuine. Migrants are more and more using the asylum ticket to gain entry into a country and stay." Other experts, such as Law Professor Lindsay M. Harris, reach different conclusions about the prevalence of fraud in recent asylum applications: "One of the humanitarian crises producing refugees happens to be south of our border, in Central America, and this accounts for the exponential increase in asylum claims and individuals seeking protection in the U.S. through the credible fear system, rather than a sudden increase in fraudulent claims." Employment Authorization Under current law, an asylum seeker who is not otherwise eligible for employment authorization cannot be granted such authorization until 180 days after filing an application for asylum. In general, under DHS regulations, an asylum applicant cannot submit an application for employment authorization and an employment authorization document (EAD) until 150 days after a complete asylum application has been received. There is no fee for an asylum applicant's initial application for employment authorization. Renewal applications are subject to standard fees. Although there seems to be general agreement that asylum seekers should be eligible for employment authorization at some point, aspects of this policy have long been debated. For example, for more than 20 years, some have argued that the availability of employment authorization creates an incentive for individuals to apply for asylum solely to be able to work legally in the United States. In his prepared testimony for the May 2018 House hearing on border issues, USCIS Director Cissna stated, "While the number of mala fide claims is difficult to estimate, experience from the 1990s indicates that a significant amount of the growth in receipts since FY 2014 may be linked to individuals pursuing work authorization and not necessarily asylum status." Others dismiss the idea that asylum seekers act in response to particular U.S. policies, arguing that they are motivated by desperate circumstances. Commenting on Central American asylum seekers, a spokesperson for the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees said, "People are leaving because they are suffering from high levels of violence from gangs and other organized criminal groups.… This flow of families from Central America will not stop because if the root causes are still there these people will keep coming to the U.S. or to other countries." The complex system set up to track when an asylum seeker has reached the 180-day point for employment authorization purposes—known as the asylum EAD clock —has also been controversial. There are various events that stop the asylum EAD clock. USCIS and EOIR characterize these as "delays requested or caused by an applicant while his or her asylum application is pending with USCIS and/or EOIR" (e.g., the applicant's "failure to appear at an interview or fingerprint appointment" or "the applicant or his or her attorney asks for additional time to prepare the case"). Over the years, immigration advocacy groups have been critical of clock-related USCIS and EOIR policies and actions. Variation in Immigration Judges' Asylum Decisions In November 2017, the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) published the report Asylum Outcome Continues to Depend on the Judge Assigned , which examined asylum decisions of judges on the same immigration court. It was based on combined data from FY2012 through FY2017 for judges who decided at least 100 asylum cases during this six-year period. Among its findings, the report identified the Newark and San Francisco Immigration Courts as having the greatest judge-to-judge differences in asylum cases decided during that time. For the San Francisco court, for example, it stated that "the odds of denial varied from only 9.4 percent all the way up to 97.1 percent depending upon the judge." The TRAC analysis assumes that "when individual judges [on the same court] handle a sufficient number of asylum requests, random case assignment will result in each judge being assigned a roughly equivalent mix of 'worthy' cases." It, thus, posits, "any large differences in the denial rates of individual judges are unlikely to be the result of differences in the nature of the incoming cases. Instead, they are likely to reflect the personal perspective that each judge brings to the bench." TRAC first reported on differences in asylum decisions by immigration judges nationwide based on an analysis of asylum cases decided by judges from FY1994 through early FY2005. Published in July 2006, this TRAC report found a "great disparity in the rate at which individual immigration judges declined the applications." Seemingly taking issue with the TRAC analysis but not mentioning it by name, a November 2007 EOIR fact sheet, "Asylum Variations in Immigration Court," stated: Asylum adjudication does not lend itself well to statistical analysis. Each asylum application is adjudicated on a case-by-case basis, and each has many variables that need to be considered by an adjudicator. It is therefore important that any statistical analysis acknowledge these variables and not draw comparisons between substantially different cases. The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) examined variations in the outcomes of asylum cases in reports issued in 2008 and 2016. The 2008 report, which was based on an analysis of asylum case data from FY1994 through April 2007, found that "within immigration courts, there were pronounced differences in grant rates across immigration judges." While acknowledging the limits of its analysis, GAO concluded that "the size of the disparities in asylum grant rates creates a perception of unfairness in the asylum adjudication process within the immigration court system." GAO analyzed EOIR data for FY1995 through FY2014 for its 2016 follow-up report. Although it was unable to control for "the underlying facts and merits of individual asylum applications," GAO maintained that the available data allowed it to compare asylum outcomes across immigration courts and immigration judges. It estimated that for the May 2007-FY2014 period since its 2008 report, "the affirmative and defensive asylum grant rates would vary by 47 and 57 percentage points, respectively, for the same representative applicant whose case was heard by different immigration judges." Safe Third Country Agreements Under the INA, an alien is ineligible to apply for asylum in the United States if he or she can be removed, pursuant to a bilateral or multilateral agreement, to a third country where the "alien's life or freedom would not be threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, and where the alien would have access to a full and fair procedure for determining a claim to asylum or equivalent temporary protection." The United States and Canada signed a safe third country agreement in 2002, which went into effect in 2004. Under the agreement, asylum seekers must request protection in the first of the two countries they arrive in, unless they qualify for an exception. Under DHS regulations, a USCIS asylum officer must determine whether an alien arriving in the United States at a U.S.-Canada land border port of entry seeking asylum is subject to removal to Canada in accordance with the U.S.-Canada safe third country agreement. The Trump Administration has had preliminary discussions with Mexico about a possible safe third country agreement. According to an unidentified senior DHS official, "We believe the flows [of Central Americans into the United States] would drop dramatically and fairly immediately" if a U.S.-Mexico safe country agreement went in effect. Human Rights First, an advocacy organization, opposes such an agreement. The group found that Mexico was not a safe third country in 2017 and indicated in a July 2018 press release that that was still the case: "Since [last year], the dangers facing refugees and migrants in Mexico have escalated. Recent reports confirm that Mexican authorities continue to improperly return asylum seekers to their countries of persecution and that the deficiencies in the Mexican asylum system have grown." Taking a different approach, House bills considered in the 115 th Congress would have amended the INA safe third country asylum provision to eliminate the "pursuant to a bilateral or multilateral agreement" language, presumably to provide for removals to a third country without a bilateral agreement. Conclusion The asylum provisions in the INA are unusual in providing a standard mechanism for eligible unauthorized aliens in the United States to apply for a legal immigration status. This aspect of asylum also serves to make this form of relief particularly controversial, especially at times when large numbers of asylum seekers are arriving in the United States. The high volume of asylum cases has elicited policy responses from the Trump Administration, as described in this report. In October 2018 remarks at an immigration conference, USCIS Director Cissna offered context for DHS's and DOJ's asylum-related actions from the Administration's perspective when he referenced "challenges associated with surges at the U. S. southern border, where migrants know that they can exploit a broken system to enter the U.S., avoid removal, and remain in the country." While the Administration maintains that its policies adhere to the INA and are necessary to preserve the integrity of the immigration system, others argue that it is tightening the asylum process in contravention of the law. It remains to be seen whether the Administration will continue to try to reshape U.S. asylum policy and whether Congress will take action, as it has at times in the past, to make legislative changes to the asylum system. Appendix A. Affirmative Asylum Applications Table A-1 provides the underlying data for Figure 1 on new affirmative asylum applications filed annually with USCIS since FY1995. Table A-2 expands on the data in Table A-1 to show the top 10 nationalities filing new affirmative asylum applications annually since FY2007. For each of the top 10 nationalities for each year, Table A-2 provides a rank and a percentage of all applications that were filed by applicants of that nationality. The table also includes annual data on the total number of applications filed by all applicants (the latter totals match the data in Table A-1 ). As shown in Table A-2 , the top four nationalities filing new affirmative asylum applications in FY2007 (China, Haiti, Mexico, and Guatemala) remained in the top 10 throughout the period, with China holding the top spot in all years except FY2017 and FY2018. Between FY2009 and FY2012, Chinese nationals filed one-third of all new affirmative asylum applications each year. In FY2017 and FY2018, however, China's rank fell to 2 nd and 4 th , respectively. In each of those two years, Venezuelans filed more new affirmative asylum applications than nationals of any other country, accounting for one-fifth of all applications filed in FY2017 and more than a quarter of the total in FY2018. Since FY2015, nationals of Venezuela and four other Latin American countries (Guatemala, El Salvador, Mexico, and Honduras) have accounted for five of the top six nationalities filing new affirmative asylum applications each year. Appendix B. USCIS Asylum Decisions and Credible Fear Findings Table B-1 provides the underlying data for Figure 2 on USCIS decisions on affirmative asylum applications issued annually from FY2009 through FY2017. It also includes an additional small outcome category (Cases Dismissed). These are cases where the applicant did not appear for fingerprinting/ biometrics collection. For the cases referred to an immigration judge (which involve applicants without lawful status), Table B-1 distinguishes among three mutually exclusive subcategories: cases that were interviewed by USCIS; cases that were interviewed by USCIS where the applicant did not meet the filing deadline; and cases that were not interviewed by USCIS. (The Referrals "Total" column in Table B-1 matches the Referrals data displayed in Figure 2 .) In addition to deciding affirmative asylum cases, USCIS is tasked with assessing the credible fear of persecution claims made by individuals in expedited removal. Table B-2 and Table B-3 provide the underlying credible fear-related data for Figure 4 . Table B-2 contains data on referrals of credible fear claims to USCIS and USCIS completions of these cases. Table B-3 provides breakdowns of the Table B-2 "Completions" data by case outcome. It also provides the percentage of the completed cases in which credible fear was found. Appendix C. Defensive Asylum Applications The "Total Applications" column in Table C-1 provides the underlying data for Figure 3 on defensive asylum applications filed annually since FY2008. In addition, Table C-1 provides data on the two components of that total: (1) asylum applications originally filed as affirmative applications with USCIS (column 2), and (2) asylum applications originally filed as defensive applications with EOIR (column 3) (see " Defensive Asylum "). As shown in Table C-1 , the growth in the total number of defensive asylum applications filed in recent years prior to FY2018 has been driven mainly by an increase in asylum applications first filed in immigration court. Appendix D. EOIR Asylum Decisions EOIR immigration judges decide defensive asylum cases. An asylum application is defensive when the applicant is in standard removal proceedings in immigration court (see " Defensive Asylum "). Table D-1 provides the underlying data for Figure 5 on defensive asylum cases decided annually since FY2009. Table D-2 provides data on a subset of EOIR asylum decisions involving credible fear claims. It is limited to decisions in defensive asylum cases that originated with an individual receiving a positive credible fear of persecution finding from USCIS.

Asylum is a complex area of immigration law and policy. While much of the recent debate surrounding asylum has focused on efforts by the Trump Administration to address asylum seekers arriving at the U.S. southern border, U.S. asylum policies have long been a subject of discussion. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952, as originally enacted, did not contain any language on asylum. Asylum provisions were added and then revised by a series of subsequent laws. Currently, the INA provides for the granting of asylum to an alien who applies for such relief in accordance with applicable requirements and is determined to be a refugee. The INA defines a refugee, in general, as a person who is outside his or her country of nationality and is unable or unwilling to return to that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. Under current law and regulations, aliens who are in the United States or who arrive in the United States, regardless of immigration status, may apply for asylum (with exceptions). An asylum application is affirmative if an alien who is physically present in the United States (and is not in removal proceedings) submits an application to the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS's) U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). An asylum application is defensive when the applicant is in standard removal proceedings with the Department of Justice's (DOJ's) Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) and requests asylum as a defense against removal. An asylum applicant may receive employment authorization 180 days after the application filing date. Special asylum provisions apply to aliens who are subject to a streamlined removal process known as expedited removal. To be considered for asylum, these aliens must first be determined by a USCIS asylum officer to have a credible fear of persecution. Under the INA, credible fear of persecution means that "there is a significant possibility, taking into account the credibility of the statements made by the alien in support of the alien's claim and such other facts as are known to the officer, that the alien could establish eligibility for asylum." Individuals determined to have a credible fear may apply for asylum during standard removal proceedings. Asylum may be granted by USCIS or EOIR. There are no numerical limitations on asylum grants. If an alien is granted asylum, his or her spouse and children may also be granted asylum, as dependents. A grant of asylum does not expire, but it may be terminated under certain circumstances. After one year of physical presence in the United States as asylees, an alien and his or her spouse and children may be granted lawful permanent resident status, subject to certain requirements. The Trump Administration has taken a variety of steps that would limit eligibility for asylum. As of the date of this report, legal challenges to these actions are ongoing. For its part, the 115th Congress considered asylum-related legislation, which generally would have tightened the asylum system. Several bills contained provisions that, among other things, would have amended INA provisions on termination of asylum, credible fear of persecution, frivolous asylum applications, and the definition of a refugee. Key policy considerations about asylum include the asylum application backlog, the grounds for granting asylum, the credible fear of persecution threshold, frivolous asylum applications, employment authorization, variation in immigration judges' asylum decisions, and safe third country agreements.

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Introduction Issues for Congress This report provides background information and issues for Congress on multiyear procurement (MYP) and block buy contracting (BBC), which are special contracting mechanisms that Congress permits the Department of Defense (DOD) to use for a limited number of defense acquisition programs. Compared to the standard or default approach of annual contracting, MYP and BBC have the potential for reducing weapon procurement costs by a few or several percent. Potential issues for Congress concerning MYP and BBC include whether to use MYP and BBC in the future more frequently, less frequently, or about as frequently as they are currently used; whether to create a permanent statute to govern the use of BBC, analogous to the permanent statute that governs the use of MYP; and whether the Coast Guard should begin making use of MYP and BBC. Congress's decisions on these issues could affect defense acquisition practices, defense funding requirements, and the defense industrial base. Terminology and Scope of Report An Air Force "Block Buy" That Is Not Discussed in This Report A contract that the Air Force has for the procurement of Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) Launch Services (ELS) has sometimes been referred to as a block buy, but it is not an example of block buy contracting as discussed in this report. The Air Force in this instance is using the term block buy to mean something different. This report does not discuss the ELS contract. (For additional discussion, see " Terminology Alert: Block Buy Contracting vs. Block Buys " below.) Contracting Mechanisms and Funding Approaches In discussing MYP, BBC, and incremental funding, it can be helpful to distinguish contracting mechanisms from funding approaches. The two are often mixed together in discussions of DOD acquisition, sometimes leading to confusion. Stated briefly Funding approaches are ways that Congress can appropriate funding for weapon procurement programs, so that DOD can then put them under contract. Examples of funding approaches include traditional full funding (the standard or default approach), incremental funding, and advance appropriations. Any of these funding approaches might make use of advance procurement (AP) funding. Contracting mechanisms are ways for DOD to contract for the procurement of weapons systems, once funding for those systems has been appropriated by Congress. Examples of contracting mechanisms include annual contracting (the standard or default DOD approach), MYP, and BBC. Contracting mechanisms can materially change the total procurement cost of a ship. The use of a particular funding approach in a defense acquisition program does not dictate the use of a particular contracting mechanism. Defense acquisition programs consequently can be implemented using various combinations of funding approaches and contracting mechanisms. Most DOD weapon acquisition programs use a combination of traditional full funding and annual contracting. A few programs, particularly certain Navy shipbuilding programs, use incremental funding as their funding approach. A limited number of DOD programs use MYP as their contracting approach, and to date three Navy shipbuilding programs have used BBC as their contracting approach. The situation is summarized in Table 1 . This report focuses on the contracting approaches of MYP and BBC and how they compare to annual contracting. Other CRS reports discuss the funding approaches of traditional full funding, incremental funding, and advance appropriations. Background Multiyear Procurement (MYP) MYP in Brief What is MYP, and how does it differ from annual contracting? MYP, also known as multiyear contracting, is an alternative to the standard or default DOD approach of annual contracting. Under annual contracting, DOD uses one or more contracts for each year's worth of procurement of a given kind of item. Under MYP, DOD instead uses a single contract for two to five years' worth of procurement of a given kind of item, without having to exercise a contract option for each year after the first year. DOD needs congressional approval for each use of MYP. To illustrate the basic difference between MYP and annual contracting, consider a hypothetical DOD program to procure 20 single-engine aircraft of a certain kind over the 5-year period FY2018-FY2022, at a rate of 4 aircraft per year: Under annual contracting , DOD would issue one or more contracts for each year's procurement of four aircraft. After Congress funds the procurement of the first four aircraft in FY2018, DOD would issue one or more contracts (or exercise a contract option) for those four aircraft. The next year, after Congress funds the procurement of the next four aircraft in FY2019, DOD would issue one or more contracts (or exercise a contract option) for those four aircraft, and so on. Under MYP , DOD would issue one contract covering all 20 aircraft to be procured during the 5-year period FY2018-FY2022. DOD would award this contract in FY2018, at the beginning of the five-year period, following congressional approval to use MYP for the program, and congressional appropriation of the FY2018 funding for the program. To continue the implementation of the contract over the next four years, DOD would request the FY2019 funding for the program as part of DOD's proposed FY2019 budget, the FY2020 funding as part of DOD's proposed FY2020 budget, and so on. Potential Savings Under MYP How much can MYP save? Compared with estimated costs under annual contracting, estimated savings for programs being proposed for MYP have ranged from less than 5% to more than 15%, depending on the particulars of the program in question, with many estimates falling in the range of 5% to 10%. In practice, actual savings from using MYP rather than annual contracting can be difficult to observe or verify because of cost growth during the execution of the contract that was caused by developments independent of the use of MYP rather than annual contracting. A February 2012 briefing by the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) office within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) states that "MYP savings analysis is difficult due to the lack of actual costs on the alternative acquisition path, i.e., the path not taken." The briefing states that CAPE up to that point had assessed MYP savings for four aircraft procurement programs—F/A-18E/F strike fighters, H-60 helicopters, V-22 tilt-rotor aircraft, and CH-47F helicopters—and that CAPE's assessed savings ranged from 2% to 8%. A 2008 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report stated that DOD does not have a formal mechanism for tracking multiyear results against original expectations and makes few efforts to validate whether actual savings were achieved by multiyear procurement. It does not maintain comprehensive central records and historical information that could be used to enhance oversight and knowledge about multiyear performance to inform and improve future multiyear procurement (MYP) candidates. DOD and defense research centers officials said it is difficult to assess results because of the lack of historical information on multiyear contracts, comparable annual costs, and the dynamic acquisition environment. How does MYP potentially save money? Compared to annual contracting, using MYP can in principle reduce the cost of the weapons being procured in two primary ways: Contractor optimization of workforce and production facilities . An MYP contract gives the contractor (e.g., an airplane manufacturer or shipbuilder) confidence that a multiyear stream of business of a known volume will very likely materialize. This confidence can permit the contractor to make investments in the firm's workforce and production facilities that are intended to optimize the facility for the production of the items being procured under the contract. Such investments can include payments for retaining or training workers, or for building, expanding, or modernizing production facilities. Under annual contracting, the manufacturer might not have enough confidence about its future stream of business to make these kinds of investments, or might be unable to convince its parent firm to finance them. E conomic order quan tity (EOQ) purchases of selected long-leadtime components. Under an MYP contract, DOD is permitted to bring forward selected key components of the items to be procured under the contract and to purchase the components in batch form during the first year or two of the contract. In the hypothetical example introduced earlier, using MYP could permit DOD to purchase, say, the 20 engines for the 20 aircraft in the first year or two of the 5-year contract. Procuring selected components in this manner under an MYP contract is called an economic order quantity (EOQ) purchase. EOQ purchases can reduce the procurement cost of the weapons being procured under the MYP contract by allowing the manufacturers of components to take maximum advantage of production economies of scale that are possible with batch orders. What gives the contractor confidence that the multiyear stream of business will materialize? At least two things give the contractor confidence that DOD will not terminate an MYP contract and that the multiyear stream of business consequently will materialize: For a program to qualify for MYP, DOD must certify, among other things, that the minimum need for the items to be purchased is expected to remain substantially unchanged during the contract in terms of production rate, procurement rate, and total quantities. Perhaps more important to the contractor, MYP contracts include a cancellation penalty intended to reimburse a contractor for costs that the contractor has incurred (i.e., investments the contractor has made) in anticipation of the work covered under the MYP contract. The undesirability of paying a cancellation penalty acts as a disincentive for the government against canceling the contract. (And if the contract is canceled, the cancellation penalty helps to make the contractor whole.) Permanent Statute Governing MYP Is there a permanent statute governing MYP contracting? There is a permanent statute governing MYP contracting—10 U.S.C. 2306b. The statute was created by Section 909 of the FY1982 Department of Defense Authorization Act ( S. 815 / P.L. 97-86 of December 1, 1981), revised and reorganized by Section 1022 of the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 ( S. 1587 / P.L. 103-355 of October 13, 1994), and further amended on several occasions since. For the text of 10 U.S.C. 2306b, see Appendix A . DOD's use of MYP contracting is further governed by DOD acquisition regulations. Under this statute, what criteria must a program meet to qualify for MYP? 10 U.S.C. 2306b(a) states that to qualify for MYP, a program must meet several criteria, including the following: Significant savings. DOD must estimate that using an MYP contract would result in "significant savings" compared with using annual contracting. Realistic cost estimates . DOD's estimates of the cost of the MYP contract and the anticipated savings must be realistic. Stable need for the items. DOD must expect that its minimum need for the items will remain substantially unchanged during the contract in terms of production rate, procurement rate, and total quantities. Stable design for the items . The design for the items to be acquired must be stable, and the technical risks associated with the items must not be excessive. 10 U.S.C. includes provisions requiring the Secretary of Defense or certain other DOD officials to find, determine, or certify that these and other statutory requirements for using MYP contracts have been met, and provisions requiring the heads of DOD agencies to provide written notifications of certain things to the congressional defense committees 30 days before awarding or initiating an MYP contract, or 10 days before terminating one. 10 U.S.C. 2306b also requires DOD MYP contracts to be fixed-price type contracts. What is meant by " significant savings"? The amount of savings required under 10 U.S.C. 2306b to qualify for using an MYP contract has changed over time; the requirement was changed from "substantial savings" to "significant savings" by Section 811 of the FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act ( S. 1356 / P.L. 114-92 of November 25, 2015). The joint explanatory statement for the FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act states the following regarding Section 811: Amendment relating to multiyear contract authority for acquisition of property (sec. 811) The House bill contained a provision (sec. 806) that would strike the existing requirement that the head of an agency must determine that substantial savings would be achieved before entering into a multiyear contract. The Senate amendment contained no similar provision. The Senate recedes with an amendment that would require that significant savings would be achieved before entering into a multiyear contract. The conferees agree that the government should seek to maximize savings whenever it pursues multiyear procurement. However, the conferees also agree that significant savings (estimated to be greater than $250.0 million), and other benefits, may be achieved even if it does not equate to a minimum of 10 percent savings over the cost of an annual contract. The conferees expect a request for authority to enter into a multiyear contract will include (1) the estimated cost savings, (2) the minimum quantity needed, (3) confirmation that the design is stable and the technical risks are not excessive, and (4) any other rationale for entering into such a contract. In addition, 10 U.S.C. 2306b states the following: If for any fiscal year a multiyear contract to be entered into under this section is authorized by law for a particular procurement program and that authorization is subject to certain conditions established by law (including a condition as to cost savings to be achieved under the multiyear contract in comparison to specified other contracts) and if it appears (after negotiations with contractors) that such savings cannot be achieved, but that significant savings could nevertheless be achieved through the use of a multiyear contract rather than specified other contracts, the President may submit to Congress a request for relief from the specified cost savings that must be achieved through multiyear contracting for that program. Any such request by the President shall include details about the request for a multiyear contract, including details about the negotiated contract terms and conditions. What is meant by "stable design"? The term "stable design" is generally understood to mean that the design for the items to be procured is not expected to change substantially during the period of the contract. Having a stable design is generally demonstrated by having already built at least a few items to that design (or in the case of a shipbuilding program, at least one ship to that design) and concluding, through testing and operation of those items, that the design does not require any substantial changes during the period of the contract. Potential Consequences of Not Fully Funding an MYP Contract What happens if Congress does not provide the annual funding requested by DOD to continue the implementation of the contract? If Congress does not provide the funding requested by DOD to continue the implementation of an MYP contract, DOD would be required to renegotiate, suspend, or terminate the contract. Terminating the contract could require the government to pay a cancellation penalty to the contractor. Renegotiating or suspending the contract could also have a financial impact. Effect on Flexibility for Making Procurement Changes What effect does using MYP have on flexibility for making procurement changes? A principal potential disadvantage of using MYP is that it can reduce Congress's and DOD's flexibility for making changes (especially reductions) in procurement programs in future years in response to changing strategic or budgetary circumstances, at least without incurring cancellation penalties. In general, the greater the portion of DOD's procurement account that is executed under MYP contracts, the greater the potential loss of flexibility. The use of MYP for executing some portion of the DOD procurement account means that if policymakers in future years decide to reduce procurement spending below previously planned levels, the spending reduction might fall more heavily on procurement programs that do not use MYP, which in turn might result in a less-than-optimally balanced DOD procurement effort. Congressional Approval How does Congress approve the use of MYP? Congress approves the use of MYP on a case-by-case basis, typically in response to requests by DOD. Congressional approval for DOD MYP contracts with a value of more than $500 million must occur in two places: an annual DOD appropriations act and an act other than the annual DOD appropriations act. In annual DOD appropriations acts, the provision permitting the use of MYP for one or more defense acquisition programs is typically included in the title containing general provisions, which typically is Title VIII. As shown in Table B-2 , since FY2011, it has been Section 8010. An annual national defense authorization act (NDAA) is usually the act other than an appropriations act in which provisions granting authority for using MYP contracting on individual defense acquisition programs are included. Such provisions typically occur in Title I of the NDAA, the title covering procurement programs. Provisions in which Congress approves the use of MYP for a particular defense acquisition program may include specific conditions for that program in addition to the requirements and conditions of 10 U.S.C. 2306b. Frequency of Use of MYP How often is MYP used? MYP is used for a limited number of DOD acquisition programs. As shown in the Appendix B , annual DOD appropriations acts since FY1990 typically have approved the use of MYP for zero to a few DOD programs each year. An August 28, 2017, press report states the following: The Pentagon's portfolio of active multiyear procurement contracts is on track to taper from $10.7 billion in fiscal year 2017—or more than 8 percent of DOD procurement spending—to $1.2 billion by FY-19, according to data recently compiled by the Pentagon comptroller for lawmakers. However, there are potential new block-buy deals in the works, including several large Navy deals. According to the Multiyear Procurement Contracts Report for FY-17, which includes data current as of June 27, seven major defense acquisition programs are being purchased through multiyear procurement contracts, collectively obligating the U.S. government to spend $16 billion across the five-year spending plan with $14.5 billion of the commitments lashed to FY-17 and FY-18. In an interview published on January 13, 2014, Sean Stackley, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition (i.e., the Navy's acquisition executive), stated the following: What the industrial base clamors for is stability, so they can plan, invest, train their work force. It gives them the ability in working with say, the Street [Wall Street], to better predict their own performance, then meet expectations in the same fashion we try to meet our expectations with the Hill. It's emblematic of stability that we've got more multiyear programs in the Department of the Navy than the rest of the Department of Defense combined. We've been able to harvest from that significant savings, and that has been key to solving some of our budget problems. It's allowed us in certain cases to put the savings right back into other programs tied to requirements. A February 2012 briefing by the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) office within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) shows that the total dollar value of DOD MYP contracts has remained more or less stable between FY2000 and FY2012 at roughly $7 billion to $13 billion per year. The briefing shows that since the total size of DOD's procurement budget has increased during this period, the portion of DOD's total procurement budget accounted for by programs using MYP contracts has declined from about 17% in FY2000 to less than 8% in FY2012. The briefing also shows that the Navy makes more use of MYP contracts than does the Army or Air Force, and that the Air Force made very little use of MYP in FY2010-FY2012. A 2008 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report stated the following: Although DOD had been entering into multiyear contracts on a limited basis prior to the 1980s, the Department of Defense Authorization Act, [for fiscal year] 1982, codified the authority for DOD to procure on a multiyear basis major weapon systems that meet certain criteria. Since that time, DOD has annually submitted various weapon systems as multiyear procurement candidates for congressional authorization. Over the past 25 years, Congress has authorized the use of multiyear procurement for approximately 140 acquisition programs, including some systems approved more than once. Block Buy Contracting (BBC) BBC in Brief What is BBC, and how does it compare to MYP? BBC is similar to MYP in that it permits DOD to use a single contract for more than one year's worth of procurement of a given kind of item without having to exercise a contract option for each year after the first year. BBC is also similar to MYP in that DOD needs congressional approval for each use of BBC. BBC differs from MYP in the following ways: There is no permanent statute governing the use of BBC. There is no requirement that BBC be approved in both a DOD appropriations act and an act other than a DOD appropriations act. Programs being considered for BBC do not need to meet any legal criteria to qualify for BBC because there is no permanent statute governing the use of BBC that establishes such criteria. A BBC contract can cover more than five years of planned procurements. The BBC contracts that were used by the Navy for procuring Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs), for example, covered a period of seven years (FY2010-FY2016). Economic order quantity (EOQ) authority does not come automatically as part of BBC authority because there is no permanent statute governing the use of BBC that includes EOQ authority as an automatic feature. To provide EOQ authority as part of a BBC contract, the provision granting authority for using BBC in a program may need to state explicitly that the authority to use BBC includes the authority to use EOQ. BBC contracts are less likely to include cancellation penalties. Given the one key similarity between BBC and MYP (the use of a single contract for more than one year's worth of procurement), and the various differences between BBC and MYP, BBC might be thought of as a less formal stepchild of MYP. When and why was BBC invented? BBC was invented by Section 121(b) of the FY1998 National Defense Authorization Act ( H.R. 1119 / P.L. 105-85 of November 18, 1997), which granted the Navy the authority to use a single contract for the procurement of the first four Virginia (SSN-774) class attack submarines. The 4 boats were scheduled to be procured during the 5-year period FY1998-FY2002 in annual quantities of 1-1-0-1-1. Congress provided the authority granted in Section 121(b) at least in part to reduce the combined procurement cost of the four submarines. Using MYP was not an option for the Virginia-class program at that time because the Navy had not even begun, let alone finished, construction of the first Virginia-class submarine, and consequently could not demonstrate that it had a stable design for the program. When Section 121(b) was enacted, there was no name for the contracting authority it provided. The term block buy contracting came into use later, when observers needed a term to refer to the kind of contracting authority that Congress authorized in Section 121(b). As discussed in the next section, this can cause confusion, because the term block buy was already being used in discussions of DOD acquisition to refer to something else. Terminology Alert: Block Buy Contracting vs. Block Buys What's the difference between block buy cont r acting and block buys? In discussions of defense procurement, the term "block buy" by itself (without "contracting" at the end) is sometimes used to refer to something quite different from block buy contracting—namely, the simple act of funding the procurement of more than one copy of an item in a single year, particularly when no more than one item of that kind might normally be funded in a single year. For example, when Congress funded the procurement of two aircraft carriers in FY1983, and another two in FY1988, these acts were each referred to as block buys, because aircraft carriers are normally procured one at a time, several years apart from one another. This alternate meaning of the term block buy predates by many years the emergence of the term block buy contracting. The term block buy is still used in this alternate manner, which can lead to confusion in discussions of defense procurement. For example, for FY2017, the Air Force requested funding for procuring five Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles (EELVs) for its EELV Launch Services (ELS) program. At the same time, Navy officials sometimes refer to the use of block buy contracts for the first four Virginia-class submarines, and in the LCS program, as block buys, when they might be more specifically referred to as instances of block buy contract ing . Potential Savings Under BBC How much can BBC save, compared with MYP? BBC can reduce the unit procurement costs of ships by amounts less than or perhaps comparable to those of MYP, if the authority granted for using BBC explicitly includes authority for making economic order quantity (EOQ) purchases of components. If the authority granted for using BBC does not explicitly include authority for making EOQ purchases, then the savings from BBC will be less. Potential savings under BBC might also be less than those under MYP if the BBC contract does not include a cancellation penalty, or includes one that is more limited than typically found in an MYP contract, because this might give the contractor less confidence than would be the case under an MYP contract that the future stream of business will materialize as planned, which in turn might reduce the amount of money the contractor invests to optimize its workforce and production facilities for producing the items to be procured under the contract. Frequency of Use of BBC How frequently has BBC been used? Since its use at the start of the Virginia-class program, BBC has been used very rarely. The Navy did not use it again in a shipbuilding program until December 2010, when it awarded two block buy contracts, each covering 10 LCSs to be procured over the six-year period FY2010-FY2015, to the two LCS builders. (Each contract was later amended to include an 11 th ship in FY2016, making for a total of 22 ships under the two contracts.) A third example is the John Lewis (TAO-205) class oiler program, in which the Navy is using a block buy contract to procure the first six ships in the program. A fourth example, arguably, is the Air Force's KC-46 aerial refueling tanker program, which is employing a fixed price incentive fee (FPIF) development contract that includes a "back end" commitment to procure certain minimum numbers of KC-46s in certain fiscal years. Using BBC Rather than MYP When might BBC be suitable as an alternative to MYP? BBC might be particularly suitable as an alternative to MYP in cases where using a multiyear contract can reduce costs, but the program in question cannot meet all the statutory criteria needed to qualify for MYP. As shown in the case of the first four Virginia-class boats, this can occur at or near the start of a procurement program, when design stability has not been demonstrated through the production of at least a few of the items to be procured (or, for a shipbuilding program, at least one ship). MYP and BBC vs. Contracts with Options What i s the difference between an MYP or block buy contract and a contract with options? The military services sometimes use contracts with options to procure multiple copies of an item that are procured over a period of several years. The Navy, for example, used a contract with options to procure Lewis and Clark (TAKE-1) class dry cargo ships that were procured over a period of several years. A contract with options can be viewed as somewhat similar to an MYP or block buy contract in that a single contract is used to procure several years' worth of procurement of a given kind of item. There is, however, a key difference between an MYP or block buy contract and a contract with options: In a contract with options, the service is under no obligation to exercise any of the options, and a service can choose to not exercise an option without having to make a penalty payment to the contractor. In contrast, in an MYP or block buy contract, the service is under an obligation to continue implementing the contract beyond the first year, provided that Congress appropriates the necessary funds. If the service chooses to terminate an MYP or block buy contract, and does so as a termination for government convenience rather than as a termination for contractor default, then the contractor can, under the contract's termination for convenience clause, seek a payment from the government for cost incurred for work that is complete or in process at the time of termination, and may include the cost of some of the investments made in anticipation of the MYP or block buy contract being fully implemented. The contractor can do this even if the MYP or block buy contract does not elsewhere include a provision for a cancellation penalty. As a result of this key difference, although a contract with options looks like a multiyear contract, it operates more like a series of annual contracts, and it cannot achieve the kinds of savings that are possible under MYP and BBC. Issues for Congress Potential issues for Congress concerning MYP and BBC include whether to use MYP and BBC in the future more frequently, less frequently, or about as frequently as they are currently used; and whether to create a permanent statute to govern the use of BBC, analogous to the permanent statute that governs the use of MYP. Frequency of Using MYP and BBC Should MYP and BBC in the future be used more frequently, less frequently, or about as frequently as they are currently used? Supporters of using MYP and BBC more frequently in the future might argue the following: Since MYP and BBC can reduce procurement costs, making greater use of MYP and BBC can help DOD get more value out of its available procurement funding. This can be particularly important if DOD's budget in real (i.e., inflation-adjusted) terms remains flat or declines in coming years, as many observers anticipate. The risks of using MYP have been reduced by Section 811 of the FY2008 National Defense Authorization Act ( H.R. 4986 / P.L. 110-181 of January 28, 2008), which amended 10 U.S.C. 2306b to strengthen the process for ensuring that programs proposed for MYP meet certain criteria (see " Permanent Statute Governing MYP "). Since the value of MYP contracts equated to less than 8% of DOD's procurement budget in FY2012, compared to about 17% of DOD's procurement budget in FY2000, MYP likely could be used more frequently without exceeding past experience regarding the share of DOD's procurement budget accounted for by MYP contracts. Supporters of using MYP and BBC less frequently in the future, or at least no more frequently than now, might argue the following: Using MYP and BBC more frequently would further reduce Congress's and DOD's flexibility for making changes in DOD procurement programs in future years in response to changing strategic or budgetary circumstances. The risks of reducing flexibility in this regard are increased now because of uncertainties in the current strategic environment and because efforts to reduce federal budget deficits could include reducing DOD spending, which could lead to a reassessment of U.S. defense strategy and associated DOD acquisition programs. Since actual savings from using MYP and BBC rather than annual contracting can be difficult to observe or verify, it is not clear that the financial benefits of using MYP or BBC more frequently in the future would be worth the resulting further reduction in Congress's and DOD's flexibility for making changes in procurement programs in future years in response to changing strategic or budgetary circumstances. Permanent Statute for BBC Should Congress create a permanent statute to govern the use of BBC, analogous to the permanent statute (10 U.S.C. 2306b) that governs the use of MYP? Supporters of creating a permanent statute to govern the use of BBC might argue the following: Such a statute could encourage greater use of BBC, and thereby increase savings in DOD procurement programs by giving BBC contracting a formal legal standing and by establishing a clear process for DOD program managers to use in assessing whether their programs might be considered suitable for BBC. Such a statute could make BBC more advantageous by including a provision that automatically grants EOQ authority to programs using BBC, as well as provisions establishing qualifying criteria and other conditions intended to reduce the risks of using BBC. Opponents of creating a permanent statute to govern the use of BBC might argue the following: A key advantage of BBC is that it is not governed by a permanent statute. The lack of such a statute gives DOD and Congress full flexibility in determining when and how to use BBC for programs that may not qualify for MYP, but for which a multiyear contract of some kind might produce substantial savings. Such a statute could encourage DOD program managers to pursue their programs using BBC rather than MYP. This could reduce discipline in DOD multiyear contracting if the qualifying criteria in the BBC statute are less demanding than the qualifying criteria in 10 U.S.C. 2306b. Coast Guard Use of MYP and BBC Should the Coast Guard should begin making use of MYP and BBC? Although the Coast Guard is part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Coast Guard is a military service and a branch of the U.S. Armed Forces at all times (14 U.S.C. 1), and 10 U.S.C. 2306b provides authority for using MYP not only to DOD, but also to the Coast Guard (and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration as well). In addition, Section 311 of the Frank LoBiondo Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2018 ( S. 140 / P.L. 115-282 of December 4, 2018) provides permanent authority for the Coast Guard to use block buy contracting with EOQ purchases of components in its major acquisition programs. The authority is now codified at 14 U.S.C. 1137. As discussed earlier in this report, the Navy in recent years has made extensive use of MYP and BBC in its ship and aircraft acquisition programs, reducing the collective costs of those programs, the Navy estimates, by billions of dollars. The Coast Guard, like the Navy, procures ships and aircraft. In contrast to the Navy, however, the Coast Guard has never used MYP or BBC in its ship or aircraft acquisition programs. Instead, the Coast has tended to use contracts with options. As discussed earlier, although a contract with options looks like a multiyear contract, it operates more like a series of annual contracts, and it cannot achieve the kinds of savings that are possible under MYP and BBC. CRS in recent years has testified and reported on the possibility of using BBC or MYP in Coast Guard ship acquisition programs, particularly the Coast Guard's 25-ship Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC) program and the Coast Guard's three-ship polar icebreaker program. CRS estimates that using multiyear contracting rather than contracts with options for the entire 25-ship OPC program could reduce the cost of the OPC program by about $1 billion. The OPC program is the Coast Guard's top-priority acquisition program, and it represents a once-in-a-generation opportunity to reduce the acquisition cost of a Coast Guard acquisition program by an estimated $1 billion. CRS also estimates that using BBC for a three-ship polar icebreaker program could reduce the cost of that program by upwards of $150 million. The Coast Guard has expressed some interest in using BBC in the polar icebreaker program, but its baseline acquisition strategy for that program, like its current acquisition strategy for the OPC program, is to use a contract with options. Legislative Activity for FY2020 DOD FY2020 Proposals for New MYP and Block Buy Contracts As part of its FY2020 budget submission, the Department of Defense is proposing continued funding for implementing several MYP contracts initiated in fiscal years prior to FY2020, but it has not highlighted any requests for authority for new MYP or block buy contracts for major acquisition programs that would begin in FY2020. Appendix A. Text of 10 U.S.C. 2306b The text of 10 U.S.C. 2306b as of April 29, 2019, is as follows: §2306b. Multiyear contracts: acquisition of property (a) In General.-To the extent that funds are otherwise available for obligation, the head of an agency may enter into multiyear contracts for the purchase of property whenever the head of that agency finds each of the following: (1) That the use of such a contract will result in significant savings of the total anticipated costs of carrying out the program through annual contracts. (2) That the minimum need for the property to be purchased is expected to remain substantially unchanged during the contemplated contract period in terms of production rate, procurement rate, and total quantities. (3) That there is a reasonable expectation that throughout the contemplated contract period the head of the agency will request funding for the contract at the level required to avoid contract cancellation. (4) That there is a stable design for the property to be acquired and that the technical risks associated with such property are not excessive. (5) That the estimates of both the cost of the contract and the anticipated cost avoidance through the use of a multiyear contract are realistic. (6) In the case of a purchase by the Department of Defense, that the use of such a contract will promote the national security of the United States. (7) In the case of a contract in an amount equal to or greater than $500,000,000, that the conditions required by subparagraphs (C) through (F) of subsection (i)(3) will be met, in accordance with the Secretary's certification and determination under such subsection, by such contract. (b) Regulations.-(1) Each official named in paragraph (2) shall prescribe acquisition regulations for the agency or agencies under the jurisdiction of such official to promote the use of multiyear contracting as authorized by subsection (a) in a manner that will allow the most efficient use of multiyear contracting. (2)(A) The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe the regulations applicable to the Department of Defense. (B) The Secretary of Homeland Security shall prescribe the regulations applicable to the Coast Guard, except that the regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense shall apply to the Coast Guard when it is operating as a service in the Navy. (C) The Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration shall prescribe the regulations applicable to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. (c) Contract Cancellations.-The regulations may provide for cancellation provisions in multiyear contracts to the extent that such provisions are necessary and in the best interests of the United States. The cancellation provisions may include consideration of both recurring and nonrecurring costs of the contractor associated with the production of the items to be delivered under the contract. (d) Participation by Subcontractors, Vendors, and Suppliers.-In order to broaden the defense industrial base, the regulations shall provide that, to the extent practicable- (1) multiyear contracting under subsection (a) shall be used in such a manner as to seek, retain, and promote the use under such contracts of companies that are subcontractors, vendors, or suppliers; and (2) upon accrual of any payment or other benefit under such a multiyear contract to any subcontractor, vendor, or supplier company participating in such contract, such payment or benefit shall be delivered to such company in the most expeditious manner practicable. (e) Protection of Existing Authority.-The regulations shall provide that, to the extent practicable, the administration of this section, and of the regulations prescribed under this section, shall not be carried out in a manner to preclude or curtail the existing ability of an agency- (1) to provide for competition in the production of items to be delivered under such a contract; or (2) to provide for termination of a prime contract the performance of which is deficient with respect to cost, quality, or schedule. (f) Cancellation or Termination for Insufficient Funding.-In the event funds are not made available for the continuation of a contract made under this section into a subsequent fiscal year, the contract shall be canceled or terminated. The costs of cancellation or termination may be paid from- (1) appropriations originally available for the performance of the contract concerned; (2) appropriations currently available for procurement of the type of property concerned, and not otherwise obligated; or (3) funds appropriated for those payments. (g) Contract Cancellation Ceilings Exceeding $100,000,000.-(1) Before any contract described in subsection (a) that contains a clause setting forth a cancellation ceiling in excess of $100,000,000 may be awarded, the head of the agency concerned shall give written notification of the proposed contract and of the proposed cancellation ceiling for that contract to the congressional defense committees, and such contract may not then be awarded until the end of a period of 30 days beginning on the date of such notification. (2) In the case of a contract described in subsection (a) with a cancellation ceiling described in paragraph (1), if the budget for the contract does not include proposed funding for the costs of contract cancellation up to the cancellation ceiling established in the contract, the head of the agency concerned shall, as part of the certification required by subsection (i)(1)(A),1 give written notification to the congressional defense committees of- (A) the cancellation ceiling amounts planned for each program year in the proposed multiyear procurement contract, together with the reasons for the amounts planned; (B) the extent to which costs of contract cancellation are not included in the budget for the contract; and (C) a financial risk assessment of not including budgeting for costs of contract cancellation. (h) Defense Acquisitions of Weapon Systems.-In the case of the Department of Defense, the authority under subsection (a) includes authority to enter into the following multiyear contracts in accordance with this section: (1) A multiyear contract for the purchase of a weapon system, items and services associated with a weapon system, and logistics support for a weapon system. (2) A multiyear contract for advance procurement of components, parts, and materials necessary to the manufacture of a weapon system, including a multiyear contract for such advance procurement that is entered into in order to achieve economic-lot purchases and more efficient production rates. (i) Defense Acquisitions Specifically Authorized by Law.-(1) In the case of the Department of Defense, a multiyear contract in an amount equal to or greater than $500,000,000 may not be entered into under this section unless the contract is specifically authorized by law in an Act other than an appropriations Act. (2) In submitting a request for a specific authorization by law to carry out a defense acquisition program using multiyear contract authority under this section, the Secretary of Defense shall include in the request the following: (A) A report containing preliminary findings of the agency head required in paragraphs (1) through (6) of subsection (a), together with the basis for such findings. (B) Confirmation that the preliminary findings of the agency head under subparagraph (A) were supported by a preliminary cost analysis performed by the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation. (3) A multiyear contract may not be entered into under this section for a defense acquisition program that has been specifically authorized by law to be carried out using multiyear contract authority unless the Secretary of Defense certifies in writing, not later than 30 days before entry into the contract, that each of the following conditions is satisfied: (A) The Secretary has determined that each of the requirements in paragraphs (1) through (6) of subsection (a) will be met by such contract and has provided the basis for such determination to the congressional defense committees. (B) The Secretary's determination under subparagraph (A) was made after completion of a cost analysis conducted on the basis of section 2334(e)(2) 1 of this title, and the analysis supports the determination. (C) The system being acquired pursuant to such contract has not been determined to have experienced cost growth in excess of the critical cost growth threshold pursuant to section 2433(d) of this title within 5 years prior to the date the Secretary anticipates such contract (or a contract for advance procurement entered into consistent with the authorization for such contract) will be awarded. (D) A sufficient number of end items of the system being acquired under such contract have been delivered at or within the most current estimates of the program acquisition unit cost or procurement unit cost for such system to determine that current estimates of such unit costs are realistic. (E) During the fiscal year in which such contract is to be awarded, sufficient funds will be available to perform the contract in such fiscal year, and the future-years defense program for such fiscal year will include the funding required to execute the program without cancellation. (F) The contract is a fixed price type contract. (G) The proposed multiyear contract provides for production at not less than minimum economic rates given the existing tooling and facilities. (4) If for any fiscal year a multiyear contract to be entered into under this section is authorized by law for a particular procurement program and that authorization is subject to certain conditions established by law (including a condition as to cost savings to be achieved under the multiyear contract in comparison to specified other contracts) and if it appears (after negotiations with contractors) that such savings cannot be achieved, but that significant savings could nevertheless be achieved through the use of a multiyear contract rather than specified other contracts, the President may submit to Congress a request for relief from the specified cost savings that must be achieved through multiyear contracting for that program. Any such request by the President shall include details about the request for a multiyear contract, including details about the negotiated contract terms and conditions. (5)(A) The Secretary may obligate funds for procurement of an end item under a multiyear contract for the purchase of property only for procurement of a complete and usable end item. (B) The Secretary may obligate funds appropriated for any fiscal year for advance procurement under a contract for the purchase of property only for the procurement of those long-lead items necessary in order to meet a planned delivery schedule for complete major end items that are programmed under the contract to be acquired with funds appropriated for a subsequent fiscal year (including an economic order quantity of such long-lead items when authorized by law). (6) The Secretary may make the certification under paragraph (3) notwithstanding the fact that one or more of the conditions of such certification are not met, if the Secretary determines that, due to exceptional circumstances, proceeding with a multiyear contract under this section is in the best interest of the Department of Defense and the Secretary provides the basis for such determination with the certification. (7) The Secretary may not delegate the authority to make the certification under paragraph (3) or the determination under paragraph (6) to an official below the level of Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. (j) Defense Contract Options for Varying Quantities.-The Secretary of Defense may instruct the Secretary of the military department concerned to incorporate into a proposed multiyear contract negotiated priced options for varying the quantities of end items to be procured over the period of the contract. (k) Multiyear Contract Defined.-For the purposes of this section, a multiyear contract is a contract for the purchase of property for more than one, but not more than five, program years. Such a contract may provide that performance under the contract during the second and subsequent years of the contract is contingent upon the appropriation of funds and (if it does so provide) may provide for a cancellation payment to be made to the contractor if such appropriations are not made. (l) Various Additional Requirements With Respect to Multiyear Defense Contracts.-(1)(A) The head of an agency may not initiate a contract described in subparagraph (B) unless the congressional defense committees are notified of the proposed contract at least 30 days in advance of the award of the proposed contract. (B) Subparagraph (A) applies to the following contracts: (i) A multiyear contract- (I) that employs economic order quantity procurement in excess of $20,000,000 in any one year of the contract; or (II) that includes an unfunded contingent liability in excess of $20,000,000. (ii) Any contract for advance procurement leading to a multiyear contract that employs economic order quantity procurement in excess of $20,000,000 in any one year. (2) The head of an agency may not initiate a multiyear contract for which the economic order quantity advance procurement is not funded at least to the limits of the Government's liability. (3) The head of an agency may not initiate a multiyear procurement contract for any system (or component thereof) if the value of the multiyear contract would exceed $500,000,000 unless authority for the contract is specifically provided in an appropriations Act. (4) Each report required by paragraph (5) with respect to a contract (or contract extension) shall contain the following: (A) The amount of total obligational authority under the contract (or contract extension) and the percentage that such amount represents of- (i) the applicable procurement account; and (ii) the agency procurement total. (B) The amount of total obligational authority under all multiyear procurements of the agency concerned (determined without regard to the amount of the multiyear contract (or contract extension)) under multiyear contracts in effect at the time the report is submitted and the percentage that such amount represents of- (i) the applicable procurement account; and (ii) the agency procurement total. (C) The amount equal to the sum of the amounts under subparagraphs (A) and (B), and the percentage that such amount represents of- (i) the applicable procurement account; and (ii) the agency procurement total. (D) The amount of total obligational authority under all Department of Defense multiyear procurements (determined without regard to the amount of the multiyear contract (or contract extension)), including any multiyear contract (or contract extension) that has been authorized by the Congress but not yet entered into, and the percentage that such amount represents of the procurement accounts of the Department of Defense treated in the aggregate. (5) The head of an agency may not enter into a multiyear contract (or extend an existing multiyear contract), the value of which would exceed $500,000,000 (when entered into or when extended, as the case may be), until the Secretary of Defense submits to the congressional defense committees a report containing the information described in paragraph (4) with respect to the contract (or contract extension). (6) The head of an agency may not terminate a multiyear procurement contract until 10 days after the date on which notice of the proposed termination is provided to the congressional defense committees. (7) The execution of multiyear contracting authority shall require the use of a present value analysis to determine lowest cost compared to an annual procurement. (8) This subsection does not apply to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration or to the Coast Guard. (9) In this subsection: (A) The term "applicable procurement account" means, with respect to a multiyear procurement contract (or contract extension), the appropriation account from which payments to execute the contract will be made. (B) The term "agency procurement total" means the procurement accounts of the agency entering into a multiyear procurement contract (or contract extension) treated in the aggregate. (m) Increased Funding and Reprogramming Requests.-Any request for increased funding for the procurement of a major system under a multiyear contract authorized under this section shall be accompanied by an explanation of how the request for increased funding affects the determinations made by the Secretary under subsection (i). Appendix B. Programs Approved for MYP in Annual DOD Appropriations Acts Since FY1990 This appendix presents, in two tables, programs approved for MYP in annual DOD appropriations acts since FY1990. Table B-1 covers FY2011 to the present, and Table B-2 covers FY1990 through FY2010.

Multiyear procurement (MYP) and block buy contracting (BBC) are special contracting mechanisms that Congress permits the Department of Defense (DOD) to use for a limited number of defense acquisition programs. Compared to the standard or default approach of annual contracting, MYP and BBC have the potential for reducing weapon procurement costs by a few or several percent. Under annual contracting, DOD uses one or more contracts for each year's worth of procurement of a given kind of item. Under MYP, DOD instead uses a single contract for two to five years' worth of procurement of a given kind of item without having to exercise a contract option for each year after the first year. DOD needs congressional approval for each use of MYP. There is a permanent statute governing MYP contracting—10 U.S.C. 2306b. Under this statute, a program must meet several criteria to qualify for MYP. Compared with estimated costs under annual contracting, estimated savings for programs being proposed for MYP have ranged from less than 5% to more than 15%, depending on the particulars of the program in question, with many estimates falling in the range of 5% to 10%. In practice, actual savings from using MYP rather than annual contracting can be difficult to observe or verify because of cost growth during the execution of the contract due to changes in the program independent of the use of MYP rather than annual contracting. BBC is similar to MYP in that it permits DOD to use a single contract for more than one year's worth of procurement of a given kind of item without having to exercise a contract option for each year after the first year. BBC is also similar to MYP in that DOD needs congressional approval for each use of BBC. BBC differs from MYP in the following ways: There is no permanent statute governing the use of BBC. There is no requirement that BBC be approved in both a DOD appropriations act and an act other than a DOD appropriations act. Programs being considered for BBC do not need to meet any legal criteria to qualify for BBC, because there is no permanent statute governing the use of BBC that establishes such criteria. A BBC contract can cover more than five years of planned procurements. Economic order quantity (EOQ) authority—the authority to bring forward selected key components of the items to be procured under the contract and purchase the components in batch form during the first year or two of the contract—does not come automatically as part of BBC authority because there is no permanent statute governing the use of BBC that includes EOQ authority as an automatic feature. BBC contracts are less likely to include cancellation penalties. Potential issues for Congress concerning MYP and BBC include whether to use MYP and BBC in the future more frequently, less frequently, or about as frequently as they are currently used; whether to create a permanent statute to govern the use of BBC, analogous to the permanent statute that governs the use of MYP; and whether the Coast Guard should begin making use of MYP and BBC.

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S ince the 1970s, policymakers have increasingly used the tax code to promote energy policy goals. Long-term energy policy goals include providing a secure supply of energy, providing energy at a low cost, and ensuring that energy production and consumption is consistent with environmental objectives. A range of federal policies, including various research and development programs, mandates, and direct financial support such as tax incentives or loan guarantees, promotes various energy policy objectives. This report focuses on tax incentives that support the production of or investment in various energy resources. Through the mid-2000s, the majority of revenue losses associated with energy tax incentives were from provisions benefiting fossil fuels. At present, the balance has shifted, such that the bulk of federal revenue losses associated with energy tax provisions are from incentives for renewable energy production and investment. While there has been growth in the amount of energy from renewable resources, the majority of domestic energy produced continues to be from fossil energy resources. This has raised questions regarding the value of energy tax incentives relative to production and the relative subsidization of various energy resources. Although the numbers in this report may be useful for policymakers evaluating the current status of energy tax policy, it is important to understand the limitations of this analysis. This report evaluates energy production relative to the value of current energy tax expenditures. It does not, however, seek to analyze whether the current system of energy tax incentives is economically efficient, effective, or otherwise consistent with broader energy policy objectives. Further, analysis in this report does not include information on federal spending on energy that is not linked to the tax code. Tax Incentives Relative to Energy Production The following sections estimate the value of tax incentives relative to the level of energy produced using fossil and renewable energy resources. Before proceeding with the analysis, some limitations are outlined. The analysis itself requires quantification of energy production and energy tax incentives. Once data on energy production and energy tax incentives have been presented, the value of energy tax incentives can be evaluated relative to current levels of energy production. Limitations of the Analysis The analysis below provides a broad comparison of the relative tax support for fossil fuels as compared with the relative support for renewables. Various data limitations prevent a precise analysis of the amount of subsidy per unit of production across different energy resources. Limitations associated with this type of analysis include the following: Current-year tax incentives may not directly support current-year production . Many of the tax incentives available for energy resources are designed to encourage investment, rather than production. For example, the expensing of intangible drilling costs (IDCs) for oil and gas provides an incentive to invest in capital equipment and exploration. Although the ability to expense IDCs does not directly support current production of crude oil and natural gas, such subsidies are expected to increase long-run supply. Differing levels of federal financial support may or may not reflect underlying policy rationales . Various policy rationales may exist for federal interventions in energy markets. Interventions may be designed to achieve various economic, social, or other policy objectives. Although analysis of federal financial support per unit of energy production may help inform the policy debate, it does not directly consider why various energy sources may receive different levels of federal financial support. Tax expenditures are estimates . The tax expenditure data provided by the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) are estimates of federal revenue losses associated with specific provisions. These estimates do not provide information on actual federal revenue losses, nor do these estimates reflect the amount of revenue that would be raised should the provision be eliminated. Additionally, the JCT advises that tax expenditures across provisions not be summed, due to interaction effects. Tax expenditure data are not specific to energy source . Many tax incentives are available to a variety of energy resources. For example, the tax expenditure associated with the expensing of IDCs does not distinguish between revenue losses associated with natural gas versus those associated with oil. The tax expenditure for five-year accelerated depreciation also does not specify how much of the benefit accrues to various eligible technologies, such as wind and solar. A number of tax provisions that support energy are not energy specific . The U.S. energy sector benefits from a number of tax provisions that are not targeted at energy. For example, the production activities deduction (Section 199), before being repealed in the 2017 tax act ( P.L. 115-97 ), benefited all domestic manufacturers. For the purposes of the Section 199 deduction, oil and gas extraction was considered a domestic manufacturing activity. Certain energy-related activities may also benefit from other tax incentives that are available to non-energy industries, such as the ability to issue tax-exempt debt, the ability to structure as a master limited partnership, or tax incentives designed to promote other activities, such as research and development. Energy Production The Energy Information Administration (EIA) provides annual data on U.S. primary energy production. EIA defines primary energy as energy that exists in a naturally occurring form, before being converted into an end-use product. For example, coal is considered primary energy, which is typically combusted to create steam and then electricity. This report relies on 2017 data on U.S. primary energy production (see Table 1 ). In 2017, most primary energy was produced using fossil fuels. Natural gas was the largest source of primary energy production, accounting for 32.0% of primary energy produced. Crude oil accounted for 22.1% of U.S. primary energy production in 2017, and coal accounted for 17.7%. Taken together, fossil energy sources were used for 77.7% of 2017 primary energy production. The remaining U.S. primary energy production is attributable to nuclear electric and renewable energy resources. Overall, 9.5% of 2017 U.S. primary energy was produced as nuclear electric energy. Renewables (including hydroelectric power) constituted 12.8% of 2017 U.S. primary energy production. Biomass was the largest source of primary production among the renewables in 2017, accounting for 5.9% of overall primary energy production and 46.1% of renewable energy production. This was followed by hydroelectric power at 3.1% and wind energy at 2.7% of primary energy production. Solar energy and geothermal energy were responsible for 0.9% and 0.2%, respectively, of 2017 primary energy production (see Table 1 ). Primary energy produced using biomass can be further categorized as biomass being used to produce biofuels (e.g., ethanol) and biomass being used to generate biopower. Of the 5.2 quadrillion Btu of energy produced using biomass, about 2.3 quadrillion Btu was used in the production of biofuels. Energy Tax Incentives The tax code supports the energy sector by providing a number of targeted tax incentives, or tax incentives only available for the energy industry. In addition to targeted tax incentives, the energy sector may also benefit from a number of broader tax provisions that are available for energy- and non-energy-related taxpayers. These broader tax incentives are not included in the analysis, since tax expenditure estimates do not indicate how much of the revenue loss associated with these generally available provisions is associated with energy-related activities. Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) tax expenditure estimates are used to tabulate federal revenue losses associated with energy tax provisions. The tax expenditure estimates provided by the JCT are forecasted revenue losses. These revenue losses are not reestimated on the basis of actual economic conditions. Thus, revenue losses presented below are projected, as opposed to actual revenue losses. The JCT advises that individual tax expenditures cannot be simply summed to estimate the aggregate revenue loss from multiple tax provisions. This is because of interaction effects. When the revenue loss associated with a specific tax provision is estimated, the estimate is made assuming that there are no changes in other provisions or in taxpayer behavior. When individual tax expenditures are summed, the interaction effects may lead to different revenue loss estimates. Consequently, aggregate tax expenditure estimates, derived from summing the estimated revenue effects of individual tax expenditure provisions, are unlikely to reflect the actual change in federal receipts associated with removing various tax provisions. Thus, total tax expenditure figures presented below are an estimate of federal revenue losses associated with energy tax provisions, and should not be interpreted as actual federal revenue losses. Table 2 provides information on revenue losses and outlays associated with energy-related tax provisions in FY2017 and FY2018. The FY2017 figures are included to facilitate comparison with the primary energy production using different energy resources. Since the tax code was substantially changed beginning in 2018, FY2018 tax expenditures are also included. In 2017, the tax code provided an estimated $17.8 billion in support for the energy sector. More than one-third of the 2017 total, $6.4 billion, was due to the renewable energy production tax credit (PTC) and investment tax credit (ITC). Nine different provisions supporting fossil fuels had an estimated cost of $4.6 billion, collectively, in 2017. This declined to $3.2 billion for 2018. While the tax legislation enacted late in 2017 ( P.L. 115-97 ) did not directly change fossil-fuel-related tax provisions, other changes, including the reduced corporate tax rate, lowered the tax savings associated with various tax incentives for fossil fuels. While the majority of federal tax-related support for energy in 2017 can be attributed to either fossil fuels or renewables, provisions supporting energy efficiency, alternative technology vehicles, and nuclear energy also resulted in forgone revenue in 2017 and 2018. Fossil Fuels Versus Renewables: Relative Production and Tax Incentive Levels Table 3 provides a side-by-side comparison of fossil fuel and renewable production, along with the cost of tax incentives supporting fossil fuel and renewable energy resources. During 2017, 77.7% of U.S. primary energy production could be attributed to fossil fuel sources. Of the federal tax support targeted to energy in 2017, an estimated 25.8% of the value went toward supporting fossil fuels. During 2017, an estimated 12.8% of U.S. primary source energy was produced using renewable resources. Of the federal tax support targeted to energy in 2017, an estimated 65.2% went toward supporting renewables. Table 3 also contains information on subcategories of renewables, specifically (1) renewables excluding hydro and (2) renewables excluding biofuels. Excluding hydro might be instructive since current energy production is the result of past investment decisions, some of which may not have benefited from targeted tax incentives. Thus, it may not always be appropriate to compare the current value of tax incentives to current levels of energy production. For example, energy generated using hydroelectric power technologies might be excluded from the renewables category, as most existing hydro-generating capacity was installed before the early 1990s. Thus, there is no current federal tax benefit for most electricity currently generated using hydropower. Further, with many of the best hydro sites already developed, there is limited potential for growth in conventional hydropower capacity. There is, however, potential for development of additional electricity-generating capacity through smaller hydro projects that could substantially increase U.S. hydroelectric generation capacity. Excluding hydro from the renewables category, or removing an energy resource where the development was not likely supported by current renewables-related tax incentives, nonhydro renewables accounted for 9.7% of 2017 primary energy production (see Table 3 ). During 2017, certain tax expenditures for renewable energy did, however, benefit taxpayers developing and operating hydroelectric power facilities. Certain hydroelectric installations, including efficiency improvements or capacity additions at existing facilities, may be eligible for the renewable energy production tax credit (PTC). Given that hydro is supported by 2017 tax expenditures, one could also argue that for the purposes of the comparison being made in this report, hydro should be included in the renewables category. It may also be instructive to consider incentives that generally support renewable electricity separately from those that support biofuels. Of the estimated $17.8 billion in energy tax provisions in 2017, an estimated $2.1 billion, or 11.8%, went toward supporting biofuels. Excluding tax incentives for biofuels, 53.4% of energy-related tax incentives in 2017 were attributable to renewables. In other words, excluding biofuels from the analysis reduces the share of tax incentives attributable to renewables from 65.2% to 53.4% (see Table 3 ). Excluding biofuels from the analysis also reduces renewables' share of primary energy production. When biofuels are excluded, the share of primary energy produced in 2017 attributable to renewables falls by 2.7 percentage points, from 12.8% to 10.1% ( Table 3 ). In 2017, 9.5% of primary energy produced was from nuclear resources. The one tax benefit for nuclear with a positive tax expenditure in 2017 was the special tax rate for nuclear decommissioning reserve funds. At $0.2 billion in 2017, this was 1.7% of the value of all tax expenditures for energy included in the analysis. Like many other energy-related tax expenditures, the special tax rate for nuclear decommissioning reserve funds is not directly related to current energy production. Instead, this provision reduces the cost of investing in nuclear energy by taxing income from nuclear decommissioning reserve funds at a preferred rate (a flat rate of 20%). Energy Tax Incentive Trends Over time, there have been substantial shifts in the proportion of energy-related tax expenditures benefiting different types of energy resources. Figure 1 illustrates the projected value of energy-related tax incentives since 1978. Energy tax provisions are categorized as primarily benefiting fossil fuels, renewables, renewable fuels, efficiency, vehicles, or some other energy purpose. Until the mid-2000s, most of the value of energy-related tax incentives supported fossil fuels. Starting in the mid-2000s, the cost of energy-related tax preferences supporting renewables increased. Some of this increase was attributable to provisions supporting renewable fuels, which have since expired. From the 1980s through 2011, most of the tax-related federal financial support for renewable energy was for renewable fuels, mainly alcohol fuels (i.e., ethanol). The tax credits for alcohol fuels (including ethanol) expired at the end of 2011. Starting in 2008, the federal government incurred outlays associated with excise tax credits for biodiesel and renewable diesel. Under current law, the tax credits for biodiesel and renewable diesel expired at the end of 2017. Thus, after FY2018 (which includes the end of calendar year 2017), there are no projected costs associated with tax incentives for renewable fuels. Expired tax incentives may be extended, however, as part of the "tax extenders." Beginning in the mid-2000s, the cost of energy tax incentives for renewables began to increase. Beginning in 2009, the Section 1603 grants in lieu of tax credits contributed to increased costs associated with tax-related benefits for renewable energy. Through 2014, Section 1603 grants in lieu of tax credits exceeded tax expenditures associated with the production tax credit (PTC) and investment tax credit (ITC) combined. The Section 1603 grant option is not available for projects that began construction after December 31, 2011. However, since grants are paid out when construction is completed and eligible property is placed in service, outlays under the Section 1603 program continued through 2017. Tax expenditures for the ITC and PTC have increased substantially in recent years. As a result of the extensions for wind and solar enacted in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 ( P.L. 114-113 ), ITC and PTC tax expenditures are projected to remain stable for several years. Under current law, the PTC will not be available to projects that begin construction after December 31, 2019. However, since the PTC is available for the first 10 years of renewable electricity production, and the expiration date is a start-of-construction deadline as opposed to a placed-in-service deadline, PTC tax expenditures will continue after the provision expires. The ITC for solar, currently 30%, is scheduled to decline to 26% for property beginning construction in 2020, and 22% for property beginning construction in 2021, before returning to the permanent rate of 10% after 2021. Thus, absent additional policy changes, the higher tax expenditures associated with the PTC and ITC are expected to be temporary. Tax expenditures for tax incentives supporting energy efficiency increased in the late 2000s, but subsequently declined. Most of the increase in revenue losses for efficiency-related provisions was associated with tax incentives for homeowners investing in certain energy-efficient property. The primary tax incentive for energy efficiency improvements to existing homes expired at the end of 2017. Extension of expired tax incentives for energy efficiency would increase the cost of energy efficiency-related tax incentives. As was noted above, many energy-related tax provisions, particularly those that support renewables, are temporary. Over time as these incentives phase out, tax expenditures associated with these provisions will decline. This process may take some time. For the PTC, for example, the credit is claimed during the first 10 years of qualifying production. It is possible that qualifying production begins after the December 31, 2019, start-of-construction expiration date, meaning that tax expenditures for the PTC are expected to continue for at least the next decade. U.S. Department of the Treasury tax expenditure estimates can be used to illustrate how expiring provisions affect the distribution of energy-related tax expenditures over time (see Figure 2 ). Treasury and JCT tax expenditure estimates differ in a number of ways. The Treasury provides tax expenditures over an 11-year budget window. The JCT uses a shorter 5-year window. The JCT and Treasury also use different methodologies when preparing tax expenditure estimates, and have different classifications as to what provisions constitute tax expenditures. Thus, the tax expenditure estimates prepared by each entity are not directly comparable. However, looking at Treasury tax expenditure estimates over time can illustrate broader trends regarding which types of energy are receiving tax-related benefits. In 2018, according to Treasury's tax expenditure estimates, tax expenditures supporting renewables totaled an estimated $8.4 billion. By 2028, that number is expected to decline to $3.5 billion. The decline can be explained by the reduced tax expenditures for the PTC and ITC as these provisions phase down or expire. Treasury estimates that tax expenditures supporting fossil fuels will total $2.2 billion in 2018. The Treasury anticipates this number increasing over time, reaching an estimated $3.8 billion by 2028. The Treasury estimates that the revenue losses associated with most permanent oil-and-gas tax incentives will increase over the next decade. Concluding Remarks The energy sector is supported by an array of tax incentives reflecting diverse policy objectives. As a result, the amount of tax-related federal financial support for energy differs across energy sectors, and is not necessarily proportional to the amount of energy production from various energy sectors. The total amount of energy-related tax incentives is projected to decline under current law, although extensions of expired energy tax provisions, or other modifications to energy tax provisions, could change these figures. Over the longer term, the amount of tax-related support for the energy sector could decline if provisions are allowed to expire as scheduled under current law.

The U.S. tax code supports the energy sector by providing a number of targeted tax incentives, or tax incentives available only for the energy industry. Some policymakers have expressed interest in understanding how energy tax benefits are distributed across different domestic energy resources. For example, what percentage of energy-related tax benefits support fossil fuels (or support renewables)? How much domestic energy is produced using fossil fuels (or produced using renewables)? And how do these figures compare? In 2017, the value of federal tax-related support for the energy sector was estimated to be $17.8 billion. Of this, $4.6 billion (25.8%) can be attributed to tax incentives supporting fossil fuels. Tax-related support for renewables was an estimated $11.6 billion in 2017 (or 65.2% of total tax-related support for energy). The remaining tax-related support went toward nuclear energy, efficiency measures, and alternative technology vehicles. While the cost of tax incentives for renewables has exceeded the cost of incentives for fossil fuels in recent years, the majority of energy produced in the United States continues to be derived from fossil fuels. In 2017, fossil fuels accounted for 77.7% of U.S. primary energy production. The remaining primary energy production is attributable to renewable energy and nuclear electric resources, with shares of 12.8% and 9.5%, respectively. The balance of energy-related tax incentives has changed over time, and it is projected to continue to change, under current law, in coming years. Factors that have contributed to recent changes in the balance of energy-related tax incentives include the following: Increased tax expenditures for solar and wind. Tax expenditures associated with the energy credit for solar and the production tax credit for wind have increased substantially in recent years. Following the long-term extensions of these temporary tax benefits provided in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113), tax expenditures for the solar energy credit are projected to remain stable for several years, before decreasing in the longer term. The expiration of tax-related support for renewable fuels. Tax-related support for renewable fuels declined substantially after the tax credits for alcohol fuels were allowed to expire at the end of 2011. Other fuels-related incentives also expired at the end of 2017 (although these may be extended as part of the "tax extenders"). Decline then increase in tax expenditures for fossil fuels. Tax expenditures for fossil fuels declined between 2017 and 2018, an indirect effect of the 2017 tax act (P.L. 115-97). Over time, however, the tax expenditures associated with permanent fossil fuels tax incentives are estimated to increase. One starting point for evaluating energy tax policy may be a calculation of subsidy relative to production level. However, a complete policy analysis might consider why the level of federal financial support differs across various energy technologies. Tax incentives for energy may support various environmental or economic objectives. For example, tax incentives designed to reduce reliance on imported petroleum may be consistent with energy security goals. Tax incentives that promote renewable energy resources may be consistent with certain environmental objectives.

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Introduction Under the Constitution, the war powers are divided between Congress and the President. Among other relevant grants, Congress has the power to declare war and raise and support the armed forces (Article I, Section 8), while the President is Commander in Chief (Article II, Section 2). It is generally agreed that the Commander-in-Chief role gives the President power to utilize the armed forces to repel attacks against the United States, but there has long been controversy over whether he is constitutionally authorized to send forces into hostile situations abroad without a declaration of war or other congressional authorization. Congressional concern about presidential use of armed forces without congressional authorization intensified after the Korean conflict. During the Vietnam War, Congress searched for a way to assert authority to decide when the United States should become involved in a war or the armed forces be utilized in circumstances that might lead to hostilities. On November 7, 1973, it passed the War Powers Resolution ( P.L. 93-148 ) over the veto of President Nixon. The main purpose of the Resolution was to establish procedures for both branches to share in decisions that might get the United States involved in war. The drafters sought to circumscribe the President's authority to use armed forces abroad in hostilities or potential hostilities without a declaration of war or other congressional authorization, yet provide enough flexibility to permit him to respond to attack or other emergencies. The record of the War Powers Resolution since its enactment has been mixed, and after 40 years it remains controversial. Some Members of Congress believe the Resolution has on some occasions served as a restraint on the use of armed forces by Presidents, provided a mode of communication, and given Congress a vehicle for asserting its war powers. Others have sought to amend the Resolution because they believe it has failed to assure a congressional voice in committing U.S. troops to potential conflicts abroad. Others in Congress, along with executive branch officials, contend that the President needs more flexibility in the conduct of foreign policy and that the time limitation in the War Powers Resolution is unconstitutional and impractical. Some have argued for its repeal. This report examines the provisions of the War Powers Resolution, actual experience in its use from its enactment in 1973 through March 2015, and proposed amendments to it. Appendix A lists instances which Presidents have reported to Congress under the War Powers Resolution, and Appendix B lists certain instances of the use of U.S. Armed Forces that were not reported. Provisions of the War Powers Resolution(P.L. 93-148) Title Section 1 establishes the title, "The War Powers Resolution." The law is frequently referred to as the "War Powers Act," the title of the measure passed by the Senate. Although the latter is not technically correct, it does serve to emphasize that the War Powers Resolution, embodied in a joint resolution which complies with constitutional requirements for lawmaking, is a law. Purpose and Policy Section 2 states the Resolution's purpose and policy, with Section 2(a) citing as the primary purpose to "insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces in hostilities or in such situations." Section 2(b) points to the Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution as the basis for legislation on the war powers. It provides that "Under Article I, section 8, of the Constitution it is specifically provided that Congress shall have the power to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution, not only its own powers but also all other powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United States...." Section 2(c) states the policy that the powers of the President as Commander in Chief to introduce U.S. Armed Forces into situations of hostilities or imminent hostilities "are exercised only pursuant to— (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces." Consultation Requirement Section 3 of the War Powers Resolution requires the President "in every possible instance" to consult with Congress before introducing U.S. Armed Forces into situations of hostilities and imminent hostilities, and to continue consultations as long as the armed forces remain in such situations. The House report elaborated: A considerable amount of attention was given to the definition of consultation . Rejected was the notion that consultation should be synonymous with merely being informed. Rather, consultation in this provision means that a decision is pending on a problem and that Members of Congress are being asked by the President for their advice and opinions and, in appropriate circumstances, their approval of action contemplated. Furthermore, for consultation to be meaningful, the President himself must participate and all information relevant to the situation must be made available. The House version specifically called for consultation between the President and the leadership and appropriate committees. This was changed to less specific wording in conference, however, in order to provide more flexibility. Reporting Requirements Section 4 requires the President to report to Congress whenever he introduces U.S. Armed Forces abroad in certain situations. Of key importance is Section 4(a)(1) because it triggers the time limit in Section 5(b). Section 4(a)(1) requires reporting within 48 hours, in the absence of a declaration of war or congressional authorization, the introduction of U.S. Armed Forces "into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances." Some indication of the meaning of hostilities and imminent hostilities is given in the House report on its War Powers bill: The word hostilities was substituted for the phrase armed conflict during the subcommittee drafting process because it was considered to be somewhat broader in scope. In addition to a situation in which fighting actually has begun, hostilities also encompasses a state of confrontation in which no shots have been fired but where there is a clear and present danger of armed conflict. " Imminent hostilities" denotes a situation in which there is a clear potential either for such a state of confrontation or for actual armed conflict. Section 4(a)(2) requires the reporting of the introduction of troops "into the territory, airspace or waters of a foreign nation, while equipped for combat, except for deployments which relate solely to supply, replacement, repair, or training of such forces." According to the House report this was to cover the initial commitment of troops in situations in which there is no actual fighting but some risk, however small, of the forces being involved in hostilities. A report would be required any time combat military forces were sent to another nation to alter or preserve the existing political status quo or to make the U.S. presence felt. Thus, for example, the dispatch of Marines to Thailand in 1962 and the quarantine of Cuba in the same year would have required Presidential reports. Reports would not be required for routine port supply calls, emergency aid measures, normal training exercises, and other noncombat military activities. Section 4(a)(3) requires the reporting of the introduction of troops "in numbers which substantially enlarge United States Armed Forces equipped for combat already located in a foreign nation." The House report elaborated: While the word "substantially" designates a flexible criterion, it is possible to arrive at a common-sense understanding of the numbers involved. A 100% increase in numbers of Marine guards at an embassy—say from 5 to 10—clearly would not be an occasion for a report. A thousand additional men sent to Europe under present circumstances does not significantly enlarge the total U.S. troop strength of about 300,000 already there. However, the dispatch of 1,000 men to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, which now has a complement of 4,000 would mean an increase of 25%, which is substantial. Under this circumstance, President Kennedy would have been required to report to Congress in 1962 when he raised the number of U.S. military advisers in Vietnam from 700 to 16,000. All of the reports under Section 4(a), which are to be submitted to the Speaker of the House and the President pro tempore of the Senate, are to set forth (A) the circumstances necessitating the introduction of United States Armed Forces; (B) the constitutional and legislative authority under which such introduction took place; and (C) the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or involvement. Section 4(b) requires the President to furnish such other information as Congress may request to fulfill its responsibilities relating to committing the nation to war. Section 4(c) requires the President to report to Congress periodically, and at least every six months, whenever U.S. forces are introduced into hostilities or any other situation in Section 4(a). The objectives of these provisions, the conference report stated, was to "ensure that the Congress by right and as a matter of law will be provided with all the information it requires to carry out its constitutional responsibilities with respect to committing the Nation to war and to the use of United States Armed Forces abroad." Congressional Action Section 5(a) deals with congressional procedures for receipt of a report under Section 4(a)(1). It provides that if a report is transmitted during a congressional adjournment, the Speaker of the House and the President pro tempore of the Senate, when they deem it advisable or if petitioned by at least 30% of the Members of their respective Houses, shall jointly request the President to convene Congress in order to consider the report and take appropriate action. Section 5(b) was intended to provide teeth for the War Powers Resolution. After a report "is submitted or is required to be submitted pursuant to section 4(a)(1), whichever is earlier," Section 5(b) requires the President to terminate the use of U.S. Armed Forces after 60 days unless Congress (1) has declared war or authorized the action; (2) has extended the period by law; or (3) is physically unable to meet as a result of an armed attack on the United States. The 60 days can be extended for 30 days by the President if he certifies that "unavoidable military necessity respecting the safety of United States Armed Forces" requires their continued use in the course of bringing about their removal. Section 5(c) requires the President to remove the forces at any time if Congress so directs by concurrent resolution; the effectiveness of this subsection is uncertain because of the 1983 Supreme Court decision on the legislative veto. It is discussed in Part II of this report. Priority Procedures Section 6 establishes expedited procedures for congressional consideration of a joint resolution or bill introduced to authorize the use of armed forces under Section 5(b). They provide for (a) a referral to the House Foreign Affairs [International Relations] or Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the committee to report one measure not later than 24 calendar days before the expiration of the 60 day period, unless the relevant House determines otherwise by a vote; (b) the reported measure to become the pending business of the relevant House and be voted on within three calendar days, unless that House determines otherwise by vote; in the Senate the debate is to be equally divided between proponents and opponents; (c) a measure passed by one House to be referred to the relevant committee of the other House and reported out not later than 14 calendar days before the expiration of the 60 day period, the reported bill to become the pending business of that House and be voted on within 3 calendar days unless determined otherwise by a vote; (d) conferees to file a report not later than four calendar days before the expiration of the 60 day period. If they cannot agree within 48 hours, the conferees are to report back in disagreement, and such report is to be acted on by both Houses not later than the expiration of the 60-day period. Section 7 establishes similar priority procedures for a concurrent resolution to withdraw forces under Section 5(c). For a recent use of these procedures see the section on the " Legislative Veto ," below. Interpretive Provisions Section 8 sets forth certain interpretations relating to the Resolution. Section 8(a) states that authority to introduce armed forces is not to be inferred from any provision of law or treaty unless such law, or legislation implementing such treaty, specifically authorizes the introduction of armed forces into hostilities or potential hostilities and states that it is "intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of this joint resolution." This language was derived from a Senate measure and was intended to prevent a security treaty or military appropriations act from being used to authorize the introduction of troops. It was also aimed against using a broad resolution like the Tonkin Gulf Resolution to justify hostilities abroad. This resolution had stated that the United States was prepared to take all necessary steps, including use of armed force, to assist certain nations, and it was cited by Presidents and many Members as congressional authorization for the Vietnam war. Section 8(b) states that further specific statutory authorization is not required to permit members of United States Armed Forces to participate jointly with members of the armed forces of one or more foreign countries in the headquarters operations of high-level military commands which were established prior to the date of enactment of this joint resolution and pursuant to the United Nations Charter or any treaty ratified by the United States prior to such date. This section was added by the Senate to make clear that the resolution did not prevent U.S. forces from participating in certain joint military exercises with allied or friendly organizations or countries. The conference report stated that the "high-level" military commands meant the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, (NATO), the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) and the United Nations command in Korea. Section 8(c) defines the introduction of armed forces to include the assignment of armed forces to accompany regular or irregular military forces of other countries when engaged, or potentially engaged, in hostilities. The conference report on the War Powers Resolution explained that this was language modified from a Senate provision requiring specific statutory authorization for assigning members of the Armed Forces for such purposes. The report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on its bill said The purpose of this provision is to prevent secret, unauthorized military support activities and to prevent a repetition of many of the most controversial and regrettable actions in Indochina. The ever deepening ground combat involvement of the United States in South Vietnam began with the assignment of U.S. "advisers" to accompany South Vietnamese units on combat patrols; and in Laos, secretly and without congressional authorization, U.S. "advisers" were deeply engaged in the war in northern Laos. Section 8(d) states that nothing in the Resolution is intended to alter the constitutional authority of either the Congress or the President. It also specifies that nothing is to be construed as granting any authority to introduce troops that would not exist in the absence of the Resolution. The House report said that this provision was to help insure the constitutionality of the Resolution by making it clear that nothing in it could be interpreted as changing the powers delegated by the Constitution. Section 9 is a separability clause, stating that if any provision or its application is found invalid, the remainder of the Resolution is not to be affected. Constitutional Questions Raised From its inception, the War Powers Resolution was controversial because it operated on the national war powers, powers divided by the Constitution in no definitive fashion between the President and Congress. Congress adopted the resolution in response to the perception that Presidents had assumed more authority to send forces into hostilities than the framers of the Constitution had intended for the Commander in Chief. President Nixon in his veto message challenged the constitutionality of the essence of the War Powers Resolution, and particularly two provisions. He argued that the legislative veto provision, permitting Congress to direct the withdrawal of troops by concurrent resolution, was unconstitutional. He also argued that the provision requiring withdrawal of troops after 60-90 days unless Congress passed legislation authorizing such use was unconstitutional because it checked presidential powers without affirmative congressional action. Every President since the enactment of the War Powers Resolution has taken the position that it is an unconstitutional infringement on the President's authority as Commander in Chief. War Powers of the President and Congress The heart of the challenge to the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution rests on differing interpretations by the two branches of the respective war powers of the President and Congress. These differing interpretations, especially the assertions of presidential authority to send forces into hostile situations without a declaration of war or other authorization by Congress, were the reason for the enactment of the Resolution. The congressional view was that the framers of the Constitution gave Congress the power to declare war, meaning the ultimate decision whether or not to enter a war. Most Members of Congress agreed that the President as Commander in Chief had power to lead the U.S. forces once the decision to wage war had been made, to defend the nation against attack, and perhaps in some instances to take other action such as rescuing American citizens. But, in this view, he did not have the power to commit armed forces to war. By the early 1970s, the congressional majority view was that the constitutional balance of war powers had swung too far toward the President and needed to be corrected. Opponents argued that Congress always held the power to forbid or terminate U.S. military action by statute or refusal of appropriations, and that without the clear will to act the War Powers Resolution would be ineffective. In his veto message, President Nixon said the Resolution would impose restrictions upon the authority of the President which would be dangerous to the safety of the Nation and "attempt to take away, by a mere legislative act, authorities which the President has properly exercised under the Constitution for almost 200 years." The War Powers Resolution in Section 2(c) recognized the constitutional powers of the President as Commander in Chief to introduce forces into hostilities or imminent hostilities as "exercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces." The executive branch has contended that the President has much broader authority to use forces, including for such purposes as to rescue American citizens abroad, rescue foreign nationals where such action facilitates the rescue of U.S. citizens, protect U.S. Embassies and legations, suppress civil insurrection, implement the terms of an armistice or cease-fire involving the United States, and carry out the terms of security commitments contained in treaties. Legislative Veto On June 23, 1983, the Supreme Court in INS v. Chadha , ruled unconstitutional the legislative veto provision in Section 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Although the case involved the use of a one-House legislative veto, the decision cast doubt on the validity of any legislative veto device that was not presented to the President for signature. The Court held that to accomplish what the House attempted to do in the Chadha case "requires action in conformity with the express procedures of the Constitution's prescription for legislative action: passage by a majority of both Houses and presentment to the President." On July 6, 1983, the Supreme Court affirmed a lower court's decision striking down a provision in another law that permitted Congress to disapprove by concurrent (two-House) resolution. Since Section 5(c) requires forces to be removed by the President if Congress so directs by a concurrent resolution, it is constitutionally suspect under the reasoning applied by the Court. A concurrent resolution is adopted by both chambers, but it does not require presentment to the President for signature or veto. Some legal analysts contend, nevertheless, that the War Powers Resolution is in a unique category which differs from statutes containing a legislative veto over delegated authorities. Perhaps more important, some observers contend, if a majority of both Houses ever voted to withdraw U.S. forces, the President would be unlikely to continue the action for long, and Congress could withhold appropriations to finance further action. Because the War Powers Resolution contains a separability clause in Section 9, most analysts take the view that the remainder of the joint resolution would not be affected even if Section 5(c) were found unconstitutional. Congress has taken action to fill the gap left by the possible invalidity of the concurrent resolution mechanism for the withdrawal of troops. On October 20, 1983, the Senate voted to amend the War Powers Resolution by substituting a joint resolution, which requires presentment to the President, for the concurrent resolution in Section 5(c), and providing that it would be handled under the expedited procedures in Section 7. The House and Senate conferees agreed not to amend the War Powers Resolution itself, but to adopt a free standing measure relating to the withdrawal of troops. The measure, which became law, provided that any joint resolution or bill to require the removal of U.S. Armed Forces engaged in hostilities outside the United States without a declaration of war or specific statutory authorization would be considered in accordance with the expedited procedures of Section 601(b) of the International Security and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, except that it would be amendable and debate on a veto limited to 20 hours. The priority procedures embraced by this provision applied in the Senate only. Handling of such a joint resolution by the House was left to that Chamber's discretion. House Members attempted to use Section 5(c) to obtain a withdrawal of forces from Somalia. On October 22, 1993, Representative Benjamin Gilman introduced H.Con.Res. 170 , pursuant to Section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution, directing the President to remove U.S. Armed Forces from Somalia by January 31, 1994. Using the expedited procedures called for in Section 5(c), the Foreign Affairs Committee amended the date of withdrawal to March 31, 1994, (the date the President had already agreed to withdraw the forces), and the House adopted H.Con.Res. 170 . The Foreign Affairs Committee reported: Despite such genuine constitutionality questions, the committee acted in accordance with the expedited procedures in section 7. The committee action was premised on a determination that neither individual Members of Congress nor Committees of Congress should make unilateral judgments about the constitutionality of provisions of law. Despite the use of the phrase "directs the President," the sponsor of the resolution and Speaker of the House Thomas Foley expressed the view that because of the Chadha decision, the resolution would be nonbinding. The March 31, 1994, withdrawal date was later enacted as Section 8151 of P.L. 103-139 , signed November 11, 1993. Automatic Withdrawal Provision The automatic withdrawal provision has become perhaps the most controversial provision of the War Powers Resolution. Section 5(b) requires the President to withdraw U.S. forces from hostilities within 60-90 days after a report is submitted or required to be submitted under Section 4(a)(1). The triggering of the time limit has been a major factor in the reluctance of Presidents to report, or Congress to insist upon a report, under Section 4(a)(1). Drafters of the War Powers Resolution included a time limit to provide some teeth for Congress, in the event a President assumed a power to act from provisions of resolutions, treaties, or the Constitution which did not constitute an explicit authorization. The Senate report called the time limit "the heart and core" of the bill that "represents, in an historic sense, a restoration of the constitutional balance which has been distorted by practice in our history and, climatically, in recent decades." The House report emphasized that the Resolution did not grant the President any new authority or any freedom of action during the time limits that he did not already have. Administration officials have objected that the provision would require the withdrawal of U.S. forces simply because of congressional inaction during an arbitrary period. Since the resolution recognizes that the President has independent authority to use armed forces in certain circumstances, they state, "on what basis can Congress seek to terminate such independent authority by the mere passage of time?" In addition, they argue, the imposition of a deadline interferes with successful action, signals a divided nation and lack of resolve, gives the enemy a basis for hoping that the President will be forced by domestic opponents to stop an action, and increases risk to U.S. forces in the field. This issue has not been dealt with by the courts. Major Cases and Issues Prior to the Persian Gulf War Perceptions of the War Powers Resolution tended to be set during the Cold War. During the 1970s the issues revolved largely around the adequacy of consultation. The 1980s raised more serious issues of presidential compliance and congressional willingness to use the War Powers Resolution to restrain presidential action. With regard to Lebanon in 1983, Congress itself invoked the War Powers Resolution, but in the 1987-1988 Persian Gulf tanker war Congress chose not to do so. Following is a summary of major U.S. military actions and the issues they raised relating to the War Powers Resolution from its enactment in 1973 to August 1990. Vietnam Evacuations and Mayaguez: What Is Consultation? As the Vietnam War ended, on three occasions, in April 1975, President Ford used U.S. forces to help evacuate American citizens and foreign nationals. In addition, in May 1975 President Ford ordered the retaking of a U.S. merchant vessel, the SS Mayaguez which had been seized by Cambodian naval patrol vessels. All four actions were reported to Congress citing the War Powers Resolution. The report on the Mayaguez recapture was the only War Powers report to date to specifically cite Section 4(a)(1), but the question of the time limit was moot because the action was over by the time the report was filed. Among the problems revealed by these first four cases were differences of opinion between the two branches on the meaning of consultation. The Ford Administration held that it had met the consultation requirement because the President had directed that congressional leaders be notified prior to the actual commencement of the introduction of armed forces. The prevailing congressional view was that consultation meant that the President seek congressional opinion, and take it into account, prior to making a decision to commit armed forces. Iran Hostage Rescue Attempt: Is Consultation Always Necessary and Possible? After an unsuccessful attempt on April 24, 1980, to rescue American hostages being held in Iran, President Carter submitted a report to Congress to meet the requirements of the War Powers Resolution, but he did not consult in advance. The Administration took the position that consultation was not required because the mission was a rescue attempt, not an act of force or aggression against Iran. In addition, the Administration contended that consultation was not possible or required because the mission depended upon total surprise. Some Members of Congress complained about the lack of consultation, especially because legislative-executive meetings had been going on since the Iranian crisis had begun the previous year. Just before the rescue attempt, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had sent a letter to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance requesting formal consultations under the War Powers Resolution. Moreover, shortly before the rescue attempt, the President outlined plans for a rescue attempt to Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd but did not say it had begun. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Frank Church stressed as guidelines for the future: (1) consultation required giving Congress an opportunity to participate in the decisionmaking process, not just informing Congress that an operation was underway; and (2) the judgment could not be made unilaterally but should be made by the President and Congress. El Salvador: When Are Military Advisers in Imminent Hostilities? One of the first cases to generate substantial controversy because it was never reported under the War Powers Resolution was the dispatch of U.S. military advisers to El Salvador. At the end of February 1981, the Department of State announced the dispatch of 20 additional military advisers to El Salvador to aid its government against guerilla warfare. There were already 19 military advisers in El Salvador sent by the Carter Administration. The Reagan Administration said the insurgents were organized and armed by Soviet bloc countries, particularly Cuba. By March 14, the Administration had authorized a total of 54 advisers, including experts in combat training. The President did not report the situation under the War Powers Resolution. A State Department memorandum said a report was not required because the U.S. personnel were not being introduced into hostilities or situations of imminent hostilities. The memorandum asserted that if a change in circumstances occurred that raised the prospect of imminent hostilities, the Resolution would be complied with. A justification for not reporting under Section 4(a)(2) was that the military personnel being introduced were not equipped for combat. They would, it was maintained, carry only personal side arms which they were authorized to use only in their own defense or the defense of other Americans. The State Department held that Section 8(c) of the War Powers Resolution was not intended to require a report when U.S. military personnel might be involved in training foreign military personnel, if there were no imminent involvement of U.S. personnel in hostilities. In the case of El Salvador, the memorandum said, U.S. military personnel "will not act as combat advisors, and will not accompany Salvadoran forces in combat, on operational patrols, or in any other situation where combat is likely." On May 1, 1981, 11 Members of Congress challenged the President's action by filing suit on grounds that he had violated the Constitution and the War Powers Resolution by sending the advisers to El Salvador. Eventually there were 29 co-plaintiffs, but by June 18, 1981, an equal number of Members (13 Senators and 16 Representatives) filed a motion to intervene in the suit, contending that a number of legislative measures were then pending before Congress and that Congress had ample opportunity to vote to end military assistance to El Salvador if it wished. On October 4, 1982, U.S. District Court Judge Joyce Hens Green dismissed the suit. She ruled that Congress, not the court, must resolve the question of whether the U.S. forces in El Salvador were involved in a hostile or potentially hostile situation. While there might be situations in which a court could conclude that U.S. forces were involved in hostilities, she ruled, the "subtleties of fact-finding in this situation should be left to the political branches." She noted that Congress had taken no action to show it believed the President's decision was subject to the War Powers Resolution. On November 18, 1983, a federal circuit court affirmed the dismissal and on June 8, 1984, the Supreme Court declined consideration of an appeal of that decision. As the involvement continued and casualties occurred among the U.S. military advisers, various legislative proposals relating to the War Powers Resolution and El Salvador were introduced. Some proposals required a specific authorization prior to the introduction of U.S. forces into hostilities or combat in El Salvador. Other proposals declared that the commitment of U.S. Armed Forces in El Salvador necessitated compliance with Section 4(a) of the War Powers Resolution, requiring the President to submit a report. Neither approach was adopted in legislation, but the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported that the President had "a clear obligation under the War Powers Resolution to consult with Congress prior to any future decision to commit combat forces to El Salvador." On July 26, 1983, the House rejected an amendment to the Defense Authorization bill ( H.R. 2969 ) to limit the number of active duty military advisers in El Salvador to 55, unless the President reported any increase above that level under Section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution. Nevertheless, the Administration in practice kept the number of trainers at 55. Honduras: When Are Military Exercises More than Training? Military exercises in Honduras in 1983 and subsequent years raised the question of when military exercises should be reported under the War Powers Resolution. Section 4(a)(2) requires the reporting of introduction of troops equipped for combat, but exempts deployments which relate solely to training. On July 27, 1983, President Reagan announced "joint training exercises" planned for Central America and the Caribbean. The first contingent of U.S. troops landed in Honduras on August 8, 1983, and the series of ground and ocean exercises continued for several years, involving thousands of ground troops plus warships and fighter planes. The President did not report the exercises under the War Powers Resolution. He characterized the maneuvers as routine and said the United States had been regularly conducting joint exercises with Latin American countries since 1965. Some Members of Congress, on the other hand, contended that the exercises were part of a policy to support the rebels or "contras" fighting the Sandinista Government of Nicaragua, threatening that government, and increased the possibility of U.S. military involvement in hostilities in Central America. Several Members of Congress called for reporting the actions under the War Powers Resolution, but some sought other vehicles for congressional control. In 1982, the Boland amendment to the Defense Appropriations Act had already prohibited use of funds to overthrow the Government of Nicaragua or provoke a military exchange between Nicaragua or Honduras. Variations of this amendment followed in subsequent years. After press reports in 1985 that the option of invading Nicaragua was being discussed, the Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1986 stated the sense of Congress that U.S. Armed Forces should not be introduced into or over Nicaragua for combat. In 1986, after U.S. helicopters ferried Honduran troops to the Nicaraguan border area, Congress prohibited U.S. personnel from participating in assistance within land areas of Honduras and Costa Rica within 120 miles of the Nicaraguan border, or from entering Nicaragua to provide military advice or support to paramilitary groups operating in that country. Gradually the issue died with peace agreements in the region and the electoral defeat of the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua in 1990. Lebanon: How Can Congress Invoke the War Powers Resolution? The War Powers Resolution faced a major test when Marines sent to participate in a Multinational Force in Lebanon in 1982 became the targets of hostile fire in August 1983. During this period President Reagan filed three reports under the War Powers Resolution, but he did not report under Section 4(a)(1) that the forces were being introduced into hostilities or imminent hostilities, thus triggering the 60-90 day time limit. On September 29, 1983, Congress passed the Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution determining that the requirements of Section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution became operative on August 29, 1983. In the same resolution, Congress authorized the continued participation of the Marines in the Multinational Force for 18 months. The resolution was a compromise between Congress and the President. Congress obtained the President's signature on legislation invoking the War Powers Resolution for the first time, but the price for this concession was a congressional authorization for the U.S. troops to remain in Lebanon for 18 months. The events began on July 6, 1982, when President Reagan announced he would send a small contingent of U.S. troops to a multinational force for temporary peacekeeping in Lebanon. Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee Clement Zablocki wrote President Reagan that if such a force were sent, the United States would be introducing forces into imminent hostilities and a report under Section 4(a)(1) would be required. When the forces began to land on August 25, President Reagan reported but did not cite Section 4(a)(1) and said the agreement with Lebanon ruled out any combat responsibilities. After overseeing the departure of the Palestine Liberation Organization force, the Marines in the first Multinational Force left Lebanon on September 10, 1982. The second dispatch of Marines to Lebanon began on September 20, 1982. President Reagan announced that the United States, France, and Italy had agreed to form a new multinational force to return to Lebanon for a limited period of time to help maintain order until the lawful authorities in Lebanon could discharge those duties. The action followed three events that took place after the withdrawal of the first group of Marines: the assassination of Lebanon President-elect Bashir Gemayel, the entry of Israeli forces into West Beirut, and the massacre of Palestinian civilians by Lebanese Christian militiamen. On September 29, 1982, President Reagan submitted a report that 1,200 Marines had begun to arrive in Beirut, but again he did not cite Section 4(a)(1), saying instead that the American force would not engage in combat. As a result of incidents in which Marines were killed or wounded, there was again controversy in Congress on whether the President's report should have been filed under Section 4(a)(1). In mid-1983 Congress passed the Lebanon Emergency Assistance Act of 1983 requiring statutory authorization for any substantial expansion in the number or role of U.S. Armed Forces in Lebanon. It also included Section 4(b) that stated: Nothing in this section is intended to modify, limit, or suspend any of the standards and procedures prescribed by the War Powers Resolution of 1983. President Reagan reported on the Lebanon situation for the third time on August 30, 1983, still not citing Section 4(a)(1), after fighting broke out between various factions in Lebanon and two Marines were killed. The level of fighting heightened, and as the Marine casualties increased and the action enlarged, there were more calls in Congress for invocation of the War Powers Resolution. Several Members of Congress said the situation had changed since the President's first report and introduced legislation that took various approaches. Senator Charles Mathias introduced S.J.Res. 159 stating that the time limit specified in the War Powers Resolution had begun on August 31, 1983, and authorizing the forces to remain in Lebanon for a period of 120 days after the expiration of the 60-day period. Representative Thomas Downey introduced H.J.Res. 348 directing the President to report under Section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution. Senator Robert Byrd introduced S.J.Res. 163 finding that Section 4(a)(1) of the war powers resolution applied to the present circumstances in Lebanon. The House Appropriations Committee approved an amendment to the continuing resolution for FY1984 ( H.J.Res. 367 ), sponsored by Representative Clarence Long, providing that after 60 days, funds could not be "obligated or expended for peacekeeping activities in Lebanon by United States Armed Forces," unless the President had submitted a report under Section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution. A similar amendment was later rejected by the full body, but it reminded the Administration of possible congressional actions. On September 20, congressional leaders and President Reagan agreed on a compromise resolution invoking Section 4(a)(1) and authorizing the Marines to remain for 18 months. The resolution became the first legislation to be handled under the expedited procedures of the War Powers Resolution. On September 28, the House passed H.J.Res. 364 by a vote of 270 to 161. After 3 days of debate, on September 29, the Senate passed S.J.Res. 159 by a vote of 54 to 46. The House accepted the Senate bill by a vote of 253 to 156. As passed, the resolution contained four occurrences that would terminate the authorization before 18 months: (1) the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon, unless the President certified continued U.S. participation was required to accomplish specified purposes; (2) the assumption by the United Nations or the Government of Lebanon of the responsibilities of the Multinational Force; (3) the implementation of other effective security arrangements; or (4) the withdrawal of all other countries from participation in the Multinational Force. Shortly afterward, on October 23, 1983, 241 U.S. Marines in Lebanon were killed by a suicide truck bombing, bringing new questions in Congress and U.S. public opinion about U.S. participation. On February 7, 1984, President Reagan announced the Marines would be redeployed and on March 30, 1984, reported to Congress that U.S. participation in the Multinational Force in Lebanon had ended. Grenada: Do the Expedited Procedures Work? On October 25, 1983, President Reagan reported to Congress "consistent with" the War Powers Resolution that he had ordered a landing of approximately 1,900 U.S. Army and Marine Corps personnel in Grenada. He said that the action was in response to a request from the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States which had formed a collective security force to restore order in Grenada, where anarchic conditions had developed, and to protect the lives of U.S. citizens. Many Members of Congress contended that the President should have cited Section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, which would have triggered the 60-90 day time limitation. On November 1, 1983, the House supported this interpretation when it adopted, by a vote of 403-23, H.J.Res. 402 declaring that the requirements of Section 4(a)(1) had become operative on October 25. The Senate did not act on this measure and a conference was not held. The Senate had adopted a similar measure on October 28 by a vote of 64 to 20, but on November 17 the provision was deleted in the conference report on the debt limit bill to which it was attached. Thus both Houses had voted to invoke Section 4(a)(1), but the legislation was not completed. On November 17, White House spokesman Larry Speakes said the Administration had indicated that there was no need for action as the combat troops would be out within the 60-90 day time period. Speaker Thomas O'Neill took the position that, whether or not Congress passed specific legislation, the War Powers Resolution had become operative on October 25. By December 15, 1983, all U.S. combat troops had been removed from Grenada. Eleven Members of Congress filed a suit challenging the constitutionality of President Reagan's invasion of Grenada. A district judge held that courts should not decide such cases unless the entire Congress used the institutional remedies available to it. An appellate court subsequently held that the issue was moot because the invasion had been ended. Libya: Should Congress Help Decide on Raids to Undertake in Response to International Terrorism? The use of U.S. forces against Libya in 1986 focused attention on the application of the War Powers Resolution to use of military force against international terrorism. Tensions between the United States and Libya under the leadership of Col. Muammar Qadhafi had been mounting for several years, particularly after terrorist incidents at the Rome and Vienna airports on December 27, 1985. On January 7, 1986, President Reagan said that the Rome and Vienna incidents were the latest in a series of brutal terrorist acts committed with Qadhafi's backing that constituted armed aggression against the United States. The War Powers issue was first raised on March 24, 1986, when Libyan forces fired missiles at U.S. aircraft operating in the Gulf of Sidra. In response, the United States fired missiles at Libyan vessels and at Sirte, the Libyan missile site involved. The U.S. presence in the Gulf of Sidra, an area claimed by Libya, was justified as an exercise to maintain freedom of the seas, but it was widely considered a response to terrorist activities. Subsequently, on April 5, 1986, a terrorist bombing of a discotheque in West Berlin occurred and an American soldier was killed. On April 14 President Reagan announced there was irrefutable evidence that Libya had been responsible, and U.S. Air Force planes had conducted bombing strikes on headquarters, terrorist facilities, and military installations in Libya in response. The President reported both cases to Congress although the report on the bombing did not cite Section 4(a)(1) and the Gulf of Sidra report did not mention the War Powers Resolution at all. Since the actions were short lived, there was no issue of force withdrawal, but several Members introduced bills to amend the War Powers Resolution. One bill called for improving consultation by establishing a special consultative group in Congress. Others called for strengthening the President's hand in combating terrorism by authorizing the President, notwithstanding any other provision of law, to use all measures he deems necessary to protect U.S. persons against terrorist threats. Persian Gulf, 1987: When Are Hostilities Imminent? The War Powers Resolution became an issue in activities in the Persian Gulf after an Iraqi aircraft fired a missile on the USS Stark on May 17, 1987, killing 37 U.S. sailors. The attack broached the question of whether the Iran-Iraq war had made the Persian Gulf an area of hostilities or imminent hostilities for U.S. forces. Shortly afterwards, the U.S. adoption of a policy of reflagging and providing a naval escort of Kuwaiti oil tankers through the Persian Gulf raised full force the question of whether U.S. policy was risking involvement in war without congressional authorization. During 1987 U.S. Naval forces operating in the Gulf increased to 11 major warships, 6 minesweepers, and over a dozen small patrol boats, and a battleship-led formation was sent to the Northern Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean to augment an aircraft carrier battle group already there. For several months the President did not report any of the deployments or military incidents under the War Powers Resolution, although on May 20, 1987, after the Stark incident, Secretary of State Shultz submitted a report similar to previous ones consistent with War Powers provisions, but not mentioning the Resolution. No reports were submitted after the USS Bridgeton struck a mine on July 24, 1987, or the U.S.-chartered Texaco-Caribbean struck a mine on August 10 and a U.S. F-14 fighter plane fired two missiles at an Iranian aircraft perceived as threatening. Later, however, after various military incidents on September 23, 1987, and growing congressional concern, the President began submitting reports "consistent with" the War Powers Resolution and on July 13, 1988, submitted the sixth report relating to the Persian Gulf. None of the reports were submitted under Section 4(a)(1) or acknowledged that U.S. forces had been introduced into hostilities or imminent hostilities. The Reagan administration contended that the military incidents in the Persian Gulf, or isolated incidents involving defensive reactions, did not add up to hostilities or imminent hostilities as envisaged in the War Powers Resolution. It held that "imminent danger" pay which was announced for military personnel in the Persian Gulf on August 27, 1987, did not trigger Section 4(a)(1). Standards for danger pay, namely, "subject to the threat of physical harm or danger on the basis of civil insurrection, civil war, terrorism, or wartime conditions," were broader than for hostilities of the War Powers Resolution, and had been drafted to be available in situations to which the War Powers Resolution did not apply. Some Members of Congress contended that if the President did not report under Section 4(a)(1), Congress itself should declare such a report should have been submitted, as it had in the Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution. Several resolutions to this effect were introduced, some authorizing the forces to remain, but none were passed. The decisive votes on the subject took place in the Senate. On September 18, 1987, the Senate voted 50-41 to table an amendment to the Defense authorization bill ( S. 1174 ) to apply the provisions of the War Powers Resolution. The Senate also sustained points of order against consideration of S.J.Res. 217 , which would have invoked the War Powers Resolution, on December 4, 1987, and a similar bill the following year, S.J.Res. 305 , on June 6, 1988. The Senate approach was to use legislation to assure a congressional role in the Persian Gulf policy without invoking the War Powers Resolution. Early in the situation, both Chambers passed measures requiring the Secretary of Defense to submit a report to Congress prior to the implementation of any agreement between the United States and Kuwait for U.S. military protection of Kuwaiti shipping, and such a report was submitted June 15, 1987. Later, the Senate passed a measure that called for a comprehensive report by the President within 30 days and provided expedited procedures for a joint resolution on the subject after an additional 30 days. The House did not take action on the bill. As in the case of El Salvador, some Members took the War Powers issue to court. On August 7, 1987, Representative Lowry and 110 other Members of Congress filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, asking the court to declare that a report was required under Section 4(a)(1). On December 18, 1987, the court dismissed the suit, holding it was a nonjusticiable political question, and that the plaintiffs' dispute was "primarily with fellow legislators." Compliance with the consultation requirement was also an issue. The Administration developed its plan for reflagging and offered it to Kuwait on March 7, 1987, prior to discussing the plan with Members of Congress. A June 15, 1987, report to Congress by the Secretary of Defense stated on the reflagging policy, "As soon as Kuwait indicated its acceptance of our offer, we began consultations with Congress which are still ongoing." This was too late for congressional views to be weighed in on the initial decision, after which it became more difficult to alter the policy. Subsequently, however, considerable consultation developed and the President met with various congressional leaders prior to some actions such as the retaliatory actions in April 1988 against an Iranian oil platform involved in mine-laying. With recurring military incidents, some Members of Congress took the position that the War Powers Resolution was not being complied with, unless the President reported under Section 4(a)(1) or Congress itself voted to invoke the Resolution. Other Members contended the Resolution was working by serving as a restraint on the President, who was now submitting reports and consulting with Congress. Still other Members suggested the Persian Gulf situation was demonstrating the need to amend the War Powers Resolution. As a result of the Persian Gulf situation, in the summer of 1988 both the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which established a Special Subcommittee on War Powers, undertook extensive assessments of the War Powers Resolution. Interest in the issue waned after a cease-fire between Iran and Iraq began on August 20, 1988, and the United States reduced its forces in the Persian Gulf area. Invasion of Panama: Why Was the War Powers Issue Not Raised? On December 20, 1989, President George H.W. Bush ordered 14,000 U.S. military forces to Panama for combat, in addition to 13,000 already present. On December 21, he reported to Congress under the War Powers Resolution but without citing Section 4(a)(1). His stated objectives were to protect the 35,000 American citizens in Panama, restore the democratic process, preserve the integrity of the Panama Canal treaties, and apprehend General Manuel Noriega, who had been accused of massive electoral fraud in the Panamanian elections and indicted on drug trafficking charges by two U.S. federal courts. The operation proceeded swiftly and General Noriega surrendered to U.S. military authorities on January 3. President Bush said the objectives had been met, and U.S. forces were gradually withdrawn. By February 13, all combat forces deployed for the invasion had been withdrawn, leaving the strength just under the 13,597 forces stationed in Panama prior to the invasion. The President did not consult with congressional leaders before his decision, although he did notify them a few hours in advance of the invasion. Some Members of Congress had been discussing the problem of General Noriega for some time. Before Congress adjourned, it had called for the President to intensify unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral measures and consult with other nations on ways to coordinate efforts to remove General Noriega from power. The Senate had adopted an amendment supporting the President's use of appropriate diplomatic, economic, and military options "to restore constitutional government to Panama and to remove General Noriega from his illegal control of the Republic of Panama," but had defeated an amendment authorizing the President to use U.S. military force to secure the removal of General Noriega "notwithstanding any other provision of law." The Panama action did not raise much discussion in Congress about the War Powers Resolution. This was in part because Congress was out of session. The first session of the 101 st Congress had ended on November 22, 1989, and the second session did not begin until January 23, 1990, when the operation was essentially over and it appeared likely the additional combat forces would be out of Panama within 60 days of their deployment. The President's action in Panama was popular in American public opinion and supported by most Members of Congress because of the actions of General Noriega. After it was over, on February 7, 1990, the House Passed H.Con.Res. 262 which stated that the President had acted "decisively and appropriately in ordering United States forces to intervene in Panama." Major Cases and Issues in the Post-Cold War World After the end of the Cold War in 1990, the United States began to move away from unilateral military actions toward actions authorized or supported by the United Nations (U.N.). Under the auspices of U.N. Security Council resolutions, U.S. forces were deployed in Kuwait and Iraq, Somalia, former Yugoslavia/Bosnia/Kosovo, and Haiti. This raised the new issue of whether the War Powers Resolution applied to U.S. participation in U.N. military actions. It was not a problem during the Cold War because the agreement among the five permanent members required for Security Council actions seldom existed. An exception, the Korean War, occurred before the War Powers Resolution was enacted. The more basic issue—under what circumstances congressional authorization is required for U.S. participation in U.N. military operations—is an unfinished debate remaining from 1945. Whether congressional authorization is required depends on the types of U.N. action and is governed by the U.N. Participation Act (P.L. 79-264, as amended), as well as by the War Powers Resolution and war powers under the Constitution. Appropriations action by Congress also may be determinative as a practical matter. For armed actions under Articles 42 and 43 of the United Nations Charter, Section 6 of the U.N. Participation Act authorizes the President to negotiate special agreements with the Security Council " which shall be subject to the approval of the Congress by appropriate Act or joint resolution ," providing for the numbers and types of armed forces and facilities to be made available to the Security Council. Once the agreements have been concluded, further congressional authorization is not necessary, but no such agreements have been concluded. Section 7 of the United Nations Participation Act, added in 1949 by P.L. 81-341, authorizes the detail of up to 1,000 personnel to serve in any noncombatant capacity for certain U.N. peaceful settlement activities. The United States has provided personnel to several U.N. peacekeeping missions, such as observers to the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine since 1948, that appear to fall within the authorization in Section 7 of the Participation Act. Controversy has arisen when larger numbers of forces have been deployed or when it appears the forces might be serving as combatants. The War Powers Resolution neither excludes United Nations actions from its provisions nor makes any special procedures for them. Section 8(a)(2) states that authority to introduce U. S. Armed Forces into hostilities shall not be inferred from any treaty unless it is implemented by legislation specifically authorizing the introduction and stating that it is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of the War Powers resolution. One purpose of this provision was to ensure that both Houses of Congress be affirmatively involved in any U.S. decision to engage in hostilities pursuant to a treaty, since only the Senate approved a treaty. From 1990 through 1999, Congress primarily dealt with the issue on a case-by-case basis, but Members also enacted some measures seeking more control over U.S. participation in future peacekeeping actions wherever they might occur. The Defense Appropriations Act for FY1994 stated the sense of Congress that funds should not be expended for U.S. Armed Forces serving under U.N. Security Council actions unless the President consults with Congress at least 15 days prior to deployment and not later than 48 hours after such deployment, except for humanitarian operations. The Defense Authorization Act for FY1994 required a report to Congress by April 1, 1994, including discussion of the requirement of congressional approval for participation of U.S. Armed Forces in multinational peacekeeping missions, proposals to conclude military agreements with the U.N. Security Council under Article 43 of the U.N. Charter, and the applicability of the War Powers Resolution and the U.N. Participation Act. In 1994 and 1995, Congress attempted to gain a greater role in U.N. and other peacekeeping operations through authorization and appropriation legislation. A major element of the House Republicans' Contract with America, H.R. 7 , would have placed notable constraints on presidential authority to commit U.S. forces to international peacekeeping operations. Senator Dole's S. 5 , The Peace Powers Act, introduced in January 1995, would have also placed greater legislative controls on such operations. General and specific funding restrictions and presidential reporting requirements were passed for peacekeeping operations underway or in prospect. Some of these legislative enactments led to presidential vetoes. These representative legislative actions are reviewed below as they apply to given cases. Persian Gulf War, 1991: How Does the War Powers Resolution Relate to the United Nations and a Real War? On August 2, 1990, Iraqi troops under the direction of President Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, seized its oil fields, installed a new government in Kuwait City, and moved on toward the border with Saudi Arabia. Action to repel the invasion led to the largest war in which the United States had been involved since the passage of the War Powers Resolution. Throughout the effort to repel the Iraqi invasion, President Bush worked in tandem with the United Nations, organizing and obtaining international support and authorization for multilateral military action against Iraq. A week after the invasion, on August 9, President George H.W. Bush reported to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that he had deployed U.S. Armed Forces to the region prepared to take action with others to deter Iraqi aggression. He did not cite Section 4(a)(1) and specifically stated, "I do not believe involvement in hostilities is imminent." The President did not consult with congressional leaders prior to the deployment, but both houses of Congress had adopted legislation supporting efforts to end the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, particularly using economic sanctions and multilateral efforts. On August 2, shortly before its recess, the Senate by a vote of 97-0 adopted S.Res. 318 urging the President "to act immediately, using unilateral and multilateral measures, to seek the full and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwaiti territory" and to work for collective international sanctions against Iraq including, if economic sanctions prove inadequate, "additional multilateral actions, under Article 42 of the United Nations Charter, involving air, sea, and land forces as may be needed...." Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Pell stressed, however, that the measure did not authorize unilateral U.S. military actions. Also on August 2, the House passed H.R. 5431 condemning the Iraqi invasion and calling for an economic embargo against Iraq. The United Nations imposed economic sanctions against Iraq on August 7, and the United States and United Kingdom organized an international naval interdiction effort. Later, on August 25, the U.N. Security Council authorized "such measures as may be necessary" to halt shipping and verify cargoes that might be going to Iraq. Both Houses adopted measures supporting the deployment, but neither measure was enacted. On October 1, 1990, the House passed H.J.Res. 658 supporting the action and citing the War Powers Resolution without stating that Section 4(a)(1) had become operative. The resolution quoted the President's statement that involvement in hostilities was not imminent. Representative Fascell stated that H.J.Res. 658 was not to be interpreted as a Gulf of Tonkin resolution that granted the President open-ended authority, and that it made clear that "a congressional decision on the issue of war or peace would have to be made through joint consultation." The Senate did not act on H.J.Res. 658 . On October 2, 1990, the Senate by a vote of 96-3 adopted S.Con.Res. 147 , stating that "Congress supports continued action by the President in accordance with the decisions of the United Nations Security Council and in accordance with United States constitutional and statutory processes, including the authorization and appropriation of funds by the Congress, to deter Iraqi aggression and to protect American lives and vital interest in the region." As in the House, Senate leaders emphasized that the resolution was not to be interpreted as an open-ended resolution similar to the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. The resolution made no mention of the War Powers Resolution. The House did not act on S.Con.Res. 147 . Congress also supported the action by appropriating funds for the preparatory operation, called Operation Desert Shield, and later for war activities called Operation Desert Storm. Some Members introduced legislation to establish a special consultation group, but the Administration objected to a formally established group. On October 23, 1990, Senate Majority Leader Mitchell announced that he and Speaker Foley had designated Members of the joint bipartisan leadership and committees of jurisdiction to make themselves available as a group for consultation on developments in the Persian Gulf. By this time U.S. land, naval, and air forces numbering more than 200,000 had been deployed. After the 101 st Congress had adjourned, President Bush on November 8, 1990, ordered an estimated additional 150,000 troops to the Gulf. He incurred considerable criticism because he had not informed the consultation group of the buildup although he had met with them on October 30. On November 16, President Bush sent a second report to Congress describing the continuing and increasing deployment of forces to the region. He stated that his opinion that hostilities were not imminent had not changed. The President wrote, "The deployment will ensure that the coalition has an adequate offensive military option should that be necessary to achieve our common goals." By the end of the year, approximately 350,000 U.S. forces had been deployed to the area. As the prospect of a war without congressional authorization increased, on November 20, 1990, Representative Ron Dellums and 44 other Democratic Members of Congress sought a judicial order enjoining the President from offensive military operations in connection with Operation Desert Shield unless he consulted with and obtained an authorization from Congress. On November 26, 11 prominent law professors filed a brief in favor of such a judicial action, arguing that the Constitution clearly vested Congress with the authority to declare war and that federal judges should not use the political questions doctrine to avoid ruling on the issue. The American Civil Liberties Union also filed a memorandum in favor of the plaintiffs. On December 13, Judge Harold Greene of the federal district court in Washington denied the injunction, holding that the controversy was not ripe for judicial resolution because a majority of Congress had not sought relief and the executive branch had not shown sufficient commitment to a definitive course of action. However, throughout his opinion Judge Greene rejected the Administration's arguments for full presidential war powers. On November 29, 1990, U.N. Security Council Resolution 678 authorized member states to use "all necessary means" to implement the Council's resolutions and restore peace and security in the area, unless Iraq complied with the U.N. resolutions by January 15, 1991. As the deadline for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait neared, President Bush indicated that if the Iraqi forces did not withdraw from Kuwait, he was prepared to use force to implement the U.N. Security Council resolutions. Administration officials contended that the President did not need any additional congressional authorization for this purpose. After the 102 nd Congress convened, on January 4, 1991, House and Senate leaders announced they would debate U.S. policy beginning January 10. A week before the January 15 deadline, on January 8, 1991, President Bush, in a letter to the congressional leaders, requested a congressional resolution supporting the use of all necessary means to implement U.N. Security Council Resolution 678. He stated that he was "determined to do whatever is necessary to protect America's security" and that he could "think of no better way than for Congress to express its support for the President at this critical time." It is noteworthy that the President's request for a resolution was a request for congressional "support" for his undertaking in the Persian Gulf, not for "authority" to engage in the military operation. In a press conference on January 9, 1991, President Bush reinforced this distinction in response to questions about the use of force resolution being debated in Congress. He was asked whether he thought he needed the resolution, and if he lost on it would he feel bound by that decision. President Bush in response stated: "I don't think I need it.... I feel that I have the authority to fully implement the United Nations resolutions." He added that he felt that he had "the constitutional authority—many attorneys having so advised me." On January 12, 1991, both houses passed the "Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution" ( P.L. 102-1 ). Section 2(a) authorized the President to use U.S. Armed Forces pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolution 678 to achieve implementation of the earlier Security Council resolutions. Section 2(b) required that first the President would have to report that the United States had used all appropriate diplomatic and other peaceful means to obtain compliance by Iraq with the Security Council resolution and that those efforts had not been successful. Section 2(c) stated that it was intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of Section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution. Section 3 required the President to report every 60 days on efforts to obtain compliance of Iraq with the U.N. Security Council resolution. In his statement made after signing H.J.Res. 77 into law, President Bush said the following: "As I made clear to congressional leaders at the outset, my request for congressional support did not, and my signing this resolution does not, constitute any change in the long-standing positions of the executive branch on either the President's constitutional authority to use the Armed Forces to defend vital U.S. interests or the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution." He added that he was pleased that "differences on these issues between the President and many in the Congress have not prevented us from uniting in a common objective." On January 16, President Bush made the determination required by P.L. 102-1 that diplomatic means had not and would not compel Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. On January 18, he reported to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that he had directed U.S. forces to commence combat operations on January 16. After the beginning of the war many Members of Congress strongly supported the President as Commander in Chief in his conduct of the war. On March 19, 1991, President Bush reported to Congress that the military operations had been successful, Kuwait had been liberated, and combat operations had been suspended on February 28, 1991. Prior to passage of P.L. 102-1 , some observers questioned the effectiveness of the War Powers Resolution on grounds that the President had begun the action, deployed hundreds of thousands of troops without consultation of Congress, and was moving the Nation increasingly close to war without congressional authorization. After the passage of P.L. 102-1 and the war had begun, Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Fascell took the position that "the War Powers Resolution is alive and well"; the President had submitted reports to Congress, and Congress, in P.L. 102-1 , had provided specific statutory authorization for the use of force. In his view, the strength and wisdom of the War Powers Resolution was that it established a process by which Congress could authorize the use of force in specific settings for limited purposes, short of a total state of war. The question is sometimes raised why Congress did not declare war against Iraq. Speaker Foley told the National Press Club on February 7, 1991, that "The reason we did not declare a formal war was not because there is any difference I think in the action that was taken and in a formal declaration of war with respect to military operations, but because there is some question about whether we wish to excite or enact some of the domestic consequences of a formal declaration of war—seizure of property, censorship, and so forth, which the President neither sought nor desired." Iraq-Post Gulf War: How Long Does an Authorization Last? After the end of Operation Desert Storm, U.S. military forces were used to deal with three continuing situations in Iraq. These activities raised the issue of how long a congressional authorization for the use of force lasts. The first situation resulted from the Iraqi government's repression of Kurdish and Shi'ite groups. U.N. Security Council Resolution 688 of April 5, 1991, condemned the repression of the Iraqi civilian population and appealed for contributions to humanitarian relief efforts. On May 17, 1991, President George H.W. Bush reported to Congress that the Iraqi repression of the Kurdish people had necessitated a limited introduction of U.S. forces into northern Iraq for emergency relief purposes. On July 16, 1991, he reported that U.S. forces had withdrawn from northern Iraq but that the U.S. remained prepared to take appropriate steps as the situation required and that, to this end, an appropriate level of forces would be maintained in the region for "as long as required." A second situation stemmed from the cease-fire resolution, Security Council Resolution 687 of April 3, 1991, which called for Iraq to accept the destruction or removal of chemical and biological weapons and international control of its nuclear materials. On September 16, 1991, President Bush reported to Congress that Iraq continued to deny inspection teams access to weapons facilities and that this violated the requirements of Resolution 687, and the United States if necessary would take action to ensure Iraqi compliance with the Council's decisions. He reported similar noncooperation on January 14, 1992, and May 15, 1992. On July 16, 1992, President Bush reported particular concern about the refusal of Iraqi authorities to grant U.N. inspectors access to the Agricultural Ministry. The President consulted congressional leaders on July 27, and in early August the United States began a series of military exercises to take 5,000 U.S. troops to Kuwait. On September 16, 1992, the President reported, "We will remain prepared to use all necessary means, in accordance with U.N. Security Council resolutions, to assist the United Nations in removing the threat posed by Iraq's chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons capability." The third situation was related to both of the earlier ones. On August 26, 1992, the United States, Britain, and France began a "no-fly" zone, banning Iraqi fixed wing and helicopter flights south of the 32 nd parallel and creating a limited security zone in the south, where Shi'ite groups were concentrated. After violations of the no-fly zones and various other actions by Iraq, on January 13, 1993, the Bush Administration announced that aircraft from the United States and coalition partners had attacked missile bases in southern Iraq and that the United States was deploying a battalion task force to Kuwait to underline the U.S. continuing commitment to Kuwait's independence. On January 19, 1993, President Bush reported to Congress that U.S. aircraft had shot down an Iraqi aircraft on December 27, 1992, and had undertaken further military actions on January 13, 17, and 18. President Clinton said on January 21, 1993, that the United States would adhere to the policy toward Iraq set by the Bush Administration. On January 22 and 23, April 9 and 18, June 19, and August 19, 1993, U.S. aircraft fired at targets in Iraq after pilots sensed Iraqi radar or anti-aircraft fire directed at them. On September 23, 1993, President Clinton reported that since the August 19 action, the Iraqi installation fired upon had not displayed hostile intentions. In a separate incident, on June 28, 1993, President Clinton reported to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that on June 26 U.S. naval forces at his direction had launched a Tomahawk cruise missile strike on the Iraqi Intelligence Service's main command and control complex in Baghdad and that the military action was completed upon the impact of the missiles. He said the Iraqi Intelligence Service had planned the failed attempt to assassinate former President Bush during his visit to Kuwait in April 1993. The question was raised as to whether the Authorization for the Use of Force in Iraq ( P.L. 102-1 ) authorized military actions after the conclusion of the war. P.L. 102-1 authorized the President to use U.S. Armed Forces pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolution 678 to achieve implementation of previous Security Council Resolutions relating to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. The cease-fire resolution, Security Council Resolution 687, was adopted afterwards and therefore not included in Resolution 678. Congress endorsed the view that further specific authorization was not required for U.S. military action to maintain the cease-fire agreement. Specifically, Section 1095 of P.L. 102-190 stated the sense of Congress that it supported the use of all necessary means to achieve the goals of Security Council Resolution 687 as being consistent with the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution. Section 1096 supported the use of all necessary means to protect Iraq's Kurdish minority, consistent with relevant U.N. resolutions and authorities contained in P.L. 102-1 . The issue of congressional authorization was debated again in 1998. On March 31, 1998, the House passed a Supplemental Appropriations bill ( H.R. 3579 ) that would have banned the use of funds appropriated in it for the conduct of offensive operations against Iraq, unless such operations were specifically authorized by law. This provision was dropped in the conference with the Senate. A more broad-gauged approach to the issue of congressional authorization of military force was attempted in mid-1998. On June 24, 1998, the House passed H.R. 4103 , the Defense Department Appropriations bill for FY1999, with a provision by Representative David Skaggs that banned the use of funds appropriated or otherwise made available by this act "to initiate or conduct offensive military operations by United States Armed Forces except in accordance with the war powers clause of the Constitution (Article 1, Section 8), which vests in Congress the power to declare and authorize war and to take certain specified, related actions." The Skaggs provision was stricken by the House-Senate conference committee on H.R. 4103 . As events developed, beginning in late 1998, and continuing into the period prior to the U.S. military invasion of Iraq in March 2003, the United States conducted a large number of ad-hoc air attacks against Iraqi ground installations and military targets in response to violations of the northern and southern "no-fly zones" by the Iraqis, and threatening actions taken against U.S. and coalition aircraft enforcing these "no-fly" sectors. Congressional authorization to continue these activities was not sought by the President, nor were these many incidents reported under the War Powers Resolution. The "no-fly zones" activities were terminated following the 2003 War with Iraq. Somalia: When Does Humanitarian Assistance Require Congressional Authorization? In Somalia, the participation of U.S. military forces in a U.N. operation to protect humanitarian assistance became increasingly controversial as fighting and casualties increased and the objectives of the operation appeared to be expanding. On December 4, 1992, President George H.W. Bush ordered thousands of U.S. military forces to Somalia to protect humanitarian relief from armed gangs. Earlier, on November 25, the President had offered U.S. forces, and on December 3, the United Nations Security Council had adopted Resolution 794 welcoming the U.S. offer and authorizing the Secretary-General and members cooperating in the U.S. offer "to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia." The resolution also called on member states to provide military forces and authorized the Secretary-General and the states concerned to arrange for unified command and control. On December 10, 1992, President Bush reported to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that on December 8, U.S. Armed Forces entered Somalia to secure the air field and port facility of Mogadishu and that other elements of the U.S. Armed Forces were being introduced into Somalia to achieve the objectives of U.N. Security Council Resolution 794. He said the forces would remain only as long as necessary to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations and would then turn over responsibility for maintaining this environment to a U.N. peacekeeping force. The President said that it was not intended that the U.S. Armed Forces become involved in hostilities, but that the forces were equipped and ready to take such measures as might be needed to accomplish their humanitarian mission and defend themselves. They would also have the support of any additional U.S. forces necessary. By mid-January, U.S. forces in Somalia numbered 25,000. Since the President did not cite Section 4(a)(1), the 60-day time limit was not necessarily triggered. By February, however, the U.S. force strength was being reduced, and it was announced the United States expected to turn over responsibility for protecting humanitarian relief shipments in Somalia to a U.N. force that would include U.S. troops. On March 26, 1993, the Security Council adopted Resolution 814 expanding the mandate of the U.N. force and bringing about a transition from a U.S.-led force to a U.N.-led force (UNOSOM II). By the middle of May, when the change to U.N. control took place, the U.S. forces were down to approximately 4,000 troops, primarily logistics and communications support teams, but also a rapid deployment force of U.S. Marines stationed on Navy ships. Violence within Somalia began to increase again. On June 5, 1993, attacks killed 23 Pakistani peacekeepers, and a Somali regional leader, General Aidid, was believed responsible. The next day the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 837 reaffirming the authority of UNOSOM II to take all necessary measures against those responsible for the armed attacks. On June 10, 1993, President Clinton reported "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that the U.S. Quick Reaction Force had executed military strikes to assist UNOSOM II in quelling violence against it. On July 1, President Clinton submitted another report, not mentioning the War Powers Resolution, describing further air and ground military operations aimed at securing General Aidid's compound and neutralizing military capabilities that had been an obstacle to U.N. efforts to deliver humanitarian relief and promote national reconstruction. From the beginning, a major issue for Congress was whether to authorize U.S. action in Somalia. On February 4, 1993, the Senate had passed S.J.Res. 45 that would authorize the President to use U.S. Armed Forces pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolution 794. S.J.Res. 45 stated it was intended to constitute the specific statutory authorization under Section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution. On May 25, 1993, the House amended S.J.Res. 45 to authorize U.S. forces to remain for one year. S.J.Res. 45 was then sent to the Senate for its concurrence, but the Senate did not act on the measure. As sporadic fighting resulted in the deaths of Somali and U.N. forces, including Americans, controversy over the operation intensified, and Congress took action through other legislative channels. In September 1993 the House and Senate adopted amendments to the Defense Authorization Act for FY1994 asking that the President consult with Congress on policy toward Somalia, and report the goals, objectives, and anticipated jurisdiction of the U.S. mission in Somalia by October 15, 1993; the amendments expressed the sense that the President by November 15, 1993, should seek and receive congressional authorization for the continued deployment of U.S. forces to Somalia. On October 7, the President consulted with congressional leaders from both parties for over two hours on Somalia policy. On October 13, President Clinton sent a 33-page report to Congress on his Somalia policy and its objectives. Meanwhile, on October 7 President Clinton said that most U.S. forces would be withdrawn from Somalia by March 31, 1994. To ensure this, the Defense Department Appropriations Act for FY1994, cut off funds for U.S. military operations in Somalia after March 31, 1994, unless the President obtained further spending authority from Congress. Congress approved the use of U.S. military forces in Somalia only for the protection of American military personnel and bases and for helping maintain the flow of relief aid by giving the U.N. forces security and logistical support; it required that U.S. combat forces in Somalia remain under the command and control of U.S. commanders under the ultimate direction of the President. Earlier, some Members suggested that the U.S. forces in Somalia were clearly in a situation of hostilities or imminent hostilities, and that if Congress did not authorize the troops to remain, the forces should be withdrawn within 60 to 90 days. After a letter from House Foreign Affairs Committee Ranking Minority Member Benjamin Gilman and Senate Foreign Relations Committee Ranking Minority Member Jesse Helms, Assistant Secretary Wendy Sherman replied on July 21, 1993, that no previous Administrations had considered that intermittent military engagements, whether constituting hostilities, would necessitate the withdrawal of forces pursuant to Section 5(b); and the War Powers Resolution, in their view, was intended to apply to sustained hostilities. The State Department did not believe congressional authorization was necessary, although congressional support would be welcome. On August 4, 1993, Representative Gilman asserted that August 4 might be remembered as the day the War Powers Resolution died because combat broke out in Somalia on June 5 and the President had not withdrawn U.S. forces and Congress had "decided to look the other way." On October 22, 1993, Representative Gilman introduced H.Con.Res. 170 directing the President pursuant to Section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution to withdraw U.S. forces from Somalia by January 31, 1994. The House adopted an amended version calling for withdrawal by March 31, 1994. The Senate did not act on this nonbinding measure. However, the Defense Appropriations Act for FY1995 ( P.L. 103-335 , signed September 30, 1994) prohibited the use of funds for the continuous presence of U.S. forces in Somalia, except for the protection of U.S. personnel, after September 30, 1994. Subsequently, on November 4, 1994, the U.N. Security Council decided to end the U.N. mission in Somalia by March 31, 1995. On March 3, 1995, U.S. forces completed their assistance to United Nations forces evacuating Somalia. Another war powers issue was the adequacy of consultation before the dispatch of forces. On December 4, 1992, President Bush had met with a number of congressional leaders to brief them on the troop deployment. In his December 10 report, President Bush stressed that he had taken into account the views expressed in H.Con.Res. 370 , S.Con.Res. 132 , and P.L. 102-274 on the urgent need for action in Somalia. However, none of these resolutions explicitly authorized U.S. military action. Former Yugoslavia/Bosnia/Kosovo: What If No Consensus Exists? Bosnia The issue of war powers and U.S. participation in United Nations actions was also raised by efforts to halt fighting in the territory of former Yugoslavia, initially in Bosnia. Because some of the U.S. action has been taken within a NATO framework, action in Bosnia has also raised the issue of whether action under NATO is exempt from the requirements of the War Powers Resolution or its standard for the exercise of war powers under the Constitution. Article 11 of the North Atlantic Treaty states that its provisions are to be carried out by the parties "in accordance with their respective constitutional processes," inferring some role for Congress in the event of war. Section 8(a) of the War Powers Resolution states that authority to introduce U.S. forces into hostilities is not to be inferred from any treaty, ratified before or after 1973, unless implementing legislation specifically authorizes such introduction and says it is intended to constitute an authorization within the meaning of the War Powers Resolution. Section 8(b) states that nothing in the War Powers Resolution should be construed to require further authorization for U.S. participation in the headquarters operations of military commands established before 1973, such as NATO headquarters operations. On August 13, 1992, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 770 calling on nations to take "all measures necessary" to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo. Many in Congress had been advocating more assistance to the victims of the conflict. On August 11, 1992, the Senate had passed S.Res. 330 urging the President to work for a U.N. Security Council resolution such as was adopted, but saying that no U.S. military personnel should be introduced into hostilities without clearly defined objectives. On the same day, the House passed H.Res. 554 urging the Security Council to authorize measures, including the use of force, to ensure humanitarian relief. During 1993 the United States participated in airlifts into Sarajevo, naval monitoring of sanctions, and aerial enforcement of a "no-fly zone." On February 10, 1993, Secretary of State Warren Christopher announced that under President Clinton, the United States would try to convince the Serbs, Muslims, and Croats to pursue a diplomatic solution and that if an agreement was reached, U.S. forces, including ground forces, would help enforce the peace. On February 28, 1993, the United States began an airdrop of relief supplies aimed at civilian populations, mainly Muslims, surrounded by fighting in Bosnia. On March 31, 1993, the U.N. Security Council authorized member states to take all necessary measures to enforce the ban on military flights over Bosnia, the "no-fly zone." NATO planes, including U.S. planes, began patrolling over Bosnia and Herzegovina on April 12, 1993, to enforce the Security Council ban, and the next day, President Clinton reported the U.S. participation "consistent with Section 4 of the War Powers Resolution." Conflict continued, but the situation was complicated and opinion in Congress and among U.N. and NATO members was divided. President Clinton consulted with about two dozen congressional leaders on potential further action on April 27 and received a wide range of views. On May 2, the Administration began consultation with allies to build support for additional military action to enforce a cease-fire and Bosnian Serb compliance with a peace agreement, but a consensus on action was not reached. On June 10, 1993, Secretary of State Christopher announced the United States would send 300 U.S. troops to join 700 Scandinavians in the U.N. peacekeeping force in Macedonia. The mission was established under U.N. Security Council Resolution 795 (1992), which sought to prevent the war in Bosnia from spilling over to neighboring countries. President Clinton reported this action "consistent with Section 4 of the War Powers Resolution" on July 9, 1993. He identified U.S. troops as part of a peacekeeping force, and directed in accordance with Section 7 of the U.N. Participation Act. Planning for U.N. and NATO action to implement a prospective peace agreement included the possibility that the United States might supply 25,000 out of 50,000 NATO forces to enforce U.N. decisions. This possibility brought proposals to require congressional approval before the dispatch of further forces to Bosnia. On September 23, 1993, Senate Minority Leader Robert Dole said he intended to offer an amendment stating that no additional U.S. forces should be introduced into former Yugoslavia without advance approval from Congress. Assistant Secretary of State Stephen Oxman said on October 5 that the Clinton Administration would consult with Congress and not commit American troops to the implementation operation for a peace agreement without congressional support, and that the Administration would act consistent with the War Powers Resolution. Congress sought to assure this in Section 8146 of P.L. 103-139 , the Defense Appropriations Act for FY1994, stating the sense of Congress that funds should not be available for U.S. forces to participate in new missions or operations to implement the peace settlement in Bosnia unless previously authorized by Congress. This provision was sponsored by the Senate by leaders Mitchell and Dole. At the NATO summit conference in Brussels on January 11, 1994, leaders, including President Clinton, repeated an August threat to undertake air strikes on Serb positions to save Sarajevo and to consider other steps to end the conflict in Bosnia. On February 17, 1994, President Clinton reported "consistent with" the War Powers Resolution that the United States had expanded its participation in United Nations and NATO efforts to reach a peaceful solution in former Yugoslavia and that 60 U.S. aircraft were available for participation in the authorized NATO missions. On March 1, 1994, he reported that on the previous day U.S. planes patrolling the "no-fly zone" under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) shot down 4 Serbian Galeb planes. On April 12, 1994, the President reported that on April 10 and 11, following shelling of Gorazde, one of the "safe areas," and a decision by U.N. and NATO leaders, U.S. planes bombed Bosnian Serbian nationalist positions around Gorazde. On August 22, 1994, President Clinton similarly reported that on August 5, U.S. planes under NATO had strafed a Bosnian Serb gun position in an exclusion zone. On September 22, 1994, two British and one U.S. aircraft bombed a Serbian tank in retaliation for Serb attacks on U.N. peacekeepers near Sarajevo; and on November 21 more than 30 planes from the United States, Britain, France, and the Netherlands bombed the runway of a Serb airfield in Croatia. As the conflict in Bosnia continued, leaders in Congress called for greater congressional involvement in decisions. Senator Dole introduced S. 2042 , calling for the United States to end unilaterally its arms embargo, conducted in accordance with a U.N. Security Council Resolution, against Bosnia and Herzegovina. On May 10, 1994, Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell introduced an amendment to authorize and approve the President's decision to carry out NATO decisions to support and protect UNPROFOR forces around designated safe areas; to use airpower in the Sarajevo region; and to authorize air strikes against Serb weapons around certain safe areas if these areas were attacked. The Mitchell amendment favored lifting the arms embargo but not unilaterally; it also stated no U.S. ground combat troops should be deployed in Bosnia unless previously authorized by Congress. The Senate adopted both the Dole proposal, as an amendment, and the Mitchell amendment on May 12, 1994, by votes of 50-49. The less stringent Mitchell amendment passed on a straight party line vote. Yet thirteen Democrats voted for the Dole amendment, indicating a sentiment in both parties to assist the Bosnians in defending themselves. The Senate then adopted S. 2042 as amended. The House did not act on the measure. The Defense Authorization Act for FY1995 ( P.L. 103-337 , signed October 5, 1994) provided, in Section 1404, the sense of the Congress that if the Bosnian Serbs did not accept the Contact Group proposal by October 15, 1994, the President should introduce a U.N. Security Council resolution to end the arms embargo by December 1, 1994; if the Security Council had not acted by November 15, 1994, no funds could be used to enforce the embargo other than those required of all U.N. members under Security Council Resolution 713. That sequence of events occurred and the United States stopped enforcing the embargo. In addition, Section 8100 of the Defense Appropriations Act, FY1995 ( P.L. 103-335 , signed September 30, 1994), stated the sense of the Congress that funds made available by this law should not be available for the purposes of deploying U.S. Armed Forces to participate in implementation of a peace settlement in Bosnia unless previously authorized by Congress. On May 24, 1995, President Clinton reported "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that U.S. combat-equipped fighter aircraft and other aircraft continued to contribute to NATO's enforcement of the no-fly zone in airspace over Bosnia-Herzegovina. U.S. aircraft, he noted, are also available for close air support of U.N. forces in Croatia. Roughly 500 U.S. soldiers were still deployed in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as part of the U.N. Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP). U.S. forces continue to support U.N. refugee and embargo operations in this region. On September 1, 1995, President Clinton reported "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that "U.S. combat and support aircraft" had been used beginning on August 29, 1995, in a series of NATO air strikes against Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina that were threatening the U.N.-declared safe areas of Sarajevo, Tuzla, and Gorazde." He noted that during the first day of operations, "some 300 sorties were flown against 23 targets in the vicinity of Sarajevo, Tuzla, Gorazde, and Mostar." On September 7, 1995, the House passed an amendment to the FY1996 Department of Defense Appropriations Bill ( H.R. 2126 ), offered by Representative Mark Neumann that prohibited the obligation or expenditure of funds provided by the bill for any operations beyond those already undertaken. However, in conference the provision was softened to a sense-of-the-Congress provision that said that President must consult with Congress before deploying U.S. forces to Bosnia. The conference report was rejected by the House over issues unrelated to Bosnia on September 29, 1995, by a vote of 151-267. The substitute conference report on H.R. 2126 , which was subsequently passed and signed into law, did not include language on Bosnia, in part due to the President's earlier objections to any provision in the bill that might impinge on his powers as Commander in Chief. On September 29, the Senate passed by a vote of 94-2 a sense-of-the-Senate amendment to H.R. 2076 , the FY1996 State, Commerce, Justice Appropriations bill, sponsored by Senator Judd Gregg that said no funds in the bill should be used for the deployment of U.S. combat troops to Bosnia-Herzegovina unless Congress approves the deployment in advance or to evacuate endangered U.N. peacekeepers. The conference report on H.R. 2076 , agreed to by the House and the Senate, included the "sense of the Senate" language of the Gregg amendment. In response to mounting criticism of the Administration's approach to Bosnian policy, on October 17-18, 1995, Secretary of State Christopher, Secretary of Defense Perry and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Shalikashvili testified before House and Senate Committees on Bosnia policy and the prospect of President Clinton deploying approximately 20,000 American ground forces as part of a NATO peacekeeping operation. During testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on October 17, Secretary Christopher stated that the President would not be bound by a resolution of the Congress prohibiting sending of U.S. forces into Bosnia without the express prior approval of Congress. Nevertheless, on October 19, 1995, President Clinton in a letter to Senator Robert C. Byrd stated that "[w]hile maintaining the constitutional authorities of the Presidency, I would welcome, encourage and, at the appropriate time, request an expression of support by the Congress" for the commitment of U.S. troops to a NATO implementation force in Bosnia, after a peace agreement is reached. Subsequently, on October 30, 1995, the House, by a vote of 315-103, passed H.Res. 247 , expressing the sense of the House that "no United States Armed forces should be deployed on the ground in the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to enforce a peace agreement until the Congress has approved such a deployment." On November 13, President Clinton's 9-page letter to Speaker Gingrich stated he would send a request "for a congressional expression of support for U.S. participation in a NATO-led Implementation Force in Bosnia ... before American forces are deployed in Bosnia." The President said there would be a "timely opportunity for Congress to consider and act upon" his request for support. He added that despite his desire for congressional support, he "must reserve" his "constitutional prerogatives in this area." On November 17, 1995, the House passed (243-171) H.R. 2606 , which would "prohibit the use of funds appropriated or otherwise available" to the Defense Department from "being used for the deployment on the ground of United States Armed Forces in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina as part of any peacekeeping operation or as part of any implementation force, unless funds for such deployment are specifically appropriated" by law. On December 4, 1995, Secretary of Defense Perry announced the deployment of about 1,400 U.S. military personnel (700 to Bosnia/700 to Croatia) as part of the advance elements of the roughly 60,000 person NATO Implementation Force in Bosnia, scheduled to deploy in force once the Dayton Peace Agreement is signed in Paris on December 14, 1995. Secretary Perry noted that once the NATO I-Force was fully deployed, about 20,000 U.S. military personnel would be in Bosnia, and about 5,000 in Croatia. On December 6, 1995, President Clinton notified the Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that he had "ordered the deployment of approximately 1,500 U.S. military personnel to Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia as part of a NATO 'enabling force' to lay the groundwork for the prompt and safe deployment of the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR)," which would be used to implement the Bosnian peace agreement after its signing. The President also noted that he had authorized deployment of roughly 3,000 other U.S. military personnel to Hungary, Italy, and Croatia to establish infrastructure for the enabling force and the IFOR. In response to these developments, Congress addressed the question of U.S. ground troop deployments in Bosnia. Lawmakers sought to take action before the final Bosnian peace agreement was signed in Paris on December 14, 1995, following which the bulk of American military forces would be deployed to Bosnia. On December 13, 1995, the House considered H.R. 2770 , sponsored by Representative Dornan, which would have prohibited the use of federal funds for the deployment "on the ground" of U.S. Armed Forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina "as part of any peacekeeping operation, or as part of any implementation force." H.R. 2770 was defeated in the House by a vote of 210-218. On December 13, the House considered two other measures. It approved H.Res. 302 , offered by Representative Buyer, by a vote of 287-141. H.Res. 302 , a nonbinding measure, reiterated "serious concerns and opposition" to the deployment of U.S. ground troops to Bosnia, while expressing confidence, "pride and admiration" for U.S. soldiers deployed there. It called on the President and Defense Secretary to rely on the judgement of the U.S. ground commander in Bosnia and stated that he should be provided with sufficient resources to ensure the safety and well-being of U.S. troops. H.Res. 302 , further stated that the U.S. government should "in all respects" be "impartial and evenhanded" with all parties to the Bosnian conflict "as necessary to ensure the safety and protection" of American forces in the region. Subsequently, the House defeated H.Res. 306 , proposed by Representative Hamilton, by a vote of 190-237. H.Res. 306 stated that the House "unequivocally supports the men and women of the United States Armed Forces who are carrying out their mission in support of peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina with professional excellence, dedicated patriotism and exemplary bravery." On December 13, the Senate also considered three measures related to Bosnia and U.S. troop deployments. The Senate defeated H.R. 2606 by a vote of 22-77. This bill would have prohibited funds to be obligated or expended for U.S. participation in peacekeeping in Bosnia unless such funds were specifically appropriated for that purpose. The Senate also defeated S.Con.Res. 35 , a nonbinding resolution of Senators Hutchison and Inhofe. This resolution stated that "Congress opposes President Clinton's decision to deploy" U.S. troops to Bosnia, but noted that "Congress strongly supports" the U.S. troops sent by the President to Bosnia. The Senate did pass S.J.Res. 44 , sponsored by Senators Dole and McCain, by a vote of 69-30. This resolution stated that Congress "unequivocally supports the men and women of our Armed Forces" who were to be deployed to Bosnia. S.J.Res. 44 stated that "notwithstanding reservations expressed about President Clinton's decision" to deploy U.S. forces, "the President may only fulfill his commitment" to deploy them to Bosnia "for approximately one year" if he made a determination to Congress that the mission of the NATO peace implementation force (IFOR) will be limited to implementing the military annex to the Bosnian peace agreement and to protecting itself. The presidential determination must also state that the United States will "lead an immediate international effort," separate from IFOR, "to provide equipment, arms, training and related logistics assistance of the highest possible quality" to the Muslim-Croat Federation so that it may provide for its own defense. The President could use "existing military drawdown authorities and requesting such additional authority as may be necessary." S.J.Res. 44 also required President Clinton to submit to Congress a detailed report on the armament effort within 30 days, and required regular presidential reports to Congress on the implementation of both the military and nonmilitary aspects of the peace accords. The House and Senate did not appoint and direct conferees to meet to reconcile the conflicting elements of the Bosnia related measures each had passed on December 13, 1995. A number of Members and Senators had wished to express their views on the troop deployment before the Dayton Accords were formally signed in Paris. That action had occurred, and the leadership of both parties apparently believed nothing further would be achieved by a conference on the measures passed. As result, no final consensus on a single specific measure was reached on the issue by the two chambers. The President meanwhile continued with the Bosnian deployment. On December 21, 1995, President Clinton notified Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that he had ordered the deployment of approximately 20,000 U.S. military personnel to participate in the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and approximately 5,000 U.S. military personnel would be deployed in other former Yugoslav states, primarily in Croatia. In addition, about 7,000 U.S. support forces would be deployed to Hungary, Italy, Croatia, and other regional states in support of IFOR's mission. The President ordered participation of U.S. forces "pursuant to" his "constitutional authority to conduct the foreign relations of the United States and as Commander-in-Chief and Chief Executive." Subsequently, President Clinton in December 1996, agreed to provide up to 8,500 ground troops to participate in a NATO-led follow-on force in Bosnia termed the Stabilization Force (SFOR). On March 18, 1998, the House defeated by a vote of 193-225, H.Con.Res. 227 , a resolution of Representative Tom Campbell, directing the President, pursuant to Section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution to remove United States Armed Forces from the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina ( H.Rept. 105-442 ). Kosovo The issue of presidential authority to deploy forces in the absence of congressional authorization, under the War Powers Resolution, or otherwise, became an issue of renewed controversy in late March 1999 when President Clinton ordered U.S. military forces to participate in a NATO-led military operation in Kosovo. This action was the focus of a major policy debate over the purpose and scope of U.S. military involvement in Kosovo. The President's action to commit forces to the NATO Kosovo operation also led to a suit in federal District Court for the District of Columbia by Members of Congress seeking a judicial finding that the President was violating the War Powers Resolution and the Constitution by using military forces in Yugoslavia in the absence of authorization from the Congress. The Kosovo controversy began in earnest when on March 26, 1999, President Clinton notified Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that on March 24, 1999, U.S. military forces, at his direction and in coalition with NATO allies, had commenced air strikes against Yugoslavia in response to the Yugoslav government's campaign of violence and repression against the ethnic Albanian population in Kosovo. Prior to the President's action, the Senate, on March 23, 1999, had passed, by a vote of 58-41, S.Con.Res. 21 , a nonbinding resolution expressing the sense of the Congress that the President was authorized to conduct "military air operations and missile strikes in cooperation with our NATO allies against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)." Subsequently, the House voted on a number of measures relating to U.S. participation in the NATO operation in Kosovo. On April 28, 1999, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 1569 , by a vote of 249-180. This bill would prohibit the use of funds appropriated to the Defense Department from being used for the deployment of "ground elements" of the U.S. Armed Forces in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia unless that deployment is specifically authorized by law. On that same day the House defeated H.Con.Res. 82 , by a vote of 139-290. This resolution would have directed the President, pursuant to Section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution, to remove U.S. Armed Forces from their positions in connection with the present operations against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. On April 28, 1999, the House also defeated H.J.Res. 44 , by a vote of 2-427. This joint resolution would have declared a state of war between the United States and the "Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia." The House on that same day also defeated, on a 213-213 tie vote, S.Con.Res. 21 , the Senate resolution passed on March 23, 1999, that supported military air operations and missile strikes against Yugoslavia. On April 30, 1999, Representative Tom Campbell and 17 other members of the House filed suit in federal District Court for the District of Columbia seeking a ruling requiring the President to obtain authorization from Congress before continuing the air war, or taking other military action against Yugoslavia. The Senate, on May 4, 1999, by a vote of 78-22, tabled S.J.Res. 20 , a joint resolution, sponsored by Senator John McCain, that would authorize the President "to use all necessary force and other means, in concert with United States allies, to accomplish United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization objectives in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)." The House, meanwhile, on May 6, 1999, by a vote of 117-301, defeated an amendment by Representative Ernest Istook to H.R. 1664 , the FY1999 defense supplemental appropriations bill, that would have prohibited the expenditure of funds in the bill to implement any plan to use U.S. ground forces to invade Yugoslavia, except in time of war. Congress, meanwhile, on May 20, 1999, cleared for the President's signature, H.R. 1141 , an emergency supplemental appropriations bill for FY1999, that provided billions in funding for the existing U.S. Kosovo operation. The Senate tabled two other amendments that would have restricted military operations by President Clinton in Kosovo. On May 24, 1999, it tabled, by a vote of 52-48, an amendment offered by Senator Arlen Specter to state that no funds available to the Defense Department may be obligated or expended for the deployment of U.S. ground troops to Yugoslavia unless authorized by a declaration of war or a joint resolution authorizing the use of military force. The Specter amendment did not apply to certain actions, such as rescuing U.S. military personnel or citizens. On May 26, 1999, the Senate tabled an amendment, by a vote of 77-21, offered by Senator Bob Smith to prohibit, effective October 1, 1999, the use of funds for military operations in Yugoslavia unless Congress enacted specific authorization in law for the conduct of these operations. On May 25, 1999, the 60 th day had passed since the President notified Congress of his actions regarding U.S. participation in military operations in Kosovo. Representative Campbell, and those who joined his suit, noted to the federal Court that this was a clear violation of the language of the War Powers Resolution stipulating a withdrawal of U.S. forces from the area of hostilities after 60 days in the absence of congressional authorization to continue, or a presidential request to Congress for an extra 30 day period to safely withdraw. The President did not seek such a 30 day extension, noting instead his view that the War Powers Resolution is constitutionally defective. On June 8, 1999, Federal District Judge Paul L. Friedman dismissed the suit of Representative Campbell and others that sought to have the court rule that President Clinton was in violation of the War Powers Resolution and the Constitution by conducting military activities in Yugoslavia without having received prior authorization from Congress. The judge ruled that Representative Campbell and the other congressional plaintiffs lacked legal standing to bring the suit. On June 24, 1999, Representative Campbell appealed the ruling to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. The appeals court subsequently agreed to hear the case on an expedited basis before Judges Silberman, Randolph, and Tatel. On February 18, 2000, the appeals court affirmed the opinion of the District Court that Representative Campbell and his co-plaintiffs lacked standing to sue the President. On May 18, 2000, Representative Campbell and 30 other Members of Congress appealed this decision to the United States Supreme Court. On October 2, 2000, the United States Supreme Court, without comment, refused to hear the appeal of Representative Campbell, thereby letting stand the holding of the U.S. Court of Appeals. While Representative Campbell's litigation was continuing, Yugoslavia, on June 10, 1999, agreed to NATO conditions for a cease-fire and withdrawal of Yugoslav military and paramilitary personnel from Kosovo, and the creation of a peacekeeping force (KFOR) which had the sanction of the United Nations. Further, on June 10, 1999, the House of Representatives defeated, by a vote of 328-97, an amendment to H.R. 1401 , the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2000-FY2001, that would have prohibited the use of any Defense Department funding in FY2000 for "military operations in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia." On that same day, the House approved, by a vote of 270-155, an amendment that deleted, from the House reported version of H.R. 1401 , language that would have prohibited any funding for "combat or peacekeeping operations" in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. On June 12, 1999, President Clinton announced and reported to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that he had directed the deployment of about "7,000 U.S. military personnel as the U.S. contribution to the approximately 50,000-member, NATO-led security force (KFOR)" being assembled in Kosovo. He also noted that about "1,500 U.S. military personnel, under separate U.S. command and control, will deploy to other countries in the region, as our national support element, in support of KFOR." Thus, by the summer of 1999, the President had been able to proceed with his policy of intervention in the Kosovo crisis under the aegis of NATO, the Congress had not achieved any position of consensus on what actions were appropriate in Yugoslavia, and a U.S. District Court had dismissed a congressional lawsuit (a position subsequently affirmed the following year by the Appeals Court, and the U.S. Supreme Court) attempting to stop presidential military action in Yugoslavia in the absence of prior congressional authorization under the War Powers Resolution. Haiti: Can the President Order Enforcement of a U.N. Embargo? On July 3, 1993, Haitian military leader Raoul Cedras and deposed President Jean-Bertrand Aristide signed an agreement providing for the restoration of President Aristide on October 30. The United Nations and the Organization of American States took responsibility for verifying compliance. In conjunction with the agreement, President Clinton offered to send 350 troops and military engineers to Haiti to help retrain the Haitian armed forces and work on construction projects. A first group of American and Canadian troops arrived on October 6. When additional U.S. forces arrived on October 11, a group of armed civilians appeared intent upon resisting their landing, and on October 12 defense officials ordered the ship carrying them, the U.S.S. Harlan County , to leave Haitian waters. Because the Haitian authorities were not complying with the agreement, on October 13 the U.N. Security Council voted to restore sanctions against Haiti. On October 20, President Clinton reported "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that U.S. ships had begun to enforce the U.N. embargo. Some Members of Congress complained that Congress had not been consulted on or authorized the action. On October 18, Senator Dole said he would offer an amendment to the Defense Appropriations bill ( H.R. 3116 ) which would require congressional authorization for all deployments into Haitian waters and airspace unless the President made specified certifications. Congressional leaders and Administration officials negotiated on the terms of the amendment. As enacted, Section 8147 of P.L. 103-139 stated the sense of Congress that funds should not be obligated or expended for U.S. military operations in Haiti unless the operations were (1) authorized in advance by Congress, (2) necessary to protect or evacuate U.S. citizens, (3) vital to the national security of the United States and there was not sufficient time to receive congressional authorization, or (4) the President reported in advance that the intended deployment met certain criteria. Enforcement of the embargo intensified. On April 20, 1994, President Clinton further reported "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that U.S. naval forces had continued enforcement in the waters around Haiti and that 712 vessels had been boarded. On May 6, 1994, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 917 calling for measures to tighten the embargo. On June 10, 1994, President Clinton announced steps being taken to intensify the pressure on Haiti's military leaders that included assisting the Dominican Republic to seal its border with Haiti, using U.S. naval patrol boats to detain ships suspected of violating the sanctions, a ban on commercial air traffic, and sanctions on financial transactions. As conditions in Haiti worsened, President Clinton stated he would not rule out the use of force, and gradually this option appeared more certain. Many Members continued to contend congressional authorization was necessary for any invasion of Haiti. On May 24, 1994, the House adopted the Goss amendment to the Defense Authorization bill ( H.R. 4301 ) by a vote of 223-201. The amendment expressed the sense of Congress that the United States should not undertake any military action against the mainland of Haiti unless the President first certified to Congress that clear and present danger to U.S. citizens or interests required such action. Subsequently, on June 9 the House voted on the Goss amendment again. This time the House reversed itself and rejected the amendment by a vote of 195-226. On June 27, a point of order was sustained against an amendment to the State Department appropriations bill that sought to prohibit use of funds for any U.N. peacekeeping operation related to Haiti. On June 29, 1994, the Senate in action on H.R. 4226 repassed a provision identical to Section 8147 of P.L. 103-139 but rejected a measure making advance congressional authorization a binding requirement. On August 5 it tabled (rejected) by a vote of 31 to 63 an amendment to H.R. 4606 by Senator Specter prohibiting the President from using U.S. Armed Forces to depose the military leadership unless authorized in advance by Congress, necessary to protect U.S. citizens, or vital to U.S. interests. President Clinton sought and obtained U.N. Security Council authorization for an invasion. On July 31, the U.N. Security Council authorized a multinational force to use "all necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military leadership ... on the understanding that the cost of implementing this temporary operation will be borne by the participating Member States" (Resolution 940, 1994). On August 3, the Senate adopted an amendment to the Department of Veterans Affairs appropriation, H.R. 4624 , by a vote of 100-0 expressing its sense that the Security Council Resolution did not constitute authorization for the deployment of U.S. forces in Haiti under the Constitution or the War Powers Resolution. The amendment, however, was rejected in conference. President Clinton said the same day that he would welcome the support of Congress but did not agree that he was constitutionally mandated to obtain it. Some Members introduced resolutions, such as H.Con.Res. 276 , calling for congressional authorization prior to the invasion. On September 15, 1994, in an address to the Nation, President Clinton said he had called up the military reserve and ordered two aircraft carriers into the region. His message to the military dictators was to leave now or the United States would force them from power. The first phase of military action would remove the dictators from power and restore Haiti's democratically elected government. The second phase would involve a much smaller force joining with forces from other U.N. members which would leave Haiti after 1995 elections were held and a new government installed. While the Defense Department continued to prepare for an invasion within days, on September 16 President Clinton sent to Haiti a negotiating team of former President Jimmy Carter, former Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Colin Powell, and Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn. Again addressing the Nation on September 18, President Clinton announced that the military leaders had agreed to step down by October 15, and agreed to the immediate introduction of troops, beginning September 19, from the 15,000 member international coalition. He said the agreement was only possible because of the credible and imminent threat of multinational force. He emphasized the mission still had risks and there remained possibilities of violence directed at U.S. troops, but the agreement minimized those risks. He also said that under U.N. Security Council resolution 940, a 25-nation international coalition would soon go to Haiti to begin the task of restoring democratic government. Also on September 18, President Clinton reported to Congress on the objectives in accordance with the sense expressed in Section 8147 (c) of P.L. 103-139 , the FY1994 Defense Appropriations Act. U.S. forces entered Haiti on September 1994. On September 21, President Clinton reported "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" the deployment of 1,500 troops, to be increased by several thousand. (At the peak in September there were about 21,000 U.S. forces in Haiti.) He said the U.S. presence would not be open-ended but would be replaced after a period of months by a U.N. peacekeeping force, although some U.S. forces would participate in and be present for the duration of the U.N. mission. The forces were involved in the first hostilities on September 24 when U.S. Marines killed 10 armed Haitian resisters in a fire-fight. On September 19, the House agreed to H.Con.Res. 290 commending the President and the special delegation to Haiti, and supporting the prompt and orderly withdrawal of U.S. forces from Haiti as soon as possible; on September 19, the Senate agreed to a similar measure, S.Res. 259 . On October 3, 1994, the House Foreign Affairs Committee reported H.J.Res. 416 authorizing the forces in Haiti until March 1, 1995, and providing procedures for a joint resolution to withdraw the forces. In House debate on October 6 the House voted against the original contents and for the Dellums substitute. As passed, H.J.Res. 416 stated the sense that the President should have sought congressional approval before deploying U.S. forces to Haiti, supporting a prompt and orderly withdrawal as soon as possible, and requiring a monthly report on Haiti as well as other reports. This same language was also adopted by the Senate on October 6 as S.J.Res. 229 , and on October 7 the House passed S.J.Res. 229 . President Clinton signed S.J.Res. 229 on October 25, 1994 ( P.L. 103-423 ). After U.S. forces began to disarm Haitian military and paramilitary forces and President Aristide returned on October 15, 1994, the United States began to withdraw some forces. On March 31, 1995, U.N. peacekeeping forces assumed responsibility for missions previously conducted by U.S. military forces in Haiti. By September 21, 1995, President Clinton reported the United States had 2,400 military personnel in Haiti as participants in the U.N. Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), and 260 U.S. military personnel assigned to the U.S. Support Group Haiti. On February 29, 1996, the U.S. Commander of the UNMIH was replaced and U.S. forces ceased to conduct security operations in Haiti, except for self-defense. The majority of the 1,907 U.S. military personnel in Haiti were withdrawn by mid-March 1996, and the remainder, who stayed to arrange the dismantlement and repatriation of equipment, were withdrawn in mid-April 1996. After that, a U.S. support unit of 300 to 500 troops, made up primarily of engineers, remained in Haiti carrying out public works such as building bridges, repairing schools, and digging wells. In December 1997, President Clinton ordered the Dept. of Defense to maintain hundreds of U.S. troops in Haiti indefinitely. In September 1999, however, the 106 th Congress passed the FY2000 DOD authorization bill ( P.L. 106-65 ) that prohibited DOD funding to maintain a continuous U.S. military presence in Haiti beyond May 31, 2000. The troops were withdrawn by the end of January 2000. According to the conference report accompanying the FY2000 DOD authorization bill ( H.Rept. 106-301 ), the President is not prohibited from engaging in periodic theater engagement activities in Haiti. Terrorist Attacks against the United States (World Trade Center and the Pentagon) 2001: How Does the War Powers Resolution Apply? On September 11, 2001, terrorists hijacked four U.S. commercial airliners, crashing two into the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York City, and another into the Pentagon building in Arlington, VA. The fourth plane crashed in Shanksville, PA, near Pittsburgh, after passengers struggled with the highjackers for control of the aircraft. The death toll from these incidents was more than three thousand, making the attacks the most devastating of their kind in United States history. President George W. Bush characterized these attacks as more than acts of terror. "They were acts of war," he said. He added that "freedom and democracy are under attack," and he asserted that the United States would use "all of our resources to conquer this enemy." In the days immediately after the September 11 attacks, the President consulted with the leaders of Congress on appropriate steps to take to deal with the situation confronting the United States. One of the things that emerged from discussions with the White House and congressional leaders was the concept of a joint resolution of the Congress authorizing the President to take military steps to deal with the parties responsible for the attacks on the United States. Between September 13 and 14, draft language of such a resolution was discussed and negotiated by the President's representatives and the House and Senate leadership of both parties. Other members of both Houses suggested language for consideration. On Friday, September 14, 2001, the text of a joint resolution was introduced. It was first considered and passed by the Senate in the morning of September 14, as Senate Joint Resolution 23, by a vote of 98-0. The House of Representatives passed it later that evening, by a vote of 420-1, after tabling an identical resolution, H.J.Res. 64 , and rejecting a motion to recommit by Representative John Tierney that would have had the effect, if passed and enacted, of requiring a report from the President on his actions under the resolution every 60 days. Senate Joint Resolution 23, titled the "Authorization for Use of Military Force," passed by Congress on September 14, 2001, was signed into law on September 18, 2001. The joint resolution authorizes the President to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons. The joint resolution further states that Congress declares that this resolution is intended to "constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution." Finally, the joint resolution also states that "[n]othing in this resolution supercedes any requirement of the War Powers Resolution." A notable feature of S.J.Res. 23 is that unlike all other major legislation authorizing the use of military force by the President, this joint resolution authorizes military force against "organizations and persons" linked to the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States. Past authorizations of the use of force have permitted action against unnamed nations in specific regions of the world or against named individual nations. This authorization of military action against "organizations or persons" is unprecedented in American history, with the scope of its reach yet to be determined. The authorization of use of force against unnamed nations is more consistent with some previous instances where authority was given to act against unnamed states as appropriate when they became aggressors or took military action against the United States or its citizens. President George W. Bush in signing S.J.Res. on September 18, 2001, noted the Congress had acted "wisely, decisively, and in the finest traditions of our country." He thanked the "leadership of both Houses for their role in expeditiously passing this historic joint resolution." He noted that he had had the "benefit of meaningful consultations with members of the Congress" since the September 11 attacks and that he would "continue to consult closely with them as our Nation responds to this threat to our peace and security." President Bush also asserted that S.J.Res. 23 "recognized the authority of the President under the Constitution to take action to deter and prevent acts of terrorism against the United States." He also stated: "In signing this resolution, I maintain the longstanding position of the executive branch regarding the President's constitutional authority to use force, including the Armed Forces of the United States and regarding the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution." Prior to its enactment, there was concern among some in Congress that the President might not adhere to the reporting requirements of the War Powers Resolution when he exercised the authority provided in S.J.Res. 23 . There appeared to be general agreement that the President had committed himself to consult with Congress on matters related to his military actions against terrorists and those associated with the attacks on the United States on September 11. On September 24, 2001, President Bush reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," and "Senate Joint Resolution 23" that in response to terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon he had ordered the "deployment of various combat-equipped and combat support forces to a number of foreign nations in the Central and Pacific Command areas of operations." The President noted that as part of efforts to "prevent and deter terrorism" he might find it necessary to order additional forces into these and other areas of the world...." He stated that he could not now predict "the scope and duration of these deployments," nor the "actions necessary to counter the terrorist threat to the United States." Subsequently, on October 9, 2001, President George W. Bush reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," and "Senate Joint Resolution 23" that on October 7, 2001, U.S. Armed Forces "began combat action in Afghanistan against Al Qaida terrorists and their Taliban supporters." The President stated that he had directed this military action in response to the September 11, 2001, attacks on U.S. "territory, our citizens, and our way of life, and to the continuing threat of terrorist acts against the United States and our friends and allies." This military action was "part of our campaign against terrorism" and was "designed to disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations." Thus, in light of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against United States territory and citizens, the President and Congress, after consultations, agreed to a course of legislative action that did not invoke the War Powers Resolution itself, but substituted a specific authorization measure, S.J.Res. 23 . Pursuit of such an action is contemplated by the language of the War Powers Resolution itself. As of the end of October 2001, President Bush had chosen to state in his reports to Congress that the military actions he had taken relating to the terrorists attacks were "consistent with" both the War Powers Resolution and Senate Joint Resolution 23. His actions follow the practice of his White House predecessors in not formally citing the language of the War Powers Resolution in Section 4(a)(1) that would trigger a military forces withdrawal timetable. Congress for its part in S.J.Res. 23 stated that this legislation constituted "specific statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution." It also noted that "nothing" in S.J.Res. 23 "supercedes any requirement of the War Powers Resolution." The President and Congress, in sum, maintained their respective positions on the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution and the responsibilities of the President under it, while finding a legislative vehicle around which both branches could unite to support the President's response to the terrorist attacks on the United States. Use of Force Against Iraq Resolution 2002: A Classic Application of the War Powers Resolution? In summer 2002, the Bush Administration made public its views regarding what it deemed a significant threat to U.S. interests and security posed by the prospect that Iraq had or was acquiring weapons of mass destruction. Senior members of the Bush Administration cited a number of violations of U.N. Security Council resolutions by Iraq regarding the obligation imposed at the end of the Gulf War in 1991 to end its chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs. On September 4, 2002, President George W. Bush met with leaders from both Houses and parties at the White House. At that meeting the President stated that he would seek congressional support, in the near future, for action deemed necessary to deal with the threat posed to the United States by the regime of Saddam Hussein of Iraq. The President also indicated that he would speak to the United Nations shortly and set out his concerns about Iraq. On September 12, 2002, President Bush addressed the U.N. General Assembly and set out the history of Iraqi misdeeds over the last two decades and the numerous times that Iraq had not fulfilled its commitments to comply with various U.N. Security Council resolutions, including disarmament, since the Gulf War of 1991. He stated that the United States would work with the U.N. Security Council to deal with Iraq's challenge. However, he emphasized that if Iraq refused to fulfill its obligations to comply with U.N. Security Council resolutions, the United States would see that those resolutions were enforced. Subsequently, on September 19, 2002, the White House sent a "draft" joint resolution to House Speaker Dennis Hastert, House Minority Leader Richard Gephardt, Senate Majority Leader Thomas Daschle and Senate Minority Leader Trent Lott. This draft would have authorized the President to use military force not only against Iraq but "to restore international peace and security in the region." Subsequently introduced as S.J.Res. 45 on September 26, it served as the basis for an extensive debate over the desirability, necessity, and scope of a new congressional authorization for the use of force. The Senate used this bill as the focus for a debate which began, after cloture was invoked, on October 3. The Senate debate continued from October 4 until October 11, 2002, and involved consideration of numerous amendments to the measure. In the end the Senate adopted H.J.Res. 114 in lieu of S.J.Res. 45 . The draft measure was not formally introduced in the House. Instead, the vehicle for House consideration of the issue was H.J.Res. 114 . Cosponsored by Speaker Hastert and Minority Leader Gephardt and introduced on October 2, 2002, H.J.Res. 114 embodied modifications to the White House draft that were agreeable to the White House, most House and Senate Republicans, and the House Democratic leader. The House International Relations Committee reported out a slightly amended version of the joint resolution on October 7, 2002 ( H.R. 721 ). The House adopted the rule governing debate on the joint resolution ( H.R. 474 ) on October 8, 2002; and debated the measure until October 10, when it passed H.J.Res. 114 by a vote of 296-133. Subsequently, the Senate passed the House version of H.J.Res. 114 on October 11 by a vote of 77-23, and President Bush signed the "Authorization for Use of Military Force against Iraq Resolution of 2002" into law on October 16, 2002. In signing H.J.Res. 114 into law, President Bush noted that by passing this legislation Congress had demonstrated that "the United States speaks with one voice on the threat to international peace and security posed by Iraq." He added that the legislation carried an important message that "Iraq will either comply with all U.N. resolutions, rid itself of weapons of mass destruction, and ... its support for terrorists, or will be compelled to do so." While the President noted he had sought a "resolution of support" from Congress to use force against Iraq, and appreciated receiving that support, he also stated that my request for it did not, and my signing this resolution does not, constitute any change in the long-standing positions of the executive branch on either the President's constitutional authority to use force to deter, prevent, or respond to aggression or other threats to U.S. interests or on the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution. The President went on to state that on the "important question of the threat posed by Iraq," his views and goals and those of Congress were the same. He further observed that he had extensive consultations with Congress in the past months, and that he looked forward to "continuing close consultation in the months ahead." He stated his intent to submit written reports to Congress every 60 days on matters "relevant to this resolution." The central element of P.L. 107-243 is the authorization for the President to use the armed forces of the United States as he determines to be necessary and appropriate in order to (1) defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and (2) enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq. As predicates for the use of force, the statute requires the President to communicate to Congress his determination that the use of diplomatic and other peaceful means will not "adequately protect the United States ... or ... lead to enforcement of all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions" and that the use of force is "consistent" with the battle against terrorism. Like P.L. 102-1 and P.L. 107-40 , the statute declares that it is "intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution." It also requires the President to make periodic reports to Congress "on matters relevant to this joint resolution." Finally, the statute expresses Congress' "support" for the efforts of the President to obtain "prompt and decisive action by the Security Council" to enforce Iraq's compliance with all relevant Security Council resolutions. http://www.congress.gov/cgi-lis/bdquery/R?d107:FLD002:@1(107+243) P.L. 107-243 clearly confers broad authority on the President to use force. In contrast to P.L. 102-1 , the authority granted is not limited to the implementation of previously adopted Security Council resolutions concerning Iraq but includes "all relevant ... resolutions." Thus, it appears to incorporate resolutions concerning Iraq that may be adopted by the Security Council in the future as well as those already adopted. The authority also appears to extend beyond compelling Iraq's disarmament to implementing the full range of concerns expressed in those resolutions. Unlike P.L. 107-40 , the President's exercise of the authority granted is not dependent upon a finding that Iraq was associated in some direct way with the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States. Moreover, the authority conferred can be used for the broad purpose of defending "the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq." Nevertheless, P.L. 107-243 is narrower than P.L. 107-40 in that it limits the authorization for the use of force to Iraq. It also requires as a predicate for the use of force that the President determine that peaceful means cannot suffice and that the use of force against Iraq is consistent with the battle against terrorism. It further limits the force used to that which the President determines is "necessary and appropriate." Finally, as with P.L. 107-40 , the statutory authorization for use of force granted to the President in P.L. 107-243 is not dependent for its exercise upon prior authorization by the U.N. Security Council. In the form that P.L. 107-243 is drafted, and given the context in which it was debated, one could argue that it is a classic example of an authorization vehicle contemplated by the original War Powers Resolution. Libya 2011: Establishing a New Definition of What Constitutes "Hostilities" for Purposes of Full Compliance with the War Powers Resolution? During U.S. military operations in Libya from mid-March through June 2011, President Barack Obama—having received legal advice from the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) at the Justice Department and State Department Legal Advisor Harold Koh—took the position that U.S. military operations in Libya did not constitute "hostilities" for purposes of the language of the War Powers Resolution nor was the United States involved in a "war" in Libya for purposes of Article I of the Constitution. Given those conclusions by the Administration, the President's view was that express statutory authorization from Congress to conduct the military operations in Libya was not required under the framework of the War Powers Resolution. The President did comply with the reporting requirements of the War Powers Resolution, when the Libya operation was first launched in March 2011, and followed up with a letter to congressional leaders on May 20, 2011—the 60 th day after U.S. military forces were "introduced" into the conflict in Libya. In his May 20 letter, the President pointed out that on April 4, 2011, the United States had transferred responsibility for military operations in Libya to NATO forces, and that from that time forward the U.S. had assumed only a supporting role for the NATO-led operation. This support included, "since April 23, [36 days after the initial introduction of U.S. military forces into Libya], precision strikes by unmanned aerial vehicles against a limited set of clearly defined targets in support of the NATO-led coalition's efforts." The President held from the outset that the actions he had directed were "in the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States." He took them, the President stated, "pursuant to my constitutional authority to conduct U.S. foreign relations and as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive." Administration Report to Congress on "United States Activities in Libya" Submitted on June 15, 2011 On June 15, 2011 (86 days after the initial introduction of U.S. military forces into Libya), the Obama Administration submitted a 32-page unclassified report, together with a classified annex, that described U.S. actions in Libya to that date. On page 25 of that unclassified report was a "Legal Analysis" consisting of one long paragraph summarizing the Administration's view of what the President's authority was to take the actions he had taken in Libya, and his rationale for not having to obtain congressional authorization to do so. This paragraph from the report states Given the important U.S. interests served by U.S. military operations in Libya and the limited nature, scope and duration of the anticipated actions, the President had constitutional authority, as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive and pursuant to his foreign affairs powers, to direct such limited military operations abroad. The President is of the view that the current U.S. military operations in Libya are consistent with the War Powers Resolution and do not under that law require further congressional authorization, because U.S. military operations are distinct from the kind of "hostilities" contemplated by the Resolution's 60 day termination provision. U.S. forces are playing a constrained and supporting role in a multinational coalition, whose operations are both legitimated by and limited to the terms of a United Nations Security Council Resolution that authorizes the use of force solely to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under attack or threat of attack and to enforce a no-fly zone and an arms embargo. U.S. operations do not involve sustained fighting or active exchanges of fire with hostile forces, nor do they involve the presence of U.S. ground troops, U.S. casualties or a serious threat thereof, or any significant chance of escalation into a conflict characterized by these factors. There are various legal arguments available to the Administration to justify use of UAVs for military action abroad against terrorist organizations and individuals. The following addresses the potential interplay of the War Powers Resolution's statutory requirements and the use of UAVs for military operations abroad. The War Powers Resolution and Military Use of UAVs: Some Considerations In another situation, it is possible that the President might use the same basic formulation he and his legal advisors set out regarding the application of the War Powers Resolution to U.S. military actions in Libya discussed above. Directly put, if it is accepted that the President's use of UAVs for military attacks against terrorist targets abroad constitutes an action that is limited in scope and duration, and does not require introduction of U.S. military forces directly and physically into "hostilities," then the War Powers Resolution, under this interpretation, does not apply to this presidential action, nor require congressional statutory authorization. The President, under this construction, has sufficient authority to act to defend the United States based only on his own Constitutional authorities as Commander in Chief, as set out in the legal memorandum of the Office of Legal Counsel of April 1, 2011, and in the President's June 15, 2011, report to Congress. To date, based on public reports, instances of the use of UAVs to attack terrorist targets abroad have not required a time period in excess of 60 days to execute, nor have U.S. military personnel been placed directly into harm's way or in places where hostilities that could directly involve them were indicated. The very nature of UAV technology permits their employment from locations remote from the places they are used to attack. Thus, the argument could be made that in these circumstances, the War Powers Resolution, as currently drafted, does not require the President to obtain statutory congressional approval for the use of UAVs in military operations abroad. In his War Powers Resolution report to Congress, on June 15, 2012, the President noted that he had authorized, during the previous six months, the U.S. military to work closely with the government of Yemen "to operationally dismantle and ultimately eliminate the terrorist threat posed by al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the most active and dangerous affiliate of al-Qa'ida today." The President added that Our joint efforts have resulted in direct action against a limited number of AQAP operatives and senior leaders in that country who posed a terrorist threat to the United States and our interests. While the term "direct action" is not defined in the President's June 15, 2012, report quoted above, its context, coupled with public reporting on the U.S. use of UAVs to attack al-Qa'ida terrorist personnel in Yemen, strongly suggests that this is what the President is referring to in this report. The President further notes in this report that similar actions may be undertaken by the United States in the future. He stated: The United States is committed to thwarting the efforts of al-Qa'ida and its associated forces to carry out future acts of international terrorism, and we have continued to work with our CT [counter-terrorism] partners to disrupt and degrade the capabilities of al-Qa'ida and its associated forces. As necessary, in response to the terrorist threat, I will direct additional measures against al-Qa'ida, the Taliban, and associated forces to protect U.S. citizens and interests. The June 15, 2012, report also stated that a "classified annex" to it "would provide further information" on such matters. That annex would perhaps elaborate on the specifics of the topics alluded to in the unclassified text, and clarify the express meaning of "direct action," and, in particular, how it was employed by the United States. In light of the above considerations, it appears that the existing statutory language of the War Powers Resolution, as interpreted by the Administration, does not require congressional authorization for the President to use UAVs in military operations against terrorists abroad, in Yemen or in other countries. It does appear that the President may believe that in fulfilling his reporting obligations to Congress under the WPR he should at least implicitly note the use of UAVs in military attacks against terrorists when he submits his supplementary WPR report every six months. Perhaps the President also believes he should, in keeping with WPR reporting requirements, report more explicitly about such actions in classified reports every six months. Even though the President has not publicly reported the specific use of UAVs in military operations within 48 hours of their use, private consultations with the congressional leadership about their use may have occurred in individual cases. Should Congress agree with what appears to be the President's position regarding his minimal obligations under the War Powers Resolution regarding the military use of UAVs, it need do nothing further. However, should Congress conclude that the War Powers Resolution should unambiguously require statutory congressional authorization of the military use of UAVs for counter-terrorism operations, then it would likely have to amend this statute, unless other mutually agreeable alternatives can be devised with the President. Military Campaign Against the Islamic State Beginning in June 2014, forces of the Islamic State (IS; also known as ISIL, ISIS, or the Arabic acronym Da' esh ) rapidly expanded their control of several Iraqi cities and threatened attack on Baghdad. These developments caused worries of debilitating destabilization of Iraq's government and increased U.S. concerns for the safety of the U.S. embassy, other U.S. facilities, and U.S. personnel in Iraq, as well as the Iraqi population. After first ordering multiple deployments of U.S. troops to Iraq to provide security to diplomatic personnel and facilities, advise Iraqi security forces, and conduct intelligence gathering and reconnaissance, President Obama began ordering U.S. military airstrikes on IS forces in Iraq in August 2014. Later in September, after laying out plans for expanded use of military force against the Islamic State in a televised speech to the American people, the President ordered U.S. military airstrikes in Syria against both IS forces and forces of the "Khorasan Group," identified by the President as part of Al Qaeda. U.S. military operations against the Islamic State have since expanded in limited fashion to Libya; targeted anti-IS airstrikes have been detailed in periodic presidential War Powers Resolution reporting to Congress. In addition, it has been reported that the Trump Administration plans a new deployment of approximately 1,000 U.S. troops to Syria, seemingly signaling further expansion of the anti-IS military campaign. U.S. military engagement in hostilities against these groups in Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere has raised numerous questions in Congress and beyond about the President's authority to use military force in this conflict. Questions concerning President Obama's WPR notifications to Congress and his eventual reliance on existing authorizations for use of military force to meet the requirements of the WPR have arisen, and Congress has considered proposals to enact a new authorization for use of military force targeting the Islamic State, including a February 2015 proposal from President Obama. The Trump Administration has continued the previous Administration's reliance on existing AUMFs to conduct the military campaign against the Islamic State, and many Members of Congress remain concerned and active in calling for congressional action to oversee, authorize, or limit presidential authority to continue the use of military force. Presidential Reporting on Individual Missions and the War Powers Resolution's Withdrawal Requirement President Obama began providing WPR notifications concerning the U.S. military response in Iraq to the Islamic State crisis in June 2014. On June 16, 2014, President Obama notified the Speaker of the House and President pro tempore of the Senate, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that he had deployed combat-equipped troops to Iraq to provide security for U.S. diplomatic personnel and facilities. On August 8, 2014, the President sent the first notification during the current crisis concerning the use of military force in Iraq. Prior to the President's announcement of a wider, sustained military campaign against the Islamic State on September 10, 2014, President Obama made seven WPR notifications for deployments and actions in Iraq, four concerning combat-equipped troop deployments with no hostilities active or imminent, and three concerning airstrikes against ISIL forces June 16, 2014, Security for U.S. Embassy Baghdad: notification informed Congress of the deployment of up to 275 U.S. Armed Forces personnel to Iraq to provide support and security for U.S. personnel and the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad. June 26, 2014, Military Advisers: notification informed Congress of the deployment of up to approximately 300 additional U.S. Armed Forces personnel in Iraq to "assess how we can best train, advise, and support Iraqi security forces and to establish joint operations centers with Iraqi security forces to share intelligence and coordinate planning to confront the threat posed by ISIL," and for presidential orders to "increase intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance that is focused on the threat posed by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)." June 30, 2014, Increased Security Deployment: notification informed Congress of the deployment of up to approximately 200 additional U.S. Armed Forces personnel to Iraq to "reinforce security at the U.S. Embassy, its support facilities, and the Baghdad International Airport." August 8, 2014, Airstrikes and Humanitarian Assistance and Intervention: notification informed Congress of airstrikes to protect U.S. personnel in Erbil and to assist a humanitarian mission to protect Iraqi civilians trapped on Mount Sinjar in northern Iraq. August 17, 2014, Airstrikes to Assist Iraq, Protect Civilians, Provide Security for U.S. Facilities and Personnel: notification informed Congress of airstrikes against ISIL forces to assist Iraqi security forces in retaking Mosul Dam in northern Iraq. September 1, 2014, Airstrikes to Assist Iraq, Humanitarian Assistance and Intervention: notification informed Congress of airstrikes near Amirli in northern Iraq targeting ISIL forces besieging the town and as part of a mission to provide humanitarian assistance. September 5, 2014, Increased Security Deployment: notification explained the deployment of 350 additional combat-equipped troops to provide security for diplomatic facilities and personnel in Baghdad. September 8, 2014, Airstrikes to Assist Iraq, Protect Civilians, Provide Security for U.S. Facilities and Personnel: notification of airstrikes "in the vicinity of the Haditha Dam in support of Iraqi forces in their efforts to retain control of and defend this critical infrastructure site from ISIL," stating that "[t]hese additional military operations will be limited in their scope and duration as necessary to address this threat and prevent endangerment of U.S. personnel and facilities and large numbers of Iraqi civilians." In each of these notifications, President Obama cited no war declaration or legislative authorization for use of military force that authorized his actions, but instead relied on his constitutional authority under Article II as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive. Without such legislative authority, any engagement in hostilities could have been considered to trigger the 60-day withdrawal requirement under Section 5(b). Although there was no indication from the President, the deployments announced in the June 16, June 24, June 30, and September 5 WPR notifications could have been construed as falling under Section 4(a)(2) and/or (3) of the WPR; such interpretation would not have triggered the WPR withdrawal requirement. The airstrikes notifications of August 8, August 17, and September 1, 2014, seem more likely to concern activities considered hostilities under the WPR, and therefore could be considered Section 4(a)(1) notifications, triggering the 60-day withdrawal period, although again, neither the President nor Congress took any action to definitively characterize such actions as triggering the WPR withdrawal requirement. President Obama's multiple notifications, some of which involved hostilities, raised questions about whether multiple WPR notifications for short-term, circumscribed military action in relation to the same enemy in the same conflict should be considered separately or be combined for purposes of the operation of the WPR withdrawal requirement. Analysts and Members of Congress struggled with how to determine whether the 60-day period was running, on what date it began, or whether it had reset each time one of the three discrete military operations had ceased. From the description in the airstrikes notifications, the Mount Sinjar, Mosul Dam, and Amirli operations involved operations by U.S. Armed Forces conducting airstrikes that lasted only a few days at most, such forces engaged in airstrikes likely entered, fought, and withdrew from Iraqi airspace in a matter of hours, and the troops that remained in Iraq after the airstrikes were apparently not engaged in hostilities or present where hostilities were imminent. In addition, the Obama Administration has been careful to state that the first airstrikes were solely to halt the advance of ISIL on Erbil and break the siege of Mount Sinjar, both of which were accomplished at the end of operations, that the second airstrikes were to help with the recapture of Mosul Dam, which was also completed, and that the third airstrikes were solely to protect ISIL-besieged Iraqi citizens in Amirli, and that objective also seemed to have been met, each within a matter of days. Some analysts raised the question whether the President's frequent notifications, each explaining a discrete operation that would last only a few days, were intended simply to ensure that Congress was kept informed in detail about ongoing U.S. military action in Iraq or, alternatively, whether they were intended to have some consequence for assessing when and whether the WPR's 60-day deadline for termination of hostilities begins and ends—that is to say, that each of the particular actions reported constitutes a separate military action that is subject to its own 60-day deadline for termination. Because the operations were short in duration, considering each operation to operate under its own 60-day period, despite seemingly being part of a larger campaign against one enemy, would arguably undercut the WPR's goal of ensuring that U.S. forces were not engaged in hostilities against an enemy force for a sustained period of time without congressional authorization. Notifications of discrete, time-limited deployments and hostilities have occurred in the past. Since Congress enacted the War Powers Resolution, Presidents have made Section 4 notifications that refer to military deployments and operations, including the use of military force, that are relatively small in scope and duration, involving individual strikes. These limited WPR notifications, however, often involve either planned strikes against foreign targets that can be regarded as isolated and not part of a larger, connected military campaign against an enemy, or address one-time defensive military action against armed attack. Presidential Reliance on Prior Existing Authorizations to Meet War Powers Resolution Requirements After relying on Article II authority as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive in his first seven WPR notifications concerning military action against the Islamic State, President Obama changed course and began relying on existing authorizations for the continuing and expanding military campaign. Obama Administration officials and the President's September 2014 notifications to Congress for airstrikes and other actions in Iraq and Syria stated that two enacted authorizations for use of military force (AUMFs) currently in force, the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001 AUMF; P.L. 107-40 ), and the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 (2002 AUMF; P.L. 107-243 ), provide authorization for certain U.S. military strikes against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, as well as the Khorasan Group of Al Qaeda in Syria. As it regarded the requirements of the WPR, President Obama by citing 2001 and 2002 AUMF authority provided a legislative basis for his decision to engage U.S. Armed Forces in hostilities against the Islamic State and other groups, which would meet the WPR's notification requirements, and prevent application of Section 5(b)'s 60-day withdrawal requirement and the WPR's provisions for consideration of legislative proposals to approve or disapprove of his actions. Trump Administration officials have also argued that existing legislative authority covers U.S. military operations against the Islamic State in Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere. Congress enacted the 2001 AUMF in response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, authorizing the President to use military force against "those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons...." The executive branch has since relied on the 2001 AUMF to fight Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, and has stated that the 2001 AUMF authorizes limited, targeted U.S. military strikes against Al Qaeda and associated forces that have been carried out in other countries, including Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and Libya. President Obama's reliance on 2001 AUMF authority to undertake a large-scale, long-term military campaign outside Afghanistan to fight the Islamic State represented to some observers an expansion of the interpretation of 2001 AUMF authority. The Obama Administration stated that the Islamic State can be targeted under the 2001 AUMF because its predecessor organization, Al Qaeda in Iraq, communicated and coordinated with Al Qaeda; the Islamic State currently has ties with Al Qaeda fighter and operatives; the Islamic State employs tactics similar to Al Qaeda; and the Islamic State, with its intentions of creating a new Islamic caliphate, is the "true inheritor of Osama bin Laden's legacy." The 2002 AUMF authorizes the President to use U.S. Armed Forces to enforce relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions and to "defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq...." Although the 2002 AUMF has no sunset provision and Congress has not repealed it, one view is that after the establishment of a new Iraqi government, the restoration of full Iraqi sovereignty, and the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, all completed by the end of 2011, the 2002 AUMF no longer has force. During the Obama Administration, executive branch officials voiced support for repealing the 2002 AUMF, reflecting the belief that it is no longer needed. Conversely, another view asserts that, although its preamble focuses on the Saddam Hussein regime and its WMD programs, the 2002 AUMF's authorization language is broad, referring only to a "continuing threat" from Iraq, and that the 2002 AUMF could provide authority to defend against threats to Iraq as well as threats posed by Iraq. Indeed, 2002 AUMF authority was the basis for the U.S. military presence in Iraq from the fall of Saddam Hussein and completion of the WMD search to its 2011 withdrawal, a span of over eight years, a period that could be characterized as dealing with threats to Iraq rather than threats from Iraq. The IS threat in Iraq could therefore be seen as breathing new life into 2002 AUMF authority. In addition, former supporters of Saddam Hussein reportedly provide support to the Islamic State, possibly forming a link between the original aims of the 2002 AUMF and any future actions taken against the Islamic State. Congressional Action Related to War Powers Resolution Requirements A number of legislative proposals have been introduced responding to presidential decisions to deploy U.S. Armed Forces and order the use of military force against the Islamic State and other groups. Some Members of Congress have proposed legislation restricting military action against the Islamic State under the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs, repealing these authorizations, and authorizing military force against the Islamic State in a new standalone AUMF. Proposals related to the WPR and its operation generally have been introduced during this period as well, possibly spurred by current U.S. use of military force against the Islamic State. On June 19, 2014, three days after President Obama's first WPR notification concerning new deployments to Iraq, Congress considered two amendments to a Department of Defense appropriations bill ( H.R. 4870 , 113 th Congress), the first of which prohibiting the use of funds appropriated to the department pursuant to the 2002 AUMF, and the second prohibiting use of such funds under the 2001 AUMF after December 31, 2014. Both amendments were defeated by roll call vote. Some Members of Congress also proposed legislation to require the President to either withdraw troops from Iraq pursuant to the procedures of the WPR or seek a new authorization for use of military force. A concurrent resolution ( H.Con.Res. 105 , 113th Congress) was introduced in the House of Representatives on July 11, 2014, requiring withdrawal from Iraq. Section 1. Removal of United States Armed F orces from I raq. Pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1544(c)), Congress directs the President to remove United States Armed Forces, other than Armed Forces required to protect United States diplomatic facilities and personnel, from Iraq— (1) by no later than the end of the period of 30 days beginning on the day on which this concurrent resolution is adopted; or (2) if the President determines that it is not safe to remove such United States Armed Forces before the end of that period, by no later than December 31, 2014, or such earlier date as the President determines that the Armed Forces can safely be removed. H.Con.Res. 105 was later amended to remove the direction to withdraw U.S. Armed Forces, replacing it with language stating that the "President shall not deploy or maintain United States Armed Forces in a sustained combat role in Iraq without specific statutory authorization for such use enacted after the date of the adoption of this concurrent resolution," and that nothing in the concurrent resolution supersedes the requirements of the WPR. This version of H.Con.Res. 105 passed the House by a vote of 370-40 on July 25, 2014. It was received in the Senate on July 28, 2014 and referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations; no further action was taken. After President Obama ordered airstrikes against IS forces in Iraq in August 2014, debate in Congress for the most part turned toward crafting a new authorization for use of military force against the Islamic State (IS AUMF), which would meet the requirements for continued military action after 60 days, rather than proposals prohibiting the use of funds for military operations or requiring an end to hostilities and withdrawal of U.S. Armed Forces from Iraq. Beginning in September 2014, several proposed IS AUMFs were introduced, many with provisions intended to define and circumscribe U.S. military engagement, likely a reaction to a perceived over-expansive interpretation and application of the 2001 AUMF by the executive branch since its initial enactment. Provisions in these proposals that would have restricted or limited Congress's overall grant of authority included limiting the type of military action or military unit to be utilized, including broad prohibitions on the use of U.S. ground forces; limiting the geographic area where military action was authorized; limiting the lawful targets of military force, including limitations on targeting "associated forces" of the Islamic State; and terminating the authority automatically after a specific time period, from 120 days to three years after enactment. One IS AUMF proposal, S.J.Res. 47 (113 th Congress), was debated, amended, and reported favorably to the full Senate by the Committee on Foreign Relations. After the resolution was reported to the Senate, no further action was taken in the 113 th Congress. On February 11, 2015, President Obama provided Congress with his draft proposal for a new IS AUMF, The proposal would have authorized the use of U.S. Armed Forces that he deems "necessary and appropriate" against the Islamic State and associated persons or forces, meaning "individuals and organizations fighting for, on behalf of, or alongside ISIL or any closely-related successor entity in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners." The authorization does not include authority for the use of U.S. Armed Forces for "enduring offensive ground combat operations." The proposal's authorization would terminate three years after enactment. The President would be required to report to Congress at least every six months on actions taken under the proposed IS AUMF, matching the timing of the reporting requirement in Section 4(c) of the WPR. Since President Obama's proposal, Members of Congress have continued to introduce new IS AUMFs. Many of these proposals, however, have not included provisions limiting the authority provided to the President to use military force against the Islamic State as several previous proposals had. Some of the proposals do contain a three-year sunset provision for such authority, however. Conversely, a few legislative proposals have been introduced to limit the President's use of military force against the Islamic State. H.Con.Res. 55 (114 th Congress), directing the President, pursuant to Section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution, to remove U.S. Armed Forces deployed after August 7, 2014, in Iraq and Syria, was similar to the concurrent resolution from the 113 th Congress discussed above. It failed passage in the House by a vote of 139-288 on June 17, 2015. After the anti-IS strikes the United States conducted in Libya, an amendment was offered in the 114 th Congress to the House version of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2017 ( H.Amdt. 1213 to H.R. 5293 , 114 th Congress), prohibiting the use of funds to engage in hostilities in Libya in contravention of the War Powers Resolution. The amendment failed passage by voice vote on June 16, 2016. Provisions in the House version of the Defense appropriations bill in the 115 th Congress (Sections 8115 and 9019 of H.R. 1301 , 115 th Congress) would prohibit the use of appropriated funds for deployments of U.S. Armed Forces in contravention of the consultation and reporting requirements of Sections 3 and 4 of the War Powers Resolution. In addition, during the nearly three years since the U.S. military campaign against the Islamic State began, a number of proposals to repeal or sunset the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs have been introduced, both as part of IS AUMF and war declaration proposals as well as contained in standalone legislative vehicles. Proposed repeals were introduced both before and after President Obama announced his reliance on 2001 and 2002 AUMF authority for his decision to order a wider military campaign against IS and other forces in September 2014, and have continued into the first session of the 115 th Congress. Niger: Hostilities Involving U.S. Forces Operating Under Title 10 Authorities An incident involving casualties among U.S. Armed Forces deployed to provide nonlethal assistance under Title 10, U.S. Code authorities, raised the question of whether previous presidential reporting of a combat-equipped deployment is sufficient when hostilities break out involving such deployed forces, and whether the exercise of Title 10 authorities to train and assist foreign militaries might necessarily involve authorities for the use of military force in some cases. On October 4, 2017, four U.S. soldiers were killed and two were wounded when they and their Nigerien partners were ambushed in western Niger while on a reconnaissance patrol as part of overall U.S. counterterrorism operations in Niger and the Sahel region generally. The Department of Defense (DOD) later identified those responsible for the ambush as members of a group affiliated with the Islamic State, the Islamic State in the Greater Sahel (ISGS). A DOD investigation later revealed that the actions of U.S. forces involved in the patrol had improperly exposed the troops to potential attack and harm, outside the mission approved under applicable Title 10 training and assistance authority. The Trump Administration later reported another ISGS attack on U.S. and Nigerien troops on December 6, 2017. Presidential reporting to Congress consistent with the War Powers Resolution with regard to U.S. Armed Forces operating in Niger began several years before the October 2017 ambush. President Obama, on February 22, 2013, notified Congress of the deployment of U.S. Armed Forces to that country. The notification stated, This deployment will provide support for intelligence collection and will also facilitate intelligence sharing with French forces conducting operations in Mali, and with other partners in the region…. The recently deployed forces have deployed with weapons for the purpose of providing their own force protection and security. Providing an explanation of applicable constitutional and/or legislative authority, President Obama stated that he had directed the deployment "pursuant to my constitutional authority to conduct U.S. foreign relations and as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive." Subsequent notifications updating Congress on the status of U.S. Armed Forces in Niger have been included regularly in the six-month periodic reports under the War Powers Resolution, reflecting an increase of total numbers of troops from approximately 40 in early 2013 to approximately 800 as of the June 2018 notification. The notifications referenced only activities for "support for intelligence collection [and] intelligence sharing with French forces in Mali, and with other forces in the region" until the June 2017 reporting, where it described U.S. forces in Niger and elsewhere in the Sahel region as "provid[ing] a wide variety of support to African partners conducting counterterrorism operations in the region," seemingly encompassing a wider possible range of CT operations for U.S. troops. Some Members of Congress expressed surprise after the deaths of U.S. troops in Niger, not only regarding the circumstances of the ambush but also the overall mission and activities of U.S. Armed Forces in Niger overall. Despite certain presidential and other DOD reporting on U.S. military operations in Niger and the Lake Chad Basin and Sahel region in general, there was still a belief among some Members that Congress had not been adequately informed of these operations, especially as their scope and purpose had seemingly expanded from 2013 to 2017. U.S. Armed Forces deployed while equipped for combat were operating in Niger and many other countries in Africa and elsewhere under Title 10 authority to assist foreign militaries: it seemed to some that such forces might at any time be engaged in hostilities against terrorist groups or other enemies alongside foreign military partners, just as had occurred in Niger. In such circumstances, Congress would be notified of a Title 10 deployment, but would have little chance to authorize or otherwise offer input concerning a decision to use military force or place U.S. troops in a situation where such use of force might be necessary. A question in the context of the Niger situation is whether the presidential reporting requirements in the War Powers Resolution might have been utilized to provide more timely information to Congress. As described earlier in this report, Section 4(a) of the War Powers Resolution requires the President, absent a relevant declaration of war from Congress, to notify Congress within 48 hours after introducing U.S. Armed Forces "into hostilities or situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances" (paragraph (a)(1)), or, short of hostilities, introducing U.S. combat-equipped armed forces into a foreign country (paragraphs (a)(2) or (3)). Although the executive branch maintains that hostilities occur only with exchanges of fire between U.S. and enemy forces, the legislative history of the War Powers Resolution refers to hostilities as also including "a state of confrontation in which no shots have been fired but where there is a clear and present danger of armed conflict," and that imminent hostilities means "a situation in which there is a clear potential either for such a state of confrontation or for actual armed conflict." A original deployment absent imminent or active hostilities reported under Section 4(a)(2) or (3) might later be expected to generate a new notification under Section 4(a)(1), if hostilities were to commence. In the case of the deployments to Niger beginning in 2013, presidential reporting first referred only to intelligence support in describing the U.S. mission, but later described broader U.S. military operations to include conducting patrols with Nigerien forces. With U.S. forces placed in the same "state of confrontation" and possible active hostilities with terrorist and other enemy groups as their Nigerien partners, a presidential report under Section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, requiring reporting within 48 hours, might have been expected. Similarly, when the extended firefight between U.S. and Nigerien forces and ISGS elements occurred October 4, 2017, resulting in U.S. dead and wounded, a Section 4(a)(1) might also have been expected within 48 hours of the exchange of fire, but no such notification was made. The President did, however, include information concerning the ambush in Niger in his December 2017 six-month periodic reporting consistent with Section 4(c) of the War Powers Resolution. As the Niger operation represented a use of military force, however limited, in a new foreign country, some observers and Members of Congress raised questions about the U.S. military activities leading up to the October 2017 ambush and the possibility that further hostilities might occur in Niger and other foreign countries where U.S. Armed Forces were engaged in close cooperation with partner forces facing active enemy groups. Of particular interest was whether the use of military force in Niger by U.S. troops would be considered authorized by the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001 AUMF; P.L. 107-40 ; 50 U.S.C. §1541 note), which had been applied to the use of military force against Al Qaeda, the Taliban, the Islamic State, and several "associated forces" in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen. Trump Administration officials, including Secretary of Defense James Mattis, initially asserted that U.S. troops were operating under Title 10 training and assistance authorities, and were not acting under 2001 AUMF authority. Later Administration statements seemed to call this initial assertion into question, however. DOD identified the attackers in the two Niger incidents as elements of the Islamic State, a group the executive branch had already determined was a targetable entity under the 2001 AUMF. These IS elements were eventually referred to as an IS-associated force known as ISGS, or ISIS-GS in DOD documents. A May 2018 DOD report on the October 2017 ambush stated that U.S. Special Operations Forces in Niger "have the authority to conduct CT operations with partner Nigerien forces," including operations "targeting … key member[s] of ISIS-GS," seemingly outside nonlethal Title 10 authorities. In a reversal of initial statements, in March 2018 the Administration explained that the 2001 AUMF did in fact apply to U.S. use of military force in Niger: On October 4, 2017 and December 6, 2017, those U.S. forces and their Nigerien partner forces were attacked by forces assessed to be elements of ISIS, a group within the scope of the 2001 AUMF, and responded with force in self-defense. The Administration has concluded that this use of force was also conducted pursuant to the 2001 AUMF. Despite finding that 2001 AUMF authority applies to the use of military force in Niger, DOD reportedly has also explained that U.S. use of military force in Niger and in other foreign countries where U.S. Armed Forces are operating under Title 10 is authorized under the "collective self-defense supplemental rule of engagement," which permits U.S. Armed Forces working alongside foreign partner forces to use military force against enemies who attack either U.S. forces or partner forces, including enemies not authorized to be targeted under "by the 2001 AUMF or other congressional authorizations for the use of force." While utilization of self-defense and collective self-defense concepts would seem to be necessary in individual instances where U.S. forces conducting training and other assistance operations and their foreign partners come under attack, some argue such concepts might be applied to permit ongoing uses of military force where no congressional authorization exists. From the standpoint of the operation of the War Powers Resolution, this might be expected to produce more situations in which presidential notifications under Section 4(a)(2) or (3), reporting combat-equipped deployments but no hostilities, are used to satisfy presidential reporting requirements without additional reporting of hostilities under Section 4(a)(1), as initially occurred in the Niger situation. This might make it more difficult for Congress to engage in a timely manner as to the details of individual instances of the introduction of U.S. Armed Forces into hostilities, their estimated scope and duration, and the proper constitutional and legislative authority for such uses of military force. Yemen: "Hostilities" and Support of Foreign Military Action Responding to the outbreak of civil war in Yemen and the Ansar Allah/Houthi movement's ouster of the Yemeni government in 2015, Saudi Arabia in the intervening years has led a coalition of countries in a military campaign to reverse gains made by the Houthi and restore Yemen's government to power. The air forces of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have continued to conduct airstrikes against Houthi targets in Yemen during this time. Houthi forces have conducted cross border missile and mortar attacks against Saudi Arabia and the UAE, with some apparent support from Iran. U.S. Armed Forces have provided discrete support to some Saudi and Emirati military operations against Houthi forces, with current operations reported to be specifically focused on Houthi missile force targets. Operating pursuant to bilateral agreements, the United States has provided "the KSA-led coalition defense articles and services, including air-to-air refueling; certain intelligence support; and military advice, including advice regarding compliance with the law of armed conflict and best practices for reducing the risk of civilian casualties," according to the Department of Defense. In June 2018, President Trump notified Congress, consistent with the War Powers Resolution, that "United States Armed Forces, in a non-combat role, have continued to provide military advice and limited information, logistics, and other support to regional forces combatting the Houthi insurgency in Yemen. United States forces are present in Saudi Arabia for this purpose." On November 9, 2018, the United States and Saudi Arabia announced that U.S. Armed Forces would cease air-to-air refueling of Saudi and Emirati aircraft engaged in the counter-Houthi campaign in Yemen. U.S. refueling missions had resupplied some Saudi and Emirati aircraft since 2015 pursuant to bilateral acquisition and cross-servicing agreements. In a bid to counter weapons proliferation to the Houthi and limit opportunities for Houthi exploitation of commerce, Saudi forces have imposed strict limits on the transit of vessels via air and sea to Yemen since 2015. These limits have been moderated to some extent by coalition coordination with a U.N. Verification and Inspection Mechanism (UNVIM) but nevertheless have contributed to shortages of food, fuel, and commercial products across the country. Along with ongoing conflict and disruption of infrastructure, the coalition-imposed limits have become a key factor in what the United Nations and various humanitarian and human rights organizations describe as a humanitarian emergency in Yemen. As of November 2018, U.N. officials have warned that as many as 14 million Yemenis are at risk of famine because of the ongoing conflict and related restrictions and disruptions of shipments of food, fuel, and goods. Military operations by the KSA-led coalition, especially some air-to-ground strikes by Saudi and other coalition aircraft, also have been identified as having caused high levels of civilian casualties and destruction of civilian infrastructure. KSA-led coalition officials state they are committed to protecting civilians, improving their military operations, and supporting humanitarian access and aid delivery programs. Saudi Arabia and the UAE continue to pledge considerable financial support to relief efforts while, until recently, carrying forward military campaigns aimed at evicting Houthi fighters from the Red Sea port of Hodeidah and the capital Sanaa, and targeting Houthi leaders and forces involved in cross-border attacks. In December 2018, the parties to the conflict met in Stockholm, Sweden, for talks on the conflict, ultimately ending in a ceasefire agreement to be implemented with assistance from the United Nations. In February 2019, it was announced that the Yemeni government and the Houthis had agreed to execute a significant part of the Stockholm agreement, withdrawing troops from Hodeidah. But subsequent reports that fighting has intensified in the north of Yemen, among other escalations, continue to cast doubt on the overall durability of the ceasefire and future prospects for an end to the conflict. Some Members of Congress have voiced concerns about the overall situation in Yemen, the actions of the Saudi military in its prosecution of its conflict with the Houthis, and the involvement of the U.S. military to date in the KSA-led campaign. Some Members have also argued that current U.S. operations to support the KSA-led campaign in Yemen represent a use of U.S. Armed Forces requiring a new, specific authorization from Congress. WPR-Related Congressional Action to Disapprove U.S. Military Involvement Driven by a range of Yemen-related concerns, Representative Ro Khanna and three co-sponsors on September 27, 2017, introduced a concurrent resolution ( H.Con.Res. 81 ) "pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution" directing the President "to remove United States Armed Forces from hostilities in the Republic of Yemen, except United States Armed Forces engaged in operations directed at Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula or associated forces, by not later than the date that is 30 days after the date of the adoption" of the resolution. In the preamble, the resolution asserts that U.S. Armed Forces "have been involved in hostilities between Saudi-led forces and the Houthi-Saleh alliance, including" airstrike targeting assistance and mid-air refueling of Saudi and UAE aircraft. The resolution further states that "[n]o authorization for the use of United States Armed Forces with respect to the conflict between Saudi-led forces and the Houthi-Saleh alliance in Yemen has been enacted, and no provision of law authorizes the provision of midair refueling services to warplanes of Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates that are engaged in such conflict." H.Con.Res. 81 was treated as a privileged resolution entitled to expedited consideration under Section 7 of the WPR. On October 11, the House adopted by unanimous consent a motion to consider the resolution under Section 7 expedited procedures, but delayed the operation of such procedures until not earlier than November 2, 2017. Before expedited procedures became applicable to H.Con.Res. 81 , proponents of the resolution, leaders of both parties in the House, and the House Foreign Affairs and Rules Committees, agreed to consider a separate simple resolution on the situation in Yemen, H.Res. 599, which was introduced by Representative Khanna on November 1, 2017. On the same day, the House adopted a motion stating that Section 7 of the WPR should not apply to H.Con.Res. 81 , and that it was in order to consider H.Res. 599 at any time, with one hour of debate on H.Res. 599 to take place before a vote of the full House. Like H.Con.Res. 81 , the language of H.Res. 599 also included the assertion, among other things, that Congress has not enacted an authorization to use military force against parties to the Yemeni civil war not otherwise subject to the 2001 or 2002 AUMFs, but did not require a withdrawal of U.S. Armed Forces from any hostilities related to the conflict in Yemen. After floor debate, the House voted 366-30 to adopt H.Res. 599 on November 13, 2017. The Senate subsequently took up a similar proposal to H.Con.Res. 81 . On February 28, 2018, Senator Bernard Sanders and two co-sponsors introduced S.J.Res. 54, a joint resolution requiring the President to remove U.S. Armed Forces from hostilities "in or affecting" Yemen, except forces fighting Al Qaeda or its associated forces. Because it is a joint resolution directing a termination of hostilities, S.J.Res. 54 relied on the authority provided in Section 1013 of the Department of State Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1984 and 1985 ("Section 1013"; 50 U.S.C. §1546a), rather than Section 5(c) of the WPR. Incorporating the expedited procedure in Section 601(b) of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 ("Section 601(b)"; P.L. 94-329 ; 90 Stat. 765), Section 1013 authorizes a motion to discharge a joint resolution such as S.J.Res. 54 from the Foreign Relations Committee if the committee has not reported the resolution to the full Senate within 10 calendar days. In accordance with this provision, on March 20, 2018, Senator Sanders made a motion to discharge S.J.Res. 54 from the committee. Senator Bob Corker, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, arguing that the Foreign Relations Committee had committed to active oversight over the Yemen situation and had not yet been able to complete such oversight, moved to table the motion to discharge. After debate, the motion to table the motion to discharge S.J.Res. 54 was adopted by a vote of 55-44 on March 20, 2018. On September 26, 2018, Representative Khanna and 26 cosponsors introduced H.Con.Res. 138 , another concurrent resolution to disapprove U.S. military activities with regard to Yemen and to require removal of U.S. Armed Forces from hostilities related to the KSA-led counter-Houthi campaign. The resolution is similar in its aims to H.Con.Res. 81 , but contains new language, including a specific reference to Section 8(c) of the WPR (50 U.S.C. §1547(c)): (4) Section 8(c) of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1547(c)) defines the introduction of United States Armed Forces to include "the assignment of members of such armed forces to command, coordinate, participate in the movement of, or accompany the regular or irregular military forces of any foreign country or government when such military forces are engaged, or there exists an imminent threat that such forces will become engaged, in hostilities". In addition, H.Con.Res. 138 , in its provision directing removal of U.S. Armed Forces, references military activities authorized pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001 AUMF; P.L. 107-40 ; 50 U.S.C. §1541 note), rather than describing counterterrorism operations against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen, as does H.Con.Res. 81 . The executive branch has relied on 2001 AUMF authority to conduct its anti-AQAP operations in Yemen, but some Members of Congress have long disagreed with what they see as the executive branch's over-expansive interpretation of 2001 AUMF authority, including its application in Yemen. On November 13, 2018, the House Rules Committee voted to submit a separate resolution to the full House that would, among other things, rescind the applicability of the expedited consideration privilege in Section 7 of the WPR (50 U.S.C. §1546) to H.Con.Res. 138 . The next day, November 14, the full House voted 201-187 to adopt this resolution, H.Res. 1142, thus effectively "deprivileging" H.Con.Res. 138 in the House. On November 29, 2018, Representative Khanna introduced H.Con.Res. 142 , containing identical language to H.Con.Res. 138 . In the Senate, S.J.Res. 54 became the pending business of the chamber once again in the last week of November 2018, with Senator Sanders making a motion to discharge the Senate disapproval resolution from the Foreign Relations Committee and subject the resolution to debate in the full Senate under the Section 1013 provisions described above. On November 28, 2018, the Senate voted 63-37 in favor of the motion to discharge, clearing the way for debate on the measure in the Senate. Senate Consideration of S.J.Res. 54 Consideration of S.J.Res. 54 in the Senate proceeded in December 2018 under Section 601(b) procedure. After the Senate's adoption of the motion to discharge S.J.Res. 54 from the Foreign Relations Committee, Section 601(b) states that a motion to consider the resolution in the Senate is in order and is privileged. Senator Sanders made such a motion to proceed to consideration on December 12, 2018, which the Senate adopted by a 60-39 vote. The Senate also agreed, by a vote of 96-3, to a point of order that any amendments offered under Section 1013 must be germane to the underlying subject of S.J.Res. 54, U.S. involvement in the conflict in Yemen. The Senate then proceeded to debate S.J.Res. 54 on December 12-13, 2018. The Senators who spoke on the floor raised a number of issues related both to the substance of the resolution, as well as the appropriateness of applying expedited consideration procedures under Section 1013 to a resolution in this particular instance. Supporters of the resolution argued that U.S. military activities to support the KSA-led counter-Houthi campaign constituted involvement in a war amounting to "hostilities" under the War Powers Resolution and Section 1013, citing language in the War Powers Resolution that refers to U.S. forces engaging in activities to "command, coordinate, participate in the movement of, or accompany" foreign forces, and characterizing U.S. forces supporting the KSA-led coalition as co-belligerents in the Yemen war. Citing Congress's sole power to declare war under the Constitution, supporters stated that because Congress had not authorized U.S. involvement in the war in Yemen, U.S. involvement in the war was unconstitutional and therefore must end. Senators opposed to the resolution responded that U.S. activities to provide aircraft refueling, targeting assistance, and intelligence sharing to the KSA-led coalition did not amount to "hostilities" under Section 1013 or the War Powers Resolution, because U.S. Armed Forces were not involved in "direct military action" against Houthi forces, nor were they operating alongside coalition forces engaging in such direct action. Characterizing U.S. support operations as hostilities in this case, they argued, would set a precedent that would prevent the U.S. military from carrying out many of the support operations it conducts around the world, including in crisis situations, unless Congress specifically authorized such use of the military. With regard to the resolution's substance and purpose, proponents argued that U.S. involvement in the KSA-led campaign against the Houthis was supporting actions that had led to a severe humanitarian crisis and large numbers of civilian casualties. They asserted that stopping military assistance to the KSA-led campaign and a shift to diplomatic and multilateral tools would better alleviate the suffering of the Yemeni population. Some senators also stressed the troubling actions of the Saudi regime generally on human rights issues, especially the Saudi government's actions in the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, and stated that continued support for the Saudi regime for its war in Yemen was not appropriate. Other senators countered these arguments, stating that continued U.S. involvement would better ensure fewer civilian deaths and an improvement in the humanitarian situation in Yemen. They also argued that withdrawing support from the KSA-led campaign would weaken Saudi Arabia and strengthen Iran, which has supported the Houthis, in Yemen. Opponents also raised the possibility that U.S. interests and national security might be threatened by terminating U.S. support, including through an increased risk to terrorist attacks against the United States and U.S. forces in the Middle East by elements of terror groups operating in Yemen, such as AQAP. After debate on the resolution, the Senate also debated and voted on six amendments to S.J.Res. 54 on December 13, 2018. The Senate agreed to amendments to include "refueling of non-United States aircraft" participating in the Yemen conflict in the definition of "hostilities" for purposes of S.J.Res. 54; to ensure nothing in the resolution be interpreted to disrupt U.S. military operations and cooperation with Israel; and to require reporting on the risks involved with ceasing certain U.S. support to the KSA-led coalition with regard to the people of the United States and Saudi Arabia, regional humanitarian crises, and terrorist attacks against the United States. The Senate did not adopt two amendments that would have limited the scope of application of the resolution's prohibitions by excluding military operations intended to reduce civilian casualties or to enable adherence to the international law of armed conflict, and operations to support strikes against Houthi targets outside Yemen. Immediately after these votes, the Senate proceeded to vote on passage of S.J.Res. 54, as amended, and the resolution passed the Senate by a vote of 56-41. The resolution was received in the House on December 19, 2018, where no further action was taken before the end of the 115 th Congress. Because Section 1013 expedited consideration procedure applies only in the Senate, the resolution was not privileged in the House. Renewed Efforts in the 116th Congress On January 30, 2019, Representative Khanna and 96 co-sponsors introduced H.J.Res. 37 , which again would direct "the removal of United States Armed Forces from hostilities in the Republic of Yemen that have not been authorized by Congress." The language in H.J.Res. 37 as introduced was identical to the amended version of S.J.Res. 54 that passed the Senate in the 115 th Congress. The resolution was referred to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, which on February 6, 2019, considered the resolution at a markup session after a hearing of the full committee regarding U.S. policy in the Arabian peninsula. During markup, opponents of the measure argued that U.S. support operations related to the counter-Houthi campaign in Yemen were not "hostilities," and that passage of H.J.Res. 37 would set a precedent under which any Member of Congress could force votes calling into question "all U.S. security cooperation agreements throughout the world." Those in favor of the measure stated that U.S. actions in Yemen in this specific case involved direct involvement in an armed conflict, and that "support for ongoing hostilities by a third power and ally … qualify" as involvement of U.S. Armed Forces in hostilities. The committee voted 25-17 to report H.J.Res. 37 to the full House and recommend its passage. On February 11, 2019, the House Rules Committee reported on H.Res. 122, which provided for immediate consideration in the House of H.J.Res. 37 , with one hour for general debate and 10 minutes for two amendments deemed in order by the rule. A motion to recommit with or without instruction was also permitted. On February 13, 2019, the House adopted H.Res. 122 and proceeded to debate on the resolution. Supporters of the measure reiterated that U.S. military support for the KSA-led coalition was counter to American interests and values and that the actions of the coalition were creating a humanitarian crisis in Yemen. Opponents stated that the situation would not improve if the United States removed its support, and that such a decision would embolden Iran's involvement in the Yemen conflict and take pressure off elements of Al Qaeda and the Islamic State in Yemen. With regard to the provisions of the War Powers Resolution and Section 1013, Members continued to disagree on the definition of hostilities and the appropriate use of the expedited consideration procedures afforded to Congress in that legislation. The House considered one amendment in order, which would have added language to ensure that nothing in the resolution would be construed to hinder U.S. forces and officials from collecting, analyzing, and sharing intelligence. The amendment was agreed to by a 252-177 rollcall vote. The House then considered a motion to recommit H.J.Res. 37 to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, with an instruction to report the resolution back to the House with an amendment to the findings section of the resolution. The amendment would have added language stating that it is in the "national security interest of the United States to combat anti-Semitism around the world," among other supporting statements. The motion to recommit with instruction was agreed to by a 424-0 vote. The House then proceeded to vote on H.J.Res. 37 , as amended, passing the resolution 248 to 177. On February 14, the House transmitted H.J.Res. 37 as adopted to the Senate, where it was referred to the Foreign Relations Committee. H.J.Res. 37 is a joint resolution introduced with specific reference to Section 1013 expedited consideration procedure, and therefore could have been expected to receive expedited consideration once it passed the House and was received in the Senate. Its privileged status in the Senate, however, was eliminated on February 25, 2019, when the Senate Parliamentarian ruled that elements of the House-passed resolution were not germane to the subject of withdrawal of U.S. Armed Forces from hostilities in Yemen, and therefore the resolution could not be treated as privileged under Section 1013 procedure. At issue it seemed were the provisions on combating anti-Semitism added to the resolution in the motion to recommit that the House agreed to on February 13, 2019. After the decision of the Parliamentarian, Senators Sanders, Mike Lee, and Chris Murphy, co-authors of S.J.Res. 7, the companion measure in the Senate to H.J.Res. 37 , stated that they would take steps to ensure that their joint resolution, which does not contain the anti-Semitism language, receives consideration and a vote in the Senate under the Section 1013 privilege. The Senate is expected to take up S.J.Res. 7 in some fashion in March 2019. What Constitutes U.S. "Hostilities" Related to Yemen In the case of U.S. operations supporting the KSA-led counter-Houthi campaign, the executive branch and certain Members of Congress have disagreed over the meaning of "hostilities" as it relates to the application of the WPR provisions. The executive branch has maintained that "hostilities" for the purposes of the WPR means only "a situation in which units of U.S. armed forces are actively engaged in exchanges of fire with opposing units of hostile forces," something that it argues is not occurring in the context of the counter-Houthi operations. Congress's intent in using the term "hostilities," however, seems to evidence a definition that is wider in scope, to include diverse circumstances in which no exchanges of fire have yet occurred. Some indication of this intended wider meaning of hostilities and imminent hostilities is given in the House report on its War Powers bill: The word hostilities was substituted for the phrase armed conflict during the subcommittee drafting process because it was considered to be somewhat broader in scope. In addition to a situation in which fighting actually has begun, hostilities also encompasses a state of confrontation in which no shots have been fired but where there is a clear and present danger of armed conflict. " Imminent hostilities " denotes a situation in which there is a clear potential either for such a state of confrontation or for actual armed conflict. In this conception, a range of situations into which U.S. Armed Forces are deployed could be considered active or imminent hostilities subject to the reporting and termination requirements of the WPR, for example U.S. Armed Forces actively exchanging fire with enemy forces; a standoff between U.S. and enemy forces poised to engage in armed conflict; or a circumstance where U.S. Armed Forces are equipped for combat in a foreign country where an opposing military might be expected to take an adversarial stance at some point in the near future against such U.S. Armed Forces. In the context of U.S. operations related to the counter-Houthi campaign in Yemen, however, this conception does not necessarily answer whether U.S. Armed Forces acting in noncombat support roles in an armed conflict, or a "state of confrontation," involving foreign partner military forces, are properly considered engaged in active hostilities or where hostilities are imminent. According to the House report quoted above, hostilities encompass armed conflict, involving the exchange of fire between U.S. Armed Forces and enemy forces, or a state of confrontation with a clear and present danger of armed conflict. As the term is used in the WPR, "hostilities" might not, then, include a situation in which U.S. Armed Forces are serving only in a noncombat support role, and would not engage in exchanges of fire with enemy forces in the case of active armed combat, or operate under a clear and present danger of exchanging fire in the case of a state of confrontation. This is the argument the Trump Administration is currently making with regard to U.S. military operations connected to the KSA-led counter-Houthi campaign in Yemen. This approach to defining hostilities, however, might be considered overly narrow. Under international law, all members of the armed forces of a party to an armed conflict are considered combatants with the right to participate in such armed conflict. To the extent the United States can be considered a party to an armed conflict in Yemen, all U.S. Armed Forces participating arguably would be engaged in such armed conflict and thus "hostilities," under the more expansive definition of the term set out in the House report language above. Interpretive Provision Related to Activities of Foreign Military Forces Proponents in Congress of the several pending Yemen disapproval resolutions in the 115 th Congress have also argued that U.S. support operations aiding the KSA-led campaign in Yemen link U.S. operations to ongoing offensive strikes by Saudi and Emirati forces, thus introducing U.S. Armed Forces into hostilities under the interpretive provisions of Section 8 of the WPR. Section 8(c) defines the introduction of armed forces to include activities of U.S. Armed Forces in connection with the operations of foreign military forces: (c) For purposes of this joint resolution, the term "introduction of United States Armed Forces" includes the assignment of members of such armed forces to command, coordinate, participate in the movement of, or accompany the regular or irregular military forces of any foreign country or government when such military forces are engaged, or there exists an imminent threat that such forces will become engaged, in hostilities. The conference report on the WPR explained that this was language modified from a Senate provision requiring specific statutory authorization for assigning members of the Armed Forces for such purposes. The report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on its bill said The purpose of this provision is to prevent secret, unauthorized military support activities and to prevent a repetition of many of the most controversial and regrettable actions in Indochina. The ever deepening ground combat involvement of the United States in South Vietnam began with the assignment of U.S. "advisers" to accompany South Vietnamese units on combat patrols; and in Laos, secretly and without congressional authorization, U.S. "advisers" were deeply engaged in the war in northern Laos. This interpretive provision could be confusing from the standpoint of determining whether an "introduction of U.S. armed forces" specifically into active or imminent hostilities under Section 4(a)(1) has occurred. Section 8(c) on the one hand seems to indicate some intention that if U.S. Armed Forces are operating alongside foreign military forces engaged in hostilities, those hostilities could be attributed to such U.S. Armed Forces as well, triggering a report under Section 4(a)(1) and possibly the termination provisions of Section 5. Yet, while Section 8(c) refers to a situation where foreign military forces are actively engaged or will be engaged imminently in hostilities, when this occurs and U.S. Armed Forces are operating alongside such foreign forces, this seems to meet only the definition of an "introduction of United States Armed Forces" for purposes of Section 4(a) of the WPR, not the definition of "hostilities" or "introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities ." Under Section 4(a), there are situations in which an introduction does not involve hostilities: an introduction can also involve foreign deployments of combat-equipped troops absent any U.S. forces engaged in active or imminent hostilities. Thus, it seems that Section 8(c) contemplates situations where "assignment of [U.S.] armed forces to command, coordinate, participate in the movement of, or accompany" foreign forces engaged in or about to engage in hostilities would not necessarily be considered an introduction of U.S. Armed Forces into such hostilities. In addition, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee report quoted above refers specifically to Section 8(c) preventing " secret , unauthorized military support activities," something a report under Section 4(a)(2) or (3) could accomplish by bringing an otherwise secret deployment to light, without a deployment being considered an "introduction into hostilities." The executive branch has notified Congress of the activities of U.S. military personnel in support of Saudi-led coalition military operations in Yemen in letters to Congress consistent with the War Powers Resolution. In February 2018, Department of Defense counsel argued in a letter to Congress, The limited military and intelligence support that the United States is providing to the KSA-led coalition does not involve any introduction of U.S. forces into hostilities for purposes of the War Powers Resolution or of section 1013 of the Department of State Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1984 and 1985 (50 USC 1546a). The Department specifically argued that since U.S. personnel providing support to the Saudi-led coalition were not then engaged themselves in exchanges of fire, they had not been introduced into hostilities or situations where hostilities were imminent. The Department further stated that U.S. forces did not then "currently command, coordinate, accompany, or participate in the movement of coalition forces in counter-Houthi operations," nor were they "accompanying the KSA-led coalition when its military forces are engaged, or an imminent threat exists that they will become engaged, in hostilities." Proposed Amendments After four decades in existence, controversy continues over the War Powers Resolution and its effectiveness and appropriateness as a system for maintaining a congressional role in the use of armed forces in conflict. One view is that the War Powers Resolution is basically sound and does not need amendment. Those who hold this opinion believe it has brought about better communication between the two branches in times of crisis, and has given Congress a vehicle by which it can act when a majority of Members wish to do so. The Resolution served as a restraint on the use of armed forces by the President in some cases because of awareness that certain actions might invoke its provisions. For example, the threat of invoking the War Powers Resolution may have been helpful in getting U.S. forces out of Grenada, in keeping the number of military advisers in El Salvador limited to 55, and in prodding Congress to take a stand on authorizing the war against Iraq. A contrary view is that the War Powers Resolution is an inappropriate instrument that restricts the President's effectiveness in foreign policy and should be repealed. Those with this perspective believe that the basic premise of the War Powers Resolution is wrong because in it, Congress attempts excessive control of the deployment of U.S. military forces, encroaching on the responsibility of the President. Supporters of repeal contend that the President needs more flexibility in the conduct of foreign policy and that the time limitation in the War Powers Resolution is unconstitutional and impractical. Some holding this view contend that Congress has always had the power, through appropriations and general lawmaking, to inquire into, support, limit, or prohibit specific uses of U.S. Armed Forces if there is majority support. The War Powers Resolution does not fundamentally change this equation, it is argued, but it complicates action, misleads military opponents, and diverts attention from key policy questions. A third view is that the War Powers Resolution has not been adequate to accomplish its objectives and needs to be strengthened or reshaped. Proponents of this view assert that Presidents have continued to introduce U.S. Armed Forces into hostilities without consulting Congress and without congressional authorization. Presidents have cited Section 4(a)(1) on only one occasion—Mayaguez—and by the time the action was reported, it was virtually over. Holders of this third view have proposed various types of amendments to the War Powers Resolution. These include returning to the version originally passed by the Senate, establishing a congressional consultation group, adding a cutoff of funds, and providing for judicial review. A general discussion of these categories of possible changes follows. Return to Senate Version: Enumerating Exceptions for Emergency Use In 1977, Senator Thomas Eagleton proposed that the War Powers Resolution return to the original language of the version passed by the Senate, and this proposal has been made several times since. This would require prior congressional authorization for the introduction of forces into conflict abroad without a declaration of war except to respond to or forestall an armed attack against the United States or its forces or to protect U.S. citizens while evacuating them. The amendment would eliminate the construction that the President has 60 to 90 days in which he can militarily act without authorization. Opponents fear the exceptions to forestall attacks or rescue American citizens abroad would serve as a blanket authorization and might be abused, yet might not allow the needed speed of action and provide adequate flexibility in other circumstances. Shorten or Eliminate Time Limitation Another proposal is to shorten the time period that the President could maintain forces in hostile situations abroad without congressional authorization from 60 to 30 days, or eliminate it altogether. Some proponents of this amendment contend the current War Powers Resolution gives the President 60 to 90 days to do as he chooses and that this provides too much opportunity for mischief or irreversible action. The original Senate version provided that the use of armed forces in hostilities or imminent hostilities in any of the emergency situations could not be sustained beyond 30 days without specific congressional authorization, extendable by the President upon certification of necessity for safe disengagement. Opponents of this and related measures argue that they induce military opponents to adopt strategies to win given conflicts in Congress that they could not win in the field over time. Replace Automatic Withdrawal Requirement The War Powers Resolution has an automatic requirement for withdrawal of troops 60 days after the President submits a Section 4(a)(1) report. Some Members of Congress favor replacing this provision with expedited procedures for a joint resolution to authorize the action or require disengagement. One of the main executive branch objections to the War Powers Resolution has been that the withdrawal requirement could be triggered by congressional inaction, and that adversaries can simply wait out the 60 days. By providing for withdrawal by joint resolution, this amendment would also deal with the provision for withdrawal by concurrent resolution, under a cloud because of the Chadha decision. On the other hand, a joint resolution requiring disengagement could be vetoed by the President and thus would require a two-thirds majority vote in both Houses for enactment. Cutoff of Funds Some proposals call for prohibiting the obligation or expenditure of funds for any use of U.S. Armed Forces in violation of the War Powers Resolution or laws passed under it except for the purpose of removing troops. Congress could enforce this provision by refusing to appropriate further funds to continue the military action. This has always been the case, some contend, and would not work because Congress would remain reluctant to withhold financial support for U.S. Armed Forces once they were abroad. Elimination of Action by Concurrent Resolution Many proposed amendments eliminate Section 5(c) providing that U.S. forces engaged in hostilities abroad without congressional authorization are to be removed if Congress so directs by concurrent resolution, and Section 7 providing priority procedures for a concurrent resolution. Those who hold this view contend the concurrent resolution section is invalid because of the Chadha decision. Expedited Procedures Several proposals call for new and more detailed priority procedures for joint resolutions introduced under the War Powers Resolution. These would apply to joint resolutions either authorizing a military action or calling for the withdrawal of forces, and to congressional action to sustain or override a presidential veto of the joint resolution. Consultation Group Several proposed amendments have focused on improving consultation under the War Powers Resolution, particularly by establishing a specific consultation group in Congress for this purpose. Senators Byrd, Nunn, Warner, and Mitchell have proposed the President regularly consult with an initial group of 6 Members—the majority and minority leaders of both Chambers plus the Speaker of the House and President pro tempore of the Senate. Upon a request from a majority of this core group, the President is to consult with a permanent consultative group of 18 Members consisting of the leadership and the ranking and minority members of the Committees on Foreign Relations, Armed Services, and Intelligence. The permanent consultative group would also be able to determine that the President should have reported an introduction of forces and to introduce a joint resolution of authorization or withdrawal that would receive expedited procedures. Other Members have favored a consultation group, but consider that amendment of the War Powers Resolution is not required for Congress to designate such a group. On October 28, 1993, House Foreign Affairs Chairman Lee Hamilton introduced H.R. 3405 to establish a Standing Consultative Group. Its purpose would be to facilitate improved interaction between the executive branch and Congress on the use of U.S. military forces abroad, including under the War Powers Resolution or United Nations auspices. Members of the Consultative Group would be appointed by the Speaker of the House and the Majority Leader of the Senate, after consultation with the minority leaders. The Group would include majority and minority representatives of the leadership and the committees on foreign policy, armed services, intelligence, and appropriations. Another proposal would attempt to improve consultation by broadening the instances in which the President is required to consult. This proposal would cover all situations in which a President is required to report, rather than only circumstances that invoke the time limitation, as is now the case. Judicial Review Proposals have been made that any Member of Congress may bring an action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for judgment and injunctive relief on the grounds that the President or the U.S. Armed Forces have not complied with any provision of the War Powers Resolution. The intent of this legislation is to give standing to Members to assert the interest of the House or Senate, but whether it would impel courts to exercise jurisdiction is uncertain. Most recent federal court decisions have rejected War Powers lawsuits by congressional litigants on the grounds they lacked standing to sue. Proposals have also called for the court not to decline to make a determination on the merits, on the grounds that the issue of compliance is a political question or otherwise nonjusticiable; to accord expedited consideration to the matter; and to prescribe judicial remedies including that the President submit a report or remove Armed Forces from a situation. Change of Name Other proposals would construct a Hostilities Act or Use of Force Act and repeal the War Powers Resolution. A possible objection to invoking the War Powers Resolution is reluctance to escalate international tension by implying that a situation is war. Some would see this as a step in the wrong direction; in the Korean and Vietnam conflicts, some contend, it was self-deceptive and ultimately impractical not to recognize hostilities of that magnitude as war and bring to bear the Constitutional provision giving Congress the power to declare war. United Nations Actions With the increase in United Nations actions since the end of the Cold War, the question has been raised whether the War Powers Resolution should be amended to facilitate or restrain the President from supplying forces for U.N. actions without congressional approval. Alternatively, the United Nations Participation Act might be amended, or new legislation enacted, to specify how the War Powers Resolution is to be applied, and whether the approval of Congress would be required only for an initial framework agreement on providing forces to the United Nations, or whether Congress would be required to approve an agreement to supply forces in specified situations, particularly for U.N. peacekeeping operations. Appendix A. Instances Reported Under the War Powers Resolution This appendix lists reports Presidents have made to Congress through early 2017 as the result of the War Powers Resolution. Each entry contains the President's reference to the War Powers Resolution. The reports generally cite the President's authority to conduct foreign relations and as Commander in Chief; each entry indicates any additional legislative authority a President cites for his action. Several of the reports listed for the period since 1991, in particular, are reports regarding ongoing operations previously reported by the President, rather than completely new instances of use of the U.S. military overseas. (1) Danang, Vietnam . On April 4, 1975, President Ford reported the use of naval vessels, helicopters, and Marines to transport refugees from Danang and other seaports to safer areas in Vietnam. His report mentioned Section 4(a)(2) of the War Powers Resolution and authorization in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 for humanitarian assistance to refugees suffering from the hostilities in South Vietnam. Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser to the Department of State, testified later that the President "advised the members of the Senate and House leadership that a severe emergency existed in the coastal communities of South Vietnam and that he was directing American naval transports and contract vessels to assist in the evacuation of refugees from coastal seaports." (2) Cambodia . On April 12, 1975, President Ford reported the use of ground combat Marines, helicopters, and supporting tactical air elements to assist with the evacuation of U.S. nationals from Cambodia. The report took note of both Section 4 and Section 4(a)(2) of the War Powers Resolution. On April 3, 1975, the day the President authorized the Ambassador to evacuate the American staff, he directed that the leaders of the Senate and House be advised of the general plan of evacuation. On April 11, the day he ordered the final evacuation, President Ford again directed that congressional leaders be notified. (3) Vietnam . On April 30, 1975, President Ford reported the use of helicopters, Marines, and fighter aircraft to aid in the evacuation of U.S. citizens and others from South Vietnam. The report took note of Section 4 of the War Powers Resolution. On April 10, the President had asked Congress to clarify its limitation on the use of forces in Vietnam to insure evacuation of U.S. citizens and to cover some Vietnamese nationals, but legislation to this effect was not completed. On April 28, the President directed that congressional leaders be notified that the final phase of the evacuation of Saigon would be carried out by military forces within the next few hours. (4) Mayaguez . On May 15, 1975, President Ford reported that he had ordered U.S. military forces to rescue the crew of and retake the ship Mayaguez that had been seized by Cambodian naval patrol boats on May 12, that the ship had been retaken, and that the withdrawal of the forces had been undertaken. The report took note of Section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution. On May 13, Administration aides contacted 10 Members from the House and 11 Senators regarding the military measures directed by the President. (5) Iran . On April 26, 1980, President Carter reported the use of six aircraft and eight helicopters in an unsuccessful attempt of April 24 to rescue the American hostages in Iran. The report was submitted "consistent with the reporting provision" of the War Powers Resolution. President Carter said the United States was acting in accordance with its right under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter to protect and rescue its citizens where the government of the territory in which they are located is unable or unwilling to protect them. The Administration did not inform congressional leaders of the plan on grounds that consultation could endanger the success of the mission. (6) Sinai . The United States, Egypt, and Israel signed an executive agreement on August 3, 1981, outlining U.S. participation in a Multinational Force and Observers unit to function as a peacekeeping force in the Sinai after Israel withdrew its forces. In anticipation of this accord, on July 21, 1981, President Reagan requested congressional authorization for U.S. participation. Congress authorized President Reagan to deploy military personnel to the Sinai in the Multinational Force and Observers Participation Resolution, P.L. 97-132 , signed December 29, 1981. On March 19, 1982, President Reagan reported the deployment of military personnel and equipment to the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai. The President said the report was provided "consistent with Section 4(a)(2) of the War Powers Resolution" and cited the Multinational Force and Observers Participation Resolution. (7) Lebanon . On August 24, 1982, President Reagan reported the dispatch of 800 Marines to serve in the multinational force to assist in the withdrawal of members of the Palestine Liberation force from Lebanon. The report was provided "consistent with" but did not cite any specific provision of the War Powers Resolution. President Reagan had begun discussions with congressional leaders on July 6, 1982, after the plan had been publicly announced, and after leaks in the Israeli press indicated that he had approved the plan on July 2. (8) Lebanon . On September 29, 1982, President Reagan reported the deployment of 1,200 Marines to serve in a temporary multinational force to facilitate the restoration of Lebanese government sovereignty. He said the report was being submitted "consistent with the War Powers Resolution." On this second Multinational Force in Lebanon there was a considerable amount of negotiation between the executive branch and Congress, but most of it occurred after the decision to participate had been made and the Marines were in Lebanon. (9) Chad . On August 8, 1983, President Reagan reported the deployment of two AWACS electronic surveillance planes and eight F-15 fighter planes and ground logistical support forces to Sudan to assist Chad and other friendly governments helping Chad against Libyan and rebel forces. He said the report was being submitted consistent with Section 4 of the War Powers Resolution. On August 23, 1983, a State Department spokesman announced that the planes were being withdrawn. (10) Lebanon . On August 30, 1983, after the Marines participating in the Multinational Force in Lebanon were fired upon and two were killed, President Reagan submitted a report "consistent with Section 4 of the War Powers Resolution." In P.L. 98-119 , the Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution, signed October 12, 1983, Congress determined Section 4(a) had become operative on August 29, 1983, and authorized the forces to remain for 18 months. (11) Grenada . On October 25, 1983, President Reagan reported that U.S. Army and Marine personnel had begun landing in Grenada to join collective security forces of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States in assisting in the restoration of law and order in Grenada and to facilitate the protection and evacuation of U.S. citizens. He submitted the report "consistent with the War Powers Resolution." President Reagan met with several congressional leaders at 8 p.m. on October 24. This was after the directive ordering the landing had been signed at 6 p.m., but before the actual invasion that began at 5:30 a.m., October 25. (12) Libya . On March 26, 1986, President Reagan reported (without any mention of the War Powers Resolution) that, on March 24 and 25, U.S. forces conducting freedom of navigation exercises in the Gulf of Sidra had been attacked by Libyan missiles. In response, the United States fired missiles at Libyan vessels and at Sirte, the missile site. (13) Libya . On April 16, 1986, President Reagan reported, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that on April 14 U.S. air and naval forces had conducted bombing strikes on terrorist facilities and military installations in Libya. President Reagan had invited approximately a dozen congressional leaders to the White House at about 4 p.m. on April 14 and discussed the situation until 6 p.m. He indicated that he had ordered the bombing raid and that the aircraft from the United Kingdom were on their way to Libya and would reach their targets about 7 p.m. (14) Persian Gulf . On September 23, 1987, President Reagan reported that, on September 21, two U.S. helicopters had fired on an Iranian landing craft observed laying mines in the Gulf. The President said that while mindful of legislative-executive differences on the interpretation and constitutionality of certain provisions of the War Powers Resolution, he was reporting in a spirit of mutual cooperation. (15) Persian Gulf . On October 10, 1987, President Reagan reported "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that, on October 8, three U.S. helicopters were fired upon by small Iranian naval vessels and the helicopters returned fire and sank one of the vessels. (16) Persian Gulf . On October 20, 1987, President Reagan reported an attack by an Iranian Silkworm missile against the U.S.-flag tanker Sea Isle City on October 15 and U.S. destruction, on October 19, of the Iranian Rashadat armed platform used to support attacks and mine-laying operations. The report was submitted "consistent with the War Powers Resolution." (17) Persian Gulf . On April 19, 1988, President Reagan reported "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that in response to the U.S.S. Samuel B. Roberts striking a mine on April 14, U.S. Armed Forces attacked and "neutralized" two Iranian oil platforms on April 18 and, after further Iranian attacks, damaged or sank Iranian vessels. The President called the actions "necessary and proportionate." Prior to this action, the President met with congressional leaders. (18) Persian Gulf . On July 4, 1988, President Reagan reported that on July 3 the USS Vincennes and USS Elmer Montgomery fired upon approaching Iranian small craft, sinking two. Firing in self-defense at what it believed to be a hostile Iranian military aircraft, the Vincennes had shot down an Iranian civilian airliner. The President expressed deep regret. The report was submitted "consistent with the War Powers Resolution." (19) Persian Gulf . On July 14, 1988, President Reagan reported that, on July 12, two U.S. helicopters, responding to a distress call from a Japanese-owned Panamanian tanker, were fired at by two small Iranian boats and returned the fire. The report was submitted "consistent with the War Powers Resolution." (20) Philippines . On December 2, 1989, President George H. W. Bush submitted a report to congressional leaders "consistent with" the War Powers Resolution, describing assistance of combat air patrols to help the Aquino government in the Philippines restore order and to protect American lives. After the planes had taken off from Clark Air Base to provide air cover, Vice President Quayle and other officials informed congressional leaders. On December 7, House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Dante Fascell wrote President Bush expressing his concern for the lack of advance consultation. In reply, on February 10, 1990, National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft wrote Chairman Fascell that the President was "committed to consultations with Congress prior to deployments of U.S. Forces into actual or imminent hostilities in all instances where such consultations are possible. In this instance, the nature of the rapidly evolving situation required an extremely rapid decision very late at night and consultation was simply not an option." (21) Panama . On December 21, 1989, President George H. W. Bush reported "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that he had ordered U.S. military forces to Panama to protect the lives of American citizens and bring General Noriega to justice. By February 13, 1990, all the invasion forces had been withdrawn. President Bush informed several congressional leaders of the approaching invasion of Panama at 6 p.m. on December 19, 1989. This was after the decision to take action was made, but before the operation actually began at 1:00 a.m., December 20. (22) Liberia . On August 6, 1990, President George H. W. Bush reported to Congress that following discussions with congressional leaders, a reinforced rifle company had been sent to provide additional security to the U.S. Embassy in Monrovia and helicopter teams had evacuated U.S. citizens from Liberia. The report did not mention the War Powers Resolution or cite any authority. (23) Iraq . On August 9, 1990, President George H. W. Bush reported to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that he had ordered the forward deployment of substantial elements of the U.S. Armed Forces into the Persian Gulf region to help defend Saudi Arabia after the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. The Bush Administration notified congressional leaders that it was deploying U.S. troops to Saudi Arabia on August 7, the date of the deployment. After the forces had been deployed, President Bush held several meetings with congressional leaders and members of relevant committees, and committees held hearings to discuss the situation. (24) Iraq . On November 16, 1990, President George H. W. Bush reported, without mention of the War Powers Resolution but referring to the August 9 letter, the continued buildup to ensure "an adequate offensive military option." Just prior to adjournment, Senate Majority Leader Mitchell and Speaker Foley designated Members to form a consultation group, and the President held meetings with the group on some occasions, but he did not consult the members in advance on the major buildup of forces in the Persian Gulf area announced November 8. (25) Iraq . On January 18, 1991, President George H. W. Bush reported to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that he had directed U.S. Armed Forces to commence combat operations on January 16 against Iraqi forces and military targets in Iraq and Kuwait. On January 12, Congress had passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force against Iraq Resolution ( P.L. 102-1 ), which stated it was the specific statutory authorization required by the War Powers Resolution. P.L. 102-1 required the President to submit a report to the Congress at least once every 60 days on the status of efforts to obtain compliance by Iraq with the U.N. Security Council resolution, and Presidents submitted subsequent reports on military actions in Iraq "consistent with" P.L. 102-1 . An exception is report submitted June 28, 1993, described below. (26) Somalia . On December 10, 1992, President George H. W. Bush reported "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that U.S. Armed Forces had entered Somalia on December 8 in response to a humanitarian crisis and a U.N. Security Council Resolution determining that the situation constituted a threat to international peace. He included as authority applicable treaties and laws, and said he had also taken into account views expressed in H.Con.Res. 370 , S.Con.Res. 132 , and the Horn of Africa Recovery and Food Security Act, P.L. 102-274 . On December 4, the day the President ordered the forces deployed, he briefed a number of congressional leaders on the action. (27) Bosnia . On April 13, 1993, President Clinton reported "consistent with Section 4 of the War Powers Resolution" that U.S. forces were participating in a NATO air action to enforce a U.N. ban on all unauthorized military flights over Bosnia-Hercegovina, pursuant to his authority as Commander in Chief. Later, on April 27, President Clinton consulted with about two dozen congressional leaders on potential further action. (28) Somalia . On June 10, 1993, President Clinton reported that in response to attacks against U.N. forces in Somalia by a factional leader, the U.S. Quick Reaction Force in the area had participated in military action to quell the violence. He said the report was "consistent with the War Powers Resolution, in light of the passage of 6 months since President Bush's initial report...." He said the action was in accordance with applicable treaties and laws, and said the deployment was consistent with S.J.Res. 45 as adopted by the Senate and amended by the House. (The Senate did not act on the House amendment, so Congress did not take final action on S.J.Res. 45 .) (29) Iraq . On June 28, 1993, President Clinton reported "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that on June 26 U.S. naval forces had launched missiles against the Iraqi Intelligence Service's headquarters in Baghdad in response to an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate former President Bush in Kuwait in April 1993. (30) Macedonia . On July 9, 1993, President Clinton reported "consistent with Section 4 of the War Powers Resolution" the deployment of approximately 350 U.S. Armed Forces to Macedonia to participate in the U.N. Protection Force to help maintain stability in the area of former Yugoslavia. He said the deployment was directed in accordance with Section 7 of the United Nations Participation Act. (31) Bosnia . On October 13, 1993, President Clinton reported "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that U.S. military forces continued to support enforcement of the U.N. no-fly zone in Bosnia, noting that more than 50 U.S. aircraft were now available for NATO efforts in this regard. (32) Haiti . On October 20, 1993, President Clinton submitted a report "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that U.S. ships had begun to enforce a U.N. embargo against Haiti. (33) Macedonia . On January 8, 1994, President Clinton reported "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that approximately 300 members of a reinforced company team (RCT) of the U.S. Army's 3 rd Infantry Division (Mechanized) had assumed a peacekeeping role in Macedonia as part of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) on January 6, 1994. (34) Bosnia . On February 17, 1994, President Clinton reported "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that the United States had expanded its participation in United Nations and NATO efforts to reach a peaceful solution in former Yugoslavia and that 60 U.S. aircraft were available for participation in the authorized NATO missions. (35) Bosnia . On March 1, 1994, President Clinton reported "consistent with" the War Powers Resolution that on February 28 U.S. planes patrolling the "no-fly zone" in former Yugoslavia under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) shot down 4 Serbian Galeb planes. (36) Bosnia . On April 12, 1994, President Clinton reported "consistent with" the War Powers Resolution that on April 10 and 11, U.S. warplanes under NATO command had fired against Bosnian Serb forces shelling the "safe" city of Gorazde. (37) Rwanda . On April 12, 1994, President Clinton reported "consistent with" the War Powers Resolution that combat-equipped U.S. military forces had been deployed to Burundi to conduct possible noncombatant evacuation operations of U.S. citizens and other third-country nationals from Rwanda, where widespread fighting had broken out. (38) Macedonia . On April 19, 1994, President Clinton reported "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that the U.S. contingent in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia had been augmented by a reinforced company of 200 personnel. (39) Haiti . On April 20, 1994, President Clinton reported "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that U.S. naval forces had continued enforcement in the waters around Haiti and that 712 vessels had been boarded. (40) Bosnia . On August 22, 1994, President Clinton reported the use on August 5 of U.S. aircraft under NATO to attack Bosnian Serb heavy weapons in the Sarajevo heavy weapons exclusion zone upon request of the U.N. Protection Forces. He did not cite the War Powers Resolution but referred to the April 12 report that cited the War Powers Resolution. (41) Haiti . On September 21, 1994, President Clinton reported "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" the deployment of 1,500 troops to Haiti to restore democracy in Haiti. The troop level was subsequently increased to 20,000. (42) Bosnia . On November 22, 1994, President Clinton reported "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" the use of U.S. combat aircraft on November 21, 1994, under NATO to attack bases used by Serbs to attack the town of Bihac in Bosnia. (43) Macedonia . On December 22, 1994, President Clinton reported "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that the U.S. Army contingent in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia continued its peacekeeping mission and that the current contingent would soon be replaced by about 500 soldiers from the 3 rd Battalion, 5 th Cavalry Regiment, 1 st Armored Division from Kirchgons, Germany. (44) Somalia . On March 1, 1995, President Clinton reported "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that on February 27, 1995, 1,800 combat-equipped U.S. Armed Forces personnel began deployment into Mogadishu, Somalia, to assist in the withdrawal of U.N. forces assigned there to the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II). (45) Haiti . On March 21, 1995, President Clinton reported "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that U.S. military forces in Haiti as part of a U.N. Multinational Force had been reduced to just under 5,300 personnel. He noted that as of March 31, 1995, approximately 2,500 U.S. personnel would remain in Haiti as part of the U.N. Mission in Haiti UNMIH). (46) Bosnia . On May 24, 1995, President Clinton reported "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that U.S. combat-equipped fighter aircraft and other aircraft continued to contribute to NATO's enforcement of the no-fly zone in airspace over Bosnia-Herzegovina. U.S. aircraft, he noted, are also available for close air support of U.N. forces in Croatia. Roughly 500 U.S. soldiers continue to be deployed in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as part of the U.N. Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP). U.S. forces continue to support U.N. refugee and embargo operations in this region. (47) Bosnia . On September 1, 1995, President Clinton reported "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that "U.S. combat and support aircraft" had been used beginning on August 29, 1995, in a series of NATO air strikes against Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina that were threatening the U.N.-declared safe areas of Sarajevo, Tuzla, and Gorazde." He noted that during the first day of operations, "some 300 sorties were flown against 23 targets in the vicinity of Sarajevo, Tuzla, Goradzde and Mostar." (48) Haiti . On September 21, 1995, President Clinton reported "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that the United States had 2,400 military personnel in Haiti as participants in the U.N. Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). In addition, 260 U.S. military personnel are assigned to the U.S. Support Group Haiti. (49) Bosnia . On December 6, 1995, President Clinton notified Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that he had "ordered the deployment of approximately 1,500 U.S. military personnel to Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia as part of a NATO 'enabling force' to lay the groundwork for the prompt and safe deployment of the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR)," which would be used to implement the Bosnian peace agreement after its signing. The President also noted that he had authorized deployment of roughly 3,000 other U.S. military personnel to Hungary, Italy, and Croatia to establish infrastructure for the enabling force and the IFOR. (50) Bosnia . On December 21, 1995, President Clinton notified Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that he had ordered the deployment of approximately 20,000 U.S. military personnel to participate in the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and approximately 5,000 U.S. military personnel would be deployed in other former Yugoslav states, primarily in Croatia. In addition, about 7,000 U.S. support forces would be deployed to Hungary, Italy and Croatia and other regional states in support of IFOR's mission. The President ordered participation of U.S. forces "pursuant to" his "constitutional authority to conduct the foreign relations of the United States and as Commander-in-Chief and Chief Executive." (51) Haiti . On March 21, 1996, President Clinton notified Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that beginning in January 1996 there had been a "phased reduction" in the number of United States personnel assigned to the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). As of March 21, 309 U.S. personnel remained a part of UNMIH. These U.S. forces were "equipped for combat." (52) Liberia . On April 11, 1996, President Clinton notified Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that on April 9, 1996, due to the "deterioration of the security situation and the resulting threat to American citizens" in Liberia he had ordered U.S. military forces to evacuate from that country "private U.S. citizens and certain third-country nationals who had taken refuge in the U.S. Embassy compound...." (53) Liberia . On May 20, 1996, President Clinton notified Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" of the continued deployment of U.S. military forces in Liberia to evacuate both American citizens and other foreign personnel, and to respond to various isolated "attacks on the American Embassy complex" in Liberia. The President noted that the deployment of U.S. forces would continue until there was no longer any need for enhanced security at the Embassy and a requirement to maintain an evacuation capability in the country. (54) Central African Republic . On May 23, 1996, President Clinton notified Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" of the deployment of U.S. military personnel to Bangui, Central African Republic, to conduct the evacuation from that country of "private U.S. citizens and certain U.S. Government employees," and to provide "enhanced security" for the American Embassy in Bangui. (55) Bosnia . On June 21, 1996, President Clinton notified Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that United States forces totaling about 17,000 remain deployed in Bosnia "under NATO operational command and control" as part of the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR). In addition, about 5,500 U.S. military personnel are deployed in Hungary, Italy and Croatia, and other regional states to provide "logistical and other support to IFOR." The President noted that it was the intention that IFOR would complete the withdrawal of all troops in the weeks after December 20, 1996, on a schedule "set by NATO commanders consistent with the safety of troops and the logistical requirements for an orderly withdrawal." He also noted that a U.S. Army contingent (of about 500 U.S. soldiers) remains in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as part of the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP). (56) Rwanda and Zaire . On December 2, 1996, President Clinton notified Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that in support of the humanitarian efforts of the United Nations regarding refugees in Rwanda and the Great Lakes Region of Eastern Zaire, he had authorized the use of U.S. personnel and aircraft, including AC-130U planes to help in surveying the region in support of humanitarian operations, although fighting still was occurring in the area, and U.S. aircraft had been subject to fire when on flight duty. (57) Bosnia . On December 20, 1996, President Clinton notified Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that he had authorized U.S. participation in an IFOR follow-on force in Bosnia, known as SFOR (Stabilization Force), under NATO command. The President said the U.S. forces contribution to SFOR was to be "about 8,500" personnel whose primary mission was to deter or prevent a resumption of hostilities or new threats to peace in Bosnia. SFOR's duration was Bosnia is expected to be 18 months, with progressive reductions and eventual withdrawal. (58) Albania . On March 15, 1997, President Clinton notified Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that on March 13, 1997, he had utilized U.S. military forces to evacuate certain U.S. Government employees and private U.S. citizens from Tirana, Albania, and to enhance security for the U.S. embassy in that city. (59) Congo and Gabon . On March 27, 1997, President Clinton notified Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that on March 25, 1997, a standby evacuation force of U.S. military personnel had been deployed to Congo and Gabon to provide enhanced security for American private citizens, government employees and selected third country nationals in Zaire, and be available for any necessary evacuation operation. (60) Sierra Leone . On May 30, 1997, President Clinton notified Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that on May 29 and May 30, 1997, U.S. military personnel were deployed to Freetown, Sierra Leone to prepare for and undertake the evacuation of certain U.S. Government employees and private U.S. citizens. (61) Bosnia . On June 20, 1997, President Clinton notified Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that U.S. Armed Forces continued to support peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and other states in the region in support of the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR). He reported that most U.S. military personnel then involved in SFOR were in Bosnia, near Tuzla, and about 2,800 U.S. troops were deployed in Hungary, Croatia, Italy, and other regional states to provide logistics and other support to SFOR. A U.S. Army contingent of about 500 also remained deployed in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as part of the U.N. Preventative Deployment Force (UNPREDEP). (62) Cambodia . On July 11, 1997, President Clinton notified Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that in an effort to ensure the security of American citizens in Cambodia during a period of domestic conflict there, he had deployed a Task Force of about 550 U.S. military personnel to Utapao Air Base in Thailand. These personnel were to be available for possible emergency evacuation operations in Cambodia. (63) Bosnia . On December 19, 1997, President Clinton notified Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that he intended "in principle" to have the United States participate in a security presence in Bosnia when the NATO SFOR contingent withdrew in the summer of 1998. (64) Guinea-Bissau . On June 12, 1998, President Clinton reported to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that, on June 10, 1998, in response to an army mutiny in Guinea-Bissau endangering the U.S. Embassy and U.S. government employees and citizens in that country, he had deployed a standby evacuation force of U.S. military personnel to Dakar, Senegal, to remove such individuals, as well as selected third country nationals, from the city of Bissau. (65) Bosnia . On June 19, 1998, President Clinton reported to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" regarding activities in the last six months of combat-equipped U.S. forces in support of NATO's SFOR in Bosnia and surrounding areas of former Yugoslavia. (66) Kenya and Tanzania . On August 10, 1998, President Clinton reported to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that he had deployed, on August 7, 1998, a Joint Task Force of U.S. military personnel to Nairobi, Kenya to coordinate the medical and disaster assistance related to the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. He also reported that teams of 50-100 security personnel had arrived in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania to enhance the security of the U.S. embassies and citizens there. (67) Albania . On August 18, 1998, President Clinton reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that he had, on August 16, 1998, deployed 200 U.S. Marines and 10 Navy SEALS to the U.S. Embassy compound in Tirana, Albania to enhance security against reported threats against U.S. personnel. (68) Afghanistan and Sudan . On August 21, 1998, by letter, President Clinton notified Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that he had authorized airstrikes on August 20 th against camps and installations in Afghanistan and Sudan used by the Osama bin Laden terrorist organization. The President did so based on what he termed convincing information that the bin Laden organization was responsible for the bombings, on August 7, 1998, of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. (69) Liberia . On September 29, 1998, by letter, President Clinton notified Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that he had deployed a stand-by response and evacuation force to Liberia to augment the security force at the U.S. Embassy in Monrovia, and to provide for a rapid evacuation capability, as needed, to remove U.S. citizens and government personnel from the country. (70) Bosnia . On January 19, 1999, by letter, President Clinton notified Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that pursuant to his authority as Commander in Chief he was continuing to authorize the use of combat-equipped U.S. Armed Forces to Bosnia and other states in the region to participate in and support the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR). He noted that U.S. SFOR military personnel totaled about 6,900, with about 2,300 U.S. military personnel deployed to Hungary, Croatia, Italy and other regional states. Also some 350 U.S. military personnel remain deployed in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) as part of the UN Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP). (71) Kenya . On February 25, 1999, President Clinton submitted a supplemental report to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" describing the continuing deployment of U.S. military personnel in Kenya to provide continuing security for U.S. embassy and American citizens in Nairobi in the aftermath of the terrorist bombing there. (72) Yugoslavia/Kosovo . On March 26, 1999, President Clinton notified Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that on March 24, 1999, U.S. military forces, at his direction and acting jointly with NATO allies, had commenced air strikes against Yugoslavia in response to the Yugoslav government's campaign of violence and repression against the ethnic Albanian population in Kosovo. (73) Yugoslavia/Albania . On April 7, 1999, President Clinton notified Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that he had ordered additional U.S. military forces to Albania, including rotary wing aircraft, artillery, and tactical missiles systems to enhance NATO's ability to conduct effective air operations in Yugoslavia. About 2,500 soldiers and aviators are to be deployed as part of this task force. (74) Yugoslavia/Albania . On May 25, 1999, President Clinton reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that he had directed "deployment of additional aircraft and forces to support NATO's ongoing efforts [against Yugoslavia], including several thousand additional U.S. Armed Forces personnel to Albania in support of the deep strike force located there." He also directed that additional U.S. forces be deployed to the region to assist in "humanitarian operations." (75) Yugoslavia/Kosovo . On June 12, 1999, President Clinton reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that he had directed the deployment of about "7,000 U.S. military personnel as the U.S. contribution to the approximately 50,000-member, NATO-led security force (KFOR)" being assembled in Kosovo. He also noted that about "1,500 U.S. military personnel, under separate U.S. command and control, will deploy to other countries in the region, as our national support element, in support of KFOR." (76) Bosnia . On July 19, 1999, President Clinton reported to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that about 6,200 U.S. military personnel were continuing to participate in the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia, and that another 2,200 personnel were supporting SFOR operations from Hungary, Croatia, and Italy. He also noted that U.S. military personnel remain in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to support the international security presence in Kosovo (KFOR). (77) East Timor . On October 8, 1999, President Clinton reported to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that he had directed the deployment of a limited number of U.S. military forces to East Timor to support the U.N. multinational force (INTERFET) aimed at restoring peace to East Timor. U.S. support had been limited initially to "communications, logistics, planning assistance and transportation." The President further noted that he had authorized deployment of the amphibious ship USS Belleau Wood , together with its helicopters and her complement of personnel from the 31 st Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (MEU SOC) to the East Timor region, to provide helicopter airlift and search and rescue support to the multinational operation. U.S. participation was anticipated to continue until the transition to a U.N. peacekeeping operation was complete. (78) Yugoslavia/Kosovo . On December 15, 1999, President Clinton reported to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that U.S. combat-equipped military personnel continued to serve as part of the NATO-led security force in Kosovo (KFOR). He noted that the American contribution to KFOR in Kosovo was "approximately 8,500 U.S. military personnel." U.S. forces were deployed in a sector centered around "Urosevac in the eastern portion of Kosovo." For U.S. KFOR forces, "maintaining public security is a key task." Other U.S. military personnel are deployed to other countries in the region to serve in administrative and logistics support roles for U.S. forces in KFOR. Of these forces, about 1,500 U.S. military personnel are in Macedonia and Greece, and occasionally in Albania. (79) Bosnia . On January 25, 2000, President Clinton reported to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that the U.S. continued to provide combat-equipped U.S. Armed Forces to Bosnia and Herzegovina and other states in the region as part of the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR). The President noted that the U.S. force contribution was being reduced from "approximately 6,200 to 4,600 personnel," with the U.S. forces assigned to Multinational Division, North, centered around the city of Tuzla. He added that approximately 1,500 U.S. military personnel were deployed to Hungary, Croatia, and Italy to provide "logistical and other support to SFOR," and that U.S. forces continue to support SFOR in "efforts to apprehend persons indicted for war crimes." (80) East Timor . On February 25, 2000, President Clinton reported to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that he had authorized the participation of a small number of U.S. military personnel in support of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), with a mandate to maintain law and order throughout East Timor, facilitate establishment of an effective administration there, deliver humanitarian assistance, and support the building of self-government. The President reported that the U.S. contingent was small: three military observers, and one judge advocate. To facilitate and coordinate U.S. military activities in East Timor, the President also authorized the deployment of a support group (USGET), consisting of 30 U.S. personnel. U.S. personnel would be temporarily deployed to East Timor, on a rotational basis, and through periodic ship visits, during which U.S. forces would conduct "humanitarian and assistance activities throughout East Timor." Rotational activities should continue through the summer of 2000. (81) Sierra Leone . On May 12, 2000, President Clinton, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" reported to Congress that he had ordered a U.S. Navy patrol craft to deploy to Sierra Leone to be ready to support evacuation operations from that country if needed. He also authorized a U.S. C-17 aircraft to deliver "ammunition, and other supplies and equipment" to Sierra Leone in support of United Nations peacekeeping operations there. (82) Yugoslavia/Kosovo . On June 16, 2000, President Clinton reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that the U.S. was continuing to provide military personnel to the NATO-led KFOR security force in Kosovo. U.S. forces were numbered at 7,500, but were scheduled to be reduced to 6,000 when ongoing troop rotations were completed. U.S. forces in Kosovo are assigned to a sector centered near Gnjilane in eastern Kosovo. Other U.S. military personnel are deployed to other countries to serve in administrative and logistics support roles, with approximately 1,000 U.S. personnel in Macedonia, Albania, and Greece. (83) Bosnia . On July 25, 2000, President Clinton reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that combat-equipped U.S. military personnel continued to participate in the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, being deployed to Bosnia, and other states in the region in support of peacekeeping efforts in former Yugoslavia. U.S. military personnel levels have been reduced from 6,200 to 4,600. Apart from the forces in Bosnia, approximately 1,000 U.S. personnel continue to be deployed in support roles in Hungary, Croatia, and Italy. (84) East Timor . On August 25, 2000, President Clinton reported to Congress," consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that the United States was contributing three military observers to the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) that is charged by the UN with restoring and maintaining peace and security there. He also noted that the U.S. was maintaining a military presence in East Timor separate from UNTAET, comprised of about 30 U.S. personnel who facilitate and coordinate U.S. military activities in East Timor and rotational operations of U.S. forces there. U.S. forces conduct humanitarian and civic assistance activities for East Timor's citizens. U.S. rotational presence operations in East Timor were presently expected, the President said, to continue through December 2000. (85) Yemen . On October 14, 2000, President Clinton reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that on October 12, 2000, in the wake of an attack on the USS C ole in the port of Aden, Yemen, he had authorized deployment of about 45 military personnel from U.S. Naval Forces Central Command to Aden to provide "medical, security, and disaster response assistance." The President further reported that on October 13, 2000, about 50 U.S. military security personnel arrived in Aden, and that additional "security elements" may be deployed to the area, to enhance the ability of the U.S. to ensure the security of the USS Cole and the personnel responding to the incident. In addition, two U.S. Navy surface combatant vessels are operating in or near Yemeni territorial waters to provide communications and other support, as required. (86) Yugoslavia/Kosovo . On December 18, 2000, President Clinton reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that the United States was continuing to provide approximately 5,600 U.S. military personnel in support of peacekeeping efforts in Kosovo as part of the NATO-led international security force in Kosovo (KFOR). An additional 500 U.S. military personnel are deployed as the National Support Element in Macedonia, with an occasional presence in Albania and Greece. U.S. forces are assigned to a sector centered around Gnjilane in the eastern portion of Kosovo. The President noted that the mission for these U.S. military forces is maintaining a safe and secure environment through conducting "security patrols in urban areas and in the countryside throughout their sector." (87) Bosnia . On January 25, 2001, President George W. Bush reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that about 4,400 combat-equipped U.S. Armed Forces continued to be deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and other regional states as part of the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR). Most were based at Tuzla in Bosnia. About 650 others were based in Hungary, Croatia, and Italy, providing logistical and other support. (88) East Timor . On March 2, 2001, President George W. Bush reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that the U. S. armed forces were continuing to support the United Nations peacekeeping effort in East Timor aimed at providing security and maintaining law and order in East Timor, coordinating delivery of humanitarian assistance, and helping establish the basis for self-government in East Timor. The U.S. had three military observers attached to the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). The United States also has a separate military presence, the U.S. Support Group East Timor (USGET), of approximately 12 U.S. personnel, including a security detachment, which "facilitates and coordinates" U.S. military activities in East Timor. (89) Yugoslavia/Kosovo . On May 18, 2001, President George W. Bush reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that the United States was continuing to provide approximately 6,000 U.S. military personnel in support of peacekeeping efforts in Kosovo as part of the NATO-led international security force in Kosovo (KFOR). An additional 500 U.S. military personnel are deployed as the National Support Element in Macedonia, with an occasional presence in Greece and Albania. U.S. forces in Kosovo are assigned to a sector centered around Gnjilane in the eastern portion. President Bush noted that the mission for these U.S. military forces is maintaining a safe and secure environment through conducting security patrols in urban areas and in the countryside through their sector. (90) Bosnia . On July 24, 2001, President George W. Bush reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," about 3,800 combat-equipped U.S. Armed Forces continued to be deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and other regional states as part of the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR). Most were based at Tuzla in Bosnia. About 500 others were based in Hungary, Croatia, and Italy, providing logistical and other support. (91) East Timor . On August 31, 2001, President George W. Bush reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that the U. S. armed forces were continuing to support the United Nations peacekeeping effort in East Timor aimed at providing security and maintaining law and order in East Timor, coordinating delivery of humanitarian assistance, and helping establish the basis for self-government in East Timor. The U.S. had three military observers attached to the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). The United States also has a separate military presence, the U.S. Support Group East Timor (USGET), of approximately 20 U.S. personnel, including a security detachment, which "facilitates and coordinates" U.S. military activities in East Timor, as well as a rotational presence of U.S. forces through temporary deployments to East Timor. The President stated that U.S. forces would continue a presence through December 2001, while options for a U.S. presence in 2002 are being reviewed, with the President's objective being redeployment of USGET personnel, as circumstances permit. (92) Anti-terrorist operations . On September 24, 2001, President George W. Bush reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," and "Senate Joint Resolution 23" that in response to terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon he had ordered the "deployment of various combat-equipped and combat support forces to a number of foreign nations in the Central and Pacific Command areas of operations." The President noted in efforts to "prevent and deter terrorism" he might find it necessary to order additional forces into these and other areas of the world...." He stated that he could not now predict "the scope and duration of these deployments," nor the "actions necessary to counter the terrorist threat to the United States." (93) Afghanistan . On October 9, 2001, President George W. Bush reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," and "Senate Joint Resolution 23" that on October 7, 2001, U.S. Armed Forces "began combat action in Afghanistan against Al Qaida terrorists and their Taliban supporters." The President stated that he had directed this military action in response to the September 11, 2001, attacks on U.S. "territory, our citizens, and our way of life, and to the continuing threat of terrorist acts against the United States and our friends and allies." This military action was "part of our campaign against terrorism" and was "designed to disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations." (94) Yugoslavia/Kosovo . On November 19, 2001, President George W. Bush reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that the United States was continuing to provide approximately 5,500 U.S. military personnel in support of peacekeeping efforts in Kosovo as part of the NATO-led international security force in Kosovo (KFOR). An additional 500 U.S. military personnel are deployed as the National Support Element in Macedonia, with an occasional presence in Greece and Albania. U.S. forces in Kosovo are assigned to a sector centered around Gnjilane in the eastern portion. President Bush noted that the mission for these U.S. military forces is maintaining a safe and secure environment through conducting security patrols in urban areas and in the countryside through their sector. (95) Bosnia . On January 21, 2002, President George W. Bush reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that about 3,100 combat-equipped U.S. Armed Forces continued to be deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and other regional states as part of the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR). Most were based at Tuzla in Bosnia. About 500 others were based in Hungary, Croatia, and Italy, providing logistical and other support. (96) East Timor . On February 28, 2002, President George W. Bush reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that U. S. armed forces were continuing to support the United Nations peacekeeping effort in East Timor aimed at providing security and maintaining law and order in East Timor, coordinating delivery of humanitarian assistance, and helping establish the basis for self-government in East Timor. The U.S. had three military observers attached to the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). The United States also has a separate military presence, the U.S. Support Group East Timor (USGET), comprised of approximately 10 U.S. personnel, including a security detachment, which "facilitates and coordinates" U.S. military activities in East Timor, as well as a rotational presence of U.S. forces through temporary deployments to East Timor. The President stated that U.S. forces would continue a presence through 2002. The President noted his objective was to gradually reduce the "rotational presence operations," and to redeploy USGET personnel, as circumstances permitted. (97) Anti-terrorist operations . On March 20, 2002, President George W. Bush reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," on U.S. efforts in the "global war on Terrorism." He noted that the "heart of the al-Qaeda training capability" had been "seriously degraded," and that the remainder of the Taliban and the al-Qaeda fighters were being "actively pursued and engaged by the U.S., coalition and Afghan forces." The United States was also conducting "maritime interception operations ... to locate and detain suspected al-Qaeda or Taliban leadership fleeing Afghanistan by sea." At the Philippine Government's invitation, the President had ordered deployed "combat-equipped and combat support forces to train with, advise, and assist" the Philippines' Armed Forces in enhancing their "existing counterterrorist capabilities." The strength of U.S. military forces working with the Philippines was projected to be 600 personnel. The President noted that he was "assessing options" for assisting other nations, including Georgia and Yemen, in enhancing their "counterterrorism capabilities, including training and equipping their armed forces." He stated that U.S. combat-equipped and combat support forces would be necessary for these efforts, if undertaken. (98) Yugoslavia/Kosovo . On May 17, 2002, President George W. Bush reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that the U.S. military was continuing to support peacekeeping efforts of the NATO-led international security force in Kosovo (KFOR). He noted that the current U.S. contribution was about 5,100 military personnel, with an additional 468 personnel in Macedonia; and an occasional presence in Albania and Greece. (99) Bosnia . On July 22, 2002, President George W. Bush reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that the U.S. military was continuing to support peacekeeping efforts of the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina and other regional states. He noted that the current U.S. contribution was "approximately 2,400 personnel." Most U.S. forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina are assigned to the Multinational Division, North headquartered in Tuzla. An additional 60 U.S. military personnel are deployed to Hungary and Croatia to provide logistical and other support. (100) Anti-terrorist operations . On September 20, 2002, President Bush reported to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that U.S. "combat-equipped and combat support forces" have been deployed to the Philippines since January 2002 to train with, assist and advise the Philippines' Armed Forces in enhancing their "counterterrorist capabilities." He added that U.S. forces were conducting maritime interception operations in the Central and European Command areas to combat movement, arming, or financing of "international terrorists." He also noted that U.S. combat personnel had been deployed to Georgia and Yemen to help enhance the "counterterrorist capabilities" of their armed forces. (101) Cote d'Ivoire . On September 26, 2002, President Bush reported to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that in response to a rebellion in Cote d'Ivoire that he had on September 25, 2002, sent U.S. military personnel into Cote d'Ivoire to assist in the evacuation of American citizens and third country nationals from the city of Bouake; and otherwise assist in other evacuations as necessary. (102) Yugoslavia/Kosovo . On November 15, 2002, the President reported to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that the U.S. was continuing to deploy combat equipped military personnel as part of the NATO-led international security force in Kosovo (KFOR). The U.S. had approximately 4,350 U.S. military personnel in Kosovo, with an additional 266 military personnel in Macedonia. The U.S. also has an occasional presence in Albania and Greece, associated with the KFOR mission. (103) Bosnia . On January 21, 2003, President George W. Bush reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that about 1,800 U.S. Armed Forces personnel continued to be deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and other regional states as part of the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR). Most were based at Tuzla in Bosnia. About 80 others were based in Hungary and Croatia, providing logistical and other support. (104) Anti-terrorist operations . On March 20, 2003, President Bush reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," as well as P.L. 107-40 , and "pursuant to" his authority as Commander in Chief, that he had continued a number of U.S. military operations globally in the war against terrorism. These military operations included ongoing U.S. actions against al-Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan; collaborative anti-terror operations with forces of Pakistan in the Pakistan/Afghanistan border area; "maritime interception operations on the high seas" in areas of responsibility of the Central and European Commands to prevent terrorist movement and other activities; and military support for the armed forces of Georgia and Yemen in counter-terrorism operations. (105) War against Iraq . On March 21, 2003, President Bush reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," as well as P.L. 102-1 and P.L. 107-243 , and "pursuant to" his authority as Commander in Chief, that he had "directed U.S. Armed Forces, operating with other coalition forces, to commence operations on March 19, 2003, against Iraq." He further stated that it was not possible to know at present the duration of active combat operations or the scope necessary to accomplish the goals of the operation—"to disarm Iraq in pursuit of peace, stability, and security both in the Gulf region and in the United States." (106) Yugoslavia/Kosovo . On May 14, 2003, President Bush reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that combat-equipped U.S. military personnel continued to be deployed as part of the NATO-led international security force in Kosovo (KFOR). He noted that about 2,250 U.S. military personnel were deployed in Kosovo, and additional military personnel operated, on occasion, from Macedonia, Albania, and Greece in support of KFOR operations. (107) Liberia . On June 9, 2003, President Bush reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that on June 8 he had sent about 35 combat-equipped U.S. military personnel into Monrovia, Liberia, to augment U.S. Embassy security forces, to aid in the possible evacuation of U.S. citizens if necessary. The President also noted that he had sent about 34 combat-equipped U.S. military personnel to help secure the U.S. embassy in Nouakchott, Mauritania, and to assist in evacuation of American citizens if required. They were expected to arrive at the U.S. embassy by June 10, 2003. Back-up and support personnel were sent to Dakar, Senegal, to aid in any necessary evacuation from either Liberia or Mauritania. (108) Bosnia . On July 22, 2003, President Bush reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that the United States continued to provide about 1,800 combat-equipped military personnel in Bosnia and Herzegovina in support of NATO's Stabilization Force (SFOR) and its peacekeeping efforts in this country. (109) Liberia . On August 13, 2003, President Bush reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that in response to conditions in Liberia, on August 11, 2003, he had authorized about 4,350 U.S. combat-equipped military personnel to enter Liberian territorial waters in support of U.N. and West African States efforts to restore order and provide humanitarian assistance in Liberia. (110) Anti-terrorist operations . On September 19, 2003, President Bush reported to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that U.S. "combat-equipped and combat support forces" continue to be deployed at a number of locations around the world as part of U.S. anti-terrorism efforts. American forces support anti-terrorism efforts in the Philippines, and maritime interception operations continue on the high seas in the Central, European and Pacific Command areas of responsibility, to "prevent the movement, arming, or financing of international terrorists." He also noted that "U.S. combat equipped and support forces" had been deployed to Georgia and Djibouti to help in enhancing their "counterterrorist capabilities." (111) Yugoslavia/Kosovo . On November 14, 2003, the President reported to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that the United States was continuing to deploy combat equipped military personnel as part of the NATO-led international security force in Kosovo (KFOR). The United States had approximately 2,100 U.S. military personnel in Kosovo, with additional American military personnel operating out of Macedonia, Albania, and Greece, in support of KFOR operations. (112) Bosnia . On January 22, 2004, the President reported to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that the United States was continuing to deploy combat equipped military personnel in Bosnia and Herzegovina in support of NATO's Stabilization Force (SFOR) and its peacekeeping efforts in this country. About 1,800 U.S. personnel are participating. (113) Haiti . On February 25, 2004, the President reported to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that, on February 23, he had sent a combat-equipped "security force" of about "55 U.S. military personnel from the U.S. Joint Forces Command" to Port-au-Prince, Haiti to augment the U.S. Embassy security forces there and to protect American citizens and property in light of the instability created by the armed rebellion in Haiti. (114) Haiti . On March 2, 2004, the President reported to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that on February 29 he had sent about "200 additional U.S. combat-equipped, military personnel from the U.S. Joint Forces Command" to Port-au-Prince, Haiti for a variety of purposes, including preparing the way for a UN Multinational Interim Force, and otherwise supporting UN Security Council Resolution 1529 (2004). (115) Anti-terrorist operations . On March 20, 2004, the President sent to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," a consolidated report giving details of multiple ongoing United States military deployments and operations "in support of the global war on terrorism (including in Afghanistan)," as well as operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Haiti. In this report, the President noted that U.S. anti-terror related activities were underway in Georgia, Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, and Eritrea. He further noted that U.S. combat-equipped military personnel continued to be deployed in Kosovo as part of the NATO-led KFOR (1,900 personnel); in Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of the NATO-led SFOR (about 1,100 personnel); and approximately 1,800 military personnel were deployed in Haiti as part of the U.N. Multinational Interim Force. (116) Anti-terrorist operations . On November 4, 2004, the President sent to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," a consolidated report giving details of multiple ongoing United States military deployments and operations "in support of the global war on terrorism." These deployments, support or military operations include activities in Afghanistan, Djibouti, as well as Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo. In this report, the President noted that U.S. anti-terror related activities were underway in Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, and Eritrea. He further noted that U.S. combat-equipped military personnel continued to be deployed in Kosovo as part of the NATO-led KFOR (1,800 personnel); and in Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of the NATO-led SFOR (about 1,000 personnel). Meanwhile, he stated that the United States continued to deploy more than 135,000 military personnel in Iraq. (117) Anti-terrorist operations . On May 20, 2005, the President sent to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," a consolidated report giving details of multiple ongoing United States military deployments and operations "in support of the global war on terrorism," as well as operations in Iraq, where about 139,000 U.S. military personnel were stationed. U.S. forces are also deployed in Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, Eritrea, and Djibouti assisting in "enhancing counter-terrorism capabilities" of these nations. The President further noted that U.S. combat-equipped military personnel were deployed in Kosovo as part of the NATO-led KFOR (1,700 personnel). Approximately 235 U.S. personnel were also deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of the NATO Headquarters-Sarajevo who assist in defense reform and perform operational tasks, such as counter-terrorism and supporting the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. (118) Anti-terrorist operations . On December 7, 2005, the President sent to Congress "consistent" with the War Powers Resolution, a consolidated report giving details of multiple ongoing United States military deployments and operations "in support of the global war on terrorism," and in support of the Multinational Force in Iraq, where about 160, 000 U.S. military personnel are deployed. U.S. forces are also deployed in the Horn of Africa region—Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, and Djibouti—assisting in "enhancing counter-terrorism capabilities" of these nations. The President further noted that U.S. combat-equipped military personnel continued to be deployed in Kosovo as part of the NATO-led KFOR (1,700 personnel). Approximately 220 U.S. personnel are also deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of the NATO Headquarters-Sarajevo who assist in defense reform and perform operational tasks, such as "counter-terrorism and supporting the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia." (119) Anti-terrorist operations . On June 15, 2006, the President sent to Congress "consistent" with the War Powers Resolution, a consolidated report giving details of multiple ongoing United States military deployments and operations "in support of the war on terror," and in Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and as part of the Multinational Force (MNF) in Iraq. Presently, about 131, 000 military personnel were deployed in Iraq. U.S. forces were also deployed in the Horn of Africa region, and in Djibouti to support necessary operations against al-Qaida and other international terrorists operating in the region. U.S. military personnel continue to support the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR). The current U.S. contribution to KFOR is about 1,700 military personnel. The NATO Headquarters-Sarajevo was established in November 22, 2004, as a successor to its stabilization operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina to continue to assist in implementing the peace agreement. Approximately 250 U.S. personnel are assigned to the NATO Headquarters-Sarajevo who assist in defense reform and perform operational tasks, such as "counter-terrorism and supporting the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia." (120) Lebanon . On July 18, 2006, the President reported to Congress "consistent" with the War Powers Resolution, that in response to the security threat posed in Lebanon to U.S. Embassy personnel and citizens and designated third country personnel," he had deployed combat-equipped military helicopters and military personnel to Beirut to assist in the departure of the persons under threat from Lebanon. The President noted that additional combat-equipped U.S. military forces may be deployed "to Lebanon, Cyprus and other locations, as necessary" to assist further departures of persons from Lebanon and to provide security. He further stated that once the threat to U.S. citizens and property has ended, the U.S. military forces would redeploy. (121) Anti-terrorist operations . On December 15, 2006, the President sent to Congress "consistent" with the War Powers Resolution, a consolidated report giving details of multiple ongoing United States military deployments and operations "in support of the war on terror," in Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and as part of the Multinational Force (MNF) in Iraq. Presently, about 134, 000 military personnel are deployed in Iraq. U.S. forces were also deployed in the Horn of Africa region, and in Djibouti to support necessary operations against al-Qaida and other international terrorists operating in the region, including Yemen. U.S. military personnel continue to support the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR). The U.S. contribution to KFOR was about 1,700 military personnel. The NATO Headquarters-Sarajevo was established in November 22, 2004, as a successor to its stabilization operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina to continue to assist in implementing the peace agreement. Approximately 100 U.S. personnel are assigned to the NATO Headquarters-Sarajevo who assist in defense reform and perform operational tasks, such as "counter-terrorism and supporting the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia." (122) Anti-terrorist operations . On June 15, 2007, the President sent to Congress, "consistent" with the War Powers Resolution, a consolidated report giving details of ongoing U.S. military deployments and operations "in support of the war on terror," and in support of the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR). The President reported that various U.S. "combat-equipped and combat-support forces" were deployed to "a number of locations in the Central, Pacific, European (KFOR), and Southern Command areas of operation" and were engaged in combat operations against al-Qaida terrorists and their supporters. The United States was "pursuing and engaging remnant al-Qaida and Taliban fighters in Afghanistan." U.S. forces in Afghanistan totaled approximately 25,945. Of this total, "approximately 14,340 were assigned to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan." The U.S. military continued to support peacekeeping operations in Kosovo, specifically the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR). The U.S. contribution to KFOR in Kosovo was approximately 1,584 military personnel. (123) Anti-terrorist operations . On December 14, 2007, the President sent to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," a consolidated report giving details of ongoing U.S. military deployments and operations "in support of the war on terror," and in support of the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR). The President reported that various U.S. "combat-equipped and combat-support forces" were deployed to "a number of locations in the Central, Pacific, European, and Southern Command areas of operation" and were engaged in combat operations against al-Qaida terrorists and their supporters. The United States was "pursuing and engaging remnant al-Qaida and Taliban fighters in Afghanistan." U.S. forces in Afghanistan totaled approximately 25,900. Of this total, "approximately 15,180 were assigned to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan." The U.S. military supports peacekeeping operations in Kosovo, specifically the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR). The U.S. contribution to KFOR in Kosovo was approximately 1,498 military personnel. (124) Anti-terrorist operations . On June 13, 2008, the President sent to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," a consolidated report giving details of ongoing U.S. military deployments and operations "in support of the war on terror," and in support of the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR). The President reported that various U.S. "combat-equipped and combat-support forces" were deployed to "a number of locations in the Central, Pacific, European, and Southern Command areas of operation" and were engaged in combat operations against al-Qaida terrorists and their supporters. The United States is "pursuing and engaging remnant al-Qaida and Taliban fighters in Afghanistan." U.S. forces in Afghanistan totaled approximately 31,122. Of this total, "approximately 14,275 were assigned to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan." The U.S. military continued to support peacekeeping operations in Kosovo, specifically the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR). The U.S. contribution to KFOR in Kosovo was about 1,500 military personnel. (125) Anti-terrorist operations . On December 16, 2008, President George W. Bush sent to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," a consolidated report giving details of ongoing U.S. military deployments and operations "in support of the war on terror," and in support of the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR). The President reported that various U.S. "combat-equipped and combat-support forces" were deployed to "a number of locations in the Central, Pacific, European, Southern, and Africa Command areas of operation" and were engaged in combat operations against al-Qaida and their supporters. The United States is "actively pursuing and engaging remnant al-Qaida and Taliban fighters in Afghanistan." U.S. forces in Afghanistan total approximately 31,000. Of this total, "approximately 13,000 are assigned to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan." The U.S. military continued to support peacekeeping operations in Kosovo, specifically the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR). The U.S. contribution to KFOR in Kosovo was about 1,500 military personnel. (126) Anti-terrorist operations . On June 15, 2009, President Barack Obama sent to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" a supplemental consolidated report giving details of "ongoing contingency operations overseas." The report noted that the total number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan was "approximately 58,000," of which approximately 20,000 were assigned to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan." The United States continued to pursue and engage "remaining al-Qa'ida and Taliban forces in Afghanistan." The U.S. also continued to deploy military forces in support of the Multinational Force (MNF) in Iraq. The current U.S. contribution to this effort is "approximately 138,000 U.S. military personnel." U.S. military operations continue in Kosovo, as part of the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR). Presently the United States contributed approximately 1,400 U.S. military personnel to KFOR. In addition, the United States continued to deploy "U.S. combat-equipped forces to help enhance the counterterrorism capabilities of our friends and allies" not only in the Horn of Africa region, but globally through "maritime interception operations on the high seas" aimed at blocking the "movement, arming and financing of international terrorists." (127) Anti-terrorist operations . On December 5, 2009, the President sent to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," a consolidated report giving details of "global deployments of U.S. Armed Forces equipped for combat." The report detailed "ongoing U.S. contingency operations overseas." The report noted that the total number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan was "approximately 68,000," of which approximately 34,000 are assigned to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. The United States continued to pursue and engage "remaining al-Qa'ida and Taliban forces in Afghanistan." The United States has deployed "various combat-equipped forces to a number of locations in the Central, Pacific, European, Southern, and African Command areas of operation" in support of anti-terrorist and anti-al-Qa'ida actions. The U.S. also continued to deploy military forces in Iraq to "maintain security and stability" there. These Iraqi operations continue pursuant to the terms of a bilateral agreement between the U.S. and Iraq, which entered into force on January 1, 2009. The U.S. force level in Iraq was "approximately 116,000 U.S. military personnel." U.S. military operations continue in Kosovo, as part of the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR). The United States contributed approximately 1,475 U.S. military personnel to KFOR. In addition, the United States continued to deploy "U.S. combat-equipped forces to assist in enhancing the counterterrorism capabilities of our friends and allies" not only in the Horn of Africa region, but globally through "maritime interception operations on the high seas" aimed at blocking the "movement, arming and financing of international terrorists." (128) Anti-terrorist operations . On June 15, 2010, the President sent to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," a consolidated report, giving details of "deployments of U.S. Armed Forces equipped for combat." The report noted that the total number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan was "approximately 87,000," of which over 62,000 are assigned to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. The United States continues combat operations "against al-Qa'ida terrorists and their Taliban supporters" in Afghanistan. The United States has deployed "combat-equipped forces to a number of locations in the U.S. Central, Pacific, European, Southern and African Command areas of operation" in support of anti-terrorist and anti-al-Qa'ida actions. The United States also continues to deploy military forces in Iraq to "maintain security and stability" there. These Iraqi operations continue pursuant to the terms of a bilateral agreement between the United States and Iraq, which entered into force on January 1, 2009. The current U.S. force level in Iraq is "approximately 95,000 U.S. military personnel." U.S. military operations continue in Kosovo, as part of the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR). Presently, the United States contributes approximately 1,074 U.S. military personnel to KFOR. In addition, the United States continues to "conduct maritime interception operations on the high seas" directed at "stopping the movement, arming and financing of international terrorist groups." (129) Anti-terrorist operations . On December 15, 2010, the President submitted to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," a consolidated report, detailing "deployments of U.S. Armed Forces equipped for combat." The report noted that the total number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan was "approximately 97,500," of which over 81,500 were assigned to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. The United States is continuing combat operations "against al-Qa'ida terrorists and their Taliban supporters" in Afghanistan. The United States has deployed "combat-equipped forces to a number of locations in the U.S. Central, Pacific, European, Southern, and African Command areas of operation" in support of anti-terrorist and anti-al-Qa'ida actions. In addition, the United States continues to conduct "maritime interception operations on the high seas in the areas of responsibility of the geographic combatant commands" directed at "stopping the movement, arming and financing of international terrorist groups." The United States also continues to deploy military forces in Iraq in support of Iraqi efforts to "maintain security and stability" there. These Iraqi operations continue pursuant to the terms of a bilateral agreement between the United States and Iraq, which entered into force on January 1, 2009. The current U.S. force level in Iraq is "approximately 48,400 U.S. military personnel." U.S. military operations also continue in Kosovo, as part of the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR). The United States currently contributes approximately 808 U.S. military personnel to KFOR. (130) Anti-terrorist operations . On June 15, 2011, the President sent to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," a supplemental consolidated report, giving details of "global deployments of U.S. Armed Forces equipped for combat." The report detailed ongoing U.S. contingency operations overseas. The report noted that the total number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan was "approximately 99,000," of which approximately 83,000 are assigned to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. The United States continues to pursue and engage "remaining al-Qa'ida and Taliban fighters in Afghanistan." The United States has deployed various "combat-equipped forces" to a number of locations in the Central, Pacific, European, Southern, and African Command areas of operation" in support of anti-terrorist and anti-al-Qa'ida actions. This includes the deployment of U.S. military forces globally to assist in enhancing the counterterrorism capabilities of our friends and allies through maritime interception operations on the high seas "aimed at stopping the movement, arming and financing of certain international terrorist groups." A combat-equipped security force of about "40 U.S. military personnel from the U.S. Central Command" were deployed to Cairo, Egypt, on January 31, 2011, for the sole purpose of "protecting American citizens and property." That force remains at the U.S. Embassy in Cairo. The United States also continues to deploy military forces in Iraq to help it "maintain security and stability" there. These Iraqi operations continue pursuant to the terms of a bilateral agreement between the United States and Iraq, which entered into force on January 1, 2009. The current U.S. force level in Iraq is "approximately 45,000 U.S. military personnel." In Libya, since April 4, 2011, the United States has transferred responsibility for military operations there to NATO, and U.S. involvement "has assumed a supporting role in the coalition's efforts." U.S. support in Libya has been limited to "intelligence, logistical support, and search and rescue assistance." The U.S. military aircraft have also been used to assist in the "suppression and destruction of air defenses in support of the no-fly zone" over Libya. Since April 23, 2011, the United States has supported the coalition effort in Libya through use of "unmanned aerial vehicles against a limited set of clearly defined targets" there. Except in the case of operations to "rescue the crew of a U.S. aircraft" on March 21, 2011, "the United States has deployed no ground forces to Libya." U.S. military operations continue in Kosovo, as part of the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR). Presently the United States contributes approximately 800 U.S. military personnel to KFOR. (131) Libya . On March 21, 2011, the President submitted to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," a report stating that at "approximately 3:00 p.m. Eastern Daylight Time, on March 19, 2011," he had directed U.S. military forces to commence "operations to assist an international effort authorized by the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council and undertaken with the support of European allies and Arab partners, to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe and address the threat posed to international peace and security by the crisis in Libya." He further stated that U.S. military forces, "under the command of Commander, U.S. Africa Command, began a series of strikes against air defense systems and military airfields for the purposes of preparing a no-fly zone." These actions were part of "the multilateral response authorized under U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973," and the President added that "these strikes will be limited in their nature, duration, and scope. Their purpose is to support an international coalition as it takes all necessary measures to enforce the terms of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973. These limited U.S. actions will set the stage for further action by other coalition partners." The President noted that United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 authorized Member States, under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, to take all necessary measures to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in Libya, including the establishment and enforcement of a "no-fly zone" in the airspace of Libya. United States military efforts are discrete and focused on employing unique U.S. military capabilities to set the conditions for our European allies and Arab partners to carry out the measures authorized by the U.N. Security Council Resolution. The President stated further that the "United States has not deployed ground forces into Libya. United States forces are conducting a limited and well-defined mission in support of international efforts to protect civilians and prevent a humanitarian disaster." Accordingly, he added, "U.S. forces have targeted the Qadhafi regime's air defense systems, command and control structures, and other capabilities of Qadhafi's armed forces used to attack civilians and civilian populated areas." It was the intent of the United States, he said, to "seek a rapid, but responsible, transition of operations to coalition, regional, or international organizations that are postured to continue activities as may be necessary to realize the objectives of U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973." The President said that the actions he had directed were "in the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States." He took them, the President stated, "pursuant to my constitutional authority to conduct U.S. foreign relations and as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive." (132) Central Africa . On October 14, 2011, the President submitted to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," a report stating that "he had authorized a small number of combat-equipped U.S. forces to deploy to central Africa to provide assistance to regional forces that are working toward the removal of Joseph Kony," leader of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), from the battlefield. For over two decades, the LRA has murdered, kidnapped, and raped tens of thousands of men, women, and children throughout central Africa, and has continued to commit atrocities in South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Central African Republic. The U.S. Armed Forces, the President noted, would be a "significant contribution toward counter-LRA efforts in central Africa." The President stated that on "October 12, 2011, the initial team of U.S. military personnel with appropriate combat equipment deployed to Uganda." In the "next month, additional forces will deploy, including a second combat-equipped team and associated headquarters, communications, and logistics personnel." The President further stated that the "total number of U.S. military personnel deploying for this mission is approximately 100. These forces will act as advisors to partner forces that have the goals of removing from the battlefield Joseph Kony and other senior leadership of the LRA." U.S. forces "will provide information, advice, and assistance to select partner nation forces." With the approval of the respective host nations, "elements of these U.S. forces will deploy into Uganda, South Sudan, the Central African Republic, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The support provided by U.S. forces will enhance regional efforts against the LRA." The President emphasized that even though the "U.S. forces are combat-equipped, they will only be providing information, advice, and assistance to partner nation forces, and they will not themselves engage LRA forces unless necessary for self-defense. All appropriate precautions have been taken to ensure the safety of U.S. military personnel during their deployment." The President took note in his report that Congress had previously "expressed support for increased, comprehensive U.S. efforts to help mitigate and eliminate the threat posed by the LRA to civilians and regional stability" through the passage of the Lord's Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009, P.L. 111-172 , enacted May 24, 2010. (133) Anti-terrorist operations . On December 15, 2011, the President submitted to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," a supplemental consolidated report, giving details of "deployments of U.S. Armed Forces equipped for combat." The report detailed ongoing U.S. contingency operations overseas. The report noted that the total number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan was "approximately 93,000," of which approximately 78,000 are assigned to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. The United States continues to pursue and engage "remaining al-Qa'ida and Taliban fighters in Afghanistan." The United States has deployed various "combat-equipped forces" to a number of locations in the Central, Pacific, European, Southern, and African Command areas of operation in support of anti-terrorist and anti-al-Qa'ida actions. This includes the deployment of U.S. military forces globally: "including special operations and other forces" for "sensitive operations" in various places, as well as forces to assist in enhancing the counterterrorism capabilities of our friends and allies. U.S. forces also have engaged in maritime interception operations on the high seas "aimed at stopping the movement, arming and financing of certain international terrorist groups." The United States continued to deploy military forces in Iraq to help it "maintain security and stability" there. These Iraqi operations were undertaken pursuant to the terms of a bilateral agreement between the United States and Iraq, which entered into force on January 1, 2009. The U.S. force level in Iraq on October 28, 2011, was "36,001 U.S. military personnel." The U.S. was committed to withdraw U.S. forces from Iraq by December 31, 2011. (This occurred, as scheduled, after this report was submitted.) In Libya, after April 4, 2011, the United States transferred responsibility for military operations there to NATO, and U.S. involvement "assumed a supporting role in the coalition's efforts." U.S. support in Libya was limited to "intelligence, logistical support, and search and rescue assistance." The U.S. military aircraft were also used to assist in the "suppression and destruction of air defenses in support of the no-fly zone" over Libya. After April 23, 2011, the United States supported the coalition effort in Libya through use of "unmanned aerial vehicles against a limited set of clearly defined targets" there. Except in the case of operations to "rescue the crew of a U.S. aircraft" on March 21, 2011, and deploying 16 U.S. military personnel to aid in re-establishing the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli in September 2011, "the U.S. deployed no ground forces to Libya." On October 27, 2011, the United Nations terminated the "no-fly zone" effective October 31, 2011. NATO terminated its mission during this same time. U.S. military operations continue in Kosovo, as part of the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR). Presently the United States contributes approximately 800 U.S. military personnel to KFOR. (134) Somalia . On January 26, 2012, the President submitted to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," a report detailing a successful U.S. Special Operations Forces operation in Somalia of January 24, 2012, to rescue Ms. Jessica Buchanan, a U.S. citizen who had been kidnapped by a group linked to Somali pirates and financiers. This operation was undertaken "by a small number of joint combat-equipped U.S. forces" following receipt of reliable intelligence establishing her location in Somalia. A Danish national Poul Hagen Thisted, kidnapped with Ms. Buchanan, was also rescued with her. (135) Anti-terrorist operations . On June 15, 2012, the President reported to Congress, "consistent with" the War Powers Resolution, a consolidated report regarding various deployments of U.S. Armed Forces equipped for combat. In the efforts in support of U.S. counterterrorism (CT) objectives against al-Qa'ida, the Taliban and, associated forces, he noted that U.S. forces were engaged in Afghanistan in the above effort were "approximately 90,000." With regard to other counter-terrorism operations, the President stated that the United States had deployed "U.S. combat-equipped forces to assist in enhancing the CT capabilities of our friends and allies including special operations and other forces for sensitive operations in various locations around the world." He noted that the "U.S. military has taken direct action in Somalia against members of al-Qa'ida, including those who are also members of al-Shabaab, who are engaged in efforts to carry out terrorist attacks against the United States and our interests." The President further stated that the U.S. military had been "working closely with the Yemini government to operationally and ultimately eliminate the terrorist threat posed by al-Qa-ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the most active and dangerous affiliate of al-Qa'ida today." He added that these "joint efforts have resulted in direct action against a limited number of AQAP operatives and senior leaders in that country who posed a terrorist threat to the United States and our interests." The President noted that he would direct "additional measures against al-Qa'ida, the Taliban, and associated forces to protect U.S. citizens and interests." Further information on such matters is provided in a "classified annex to this report...." Other military operations reported by the President include the deployment of U.S. combat-equipped military personnel to Uganda "to serve as advisors to regional forces that are working to apprehend or remove Joseph Kony and other senior Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) leaders from the battlefield and to protect local populations." The total number of U.S. military personnel deployed for this mission is "approximately 90," and elements of these U.S. forces have been sent to "forward locations in the LRA-affected areas of the Republic of South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Central African Republic." These U.S. forces "will not engage LRA forces except in self-defense." The President also reported that presently the U.S. was contributing "approximately 817 military personnel" to the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) in Kosovo. He also reported that the U.S. remained prepared to engage in "maritime interception operations" intended to stop the "movement, arming, and financing of certain international terrorist groups," as well as stopping "proliferation by sea of weapons of mass destruction and related materials." Additional details about these efforts are included in "the classified annex" to this report. (136) Libya/Yemen . On September 14, 2012, the President reported to Congress, "consistent with" the War Powers Resolution, that on September 12, 2012, he ordered deployed to Libya "a security force from the U.S. Africa Command" to "support the security of U.S. personnel in Libya." This action was taken in response to the attack on the U.S. "diplomatic post in Benghazi, Libya," that had killed four America citizens, including U.S. Ambassador John Christopher Stevens. The President added on September 13, 2012, that "an additional security force arrived in Yemen in response to security threats there." He further stated that "Although these security forces are equipped for combat, these movements have been undertaken solely for the purpose of protecting American citizens and property." These security forces will remain in Libya and in Yemen, he noted, "until the security situation becomes such that they are no longer needed." (137) Six-Month Periodic Report. On December 14, 2012, President Obama reported to Congress concerning ongoing military deployments for U.S. counterterrorism operations, military operations in Central Africa, maritime interception operations, military operations in Egypt, U.S./NATO Operations in Kosovo, and regional security operations in Libya and Yemen. (138) Chad/Central African Republic. On December 29, 2012, President Obama reported to Congress that he had ordered deployment of "a stand-by response and evacuation force of approximately 50 U.S. military personnel from U.S. Africa Command" to Chad "to support the evacuation of U.S. embassy personnel and U.S. citizens from the Central African Republic," due to the "the deteriorating security situation" in that country. (139) Somalia. On January 13, 2013, the President notified Congress that U.S. combat aircraft entered Somali airspace on January 11, 2013, in support of a French mission to rescue a French citizen held hostage by the al-Shabaab terror group, but did not "employ weapons" and departed Somali airspace the same day. (140) Niger. On February 22, 2013, the President notified Congress of deployment of "the last elements of ... approximately 40 additional U.S. military personnel" to Niger to "provide support for intelligence collection and will also facilitate intelligence sharing with French forces conducting operations in Mali, and with other partners in the region." The President stated that the forces are combat-equipped "for the purpose of providing their own force protection and security." (141) Six-Month Periodic Report. On June 14, 2013, President Obama reported to Congress concerning ongoing military deployments for U.S. counterterrorism operations, military operations in Central Africa, maritime interception operations, military operations in Egypt, U.S./NATO Operations in Kosovo, and regional security operations in Libya and Yemen. He also notified Congress that forces deployed to Chad in December 2012 had withdrawn. (142) Jordan. On June 21, 2013, the President reported to Congress on deploying U.S. Armed Forces to Jordan "solely to participate in a training exercise," and "a combat-equipped detachment of approximately 700 of these forces remained in Jordan after the conclusion of the exercise to join other U.S. forces already in Jordan." (143) Six-Month Periodic Report. On December 13, 2013, President Obama reported to Congress concerning ongoing military deployments for U.S. counterterrorism operations, military operations in Central Africa, maritime interception operations, military operations in Egypt, military operations in Jordan, U.S./NATO Operations in Kosovo, and regional security operations in Libya and Yemen. (144) South Sudan. On December 19, 2013, the President notified Congress that "45 U.S. Armed Forces personnel deployed to South Sudan to support the security of U.S. personnel and our Embassy" for "the purpose of protecting U.S. citizens and property." (145) South Sudan. On December 22, 2013, the President notified Congress of deployment of "46 additional U.S. military personnel deployed by military aircraft to the area of Bor, South Sudan, to conduct an operation to evacuate U.S. citizens and personnel." According to the notification, U.S. aircraft "came under fire" and withdrew from South Sudan without completing the evacuation. (146) Uganda/South Sudan/Democratic Republic of the Congo/Central African Republic. On March 25, 2014, the President notified Congress of a new deployment of U.S. aircraft and 150 U.S. aircrew and support personnel to Uganda, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Central African Republic "to support regional forces from the African Union's Regional Task Force that are working to apprehend or remove Lord's Resistance Army leader Joseph Kony and other senior leaders from the battlefield and to protect local populations." (147) Chad. On May 21, 2014, the President notified Congress that "[a]pproximately 80 U.S. Armed Forces personnel have deployed to Chad as part of the U.S. efforts to locate and support the safe return of over 200 schoolgirls who are reported to have been kidnapped in Nigeria" in support of the "operation of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance aircraft for missions over northern Nigeria and the surrounding area." (148) Six-Month Periodic Report. On June 12, 2014, President Obama reported to Congress concerning ongoing military deployments for U.S. counterterrorism operations, military operations related to the Lord's Resistance Army, military operations in Egypt, military operations in Jordan, U.S./NATO Operations in Kosovo, and regional security operations in Libya and Yemen. (149) Iraq. On June 16, 2014, the President notified Congress of the deployment of up to 275 U.S. Armed Forces personnel to Iraq to provide support and security for U.S. personnel and the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad. (150) Iraq. On June 26, 2014, the President notified Congress of the deployment of up to approximately 300 additional U.S. Armed Forces personnel in Iraq to "assess how we can best train, advise, and support Iraqi security forces and to establish joint operations centers with Iraqi security forces to share intelligence and coordinate planning to confront the threat posed by ISIL," and for presidential orders to "increase intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance that is focused on the threat posed by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)." (151) Iraq. On June 30, 2014, the President notified Congress of the deployment of up to approximately 200 additional U.S. Armed Forces personnel to Iraq to "reinforce security at the U.S. Embassy, its support facilities, and the Baghdad International Airport." (152) Iraq. On August 8, 2014, the President notified Congress of airstrikes against Islamic State (IS) forces to protect U.S. personnel in Erbil and to assist a humanitarian mission to protect Iraqi civilians trapped on Mount Sinjar in northern Iraq. (153) Iraq. On August 17, 2014, the President notified Congress of airstrikes against IS forces to assist Iraqi security forces in retaking Mosul Dam in northern Iraq. (154) Iraq. On September 1, 2014, the President notified Congress of airstrikes near Amirli in northern Iraq targeting IS forces besieging the town and as part of a mission to provide humanitarian assistance. (155) Iraq. On September 5, 2014, the President notified Congress of the deployment of 350 additional combat-equipped troops to provide security for diplomatic facilities and personnel in Baghdad. (156) Iraq. On September 8, 2014, President Obama notified Congress of airstrikes "in the vicinity of the Haditha Dam in support of Iraqi forces in their efforts to retain control of and defend this critical infrastructure site from ISIL," stating that "[t]hese additional military operations will be limited in their scope and duration as necessary to address this threat and prevent endangerment of U.S. personnel and facilities and large numbers of Iraqi civilians." (157) Central African Republic. President Obama notified Congress on September 11, 2014, of the deployment of "approximately 20 U.S. Armed Forces personnel" to the Central African Republic "to support the resumption of the activities of the U.S. Embassy in Bangui." (158) Syria/Khorasan Group. On September 23, 2014, the President notified Congress that he directed U.S. Armed Forces to begin "a series of strikes in Syria against elements of al-Qa'ida known as the Khorasan Group." (159) Iraq/Syria/Islamic State. On September 23, 2014, President Obama notified Congress that he had "ordered implementation of a new comprehensive and sustained counterterrorism strategy to degrade, and ultimately defeat, ISIL," The notification states that the President deployed "475 additional U.S. Armed Forces personnel to Iraq," and "that it is necessary and appropriate to use the U.S. Armed Forces to conduct coordination with Iraqi forces and to provide training, communications support, intelligence support, and other support, to select elements of the Iraqi security forces, including Kurdish Peshmerga forces." The President also notified Congress that he had ordered U.S. forces "to conduct a systematic campaign of airstrikes and other necessary actions against these terrorists in Iraq and Syria," "in coordination with and at the request of the Government of Iraq and in conjunction with coalition partners." The President stated that the duration of the deployments and operations is not known. (160) Six-Month Periodic Report. On December 11, 2014, President Obama reported to Congress concerning ongoing military deployments for U.S. counterterrorism operations, including the military campaign against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, military operations related to the Lord's Resistance Army, military operations in Egypt, military operations in Jordan, U.S./NATO Operations in Kosovo, and regional security operations in the Central African Republic, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen. (161) Six-Month Periodic Report. On June 11, 2015, President Obama reported to Congress concerning ongoing military deployments for U.S. counterterrorism operations, including the military campaign against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, military operations related to the Lord's Resistance Army, military operations in Egypt, military operations in Jordan, and U.S./NATO Operations in Kosovo. (162) Cameroon. On October 14, 2015, President Obama notified Congress that he had deployed approximately 90 U.S. Armed Forces personnel to Cameroon to "conduct airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations in the region." (163) Six-Month Periodic Report. On December 11, 2015, President Obama reported to Congress concerning ongoing military deployments for U.S. counterterrorism operations, including the military campaign against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (of note were deployments of combat aircraft and personnel to Turkey and airstrikes in Libya), as well as new counterterrorism deployments to Cameroon, military operations related to the Lord's Resistance Army, military operations in Egypt, military operations in Jordan, and U.S./NATO Operations in Kosovo. (164) Six-Month Periodic Report. On June 13, 2016, President Obama reported to Congress concerning ongoing military deployments for U.S. counterterrorism operations, including the military campaign against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, military operations related to the Lord's Resistance Army, military operations in Egypt, military operations in Jordan, and U.S./NATO Operations in Kosovo. (165) South Sudan. On July 13, 2016, President Obama notified Congress that he had ordered deployment of approximately 47 U.S. Armed Forces personnel to South Sudan to support the security of U.S. personnel and the U.S. embassy in Juba. (166) Uganda. On July 15, 2016, President Obama notified Congress of the deployment of approximately 200 U.S. Armed Forces personnel in Uganda, for the purpose of supporting the security of U.S. citizens and property in South Sudan. (167) Yemen. On October 14, 2016, President Obama reported to Congress that he had ordered U.S. armed force to conduct missile strikes in Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen, targeting radar facilities in response to anti-ship cruise missile launches conducted by Houthi insurgents against U.S. Navy warships in the Red Sea. (168) Six-Month Periodic Report. On December 5, 2016, President Obama reported to Congress concerning ongoing military deployments for U.S. counterterrorism operations, including the military campaign against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, military operations related to the Lord's Resistance Army, military operations in the Red Sea (previously reported missile strikes against Houthi insurgents in Yemen), military operations in Egypt, military operations related to the security of U.S. citizens and property in South Sudan, and U.S./NATO Operations in Kosovo. Appendix B. Instances Not Formally Reported to the Congress Under the War Powers Resolution In some instances where U.S. Armed Forces have been deployed in potentially hostile situations abroad, Presidents did not submit reports to Congress under the War Powers Resolution and the question of whether a report was required could be raised. Representative examples of these instances from 1973 to 1998 include evacuation of civilians from Cyprus in 1974 evacuation of civilians from Lebanon in 1976 Korean DMZ tree-cutting incident of 1976 transport of European troops to Zaire in 1978 dispatch of additional military advisers to El Salvador in 1981 shooting down of two Libyan jets over the Gulf of Sidra on August 19, 1981, after one had fired a heat-seeking missile the use of training forces in Honduras after 1983 dispatch of AWACS to Egypt after a Libyan plane bombed a city in Sudan March 18, 1983 shooting down of two Iranian fighter planes over Persian Gulf on June 5, 1984, by Saudi Arabian jet fighter planes aided by intelligence from a U.S. AWACS interception by U.S. Navy pilots on October 10, 1985, of an Egyptian airliner carrying hijackers of the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro use of U.S. Army personnel and aircraft in Bolivia for anti-drug assistance on July 14, 1986 buildup of fleet in Persian Gulf area in 1987 force augmentations in Panama in 1988 and 1989 shooting down 2 Libyan jet fighters over the Mediterranean Sea on January 4, 1989 dispatch of military advisers and Special Forces teams to Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru, in the Andean initiative, announced September 5, 1989, to help those nations combat illicit drug traffickers transport of Belgian troops and equipment into Zaire September 25-27, 1991 evacuation of nonessential U.S. government workers and families from Sierra Leone, May 3, 1992 a bombing campaign against Iraq, termed Operation Desert Fox, aimed at destroying Iraqi industrial facilities deemed capable of producing weapons of mass destruction, as well as other Iraqi military and security targets, December 16-23, 1998. Appendix C. Text of the War Powers Resolution War Powers Resolution P.L. 93-148 (H.J.Res 542), 87 Stat. 555, passed over President's veto November 7, 1973 JOINT RESOLUTION Concerning the war powers of Congress and the President. Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, SHORT TITLE Section 1. This joint resolution may be cited as the "War Powers Resolution." PURPOSE AND POLICY Section 2. (a) It is the purpose of this joint resolution to fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United States and insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces in hostilities or in such situations. (b) Under article I, section 8, of the Constitution, it is specifically provided that the Congress shall have the power to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution, not only its own powers but also all other powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof. (c) The constitutional powers of the President as Commander in Chief to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, are exercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces. CONSULTATION Section 3. The President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and after every such introduction shall consult regularly with the Congress until United States Armed Forces are no longer engaged in hostilities or have been removed from such situations. REPORTING Section 4. (a) In the absence of a declaration of war, in any case in which United States Armed Forces are introduced— (1) into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances; (2) into the territory, airspace, or waters of a foreign nation, while equipped for combat, except for deployments which relate solely to supply, replacement, repair, or training of such forces; or (3) in numbers which substantially enlarge United States Armed Forces equipped for combat already located in a foreign nation; the President shall submit within 48 hours to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the President pro tempore of the Senate a report, in writing, setting forth— (A) the circumstances necessitating the introduction of United States Armed Forces; (B) the constitutional and legislative authority under which such introduction took place; and (C) the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or involvement. (b) The President shall provide such other information as the Congress may request in the fulfillment of its constitutional responsibilities with respect to committing the Nation to war and to the use of United States Armed Forces abroad. (c) Whenever United States Armed Forces are introduced into hostilities or into any situation described in subsection (a) of this section, the President shall, so long as such armed forces continue to be engaged in such hostilities or situation, report to the Congress periodically on the status of such hostilities or situation as well as on the scope and duration of such hostilities or situation, but in no event shall he report to the Congress less often than once every six months. CONGRESSIONAL ACTION Section 5. (a) Each report submitted pursuant to section 4(a)(1) shall be transmitted to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the President pro tempore of the Senate on the same calendar day. Each report so transmitted shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate for appropriate action. If, when the report is transmitted, the Congress has adjourned sine die or has adjourned for any period in excess of three calendar days, the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate, if they deem it advisable (or if petitioned by at least 30% of the membership of their respective Houses) shall jointly request the President to convene Congress in order that it may consider the report and take appropriate action pursuant to this section. (b) Within sixty calendar days after a report is submitted or is required to be submitted pursuant to section 4(a)(1), whichever is earlier, the President shall terminate any use of United States Armed Forces with respect to which such report was submitted (or required to be submitted), unless the Congress (1) has declared war or has enacted a specific authorization for such use of United States Armed Forces, (2) has extended by law such sixty-day period, or (3) is physically unable to meet as a result of an armed attack upon the United States. Such sixty-day period shall be extended for not more than an additional thirty days if the President determines and certifies to the Congress in writing that unavoidable military necessity respecting the safety of United States Armed Forces requires the continued use of such armed forces in the course of bringing about a prompt removal of such forces. (c) Notwithstanding subsection (b), at any time that United States Armed Forces are engaged in hostilities outside the territory of the United States, its possessions and territories without a declaration of war or specific statutory authorization, such forces shall be removed by the President if the Congress so directs by concurrent resolution. CONGRESSIONAL PRIORITY PROCEDURES FOR JOINT RESOLUTION OR BILL Section 6. (a) Any joint resolution or bill introduced pursuant to section 5(b) at least thirty calendar days before the expiration of the sixty-day period specified in such section, shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives or the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, as the case may be, and such committee shall report one such joint resolution or bill, together with its recommendations, not later than twenty-four calendar days before the expiration of the sixty-day period specified in such section, unless such House shall otherwise determine by the yeas and nays. (b) Any joint resolution or bill so reported shall become the pending business of the House in question (in the case of the Senate the time for debate shall be equally divided between the proponents and the opponents), and shall be voted on within three calendar days thereafter, unless such House shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays. (c) Such a joint resolution or bill passed by one House shall be referred to the committee of the other House named in subsection (a) and shall be reported out not later than fourteen calendar days before the expiration of the sixty-day period specified in section 5(b). The joint resolution or bill so reported shall become the pending business of the House in question and shall be voted on within three calendar days after it has been reported, unless such House shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays. (d) In the case of any disagreement between the two Houses of Congress with respect to a joint resolution or bill passed by both Houses, conferees shall be promptly appointed and the committee of conference shall make and file a report with respect to such resolution or bill not later than four calendar days before the expiration of the sixty-day period specified in section 5(b). In the event the conferees are unable to agree within 48 hours, they shall report back to their respective House in disagreement. Notwithstanding any rule in either House concerning the printing of conference reports in the Record or concerning any delay in the consideration of such reports, such report shall be acted on by both Houses not later than the expiration of such sixty-day period. CONGRESSIONAL PRIORITY PROCEDURES FOR CONCURRENT RESOLUTION Section 7. (a) Any concurrent resolution introduced pursuant to section 5(c) shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives or the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, as the case may be, and one such concurrent resolution shall be reported out by such committee together with its recommendations within fifteen calendar days, unless such House shall otherwise determine by the yeas and nays. (b) Any concurrent resolution so reported shall become the pending business of the House in question (in the case of the Senate the time for debate shall be equally divided between the proponents and the opponents) and shall be voted on within three calendar days thereafter, unless such House shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays. (c) Such a concurrent resolution passed by one House shall be referred to the committee of the other House named in subsection (a) and shall be reported out by such committee together with its recommendations within fifteen calendar days and shall thereupon become the pending business of such House and shall be voted upon within three calendar days, unless such House shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays. (d) In the case of any disagreement between the two Houses of Congress with respect to a concurrent resolution passed by both Houses, conferees shall be promptly appointed and the committee of conference shall make and file a report with respect to such concurrent resolution within six calendar days after the legislation is referred to the committee of conference. Notwithstanding any rule in either House concerning the printing of conference reports in the Record or concerning any delay in the consideration of such reports, such report shall be acted on by both Houses not later than six calendar days after the conference report is filed. In the event the conferees are unable to agree within 48 hours, they shall report back to their respective Houses in disagreement. INTERPRETATION OF JOINT RESOLUTION Section 8. (a) Authority to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations wherein involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances shall not be inferred— (1) from any provision of law (whether or not in effect before the date of the enactment of this joint resolution), including any provision contained in any appropriation Act, unless such provision specifically authorizes the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into such situations and states that it is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of this joint resolution; or (2) from any treaty heretofore or hereafter ratified unless such treaty is implemented by legislation specifically authorizing the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into such situations and stating that it is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of this joint resolution. (b) Nothing in this joint resolution shall be construed to require any further specific statutory authorization to permit members of United States Armed Forces to participate jointly with members of the armed forces of one or more foreign countries in the headquarters operations of high-level military commands which were established prior to the date of enactment of this joint resolution and pursuant to the United Nations Charter or any treaty ratified by the United States prior to such date. (c) For purposes of this joint resolution, the term "introduction of United States Armed Forces" includes the assignment of members of such armed forces to command, coordinate, participate in the movement of, or accompany the regular or irregular military forces of any foreign country or government when such military forces are engaged, or there exists an imminent threat that such forces will become engaged, in hostilities. (d) Nothing in this joint resolution— (1) is intended to alter the constitutional authority of the Congress or of the President, or the provisions of existing treaties; or (2) shall be construed as granting any authority to the President with respect to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations wherein involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances which authority he would not have had in the absence of this joint resolution. SEPARABILITY CLAUSE Section 9. If any provision of this joint resolution or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, the remainder of the joint resolution and the application of such provision to any other person or circumstance shall not be affected thereby. EFFECTIVE DATE Section 10. This joint resolution shall take effect on the date of its enactment.

This report discusses and assesses the War Powers Resolution and its application since enactment in 1973, providing detailed background on various cases in which it was used, as well as cases in which issues of its applicability were raised. In the post-Cold War world, Presidents have continued to commit U.S. Armed Forces into potential hostilities, sometimes without a specific authorization from Congress. Thus the War Powers Resolution and its purposes continue to be a potential subject of controversy. On June 7, 1995, the House defeated, by a vote of 217-201, an amendment to repeal the central features of the War Powers Resolution that have been deemed unconstitutional by every President since the law's enactment in 1973. In 1999, after the President committed U.S. military forces to action in Yugoslavia without congressional authorization, Representative Tom Campbell used expedited procedures under the Resolution to force a debate and votes on U.S. military action in Yugoslavia, and later sought, unsuccessfully, through a federal court suit to enforce presidential compliance with the terms of the War Powers Resolution. The War Powers Resolution (P.L. 93-148) was enacted over the veto of President Nixon on November 7, 1973, to provide procedures for Congress and the President to participate in decisions to send U.S. Armed Forces into hostilities. Section 4(a)(1) requires the President to report to Congress any introduction of U.S. forces into hostilities or imminent hostilities. When such a report is submitted, or is required to be submitted, Section 5(b) requires that the use of forces must be terminated within 60 to 90 days unless Congress authorizes such use or extends the time period. Section 3 requires that the "President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before introducing" U.S. Armed Forces into hostilities or imminent hostilities. From 1975 through March 2017, Presidents have submitted 168 reports as the result of the War Powers Resolution, but only one, the 1975 Mayaguez seizure, cited Section 4(a)(1), which triggers the 60-day withdrawal requirement, and in this case the military action was completed and U.S. Armed Forces had disengaged from the area of conflict when the report was made. The reports submitted by the President since enactment of the War Powers Resolution cover a range of military activities, from embassy evacuations to full-scale combat military operations, such as the Persian Gulf conflict, and the 2003 war with Iraq, the intervention in Kosovo, and the anti-terrorism actions in Afghanistan. In some instances, U.S. Armed Forces have been used in hostile situations without formal reports to Congress under the War Powers Resolution. On one occasion, Congress exercised its authority to determine that the requirements of Section 4(a)(1) became operative on August 29, 1983, through passage of the Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution (P.L. 98-119). In 1991 and 2002, Congress authorized, by law, the use of military force against Iraq. In several instances none of the President, Congress, or the courts has been willing to initiate the procedures of or enforce the directives in the War Powers Resolution. In the 115th Congress, U.S. military operations related to the joint counter-Houthi campaign conducted by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in Yemen spurred congressional legislative action in both houses of Congress. The Senate on December 13, 2018, voted to adopt S.J.Res. 54, a joint resolution to "direct the removal of United States Armed Forces from hostilities in the Republic of Yemen that have not been authorized by Congress," marking the first instance that such a joint resolution received consideration and passed the full Senate under the expedited consideration provisions of Section 1013 of the Department of State Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1984 and 1985 (P.L. 98-164; 50 U.S.C. §1546a). In the 116th Congress, the House of Representatives on February 13, 2019, voted to adopt a similar joint resolution on U.S. military involvement in Yemen, H.J.Res. 37, and the Senate is expected to take up a companion measure, S.J.Res. 7, in March 2019.

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Introduction On December 20, 2018, President Trump signed into law a new five-year omnibus farm bill, the Agricultural Improvement Act of 2018 ( P.L. 115-334 ; the 2018 farm bill). The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) will implement the provisions, most of which take effect in calendar year 2019. The 2018 farm bill includes 12 titles covering different program areas. The first title, Title I—Commodities, authorizes several major revenue support and disaster assistance programs (see shaded box below). This report briefly describes the major revenue support programs in Title I of the 2018 farm bill. In addition, it reviews changes to key administrative provisions such as program eligibility and signup, payment acres and yields, payment limits, and cost projections. Appendixes at the end of this report ( Table A-1 to Table A-5 ) provide side-by-side comparisons of the provisions for five of the subtitles of Title I with prior law (as indicated in the shadow box above—Subtitle C, sugar, and Subtitle D, dairy, are discussed elsewhere). Background on Title I Support Programs Aside from dairy and sugar, which have their own specific programs, most grain and oilseed crops produced in the United States are eligible for two tiers of revenue support under Title I of the 2018 farm bill. Specialty crops such as fruits, vegetables, and tree nuts are not covered. The first tier of support is provided by the Marketing Assistance Loan (MAL) program, which offers a minimum price guarantee for production of "loan" commodities in the form of a short-term loan at statutorily set prices ( Table 1 ). The MAL program may be supplemented by a higher, second tier of revenue support comprised of two other programs: (1) the Price Loss Coverage (PLC) program, which provides price protection via statutory fixed "reference" prices for eligible crops, or (2) the Agricultural Risk Coverage (ARC) program, which provides revenue protection via historical moving average revenue guarantees based on the five most recent years of crop prices and yields. PLC and ARC are available for producers that own or rent historical "base" acres of "covered" commodities. The sugar and dairy sectors are supported by separate federal farm programs that are tailored more specifically to the physical differences associated with each of their products—refined sugar and liquid fresh milk—and their respective markets. Disaster assistance is available for producers of most tree crops and livestock. The Noninsured Crop Assistance Program is available for all agricultural commodities that are not covered by a federal crop insurance policy. All of these Title I programs existed under the previous 2014 farm bill. The 2018 farm bill extends their authority through crop year 2023 but with some modifications to most of them. Occasionally, agricultural producers may receive federal support under programs authorized outside of the farm bill. The Secretary of Agriculture has broad latitude under the authority of the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) Charter Act to make direct payments in support of U.S. agriculture. Two such programs implemented in recent years under CCC authority are the Cotton Ginning Cost Share program and the Market Facilitation Program. Separately, under the federal crop insurance program, Title I program commodities—along with more than 100 other crops including fruits and vegetables—are also eligible for subsidized crop insurance, which provides within-year yield (or revenue) protection. The federal crop insurance program is permanently authorized outside of the omnibus farm bill by the Federal Crop Insurance Act (7 U.S.C. §1501 et seq. ). The 2018 farm bill includes Title XI—Crop Insurance, which makes minor adjustments to program implementation but does not alter the underlying authority of the federal crop insurance program. Neither the federal crop insurance program nor programs authorized under the CCC Charter Act are discussed in this report. Policy Rationale for Farm Commodity Subsidies Federal farm support began in the 1930s through Depression-era efforts to raise farm household income when commodity prices were low because of prolonged weak consumer demand. While initially intended to be a temporary effort, the commodity support programs have continued. However, several of them have been modified away from supply control and management of commodity stocks (which was designed to prop up prices) that directly linked support payments to farm production activities into decoupled revenue support that makes payments on historical program acres—referred to as base acres. Proponents of farm revenue support programs argue that federal involvement in the sector is needed to stabilize and support farm incomes by shifting some of the production risks to the federal government. These risks include short-term market price instability often due to weather or international events—both of which are outside the farmer's control. Proponents see the goal of farm policy as maintaining the economic health of the nation's farm sector so that it can use its comparative advantage in supplying domestic demand and competing in the global market for food and fiber. Critics argue that farm revenue support programs waste taxpayer dollars, distort producer behavior in favor of certain crops, capitalize benefits to the owners of the resources, encourage concentration of production, and comparatively harm smaller domestic producers and farmers in lower-income foreign nations. Authorizing Legislation The authority for USDA to operate farm revenue support programs comes from three permanent laws, as amended: the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 (P.L. 75-430), the Agricultural Act of 1949 (P.L. 81-439), and the CCC Charter Act of 1948 (P.L. 80-806). Congress typically alters these laws through multi-year omnibus farm bills to address current market conditions, budget constraints, or other concerns. If a new farm bill is not enacted when an old one expires, farm programs would revert to the permanent laws mentioned above for most of the major program crops. Under permanent law, eligible commodities would be supported under a parity-price formula at levels much higher than they are now, and many of the currently supported commodities might not be eligible. Since reverting to permanent law is incompatible with current national economic objectives, global trading rules, and federal budgetary policies, pressure builds at the end of each farm bill for policymakers to enact another. The 2018 farm bill ( P.L. 115-334 ) contains the most recent version of the farm commodity support programs. It supersedes the commodity provisions of previous farm bills and includes a provision (Section 1702) that suspends the relevant price support provisions of permanent law for the crop (and marketing) years 2019-2023. Eligible Commodities Federal support exists for about two dozen farm commodities representing about one-third of gross farm sales. During the five marketing years of 2014 through 2018, six crops (corn, wheat, soybeans, peanuts, cotton, and rice) accounted for an estimated 92% of farm commodity program payments. Covered Commodities The 2018 farm bill continues to define covered commodities as the crops eligible for the farm revenue support programs PLC and ARC: wheat, oats, barley (including wheat, oats, and barley used for haying and grazing), corn, grain sorghum, long-grain rice, medium-grain rice, seed cotton (unginned upland cotton that contains both lint and seed), pulse crops (dry peas, lentils, small chickpeas, and large chickpeas), soybeans, other oilseeds (including sunflower seed, rapeseed, canola, safflower, flaxseed, mustard seed, crambe, and sesame seed), and peanuts (7 U.S.C. §9011). Each of these commodities has a statutorily defined PLC reference price (listed in Table 1 ). Upland cotton was removed from eligibility as a covered commodity by the 2014 farm bill ( P.L. 113-79 ). However, it indirectly regained its status as a covered commodity, via seed cotton, under the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 ( P.L. 115-113 ). Loan Commodities "Loan commodities" include all of the "covered commodities" plus upland cotton, extra-long-staple cotton, wool, mohair, and honey. These commodities have statutory loan rates ( Table 1 ) and are eligible for the MAL program. Fresh Milk Support for milk production is available in the form of subsidized protection for producer milk margins (milk prices minus feed costs) under the Dairy Margin Coverage program. Sugar Cane and Sugar Beets Sugar support is indirect through import quotas, processor price guarantees, and domestic marketing allotments. No direct payments are made to sugar growers or processors. Agricultural Products Without a Title I Revenue Support Program Livestock, poultry, fruits, vegetables, nuts, hay, and nursery products (about two-thirds of U.S. farm sales) are not eligible to participate in a Title I revenue support program under the 2018 farm bill. However, livestock and fruit tree producers may qualify for partial relief from losses related to natural disasters under one of the four permanently authorized agricultural disaster assistance programs under Title I of the 2018 farm bill. Also, subsidized federal crop insurance is available for more than 100 crops, including fruits, vegetables, and selected livestock activities that are not supported by Title I farm programs. Crop insurance is designed primarily to cover losses from natural disasters or disease and within-season price or revenue declines. Another Title I farm bill program—the Noninsured Crop Disaster Assistance Program—is available for crops not currently covered by crop insurance. Definition of Farm The definition of farm used to administer the revenue support programs is different from common perception or statistical definitions of farm based on size or output. Under USDA's Farm Service Agency (FSA) regulations, a "farm" for program payment purposes is one or more tracts of land considered to be a separate operation. A producer must register each farm operation with USDA and identify the resources (land, labor, equipment, capital, and management) associated with it. Land in a farm does not need to be contiguous. However, all tracts within a farm must have the same operator and the same owner (unless all owners agree to combine multiple tracts into a single FSA farm). Thus, one producer may be operating several "farms" if he or she is renting land from several landlords or has purchased land in several tracts. Base Acres B ase acres describes the historical planted acreage on each FSA farm using a multi-year average from as far back as the 1980s, for purposes of calculating program payments under one of the two revenue support programs—PLC or ARC. As of crop year 2015, USDA reported 273 million base acres, of which 254 million acres were enrolled in either ARC or PLC ( Figure 1 ). Base acres are calculated for each covered commodity and remain with the land when real estate is sold, thus making the new landowner eligible for farm programs. A farm's base acres may increase from year to year if base acres expire from a conservation contract or easement or a producer has eligible oilseed acreage as a result of the Secretary of Agriculture designating a new oilseed eligible as a covered commodity. Similarly, base acres may decline from year to year if some base acres are enrolled in a conservation easement; are converted to certain nonfarm or residential uses and are unlikely to return to agriculture; or are planted to fruits, vegetables, or wild rice in excess of certain planting flexibility rules. Under the PLC and ARC program payment-acre provisions (7 U.S.C. 9014; Table A-1 ), planting flexibility rules allow crops other than the program crop to be grown, but eligible payment acreage is reduced when fruits, vegetables (other than mung beans and pulse crops), or wild rice are planted in excess of 15% of base acres (or 35% depending upon a farmer's program choice discussed below). The reduction to payment acres is one-for-one for every acre in excess of these percentages for that year. A farm with base acres is not obligated to participate in farm programs. For those farms that do participate, once a farm's base acres are enrolled in either ARC or PLC, the farm does not have to plant a particular program crop to be eligible for a program payment. This is because ARC and PLC payments are decoupled from actual crop plantings. However, all participating producers must maintain conservation compliance, which requires planting a cover crop on highly erodible land. Under both the 2014 farm bill ( P.L. 113-79 ) and the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 ( P.L. 115-113 ), the calculation of base acres underwent several changes. These are briefly discussed next. 2014 Farm Bill: Updating Base Acres, Creation of Generic Base Because a farmer's actual plantings may differ from farm base acres, program payments may not necessarily align with financial losses associated with market prices or crop revenue. To better match program payments with farm risk, the 2014 farm bill provided farmers with a one-time opportunity to update individual crop base acres by reallocating acreage within their current base portfolio to match their actual crop mix (plantings) during the crop years 2009-2012. Farmers could also choose to not reallocate their base acres if they expected payments to be maximized under their then-current base acres. Even after the opportunity to update base acres to better match actual farm plantings, disparities remained between base and planted acres ( Figure 2 ). The 2014 farm bill also removed upland cotton from eligibility for the ARC and PLC programs due to a ruling from a World Trade Organization dispute settlement case successfully brought by Brazil against U.S. cotton support programs. Former cotton base acres were renamed "generic base" and added to a producer's base for potential payments if a covered commodity (now excluding upland cotton) was planted on the farm. However, upland cotton remained eligible for the MAL program. Bipartisan Budget Agreement of 2018: Seed Cotton as a Covered Commodity In 2018, seed cotton was added as a covered commodity, but not as a MAL loan commodity, by the Bipartisan Budget Agreement (BBA) of 2018 ( P.L. 115-123 ). Under the BBA, producers were given a choice of how to allocate their generic base acres—either as base acres assigned to seed cotton or to another covered commodity and thus eligible for either ARC or PLC payments or into an unassigned pool where they would be ineligible for ARC or PLC program payments. 2018 Farm Bill: Base Acres Retained from Prior Law with Potential Reduction The 2018 farm bill retained base acres as defined on September 30, 2018, under the 2014 farm bill and inclusive of the BBA changes. Thus, upland cotton remains ineligible for PLC or ARC but is so indirectly via seed cotton. The 2018 farm bill also added a provision (Section 1102(b)) regarding base-acre eligibility for ARC or PLC program payments. If base acres were planted continuously to grass or pasture (including fallow acres) during the nine-year period extending from January 1, 2009, through December 31, 2017, then those affected base acres are not eligible for ARC or PLC payments during the life of the 2018 farm bill—that is, during crop years 2019-2023. However, these acres would remain eligible to be counted as base acres for a future farm bill. Eligible Producers The 2018 farm bill defines producer (for purposes of revenue support program benefits) as an owner-operator, landlord, tenant, or sharecropper who shares in the risk of producing a crop and is entitled to a share of the crop produced on the farm. Participation in revenue support programs is free. However, an individual must comply with certain requirements to be eligible for most program payments. These requirements include: Actively engaged in farming (AEF) . Each individual must provide a significant contribution of capital (land or equipment) and personal labor or active personal management to the farm operation, share in the risk of loss from the farm operation, and receive a share of the output as compensation. Legal entities can be actively engaged if members collectively contribute personal labor or active personal management. Special classes allow landowners to be considered actively engaged if they receive income based on the farm's operating results without providing labor or management (as described below). Conservation co mpliance . A producer agrees to maintain a minimum level of conservation on highly erodible land and not to convert or make production possible on wetlands. Adjusted gross income (AGI) thr eshold . Persons with combined farm and nonfarm AGI in excess of $900,000 are ineligible for most program benefits. Average AGI is measured from the three tax years prior to the most recent taxable year. The AGI limit may be waived on a case-by-case basis to protect environmentally sensitive land of special significance. Minimum farm size . A producer on a farm may not receive farm program payments if the sum of the base acres on the farm is 10 acres or less. Two producer groups are excluded from this prohibition: beginning farmers and ranchers and veteran farmers and ranchers. Eligibility and Tenancy A farm operation usually involves some combination of owned and rented land. The amount of total land in farms rented by farm operators has ranged between 34% and 43% of farmland during 1964-2012. In 2014, an estimated 39% of farmland was rented—80% of rented farmland is owned by non-operator landlords. Two types of rental arrangements are common: cash rent and share rent. Cash Renting Base Acres Under cash rental contracts, the tenant pays a fixed cash rent to the landlord. The landlord receives the same rent irrespective of market conditions, bears no risk in production, and thus fails to meet the AEF criteria and is not eligible to receive program payments. The tenant bears all of the risk, takes all of the harvest, and receives all of the program payment. Even though tenants might receive all of the government payments under cash rent arrangements, they might not keep all of the benefits if landlords demand higher rent. Economists widely agree that a large portion of government farm payments passes through to landlords, since government payments boost the rental value of land. Share Cropping Base Acres Under share rental contracts, the tenant usually supplies most or all of the labor and machinery, while the landlord supplies land and perhaps some machinery or management. Both the landlord and the tenant bear risk in producing a crop and receive a portion of the harvest. In most cases, both meet the AEF criteria and are eligible to share in the government subsidy. Farm Commodity Revenue Support Programs The farm revenue support program provisions from Title I of the 2014 farm bill are largely preserved under the 2018 farm bill but with some modifications, as identified below. The Marketing Assistance Loan (MAL) Program The MAL program has been in existence, in one form or another, since the 1930s. Its longevity as a farm program derives from its utility at providing both short-term financing and a guaranteed floor price. This is done by offering producers a nonrecourse nine-month loan—valued at a commodity-specific, statutorily-fixed loan rate—for all harvested production of qualifying crops. These qualifying crops are referred to as loan commodities ( Table 1 ). Because MAL benefits are directly linked to the harvested output, benefits are said to be "coupled." No Signup, but Participation Requires a Harvested Crop No pre-planting signup is necessary to participate in the MAL program, and a producer does not need to own or rent base acres to be eligible. However, a producer must have a harvested crop to use as collateral for the loan. Thus, if a producer suffers a crop failure due to a natural disaster and has no marketable crop, the MAL program is not available as a program option. How the MAL Program Works At harvest time, crop prices are usually at their lowest point for the year because of the large supply of harvested crops entering the marketplace at the same time. To avoid selling into a weak market, the MAL program offers producers the option to put a harvested loan commodity under a nine-month nonrecourse loan valued at a statutorily fixed, per-unit commodity loan rate ( Table 1 ) using the crop as collateral. Thus, MAL benefits are coupled to the harvested crop. Nonrecourse means that USDA must accept the pledged crop (i.e., the collateral) as full payment of an outstanding loan if the collateral is forfeited. During the nine-month loan period, producers will consider whether market prices are above or below the MAL loan rate. If they are above the loan rate, producers will pay off their loans and reclaim their collateral crops to sell into the higher priced marketplace. However, if market prices are below the loan rate, then producers may consider forfeiting their crop to USDA and keeping the loan value as payment. Thus, the statutory loan rate, in effect, establishes a price guarantee. Under the 2018 farm bill a producer has additional choices besides forfeiture in claiming MAL benefits when market prices are low (see " Policy Evolution of the MAL Program " section below). Policy Evolution of the MAL Program In the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, during extended periods when commodity prices were below the MAL loan rates, many producers chose to forfeit their crops to USDA rather than repay their MAL loans at the higher loan rate. These forfeitures led to large accumulations of grain and oilseed stocks by USDA. These government-held stocks were costly to taxpayers and contributed to market conditions of oversupply. In the 1980s and 1990s, Congress redesigned the MAL program to avoid government stock accumulation by offering alternative repayment prices to the statutory loan rates (see box below). Under current law, prior to loan maturity, producers may compare the repayment prices announced by USDA for their localities with the statutory MAL loan rates for each eligible commodity before selecting from among several potential MAL program benefits. A Producer Has Four Potential Repayment Choices Under an MAL Loan Under current law (as continued by the 2018 farm bill), a producer with a commodity under an MAL loan has several repayment options. If the USDA-announced repayment rate is at or above the loan rate, the farmer repays the loan principal and interest and reclaims the commodity. In contrast, when the announced repayment rate is below the loan rate, the farmer may choose from among four potential options: Loan deficiency payment ( LDP ). Rather than putting the harvested crop under an MAL, a farmer may request an LDP with the per-unit payment rate equal to the difference between the loan rate and loan repayment rate. The farmer receives the LDP payment and keeps the crop to sell or use on farm. Marketing loan gain (MLG) . A participating farmer with a crop under an MAL loan can repay the loan at the USDA-announced repayment price and pocket the difference (between the loan rate and the repayment rate) as an MLG. The farmer keeps the MLG and the crop to sell or use on farm. Commodity certificate exchange . A farmer may use commodity certificates—paper certificates with a dollar denomination that may be exchanged for commodities in USDA inventory—to repay an MAL loan at the lower USDA-announced price and keep the associated price gain. The farmer keeps the gain and the crop to sell or use on farm. Forfeiture . A producer can forfeit the pledged crop to USDA at the end of the loan period. The producer may keep any price gains associated with forfeiture but relinquishes access to the crop. Higher MAL Loan Rates for Some Commodities Under the 2018 Farm Bill The level of revenue support provided by the MAL program varies with market conditions and the relationship between MAL loan rates and market prices. The 2018 farm bill raised MAL loan rates for several loan commodities, including barley, corn, grain sorghum, oats, extra-long-staple cotton, sugar, rice, soybeans, dry peas, lentils, and small and large chickpeas. The MAL program's usefulness as a risk management and marketing tool varies widely across program crops depending on the relationship between farm prices and the statutory loan rates. Under the 2018 farm bill (Section 1703): MAL benefits are no longer subject to annual payment limits (this includes MLG and LDP benefits, as well as any gains under commodity certificates and forfeiture). Under the previous 2014 farm bill: MLG and LDP benefits combined with payments under PLC and ARC were subject to a payment limit of $125,000 per person for all covered commodities (except peanuts, which has a separate limit of $125,000). However, MAL gains under commodity certificates and forfeiture were excluded from payment limits. PLC and ARC Programs A second tier of revenue support is available under the PLC and ARC programs. PLC and ARC provide income support to covered commodities at levels above the price protection offered by the MAL program's loan rates. ARC and PLC were first authorized under the 2014 farm bill ( P.L. 113-79 ). The 2018 farm bill extends both programs but with several modifications intended to increase producer flexibility in their use. Participation is free. However, a producer must own or rent base acres to participate. In addition, a producer must elect ARC or PLC for the farm's historical base acres and enroll his or her farm operation in the elected program. Unlike MAL payments, which are coupled to harvested crops, PLC and ARC payments are decoupled and made proportional to base acres. Producer Election Producers choose between PLC and ARC depending on their preference for protection against a decline in (a) crop prices or (b) crop revenue, respectively. Payments under the PLC program are triggered when the national market-year average farm price (MYAP) for a covered commodity is below its "effective reference price" ( Figure 3 ). In contrast, ARC payments are triggered when crop revenue is below its guaranteed level based on a multi-year moving average of historical crop revenue ( Figure 5 ). Producers can elect ARC at either the county (ARC-CO) or individual farm (ARC-IC) level. PLC and ARC-CO choices can vary by "covered" commodities (for a list of covered commodities, see Table 1 ), whereas ARC-IC includes all "covered" commodities on a farm under a single whole-farm revenue guarantee. Under the 2014 farm bill, producers had a one-time choice between ARC and PLC, on a commodity-by-commodity basis that lasted for five crop years (2014-2018). In contrast, the 2018 farm bill allows producers to alter their program choices more frequently. In 2019, producers may select ARC or PLC coverage, on a commodity-by-commodity basis, effective for both crop years 2019 and 2020. If no initial choice is made, then the default is whichever program was in effect during crop years 2015 through 2018 under the 2014 farm bill. Then, beginning in 2021, producers may again choose (i.e., make a new election) between ARC and PLC annually by covered commodity for each of crop year 2021, 2022, and 2023. In addition, producers now may remotely and electronically sign annual or multi-year contracts for ARC and PLC. Price Loss Coverage (PLC) PLC price protection is based on a statutorily fixed reference price ( Table 1 ) that may be temporarily increased under certain conditions. Under the 2014 farm bill version of the PLC program, producers received payments on a portion of their enrolled base acres when the national MYAP for the enrolled covered commodity was below its reference price set in statute. This option was attractive if farmers expected farm prices to drop below the reference price for a covered commodity. The 2018 farm bill added a provision (Section 1101) that replaced the statutory reference price with an "effective reference price" that may increase to as much as 115% of the statutory PLC reference price based on market conditions. The effective reference price is determined by a formula as the higher of the statutory reference price or 85% of the five-year Olympic average of the national MYAP for the five preceding years. PLC Payment Formula Under the 2018 farm bill, the PLC program will make a payment when the MYAP for a covered commodity is less than the effective reference price. See Figure 3 for a graphical interpretation of the formula and Figure 4 for a hypothetical example for rice. The farm's total PLC payments for a covered commodity may be calculated as follows: The PLC per-unit payment rate equals the difference between the effective PLC reference price and the higher of the MYAP or the MAL loan rate. The PLC per-acre payment rate equals the PLC per-unit payment rate times the program yield (described below). The PLC total payment equals the PLC per-acre payment rate times 85% of base acres signed up for the respective covered commodity. PLC Payment Yield PLC payment yields are similar to base acres in that they are historical farm-level, crop-specific measures that are used to determine program payments under the PLC program. Producers were given the option of updating their payment yields under the 2002, 2014, and 2018 farm bills. Under the 2014 farm bill, producers were given an opportunity to update payment yields, on a covered-commodity-by-covered-commodity basis, using 90% of average yields for the 2008-2012 crop years—excluding any year in which acreage planted to the covered commodity was zero. Producers could also use a "plug" yield in the update calculation, equal to 75% of the five-year average county yield for a covered commodity, if the farm-level yield for any of the 2008-2012 crop years was less than 75% of the average county yield during that period. The yield update election had to be made so as to be in effect beginning with the 2014 crop year. Under the 2018 farm bill, producers could again update program yields, on a covered-commodity-by-covered-commodity basis, using 90% of the average of the yield per planted acre for the 2013-2017 crop years. However, unlike the 2014 farm bill yield update which used the simple average for the data period, the 2018 farm bill yield update was subject to a commodity-specific adjustment factor to account for any national increase in trend yield. Producers could again use a "plug" yield in the update calculation, equal to 75% of the average county yield for a covered commodity during the 2013-2017 crop years, if the farm-level yield for any year was less than 75% of the average county yield during that period. Any year in which planted acreage to the covered commodity was zero could be excluded from the calculation. The yield update election must be made so as to be in effect beginning with the 2020 crop year. Agriculture Risk Coverage (ARC) Producers more concerned about declines in crop revenue (i.e., yield times price) than price can select the county ARC program (ARC-CO) as an alternative to PLC for each covered commodity. Under ARC-CO, payments are triggered when the annual county revenue for a covered commodity is less than 86% of its recent five-year average revenue. If farmers prefer farm-level revenue protection based on farm-level yields, then they could choose to combine all covered commodities into a single, whole-farm revenue guarantee under the farm-level "individual" ARC (ARC-IC) program. County ARC (ARC-CO) The ARC-CO program has a county revenue guarantee, and only a crop revenue loss at the county level triggers a payment. The ARC-CO crop revenue guarantee equals 86% of the county benchmark revenue ( Figure 5 ). The benchmark revenue is the product of the five-year Olympic average of county yields (measured as units of output per acre) and the five-year Olympic average of the higher of the national MYAP or the PLC effective reference price. An ARC-CO payment is made if the current-year county revenue (calculated as the product of county yield and national MYAP) is below the ARC-CO revenue guarantee. The ARC-CO payment rate, which equals the difference between the per-acre county revenue guarantee and the actual county per-acre crop revenue, is capped at 10% of benchmark revenue. With the revenue guarantee set at 86% of the benchmark revenue, the producer absorbs the first 14% of any shortfall, and the government absorbs the next 10% of revenue shortfall. Remaining losses may be backstopped by crop insurance if purchased at sufficient coverage levels by the producer and by the MAL program. Similar to PLC, the ARC-CO payment formula for a particular covered commodity is the ARC-CO payment rate times 85% times the number of base acres enrolled in ARC-CO. See Figure 5 for a graphical interpretation of the formula and Figure 6 for a hypothetical example for corn. County Yield Data Changes Under the 2014 farm bill, USDA's National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) was the primary source for the county yield estimates used in the ARC-CO formulas. However, when USDA announced its first ARC-CO payments under the then-new program in 2015, significant discrepancies in county-level payments were discovered. These discrepancies appeared to be due, in part, to how average county yield calculations were being made. If a county lacked sufficient NASS data, then USDA would use Risk Management Agency (RMA) yield data based on crop insurance program participation. A comparison of the two estimates suggested that RMA yields were frequently higher than NASS yields at the county level. As a result, payments to producers in counties where RMA yields were used could be substantially lower than payments in counties using NASS yields. Congress showed interest in minimizing such discrepancies. Since RMA yield data were more widely available at the county level than NASS yield data, there was considerable debate about switching yield data prioritization for ARC-CO calculations to the RMA data. Under the 2018 farm bill (Section 1107), yield data from RMA are made the primary source for county average yield calculations for the ARC-CO benchmark revenue. Where RMA data are not available, USDA is to determine the data source considering data from NASS or the yield history of representative farms in the state, region, or crop-reporting district. Also, ARC-CO is to use a trend-adjusted yield to calculate the benchmark revenue, as is done by RMA for the federal crop insurance program. Finally, the five-year Olympic average county yield calculations are to include a yield plug (equal to 80% of the 10-year average county yield) for each year where actual county yield is lower than the estimated plug. Other 2018 farm bill (Section 1107) modifications to ARC-CO include allowing yields used in ARC-CO revenue calculations to be calculated separately for irrigated and non-irrigated land in each county and basing ARC-CO payments on the physical location of the farm—farms that cross multiple counties are prorated for each county. Finally, up to 25 counties nationwide may subdivide for ARC-CO yield calculations to reflect significant yield deviations within a county. Such subdivision is to be based on certain criteria: A county must be larger than 1,400 square miles and have more than 190,000 base acres. Individual ARC (ARC-IC) Instead of an ARC-CO revenue guarantee on a crop-by-crop basis, farmers could select a farm-level guarantee that includes all covered commodities on a farm under one revenue guarantee. The farm-level revenue guarantee is again based on a five-year moving average of farm-level yields for each crop year, multiplied by the higher of the reference price or the MYAP, that aggregates all crop revenue into a single, whole-farm guarantee. The individual ARC payment formula is 65% times the number of total base acres for the farm times the difference between the whole-farm revenue guarantee and the actual whole-farm crop revenue. The calculation for the guarantee and actual revenue are based on the aggregation of all covered commodities on the farm using individual farm yields instead of county yields. Decoupled Payments Made on Base Acres A participating farmer does not have to plant or harvest a covered commodity to receive a PLC or ARC payment. However, a portion of the farm's base acres must be enrolled in either PLC or ARC for that covered commodity. This is because ARC-CO, ARC-IC, and PLC payments are decoupled: Payments are made on a portion of a crop's enrolled base acres rather than actual production. If ARC-CO or PLC program payments are triggered, then they are made on 85% of the producer's base acres that were enrolled for that covered commodity irrespective of actual plantings. ARC-IC payments are made on a reduced 65% of base acres. Payments are made with a lag of approximately one year, as a full 12-month marketing year must be completed to compile the annual price and yield data necessary for USDA's calculations. According to statute (Section 1106 for PLC, Section 1107 for ARC), USDA is to announce payments no later than 30 days after the end of each marketing year. However, the actual payments may not be made prior to October 1 after the end of the applicable marketing year for the covered commodity. The marketing year varies by crop. For example, the marketing year for corn or soybeans harvested in fall 2019 ends on August 31, 2020. Thus, corn and soybean payments must be announced by September 30, 2020, but may not be made before October 1, 2020. Payment Limits The enacted 2018 farm bill sets a $125,000 per-person cap on the total combined payments of PLC and ARC for all covered commodities on a farming operation except peanuts, which has a separate $125,000 limit. In addition, a provision in the 2018 farm bill (Section 1603) specifies that any reductions in PLC and ARC payments due to sequestration must be applied before evaluating payment limit criteria. The 2018 farm bill (Section 1703) removed MAL program payments from any payment limit criteria. Payment limits may be doubled if the farm operator has a spouse. On family farming operations, all family members ages 18 or older are deemed to meet AEF criteria and are eligible for a separate payment limit. Prior to the 2018 farm bill, family membership was based on lineal ascendants or descendants but was also extended to siblings and spouses. The 2018 farm bill (Section 1703(a)(1)(B)) expands the definition of family farm to include cousins, nephews, and nieces. Miscellaneous Payment Programs Producers of upland cotton may also benefit from payments under two 2018 farm bill provisions: Section 1203(b), which provides economic adjustment assistance to users of upland cotton, and Section 1201(b)(2), which authorizes cotton storage cost reimbursements under certain market conditions. Economic adjustment assistance payments are made to domestic users for all documented use of upland cotton on a monthly basis, regardless of the origin of the upland cotton (imported or domestic). The payment rate is $0.03 per pound. Although the payments are made to cotton users, at least a portion of the payment is likely returned to producers in the form of higher prices associated with the increased demand from domestic users. The cotton storage cost reimbursement is generally referred to as a storage credit, since it is used to reduce the loan repayment rate by a portion of the accrued storage costs for upland cotton that has been placed under a MAL loan. It does not involve any actual CCC budgetary outlay but rather is a reduction in potential receipts from the CCC budget. The availability of a cotton storage credit is determined by the relationship between the MAL rate for upland cotton, the weekly announced average world price, and the accrued interest and storage charges specific to each bale of cotton placed under the MAL program. Interaction with Federal Crop Insurance Federal crop insurance directly intersects with farm programs when producers choose between the ARC and PLC programs. For producers who select the PLC, additional price protection is available by purchasing Supplemental Coverage Option (SCO). SCO is a crop insurance product that was permanently authorized under the 2014 farm bill (Section 11003). SCO is designed to cover part of the deductible on a producer's underlying crop insurance policy. SCO is not available for base acres enrolled in ARC. Dairy and Sugar Programs The sugar (Subtitle C) and dairy (Subtitle D) programs are essential parts of Title I of the 2018 farm bill. However, their programs differ markedly from the MAL, PLC, and ARC programs. Neither dairy nor sugar program benefits are subject to any per-person payment limit. In addition, the commodities themselves differ from the other Title I commodities (primarily grain and oilseed crops) in the nature of their output—fluid milk and refined sugar, how these commodities are processed and stored, and the markets that they are sold into. As a result, the dairy and sugar programs are briefly discussed below but are described in more detail in other reports. The Dairy Margin Coverage Program The current U.S. dairy program—known as the Dairy Margin Coverage (DMC) program—was first authorized by the 2014 farm bill under the previous name of Margin Protection Program (MPP). The DMC offers milk producers a range of milk price margin protection levels based on their historical milk production. The milk margin is defined as the difference between the farm price per hundred pounds (cwt) of milk and the price of a representative feed ration based on USDA-announced prices for milk and major feed ingredients (corn, soymeal, and alfalfa hay). The DMC pays participating dairy producers the difference (when positive) between a producer-selected DMC margin protection level and the actual national milk margin. Producers must sign up for the program and pay an administrative fee of $100. Producers choose coverage either at the free $4.00/cwt margin or pay a premium that increases for higher milk production coverage levels and higher margin protection thresholds. The 2018 farm bill significantly revised the margin program, including renaming it as the DMC. Premium rates for the first 5 million pounds of milk coverage were lowered; the range of margin protection for the first 5 million pounds of production was expanded (the previous range was $4.50/cwt to $8.00/cwt; the new range is $4.50/cwt to $9.50/cwt); the range of margin protection available for the production beyond the first 5 million pounds retains the previous $4.50-$8.00/cwt range of choices but with slightly higher premiums; and producers may now cover a larger quantity of milk production (up to 95% of their historical base production). DMC is authorized through December 31, 2023. Also, under the 2018 farm bill, dairy producers may receive a 25% discount on their premiums if they select and lock in their margin and production coverage levels for the entire five years (calendar years 2019-2023) of the DMC program. Otherwise, producers may select coverage levels annually. Also under DMC, dairy producers may apply to USDA for reimbursement of MPP premiums paid, less any payments received, during calendar years 2014-2017. Unlike MPP, the DMC program allows dairy producers to participate in both margin coverage and the Livestock Gross Margin-Dairy insurance program that insures the margin between feed costs and a designated milk price. The Sugar Program Current law mandates that raw cane and refined beet sugar prices are supported through a combination of limits on domestic output that can be sold (marketing allotments), nonrecourse marketing assistance loans for domestic sugar (but at the processor level), quotas that limit imports, and a sugar-to-ethanol backstop program (Feedstock Flexibility Program). These sugar program features result in essentially no federal outlays. The only change to the sugar program under the 2018 farm bill was a 5% increase in the MAL rate for raw cane and refined beet sugar ( Table 1 ). U.S. producers of both sugar and milk receive important price support via import protection from international competitor products under tariff-rate quotas (TRQs). Such TRQ support does not incur a direct cost to the federal government. Instead, domestic consumers bear the costs. For example, despite incurring no federal outlays, the U.S. government notifies sugar TRQ protection annually to the World Trade Organization as market price support (valued at over $1.4 billion in 2014). Agricultural Disaster Assistance Programs Four disaster assistance programs that focus primarily on livestock and tree crops were permanently authorized in the 2014 farm bill. These disaster assistance programs provide federal assistance to help farmers and ranchers recover financially from natural disasters, including drought and floods. Participation is free. The Livestock Indemnity Program (LIP) compensates producers at a rate of 75% of market value for livestock mortality or livestock sold at a loss. Eligible loss conditions may include (1) extreme or abnormal damaging weather that is not expected to occur during the loss period for which it occurred, (2) disease that is caused or transmitted by a vector and is not susceptible to control by vaccination, and (3) an attack by animals reintroduced into the wild by the federal government or protected by federal law. The Livestock Forage Disaster Program (LFP) provides payments to eligible livestock producers who have suffered grazing losses on drought-affected pastureland (including cropland planted specifically for grazing) or on rangeland managed by a federal agency due to a qualifying fire. The Tree Assistance Program (TAP) provides payments to eligible orchardists and nursery growers to replant or rehabilitate trees, bushes, and vines damaged by natural disasters, disease, and insect infestation. Eligible losses must exceed 15% after adjustment for normal mortality. Payments cover 65% of the cost of replanting trees or nursery stock and 50% of the cost of rehabilitation (e.g., pruning and removal). The Emergency Assistance for Livestock, Honey Bees, and Farm-Raised Fish Program (ELAP) provides payments to producers of livestock, honey bees, and farm-raised fish as compensation for losses due to disease, adverse weather, feed or water shortages, or other conditions (such as wildfires) that are not covered under LIP or LFP. The 2018 farm bill amended the permanent agricultural disaster assistance programs by expanding the definition of eligible producer to include Indian tribes or tribal organizations. It also expanded payments under LIP for livestock losses caused by disease and for losses of unweaned livestock that occur before vaccination. It increased replanting and rehabilitation payment rates for orchardists who are beginning farmers or veterans under TAP. Finally, it removed payment limits on ELAP. Of the four disaster assistance programs, only the LFP is now subject to the $125,000 per-person payment limit. Noninsured Crop Disaster Assistance Program (NAP) NAP is available for production of all agricultural commodities that are not covered by a federal crop insurance policy. NAP was permanently authorized by the 1996 farm bill (Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act; P.L. 104-127 ). The 2018 farm bill (Section 1601) amended NAP by increasing the per-crop signup fee to $325 per crop, or $825 per producer per county, but not to exceed $1,950 per producer. Also, NAP eligibility was expanded to include crops that may be covered by select forms of crop insurance but only under whole farm plans or weather index policies. The 2018 farm bill also amended the payment calculation to consider the producer's share of the crop. NAP offers both catastrophic coverage (a crop loss of at least 50% valued at 55% of the average market price) and additional buy-up coverage (ranging from 50% to 65% of established yields and 100% of the average market price). The 2018 farm bill made buy-up coverage permanent, added data collection and program coordination requirements, and created separate payment limits for catastrophic ($125,000 per person) and buy-up ($300,000 per person) coverage. Estimated Cost of the Commodity Title CBO projects USDA spending for Title I farm commodity and disaster programs under the 2018 farm bill at $31.3 billion for the five-year 2019-2023 period. This translates to $6.3 billion annually, including projected annual outlays of $4.1 billion for PLC and $1.2 billion for ARC ( Table 2 ). This contrasts with estimated annual outlays on Title I programs under the 2014 farm bill of $7.2 billion, including $1.8 billion for PLC and $3.3 billion for ARC. Under the 2014 farm bill, most acres of corn, soybeans, and wheat—the three largest crops produced annually in the United States—were enrolled in ARC (93%, 97%, and 56%, respectively). This preference for enrollment in ARC contributed to larger annual payment outlays under ARC ($3.3 billion per year on average) than PLC ($1.8 billion per year) under the 2014 farm bill. CBO's spending projections assume that a large proportion of producers will switch from participating in ARC to PLC under the 2018 farm bill ( Figure 7 ). The assumed shift in participation between the two programs is driven by projections of farm prices for major program crops to track near or below PLC reference prices throughout the 10-year projection period, thus implying greater potential for PLC payments. The substantial projected shift in participation from ARC to PLC is projected to result in significantly larger annual outlays under the PLC program ($4.1 billion per year) than under the ARC program ($1.2 billion per year) under the five-year life of the 2018 farm bill, crop years 2019-2023 ( Table 2 and Figure 8 ). Annual program outlays can be highly variable. This is because spending on the farm revenue support programs—MAL, PLC, and ARC—is market-driven, and disaster assistance payments are associated with unpredictable acts of nature. Given the counter-cyclical design of the PLC and ARC programs, if commodity prices turn out to be higher than projected, then outlays will be lower than projected levels (and vice versa). Appendix. Comparison of Major Title I Provisions in Prior Law and the Enacted 2018 Farm Bill, by Subtitle This appendix provides a side-by-side comparison of provisions from Title I (the Commodity title) of the 2018 farm bill with prior law—that is, provisions from Title I of the 2014 farm bill ( P.L. 113-79 ) as amended by subsequent law including the Bipartisan Budget Agreement (BBA) of 2018 ( P.L. 115-123 ). The BBA made substantial changes to both the dairy program and the treatment of cotton under the PLC and ARC programs. Each subtitle (A-G) is individually examined in a separate table with the exception of Subtitle C (Sugar) and Subtitle D (Dairy), which are examined in more detail by other CRS products. This appendix includes the following tables by subtitle. Table A-1. Subtitle A—Commodity PolicyTable A-2. Subtitle B—Marketing LoansTable A-3. Subtitle E—Supplemental Agricultural Disaster AssistanceTable A-4. Subtitle F—Noninsured Crop AssistanceTable A-5. Subtitle G—Administration For information on the dairy and sugar programs and their explicit legislative text, see: CRS Report R45525, The 2018 Farm Bill (P.L. 115-334): Summary and Side-by-Side Comparison , coordinated by Mark A. McMinimy; CRS In Focus IF10750, Farm Bill Primer: Dairy Safety Net , by Joel L. Greene; CRS In Focus IF10833, Dairy Provisions in the Bipartisan Budget Act (P.L. 115-123) , by Joel L. Greene; CRS In Focus IF10223, Fundamental Elements of the U.S. Sugar Program , by Mark A. McMinimy; and CRS Report R43998, U.S. Sugar Program Fundamentals , by Mark A. McMinimy.

The farm commodity program provisions in Title I of the Agricultural Improvement Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-334; the 2018 farm bill) include revenue support programs for major program crops and permanent agricultural disaster assistance programs for producers of most tree crops and livestock. Aside from dairy and sugar, which have their own specific programs, most grain and oilseed crops produced in the United States are eligible for two tiers of revenue support under Title I of the 2018 farm bill—specialty crops such as fruits, vegetables, and tree nuts are not covered. The first tier of support is provided by the Marketing Assistance Loan (MAL) program, which offers interim financing for production of "loan" commodities in the form of a nine-month nonrecourse loan at statutorily set prices. A producer must have a harvested crop to offer as collateral for the MAL loan. Nonrecourse means that, if forfeited, USDA must accept the crop pledged as collateral as full payment of an outstanding loan. Thus, the statutory loan rates serve as minimum price guarantees for eligible commodities. The MAL program may be supplemented by a higher, second tier of revenue support comprised of (1) the Price Loss Coverage (PLC) program, which provides price protection at the national level via statutory fixed "reference" prices for eligible crops, or (2) the Agricultural Risk Coverage (ARC) program, which provides revenue protection via historical moving average revenue guarantees based on the five most recent years of national crop prices and county or farm average yields. Participation is free for both ARC and PLC. However, a producer must own or rent historical "base" acres of "covered" commodities. In addition, producers must sign up and elect either PLC or a county-coverage ARC program (ARC-CO) on a crop-by-crop basis or enroll all covered commodities together in a whole-farm revenue guarantee under an individual-coverage ARC program (ARC-IC). The dairy and sugar sectors are supported by separate federal farm programs that are tailored more specifically to the physical differences associated with each of their products—liquid fresh milk and refined sugar—and their respective markets. For dairy, the Dairy Margin Coverage (DMC) program offers producers milk margin protection for a range of margin thresholds—the milk margin equals the difference between the all-milk farm price and the price of a formula-based feed ration—and for a producer-selected portion (ranging from 5% to 95%) of historical milk production. Milk producers must sign up, select both margin and milk production coverage levels, and pay a premium that varies with coverage levels. The U.S. dairy sector also benefits from tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) on selected dairy products. The sugar program provides revenue support through a combination of limits on domestic output sales (marketing allotments), nonrecourse MAL loans for domestic sugar production (but at the processor level), a sugar-to-ethanol backstop program (Feedstock Flexibility Program), and quotas that limit imports. The import quotas for dairy and sugar are authorized outside of the omnibus farm bill. Disaster assistance is available for producers of most tree crops and livestock. The Noninsured Crop Assistance Program (NAP) is available for all agricultural production that is not covered by a federal crop insurance policy. All of these programs have permanent authority. However, the 2018 farm bill amends most of them. The enacted 2018 farm bill continues a $125,000 per-person cap on combined PLC and ARC payments but excludes MAL program benefits from the limit. The limit applies to the total from all covered commodities except peanuts, which has a separate $125,000 limit. To be eligible for payments, persons must be actively engaged in farming (AEF). Payment limits are doubled if the farm operator has a spouse. On family farming operations, all family members 18 years or older are deemed AEF and eligible for payments, including cousins, nephews, and nieces. The 2018 farm bill retains the adjusted gross income (AGI) limit for payment eligibility of $900,000. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects outlays for Title I provisions of the 2018 farm bill for the five-year period (FY2019-FY2023) to average $6.3 billion compared with an estimated $7.2 billion in annual outlays under the 2014 farm bill. Based on projected market-price-to-PLC-reference price ratios, producers are expected to shift their preference toward PLC over ARC under the 2018 farm bill, resulting in a shift in program outlays concentrated more on PLC than ARC. The farm commodity program provisions in Title I of the Agricultural Improvement Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-334; the 2018 farm bill) include revenue support programs for major program crops and permanent agricultural disaster assistance programs for producers of most tree crops and livestock. Aside from dairy and sugar, which have their own specific programs, most grain and oilseed crops produced in the United States are eligible for two tiers of revenue support under Title I of the 2018 farm bill—specialty crops such as fruits, vegetables, and tree nuts are not covered. The first tier of support is provided by the Marketing Assistance Loan (MAL) program, which offers interim financing for production of "loan" commodities in the form of a nine-month nonrecourse loan at statutorily set prices. A producer must have a harvested crop to offer as collateral for the MAL loan. Nonrecourse means that, if forfeited, USDA must accept the crop pledged as collateral as full payment of an outstanding loan. Thus, the statutory loan rates serve as minimum price guarantees for eligible commodities. The MAL program may be supplemented by a higher, second tier of revenue support comprised of (1) the Price Loss Coverage (PLC) program, which provides price protection at the national level via statutory fixed "reference" prices for eligible crops, or (2) the Agricultural Risk Coverage (ARC) program, which provides revenue protection via historical moving average revenue guarantees based on the five most recent years of national crop prices and county or farm average yields. Participation is free for both ARC and PLC. However, a producer must own or rent historical "base" acres of "covered" commodities. In addition, producers must sign up and elect either PLC or a county-coverage ARC program (ARC-CO) on a crop-by-crop basis or enroll all covered commodities together in a whole-farm revenue guarantee under an individual-coverage ARC program (ARC-IC). The dairy and sugar sectors are supported by separate federal farm programs that are tailored more specifically to the physical differences associated with each of their products—liquid fresh milk and refined sugar—and their respective markets. For dairy, the Dairy Margin Coverage (DMC) program offers producers milk margin protection for a range of margin thresholds—the milk margin equals the difference between the all-milk farm price and the price of a formula-based feed ration—and for a producer-selected portion (ranging from 5% to 95%) of historical milk production. Milk producers must sign up, select both margin and milk production coverage levels, and pay a premium that varies with coverage levels. The U.S. dairy sector also benefits from tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) on selected dairy products. The sugar program provides revenue support through a combination of limits on domestic output sales (marketing allotments), nonrecourse MAL loans for domestic sugar production (but at the processor level), a sugar-to-ethanol backstop program (Feedstock Flexibility Program), and quotas that limit imports. The import quotas for dairy and sugar are authorized outside of the omnibus farm bill. Disaster assistance is available for producers of most tree crops and livestock. The Noninsured Crop Assistance Program (NAP) is available for all agricultural production that is not covered by a federal crop insurance policy. All of these programs have permanent authority. However, the 2018 farm bill amends most of them. The enacted 2018 farm bill continues a $125,000 per-person cap on combined PLC and ARC payments but excludes MAL program benefits from the limit. The limit applies to the total from all covered commodities except peanuts, which has a separate $125,000 limit. To be eligible for payments, persons must be actively engaged in farming (AEF). Payment limits are doubled if the farm operator has a spouse. On family farming operations, all family members 18 years or older are deemed AEF and eligible for payments, including cousins, nephews, and nieces. The 2018 farm bill retains the adjusted gross income (AGI) limit for payment eligibility of $900,000. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects outlays for Title I provisions of the 2018 farm bill for the five-year period (FY2019-FY2023) to average $6.3 billion compared with an estimated $7.2 billion in annual outlays under the 2014 farm bill. Based on projected market-price-to-PLC-reference price ratios, producers are expected to shift their preference toward PLC over ARC under the 2018 farm bill, resulting in a shift in program outlays concentrated more on PLC than ARC.

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Availability Requirements in House Rules The rules of the House of Representatives generally grant Members an opportunity to review legislative measures by governing the length of time the measures must be made available before being considered on the floor. Different House rules establish availability requirements for reported bills and resolutions, unreported bills and joint resolutions, conference committee reports, and special rules (resolutions reported by the Rules Committee intended to regulate floor consideration of a measure named in the resolution). Under House rules, draft committee reports and unreported bills and joint resolutions are considered available under these rules if they are "publicly available in electronic form at a location designated by the Committee on House Administration." Conference committee reports and accompanying joint explanatory statements are also considered available if they are in electronic form at such a location. It is not a requirement under the rule that the measures be available in the designated location. Instead, the House rule is meant to provide an additional means through which Members, congressional staff, and the general public can access these documents. Reported Bills and Resolutions (Rule XIII, Clause 4(a)) Measures and other matters reported by committees may not be considered on the House floor until a draft of the committee report on the matter has been available for at least 72 hours. Specifically, the "proposed text" of the committee report—except for any supplemental, minority, additional, or dissenting views—must be made available. Under House Rule XI, clause 2(l), committee members are guaranteed two calendar days to submit supplemental or other views for inclusion in a committee report—if notice of intent to file supplement views was given at the markup. However, the committee majority, before receiving such views, can make a draft of the committee report available and start the 72-hour clock. The House rule exempts several kinds of measures specified in the rule, including resolutions reported by the Rules Committee. Unreported Bills and Joint Resolutions (Rule XXI, Clause 11) Bills and joint resolutions that have not been reported by committee, and therefore are not accompanied by a written report, may also not be considered on the House floor unless the measure has been available for at least 72 hours. If a measure has not been reported by a committee, it is generally not eligible for floor consideration unless it is called up under a procedure that waives the requirement that it be reported. Such procedures are discussed below in the section on waiving the availability requirements. Conference Reports (Rule XXII, Clause 8(a)) The House rule requires that before a conference report can be considered, its text and its accompanying joint explanatory statement must be available in the Congressional Record for 72 hours. Alternatively, the conference report can be considered if it has been made publicly available in electronic form at a location designated by the Committee on House Administration (currently http://docs.house.gov/ ) . In addition, copies of a conference report and the joint explanatory statement must be available for at least two hours prior to its consideration. According to the rule, this 72-hour availability requirement does not apply during the last six days of a session. In contemporary practice, however, it is difficult to implement this exception to the rule. Adjournment resolutions are usually not approved until very shortly before the adjournment takes place. This practice usually makes it impossible to know when the "last six days" of a session begin. Absent a resolution setting a future date for adjournment, the 72-hour rule applies even as the House nears the end of a session. The 72-hour availability requirement for conference reports would cease to apply only in the last six calendar days before the constitutional end of a session on January 3. Near the end of a session, however, the House sometimes agrees to special rules reported by the Rules Committee that waive the availability requirement. This is discussed below in the section on waiving availability requirements. Special Rules (Rule XIII, Clause 6(a)) The House frequently operates under special rules, or resolutions reported from the Rules Committee, which can waive any or all of the above rules . Special rules are required to lie over for one legislative day, which means the special rule cannot be reported and considered on the same legislative day. A legislative day is not necessarily a calendar day. A legislative day begins the first time the House meets after an adjournment and ends when the House adjourns again. Because the House typically adjourns at the end of a calendar day, legislative and calendar days usually coincide. Rule XIII also provides several exceptions to the layover requirement for special rules. First, a special rule may be considered the same day it is presented if it proposes only to waive the rules mandating that committee reports and conference reports be available for 72 hours. If the rule also sets the terms for the consideration of the matter, perhaps by waiving points of order, then the rule is required to lie over for one legislative day. Second, a special rule may be considered the same day it is presented to the House in the last three days of a session. In modern practice, as mentioned above, the House rarely agrees to an adjournment date far in advance, usually making it impossible to know when "the last three days" begin. Third, the one-day layover requirement for special rules can be waived if two-thirds of the Members voting agree to the waiver (a quorum being present). In addition, as discussed below, the Rules Committee may report a special rule that waives the one-day layover requirement for subsequent special rules. Waiving the Availability Requirements in the Rules The House has several means for waiving its rules when it wishes to act expeditiously. For example, the House may set aside any of its availability requirements by unanimous consent. It may also call up and agree to a bill or conference report that has not met the availability requirements by a two-thirds vote to suspend the rules. As previously mentioned, according to Rule XIII, clause 6(a)(1), the one-day layover requirement for a special rule can be waived by two-thirds of the Members voting. The House can also waive the availability requirements by a simple majority. If a majority of the House desires to do so, the House can vote on a measure the same calendar day that the text was made available to Members. The House usually does this by agreeing to two special rules, as explained below. It may also achieve the same result by convening for two legislative days on the same calendar day in the manner also described below. Waiving Availability Requirements by Special Rule The Rules Committee may report a special rule that waives the 72-hour availability requirement for bills, resolutions, or conference reports. A rule only waiving the availability requirement can be presented and called up on the same day. Special rules, however, often set the terms for considering a measure as well. A special rule for the consideration of a measure might waive the 72-hour availability requirement but also structure the amending process. Such a rule would be required to lie over for one legislative day (unless this requirement was waived by a two-thirds vote). Similarly, a rule for the consideration of a conference report often waives points of order against the conference report and against its consideration. Under current House rules, that special rule is also required to lie over for one legislative day unless the requirement is waived by a two-thirds vote. In short, special rules only waiving the 72-hour availability requirement are not required to lie over for one legislative day. To waive the one-day layover requirement of Rule XIII, clause 6(a), for a special rule, the Rules Committee may report a special rule that waives this requirement. The rule providing this waiver is subject to the same one-day layover requirement. If such a special rule is adopted, the House can then consider and adopt a special rule providing for the consideration of a measure later on the same legislative day. The special rule for the consideration of the measure can waive the 72-hour availability requirement for the measure. In this way, the House of Representatives, by majority vote, has the potential to call up, debate, and pass a measure in a single day even if the measure has not been made available prior to consideration. In order to achieve this result, however, the Rules Committee must have reported the additional special rule on the previous legislative day. In summary, a simple majority of the House can call up, debate, and vote on a measure in a single calendar day, regardless of how long the text has been available, by taking the following steps: First, the House agrees to a special rule waiving the one-day layover requirement for any special rule for the consideration of a specified matter. (This rule is required to lie over for one legislative day.) Second, the House agrees to a separate special rule setting the terms of consideration of the measure and waiving any availability requirements for the measure itself. (This rule need not lie over for one legislative day. The first special rule waived the one-day layover requirement for this special rule.) Third, the House calls up, debates, and votes on the measure. Creating or Extending a Legislative Day Although the House rarely chooses to do so, it could agree to call up and consider a measure in a single calendar day by convening two legislative days in a single calendar day. It would do this by agreeing to a motion to adjourn for a brief period at some point during its session. Agreement to this motion would terminate the legislative day, and when the House returned from its brief adjournment pursuant to this motion, a new legislative day would begin. If the Rules Committee presents a special rule before the House adjourns, the rule can be considered on the next legislative day regardless of how much time has elapsed. In other words, if a special rule were reported, and the House adjourned and then shortly thereafter reconvened, the special rule would have been available for one legislative day, meeting the layover requirement of the standing rule. The House could then consider the special rule that, among other things, could waive the 72-hour availability requirement for a resolution, bill, or conference report. From time to time, the House has also been known to recess after legislative business, but not adjourn, in order to give the Rules Committee time to complete and report a special rule. The rule could be reported very late or even early in the morning of the next calendar day. Regardless of whether or not it is the next calendar day when the rule is reported, if the House adjourns after it is reported, when it reconvenes it will be a new legislative day, and the layover requirement will be considered met. Special Rules Near the End of a Session In the contemporary House, it is not uncommon for the Rules Committee to report several special rules at the end of a session that waive the availability requirements for subsequent special rules for the consideration of certain specified measures. In the past, the House has also agreed to resolutions reported by the Rules Committee near the end of a session that waived availability requirements in general. Special rules that waive availability requirements are sometimes referred to as "same day rules." They are also sometimes referred to, particularly by their opponents, as "martial law" rules. The term has been used by Members of the House for at least 15 years, but it has not been applied consistently to any one type of special rule. It has been used, for example, to describe both special rules that waive the one-day layover requirement for subsequent special rules and to describe broad special rules that trigger some provisions of House rules and waive others for the remaining duration of a session. Supporters of end-of-session resolutions that waive availability requirements sometimes argue that these special rules are meant to achieve the same end as the standing rules that make certain provisions of House rules inapplicable during the final days of the session. As mentioned above, the 72-hour availability requirement for conference reports does not apply in the last six days of a session. The one-day layover requirement for special rules does not apply in the last three days of a session. In recent years, Congress has not agreed to a concurrent resolution setting an adjournment date until just before adjournment takes place. As a result, these standing rules are not triggered in the contemporary House. By agreeing to a same-day rule near the end of the session, the House can achieve the same end as the existing, but technically inapplicable, standing rules that waive availability requirements at the end of a session. Opponents of these end-of-session resolutions sometimes argue that all Representatives should be guaranteed some time to examine legislative proposals regardless of when they are presented during the course of a session.

House rules govern the length of time legislative measures must be available to Members before being considered on the floor. For measures reported from committee, a draft of the committee report must have been available for 72 hours. Conference reports must also have been available for 72 hours and special rules for considering measures for one legislative day. Bills and joint resolutions that have not been reported by committee, and therefore are not accompanied by a written report, may also not be considered on the House floor unless the measure has been available for 72 hours. Proposed committee reports, unreported bills and joint resolutions, conference reports, and joint explanatory statements are considered available under these rules if they are publicly available in electronic form on a website designated by the Committee on House Administration for this purpose, http://docs.house.gov. The House has several means by which it can choose to waive these availability requirements and call up, debate, and vote on a measure in a single calendar day even if the text of the measure was not made available prior to consideration. These include (1) considering a measure under the suspension of the rules procedure or by unanimous consent, (2) adopting a special rule that waives the 72-hour requirement, (3) adopting a special rule that waives the one-day requirement for another special rule, and (4) convening a second legislative day on the same calendar day. Waiving availability requirements allows the House to act quickly when necessary, such as near the end of a session.

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Unemployment Compensation, Unemployment Taxes, and a State's Obligation to Pay Benefits Unemployment Compensation (UC) is a joint federal-state program financed by federal payroll taxes under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) and by state payroll taxes under State Unemployment Tax Acts (SUTA). These revenues are deposited into the appropriate account within the federal Unemployment Trust Fund (UTF). Originally, the intent of the UC program, among other goals, was to help counter economic fluctuations such as recessions. This intent is reflected in the current UC program's funding and benefit structure. When the economy grows, UC program revenue rises through increased tax revenues. At the same time, UC program spending falls because fewer workers are unemployed. The effect of collecting more taxes while decreasing spending on benefits dampens demand in the economy. It also creates a surplus of funds, or a reserve fund , for the UC program to draw upon during a recession. These reserve balances are credited in the state's account within the UTF. During an economic slowdown or recession, UC tax revenue falls and UC program spending rises as more workers lose their jobs and receive UC benefits. The increased amount of UC payments to unemployed workers dampens the economic effect of lost earnings by injecting additional funds into the economy. State and Federal Unemployment Taxes State Unemployment Taxes States levy their own payroll taxes (SUTA) on employers to fund regular UC benefits and the state share (50%) of the Extended Benefit (EB) program. Federal laws and regulations provide broad guidelines for these state taxes. Each state deposits its SUTA revenue into its account within the UTF. SUTA revenue finances UC benefits. Generally, when economic activity is robust and increasing, SUTA revenue is greater than a state's UC expenditures. As a result, the state's reserves within the UTF grow. This trend is reversed during economic recessions and during the early economic recovery period, when the state's reserves are drawn down and new SUTA revenue does not always make up the shortfall. If the recession is deep enough and if SUTA revenue is inadequate for long periods of time, states may have insufficient funds to pay for UC benefits. Federal law, which requires states to pay these benefits, provides a loan mechanism within the UTF framework that an insolvent state may opt to use to meet its UC benefit payment obligations. States must pay back these loans. If the loans are not paid back quickly (depending on the timing of the beginning of the loan period), states may face interest charges and the states' employers may face increased net FUTA rates until the loans are repaid. In the years immediately following the most recent recession, many states had insufficient SUTA revenue and UTF account balances to pay UC benefits. Federal Unemployment Taxes All FUTA revenue is deposited into the Employment Security Administration Account (ESAA) within the UTF. Federal unemployment taxes pay for the federal share of EB (50%) and for administrative grants to the states. Additionally, through the federal loan account within the UTF, FUTA funds may be loaned to insolvent states to assist the payment of the states' UC obligations. Net FUTA Rate Is 0.6% FUTA imposes a 6.0% gross federal unemployment tax rate on the first $7,000 paid annually by employers to each employee. Employers in states with programs approved by the U.S. Labor Secretary and with no outstanding federal loans may credit up to 5.4 percentage points of state unemployment taxes paid against the 6.0% tax rate, making the minimum net federal unemployment tax rate 0.6%. Because most employees earn more than the $7,000 taxable wage ceiling in a calendar year, the FUTA tax typically is $42 per worker per year ($7,000 × 0.6%), or just over 2 cents per hour for a full-time, year-round worker. States Required to Pay UC Benefits States have a great deal of autonomy in how they establish and run their unemployment insurance programs. However, the framework established by federal laws is clear and requires states to promptly pay the UC benefits as provided under state law. In budgetary terms, UC benefits are an entitlement (although the program is financed by a dedicated tax imposed on employers and not by general revenue). Thus, even if a recession hits a given state and, as a result, that state's trust fund account is depleted, the state remains legally required to continue paying benefits. To do so, the state might borrow money either from the dedicated loan account within the UTF or from outside sources. If the state chooses to borrow funds from the UTF, not only will the state be required to continue paying benefits, it also will be required to repay the funds (plus any interest due) it has borrowed from the federal loan account within a few years. Such states may need to raise taxes on their employers or reduce UC benefit levels, actions that dampen economic growth, job creation, and consumer demand. In short, states have strong incentives to keep adequate funds in their trust fund accounts. If the state borrows from sources outside the UTF, the state would not be subject to the loan restrictions described below. Instead, the state would be subject to the terms within that outside loan agreement, which might offer a different (more favorable) interest rate or repayment schedule but may include fees to establish the loan. Funds Available for Loans to States Within the UTF The Federal Unemployment Account (FUA) is the federal loan account within the UTF. The FUA is primarily funded from the statutory transfer of excess revenue from the Extended Unemployment Compensation Account (EUCA) being deposited into the FUA. If needed, the FUA may borrow funds from other federal accounts within the UTF or from the general fund of the U.S. Treasury. From FY2009 to FY2015, the FUA had to borrow funds from the U.S. Treasury to finance loans to the state accounts. 1. Revenue from additional FUTA taxes paid by employers when a reduced credit against federal unemployment taxes exists because the state has an outstanding unpaid loan from FUA is deposited into the FUA. (See the discussion below on " Federal Tax Increases on Outstanding Loans Through Credit Reductions " for a more detailed explanation of these additional taxes.) 2. Federal law allows the FUA to borrow available funds from the other federal (EUCA and ESAA) accounts within the UTF. 3. Federal law also authorizes appropriations as loans from the general fund of the U.S. Treasury if balances in the federal accounts are insufficient to cover their expenditures. (For example, if the states' borrowing needs exceed the available FUA balance.) Such appropriations require discretionary action by Congress and the President. Mechanism for Receiving a Loan from the UTF Once a state recognizes that it does not have sufficient funds to pay UC benefits, the mechanism for receiving a loan from the UTF is straightforward. The state's governor (or the governor's designee) must submit a letter requesting that the U.S. Labor Secretary advance funds to the state account within the UTF. Once the loan is approved by the U.S. Labor Secretary, the funds are placed into the state account in monthly increments. Loan Repayment States with outstanding loans from the UTF must repay them fully by the November 10 following the second consecutive January 1 on which the state has an outstanding loan. If the outstanding loan is not repaid by that time, the state will face an effective federal tax increase. Thus, a state may have approximately 22 months (if borrowing began on January 1) to 34 months (if borrowing began on January 2) to repay the loan without a federal tax increase, depending on when it obtained the outstanding loan. As of January 29, 2019, approximately $68.3 million in federal UTF loans to the states were outstanding. A current list of states with outstanding loans may be found at the Department of Labor's (DOL's) website, https://oui.doleta.gov/unemploy/budget.asp . Federal Tax Increases on Outstanding Loans Through Credit Reductions If the state does not repay a loan by November 10 of the second year, the state becomes subject to a reduction in the amount of state unemployment tax credit applied against the federal unemployment tax beginning with the preceding January 1 until the state repays the loan fully. Depending on the duration of the loan and certain other measures, one or more of three different credit reductions may be required. These reductions are fully catalogued in Table 1 . At the height of the period following the most recent recession (2011), 20 states and the Virgin Islands faced increased FUTA rates because of outstanding UTF loans. Basic Credit Reduction The credit reduction is initially a 0.3 percentage point reduction for the year beginning with the calendar year in which the second consecutive January 1 passes during which the loan is outstanding and increases by a 0.3 percentage point reduction for each year there is an outstanding loan. For example, in the first year, the credit reduction results in the net federal tax rate increasing from 0.6% to 0.9%—an additional $21 for each employee; in the second year, it would increase to 1.2%—a cumulative additional $42 for each employee. Additional Credit Reductions: 2.7 Add-on and Benefit-Cost Ratio Add-on Two potential other credit reductions exist (in addition to the cumulative 0.3 percentage point increases) during the ensuing calendar years in which a state has an outstanding loan: 1. Beginning in the third year, the 2.7 add-on uses a statutory formula that takes into consideration the average annual wages and average employment contribution rate. 2. Beginning in the fifth year, the Benefit-Cost Ratio (BCR) add-on replaces the 2.7 add-on and uses the five-year benefit-cost rate as well as average wages in its calculation. Table 1 presents these reductions and the subsequent net FUTA tax faced by state employers as a result of these unpaid loans. If any January 1 passes without an outstanding balance, the year count starts over with the next loan. DOL maintains a list of potential reduced credit states at http://workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/unemploy/docs/reduced_credit_states.xlsx . Avoiding Some or All of the Credit Reduction Section 272 of P.L. 97-248 allows a delinquent state the option of repaying—on or before November 9—a portion of its outstanding loans each year through transfer of a specified amount from its account in the UTF to the FUA. If the state complies with all the requirements listed below, the potential credit reduction is avoided (there is no reduction): The state must repay all loans for the most recent one-year period ending on November 9, plus the potential additional taxes that would have been imposed for the tax year based upon a state tax credit reduction. The state must have sufficient amounts in the state account of the UTF to pay all compensation for the last quarter of that calendar year without receiving a loan. The state also must have altered its state law to increase the net solvency of its account with the UTF. From 2011 through 2014, South Carolina met these requirements. As a result, employers in South Carolina were not subject to a state tax credit reduction in the calculation of their FUTA taxes. (Generally, employers in South Carolina would have paid more in state unemployment taxes to meet these requirements.) Avoiding Credit Reduction: Cap Once a state begins to have a credit reduction, the state may apply to have the reductions capped if the state meets four criteria: No legislative or other action in 12 months ending September 30 has been taken to decrease the state's unemployment tax effort. (A state cannot actively decrease its expected state unemployment tax revenue from current law.) No legislative or other action has been taken to decrease the net solvency of the state's trust fund account. (For example, the state would not be allowed to actively increase the average UC benefit amount from current law requirements.) Average state unemployment tax rate on total wages must exceed the five-year average benefit-cost rate on total wages. Balance of outstanding loans as of September 30 must not be greater than the balance three years before. Waiving the BCR Add-on The BCR add-on may be waived if the Secretary of Labor determines the state did not take legislative or other actions to decrease the net solvency of the state's trust fund account. The 2.7 add-on would then replace the BCR add-on. Revenue from Credit Reductions Reduces State UTF Loans The additional federal taxes attributable to the credit reduction are applied against the state's outstanding UTF loan. Thus, although technically employers are paying additional FUTA taxes, the additional tax pays off a state's debt. The state's employers will pay the additional federal taxes resulting from the credit reduction no later than January 31 of the next calendar year. Interest Charges on Loans Since April 1, 1982 ( P.L. 97-35 as amended), states have been charged interest on new loans that are not repaid by the end of the fiscal year in which they were obtained. (Before April 1, 1982, states could receive these loans interest free.) The interest is the same rate as that paid by the federal government on state reserves in the UTF for the quarter ending December 31 of the preceding year but not higher than 10% per annum. The interest rate for calendar year loans is determined by Section 1202(b)(4) of the Social Security Act. The interest rate for a calendar year is the earnings yield on the UTF for the quarter ending December 31 of the previous calendar year. The U.S. Treasury Department calculated the fourth-quarter earnings yield in 2018 to be 2.3081%. Thus, loans made in calendar year 2019 are subject to an interest rate of 2.3081%. States may not pay the interest directly or indirectly from SUTA revenue or funds in their state account within the UTF. If a state does not repay the interest, or if it pays the interest with funds from SUTA taxes, DOL is required by federal law to refuse to certify that state's program as being in compliance with federal law. Not being in compliance with federal unemployment law would mean that the state would not be eligible to receive administrative grants and employers in that state would not receive the state unemployment tax credit in the calculation of their federal unemployment taxes. States may borrow funds without interest from the UTF during the year. To receive these interest-free loans, the states must meet five conditions: 1. The states must repay the loans by September 30. 2. For those repaid (by September 30) loans to maintain their interest-free status, there cannot be any loans made to that state in October, November, or December of the calendar year of such an interest-free loan. If loans are made in the last quarter of the calendar year, the "interest-free" loans made in the previous fiscal year will retroactively accrue interest charges. 3. The states must meet funding goals relating to their account in the UTF, established under regulations issued by DOL. In addition to these first three requirements, the phase-in of two new requirements began in 2014. The full effect of the requirements began in 2019. 4. States must have had at least one year in the past five calendar years before the year in which advances are taken in which the Average High Cost Multiple (AHCM) was greater than or equal to 1.0. 5. Additionally, states must meet two criteria for maintenance-of-tax effort in every year from the most recent year the AHCM was at least 1.0 and the year in which loans are taken. a. The average state unemployment tax rate (total state unemployment tax amount collected over total taxable wages) was at least 80% of the prior year's rate. b. The average state unemployment tax rate was at least 75% of the average benefit-cost ratio over the preceding five calendar years, where the benefit-cost ratio for a year is defined as the amount of benefits and interest paid in the year divided by the total covered wages paid in the year. Status of Outstanding Loans, Accrued Interest Owed, and State Tax Credit Reductions Table 2 lists outstanding state loans. (At this time, only the U.S. Virgin Islands has an outstanding loan.) The table also includes information on accrued interest payments for FY2019. The third column provides information on whether the state was subject to a credit reduction for tax year 2018. The last column provides the net FUTA tax faced by employers in each state that had an outstanding loan.

Although states have a great deal of autonomy in how they establish and run their unemployment insurance programs, federal law requires states to pay Unemployment Compensation (UC) benefits promptly as provided under state law. During some recessions, current taxes and reserve balances may be insufficient to cover state obligations for UC benefits. States may borrow funds from the federal loan account within the Unemployment Trust Fund (UTF) to meet UC benefit obligations. This report summarizes how insolvent states may borrow funds from the UTF loan account to meet their UC benefit obligations. It includes the manner in which states must repay federal UTF loans. It also provides details on how the UTF loans may trigger potential interest accrual and explains the timetable for increased net Federal Unemployment Taxes Act (FUTA) taxes if the funds are not repaid promptly. Outstanding loans listed by state may be found at the Department of Labor's (DOL's) website, https://oui.doleta.gov/unemploy/budget.asp.

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crs_R45046_0

Overview In March 2015, Saudi Arabia established a coalition of nations (hereinafter referred to as the Saudi-led coalition or the coalition) to engage in military operations in Yemen against the Ansar Allah/Houthi movement and loyalists of the previous president of Yemen, the late Ali Abdullah Saleh. During 2014, the United States joined Saudi Arabia in demanding that Houthi forces reverse their campaign to occupy the Yemeni capital of Sanaa, but the rapid onset of hostilities in March 2015 forced the Obama Administration to react quickly. At the start of the Saudi-led intervention on March 25, 2015, the Administration announced that the United States would provide "logistical and intelligence support" to the coalition's operations without taking "direct military action in Yemen in support of this effort." Soon thereafter, a joint U.S.-Saudi planning cell was established to coordinate military and intelligence support for the campaign. At the United Nations Security Council, the United States supported the passage of Resolution 2216 (April 2015), which, among other things, required member states to impose an arms embargo against the Houthi-Saleh forces and demanded that the Houthis withdraw from all areas seized during the current conflict. Since the March 2015 Saudi-led coalition intervention in Yemen, Congress has taken an active role in debating and overseeing U.S. policy in the Arabian Peninsula. Members have considered legislative proposals seeking to reduce Yemeni civilian casualties resulting from the coalition's operations; improve deteriorating humanitarian conditions; end restrictions on the flow of goods and humanitarian aid; combat Iranian support for the Houthis; preserve maritime security in the Bab al Mandab Strait; and/or support continued Saudi-led coalition and U.S. efforts to counter Al Qaeda and Islamic State forces in Yemen. Beyond Yemen, many Members have appeared to view the conflict through the prism of a broader regional rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and the U.S. effort to limit Iran's malign regional influence. Others lawmakers have viewed the Yemen conflict as indicative of what they perceive as problems in the U.S.-Saudi relationship, a concern that deepened after the killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi government personnel in October 2018. Congress has considered but has not enacted proposals to curtail or condition U.S. defense sales to Saudi Arabia. Responding to the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen also appears to be reinvigorating some Members' interest in strengthening the role of Congress in foreign policy vis-à-vis the executive branch. Debate in Congress over Yemen has featured bipartisan statements of interest in asserting the prerogatives of the legislative branch to limit executive branch power, specifically using war powers legislation and the appropriations and authorization processes to curb U.S. military involvement in support of coalition operations. Congressional scrutiny of U.S. policy in Yemen also has led to legislative changes to global authorities, such as the Department of Defense's authority to enter into and use acquisition and cross servicing agreements with partner militaries. Congress, the Obama Administration, and Yemen (2015-2016) 2015 Congressional interest in the Yemen conflict has evolved and grown gradually and was not widespread at the outset of the coalition's March 2015 intervention in Yemen. In early to mid-2015, congressional interest in U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East centered on the Iran nuclear deal and Operation Inherent Resolve against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. Several months after the March 2015 intervention, the Saudi-led coalition had not achieved a conclusive victory and what modest gains had been made on the ground were offset by mounting international criticism of growing civilian casualties from coalition air strikes. In Congress, several lawmakers began to express concern about the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Yemen. In late September 2015, Representative Ted W. Lieu wrote a letter to the Joint Chiefs of Staff advocating for a halt to U.S. support for the Saudi-led coalition until it instituted safeguards to prevent civilian casualties. In October 2015, 10 Members of Congress wrote a letter to President Obama urging him to "work with our Saudi partners to limit civilian casualties to the fullest extent possible." In October 2015, Senator Markey stated that "I fear that our failure to strongly advocate diplomacy in Yemen over the past two years, coupled with our failure to urge restraint in the face of the crisis last spring, may put the viability of this critical [U.S.-Saudi] partnership at risk." By the fall of 2015, as the Obama Administration tried to balance its concern for adhering to the laws of armed conflict with its support for Gulf partners, lawmakers began to express their concern over U.S. involvement in the coalition's intervention by scrutinizing U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia. When the Administration informally notified Congress of a proposed sale of precision guided munitions (PGMs) to Saudi Arabia, some Senators sought to delay its formal notification. After the formal notification in November 2015, Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) leaders jointly requested that the Administration notify Congress 30 days prior to associated shipments, marking the first use of this prior notification request authority. At that time, no related joint resolutions of disapproval on proposed sales of PGMs to the kingdom were introduced, but the delay and additional notification request demonstrated congressional concern. 2016 By the one-year anniversary of the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen, a more defined opposition to U.S. support for the coalition had begun to coalesce amid repeated international documentation of human rights abuses and errant coalition airstrikes. In April 2016, legislation was introduced that sought to place conditions on future proposed sale notifications, previously approved sales, or transfers of PGMs to Saudi Arabia. Proposed amendments to FY2017 defense legislation would have added some similar conditions on the use of funds to implement sales of PGMs or prohibited the transfer of cluster munitions to Saudi Arabia. The PGM amendment was not considered, but the cluster munitions amendment was narrowly defeated in a June 2016 House floor vote. In the spring and summer of 2016, the United Nations held multiple rounds of peace talks in Kuwait aimed at brokering an end to the conflict. From April 2016 to August 2016, the Saudi-led coalition had largely spared Yemen's capital Sanaa from aerial strikes as part of its commitment to the cessation of hostilities. When U.N.-mediated peace talks collapsed in August 2016, the Saudi-led coalition resumed bombing and the war intensified. During the summer of 2016, the Obama Administration reduced some U.S. support for Saudi Arabia's air campaign in Yemen by withdrawing U.S. personnel assigned to a joint U.S.-Saudi planning cell. Nevertheless, overall U.S.-Saudi cooperation continued and, in August 2016, the Obama Administration notified Congress of a proposed sale of M1A2S tanks to Saudi Arabia. In response, some lawmakers wrote to request that President Obama withdraw the proposal, citing concerns about Yemen. In September 2016, joint resolutions of disapproval of the proposed tank sale were introduced in the Senate ( S.J.Res. 39 ) and House ( H.J.Res. 98 ). On September 21, 2016, the Senate voted to table a motion to discharge the SFRC from further consideration of S.J.Res. 39 (71-27, Record Vote 145). During debate over the motion, many Senators argued in favor of continued U.S. support for Saudi Arabia, with Senator Lindsey Graham remarking "To those who want to vote today to suspend this aid to Saudi Arabia, people in Iran will cheer you on." In the wake of an October 2016 Saudi airstrike on a funeral hall in Sanaa that killed 140 people, the Obama Administration initiated a review of U.S. security assistance to Saudi Arabia. Based on that review, it put a hold on a planned sale of precision guided munitions (PGMs) to Saudi Arabia and limited intelligence sharing, but maintained counterterrorism cooperation and refueling for coalition aircraft. In the final months of the Obama Administration, U.S. Armed Forces briefly exchanged fire with forces party to the conflict. In October 2016, Houthi-Saleh forces launched anti-ship missiles at U.S. Navy vessels on patrol off the coast of Yemen. The attacks against the U.S. ships marked the first time U.S. Armed Forces had come under direct fire in the war. The Obama Administration responded to the attacks against U.S. naval vessels by directing the Armed Forces to fire cruise missiles against Houthi-Saleh radar installations. The Obama Administration described the U.S. strikes as self-defense and indicated that it did not want to deepen its direct involvement in the conflict. In August and November 2016, then-Secretary of State John Kerry made several attempts to broker a peace initiative in Oman, but his efforts were rejected by the parties themselves. Analysis By the end of 114 th Congress, the war in Yemen was becoming a more significant foreign policy issue for lawmakers. While a growing number of Members were becoming critical of the U.S. role in supporting the Saudi-led coalition amid a deteriorating humanitarian situation in Yemen, more lawmakers still viewed the conflict through a regional lens rather than as a localized affair. Amid significant congressional opposition to the 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or JCPOA), some Members viewed Iran's support for the Houthi movement and the broader conflict in Yemen as an example of Iran's malign regional activities not directly addressed by the JCPOA. As the Houthis targeted Gulf state infrastructure on land and vessels at sea, their behavior was touted as evidence of Iran's growing capabilities to threaten U.S. and Gulf security. Just as some Members considered the Yemen conflict primarily a proxy war between the Iran-backed Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition, others viewed it as a test of long-standing U.S. commitments to supporting Saudi Arabian security. Supporters of the relationship, while acknowledging that Saudi Arabia's conduct of the war was at times problematic, argued that to curtail U.S. arms sales or other defense support to the kingdom would weaken a vital partner that was under threat from a hostile nonstate actor on its southern border. Others lawmakers charged that continued U.S. support for the coalition was not improving coalition behavior but damaging the U.S. reputation for upholding commitments to international law and human rights. Legislation seeking to limit U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia was not enacted in the 114 th Congress, but marked the beginning of the broader congressional debate that has continued. As the Trump Administration prepared to assume office, human rights organizations and aid groups were pressing Congress to become more attuned to the growing humanitarian crisis in Yemen. Though the Obama Administration had taken some steps, particularly in late 2016, to limit U.S.-coalition cooperation and restrict deliveries of PGMs to Saudi Arabia, nongovernmental groups deemed such action as insufficient. According to Human Rights Watch, "Whatever conditionality the Obama administration thought it had created—in holding up the transfer of precision munitions near the tail end of Obama's term and suspending cluster munition transfers earlier—ultimately did not have meaningful impact in reining in the continued Saudi-led coalition attacks on civilians." Congress, the Trump Administration, and Yemen (2017-2018) 2017 From the beginning of his Administration, President Donald Trump has signaled strong support for the Saudi-led coalition's operations in Yemen as a bulwark against Iranian regional interference. He initiated a review of U.S. policy toward Yemen, including President Obama's October 2016 restrictions on U.S. arms sales and intelligence sharing to the coalition. On March 19, 2017, just prior to his visit to Saudi Arabia, President Trump notified Congress that he was proceeding with three proposed direct commercial sales of precision guided munitions technology deferred by the Obama Administration, subject to congressional review. In May 2017, the Administration officially notified Congress of its intention to proceed with proposed sales of precision guided munitions technologies that the Obama Administration had deferred, while announcing plans to increase training for Saudi Arabia's air force on both targeting and the Law of Armed Conflict. Congress debated another resolution of disapproval ( S.J.Res. 42 ) of these proposed PGM sales in June 2017 (see below). After completing the policy review in July 2017, President Trump directed his Administration "to focus on ending the war and avoiding a regional conflict, mitigating the humanitarian crisis, and defending Saudi Arabia's territorial integrity and commerce in the Red Sea." As President Trump entered office, the dynamics of the conflict in Yemen were changing, and the coalition launched a new offensive along Yemen's 280-mile western coastal plain ultimately aimed at taking the strategic Houthi-held port city of Hudaydah. In early 2017, the coalition's gradual advance toward Hudaydah, coupled with an ongoing deterioration in humanitarian conditions, sparked some Members of Congress to implore the Administration to improve aid access and negotiate a cease-fire. In March 2017, several House Members wrote a letter to then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson urging him to "use all U.S. diplomatic tools to help open the Yemeni port of Hodeida [Hudaydah] to international humanitarian aid organizations." A month later, another group of House Members wrote to President Trump stating that Congress should approve any new U.S. support to the coalition amid its offensive against Hudaydah. On June 13, 2017, the Senate debated another resolution ( S.J.Res. 42 ) to disapprove of three direct commercial sales of PGMs to Saudi Arabia. During Senate floor consideration over the motion to discharge the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from further consideration of S.J.Res. 42 , Members once again weighed various issues, such as the U.S.-Saudi bilateral relationship, countering Iran, and limiting U.S. involvement in the war in Yemen. Some lawmakers suggested that U.S. arms sales and military support to the coalition had enabled alleged violations of international humanitarian law, while others argued that U.S. support to the coalition improved its effectiveness and helps minimize civilian casualties. For example, during floor debate, Senator Graham argued that "If we are worried about collateral damage in Yemen, I understand the concern. Precision weapons would help that cause, not hurt it." Senator Murphy retorted, saying "What we are asking for is to hold off on selling these precision-guided munitions until we get some clear promise—some clear assurance—from the Saudis that they are going to use these munitions only for military purposes and that they are going to start taking steps—real steps, tangible steps—to address the humanitarian crisis." On June 13, 2017, the Senate voted to reject the motion to discharge the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from further consideration (47-53, Record Vote 143), and a companion resolution was not taken up in the House ( H.J.Res. 102 ). Representative Ro Khanna introduced a concurrent resolution ( H.Con.Res. 81 ) pursuant to the War Powers Resolution ( P.L. 93-148 ) in a bid to end U.S. support for the coalition's military intervention. After consultation between House leaders and supporters of the resolution on a compromise approach, the House agreed to delay expedited consideration of the resolution until after the November 2016 election and then adopted a nonbinding alternative ( H.Res. 599 , 366-30, 1 Present, Roll no. 623). In his first year in office, while President Trump sought to improve relations with Saudi Arabia, counter Iran, and increase U.S. counterterrorism activity in Yemen, his Administration also at times took strong positions on the need for members of the coalition to improve humanitarian access, pursue a settlement to the conflict, and take measures to prevent civilian casualties. After a Houthi-fired missile with alleged Iranian origins landed deep inside Saudi Arabia in November 2017, the coalition instituted a full blockade of all of Yemen's ports, including the main port of Hudaydah, exacerbating the country's humanitarian crisis. The White House issued four press statements on the conflict between November 8 and December 8, including a statement on December 6 in which President Trump called on Saudi Arabia to "completely allow food, fuel, water, and medicine to reach the Yemeni people who desperately need it. This must be done for humanitarian reasons immediately." On December 20, 2017, the Saudi-led coalition announced that it would end its blockade of Hudaydah port for a 30-day period and permit the delivery of four U.S.-funded cranes to Yemen to increase the port's capability to off-load commercial and humanitarian goods. The next day, the White House issued a statement welcoming "Saudi Arabia's announcement of these humanitarian actions in the face of this major conflict." 2018 As the Saudi-led coalition intervention entered its fourth year, some in the Senate also proposed use of the War Powers Resolution as a tool for ending U.S. support for the coalition's military intervention. On February 28, 2018, Senator Bernie Sanders introduced S.J.Res. 54 , a joint resolution to "direct the removal of United States Armed Forces from hostilities in the Republic of Yemen that have not been authorized by Congress (except for those U.S. forces engaged in counterterrorism operations directed at al Qaeda or associated forces)." Efforts in the Senate followed a late 2017 attempt in the House (see Table 1 below), in which a concurrent resolution directing the President to remove U.S. forces from Yemen was tabled in favor of a House-passed nonbinding resolution. Throughout 2018, between Congress and the Trump Administration and within Congress itself, there was disagreement as to whether U.S. forces assisting the Saudi-led coalition have been introduced into active or imminent hostilities for purposes of the War Powers Resolution. Some Members claimed that by providing support to the Saudi-led coalition, U.S. forces have been introduced into a "situation where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated" based on the criteria of the War Powers Resolution. The Trump Administration disagreed. In February 2018, the Acting Department of Defense General Counsel wrote to Senate leaders describing the extent of current U.S. support , and reported that "the United States provides the KSA-led coalition defense articles and services, including air-to-air refueling; certain intelligence support; and military advice, including advice regarding compliance with the law of armed conflict and best practices for reducing the risk of civilian casualties." On March 20, 2018, the Senate considered S.J.Res. 54 on the floor. During debate, arguments centered on a number of issues, ranging from concern over exacerbating Yemen's humanitarian crisis to reasserting the role of Congress in authorizing the use of armed force abroad. After then-Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Senator Bob Corker promised to propose new legislation and hold hearings scrutinizing U.S. policy in Yemen, a majority of Senators voted to table a motion to discharge the Foreign Relations committee from further consideration of S.J.Res. 54 . Senator Robert Menendez made remarks expressing conditional support for Senator Corker's approach, a view shared by some other Senators who voted to table the motion. The Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing on Yemen a month later. In parallel testimony before Congress, U.S. defense officials stated that while the United States refueled Saudi aircraft and provided advice on targeting techniques, CENTCOM did not track coalition aircraft after they were refueled and did not provide advice on specific targets. Then-Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Robert S. Karem testified that "It's correct that we do not monitor and track all of the Saudi aircraft aloft over Yemen." During the same hearing, U.S. officials acknowledged that pressure from Congress has altered how the Administration deals with the coalition over the Yemen conflict. Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs David Satterfield told Senator Todd Young and the SFRC the following: Senator, your efforts, the efforts of your colleagues in this body and on this Committee have been exceedingly helpful in allowing the Administration to send a message from whole of government regarding the very specific concerns we have over any limitations, restrictions, constraints on the ability of both humanitarian and commercial goods specifically to include fuel to have unrestricted and expeditious entry into Yemen. And that messaging which comes from us, the Executive Branch, also comes from this body is extremely important. After the promised hearing, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee also proposed new legislation to place conditions on U.S. assistance to the coalition. In May, the committee reported S.J.Res. 58 to the Senate; it would have prohibited the obligation or expenditure of U.S. funds for in-flight refueling operations of Saudi and Saudi-led coalition aircraft that were not conducting select types of operations if certain certifications cannot be made and maintained. The Senate Armed Services Committee incorporated the provisions of the SFRC-reported text of S.J.Res. 58 as Section 1266 of the version of the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) that it reported to the Senate on June 5, 2018 ( S. 2987 ). The provision was modified further and passed by both the House and Senate as Section 1290 of the conference version of the FY2019 NDAA ( H.R. 5515 ). It was signed into law as P.L. 115-232 in mid-August, giving the Administration until mid-September 2018 to make certain certifications. In a statement accompanying the President's signing of P.L. 115-232 into law, President Trump objected to provisions such as Section 1290, stating the Administration's view that such provisions "encompass only actions for which such advance certification or notification is feasible and consistent" with "[his] exclusive constitutional authorities as Commander in Chief and as the sole representative of the Nation in foreign affairs." As Congress continued to question the role of the United States in supporting coalition operations in Yemen, the pace and scale of fighting on the ground increased dramatically by the summer of 2018. On June 12, 2018, the Saudi-led coalition launched "Operation Golden Victory," aimed at retaking the Red Sea port city of Hudaydah. As coalition forces engaged Houthi militants in and around Hudaydah, humanitarian organizations warned that if port operation ceased, famine could become widespread throughout northern Yemen. On June 12, nine Senators wrote a letter to Secretary of State Pompeo and then-Secretary of Defense Mattis saying, "We are concerned that pending military operations by the UAE and its Yemeni partners will exacerbate the humanitarian crisis by interrupting delivery of humanitarian aid and damaging critical infrastructure. We are also deeply concerned that these operations jeopardize prospects for a near-term political resolution to the conflict." Several weeks later, Senator Robert Menendez, the ranking member on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, placed a hold on a potential U.S. sale of precision guided munitions to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. In a June 28 letter to Secretary of State Pompeo and Secretary of Defense Mattis, Senator Menendez said, I am not confident that these weapons sales will be utilized strategically as effective leverage to push back on Iran's actions in Yemen, assist our partners in their own self-defense, or drive the parties toward a political settlement that saves lives and mitigates humanitarian suffering…. Even worse, I am concerned that our policies are enabling perpetuation of a conflict that has resulted in the world's worst humanitarian crisis. On August 9, the coalition conducted an airstrike that hit a bus in a market near Dahyan, Yemen, in the northern Sa'ada governorate adjacent to the Saudi border. The strike reportedly killed 51 people, 40 of whom were children. The coalition claims that its airstrike was a "legitimate military operation" and conducted in response to a Houthi missile attack on the Saudi city of Jizan a day earlier that killed a Yemeni national in the kingdom. The U.S. State Department called on the Saudi-led coalition to conduct a "thorough and transparent investigation into the incident." Several Members of Congress wrote to the Administration seeking additional information regarding U.S. operations in the wake of the August 2018 coalition strike at Dahyan. Several Senators also submitted an amendment to the FY2019 Defense Department appropriations act ( H.R. 6157 ) that would have prohibited the use of funds made available by the act to support the Saudi-led coalition operations in Yemen until the Secretary of Defense certifies in writing to Congress that the coalition air campaign "does not violate the principles of distinction and proportionality within the rules for the protection of civilians." The provision did not apply to support for ongoing counterterrorism operations against Al Qaeda and the Islamic State in Yemen. On September 12, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo issued a certification that would allow the use of FY2019 defense funds to support in-flight refueling of coalition aircraft to continue, per the terms of Section 1290 (see discussion above) of the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, P.L. 115-232 ). Some Members of Congress criticized the Administration's actions, asserting that the coalition has not met the act's specified benchmarks for avoiding civilian casualties in Yemen. On September 26, several House Members introduced H.Con.Res. 138 , which sought to direct the President to remove U.S. Armed Forces from hostilities in Yemen, except for Armed Forces engaged in operations authorized under the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force, within 30 days unless and until a declaration of war or specific authorization for such use has been enacted into law. In response to a similar initiative in the Senate, the Administration submitted a detailed argument expressing its view that U.S. forces supporting Saudi-led coalition operations are not engaged in hostilities in Yemen. By late 2018, the prospect of widespread famine in Yemen coupled with international reprobation over the killing of Jamal Khashoggi pressured the Administration and the coalition to accelerate moves toward peace talks. On October 30, then-Secretary of Defense James Mattis and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo called for all parties to reach a cease-fire and resume negotiations. On November 9, Secretary Mattis further announced that effective immediately, the coalition would use its own military capabilities—rather than U.S. capabilities—to conduct in-flight refueling in support of its operations in Yemen. Though fighting continued along several fronts, on December 13, 2018, Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General for Yemen Martin Griffiths brokered a cease-fire centered on the besieged Red Sea port city of Hudaydah (Yemen's largest port). As part of the U.N.-brokered deal (known as the Stockholm Agreement), the coalition and the Houthis agreed to redeploy their forces outside Hudaydah city and port. The United Nations agreed to chair a Redeployment Coordination Committee (RCC) to monitor the cease-fire and redeployment. The international community praised the Stockholm Agreement as a first step toward broader de-escalation and a possible road map to a comprehensive peace settlement. Also on December 13, 2018, the Senate amended and passed S.J.Res. 54 (56-41), which, among other things, directed the President to remove U.S. forces from hostilities in Yemen, except U.S. forces engaged in operations directed at Al Qaeda or associated forces. In the House, lawmakers twice narrowly approved rules resolutions containing provisions that made similar resolutions directing the President to remove U.S. forces from hostilities in Yemen ineligible for expedited consideration ( H.Res. 1142 and H.Res. 1176 ). On December 13, the Senate also passed S.J.Res. 69 , which, among other things, expresses the sense of the Senate that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is responsible for the murder of the journalist Jamal Khashoggi and that there is no statutory authorization for United States involvement in hostilities in the Yemen civil war. Analysis The 115th Congress frequently debated the extent and terms of the United States' involvement in the ongoing conflict in Yemen. Lawmakers questioned the extent to which successive Administrations have adhered to existing law related to providing security assistance, including sales or transfers of defense goods and defense services, while upholding international human rights standards (e.g., 22 U.S.C. §2754 or 22 U.S.C. §2304). They also enacted new legislation that would condition or prohibit the use of U.S. funds for some activities related to Yemen and extend legislative oversight over the executive branch's policy toward the war in Yemen. While the House and its Rules Committee voted to make resolutions with respect to war powers and Yemen ineligible for expedited consideration, the Senate passage of S.J.Res. 54 at the conclusion of the 115 th Congress demonstrated growth in congressional opposition to U.S. involvement in the Saudi-led coalition intervention in Yemen relative to previous years. Over time, the balance of votes shifted in favor of measures that could be described as critical or restrictive of U.S. support for Saudi-led coalition operations with regard to arms sales, oversight measures, and war powers measures. Nevertheless, after nearly four years of conflict, it remains difficult to identify the locus of congressional consensus about Yemen. Many in the House and Senate state that they seek to preserve cooperative U.S.-Saudi relations in broad terms and express concern about Iranian activities in Yemen, while also expressing support for expanded humanitarian access and efforts to bring the conflict to a close. Some lawmakers express opposition to the intervention and U.S. involvement on moral grounds, citing errant coalition airstrikes and the prospect of a looming famine. Others argue the conflict's continuation creates opportunities for Iran and Sunni Islamist extremist groups to expand their influence and operations in Yemen. Still others may have come to oppose continued U.S. support for the intervention based on factors not directly related to Yemen itself, including the opaque mechanisms used by the executive branch to support the coalition and/or anger with the Saudi government over the killing of Jamal Khashoggi. It remains to be seen whether recent congressional consideration of Yemen legislation is a harbinger of broader efforts by Members of Congress to reassert congressional prerogatives toward U.S. foreign policy writ large. Measures to enhance oversight over U.S. support to the Saudi-led coalition and U.S. strategy toward Yemen have received broad bipartisan support, while proponents of other recently considered arms sales and war powers measures have used mechanisms to ensure privileged consideration of their proposals. The 116 th Congress may continue to debate U.S. support for the Saudi-led coalition and Saudi Arabia's conduct of the war in Yemen. It is uncertain whether lawmakers may also broaden the scope of their oversight activities beyond the current conflict to more fully address the root causes of Yemen's chronic instability. Even if the United States is no longer an active supporter of coalition military efforts, Yemen itself has been devastated by years of war and remains the world's worst humanitarian crisis. Experts expect Yemen to require sustained international attention and financial assistance in order to help local actors reach and sustain a political settlement. This suggests that Congress may grapple with questions about the conduct of U.S. diplomacy, the provision of U.S. security support, and the investment of U.S. assistance and defense funds for years to come.

This product provides an overview of the role Congress has played in shaping U.S. policy toward the conflict in Yemen. Summary tables provide information on legislative proposals considered in the 115th and 116th Congresses. Various legislative proposals have reflected a range of congressional perspectives and priorities, including with regard to the authorization of the activities of the U.S. Armed Forces related to the conflict; the extent of U.S. logistical, material, advisory, and intelligence support for the coalition led by Saudi Arabia; the approval, disapproval, or conditioning of U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia; the appropriation of funds for U.S. operations in support of the Saudi-led coalition; the conduct of the Saudi-led coalition's air campaign and its adherence to international humanitarian law and the laws of armed conflict; the demand for greater humanitarian access to Yemen; the call for a wider government assessment of U.S. policy toward Yemen and U.S. support to parties to the conflict; the nature and extent of U.S.-Saudi counterterrorism and border security cooperation; and the role of Iran in supplying missile technology and other weapons to the forces of the Houthi movement. The 116th Congress may continue to debate U.S. support for the Saudi-led coalition and Saudi Arabia's conduct of the war in Yemen, where fighting has continued since March 2015. The war has exacerbated a humanitarian crisis in Yemen that began in 2011; presently, the World Food Program reports that 20 million Yemenis face hunger in the absence of sustained food assistance. The difficulty of accessing certain areas of Yemen has made it hard for governments and aid agencies to count the war's casualties. Data collected by the U.S. and European-funded Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) suggest that 60,000 Yemenis have been killed since January 2016. The Trump Administration has opposed various congressional proposals, including initiatives to reject or condition proposed U.S. arms sales or to require an end to U.S. military support to Saudi-led coalition operations in Yemen. Many in Congress have condemned the October 2018 murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi government personnel, and in general, the incident appears to have exacerbated existing congressional concerns about Saudi leaders and the pace, scope, and direction of change in the kingdom's policies. This product includes legislative proposals considered during the 115th and 116th Congresses. It does not include references to Yemen in Iran sanctions legislation, which are covered in CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions. For additional information on the war in Yemen and Saudi Arabia, please see the following CRS products. CRS Report R43960, Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention. CRS Report RL33533, Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations. CRS Insight IN10729, Yemen: Cholera Outbreak.

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Introduction The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant was created by the 1996 welfare reform law, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 ( P.L. 104-193 ). It replaced the program of cash assistance for needy families that dated back to the New Deal, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), and some of its related programs. The enactment of the 1996 welfare reform law was the culmination of a debate about how to overhaul programs providing cash assistance to needy families with children—specifically, those headed by single mothers—that spanned four decades: from the 1960s to the 1990s. The 1996 welfare law provided both program authority and funding (appropriations) for TANF through the end of FY2002. Most of the legislative activity on TANF since 2002 has been to extend the program funding and financing authority for TANF. Most of these extensions did not change TANF policy, though policy changes were included in extensions enacted in 2006, 2010, and 2012. The TANF Extension Act of 2019 ( P.L. 116-4 ) extended TANF funding through June 30, 2019. This report will begin with a brief overview of the history of the AFDC program and the welfare reform debates of the 1960s to the 1990s. That overview will be followed by a summary of the 1996 welfare reform law and the changes made since 1996. The report concludes with a detailed chronology of TANF legislation. Brief History of AFDC and the Welfare Reform Debates The modern form of cash assistance for needy families with children dates back to the Progressive Era of the early 1900s, and state- or locally funded mothers' pensions for "fatherless" families. The purpose of these programs was to permit these mothers to stay at home and care for their children. Federal funding for these programs was first provided in the Social Security Act of 1935 (P.L. 74-271) through the Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) program, later renamed the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program (AFDC). Many of the later changes, and the welfare reform debates of the 1960s to the 1990s, focused on issues of work and whether providing cash to nonworking single mothers served as disincentives for both work and marriage. However, the history of the ADC/AFDC program touched many other facets of the well-being of children and their families. ADC/AFDC provided federal funding for social services, medical assistance, child care, and foster care. These were later spun off into separate programs, with dedicated federal funding. While much of the focus of the welfare reform debates was on the single mother (custodial parent), ADC/AFDC policy also touched on noncustodial parents. The Child Support Enforcement (CSE) program was created, in great part, to reimburse states and the federal government for the costs of providing assistance to single mothers, and making noncustodial fathers responsible for these costs. CSE has evolved into a program that distributes child support payments collected from noncustodial parents to custodial parents, mostly to families that have never received or are no longer receiving cash assistance. The Early Years: 1930s to mid-1950s The Social Security Act of 1935 (P.L. 74-271) created the social insurance programs of Old Age Benefits and unemployment compensation, where workers earned protection against lost wages because of old age and involuntary unemployment. It also created federal funding for state programs providing assistance for low-income aged persons, blind persons, and programs for needy families with children where one parent (usually the father) was unable to support the family. The ADC program provided grants to the states to help finance programs to assist children who were "deprived of parental support or care by reason of the death, continued absence from the home, or physical or mental incapacity of a parent" and who lived with the other parent or a relative. States ran the program and determined eligibility for its benefits. The federal government provided funding for a portion of the expenditures made in state ADC programs. The legislative history of the 1935 act explicitly stated that the purpose of ADC payments was to permit mothers to stay at home rather than work: The very phrases "mothers' aid" and "mothers' pensions" place an emphasis equivalent to misconstruction of the intention of these laws. These are not primarily aids to mothers but defense measures for children. They are designed to release from the wage-earning role the person whose natural function is to give her children the physical and affectionate guardianship necessary not alone to keep them from falling into social misfortune, but more affirmatively to rear them into citizens capable of contributing to society. The 1935 Social Security Act left administration and many decisions about eligibility to the states. States also determined ADC benefit amounts. In the early years, families receiving ADC benefits were often headed by a widow or had a disabled father. However, over time the natures of both the program and the families it aided changed. The Social Security Amendments of 1939 (P.L. 76-379) added "survivor" benefits to the program of old age benefits, renaming it Old Age and Survivors Insurance. Survivor benefits, like old age benefits, were social insurance benefits earned through work in a covered job and paid to spouses and children upon the death of a worker or retiree. This provided an alternative, and more universal, means of aiding widows and their children. The Social Security Amendments of 1956 (P.L. 84-881) added Disability Insurance to Old Age and Survivor Insurance, with the combined program now commonly referred to as Social Security. The 1956 amendments also expanded the types of jobs covered by Social Security. These changes, too, provided more universal means of aiding the types of families that were originally assisted by ADC. The families receiving ADC increasingly were families where the father was alive but absent. The caseload also became increasingly nonwhite. The mid-1950s to the 1960s: Self-Sufficiency and Work The issue of whether single mothers should work was also much debated. The intent of ADC to allow single mothers to stay home and raise their children was often met with resistance at the state and local levels. It was also contrary to the reality that low-income women, particularly women of color, were sometimes expected to, and often did, work. Further, the increase in women's labor force participation in the second half of the 20 th century—particularly among married white women—eroded support for payments that permitted single mothers to remain at home and out of the workforce. The Social Security Amendments of 1956 (P.L. 84-881) added the goals of creating "self-sufficiency" and strengthening family life to ADC, along with funding for services that would seek to achieve these goals. P.L. 87-31, enacted in 1961, first made cash assistance benefits available to families headed by two able-bodied parents at state option. This authority was temporary at first (in response to an economic downturn), but was later made permanent. In 1962, the program was renamed Aid to Families with Dependent Children. The 1962 amendments, the Public Welfare Amendments of 1962 (P.L. 87-543), also established a community work and training program for adult AFDC recipients, largely intended for men in two-parent families. The Social Security Amendments of 1967 (P.L. 90-248) enacted both financial incentives for adult recipients to work and, for the first time, requirements for AFDC mothers to work. These amendments required states to disregard from a family's countable income some earnings when determining its "need" and benefits. The amendments also created a new work program under AFDC—the Work Incentive Program (WIN)—that expanded the population served by an AFDC-related work program to women. The Late 1960s and 1970s: Negative Income Tax and Guaranteed Incomes The late 1960s marked the beginning of the welfare reform debates, with proposals put to Congress to completely replace AFDC with a different type of program. This occurred as AFDC's costs and the number of families receiving its benefits increased. In 1964, fewer than 1 million families received AFDC. By 1973, the AFDC rolls had increased to 3.1 million families. For the decade beginning in 1969, these proposals were based on the "negative income tax" (NIT) concept. The NIT proposals would have provided a guaranteed income to families who had no earnings (the "income guarantee" that was part of these proposals). For families with earnings, the NIT would have provided for a gradual reduction in the benefit as earnings increased. President Nixon proposed to replace AFDC with an NIT-type program in 1969, the Family Assistance Plan (FAP). This proposal also would have nationalized the program, with the federal government paying the income guarantee and states able to supplement the federal guarantee with their own funds. This legislation was not enacted; it passed the House twice but never passed the Senate. In 1972, the Senate Finance Committee proposed to guarantee jobs—rather than income—for parents of school-age children. That proposal, too, did not ultimately pass. President Carter also proposed an NIT-based cash assistance program coupled with a public service job program in 1977. President Carter's proposals died in committee (they were never reported to either the full House or Senate). A less ambitious proposal from President Carter in 1979 passed the House but did not pass the Senate. The 1980s: Devolution and Early Experiments The proposals to change AFDC made by President Reagan at the beginning of his Administration differed sharply from the earlier welfare reform proposals. They emphasized devolution to the states in decisionmaking, rather than nationalization. They also emphasized requirement to work, rather than work incentives. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 ( P.L. 97-35 ) limited the earnings disregard that was enacted in 1967, ending benefits for many who were on the rolls and working. It also gave states expanded authority to require recipients to engage in community service or work experience programs (unpaid work) in exchange for their AFDC benefit. In 1982, President Reagan proposed to completely devolve cash assistance for families with children. That proposal did not pass. In the 1980s, there was increasing attention to "welfare dependency." Research at that time showed that while many mothers were on cash assistance for a short period of time, a substantial minority of mothers remained on the rolls for long periods. Additionally, policymakers began to focus on the possibility that a single mother who left welfare for work might be financially worse off than if she did not work and continued to collect benefits. Such a single mother, who might command relatively low wages in the labor force, risked losing medical assistance from Medicaid for herself and her children and faced work-related costs such as child care. The Family Support Act of 1988 ( P.L. 100-485 ) established in AFDC the notion of mutual responsibility between the cash assistance recipient and the state. It created the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills (JOBS) Training program, which provided employment services, education, and training for cash assistance recipients. The Family Support Act also mandated that states provide benefits for two-parent families, though it was on more restrictive terms than those for single-parent families. The Family Support Act also established the Transitional Medical Assistance (TMA) program that continued Medicaid coverage for a period of time for those who otherwise would have lost eligibility for Medicaid when moving from welfare to work. Further, it guaranteed child care for AFDC recipients engaged in work activities and provided time-limited (transitional) child care for those who left AFDC for work. Subsequent legislation, enacted in 1990, further expanded child care by creating a new block grant for those without a connection to AFDC, new matching funds to subsidize child care for those "at risk" of receiving AFDC, and a major expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). Additionally, an era of experimentation on "welfare-to-work" initiatives began in the 1980s. President Reagan proposed legislation in 1987 that would have authorized states to conduct demonstration projects that could have included AFDC and any other low-income assistance programs. These demonstrations would have been overseen at the federal level by an Interagency Low-Income Opportunity Board. Though the proposed legislation was not enacted, the Reagan Administration, and subsequently the Administrations of George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton, issued waivers of AFDC requirements under another provision of law. The experimentation on "welfare-to-work" initiatives found that requiring participation in work or job preparation activities could effectively move single mothers off the benefit rolls and into jobs. 1992 to 1996: "Ending Welfare As We Know It" The number of families receiving cash assistance had been fairly stable during the period from 1982 to 1988. However, beginning in the summer of 1989 the number of families receiving cash assistance began to increase once again. President Clinton's Proposal During the 1992 presidential campaign, then-candidate Bill Clinton promised to "end welfare as we know it." He stressed time-limited aid and expanded financial supports for those who did go to work. The 1993 tax bill further expanded the EITC. President Clinton made his welfare reform proposal in June 1994. It would have phased in a two-year limit on AFDC receipt without work, followed by required participation in a wage-paying work program after two years. It would also have expanded funding for training within the first two years. It was estimated to increase child care costs for participants in the JOBS program or the wage-paying work program. The proposal would have barred AFDC to unwed minor mothers. President Clinton's proposal was never considered by either the House or the Senate. However, during the period before the enactment of the 1996 welfare reform law, the Administration granted waivers of AFDC law to 43 states allowing them to engage in "welfare reform" demonstration projects. Some of these waivers were for small-scale demonstrations, but some were for statewide demonstrations of state-designed cash assistance and work programs. The Contract with America Welfare reform was one of 10 legislative initiatives that was included in the "Contract with America," developed by Republicans for the 1994 congressional campaign. The welfare proposal in the Contract with America would have required recipients to work after two years of AFDC (like the Clinton Administration proposal), but it also would have imposed a lifetime five-year limit on benefits. It would have barred AFDC to unwed minor mothers and would have imposed a "family cap," not increasing benefits for new babies born into AFDC families. Funding for AFDC and child care would have been capped, with states given the option to receive AFDC as a block grant. A Block Grant for Temporary Assistance to Needy Families H.R. 4 , as introduced at the start of the 104 th Congress, was the Contract with America proposal. However, immediately following the 1994 congressional election, House Republicans worked with several Republican governors to craft an alternative proposal that would block grant funding for AFDC and other social programs. The welfare reform legislation considered by House committees reflected the block grant proposals rather than the original H.R. 4 legislation. Legislation reported from the House committees was bundled into an omnibus welfare reform bill that included the end of AFDC and its replacement with TANF. That bill, the Personal Responsibility Act, substituting for the original text of H.R. 4 , passed the House on March 24, 1995. H.R. 4 , as passed by the House, formed the basis for all later welfare reform bills considered and passed by the 104 th Congress. It would have replaced AFDC and related programs of Emergency Assistance, and the work and training program for AFDC recipients, with a block grant to the states for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families; allotted TANF basic block grant funds to states based on recent expenditures in AFDC and related programs; allowed states to spend their TANF grants on a broad range of benefits and services; gradually phased in a requirement that 50% of the caseload be either working or engaged in activities, but limited the ability of states to count education and training toward that target; the requirement could also be met, fully or partially, through caseload reduction (i.e., the caseload reduction credit); established a five-year lifetime limit on cash assistance; prohibited unwed minor parents from receiving cash assistance; prohibited states from increasing cash benefits when a new baby was born to a family already on the rolls (the family cap); and limited need-tested benefits for noncitizens in need-tested programs, including requiring that noncitizens be in the United States for five years before being eligible for TANF. The House-passed bill also consolidated AFDC-related child care funding with the block grant created in 1990, and it increased funding for child care. However, it ended the guarantee that those transitioning from welfare-to-work be provided child care. The Senate Finance Committee ordered H.R. 4 reported in May 1995. The Finance Committee bill adopted a similar structure to the House bill. Different from the House bill, however, the Senate Finance Committee bill would have continued a separate employment and training program; did not include a family cap; and did not include the prohibition on benefits to unwed minor parents. Disputes about the committee-reported measure over items such as the distribution of funds held up consideration of the bill until August and September of 1995. Negotiations between party leaders in the Senate, Senator Robert Dole for the Republicans and Senator Thomas Daschle for the Democrats, produced an accord that also adopted the basic structure of the House bill but made some substantial modifications. The compromise bill included a requirement that states continue to spend some of their own funds (a "maintenance of effort," or MOE requirement) in order to receive their full block grant funds; supplemental grants to states with high rates of population growth and/or low historical welfare spending per poor child; a contingency fund for states experiencing economic need; a provision to allow aid to unwed minor parents who were living in an adult supervised setting; and "charitable choice" provisions to permit increased participation of faith-based organizations in the delivery of welfare services. The Senate passed its version of H.R. 4 on September 19, 1995. Welfare Reform Added to the 1995 Budget Bill—First Veto of Welfare Reform Following passage of welfare reform legislation in the Senate, both the House and Senate began the process of crafting legislation to implement the budget adopted for FY1996. On October 17, 1995, the House Budget Committee reported its budget reconciliation bill ( H.R. 2491 ), which included the end of AFDC and its replacement with TANF. It passed the House on October 26, 1995. The Senate version of the budget reconciliation bill also generally included the Senate-passed version of the TANF proposal, and it passed on October 28, 1995. Conferees came to an agreement on the budget reconciliation bill—including the welfare reform provisions—on November 17, 1995. The House- and Senate-approved conference agreement was vetoed by President Clinton on December 6, 1995. President Clinton's veto message highlighted his opposition to cuts to Medicare, Medicaid, the EITC, and child nutrition programs. The President said: On welfare reform, I strongly support real welfare reform that strengthens families and encourages work and responsibility. But the provisions in this bill, when added to the EITC cuts, would cut low-income programs too deeply. Final Agreement on H.R. 4 and Second Veto of Welfare Reform With the veto of the budget reconciliation bill, attention turned toward finalizing House-Senate agreements on the stand-alone welfare reform bill ( H.R. 4 ). A final conference report on H.R. 4 was filed on December 20, 1995. The final agreement included many of the modifications to TANF that were adopted in the Senate, including a compromise maintenance of effort requirement; supplemental grants to states with high population growth and/or low historical spending per poor child, but with limited funding; and a state option to impose a family cap. President Clinton vetoed H.R. 4 on January 9, 1996. In vetoing the bill, the President remarked: The final welfare reform legislation should provide sufficient child care to enable recipients to leave welfare to work; reward States for placing people in jobs; restore the guarantee of health coverage for poor families; require States to maintain their stake in moving people from welfare to work; and protect States and families in the event of economic downturn and population growth. The President also objected to budget cuts not related to the TANF proposal, such as provisions that would have cut spending in food stamps (now the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program), benefits for disabled children, benefits for noncitizens, school lunches, and foster care and adoption assistance. Legislation Action in 1996 With welfare reform twice vetoed, the National Governor's Association (NGA) in February 1996 adopted a policy position asking for additional child care funds, additional contingency funds for recessionary periods, and bonus payments for states that meet certain employment outcomes. In May 1996, House and Senate Republicans introduced bills that reflected the policies of the vetoed H.R. 4 and provided additional funding for child care, the TANF contingency fund, and performance bonuses. H.R. 3734 , the budget reconciliation bill for that year, included these welfare reform provisions together with a proposal to revise Medicaid. H.R. 3734 passed the House on July 18, 1996. The Senate made a key modification to the bill by dropping its Medicaid provisions. The welfare reform provisions remained in H.R. 3734 , and it passed the Senate on July 23, 1996. A conference agreement on the bill was filed July 30, 1996; it passed the House on July 31, 1996, and the Senate on August 1, 1996. President Clinton signed the legislation, known as the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA; P.L. 104-193 ), into law on August 22, 1996. Major Differences Between AFDC and TANF The 1996 welfare reform law repealed AFDC and some of its related programs and replaced it with the TANF block grant. Funding for the AFDC-related child care programs was consolidated into a separate funding stream dedicated to child care. Some things did not change with the 1996 law. As was the case with AFDC, TANF programs are run by states (and sometimes localities), and they determine the maximum benefits under the programs and set the income eligibility thresholds. Table 1 summarizes some of the major differences between AFDC and TANF. It should be noted that at the time of enactment of the 1996 law many states were operating under waivers of the AFDC rules that related to cash assistance. These waivers imposed time limits, set different rules for counting earnings than did the AFDC federal rules, and set different rules for work or participation in job activities. TANF permitted states to continue programs operated under waivers, even if the provisions of the waiver were inconsistent with TANF rules. The last of these waivers expired in 2007. Overview of Post-1996 TANF Legislation Balanced Budget Act of 1997 The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA97, P.L. 105-33 ), enacted one year after the 1996 welfare reform law, made a number of changes to TANF. It created a program providing additional funding dedicated to financing work activities. The Welfare-to-Work Grant program (WTW) provided $3 billion for two years, FY1998 and FY1999. Under the program, funding was divided, with 75% provided to states and local workforce areas through a formula and 25% dedicated to competitive grants. The program was originally targeted at the hardest to serve population on TANF and similarly disadvantaged noncustodial parents. The WTW grant program was administered by the Department of Labor (DOL), not the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), which administers TANF. Subsequent legislation relaxed requirements for targeting services to the hardest to serve, and as funds were spent more slowly than anticipated, the deadline for expenditures was extended. The BBA97 made several other permanent changes to TANF, including permitting a greater percentage of recipients to be counted as engaged in work through education and training, but retaining a limit on counting such participation; setting a statutory limit on transfers from TANF to the Social Services Block Grant at 10%; and making technical corrections to the 1996 welfare reform bill, including technical corrections to TANF. Attempts at Reauthorization: 2002-2005 In February 2002, President George W. Bush made proposals for the reauthorization of the TANF block grant and related welfare reform proposals. The document, Working for Independence, outlined a five-year reauthorization that would have funded the basic TANF block grant at the same level provided from FY1997 through FY2002 for an additional five years; provided mandatory child care funding through FY2007 at its FY2002 level (with no inflation or other adjustment over the period FY2003-FY2007); provided dedicated funding for grants to promote healthy marriage; raised the work participation standard to a minimum of 70% of families with a "work-eligible individual" that must be working or engaged in activities; required 40 hours per week of work or engagement in activities for full credit toward meeting the standard, but allowed for partial credit for hours less than 40 hours per week; allowed states to count rehabilitative activities for three months on the rolls, but narrowed the activities that counted after three months to work or community service or work experience; and ended the caseload reduction credit against the work standards, replacing it with a credit for recipients who left the rolls for work. The Bush Administration proposals were incorporated (with some modifications) into bills that passed the House in 2002 and 2003: H.R. 4737 (107 th Congress) and H.R. 4 (108 th Congress). A major difference between the Bush Administration proposal and the House proposals of 2002 and 2003 was that the House proposals retained the caseload reduction credit and provided extra credit to states that had large historical caseload reductions. Following House action, the Senate Finance Committee reported substantially differing versions of each bill. The Senate Finance Committee bills did not narrow the activities that could be counted toward the work participation standard after three months, and they expanded the ability of states to count participation in rehabilitative activities toward the TANF work participation standard. The Senate Finance Committee bills would have replaced the caseload reduction credit with a credit based on employed leavers, families diverted from the rolls, and families receiving work supports. The full Senate never acted on either of the Senate Finance Committee-reported bills. In the absence of reauthorization legislation, TANF program and funding authority was extended on a temporary basis 13 times from 2002 to 2006. The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 The early part of 2005 again saw committee action on legislation to reauthorize TANF. On March 9, 2005, the Senate Finance Committee ordered reported legislation that became S. 667 (109 th Congress). The following week, the House Ways and Means Committee's Subcommittee on Human Resources considered H.R. 240 and sent it to the full committee. However, further action on TANF reauthorization did not occur until the fall of 2005, when the House and Senate began considering legislation under the budget reconciliation process. The House passed as part of their reconciliation bill (the House amendment to S. 1932 ) the TANF reauthorization bills that essentially incorporated the proposals passed by the House in 2002 and 2003 and were contained in H.R. 240 . The Senate version of the reconciliation bill contained no TANF provisions. The conference report on the budget reconciliation bill included TANF provisions different from those that passed the House. The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA, P.L. 109-171 ) included (1) a long-term extension of TANF funding, through the end of FY2010; (2) the elimination of performance bonuses to states; (3) the establishment of a $150 million fund for research and competitive grants on healthy marriage and responsible fatherhood, with $100 million per year for healthy marriage initiatives and $50 million per year for responsible fatherhood initiatives; and (4) changes to TANF work rules, such as counting caseload reduction only from 2005 (rather than 1995) toward the work participation standards, requiring HHS to define specific work activities that may count for each listed statutory work activity, and requiring that states verify work activities of recipients. The DRA also included an increase in mandatory child care funding from $2.717 billion per year to $2.917 billion per year. The conference report on the DRA passed the House on December 19, 2005. Congress finished reconciling differences between the two chambers in February 2006. President Bush signed the DRA into law as P.L. 109-171 on February 8, 2006. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 The economy entered into a recession after December 2007, with a major financial crisis and accelerating job loss occurring in late 2008. In response, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA, P.L. 111-5 ) passed Congress and was signed by President Obama. ARRA included tax cuts; unemployment insurance provisions; and extra funding for programs, including provisions to provide fiscal relief to states. ARRA also included $5 billion for a new TANF Emergency Contingency Fund (ECF) available to be spent in FY2009 and FY2010. The ECF supplemented funding for the regular TANF contingency fund, which itself was depleted in early FY2010. The ECF reimbursed states for 80% of the cost of increased expenditures for basic assistance, short-term emergency aid, and subsidized employment. ARRA also temporarily froze the TANF caseload reduction credit at prerecession levels, through its application to the FY2011 work participation standards. TANF Legislation from 2010 to 2019 The long-term extension of TANF enacted in the DRA expired at the end of FY2010 (September 30, 2010). Since then, Congress continued TANF program authority and funding through a series of short-term extensions. TANF extensions have been incorporated into stop-gap continuing resolutions or omnibus appropriations bills to fund all or most of the government, added to tax bills, added to unrelated legislation, or passed as stand-alone legislation. (As used in this report, stand-alone legislation represents laws enacted that addressed only TANF and related programs.) There were two gaps in funding for TANF during this period. Funding lapsed during broader "government shutdowns" in October 2013 and beginning in December 2018. States were permitted to draw on unspent, previously appropriated TANF funds to finance their TANF activities during the shutdown. While many of the short-term extensions of TANF funding did not make changes to TANF policy, three extension laws did The Claims Resolution Act of 2010 (CRA, P.L. 111-291 ), a bill to settle claims against the federal government for certain Indian tribes, included a TANF extension through the end of FY2011. It also altered funding for the healthy marriage and responsible fatherhood programs, splitting the combined $150 million appropriation for them at $75 million for healthy marriage and $75 million for responsible fatherhood (it had previously been $100 million for healthy marriage and $50 million for responsible fatherhood). Additionally, the CRA required special one-time reports from the states on how they spend funds and on individuals with no reported hours of work participation. The CRA also provided funding for TANF supplemental grants only through June 30, 2011 (rather than September 30, 2011, the end of the fiscal year). Supplemental grants were not funded for the last quarter of FY2011, nor any fiscal year thereafter. The Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 ( P.L. 112-96 ) extended TANF through the end of FY2012, and also permanently amended TANF law to require states to act to prevent cash assistance recipients from withdrawing their benefits at Automated Teller Machines (ATMs) at strip clubs, casinos, and liquor stores. The FY2017 Consolidated Appropriations Act ( P.L. 115-31 ) extended funding for the TANF block grant for the remainder of FY2017 and for FY2018. It also financed TANF-related research through a set-aside of 0.33% of the TANF basic block grant appropriation. This reduced the TANF basic block grant to each state by 0.33%. In 2018, the House Ways and Means Committee reported legislation ( H.R. 5861 , 115 th Congress) that would have reauthorized and funded TANF for five years; revised TANF's work rules to measure employment outcomes rather than participation; required all assistance recipients to have an individualized plan; required that all TANF funds be spent on families with incomes at or below 200% of poverty; and required a minimum percentage of TANF funds to be spent on assistance, work activities, or short-term economic aid. The bill was not considered by the full House. Detailed Legislative Chronology 1996 P.L. 104-193 , enacted August 22, 1996, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, established the block grant of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families. Funds for most TANF grants were appropriated through FY2002; supplemental grants and the TANF contingency fund were appropriated through FY2001. States were required to implement TANF, and accept their block grant funding, by July 1, 1997, though they could opt to implement earlier. P.L. 104-327 , enacted October 19, 1996, amended the transition rule from the pre-TANF programs to TANF that limited total FY1997 federal funding for TANF and pre-TANF programs. It changed the limit on funding to the states for FY1997 from an amount equal to their basic block grant to an amount equal to their basic block grant plus, if they qualified, what they would have received from the TANF contingency fund. 1997 P.L. 105-33 , enacted August 5, 1997, the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, raised the cap limiting the counting of education as work from 20% to 30% of those considered engaged in work, and temporarily removed from that cap teen parents engaged in education through FY1999; set the maximum allowable TANF transfer to Title XX social services at 10% of the block grant (rather than one-third of total transfers); and made technical corrections to P.L. 104-193 . P.L. 105-33 also established the Welfare-to-Work (WTW) grant program within TANF (funded at $3 billion over two years, FY1998 and FY1999), but administered by the Department of Labor at the federal level, with local administration by state workforce investment boards and competitive grantees. P.L. 105-89 , enacted November 19, 1997, the Adoption and Safe Families Act, reduced the contingency fund appropriation by $40 million. 1998 P.L. 105-178 , enacted June 9, 1998, the Transportation Act for the 21 st Century, permitted the use of federal TANF funds as matching funds for reverse commuter grants. It also set the statutory limit on TANF transfers to Title XX social services at 4.25% of the block grant. (Note that subsequent annual appropriation bills restored the 10% limit on TANF transfers to SSBG.) 1999 P.L. 106-113 , enacted November 29, 1999, an omnibus appropriations act, broadened eligibility for recipients to be served by the WTW grant program and added limited authority for vocational education or job training to be WTW activities. 2000 P.L. 106-554 , enacted December 21, 2000, an omnibus appropriation act, gave grantees two more years to spend WTW grant funds (for a total of five years from the date of the grant award). 2002 P.L. 107-147 , enacted March 9, 2002, the Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act, extended the TANF supplemental grants and contingency funds, both of which had expired on September 30, 2001, through FY2002. Supplemental grants were extended at FY2001 levels. P.L. 107-229 , enacted September 30, 2002, a short-term continuing resolution, extended TANF basic grants, supplemental grants, bonus funds, and contingency funds (and other related programs) through December 20, 2002. P.L. 107-294 , enacted November 22, 2002, a short-term continuing resolution, extended TANF and related funding through March 30, 2003. 2003 P.L. 108-7 , enacted February 20, 2003, an omnibus appropriations act, extended TANF and related funding through June 30, 2003. P.L. 108-40 , enacted June 30, 2003, a stand-alone bill, extended TANF and related funding through September 30, 2003. P.L. 108-89 , enacted October 1, 2003, a multipurpose bill, included an extension of TANF and related funding through March 31, 2004. 2004 P.L. 108-199 , enacted January 23, 2004, a consolidated appropriations bill, rescinded all remaining unspent WTW formula grant funds, effectively ending the WTW grant program. P.L. 108-210 , enacted March 31, 2004, a stand-alone bill, extended TANF and related funding through June 30, 2004. P.L. 108-262 , enacted June 30, 2004, a stand-alone bill, extended TANF and related funding through September 30, 2004. P.L. 108-308 , enacted September 30, 2004, a stand-alone bill, extended TANF and related funding through March 31, 2005. 2005 P.L. 109-4 , enacted March 25, 2005, a stand-alone bill, extended TANF and related funding through June 30, 2005. P.L. 109-19 , enacted July 1, 2005, a stand-alone bill, extended TANF and related funding through September 30, 2005. P.L. 109-68 , enacted September 21, 2005, allowed states to draw upon contingency funds to assist those displaced by Hurricane Katrina, allowing directly affected states to receive funds from the loan fund, with repayment of the loan forgiven, and suspending penalties for failure to meet certain requirements for states directly affected by the hurricane. It also temporarily extended TANF grants through December 30, 2005. P.L. 109-161 , enacted December 30, 2005, a stand-alone bill, extended TANF grants through March 30, 2006. 2006 P.L. 109-171 , enacted February 8, 2006, the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, extended most TANF grants through FY2010 (supplemental grants were extended through the end of FY2008), eliminated TANF bonus funds, established competitive grants within TANF for healthy marriage and responsible fatherhood initiatives, revised the caseload reduction credit, and required HHS to issue regulations to define specific activities that count toward the TANF work participation standards as well as verify work and participation in activities. 2008 P.L. 110-275 , enacted July 15, 2008, the Medicare Improvements and Patients and Providers Act of 2008, included an extension of TANF supplemental grants through the end of FY2009. 2009 P.L. 111-5 , enacted February 17, 2009, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, established a $5 billion Emergency Contingency Fund (ECF) to reimburse states for increased costs associated with the Great Recession for FY2009 and FY2010. The fund reimbursed states, territories, and tribes for 80% of the increased costs of basic assistance, nonrecurrent short-term benefits, and subsidized employment. The law also permitted states to freeze caseload reduction credits at prerecession levels, allowed states to use TANF reserve funds for any benefit or service (it was previously restricted to assistance), and extended supplemental grants through the end of FY2010. 2010 P.L. 111-242 , enacted September 30, 2010, a short-term continuing resolution, extended TANF funding through December 3, 2010. P.L. 111-290 , enacted December 4, 2010, a short-term continuing resolution, extended TANF funding authority through December 18, 2010. P.L. 111-291 , enacted December 8, 2010, the Claims Resolution Act of 2010, extended basic TANF funding through the end of FY2011 (September 30, 2011) but provided supplemental grants only through June 30, 2011. It also altered funding for the healthy marriage and responsible fatherhood programs, splitting the combined $150 million appropriation for them at $75 million for healthy marriage and $75 million for responsible fatherhood. The act required some additional reporting on work activities and TANF expenditures. 2011 P.L. 112-35 , enacted September 30, 2011, the Short-Term TANF Extension Act, extended basic TANF funding for three months, through December 31, 2011. No funding was provided for TANF supplemental grants. P.L. 112-78 , enacted December 23, 2011, the Temporary Payroll Tax Cut Continuation Act of 2011, extended basic TANF funding for two months, through February 29, 2012. 2012 P.L. 112-96 , enacted February 22, 2012, the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012, extended basic TANF funding for the remainder of FY2012 (to September 30, 2012). It also prevented electronic benefit transaction access to TANF cash at liquor stores, casinos, and strip clubs; states would be required to prohibit access to TANF cash at ATMs at such establishments. It also required states to report TANF data in a manner that facilitates the exchange of that data with other programs' data systems. P.L. 112-175 , enacted September 28, 2012, a continuing resolution providing funding for the first six months of FY2013, extended TANF funding through March, 2013. 2013 P.L. 112-275 , enacted January 14, 2013, the Protect Our Kids Act of 2012, appropriated $612 million to the TANF contingency fund for FY2013 and FY2014, and reserved $2 million from each of the two years' appropriations for the activities of a commission to examine child welfare fatalities. P.L. 113-6 , enacted March 26, 2013, an omnibus appropriations bill, extended TANF funding through the remainder of FY2013. P.L. 113-46 , enacted October 17, 2013, a short-term continuing resolution , extended TANF funding through January 15, 2014. (T h is resolution ended the government shutdown and a TANF funding gap from October 1, 2013, through October 16, 2013.) 2014 P.L. 113-73 , enacted January 15, 2014, a short-term continuing resolution, extended TANF funding through January 18, 2014. P.L. 113-76 , enacted January 17, 2014, a consolidated appropriations act, extended TANF funding for the remainder of FY2014 (through September 30, 2014). P.L. 113-164 , enacted September 19, 2014, a short-term continuing resolution, extended TANF funding through December 11, 2014. P.L. 113-202 , enacted December 12, 2014, a short-term continuing resolution, extended TANF funding through December 13, 2014. P.L. 113-203 , enacted December 13, 2014, a short-term continuing resolution, extended TANF funding through December 17, 2014. P.L. 113-235 , enacted December 16, 2014, an omnibus appropriations act, extended TANF funding through September 30, 2015. 2015 P.L. 114-53 , enacted September 30, 2015, a short-term continuing resolution, extended TANF funding through December 11, 2015. P.L. 114-96 , enacted December 11, 2015, a short-term continuing resolution, extended TANF funding through December 16, 2015. P.L. 114-100 , enacted December 16, 2015, a short-term continuing resolution, extended TANF funding through December 22, 2015. P.L. 114-113 , enacted December 18, 2015, a consolidated appropriations act, extended TANF funding for the remainder of FY2016 as part of an omnibus appropriations act. 2016 P.L. 114-223 , enacted September 29, 2016, a short-term continuing resolution, extended TANF funding through December 9, 2016. P.L. 114-254 , enacted December 10, 2016, extended TANF funding through April 28, 2017. 2017 P.L. 115-30 , enacted April 28, 2017, extended TANF funding through May 5, 2017. P.L. 115-31 , the Consolidated Appropriation Act, 2017, enacted May 5, 2017, extended TANF funding for the remainder of FY2017 and through the end of FY2018. It provided that 0.33% of the funding in the TANF basic block grant pay for TANF-related research activities. This reduced the basic TANF block grant for each state by that percentage (0.33%). The act also required the Department of Health and Human Services, in consultation with the Department of Labor, to develop a database named "What Works Clearinghouse of Proven and Promising Projects to Move Welfare Recipients into Work," to consist of research projects that deliver services to move TANF recipients into work. 2018 P.L. 115-245 , enacted September 28, 2018, a short-term continuing resolution, extended TANF funding through December 7, 2018. P.L. 115-298 , enacted December 7, 2018, a short-term continuing resolution, extended TANF funding through December 21, 2018. 2019 P.L. 116-4 , the TANF Extension Act of 2019, enacted January 24, 2019, a stand-alone TANF bill, extended TANF funding through June 30, 2019. (This legislation ended a TANF funding gap that occurred after the expiration of P.L. 115-298 on December 21, 2018.)

The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant was created in the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-193). It was born out of the welfare reform debates that spanned four decades, from the 1960s through the 1990s. These debates focused on the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, which provided federal funding for state-run programs delivering assistance to needy families with children, with most families receiving assistance historically being headed by single mothers who were not working. The welfare reform debates focused on whether and how much single mothers should be expected to work, and whether the program itself contributed to dependency by providing disincentives to work and raise children in two-parent families. In 1992, then-candidate Bill Clinton promised to "end welfare as we know it." President Clinton submitted his welfare reform proposal to Congress in June 1994, but Congress did not take any action on it. A welfare reform proposal was included in the House Republican "Contract with America" document during the 1994 congressional campaign. This proposal would have altered, but not replaced, AFDC. Immediately after the 1994 congressional campaign, with Republicans taking control of both the House and the Senate, the new House leadership and Republican governors crafted a proposal to end AFDC and replace it with the TANF block grant. This proposal passed Congress as part of two separate pieces of legislation in 1995, but President Clinton vetoed both. In 1996, a revised proposal was offered and passed Congress. On August 22, 1996, President Clinton signed the 1996 welfare reform bill that ended AFDC and replaced it with TANF, a broad-purpose block grant to the states that helps fund a wide range of benefits, services, and activities to address the effects of, and root causes of, child poverty and economic disadvantage. Reflecting its origins in the welfare reform debates, most TANF policy revolves around the state programs of cash assistance and work programs that the block grant helps fund. Most TANF policies in effect in 2019 date back to the 1996 welfare reform law. The original funding provided in that law for TANF expired at the end of FY2002 (September 30, 2002), and most of the legislative activity since then has been to continue funding on a short-term basis. From FY2002 to FY2006, TANF was funded by a series of short-term extensions. There was one long-term extension of TANF funding—The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA, P.L. 109-171)—which extended it from FY2006 through the end of FY2010. The DRA also made some changes to TANF work rules and established a program of competitive grants mostly to community-based organizations for healthy marriage and responsible fatherhood initiatives. Since the end of FY2010, TANF has again been funded by a series of short-term extensions. Most recently, it was extended through June 30, 2019, by the TANF Extension Act of 2019 (P.L. 116-4).

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Introduction The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) is an agency of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) that insures private mortgage lenders against the possibility of borrowers defaulting on certain mortgage loans. If a mortgage borrower defaults on a mortgage—that is, does not repay the mortgage as promised—and the home goes to foreclosure, FHA is to pay the lender the remaining amount that the borrower owes. FHA insurance protects the lender, rather than the borrower, in the event of borrower default; a borrower who defaults on an FHA-insured mortgage will still experience the consequences of foreclosure. To be eligible for FHA insurance, the mortgage must be originated by a lender that has been approved by FHA, and the mortgage and the borrower must meet certain criteria. FHA is one of three government agencies that provide insurance or guarantees on certain home mortgages made by private lenders, along with the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). Of these federal mortgage insurance programs, FHA is the most broadly targeted. Unlike VA- and USDA-insured mortgages, the availability of FHA-insured mortgages is not limited by factors such as veteran status, income, or whether the property is located in a rural area. However, the availability or attractiveness of FHA-insured mortgages may be limited by other factors, such as the maximum mortgage amount that FHA will insure, the fees that it charges for insurance, and its eligibility standards. This report provides background on FHA's history and market role and an overview of the basic eligibility and underwriting criteria for FHA-insured home loans. It also provides data on the number and dollar volume of mortgages that FHA insures, along with data on FHA's market share in recent years. It does not go into detail on the financial status of the FHA mortgage insurance fund. For information on FHA's financial position, see CRS Report R42875, FHA Single-Family Mortgage Insurance: Financial Status of the Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund (MMI Fund) . Background History The Federal Housing Administration was created by the National Housing Act of 1934, during the Great Depression, to encourage lending for housing and to stimulate the construction industry. Prior to the creation of FHA, few mortgages exceeded 50% of the property's value and most mortgages were written for terms of five years or less. Furthermore, mortgages were typically not structured to be fully repaid by the end of the loan term; rather, at the end of the five-year term, the remaining loan balance had to be paid in a lump sum or the mortgage had to be renegotiated. During the Great Depression, lenders were unable or unwilling to refinance many of the loans that became due. Thus, many borrowers lost their homes through foreclosure, and lenders lost money because property values were falling. Lenders became wary of the mortgage market. FHA institutionalized a new idea: 20-year mortgages on which the loan would be completely repaid at the end of the loan term. If borrowers defaulted, FHA insured that the lender would be fully repaid. By standardizing mortgage instruments and setting certain standards for mortgages, the creation of FHA was meant to instill confidence in the mortgage market and, in turn, help to stimulate investment in housing and the overall economy. Eventually, lenders began to make long-term mortgages without FHA insurance if borrowers made significant down payments. Over time, 15- and 30-year mortgages have become standard mortgage products. When the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) was created in 1965, FHA became part of HUD. Today, FHA is intended to facilitate access to affordable mortgages for some households who otherwise might not be well-served by the private market. Furthermore, it facilitates access to mortgages during economic or mortgage market downturns by continuing to insure mortgages when the availability of mortgage credit has otherwise tightened. For this reason, it is said to play a "countercyclical" role in the mortgage market—that is, it tends to insure more mortgages when the mortgage market or overall economy is weak, and fewer mortgages when the economy is strong and other types of mortgages are more readily available. Current Role Facilitating Access to Mortgage Credit Some prospective homebuyers may have the income to sustain monthly mortgage payments but lack the funds to make a large down payment or otherwise have difficulty obtaining a mortgage. Borrowers with small down payments, weaker credit histories, or other characteristics that increase their credit risk might find it difficult to obtain a mortgage at an affordable interest rate or to qualify for a mortgage at all. This has raised a policy concern that some borrowers with the income to repay a mortgage might be unable to obtain affordable mortgages. FHA mortgage insurance is intended to make lenders more willing to offer affordable mortgages to these borrowers by insuring the lender against the possibility of borrower default. FHA-insured loans have lower down payment requirements than most conventional mortgages. (Conventional mortgages are mortgages that are not insured by FHA or guaranteed by another government agency, such as VA or USDA. ) Because saving for a down payment is often the biggest barrier to homeownership for first-time homebuyers and lower- or moderate-income homebuyers, the smaller down payment requirement for FHA-insured loans may allow some households to obtain a mortgage earlier than they otherwise could. (Borrowers with down payments of less than 20% could also obtain non-FHA mortgages with private mortgage insurance. See the nearby text box on "FHA and Private Mortgage Insurance.") FHA-insured mortgages also have less stringent requirements related to credit history than many conventional loans. This might make FHA-insured mortgages attractive to borrowers without traditional credit histories or with weaker credit histories, who would either find it difficult to take out a mortgage absent FHA insurance or may find it more expensive to do so. FHA-insured mortgages play a particularly large role for first-time homebuyers, low- and moderate-income households, and minorities. For example, 83% of FHA-insured mortgages made to purchase a home (rather than to refinance an existing mortgage) in FY2018 were obtained by first-time homebuyers. Over one-third of all FHA loans (both purchase and refinance loans) were obtained by minority households, and FHA-insured mortgages accounted for about 57% of all forward mortgages made to low- or moderate-income borrowers during the year. Since FHA-insured mortgages are often obtained by borrowers who cannot make large down payments or those with weaker credit histories, some have questioned whether FHA-insured mortgages are similar to subprime mortgages. Like subprime mortgages, FHA-insured mortgages are often obtained by borrowers with lower credit scores, though some borrowers with higher credit scores also obtain FHA-insured mortgages. However, FHA-insured mortgages are prohibited from carrying the full range of features that many subprime mortgages could carry. For example, FHA-insured loans must be fully documented, and they cannot include features such as negative amortization. (FHA mortgages can include adjustable interest rates.) Some of these types of features appear to have contributed to high default and foreclosure rates on subprime mortgages. Nevertheless, some have suggested that FHA-insured mortgages are too risky, and that they can harm borrowers by providing mortgages that often have a higher likelihood of default than other mortgages due to combinations of risk factors such as low down payments and lower credit scores. Countercyclical Role Traditionally, FHA plays a countercyclical role in the mortgage market, meaning that it tends to insure more mortgages when mortgage credit markets are tight and fewer mortgages when mortgage credit is more widely available. A major reason for this is that FHA continues to insure mortgages that meet its standards even during market downturns or in regions experiencing economic turmoil. When the economy is weak and lenders and private mortgage insurers tighten credit standards and reduce lending activity, FHA-insured mortgages may be the only mortgages available to some borrowers, or may have more favorable terms than mortgages that lenders are willing to make without FHA insurance. When the economy is strong and mortgage credit is more widely available, many borrowers may find it easier to qualify for affordable conventional mortgages. Features of FHA-Insured Mortgages This section briefly describes some of the major features of FHA-insured mortgages for purchasing or refinancing a single-family home. Single-family homes are defined as properties with one to four separate dwelling units. Eligibility and Underwriting Guidelines FHA-insured loans are available to borrowers who intend to be owner-occupants and who can demonstrate the ability to repay the loan according to the terms of the contract. FHA-insured loans must be underwritten in accordance with accepted practices of prudent lending institutions and FHA requirements. Lenders must examine factors such as the applicant's credit, financial status, monthly shelter expenses, funds required for closing expenses, effective monthly income, and debts and obligations. In general, individuals who have previously been subject to a mortgage foreclosure are not eligible for FHA-insured loans for at least three years after the foreclosure. As a general rule, the applicant's prospective mortgage payment should not exceed 31% of gross effective monthly income. The applicant's total obligations, including the proposed housing expenses, should not exceed 43% of gross effective monthly income. If these ratios are not met, the borrower may be able to present the presence of certain compensating factors, such as cash reserves, in order to qualify for an FHA-insured loan. Since October 4, 2010, FHA has required a minimum credit score of 500, and has required higher down payments from borrowers with credit scores below 580 than from borrowers with credit scores above that threshold. See the " Down Payment " section for more information on down payment requirements for FHA-insured loans. Owner Occupancy In general, borrowers must intend to occupy the property as a principal residence. Eligible Loan Purposes FHA-insured loans may be used to purchase one-family detached homes, townhomes, rowhouses, two- to four-unit buildings, manufactured homes and lots, and condominiums in developments approved by FHA. FHA-insured loans may also be obtained to build a home; to repair, alter, or improve a home; to refinance an existing home loan; to simultaneously purchase and improve a home; or to make certain energy efficiency or weatherization improvements in conjunction with a home purchase or mortgage refinance. Loan Term FHA-insured mortgages may be obtained with loan terms of up to 30 years. Interest Rates The interest rate on an FHA-insured loan is negotiated between the borrower and lender. The borrower has the option of selecting a loan with an interest rate that is fixed for the life of the loan or one on which the rate may be adjusted annually. Down Payment FHA requires a lower down payment than many other types of mortgages. Under changes made by the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA, P.L. 110-289 ), borrowers are required to contribute at least 3.5% in cash or its equivalent to the cost of acquiring a property with an FHA-insured mortgage. (Prior law had required borrowers to contribute at least 3% in cash or its equivalent.) Prohibited sources of the required funds include the home seller, any entity that financially benefits from the transaction, and any third party that is directly or indirectly reimbursed by the seller or by anyone that would financially benefit from the transaction. HUD has interpreted the 3.5% cash contribution as a down payment requirement and has specified that contributions toward closing costs cannot be counted toward it. Since October 4, 2010, FHA has required a 10% down payment from borrowers with credit scores between 500 and 579, while borrowers with credit scores of 580 or above are still required to make a down payment of at least 3.5%. FHA no longer insures loans made to borrowers with credit scores below 500. Maximum Mortgage Amount There is no income limit for borrowers seeking FHA-insured loans. However, FHA-insured mortgages cannot exceed a maximum mortgage amount set by law. The maximum mortgage amounts allowed for FHA-insured loans vary by area, based on a percentage of area median home prices. Different limits are in effect for one-unit, two-unit, three-unit, and four-unit properties. The limits are subject to a statutory floor and ceiling; that is, the maximum mortgage amount that FHA will insure in a given area cannot be lower than the floor, nor can it be higher than the ceiling. In 2008, Congress temporarily increased the maximum mortgage amounts in response to turmoil in the housing and mortgage markets, with the intention of allowing more households to qualify for FHA-insured mortgages during a period of tighter credit availability. New permanent maximum mortgage amounts were later established by the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008. The maximum mortgage amounts established by HERA were higher than the previous permanent limits, but in many cases lower than the temporarily increased limits. However, the higher temporary limits were extended for several years, until they expired at the end of calendar year 2013. Since January 1, 2014, the maximum mortgage amounts have been set at the permanent HERA levels. For a one-unit home, HERA established the maximum mortgage amounts at 115% of area median home prices, with a floor set at 65% of the Freddie Mac conforming loan limit and a ceiling set at 150% of the Freddie Mac conforming loan limit. For calendar year 2019, the floor is $314,827 and the ceiling is $726,525. (That is, FHA will insure mortgages with principal balances up to $314,827 in all areas of the country. In higher-cost areas, it will insure mortgages with principal balances up to 115% of the area median home price, up to a cap of $726,525 in the highest-cost areas.) These maximum mortgage amounts, and the maximum mortgage amounts for 2-4 unit homes, are shown in Table 1 . Mortgage Insurance Fees (Premiums) Borrowers of FHA-insured loans pay an up-front mortgage insurance premium (MIP) and annual mortgage insurance premiums in exchange for FHA insurance. These premiums are set as a percentage of the loan amount. The maximum amounts that FHA is allowed to charge for the annual and the upfront premiums are set in statute. However, since these are maximum amounts, HUD has the discretion to set the premiums at lower levels. Up-Front Mortgage Insurance Premiums The maximum up-front premium that FHA may charge is 3% of the mortgage amount, or 2.75% of the mortgage amount for a first-time homebuyer who has received homeownership counseling. Currently, FHA is charging the same up-front premiums to first-time homebuyers who receive homeownership counseling and all other borrowers. Since April 9, 2012, HUD has set the up-front premium at 1.75% of the loan amount, whether or not the borrower is a first-time homebuyer who received homeownership counseling. This premium applies to most single-family mortgages. Annual Mortgage Insurance Premiums The amount of the maximum annual premium varies based on the loan's initial loan-to-value ratio. For most loans, (1) if the loan-to-value ratio is above 95%, the maximum annual premium is 1.55% of the loan balance, and (2) if the loan-to-value ratio is 95% or below, the maximum annual premium is 1.5% of the loan balance. FHA increased the actual annual premiums that it charges several times in recent years in order to bring more money into the FHA insurance fund and ensure that it has sufficient funds to pay for defaulted loans. However, in January 2015, FHA announced a decrease in the annual premium for most single-family loans. For most FHA case numbers assigned on or after January 26, 2015, the annual premiums are 0.85% of the outstanding loan balance if the initial loan-to-value ratio is above 95% and 0.80% of the outstanding loan balance if the initial loan-to-value ratio is 95% or below. This is a decrease from 1.35% and 1.30%, respectively, which is what FHA had been charging from April 1, 2013, until January 26, 2015. These premiums apply to most single-family mortgages; FHA charges different annual premiums in certain circumstances, including for loans with shorter loan terms or higher principal balances. Table 2 shows the up-front and annual mortgage insurance premiums that have been in effect for most loans since January 26, 2015. Premium Refunds and Cancellations In the past, if borrowers prepaid their loans, they may have been due refunds of part of the up-front insurance premium that was not "earned" by FHA. The refund amount depended on when the mortgage closed and declined as the loan matured. The Consolidated Appropriations Act 2005 ( P.L. 108-447 ) amended the National Housing Act to provide that, for mortgages insured on or after December 8, 2004, borrowers are not eligible for refunds of up-front mortgage insurance premiums except when borrowers are refinancing existing FHA-insured loans with new FHA-insured loans. After three years, the entire up-front insurance premium paid by borrowers who refinance existing FHA-insured loans with new FHA-insured loans is considered "earned" by FHA, and these borrowers are not eligible for any refunds. The annual mortgage insurance premiums are not refundable. However, beginning with loans closed on or after January 1, 2001, FHA had followed a policy of automatically cancelling the annual mortgage insurance premium when, based on the initial amortization schedule, the loan balance reached 78% of the initial property value. However, for loans with FHA case numbers assigned on or after June 3, 2013, FHA will continue to charge the annual mortgage insurance premium for the life of the loan for most mortgages. This change responded to concerns about the financial status of the FHA insurance fund. FHA has stated that, since it continues to insure the entire remaining mortgage amount for the life of the loan, and since premiums were cancelled on the basis of the loan amortizing to a percentage of the initial property value rather than the current value of the home, FHA has at times had to pay insurance claims on defaulted mortgages where the borrowers were no longer paying annual mortgage insurance premiums. Options for FHA-Insured Loans in Default An FHA-insured mortgage is considered delinquent any time a payment is due and not paid. Once the borrower is 30 days late in making a payment, the mortgage is considered to be in default. In general, mortgage servicers may initiate foreclosure on an FHA-insured loan when three monthly installments are due and unpaid, and they must initiate foreclosure when six monthly installments are due and unpaid, except when prohibited by law. A program of loss mitigation strategies was authorized by Congress in 1996 to minimize the number of FHA loans entering foreclosure, and has since been revised and expanded to include additional loss mitigation options. Prior to initiating foreclosure, mortgage servicers must attempt to make contact with borrowers and evaluate whether they qualify for any of these loss mitigation options. The options must be considered in a specific order, and specific eligibility criteria apply to each option. Some loss mitigation options, referred to as home retention options, are intended to help borrowers remain in their homes. Other loss mitigation options, referred to as home disposition options, will result in the borrower losing his or her home, but avoiding some of the costs of foreclosure. The loss mitigation options that servicers are instructed to pursue on FHA-insured loans are summarized in Table 3 . Additional loss mitigation options are available for certain populations of borrowers. For example, defaulted borrowers in military service may be eligible to suspend the principal portion of monthly payments and pay only interest for the period of military service, plus three months. On resumption of payment, loan payments are adjusted so that the loan will be paid in full according to the original amortization. Certain loss mitigation options are also available in areas affected by presidentially declared major disasters. Program Funding FHA's single-family mortgage insurance program is funded through FHA's Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund (MMI Fund). Cash flows into the MMI Fund primarily from insurance premiums and proceeds from the sale of foreclosed homes. Cash flows out of the MMI Fund primarily to pay claims to lenders for mortgages that have defaulted. This section provides a brief overview of (1) how the FHA-insured mortgages insured under the MMI Fund are accounted for in the federal budget and (2) the MMI Fund's compliance with a statutory capital ratio requirement. For more detailed information on the financial status of the MMI Fund, see CRS Report R42875, FHA Single-Family Mortgage Insurance: Financial Status of the Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund (MMI Fund) . FHA Home Loans in the Federal Budget The Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 (FCRA) specifies the way in which the costs of federal loan guarantees, including FHA-insured loans, are recorded in the federal budget. The FCRA requires that the estimated lifetime cost of guaranteed loans (in net present value terms) be recorded in the federal budget in the year that the loans are insured. When the present value of the lifetime cash flows associated with the guaranteed loans is expected to result in more money coming into the account than flowing out of it, the program is said to generate negative credit subsidy. When the present value of the lifetime cash flows associated with the guaranteed loans is expected to result in less money coming into the account than flowing out of it, the program is said to generate positive credit subsidy. Programs that generate negative credit subsidy result in offsetting receipts for the federal government, while programs that generate positive credit subsidy require an appropriation to cover the cost of new loan guarantees. The MMI Fund has historically been estimated to generate negative credit subsidy in the year that the loans are insured and therefore has not required appropriations to cover the expected costs of loans to be insured. The MMI Fund does receive appropriations to cover salaries and administrative contract expenses. The amount of money that loans insured in a given year actually earn for or cost the government over the course of their lifetime is likely to be different from the original credit subsidy estimates. Therefore, each year as part of the annual budget process, each prior year's credit subsidy rates are re-estimated based on the actual performance of the loans and other factors, such as updated economic projections. These re-estimates affect the way in which funds are held in the MMI Fund's two primary accounts: the Financing Account and the Capital Reserve Account. The Financing Account holds funds to cover  expected  future costs of FHA-insured loans. The Capital Reserve Account holds additional funds to cover any additional unexpected future costs. Funds are transferred between the two accounts each year on the basis of the re-estimated credit subsidy rates to ensure that enough is held in the Financing Account to cover updated projections of expected costs of insured loans.  If FHA ever needs to transfer more funds to the Financing Account than it has in the Capital Reserve Account, it can receive funds from Treasury to make this transfer under existing authority and without any additional congressional action. This occurred for the first time at the end of FY2013, when FHA received $1.7 billion from Treasury to make a required transfer of funds between the accounts. The funds that FHA received from Treasury did not need to be spent immediately, but were to be held in the Financing Account and used to pay insurance claims, if necessary, only after the remaining funds in the Financing Account were spent. The MMI Fund has not needed any additional funds from Treasury to make required transfers of funds between the two accounts since that time. The Capital Ratio The MMI Fund is also required by statute to maintain a capital ratio of at least 2%, which is intended to ensure that the fund is able to withstand some increases in the costs of loans guaranteed under the insurance fund. The capital ratio measures the amount of funds that the MMI Fund currently has on hand, plus the net present value of the expected future cash flows associated with the mortgages that FHA currently insures (e.g., the amounts it expects to earn through premiums and lose through claims paid). It then expresses this amount as a percentage of the total dollar volume of mortgages that FHA currently insures. In other words, the capital ratio is a measure of the amount of funds that would remain in the MMI Fund after all expected future cash flows on the loans that it currently insures have been realized, assuming that FHA did not insure any more loans going forward. Beginning in FY2009, and for several years thereafter, the capital ratio was estimated to be below this mandated 2% level. The capital ratio again exceeded the 2% threshold in FY2015, when it was estimated to be 2.07%. This represented an improvement from an estimated capital ratio of 0.41% at the end of FY2014, and from negative estimated capital ratios at the ends of FY2013 and FY2012. The capital ratio has remained above 2% since that time, and was estimated to be 2.76% in FY2018. A low or negative capital ratio does not in itself trigger any special assistance from Treasury, but it raises concerns that FHA could need assistance in order to continue to hold enough funds in the Financing Account to cover expected future losses. In the years since the housing market turmoil that began around 2007, FHA has taken a number of steps designed to strengthen the insurance fund. These steps have included increasing the mortgage insurance premiums charged to borrowers; strengthening underwriting requirements, such as by instituting higher down payment requirements for borrowers with the lowest credit scores; and increasing oversight of FHA-approved lenders. Program Activity Number of Mortgages Insured The number of new mortgages insured by FHA in a given year depends on a variety of factors. In general, the number of new mortgages insured by FHA increased during the housing market turmoil (and resulting contraction of mortgage credit) that began around 2007, reaching a peak of 1.8 million mortgages in FY2009 before beginning to decrease somewhat. FY2014 was the only year since FY2007 that FHA insured fewer than 1 million new mortgages. As shown in Table 4 , FHA insured just over 1 million new single-family purchase and refinance mortgages in FY2018. Together, these mortgages had an initial loan balance of $209 billion. About 77% (776,284) of the mortgages were for home purchases, while about 23% (238,325) were for refinancing an existing mortgage. The overall number of mortgages insured by FHA in FY2018 represented a decrease from FY2017, when it insured 1.25 million mortgages. Many FHA-insured mortgages are obtained by first-time homebuyers, lower-and moderate-income homebuyers, and minority homebuyers. Of the home purchase mortgages insured by FHA in FY2018, about 83% were made to first-time homebuyers. Over a third of all mortgages (both for home purchases and refinances) insured by FHA in FY2018 were made to minority borrowers. As shown in Table 5 , at the end of FY2018 FHA was insuring a total of over 8 million single-family loans that together had an outstanding balance of nearly $1.2 trillion. Since it was first established in 1934, FHA has insured a total of over 47.5 million home loans. Market Share Measuring Market Share FHA's share of the mortgage market is the amount of mortgages that are insured by FHA compared to the total amount of mortgages originated or outstanding in a given time period. FHA's market share can be measured in a number of different ways. Therefore, when evaluating FHA's market share, it is important to recognize which of several different figures is being reported. First, FHA's share of the mortgage market can be computed as the number of FHA-insured mortgages divided by the total number of mortgages, or as the dollar volume of FHA-insured mortgages divided by the total dollar volume of mortgages. Furthermore, FHA's market share is sometimes reported as a share of all mortgages , and sometimes only as a share of home purchase mortgages (as opposed to both mortgages made to purchase a home and mortgages made to refinance an existing mortgage). A market share figure can be reported as a share of all mortgages originated within a specific time period , such as a given year, or as a share of all mortgages outstanding at a point in time , regardless of when they were originated. Finally, FHA's market share is sometimes also reported as a share of the total number of mortgages that have some kind of mortgage insurance (including mortgages with private mortgage insurance and mortgages insured by another government agency) rather than as a share of all mortgages regardless of whether or not they have mortgage insurance. FHA's Share of the Mortgage Market FHA's market share tends to fluctuate in response to economic conditions and other factors. Between calendar years 1996 and 2002, FHA's market share averaged about 14% of the home purchase mortgage market and about 11% of the overall mortgage market (both home purchase mortgages and refinance mortgages), as measured by number of mortgages. However, by 2005 FHA's market share had fallen to less than 5% of home-purchase mortgages and about 3% of the overall mortgage market. Subsequently, as economic conditions worsened and mortgage credit tightened in response to housing market turmoil that began around 2007, FHA's market share rose sharply, peaking at over 30% of home-purchase mortgages in 2009 and 2010, and over 20% of all mortgages (including both home purchases and refinances) in 2009. In 2017, FHA insured 19.5% of new home purchase mortgages and about 16.7% of new mortgages overall, a small decrease compared to its market share in 2016. Figure 1 shows FHA's market share as a percentage of the total number of new mortgages originated for each calendar year between 1996 and 2017. As described, FHA's market share can be measured in a number of different ways. The figure shows FHA's share of (1) all newly originated mortgages, (2) just newly originated purchase mortgages, and (3) just newly originated refinance mortgages. FHA's share of home purchase mortgages tends to be the highest, largely because borrowers who refinance are more likely to have built up a greater amount of equity in their homes and, therefore, might be more likely to obtain conventional mortgages. For the number of mortgages insured by FHA in each year calendar since 1996, see the Appendix . The increase in FHA's market share after 2007 was due to a variety of factors related to the housing market turmoil and broader economic instability that was taking place at the time. Housing and economic conditions led many banks to limit their lending activities, including lending for mortgages. Similarly, private mortgage insurance companies, facing steep losses from past mortgages, began tightening the underwriting criteria for mortgages that they would insure. Furthermore, in 2008 Congress increased the maximum mortgage amounts that FHA can insure, which may have made FHA-insured mortgages a more viable option for some borrowers in certain areas. More recently, FHA's market share has decreased somewhat from its peak during the housing market turmoil, although it generally remains somewhat higher than it was in the late 1990s and early 2000s. A number of factors may have contributed to this decrease, including lower loan limits in some high-cost areas, higher mortgage insurance premiums, and greater availability of non-FHA-insured mortgages. While not the focus of this report, the appropriate market share for FHA has been a subject of ongoing debate among policymakers. It is likely to continue to be a topic of debate, both in the context of policies specifically related to FHA as well as part of broader debate about the future of the U.S. housing finance system. Appendix. FHA's Market Share Since 1996 Table A-1 provides data on the number of mortgages insured by FHA in each calendar year since 1996, along with FHA's overall market share in each calendar year.

The Federal Housing Administration (FHA), an agency of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), was created by the National Housing Act of 1934. FHA insures private lenders against the possibility of borrowers defaulting on mortgages that meet certain criteria, thereby expanding the availability of mortgage credit beyond what may be available otherwise. If the borrower defaults on the mortgage, FHA is to repay the lender the remaining amount owed. A household that obtains an FHA-insured mortgage must meet FHA's eligibility and underwriting standards, including showing that it has sufficient income to repay a mortgage. FHA requires a minimum down payment of 3.5% from most borrowers, which is lower than the down payment required for many other types of mortgages. FHA-insured mortgages cannot exceed a statutory maximum mortgage amount, which varies by area and is based on area median house prices but cannot exceed a specified ceiling in high-cost areas. (The ceiling is set at $726,525 in high-cost areas in calendar year 2019.) Borrowers are charged fees, called mortgage insurance premiums, in exchange for the insurance. In FY2018, FHA insured over 1 million new mortgages (including both home purchase and refinance mortgages) with a combined principal balance of $209 billion. FHA's share of the mortgage market tends to vary with economic conditions and other factors. In the aftermath of the housing market turmoil that began around 2007 and a related contraction of mortgage lending, FHA insured a larger share of mortgages than it had in the preceding years. Its overall share of the mortgage market increased from about 3% in calendar year 2005 to a peak of 21% in 2009. Since that time, FHA's share of the mortgage market has decreased somewhat, though it remains higher than it was in the early 2000s. In calendar year 2017, FHA's overall share of the mortgage market was about 17%. FHA-insured mortgages, like all mortgages, experienced increased default rates during the housing downturn that began around 2007, leading to concerns about the stability of the FHA insurance fund for single-family mortgages, the Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund (MMI Fund). In response to these concerns, FHA adopted a number of policy changes in an attempt to limit risk to the MMI Fund. These changes have included raising the fees that it charges and making changes to certain eligibility criteria for FHA-insured loans.

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Introduction The issue of the President and Vice President's term of office is generally regarded as an accepted constitutional norm that arouses little controversy in the 21 st century. Both the four-year term and the venerable two-term tradition, initiated by George Washington and ultimately incorporated in the Constitution in 1951 by the Twenty-Second Amendment, appear to be fixed elements in the nation's political landscape. In marked comparison, the issues of tenure and reelection of the President, and of the Vice President (an office added almost as an afterthought during the Constitutional Convention of 1787), were the subject of intense and prolonged debate during the Philadelphia gathering. Delegates argued for three months over the length of the presidential term and whether the chief executive should be eligible for reelection before reaching a compromise package of provisions—a four-year term, and eligibility for reelection—several days before the convention adjourned. Since that time, a wide range of changes to these conditions has been proposed as constitutional amendments, but relatively few conditions have been added to the original provisions governing the President's term of office. In addition to the Twenty-Second Amendment cited above, the Twelfth, ratified in 1804, set the same qualifications for the Vice President; the Twentieth, ratified in 1933, set January 20 of every year following a presidential election as the date on which the chief executive's term begins; and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment clarified the question of vice-presidential succession to the presidency and authorized the President to nominate persons to fill vacancies in the vice presidency, subject to approval by vote of both houses of Congress. Proposals for a single term were popular in the 19 th century, and for several decades before the Civil War, the concept of a voluntary limit of one presidential term in office drew wide support. Beginning in 1808, constitutional amendments were introduced that would have changed the presidential term to five, six, seven, and even eight years. By the 20 th century, the single six-year term for Presidents had become a preferred option for such amendments, with multiple amendment proposals introduced in successive Congresses as late as the 1990s, while amendments to repeal the Twenty-Second Amendment to allow unlimited reelection were regularly introduced as recently as the 113 th Congress. In the past two decades, however, public and congressional interest in these issues has arguably declined. In contrast to proceedings at the Constitutional Convention and widespread congressional interest in the past, the questions of presidential term and tenure appear to be relatively settled issues in the contemporary context. Nevertheless, the potential for renewed interest in change, which has emerged as a force to be contended with in the past, remains a possibility in both the present and future. Presidential Term of Office: Current Provisions and Options for Change The conditions of terms and tenure for the President and Vice President of the United States have evolved over nearly two centuries, from the earliest provisions in Article II, Section 1, of the U.S. Constitution, set by the Constitutional Convention in 1787, to provisions governing vacancies in the office of Vice President established in the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, ratified in 1967. Current Provisions in Brief The Constitution, in its original text and four subsequent amendments, provides the basic conditions of presidential and vice presidential terms and tenure. Constitution : Article II, Section 1, of the Constitution, ratified in 1788, sets a four-year term of office for the President and Vice President. Twelfth Amendment: This amendment extended the same qualifications for the President to the office of Vice President. Twentieth Amendment : Section 1 of this amendment, ratified in 1933, sets the expiration date for these terms at noon on January 20 of each year following a presidential election. Twenty- S econd Amendment : Section 1 of this amendment, ratified in 1951, states that no person shall be elected to the office of President more than twice. It also limits the number of times a Vice President who becomes President may subsequently be elected to that office, depending on when the Vice President succeeds to the presidency. Twenty- F ifth Amendment : Sections 1 and 2 of this amendment, ratified in 1967, do not directly affect terms and tenure of the President and Vice President, but provide for succession of the Vice President and the filling of vice-presidential vacancies. Contemporary Options for Change Proposals to change the length of the President's term of office, or to limit the number of terms to which a President could be elected, were introduced in Congress beginning in the early 19 th century. The first category included constitutional amendments for a five-, six-, seven-, or eight-year term of office, usually coupled with limitation to a single term in office. By the 20 th century, a six-year single term of office had become the preferred alternative. The Twenty-Second Amendment, ratified in 1951, achieved the goal of limiting the number of times a person could be elected President, but did not alter the four-year term set in Article II. Since that time, most proposed amendments related to the President's term and tenure have (1) called either for a six-year presidential term, usually without the possibility of reelection; or (2) proposed repeal of the Twenty-Second Amendment, allowing individuals to be elected President more than twice. A Single Six-Year Term for the President and Vice President The idea of a six-year term for the President and Vice President has a long history: the first amendment to this effect was introduced in 1826, in the 19 th Congress (1825-1826). According to earlier CRS research, a total of 181 such amendments had been introduced through the 96 th Congress (1979-1980). Thirty-one more amendments that would have established the six-year term, either as "stand-alone" proposals, or as part of more inclusive plans that included changes in congressional terms and term limits, were introduced between the 97 th (1981-1982) and 104 th (1995-1996) Congresses, for a total of 212. Since then, up through and including the 116 th Congress (2019-) however, no amendment proposing a six-year term has been introduced. The basic provisions of most of these proposals called for a six-year term for the President and Vice President, with each limited to a single term. In addition, most contained a variant of the existing Twenty-Second Amendment provision for Vice Presidents who succeed to the highest office: they would be eligible for election in their own right to a term as President provided they had served less than three years of the term to which their predecessor was elected. Additionally, in the interest of constitutional consistency, most of these proposed amendments would also have specifically repealed the Twenty-Second Amendment. For and Against Over the years, proponents of the single six-year term have deployed a range of arguments in support of their position. Perhaps most prominent, they assert that it would end the "permanent campaign" for reelection, which is said to begin as soon as a newly elected President is inaugurated for a first term. According to this theory, the chief executive would be freed from the distraction of partisan political concerns associated with planning and campaigning for reelection, and would be able to concentrate on legislation, administration, and development of a program of public policy. Decisions on major issues would, proponents claim, be less likely to be judged by their impact on the President's reelection prospects. They maintain that this, in turn, would promote greater consistency in foreign and domestic policy, as the President would be able to focus exclusively on the value and utility of policy proposals, rather than on their political implications. A six-year term would have additional substance, they assert, because it would give the President more time to advocate for and implement these policies, to adjust them as necessary, and to monitor their success; this would give the President's initiatives "a fair chance to work." Former President Jimmy Carter (1977-1981) endorsed the longer single presidential term, adding another dimension when he suggested that a President who had no prospect of reelection might enjoy greater moral authority and credibility, and perhaps greater influence on the course of policy formulation, since he could not be accused of political motivation (i.e., his interest in securing a second term). Similarly, another commentator, noting the length of contemporary presidential election campaigns, suggested that a President who serves a single six-year term would not need to focus two or more years on renomination and reelection. Instead of turning to reelection almost immediately after assembling an administration "team," he or she could devote greater energy to the demands of office as chief executive, a process that could lead to greater stability and continuity in policy formation and administration. Critics of the proposal suggest that, at its most basic, restricting the President to a single term is fundamentally undemocratic because it deprives voters of the right to choose their preferred candidate for the office. They rebut the arguments of those who claim a single term will help a President concentrate on policy issues, noting that Presidents in their second terms have often struggled to implement their programs because, as "lame ducks," they have lost influence in Congress and the larger political arena. A one-term chief executive who did not enjoy the prospect of reelection would, they claim, be a lame duck the day he or she took office. Far from being more devoted to questions of policy, opponents suggest that a one-term President might be too well insulated from the give and take of political discourse, and less responsive to the will of the people. As one commentator notes: "a [P]resident protected from public opinion is also a [P]resident unrestrained by it. If he is free to act in the national interest ... that national interest will be as he defines it. And will his definition be superior to the one that is hammered out, under the current system, in the heat of a reelection contest?" In the final analysis, opponents maintain that the single, but longer, term would extend the tenure of failed or simply inadequate Presidents two years beyond their current termination date, while reducing the possible tenure of more capable chief executives by the same length of time: six years in office is too long for a failed President, they say, and too short for a successful one. History of Congressional Activity As noted earlier, the proposal to establish a single six-year term for the President and Vice President was a hardy perennial from the early days of the republic: 212 such amendments were introduced between the 19 th through 104 th Congresses. The format varied: most of these amendments, particularly those introduced before the 1950s, proposed only a single six-year term for the President and Vice President, while others introduced since ratification of the Twenty-Second Amendment included provisions for its repeal. Some versions also prohibited a person elected President from being subsequently elected Vice President. In earlier years, the frequency of these proposals tended to cluster during periods in which an incumbent President was known or suspected to be seeking a third term; they were generally introduced in reaction to such prospects. These periods include the 1870s, when President Ulysses Grant contemplated a third term in both 1876 and 1880; between 1905 and 1916, presumably in response to President Theodore Roosevelt's consideration of a third term; and the 1930s through the late 1940s, first in anticipation of, and later in response to, President Franklin Roosevelt's election to a third and fourth term. The most recent substantial legislative activity took place during the 92 nd (1971-1972) and 93 rd (1973-1974) Congresses. Proposals for a six-year term were arguably connected to congressional concern during the Vietnam War era of the 1960s and 1970s about the perceived growing imbalance of power and authority in favor of the President and at the expense of Congress—an "imperial presidency" —and later in the context of the Watergate scandal of 1972-1974. In the 92 nd Congress, the Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments held two days of hearings, on October 28 and 29, 1971, on S.J.Res. 77. A hearing in the House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Crime on H.J.Res. 76 and H.J.Res. 127 , held on September 26, 1973, in the 93 rd Congress, were the last congressional activity (beyond the introduction and committee referral of proposed amendments) dealing with this question through the time of the present writing. Beginning in the late 1970s, the volume of amendment proposals declined, so that the most recent stand-alone amendments were offered in the 101 st Congress (1989-1990), including H.J.Res. 6 , introduced by Representative Jack Brooks; H.J.Res. 52 , introduced by Representative Bill Frenzel; and H.J.Res. 176 , introduced by Representative Frank Guarini. These proposals received no action beyond committee referral. In subsequent Congresses, the six-year presidential term was incorporated into several proposals that sought to establish a comprehensive system of term limits for both Congress and the President. In the 102 nd Congress, for instance, H.J.Res. 28 , introduced by Representative Richard Schulze, sought to establish a single six-year presidential and vice presidential term, but retained the two-term limit. This resolution also proposed a three-year term for Representatives and a rotation in office requirement that effectively limited Representatives to six consecutive three-year terms and Senators to three consecutive six-year terms, or 18 consecutive years in either case. In the 104 th Congress, Representative Frank Mascara introduced H.J.Res. 28 , which proposed a single six-year term for the President and Vice President, within the context of a four-year term for Representatives and an absolute limit of 12 years of service in one house for Members of both chambers of Congress. No action beyond committee referral occurred on either of these two most recent proposals. Repeal of the Twenty-Second Amendment The first efforts to repeal the Twenty-Second Amendment began in 1956, within five years of the amendment's ratification. Since that time, 46 proposed amendments that would eliminate the two-term presidential election limit have been introduced in Congress, most in the House of Representatives, and most recently in the 113 th Congress. Several early proposals to repeal the Twenty-Second Amendment were the subject of congressional interest in the 1950s, but after this period, congressional interest in repeal of the amendment, as measured by the introduction of relevant proposed amendments, receded for some years. Among many other contributing factors, the lack of congressional activity could arguably be attributed to the fact that, with time, the amendment and its effective two-term limit came to be accepted as an increasingly settled element of the constitutional order. Another factor that may have contributed to lack of support for eliminating the two-term restriction may be found in the turbulent history of the 1960s and 1970s. Public sentiment for repeal of the Twenty-Second Amendment is arguably associated with support for extending the tenure of popular two-term chief executives whose presidencies are perceived at the time as having been successful. If so, then this era, during which five Presidents held office in a period of 20 years, notably lacked this catalyst. During the two decades between the end of Eisenhower's second term in 1961 and the election of President Ronald Reagan in 1980, two presidencies ended prematurely, John Kennedy's by assassination in 1963 and Richard Nixon's by resignation in 1974. Two other Presidents were defeated for election: Gerald Ford, who succeeded as President when Richard Nixon resigned in 1974, lost his bid for election in 1976, while his successor, Jimmy Carter, failed to win reelection in 1980. The fifth President to serve during this period, Lyndon Johnson, withdrew as a candidate for reelection in 1968 due in large part to widespread opposition to U.S. military action in Vietnam. Beyond the immediate ambit of legislative proposals, the idea, if not the reality, of repealing the Twenty-Second Amendment does appear to gain publicity and a level of at least theoretical support when term-limited Presidents approach the end of their time in office. As noted earlier in this report, there was some interest in the possibility of a third term by President Eisenhower in 1960, notwithstanding the President's documented health problems. In 1973, following his reelection to a second term, supporters of President Richard Nixon established an organization to promote repeal of the Twenty-Second Amendment as the President brought an end to conflict in Vietnam, pursued arms control and détente with the Soviet Union, and successfully opened informal U.S. relations with China after 24 years of hostility. As the President was increasingly implicated in the events stemming from the Watergate break-in, however, this effort was abruptly abandoned. Again in 1985, as Ronald Reagan entered his second term, suggestions emerged that repeal of the Twenty-Second Amendment might enable a third term for the popular President. Although Reagan himself indicated his support, he maintained only future Presidents should be eligible for additional terms in office. Supporters in Congress and elsewhere, however, mounted a public campaign to repeal the amendment in time for a third Reagan term in 1989. Although greeted enthusiastically by the President's supporters, the proposal met with mixed reviews in the press and among the general public. Substantial Republican losses in the 1986 congressional elections, followed almost immediately by revelation of the Iran-Contra events, largely dampened further enthusiasm for repeal. The question of repeal regained support early in President Bill Clinton's second term in office, when five relevant amendments were introduced in the 105 th Congress (1997-1998), while more recently, in 2014, Change.org, a petition website, sponsored an "Obama-for-3" Political Action Committee that circulated an online petition to repeal the amendment and thus enable President Barack Obama to run for a third term. In contrast to these occasional surges in support for repeal that have tended to emerge during the second term of a popular President, the Roper Center reports that at no time since ratification of the Twenty-Second Amendment has public opinion favored its repeal. In 2013, the most recent findings reported by Roper, 17% of respondents favored "changing the Constitution and removing the limitation so a President could be elected to more than two terms," while 81% were opposed, and 1% had no opinion. For and Against Many of the arguments raised in favor of and opposition to repeal of the Twenty-Second Amendment were cited earlier in this report. Briefly, proponents assert that the amendment is inherently undemocratic, in that it prohibits the voters from electing a qualified candidate they favor. In most instances, they suggest that Presidents would continue to limit themselves to two terms, or be limited by external constraints, such as political considerations, health, or other reasons, unless there were pressing need and demand for a third term. In periods of national or international crisis, they maintain that the Twenty-Second Amendment is a straightjacket that prevents the nation from retaining an experienced and trusted leader at a time when continuity in presidential leadership may be essential. As journalist John B. Judis asserted in The New Republic , The 22 nd Amendment deprives the United States of the possibility of successful second acts. It has also made a virtue of inexperience among American presidents. The practice of having an entirely new president every four or eight years has led to flailing and mistakes during a president's first year or two in office…. Repealing the 22 nd Amendment would not eliminate the possibility of presidential stumbles, but might lessen them, particularly if the country faced the prospect of electing an untutored new executive in the midst of a foreign policy crisis. Finally, as is the case with arguments against the single six-year term, proponents of repeal suggest that every President who is reelected becomes a lame duck the day he takes the oath for his second term, handicapped by diminished influence and authority. The prospect of a third term, they argue, would help avoid the slow diminution of influence most Presidents experience during their second terms. Supporters of presidential term limits in general and the Twenty-Second Amendment in particular argue that eight years is time enough for any individual in a position of such great power as the presidency of the United States. The intent of the founders for a time-limited presidency, they assert, was clearly expressed at the Constitutional Convention, where the delegates accepted the prospect that Presidents might serve an additional term of office only after lengthy debate. Moreover, they suggest that temptation to accrue excessive power to the executive, even with the best of intentions, is a constant danger to the constitutional model of a balanced federal government embracing a system of checks and balances within a framework of separation of powers. They note that recent history provides what they regard as troubling examples of this impulse to concentration (e.g., the "imperial presidency," as noted earlier in this report), and the "unitary presidency." Presidential term limits, they conclude, are an essential check to any possibility of a "cult of personality" and the potential for excessive presidential power. History of Congressional Activity Amendment proposals that call for the repeal of the Twenty-Second Amendment have generally incorporated simple language and the single requirement of repeal. The legislative language used most frequently has been, "[t]he twenty-second article of amendment to the Constitution of the United States is hereby repealed." As was noted earlier in this report, repeal of the Twenty-Second Amendment appeared in some proposals to establish a single six-year term for President. Unlike the single six-year term approach, which was last introduced in the 94 th Congress, simple repeal continued to be a live option until comparatively recently. As noted previously in this report, the first joint resolutions to repeal the Twenty-Second Amendment were introduced in the 84 th Congress (1955-1956), in 1956, less than five years after the amendment had been ratified. Several early proposals to repeal the amendment were the subject of congressional interest in the 1950s, most notably S.J.Res. 11 in the 86 th Congress (1959-1960). This measure was accorded hearings in 1959 by the Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments, the highlight of which was former President Harry Truman's testimony in its support. The subcommittee's vote to approve the proposal and report it to the full committee on September 1 of that year ultimately proved to be the high water mark of the repeal movement in the 1950s. Following this period, congressional interest in repeal of the amendment, as measured by the introduction of relevant proposed amendments, receded for some years, but revived in the 1970s. From that time forward, proposals to repeal the Twenty-Second Amendment continued to be introduced in almost every Congress through the first decade of the 21 st century. The most recent was H.J.Res. 15 in the 113 th Congress (2013-2014), which was introduced on January 4, 2013, by Representative Jose Serrano. The language of H.J.Res. 15 was typical of many repeal proposals, stating that "[t]he twenty-second article of amendment to the Constitution of the United States is hereby repealed." The resolution was referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary's Subcommittee on the Constitution and Civil Justice, but no further action was taken. Presidential Terms and Tenure: Perspectives The terms of the President and Vice President were originally established at four years, with eligibility for reelection, by the Philadelphia Convention of 1787, which drafted the U.S. Constitution. The Philadelphia Convention: Debate and Decisions on Terms and Tenure The questions of presidential term length and reeligibility—whether the executive would be eligible to run for more than one term—were the subject of considerable discussion at the Constitutional Convention, which met in Philadelphia from May 28 through September 17, 1787. The delegates were generally divided between two factions—"federalists" and "anti-federalists." Federalists generally sought to establish a robust federal government vested with the power to tax, exercise authority over interstate commerce and relations, and manage the nation's international trade, foreign relations, and defense policy with a stronger hand. An executive who possessed considerable independence and authority was a key element in the federalist vision. Although considerable overlap existed between the two groups or tendencies, "anti-federalists" generally opposed a stronger central government. They tended to fear greater concentration of authority as a threat to individual liberty and states' rights, preferring a less powerful executive who possessed limited authority and more closely resembled the President of Congress under the Articles of Confederation, or a plural executive that would include up to three members who could check each other. Early in its deliberations, the convention rejected the concept of a plural executive, however, settling on a single President. It then moved to address two fundamental issues concerning tenure: The first centered on duration of the executive's term. Most state governors at that time served terms of one or two years. There appears to have been agreement among most of the delegates that whatever view they took of the federal executive, the office should have a longer term to guarantee stability and continuity in the conduct of government. During the convention, nothing shorter than a three-year term received serious consideration. The second was the issue of reelection: should the executive be limited to a single term or be permitted to run for reelection to additional terms, and, if so, how many? Here, the convention delegates sought to balance the potential advantages of continuity and perspective provided by a long-serving executive with their still-fresh memories of domineering colonial governors and pervasive concern that an infinitely reelectable executive might lead to dictatorship or monarchy. Both these questions were influenced by the question of who should elect the President: from the beginning, many delegates assumed the executive would be chosen by the "legislature" (Congress). It was widely held that in these circumstances a single term would be necessary to avoid excessive congressional influence over the presidency, or worse, the unseemly spectacle of the executive scrambling to ensure congressional support for reelection to a second term. At least a solid minority of delegates, which occasionally expanded to a majority, also opposed eligibility for reelection for the executive on general principle. They feared this provision might result in lengthy or even indefinite tenure for Presidents, providing them the opportunity to accrue overweening power in the executive branch. Other delegates, however, were more concerned about the need, as they saw it, to establish an independent, energetic executive; the fact that the President might be eligible for reelection presented less difficulty for them. Debate over these issues continued off and on for two months, with the convention changing position several times before it reached a final compromise. As the convention opened, the delegates initially debated a three-year and a seven-year term, both in the context of election by Congress. In early June, they agreed to seven years without eligibility for reelection. Two weeks later, they revisited this decision, at the same time voting to move election from the national legislature to electors chosen in the states. The option for choice by electors was seen by some delegates as eliminating congressional influence over, or control of, the presidential election, which was regarded as an important element of separation of powers. This first hint of what ultimately emerged as the electoral college was followed by a vote to eliminate the prohibition on reelection. At the same time, the delegates voted to shorten the executive's term to six years, but the issue was not yet settled. On July 24, dissatisfied with their earlier choices, the convention voted to restore election by Congress, and followed up immediately with a heated debate on a proposal to reinstate the one-term requirement. The record suggests that tempers had grown short by this time, and even James Madison's restrained style as recorder of the proceedings does not conceal the apparent passion of the debate that followed. Supporters of independent election, still smarting from the recent reversion to congressional election, vehemently opposed the motion, while partisans of the single term and legislative supremacy countered, perhaps facetiously, with various proposals, including an indefinite term (i.e., the executive would serve "during good behavior") and terms of 11, 15, and even 20 years. After two days of further debate, the Convention referred the following resolution to the Committee on Detail by a vote of six states to three: "that a National Executive be instituted—to consist of a single person—to be chosen by the Natl. legislature—for the term of seven years—to be ineligible a 2d time." The Committee on Detail, which was charged with organizing and fleshing out the convention's decisions, returned its draft to the full convention on August 6; as instructed, the report provided a seven-year term, without a provision for reelection. The matter was still not settled, however. The delegates continued to debate over who should elect the President, with term length and reelection now recognized as a subset of the greater question. By this time, proposals for election of the President by the state legislatures, by electors chosen by lot from among the Members of Congress, and even popular election, had been considered and rejected, but agreement still eluded the delegates. One modern account of the convention notes that some delegates had left the convention to attend to personal business and professional matters after almost three months of nearly continuous, six-day-a-week sessions, while those who remained shared a growing inclination to finish the project. Debates grew shorter and members were quicker to accept compromise solutions to persistent disagreements. In this context, recognizing they were at an impasse, the delegates voted on August 31 to refer the presidency question, along with other unresolved issues, to a Committee on Postponed Matters (also known as The Committee of Eleven, for the number of its members). As active participants, the committee members were fully aware of the protracted struggle over presidential election, term, and reelection that had continued since early June. They chose to offer a fresh take on the issue: their report on the presidency, submitted on September 4, provided a four-year term, eligibility for reelection, and, key to the issue, a reworked method of election, by an electoral college appointed in each state "in such manner as its Legislature may direct." The committee's novel solution ultimately resolved the impasse. Although several die-hard opponents continued to argue in favor of legislative election, a single term, or shorter terms, all such motions were defeated by wide margins. The convention had finally reached agreement on term and tenure for the President and the recently conceived office of Vice President. The Committee on Style and Arrangement reworked the various decisions into a form recognizable as the Constitution, and, after some final revisions, the document was approved and proposed to the states for ratification on September 17, 1787, with its now-familiar wording: The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. He shall hold his Office during the Term of four Years, and, together with the Vice President, chosen for the same Term, be elected as follows. In the ensuing campaign for its approval in the states, the federalists cited "energy in the executive," stability in government, and separation of powers in defense of the presidential term and tenure. Conversely, opponents warned that reeligibility and the potential for lengthy or even indefinite terms of office would lead to an excess concentration of power in the presidency, and a tendency to dictatorship or even monarchy. In the final analysis, however, it is arguable that many doubts about these arrangements were mitigated, at least in the short run, by the near certainty that the universally respected George Washington would serve as first President under the Constitution. Vice Presidential Vacancies: A Constitutional Oversight? The Constitution addressed the question of presidential vacancies in the following language in Article II, Section 1, clause 6: In case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then act as President. It did not, however, make similar provision for vacancies in the vice presidency, so that office became vacant whenever the Vice President succeeded as President, or left office for any other reason, and remained so for the balance of the presidential term. The lack of such a provision was eventually addressed by the 25 th Amendment, which also provided more explicitly for cases of presidential disability. Historical Patterns in Presidential Tenure As the nation's first President, George Washington set many precedents. One of the most enduring is the tradition that he limited himself, and future chief executives by his example, to not more than two terms in office. His action was frequently cited and generally emulated until Franklin Roosevelt was elected to a third term in 1940. Further, Roosevelt's unprecedented four-term presidency then spurred the subsequent ratification of the Twenty-Second Amendment, which conferred constitutional force on the practice. The two-term tradition is thus widely regarded as the norm, but the record of presidential tenure is more complex: only 12 of the 44 Presidents who served between 1789 and 2017 were elected to, and served, two full consecutive terms, or 96 months, in office. When deaths in office and the vicissitudes of electoral politics are taken into account, average presidential tenure declines to 62 months for the nation's 227 years and 9 months of government under the Constitution between Washington's inauguration on April 30, 1789 and that of Donald J. Trump on January 20, 2017. The average tenure in office of Presidents has fluctuated over time. This is attributable in part to presidential mortality and the renomination and reelection rates of incumbents. In addition, the average length of presidential terms arguably reflects the prevailing levels of political disquiet and/or socioeconomic volatility in the nation during given periods. Moreover, the two-term tradition was persistently challenged during the nation's first century of constitutional government, while proposals that would have extended the executive's term to six years and/or limit Presidents to a single term continued to be offered into the late 20 th century and beyond in the case of the latter. Presidential Tenure, 1789-1825: The Era of the Founders Although the presidential election of 1800 was among the most bitterly contested in American history, the period between 1789 and 1825 was characterized by stability in presidential tenure: four of the nation's first five Presidents—Washington (1789-1797), Jefferson (1801-1809), Madison (1809-1817), and Monroe (1817-1825)—served two consecutive terms. John Adams (1797-1801) was the outlier, defeated in the 1800 presidential election by his Vice President and longtime rival. Presidents during this period served an average of 86 months, a length of tenure matched in a comparable period only recently, between 1981 and 2017. This stability can be attributed to several factors, notably the triumph of the Jeffersonian Republican Party and the demise of the Federalists, which led to the nation's only period of de facto one-party government, at least on the federal level. Presidential nominees were generally selected by the Jeffersonian caucus (later known as the Democratic-Republicans) in Congress during this period, which settled on the incumbent Secretary of State for the succession elections of 1808 and 1816. The latter part of this period was widely referred to at the time as "the Era of Good Feelings," particularly at its zenith during the administration of James Monroe (1817-1825). The Era of Good Feelings came to an abrupt end with the contentious election of 1824, which coincided roughly with the death or retirement from public life of the last of the generation of the Founders. Setting the Two-Term Precedent George Washington, the "indispensable man," set a precedent for presidential tenure in 1796 when he announced his retirement after two terms (1789-1797), but there is little evidence he based the decision on a personal understanding that the Constitution implicitly limited his tenure. Washington's announcement, which was incorporated in his renowned 1796 Farewell Address, actually gave no indication that he considered his action to set a precedent for his successors. Rather, he cited his own weariness, and particularly the growing infirmities of age, as primary factors in his decision: "every day the encreasing [ sic ] weight of years admonishes me more and more, that the shade of retirement is as necessary to me as it will be welcome." Washington's immediate successor, John Adams (1797-1801), was defeated in the tumultuous election of 1800, and never faced the question of how many terms he would serve. According to some modern scholars, the two-term tradition is more accurately attributed to Thomas Jefferson (1801-1809), who had expressed concern about "perpetual reeligibility" in the presidency as early as 1788. As his own second term drew to a close, he was petitioned by the Vermont legislature to consider another run. Jefferson declined, stating in his reply his belief that [i]f some termination to the services of the Chief Magistrate be not fixed by the Constitution, or supplied by practice, his office, nominally four years, will in fact become for life, and history shows how easily that degenerates into an inheritance. Believing that a representative Government responsible at short periods is that which produces the greatest sum of happiness to mankind, I feel it a duty to do no act which shall essentially impair that principle, and I should unwillingly be the person who, disregarding the sound precedent set by an illustrious predecessor [George Washington], should furnish the first example of prolongation beyond the second term of office. Jefferson's decision acquired the force of tradition, at least in the short run, and was frequently attributed to Washington. Three of Jefferson's four immediate successors, Madison, Monroe, and Andrew Jackson (1829-1837), who, arguably, would have been able to secure reelection, retired at the close of their second terms, while the fourth, John Quincy Adams (1825-1829), was defeated for reelection in 1828 by Jackson. The vice presidency during this period had a similar pattern of stability, with the eight incumbents serving an average tenure of 67 months. Presidential Tenure, 1825-1901: Decline of the Two-Term Presidency In contrast to the relative stability of presidential tenure during the first decades of government under the Constitution, the balance of the 19 th century was more volatile, reflecting the contentious political, social, and economic developments experienced by the nation during this period. With the retirement of James Monroe in 1824, the "Era of Good Feelings" Democratic-Republican coalition fractured under sectional pressure, perhaps most notably due to the candidacy of Andrew Jackson, who epitomized the rise of the west and its challenge to the settled order of the previous decades. Four candidates contested the presidency, but none of them gained the requisite majority of electoral votes. In the only contingent election to date under the provisions of the Twelfth Amendment, the House of Representatives picked Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, one of the "establishment" candidates, despite the fact that Jackson had gained more popular and electoral votes. Jackson denounced the House's action as a "corrupt bargain," and although his charge was never proved, he used it in his successful campaign to defeat Adams in the election of 1828. Between 1837, when Andrew Jackson left office, and 1901, when William McKinley was inaugurated for a second term, only Abraham Lincoln (1861-1865) and Ulysses Grant (1869-1877) were reelected, and only Grant served two full consecutive terms. During these 64 years, 18 Presidents held office for an average of 43 months each, less than a single complete term. The Single Term Presidency: Design and Circumstance Throughout much of this period, the concept of a single term for Presidents, rather than the two-term tradition, enjoyed support as an appropriate norm for executive tenure, both by design and circumstance. From the standpoint of amending the Constitution to limit Presidents to a single term, Jackson himself recommended that Congress consider an amendment that would establish a single four- or six-year presidential term in his Annual Messages to Congress every year between 1830 and 1835. William Henry Harrison (1841) recommended a constitutional amendment to prohibit "the eligibility of the same individual to a second term of the Presidency" in his 1841 inaugural address, while his Whig Party called for "a single term for the presidency" three years later in 1844, in its first published presidential platform. Although similar declarations do not appear in the Democratic platforms of the time, historian Michael Nelson notes that many Democrats supported the proposal; moreover, Democratic Presidents James Polk (1845-1849) and James Buchanan (1857-1861) announced their intention to serve only one term before they entered office. In fact, none of the eight Presidents who served between Jackson and Lincoln was elected to a second term. While such events indicate the acceptance of the single-term presidency during this period, the short tenures of these chief executives are arguably also due to the vagaries of political life: electoral defeat or rejection by their parties, and, in two instances, death in office. Throughout the balance of the 19 th century, the ideal of the two-term presidency, while often deferred to, actually remained the exception, rather than the rule, arguably, both by design and circumstance. At the same time, proposals for a single-term amendment to the Constitution continued to be offered in Congress. As noted previously, in 1864 Abraham Lincoln became the first President elected to a second term since Jackson, while Ulysses S. Grant (1869-1877) was the only chief executive between Jackson and Woodrow Wilson (1913-1921) to serve two full consecutive terms in office. In 1876, Republican Party leaders, with Grant's tacit approval, explored the possibility of a third term for the incumbent, but the force of tradition, combined with the record of his tenure in office, led to a public outcry, and this trial balloon was eventually deflated. Of the other chief executives holding office during this period, Rutherford B. Hayes (1877-1881) declined to seek a second term; moreover, he also proposed a single-term amendment in his inaugural address. Grant sought the GOP nomination again in 1880, permitting his name to be placed in nomination at the Republican National Convention. While he gained a plurality of delegate votes in the first ballot, Grant was unable to attain a majority. Instead, James A. Garfield (1881), a "dark horse" reform candidate won the nomination on the 36 th ballot and the subsequent general election. Garfield was shot on July 2, 1881, less than four months after his inauguration, and lingered into September of that year before succumbing to his wound. He was succeeded by his Vice President, Chester Arthur (1881-1885), who was denied nomination for a second term by his Republican Party. Arthur's successor, Democrat Grover Cleveland, advocated a single-term amendment in his acceptance message to the Democratic National Convention in 1884, but ultimately became unique among American Presidents. Cleveland served two nonconsecutive terms, 1885-1889 and 1893-1897; his tenure was interrupted when he was defeated for reelection by Benjamin Harrison (1889-1893). He accomplished the unique feat of beating his successor four years later, in 1892, and returning for a second term. William McKinley (1897-1901) won election in 1896, and with his 1900 victory, became the first President elected to a second term since Grant. Three months into his second term, McKinley notified his Cabinet that he would respect the two-term tradition, but three months after making that announcement, he was assassinated, and was succeeded by Vice President Theodore Roosevelt. The period between 1825 and 1901 thus presents a contrast in presidential tenure to the era of the founders. A wide range of factors arguably contributed to the change: the death of five incumbent Presidents, two due to natural causes and three to assassination; chronic political volatility; the occurrence of the Civil War and its aftermath; recurrent financial crises and subsequent economic downturns. All these events, as well as continued support for a one-term limit, could be cited as contributing to shorter average presidential tenure between 1837 and 1901. After Jackson, the 18 chief executives who served during this period spent an average of 43 months in office, considerably less than the overall historical mean of 61 months. Presidential tenure during the earlier part of the era, between 1837 and 1861, serves to highlight the comparative political instability of the post-Jackson period, when the nation seemed to move inevitably toward disunion. During these tumultuous 24 years, presidential tenure reached a low point: the eight chief executives from Van Buren to Buchanan served an average of 36 months, less than one full term each. The period between 1861 and 1901, which began with Lincoln's inauguration and the onset of the Civil War, and concluded with the death of William McKinley, was only marginally less volatile: the 10 Presidents from Lincoln through McKinley averaged 48 months in office, a single term. Tenure in the Early 20th Century The assassination and death of William McKinley in September 1901, and the accession of Vice President Theodore Roosevelt, provides a break with the conditions of presidential tenure that prevailed in the 19 th century. Average presidential tenure lengthened between 1901 and 1945, growing to more than 74 months, due largely to the record time in office of Franklin D. Roosevelt (1933-1945), and the terms served by Theodore Roosevelt (1901-1909) and Woodrow Wilson (1913-1921). This was substantially longer than the mean of 61 months for all chief executives, especially when compared with the 43-month average time in office of Presidents who served between 1837 and 1901. Most early 20 th century Presidents prior to Franklin Roosevelt observed the two-term tradition, although several considered the prospect of a third. After serving most of McKinley's second term, Theodore Roosevelt was elected President in his own right in 1904. He declared his adherence to the two-term tradition in a statement issued on the night of his election victory: On the 4 th of March next I shall have served three and a half years and this ... constitutes my first term. The wise caution which limits the President to two terms regards the substance and not the form; and under no circumstances will I be a candidate for or accept another nomination. Roosevelt kept his promise, retiring in 1908, but dissatisfaction with his chosen successor, William Howard Taft (1909-1913), led the former President to run again in 1912, explaining that in 1904 he had meant to say he would not seek a third consecutive term. Denied the Republican nomination, Roosevelt ran as the Progressive Party candidate, thus dividing the Republican vote and guaranteeing the election of Democratic nominee Woodrow Wilson. The Democratic National Convention responded to Theodore Roosevelt's third-party bid by adopting a plank in its 1912 platform that called for "an amendment to the Constitution making the President of the United States ineligible to reelection." Following the election, the Democratic-controlled 62 nd Congress moved to implement the proposal, and a single-term amendment passed the Senate by the requisite two-thirds majority in February 1913, even before Wilson's inauguration. The Senate resolution was referred to the House Judiciary Committee, but no further action was taken on it, despite suggestions that it enjoyed substantial support in the House of Representatives, and it expired with the end of the 62 nd Congress on March 4, 1913. The reason the amendment stalled was not explained until 1916, when it was revealed Wilson himself had written to a trusted Representative in February relating his opposition to the single-term amendment. When the House Democratic leadership learned of the President-elect's opinion, they bowed to his wishes and shelved the amendment. According to one historian, Wilson himself contemplated running for a third term eight years later, in 1920. Although crippled by a stroke suffered in October 1919, the President may have envisioned his third-term candidacy as an opportunity for a national referendum on his plan for the League of Nations, which had been stalled in the Senate for more than a year. Beyond discussion among Democratic Party leaders, nothing came of these suggestions. The lack of follow-through is attributed variously to rumors of Wilson's ill health, the influence of the two-term tradition, a robust succession struggle within the Democratic Party, and anxieties that a referendum on the League would lead to repudiation of the party by the voters. Although the 1920 Democratic National Convention required 44 ballots before it picked James M. Cox as the party's standard-bearer, President Wilson's name was never placed in nomination. None of Wilson's three immediate successors served two full terms. Warren Harding (1921-1923) died in office in 1923; he was succeeded by Calvin Coolidge (1923-1929), who was elected in his own right in 1924, but declined to seek a second term in 1928, and ultimately by Herbert Hoover (1929-1933), who was defeated for reelection in 1932. One account asserts, however, that Coolidge (1923-1929) was actively interested in the Republican nomination in 1928, had it been offered to him. He continued to enjoy broad popularity as the election approached, and a substantial number of party leaders and journalists continued to suggest his candidacy. According to Charles Stein, writing in The Third - Term Tradition , the President refused to commit himself unless he was sure of an overwhelming demand. As the level of support for an additional Coolidge candidacy stalled, the President ended speculation with a characteristically laconic statement, which he issued without additional comment on August 2, 1927: "I do not choose to run for President in 1928." Breaking With Tradition: A Third and Fourth Term for President Franklin D. Roosevelt The two-term mold was finally broken by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1940. Following his 1936 landslide reelection to a second term, it seemed likely that he would retire in 1940. Although some supporters urged him to seek a third term, the President refused to commit himself, and, according to some historians, he may have been undecided at the time. In September 1939, the political landscape was transformed by the outbreak of war in Europe. The conflict erupted into a world crisis in the spring and summer of 1940, as Germany first overwhelmed Denmark and Norway in April, and then attacked France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg in May, crushing resistance in less than six weeks. By the time the Democratic National Convention opened on July 15, the President had decided to accept his party's nomination, but only if it came in the form of a draft. With characteristic indirection, Roosevelt authorized Senator Alben Barkley to declare from the convention platform that "[h]e (President Roosevelt) wishes in all earnestness and sincerity to make it clear that all the delegates to this Convention are free to vote for any candidate." The President's ambiguous statement was taken, as he intended it would be, as a signal that he would accept the nomination. The convention erupted in boisterous pro-Roosevelt demonstrations, and the President was duly nominated on July 17 by an overwhelming margin. Little more than a year after President Roosevelt's 1940 reelection, the United States was thrust into the war following a surprise Japanese attack on U.S. military installations at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii, as well as on other American possessions in the Pacific. As the election of 1944 approached, the nation was deeply involved in World War II, and the injunction "don't change horses in the middle of a stream" seemed even more compelling than in 1940. Roosevelt, whose coronary artery disease and failing general health were concealed from the public, was elected to a fourth term in November. Exhausted by years of stress and overwork, however, he succumbed to what was believed to be a cerebral hemorrhage on April 12, 1945, less than three months after his fourth inaugural. The Twenty-Second Amendment and After: Presidential Tenure Since President Franklin Roosevelt President Roosevelt was succeeded in 1945 by his Vice President, Harry S. Truman. Within two years, in 1947, the 80 th Congress had proposed the Twenty-Second Amendment to the states, and in 1951, the states completed the ratification process. The amendment, examined in detail later in this report, provides that no person shall be elected more than twice to the presidency and also sets additional conditions of service for Presidents who succeed to the unfinished terms of their predecessors. While Truman was not covered by the amendment, all 12 Presidents who have served since the amendment took effect have been subject to its provisions. Of these, five—Dwight Eisenhower (1953-1961), Ronald Reagan (1981-1989), William (Bill) Clinton (1993-2001), George W. Bush (2001-2009), and Barack Obama (2009-2017)—each served two full consecutive terms, while Truman's time in office was just three months short of a full eight years. These "standard" two-term presidencies contributed to lengthening the average tenure in office to just under 74 months for the period between the accession of Truman in 1945 and the inauguration of Donald Trump in 2017, making this the longest average tenure for any of the periods covered in this report since the early days under the Constitution. Embedded within this period, however, were two volatile decades: the years between 1961 and 1981, which witnessed a rate of presidential turnover comparable to that of the 1840s and the 1850s. Five Presidents served in the space of 20 years: John Kennedy (1961-1963), Lyndon Johnson (1963-1969), Richard Nixon (1969-1974), Gerald Ford (1974-1977), and Jimmy Carter (1977-1981). The reasons for their rapid succession in office tend to mirror those experienced by the chief executives of the similarly turbulent 1840s and 1850s: Kennedy was assassinated, but his four immediate successors arguably experienced the consequences of a series of adverse political and economic developments. Constitutional Amendments Affecting Presidential and Vice Presidential Tenure More than a century after the Twelfth Amendment set qualifications for the vice presidency, the Twentieth, Twenty-Second, and Twenty-Fifth Amendments altered some of the original constitutional and early legislative provisions governing presidential and vice presidential terms and tenure. The Twentieth Amendment: Beginning Presidential Terms on January 20 The Twentieth Amendment was proposed by Congress in 1932, and its ratification by the states was completed in 1933. It provided the first change in any aspect of presidential or vice presidential term and tenure since the Twelfth Amendment, in 1804, extended qualifications for the President to the Vice President, which was arguably only a technical adjustment made necessary by the amendment's establishment of separate votes for the two offices. From 1789 until 1937, presidential and vice presidential terms ended on March 4 of every year following a presidential election. This date, which originally applied to the opening day of the First Congress, was confirmed and extended to presidential and vice presidential terms of office by the Second Congress in 1792. This arrangement led to a four-month interval between the choice of presidential electors, which was set by Congress in 1845 for Tuesday after the first Monday in November "of the year in which they are to be appointed…." and the opening of the new Congress and the presidential inauguration, both of which, as noted above, occurred on March 4 of the following year. Congressional sessions were also connected with the presidential term of office. Article I, Section 4, clause 2 of the Constitution required Congress to assemble "at least once in every Year, and such meeting shall be on the first Monday in December, unless they shall by Law appoint a different Day." As a result, the first session of most Congresses did not convene until more than a year after election day, and the second session, also known as the short session, usually convened after elections for its successor had been held, and continued through March 4. These "lame duck" sessions were increasingly criticized in the 20 th century, as they included Members of both chambers who had retired or had been defeated for reelection, and occasionally were dominated by political parties that had been repudiated at the November elections. Similarly, as the powers and responsibilities of the presidency expanded, there was increasing demand that the four-month presidential transition be shortened. Although the Senate passed an amendment resolution ending the lame duck session as early as 1923, efforts to change the dates for congressional and presidential terms of office were stalled in the House of Representatives throughout the decade of the 1920s. In addition to the lame duck session arguments noted above, proponents of the amendment favored elimination of time limits on the short session on the grounds that it promoted obstructionism in both chambers, and particularly, filibusters in the Senate. Opposition to the measure centered on the congressional term: opponents of both parties feared it would eliminate what they regarded as a politically salubrious "cooling off period" after the elections. By convening the new Congress just two months after elections, rather than 13 months, as under the then-current system, the passions generated during the election campaign would, they suggested, still be fresh, and might negatively affect the flow of legislative business. Further, they opposed longer, or continuous, congressional sessions on the grounds that these would present opportunities for the abuse of legislative power. House Speaker Nicholas Longworth spoke for many opponents when he stated the following (in the lame duck third session of the 71 st Congress): Under this resolution ... it will be entirely possible for Congress to be in session perpetually from the time it convenes.... It seems to me obvious that great and serious danger might follow a perpetual two years' session of the Congress. I am not one of those who says the country is better off when Congress goes home, I do not think so, but I do think that the Congress and the country ought to have a breathing space at least once every two years. By 1932, however, party control of the House in the 75 th Congress had shifted, and a bipartisan coalition was able to bring a proposal to the floor in both chambers. The amendment, which was proposed to the states on March 2, 1932, included the following provisions: Terms of the President and Vice President would end on January 20 of the year following a presidential election. Terms of Representatives and Senators would end at "noon on the 3d day of January." Congress would meet at least once annually, at "noon on the 3d day of January," unless Congress appointed a different day by law. If the President elect died, the Vice President elect would become the President-elect. Congress was empowered to provide by law for cases of vacancy or deadlock connected with the contingent election process. In addition, although not included in the amendment's text, one of its intended effects was that the counting of electoral votes cast in presidential elections, declaration of the election results, and contingent election of the President and Vice President, if necessary, would be conducted by the newly elected Congress, rather than by the lame duck session. The ratification process proceeded with considerable speed, and was completed on January 23, 1933, when the 36 th state approved it. By May of the same year, the 48 th , and last, state legislature added its approval. The Twentieth Amendment became effective for the legislative branch in 1935, when the 74 th Congress convened on January 4, and for the President and Vice President in 1937, when President Roosevelt and Vice President John Garner were inaugurated on January 20. The Twenty-Second Amendment: "Term Limits" for the President In 1946, the Republican Party regained control of both houses of Congress for the first time in 16 years. The GOP had previously committed itself to term limitations on the presidency "[t]o insure against the overthrow of our American system of government" in its 1940 national convention platform, while the party's 1944 manifesto called for a single six-year term for the chief executive. The question of presidential tenure was thus high on the agenda of the 80 th Congress when it convened on January 3, 1947, and resolutions proposing constitutional amendments that would impose term limitations on future Presidents were introduced in both chambers when Congress assembled. Debate on the amendment proceeded generally on partisan lines. Clearly the most important factor in consideration of the amendment was the unprecedented example of President Roosevelt's 12 years in office. Between the successive crises of the depression and World War II, and President Roosevelt's activist conception of the office, the power and authority of the presidency had expanded well beyond its traditional boundaries. Supporters claimed their goal was the prevention of excessive concentration of power in the hands of future Presidents. Opponents argued that the proposal was a case of overkill: the informal two-term limit had been set aside by the President (with the approval of a substantial majority of the voters, they noted) only because of the extraordinary circumstances surrounding World War II. It was, they asserted, a restriction of democracy, depriving the people of their right to elect any qualified candidate they chose. One nationally prominent journalist of the era described the amendment as "'an act of retroactive vindictiveness' [against Franklin Roosevelt]. They could never beat him while he was alive, [Elmer] Davis said, so they beat him after he was dead." On the other hand, one scholar of the presidency noted that the idea of presidential term limits was not new at that time: more than 270 amendments to circumscribe presidential tenure had been introduced between 1789 and 1947. The House took the lead on the question, moving quickly after the new Congress assembled. Two approaches to the question of presidential term limitations emerged: H.J.Res. 25, introduced by Representative Everett M. Dirksen, sought a single six-year term, while H.J.Res. 27, offered by Representative Earl C. Michener, proposed a limit of two four-year terms. On February 5, the Judiciary Committee reported H.J.Res. 27 favorably, and the proposal was taken up by the full House on February 6. Debate on the resolution itself was limited to two hours, and to five minutes each on proposed amendments, after which the House voted to approve H.J.Res. 27 on February 6, 1947, by a vote of 285 to 121. House debate fell largely along party lines; the amendment has largely been characterized as a "Republican" measure, and it is worth noting that the Republican caucus in the House was united in support of the resolution. On the other hand, one historian points out that the votes of 47 mostly southern Democrats provided the resolution the necessary two-thirds majority required by the Constitution, so there was, in fact, a level of bipartisan support; most Democratic "yes" votes came from southern or border states. Senate consideration of the amendment proceeded at a more measured pace than in the House. The House measure, H.J.Res. 27, which the Senate used as the vehicle for its deliberation, was reported from the Senate Judiciary Committee on February 21; it differed from the House resolution by requiring that the amendment be submitted to ad hoc state conventions for ratification, rather than to the state legislatures—Article V of the Constitution provides for either method of ratification, at the discretion of Congress. The argument was that ad hoc conventions, elected for the single purpose of considering the amendment, would be more familiar with, and responsive to, public opinion on the proposal. Secondly, the committee version included a prohibition on further presidential service of any person who had served more than 365 days in each of two terms. When the full Senate took up the amendment, both these provisions were stripped out, but the Senate approved an amendment by Senator Robert Taft that clarified procedures governing the number of times a Vice President who succeeded to the presidency might be elected. Taft's amendment included the now-familiar provision that if a Vice President becomes President in the latter two years of a predecessor's term, he or she is eligible to be elected to two full terms, for a total of 10 years' service. If, however, the Vice President serves more than two years of a predecessor's term, he or she may be elected only to a single subsequent term. The Senate passed the resolution, as amended, by a vote of 59 to 23 on March 12. As with the House, there was substantial Democratic support for the measure: 16 Democratic Senators, mostly from southern and border states, joined all 43 Republicans present and voting to produce the necessary two-thirds majority. The 23 "no" votes were cast by Democrats. Although the Senate appointed conferees to resolve differences between the two versions of the bill, there is no evidence a conference committee met. On March 21, the House took up the Senate version, which, according to Representative Michener, had been "considered informally before the full Judiciary Committee." The House, after additional debate, accepted the Senate's amendments to H.J.Res. 27 on March 21. The Senate version of the amendment, as agreed to in the House and proposed to the states, included the following provisions: No person could be elected to the office of President more than twice. Persons who had been President or acted as President for more than two years of their predecessor's term could be elected once. Persons who had been President or acted as President for less than two years of their predecessor's term could be elected twice. The amendment did not apply to any person serving as President when it was proposed, or when it was ratified. The amendment was proposed to the states for ratification by their legislatures on March 24, 1947. Minnesota became the 36 th state to ratify the proposal on February 27, 1951, and it was declared to be ratified and effective on March 1 of the same year. Since its ratification in 1951, the Twenty-Second Amendment has applied to six Presidents who have been elected twice to the Presidency: Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953-1961), Ronald W. Reagan (1981-1989), William (Bill) J. Clinton (1993-2001), George W. Bush (2001-2009), and Barack H. Obama (2009-2017). In addition, Richard M. Nixon (1969-1974), who resigned from office under the threat of impeachment, was technically covered by the amendment's provisions, having been elected twice to the presidency. To date, two Presidents who succeeded to the presidency have been covered under the Amendment's provisions that govern succession to their predecessors' uncompleted terms: … and no person who has held the office of President, or acted as President, for more than two years of a term to which some other person was elected President shall be elected to the office of the President more than once. The first, Lyndon B. Johnson (1963-1969), succeeded to the presidency when John F. Kennedy was assassinated in November 1963. Under the provisions of the Twentieth Amendment, Johnson would have been eligible to be elected to two full terms, because he entered office more than halfway through his predecessor's term. On the other hand, Gerald R. Ford (1974-1977), the second Vice President to succeed to the presidency during this period, was eligible to be elected to only one full term in his own right, since he served more than two years of the term to which President Nixon had been elected. Does the Twenty-Second Amendment Provide an Absolute Term Limitation on Presidential Service? The Twenty-Second Amendment prohibits anyone from being elected President more than twice. The question has been asked, however, whether a President who was elected to two terms as chief executive could subsequently be elected Vice President and then succeed to the presidency as a result of the incumbent's death, resignation, or removal from office. Another version of this scenario questions whether a former President who had been elected twice could succeed to the office of chief executive from other positions in the line of presidential succession, such as the offices of Speaker of the House of Representatives, President pro tempore of the Senate, or positions in the Cabinet, as provided for in the Presidential Succession Act. This issue was raised initially during discussions of the Twenty-Second Amendment in 1960, when President Eisenhower was about to become the first President covered by its limitations. While the question may have been largely academic with respect to Eisenhower, due to his age and condition of his health, it was also raised again concerning former President Barack Obama, who left office in 2017 at the age of 55. Some commentators argue that the Twelfth Amendment's statement that "no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall be eligible to that of Vice-President" ipso facto bars any former chief executive covered by the Twenty-Second Amendment from serving either as Vice President or succeeding to the presidency from any other line of succession position (i.e., the Speaker of the House, President pro tempore of the Senate, or the Cabinet). Others maintain, however, that the original intent of the Twelfth Amendment's language was only to apply the same qualifications of age, residence, and "natural born" citizenship to the Vice President as apply to the President, and that it has no bearing on eligibility to serve as President. Moreover, they maintain that the Twenty-Second Amendment's prohibition can be interpreted as extending only to eligibility for election , not service ; by this reasoning, a term-limited President could be elected Vice President, and then succeed to the presidency to serve out the balance of the term. Adherents of both positions, however, generally agree that anyone becoming President under any of these scenarios would be prohibited from running for election to an additional term. Assessing a related question, legal scholars Bruce Peabody and Scott Gant asserted in a 1999 article that a former President could also succeed to the presidency, or be "acting President" from the wide range of positions covered in the Presidential Succession Act. By their reasoning, a former President serving as Speaker of the House, President pro tempore of the Senate, or as a Cabinet officer would also be able to assume the office of President or act as President under the "service vs. election" interpretation of the Twenty-Second Amendment. The Constitution Annotated tends to support some version of this interpretation, but notes that many issues would need to be addressed if this situation ever occurred: The Twenty-Second Amendment has yet to be tested or applied. Commentary suggests, however, that a number of issues could be raised as to the Amendment's meaning and application, especially in relation to the Twelfth Amendment. By its terms, the Twenty-Second Amendment bars only the election of two-term Presidents, and this prohibition would not prevent someone who had twice been elected President from succeeding to the office after having been elected or appointed Vice-President. Broader language providing that no such person "shall be chosen or serve as President ... or be eligible to hold the office" was rejected in favor of the Ame ndment's ban merely on election (H.J.Res. 27, 80 th Cong., 1 st Sess. (1947)), (as introduced). As the House Judiciary Committee reported the measure, it would have made the covered category of former presidents "ineligible to hold the office of President." (H.R. Rep. No. 17, 80 th Cong., 1 st Sess. at 1 (1947)). Whether a two-term President could be elected or appointed Vice President depends upon the meaning of the Twelfth Amendment, which provides that "no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall be eligible to that of Vice-President." Is someone prohibited by the Twenty-Second Amendment from being "elected" to the office of President thereby "constitutionally ineligible to the office"? Note also that neither Amendment addresses the eligibility of a former two-term President to serve as Speaker of the House or as one of the other officers who could serve as President through operation of the Succession Act. It seems unlikely that this question will be answered conclusively barring an actual occurrence of the as-yet hypothetical situation cited above. As former Secretary of State Dean Acheson commented when the issue was first raised in 1960, "it may be more unlikely than unconstitutional." The Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Filling Vice Presidential Vacancies The Twenty-Fifth Amendment, which provides for several aspects of presidential succession and disability, also filled a gap in constitutional procedures that had existed since 1789. The amendment established procedures for filling vacancies in the vice presidency that have been implemented twice since the amendment's ratification in 1967. As noted previously in this report, the Constitution originally made no provision for filling vacancies in the vice presidency, but authorized Congress to provide for simultaneous vacancies in both executive offices. The Succession Act of 1792 (1 Stat. 240), passed by the Second Congress (1791-1793), addressed the issue, authorizing the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House, in that order, to act as President until a special election could be held to fill a presidential vacancy, unless the vacancy occurred late in the last full year of the incumbent's term of office. The act made no provision for vacancies in the vice presidency, an omission that continued in its subsequent revisions, the succession acts of 1881 (24 Stat. 1) and 1947 (61 Stat. 380). Consequently, the office of Vice President was vacant on 14 different occasions between 1809 and 1965, due to the death or resignation of various incumbents. These vacancies ranged in duration from 67 days, following John C. Calhoun's resignation to assume a Senate seat in December 1832, to 47 months, when John Tyler became President following the death of William Henry Harrison in 1841. During the 1950s, Congress considered proposals concerning presidential disability that were largely generated by concern over illnesses suffered by President Dwight Eisenhower during his two terms in office (1953-1961). These included a moderate heart attack, a mild stroke, and surgery for a partial obstruction of the President's intestine. Hearings on an amendment to provide for instances of presidential disability were held by the Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments, chaired by Senator Estes Kefauver, in 1958 and 1959. No floor action was taken in either chamber on the question during this period. When Senator Kefauver, the chief advocate for constitutional action, died in August 1963, Senator Birch Bayh assumed leadership of succession and disability reform proponents in the Senate, in cooperation with Representative Emanuel Celler, chairman of the House Judiciary Committee. The assassination of President John F. Kennedy on November 22, 1963, shocked and traumatized the nation. In Congress, the President's death provided fresh impetus to congressional action on presidential succession and disability leading to proposal of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. Although Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson succeeded without incident after Kennedy's death, the office of Vice President remained vacant for 14 months, until Senator Hubert Humphrey was elected in 1964 and inaugurated on January 20, 1965. Following President Johnson's November 27, 1963, address to a joint session of Congress, contemporary observers noted that his potential immediate successor, House Speaker John W. McCormack, was 71 years old, and that Senate President pro tempore Carl T. Hayden, second in the order of succession, was 86 and visibly frail. A consensus emerged that a vice presidential vacancy for any length of time constituted a dangerous gap in the nation's leadership during the Cold War, an era of international tensions and the threat of nuclear war. Senator Bayh introduced a constitutional amendment shortly after President Kennedy's death that provided new procedures for (1) presidential succession, (2) vice presidential vacancies, and (3) instances of presidential disability. Although the House did not act on the proposal in 1964, it was reintroduced the following year in both chambers early in the first session of the 89 th Congress. The proposal included in its nearly identical House and Senate versions (H.J.Res. 1 and S.J.Res. 1, respectively) the following provisions: Section 1 provided that the Vice President becomes President in "case of the removal of the President from office or of his death or resignation." Section 2 provided that whenever the office of Vice President is vacant, the President nominates a successor "who shall take office upon confirmation by a majority vote of both Houses of Congress." Section 3 provided that whenever the President declares he is disabled and unable to discharge his duties, the Vice President serves as Acting President. Section 4 provided that whenever the Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet, or, alternatively, the Vice President and a disability review body established by law, transmits to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate a declaration that the President is incapacitated, the Vice President becomes Acting President. When the President transmits a message to the same officers declaring that no inability exists, the President resumes the powers and duties of the office. If, however, the Vice President and a majority of either the Cabinet or the Vice President and the disability review body, if one has been established, disputes the President's message, then Congress decides the issue within a limited period of time. A two-thirds vote of both houses of Congress is necessary to sustain the Vice President's judgment that the President remains impaired; otherwise the President resumes the powers and duties of the office. The proposed amendment moved through the relevant committees and came to the floor of both chambers early during the first session of the new Congress. A bipartisan consensus emerged in favor of Sections 1 through 3; Section 4, however, generated controversy that centered on its provisions governing disputed presidential disability. Opponents asserted that these procedures were too detailed to be included in a constitutional amendment, and that the question of disability would be better addressed in the proposed amendment by authorizing Congress to provide by law for such instances. Defenders responded by noting that leaving the disability review function to legislation, and dependent on a simple majority in both houses of Congress, might subject this critical issue to political manipulation: better to "set it in stone" in the Constitution. Senator Everett Dirksen was the chief proponent of the legislative route for disability procedures, but his amendment to the resolution was rejected by a substantial margin. The Senate ultimately passed S.J.Res. 1 without the Dirksen amendment on February 13, 1965, by a vote of 72 to 0, followed by House passage of H.J.Res. 1 on April 13, by a vote of 368 to 29. A conference reconciled minor differences between the two versions, and the amendment was officially proposed to the states on July 6. Ratification proceeded quickly in the states; Nevada became the 38 th state to ratify on February 10, 1967, and the Administrator of General Services declared the amendment to be in effect on February 23 of the same year. Implementing Section 1 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment Both Sections 1 and 2 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, which relate to presidential and vice presidential term and tenure, have been implemented since its ratification in 1967. In the case of Section 1, no direct action beyond swearing in the new President was necessary on August 9, 1974, when President Richard Nixon resigned while facing almost certain impeachment resulting from the revelation of his involvement in events connected with the Watergate break-in and subsequent cover-up. The Vice President, former Representative Gerald R. Ford, became President, and was inaugurated without incident when he took the oath of office the same day. Implementing Section 2 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment Section 2 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment has been implemented twice since its ratification, in 1973, with the nomination and confirmation of Representative Gerald R. Ford as Vice President, and in 1974, with the nomination and confirmation of New York Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller as Vice President. 1973: Nomination and Confirmation of Gerald R. Ford as Vice President The provisions of Section 2 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment were invoked twice within a few years of the amendment's ratification. Between 1973 and 1974, the circumstances surrounding the Watergate break-in of 1972 resulted in what amounted to back-to-back implementations of the section within the space of 16 months, as the vice presidency became vacant twice, first due to resignation, and second, due to succession of the Vice President to the presidency. As the events resulting from the Watergate break-in unfolded in June 1973, an unrelated federal investigation of political corruption in Baltimore County, Maryland, uncovered evidence of illegal activities by Vice President Spiro T. Agnew during and after his service both as county executive and as Governor of Maryland from 1967 to 1969. After a grand jury was convened, the Vice President entered into negotiations with the Justice Department and President Nixon's counsel, as a result of which he agreed to resign and plead "no contest" to one count of tax evasion, in return for a fine and three years of probation. Agnew resigned the vice presidency on October 10, 1973. On October 12, the President nominated the House Republican Leader, Representative Gerald Ford, to be Vice President, thus activating Section 2 of the amendment. The nomination was referred in the House to the Committee on the Judiciary, and in the Senate to the Committee on Rules and Administration; the two chambers agreed on consecutive hearings, with the Senate proceeding first. The Senate Rules Committee hearings began on November 1, 1973, and continued in both public and executive sessions until the committee voted unanimously to report the nomination favorably to the full Senate on November 20. The House Judiciary Committee opened its first session on November 15, immediately following the Senate's last public hearings session. House hearings continued until November 26, and on November 29, the committee voted 30-8 to report the nomination favorably to the full House. After two days of floor debate, the Senate voted on November 27 by a margin of 93 to 2 to confirm Ford as Vice President. The House voted to confirm Ford on December 6, after one day of debate, by a vote of 387 to 35. Representative Ford took the oath as Vice President before a joint session of Congress in the House chamber the same day. 1974: Nomination and Confirmation of Nelson A. Rockefeller as Vice President The second, and to date the only other, implementation of Section 2 occurred less than a year later. On August 9, 1974, Richard Nixon resigned the presidency, after being confronted with the near certainty of impeachment and possible removal from office due to his role in the events associated with the Watergate break-in. Gerald Ford was immediately sworn in as President, thus creating a vacancy in the vice presidency, for which he nominated former New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller on August 20. Congress adopted the procedures used in consideration of the Ford nomination, but the hearing schedules were complicated by the press of legislative business and the fact that 33 members of the House Judiciary Committee and 2 members of the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration were running for reelection in the midterm congressional elections held November 2, 1974. An additional factor in the delay was the fact that, as a scion of one of America's wealthiest families, Governor Rockefeller's personal finances were extremely complex and required a lengthy investigation. Given these factors, the Senate hearings were conducted in two widely separated installments, from September 23 to 26, and again between November 13 and 15. The Rules Committee voted unanimously to report the nomination to the full Senate on November 22. The House again scheduled consecutive hearings, convening the Judiciary Committee from November 21 to 26, and again between December 2 and 4. The committee voted 26 to 12 to report the nomination favorably on December 12. As was the case with the Ford nomination, floor debate on the confirmation of Nelson Rockefeller to be Vice President was somewhat anticlimactic. Most of the substantive points in favor of, or in opposition to, the nominee had been thoroughly examined in the hearings process and were largely disposed of in the Rules and Judiciary Committee reports. The Senate voted 90 to 7 to confirm Rockefeller on December 10, while the House confirmed the nomination by a closer margin, 287 to 128, on December 19. Vice President Rockefeller was inaugurated in the Senate, with House Members in attendance, the same day. Concluding Observations The question of presidential and vice presidential terms and tenure has had a sometimes-dramatic history in the more than two centuries that have passed since the Constitutional Convention settled on the basic questions of term length and reelection. As this report documents, various circumstances contributed to what approached a de facto one-term presidential tradition for much of the 19 th century, while during this same period a durable body of opinion favored a constitutional amendment to formalize the single term. In the 20 th century, three constitutional amendments made incremental changes in certain conditions of presidential tenure, most notably the Twenty-Second Amendment's establishment of limits on the number of times a person could be elected President of the United States. In recent years, however, these issues have not been the subject of much debate. Certain questions do occasionally rise to command some degree of public attention, including speculation on the applicability of the Twenty-Second Amendment to Presidents who have been elected twice, or proposals for constitutional changes that would repeal the amendment or establish a single six-year presidential and vice presidential term. By design, however, constitutional amendments must pass a number of demanding tests before they can be incorporated in the nation's fundamental charter. Those few of the many hundreds of amendments proposed that were successful arguably owe their success to one or more of the following developments: They incorporate a reform that has been considered and debated over a period of time, and has gradually gained the approval of a contemporaneous majority of the public that includes a wide range of social, cultural, and political support from diverse elements around the nation. They have been viewed as a remedy to a sudden and traumatic event in the nation's life that requires a swift and definitive solution. They have received the steady support of generally bipartisan leadership in both houses of Congress over the extended periods generally necessary for the legislature to consider and propose amendments for consideration by the states. Until or unless any proposals to change the existing conditions of presidential terms and tenure meet one or more of these requirements, there is arguably little momentum for their moving beyond the realm of advocacy and speculation.

The President and Vice President's terms of office are prescribed by the Constitution and four of its amendments. Article II, Section 1, of the Constitution, which came into effect with the convening of the First Congress and inauguration of the first President and Vice President in 1789, sets the terms of these two officers at four years, and does not prohibit their reelection. Four amendments to the Constitution, ratified between 1804 and 1967, have added further conditions to presidential terms and tenure. The Twelfth Amendment, ratified in 1804, extended the qualifications for Presidents to the vice presidency. Section 1 of the Twentieth Amendment, ratified in 1933, sets the expiration date for these terms at noon on January 20 of each year following a presidential election. The Twenty-Second Amendment, ratified in 1951, limits presidential tenure: no person may be elected President more than twice. It also specifies that Vice Presidents who succeed to the office may be elected to two full terms if they served less than two years of the term of the President they succeeded. If they served more than two years of the predecessor's term, they are eligible for election to only one additional term. The Twenty-Fifth Amendment, ratified in 1967, does not directly affect terms and tenure of the President and Vice President, but provides in Section 1 that the Vice President "shall become President" on the death, resignation, or removal from office of the President. This section clarifies original constitutional language on the status of a Vice President who succeeds to the presidency. Section 2 authorizes the President to make nominations to fill vacancies in the office of Vice President, subject to approval by a majority vote of both houses of Congress, a contingency not covered in the original language of the Constitution. The length of the President's term and the question of whether Presidents should be eligible for reelection were extensively debated in 1787 at the Constitutional Convention. Late in the proceedings, the delegates settled on a four-year term for both President and Vice President but did not place a limit on the number of terms a President could serve. Following a precedent set by President George Washington (1789-1797), and reinforced by Thomas Jefferson (1801-1809), however, U.S. Presidents adhered to a self-imposed limit of two terms, a precedent that was observed for over 140 years. Although several Presidents during this period who had served two terms considered running for a third, Franklin Roosevelt (1933-1945) was the first to seek and be elected to both a third term, in 1940, and a fourth, in 1944. Following ratification of the four amendments cited above, additional amendment proposals to change the conditions of presidential terms and tenure were regularly introduced during the second half of the 20th century, but much less frequently to date in the 21st. Two categories of amendment predominated during this period: one variant proposed repeal of the Twenty-Second Amendment, thus permitting Presidents to be elected an unlimited number of times. Another category of proposed amendment would have extended the presidential and vice-presidential terms to six years, often in combination with a requirement limiting Presidents to one term. No measure to repeal the Twenty-Second Amendment or otherwise change the presidential term of office has been introduced to date in the 116th Congress. This report will be updated if events warrant.

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Developing Ideas for Legislation "Ideas can come from anywhere," a scholar of American politics once wrote. To be sure, ideas and recommendations for legislation come from a wide variety of sources, such as individual Representatives; committees and other House working groups; legislative staff; party and chamber leaders; executive branch agencies and the White House; states and localities; members of the media; citizens; and interest groups. Any or all of these individuals or entities may participate in drafting legislation, but only a Member of Congress may formally introduce legislation. Some common considerations taken into account when drafting a bill include the following: What problem does the bill seek to address? Understanding the source of a problem is necessary in order to properly address it. An abundance of information is available to Members in the form of reports, studies, and presentations offered by a wide range of individuals, groups, and organizations, including CRS. Soliciting expert testimony in the context of a committee hearing is another common method by which the House gathers relevant information for use in policymaking. To what committee(s) is it likely to be referred? Committee referral can matter because one committee might be especially receptive to the proposed legislation in comparison to another committee. Members may also prefer that their bill be referred to a committee on which they serve in order to ensure their continued involvement at the committee stage of proceedings. Will the bill attract cosponsors? Cosponsorship conveys a Member's support for a measure, so bills that attract many cosponsors could be seen as enjoying broad support within the chamber. A measure with many cosponsors, especially if they include committee and party leaders, could encourage the relevant committee chair to take some action on the legislation, such as hold hearings on it. Does it have bipartisan appeal? Building a coalition of support for a proposal can take time, and some amount of bipartisan cooperation may be required to secure final passage. Measures that are limited in scope but have broad bipartisan appeal are often brought to the House floor under suspension of the rules, a parliamentary procedure that limits debate and amendment and requires a supermajority vote of two-thirds for a measure to pass. What are the budgetary implications? The House places a number of restrictions on legislation with budgetary consequences. For instance, if a proposal adds to the federal deficit, it may be subject to a point of order on the chamber floor for violating congressional budget rules (many of which are codified in the Congressional Budget Act of 1974). Support for a measure may also hinge on how its costs are paid for. Members may agree about the merits of a bill but disagree with how its provisions are funded. Should companion legislation be introduced in the Senate? To become law, a bill or joint resolution must pass both houses of Congress in identical form (the same text and bill number) and be signed by the President. For this reason, House sponsors sometimes encourage allies in the Senate to introduce identical or similarly worded legislation to expedite bicameral consideration. Companion bills might also attract wider public and Member attention to the issues addressed in the legislation. Is the measure best introduced at the beginning, in the middle, or toward the end of a Congress? Timing the introduction of a measure can be important. Comprehensive legislation is likely to require a great deal of time to work through, both in committee and on the floor. An early introduction will give the House more time to examine the measure's provisions. Advantage might also be gained by being the first to address an issue. Those who move first tend to attract media attention and may be seen by their colleagues as exercising leadership in that particular policy area. Strategic delay is another option. This approach might provide more time for an individual or committee to study the issue and build support for a preferred solution. To be sure, many bills do not follow a linear (or "regular order") legislative process—introduction, consideration in committee, and arrival on the floor for further debate and amendment. For example, a legislative proposal that had languished in committee might suddenly be taken up because it deals with an unfolding crisis or emergency. Drafting Legislation There is no House rule that introduced bills and resolutions must be prepared by the House Office of the Legislative Counsel, but the office plays an important role by providing Members and staff, at their request, with drafts of legislation. Use of the office by Members and staff is nearly universal. Its staff attorneys are both subject matter specialists and experts in legislative drafting, and they focus almost exclusively on policy issues within their areas of expertise. Legislative attorneys are often assigned to serve a specific committee or committees as a kind of nonpartisan, shared staff, and they work closely with committee members and staff to ensure that the bill's language and form matches the intent of its sponsor and adheres to drafting rules and linguistic traditions of the House. Several drafts may be required before a measure is ready for formal introduction. Those drafting legislation may seek assistance from the Office of the Legislative Counsel at any stage. All communications with the office are treated as confidential. The office is located in Room 337 of the Ford House Office Building and can be reached at extension 5-6060 or by sending an email request to [email protected]. Following introduction, the Speaker refers legislation to the appropriate committee(s) based primarily on how its contents align with the subject matter jurisdictions of committees established in clause 1 of House Rule X. According to clause 2 of House Rule XII, the Speaker shall refer legislation [I]n such a manner as to ensure to the maximum extent feasible that each committee that has jurisdiction under clause 1 of rule X over the subject matter of a provision thereof may consider such provision and report to the House thereon. The Office of the Parliamentarian advises the Speaker on committee referrals. In practice, the Parliamentarian has been delegated the responsibility for committee referrals. Representatives and staff involved in drafting legislation may consult the Office of the Parliamentarian regarding the committee(s) to which their draft measure might be referred. The office is located in Room H-209 of the Capitol (5-7373). Introducing a Bill or Resolution The formal procedures that govern the introduction of legislation are few and are found in House Rule XII. "The system for introducing measures in the House is a relatively free and open one," wrote former House Parliamentarian William Holmes Brown. House rules do not limit the number of bills a Member may introduce. Members may introduce legislation for any number of reasons, and they may do so on behalf of another individual, entity, or group "by request." Between 1973 and 2018, Members introduced an average of about 20 bills and resolutions each per Congress. Statistics on introduced measures are presented in Table 1 . When a Representative has determined that a bill or resolution is ready for introduction, it is placed in the box, or "hopper," at the bill clerk's desk on the chamber floor when the House is in session, including a "pro forma" session. The hopper is pictured in Figure 1 . The sponsor must sign the measure and attach the names of any original cosponsors on a form provided by the Clerk's office, which is located in Room H-154 of the Capitol Building (5-7000). Cosponsors do not sign the bill. Under the Speaker's announced policies of the 116 th Congress (2019-2020), sponsors are "encouraged" to obtain original signatures from cosponsors prior to submitting a cosponsorship form. The bill as drafted by legislative counsel leaves space both for the insertion of a bill number, which is assigned chronologically based on the date of introduction, and for the Parliamentarian's office to note the committee(s) to which the measure was referred. A Member need not seek recognition from the chamber's presiding officer in order to introduce a measure. Following introduction, Members often summarize the purpose and merits of their proposal in a statement published in the "Extension of Remarks" section of the Congressional Record . Since the 112 th Congress, House rules have required Members to provide at the time of introduction a statement of constitutional authority indicating why Congress has the authority to enact the proposed bill or joint resolution. The bill clerk does not accept a bill or joint resolution for introduction that lacks a constitutional authority statement. Clause 7(c) of Rule XII establishes that the statement must be as "specific as practicable," and must be attached to the bill when it is dropped in the hopper for introduction. If no such statement is provided, then the measure will be returned to its sponsor. A point of order cannot be lodged against a bill based on the content of a constitutional authority statement. A sponsor may not reclaim a measure he or she has placed in the hopper after it has been assigned a number and referred to committee (a process that normally occurs the same day). Once a measure has been numbered and referred, it becomes the property of the House and cannot be modified by the sponsor. It is too late at this point to make any changes to the bill—however cosmetic they might be—except by amending the bill on the House floor during its consideration. Introduced bills or resolutions can be taken up by the House even if the sponsor resigns from the House or dies. In the first days of a new Congress, hundreds of bills and resolutions are introduced. Measures are usually numbered sequentially based on the date of introduction, but Representatives may seek to reserve bill numbers in advance by communicating with the Parliamentarian's office prior to introduction. Bill numbers are sometimes seen as a way to provide shorthand meaning to the legislation, enhance its visibility, or confer symbolic importance. Measures have sometimes been assigned the same number for several Congresses, perhaps because lawmakers and others have grown accustomed to referring to a bill by its number. For instance, sponsors of tax reform proposals may request H.R. 1040 as a bill number to draw attention to the 1040 tax form many individuals use to pay federal income taxes. By the same logic, a bill addressing ocular health or medical coverage for eyeglass and contact lenses might take the number H.R. 2020 because 20/20 is considered normal vision. In recent Congresses, the House has ordered that bill numbers H.R. 1 through H.R. 10 be reserved for assignment by the majority leader and numbers H.R. 11 through H.R. 20 be reserved for the minority leader. These bills, sometimes called "message" bills because they often represent the top agenda items of each political party, tend to generate considerable attention and coverage. Statistics on Introduced Measures The number of bills and resolutions introduced in a given Congress fluctuates over time as Table 1 shows. Some of this variation can be explained on the basis of changes in House rules and practices. From 1968 to 1978, for instance, a limit of 25 was placed on the number of cosponsorships a measure could obtain. One effect of this rule was to encourage the introduction of identically worded legislation (with a new bill number) to allow additional Members to sign on as cosponsors. The cosponsorship limit was removed in 1979, which accounts in part for the drop in introduced measures between the 95 th and 96 th Congresses. No longer was it necessary to introduce duplicative bills for the purpose of gaining cosponsors. The House has also sought to reduce the amount of commemorative legislation it considers. The rules for the 104 th Congress (1995-1996), for instance, included new restrictions on the introduction of measures that would express a commemoration "through the designation of a specified period of time." The decline in the number of introduced measures in that Congress might be attributed at least in part to the new rule. The 116 th Congress (2019-2020) maintains this ban on temporal commemorations. Most measures are introduced by individual Members. Five House committees (Appropriations, Budget, Ethics, House Administration, and Rules) may also draft and report an "original" measure on specific subjects identified in House rules. This means that those particular committees do not have to wait for measures to be referred to them in order to act. The committee chair is often considered the sponsor when a committee reports original legislation, although the measure is perhaps best understood as a product that incorporates views and input from other committee members as well.

Authoring and introducing legislation is fundamental to the task of representing voters as a Member of Congress. In fact, part of what makes the American political process unique is that it affords all Members an ability to propose their own ideas for chamber consideration. By comparison, most other democratic governments around the world rely on an executive official, often called a premier, chancellor, or prime minister, to originate and submit policy proposals for discussion and enactment by the legislature. Legislators serving in other countries generally lack the power to initiate legislative proposals of their own. In the American political system, ideas and recommendations for legislation come from a wide variety of sources. Any number of individuals, groups, or entities may participate in drafting bills and resolutions, but only Members of Congress may formally introduce legislation, and they may do so for any reason. When a Representative has determined that a bill or resolution is ready for introduction, it is placed in the box, or "hopper," at the bill clerk's desk on the chamber floor when the House is in session. The sponsor must sign the measure and attach the names of any original cosponsors on a form provided by the Clerk's office. Cosponsors do not sign the bill, but sponsors are "encouraged" by the Speaker to obtain original signatures from cosponsors prior to submitting the cosponsorship form. Since the 112th Congress, House rules have required Members to provide at the time of introduction a statement of constitutional authority indicating why Congress has the authority to enact the proposed bill or joint resolution. There is no House rule that introduced bills and resolutions must be prepared by the House Office of the Legislative Counsel, but that office plays an important role by providing Members and staff, at their request, with drafts of legislation. Use of the office by Members and staff is nearly universal. Once introduced, the Speaker refers legislation to one or more committees based primarily on how its contents align with the subject matter jurisdictions of committees established in clause 1 of House Rule X. In practice, the Office of the Parliamentarian advises the Speaker in these referral decisions, and the Parliamentarian's recommendations are followed in virtually every case. This report is intended to assist Members and staff in preparing legislation for introduction. Its contents address essential elements of the process, including bill drafting, the mechanics of introduction, and the roles played by key House offices involved in the drafting, submission, and referral of legislation. Statistics on introduced measures are presented in the final section, and a brief explanation of patterns of introduction over time is also provided.

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Overview Congress appropriates approximately $23 million annually to maintain the Selective Service agency. The United States has not used conscription to fill manpower requirements for over four decades; however, the Selective Service System and the requirement for young men to register for the draft remain today. Men who fail to register are subject to penalties in the form of lost benefits and criminal action. Some have questioned the need to maintain this agency and the registration requirements. Others have questioned whether the current requirements for registration are fair and equitable. This report is intended to provide Congress with information about how the Military Selective Service Act (MSSA), the Selective Service System (SSS), and associated requirements for registration have evolved over time. It explains why the United States developed the SSS, what the system looks like today, how constituents are affected by the MSSA requirements, and what the options and considerations may be for the future of the Selective Service. The first section of the report provides background and history on the Military Selective Service Act, the Selective Service System, and the implementation of the draft in the United States. The second section discusses statutory registration requirements, processes for registering, and penalties for failing to register. The third section discusses the current organization, roles, and resourcing of the Selective Service System. The final section discusses policy options and consideration for Congress for the future of the MSSA and the Selective Service System. This report does not discuss the state of the all-volunteer force or whether it is adequate to meet our nation's current or future manpower needs. In addition, it will not provide an analysis of other options for military manpower resourcing such as universal military service or universal military training. It also does not discuss the history of the draft and draft planning for health service workers. Finally, this report does not evaluate whether the SSS, as currently structured, is adequately resourced and organized to perform its statutory mission. These questions and others will be reviewed by the National Commission on Military, National, and Public Service established by the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2017 ( P.L. 114-328 ). Background The United States has used federal conscription at various times since the Civil War era, primarily in times of war, but also during peacetime in the aftermath of World War II. When first adopted in 1863, national conscription was a marked departure from the traditional military policy of the United States, which from the founding era had relied on a small standing force that could be augmented by state militias in times of conflict. Conscription into the Armed Forces of the United States was used just prior to, during, and immediately after World War II (WWII). Reinstated on June 24, 1948, it remained in force until June 30, 1973. Following the adoption of the all-volunteer force (AVF) in 1973, authority to induct new draftees under the Military Selective Service Act ceased. Nevertheless, a standby draft mechanism still exists to furnish manpower above and beyond that provided by the active and reserve components of the Armed Forces in the case of a major military contingency. If the federal government were to reinstate the draft, draftees would likely be required to fill all authorized positions to include casualty replacements, billets in understrength units, and new military units activated to expand the wartime force. 1863 Enrollment Act and Civil War Conscription During the Civil War, due to high demand for military manpower, weaknesses in the system for calling up state militia units, and an insufficient number of volunteers for active federal service, President Abraham Lincoln signed the 1863 Enrollment Act. This marked the first instance of the federal government calling individuals into compulsory federal service through conscription. All male citizens between the ages of 20 and 45 who were capable of bearing arms were liable to be drafted. The law allowed exemptions for dependency and employment in official positions. The Enrollment Act also established a national Provost Marshal Bureau, led by a provost marshal general and was responsible for enforcing the draft. Under the act, the President had authority to establish enrollment districts and to appoint a provost marshal to each district to serve under the direction of the Secretary of War in a separate bureau under the War Department. The provost marshal general was responsible for establishing a district board for processing enrollments and was given authority under the law to make rules and regulations for the operation of the boards and to arrest draft dodgers and deserters. Government agents went door-to-door to enroll individuals, followed by a lottery in each congressional district based on district quotas. Some observers criticized the Enrollment Act as favoring the wealthiest citizens because it allowed for either the purchase of a substitute who would serve in the draftee's place or payment by the draftee of a fee up to $300. In addition, volunteers were offered bounties by both the federal government and some local communities. Under this system, fraud and desertions were common. Enforcement of the draft also incited rioting and violence in many cities across the United States, most famously in New York City. On July 13, 1863, the intended date of the second draft drawing in New York City, an angry mob attacked the assistant Ninth District provost marshal's office, smashing the lottery selection wheel and setting the building on fire. Several days of rioting and violence ensued until federal troops were called in to restore order. The draft call was suspended in New York City during the rioting and was not resumed until August 19, 1863. The total number of men that served in the Union forces during the course of the war was 2,690,401. The number drafted was 255,373. Of the total draftees, 86,724 avoided military service by the payment of commutation, and 117,986 furnished substitutes. Volunteerism during this war was likely driven in part by the bounty system. Selective Service Act of 1917 and World War I Conscription After the Civil War, the federal government did not use conscription again until World War I (WWI). By then a new concept for a draft system termed "Selective Service" had been developed that would apportion requirements for manpower to the states and through the states to individual counties. By 1915, Europe was in all-out war; however, the United States only had a small volunteer Army of approximately 100,000 men. On April 2, 1917, President Woodrow Wilson asked Congress for a declaration of war, and on May 18, 1917, he signed an act commonly known as the Selective Service Act of 1917 into law. This new law allowed the President to draft the National Guard into federal service and made all male citizens between the ages of 21 and 31 liable for the draft. On July 15, 1917, Congress enacted a provision that all conscripted persons would be released from compulsory service within four months of a presidential proclamation of peace. In 1918, Congress extended the eligible draft age to include all males between the ages of 18 and 45. World War I was the first instance of conscription of United States citizens for overseas service. A key aspect of the Selective Service Act of 1917 was that it allowed the federal government to select individuals from a pool of registrants for federal service. Unlike the Civil War, a shortage of volunteers was not the primary concern in enacting this leg islation. The selective aspects of the WWI draft law were driven by concerns that indiscriminate volunteerism could adversely affect the domestic economy and industrial base. In support of the selective service law, Senator William M. Calder of New York said, "under a volunteer system, there is no way of preventing men from leaving industries and crippling resources that are just as important as the army itself." In contrast to the Civil War draft, the Selective Service Act of 1917 did not allow for the furnishing of substitutes or bounties for enlistment. It also provided for decentralized administration through local and district draft boards that were responsible for registering and classifying men, and calling registrants into service. The law specified that the President would appoint boards consisting of civilian members "not connected with the Military Establishment." Over 4,600 such boards were established to hear and decide on claims for exemptions. The provost marshal general, at the time Major General Enoch Crowder, oversaw the operation of these boards. The first draft lottery was held on July 20, 1917. Out of the 24.2 million that registered for the draft in WWI, 2.8 million were eventually inducted. While the law did not prohibit volunteers, the implementation of the selective service system alongside a volunteer system became too complex and the Army discontinued accepting volunteer enlistees by December 15, 1917. By 1919, at the end of the war, the provost marshal general was relieved from his duties, all registration activities were terminated, and all local and district boards were closed. In 1936, the Secretaries of War and the Navy created the Joint Army-Navy Selective Service Committee (JANSSC) to manage emergency mobilization planning. The committee was headed by Army Major Lewis B. Hershey. Between WWI and WWII, the Armed Forces shrank in numbers due to both treaty commitments and public attitudes toward a large standing force. In the interwar period, two opposing movements emerged. Some were in support of legislative provisions that would empower the President to conscript men for military service upon a declaration of war, and some called for a universal draft, universal military training, or broader authorities to conscript civilian labor in times of both war and peace. Others proposed provisions that would require a national referendum on any future use of conscription, or would forbid conscripts from serving outside the territorial borders of the United States. The Selective Training and Service Act and World War II In 1940, Europe was already at war, and despite the neutrality of the United States at the time, some in Congress argued that the United States could not continue with a peacetime force while other nations were mobilizing on a massive scale. In June of 1940, President Franklin D. Roosevelt announced that he would recommend a program of universal compulsory government service for American youth (men and women). A few days later a conscription bill, modeled on the Selective Service Act of 1917, was sponsored by Senator Edward Burke and Representative James Wadsworth in their respective chambers. The bill garnered support by senior Army leaders, who expressed concerns about the ability to recruit a sufficient number of volunteers necessary to fight a major war. Some in Congress opposed to the bill argued the following: Regimentation of American life as provided for by the Burke-Wadsworth bill in peacetime is abhorrent to the ideals of patriotic Americans and is utterly repugnant to American democracy and American traditions ... no proof or evidence was offered to indicate that the personnel needs of the Army and Navy cannot be obtained on a voluntary basis. The conscription bill became the Selective Training and Service Act, and was signed into law on September 16, 1940, by Franklin D. Roosevelt. The act was the first instance of peacetime conscription in the United States and required men between aged 21 through 35 to register with local draft boards. The law required a 12-month training period for those inducted, at which time the inductees would be transferred to a reserve component of the Armed Forces for 10 years. Criminal penalties for failing to comply with registration or other duties under this act included "imprisonment of not more than five years or a fine of not more than $10,000, or by both such fine and imprisonment." The act also gave the President the authority to establish a Selective Service System, and to appoint a Director of the Selective Service with oversight of local civilian boards. Because the image of civilian leadership was deemed important during a time of peace, in 1940 the President initially appointed Dr. Clarence Dykstra as Director of the Selective Service while also retaining his position as president of the University of Wisconsin. Due to poor health Dykstra never took up his position as Director of Selective Service. In July of 1941, the JANSSC that had been established in the interwar period became the new Selective Service headquarters and Colonel Lewis B. Hershey was appointed as the Director, a position he held until 1970, retiring with the rank of Lieutenant General. In terms of the implementation of the Selective Service System, there was an emphasis on establishing an equitable lottery system administered by decentralized local draft boards as was deemed a successful approach during WWI: The Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 is based on the principle that the obligation and privileges of military training and service should be shared generally in accordance with a fair and just system of compulsory military training and service.... The public expected that the lottery under the new law would be conducted as the lottery of 1917-1918 was conducted, and those charged with the administration of the Selective Service felt likewise. The 6,442 district boards assigned a number from 1 to 7,836 to each registrant in their district. On October 29, 1940, the first draft lottery was held in a similar manner to the WWI draft lottery and draft inductions into the Army began on November 18, 1940. The lottery system was used for three groups of registrants, then abandoned in 1942 and not used again for the draft until 1969 during the Vietnam conflict. In the interim, draftees were inducted by local boards based on required quotas, classification, age (oldest first), and order of precedence as determined by contemporary policy. Although some complaints arose over inequalities and inconsistencies in the draft administration, a Gallup poll conducted in 1941 found that 93% of those polled thought the draft had been handled fairly in their community. Volunteers were allowed to serve; however, approximately 10 million of the 16 million servicemembers who served during WWII were draftees. Consideration of Universal Compulsory Service Although the Selective Training and Service Act was set to expire in 1945, at the time of drafting, some felt that the emergency conscription program should evolve into a permanent system of universal military training. In testimony before the House Appropriations Committee on June 5, 1941, General Marshall stated I believe that Selective Service provides the only practical and economical method of maintaining the military force that we inevitably are going to be required to have in the future, and I think, with all my heart, that Selective Service is a necessity to the maintenance of a true democracy. These sentiments continued at the end of the WWII, and there was a push by some to maintain compulsory military training or another program of postwar conscription. In 1945, the congressional Committee on Postwar Military Policy held a series of open hearings on compulsory military training. Those in favor of maintaining some form of conscription argued that it would provide a deterrent to future "Hitlers and Hirohitos" as well as build the health and character of American youth. Those opposed contended that conscription was antithetical to democratic ideals, was an inefficient mechanism for building force structure, and led to war, international distrust, and profiteering. Post-World War II, the Selective Service Act of 1948 Congress extended the Selective Training and Service Act in 1945 and 1946. In 1947, Congress repealed the act and all functions and responsibilities of the Selective Service System were transferred to the Office of Selective Service Records. This office, by law, had a limited mandate for knowledge preservation, and maintenance and storage of individual records. This restructuring essentially put the Selective Service System into a deep standby mode. By 1948, the military had shrunk in size to less than 1.5 million from a peak of 12 million in 1945. Concerned about lagging recruiting efforts and the rising power of the Soviet Union, Congress authorized reinstatement of the draft in the Selective Service Act of 1948, which was signed into law by President Truman on June 24, 1948. The act was similar to previous acts authorizing the Selective Service System. It established registration requirements for males ages 19 to 26, and the same criminal penalties for fraudulent registration or evasion. It also dissolved the Office of Selective Service Records and transferred its responsibilities back to the newly established Selective Service System as an independent agency of the federal government. Under this act, the President had authority to appoint state directors of the Selective Service System. It also provided the authority to call National Guard and Reserve personnel into active duty to support the administration of state and national headquarters. Korean War and the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951 The Selective Service Act of 1948 was set to expire on June 24, 1950. Due to budget constraints and absence of an immediate threat to national security, between 1948 and 1949 conscription was only used to fill recruiting shortfalls. On June 25, 1950, war broke out between North and South Korea. Although a bill to extend the Selective Service Act of 1948 was already in conference, the Senate rushed to approve the bill on June 28 and it was signed by the President on June 30, 1950. The following year, Congress renamed the act the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951. The act extended the draft until July 1, 1955, and also lowered the registration age to 18. As the new name suggested, the law also contained a clause that would have obligated all eligible males to perform 12 months of military service and training within a National Security Training Corps if amended by future legislation (it was never amended). The act did not alter the structure or functions of the SSS; however, it did require the Director to submit an annual report to Congress on the number of persons registered, the number of persons inducted, and the number of deferments granted and the basis for them. The United States inducted approximately 1.5 million men into the military (one-quarter of the total uniformed servicemembers) under this act in support of the Korean conflict. A draft lottery was not used in this era, rather, the Department of Defense issued draft calls, and quotas were issued to local boards. The local boards would then fill their quotas with those classified as "1-A", or "eligible for military service" by precedence as determined by policy. Public concerns with the draft at this time were equitable implementation of the draft due to the broad availability of deferments for what some saw as privileged groups. Others expressed concerns about the potential disruption of citizens' lives. Between 1950 and 1964 Congress repeatedly extended the Universal Military Training and Service Act in four-year periods with minor amendments. During this time, volunteers made up approximately two-thirds of the total military force with the remainder supplemented through inductions—with some limited exceptions, the Navy, Air Force, and Marines relied on volunteers almost entirely. For example, monthly draft calls in 1959 were for approximately 9,000 men out of an eligible population of about 2.2 million. The Vietnam War and Proposals for Draft Reform In 1964, when America became involved militarily in Vietnam, conscription was again used to mobilize manpower and augment the volunteer force. Among the criticisms of the draft system during this period were that it was inequitable and discriminatory since the chance of being drafted varied by state, by local community, and by one's economic status. In the late 1960s, public acceptance of the draft began to erode for the following reasons, inter alia : Opposition to the war in Vietnam. The U.S. Army's desire for change due to discipline problems among some Vietnam draftees. Belief that the state did not have a right to impose military service on young men without consent. Belief that the draft was an unfair "tax" being imposed only on young men in their late teens and twenties. Perception of some observers that the draft placed an unfair burden on underprivileged members of society. Demographic change increasing the size of the eligible population for military service relative to the needs of the military. Estimations that an all-volunteer force could be fielded within acceptable budget levels. In response to some of these concerns and associated political pressures, President Lyndon B. Johnson issued Executive Order 11289 on July 2, 1966, establishing the National Advisory Commission on Selective Service headed by Burke Marshall. President Johnson instructed the commission to consider past, present, and prospective functioning of the Selective Service System and other systems of national service, taking into account the following factors: Fairness to all citizens, Military manpower requirements, Minimizing uncertainty and interference with individuals' careers and educations, National social, economic, and employment goals, and Budgetary and administrative considerations. The commission examined a number of potential options from requiring everyone to serve to elimination of all compulsory service. The commission's final report, In Pursuit of Equity: Who Serves When not all Serve? , was delivered to the President in February of 1967 at the time when the Selective Service law was up for renewal. The commission recommended continuing conscription but making significant changes to the Selective Service System to "assure equal treatment for those in like circumstances." Among these recommended changes were (1) adopting an impartial and random selection process and order of call, (2) consolidating the local boards under centralized administration with uniform policies for classification, deferment, and exemptions, and (3) ensuring that composition of local boards was representative of the population that they served. In parallel with the Presidential Commission's review, the House Armed Services Committee chartered their own review with a civilian advisory panel chaired by retired Army General Mark Clark. The Clark panel also recommended against shifting to an all-volunteer force but disagreed on the establishment of a lottery. In 1967, Congress extended the SSS through July 1, 1971, under the renamed Military Selective Service Act of 1967 (henceforth MSSA). While the Administration had pushed for comprehensive draft reform based on the commission's recommendations, the bill contained few of President Lyndon Johnson's proposals. In particular, the bill, as enacted, prohibited the President from establishing a random system of selection (draft lottery) without congressional approval. In 1969, President Richard M. Nixon called on Congress to provide the authority to institute the draft lottery system. In response, Congress amended the 1967 law, repealing the prohibition on the President's authority. On the same day, President Nixon signed Executive Order 11497 establishing the order of call for the draft lottery for men aged 19 through 25 at the end of calendar year 1969. While the draft remained contentious, in 1971 the induction authority under the MSSA was again extended through 1973. In response to concerns regarding the composition of local boards, the bill stated, The President is requested to appoint the membership of each local board so that to the maximum extent practicable it is proportionately representative of the race and national origin of those registrants within its district. The bill also included a significant pay raise for military members as a first step toward building an all-volunteer force (AVF). The Gates Commission Two months into President Nixon's first term, he launched the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Force, which came to be known as the Gates Commission. In its 1970 report, the commission unanimously recommended that "the nation's best interests will be better served by an all-volunteer force, supported by an effective standby draft, than by a mixed force of volunteers and conscripts." The Gates Commission also recommended maintaining a Selective Service System that would be responsible for a register of all males who might be conscripted when essential for national security, a system for selection of inductees, specific procedures for the notification, examination, and induction of those to be conscripted, an organization to maintain the register and administer the procedures for induction, and the provision that a standby draft system may be invoked only by resolution of Congress at the request of the President. The last draft calls were issued in December 1972 and the statutory authority to induct expired on June 30, 1973. On January 27, 1973, Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird announced the end of conscription. The last man to be inducted through the draft entered the Army on June 30, 1973. Table 1 shows the number of inductees and total participants for each major conflict in which the United S tates used the draft and for which data are available. More than half of the participants in WWI and nearly two-thirds of the WWII participants were draftees. About one-quarter of the participants in the Korean and Vietnam conflicts were draftees, however , it should be noted that the possibility of being drafted may have induced higher rates of volunteerism during these later conflicts. All-Volunteer Force (AVF) and a Standby SSS President Gerald Ford temporarily suspended the registration requirement through Proclamation 4360 (89 Stat. 1255) in April 1975. The MSSA was not repealed, however, and the requirement for the SSS to be ready to provide untrained manpower in a military emergency remained. This proclamation essentially put the SSS into deep standby mode. At the time there were approximately 98 full-time staff operating a pared-down field structure with a national headquarters and nine regional headquarters. In the late 1970s, some were concerned that this "standby" system did not have the resources or infrastructure to register, select, classify, and deliver the first inductees within 30 days from the start of an emergency mobilization. These concerns became even more salient when, in December 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. In his January 1980 State of the Union address, President Jimmy Carter announced his intention to resume draft registration requirements in the coming year. A Gallup Poll conducted in March 1980 found that 76% were in favor of a registration requirement for young men. Congress responded by providing $13.3 million in appropriations for the Selective Service System on June 25, 1980. President Carter signed Proclamation 4771 on July 2, 1980, reestablishing the requirement for all 18- to 25-year-old males to register for the Selective Service and setting out guidelines for registration. Penalties for failing to register were the same as those first established in the 1940 Selective Training and Service Act (a fine of up to $10,000 and/or a prison term of up to five years). However, unlike in previous draft registration regulations, there was no requirement for men to undergo evaluation and classification for fitness to serve. The new standby SSS had five key components that are still largely in place today: A registration process that is reliable and efficient. An automated data processing system that could handle pre- and postmobilization requirements. A system for promulgation and distribution of orders for induction. A claims process that can quickly insure all registrants' rights to due process are protected. A field structure that can support the claims process. Supporters of reestablishing the registration requirement for men argued that it would send a message to the Soviet Union that the United States was prepared to act to defend its interests and also that it would cut down the mobilization time in the event of a national emergency. Some argued that registration was not enough, and advocated for a return of peacetime conscription, universal military training, or compulsory national service. Organizations opposed to the reinstatement of registration requirements argued that registration forms were illegal because they required registrants to disclose their Social Security numbers. Others argued that the exemption of women in the draft law was unconstitutional. Carter's proposal to Congress included legislative language that would have given the President the authority to register women. As justification for this proposal, he stated, My decision to register women is a recognition of the reality that both women and men are working members of our society. It confirms what is already obvious throughout our society – that women are now providing all types of skills in every profession. The military should be no exception. […] There is no distinction possible, on the basis of ability or performance, that would allow me to exclude women from an obligation to register. Congress rejected the President's proposal to include women with an explanation under Title VIII of S. Rept. 96-826, [T]he starting point for any discussion of the appropriateness of registering women for the draft is the question of the proper role of women in combat. The principle that women should not intentionally and routinely engage in combat is fundamental, and enjoys wide support among our people. It is universally supported by military leaders who have testified before the committee, and forms the linchpin for any analysis of this problem. […] Current law and policy exclude women from being assigned to combat in our military forces, and the committee reaffirms this policy. The policy precluding the use of women in combat is, in the committee's view, the most important reason for not including women in a registration system. In 1981, the Supreme Court heard a challenge to the exception for women to register for Selective Service. In the Rostker v. Goldberg case, the Court held that the practice of only registering men for the draft was constitutional. In the majority opinion, Justice William Rehnquist wrote [t]he existence of the combat restrictions clearly indicates the basis for Congress' decision to exempt women from registration. The purpose of registration was to prepare for a draft of combat troops. Since women are excluded from combat, Congress concluded that they would not be needed in the event of a draft, and therefore decided not to register them. New Penalties for Registration Noncompliance The first national registration after the reinstatement of the requirement was held in 1980 through registration at local U.S. Post Offices. The registration rate for the 1980 registration was 87% within the two-week registration period and 95% through the fourth month of registrations. In 1973, the registration rates were 77% within 30 days of one's 18 th birthday as required by statute, and 90% through the fourth month. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) estimated that, of the registrations submitted, there was a final accuracy level of 98%. Despite initial successes in registration, there was a push by many in Congress and the Administration to maintain public awareness of the requirements and to maintain high compliance rates. On January 21, 1982, President Ronald Reagan authorized a grace period until February 28, 1982, allowing those who had not registered to do so. In 1982, the Department of Justice began prosecution of those men who willfully refused to register for selective service. In the June 1983 SSS semiannual report to Congress, the agency reported that it had referred 341 persons to the Department of Justice for investigation. At the time of the report, there were 11 indictments and 2 convictions. In the same year, there was a movement in Congress to tie eligibility for federal benefits to registration requirements. National Defense Authorization bills for Fiscal Year 1983 were reported to the House and Senate floor without any proposed amendments to the MSSA. However, on May 12, 1982, the bill was amended by Senators Hayakawa and Mattingly on the Senate floor to prohibit young male adults from receiving any federal student assistance under Title IV of the Higher Education Act if they cannot certify they had registered with Selective Service. The Senate passed amendment as drafted by voice vote. Representative Jerry Solom introduced a similar amendment on the House floor. In conference committee, Members added language to direct the Secretary of Education and the Director of Selective Service to jointly develop methods for certifying registration. This provision amending the MSSA was signed into law as part of the FY1983 National Defense Authorization Act with an effective date of July 1, 1983. Representative Solomon also led the effort to attach similar language to the Job Training Partnership Act of 1982, which was passed on October 13, 1982. This law prohibited those who failed to register from receiving certain federal job training assistance. Congress repealed the Job Training and Partnership Act and replaced it with the Workforce Investment Act of 1998; however, the statutory language enforcing the MSSA was maintained in the new law. In 1985, Congress added a provision to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1986 that made an individual ineligible for federal civil service appointments if he "is not registered and knowingly and willfully did not so register before the requirement terminated or became inapplicable to the individual." Congress also expressed support for the peacetime registration program as a "contribution to national security by reducing the time required for full defense mobilization," and as sending "an important signal to our allies and to our potential adversaries of the United States defense commitment." On November 6, 1986, President Reagan signed into law the Immigration Reform and Control Act. This law required males between the ages of 18 and 26 who are applying for legalization under the act to register for the Selective Service if they have not already done so. In response, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and the SSS established procedures for registering young men as part of the immigration application process. Other Legislative Proposals in the Modern Era Between 1980 and 2019, several Members of Congress proposed a number of legislative changes to the MSSA; however, none have been enacted. Typically, such proposed changes to the MSSA have included one or more of the following options: Repeal the entire MSSA. Terminate the registration requirement. Reinstate draft induction authority. Defund the Selective Service System. Require women to register for the draft. Other proposed changes would seek to modify SSS record management or registration processes. These options are discussed in more detail later in this report. National Commission on Military, National, and Public Service In the FY2017 NDAA ( P.L. 114-328 ), Congress established a National Commission on Military, National, and Public Service to help consider some of the options for the future of the MSSA. The commission is tasked not only with a review of the military selective service process, but also with proposing "methods to increase participation in military, national, and other public service, in order to address national security and other public service needs of the Nation." The statutory scope of the commission is to review (1) The need for a military selective service process, including the continuing need for a mechanism to draft large numbers of replacement combat troops; (2) means by which to foster a greater attitude and ethos of service among United States youth, including an increased propensity for military service; (3) the feasibility and advisability of modifying the military selective service process in order to obtain for military, national, and public service individuals with skills (such as medical, dental, and nursing skills, language skills, cyber skills, and science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) skills) for which the Nation has a critical need, without regard to age or sex; and (4) the feasibility and advisability of including in the military selective service process, as so modified, an eligibility or entitlement for the receipt of one or more Federal benefits (such as educational benefits, subsidized or secured student loans, grants or hiring preferences) specified by the Commission for purposes of the review. Section 552 of the FY2017 NDAA also required DOD to prepare a preliminary report on the purpose and utility of the SSS to support the commission's work, to include (1) A detailed analysis of the current benefits derived, both directly and indirectly, from the Military Selective Service System, including— (A) the extent to which mandatory registration benefits military recruiting; (B) the extent to which a national registration capability serves as a deterrent to potential enemies of the United States; and (C) the extent to which expanding registration to include women would impact these benefits. (2) An analysis of the functions currently performed by the Selective Service System that would be assumed by the Department of Defense in the absence of a national registration capability. (3) An analysis of the systems, manpower, and facilities that would be needed by the Department to physically mobilize inductees in the absence of the Selective Service System. (4) An analysis of the feasibility and utility of eliminating the current focus on mass mobilization of primarily combat troops in favor of a system that focuses on mobilization of all military occupational specialties, and the extent to which such a change would impact the need for both male and female inductees. (5) A detailed analysis of the Department's personnel needs in the event of an emergency requiring mass mobilization, including— (A) a detailed timeline, along with the factors considered in arriving at this timeline, of when the Department would require— (i) the first inductees to report for service; (ii) the first 100,000 inductees to report for service; and (iii) the first medical personnel to report for service; and (B) an analysis of any additional critical skills that would be needed in the event of a national emergency, and a timeline for when the Department would require the first inductees to report for service. (6) A list of the assumptions used by the Department when conducting its analysis in preparing the report. DOD submitted its congressionally mandated report in July 2017. The report noted that the department "currently has no operational plans that envision mobilization at a level that would require conscription." Nevertheless, it acknowledges that, "the readiness of the underlying systems, infrastructure, and processes to effect [a draft] – serve as a quiet but important hedge against an unknowable future." The GAO's report, released in January 2018, noted that DOD's requirements and timeline for mobilization of forces remain unchanged since 1994, despite changes to force structure, capability needs, national security environment, and strategic objectives. In particular, the report authors stated the following: DOD provided the personnel requirements and a timeline that was developed in 1994 and that have not been updated since. These requirements state that, in the event of a draft, the first inductees are to report to a Military Entrance Processing Station in 193 days and the first 100,000 inductees would report for service in 210 days. DOD's report states that the all-volunteer force is of adequate size and composition to meet DOD's personnel needs and it has no operational plans that envision mobilization at a level that would require a draft. Officials stated that the personnel requirements and timeline developed in 1994 are still considered realistic. Thus, they did not conduct any additional analysis to update the plans, personnel requirements, or timelines for responding to an emergency requiring mass mobilization. The authors stated that the GAO's 2012 recommendation that DOD "establish a process of periodically reevaluating DOD's requirements for the Selective Service System in light of changing operating environments, threats, and strategic guidance" remains valid. The National Commission on Military, National and Public Service released an interim report on their research findings on January 23, 2019. The report summarizes preliminary findings. With respect to the SSS, the commission is considering options that could expand the registration requirement to include women; identify individuals who possess critical skills the nation might need; call for volunteers during times of emergency using the existing system; and, incorporate reasonable changes to identify, evaluate, and protect those who object to military service, but are otherwise willing to serve. The commission is scheduled to continue its work through March 2020. Selective Service Registration Today, nearly all males residing in the United States—U.S. citizens and documented or undocumented immigrant men—are required to register with the Selective Service if they are at least 18 years old and are not yet 26 years old. Those who are required to register must do so within 30 days of their 18 th birthday unless exemptions apply as listed in Table 2 . Men born from March 29, 1957, to December 31, 1959, were never required to register because the registration program was not in effect at the time they turned 18. Individuals are not allowed to register beyond their 26 th birthday. Women are currently not required to register for the Selective Service. Federal regulations state, " No person who is not required by selective service law or the Proclamation of the President to register shall be registered." All of those required to register would be considered "available for service" in the case of an emergency mobilization unless they were reclassified by the SSS. Processes for Registration Almost all Selective Service registrations are completed electronically; however, registration can also be done at U.S. Post Offices and by submission of paper registrations. Most states, four territories, and the District of Columbia (D.C.) have driver's license legislation that provides for automatic Selective Service registration when obtaining a driver's license, driver's permit, or other form of identification from the Department of Motor Vehicles. In FY2017, 42% of all registrations, representing nearly 1 million young men, were conducted electronically through driver's license legislation (see Figure 1 ). The SSS also has interagency agreements for registration. In cooperation with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, immigrant men ages 18 through 25 who are accepted for permanent U.S. residence are registered automatically. In addition, men of registration age who apply for an immigrant visa through the Department of State are also registered. The application form for federal student aid includes a "register me" checkbox for those who have not yet registered for the Selective Service, which authorizes the SSS to automatically register those individuals. The SSS reports that approximately 25% of their electronic registrant data come from the Department of Education as part of the student aid application process. The SSS also has existing data-sharing relationships with the DOD and the Department of Labor. In FY2017, the SSS reported a 73% compliance rate for the 18-year-old year of birth (YOB) group. Registration compliance rate for the 20 through 25 YOB group was 92% in calendar year 2016, a decrease of 2% from the previous year, but above the SSS goal of 90%. Reasons for noncompliance may include lack of awareness of requirements, or purposeful avoidance. Knowingly failing to register comes with certain penalties including the following: If indicted, imprisonment of not more than five years and/or fine of not more than $10,000 (increased to $250,000 in 1987 by 18 U.S.C. §3571(b)(3)). Ineligibility for federal student aid. Ineligibility for appointment to a position in an executive agency. Ineligibility for federal job training benefits. Potential ineligibility for citizenship (for certain immigrants to the United States). Possible inability to obtain a security clearance. In addition, a large number of state legislatures as well as county and city jurisdictions have conditioned eligibility for certain government programs and benefits on SSS registration. Failing to register for the Selective Service, or knowingly counseling, aiding, or abetting another to fail to comply with the MSSA, is considered a felony. Those who fail to register may have their names forwarded to the Department of Justice (DOJ). In FY2017, 184,051 names and addresses of suspected violators were provided to DOJ. In practice, there have been no criminal prosecutions for failing to register since January 1986. At that time the SSS reported a total of 20 indictments with 14 convictions. Other penalties adversely affect the population required to register. For example, California estimated that between 2007 and 2014, young men in that state who failed to register were denied access to more than $99 million in federal and state financial aid and job training benefits. There is some relief from penalties for those who fail to register. The MSSA establishes a statute of limitations on criminal prosecutions for evading registration to five years after a fraudulent registration or failure to register, whichever is first. Also, individuals may not be denied federal benefits for failing to register if the requirement to register has terminated or become inapplicable to the person; and the person shows by a preponderance of the evidence that the failure of the person to register was not a knowing and willful failure to register. Individuals who unknowingly fail to register may ask for reconsideration from the official handling their case and may be required to submit evidence that they were unaware of their requirement to register. Selective Service System The Selective Service System is an independent federal agency within the executive branch with headquarters located in Arlington, VA. The agency is currently maintained as an active standby organization. The statutory missions of the SSS are to maintain a complete registration and classification structure capable of immediate operation in the event of a national emergency (including a structure for registration and classification of persons qualified for practice or employment in a health care occupation essential to the maintenance of the Armed Forces), and personnel adequate to reinstitute immediately the full operation of the System, including military reservists who are trained to operate such System and who can be ordered to active duty for such purpose in the event of a national emergency. If the SSS were activated with the authority to induct individuals, the agency would be responsible for (1) holding a national draft lottery, (2) contacting registrants who are selected via the lottery, (3) arranging transportation for selectees to Military Entrance Processing Stations (MEPS) for testing and evaluation of fitness to serve, and (4) activating a classification structure that would include area offices, local offices, and appeal boards. Local boards would also evaluate claims for exemption, postponement, or deferments. Those classified as conscientious objectors would be required to serve in a noncombatant or nonmilitary capacity. For those permitted to serve in a nonmilitary capacity, the SSS would be responsible for placing these "alternative service workers" with alternate employers and tracking completion of 24 months of their required service. Workforce and Organization The agency's workforce is comprised of full-time career employees, part-time military and civilian personnel, and approximately 11,000 part-time civilian volunteers. In FY2017, the agency had 124 full-time equivalent civilian positions for administration and operations across agency headquarters, the Data Management Center, and three regional headquarters offices. Part-time employees include 56 State Directors representing the 50 states, four territories, the District of Columbia, and New York City. The median GS grade for the agency is GS-11. The SSS maintains a list of unpaid volunteers who serve as local, district, and national appeal board members who could be activated to help decide the classification status of men seeking exemptions or deferments in the case of a draft. The Selective Service System also has positions for 175 part-time Reserve Forces Officers (RFOs) representing all branches of the Armed Forces. RFO duties include interviewing Selective Service board member candidates, training board members, participating in readiness exercises, supporting the registration public awareness effort, and maintaining space, equipment, and supplies. Funding Congress appropriates funds for the SSS through the Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act. For FY2018, Congress appropriated $22.9 million, the same as the FY2017 appropriation. The budget request for FY2019 was $26.4 million, an increase of $3.5 million over the FY2018 appropriation. Funding decreased by 10% from FY2012 to FY2013, from just under $25 million to $22 million in FY2013. Since FY2013, funding has remained fairly stable in terms of current dollars, but has decreased in terms of inflation-adjusted (real) dollars. In current dollars, funding for the SSS has been about $25 million since 1980, when the requirement to register was reinstated. In FY1977-FY1979, while the SSS was in "deep standby" mode, funding for the agency was between $6 million and $8 million. About two-thirds of the agency's annual budget goes to personnel compensation and benefits, 11% of which is Reserve Force Officer training pay and allowances. Government and commercial agency contracts and services accounted for 11% ($42.4 million) of total spending. The SSS allocated approximately $1.4 million to postage and express courier services in FY2017, and spent nearly $2 million on software and data processing systems (see Figure 2 ). Data-Sharing and Data Management The agency maintains data for registrants until their 85 th birthday at the Data Management Center in Palatine, IL; the center is authorized 48 full-time employees. The purpose of retaining the data for this length of time is to enable SSS to verify eligibility for registered males who apply for certain government employment or benefits. The number of records in the database is approximately 78 million. According to the SSS, this database grows by 2 million to 2.5 million records per year. The information held in this database includes registrants' full name, date of birth, street address, city, state, zip code, and Social Security number. The SSS also maintains a "Suspected Violator Inventory System," which includes data on nonregistrants that the SSS has received through data-sharing agreements. The SSS uses information on this list to reach out to individuals and remind them of their obligation to register. Most of the registration and data-sharing is automated. The SSS both provides data to and receives data from other government agencies, including the Department of Labor, the Department of Education, the Department of State, the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, the Department of Defense, and the Alaska Permanent Fund. Information received from these agencies by the SSS is matched with existing data and if no record exists, one is created. On a monthly basis, SSS provides the Joint Advertising and Market Research Studies (JAMRS, part of DOD) new registrant names, addresses, and date of birth, and a file of individuals identified as deceased. These data are kept for three years by JAMRS and are used by DOD for recruiting purposes. Yearly, SSS provides the names, addresses, and Social Security numbers of individuals ages 18 through 25 to the U.S. Census Bureau for its intercensus estimate program. The Census Bureau keeps these data for two years. Annually, the SSS also sends the Department of Justice a list of individuals who are required to register, but have failed to do so. Men are required to update the Selective Service within 10 days when their address changes until January 1 of the year that they turn 26 years old. Those who register at 18 years old are likely to move at least once, if not a number of times, before their 26 th birthday. For example, a college-bound 18-year-old may move away from their parents' home to university housing, then into an off-campus apartment, and into a new home after graduation. The SSS updates addresses in its database using information from other agencies and self-reported information from individuals. What are Some Options for the Future of the Selective Service System? Although Congress has amended the MSSA a number of times, some of its main tenets—the preservation of a peacetime selective service agency and a registration requirement—have remained much the same since the mid-20 th century. The future of the Selective Service System is a concern for many in Congress. The registration requirements and associated penalties affect young men in every congressional district. At the same time, some see the preservation of the SSS as an important component of national security and emergency preparedness. Others have suggested that the MSSA is no longer necessary and should be repealed. Still others have suggested amendments to the MSSA to address issues of equity, efficiency, and cost. Arguments For and Against Repeal of MSSA Some form of selective service legislation has been in effect almost continuously since 1940. Repealing the MSSA and associated statute would dismantle the SSS agency infrastructure and would remove the registration requirement with its associated penalties. Efforts to repeal the Selective Service Act have been repeatedly introduced in Congress, and repeal is popular among many advocacy groups and defense scholars. Those who would like to disband the SSS question whether the agency is still necessary in the modern-day context. A return to the draft is unpopular with a majority of the American public. Some argue that there is a low likelihood of the draft ever being reinstated. Even in the face of nearly a decade of conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan, DOD has maintained its ability to recruit and retain a professional volunteer force without resorting to conscription. The nature of warfare has shifted in such a way that the United States would not likely need to mobilize manpower at the rates seen in the 20 th century. Even if such high mobilization rates were needed, some question whether the Armed Forces would have the capacity and infrastructure to rapidly absorb the large numbers of untrained personnel that a draft would provide. DOD has reported that the Military Entry Processing Command (MEPCOM) can process approximately 18,000 registrants per day. These new accessions would then be sent to training centers/duty stations as identified by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Some analysts have suggested that a draft, if implemented, would be an inefficient use of labor, as it would "indiscriminately compel employment in the military regardless of an individual's skills where that individual could have much greater value to our society elsewhere." In addition, when conscription has been used, it has generally provided a lower-quality force in comparison with today's all-volunteer force. Others, including civil rights advocacy groups, contend that the registration requirement and conscription are an invasion of civil liberty. Those who advocate for suspension of all SSS activity contend that the SSS infrastructure and registrant databases could be reconstructed in due time if the need arose. In the short term, additional manpower needs might be augmented by Delayed Entry Program (DEP) participants, nonprior reservists awaiting training, and other inactive reserve manpower. A reauthorization of the draft might also encourage volunteerism, as choosing a branch of service and occupational specialty might be more preferable to the possibility of being drafted into a less favorable branch and occupation. Proponents of maintaining the SSS and registration requirement often cite a few key arguments. First, at approximately $23 million per year, it provides a relatively low-cost "insurance policy" against potential future threats that may require national mobilization beyond what could be supported by the all-volunteer force. Second, adversaries of the United States could see the disbanding of the SSS as a potential weakness, thus emboldening existing or potential enemies. Third, the registration requirement is important to maintain connections between the all-volunteer force and civil society by creating an awareness of the military and duty to serve among the nation's youth. Finally, maintaining an all-volunteer force is costly, particularly in times of conflict. Sustaining the AVF over the past decade has stretched DOD's resources. If the United States were to become involved in a sustained large-scale conflict, the compensation and benefits required to incentivize voluntary military participation by a larger segment of the population could be substantial. Options for Amending MSSA Some of the options for amending the MSSA include the following: Repealing the registration requirement. Dissolving the SSS agency and transferring certain functions to an existing federal agency. Removing or modifying penalties for failure to register. Requiring women to register. Enhancing SSS data collection. Repealing the Peacetime Registration Requirement Congress could repeal the registration requirement and terminate the existing penalties for failing to register. Removing the registration requirement and the need to verify registration would reduce the activities of the SSS. In this instance, the agency's functions would likely be limited to historical record preservation and maintenance of standby plans and volunteer rolls. Some have proposed that if registrant data were needed for a future draft, they might be acquired through existing federal or state government databases. The current SSS database relies heavily on information collected by other federal and state entities for initial inputs, updates, and verification of registrants' address information. However, this data sharing is enabled by existing statutes and agency agreements that if repealed or allowed to lapse might require time and effort to reconstitute. The use of existing government or even commercial databases to develop a list of draft-eligible youth also raises concerns about a fair and equitable draft, as these lists might also exclude some draft-eligible individuals. In the case of a national emergency, Congress could enact a new statutory requirement for draft registration, and reconstitute the SSS (if it had been dissolved). A 1997 GAO study found that the time needed to raise the necessary infrastructure might be insufficient to respond to urgent DOD requirements. There may be other challenges in enforcing a new registration requirement in a time of national need. Currently, compliance rates for registration are relatively high, but the probability of implementing a draft is considered to be very low. If the government tried to reintroduce a registration requirement during a time when conscription were more likely, compliance rates could fall and it might be more difficult to build up a database of eligible individuals. On the other hand, some point to the SSS experience in 1980, when the the SSS reported 95% compliance rates within four months of reinstatement of the registration requirement. Transferring SSS Functions to an Existing Federal Agency Current law states, "the Selective Service System should remain administratively independent of any other agency, including the Department of Defense." Nevertheless, Congress could amend the MSSA to transfer its functions to an existing federal agency. Such a transfer might take into account not only the SSS's value as a unique data center, but also the staff who comprise the agency at many levels, who would be needed in case of an actual draft. As described previously, this staffing includes regional directors and a pool of civilian volunteers that would serve on local draft boards. This responsibility for maintaining volunteer rolls and training could also be transferred to an existing federal agency, potentially the Department of Defense, and the capability could be augmented with military reserve manpower (as is currently done). The statutory independence of the SSS with respect to DOD and the presence of local civilian boards have historically been viewed as important to the public's perception of a fair and equitable draft. To address this concern, some have proposed that administrative responsibilities could be transferred to DOD while the draft is inactive with the option of transferring all functions back to an independent agency if draft authority were reinstated. Another option might be to transfer the agency and/or its functions to the Department of Homeland Security. There are potential synergies between the SSS and other DHS agencies that would play an active role in a time of national emergency. At least one agency under DHS (the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service) already has a role in data sharing with the SSS. Some suggest that suspension or transfer of SSS operations could deliver some federal budget savings. In 2012, as mandated by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, the GAO compared the potential costs and savings of operating in a "deep standby" mode versus active registration. According to the report, the SSS estimated that operating in a deep standby mode would provide approximately $5 million in savings in the first year with recurring savings of $6.6 million annually. This would be a reduction of about 25% of the current budget. The transfer of SSS functions to an existing agency might have some initial implementation costs but could potentially reduce some of the overhead costs of maintaining an independent agency. Amending or Repealing the Penalties for Failing to Register Finally, some argue that Congress should amend the MSSA and associated statute to remove penalties for failing to register, particularly since only men are subject to the requirements. They argue that ineligibility for federal benefits is most harmful to those with fewer financial resources who also might be least aware of their obligation to register. Nevertheless, weakening or removing penalties could affect registration compliance rates. Alternatively, Congress could amend the penalties to limit the amount of time that one is ineligible for federal benefits following failure to register. For example, under current law, the statute of limitations for criminal penalties is five years following the individual's 26 th birthday or fraudulent registration. The MSSA could be amended to sunset ineligibility after a certain time period, or to reinstate eligibility for federal benefits through some other form of public service. Changing Registration Requirements to Include Women Women in the United States have never been required to register for the draft; however, recent DOD policy changes that have opened all military occupational specialties (MOSs) including ground combat positions to women have called into question the Selective Service exemption for women. Although the Trump Administration has not announced a formal position, in 2016, several senior DOD leaders made personal statements in favor of registering women for the draft. Some military leaders have argued that in the case of national need, it would be unwise to exclude 50% of the population from draft eligibility. In a February 2019 decision, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted a summary judgement declaring the male-only registration requirement was unconstitutional; however, the court did not grant injunctive relief blocking the government's current male-only registration policy because the plaintiffs' summary judgment motion seeking declaratory relief failed to request it. As such, the male-only registration policy remains in place. The plaintiffs in this case, the National Coalition for Men and two men of registration age, argue that requiring only men to register constitutes sex discrimination in violation of the Fifth Amendment's equal protection clause. Some women have also pushed for female registration, arguing that women cannot be equal in society as long as they are barred from full participation in all levels of the national security system and thus should be allowed to register for Selective Service. Others believe that equal access to combat jobs should oblige women to take equal responsibility for registering for Selective Service and potential assignments to combat roles should the draft be reinstated. Still others suggest that women should be obliged to enroll in the selective service system but should not be forced into combat roles in the occasion of a draft. Any exemptions for women would raise fairness concerns for men, who would not have the same opportunities to opt out of combat assignments. Making the choice not to serve in combat available to both men and women might make it difficult for the services to function, especially in the event of war or national emergency. Those who are opposed to a requirement for women to register suggest that it is not fair and equitable for women to be placed in the same roles as men. They argue that the average woman does not have the same physical capabilities as the average man and thus would have higher rates of injury and a lower probability of survival if forced to serve in direct ground combat roles. Some have countered that the physical standards for assignment to these roles are unlikely to be lowered on the instance of draft mobilization, ensuring that the cadre of men and women would be assigned to those roles at rates proportional to their ability to meet those standards. This approach would prevent both women and men who were unable to meet physical standards for direct ground combat occupations from those assignments. Moreover, opponents of drafting women point out that it would be militarily inefficient to draft thousands of women when only a small percentage would be physically qualified to serve in direct ground combat roles. At the same time, future wars may have requirements for other skills in noncombat fields where the percentage of individuals qualified would not be as variable by gender. A requirement for young women to register may have some benefits for DOD in terms of military recruiting. The address data collected by the Selective Service System and shared with DOD currently enhances recruiters' ability to identify potential enlistees and distribute marketing materials to registered young men by mail. DOD estimates that marketing materials included with SSS registration confirmation mailing—or joint leads—generate between 75,000-80,000 male recruiting prospects annually. DOD, through JAMRS, purchases similar databases for information about enlistment-eligible women. Although most registrations are now completed automatically through other interactions with the federal or state government, some contend that the very act of registering would make young women more aware of their citizenship duties, thus broadening the percentage of qualified women considering a career in the military. From certain theological or moral perspectives, some say that it is wrong for women to serve in combat roles, and since a draft would most likely be used to fill positions for combat operations, women should be exempt from registering. These arguments resonate with a segment of the U.S. population, and polling data suggest that if women were required to register for the draft, it would significantly increase public opposition to reinstating the draft and could affect public support for engaging in any conflict that has the potential to escalate beyond the capability of the all-volunteer force. Including women in the registration process may require some additional budget resources for the SSS due to increased administrative processing and public awareness needs. Currently there are about 11 million women ages 18-26 who would be eligible to register under the statutory age requirement. In January of 2016, the SSS reported to the White House Office of Management and Budget that it would need about $8.5 million more for the first year of registering women and slightly less in the following several years. Enhanced SSS Data Collection As previously discussed, some have suggested that the future threats that the United States may face may require rapid mobilization of those with specialized skills and experience (e.g., engineers, coders, truck drivers). Congress could expand the current SSS registration system to collect data on degrees, licenses, or other certifications. It could also be extended to include these types of experts outside of the 18- to 26-year-old age range. For example, Norway operates a peacetime conscription registration system in this fashion. All Norwegian citizens in a conscription cohort (men and women, age 17) are required to fill out an online questionnaire that helps to determine their relevant skills, eligibility for, and interest in military service. Based on the results of this questionnaire, the armed forces calls in about 22,000 individuals to "Session Part 2" to determine fitness for service through physical and psychological tests. Selection boards choose individuals for a mandatory 12-month service obligation based on the armed forces' needs for various skills. DOD has also pointed to the Health Care Professional Delivery System (HCPDS), currently a congressionally mandated standby plan , as a potential model for a registration/draft system by specialty. The HCPDS, if activated, would require registration of all health care workers between the ages of 20 and 45. DOD's 2017 report to Congress considered what a "mobilization by military occupational specialty (MOS)" might require. The benefit of establishing an enhanced registration system would be to allow rapid acquisition of personnel with necessary expertise through a targeted draft. This type of data collection could also support targeted recruiting. Should a draft ever be reinstated, available information on individual qualifications could also shorten the timeline needed to train personnel in certain specialties and could support more efficient alternative service matching with employers for those who are conscientious objectors. The challenges with pursuing this option for the SSS would be increased administration costs to maintain, update, and enforce reporting for such a database. In addition, some may oppose such a proposal due to privacy or civil liberty concerns.

The Military Selective Service Act (MSSA), first enacted as the Selective Service Act of 1948, provides the statutory authority for the federal government to maintain a Selective Service System (SSS) as an independent federal agency responsible for delivering appropriately qualified civilian men for induction into the Armed Forces of the United States as authorized by Congress. The annual budget for the agency is just under $23 million. One of the SSS's main functions is to maintain a database of registrants in case of a draft. The agency stores approximately 78 million records in order to verify registration status and eligibility for certain benefits that require certification of registration for eligibility. The SSS has a staff of about 124 full-time employees, complemented by a corps of volunteers and military reservists. The MSSA requires most males between the ages of 18 and 26 who are citizens or residents of the United States to register with Selective Service. Women in the United States have never been required to register for the draft. Men who fail to register may be subject to criminal penalties, loss of eligibility for certain federal or state employment opportunities and education benefits, and denial of security clearances. Documented or undocumented immigrants who fail to register may not be able to obtain United States citizenship. Registration compliance rates were 92% in calendar year 2016. While individuals may still register at U.S. post offices, the SSS attributes high compliance rates to a system of automatic electronic registration supported by state legislation and interagency cooperation. The MSSA does not currently authorize the use of a draft for induction into the Armed Forces. When the draft has been implemented, it has met some public resistance. Such resistance to the draft drives much of the opposition toward maintaining the SSS and the registration requirement. Even some who are not opposed to the government's use of conscription in a time of national need are opposed to maintaining the current SSS agency infrastructure. They argue that a stand-alone agency is unnecessary and expensive and that there are a number of alternatives that could more effectively and efficiently enable the country to reestablish conscription, if necessary. Others counter that, at the cost of $23 million annually, maintaining the SSS is a relatively inexpensive insurance policy should the draft need to be quickly reinstated. They also argue that maintaining the SSS sends a signal to potential adversaries that the United States is willing to draw on its full national resources for armed conflict if necessary. Some are concerned that the registration requirements are inequitable, arguing that it is unfair to men that women can voluntarily serve in all military occupations but are exempt from the registration requirement and the prospect of being drafted. In addition, some have raised concerns about the statutory penalties for failing to register and whether these penalties are more likely to be levied on vulnerable groups. Some contend that Congress should amend MSSA and associated statute to remove penalties for failing to register. Others argue that weakening or removing penalties would cause registration compliance rates to fall to unacceptably low levels. In response to these issues, Congress has established a National Commission on Military, National, and Public Service to provide research support and recommendations on the future of the SSS.

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Introduction This report provides background information and potential oversight issues for Congress on the Columbia-class program, a program to design and build a class of 12 new ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) to replace the Navy's current force of 14 aging Ohio-class SSBNs. The Navy has identified the Columbia-class program as the Navy's top priority program. The Navy wants to procure the first Columbia-class boat in FY2021. The Navy's proposed FY2020 budget requests $1,698.9 million in advance procurement (AP) funding and $533.1 million in research and development funding for the program. The program poses a number of funding and oversight issues for Congress. Decisions that Congress makes on the Columbia-class program could substantially affect U.S. military capabilities and funding requirements, and the U.S. shipbuilding industrial base. For an overview of the strategic and budgetary context in which the Columbia-class program and other Navy shipbuilding programs may be considered, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress , by Ronald O'Rourke. This report focuses on the Columbia-class program as a Navy shipbuilding program. Another CRS report—CRS Report RL33640, U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues , by Amy F. Woolf—discusses the Columbia class as an element of future U.S. strategic nuclear forces in the context of strategic nuclear arms control agreements. Background U.S. Navy SSBNs in General Mission of SSBNs The U.S. Navy operates three kinds of submarines—nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs), nuclear-powered cruise missile submarines (SSGNs), and nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). The SSNs and SSGNs are multi-mission ships that perform a variety of peacetime and wartime missions. They do not carry nuclear weapons. The SSBNs, in contrast, perform a specialized mission of strategic nuclear deterrence. To perform this mission, SSBNs are armed with submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), which are large, long-range missiles armed with multiple nuclear warheads. SSBNs launch their SLBMs from large-diameter vertical launch tubes located in the middle section of the boat. The SSBNs' basic mission is to remain hidden at sea with their SLBMs, so as to deter a nuclear attack on the United States by another country by demonstrating to other countries that the United States has an assured second-strike capability, meaning a survivable system for carrying out a retaliatory nuclear attack. Navy SSBNs, which are sometimes referred to informally as "boomers," form one leg of the U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent force, or "triad," which also includes land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and land-based long-range bombers. At any given moment, some of the Navy's SSBNs are conducting nuclear deterrent patrols. The Department of Defense's (DOD's) report on the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), released on February 2, 2018, states the following: Ballistic missile submarines are the most survivable leg of the triad. When on patrol, SSBNs are, at present, virtually undetectable, and there are no known, near-term credible threats to the survivability of the SSBN force. Nevertheless, we will continue to hedge against the possibility that advances in anti-submarine warfare could make the SSBN force less survivable in the future. Current Ohio-Class SSBNs The Navy currently operates 14 Ohio (SSBN-726) class SSBNs (see Figure 1 ). The boats are commonly called Trident SSBNs or simply Tridents because they carry Trident D-5 SLBMs. They were procured in FY1977-FY1991 and entered service in 1984-1997. They were designed and built by General Dynamics' Electric Boat Division (GD/EB) of Groton, CT, and Quonset Point, RI. They were originally designed for 30-year service lives but were later certified for 42-year service lives, consisting of two approximately 19-year periods of operation separated by an approximately 4-year midlife nuclear refueling overhaul, called an engineered refueling overhaul (ERO). The nuclear refueling overhaul includes both a nuclear refueling and overhaul work on the ship that is not related to the nuclear refueling. The boats were originally designed to each carry 24 SLBMs. As part of DOD's plan for complying with U.S.-Russia strategic nuclear arms control limits, four SLBM launch tubes on each boat have been deactivated, reducing to 20 the number of SLBMs they can each carry. Eight of the 14 Ohio-class SSBNs are homeported at Bangor, WA, in Puget Sound; the other six are homeported at Kings Bay, GA, close to the Florida border. Unlike most Navy ships, which are operated by single crews, Navy SSBNs are operated by alternating crews (called the Blue and Gold crews) so as to maximize the percentage of time that they spend at sea in deployed status. The first of the 14 Ohio-class SSBNs (SSBN-730) will reach the end of its 42-year service life in 2027. The remaining 13 will reach the ends of their service lives at a rate of roughly one ship per year thereafter, with the 14 th reaching the end of its service life in 2040. The Navy has initiated a program to refurbish and extend the service lives of D-5 SLBMs to about 2040. As Columbia-class SSBNs begin to replace Ohio-class boats in 2031, refurbished D-5s carried by retiring Ohio-class boats will be transferred to new Columbia-class boats. Columbia-class boats will continue to be armed with these refurbished D-5s until about 2040, at which time the D-5s are to be replaced by a successor SLBM. Including the Ohio class, the Navy has operated four classes of SSBNs since 1959. For a table summarizing these four classes, see Appendix A . U.S.-UK Cooperation on SLBMs and the New UK SSBN As one expression of U.S.-UK cooperation on nuclear weapon matters that dates back to World War II, the UK's four Vanguard-class SSBNs, which entered service in 1993-1999, each carry 16 Trident II D-5 SLBMs, and previous classes of UK SSBNs similarly carried earlier-generation U.S. SLBMs. The UK plans to replace the four Vanguard-class boats with three or four Dreadnought-class next-generation SSBNs. Dreadnought-class boats are to be equipped with 12 missile launch tubes, but current UK plans call for each boat to carry eight D-5 SLBMs, with the other four tubes not being used for SLBMs. The United States is providing technical assistance to the United Kingdom for the Dreadnought-class program, as it has over the years for some other UK submarine programs; for additional discussion, see Appendix B . Submarine Construction Industrial Base U.S. Navy submarines are built at two shipyards—General Dynamics' Electric Boat Division (GD/EB) of Groton, CT, and Quonset Point, RI, and Huntington Ingalls Industries' Newport News Shipbuilding (HII/NNS), of Newport News, VA. GD/EB and HII/NNS are the only two shipyards in the country capable of building nuclear-powered ships. GD/EB builds submarines only, while HII/NNS also builds nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and is capable of building other types of surface ships. The two yards currently are jointly building Virginia-class attack submarines. In addition to GD/EB and HII/NNS, the submarine construction industrial base includes hundreds of supplier firms, as well as laboratories and research facilities, in numerous states. Much of the total material procured from supplier firms for the construction of submarines comes from sole-source suppliers. For nuclear-propulsion component suppliers, an additional source of stabilizing work is the Navy's nuclear-powered aircraft carrier construction program. Much of the design and engineering portion of the submarine construction industrial base is resident at GD/EB. Smaller portions are resident at HII/NNS and some of the component makers. Columbia-Class Program Navy's Top Priority Program Navy officials have stated consistently since September 2013 that the Columbia-class program is the Navy's top priority program, and that this means, among other things, that from the Navy's perspective, the Columbia-class program will be funded, even if that comes at the expense of funding for other Navy programs. Program Name Until 2016, the Columbia-class program was known as the Ohio replacement program (ORP) or SSBN(X) program, and boats in the class were referred to as Ohio replacement boats or SSBNXs. Program Origin and Milestones For information on the Columbia-class program's origin and milestones, see Appendix C . Planned Procurement Quantity and Schedule Planned Procurement Quantity Navy plans call for procuring 12 Columbia-class boats to replace the current force of 14 Ohio-class SSBNs. In explaining the planned procurement quantity of 12 boats, the Navy states the following: Ten operational SSBNs—meaning boats not encumbered by lengthy maintenance actions—are needed to meet strategic nuclear deterrence requirements for having a certain number of SSBNs at sea at any given moment. A total of 14 Ohio-class boats was needed to meet the requirement for 10 operational boats because, during the middle years of the Ohio class life cycle, three and sometimes four of the boats were nonoperational at any given moment on account of being in the midst of lengthy midlife nuclear refueling overhauls or other extended maintenance actions. A total of 12 (rather than 14) Columbia-class boats will be needed to meet the requirement for 10 operational boats because the midlife overhauls of Columbia-class boats, which will not include a nuclear refueling, will require less time (about two years) than the midlife refueling overhauls of Ohio-class boats (which require about four years from contract award to delivery), the result being that only two Columbia-class boats (rather than three or sometimes four) will be in the midst of midlife overhauls or other extended maintenance actions at any given moment during the middle years of the Columbia-class life cycle. The Trump Administration's Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), released in February 2018, states the following: "The COLUMBIA-class program will deliver a minimum of 12 SSBNs to replace the current OHIO fleet and is designed to provide required capabilities for decades." The use of the word "minimum" in that sentence can be viewed as signaling a possibility that the required number of Columbia-class boats might at some point be increased to something more than 12 boats. Planned Procurement Schedule The Navy wants to procure the first Columbia-class boat in FY2021, the second in FY2024, and the remaining 10 at a rate of one per year from FY2026 through FY2035. Under this schedule, the Navy projects that the lead boat (i.e., first boat) would be delivered in FY2028, the second in FY2031, and the remaining 10 at a rate of one per year from FY2033 through FY2042. After being delivered in FY2028, the lead boat would undergo substantial testing, with the aim of having it be ready for its first deterrent patrol in 2031. Under this schedule, and given planned retirement dates for Ohio-class boats, the Navy projects that the SSBN force would decline to 13 boats in FY2027-FY2028, 12 boats in FY2029, 11 boats in FY2030-FY2036 and 10 boats in FY2037-FY2040, and then increase back to 11 boats in FY2041 and 12 boats in FY2042. The Navy states that the reduction to 11 or 10 boats during the period FY2030-FY2041 is acceptable in terms of meeting strategic nuclear deterrence requirements, because during these years, all 11 or 10 of the SSBNs in service will be operational (i.e., none of them will be in the midst of a lengthy midlife overhaul). The Navy acknowledges that there is some risk in having the SSBN force drop to 11 or 10 boats, because it provides little margin for absorbing an unforeseen event that might force an SSBN into an unscheduled and lengthy maintenance action. The projected minimum level of 11 or 10 boats can be increased to 12 or 11 boats (providing some additional margin for absorbing an unforeseen event that might force an SSBN into an unscheduled and lengthy maintenance action) by accelerating by about one year the planned procurement dates of boats 2 through 12 in the program. Under this option, the second boat in the program would be procured in FY2023 rather than FY2024, the third boat in the program would be procured in FY2025 rather than FY2026, and so on. Implementing this option could affect the Navy's plan for funding the procurement of other Navy shipbuilding programs during the period FY2022-FY2025. Columbia Class Design The Columbia-class design (see Figure 2 ) includes 16 SLBM tubes, as opposed to 24 SLBM tubes (of which 20 are now used for SLBMs) on Ohio-class SSBNs. Although the Columbia-class design has fewer SLBM tubes than the Ohio-class design, it is larger than the Ohio-class design in terms of submerged displacement. The Columbia-class design, like the Ohio-class design before it, will be the largest submarine ever built by the United States. For additional background information on the Columbia-class design, see Appendix D . Current U.S. and UK plans call for the Columbia class and the UK's Dreadnought-class SSBN to use a missile compartment—the middle section of the boat with the SLBM launch tubes—of the same general design. As mentioned earlier, Dreadnought-class SSBNs are to each be armed with eight D-5 SLBMs, or half the number to be carried by the Columbia class. The modular design of the CMC will accommodate this difference. The UK provided some of the funding for the design of the CMC, including a large portion of the initial funding. Program Cost Acquisition Cost Estimates of the procurement cost or acquisition cost (i.e., the research and development cost plus procurement cost) of the Columbia-class program include the following: The Navy's FY2020 budget submission estimates the total procurement cost of the 12-ship class at $109.0 billion in then-year dollars. The Navy in August 2017 estimated the total procurement cost of the Columbia-class program at $109.2 billion in then-year dollars and the program's research and development cost at $13.0 billion in then-year dollars, for a total acquisition (research and development plus procurement) cost of $122.3 billion in then-year dollars. The Navy as of January 2017 estimated the procurement cost of the lead ship in the Columbia class at $8.2 billion in constant 2017 dollars, not including several billion dollars in additional cost for plans for the class, and the average unit procurement cost of ships 2 through 12 in the program at $6.5 billion each in constant FY2017 dollars. A May 2019 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report assessing selected major DOD weapon acquisition programs stated that the estimated total acquisition (development plus procurement) cost of the Columbia-class program as of June 2018 was $103,035.2 million (about $103.0 billion) in constant FY2019 dollars, including $13,103.0 million (about $13.1 billion) in research and development costs and $89,932.2 million (about $89.9 billion) in procurement costs. The above estimates do not include estimated costs for refurbishing D-5 SLBMs so as to extend their service lives to about 2040. Operation and Support (O&S) Cost The Navy as of January 2017 estimated the average annual operation and support (O&S) cost of each Columbia class boat at $119 million per year. National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund (NSBDF) The National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund (NSBDF) is a fund in DOD's budget separate from the Navy's shipbuilding account for holding and executing procurement funding for the construction of new SSBNs. It was created by Congress in 2014 originally with the aim of helping to financially insulate other Navy shipbuilding programs from the potential cost impact of the Columbia-class program, and to encourage U.S. policymakers to finance the procurement of Columbia-class boats from across DOD's budget rather than solely from the Navy's budget. In more recent years, the statute establishing and governing the fund (10 U.SC. 2218a) has been amended to give the NSBDF an additional function of acting as a vehicle or repository for certain special acquisition authorities that have the potential for reducing at the margin the cost of Columbia-class boats and other Navy nuclear-powered ships (i.e., aircraft carriers and attack submarines). For additional background information on the NSBDF, see Appendix E . Submarine Unified Build Strategy (SUBS) The Navy, under a plan it calls the Submarine Unified Build Strategy (SUBS), plans to build Columbia-class boats jointly at GD/EB and HII/NNS, with most of the work going to GD/EB. As part of this plan, the Navy is also proposing to adjust the division of work on the Virginia-class attack submarine program (in which boats are jointly built at GD/EB and HII/NNS), so that HII/NNS would receive a larger share of the work for that program than it has received in the past. Columbia-Class Program Funding Table 1 shows FY2020-FY2024 funding for the Columbia-class program under the Navy's FY2020 budget submission. Issues for Congress FY2020 Funding Request One issue for Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy's FY2020 funding request for the program. In assessing this question, Congress may consider whether the Navy has accurately priced the work that is proposed to be done with FY2020 funding, as well as broader issues, including those discussed in some of the sections below. Risk of Cost Growth Another oversight issue for Congress is the risk of cost growth in the program. As detailed by CBO and GAO, lead ships in Navy shipbuilding programs in many cases have turned out to be more expensive to build than the Navy had estimated. As discussed in further detail below, CBO and GAO have concluded that there is a significant risk of cost growth in the Columbia-class program. Navy officials, as discussed earlier, have stated consistently since 2013 that the Columbia-class program is the Navy's top priority program, and that this means, among other things, that from the Navy's perspective, the Columbia-class program will be funded, even if that comes at the expense of funding for other Navy programs. Given this, the impact of cost growth in the Columbia-class program in a situation of finite DOD funding might be not so much on the execution of the Columbia-class program itself as on the consequent affordability of other DOD programs, perhaps particularly other Navy shipbuilding programs. The issue of the potential impact of the Columbia-class program on the affordability of other DOD programs is discussed in a subsequent section of this report. Navy Perspective Navy Confidence Level at Milestone B Was Less Than 50% A January 24, 2017, Navy information paper provided to CRS and CBO in March 2017 stated that, at the time of Milestone B for the Columbia-class program, the Navy had assigned a confidence level of 43% to its estimated procurement cost for the lead ship in the Columbia class and a confidence level of 46% to its estimated average procurement cost for ships 2 through 12 in program. What this meant was that the Navy at the time of Milestone B had calculated that there was more than a 50% chance that the procurement costs of Columbia-class boats would turn out to be greater than what the Navy estimates. The January 24, 2017, Navy information paper stated the following: The confidence levels associated with the Milestone B Lead Ship End Cost (Less Plans) and Average Follow Ship End Cost estimate are approximately 43 percent and 46 percent respectively. The risk analysis was performed on 54 parameters influencing shipbuilder labor and material, changes, plans, and government furnished equipment costs. Reflecting confidence levels that had been calculated at the time of Milestone B, a December 1, 2017, Navy information paper provided the confidence levels and corresponding estimated unit procurement costs shown in Table 2 . Navy Confidence Level as of May 2019 Was 50% Navy officials stated in May 2019 that during the time that has transpired since Milestone B, certain risk elements affecting the calculation of confidence levels have been retired, and that as a result, the Navy's confidence level for its costs estimates had increased to 50%, meaning that the Navy as of May 2019 calculated that there is a 50% chance that the procurement costs of Columbia-class boats will turn out to be greater than what the Navy estimates, and a 50% chance that it will turn out to be less than what the Navy estimates. Navy officials also stated in May 2019 that a confidence level of 50% is where they want the Navy's estimate to be. CBO Perspective An October 2018 CBO report on the cost of the Navy's shipbuilding programs stated the following (emphasis added): The cost of the 12 Columbia class submarines included in the 2019 shipbuilding plan is one of the most significant uncertainties in the Navy's and CBO's analyses of future shipbuilding costs…. The Navy currently estimates that the first Columbia would cost $13.2 billion in 2018 dollars and that subsequent ships would have an average cost of $6.6 billion. The implied total cost for the 12 submarines is $85 billion, or an average of $7.1 billion for each ship…. The Navy estimates that research and development costs would amount to $13 billion, bringing the total acquisition cost to $98 billion. The Navy's current estimate of costs for the Columbia class is greater than its estimate for the 2017 [shipbuilding] plan because it is the only shipbuilding program in the 2019 [shipbuilding] plan that includes real cost growth in the naval shipbuilding industry. That adjustment was required as part of the Department of Defense's approval of the Columbia class to Milestone B status, an important marker in the evolution of a major defense procurement program. According to the Navy's estimate, the cost per thousand tons for the first Columbia would be 14 percent less than that of the first Virginia class attack submarine—an improvement that would affect costs for the entire new class of ballistic missile submarines. The Navy anticipates lower costs per thousand tons for the Columbia because it plans to recycle, to the extent possible, the design, technology, and components used for the Virginia class. Furthermore, because ballistic missile submarines (such as the Columbia class) tend to be larger and less densely built than attack submarines (like the Virginia class), the Navy maintains that they will be easier to build and thus less expensive per thousand tons. The Navy has stated, however, that there is a greater than 50 percent probability that the cost of the first Columbia and subsequent ships of the class would exceed its estimates, and CBO estimates costs that are about 9 percent greater than the Navy projects. The costs of lead ships of new classes of submarines built in the 1970s and 1980s provide little evidence that ballistic missile submarines are cheaper by weight to build than attack submarines…. The first Ohio class submarine was more expensive to build than the lead ships of the two classes of attack submarines built during the same period—the Los Angeles and the Improved Los Angeles. (The design of the Improved Los Angeles included the addition of 12 vertical-launch system cells.) In addition, the average cost-to-weight ratio of the first 12 or 13 ships of the class was virtually identical for the Ohio, Los Angeles, and Improved Los Angeles classes. Although the cost by weight of lead ships for submarines had grown substantially by the 1990s, there was still little evidence that submarine size affected the cost per thousand tons. The first Virginia class submarine, which was ordered in 1998, cost about the same by weight as the first Seawolf submarine even though the Seawolf is 20 percent larger and was built nine years earlier. The difference between the Navy's and CBO's estimates is smaller than in earlier years, mostly because of the change in the way the service calculated its estimate. CBO estimates that purchasing the first Columbia class submarine would cost $13.6 billion in 2018 dollars, $0.4 billion more than the Navy estimates. Estimating the cost of the lead ship of a class with a new design is particularly difficult because of uncertainty about how much the Navy will spend on nonrecurring engineering and detailed design. CBO estimates that, all told, 12 Columbia class submarines would cost $93 billion, or an average of $7.7 billion each—a half billion more per submarine than the Navy estimates. That average is based on the $13.6 billion estimated cost of the lead submarine and an average cost of $7.1 billion estimated for the 2 nd through 12 th submarines. Research and development would cost between $13 billion and $17 billion, CBO estimates. Overall, the Navy expects a 14 percent improvement in the cost-to-weight ratio of the Columbia class compared with the first 12 submarines in the Virginia class. Given the history of submarine construction, however, CBO is less optimistic than the Navy. CBO estimates that the Navy will realize a 6 percent improvement, stemming in part from the projected savings attributable to the concurrent production of the Columbia and Virginia class submarines. The costs for the Columbia class submarines could be lower than the Navy and CBO project, depending on the acquisition strategy. The Navy is purchasing the submarines through the National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund, which was established in the Carl Levin and Howard P. "Buck" McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 ( P.L. 113-291 ). The Congress appropriates money for the program in the Navy's main shipbuilding account, and then DoD transfers money into the fund. The Navy could realize savings from special procurement authorities associated with that fund, such as the ability to purchase components and materials for several submarines, and possibly for other ships, at the same time. Further savings could be considerable if, for example, lawmakers authorized the Navy to use a block-buy strategy—an approach it has used with other types of ships. A block-buy strategy allows the Navy to purchase a group of submarines over a specified period (effectively lowering the price of the ships by promising a steady stream of work for the shipyards) and to buy components and materials for the submarines in optimal amounts that minimize costs (known as economic order quantities). One disadvantage of the strategy is that if lawmakers later decided not to build all the submarines, materials that were purchased for the unbuilt ships might go unused. A block-buy strategy might also leave the Congress with less flexibility to change procurement plans or to purchase fewer submarines if lawmakers did not approve of how the program was progressing. Costs for the Columbia class submarines could, however, exceed both the Navy's and CBO's estimates. The new SSBN would be the largest submarine that the United States has ever built. It is expected to reuse some technology and components from the Virginia class submarine, but it would also include many new elements, such as an all-electric drive system, an X-stern ship control system, a new missile compartment, and a nuclear reactor that is designed to last the entire 42-year service life of the submarine. GAO Perspective An April 2019 GAO report on the Columbia-class program stated the following: The Navy's $115 billion procurement cost estimate is not reliable partly because it is based on overly optimistic assumptions about the labor hours needed to construct the submarines. While the Navy analyzed cost risks, it did not include margin in its estimate for likely cost overruns. The Navy told us it will continue to update its lead submarine cost estimate, but an independent assessment of the estimate may not be complete in time to inform the Navy's 2021 budget request to Congress to purchase the lead submarine. Without these reviews, the cost estimate—and, consequently, the budget—may be unrealistic. A reliable cost estimate is especially important for a program of this size and complexity to help ensure that its budget is sufficient to execute the program as planned. The Navy is using the congressionally-authorized National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund to construct the Columbia class. The Fund allows the Navy to purchase material and start construction early on multiple submarines prior to receiving congressional authorization and funding for submarine construction. The Navy anticipates achieving savings through use of the Fund, such as buying certain components early and in bulk, but did not include the savings in its cost estimate. The Navy may have overestimated its savings as higher than those historically achieved by other such programs. Without an updated cost estimate and cost risk analysis, including a realistic estimate of savings, the fiscal year 2021 budget request may not reflect funding needed to construct the submarine. Risk of Schedule Delay in Designing and Building Lead Boat Another oversight issue for Congress is the risk of technical challenges or funding-related issues (such as lapses in appropriations or restrictions on spending during periods when DOD is funded under continuing resolutions) that could lead to delays in designing and building the lead Columbia-class boat and having it ready for its scheduled initial deterrent patrol in 2031, when it is to deploy in the place of the first retiring Ohio-class SSBN. The schedule for designing and building the lead boat and having it ready for its scheduled first deterrent patrol in 2031 has little slack for absorbing unforeseen delays due to technical challenges or funding-related issues. To help mitigate the risk of technical challenges causing delays that threaten the lead boat's 2031 first-patrol date, the Navy has been working to generate additional margin inside the schedule for designing and building the lead boat, so as to provide more ability for absorbing delays and thereby make the schedule less brittle and more resilient. At a March 27, 2019, hearing before the Seapower subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee on Navy shipbuilding programs, Navy officials testified that for the Columbia-class program, the Navy is implementing Continuous Production on selected shipyard-manufactured items to reduce cost and schedule risk and help strengthen the industrial base with a focus on critical vendors. Advance Construction activities are set to start in June 2019 at General Dynamics Electric Boat and Huntington Ingalls Industries-Newport News to proactively manage schedule margin and reduce controlling path risks for COLUMBIA. At least two technical challenges have already occurred in the Columbia-class program, one first reported in 2017 involving an electric motor, and another first reported in 2018 involving faulty welds in the first missile tube sections being built for the lead boat. Navy officials have stated that neither of these challenges jeopardized the lead's boat's schedule for being ready for its first patrol in 2031, in part because the Navy—recognizing that it had not built SSBN missile tube sections in many years—had built 23 months of margin into the schedule for manufacturing the missile tube sections. (This is in part why manufacturing of missile tube sections began well ahead of fabrication work on other parts of the submarine.) The problem with the welds reportedly absorbed up to 15 months of that margin, but even after absorbing that delay, 8 or more months of margin remained. Technical challenges could arise in various parts of the ship. One area that may bear close watching is the ship's electric-drive propulsion system, which is quite different than the mechanical-drive system used in other Navy nuclear-powered submarines. The Navy has been working for years to mitigate the risks associated with the Columbia-class design's electric-drive system through a technology-development process that includes testing and validation with land-based component prototypes. An April 2019 GAO report states the following: We found that the Navy continues to experience problems with the electric drive of the integrated power system that could potentially affect construction of the lead submarine. A manufacturing defect that affected the system's first production-representative propulsion motor required extensive repair that consumed 9 months of schedule margin at the land-based test facility. The Navy now plans to test the motor at the same time it had originally scheduled to make any final design changes before starting production. This could constrain opportunities to implement timely, corrective actions if problems are discovered during testing. More generally, regarding the risk of delays in designing and building the lead boat, the April 2019 GAO report stated the following: The Navy's goal is to complete a significant amount of the Columbia class submarine's design—83 percent—before lead submarine construction begins in October 2020. The Navy established this goal based on lessons learned from another submarine program in an effort to help mitigate its aggressive construction schedule. Achieving this goal may prove to be challenging as the shipbuilder has to use a new design tool to complete an increasingly higher volume of complex design products…. The shipbuilder has hired additional designers to improve its design progress. The Navy also plans to start advance construction of components in each major section of the submarine, beginning in fiscal year 2019, when less of the design will be complete…. The Navy is attempting to mitigate an aggressive schedule for lead submarine construction by (1) setting a goal to mature a significant amount of the submarine's design prior to the start of construction and (2) beginning advance construction of submarine modules prior to October 2020. The shipbuilder is working to improve design performance and would have to maintain this increased pace to achieve its design goal, which is necessary to mitigate schedule risk associated with constructing the lead submarine. This may prove challenging as it must complete an increasingly higher volume and complexity of design products. At the same time, the Navy is continuing to develop several critical technologies and recent manufacturing defects with the integrated power system and missile tubes are among the challenges that the Navy is facing in ensuring timely delivery of critical components to the shipyard. A May 2019 GAO report assessing selected major DOD weapon acquisition programs additionally stated the following regarding the Columbia-class program: Technology Maturity The Columbia class program identified two critical technologies—a carbon dioxide removal system and the stern area system, the details of which are classified. The program expects the carbon dioxide removal system to reach full maturity in late 2019, while the stern area system is still immature. In December 2017, we reported that several Columbia class technologies that met GAO's definition of a critical technology element were not identified by the Navy as critical technologies. Specifically, the Navy did not follow best practices for assessing critical technologies. When we applied these best practices, we identified four additional critical technologies that the Navy excluded. These include the integrated power system, the propulsor/coordinated stern, the common missile compartment (CMC), and the nuclear reactor. Of these, only the nuclear reactor is fully mature as of late 2018. The Navy expects the CMC to reach full maturity in 2019. However, officials reported that in July 2018 the shipbuilder identified significant weld defects in CMC missile tubes from one of three suppliers after the supplier had already delivered seven tubes to the shipyard and installation work had begun, resulting in rework. Officials further report that the shipbuilder found defects affected five additional tubes. Program officials attributed these defects to inexperienced welders and weld inspectors. The Navy estimates that, as of January 2019, the CMC consumed 52 percent of its schedule margin. Should the Navy discover additional CMC deficiencies, the planned construction sequence for the lead submarine will be jeopardized. Further, manufacturing defects have delayed delivery of the integrated power system's (IPS) first production-representative motor. The Navy plans to recover the motor's schedule margin by testing it while the supplier updates the motor's production design. Consequently, any new deficiencies discovered in testing may require the supplier to modify its design, which could delay the lead ship's IPS motor production schedule. Design Stability The program office plans to complete the basic and functional design prior to the lead submarine's scheduled construction start, in October 2020. However, Navy officials report the shipbuilder has already begun building sections of the submarine, with 95 percent of the basic and functional design complete—a level slightly below best practices. Further, the Navy has determined that the shipbuilder needs to complete 83 percent of the detail design—the most complex design phases down to the lowest level of the submarine—by October 2020 to meet its cost and schedule goals. Currently, the shipbuilder is behind schedule because it has yet not achieved planned efficiencies with new design software. The shipbuilder increased its design staff by 18 percent in an effort to reach the design goal on schedule. However, the program's plan for achieving design stability is premised on assumptions about the final form, fit, and function of critical technologies—and how those technologies will perform in a realistic environment—that the program has yet to demonstrate. Production Readiness By beginning to build sections of the submarine starting in December 2018, the Navy believes that the builder can achieve an aggressive 84-month construction schedule. However, this is 2 years prior to the planned request for fiscal year 2021 authorization to start construction of the lead ship. Other Program Issues In a April 2019 report, we made several recommendations to improve the program's cost estimate. Specifically, we found that the program's $115 billion procurement cost estimate is not reliable because its estimate is based on overly optimistic assumptions about the labor hours needed to construct Columbia class submarines and did not include any cost margin in case these assumptions are not met. While the Navy analyzed program cost risks, it did not include enough margin in its estimate for likely cost growth. The Navy plans to update the cost estimate for the lead ship, but it may not complete this update in time for its fiscal year 2021 budget request, which will seek authorization and funding for lead submarine construction. Program Office Comments We provided a draft of this assessment to the program office for review and comment. The program office provided technical comments, which we incorporated where appropriate. The program office stated that it intends to provide needed capabilities on schedule and at an affordable price by committing to stable requirements, achieving high design maturity at the start of construction for the lead submarine, improving manufacturing and construction readiness, and aggressively working to reduce costs. It also said it plans to complete 83 percent of the design by construction start—more than other recent submarine programs. The program also stated that it plans to update its cost estimate in 2019 to inform lead submarine funding. The program noted that the Navy recognizes its supplier base remains a high risk to construction readiness and continues to devote increased oversight on manufacturing issues and readiness assessments. The program said it continues to comply with all Navy, Department of Defense, and statutory requirements for managing critical technologies. Until such time that the Navy can find ways to generate additional margin inside the program's schedule, the program appears to be in a situation where many things need to go right, and few things can go wrong, between now and 2031 for the lead boat to be ready for its first patrol in 2031. In assessing this situation, it can be noted on the one hand that the Columbia-class program's status as the Navy's top priority program means that the program can be a high claimant for funding and personnel (including engineers, supervisors, and managers) that can be used to reduce the risk of occurrence of technical challenges that could threaten the lead boat's 2031 first-patrol date. On the other hand, it can be noted that the lead ship in the Columbia-class program, like the lead ships in most Navy shipbuilding programs, is serving as the program's prototype, creating an inherent risk of technical challenges. Program Affordability and Impact on Other Navy Shipbuilding Programs Another issue for Congress—one that observers have focused on for several years—concerns the potential impact of the Columbia-class program on funding that will be available for other Navy programs, including other shipbuilding programs, particularly during the 10-year period FY2026-FY2035, when the Navy plans to procure one Columbia-class boat per year. Other things held equal, cost growth in the Columbia-class program (see the earlier discussion of the risk of cost growth in the program) could reinforce concerns about the potential impact of the Columbia-class program on funding that will be available for other Navy programs, including other shipbuilding programs. Even without such cost growth, however, this issue would remain as a matter of concern. Starting in FY2026, when the Navy plans to procure one Columbia-class boat per year for a period of 10 years, the Navy estimates that the Columbia-class program will require, in constant FY2019 dollars, roughly $7 billion per year in procurement funding. Several years ago, when the Navy's shipbuilding budget was being funded at a level of roughly $14 billion per year, observers were concerned that the Columbia-class program during the period FY2026-FY2035 could absorb as much as half of the Navy's shipbuilding budget, leaving relatively little funding available for all other Navy shipbuilding programs. Over the last several years, the Navy's shipbuilding budget has been increased to an annual funding level of roughly $24 billion per year. In a context of a shipbuilding budget of roughly $24 billion per year, a Columbia-class requirement for roughly $7 billion per year does not loom as large proportionately as it once did. Concerns remain, however, about funding that will be available for the procurement of other kinds of ships. The Navy's report on its FY2020 30-year shipbuilding plan states the following: The fiscal impact of the new SSBN begins in FY2023 with advanced procurement [funding], and then increases in FY2026 with full annual procurements. This represents Navy's largest fiscal challenge for near-term budgets and could impact the pace of procuring other ship types – potentially causing a drop below the steady profiles [shown elsewhere in this report]. At a March 27, 2019, hearing before the Seapower subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee on Navy shipbuilding programs, Navy officials testified that the COLUMBIA Class program remains the Navy's number one acquisition priority program and is on track to start construction in October 2020 and deliver to pace the retirement of our current ballistic missile submarines, deploying for its first patrol in FY 2031. To better align focus and resources and ensure successful delivery of this program to the Fleet, DON has established Program Executive Office COLUMBIA. Additional resources above the Navy's [budget] topline will be required for the Navy to fund serial production of the COLUMBIA Class SSBN and maintain its planned shipbuilding profile. The creation of the National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund (NSBDF) and the amending of the statute governing the fund to include special acquisition authorities can be viewed as one response to concerns about the potential impact of the Columbia-class program on funding that will be available for other Navy programs, including other shipbuilding programs. For additional information about the NSBDF, see Appendix E . Another potential option for reducing the potential impact of the Columbia-class program on funding that will be available for other Navy programs, including other shipbuilding programs, would be to reduce the Columbia-class program to something fewer than 12 boats. Over the years, for various reasons, some observers have advocated or presented options for an SSBN force of fewer than 12 SSBNs. A November 2013 CBO report on options for reducing the federal budget deficit, for example, presented an option for reducing the SSBN force to 8 boats as a cost-reduction measure. Earlier CBO reports have presented options for reducing the SSBN force to 10 boats as a cost-reduction measure. CBO reports that present such options also provide notional arguments for and against the options. A June 2010 report by a group known as the Sustainable Defense Task Force recommended reducing the SSBN force to 7 boats, a September 2010 report from the Cato Institute recommended reducing the SSBN force to 6 boats, and a September 2013 report from a group organized by the Stimson Center recommended reducing the force to 10 boats. Views on whether a force of fewer than 12 Columbia-class boats would be appropriate could depend on, among other things, assessments of strategic nuclear threats to the United States and the role of SSBNs in deterring such threats as a part of overall U.S. strategic nuclear forces, as influenced by the terms of strategic nuclear arms control agreements. Reducing the number of SSBNs below 12 could also raise a question as to whether the force should continue to be homeported at both Bangor, WA, and Kings Bay, GA, or consolidated at a single location. The Navy's position is that the current requirement for having a certain number of SSBNs on patrol translates into a need for a force of 14 Ohio-class boats, and that this requirement can be met in the future by a force of 12 Columbia-class boats. Industrial-Base Challenges of Building Both Columbia- and Virginia-Class Boats Another oversight issue for Congress concerns potential industrial-base challenges of building both Columbia-class boats and Virginia-class attack submarines (SSNs) at the same time, particularly as procurement of Virginia-class submarines shifts to production of a new and larger version of the Virginia-class design that incorporates an additional mid-ship section called the Virginia Payload Module (VPM). Concerns about the ability of the submarine construction industrial base to execute an eventual procurement rate of two VPM-equipped Virginia-class boats and one Columbia-class boat per year, as currently planned under the Navy's FY2020 30-year shipbuilding plan, have been heightened by recent reports of challenges faced by the two submarine-construction shipyards (GD/EB and HII/NNS) as well as submarine component supplier firms in meeting scheduled delivery times for Virginia-class boats as the Virginia-class program transitions over time from production of two "regular" Virginia-class boats per year to two VPM-equipped boats per year. Concerns about the industrial-base issue can be viewed as an additional element of the previously discussed issue of the risk of schedule delay in designing and building the lead Columbia-class boat. Legislative Activity for FY2020 Summary of Congressional Action on FY2020 Funding Request Table 3 below summarizes congressional action on the Navy's FY2020 funding request for the Columbia-class program. Appendix A. Summary of Past U.S. SSBN Designs This appendix provides background information on the four SSBN classes that the United States has operated since 1959. The four classes are summarized in Table A-1 . As shown in the table, the size of U.S. SSBNs has grown over time, reflecting in part a growth in the size and number of SLBMs carried on each boat. The Ohio class carries an SLBM (the D-5) that is much larger than the SLBMs carried by earlier U.S. SSBNs, and it carries 24 SLBMs, compared to the 16 on earlier U.S. SSBNs. In part for these reasons, the Ohio-class design, with a submerged displacement of 18,750 tons, is more than twice the size of earlier U.S. SSBNs. Appendix B. U.S.-UK Cooperation on SLBMs and the New UK SSBN This appendix provides background information on U.S.-UK cooperation on SLBMs and the UK's next-generation SSBN, previously called the Successor-class SSBN and now called the Dreadnought-class SSBN. The UK's four Vanguard-class SSBNs, which entered service in 1993-1999, each carry 16 Trident II D-5 SLBMs. Previous classes of UK SSBNs similarly carried earlier-generation U.S. SLBMs. The UK's use of U.S.-made SLBMs on its SSBNs is one element of a long-standing close cooperation between the two countries on nuclear-related issues that is carried out under the 1958 Agreement for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes (also known as the Mutual Defense Agreement). Within the framework established by the 1958 agreement, cooperation on SLBMs in particular is carried out under the 1963 Polaris Sales Agreement and a 1982 Exchange of Letters between the two governments. The Navy testified in March 2010 that "the United States and the United Kingdom have maintained a shared commitment to nuclear deterrence through the Polaris Sales Agreement since April 1963. The U.S. will continue to maintain its strong strategic relationship with the UK for our respective follow-on platforms, based upon the Polaris Sales Agreement." The first Vanguard-class SSBN was originally projected to reach the end of its service life in 2024, but an October 2010 UK defense and security review report states that the lives of the Vanguard class ships will now be extended by a few years, so that the four boats will remain in service into the late 2020s and early 2030s. The UK plans to replace the four Vanguard-class boats with three or four next-generation Dreadnought-class boats are to be equipped with 12 missile launch tubes, but current UK plans call for each boat to carry eight D-5 SLBMs, with the other four tubes not being used for SLBMs. The report states that "'Main Gate'—the decision to start building the submarines—is required around 2016." The first new boat is to be delivered by 2028, or about four years later than previously planned. The United States is assisting the UK with certain aspects of the Dreadnought SSBN program. In addition to the modular Common Missile Compartment (CMC), the United States is assisting the UK with the new PWR-3 reactor plant to be used by the Dreadnought SSBN. A December 2011 press report states that "there has been strong [UK] collaboration with the US [on the Dreadnought program], particularly with regard to the CMC, the PWR, and other propulsion technology," and that the design concept selected for the Dreadnought class employs "a new propulsion plant based on a US design, but using next-generation UK reactor technology (PWR-3) and modern secondary propulsion systems." The U.S. Navy states that Naval Reactors, a joint Department of Energy/Department of Navy organization responsible for all aspects of naval nuclear propulsion, has an ongoing technical exchange with the UK Ministry of Defence under the US/UK 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement. The US/UK 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement is a Government to Government Atomic Energy Act agreement that allows the exchange of naval nuclear propulsion technology between the US and UK. Under this agreement, Naval Reactors is providing the UK Ministry of Defence with US naval nuclear propulsion technology to facilitate development of the naval nuclear propulsion plant for the UK's next generation SUCCESSOR ballistic missile submarine. The technology exchange is managed and led by the US and UK Governments, with participation from Naval Reactors prime contractors, private nuclear capable shipbuilders, and several suppliers. A UK based office comprised of about 40 US personnel provide full-time engineering support for the exchange, with additional support from key US suppliers and other US based program personnel as needed. The relationship between the US and UK under the 1958 mutual defence agreement is an ongoing relationship and the level of support varies depending on the nature of the support being provided. Naval Reactors work supporting the SUCCESSOR submarine is reimbursed by the UK Ministry of Defence. U.S. assistance to the UK on naval nuclear propulsion technology first occurred many years ago: To help jumpstart the UK's nuclear-powered submarine program, the United States transferred to the UK a complete nuclear propulsion plant (plus technical data, spares, and training) of the kind installed on the U.S. Navy's six Skipjack (SSN-585) class nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs), which entered service between 1959 and 1961. The plant was installed on the UK Navy's first nuclear-powered ship, the attack submarine Dreadnought , which entered service in 1963. The December 2011 press report states that "the UK is also looking at other areas of cooperation between Dreadnought and the Ohio Replacement Programme. For example, a collaboration agreement has been signed off regarding the platform integration of sonar arrays with the respective combat systems." A June 24, 2016, press report states the following: The [U.S. Navy] admiral responsible for the nuclear weapons component of ballistic missile submarines today praised the "truly unique" relationship with the British naval officers who have similar responsibilities, and said that historic cooperation would not be affected by Thursday's vote to have the United Kingdom leave the European Union. Vice Adm. Terry Benedict, director of the Navy's Strategic Systems Programs, said that based on a telephone exchange Thursday morning with his Royal Navy counterpart, "I have no concern." The so-called Brexit vote—for British exit—"was a decision based on its relationship with Europe, not with us. I see yesterday's vote having no effect." Appendix C. Columbia-Class Program Origin and Milestones This appendix provides background information on the Columbia-class program's origin and milestones. Program Origin and Early Milestones Although the eventual need to replace the Ohio-class SSBNs has been known for many years, the Columbia-class program can be traced more specifically to an exchange of letters in December 2006 between President George W. Bush and UK Prime Minister Tony Blair concerning the UK's desire to participate in a program to extend the service life of the Trident II D-5 SLBM into the 2040s, and to have its next-generation SSBNs carry D-5s. Following this exchange of letters, and with an awareness of the projected retirement dates of the Ohio-class SSBNs and the time that would likely be needed to develop and field a replacement for them, DOD in 2007 began studies on a next-generation sea-based strategic deterrent (SBSD). The studies used the term sea-based strategic deterrent (SBSD) to signal the possibility that the new system would not necessarily be a submarine. An Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) for a new SBSD was developed in early 2008 and approved by DOD's Joint Requirements Oversight Committee (JROC) on June 20, 2008. In July 2008, DOD issued a Concept Decision providing guidance for an analysis of alternatives (AOA) for the program; an acquisition decision memorandum from John Young, DOD's acquisition executive, stated the new system would, barring some discovery, be a submarine. The Navy established an Columbia-class program office at about this same time. The AOA reportedly began in the summer or fall of 2008. The AOA was completed, with final brief to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), on May 20, 2009. The final AOA report was completed in September 2009. An AOA Sufficiency Review Letter was signed by OSD's Director, Cost Assessment & Program Evaluation (CAPE) on December 8, 2009. The AOA concluded that a new-design SSBN was the best option for replacing the Ohio-class SSBNs. (For a June 26, 2013, Navy blog post discussing options that were examined for replacing the Ohio-class SSBNs, see Appendix D .) The program's Milestone A review meeting was held on December 9, 2010. On February 3, 2011, the Navy provided the following statement to CRS concerning the outcome of the December 9 meeting: The OHIO Replacement Program achieved Milestone A and has been approved to enter the Technology Development Phase of the Dept. of Defense Life Cycle Management System as of Jan. 10, 2011. This milestone comes following the endorsement of the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB), chaired by Dr. Carter (USD for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) who has signed the program's Milestone A Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM). The DAB endorsed replacing the current 14 Ohio-class Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBNs) as they reach the end of their service life with 12 Ohio Replacement Submarines, each comprising 16, 87-inch diameter missile tubes utilizing TRIDENT II D5 Life Extended missiles (initial loadout). The decision came after the program was presented to the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) on Dec. 9, 2010. The ADM validates the program's Technology Development Strategy and allows entry into the Technology Development Phase during which warfighting requirements will be refined to meet operational and affordability goals. Design, prototyping, and technology development efforts will continue to ensure sufficient technological maturity for lead ship procurement in 2019. January 2017 Milestone B Approval On January 4, 2017, DOD gave Milestone B approval to the Columbia-class program. Milestone B approval, which permits a program to enter the engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) phase, is generally considered a major milestone for a defense acquisition program, permitting the program to transition, in effect, from a research and development effort into a procurement program of record. A January 6, 2017, Navy notification to Congress on the Milestone B approval for the Columbia-class program states the following: On 4 November 2016, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Frank Kendall chaired the Milestone B Defense Acquisition Board, and on 4 January, 2017 signed the acquisition decision memorandum approving COLUMBIA Class program's Milestone B and designating the program as an Acquisition Category ID major defense acquisition program. Milestone B also establishes the Acquisition Program Baseline against which the program's performance will be assessed. Additionally, this decision formally authorizes entry into the Engineering and Manufacturing Development Phase of an acquisition program, permitting the transition from preliminary design to detail design, using Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) funds. Cost estimates for this program have been rebaselined from CY2010 dollars to CY2017 dollars in accordance with DoDI 5000.02, Rev p, dated 7 January 2015. The MS B Navy Cost Estimate for Average Follow Ship End Cost (hulls 2-12) in 2010$ using specific shipbuilding indices is $5.0 billion, a $600 million reduction from the MS A estimate, which nearly achieves the affordability target of $4.9 billion set at MS A. To continue cost control, the Navy will focus on: • Stable operational and technical requirements • High design maturity at construction start • Detailed plans to ensure manufacturing readiness including robust prototyping efforts and synergies with other nuclear shipbuilding programs • Aggressive cost reduction actions Affordability caps have been assigned that are consistent with current cost estimates and reasonable margins for cost growth. Relative to Milestone A, these estimates have been updated to adjust Base Year from 2010 to 2017, a standard practice to match Base Year with the year of Milestone B approval. The MS A unit cost affordability target ($4.9 billion in CY2010$ using Navy indices) used a unique metric, "Average Follow-on Ship End Cost," which accounted for hulls 2-12. From Milestone B forward, the affordability cap for the unit cost will be measured by using the Average Procurement Unit Cost (APUC), which includes all 12 hulls. The Affordability Cap of $8.0 billion in CY2017$ is based upon the approved APUC estimate of $7.3 billion plus 10%.... The Navy and industry are currently negotiating the detail design and construction (DD&C) contract, which is expected to award in early 2017. With negotiations continuing on the DD&C contract, the Navy has ensured the COLUMBIA Program design effort will continue without interruption. The Navy issued a contract modification to allow execution of SCN for detail design on the existing R&D contract. With this modification in place, detail design efforts that had initially planned to transition to the DD&C contract, will continue on the current R&D contract to ensure continued design progress. With the Milestone B approval and the appropriation of $773M in FY17 SCN under the second Continuing Resolution, funding is now available to execute detail design. In accordance with 10 U.S.C. §2218a and the FY17 National Defense Authorization Act, the Navy deposited the FY17 SCN into the National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund (NSBDF). The first installment of funding will be executed on the existing R&D contract, which allows transition into detail design and continued design progress until the award of the DD&C contract. Appendix D. Design of Columbia-Class Boats This appendix provides additional background information on the design for the Columbia-class boats. Some Key Design Features The Columbia-class design will reflect the following: The Columbia class is being designed for a 42-year expected service life. Unlike the Ohio-class design, which requires a midlife nuclear refueling, the Columbia class is to be equipped with a life-of-the-ship nuclear fuel core (a nuclear fuel core that is sufficient to power the ship for its entire expected service life). Although the Columbia class will not need a midlife nuclear refueling, it will still need a midlife nonrefueling overhaul (i.e., an overhaul that does not include a nuclear refueling) to operate over its full 42-year life. The Columbia class is to be equipped with an electric-drive propulsion train, as opposed to the mechanical-drive propulsion train used on other Navy submarines. The electric-drive system is expected to be quieter (i.e., stealthier) than a mechanical-drive system. The Columbia class is to have SLBM launch tubes that are the same size as those on the Ohio class (i.e., tubes with a diameter of 87 inches and a length sufficient to accommodate a D-5 SLBM). The Columbia class will have a beam (i.e., diameter) of 43 feet, compared to 42 feet on the Ohio-class design, and a length of 560 feet, the same as that of the Ohio-class design. Instead of 24 SLBM launch tubes, as on the Ohio-class design, the Columbia class is to have 16 SLBM launch tubes. As noted earlier, although the Columbia-class design has fewer SLBM tubes than the Ohio-class design, it is larger than the Ohio-class design in terms of submerged displacement. The Columbia-class design has a reported submerged displacement of 20,815 tons (as of August 2014), compared to 18,750 tons for the Ohio-class design. The Columbia-class design, like the Ohio-class design before it, will be the largest submarine ever built by the United States. The Navy states that "owing to the unique demands of strategic relevance, [Columbia-class boats] must be fitted with the most up-to-date capabilities and stealth to ensure they are survivable throughout their full 40-year life span." June 2013 Navy Blog Post Regarding Ohio Replacement Options A June 26, 2013, blog post by Rear Admiral Richard Breckenridge, the Navy's Director for Undersea Warfare (N97), discussing options that were examined for replacing the Ohio-class SSBNs, stated the following: Over the last five years, the Navy–working with U.S. Strategic Command, the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense–has formally examined various options to replace the Ohio ballistic missile submarines as they retire beginning in 2027. This analysis included a variety of replacement platform options, including designs based on the highly successful Virginia-class attack submarine program and the current Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine. In the end, the Navy elected to pursue a new design that leverages the lessons from the Ohio, the Virginia advances in shipbuilding and improvements in cost-efficiency. Recently, a variety of writers have speculated that the required survivable deterrence could be achieved more cost effectively with the Virginia-based option or by restarting the Ohio-class SSBN production line. Both of these ideas make sense at face value–which is why they were included among the alternatives assessed–but the devil is in the details. When we examined the particulars, each of these options came up short in both military effectiveness and cost efficiency. Virginia-based SSBN design with a Trident II D5 missile. An SSBN design based on a Virginia-class attack submarine with a large-diameter missile compartment was rejected due to a wide range of shortfalls. It would: • Not meet survivability (stealth) requirements due to poor hull streamlining and lack of a drive train able to quietly propel a much larger ship • Not meet at-sea availability requirements due to longer refit times (since equipment is packed more tightly within the hull, it requires more time to replace, repair and retest) • Not meet availability requirements due to a longer mid-life overhaul (refueling needed) • Require a larger number of submarines to meet the same operational requirement • Reduce the deterrent value needed to protect the country (fewer missiles, warheads at-sea) • Be more expensive than other alternatives due to extensive redesign of Virginia systems to work with the large missile compartment (for example, a taller sail, larger control surfaces and more robust support systems) We would be spending more money (on more ships) to deliver less deterrence (reduced at-sea warhead presence) with less survivability (platforms that are less stealthy). Virginia-based SSBN design with a smaller missile. Some have encouraged the development of a new, smaller missile to go with a Virginia-based SSBN. This would carry forward many of the shortfalls of a Virginia-based SSBN we just discussed, and add to it a long list of new issues. Developing a new nuclear missile from scratch with an industrial base that last produced a new design more than 20 years ago would be challenging, costly and require extensive testing. We deliberately decided to extend the life of the current missile to decouple and de-risk the complex (and costly) missile development program from the new replacement submarine program. Additionally, a smaller missile means a shorter employment range requiring longer SSBN patrol transits. This would compromise survivability, require more submarines at sea and ultimately weaken our deterrence effectiveness. With significant cost, technical and schedule risks, there is little about this option that is attractive. Ohio-based SSBN design. Some have argued that we should re-open the Ohio production line and resume building the Ohio design SSBNs. This simply cannot be done because there is no Ohio production line. It has long since been re-tooled and modernized to build state-of-the-art Virginia-class SSNs using computerized designs and modular, automated construction techniques. Is it desirable to redesign the Ohio so that a ship with its legacy performance could be built using the new production facilities? No, since an Ohio-based SSBN would: • Not provide the required quieting due to Ohio design constraints and use of a propeller instead of a propulsor (which is the standard for virtually all new submarines) • Require 14 instead of 12 SSBNs by reverting to Ohio class operational availability standards (incidentally creating other issues with the New START treaty limits) • Suffer from reduced reliability and costs associated with the obsolescence of legacy Ohio system components Once again, the end result would necessitate procuring more submarines (14) to provide the required at-sea presence and each of them would be less stealthy and less survivable against foreseeable 21 st century threats. The Right Answer: A new design SSBN that improves on Ohio: What has emerged from the Navy's exhaustive analysis is an Ohio replacement submarine that starts with the foundation of the proven performance of the Ohio SSBN, its Trident II D5 strategic weapons system and its operating cycle. To this it adds: • Enhanced stealth as necessary to pace emerging threats expected over its service life • Systems commonality with Virginia (pumps, valves, sonars, etc.) wherever possible, enabling cost savings in design, procurement, maintenance and logistics • Modular construction and use of COTS equipment consistent with those used in today's submarines to reduce the cost of fabrication, maintenance and modernization. Total ownership cost reduction (for example, investing in a life-of-the-ship reactor core enables providing the same at-sea presence with fewer platforms). Although the Ohio replacement is a "new design," it is in effect an SSBN that takes the best lessons from 50 years of undersea deterrence, from the Ohio, from the Virginia, from advances in shipbuilding efficiency and maintenance, and from the stern realities of needing to provide survivable nuclear deterrence. The result is a low-risk, cost-effective platform capable of smoothly transitioning from the Ohio and delivering effective 21 st century undersea strategic deterrence. 16 vs. 20 SLBM Tubes Overview The Navy's decision to design Columbia-class boats with 16 SLBM tubes rather than 20 was one of several decisions the Navy made to reduce the estimated average procurement cost of boats 2 through 12 in the program toward a Navy target cost of $4.9 billion in FY2010 dollars. Some observers were concerned that designing the Columbia class with 16 tubes rather than 20 would create a risk that U.S. strategic nuclear forces might not have enough capability in the 2030s and beyond to fully perform their deterrent role. These observers noted that to comply with the New Start Treaty limiting strategic nuclear weapons, DOD plans to operate in coming years a force of 14 Trident SSBNs, each with 20 operable SLBM tubes (4 of the 24 tubes on each boat are to be rendered inoperable), for a total of 280 tubes, whereas the Navy in the Columbia-class program is planning a force of 12 SSBNs each with 16 tubes, for a total of 192 tubes, or about 31% less than 280. These observers also cited the uncertainties associated with projecting needs for strategic deterrent forces out to the year 2080, when the final Columbia-class boat is scheduled to leave service. These observers asked whether the plan to design the Columbia class with 16 tubes rather than 20 was fully supported within all parts of DOD, including U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM). In response, Navy and other DOD officials stated that the decision to design the Columbia class with 16 tubes rather than 20 was carefully considered within DOD, and that they believe a boat with 16 tubes will give U.S. strategic nuclear forces enough capability to fully perform their deterrent role in the 2030s and beyond. Testimony in 2011 At a March 1, 2011, hearing before the House Armed Services Committee, Admiral Gary Roughead, then-Chief of Naval Operations, stated the following: I'm very comfortable with where we're going with SSBN-X. The decision and the recommendation that I made with regard to the number of tubes—launch tubes are consistent with the new START treaty. They're consistent with the missions that I see that ship having to perform. And even though it may be characterized as a cost cutting measure, I believe it sizes the ship for the missions it will perform. At a March 2, 2011, hearing before the Strategic Forces subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, the following exchange occurred: REPRESENTATIVE TURNER: General Kehler, thank you so much for your continued thoughts and of course your leadership. One item that we had a discussion on was the triad, of looking to—of the Navy and the tube reductions of 20 to 16, as contained in other hearings on the Hill today. I would like your thoughts on the reduction of the tubes and what you see driving that, how you see it affecting our strategic posture and any other thoughts you have on that? AIR FORCE GENERAL C. ROBERT KEHLER, COMMANDER, U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Well, first of all, sir, let me say that the—in my mind anyway, the discussion of Trident and Ohio-class replacement is really a discussion in the context of the need to modernize the entire triad. And so, first of all, I think that it's important for us to recognize that that is one piece, an important piece, but a piece of the decision process that we need to go through. Second, the issue of the number of tubes is not a simple black-and-white answer. So let me just comment here for a minute. First of all, the issue in my mind is the overall number of tubes we wind up with at the end, not so much as the number of tubes per submarine. Second, the issue is, of course, we have flexibility and options with how many warheads per missile per tube, so that's another consideration that enters into this mixture. Another consideration that is important to me is the overall number of boats and the operational flexibility that we have with the overall number of boats, given that some number will need to be in maintenance, some number will need to be in training, et cetera. And so those and many other factors—to include a little bit of foresight here, in looking ahead to 20 years from now in antisubmarine warfare environment that the Navy will have to operate in, all of those bear on the ultimate sideways shape configuration of a follow-on to the Ohio. At this point, Mr. Chairman, I am not overly troubled by going to 16 tubes. As I look at this, given that we have that kind of flexibility that I just laid out; given that this is an element of the triad and given that we have some decision space here as we go forward to decide on the ultimate number of submarines, nothing troubles me operationally here to the extent that I would oppose a submarine with 16 tubes. I understand the reasons for wanting to have 20. I understand the arguments that were made ahead of me. But as I sit here today, given the totality of the discussion, I am—as I said, I am not overly troubled by 16. Now, I don't know that the gavel has been pounded on the other side of the river yet with a final decision, but at this point, I am not overly troubled by 16. At an April 5, 2011, hearing before the Strategic Forces subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, the following exchange occurred: REPRESENTATIVE LARSEN: General Benedict, we have had this discussion, not you and I, I am sorry. But the subcommittee has had a discussion in the past with regards to the Ohio-class replacement program. The new START, though, when it was negotiated, assumed a reduction from 24 missile tubes per hole to, I think, a maximum a maximum of 20. The current configuration [for the Columbia class], as I understand it, would move from 24 to 16. Can you discuss, for the subcommittee here, the Navy's rationale for that? For moving from 24 to 16 as opposed to the max of 20? NAVY REAR ADMIRAL TERRY BENEDICT, DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC SYSTEMS PROGRAMS (SSP): Sir, as part—excuse me, as part of the work-up for the milestone A [review for the Columbia class program] with Dr. Carter in OSD, SSP supported the extensive analysis at both the OSD level as well as STRATCOM's analysis. Throughout that process, we provided, from the SWS [strategic weapon system] capability, our perspective. Ultimately that was rolled up into both STRATCOM and OSD and senior Navy leadership and in previous testimony, the secretary of the Navy, the CNO, and General Chilton have all expressed their confidence that the mission of the future, given their perspectives, is they see the environment today can be met with 16. And so, as the acquisition and the SWS provider, we are prepared to support that decision by leadership, sir. REPRESENTATIVE LARSEN: Yes. And your analysis supports—did your analysis that fed into this, did you look at specific numbers then? REARD ADMIRAL BENEDICT: Sir, we looked at the ability of the system, again, SSP does not look at specific targets with... REPRESENTATIVE LARSEN: Right. Yes, yes, yes. REAR ADMIRAL BENEDICT: Our input was the capability of the missile, the number of re-entry bodies and the throw weight that we can provide against those targets and based on that analysis, the leadership decision was 16, sir. At an April 6, 2011, hearing before the Strategic Forces subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, the following exchange occurred: SENATOR SESSIONS: Admiral Benedict, according to recent press reports, the Navy rejected the recommendations of Strategic Command to design the next generation of ballistic missile submarines with 20 missile tubes instead of opting for only 16 per boat. What is the basis for the Navy's decision of 16? And I'm sure cost is a factor. In what ways will that decision impact the overall nuclear force structure associated with the command? NAVY REAR ADMIRAL TERRY BENEDICT, DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC SYSTEMS PROGRAMS (SSP): Yes, sir. SSP supported the Navy analysis, STRATCOM's analysis, as well as the OSD analysis, as we proceeded forward and towards the Milestone A decision [on the Columbia class program] that Dr. Carter conducted. Based on our input, which was the technical input as the—as the director of SSP, other factors were considered, as you stated. Cost was one of them. But as the secretary, as the CNO, and I think as General Kehler submitted in their testimony, that given the threats that we see today, given the mission that we see today, given the upload capability of the D-5, and given the environment as they saw today, all three of those leaders were comfortable with the decision to proceed forward with 16 tubes, sir. SENATOR SESSIONS: And is that represent your judgment? To what extent were you involved—were you involved in that? REAR ADMIRAL BENEDICT: Sir, we were involved from technical aspects in terms of the capability of the missile itself, what we can throw, our range, our capability. And based on what we understand the capability of the D-5 today, which will be the baseline missile for the Ohio Replacement Program, as the director of SSP I'm comfortable with that decision. Section 242 Report Section 242 of the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act ( H.R. 1540 / P.L. 112-81 of December 31, 2011) required DOD to submit a report on the Columbia-class program that includes, among other things, an assessment of various combinations of boat quantities and numbers of SLBM launch tubes per boat. The text of the section is as follows: SEC. 242. REPORT AND COST ASSESSMENT OF OPTIONS FOR OHIO-CLASS REPLACEMENT BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINE. (a) Report Required- Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Navy and the Commander of the United States Strategic Command shall jointly submit to the congressional defense committees a report on each of the options described in subsection (b) to replace the Ohio-class ballistic submarine program. The report shall include the following: (1) An assessment of the procurement cost and total life-cycle costs associated with each option. (2) An assessment of the ability for each option to meet— (A) the at-sea requirements of the Commander that are in place as of the date of the enactment of this Act; and (B) any expected changes in such requirements. (3) An assessment of the ability for each option to meet— (A) the nuclear employment and planning guidance in place as of the date of the enactment of this Act; and (B) any expected changes in such guidance. (4) A description of the postulated threat and strategic environment used to inform the selection of a final option and how each option provides flexibility for responding to changes in the threat and strategic environment. (b) Options Considered- The options described in this subsection to replace the Ohio-class ballistic submarine program are as follows: (1) A fleet of 12 submarines with 16 missile tubes each. (2) A fleet of 10 submarines with 20 missile tubes each. (3) A fleet of 10 submarines with 16 missile tubes each. (4) A fleet of eight submarines with 20 missile tubes each. (5) Any other options the Secretary and the Commander consider appropriate. (c) Form- The report required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. Subsection (c) above states the report "shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex." The report as submitted was primarily the classified annex, with a one-page unclassified summary, the text of which is as follows (underlining as in the original): The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2012 (FY12) directed the Secretary of the Navy and the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) to jointly submit a report to the congressional defense committees comparing four different options for the OHIO Replacement (OR) fleet ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) program. Our assessment considered the current operational requirements and guidance. The four SSBN options analyzed were: 1.12 SSBNs with 16 missile tubes each 2.10 SSBNs with 20 missile tubes each 3.10 SSBNs with 16 missile tubes each 4.8 SSBNs with 20 missile tubes each The SSBN force continues to be an integral part of our nuclear Triad and contributes to deterrence through an assured second strike capability that is survivable, reliable, and credible. The number of SSBNs and their combined missile tube capacity are important factors in our flexibility to respond to changes in the threat and uncertainty in the strategic environment. We assessed each option against the ability to meet nuclear employment and planning guidance, ability to satisfy at-sea requirements, flexibility to respond to future changes in the postulated threat and strategic environment, and cost. In general, options with more SSBNs can be adjusted downward in response to a diminished threat; however, options with less SSBNs are more difficult to adjust upward in response to a growing threat. Clearly, a smaller SSBN force would be less expensive than a larger force, but for the reduced force options we assessed, they fail to meet current at-sea and nuclear employment requirements, increase risk in force survivability, and limit flexibility in response to an uncertain strategic future. Our assessment is the program of record, 12 SSBNs with 16 missile tubes each, provides the best balance of performance, flexibility, and cost meeting commander's requirements while supporting the Nation's strategic deterrence mission goals and objectives. The classified annex contains detailed analysis that is not releasable to the public. Appendix E. National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund (NSBDF) This appendix provides additional background information on the National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund (NSBDF). Created by P.L. 113-291 Section 1022 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. "Buck" McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 ( H.R. 3979 / P.L. 113-291 of December 19, 2014) created the National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund (NSBDF), a fund in the DOD budget, codified at 10 U.S.C. 2218a, that is separate from the Navy's regular shipbuilding account (which is formally known as the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy, or SCN, appropriation account). Amended by P.L. 114-92 , P.L. 114-328 , and P.L. 115-91 Section 1022 of the FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act ( S. 1356 / P.L. 114-92 of November 25, 2015), Section 1023 of the FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act ( S. 2943 / P.L. 114-328 of December 23, 2016), and Section 1022 of the FY2018 National Defense Authorization Act ( H.R. 2810 / P.L. 115-91 of December 12, 2017) amended 10 U.S.C. 2218a to provide additional acquisition authorities for the NSBDF. Text as Amended The text of 10 U.S.C. 2218a, as amended, is as follows: §2218a. National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund (a) Establishment.-There is established in the Treasury of the United States a fund to be known as the "National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund". (b) Administration of Fund.-The Secretary of Defense shall administer the Fund consistent with the provisions of this section. (c) Fund Purposes.-(1) Funds in the Fund shall be available for obligation and expenditure only for construction (including design of vessels), purchase, alteration, and conversion of national sea-based deterrence vessels. (2) Funds in the Fund may not be used for a purpose or program unless the purpose or program is authorized by law. (d) Deposits.-There shall be deposited in the Fund all funds appropriated to the Department of Defense for construction (including design of vessels), purchase, alteration, and conversion of national sea-based deterrence vessels. (e) Expiration of Funds After 5 Years.-No part of an appropriation that is deposited in the Fund pursuant to subsection (d) shall remain available for obligation more than five years after the end of fiscal year for which appropriated except to the extent specifically provided by law. (f) Authority to Enter Into Economic Order Quantity Contracts.-(1) The Secretary of the Navy may use funds deposited in the Fund to enter into contracts known as "economic order quantity contracts" with private shipyards and other commercial or government entities to achieve economic efficiencies based on production economies for major components or subsystems. The authority under this subsection extends to the procurement of parts, components, and systems (including weapon systems) common with and required for other nuclear powered vessels under joint economic order quantity contracts. (2) A contract entered into under paragraph (1) shall provide that any obligation of the United States to make a payment under the contract is subject to the availability of appropriations for that purpose, and that total liability to the Government for termination of any contract entered into shall be limited to the total amount of funding obligated at time of termination. (g) Authority to Begin Manufacturing and Fabrication Efforts Prior to Ship Authorization.-(1) The Secretary of the Navy may use funds deposited into the Fund to enter into contracts for advance construction of national sea-based deterrence vessels to support achieving cost savings through workload management, manufacturing efficiencies, or workforce stability, or to phase fabrication activities within shipyard and manage sub-tier manufacturer capacity. (2) A contract entered into under paragraph (1) shall provide that any obligation of the United States to make a payment under the contract is subject to the availability of appropriations for that purpose, and that total liability to the Government for termination of any contract entered into shall be limited to the total amount of funding obligated at time of termination. (h) Authority to Use Incremental Funding to Enter Into Contracts for Certain Items.-(1) The Secretary of the Navy may use funds deposited into the Fund to enter into incrementally funded contracts for advance procurement of high value, long lead time items for nuclear powered vessels to better support construction schedules and achieve cost savings through schedule reductions and properly phased installment payments. (2) A contract entered into under paragraph (1) shall provide that any obligation of the United States to make a payment under the contract is subject to the availability of appropriations for that purpose, and that total liability to the Government for termination of any contract entered into shall be limited to the total amount of funding obligated at time of termination. (i) Authority for Multiyear Procurement of Critical Components to Support Continuous Production.-(1) To implement the continuous production of critical components, the Secretary of the Navy may use funds deposited in the Fund, in conjunction with funds appropriated for the procurement of other nuclear-powered vessels, to enter into one or more multiyear contracts (including economic ordering quantity contracts), for the procurement of critical contractor-furnished and Government-furnished components for critical components of national sea-based deterrence vessels. The authority under this subsection extends to the procurement of equivalent critical components common with and required for other nuclear-powered vessels. (2) In each annual budget request submitted to Congress, the Secretary shall clearly identify funds requested for critical components and the individual ships and programs for which such funds are requested. (3) Any contract entered into pursuant to paragraph (1) shall provide that any obligation of the United States to make a payment under the contract is subject to the availability of appropriations for that purpose and that the total liability to the Government for the termination of the contract shall be limited to the total amount of funding obligated for the contract as of the date of the termination. (j) Budget Requests.-Budget requests submitted to Congress for the Fund shall separately identify the amount requested for programs, projects, and activities for construction (including design of vessels), purchase, alteration, and conversion of national sea-based deterrence vessels. (k) Definitions.-In this section: (1) The term "Fund" means the National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund established by subsection (a). (2) The term "national sea-based deterrence vessel" means any submersible vessel constructed or purchased after fiscal year 2016 that is owned, operated, or controlled by the Department of Defense and that carries operational intercontinental ballistic missiles. (3) The term "critical component" means any of the following: (A) A common missile compartment component. (B) A spherical air flask. (C) An air induction diesel exhaust valve. (D) An auxiliary seawater valve. (E) A hovering valve. (F) A missile compensation valve. (G) A main seawater valve. (H) A launch tube. (I) A trash disposal unit. (J) A logistics escape trunk. (K) A torpedo tube. (L) A weapons shipping cradle weldment. (M) A control surface. (N) A launcher component. (O) A propulsor. Precedents for Funding Navy Acquisition Programs Outside Navy Appropriation Accounts Prior to the establishment of the NSBDF, some observers had suggested funding the procurement of Columbia-class boats outside the Navy's shipbuilding budget, so as to preserve Navy shipbuilding funds for other Navy shipbuilding programs. There was some precedent for such an arrangement Construction of certain DOD sealift ships and Navy auxiliary ships was funded in past years in the National Defense Sealift Fund (NDSF), a part of DOD's budget that is outside the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) appropriation account, and also outside the procurement title of the DOD appropriations act. Most spending for ballistic missile defense (BMD) programs (including procurement-like activities) is funded through the Defense-Wide research and development and procurement accounts rather than through the research and development and procurement accounts of the individual military services. A rationale for funding DOD sealift ships in the NDSF had been that DOD sealift ships perform a transportation mission that primarily benefits services other than the Navy, and therefore should not be forced to compete for funding in a Navy budget account that funds the procurement of ships central to the Navy's own missions. A rationale for funding BMD programs together in the Defense-Wide research and development account is that this makes potential trade-offs in spending among various BMD programs more visible and thereby helps to optimize the use of BMD funding. Potential Implications of NSBDF on Funding Available for Other Programs The NSBDF has at least two potential implications for the impact that the Columbia-class program may have on funding available in coming years for other DOD acquisition programs A principal apparent intent in creating the NSBDF is to help preserve funding in coming years for other Navy programs, and particularly Navy shipbuilding programs other than the Columbia-class program, by placing funding for the Columbia-class program in a location within the DOD budget that is separate from the Navy's shipbuilding account and the Navy's budget in general. Referring to the fund as a national fund and locating it outside the Navy's budget appears intended to encourage a view (consistent with an argument made by supporters of the Columbia-class program that the program is intended to meet a national military need rather than a Navy-specific need) that funding for the Columbia-class program should be resourced from DOD's budget as a whole, rather than from the Navy's budget in particular. The acquisition authorities in subsections (f), (g), (h), and (i) of 10 U.S.C. 2218a, which were added by P.L. 114-92 and P.L. 114-328 , could marginally reduce the procurement costs of not only Columbia-class boats, but also other nuclear-powered ships, such as Virginia-class attack submarines and Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) class aircraft carriers, by increasing economies of scale in the production of ship components and better optimizing ship construction schedules. The joint explanatory statement for the FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act ( S. 1356 / P.L. 114-92 of November 25, 2015) directed DOD to submit a report on the "acquisition strategy to build Ohio-class replacement submarines that will leverage the enhanced procurement authorities provided in the [NSBDF] ... ." Among other things, the report was to identify "any additional authorities the Secretary [of Defense] may need to make management of the Ohio-class replacement more efficient...." The Navy submitted the report on April 18, 2016. The report states in part that the high cost for this unique, next generation strategic deterrent requires extraordinary measures to ensure its affordability. Further, procuring the OHO Replacement (OR), the next generation SSBN, within the current shipbuilding plan presents an extreme challenge to the Navy's shipbuilding budget. To minimize this challenge and reduce OR schedule risk, the Navy proposes to leverage those authorities provided by the National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund (NSBDF) in conjunction with the employment of best acquisition practices on this critical program.... ... the Navy is continuing to identify opportunities to further acquisition efficiency, reduce schedule risk, and improve program affordability. Most notably in this regard, the Navy is currently assessing [the concept of] Continuous Production [for producing components of Columbia-class boats more efficiently than currently scheduled] and will keep Congress informed as we quantify the benefits of this and other initiatives that promise substantial savings.... ... the Navy's initial assessment is that the authorities and further initiatives described [in this report] will be essential to achieving the reductions to acquisition cost and schedule risk that are so critical to success on the OR program.... Section 1022 of the FY2016 NDAA authorized the use of funds in the NSBDF to enter into contracts for EOQ [Economic Order Quantity purchases of materials and equipment] and AC [advance construction activities in shipyards], and to incrementally fund contracts for AP [advance procurement] of specific components. These authorities are essential to successfully executing the OR acquisition strategy. The Navy is able to take advantage of these authorities largely due to how its submarine shipbuilding plan is phased.... Economic Order Quantity contracts provide substantial cost savings to the Navy from procuring materials and equipment in bulk quantities. In addition to the cost savings typically associated with EOQ authority, the Navy has identified an opportunity to implement EOQ procurements to achieve OR schedule efficiencies and commonality contract actions with VCS [Virginia-class submarine] Block V [boats] and CVN [nuclear-powered aircraft carriers].... Advance Construction is the authority to begin [shipyard] construction [work] in fiscal years of AP [advance procurement] budget requests prior to the full funding/authorization year of a hull. Early manufacturing activities help retire construction risk for first-of-a-kind efforts, ease transition from design to production, and provide efficiencies in shipyard construction workload. Advance Construction would allow the shipbuilders to begin critical path construction activities earlier, thus reducing risk to the OR delivery schedule.... The FY2016 NDAA allows the Navy and shipbuilders to enter into incrementally funded procurements for long lead components that employ both AP and Full Funding (FF) SCN increments. This funding approach will provide significant schedule improvements and cost savings by maximizing the utilization of limited funding.... Maximum economic advantage can be obtained through Continuous Production. Procuring components and systems necessary for Continuous Production lines [as opposed to production lines that experience periods during which they are without work] would provide opportunities for savings through manufacturing efficiencies, increased [production-line] learning and the retention of critical production skills. In addition to lowering costs, Continuous Production would reduce schedule risk for both the U.S. and UK SSBN construction programs and minimize year-to-year funding spikes. To execute Continuous Production, the Navy requires authority to enter into contracts to procure contractor furnished and government furnished components and systems for OR SSBNs. OR Missile Tube and Missile Tube Module component procurement through Continuous Production lines have been identified as the most efficient and affordable procurement strategy.... Missile Tube Continuous Production could achieve an average reduction of 25 percent in Missile Tube procurement costs across the [Columbia] Class. These savings are compared to [the] single shipset procurement costs [that are] included in the PB17 PoR [the program of record reflected in the President's (proposed) Budget for FY2017].... The Navy estimates that procuring Missile Tube Modules in Continuous Production lines would result in a cumulative one year schedule reduction in Missile Tube Module manufacturing for the OR Class. This schedule reduction, on a potential critical path assembly, would reduce ship delivery risk and increase schedule margin for follow ship deliveries. In addition to improving schedule, Missile Tube Module Continuous Production (including Strategic Weapon System (SWS) Government Furnished Equipment (GFE)) would produce savings as high as 20 percent compared to single shipset procurement costs included in the PB17 PoR. Executing Continuous Production of Missile Tubes or Missile Tube Modules requires re-phasing of funding from outside the PB17 Future Year's Defense Program (FYDP) [to years that are within the FYDP] but results in significant overall program reductions. The Navy is evaluating additional Continuous Production opportunities for nuclear and nonnuclear components with common vendors required for VIRGINIA Class submarines and FORD Class aircraft carriers. Some examples include spherical air flasks, hull valves, pressure hull hemi heads, bow domes, castings, and torpedo tubes. The prerequisite to Continuous Production in each of these cases would be an affirmation of design stability consistent with completion of first article testing, or its equivalent.... The Navy's position on the cost benefits of these authorities is not fully developed. However, the Congressional Budget Office stated in its Analysis of the Navy's FY2016 Shipbuilding Plan , " ... the Navy could potentially save several hundred million dollars per submarine by purchasing components and materials for several submarines at the same time."... The Navy's initial cost analysis aligns with CBO's projections, and the cost reductions from employing these acquisition authorities will be further evaluated to support the Navy's updated OR Milestone B cost estimate in August 2016.... The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD AT&L) approved the OR Program Acquisition Strategy on January 4, 2016. This strategy emphasizes using alternative acquisition tools and cross-platform contracting to reduce schedule risk and lower costs in support of the Navy's shipbuilding programs.... To reduce costs and help alleviate fiscal pressures, the Navy will work with Congress to implement granted authorities and explore the additional initiatives identified in this report.... The cost reductions from employing the granted and proposed acquisition authorities will be further evaluated to support the Navy's updated OR Milestone B cost estimate in August 2016.... These authorities are needed with the National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund, RDTEN [research, development, test, and evaluation, Navy], and SCN appropriations accounts. Together, these acquisition tools will allow the Navy, and the shipbuilders, to implement the procurement strategy which will reduce total OR acquisition costs and shorten construction schedules for a program with no margin for delay.

The Columbia (SSBN-826) class program is a program to design and build a class of 12 new ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) to replace the Navy's current force of 14 aging Ohio-class SSBNs. The Navy has identified the Columbia-class program as the Navy's top priority program. The Navy wants to procure the first Columbia-class boat in FY2021. Research and development work on the program has been underway for several years, and advance procurement (AP) funding for the program began in FY2017. The Navy's proposed FY2020 budget requests $1,698.9 million in advance procurement (AP) funding and $533.1 million in research and development funding for the program. The Navy's FY2020 budget submission estimates the total procurement cost of the 12-ship class at $109.0 billion in then-year dollars. An April 2018 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report assessing selected major DOD weapon acquisition programs stated that the estimated total acquisition cost of the Columbia-class program is $102,075.3 million (about $102.1 billion) in constant FY2018 dollars, including $12,901.0 million (about $12.9 billion) in research and development costs and $89,174.3 million (about $89.2 billion) in procurement costs. Issues for Congress for the Columbia-class program include the following: whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy's FY2020 funding requests for the program; the risk of cost growth in the program; the risk of technical challenges or funding-related issues that could lead to delays in designing and building the lead boat in the program and having it ready for its scheduled initial deterrent patrol in 2031; the potential impact of the Columbia-class program on funding that will be available for other Navy programs, including other shipbuilding programs; and potential industrial-base challenges of building both Columbia-class boats and Virginia-class attack submarines (SSNs) at the same time. This report focuses on the Columbia-class program as a Navy shipbuilding program. CRS Report RL33640, U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues, by Amy F. Woolf, discusses the Columbia class as an element of future U.S. strategic nuclear forces in the context of strategic nuclear arms control agreements.

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M ost of the funding for the activities of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) comes from discretionary appropriations provided each year in annual appropriations acts, typically as a part of the Transportation, HUD, and Related Agencies appropriations bill (THUD). HUD's programs are designed primarily to address housing problems faced by households with very low incomes or other special housing needs and to expand access to homeownership. Three main rental assistance programs—Section 8 tenant-based rental assistance (which funds Section 8 Housing Choice Vouchers), Section 8 project-based rental assistance, and public housing—account for the majority of the department's funding (about 78% of total HUD appropriations in FY2018; see Figure 1 ). All three programs provide deep subsidies allowing low-income recipients to pay below-market, income-based rents. Additional, smaller programs are targeted specifically to persons who are elderly and persons with disabilities. Two flexible block grant programs—the HOME Investment Partnerships grant program and the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program—help states and local governments finance a variety of housing and community development activities designed to serve low-income families. Following disasters, special supplemental CDBG disaster recovery (CDBG-DR) grants are funded by Congress to help communities rebuild damaged housing and community infrastructure. Native American tribes receive their own direct housing grants through the Native American Housing Block Grant. Other, more-specialized grant programs help communities meet the needs of homeless persons, through the Homeless Assistance Grants and the Continuum of Care and Emergency Solutions Grants programs, as well as those living with HIV/AIDS. Additional programs fund fair housing enforcement activities and healthy homes activities, including lead-based paint hazard identification and remediation. HUD's Federal Housing Administration (FHA) insures mortgages made by lenders to homebuyers with low down payments and to developers of multifamily rental buildings containing relatively affordable units. FHA collects fees from insured borrowers, which are used to sustain its insurance funds. Surplus FHA funds have been used to offset the cost of the HUD budget. This In Brief report tracks progress on FY2019 HUD appropriations and provides detailed account-level, and in some cases subaccount-level, funding information ( Table 1 ) as well as a discussion of selected key issues. For more information about the Transportation, HUD, and Related Agencies appropriations bill see CRS Report R45487, Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies (THUD) Appropriations for FY2019: In Brief , by Maggie McCarty and David Randall Peterman. For more information on trends in HUD funding, see CRS Report R42542, Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD): Funding Trends Since FY2002 . Figure 1. Composition of HUD's Budget, FY2018Gross Budget AuthoritySource: Prepared by CRS, based on data in Table 1.Notes: Primary rental assistance programs include Tenant-based Rental Assistance (Housing Choice Voucher Program), Public Housing Capital Fund, Public Housing Operating Fund, Choice Neighborhoods, Family Self Sufficiency Program, and Project-based Rental Assistance. Formula grants include CDBG, HOME, Homeless Assistance Grants, Housing for Persons with AIDS (HOPWA), and Native American Housing Block Grants. Other programs and activities encompass the remainder of HUD accounts. Status of Appropriations The FY2019 appropriations process spanned two Congresses, both of which took action, as summarized below. Action in the 115th Congress President's Budget On February 12, 2018, the Trump Administration submitted its FY2019 budget request to Congress. The budget request was released before final FY2018 appropriations were enacted and shortly after enactment of the Bipartisan Budget Act of FY2018 (BBA; P.L. 115-123 ), which, among other things, increased the statutory limits on discretionary spending for FY2018 and FY2019. The President's FY2019 request proposed $41.4 billion in gross discretionary appropriations for HUD, which is the amount of new budget authority available for HUD programs and activities, not accounting for savings from offsets and other sources. That amount is about $11.3 billion (21.5%) less than was provided in FY2018. Most of that reduction ($7.7 billion) is attributable to program eliminations proposed by the President, including CDBG, HOME, Public Housing Capital Funding, Choice Neighborhoods grants, and the programs funded in the Self-Help Homeownership Opportunity Program (SHOP) account. House Action On May 23, 2018, the House Appropriations Committee approved its version of a FY2019 THUD appropriations bill ( H.R. 6072 ; H.Rept. 115-750 ), about a week after THUD subcommittee approval (May 16, 2018). The bill included $53.2 billion in gross funding for HUD, or $43.7 billion after accounting for savings from offsets and rescissions. This is about 29% more in gross funding than was requested by the President and slightly more (1%) than was provided in FY2018. The bill did not include the program eliminations proposed by the President, and instead funded CDBG and the Public Housing Capital Fund at FY2018 levels while reducing funding for the HOME and SHOP accounts (-12% and -7%, respectively). Senate Action On June 7, 2018, the Senate Appropriations Committee approved its version of a FY2019 THUD appropriations bill ( S. 3023 ; S.Rept. 115-268 ), two days after THUD subcommittee approval. It included more than $54 billion in gross funding for HUD, or $44.5 billion after accounting for savings from offsets and rescissions. This is 30% more in gross funding than was requested by the President, and about 2.5% more than was provided in FY2018. Like the House committee-passed bill, S. 3023 did not include the President's proposed program eliminations, and instead proposed funding those programs at their prior-year levels. On August 1, 2018, the Senate approved H.R. 6147 , the Financial Services Appropriations bill, which was amended to include four regular appropriations acts, including the text of S. 3023 as Division D. Several HUD-related amendments were approved during floor consideration, none of which changed funding levels. Continuing Resolutions and Funding Lapse On September 28, 2018, a continuing resolution (CR) through December 7, 2018, was enacted as part of a consolidated full-year Defense and Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education spending bill ( P.L. 115-245 , Division C). The CR covered the agencies and activities generally funded under seven regular FY2019 appropriations bills that had not been enacted before the end of the fiscal year, including THUD. On December 7, 2018, the previous CR was extended through December 21, 2018 ( P.L. 115-298 ). No further funding action was completed before the expiration of the CR on December 21, 2018, and a funding lapse affecting the unfunded portions of the federal government, including HUD, commenced on December 22, 2018. 116th Congress Legislative Action During the Funding Lapse Following the start of the 116 th Congress and during the funding lapse, the House passed several full-year THUD funding bills, none of which were taken up in the Senate. These include the following: H.R. 21 , an omnibus funding bill, which included THUD language identical to that which had passed the Senate in the 115 th Congress in H.R. 6147 ; H.R. 267 , a standalone THUD bill, again containing language identical to the 115 th Congress Senate-passed THUD language; and H.R. 648 , an omnibus funding bill containing provisions and funding levels characterized by the chairwoman of the House Appropriations Committee as reflecting House-Senate conference negotiations on H.R. 6147 from the 115 th Congress. (The Transportation, HUD, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 2019 was included as Division F.) On January 16, 2019, the House passed H.R. 268 , a supplemental appropriations bill. As passed by the House, the bill would have provided supplemental appropriations to HUD (as well as other agencies) in response to the major disasters of 2018. The bill also contained CR provisions to extend regular appropriations through February 8, 2019, for agencies and programs affected by the funding lapse. On January 24, 2019, the Senate considered H.R. 268 , the supplemental appropriations bill that previously passed the House. One amendment, S.Amdt. 5 , offered by Senator Shelby, included additional funding for border security, as well as full-year appropriations for those agencies affected by the funding lapse. The THUD provisions in Division G were identical to those that had passed the Senate in the 115 th Congress in H.R. 6147 . The Senate voted not to invoke cloture on S.Amdt. 5 on January 24, 2019. Enactment of Third Continuing Resolution Late on January 25, 2019, a CR ( H.J.Res. 28 ; P.L. 116-5 ) was enacted, providing funding through February 15, 2019, for THUD and the six other funding bills that had not received full-year funding, allowing HUD and the other agencies that had been subject to the funding lapse to resume full operations. Enactment of Full-Year Appropriations On February 15, 2019, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P.L. 116-6 ) was enacted providing full-year appropriations for the remaining agencies that had lacked full-year appropriations. The Transportation, HUD, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 2019 was included as Division G and its text mirrored that of H.R. 648 . Selected Issues Housing Choice Voucher Renewal Funding The cost of renewing existing Section 8 Housing Choice Vouchers is generally one of the most high-profile HUD funding issues each year. It is the largest single expense in the largest account (the tenant-based rental assistance account) in HUD's budget. All of the roughly 2 million portable rental vouchers that are currently authorized and in use are funded annually, so for the low-income families currently renting housing with their vouchers to continue to receive assistance (i.e., renew their leases at the end of the year), new funding is needed each year. If the amount ultimately provided proves to be less than the amount needed to fund all vouchers currently in use, then several things may happen. The Public Housing Authorities (PHAs)—the state-chartered entities that administer the program at the local level—with reserve funding from prior years, may spend some of those reserves to maintain current services. PHAs without reserve funding may apply to HUD for a share of the set-aside funding that is generally provided in the annual appropriations acts to the department and allowed to be used to prevent termination of assistance. And PHAs may undertake cost-saving measures, such as not reissuing vouchers to families on their waiting lists when currently assisted families leave the program. Conversely, if the amount is greater than the amount needed to renew existing vouchers, PHAs may be able to serve additional families from their waiting lists. Although the President's budget request, the House committee-reported HUD appropriations bill, and the Senate bill all included different funding levels for voucher renewals for FY2019, each purported to provide enough to fund all vouchers currently in use. The final FY2019 enacted funding level was $22.598 billion, an amount between the House committee-reported and Senate-passed levels. Advocacy groups have estimated that the amount provided will be enough at least to renew all existing voucher holders' leases, as well as potentially serve some additional families. Funding for Public Housing The low-rent public housing program houses approximately 1 million families in properties owned by local PHAs but subsidized by the federal government. PHAs' budgets for public housing are made up of rent paid by tenants and formula grant funding from the federal government to make up the difference between the rents collected from tenants and the cost of maintaining the properties. The two primary formula funding programs are Operating Fund program and Capital Fund program. Additionally, PHAs may apply for competitive Choice Neighborhood Initiative grants. The largest source of federal funding to support the low-rent public housing program is provided through the public housing Operating Fund account. Operating funds are allocated to PHAs according to a formula that estimates what it should cost PHAs to maintain their public housing properties based on the characteristics of those properties. When the amount of appropriations provided is insufficient to fully fund the amount PHAs qualify for under the formula, their allocation is prorated. Assuming the Operating Fund formula accurately reflects the costs of maintaining public housing, less than full funding means PHAs either will not be able to meet their full operating needs (e.g., maintenance, staffing, services for residents) or will have to spend down reserves they may have accumulated or seek other sources of funding. According to HUD's Congressional Budget Justifications, the amount requested in the President's budget for the Operating Fund for FY2019 (a 28% decrease from FY2018) would be sufficient to fund an estimated 54% of PHAs' formula eligibility in CY2019 (the program runs on a calendar year basis). Both the House committee-passed bill and the Senate bill proposed more funding than requested, but neither proposed the full amount the President's budget estimated would be needed to fully fund PHAs' formula eligibility in CY2019. The final HUD appropriations law provided $4.65 billion for operating funding in FY2019, which is more than the House committee-passed bill, but less than the Senate level. While it is not expected to fund 100% of formula eligibility in CY2019, the funding increase may result in a higher proration level than CY2018. The other major source of federal funding for public housing is the Capital Fund. Capital Fund formula grants are used to meet the major modernization needs of public housing, beyond the day-to-day maintenance expenses included among operating expenses. The most recent national assessment of public housing capital needs sponsored by HUD found that inadequate funding had resulted in a backlog of about $25.6 billion in capital/modernization needs across the public housing stock, with new needs accruing nationally at a rate of about $3.4 billion per year. For FY2019, the President's budget requested no funding for the Capital Fund, citing federal fiscal constraints and a desire to "strategically reduce the footprint of Public Housing." Both the House committee bill and the Senate bill would have provided funding for the Capital Fund, with H.Rept. 115-750 explicitly stating that it rejected the Administration's proposed strategic reduction of public housing. The final FY2019 appropriations law provided $2.775 billion for the Capital Fund, a $25 million increase over FY2018 funding. That $25 million is provided as a set-aside to provide grants to PHAs to address lead hazards in public housing. Similarly, the Administration's budget requested no new funding for competitive Choice Neighborhoods grants that are used to redevelop distressed public housing and other assisted housing. Both the House committee bill and the Senate bill proposed to fund the program. The House committee bill proposed even funding with FY2018 ($150 million) and the Senate bill proposed a decrease in funding relative to FY2018 (a reduction of $50 million, or 33%). The final FY2019 appropriations law funded the account at the FY2018 level of $150 million. Funding for HUD Grant Programs The President's budget request included a proposal to eliminate funding for several HUD grant programs that support various affordable housing and community development activities. Most notable among these are HUD's two largest block grant programs for states and localities, CDBG and HOME, as well as competitive grants funded in the SHOP account (i.e., funding for sweat-equity programs, like Habitat for Humanity, and certain capacity building programs). These grant programs were also slated for elimination in the President's FY2018 budget request, although they were ultimately funded in FY2018. The press release accompanying the budget request suggested that the activities funded by these grant programs should be devolved to the state and local levels. Both the House committee bill and the Senate bill would have continued funding for these programs. The House committee bill would have provided level funding for CDBG, but funding reductions for the other accounts. The Senate bill would have provided level funding for all three accounts. Like the House committee and Senate bills, the final FY2019 appropriations law continued funding for all three accounts. In the case of CDBG and SHOP, it provided level funding with FY2018 at $3.365 billion and $54 million, respectively; in the case of HOME, the FY2019 law decreased funding by 8.2% relative to FY2018, bringing it down to $1.250 billion. FHA and Ginnie Mae Offsets Under the terms of the Budget Control Act, as amended, discretionary appropriations are generally subject to limits, or caps, on the amount of funding that can be provided in a fiscal year. In addition, the annual appropriations bills also are individually subject to limits on the funding within them that are associated with the annual congressional budget resolution. Congressional appropriators can keep these bills within their respective limits in a number of ways, including by providing less funding for certain purposes to allow for increases elsewhere in the bill. In certain circumstances, appropriators also can credit "offsetting collections" or "offsetting receipts" against the funding in the bill, thereby lowering the net amount of budget authority in that bill. In the THUD bill, the largest source of these offsets is generally the Federal Housing Administration (FHA). FHA generates offsetting receipts when estimates suggest that the loans that it will insure during the fiscal year are expected to collect more in fees paid by borrowers than will be needed to pay default claims to lenders over the life of those loans.  While usually not as large a source, the Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA), or Ginnie Mae, generally provides significant offsets within the THUD bill as well. GNMA guarantees mortgage-backed securities made up of government-insured mortgages (such as FHA-insured mortgages) and similarly generates offsetting receipts when the associated fees it collects are estimated to exceed any payments made on its guarantee. The amount of offsets available from FHA and GNMA varies from year to year based on estimates of the amount of mortgages that FHA will insure, and that GNMA will guarantee, in a given year and how much those mortgages are expected to earn for the government. These estimates, in turn, are based on expectations about the housing market, the economy, the credit quality of borrowers, and relevant fee levels, most of which are factors outside of the immediate control of policymakers. If the amount of available offsets increases from one year to the next, then additional funds could be appropriated relative to the prior year's funding level while still maintaining the same overall net level of budget authority. If the amount of offsets decreases, however, then less funding would need to be appropriated relative to the prior year to avoid increasing the overall net level of budget authority, all else equal. For FY2019, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that offsetting receipts available from FHA would be lower than in FY2018 ($7.6 billion compared to $8.3 billion) while the amount of offsets available from Ginnie Mae would be higher (about $2 billion compared to $1.7 billion). The total combined amount of offsets, then, was estimated at about $500 million less in FY2019 as compared to the prior year. As a result of this lower amount of offsets, the increase in net budget authority proposed in both the House committee bill and the Senate bill, as well as that ultimately provided by the final FY2019 appropriations law, as compared to FY2018 is greater than the increase in gross appropriations for HUD programs and activities.

The programs and activities of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) are designed primarily to address housing problems faced by households with very low incomes or other special housing needs and to expand access to homeownership. Nearly all of the department's budget comes from discretionary appropriations provided each year in the annual appropriations acts, typically as a part of the Transportation, HUD, and Related Agencies appropriations bill (THUD). On February 12, 2018, the Trump Administration submitted its FY2019 budget request to Congress, including $41.4 billion in gross new budget authority for HUD (not accounting for savings from offsets or rescissions). That is about $11.3 billion (21.5%) less than was provided in FY2018. Most of that reduction ($7.7 billion) is attributable to proposed program eliminations, including Community Development Block Grants (CDBG), the HOME Investment Partnerships grant program, Public Housing Capital Funding, Choice Neighborhoods grants, and the programs funded in the Self-Help Homeownership Opportunity Program (SHOP) account. On May 23, 2018, the House Appropriations Committee approved its version of a FY2019 THUD appropriations bill ( H.R. 6072 ; H.Rept. 115-750 ), which proposed $53.2 billion in gross funding for HUD. This was about 29% more in gross funding than was requested by the President and slightly more (1%) than was provided in FY2018. The bill did not include the program eliminations proposed by the President, and instead proposed to fund CDBG and the Public Housing Capital Fund at FY2018 levels while reducing funding for the HOME and SHOP accounts (-12% and -7%, respectively). On August 1, 2018, the Senate approved H.R. 6147 , the Financial Services Appropriations bill, which had been amended to include the Senate Appropriations Committee-approved version of a FY2019 THUD appropriations bill ( S. 3023 , incorporated as Division D), along with three other appropriations bills. It included more than $54 billion in gross funding for HUD. This is 30% more in gross funding than was requested by the President, and about 2.5% more than was provided in FY2018. Like H.R. 6072 , the Senate-passed bill did not include the President's proposed program eliminations, and instead proposed to fund those programs at their prior-year levels. Final FY2019 appropriations were not completed before the start of the fiscal year. Funding for HUD and most other federal agencies was continued under a series of continuing resolutions until December 21, 2018, at which point funding lapsed and a partial government shutdown commenced. It continued until January 25, 2019, when another short-term continuing resolution was enacted. Final FY2019 HUD appropriations were enacted on February 15, 2019 as a part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P.L. 116-6 ). Appropriations for Selected HUD Accounts, FY2018-FY2019 (dollars in millions)

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Introduction The U.S. corporate income tax is based on worldwide economic activity. If all of a corporation's economic activity is in the United States, then tax administration and compliance is relatively straightforward. Many corporations, however, operate in several jurisdictions, which creates complications for tax administration and compliance. Further, corporations may actively choose where and how to organize to reduce their U.S. and worldwide tax liabilities. Some of these strategies have been referred to as expatriation, inversions, and mergers. This report begins with a brief discussion of relevant portions of the U.S. corporate income tax system before examining how inversions were commonly structured. The report then looks at how Congress and the Department of the Treasury have reduced the benefits of inversions. The report concludes with an examination of remaining methods for inverting and policy options available to prevent or limit these inversions. Achieving tax savings using an inversion became more difficult with the enactment of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (JOBS Act; P.L. 108-357 ). The JOBS Act denied or restricted the tax benefits of an inversion if the owners of the new company were not substantially different from the owners of the original company. The act also allowed a firm to invert only if it had substantial business operations in the country where the new headquarters was to be located. Although the 2004 legislation largely prevented the types of inversions that drew attention prior to its adoption, several companies have successfully inverted in the past few years by using the substantive business operations mechanism or merging. Treasury regulations have subsequently limited the former mechanism. In spring 2014, several high-profile companies indicated an interest in merging or plans to merge with a non-U.S. firm, including Pfizer, Chiquita, and Omnicom (an advertising firm). News reports indicated that a group of Walgreens investors was also urging such a move. Although the Pfizer and Omnicon mergers and Walgreens headquarters shifts ultimately did not take place, other firms announced mergers in the late spring and early summer. A number of firms in the medical device or pharmaceuticals fields announced mergers or proposed mergers with a shift of headquarters: Medtronics, Salix, AbbVie, Mylan, and Hospira. In August 2014, concern about inversions increased with the announcement that Burger King was in talks to merge with Tim Hortons, a Canadian firm, with the merged firm's headquarters in Canada. An agreement was announced on August 26. Although Burger King is a smaller firm than AbbVie, for example, it is a household name and this proposed inversion garnered much attention. In September 2014, the Treasury Department released a notice of regulatory changes that would restrict some aspects of inversions or their benefits and indicated that other actions may follow. AbbVie, Chiquita, and some other firms canceled their plans in the wake of these Treasury regulations, although new merger proposals were also announced. In November 2015, the Treasury announced additional regulatory restrictions. Although new inversions slowed significantly, others continued but in many cases have been structured to avoid the regulations by reducing ownership below 60%. Most notable of these is the proposed merger of Pfizer with Allergan in November 2015. Pfizer terminated the merger after the release of the April 4, 2016, regulations. This "second wave" of inversions again raised concerns about an erosion of the U.S. tax base. While the substantial business avenue appears to have been largely eliminated by Treasury regulations that increased the required share of activity, the option of merging with a smaller foreign company remains. U.S. firms may also merge with larger firms, although in this case the tax benefits are less likely to be key factors in the decision to merge. Data released by the Bureau of Economic Analysis indicated that acquisitions by foreigners, which rose substantially in 2015, fell by 15% in 2016, and by 32% in 2017. Some of the largest declines were in countries associated with inversions, such as Ireland, where acquisitions fell from $176 billion in 2015, to $35 billion in 2016, and to $7 billion in 2017. In December 2017, a tax revision ( P.L. 115-97 ), often called the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA), and subsequently referred to as the "Act," made major changes to the corporate tax and the international tax rules, along with some specific revisions aimed at discouraging inversions. Although data for 2018 are not yet available, one planned inversion, by Assurant, Inc., was revised to retain the headquarters in the United States. Ohio-based Dana, Inc. announced plans to merge and move the headquarters to the U.K., although the merger would leave the U.S. shareholders with less than 60% ownership, and therefore not make them subject to anti-inversion penalties. U.S. International Tax System The United States uses a system that taxes both the worldwide income of U.S. corporations and the income of foreign firms earned within U.S. borders. All income earned within U.S. borders is taxed the same—in the year earned and at statutory tax rates of 21% (reduced from 35% by the Act). Under pre-Act law, U.S. corporate income earned outside the United States was also subject to U.S. taxation, though not necessarily in the year earned. This treatment occurred because U.S. corporations could defer U.S. tax on active income earned abroad in foreign subsidiaries until it was paid, or repatriated, to the U.S. parent company as a dividend. To mitigate double taxation, tax due on repatriated income was reduced by the amount of foreign taxes already paid. The Act substituted a new system (Global Intangible Low-Taxed Income, or GILTI) that taxed foreign source income of U.S. subsidiaries currently but with an exemption for a deemed return of 10% on tangible assets and a deduction from the remaining income (for 50% of income through 2025 and 37.5% afterward). It allows a credit for 80% of foreign taxes. The new system also allows U.S. firms a deduction for foreign derived intangible income, or FDII, which was designed to reduce tax rates on foreign earnings from the use of intangible assets held in the United States. The deduction is 37.5% of this estimated income through 2025 and 21.875% afterward. Income from certain foreign sources earned by subsidiaries—which generally includes passive types of income, such as interest, dividends, annuities, rents, and royalties, and is referred to as Subpart F income—is generally taxed in the year it is earned and was retained by the Act. Subpart F applies only to shareholders who may be able to influence location decisions at the corporate level. These subsidiaries are referred to as controlled foreign corporations (CFCs). The Act also adopted the Base Erosion and Anti-Abuse tax (BEAT), an alternative minimum tax with the tax based increased by certain payments to related foreign parties. Its primary focus was to address profit shifting between foreign parents and U.S. subsidiaries, but it applies in general. Notably, it excludes payments for costs of goods sold and for costs of services under some pricing rules. One way of shifting profits was to locate debt in high-tax countries. Preexisting thin capitalization rules limited interest to 50% of earnings before the deduction of interest, taxes, and amortization, deprec iation, and depletion (EBITA), although firms with a debt-to-asset rate of 1.5 or less were exempt. The new law adopted much stricter thin capitalization rules to prevent firms from deducting large amounts of interest. The new law lowers the cap to 30% of profits, eliminates the exemption based on the debt-to-asset ratio and, after 2021, measures the cap as a share of profits after amortization, depreciation, and depletion deductions. The Act also adopted some tax provisions targeted at discouraging inversions, which are discussed subsequently. Anatomy of an Inversion A corporate inversion is a process by which an existing U.S. corporation changes its country of residence. After the inversion, the original U.S. corporation becomes a subsidiary of a foreign parent corporation. Corporate inversions occur through three different paths: the substantial activity test, merger with a larger foreign firm, and merger with a smaller foreign firm. Regardless of the form of the inversion, the typical result is that the new foreign parent company faces a lower home country tax rate and no tax on the company's foreign-source income. The U.S. firm can use inversions to reduce taxes using various techniques. Foreign operations in the future can be formed as subsidiaries of the new foreign parent in a country with a territorial tax, so that future foreign income can be exempt from tax. Accumulated and future foreign income from the U.S. company's foreign subsidiaries (which would be taxed by the United States if paid to the parent as a dividend) may be effectively repatriated tax free by lending or otherwise investing in the related foreign firm, such as a low-interest loan to the foreign parent holding company. These borrowed funds could then be used, for example, to pay dividends to shareholders or make loans to the U.S. firm. In addition, the combined firm can engage in "earnings stripping": reducing income in the U.S. firm by borrowing from the U.S. company and increasing interest deductions. For example, a foreign parent may lend to its U.S. subsidiary. This intercompany debt does not alter the overall company's debt, but does result in an interest expense in the United States (which reduces U.S. taxes paid) and an increased portion of company income being "booked" outside the United States. Royalty payments, management fees, and transfer pricing arrangements are other avenues for earnings stripping, but are thought to be of lesser importance than intercompany debt. Substantial Business Presence In this form of inversion, a U.S. corporation with substantial business activity in a foreign company creates a foreign subsidiary. The U.S. corporation and foreign subsidiary exchange stock—resulting in each entity owning some of the other's stock. After the stock exchange, the new entity is a foreign corporation with a U.S. subsidiary, as the exchange is generally in proportion to the respective company valuations. As this form of inversion does not require any change in the effective control of the corporation, it is referred to as a "naked inversion." U.S. Corporation Acquired by a Larger Foreign Corporation In this form of inversion, a U.S. corporation would like to bolster its foreign operations and, perhaps, lower its U.S. tax. To do so, the U.S. corporation merges with a larger foreign corporation, with the U.S. shareholders owning a minority share of the new merged company. This results in the effective control of the new company being outside U.S. borders. While this form of inversion may be driven by business considerations, tax considerations may also be part of the decision. An example of this can be seen in the following statement by the board of directors of a U.S. corporation recommending approval of a merger with a U.K. corporation. The board of directors pursued the merger in part because Ensco was headquartered in a jurisdiction that has a favorable tax regime and an extensive network of tax treaties, which can allow the combined company to achieve a global effective tax rate comparable to Pride's competitors. In this case, a U.S. firm, Pride, merged with a U.K. firm, Ensco, and the headquarters remained in the U.K. A Smaller Foreign Corporation Acquired by a U.S. Corporation In this form of inversion, a U.S. corporation would like to bolster its foreign operations and lower its U.S. tax. To do so, the U.S. corporation merges with a smaller foreign corporation, with the U.S. shareholders owning a majority share of the new merged company. This merger results in the effective control of the new company staying with the shareholders of the U.S. corporations. While this form of inversion may be driven by business considerations, tax considerations may also be part of the decision. An example is the Eaton Cooper merger. The following is an excerpt of a U.S. corporation's (Eaton's) press release announcing the acquisition of an Irish company (Cooper), with the company headquartering in Ireland (with a 12.5% tax rate and a territorial system). At the close of the transaction ... Eaton and Cooper will be combined under a new company incorporated in Ireland, where Cooper is incorporated today. The newly created company, which is expected to be called Eaton Global Corporation Plc or a variant thereof ("New Eaton"), will be led by Alexander M. Cutler, Eaton's current chairman and chief executive officer. At the close of the merger, it was expected that the shareholders of the U.S. company would control 73% of the combined company, with the shareholders of the Irish company controlling the remaining 27%. The press release notes expected tax benefits from the merger at $165 million in 2016, out of $535 million of total cost savings. In this case, a U.S. corporation used a merger to achieve an inversion while its shareholders retained a significant majority of shares. Response to Initial Inversions: The American Jobs Creation Act In the late 1990s and early 2000s, news reports drew the attention of policymakers and the public to a phenomenon sometimes called corporate "inversions" or "expatriations": instances where firms that consist of multiple corporations reorganize their structure so that the "parent" element of the group is a foreign corporation rather than a corporation chartered in the United States. Among the more high-profile inversions were Ingersoll-Rand, Tyco, the PXRE Group, Foster Wheeler, Nabors Industries, and Coopers Industries. These corporate inversions apparently involved few, if any, shifts in actual economic activity from the United States abroad, at least in the near term. In particular, inverted firms typically continued to maintain headquarters in the United States and did not systematically shift capital or employment abroad post inversion. Further, Bermuda and the Cayman Islands were the location of many of the newly created parent corporations—jurisdictions that have no corporate income tax but that also do have highly developed legal, institutional, and communications infrastructures. A 2002 study by the U.S. Treasury Department concluded that while inversions were not new—the statutory framework making them possible has long been in existence—there had been a "marked increase" in their frequency, size, and visibility. Taken together, these facts suggested that tax savings were one goal of the inversion, if not the primary goal. Beyond taxes, firms engaged in the inversions cited a number of reasons for undertaking them, including creating greater "operational flexibility," improved cash management, and an enhanced ability to access international capital markets. The 2002 Treasury report identified three main concerns about corporate inversions: erosion of the U.S. tax base, a cost advantage for foreign-controlled firms, and a reduction in perceived fairness of the tax system. These concerns, along with a growing awareness of inversion transactions, may have resulted in congressional concern and debate about how to address the issues surrounding inversions, culminating with the enactment of an anti-inversion provision (Section 7874) in the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (AJCA; P.L. 108-357 ). The AJCA adopted two alternative tax regimes applicable to inversions occurring after March 4, 2003. The AJCA treats the inverted foreign parent company as a domestic corporation if it is owned by at least 80% of the former parent's stockholders. In these cases, the AJCA would deny the firm any tax benefits of the inversion (i.e., it would continue to be taxed on the combined group's worldwide income). The second regime applies when there is at least 60% continuity of ownership but less than 80%. In this case, the new foreign parent is not taxed like a domestic corporation, but any U.S. toll taxes (taxes on gains) that apply to transfers of assets to the new entity are not permitted to be offset by foreign tax credits or net operating losses. The AJCA also exempted corporations with substantial economic activity in the foreign country from the anti-inversion provisions, but it did not define substantial business activity in the statute. Post-2004 Inversions and Treasury Regulations of 2012 Although the 2004 act largely eliminated the generic naked inversions, two alternatives remained that allowed a firm to shift headquarters and retain control of the business: the naked inversion via the business activity exemption, and merger with a smaller company. Using the business activity route would require significant economic operations in the target country. An inversion by merger would require a large firm that would be at least 25% of the size of the U.S. firm. The post-2004 approaches to inversions no longer involved countries such as Bermuda and the Cayman Islands, but larger countries with substantial economic activity such as the U.K., Canada, and Ireland. The U.K., in particular, has become a much more attractive headquarters. Because of freedom of movement rules in the European Union, the U.K. cannot have anti-inversion laws, which may have played a role in both moving to a territorial tax and lowering the corporate tax rate. A 2012 report in the Wall Street Journal highlighted some recent moves abroad. This report claimed 10 companies had inverted since 2009, with 6 within the past year or so. This was a small number of companies, but it is useful to look at the methods involved. The Wall Street Journal article identified by name 5 of the 10 companies that had moved abroad recently: Aon, ENSCO, Rowan, Eaton, and DE Master Blenders 1763. (The article also referred to Transocean and Weatherford International, but these were firms that had inverted before the 2004 legislation: Transocean first to the Cayman Islands, and then Switzerland, and Weatherford first to Bermuda, and then Switzerland.) The remaining firm mentioned in the Wall Street Journal article is Eaton. Eaton's move abroad was a merger; it merged with Coopers, a firm effectively operating its headquarters in the United States, but one that had inverted prior to the 2004 law change. An article by Bret Wells identified Aon, ENSCO, and Rowan as having inverted via the substantial business activity exemption (where the only apparent objective is tax savings). All three moved to the United Kingdom, where a recent move to a territorial tax, as well as decisions in the European Court of Justice that limited their anti-abuse rules, had made their tax system more attractive. The U.K. was also in the process of lowering its own corporate rate. Two of the firms are oil drilling firms; drilling in the North Sea might have affected their ability to use this exemption. Aon is an insurance firm. Wells mentions another firm, Tim Hortons, which also used a naked inversion using the substantial business activity exemption in 2009 to relocate to Canada. In doing so, the firm was returning to its origins, as it was founded in Canada. It became an American company when Wendy's acquired it in 1995, but it was subsequently spun off in 2006. DE Master Blenders 1763, like Tim Hortons, was returning to its origins as well (a Netherlands firm), as it was spun off from Sara Lee, which had acquired it in 1978. In response to increased use of the substantial business activity exemption, Treasury Regulations (T.D. 9592, June 12, 2012) increased the safe harbor for the substantial business activities test from 10% to 25%, effectively closing off this avenue in the future. This action could be done by regulation because the statute did not specify how the substantial business activity test was to be implemented. A number of mergers have either been effectuated or were proposed: Chiquita, Actavis, and Perrigo (the latter two are pharmaceutical firms) moving to Ireland; Valeant Pharmaceuticals and Endo Health Services moving to Canada; and Liberty Global (a cable company) to the U.K. Subsequently, the new Irish firm Actavis (itself the result of two prior mergers) merged with Forest Labs. Omnicom (an advertising firm) planned a move to the U.K. (after proposed merger with a French firm, creating a Netherlands holding company, resident in the U.K. for tax purposes), but has abandoned its merger. Chiquita canceled its plans after Treasury regulations were issued in September 2014. Most of these firms are not household names or industry giants. Thus, perhaps none created as much interest as the attempt by pharmacy giant Pfizer to acquire AstraZeneca with a U.K. headquarters, or the urging of some stockholders of Walgreens to invert to Switzerland. Pfizer represented a significant potential loss of future tax revenue, as much as $1.4 billion per year. According to a study by Martin Sullivan, in 2005, when a temporary tax exclusion of 85% of dividends (the repatriation holiday) was in force, Pfizer repatriated $37 billion, the single largest amount of repatriations of any firm. In 2009, Pfizer repatriated $34 billion (and paid U.S. taxes on that amount) to finance the acquisition of Wyeth, but earnings abroad grew from $42 billion in 2009 (after the repatriation) to $73 billion by 2012. These earnings have not been repatriated and taxed in the United States. An inversion by Pfizer would, however, result in current shareholders paying capital gains taxes on any stock appreciation when they are converted into shares of the new company. Shares held in IRAs and 401(k)s would not typically owe this tax, but shares owned directly by individuals and in mutual funds would owe tax even if they did not sell their stock. Policymakers and the public remained interested in the issue of inversions through 2014. Although the initial Pfizer merger did not occur, the spate of mergers or proposed mergers in the medical device and pharmaceuticals industries continued in 2014. One example included one of the largest proposed mergers yet, AbbVie's acquisition of Shire, an Irish firm. The announcement of a proposed merger between Burger King and Tim Hortons also generated interest in the issue. As is the case with Chiquita, AbbVie canceled its plans after the issuance of Treasury regulations in September 2014, but Burger King planned to complete its merger and did so on December 12, 2014. Treasury continues to regulate inversions where regulations are possible. For example, in 2014 it took action to close a loophole stemming from the coordination of two sets of regulations—the "Anti-Killer B Regulations" and the "Helen of Troy Anti-Inversion Regulations"—that allowed Liberty Global shareholders to avoid some capital gains taxes. Treasury Notice 2014-52, September 22, 2014 In response to the new wave of inversions, the Treasury Department released a notice of regulatory actions that would restrict inversions and their benefits. Treasury news releases, however, indicated that legislative action is the only way to fully rein in these transactions. Following this notice, several firms announced they were canceling plans to merge, and one firm, Medtronic, announced a change in financing plans (no longer using earnings abroad to pay acquisition costs). Other firms, however, have announced inversion plans. There is no way to know how many unannounced mergers were, or will be, prevented by these regulations. The regulatory actions address two basic aspects of inversions. One set of changes limits the ability to access the accumulated deferred earnings of foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms. The second regulatory action restricts certain techniques used in inversion transactions that allowed firms to qualify with less than 80% ownership. This regulation is effective for inversions that closed on or after September 22, 2014. The regulations do not prevent inversions via merger and do not address earnings stripping by shifting debt to the U.S. firm, although Treasury has indicated future action in this area. Limiting the Access to Earnings of U.S. Foreign Subsidiaries In an inversion, the foreign subsidiaries of the original U.S. firm remain subsidiaries so that any dividends paid to the U.S. parent would be taxed. Regulations also treat other direct investments in U.S. property, such as loans to the U.S. parent, as dividends. Once a firm has inverted and the U.S. firm is now a subsidiary of a foreign parent, there are methods of accessing the earnings of overseas subsidiaries by transactions between the new foreign parent and the U.S. firm's foreign subsidiaries. The regulation is intended to address three such methods. First, the regulation prevents the access to funds by, for example, a loan from the U.S. company's foreign subsidiary to the new foreign parent (called "hopscotching"). Before the regulation, funds of this type could have been used to pay dividends to the individual shareholders or for other purposes. Under the regulation, acquiring any obligation (such as a loan) or stock of a foreign related person is treated as U.S. property subject to tax. Second, the regulation addresses "decontrolling," where the foreign acquiring corporation issues a note or transfer of property for stock in the U.S. firm's foreign subsidiaries. If a majority of stock is obtained, the U.S. firm's subsidiary is no longer a controlled foreign corporation (CFC) and not subject to Subpart F, which taxes currently certain passive or easily shifted income. However, even a less than majority share can allow partial access to deferred earnings without a U.S. tax. This regulation prevents this by treating acquisition of foreign subsidiary stock as acquisition of stock in the U.S. parent. Third, the regulation addresses transactions where the foreign acquiring corporation sells stock of the former U.S. parent corporation to that U.S. parent corporation's CFC in exchange for property or cash. If such a transaction is structured properly, some interpretations of the old regulations would have permitted the income to avoid taxation. The new regulations would prevent that and would apply regardless of the firm's inversion status. Addressing Techniques to Achieve Less Than 80% Ownership Requirement A firm can realize the tax benefits of an inversion only if the shareholders of the original U.S. firm retain, after the merger, less than 80% of the ownership in the new company. The regulation contains several provisions that limit certain techniques for achieving this goal. The avoidance techniques include inflating the foreign firm, shrinking the U.S. firm, and inverting only part of the U.S. firm. First, it prevents firms from reaching the less than 80% goal by inflating the size of the foreign merger partner (which must have more than 20% ownership subsequent to the merger) by use of passive assets (e.g., an interest bearing bank deposit). This notice disregards passive assets of the foreign firm if more than 50% of its value is in passive assets. (Banks and financial service companies are excluded.) Second, it prevents firms from shrinking the size of the U.S. firm by paying extraordinary dividends before the merger. The notice disregards this reduction in value. Third, it prevents an inversion of part of a U.S. company (a "spinversion") by spinning it off to a newly formed foreign corporation, by treating the new "foreign" company as a domestic corporation. Inversions After Treasury Notice 2014-52 and the 2015 Treasury Regulations After the 2014 Treasury regulations were issued, some firms revised their plans, and the pace of inversions slowed. Some mergers were structured to avoid the anti-inversion rules and Treasury regulations, by an ownership share of less than 60%. Among what appear to be inversions is the merger of telecom firm Arris and Pace (a U.K. firm), CF Industries (fertilizer) and OCI NB (a Netherlands firm), Terex with Konecranes (a Finnish firm), and a consolidation of European Coca-Cola bottling firms (one such firm, Coca-Cola Enterprises, was a U.S. headquartered firm). Waste Connections Inc. merged with Progressive Waste Solutions Ltd (a Canadian Firm), with 70% ownership and a headquarters in Canada. Monsanto's proposal to merge with Syngenta (a Swiss firm) was called off. Some mergers that did not qualify as inversions under the tax law also occurred. The most significant in size was the proposed Pfizer merger. On November 23, 2015, Pfizer announced a proposed merger with Allergan, an Irish company, and the move of its headquarters to Ireland. This merger, which would result in the largest pharmaceutical company in the world, is not covered under the anti-inversion rules because Pfizer will own 56% of the value of the new firm. Allergan itself is the product of a merger involving both stock and cash acquisition by Actavis in 2015, with former Allergen shareholders owning a minority of the new company. Thus, this merger as well was not an inversion under the tax law. Actavis, in turn, was a former U.S. firm that inverted by merger with Warner Chillcott, an Irish firm, in 2013 (where the former shareholders of the U.S. firm acquired 77% of the stock). Pfizer terminated its merger with Allergen after the April 4, 2016, regulations (discussed below). Other notable mergers not subject to anti-inversion rules were the acquisition of Salix, a pharmaceutical company, by Valeant (a Canadian company); the acquisition of Auxilium by Endo (after Auxilium backed out of an inversion with Canadian firm QLT); the merger of Cyberonics with Italy's Sorin (to be headquartered in the U.K.); and the merger of Broadcom (a chipmaker) with Avago (a Singapore firm). Information and analytics provider HIS announced a merger with Markit Ltd, a U.K. firm, to be headquartered in the U.K., but the ownership share of HIS would be less than 60% of the firm. Johnson Controls also merged with Tyco, one of the earlier inverted firms. The 2015 Treasury regulations appear to have more limited consequences for inversions than the 2014 regulations did. Three regulatory changes were made by the notice. First, in the case where the foreign parent is a tax resident of a third country, stock issued by that parent to the existing foreign firm will be disregarded for purposes of the ownership requirement. That change will prevent a U.S. firm from merging with a partner and then choosing a tax friendly third country to headquarter in. The second provision would clarify the so called "anti-stuffing" rules, where the foreign firm's size is inflated by adding assets to that firm. The notice clarifies that this rule applies to any assets, not just passive assets. Third, the current business activity exception requires 25% of business activity to be in the foreign country where the new parent is created or organized, but does not require it to be a foreign parent. This rule requires the business activity to be in the foreign parent. It prevents inversion based on the business activity test when the foreign parent has a tax residence in another country without substantial business activities. Treasury Regulations, April 4, 2016 On April 4, 2016, the Treasury Department issued temporary and proposed regulations formalizing rules contained in Notices 2014-52 and 2015-79 limiting corporate tax inversions, as well as adding new rules addressing inversions and earnings-stripping transactions. In response to these new regulations, the proposed merger between Pfizer and Allergen PLC has been terminated. Anti-Inversion Regulations The April 4, 2016, Treasury regulations put in place several anti-inversion rules that target groups that have engaged in a series of inversion or acquisition transactions as well as a rule that restricts postinversion asset dilution. Multiple Domestic Entity Acquisition Rule The temporary regulations target inversion transactions involving a new foreign parent that previously acquired one or more U.S. entities in inversions or acquisitions in which the new foreign parent issued stock. These prior acquisitions would generally increase the value of the foreign entity, enabling it to subsequently engage in an inversion transaction with a larger U.S. company while remaining below the 60% or 80% ownership thresholds. The temporary regulations disregard stock of the new foreign parent to the extent the value of such stock is attributable to its prior U.S. entity acquisitions during the prior three years. According to analysis by Americans for Tax Fairness, the implementation of this rule would have increased Pfizer's share of the merged company to roughly 70% from 56% prior to the rule. Multiple-Step Acquisition Rule Similar to the multiple domestic entity acquisition rule, the multiple-step acquisition rule targets certain inversions that are structured as back-to-back foreign acquisitions. Specifically, it targets transactions that are part of a plan in which a foreign corporation acquires substantially all of the assets of a U.S. entity and, subsequent to this first acquisition, a second foreign corporation acquires substantially all of the assets of the first foreign corporation. The temporary regulations, under certain circumstances, treat each acquisition as an acquisition of a U.S. entity that may be subject to anti-inversion rules. Unlike the multiple domestic entity acquisition rule, which has a three-year look-back period, the multiple-step acquisition rule can be applied to all acquisitions that are part of the same plan regardless of time. Asset Dilution Rule A third rule modified existing regulations to restrict the ability of inverted companies to avoid paying tax on unrealized gains (under Section 965) through a transfer to a controlled foreign corporation (CFC) (under Section 351). This would address situations where a CFC of an inverted U.S. company engages in a postinversion exchange that could dilute a U.S. shareholder's indirect interest in the exchanged asset, allowing the U.S. shareholder to avoid U.S. tax on any realized gain in the asset that is not recognized at the time of the transfer. The rule requires a CFC of an inverted U.S. group to recognize all realized gain with respect to any such postinversion Section 351 exchange. Earnings-Stripping Regulations The earnings-stripping regulations aim to restrict the ability of foreign-parent groups to shift earnings out of the United States through dividends or other economically similar transactions (under Section 385). In these cases certain related-party debt will be characterized as equity for tax purposes. The result of equity classification is that interest deductions will be disallowed, and withholding obligations of 30% (or lower rate based on an applicable income tax treaty) could ensue. The regulations do not normally apply for related-party debt that is incurred to fund actual business investment, such as building or equipping a factory. The regulations also require documentation of debt instruments issued and held by certain members of an expanded group to establish that such instruments are properly characterized as debt. The regulations also allow the IRS on audit to treat an instrument issued to a related party as in part debt and in part equity. The final regulations issued on October 21, 2016, scaled back the original regulations in response to the comment period. The final regulations removed the general bifurcation rule that would have allowed a debt instrument to be classified as part debt and part equity and an exemption for debt for foreign issuers. The rules also provided exemptions for cash pools (a pool of cash to be accessed for short-term needs), short-term loans, regulated financial entities, and pass-throughs (firms not taxed as corporations). The Treasury delayed documentation rules for a year on July 28, 2017. Treasury announced on July 7, 2017, that these debt-equity regulations were to be among eight rules targeted for review. The Treasury issued final regulations for the temporary regulations introduced in April 2016 on July 12, 2018, as TD 9834 with minor changes. Inversions After the April 4, 2016, Treasury Regulations Two days after the regulations were issued, Pfizer withdrew from its merger with Allergen, an Irish-based company that was an inverted firm. It appears that this merger was affected by the multiple-entity rule, which has come to be called "serial inversion." Mergers between Shire (Ireland based) and Basalta, and between HIS and Markit Group Inc. (U.K. based) went forward. The CF Industries merger with OCI NV (based in the Netherlands) was also called off; Johnson Controls and Tyco went forward. A merger between Konecranes (a Finnish firm) and Terex was scaled down to an acquisition of a share of Terex with the U.S. firm owning 25%, thus avoiding the effect of regulations. In May 2016 Cardtronics, Inc., an ATM operator, announced a plan to move to the U.K. using the substantial business activities test. Also in May, an oil and gas industry service and technology firm announced a merger with Technip SA (France) to form a U.K. company, with each firm holding about half the stock and thus avoiding any of the recent regulations and establishing a new headquarters in another country. In 2017, Praxaire (a U.S. industrial gas company) announced a merger with Linde AG (a German gas and technology company), also with each owning half of the new company. As noted in the introduction, statistical data suggest a decline in inversions from 2015 to 2016, and again from 2016 to 2017, and these data are consistent with the limited news reports of major inversions. Pfizer's CEO has recently indicated that deals are on hold generally while tax reform is being considered. P.L. 115-97, the 2017 Act The 2017 legislation not only made fundamental changes to the overall treatment of corporate income at home and abroad, but also adopted several provisions specifically aimed at inverted corporations (those with 60% to 80% ownership). Recapture of Deemed Repatriation Rate Reduction Under the new law, existing untaxed earnings held abroad are taxed under a deemed repatriation rule, but at a lower rate (8% for earnings reinvested in noncash assets and 15.5% for earnings held as cash or cash equivalents). A special recapture rule applies on deemed repatriations of newly inverted firms. This recapture rule applies if a firm first becomes an expatriated entity at any time during the 10-year period beginning on December 22, 2017. In this case, the tax will be increased from 8% and 15.5% to 35% tax for the entire deemed repatriation, with no foreign tax credit allowed for the increase in tax rate. The additional tax is due on the full amount of the deemed repatriation in the first tax year in which the taxpayer becomes an expatriated entity. Inclusion of Cost of Goods Sold in BEAT BEAT excludes payments which reduce gross receipts with the result that payment for the cost of goods sold is not included under BEAT. An exception applies for firms that invert after November 9, 2017, where payments to a foreign parent or any foreign firm in the affiliated for cost of goods sold is included in BEAT. Modification of Attribution Rules The constructive ownership rules for purposes of determining 10% U.S. shareholders, whether a corporation is a CFC and whether parties satisfy certain relatedness tests, were expanded in the 2017 tax revision. Specifically, the new law treats stock owned by a foreign person as attributable to a U.S. entity owned by the foreign person (so-called "downward attribution"). As a result, stock owned by a foreign person may generally be attributed to (1) a U.S. corporation, 10% of the value of the stock of which is owned, directly or indirectly, by the foreign person; (2) a U.S. partnership in which the foreign person is a partner; and (3) certain U.S. trusts if the foreign person is a beneficiary or, in certain circumstances, a grantor or a substantial owner. The downward attribution rule was originally conceived to deal with inversions. In an inversion, without downward attribution, a subsidiary of the original U.S. parent could lose CFC status if it sold enough stock to the new foreign parent so the U.S. parent no longer had majority ownership. With downward attribution, the ownership of stock by the new foreign parent in the CFC is attributed to the U.S. parent, so that the subsidiary continues its CFC status, making it subject to any tax rules that apply to CFCs (such as Subpart F and repatriation taxes under the old law, and Subpart F and GILTI under the new law). Other Provisions Affecting Stockholders and Stock Compensation Dividends (like capital gains) are allowed lower tax rates than the rates applied to ordinary income. The rates are 0%, 15%, and 20% depending on the rate bracket that ordinary income falls into. Certain dividends received from foreign firms (those that do not have tax treaties and PFICs ) are not eligible for these lower rates. Dividends paid by firms that inverted after the date of enactment of P.L. 115-97 are added to the list of those not eligible for the lower rates. In 2004, an excise tax of 15% was imposed on stock compensation received by insiders in an expatriated corporation; the new law increases it to 20%, effective on the date of enactment for corporations that first become expatriated after that date. Inversions After the Act As noted earlier, there are no aggregate data available yet for 2018, but there are also indications that most tax-motivated inversions had already been discouraged by the 2016 regulations. Considering announcements of individual companies, one planned inversion, by Assurant, Inc. was revised to retain the headquarters in the United States. Ohio-based Dana, Inc. announced plans to merge and move the headquarters to the U.K., although the merger would leave the U.S. shareholders with less than 60% ownership, and therefore not make them subject to anti-inversion penalties. A recent announcement indicated that the Dana merger was called off. Some firms may be considering reversing their headquarters decisions. Policy Options The AJCA was successful at limiting a form of inversions, at least initially. In particular, the AJCA stopped the practice of basic "naked inversions," in which little activity or presence in the new jurisdiction is required and the new parent is domiciled in a tax haven. Further, through regulation, Treasury has limited the use of the substantial business activity test safe harbor to invert. Recent activity (as noted above), however, suggests that mergers continued to be used as a vehicle for corporate inversions after these changes. These more recent mergers have increasingly resulted in a U.K. parent company (e.g., FMC-Technip, HIS-Markit), due to policy decisions by the U.K. government. Specifically, the U.K. lowered its corporate tax rate and adopted a territorial tax system. In addition, anti-abuse provisions for foreign source income were weakened by the European Union courts. The U.K. has also proposed taxing certain intangible income at a 10% rate. (This is referred to as a patent box.) To restrict the occurrence of tax-motivated inversions, both a general reform of the U.S. corporate tax and specific provisions to deal with tax-motivated international mergers were discussed. Some important changes were made in 2017; other options remain. U.S. Corporate Tax Reform and the 2017 Act Interest in reforming the corporate income tax was long-standing, including calling for explicit accommodation of international concerns. As noted earlier, two aspects of the U.S. corporate tax system are particularly relevant to corporate location decisions: the corporate tax rate and the taxation of foreign-source earnings. Taken together, these factors, under prior law, could yield a substantial reduction in taxes paid. In the case of the proposed merger of Forest Laboratories Inc. (a U.S. company) and Actavis (an Irish company) in 2014, the tax reduction was estimated to be roughly $100 million per year. Lowering the Corporate Tax Rate Prior to the 2017 changes, the U.S. corporate statutory tax rate was higher than both the average statutory rates of the other Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries and that of the 15 largest economies in the world. Many asserted that the U.S. statutory tax rate needed to be lowered to reduce the incentive for inversion transactions. With the rate lowered from 35% to 21%, the combined central and subnational corporate tax rates are similar to most rates in the OECD. While lowering the corporate tax rate would reduce the incentive to invert, there are reasons to suggest that it would be impractical to reduce the rate to the level needed to stop inversions. Namely, to stop inversions through a reduction in the corporate tax rate would require a U.S. corporate tax rate set equal to the lowest tax rate of a destination company, or zero. A lower corporate tax rate alone reduced the incentive for corporate inversions, primarily by reducing the tax rate applied to repatriated earnings. For a company like Pfizer, with large foreign earnings, a rate reduction could yield significantly lower taxes paid. However, as discussed below, the benefit of a lowered rate is negligible relative to the benefit to corporate taxpayers afforded by territorial tax systems, when income earned in low- or no-tax foreign jurisdictions is never subject to U.S. tax. Two factors present challenges for lowering the corporate tax rate further. First, if revenue neutrality is a goal, there may not be enough base-broadening provisions with revenue offsets to provide deep cuts in the corporate tax; and, if such offsets were found, they might have their own consequences for investment. Reducing the corporate tax without corresponding base broadening would likely reduce corporate tax revenue, adding to chronic budget deficits. Adopt a Territorial Tax System Prior to the 2017 revision, the United States was one of the few countries that had a worldwide tax system and levied a tax on the foreign-source income of domestic corporations. Changing corporate tax residence to a country with a territorial tax system (where foreign earnings would not be taxed at all) was thought to drive inversion decisions. This issue led to proposals for the United States to adopt a territorial tax system to stop inversion transactions. One concern about adopting a territorial tax system is the strain it would likely place on the current transfer pricing system. From this perspective, the worldwide tax system provided a backstop on the amount of profit shifting or base erosion possible, because shifted profits will eventually be repatriated. Under a territorial tax system, this is not the case. Research has found evidence of significant profit shifting, especially related to mobile intellectual property, suggesting a lot of income from foreign sources is really U.S. income in disguise. Numerous other issues surround the adoption of a U.S. territorial tax. For example, while some supported a territorial tax to eliminate the incentive to keep earnings abroad, others opposed it because it likely discourages domestic investment and activity in the United States. The revisions in 2017 maintained a worldwide system, but with some changes. Income from U.S. subsidiaries is taxed on a current basis but at a lower rate and with an exemption for a deemed return on tangible assets. It also provided a subsidy for locating intangible assets with earnings from abroad in the United States. Many of the inverting firms had significant intangible assets, and it is not clear whether this new regime (a lower tax rate but on a current basis) is more or less generous to firms considering inverting. Tax Reform Proposals Moving closer to a pure territorial tax, as in the case of a rate reduction, would likely reduce corporate tax revenue and add to current budget pressures unless it is offset by other tax increases, although this effect would be less costly at the lower 21% tax rate. In 2027, GILTI is projected to raise $21 billion. GILTI could be retained and the rate lowered or the temporarily lower rate could be made permanent. There has been some agreement that adopting a territorial tax without some significant anti-abuse provisions could be problematic, as it would likely increase profit shifting abroad by U.S. firms. Targeted Approaches Evidence suggests that administrative remedies were successful at dramatically slowing inversions; the targeted legislative changes in the 2017 Act may have had some impact as well. There are further changes that could be made to discourage inversions. This section discusses the history of these proposals, both legislative and administrative. One approach would be to extend the rate recapture enacted in the 2017 Act for a period longer than 10 years, or to make it apply indefinitely to future inversions. A second alternative is to directly restrict the ability of U.S. firms to invert by merger. The President's FY2015, FY2016, and FY2017 budget proposals contained a provision that would have further restricted the use of inversions. The proposal would modify the 80% test enacted in the AJCA to a 50% test and eliminate the 60% test. In effect, this proposal would reduce the percentage of shareholders that are owners of the "old U.S. company" and the "new foreign merged company." The proposal would also require that the new foreign corporation be managed and controlled from outside the United States and prohibit transactions where the new foreign company has substantial business activities in the United States. In November 2015, then-Senate Finance Committee Chairman Hatch indicated the possibility of adding an anti-inversion provision to legislation to extend expired provisions. Many of these bills were introduced in the 115 th Congress. H.R. 1931 (Doggett), the Corporate EXIT Fairness Act, and H.R. 3434 (Levin) and S. 1636 (Durbin, along with a number of cosponsors), the Stop Corporate Inversions Act, would have treated all mergers as U.S. firms when the U.S. firm's shareholders hold more than 50% or when management and control primarily takes place in the United States. H.R. 1932 (Doggett) and S. 851 (Whitehouse), as with bills introduced in the 114 th Congress, would have included anti-inversion provisions as part of a broader proposal to address tax havens and deferral. H.R. 3603 (Levin) would have addressed earnings stripping of inverted corporations. H.R. 3424 (DeLauro) would disallow federal contracts for inverted firms. H.R. 1451 (Schakowsky) and S. 586 (Sanders) would make major changes in the tax treatment of foreign source income and include anti-inversion rules. Following the change in the international system adopted at the end of 2017, Representative Doggett and Senator Whitehouse introduced the "No Tax Break for Outsourcing Act" ( H.R. 5108 , S. 2459 ) which, in addition to other changes, would have treated foreign corporations that are managed and controlled in the United States as domestic corporations and treated inverted firms as U.S. firms when the shareholders of the former U.S. company own more than 50% of the shares. These bills would have also limited interest deductions in the United States to the proportionate share of the firm's assets. The last proposal (to allocate worldwide interest) was in both the House and Senate versions of the legislation ( H.R. 1 ; 115 th Congress) in somewhat different form but was not retained in the final legislation. While this proposal was not specifically targeted at inverted firms it would have increased the restrictions that limit earnings stripping. Administrative Changes Former President Obama had encouraged Congress to act directly to limit inversions, but had also indicated on August 6, 2014, that administrative changes to limit inversions were under examination. Prior to that announcement, Steve Shay, a Harvard professor and former practitioner and Treasury official, outlined two regulatory actions that he believed could be taken. The first would limit earnings stripping by reclassifying debt as equity due to excessive related party debt in an inversion. (The second provision is no longer relevant under the new international tax regime.) A number of other administrative proposals that have been suggested (such as provisions relating to taxing accumulated deferred earnings) are no longer relevant and others have been adopted in the regulatory changes discussed above. Expanding the scope of Section 7874 (which treats inverted firms as U.S. firms) by combining multiple transactions into single ones, or vice versa. The scope of Section 7874 could also be expanded by treating certain stock as disqualified (because it is expected to be held temporarily or because it is accompanied by restrictions on voting rights); this provision was adopted in Treasury regulations; Potentially recognizing accumulated deferred earnings as currently taxable under authority such as Subpart F, Section 367, or other rules (this provision is no longer relevant with the end of deferral, but it may have influenced the decision to tax deferred earnings of newly inverted firms at the full 35% rate for the next 10 years); Issuing regulations that would generally tighten restrictions on interest deductions under the thin capitalization rules of Section 163(j). These changes would probably apply to corporations in general, and not just to inverted corporations (this change was made in the 2017 tax revision); Stricter regulations under Section 367 to immediately include foreign earnings in the case of actions that attempt to move foreign operations out from under the U.S. parent. This would make future earnings of these operations nontaxable; Strengthening and modernizing the effectively connected income rules that determined whether trade or business activity is taking place in the United States by foreign firms; and Closely monitoring the creation of non-U.S. subsidiaries owned by the foreign parent after inversion, and ensuring that assets (including intangibles such as inventions, knowhow, etc.) transferred from the U.S. firm are transferred at arms-length prices. There is disagreement among experts about whether the types of regulatory changes discussed in this section are feasible or desirable. Appendix. Legislative Proposals in the 113th and 114th Congresses A number of legislative proposals were advanced in 2014, when the wave of inversions through merger began. Representative Levin, the ranking member of the House Ways and Means Committee, introduced the Stop Corporate Inversions Act of 2014 ( H.R. 4679 ), which would have reflected the Administration's proposed changes, retroactive to May 8, 2014. The inversion would have not been recognized if the U.S. stockholders had 50% of the shares or if 25% of the business activity is in the United States. A companion bill, which would have sunset in two years to provide time for tax reform, was introduced in the Senate by Senator Levin in 2014 ( S. 2360 ). The Joint Committee on Taxation estimated the permanent proposal to gain $19.5 billion in revenue over FY2015-FY2024. The two-year proposal would have raise $0.8 billion over the same period. In the 114 th Congress, these legislative proposals were introduced as H.R. 415 (Levin) and S. 198 (Durbin). Senator Casey proposed an anti-inversion amendment to an education bill ( S. 1177 ). In the 114 th Congress, H.R. 297 (Doggett) and S. 174 (Whitehouse) included anti-inversion provisions as part of a broader proposal to address tax haven abuses and restrict the benefits of deferral. S. 922 (Sanders) and H.R. 1790 (Schakowsky) also included anti-inversion provisions, as well as earnings-stripping provisions (discussed below) and broader provisions, including the repeal of deferral. In 2014 a number of legislative proposals were introduced that would limit the tax benefits associated with inversions for certain corporations. For example, H.R. 1554 (Doggett), H.R. 3666 (DeLauro), H.R. 3793 (Maffei), S. 268 (Levin), S. 1533 (Levin), and S. 1844 (Shaheen) would each treat corporations managed and controlled from the United States as domestic corporations regardless of their legal tax home or status as an inverted company. This provision was also included in S. 922 (Sanders) and H.R. 1790 (Schakowsky). Other proposals in 2014, H.R. 694 (Schakowsky) and S. 250 (Sanders), would have eliminated deferral (taxing foreign source income currently), in addition to limiting the benefits of inversions when management and control continues to reside in the United States. Legislative proposals were also under discussion in 2014 by Representative Levin (announced July 31, 2014) and by Senator Schumer (announced August 14, 2014) to address earnings stripping, where foreign parent companies borrow from the U.S. subsidiary to increase interest deductions and reduce taxable income in the United States. Both of these proposals would have tightened the rules allowing interest deductions by reducing the current limit on interest deductions relative to adjusted income from 50% to 25% and repealing an alternative safe-harbor debt-to-equity test. Both proposals would have also eliminated or limited interest carryforwards. The Schumer proposal was intended to apparently apply to inverted firms while the Levin proposal would have applied generally. The Levin proposal would have also limited other transactions between related parties within the firm that allow untaxed investment of funds in the United States. The restrictions on interest in the Levin bill were the same as those initially proposed in the House in 2004. Senator Schumer introduced his proposal, S. 2786 , the Corporate Inverters Earnings Stripping Reform Act of 2014. Its limits on interest deductions would have applied to inverted firms where U.S. shareholders own more than 50% of the firm. The restriction also would have applied to firms that inverted using the substantial business activities test. The bill had nine Democratic cosponsors; five of them were on the Senate Finance Committee. In the 114 th Congress, S. 922 (Sanders) and H.R. 1790 (Schakowsky) included general earnings-stripping provisions for firms with a foreign parent. Earnings stripping provisions were also addressed in the report of the Senate Finance Committee's working group on Tax Reform. H.R. 5278 (DeLauro) and S. 2704 (Levin), introduced May 30, 2014, would have disallowed awarding federal contracts to inverted firms. These proposals were introduced in the 114 th Congress as H.R. 1809 (DeLauro) and S. 975 (Durbin). In 2014, Senators Brown and Durbin proposed S. 2895 , and Representative Doggett introduced H.R. 5549 , the Pay What You Owe Before You Go Act, that would have taxed the accumulated deferred earnings of inverting firms. Then Senate Finance Committee Chairman Ron Wyden had proposed having draft legislation in place in September 2014, and also referred to Schumer's earnings-stripping proposal. Senator Wyden had previously announced that any changes would be retroactive to May 8, 2014.

News reports in the late 1990s and early 2000s drew attention to a phenomenon sometimes called corporate "inversions" or "expatriations": instances where U.S. firms reorganize their structure so that the "parent" element of the group is a foreign corporation rather than a corporation chartered in the United States. The main objective of these transactions was tax savings, and they involved little to no shift in actual economic activity. Bermuda and the Cayman Islands (countries with no corporate income tax) were the locations of many of the newly created parent corporations. These types of inversions largely ended with the enactment of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (JOBS Act; P.L. 108-357), which denied the tax benefits of an inversion if the original U.S. stockholders owned 80% or more of the new firm. The act effectively ended shifts to tax havens where no real business activity took place. However, two avenues for inverting remained. The act allowed a firm to invert if it has substantial business operations in the country where the new parent was to be located; the regulations at one point set a 10% level of these business operations. Several inversions using the business activity test resulted in Treasury regulations in 2012 that increased the activity requirement to 25%, effectively closing off this method. Firms could also invert by merging with a foreign company if the original U.S. stockholders owned less than 80% of the new firm. If the original U.S. shareholders owned less than 60%, the firm was not considered as inverting. Two features made a country an attractive destination: a low corporate tax rate and a territorial tax system that did not tax foreign source income. The U.K. joined countries such as Ireland, Switzerland, and Canada as targets for inverting when it adopted a territorial tax in 2009. At the same time, the U.K. also lowered its rate (from 25% to 20% by 2015). Inverted firms could reduce worldwide taxes by stripping taxable earnings out of the new U.S. subsidiary, largely through allocating debt to that subsidiary. Soon after, several high-profile companies indicated an interest in merging with a non-U.S. headquartered company, including Pfizer, Chiquita, AbbVie, and Burger King. This "second wave" of inversions again raised concerns about an erosion of the U.S. tax base. Chiquita and AbbVie canceled their plans in the wake of 2014 Treasury regulations, but Burger King and other firms completed merger plans. Pfizer subsequently terminated its planned merger with Allergan after Treasury regulations issued in 2016. Evidence suggests that these Treasury regulations have been an important factor in subsequently decreasing these merger-related inversions. Two policy options had been discussed in response: a general reform of the U.S. corporate tax and specific provisions to deal with tax-motivated international mergers. In December 2017, P.L. 115-97 (popularly known as the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act) lowered the corporate tax rate as part of broader tax reform which some argued would slow the rate of inversions. Other tax reform proposals suggested that if the United States moved to a territorial tax, the incentive to invert would be eliminated. There were concerns that a territorial tax could worsen the profit-shifting that already exists among multinational firms. P.L. 115-97, while moving in some ways to a territorial tax, also instituted a number of measures aimed at combatting profit shifting, including a global minimum tax on intangible income that limited the tax benefits of a territorial tax. The second option is to directly target inversions. The 2017 act included several provisions that discouraged inversions. In addition, further anti-inversion provisions have been introduced, most recently H.R. 5108 and S. 2459 in the 115th Congress, to treat all firms in which former U.S. shareholders have more than 50% ownership (or in which management and control is in the United States) as U.S. firms. These bills also provided that debt could also be allocated to the U.S. member of a worldwide operation in proportion to the U.S. ownership of assets.

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Small Business Administration Loan Guaranty Programs The Small Business Administration (SBA) administers programs to support small businesses, including loan guaranty programs to encourage lenders to provide loans to small businesses "that might not otherwise obtain financing on reasonable terms and conditions." The SBA's 7(a) loan guaranty program is considered the agency's flagship loan program. Its name is derived from Section 7(a) of the Small Business Act of 1953 (P.L. 83-163, as amended), which authorizes the SBA to provide and guarantee business loans to American small businesses. The SBA also administers several 7(a) subprograms that offer streamlined and expedited loan procedures for particular groups of borrowers, including the SBAExpress, Export Express, and Community Advantage Pilot programs (see the Appendix for additional details). Although these subprograms have their own distinguishing eligibility requirements, terms, and benefits, they operate under the 7(a) program's authorization. Proceeds from 7(a) loans may be used to establish a new business or to assist in the operation, acquisition, or expansion of an existing business. Specific uses include to acquire land (by purchase or lease); improve a site (e.g., grading, streets, parking lots, and landscaping); purchase, convert, expand, or renovate one or more existing buildings; construct one or more new buildings; acquire (by purchase or lease) and install fixed assets; purchase inventory, supplies, and raw materials; finance working capital; and refinance certain outstanding debts. In FY2018, the SBA approved 60,353 7(a) loans totaling nearly $25.4 billion. The average approved 7(a) loan amount was $420,401. As will be discussed, the total number and amount of SBA 7(a) loans approved (and actually disbursed) declined in FY2008 and FY2009, increased during FY2010 and FY2011, declined somewhat in FY2012, and have increased since then. Historically, one of the justifications presented for funding the SBA's loan guaranty programs has been that small businesses can be at a disadvantage, compared with other businesses, when trying to obtain access to sufficient capital and credit. Congressional interest in the 7(a) loan program has increased in recent years because of concerns that small businesses might be prevented from accessing sufficient capital to enable them to grow and create jobs. Some Members of Congress have argued that the SBA should be provided additional resources to assist small businesses in acquiring capital necessary to start, continue, or expand operations with the expectation that in so doing small businesses will create jobs. Others worry about the long-term adverse economic effects of spending programs that increase the federal deficit. They advocate business tax reduction, reform of financial credit market regulation, and federal fiscal restraint as the best means to help small businesses further economic growth and job creation. This report discusses the rationale provided for the 7(a) program; the program's borrower and lender eligibility standards and program requirements; and program statistics, including loan volume, loss rates, use of the proceeds, borrower satisfaction, and borrower demographics. It also examines issues raised concerning the SBA's administration of the 7(a) program, including the oversight of 7(a) lenders and the program's lack of outcome-based performance measures. This report also surveys congressional and presidential actions taken in recent years to help small businesses gain greater access to capital. For example, during the 111 th Congress P.L. 111-5 , the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), provided the SBA an additional $730 million, including $375 million to temporarily subsidize the 7(a) and 504/Certified Development Companies (504/CDC) loan guaranty programs' fees ($299 million) and to temporarily increase the 7(a) program's maximum loan guaranty percentage to 90% ($76 million). P.L. 111-240 , the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, provided $505 million (plus $5 million for administrative expenses) to extend the fee subsidies and 90% loan guaranty percentage through December 31, 2010; increased the 7(a) program's gross loan limit from $2 million to $5 million; and established an alternative size standard for the 7(a) and 504/CDC loan programs to enable more small businesses to qualify for assistance. P.L. 111-322 , the Continuing Appropriations and Surface Transportation Extensions Act, 2011, authorized the SBA to continue the fee subsidies and the 7(a) program's 90% maximum loan guaranty percentage through March 4, 2011, or until available funding was exhausted (which occurred on January 3, 2011). During the 112 th Congress, several bills were introduced to expand the 7(a) program: S. 1828 , a bill to increase small business lending (and for other purposes), would have reinstated for one year following the date of its enactment the fee subsidies for the 7(a) and 504/CDC loan guaranty programs and the 90% loan guaranty percentage for the 7(a) program, which were originally authorized by ARRA. H.R. 2936 , the Small Business Administration Express Loan Extension Act of 2011, would have extended a one-year increase in the maximum loan amount for the SBAExpress program from $350,000 to $1 million for an additional year. That temporary increase was authorized by P.L. 111-240 and expired on September 27, 2011. S. 532 , the Patriot Express Authorization Act of 2011, would have provided statutory authorization for the Patriot Express Pilot Program and increased its loan guaranty percentages and its maximum loan amount from $500,000 to $1 million. The Patriot Express Pilot Program was subsequently discontinued by the SBA on December 31, 2013. During the 113 th Congress, the SBA waived the up-front, one-time loan guaranty fee and ongoing servicing fee for 7(a) loans of $150,000 or less approved in FY2014 and FY2015 as a means to encourage the demand for smaller 7(a) loans. H.R. 2462 , the Small Business Opportunity Acceleration Act of 2013, would have made the fee waiver for smaller 7(a) loans permanent. waived the up-front, one-time loan guaranty fee for a loan to a veteran or to a veteran's spouse under the SBAExpress program (up to $350,000) from January 1, 2014, through the end of FY2015 (called the SBA Veterans Advantage Program). waived 50% of the up-front, one-time loan guaranty fee on all non-SBAExpress 7(a) loans to veterans of $150,001 up to and including $5 million in FY2015. In addition, P.L. 113-235 , the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, provided statutory authorization for the Veterans Advantage fee waiver in FY2015. During the 114 th Congress, the SBA waived the up-front, one-time loan guaranty fee for 7(a) loans of $150,000 or less approved in FY2016 and FY2017 as a means to encourage the demand for smaller 7(a) loans. waived the annual service fee for 7(a) loans of $150,000 or less approved in FY2016 (increased to 0.546% in FY2017). waived 50% of the up-front, one-time loan guaranty fee on all non-SBAExpress 7(a) loans to veterans of $150,001 to $5 million in FY2016; and 50% of the up-front, one-time loan guaranty fee on all non-SBAExpress 7(a) loans to veterans of $150,001 to $500,000 in FY2017. In addition P.L. 114-38 , the Veterans Entrepreneurship Act of 2015, provided statutory authorization and made permanent the veteran's fee waiver under the SBAExpress program, except during any upcoming fiscal year for which the President's budget, submitted to Congress, includes a cost for the 7(a) program, in its entirety, that is above zero. The SBA waived this fee in FY2016, FY2017, FY2018, and is waiving this fee in FY2019. The act also increased the 7(a) program's FY2015 authorization limit of $18.75 billion (on disbursements) to $23.5 billion. P.L. 114-113 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, increased the 7(a) program's authorization limit to $26.5 billion in FY2016. P.L. 114-223 , the Continuing Appropriations and Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2017, authorized the SBA to use funds from its business loan program account "to accommodate increased demand for commitments for [7(a)] general business loans" for the duration of the continuing resolution (initially December 9, 2016, later extended by P.L. 114-254 , the Further Continuing and Security Assistance Appropriations Act, 2017, to April 28, 2017). During the 115 th Congress, the SBA waived the up-front, one-time loan guaranty fee for 7(a) loans of $125,000 or less approved in FY2018 as a means to encourage the demand for smaller 7(a) loans. waived 50% of the up-front, one-time loan guaranty fee on all non-SBAExpress 7(a) loans to veterans of $125,001 to $350,000 in FY2018. is waiving the annual service fee for 7(a) loans of $150,000 or less made to small businesses located in a rural area or a HUBZone and reducing the up-front one-time guaranty fee for these loans from 2.0% to 0.6667% of the guaranteed portion of the loan in FY2019. In addition P.L. 115-31 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017, increased the 7(a) program's authorization limit to $27.5 billion in FY2017 and P.L. 115-141 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, increased the 7(a) program's authorization limit to $29.0 billion in FY2018. P.L. 115-189 , the Small Business 7(a) Lending Oversight Reform Act of 2018, among other provisions, codified the SBA's Office of Credit Risk Management; required that office to annually undertake and report the findings of a risk analysis of the 7(a) program's loan portfolio; created a lender oversight committee within the SBA; authorized the Director of the Office of Credit Risk Management to undertake informal and formal enforcement actions against 7(a) lenders under specified conditions; redefined the credit elsewhere requirement; and authorized the SBA Administrator to increase the amount of 7(a) loans not more than once during any fiscal year to not more than 115% of the 7(a) program's authorization limit. The SBA is required to provide at least 30 days' notice of its intent to exceed the 7(a) loan program's authorization limit to the House and Senate Committees on Small Business and the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations' Subcommittees on Financial Services and General Government and may exercise this option only once per fiscal year. P.L. 115-232 , the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, included provisions originally in H.R. 5236 , the Main Street Employee Ownership Act of 2018, to make 7(a) loans more accessible to employee-owned small businesses (ESOPs) and cooperatives. The act clarified that 7(a) loans to ESOPs may be made under the Preferred Lenders Program; allows the seller to remain involved as an officer, director, or key employee when the ESOP or cooperative has acquired 100% ownership of the small business; and authorizes the SBA to finance transition costs to employee ownership and waive any mandatory equity injection by the ESOP or cooperative to help finance the change of ownership. The act also directs the SBA to create outreach programs and an interagency working group to promote lending to ESOPs and cooperatives. President Trump's FY2019 budget request included proposals to offset SBA business loan administrative costs by, among other provisions, (1) allowing the SBA to set the 7(a) program's annual servicing fee at rates below zero credit subsidy; (2) increasing the 7(a) loan program's FY2019 annual servicing fee's cap from 0.55% to 0.625%; and (3) increasing the FY2019 upfront loan guarantee fee on 7(a) loans over $1 million by 0.25%. The Trump Administration estimated that these changes would raise $93 million in additional revenue. The Trump Administration also requested that the 7(a) loan program's authorization limit be increased to $30.0 million in FY2019; that the SBA be allowed to further increase the 7(a) loan program's authorization amount in FY2019 by 15% under specified circumstances "to better equip the SBA to meet peaks in demand while continuing to operate at zero subsidies"; and that the SBAExpress program's loan limit be increased from $350,000 to $1 million. During the 116 th Congress P.L. 116-6 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019, increased the 7(a) program's authorization limit to $30.0 billion in FY2019. This report's Appendix provides a brief description of the 7(a) program's SBAExpress, Export Express, and Community Advantage programs. Borrower Eligibility Standards and Program Requirements Borrower Eligibility Standards To be eligible for an SBA business loan, a small business applicant must be located in the United States; be a for-profit operating business (except for loans to eligible passive companies and businesses engaged in specified industries, such as insurance companies and financial institutions primarily engaged in lending); qualify as small under the SBA's size requirements; demonstrate a need for the desired credit; and be certified by a lender that the desired credit is unavailable to the applicant on reasonable terms and conditions from nonfederal sources without SBA assistance. To qualify for an SBA 7(a) loan, applicants must be creditworthy and able to reasonably assure repayment. SBA requires lenders to consider the strength of the business and the applicant's character, reputation, and credit history; experience and depth of management; past earnings, projected cash flow, and future prospects; ability to repay the loan with earnings from the business; sufficient invested equity to operate on a sound financial basis; potential for long-term success; nature and value of collateral (although inadequate collateral will not be the sole reason for denial of a loan request); and affiliates' effect on the applicant's repayment ability. Borrower Program Requirements Use of Proceeds Borrowers may use 7(a) loan proceeds to establish a new business or to assist in the operation, acquisition, or expansion of an existing business. 7(a) loan proceeds may be used to acquire land (by purchase or lease); improve a site (e.g., grading, streets, parking lots, landscaping), including up to 5% for community improvements such as curbs and sidewalks; purchase one or more existing buildings; convert, expand, or renovate one or more existing buildings; construct one or more new buildings; acquire (by purchase or lease) and install fixed assets; purchase inventory, supplies, and raw materials; finance working capital; and refinance certain outstanding debts. Borrowers are prohibited from using 7(a) loan proceeds to refinance existing debt where the lender is in a position to sustain a loss and the SBA would take over that loss through refinancing; effect a partial change of business ownership or a change that will not benefit the business; permit the reimbursement of funds owed to any owner, including any equity injection or injection of capital for the business's continuance until the loan supported by the SBA is disbursed; repay delinquent state or federal withholding taxes or other funds that should be held in trust or escrow; or pay for a nonsound business purpose. Loan Amounts As mentioned previously, P.L. 111-240 increased the 7(a) program's maximum gross loan amount for any one 7(a) loan from $2 million to $5 million (up to $3.75 million maximum guaranty). In FY2018, the average approved 7(a) loan amount was $420,401, and about 36% of all 7(a) loans exceeded $2 million. Loan Terms, Interest Rate, and Collateral Loan Terms A 7(a) loan is required to have the shortest appropriate term, depending upon the borrower's ability to repay. The maximum term is 10 years, unless the loan finances or refinances real estate or equipment with a useful life exceeding 10 years. In that case, the loan term can be up to 25 years, including extensions. Interest Rate Lenders are allowed to charge borrowers "a reasonable fixed interest rate" or, with the SBA's approval, a variable interest rate. The SBA uses a multistep formula to determine the maximum allowable fixed interest rate for all 7(a) loans (with the exception of the Export Working Capital Program and Community Advantage loans) and periodically publishes that rate and the maximum allowable variable interest rate in the Federal Register . The maximum allowable fixed interest rates in February 2019 are 13.50% for 7(a) loans of $25,000 or less; 12.50% for loans over $25,000 but not exceeding $50,000; 11.50% for loans over $50,000 up to and including $250,000; and 10.50% loans greater than $250,000. The 7(a) program's maximum allowable variable interest rate may be pegged to the lowest prime rate (5.50% in February 2019), the 30-day LIBOR rate plus 300 basis points (5.51% in February 2019), or the SBA optional peg rate (3.13% in the second quarter of FY2019). The optional peg rate is a weighted average of rates the federal government pays for loans with maturities similar to the average SBA loan. Collateral For 7(a) loans of $25,000 or less, the SBA does not require lenders to take collateral. For 7(a) loans exceeding $25,000 to $350,000, the lender must follow the collateral policies and procedures that it has established and implemented for its similarly sized non-SBA-guaranteed commercial loans. However, the lender must, at a minimum, obtain a first lien on assets financed with loan proceeds, and a lien on all of the applicant's fixed assets, including real estate, up to the point that the loan is fully secured. For 7(a) loans exceeding $350,000, the SBA requires lenders to collateralize the loan to the maximum extent possible up to the loan amount. If business assets do not fully secure the loan, the lender must take available equity in the principal's personal real estate (residential and investment) as collateral. 7(a) loans are considered "fully secured" if the lender has taken security interests in all available fixed assets with a combined "net book value" up to the loan amount. The SBA directs lenders to not decline a loan solely on the basis of inadequate collateral because "one of the primary reasons lenders use the SBA-guaranteed program is for those Applicants that demonstrate repayment ability but lack adequate collateral to repay the loan in full in the event of a default." Lender Eligibility Standards and Program Requirements Lender Eligibility Standards Lenders must have a continuing ability to evaluate, process, close, disburse, service, and liquidate small business loans; be open to the public for the making of such loans (and not be a financing subsidiary, engaged primarily in financing the operations of an affiliate); have continuing good character and reputation; and be supervised and examined by a state or federal regulatory authority, satisfactory to the SBA. They must also maintain satisfactory performance, as determined by the SBA through on-site review/examination assessments, historical performance measures (such as default rate, purchase rate, and loss rate), and loan volume to the extent that it affects performance measures. In FY2017, 1,978 lenders provided 7(a) loans. PLP Lenders The SBA started the Preferred Lenders Program (PLP) on March 1, 1983, initially on a pilot basis. It is designed to streamline the procedures necessary to provide financial assistance to small businesses by delegating the final credit decision and most servicing and liquidation authority and responsibility to carefully selected PLP lenders. PLP loan approvals are subject only to a brief eligibility review and the assignment of a loan number by SBA. PLP lenders draft the SBA Authorization (of loan guaranty approval) without the SBA's review, and execute it on behalf of the SBA. In FY2018, PLP lenders approved 26,497 7(a) loans (43.9% of all 7(a) loans), amounting to $18.8 billion (74.2% of the total amount approved). PLP lenders must comply with all of the SBA's business loan eligibility requirements, credit policies, and procedures. The PLP lender is required to stay informed on, and apply, all of the SBA's loan program requirements. They must also complete and retain in the lender's file all forms and documents required of standard 7(a) loan packages. Lender Program Requirements The Application Process Borrowers submit applications for a 7(a) business loan to private lenders. The lender reviews the application and decides if it merits a loan on its own or if it has some weaknesses which, in the lender's opinion, do not meet standard, conventional underwriting guidelines and require additional support in the form of an SBA guaranty. The SBA guaranty assures the lender that if the borrower does not repay the loan and the lender has adhered to all applicable regulations concerning the loan, the SBA will reimburse the lender for its loss, up to the percentage of the SBA's guaranty. The small business borrowing the money remains obligated for the full amount due. If the lender determines that it is willing to provide the loan, but only with an SBA guaranty, it submits the application for approval to the SBA's Loan Guaranty Processing Center (LGPC) through the SBA's E-Tran (Electronic Loan Processing/Servicing) website (which is available through SBA One, the SBA's automated lending platform) or, if attachments to the application are too large for E-Tran, by secured electronic file transfer. The LGPC has two physical locations: Citrus Heights, CA, and Hazard, KY. This center has responsibility for processing 7(a) loan guaranty applications for lenders who do not have delegated authority to make 7(a) loans without the SBA's final approval. The SBA has authorized PLP and express lenders to make credit decisions without SBA review prior to loan approval. However, the PLP and express lender's analysis is subject to the SBA's review and determination of adequacy when the lender requests the SBA to purchase its guaranty and when the SBA is conducting a review of the lender. As an additional safeguard against the potential for loan defaults, the SBA now requires all non-express 7(a) loans of $350,000 or less to be SBA credit scored through E-Tran prior to submission/approval. If the credit score is below the minimum set by the SBA (currently 140 for 7(a) loans of $350,000 or less, including Community Advantage loans), the loan must be submitted to the SBA for approval with a full credit write-up for consideration. The loan cannot be processed under delegated authority. If the credit score is acceptable to the SBA, the lender is a PLP lender, and the loan is eligible to be processed under the PLP lender's delegated authority, the lender will receive an SBA loan number indicating that the loan is approved. The PLP lender's documentation, including underwriting, closing, and servicing, must be maintained in their files, and can be reviewed by the SBA at any time. If the lender is not a PLP lender or if the loan is not eligible to be submitted under the PLP lender's delegated authority, the lender must refer the loan to the LGPC for review. The application materials required for a SBA guaranty vary depending on the size of the loan ($350,000 or less versus exceeding $350,000) and the method of processing used by the lender (standard versus expedited/express). The following SBA documentation is required for all 7(a) standard loans of $350,000 or less: Form 191 9: Borrower Information Form . SBA form 1919 provides information about the borrower (name, name of business, social security number, date and place of birth, gender, race, veteran, etc.); the loan request; any indebtedness; the principals and affiliates; current or previous government financing; the applicant's eligibility (e.g., criminal information, citizenship status); the loan's eligibility for delegated or expedited processing (e.g., the borrower is not more than 60 days delinquent in child support payments, not proposed or presently excluded from participation in this transaction by any federal department or agency, has no potential for a conflict of interest due to an owner being a current or former SBA employee, a Member of Congress, or a SCORE volunteer); and, among other disclosures, the firm's existing number of employees, the number of jobs to be created as a result of the loan, and the number of jobs that will be retained as a result of the loan that would have otherwise been lost. Form 912 : Statement of Personal History . SBA form 912 is required if the borrower reports on Form 1919 an arrest in the past six months for a criminal offense or had ever been convicted, plead guilty, plead nolo contendere, been placed on pretrial diversion, or been placed on any form of parole or probation (including probation before judgment) of any criminal offense. Form 912 requires the borrower to furnish details concerning his or her offense(s) and authorizes the SBA's Office of Inspector General to request criminal record information about the applicant from criminal justice agencies for determining program eligibility. It must be dated within 90 days of the application's submission to the SBA. Form 159 : Fee Disclosure and Compensation Agreement . SBA form 159 is required if the borrower reports on Form 1919 that he or she used (or intends to use) a packager, broker, accountant, lawyer, etc. to assist in preparing the loan application or any related materials. SBA form 159 is also required if the lender retains the services of a packager, broker, accountant, lawyer, etc. to assist in preparing the loan application or any related materials. Form 159 provides identifying information about the packager, broker, accountant, lawyer, etc. and the fees paid to any such person. Form 601 : Agreement of Compliance (prohibiting discrimination). SBA form 601 is required if the borrower reports on Form 1919 that more than $10,000 of the loan proceeds will be used for construction. Form 601 certifies that the borrower will cooperate actively in obtaining compliance with Executive Order 11246, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and requires affirmative action to ensure equality of opportunity in all aspects of employment related to federally assisted construction projects in excess of $10,000. Form 1920 : Lenders Application for Guaranty for all 7(a) Programs . SBA form 1920 provides identifying information about the lender; the loan type (standard, SBAExpress, Export Express, etc.); loan terms; use of proceeds; the business's size and information about affiliates, if any; the applicant's character; if credit is reasonably available elsewhere; the type of business; potential conflicts of interest; and other information such the number of jobs created or retained. PLP lenders complete the form and retain it in the loan file. Other lenders must submit this form electronically to the LGPC. Verification of Alien Status . Documentation of the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) status of each alien is required prior to submission of the application to the SBA. Lender's Credit Memo randum . For loans up to and including $350,000, the Lender's Credit Memorandum includes a brief description of the history of the business and its management; the debt service coverage ratio (net operating income compared to total debt service must be at least 1:1); statement that the lender has reconciled financial data (including seller's financial data) against IRS transcripts; an owner/guarantor analysis (including personal financial condition); lender's discussion of life insurance requirements; explanation and justification for any refinancing; analysis of credit, including lender's rationale for recommending approval; for a change of ownership, discussion/analysis of business valuation and how the change benefits the business; discussion of any liens, judgments, or bankruptcy filings; and discussion of any other relevant information. For loans exceeding $350,000, the Lender's Credit Memorandum must also include an analysis of collateral and a financial analysis which includes an analysis of the historical financial statements; defining assumptions supporting projected cash flow; and, when used, spread of pro forma balance sheet, ratio calculations, and working capital analysis. Cash Flow Projections . A projection of the borrower's cash flow, month-by-month for one year, is required for all new businesses, and when otherwise applicable. The following forms and documentation are also required for 7(a) standard loans exceeding $350,000: Form 413 : Personal Financial Statement . SBA form 413 provides detailed information concerning the applicant's assets and liabilities and must be dated within 90 days of submission to the SBA, on all owners of 20% or more (including the assets of the owner's spouse and any minor children), and proposed guarantors. Lenders may substitute their own Personal Financial Statement form. Form 1846 : Statement Regarding Lobbying . SBA Form 1846 must be signed and dated by lender. It indicates that if any funds have been paid or will be paid to any person for influencing or attempting to influence an officer or employee of any agency, a Member of Congress, an officer or employee of Congress, or an officer or employee of a Member of Congress in connection with this commitment, the lender will complete and submit a Standard Form LLL "Disclosure of Lobbying Activities." A copy of Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Form 4506-T, Request for Copy of Tax Return . Lenders must identify the date IRS Form 4506-T was sent to the IRS. For nondelegated lenders, verification of IRS Form 4506-T is required prior to submission of the application to the SBA. For PLP and express lenders, verification of IRS Form 4506-T is required prior the first disbursement. Business Financial Statements or tax returns dated within 180 days of the application's submission to the SBA, consisting of (1) year-end balance sheets for the last three years, (2) year-end profit and loss statements for the last three years, (3) reconciliation of net worth, (4) interim balance sheet, and (5) interim profit and loss statements. Affiliate and Subsidiary Financial Statements or tax returns dated within 180 days of the application's submission to the SBA, consisting of (1) year-end balance sheets for the last three years, (2) year-end profit and loss statements for the last three years, (3) reconciliation of net worth, (4) interim balance sheet, and (5) interim profit and loss statements. A copy of the Le ase Agreement , if applicable. A detailed Schedule of C ollateral . A detailed List of M&E (machinery and equipment) being purchased with SBA loan proceeds, including cost quotes. If real estate is to be purchased with the loan proceeds, a Real Estate Appraisal , Environmental Investigation Report questionnaire, a cost breakdown, and copy of any Real Estate Purchase Agreements . If purchasing an existing business with loan proceeds, a (1) copy of buy-sell agreement, (2) copy of business valuation, (3) pro forma balance sheet for the business being purchased as of the date of transfer, (4) copy of the seller's financial statements for the last three complete fiscal years or for the number of years in business if less than three years, (5) interim statements no older than 180 days from date of submission to the SBA, and (6) if the seller's financial statements are not available, the seller must provide an alternate source of verifying revenues. An explanation of the type and source of applicant's equity injection. Proper evidence of a borrower's equity injection may include the copy of a check together with proof it was processed, or a copy of an escrow settlement sheet with a bank account statement showing the injection into the business prior to disbursement. A promissory note, "gift letter," or financial statement is generally not sufficient evidence. SBA Guaranty and Servicing Fees To offset its costs, the SBA is authorized to charge lenders an up-front, one-time guaranty fee and an annual, ongoing service fee for each 7(a) loan approved and disbursed. The SBA's fees vary depending on loan amount and loan maturity. The maximum guaranty fee for 7(a) loans with maturities exceeding 12 months is set by statute and varies depending on the loan amount. The fee is a percentage of the SBA guaranteed portion of the loan. On short-term loans (maturities of less than 12 months), the lender must pay the guaranty fee to the SBA electronically through www.pay.gov within 10 days from the date the SBA loan number is assigned. If the fee is not received within the specified time frame, the SBA will cancel the guaranty. On loans with maturities in excess of 12 months, the lender must pay the guaranty fee to the SBA within 90 days of the date of loan approval. For short-term loans, the lender may charge the guaranty fee to the borrower only after the lender has paid the guaranty fee. For loans with maturities in excess of 12 months, the lender may charge the guaranty fee to the borrower after initial disbursement. Lenders are permitted to retain 25% of the guaranty fee on loans with a gross amount of $150,000 or less. The annual service fee cannot exceed 0.55% of the outstanding balance of the SBA's share of the loan and is required to be no more than the "rate necessary to reduce to zero the cost to the Administration" of making guaranties. The lender's annual service fee to the SBA cannot be charged to the borrower. In an effort to assist small business owners, the SBA waived its annual service fee for all 7(a) loans of $150,000 or less approved from FY2014 through FY2016 (the annual service fee for other small businesses was 0.52% in FY2014, 0.519% in FY2015, and 0.473% in FY2016); is waiving the annual service fee for 7(a) loans of $150,000 or less made to small businesses located in a rural area or a HUBZone in FY2019 (the annual service fee for other small businesses is 0.55% in FY2019); waived the up-front, one-time guaranty fee for all 7(a) loans of $150,000 or less approved from FY2014 through FY2017; waived the up-front, one-time guaranty fee for all 7(a) loans of $125,000 or less approved in FY2018; and is reducing the up-front one-time guaranty fee for loans made small businesses located in a rural area or a HUBZone from 2.0% to 0.6667% of the guaranteed portion of the loan in FY2019. Table 1 shows the annual service fee and guaranty fee for 7(a) loans in FY2019. The annual service fee is a percentage of the outstanding balance of the SBA's share of the loan. The guaranty fee is a percentage of the SBA guaranteed portion of the loan. As mentioned previously, the SBA waived its up-front, one-time guaranty fee for all veteran loans under the 7(a) SBAExpress program (up to $350,000) from January 1, 2014, through the end of FY2015. P.L. 114-38 , the Veterans Entrepreneurship Act of 2015, made this fee waiver permanent, except during any upcoming fiscal year for which the President's budget, submitted to Congress, includes a cost for the 7(a) program, in its entirety, that is above zero. The SBA waived this fee in FY2016, FY2017, and FY2018 and is waiving it in FY2019. The SBA also waived 50% of the up-front, one-time guaranty fee on all non-SBAExpress 7(a) loans of $150,001 to $5 million for veterans in FY2015 and FY2016; 50% of the up-front, one-time guaranty fee on all non-SBAExpress 7(a) loans of $150,001 to $500,000 for veterans in FY2017; and 50% of the up-front, one-time guaranty fee on all non-SBAExpress 7(a) loans of $125,001 to $350,000 for veterans in FY2018. The Obama Administration argued that fee waivers for 7(a) loans of $150,000 or less were necessary because the demand for smaller 7(a) loans had fallen and the waiver reduction "can be achieved with zero credit subsidy appropriations" because the "annual fees for larger 7(a) loans will cover the cost for those smaller loans." The Administration also contended that waiving the fees on smaller SBA loans would "promote lending to small businesses that face the most constraints on credit access." For context, 7(a) loans of $150,000 or less accounted for about 11.8% of the total amount of 7(a) loan approvals in FY2010 ($1.46 billion of $12.41 billion); 8.3% in FY2011 ($1.63 billion of $19.64 billion); 9.5% in FY2012 ($1.44 billion of $15.15 billion); 8.1% in FY2013 ($1.45 billion of $17.87 billion); 9.7% in FY2014 ($1.86 billion of $19.19 billion); 9.7% in FY2015 ($2.28 billion of $23.58 billion); 9.4% in FY2016 ($2.75 billion of $24.13 billion), and 9.2% in FY2017 ($2.33 billion of $25.45 billion). The SBA also announced that eliminating guaranty fees for 7(a) loans of $150,000 or less ($125,000 or less in FY2018) was part of its broader effort to "reduce barriers, attract new lenders, grow loan volumes of existing lenders and improve access to capital for small businesses and entrepreneurs." Some in Congress questioned whether it is appropriate to require borrowers of larger 7(a) loans to, in effect, subsidize borrowers of smaller 7(a) loans, who might be direct competitors. They have suggested that it might be more appropriate to reduce fees across-the-board without regard to loan size. Lender Packaging, Servicing, and Other Fees The lender may charge an applicant "reasonable fees" customary for similar lenders in the geographic area where the loan is being made for packaging and other services. The lender must advise the applicant in writing that the applicant is not required to obtain or pay for unwanted services. These fees are subject to SBA review at any time, and the lender must refund any such fee considered unreasonable by the SBA. The lender may also charge an applicant an additional fee if, subject to prior written SBA approval, all or part of a loan will have extraordinary servicing needs. The additional fee cannot exceed 2% per year on the outstanding balance of the part requiring special servicing (e.g., field inspections for construction projects). The lender may also collect from the applicant necessary out-of-pocket expenses, including filing or recording fees, photocopying, delivery charges, collateral appraisals, environmental impact reports that are obtained in compliance with SBA policy, and other direct charges related to loan closing. The lender is prohibited from requiring the borrower to pay any fees for goods and services, including insurance, as a condition for obtaining an SBA guaranteed loan, and from imposing on SBA loan applicants processing fees, origination fees, application fees, points, brokerage fees, bonus points, and referral or similar fees. The lender is also allowed to charge the borrower a late payment fee not to exceed 5% of the regular loan payment when the borrower is more than 10 days delinquent on its regularly scheduled payment. The lender may not charge a fee for full or partial prepayment of a loan. For loans with a maturity of 15 years or longer, the borrower must pay to the SBA a subsidy recoupment fee when the borrower voluntarily prepays 25% or more of its loan in any one year during the first three years after first disbursement. The fee is 5% of the prepayment amount during the first year, 3% in the second year, and 1% in the third year. Program Statistics Loan Volume As shown in Table 2 , the total number and amount of SBA 7(a) loans approved (before and after cancellations and modifications) declined in FY2008 and FY2009, increased during FY2010 and FY2011, declined somewhat in FY2012, and have increased since then. The number and amount of 7(a) loans approved annually is higher than the number and amount of loans disbursed because some borrowers decide not to accept the loan for a variety of reasons, such as financing was secured elsewhere, the funds are no longer needed, or there was a change in business ownership. The SBA attributed the decreased number and amount of 7(a) loans approved in FY2008 and FY2009 to a reduction in the demand for small business loans resulting from the economic uncertainty of the recession (December 2007-June 2009) and to tightened loan standards imposed by lenders concerned about the possibility of higher loan default rates resulting from the economic slowdown. The SBA attributed the increased number of loans approved in FY2010 and FY2011 to legislation that provided funding to temporarily reduce the 7(a) program's loan fees and temporarily increase the 7(a) program's loan guaranty percentage to 90% for all standard 7(a) loans from up to 85% of loans of $150,000 or less and up to 75% of loans exceeding $150,000. The fee subsidies and 90% loan guaranty percentage were in place during most of FY2010 and the first quarter of FY2011. The increased number and amount of 7(a) loans approved since FY2012 are generally attributed to improving economic conditions. Table 2 also provides the 7(a) program's unpaid principal balance by fiscal year. Precise measurements of the small business credit market are not available. However, the SBA has estimated that the small business credit market (outstanding bank loans of $1 million or less, plus credit extended by finance companies and other sources) is roughly $1.2 trillion. The 7(a) program's unpaid principal balance of $92.41 billion at the end of FY2018 was about 7.7% of that amount. Appropriations for Loan Subsidy Costs One of the SBA's goals is to achieve a zero subsidy rate for its loan guaranty programs. A zero subsidy rate occurs when the SBA's loan guaranty programs generate sufficient revenue through fee collections and recoveries of collateral on purchased (defaulted) loans to not require appropriations to issue new loan guarantees. From 2005 to 2009, the SBA did not request appropriations to subsidize the cost of any of its loan guaranty programs, including the 7(a) program. However, as indicated in Table 3 , loan guaranty fees and loan liquidation recoveries did not generate enough revenue to cover loan losses in the 7(a) loan guaranty program from FY2010 through FY2013 and in the 504/CDC loan guaranty program from FY2012 through FY2015. Appropriations were provided to address the shortfalls. Congress did not approve appropriations for 7(a) and 504/CDC loan guaranty program credit subsidies for FY2016 through FY2019 because the President's budget request indicated that those programs did not require appropriations for credit subsidies in those fiscal years. Administrative Expenses In FY2017, the SBA spent $82.2 million on the 7(a) program for administrative expenses, including $63.0 million for loan making, $4.1 million for loan servicing, and $15.1 million for loan liquidation. Also, the SBA spent $36.9 million on lender oversight, including oversight of 7(a) lenders. The SBA anticipated that 7(a) program administrative expenses will be about $82.2 million in FY2018 and $84.5 million in FY2019. In addition, the SBA anticipated that it will spend about $36.9 million in FY2018 and $36.6 million in FY2019 for lender oversight of the SBA's various lending programs. Use of Proceeds and Borrower Satisfaction In FY2017, borrowers used 7(a) loan proceeds to purchase land or make land improvements (26.62%); purchase a business (17.06%); finance working capital (15.59%); pay off loans, accounts payable or notes payable (13.23%); construct new buildings (6.06%); purchase equipment (5.76%); make leasehold improvements (3.25%); expand or renovate current buildings (2.39%); refinance existing debt (1.40%); and cover other expenses (8.64%). In 2008, the Urban Institute released the results of an SBA-commissioned study of the SBA's loan guaranty programs. As part of its analysis, the Urban Institute surveyed a random sample of SBA loan guaranty borrowers. The survey indicated that most of the 7(a) borrowers responding to the survey rated their overall satisfaction with their 7(a) loan and loan terms as either excellent (18%) or good (50%). One out of every five 7(a) borrowers (20%) rated their overall satisfaction with their 7(a) loan and loan terms as fair, and 6% rated their overall satisfaction with their 7(a) loan and loan terms as poor (7% reported don't know or did not respond). In addition, 90% of the survey's respondents reported that the 7(a) loan was either very important (62%) or somewhat important (28%) to their business success (2% reported somewhat unimportant, 3% reported very unimportant, and 4% reported don't know or did not respond). Borrower Demographics The Urban Institute found that about 9.9% of conventional small business loans are issued to minority-owned small businesses, and about 16% of conventional small business loans are issued to women-owned businesses. In FY2018, 32.8% of 7(a) loan approvals ($8.32 billion of $25.37 billion) were to minority-owned businesses (23.0% Asian, 6.0% Hispanic, 3.1% African-American, and 0.7% American Indian) and 13.6% ($3.46 billion of $25.37 billion) were to women-owned businesses. From its comparative analysis of conventional small business loans and the SBA's loan guaranty programs, the Urban Institute concluded the following: SBA's loan programs are designed to enable private lenders to make loans to creditworthy borrowers who would otherwise not be able to qualify for a loan. As a result, there should be differences in the types of borrowers and loan terms associated with SBA-guaranteed and conventional small business loans. Our comparative analysis shows such differences. Overall, loans under the 7(a) and 504 programs were more likely to be made to minority-owned, women-owned, and start-up businesses (firms that have historically faced capital gaps) as compared to conventional small business loans. Moreover, the average amounts for loans made under the 7(a) and 504 programs to these types of firms were substantially greater than conventional small business loans to such firms. These findings suggest that the 7(a) and 504 programs are being used by lenders in a manner that is consistent with SBA's objective of making credit available to firms that face a capital opportunity gap. Congressional Issues Access to Capital Congressional interest in the 7(a) loan program has increased in recent years largely because of concerns that small businesses might be prevented from accessing sufficient capital to enable them to assist in the economic recovery. During the 110 th and 111 th Congresses, several laws were enacted to increase the supply and demand for capital for both large and small businesses. For example, in 2008, Congress adopted P.L. 110-343 , the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, which authorized the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). Under TARP, the U.S. Department of the Treasury was authorized to purchase or insure up to $700 billion in troubled assets, including small business loans, from banks and other financial institutions. The law's intent was "to restore liquidity and stability to the financial system of the United States." P.L. 111-203 , the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, reduced total TARP purchase authority from $700 billion to $475 billion. The Department of the Treasury's authority to make new financial commitments under TARP ended on October 3, 2010. The Department of the Treasury has disbursed approximately $430 billion in TARP funds, including $370 million to purchase SBA 7(a) loan guaranty program securities. In addition, as mentioned previously, in 2009, ARRA provided an additional $730 million for SBA programs, including $375 million to temporarily reduce fees in the SBA's 7(a) and 504/CDC loan guaranty programs and increase the 7(a) program's maximum loan guaranty percentage from up to 85% of loans of $150,000 or less and up to 75% of loans exceeding $150,000 to 90% for all standard 7(a) loans. Congress subsequently provided another $265 million, and authorized the SBA to reprogram another $40 million, to extend the fee reductions and loan modification through May 31, 2010, and the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 provided another $505 million (plus $5 million for administrative expenses) to extend the fee reductions and loan modification from September 27, 2010, through December 31, 2010. Also, P.L. 111-322 , the Continuing Appropriations and Surface Transportation Extensions Act, 2011, authorized the use of any funding remaining from the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 to extend the fee subsidies and 90% maximum loan guaranty percentage through March 4, 2011, or until the available funding was exhausted. Funding for these purposes was exhausted on January 3, 2011. The Obama Administration argued that TARP and the additional funding for the SBA's loan guaranty programs helped to improve the small business lending environment and supported "the retention and creation of hundreds of thousands of jobs." Critics argued that small business tax reduction, reform of financial credit market regulation, and federal fiscal restraint are the best means to assist small business economic growth and job creation. Program Administration Over the years, the SBA's Office of Inspector General (OIG) and the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) have independently reviewed the SBA's administration of the SBA's loan guaranty programs. Although improvements have been noted, both agencies have reported deficiencies in the SBA's administration of its loan guaranty programs that they argue need to be addressed, including issues involving the oversight of 7(a) lenders and the lack of outcome-based performance measures. Oversight of 7(a) Lenders On December 1, 2000, the OIG released its FY2001 list of the most serious management challenges facing the SBA and included, for the first time, the oversight of SBA lenders. Since then, the OIG has determined that the SBA has made significant progress in improving its oversight of SBA lenders. For example The SBA established an Office of Lender Oversight (renamed the Office of Credit Risk Management in 2007), led by an Associate Administrator, which, in October 2000, drafted a strategic plan to serve as a basis for developing a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for lender oversight and, among other activities, initiated "steps to develop and implement a comprehensive loan monitoring system to evaluate lender performance. The system will collect data on lenders such as delinquency default rates, liquidations, loan payments, and loan originations." In 2004, the SBA's National Guaranty Purchase Center developed a quality control plan "to review the quality of the guaranty purchase process." In 2006, the SBA issued an SOP that established procedures for on-site, risk-based lender reviews and safety and soundness examinations for 7(a) lenders and Certified Development Companies (CDCs) participating the SBA's 504/CDC loan guaranty program. In 2007, the SBA completed the centralization of all 7(a) loan processing activities and, with very limited exception, ended loan making, servicing, liquidation, and guaranty purchase activity at district offices. In 2008, the SBA issued an SOP for 7(a) lender oversight which included uniform policies and procedures for the evaluation of lender performance and the SBA's Office of Financial Program Operations (OFPO) began designing "a comprehensive quality control program across all of its centers." Previously, quality control was conducted within each loan center (Standard 7(a) Loan Guaranty Processing Center, Commercial Loan Service Center, and National Guaranty Purchase Center) "at various levels of sophistication." The SBA issued an interim final rule in the Federal Register on December 1, 2008, incorporating the SBA's risk-based lender oversight program into the SBA's regulations. In 2010, the SBA's OFPO established its agency-wide quality control program, which is designed to improve service and "reduce waste, fraud, and abuse" by ensuring "that centers accurately and consistently apply statutory, regulatory, and procedural loan program requirements." The SBA also developed a "risk-based, off-site analysis of lending partners through its Loan/Lender Monitoring System (L/LMS), a state-of-the-art portfolio monitoring system that incorporates credit scoring metrics for portfolio management purposes." In 2012-2013, the SBA "(1) developed risk profiles and lender performance thresholds, (2) developed a select analytical review process to allow for virtual risk-based reviews, (3) updated its lender risk rating model to better stratify and predict risk, and (4) conducted test reviews under the new risk-based review protocol." In 2013-2014, the SBA "improved its monitoring and verification of corrective actions by lenders by: (1) developing corrective action assessment procedures, (2) finalizing a system to facilitate the corrective action process, and (3) populating the system with lender oversight results requiring corrective action." In 2015, the SBA's Office of Credit Risk Management (OCRM) "engaged contractor support to expand on its corrective action follow-up process. Additionally, OCRM issued its FY2015 Risk Management Oversight Plan, which included plans to conduct 170 corrective action reviews between 7(a) and 504 lenders." In 2016, OCRM reported that it conducted 147 corrective action follow-up assessments, established performance measures and risk mitigation goals for the SBA's entire lending portfolio, and "conducted portfolio analyses of problem lenders with heavy concentrations in SBA 7(a) lending and sales on the secondary market." Despite these improvements, the OIG continues to list lender oversight as one of the most serious management challenges facing the SBA because it argues that several issues that it has identified in audits have not been fully addressed. Specifically, the OIG reports that the SBA needs to show that the portfolio risk management program is used to support risk based decisions, implement additional controls to mitigate risks, develop an effective method for tracking loan agents, and update regulations on loan agents. Outcome-Oriented Performance Measures GAO has argued that the 7(a) program's performance measures (e.g., number of loans approved, loans funded, and firms assisted across the subgroups of small businesses) provide limited information about the impact of the loans on participating small businesses: The program's performance measures focus on indicators that are primarily output measures–for instance, they report on the number of loans approved and funded. But none of the measures looks at how well firms do after receiving 7(a) loans, so no information is available on outcomes. As a result, the current measures do not indicate how well the agency is meeting its strategic goal of helping small businesses succeed. The SBA's OIG has made a similar argument concerning the SBA's Microloan program's performance measures. Because the SBA uses similar program performance measures for its Microloan and 7(a) programs, the OIG's recommendations could also be applied to the SBA's 7(a) program. Specifically, as part of its audit of the SBA Microloan program's use of ARRA funds, the OIG found that the SBA's performance measures for the Microloan program are based on the number of microloans funded, the number of small businesses assisted, and program's loan loss rate. It argued that these "performance metrics ... do not ensure the ultimate program beneficiaries, the microloan borrowers, are truly assisted by the program" and "without appropriate metrics, SBA cannot ensure the Microloan program is meeting policy goals." It noted that the SBA does not track the number of microloan borrowers who remain in business after receiving a microloan to measure the extent to which the loans contributed to the success of borrowers and does not determine the effect that technical training assistance may have on the success of microloan borrowers and their ability to repay loans. It recommended that the SBA "develop additional performance metrics to measure the program's achievement in assisting microloan borrowers in establishing and maintaining successful small businesses." In its response to GAO's recommendation to develop additional performance measures for the 7(a) program, the SBA formed, in July 2014, an impact evaluation working group to develop a methodology for conducting impact evaluations of the agency's programs using administrative data sources residing at the SBA and in other federal agencies, such as the U.S. Census Bureau and the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Numerous SBA program offices participated in this working group and each office developed its own program evaluation methodology or established program evaluation frameworks. More recently, the SBA indicated in its FY2017 congressional budget justification document that although it "continues to face barriers gathering outcome rich evaluation data with current restrictions in collecting personal identification information (PII) and business identification information (BII)" it "plans to further develop its analytical capabilities, enhance collaboration across its programs, provide evaluation-specific trainings, and broaden use of impact evaluations to support senior leaders and institutionalize the evidence-based process across programs." To encourage evidence-based evaluations across its programs, the SBA has created an annual Enterprise Learning Agenda designed to "help program managers continue to build and use evidence and to foster an environment of continuous learning." As part of this agenda building process, the SBA identifies programs for evidence-based evaluation and undertakes both internal evaluations using available data or contracts with third parties to conduct the evaluations. Legislative Activity During the 111th Congress Congress authorized several changes to the 7(a) program during the 111 th Congress in an effort to increase the number and amount of 7(a) loans. The Obama Administration's Proposals During the 111 th Congress, the Obama Administration supported congressional efforts to temporarily subsidize fees for the 7(a) and 504/CDC loan guaranty programs and to increase the 7(a) program's loan guaranty percentage from up to 85% of loans of $150,000 or less and up to 75% of loans exceeding $150,000 to 90%. Congress subsequently provided nearly $1.1 billion to temporarily subsidize fees for the 7(a) and 504/CDC loan guaranty programs and to increase the 7(a) program's maximum loan guaranty percentage to 90% for all standard 7(a) loans. The Obama Administration also proposed the following modifications to several SBA programs, including the 7(a) program: increase the maximum loan size for 7(a) loans from $2 million to $5 million; increase the maximum loan size for the 504/CDC program from $2 million to $5 million for regular projects and from $4 million to $5.5 million for manufacturing projects; increase the maximum loan size for microloans to small business concerns from $35,000 to $50,000; increase the maximum loan limits for lenders in their first year of participation in the Microloan program, from $750,000 to $1 million, and from $3.5 million to $5 million in the subsequent years; temporarily increase the cap on SBAExpress loans from $350,000 to $1 million; and temporarily allow in FY2010 and FY2011, with an option to extend into FY2012, the refinancing of loans for owner-occupied commercial real estate that are within one year of maturity under the SBA's 504/CDC program. Arguments for Increasing the SBA's Maximum Loan Limits The Obama Administration argued that increasing the maximum loan limits for the 7(a), 504/CDC, Microloan, and SBAExpress programs would allow the SBA to "support larger projects," which would "allow the SBA to help America's small businesses drive long-term economic growth and the creation of jobs in communities across the country." The Administration also argued that increasing the maximum loan limits for these programs would be "budget neutral" over the long run and "help improve the availability of smaller loans." Arguments Against Increasing the SBA's Maximum Loan Limits Critics of the Obama Administration's proposals to increase the SBA's maximum loan limits argued that higher loan limits might increase the risk of defaults, resulting in higher guaranty fees or the need to provide the SBA additional funding, especially for the SBAExpress program, which has experienced somewhat higher default rates than other SBA loan guaranty programs. Others advocated a more modest increase in the maximum loan limits to ensure that the 7(a) program "remains focused on startup and early-stage small firms, businesses that have historically encountered the greatest difficulties in accessing credit," and "avoids making small borrowers carry a disproportionate share of the risk associated with larger loans." Others argued that creating a small business direct lending program within the SBA would reduce paperwork requirements and be more efficient in providing small businesses access to capital than modifying existing SBA programs that rely on private lenders to determine if they will issue the loans. Also, as mentioned previously, others argued that providing additional resources to the SBA or modifying the SBA's loan programs as a means to augment small business access to capital is ill-advised. In their view, the SBA has limited impact on small businesses' access to capital. They argued that the best means to assist small business economic growth and job creation is to focus on small business tax reduction, reform of financial credit market regulation, and federal fiscal restraint. P.L. 111-5, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) As mentioned previously, in 2009, ARRA provided an additional $730 million for SBA programs, including $375 million to temporarily reduce fees in the SBA's 7(a) and 504/CDC loan guaranty programs ($299 million) and increase the 7(a) program's maximum loan guaranty percentage from up to 85% of loans of $150,000 or less and up to 75% of loans exceeding $150,000 to 90% for all standard 7(a) loans ($76 million). P.L. 111-240, the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 P.L. 111-240 provided $505 million (plus $5 million for administrative expenses) to extend the 7(a) program's 90% maximum loan guaranty percentage and 7(a) and 504/CDC loan guaranty programs' fee subsidies through December 31, 2010 (later extended to March 4, 2011), or until available funding was exhausted (which occurred on January 3, 2011). The act also made the following changes to the SBA's programs: increased the maximum loan size for 7(a) loans from $2 million to $5 million; temporarily increased for one year (through September 27, 2011) the cap on SBAExpress loans from $350,000 to $1 million; increased the maximum loan size for the 504/CDC loans from $1.5 million to $5 million for regular projects, from $2 million to $5 million for projects meeting one of the program's specified public policy goals, and from $4 million to $5.5 million for manufacturers; increased the maximum loan size for the Microloan program from $35,000 to $50,000; authorized the SBA to establish an alternative size standard for the 7(a) and 504/CDC programs that uses maximum tangible net worth and average net income as an alternative to the use of industry standards and established an interim size standard of a maximum tangible net worth of not more than $15 million and an average net income after federal taxes (excluding any carryover losses) for the preceding two fiscal years of not more than $5 million; and allowed 504/CDC loans to be used to refinance up to $7.5 billion in short-term commercial real estate debt each fiscal year for two years after enactment (through September 27, 2012) into long-term fixed rate loans. The act also authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to establish a $30 billion Small Business Lending Fund (SBLF) to encourage community banks to provide small business loans ($4 billion was issued), a $1.5 billion State Small Business Credit Initiative to provide funding to participating states with small business capital access programs, and about $12 billion in tax relief for small businesses. It also contained revenue raising provisions to offset the act's cost and authorized a number of changes to other SBA loan and contracting programs. Legislative Activity During the 112th Congress Congress did not approve any changes to the 7(a) program during the 112 th Congress. However, several bills were introduced during the 112 th Congress that would have changed the program. S. 1828 , a bill to increase small business lending, and for other purposes, was introduced on November 8, 2011, and referred to the Senate Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship. The bill would have reinstated for a year following the date of its enactment the temporary fee subsidies for the 7(a) and 504/CDC loan guaranty programs and the 90% loan guaranty for standard 7(a) loans, which were originally authorized by ARRA and later extended by several laws, including the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010. H.R. 2936 , the Small Business Administration Express Loan Extension Act of 2011, introduced on September 15, 2011, and referred to the House Committee on Small Business, would have extended a one-year increase in the maximum loan amount for the SBAExpress program from $350,000 to $1 million for an additional year. The temporary increase in that program's maximum loan amount was authorized by P.L. 111-240 , the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, and expired on September 27, 2011 (see Appendix ). S. 532 , the Patriot Express Authorization Act of 2011, introduced on March 9, 2011, and referred to the Senate Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship, would have provided statutory authorization for the Patriot Express Pilot Program. This program was subsequently discontinued by the SBA on December 31, 2013. The bill would have increased the program's maximum loan amount from $500,000 to $1 million, and it would have increased the guaranty percentages from up to 85% of loans of $150,000 or less and up to 75% of loans exceeding $150,000 to up to 85% of loans of $500,000 or less and up to 80% of loans exceeding $500,000. Legislative Activity During the 113th Congress H.R. 2451 , the Strengthening Entrepreneurs' Economic Development Act of 2013, was introduced on June 20, 2013, and referred to the House Committee on Small Business. It would have authorized the SBA to make direct loans of up to $150,000 to businesses with fewer than 20 employees. It would have also required the SBA to assess, collect, and retain a fee with respect to the outstanding balance of the deferred participation share of each 7(a) loan in excess of $2 million that is no more than is necessary to reduce to zero the SBA's cost of making the loan. H.R. 2461 , the SBA Loan Paperwork Reduction Act of 2013, was introduced on June 20, 2013, and referred to the House Committee on Small Business. It would have provided statutory authorization for the Small Loan Advantage (SLA) pilot program. The SBA started that program on February 15, 2011. It provided a streamlined application process for 7(a) loans of up to $350,000 if the loan received an acceptable credit score from the SBA prior to the loan being submitted for processing. The SBA adopted the SLA application process as the model for processing all non-express 7(a) loans of $350,000 or less, effective January 1, 2014. As mentioned previously, the Obama Administration waived the up-front, one time loan guaranty fee and ongoing servicing fee for 7(a) loans of $150,000 or less approved in FY2014 (and later extended the fee waiver in FY2015 and FY2016). H.R. 2462 , the Small Business Opportunity Acceleration Act of 2013, introduced on June 20, 2013, and referred to the House Committee on Small Business, would have made the fee waiver permanent. Also, the Obama Administration waived the up-front, one-time loan guaranty fee for veteran loans under the SBAExpress program (up to $350,000) from January 1, 2014, through the end of FY2015 (called the Veterans Advantage Program). S. 2143 , the Veterans Entrepreneurship Act, would have authorized this fee waiver and made it permanent. Also, P.L. 113-235 provided statutory authorization to waive the 7(a) SBAExpress program's guarantee fee for veterans (and their spouse) in FY2015. Legislative Activity During the 114th Congress P.L. 114-38 , the Veterans Entrepreneurship Act of 2015, authorized and made permanent the waiver of the up-front, one-time loan guaranty fee for veterans (and their spouse) in the SBAExpress program beginning on or after October 1, 2015, except during any upcoming fiscal year for which the President's budget, submitted to Congress, includes a cost for the 7(a) program, in its entirety, that is above zero. The act also increased the 7(a) program's authorization limit from $18.75 billion in FY2015 to $23.5 billion. On June 25, 2015, the SBA informed Congress that the 7(a) program "is on track to hit its authorization ceiling of $18.75 billion well before the end of FY2015." The SBA indicated that "our activity and trend analysis reveal a strong uptick that, if sustained, would exceed our lending authority ceiling by late August." If that were to occur, and in the absence of statutory authority to do otherwise, the SBA reported that it would have to suspend 7(a) loan making for the remainder of the fiscal year. The SBA requested an increase in the 7(a) loan program's authorization limit to $22.5 billion in FY2015. On July 23, 2015, citing "unprecedented demand," the SBA suspended 7(a) program lending. The SBA indicated that it would continue to process loan applications "up to the point of approval" and then place approved loans "into a queue awaiting the availability of program authority." Loans would be released "once program authority became available due to Congressional action or as a result of cancellations of loans previously approved this fiscal year." Applications would then "be funded in the order they were approved by SBA, with the exception that requests for increases to previously approved loans will be funded before applications for new loans." The SBA resumed 7(a) lending on July 28, 2015, following P.L. 114-38 's enactment. In addition to increasing the 7(a) program's authorization limit for FY2015, the act added requirements designed to ensure that SBA loans do not displace private sector loans (e.g., the SBA Administrator may not guarantee a 7(a) loan if the lender determines that the borrower is unable to obtain credit elsewhere solely because the liquidity of the lender depends upon the guarantied portion of the loan being sold on the secondary market, or if the sole purpose for requesting the guarantee is to allow the lender to exceed the lender's legal lending limit), and requires the SBA to report, on a quarterly basis, specified 7(a) program statistics to the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations and Small Business. These required statistics are designed to inform the committees of the SBA's pace of 7(a) lending, provide estimates concerning the date on which the program's authorization limit may be reached, and present information concerning early defaults and actions taken by the SBA to combat early defaults. As mentioned previously, P.L. 114-113 increased the 7(a) program's authorization limit from $23.5 billion in FY2015 to $26.5 billion for FY2016. In addition, P.L. 114-223 , the Continuing Appropriations and Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2017, authorized the SBA to use funds from its business loan program account "to accommodate increased demand for commitments for [7(a)] general business loans" for the duration of the continuing resolution (initially December 9, 2016, later extended by P.L. 114-254 , the Further Continuing and Security Assistance Appropriations Act, 2017, to April 28, 2017). In a related development, S. 2496 , the Help Small Businesses Access Affordable Credit Act, introduced on February 2, 2016, would have authorized the SBA Administrator, with prior approval of the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations, to make loans in an amount equal to not more than 110% of the 7(a) program's authorization limit if the demand for 7(a) loans should exceed that limit. The Obama Administration also requested authorization to allow the SBA Administrator to continue to issue loans should the demand for 7(a) loans exceed the program's authorization limit. Also. S. 2992 , the Small Business Lending Oversight Act of 2016, would have required the Director of the SBA's Office of Credit Risk Management (OCRM) to impose penalties on 7(a) lenders who "knowingly and repeatedly" undertake specified activities; required the SBA to annually undertake and report the findings of a risk analysis of the 7(a) program's loan portfolio; redefined the credit elsewhere requirement; authorized fees to be used to support OCRM operations; required the SBA to identify potential loan risks by lenders participating in the Preferred Lenders Program by requiring the SBA, at the end of each year, to "calculate the percentage of loans in a lender's portfolio made without a contribution of borrower equity when the loan's purpose was to establish a new small business concern, to effectuate a change of small business ownership, or to purchase real estate"; and, among other provisions, prohibited the SBA from approving any loan if its financing is more than 100% of project costs. Legislation was also introduced ( S. 2125 , the Small Business Lending and Economic Inequality Reduction Act of 2015) to provide permanent, statutory authorization for the Community Advantage Pilot program (see Appendix ). The SBA announced on December 28, 2015, that it was extending the Community Advantage Pilot program through March 31, 2020. It had been set to expire on March 15, 2017. Legislative Activity During the 115th Congress Recognizing that 7(a) loan approvals during the first half of FY2017 were about 9% higher than during the first half of FY2016, Congress included a provision in P.L. 115-31 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017, that increased the 7(a) program's authorization limit to $27.5 billion in FY2017 from $26.5 billion in FY2016. Congress also approved legislation ( P.L. 115-141 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018) that increased the 7(a) program's authorization limit to $29.0 billion in FY2018. In addition, as mentioned earlier, P.L. 115-189 , the Small Business 7(a) Lending Oversight Reform Act of 2018, among other provisions, codified the SBA's Office of Credit Risk Management; required that office to annually undertake and report the findings of a risk analysis of the 7(a) program's loan portfolio; created a lender oversight committee within the SBA; authorized the Director of the Office of Credit Risk Management to undertake informal and formal enforcement actions against 7(a) lenders under specified conditions; redefined the credit elsewhere requirement; and authorized the SBA Administrator to increase the amount of 7(a) loans not more than once during any fiscal year to not more than 115% of the 7(a) program's authorization limit. The SBA is required to provide at least 30 days' notice of its intent to exceed the 7(a) loan program's authorization limit to the House and Senate Committees on Small Business and the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations' Subcommittees on Financial Services and General Government and may exercise this option only once per fiscal year. Also, P.L. 115-232 , the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, included provisions to make 7(a) loans more accessible to employee-owned small businesses (ESOPs) and cooperatives. The act authorizes the SBA to make "back-to-back" loans to ESOPs to better align with industry practices (the loan proceeds must only be used to make a loan to a qualified employee trust); clarifies that 7(a) loans to ESOPs may be made under the Preferred Lenders Program; allows the seller to remain involved as an officer, director, or key employee when the ESOP or cooperative has acquired 100% ownership of the small business; and authorizes the SBA to finance transition costs to employee ownership and waive any mandatory equity injection by the ESOP or cooperative to help finance the change of ownership. The act also directs the SBA to create outreach programs with Small Business Investment Companies and Microloan intermediaries to make their lending programs more accessible to all eligible ESOPs and cooperatives, an interagency working group to promote lending to ESOPs and cooperatives, and a Small Business Employee Ownership and Cooperatives Promotion Program, administered by Small Business Development Centers, to offer technical assistance and training to small businesses on the transition to employee ownership through cooperatives and ESOPs. Congress did not focus much attention on the Trump Administration's proposal in its FY2019 budget request to "introduce counter-cyclical policies in SBA's business guaranty loan programs and update certain fees structures to offset $155 million in business loan administration." As mentioned earlier, the proposal included raising $93 million in additional revenue by allowing the SBA to set the 7(a) program's annual servicing fee at rates below zero credit subsidy; increasing the 7(a) loan program's FY2019 annual servicing fee's cap from 0.55% to 0.625%; and increasing the FY2019 upfront loan guarantee fee on 7(a) loans over $1 million by 0.25%. The Administration also requested that the 7(a) loan program's authorization limit be increased to $30.0 million in FY2019; that the SBA be allowed to further increase the 7(a) loan program's authorization amount in FY2019 by 15% under specified circumstances "to better equip the SBA to meet peaks in demand while continuing to operate at zero subsidies;" that the SBA be allowed to impose an annual fee, not to exceed 0.05% per year, of the outstanding balance on 7(a) secondary market trust certificates to help offset administrative costs; and that the SBAExpress program's loan limit be increased from $350,000 to $1 million. Legislative Activity During the 116th Congress P.L. 116-6 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019, increased the 7(a) program's authorization limit to $30.0 billion in FY2019. Concluding Observations The congressional debate concerning the SBA's 7(a) program during the 111 th Congress was not whether the federal government should act, but which federal policies would most likely enhance small businesses' access to capital and result in job retention and creation. As a general proposition, some Members of Congress argued that the SBA should be provided additional resources to assist small businesses in acquiring capital necessary to start, continue, or expand operations with the expectation that in so doing small businesses will create jobs. Others worried about the long-term adverse economic effects of spending programs that increase the federal deficit. They advocated business tax reduction, reform of financial credit market regulation, and federal fiscal restraint as the best means to help small businesses further economic growth and job creation. In terms of specific program changes, increasing the 7(a) program's loan limit, extending the 7(a) program's temporary fee subsidies and 90% maximum loan guaranty percentage, and establishing an alternative size standard for the 7(a) program were all designed to achieve the same goal: to enhance job creation by increasing the ability of 7(a) borrowers to access credit at affordable rates. However, determining how specific changes in federal policy are most likely to enhance job creation is a challenging task. For example, a 2008 Urban Institute study concluded that differences in the term, interest rate, and amount of SBA financing were "not significantly associated with increasing sales or employment among firms receiving SBA financing." The study also reported that the analysis accounted for less than 10% of the variation in firm performance. The Urban Institute suggested that local economic conditions, local zoning regulations, state and local tax rates, state and local business assistance programs, and the business owner's charisma or business acumen also "may play a role in determining how well a business performs after receipt of SBA financing." As the Urban Institute study suggests, because many factors influence business success, measuring the 7(a) program's effect on job retention and creation is complicated. That task is made even more challenging by the absence of performance-oriented measures that could serve as a guide. Both GAO and the SBA's OIG have recommended that the SBA adopt outcome performance-oriented measures for its loan guaranty programs, such as tracking the number of borrowers who remain in business after receiving a loan to measure the extent to which the program contributed to their ability to stay in business. Other performance-oriented measures that Congress might also consider include requiring the SBA to survey 7(a) borrowers to measure the difficulty they experienced in obtaining a loan from the private sector and the extent to which the 7(a) loan or technical assistance received contributed to their ability to create jobs or expand their scope of operations. Appendix. 7(a) Specialized Programs The 7(a) program has several specialized programs that offer streamlined and expedited loan procedures for particular groups of borrowers, including the SBAExpress, Export Express, and Community Advantage programs. Lenders must be approved by the SBA for participation in these programs. SBAExpress Program The SBAExpress program was established as a pilot program by the SBA on February 27, 1995, and made permanent through legislation, subject to reauthorization, in 2004 ( P.L. 108-447 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005). The program is designed to increase the availability of credit to small businesses by permitting lenders to use their existing documentation and procedures in return for receiving a reduced SBA guaranty on loans. It provides a 50% loan guaranty on loan amounts up to $350,000. As shown in Table A-1 , the SBA approved 27,794 SBAExpress loans (46.1% of total 7(a) program loan approvals), totaling $1.98 billion (7.8% of total 7(a) program amount approvals) in FY2018. The program's higher loan amount in FY2011 was due, at least in part, to a provision in P.L. 111-240 , the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, which temporarily increased the SBAExpress program's loan limit to $1 million for one year following enactment (through September 27, 2011). During the 112 th Congress, H.R. 2936 , the Small Business Administration Express Loan Extension Act of 2011, would have extended the SBAExpress program's higher loan limit for an additional year (through September 27, 2012). SBAExpress loan proceeds can be used for the same purposes as those of the 7(a) program (expansion, renovation, new construction, the purchase of land or buildings, the purchase of equipment, fixtures, and lease-hold improvements, working capital, to refinance debt for compelling reasons, seasonal line of credit, and inventory); except that participant debt restructure cannot exceed 50% of the project and may be used for revolving credit. The program's loan terms are the same as those of the 7(a) program (the loan maturity for working capital, machinery, and equipment (not to exceed the life of the equipment) is typically 5 years to 10 years; and the loan maturity for real estate is up to 25 years, except that the term for a revolving line of credit cannot exceed 7 years. The SBAExpress loan's interest rates and fees are the same as those used for the 7(a) program. To account for the program's lower guaranty rate of 50%, lenders are allowed to perform their own loan analysis and procedures and receive SBA approval with a targeted 36-hour maximum turnaround time. Also, collateral is not required for loans of $25,000 or less. Lenders are allowed to use their own established collateral policy for loans over $25,000. As mentioned earlier, the SBA waived the up-front, one-time loan guaranty fee for 7(a) loans of $125,000 or less approved in FY2018. The SBA also waived 50% of the up-front, one-time loan guaranty fee on all non-SBAExpress 7(a) loans to veterans of $125,001 to $350,000 in FY2018. In addition, P.L. 114-38 , the Veterans Entrepreneurship Act of 2015, provided statutory authorization and made permanent the veteran's fee waiver in the SBAExpress program, except during any upcoming fiscal year for which the President's budget, submitted to Congress, includes a cost for the 7(a) program, in its entirety, that is above zero. The SBA waived this fee in FY2016, FY2017, and FY2018 and is waiving it in FY2019. The SBA indicated that its fee waivers for veterans are part "of SBA's broader efforts to make sure that veterans have the tools they need to start and grow a business." In a related development, the SBA discontinued the Patriot Express Pilot Program on December 31, 2013. It provided loans of up to $500,000 (with a guaranty of up to 85% of loans of $150,000 or less and up to 75% of loans exceeding $150,000) to veterans and their spouses. It had been in operation since 2007, and, like the SBAExpress program, featured streamlined documentation requirements and expedited loan processing. Over its history, the Patriot Express Pilot Program disbursed 9,414 loans amounting to more than $791 million. Export Express The Export Express program was established as a subprogram of the SBAExpress program in 1998, and made a separate pilot program in 2000. It was made permanent through legislation, subject to reauthorization, in 2010 ( P.L. 111-240 , the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010). The Export Express program is designed to increase the availability of credit to current and prospective small business exporters that have been in business, though not necessarily in exporting, for at least 12 full months, particularly those small businesses needing revolving lines of credit. Export Express loans may not be used to finance overseas operations, except for the marketing or distribution of products or services exported from the United States. The program is generally subject to the same loan processing, making, closing, servicing, and liquidation requirements as well as the same maturity terms, interest rates, and applicable fees as the SBAExpress program. Two key differences between the two programs is that the Export Express program's maximum loan amount is up to $500,000, and its guaranty rate is 90% for loans of $350,000 or less, and 75% for loans exceeding $350,000. There were 215 lenders with approved SBA Export Express loan guaranties at the end of FY2017. These lenders are located in 46 states, Guam, and Puerto Rico. As shown in Table A-2 , the SBA approved 59 Export Express loans totaling $15.45 million in FY2018. Community Advantage 7(a) Loan Initiative The SBA's Community Advantage (CA) 7(a) loan initiative became operational on February 15, 2011. Originally announced as a three-year pilot program (through March 15, 2014), it subsequently was extended through March 15, 2017; March 31, 2020; and September 30, 2022. As of September 12, 2018, there were 113 approved CA lenders, 99 of which were actively making and servicing CA loans. The CA loan initiative is designed to increase lending to underserved low- and moderate-income communities. It, along with the now-discontinued Small Loan Advantage program, replaced the Community Express Pilot Program, which also was designed to increase lending to underserved communities. The CA loan initiative provides the same loan terms, guaranty fees, and guaranty as that of the 7(a) program on loan amounts up to $250,000 (85% for loans up to $150,000 and 75% for those greater than $150,000). Loan proceeds can be used for the same purposes as those of the 7(a) program. The loan's maximum interest rate is prime, plus 6%. The program has an expedited approval process, which includes a two-page application for borrowers and a goal of completing the approval process within 5 to 10 days. The CA loan initiative is designed to increase "the number of SBA 7(a) lenders who reach underserved communities, targeting community-based, mission-focused financial institutions which were previously not able to offer SBA loans." These mission-focused financial institutions include the following: nonfederally regulated Community Development Financial Institutions certified by the U.S. Department of the Treasury, SBA's Certified Development Companies, SBA's nonprofit microlending intermediaries, and, added in December 2015, SBA's Intermediary Lending Pilot Program intermediaries. They are expected to maintain at least 60% of their SBA loan portfolio in underserved markets, including loans to small businesses in, or that have more than 50% of their full-time workforce residing in, low-to-moderate income (LMI) communities; Empowerment Zones and Enterprise Communities; HUBZones; start-ups (firms in business less than two years); businesses eligible for the SBA's Veterans Advantage program; Promise Zones (added in December 2015); and Opportunity Zones and Rural Areas (added in October 2018). The SBA placed a moratorium, effective October 1, 2018, on accepting new CA lender applications, primarily as a means to mitigate the risk of future loan defaults. The SBA also increased the minimum acceptable credit score for CA loans "that satisfies the need to consider several required underwriting criteria" from 120 to 140; increased the wait time for CA lenders ineligible for delegated lender status at the time of approval as a CA lender from 6 months to 12 months and increased the number of CA loans that must be initially dispersed before a CA lender may process applications under delegated authority from five to seven loans; increased the loan loss reserve requirement for CA loans sold in the secondary market from 3% to 5% of the outstanding amount of the guaranteed portion of each loan; modified requirements related to the refinancing of debts with a CA loan; limited fees that can be charged by a CA lender for assistance in obtaining a CA loan to no more than $2,500, with the exception of necessary out-of-pocket costs such as filing or recording fees; and as mentioned previously, added Opportunity Zones and Rural Areas to the list of economically distressed communities that are eligible for a CA loan. As shown in Table A-3 , the SBA approved 1,118 CA loans amounting to $157.5 million in FY2018 and 4,906 CA loans amounting to $643.72 million from the time the program became operational to the end of FY2018. As mentioned previously, legislation was introduced during the 114 th Congress ( S. 2125 , the Small Business Lending and Economic Inequality Reduction Act of 2015) to provide the Community Advantage Pilot program permanent, statutory authorization.

The Small Business Administration (SBA) administers several programs to support small businesses, including loan guaranty programs designed to encourage lenders to provide loans to small businesses "that might not otherwise obtain financing on reasonable terms and conditions." The SBA's 7(a) loan guaranty program is considered the agency's flagship loan program. Its name is derived from Section 7(a) of the Small Business Act of 1953 (P.L. 83-163, as amended), which authorizes the SBA to provide business loans and loan guaranties to American small businesses. In FY2018, the SBA approved 60,353 7(a) loans totaling nearly $25.4 billion. The average approved 7(a) loan amount was $420,401. Proceeds from 7(a) loans may be used to establish a new business or to assist in the operation, acquisition, or expansion of an existing business. This report discusses the rationale provided for the 7(a) program; the program's borrower and lender eligibility standards and program requirements; and program statistics, including loan volume, loss rates, use of proceeds, borrower satisfaction, and borrower demographics. It also examines issues raised concerning the SBA's administration of the 7(a) program, including the oversight of 7(a) lenders and the program's lack of outcome-based performance measures. The report also surveys congressional and presidential actions taken in recent years to enhance small businesses' access to capital. For example, Congress approved legislation during the 111th Congress to provide more than $1.1 billion to temporarily subsidize the 7(a) and 504/Certified Development Companies (504/CDC) loan guaranty programs' fees and temporarily increase the 7(a) program's maximum loan guaranty percentage to 90% (funding was exhausted on January 3, 2011); raise the 7(a) program's gross loan limit from $2 million to $5 million; and establish an alternative size standard for the 7(a) and 504/CDC loan programs. The SBA waived the up-front, one-time loan guaranty fee for smaller 7(a) loans from FY2014 through FY2018; and is waiving the annual service fee for 7(a) loans of $150,000 or less made to small businesses located in a rural area or a HUBZone and reducing the up-front one-time guaranty fee for these loans from 2.0% to 0.6667% of the guaranteed portion of the loan in FY2019. The SBA has also waived the up-front, one-time loan guaranty fee for veteran loans under the SBAExpress program (up to $350,000) since January 1, 2014; and reduced the up-front, one-time loan guaranty fee on non-SBAExpress 7(a) loans to veterans from FY2015 through FY2018. P.L. 114-38, the Veterans Entrepreneurship Act of 2015, provided statutory authorization and made permanent the veteran's fee waiver under the SBAExpress program, except during any upcoming fiscal year for which the President's budget, submitted to Congress, includes a cost for the 7(a) program, in its entirety, that is above zero. Congress also approved legislation that increased the 7(a) program's authorization limit from $18.75 billion (on disbursements) in FY2014 to $23.5 billion in FY2015, $26.5 billion in FY2016, $27.5 billion in FY2017, $29.0 billion in FY2018, and $30 billion in FY2019. P.L. 115-189, the Small Business 7(a) Lending Oversight Reform Act of 2018, among other provisions, codified the SBA's Office of Credit Risk Management; required that office to annually undertake and report the findings of a risk analysis of the 7(a) program's loan portfolio; created a lender oversight committee within the SBA; authorized the Director of the Office of Credit Risk Management to undertake informal and formal enforcement actions against 7(a) lenders under specified conditions; redefined the credit elsewhere requirement; and authorized the SBA Administrator, starting in FY2019 and after providing at least 30 days' notice to specified congressional committees, to increase the amount of 7(a) loans not more than once during any fiscal year to not more than 115% of the 7(a) program's authorization limit. The Appendix provides a brief description of the 7(a) program's SBAExpress, Export Express, and Community Advantage programs.

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Introduction Since 1978, the federal government has entered into 36 water rights settlements with 40 individual Indian tribes. These Indian water rights settlements are a means of resolving ongoing disputes related to Indian water rights between tribes, federal and state governments, and other parties (e.g., water rights holders). The federal government is involved in these settlements pursuant to its tribal trust responsibilities. Many of these settlements have been authorized by Congress to provide funding for projects that allow tribes to access and develop their water resources. At issue for Congress is not only the new settlements completing negotiations but also how well the current process for negotiating and recommending settlements for authorization is working. Some of the challenges raised by these settlements pertain to satisfying the federal trust responsibility related to tribal water rights, the provision of federal funding associated with the universe of these settlements, and the principles and expectations guiding ongoing and future negotiation of new settlements and renegotiation of past settlements. This report provides background on Indian water rights settlements and an overview of the settlement process. It provides background on Indian water rights, describes the settlement process, and summarizes enacted and potential settlements to date. It also analyzes issues related to Indian water rights, with a focus on the role of the federal government and challenges faced in negotiating and implementing Indian water rights settlements. Finally, it focuses on settlements in a legislative context, including enacted and proposed legislation. Background Indian water rights are vested property rights and resources for which the United States has a trust responsibility. The federal trust responsibility is a legal obligation of the United States dictating that the federal government must protect Indian resources and assets and manage them in the Indians' best interest. Historically, the United States has addressed its trust responsibility by acting as trustee in managing reserved lands, waters, resources, and assets for Indian tribes and by providing legal counsel and representation to Indians in the courts to protect such rights, resources, and assets. Specifically in regard to Indian water rights settlements, the United States has fulfilled its trust responsibility to Indian tribes by assisting tribes with their claims to reserved water rights through litigation, negotiations, and/or implementation of settlements. The specifics of Indian water rights claims vary, but typically these claims arise out of the right of many tribes to water resources dating to the establishment of their reservations. Indian reserved water rights were first recognized by the Supreme Court in Winters v. United States in 1908. Under the Winters doctrine, when Congress reserves land (i.e., for an Indian reservation), Congress implicitly reserves water sufficient to fulfill the purpose of the reservation. In the years since the Winters decision, disputes have arisen between Indians asserting their water rights and non-Indian water users, particularly in the western United States. In that region, the establishment of Indian reservations (and, therefore, of Indian water rights) generally predated settlement by non-Indians and the related large-scale development by the federal government of water resources for non-Indian users. In most western states, water allocation takes place under a system of prior appropriation in which water is allocated to users based on the order in which water rights were acquired. Under the Winters doctrine and the western system of prior appropriation, the water rights of tribes often are senior to those of non-Indian water rights holders because Indian water rights generally date to the creation of the reservation. However, despite the priority of Indian reserved water rights, non-Indian populations frequently have greater access to and allocations of water through infrastructure. This discrepancy leads to disputes that typically have been litigated or, more recently, resolved by negotiated settlements. Litigation of Indian water rights is a costly process that may take several decades to complete. Even then, Indian water rights holders may not see tangible water resources and may be awarded only paper water —that is, they may be awarded a legal claim to water but lack the financial capital to develop those water resources. This situation occurs because, unlike Congress, the courts cannot provide tangible wet water by authorizing new water projects and/or water-transfer infrastructure (including funding for project development) that would allow the tribes to exploit their rights. As a result, negotiated settlements recently have been the preferred means of resolving many Indian water rights disputes. Negotiated settlements afford tribes and other interested stakeholders an opportunity to discuss and come to terms on quantification of and access to tribal water allocations, among other things. These settlements often are attractive because they include terms and conditions that resolve long-standing uncertainty and put an end to conflict by avoiding litigation. However, there remains disagreement among some as to whether litigation or settlements are most appropriate for resolving Indian water rights disputes. Settlement Structure and Process The primary issue regarding settlement for Indian reserved water rights is quantification —identifying the amount of water to which users hold rights within the existing systems of water allocation in various areas in the West. However, quantification alone often is not sufficient to secure resources for tribes. Thus, the negotiation process frequently also involves provisions to construct water infrastructure that increases access to newly quantified resources. In addition to providing access to wet water, some negotiated settlements have provided other benefits and legal rights aligned with tribal values. For instance, some tribal settlements have included provisions for environmental protection and restoration. The federal government's involvement in the Indian water rights settlement process is guided by a 1990 policy statement established during the George H. W. Bush Administration, "Criteria and Procedures for the Participation of the Federal Government in Negotiations for the Settlement of Indian Water Rights Claims" by the Working Group on Indian Water Settlements (Working Group) from the Department of the Interior (DOI). DOI adopted the criteria and procedures in 1990 to establish a framework to inform the Indian water rights settlement process and expressed the position that negotiated settlements, rather than litigation, are the preferred method of addressing Indian water rights. As discussed in the below section " Steps in Settlement Process ," the primary federal entities tasked with prenegotiation, negotiation, and implementation duties for Indian water rights settlements are DOI, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). DOI has the majority of responsibilities related to participating in and approving Indian water rights settlements. Within DOI, two entities coordinate Indian water settlement policy. First, the Working Group on Indian Water Settlements, established administratively in 1989 and comprised of all Assistant Secretaries and the Solicitor (and typically chaired by a counselor to the Secretary or Deputy Secretary), is responsible for making recommendations to the Secretary of the Interior regarding water rights settlements, including overarching policy guidance for settlements. Second, the Secretary of the Interior's Indian Water Rights Office (SIWRO) is responsible for oversight and coordination of Indian water rights settlements, including interfacing with negotiation and implementation teams for individual settlements, as well as tribes and other stakeholders. The SIWRO is led by a director who reports to the chair of the Working Group. DOI also appoints teams to work on individual Indian water rights settlements during the various stages of the settlement process (see below section, " Steps in Settlement Process "). Each team includes a chairman who is designated by the chair of the Working Group (i.e., the counselor to the Secretary) and who represents the Secretary in all settlement activities. Federal teams typically are composed of representatives from the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation), U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Office of the Solicitor, and DOJ. The teams explain general federal policies on settlement and, when possible, help to develop the parameters of a particular settlement. Steps in Settlement Process Broadly speaking, there are four steps associated with Indian water rights settlements: prenegotiation, negotiation, settlement, and implementation. The time between negotiation, settlement, and implementation can take several years. Each step, including relevant federal involvement, is discussed below. Prenegotiation Prenegotiation includes any of the steps before formal settlement negotiations begin. This stage includes, in some cases, litigation and water rights adjudications that tribes have taken part in before deciding to pursue negotiated settlements. For instance, one of the longest-running cases in Indian water rights history, New Mexico v. Aamodt , was first filed in 1966; multiparty negotiations began in 2000 and took more than a decade to complete. The federal government also has its own prenegotiation framework that may involve a number of phases, such as fact-finding, assessment, and briefings. More information on these roles (based on DOI's "Criteria and Procedures" statement) is provided below. Federal Process for Prenegotiation The fact-finding phase of the federal prenegotiation process is prompted by a formal request for negotiations with the Secretary of the Interior by Indian tribes and nonfederal parties. During this time, consultations take place between DOI and DOJ, which examine the legal considerations of forming a negotiation team. If the Secretary decides to establish a team, OMB is notified with a rationale for potential negotiations (based on potential litigation and background information of the claim). No later than nine months after notification, the team submits a fact-finding report containing background information, a summary and evaluation of the claims, and an analysis of the issues of the potential settlement to the relevant federal entities (DOI, DOJ, and OMB). During the second phase, the negotiating team works with DOJ to assess the positions of all parties and develops a recommended federal negotiating position. The assessment should quantify all costs for each potential outcome, including settlement and no settlement. These costs can range from the costs for litigation to the value of the water claim itself. During the third phase, the Working Group on Indian Water Settlements presents a recommended negotiating position to the Secretary. In addition to submitting a position, the working group recommends the funding contribution of the federal government, puts forth a strategy for funding the contribution, presents any views of DOJ and OMB, and outlines positions on major issues expected during the settlement process. The actual negotiations process (see " Negotiation ," below) is the next phase for the Working Group on Indian Settlements, in which OMB and DOJ are updated periodically. If there are proposed changes to the settlement, such as in cost or conditions, the negotiating position is revised following the procedures of the previous phases. Negotiation The negotiation phase can be prolonged and may take years to resolve. During this process, the federal negotiation team works with the parties to reach a settlement. The process generally is overseen by the aforementioned DOI offices, as well as by the BIA's Branch of Water Resources and Water Rights Negotiation/Litigation Program, which provide technical and factual work in support of Indian water rights claims and financial support for the federal government to defend and assert Indian water rights. Reclamation's Native American Affairs Program also facilitates the negotiation of water rights settlements by providing technical support and other assistance. In 2016, OMB issued guidance that it be more involved in the negotiation process, and it has laid out a set of requirements for DOI and DOJ to provide regular written updates on individual settlements. Settlement Once the negotiation phase has been completed and parties have agreed to specific terms, the settlement is typically presented for congressional authorization (as applicable). In these cases, Congress typically must enact the settlement for it to become law and for projects outlined under the settlement to be eligible for federal funding. If Congress is not required to approve the settlement, the settlements generally may be approved administratively by the Secretary of the Interior or the U.S. Attorney General or judicially by judicial decree. Implementation Once a settlement is approved (either administratively or by Congress), the SIWRO oversees its implementation through federal implementation teams. Federal implementation teams function much like federal negotiation teams, only with a focus on helping the Indian tribe(s) and other parties implement the settlement. For settlements that began through litigation or adjudication, the settlement parties must reconvene to reconcile the original agreement with the settlement, along with any additional changes. After the Secretary of the Interior signs the revised agreement, the adjudication court conducts an inter se process in which it hears objections from any party. Once the court approves the settlement, it enters a final decree and judgment. The actual implementation usually is carried out by one or more federal agencies (typically Reclamation or BIA, based on terms of the agreement) that act as project manager. Altogether, the "Criteria and Procedures" statement stresses that the cost of settlement should not exceed the sum of calculable legal exposure and any additional costs related to federal trust responsibility and should promote comity, economic efficiency, and tribal self-sufficiency. Funding for the settlement itself typically is provided through Reclamation and/or BIA. However, in some cases other agencies contribute based on the particular terms of a settlement. Status of Individual Indian Water Rights Settlements The federal government has been involved with Indian water rights settlements through assessment, negotiation, and implementations teams (for enacted settlements) since 1990. As of 2018, there were 21 ongoing negotiation teams working on settlements projected to cost more than $2 billion. Additionally, there are 23 implementation teams active for carrying out approved settlements. Overall, the federal government has entered into 36 settlements since 1978, with Congress enacting 32 of these settlements. The remaining settlements were approved administratively by the Secretary of the Interior or the U.S. Attorney General or by judicial decree. Table 1 below lists enacted settlements as of the date of this report, while Table 2 lists negotiation teams as of 2017 (the last time this information was made available). Issues in the Consideration of Indian Water Rights Settlements Once the stakeholders have agreed to initiate negotiation of a settlement, a number of issues may pose challenges to a successful negotiation and implementation of a settlement. Such challenges may include defining and finding a source of adequate funding for a settlement and contending with other issues within settlements, such as compliance with environmental regulations and identification of sources and conditions for water delivery. Congress may be asked to weigh in on one or more of these issues as they are considered. Funding Considerations in Funding Indian Water Rights Settlements The delivery of wet water (as opposed to paper water) to tribes that have enacted settlement agreements frequently requires significant financial resources and long-term investments by the federal government, often in the form of new projects and infrastructure. For federal policymakers, a widely recognized challenge is identifying and enacting federal funding to implement settlements while also resulting in cost-savings relative to litigation. In response to concerns related to implementation costs, some settlements have been renegotiated over time to decrease their estimated federal costs. For instance, legislation to authorize the Blackfeet Compact was first introduced in 2010 and was subsequently renegotiated and revised, resulting in a reduction to estimated federal costs by approximately $230 million (nominal dollars) compared to the version of this legislation that was introduced in 2016. Partially in response to concerns related to justifying the costs of proposed settlements, OMB issued a memo to DOI and DOJ on June 23, 2016, outlining new steps that would provide for greater involvement by OMB earlier in the settlement negotiation process. OMB also stated that it would require, among other things, a description and quantification of the costs and benefits of proposed settlements by DOI and DOJ prior to a formal letter of Administration position. After a preferred federal contribution is identified and agreed upon, other challenges include identifying the source and structure of federal funding proposed for authorization. Recent congressionally authorized Indian water rights settlements have been funded in various ways, including through discretionary funding authorizations (i.e., authorizations that require annual appropriations by Congress); direct or mandatory funding (i.e., spending authorizations that do not require further appropriations); and combinations of both. In regard to mandatory funding, some settlements have been funded individually and several others have been funded with mandatory spending from a single account, the Reclamation Water Settlements Fund (see " Combined Mandatory/Discretionary Funding ," below). Additionally, some have tapped preexisting or related federal receipt accounts as the source for mandatory funding. The timing of the release of funds also has varied widely among settlements and may in some cases depend on expected future actions (e.g., contingent on completion of plans and/or certain nonfederal activities). Selected examples of how recent Indian water rights settlements have been funded are discussed below. These sections describe different structural approaches to funding Indian water rights settlements that have been approved by Congress in the past, including when and how the funding is expected to be released (if applicable). They also discuss another source that is sometimes mentioned in this context, the DOJ Judgment Fund in the Department of the Treasury. Examples of Funding Sources Discretionary Funding Discretionary spending, or spending that is subject to appropriations, historically has been the most common source of funding for congressionally approved Indian water rights settlements. In many cases, Congress has authorized the appropriations of specific sums for individual settlements, including individual funds within the settlement. For example, the Pechanga Band of Luiseño Mission Indians Water Rights Settlement Act ( P.L. 114-322 , Title III, Subtitle D) approved the Pechanga Water Rights Settlement. This legislation established the Pechanga Settlement Fund and four accounts within it: (1) Pechanga Recycled Water Infrastructure account; (2) Pechanga ESAA Delivery Capacity account; (3) Pechanga Water Fund account; and (4) Pechanga Water Quality account. These accounts are authorized to receive future discretionary appropriations from Congress totaling to $28.5 million, and the funds must be spent by April 30, 2030. Congress also has chosen to authorize discretionary appropriations of "such sums as may be necessary" at times. For instance, the Colorado Ute Settlement Act Amendments of 2000 (Title III, P.L. 106-554 ) authorized the implementation and the operations and maintenance of the Animas-La Plata project and authorized Reclamation to construct these facilities using such sums as may be necessary. Combined Mandatory/Discretionary Funding Two major pieces of settlement legislation in the 111 th Congress authorized a combination of mandatory and discretionary spending for Indian water rights settlement and are discussed below. Omnibus Public Land Management Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-11) Title X of the Omnibus Public Land Management Act of 2009 ( P.L. 111-11 ) authorized mandatory spending for accounts with broadly designated purposes aligning with Indian water rights settlements. It also included discretionary funding for a number of settlements. This legislation created a new Treasury Fund, the Reclamation Water Settlements Fund, and scheduled funds to be deposited and available in this account beginning in 2020. The act directed the Secretary of the Treasury to deposit $120 million into the fund for each of the fiscal years 2020 through 2029 (for a total of $1.2 billion). The fund may be used to implement a water rights settlement agreement approved by Congress that resolves, in whole or in part, litigation involving the United States, and it may be used if the settlement agreement or implementing legislation requires Reclamation to provide financial assistance for or to plan, design, or construct a water project. The act also assigned tiers of priority to access these funds in the following order: First-tier priority is assigned to the Navajo-Gallup Water Supply Project (a key element of the Navajo Nation Water Rights Settlement), the Aamodt Settlement, and the Abeyta Settlement; and Second-tier priority is assigned to the settlements for the Crow Tribe, the Blackfeet Tribe, and the Tribes of the Fort Belknap reservation, as well as the Navajo Nation in its water rights settlement over claims in the Lower Colorado River basin. If Congress does not approve and authorize projects that are given priority under the legislation by December 31, 2019, the amounts reserved for the priorities are to revert to the Reclamation Water Settlement Fund for any other authorized use of the fund under the act. Thus, if there were any "leftover" funding, these funds could be available for other authorized Indian water rights settlements. The fund itself is scheduled to terminate on September 30, 2034, and the unexpended and unobligated balance of the fund will be transferred to the Treasury at that time. In addition to the mandatory funds noted above, P.L. 111-11 also authorized $870 million in discretionary appropriations for the Navajo-Gallup project. Claims Resolution Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-291) Although P.L. 111-11 provided an appropriation of mandatory funding to be used by several settlements at a future date, provisions in the Claims Resolution Act of 2010 ( P.L. 111-291 ) authorized and provided direct or mandatory spending for four individual water rights settlements. P.L. 111-291 also included discretionary funding for some of these settlements and additional mandatory funding for the Navajo-Gallup project (authorized in P.L. 111-11 ). Among other things, P.L. 111-291 authorized and appropriated approximately $82 million in mandatory funding for the Aamodt Settlement in a newly created Aamodt Settlement Pueblos' Fund and authorized an additional $93 million in discretionary funding subject to appropriations; authorized the Abeyta Settlement, appropriated $66 million in mandatory funds for implementation of that agreement in a newly created Taos Pueblos' Water Development Fund, and authorized an additional $58 million in discretionary funding subject to appropriations; authorized the Crow Tribe Water Rights Settlement, appropriated $302 million in mandatory funding for that agreement, and authorized an additional $158 million in discretionary funding subject to appropriations; authorized the White Mountain Apache Tribe water rights quantification, appropriated mandatory funding of approximately $203 million to multiple sources to carry out that settlement, and authorized an additional $90 million in discretionary appropriations; and authorized and appropriated a total of $180 million from FY2012 to FY2014 in mandatory funding to the Reclamation Water Settlements Fund established under P.L. 111-11 to carry out the Navajo-Gallup Water Supply Project authorized in that same legislation. Other Funding Sources Redirection of Existing Receipt Accounts Other water rights settlements have been funded through additional mechanisms, including redirection of funds accruing to existing federal receipt accounts. These funds may differ from traditional mandatory funds in that they make available funding without further appropriations but they also depend on the amount of funding accruing to such an account. For example, the Arizona Water Settlements Act ( P.L. 108-451 ) authorized water rights settlements for the Gila River Indian Community (GRIC) and the Tohono O'odham Nation, respectively. Both water rights settlements required funding for delivery infrastructure associated with water deliveries from the Central Arizona Project (CAP). To fund these costs, P.L. 108-451 required that certain CAP repayments and other receipts that accrue to the previously existing Lower Colorado River Basin Development Fund (LCRBDF, which averages receipts of approximately $55 million per year) be made available annually, without further appropriation (i.e., mandatory funding) for multiple purposes related to the GRIC and Tohono O'odham settlements. For instance, the bill required that after FY2010, deposits totaling $53 million be made into a newly established Gila River Indian Community Operations Maintenance and Rehabilitation Trust Fund, to assist in paying for costs associated with the delivery of CAP water. In addition to a number of other settlement-related spending provisions, the bill stipulated that up to $250 million in LCRBDF receipts be made available for future Indian water rights settlements in Arizona. However, if sufficient LCRBDF balances are not available for any of the bill's priorities, then funding is to be awarded according to the order in which these priorities appear in the bill. Judgment Fund Another potential source of payment for Indian water rights settlements could be the Judgment Fund, which is a permanent indefinite appropriation available to pay all judgments against the United States that are "not otherwise provided for" by another funding source. Certain criteria must be met for a payment to come out of the Judgment Fund. First, the judgment must be monetary and final, so that payments are not made from the Judgment Fund when there is a chance the award could be changed or overturned. Second, the payment must be certified by the Secretary of the Treasury, who has delegated administration of the Judgment Fund to the Bureau of the Fiscal Service. Finally, payment of the judgment, award, or settlement either must be authorized by certain statutes or must be a final judgment rendered by a district court, the Court of International Trade, or the U.S. Court of Federal Claims. Alternatively, payment can stem from a compromise settlement negotiated by the Attorney General (or any authorized person) if such settlement arises under actual litigation or is in "defense of imminent litigation or suits against the United States." Many judgments are paid from the Judgment Fund because the operating appropriations of federal agencies are "generally not available to pay judgments." The government historically has entered into compromise settlements with Indians and Indian tribes on a variety of legal issues, and both the federal district courts and the U.S. Court of Federal Claims generally can hear suits brought by Indian tribes. The Judgment Fund has been used to pay for some of these settlements. For example, Title I of the Claims Resolution Act of 2010 (CRA; P.L. 111-291 ) authorizes and implements the settlement reached in the Cobell v. Salazar litigation. Under the act, Congress directed the Secretary of the Treasury to establish a Trust Land Consolidation Fund and deposit into it $1.9 billion "out of the amounts appropriated to pay final judgments, awards, and compromise settlements" under the Judgment Fund. For purposes of this transfer, the act also states that the statutory conditions of the Judgment Fund have been met. Notably, although the CRA included a number of separate water rights settlements with specific Indian tribes, it appears to have set up other funding mechanisms for the Indian tribes' water rights settlements, as it did not specifically direct payment from the Judgment Fund. For example, although Title III of the CRA authorized mandatory funding of approximately $203 million to multiple sources to carry out the White Mountain Apache Tribe (WMAT) Water Rights Quantification Agreement and authorized an additional $90 million in discretionary appropriations (see reference to this legislation in the previous section, " Combined Mandatory/Discretionary Funding "), it established various funds from which these moneys could be used. One such fund is the WMAT Settlement Fund, for which Congress authorized $78.5 million to be appropriated to the Secretary of the Treasury. This language indicates that Congress must act separately to appropriate funds so that the Secretary may then transfer $78.5 million into the WMAT Settlement Fund. The CRA established a second fund, the WMAT Maintenance Fund, for which Congress mandated appropriations by directing the Secretary to transfer $50 million "out of any funds in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated." This language indicates that the funds will be transferred, without a separate appropriation, from the U.S. Treasury General Fund, which is "the largest fund in the Government ... [and] is used for all programs that are not supported by trust, special, or revolving funds." As mentioned above, if there is another source of funding provided for by appropriation or statute, regardless of the actual funding level, then payment from the Judgment Fund is precluded. Courts look for an appropriation that has programmatic specificity, regardless of the agency's use of the funds. For example, if an agency already had spent an appropriated sum on other litigation or expended the money elsewhere (as in many of the above examples of Indian water rights settlements), then payment from the Judgment Fund for all or part of the award may be precluded. Under these circumstances, the agency would have to seek an additional appropriation from Congress . In the future, whether the Judgment Fund may be used for payments related to Indian water settlement agreements seems to depend on the nature of the claim, the substantive law at issue, existing sources of funding, and the forum in which the award is made. Compliance with Environmental Laws The environmental impact of settlements has been an issue for federal agencies, environmental groups, and tribes, among others. In some cases, construction of settlement projects has been challenged under federal environmental laws, such as the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA; P.L. 91-190), the Clean Water Act (CWA; P.L. 92-500), the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA; P.L. 93-205 ), and the Safe Drinking Water Act ( P.L. 93-523 ). Because some settlements involve construction of new water projects (such as reservoirs, dams, pipelines, and related facilities), some have argued that settlements pose negative consequences for water quality, endangered species, and sensitive habitats. For example, the Animas-La Plata project, originally authorized in the Colorado River Basin Project Act of 1968 (P.L. 84-485) and later incorporated into the Colorado Ute Water Rights Settlement Act of 1988 ( P.L. 100-585 ), faced opposition from several groups over the alleged violation of various environmental laws. Additionally, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency raised concerns that the project would negatively affect water quality and wetlands in New Mexico. These and other concerns stalled construction of the project for a decade. The Colorado Ute Settlement Act Amendments of 2000 ( P.L. 106-554 ) amended the original settlement to address these concerns by significantly reducing the size and purposes of the project and codifying compliance to NEPA, CWA, and ESA. Other enacted settlements that initially encountered opposition stemming from environmental concerns include the Jicarilla Apache Tribe Water Settlement Act of 1992 ( P.L. 102-441 ) and the Yavapai-Prescott Indian Tribe Water Rights Settlement Act of 1994 ( P.L. 103-434 ). Water Supply Issues In addition to the need to quantify reserved water rights, a key difficulty during the negotiation process is identifying a water source to fulfill reserved water rights. Generally, this is done through reallocating water to tribes from existing sources, as was done for selected tribes in Arizona and the Central Arizona Project under the Arizona Water Settlements Act of 2004 ( P.L. 108-451 ). In some cases, settlements have provided funds for tribes to acquire water from willing sellers. In addition to identifying and quantifying a water source, settlements can address the type of water (i.e., groundwater, surface water, effluent water, stored water) and the types of uses that are held under reserved water rights (e.g., domestic, municipal, irrigation, instream flows, hunting and fish, etc.) as well as water quality issues. Another common issue addressed within settlements is the question of whether to allow for the marketing, leasing, or transfer of tribal water. Twenty-one of the 32 congressionally enacted settlements permitted some form of marketing, leasing, or transferring, ranging from limited off-reservation leasing to less restrictive forms of marketing. This exchange of water can provide dual benefits of better water reliability in areas of scarce supplies and economic incentives to tribes. At the same time, some tribes and state users oppose any allowance for water marketing in settlements. Some members within tribes object to the exchange of water on religious and cultural grounds, due to the belief that water is fundamentally attached to tribal life and identity. Some non-Indians oppose allowances for water marketing in these agreements when marketing has the potential to increase the price of water that otherwise might be available for free to downstream water users and thus potentially could harm regional economies. As such, negotiating the right to market, lease, or transfer water can be a contentious issue that results in several restrictions to mitigate potential negative impacts. Debating the "Certainty" of Settlements The certainty of Indian water rights settlements is commonly cited as a multilateral benefit for the stakeholders involved. Supporters regularly argue that mutual benefits accrue as a result of these agreements: tribes secure certainty in the form of water resources and legal protection, local users and water districts receive greater certainty and stability regarding their water supplies, and the federal and state governments are cleared from the burden of potential liability. Some tribal communities have objected to settlements based on these principles. They have argued that the specific, permanent quantification of their water rights through settlements may serve to limit the abilities of tribes to develop in the future. Similarly, some have argued against settlements as they may limit tribes to a particular set of uses (e.g., agriculture) and prevent potential opportunities for greater economic yields in the future. Some contend that to avoid use-based limitations, water rights settlements should focus on allowing water leasing and marketing (see discussion in " Water Supply Issues ," above) so tribes can control and use their water resources with greater flexibility. Still others have spoken out against the idea of negotiated settlements entirely, as they oppose negotiating their claims in exchange for lesser water rights and money. They view the process as akin to the "first treaty era," when Indian tribes forfeited their lands. They note that in the future, the courts may be more favorable and allow for greater gains through litigation. Nontribal users also may raise their own concerns with the certainty of water rights settlements. Some water users have complained that provisions in certain settlements have the potential to maintain or even increase uncertainty associated with their water rights. For example, some water users in western Montana have raised concerns that the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes (CSKT) Water Compact recognizes off-reservation water rights with the potential to significantly curtail nontribal water rights beyond those quantified in the CSKT Compact. Legislative Questions Several common questions that are raised often in regard to Indian water rights settlements are discussed below. Why Is the Federal Government Involved in Indian Water Rights Settlements? Although settlements essentially act as a quid pro quo relationship among the many stakeholders involved, the federal government's role in all stages of the settlement process serves as a way to fulfill its trust responsibility to the tribes to secure, protect, and manage the tribes' water rights. Furthermore, many tribes have breach-of-trust claims against the federal government. Settlements (including those that provide for federal resources and funding for new water infrastructure) provide an opportunity for tribes to formally waive these claims and potentially resolve these disputes. Has Negotiating Settlements Been Successful? It is difficult to make broad characterizations of the impact of Indian water rights settlements. As of 2019, the federal government has been involved in the negotiation of more than 50 Indian water rights settlements. As previously noted, 36 of these negotiations have resulted in federal settlements with tribes and others. Whether these settlements have been successful depends in part on the metric used to define success. In most cases, the settlements have secured rights and access (or potential access) to tribal water resources. However, many of the projects to provide this access are ongoing, so it is not possible to characterize their end result for tribes and the federal government. Further, the extent to which settlements eventually achieve their anticipated benefits likely will vary among individual settlements. Some (including both Indian and non-Indian users) who support negotiating settlements in general may disagree with the contents or outcomes of specific settlements. Others may contend that other means (i.e., litigation) are more appropriate for solving these issues. What Is the Funding Status of Current Enacted Settlements? Due to the mix of discretionary and mandatory funds involved, it can be difficult to track the funding status of Indian water rights settlements. CRS estimates that as of FY2019, the federal government had appropriated more than $2.9 billion in nominal discretionary funding to implement Indian water rights settlements, plus an additional $4.3 billion in mandatory funds that have been made available or are expected to be made available in future years pursuant to authorizing legislation. These appropriations have been provided to multiple agencies, including Reclamation, BIA, the Bureau of Land Management, and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. The total amount of authorized Indian water rights settlements is not formally tracked by the Administration. In early 2019, DOI estimated that Reclamation had a backlog of $1.3 billion in "authorized but unfunded" Indian water rights settlements. Presumably, any future authorized settlements without associated mandatory funding commitments would add to this total. What Types of Activities Typically Are Authorized in Indian Water Rights Settlements? Settlements are negotiated on a case-by-case basis, so the details of each settlement vary and are related to specific issues between tribes and water users in a given area. Generally, most settlements ratify agreements and compacts that have been reached by stakeholders; authorize reallocation and delivery of water from existing sources; and authorize construction and funding for new water projects that are built by Reclamation (and in many cases, transferred to the tribes). In addition to providing access to water, most settlements have resulted in tribal development funds into which the Secretary of the Interior makes scheduled payments for the purpose of economic development and to cover various costs of managing water projects. As previously stated, quantification and types of use are general issues within settlements, although additional benefits can be prominent factors as well. For example, numerous settlements have been negotiated to include provisions that would establish programs for fish and wildlife protection as well as ecosystem restoration. In other cases, tribes and settlements have focused less on specific quantification and more on securing greater control of their rights or pursuing alternative forms of gaining water rights—for example, P.L. 100-228 approved an agreement that would allow the Seminole Tribe of Florida to administer its water rights and possess jurisdiction to manage its water resources with a water district at no cost to the federal government. In another case, the Zuni Indian Tribe waived certain claims to water to gain federal funds to purchase water rights from willing sellers. And, in many cases, settlements have authorized conditions for water marketing and leasing for tribes, although the degree to which this is allowed varies by settlement. Recent Indian Water Rights Settlement Legislation Since 2009, Congress has enacted nine Indian water rights settlements involving 13 tribes, at an authorized federal cost of more than $2 billion. These settlements were enacted in four bills: P.L. 111-291 (The Claims Resolution Act of 2010); P.L. 113-169 (the Pyramid Lake Paiute-Fish Springs Ranch Settlement Act); P.L. 113-223 (the Bill Williams River Water Rights Settlement Act of 2014); and P.L. 114-322 (the Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation Act, or WIIN). Several of these settlements, including those enacted by the 113 th Congress and the Choctaw Nation and Chickasaw Nation Water Settlement Act included in WIIN, were not associated with any new federal funding authorizations or appropriations. An issue related to Indian water rights settlements in recent Congresses has been the circumstances under which this type of legislation is to be transmitted and considered. During the 115th Congress, the chairman of the House Natural Resources Committee sent a letter to the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Interior outlining the committee's process and expectations for considering Indian water rights settlement legislation (this process was similar to that used by the committee dating in the 114 th Congress). These requirements included the following: A statement by the relevant departments (i.e., DOI and DOJ) affirming that each proposed settlement adheres to current executive branch criteria and procedures. Specific affirmation by the departments that the cost of a settlement to all parties does not exceed the value of the existing claims as calculated by the federal government and that federal contributions do not exceed the sum of calculable legal exposure and federal trust or programmatic responsibilities. Conveyance to a court by DOJ and agreement in writing by all settling parties to the settlement, pending a legislative resolution. Approval in writing by the departments of the legislative text needed to codify the settlement. Consent to being available to testify by DOJ. Listing of the legal claims being settled by both departments. It is unclear to what extent any of these requirements will continue to apply in the 116 th Congress. Navajo Utah Settlement In the 116 th Congress, H.R. 644 and S. 1207 would both approve a settlement resolving water rights claims of the Navajo Nation on the San Juan River in the Upper Colorado River Basin in Utah. It would authorize the Secretary of the Interior to establish a Navajo Water Development Trust Fund and would authorize appropriations (plus any interest on these deposits) for two accounts to be established within the fund: 1. The Navajo Water Development Projects Account, which would be authorized to receive appropriations of $198.3 million, adjusted for inflation, for municipal water supply projects. 2. The Navajo OM&R Account, which would be authorized to receive appropriations of $11.1 million for water supply facility operations and maintenance activities. In addition, $1 million in nontrust fund appropriations would be authorized for the Department of the Interior to implement the settlements. The bill would reserve tribal access (through the project) to as much as 81,500 acre-feet per year from water sources adjacent to or within the Navajo Nation's reservation in Utah. This depletion would be subtracted from the State of Utah's Colorado River allocation. In return, parties (including the Navajo Nation, the United States, and the State of Utah) would waive and release most claims associated with this settlement. Additionally, the Navajo Nation has agreed to subordinate its water rights under the settlement to existing, non-Indian uses. According to the Navajo Nation, this could result in water shortages for the tribe 11% to 46% of the time when its full 81,500 acre-feet water right is put to use. Earlier versions of the Navajo Utah Settlement legislation (e.g., introduced versions in the 115 th Congress) adhered to the historically common practice of authorizing funds for Reclamation to construct new water resource facilities for the tribe. However, the fund-based approach evidenced in the current version of the legislation, in which the department would release funds from the Trust Fund to the Navajo Nation for expenditures as needed, represents a notable departure from this model. Advocates of the approach believe it may help to avoid cost overruns and would have the added benefit of supplementing available funds by accumulating interest. While the Navajo Nation supports this approach for this proposed settlement, it is unclear if other tribes with pending water-rights claims would support such a fund-based template for future settlements. Reclamation Water Settlements Fund Extension Congress is also considering the extension of mandatory funding for the Reclamation Water Settlement Fund, which was originally enacted in 2009. In the 116 th Congress, H.R. 1904 and S. 886 would both extend the aforementioned $120 million per year in mandatory funds for the Reclamation Water Rights Settlement Fund to make these amounts available in perpetuity. The annual transfer to this fund is currently set to begin in FY2020 and occur annual through FY2029. The bill would allow these transfers to continue, and would not alter the priority tiers laid out currently laid out for the fund. In absence of specific prioritized settlements, funding would be available for other settlement agreements that require the planning, design and construction of water supply infrastructure, project.to rehabilitate existing water delivery systems, or projects restore fish and wildlife habitat affected by Reclamation projects. Conclusion Long-standing disputes over water rights and use involving Indian tribes continue to be negotiated and settled by the executive branch and are thus likely to be an ongoing issue for Congress. This matter includes implementation of ongoing Indian water rights settlements, negotiation of new settlements, and consideration of these settlements for potential enactment and subsequent funding. As of the end of the 115 th Congress, 32 settlements had been enacted since 1978, and 4 settlements had been approved administratively. Additional funding for ongoing settlements and authorization of and appropriations for new settlements are likely to be requested in the future. In considering Indian water rights settlements, primary issues for Congress may include the cost, contents, and sufficiency of federally authorized efforts to settle tribal water rights claims, as well as the circumstances under which these settlements are considered and approved by authorizing committees and others (i.e., whether the settlements are accompanied by formal statements of Administration support, cost estimates, etc.). In addition, the preferred extent of federal involvement in implementing settlements, including the question of whether the federal government or tribes should take the lead in developing and constructing projects, may be of interest to Congress.

In the second half of the 19th century, the federal government pursued a policy of confining Indian tribes to reservations. These reservations were either a portion of a tribe's aboriginal land or an area of land taken out of the public domain and set aside for a tribe. The federal statutes and treaties reserving such land for Indian reservations typically did not address the water needs of these reservations, a fact that has given rise to questions and disputes regarding Indian reserved water rights. Dating to a 1908 Supreme Court ruling, courts generally have held that many tribes have a reserved right to water sufficient to fulfill the purpose of their reservations and that this right took effect on the date the reservations were established. This means that, in the context of a state water law system of prior appropriations, which is common in many U.S. western states, many tribes have water rights senior to those of non-Indian users with water rights and access established subsequent to the Indian reservations' creation. Although many Indian tribes hold senior water rights through their reservations, the quantification of these rights is undetermined in many cases. Tribes have pursued quantification of their water rights through both litigation and negotiated settlements. The settlements involve negotiation between tribes, the federal government, states, water districts, and private water users, among others. They aim to resolve conflict between rights holders and allow the parties to determine specific terms of water allocation and use with certainty. Over the last 50 years, negotiated settlements have been the preferred course for most tribes because they are often less lengthy and costly than litigation. Additionally, many stakeholders have noted that these negotiated agreements are more likely to allow tribes not only to quantify their water rights on paper but also to procure access to these resources in the form of infrastructure and other related expenses, at least in some cases. After being negotiated, approval and implementation of Indian water rights settlements require federal action. As of 2019, 36 Indian water rights settlements had been federally approved, with total costs in excess of $5.8 billion. Of these, 32 settlements were approved and enacted by Congress and 4 were administratively approved by the U.S. Departments of Justice and the Interior. After being congressionally authorized, federal projects associated with approved Indian water rights settlements generally have been implemented by the Bureau of Reclamation or the Bureau of Indian Affairs (both within the Department of the Interior), pursuant to congressional directions. Congress has appropriated discretionary and mandatory funding (and, in some cases, both) for these activities, including in recent appropriations bills. In the 116th Congress, H.R. 1904 proposes to extend certain mandatory funds for these settlements in perpetuity (the funding currently expires in FY2029). Several individual Indian water rights settlements recently have been considered and enacted, including three that were enacted during the 114th Congress. A primary challenge facing new settlements is the availability of federal funds to implement ongoing and future agreements. Indian water rights settlements often involve the construction of major new water infrastructure to allow tribal communities to access water they hold rights to, and obtaining federal funding for these projects can be difficult. As a result, some settlements have been renegotiated to reduce their federal costs. At issue is under what circumstances (if any) Congress should approve new Indian water rights settlements and whether Congress should fund (and in some cases amend) existing settlements. Some argue that resolution of Indian water rights settlements is a mutually beneficial means to resolve long-standing legal issues, provide certainty of water deliveries, and reduce the federal government's liability. Others argue against authorization and funding of new settlements, either on general principle or with regard to specific individual settlements and activities.

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Introduction Social Security is a self-financing program that provides monthly cash benefits to retired or disabled workers and their family members and to the family members of deceased workers. As of March 2019, there were approximately 63.3 million Social Security beneficiaries. Of those, 47.2 million (74.6%) were retired workers and family members, 10.1 million (16.0%) were disabled workers and family members, and 6.0 million (9.4%) were survivors of deceased workers. Social Security is financed primarily by payroll taxes paid by covered workers and their employers. An estimated 176 million workers are covered by Social Security. Employers and employees each pay 6.2% of covered earnings, up to an annual limit; self-employed individuals pay 12.4% of net self-employment income, up to an annual limit. The annual limit on taxable earnings is $132,900 in 2019. Social Security is also credited with tax revenues from the federal income taxes paid by some beneficiaries on a portion of their benefits. In addition, Social Security receives interest income from Social Security trust fund investments. Social Security income and outgo are accounted for in two separate trust funds authorized under Title II of the Social Security Act: the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) Trust Fund and the Federal Disability Insurance (DI) Trust Fund. This report refers to the separate OASI and DI trust funds on a combined basis as the Social Security trust funds. In 2018, the combined Social Security trust funds (OASDI) had total receipts of $1,003 billion, total expenditures of $1,000 billion, and accumulated holdings (assets) of more than $2.9 trillion. Origins and Brief History of Social Security Title II of the original Social Security Act of 1935 established a national plan designed to provide economic security for the nation's workers. The system of Old-Age Insurance it created provided benefits to individuals who were aged 65 or older and who had "earned" retirement benefits through work in jobs covered by the system. Benefits were to be financed by a payroll tax paid by employees and their employers on wages up to a base amount ($3,000 per year at the time). Monthly benefits were to be based on cumulative wages in covered jobs. The law related the amount of the benefit to the amount of a worker's wages covered by the program, but the formula was progressive. That is, the formula was weighted to replace a larger share of the earnings of low-wage workers compared with those of higher-wage workers. Before the Old-Age Insurance program was in full operation, the Social Security Amendments of 1939 shifted the emphasis of Social Security from protection of the individual worker to protection of the family by extending monthly cash benefits to the dependents and survivors of workers. The program now provided OASI. During the decades that followed, changes to the Social Security program were mainly ones of expansion. Coverage of workers became nearly universal (the largest groups remaining outside the system are state and local government employees who have not chosen to join the system and federal employees who were hired before 1984). In 1956, Congress established the Disability Insurance (DI) program. Over the years, there were increases in the payroll tax rate, which increased from 2.0% of pay (1.0% each for employees and employers) in the 1937-1949 period to its current level of 12.4%. In addition, there were increases in the amount of wages subject to the payroll tax (the taxable wage base), which increased from $3,000 in the 1937-1950 period to $132,900 in 2019. The types of individuals eligible for benefits were expanded over the years, and benefit levels were increased periodically. In 1972, legislation provided for automatic cost-of-living adjustments, starting in 1975, indexed to the change in consumer prices as measured by the Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers (CPI-W) published by the Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics. Beginning in the late 1970s, legislative action regarding Social Security became more concentrated on solving persistent financing problems. Legislation enacted in 1977 raised taxes and curtailed future benefit growth in an effort to shore up the system's finances. Still, in 1982, the OASI trust fund needed to borrow assets from the DI trust fund and the Medicare Hospital Insurance (HI) trust fund (borrowed amounts were fully repaid by 1986). In 1983, Congress passed additional major legislation that was projected to restore solvency to the Social Security system on average over the 75-year projection period at that time. Current projections by the Social Security Board of Trustees show that the Social Security system has a long-range funding shortfall, and that the system will operate with annual cash-flow deficits each year through the end of the 75-year projection period (2093). These projections, and other factors, have focused attention on potential Social Security program changes. Social Security Financing The Social Security program is financed primarily by revenues from Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) taxes and Self-Employment Contributions Act (SECA) taxes. FICA taxes are paid by both employers and employees, however, it is employers who remit the taxes to the U.S. Treasury. Employers remit FICA taxes on a regular basis throughout the year (e.g., weekly, monthly, quarterly, or annually), depending on the employer's level of total employment taxes (Social Security, Medicare, and federal individual income tax withholding). The FICA tax rate of 7.65% each for employers and employees has two components: 6.20% for Social Security and 1.45% for Medicare HI. Under current law, employers and employees each pay 6.2% of covered wages, up to the taxable wage base, in Social Security payroll taxes. The SECA tax rate is 15.3% for self-employed individuals, with 12.4% for Social Security and 2.9% for Medicare HI. Self-employed individuals pay 12.4% of net self-employment income, up to the taxable wage base, in Social Security payroll taxes. One-half of the SECA taxes are allowed as a deduction for federal income tax purposes. SECA taxes are normally paid once a year as part of filing an annual individual income tax return. In addition to Social Security payroll taxes, the Social Security program has two other sources of income. First, certain Social Security beneficiaries must include a portion of Social Security benefits in taxable income for the federal income tax, and the Social Security program receives part of those federal tax revenues. Second, the Social Security program receives interest from the U.S. Treasury on its investments in special U.S. government obligations. As the Managing Trustee of the Social Security trust funds, the Secretary of the Treasury is required by law to invest Social Security revenues in interest-bearing federal government securities held by the trust funds. The revenues exchanged for the federal government securities are deposited into the general fund of the U.S. Treasury and are indistinguishable from revenues in the general fund that come from other sources. Because the assets held by the trust funds are federal government securities, the trust fund balance represents the amount of money owed to the Social Security trust funds by the general fund of the U.S. Treasury. Funds needed to pay Social Security benefits and administrative expenses come from the redemption of federal government securities held by the trust funds. Taxation of Social Security Benefits Since 1984, Social Security benefits have been subject to the federal income tax. As part of the Social Security Amendments of 1983 ( P.L. 98-21 ), Congress made up to 50% of a person's Social Security benefits subject to the federal income tax if he or she has provisional income above a specified threshold ($25,000 for an individual tax filer; $32,000 for a married couple filing jointly). Provisional income is defined as total income from all sources recognized for tax purposes plus certain otherwise tax-exempt income, including half of Social Security benefits. Revenues from this "first tier" of taxation are credited to the Social Security trust funds. In 2018, the trust funds received $35.0 billion (3.5% of total trust fund income) from this provision. Next, as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 ( P.L. 103-66 ), Congress made up to 85% of a person's Social Security benefits subject to the federal income tax if he or she has provisional income above a second higher threshold ($34,000 for an individual tax filer; $44,000 for a married couple filing jointly). Revenues from this "second tier" of taxation are credited to the Medicare HI trust fund. In 2018, the HI trust fund received $24.2 billion (7.9% of total trust fund income) from this provision. Under current law, the income thresholds are fixed (i.e., they are not adjusted for inflation or wage growth). Over time an increasing number of beneficiaries will be subject to the federal income tax on benefits. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that about half of current Social Security beneficiaries are affected by the taxation of benefits. Status of the Social Security Trust Funds Projections by the Social Security Board of Trustees (the trustees) show that Social Security expenditures will exceed tax revenues each year through the end of the 75-year valuation period (2093). That is, Social Security will operate with annual cash-flow deficits . With interest income taken into account, Social Security maintained a total surplus (tax revenues plus interest income exceeded expenditures) from 2010 through 2018. Total revenues in 2019 are projected to exceed total costs by $1 billion; the last instance of costs exceeding revenues was in 1982. The trustees project that the trust funds will have a positive balance (asset reserves) until 2035, allowing Social Security benefits scheduled under current law to be paid in full and on time until then. Over the long run, the trustees project that the 75-year actuarial deficit for the trust funds is equal to 2.78% of taxable payroll. Stated a different way, the trustees project that Social Security expenditures will exceed income by at least 20% over the next 75 years. For illustration purposes, the trustees point out that the following cha nges would be needed for the trust funds to remain solvent throughout the 75-year projection period: (1) an immediate 2.70-percentage-point increase in the payroll tax rate (from 12.40% to 15.10%); or (2) an immediate 17% reduction in benefits for all current and future beneficiaries; or (3) some combination of these approaches. Social Security's projected long-range funding shortfall is attributed primarily to demographic factors (such as lower fertility rates and increasing life expectancy) as well as program design features (such as a wage-indexed benefit formula and annual COLAs). At the end of 2018, the trust funds were credited with asset reserves of more than $2.9 trillion. With the projection that the program's total costs will begin to exceed total revenue in 2020, the trustees project the trust funds to peak at the end of 2019. Beginning in 2020, the trustees project that the trust fund balance will begin to decline, until the asset reserves are depleted in 2035. The trust fund ratio can be used to put the size of the trust fund balance into perspective. This ratio represents trust fund assets at the beginning of a year as a percentage of cost for the year. In 2019, for example, the projected trust fund ratio is 273%. (Assets held by the trust funds at the beginning of 2019 are projected to be 2.73 times greater than the cost of the program in 2019.) The trustees project that the trust fund ratio will decline to 130% in 2028 and reach zero at the point of trust fund reserve depletion in 2035. After depletion of trust fund reserves, the program would continue to operate with incoming Social Security receipts; those receipts are projected to be sufficient to pay 80% of benefits scheduled under current law in 2035, declining to 75% of scheduled benefits in 2093. Under current law, Social Security does not have authority to borrow from the general fund of the Treasury. Therefore, the program cannot draw upon general revenues to make up the difference between incoming receipts and benefit payments when the program no longer has asset reserves to draw upon. The Social Security Act does not specify what would happen to the payment of benefits scheduled under current law in the event of Social Security trust fund depletion. Two possible scenarios are (1) the payment of full monthly benefits on a delayed basis or (2) the payment of partial (reduced) monthly benefits on time. Social Security Cash-Flow Surpluses and Deficits From 1984 to 2009, Social Security generated surplus tax revenues (i.e., the program operated with annual cash-flow surpluses). Surplus tax revenues and interest income credited to the trust funds in the form of federal government securities contributed to a growing trust fund balance. Beginning in 2010, however, the program began operating with annual cash-flow deficits, and the trustees project that Social Security tax revenues will remain below program expenditures each year throughout the 75-year projection period (2019-2093). When Social Security operates with a cash-flow deficit, the trust funds redeem more federal securities than the amount of current Social Security tax revenues, relying in part on trust fund asset reserves to pay benefits and administrative expenses. Because the federal securities held by the trust funds are redeemed with general revenues, this results in increased spending for Social Security from the general fund. When there are no surplus governmental receipts, the federal government must raise the necessary funds by increasing taxes or other income; reducing other spending; borrowing from the public; or some combination of these measures. With respect to the program's reliance on general revenues, it is important to note that Social Security does not have authority to borrow from the general fund of the Treasury under current law. Rather, the program relies on revenues collected for Social Security purposes in previous years that were used by the federal government at the time for other (non-Social Security) spending needs and interest income earned on trust fund investments. The program draws on those previously collected Social Security tax revenues and interest income (trust fund asset reserves) when current Social Security tax revenues fall below current program expenditures. Social Security Reform Debate Social Security reform is an issue of ongoing interest to lawmakers. For some advocates of reform, the focus is on restoring long-range solvency to the trust funds. For others, the focus is on constraining the projected growth in spending for entitlement programs—including Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid—in the context of broader efforts to reduce growing federal budget deficits. The Social Security reform debate reflects other policy objectives as well, such as improving the adequacy and equity of benefits, and different philosophical views about the role of the Social Security program and the federal government in providing retirement income. Over the years, the debate has reflected two fundamentally different approaches to reform. The traditional approach would maintain the current structure of the program (i.e., a defined benefit system funded on a pay-as-you-go basis) by making relatively modest changes, such as an increase in the retirement age or an increase in the taxable wage base. In general, the goal of this approach is to preserve the social insurance nature of the program. In contrast, the personal savings and investment approach would redesign the 1930s-era program to create a prefunded system in which benefits would be based partially or entirely on personal savings and investments. More recently, the Social Security debate has reflected a shift in focus among some lawmakers away from efforts to scale back the program toward proposals that would expand Social Security benefits to address concerns about the adequacy of benefits and, more broadly, retirement income security. Social Security Benefit Rules Social Security provides monthly cash benefits to retired or disabled workers and to the family members of retired, disabled, or deceased workers. Benefits are designed to replace part of a worker's earnings. As such, a worker's benefit is based on his or her career-average earnings in covered employment (i.e., earnings up to the annual taxable limit) and a progressive benefit formula that is intended to provide adequate benefit levels for workers with low career-average earnings. This section explains how the worker's primary insurance amount (PIA) is computed. The worker's PIA is his or her monthly benefit amount payable at the full retirement age (FRA); it also determines the amount of monthly benefits payable to family members based on the worker's record. This section also covers the basic eligibility requirements for different types of Social Security benefits. Full Retirement Age Social Security retirement benefits are first payable to retired workers at the age of 62, subject to a permanent reduction for "early retirement." The age at which full (unreduced) retirement benefits are first payable is the FRA. For most of the program's history, the FRA was 65. As part of the Social Security Amendments of 1983 ( P.L. 98-21 ), Congress raised the FRA from 65 to 67. The 1983 law established a gradual phase-in from 65 to 67 over a 22-year period (2000 to 2022). Specifically, workers born in 1938 or later are affected by the increase in the FRA (i.e., workers who become eligible for retirement benefits at age 62 in 2000 or later). The increase in the FRA will be fully phased in for workers born in 1960 or later (i.e., workers who become eligible for retirement benefits at age 62 in 2022 or later). Table 1 shows the scheduled increase in the FRA being phased in under current law. Computation of a Social Security Retired-Worker Benefit Among other requirements, a worker generally needs 40 earnings credits (10 years of Social Security-covered employment) to be eligible for a Social Security retired-worker benefit. A worker's initial monthly benefit is based on his or her highest 35 years of earnings in covered employment, which are indexed to historical wage growth. The highest 35 years of indexed earnings are summed, and the total is divided by 420 months (35 years x 12 months). The resulting amount is the worker's average indexed monthly earnings (AIME). If a worker has fewer than 35 years of earnings in covered employment, years with no earnings are entered as zeroes in the computation, resulting in a lower AIME and therefore a lower monthly benefit. The worker's PIA is determined by applying a formula to the AIME as shown in Table 2 . First, the AIME is sectioned into three brackets (or segments) of earnings, which are divided by dollar amounts known as bend points. In 2019, the bend points are $926 and $5,583. Three different replacement factors—90%, 32%, and 15%—are applied to the three brackets of AIME. The three products derived from multiplying each replacement factor and bracket of AIME are added together. For workers who become eligible for retirement benefits (i.e., those who attain age 62), become disabled, or die in 2019, the PIA is determined as shown in the example in Table 2 . Generally, a worker's PIA increases each year from the year of eligibility (at age 62) to the year of benefit receipt based on the Social Security COLA. In addition, Social Security benefits already in payment generally increase each year based on the COLA. Adjustments to Benefits Claimed Before or After the FRA A worker's initial monthly benefit is equal to his or her PIA if he or she begins receiving benefits at the FRA. A worker's initial monthly benefit will be less than his or her PIA if he or she begins receiving benefits before the FRA, and it will be greater than his or her PIA if he or she begins receiving benefits after the FRA. A retired-worker benefit is payable as early as the age of 62, however, the benefit will be permanently reduced to reflect the longer expected period of benefit receipt. Retired-worker benefits are reduced by five-ninths of 1% (or 0.0056) of the worker's PIA for each month of entitlement before the FRA up to 36 months, for a reduction of about 6.7% per year. For each month of benefit entitlement before the FRA in excess of 36 months, retirement benefits are reduced by five-twelfths of 1% (or 0.0042), for a reduction of 5% per year. Workers who delay filing for benefits until after the FRA receive a delayed retirement credit (DRC). The DRC applies to the period that begins with the month the worker attains the FRA and ends with the month before he or she attains the age of 70. The DRC is 8% per year for workers born in 1943 or later (i.e., workers who attain the age of 62 in 2005 or later). The actuarial adjustment to benefits based on claiming age is intended to provide the worker with roughly the same total lifetime benefits, regardless of the age at which he or she begins receiving benefits (based on average life expectancy). Therefore, if a worker claims benefits before the FRA, his or her monthly benefit is reduced to take into account the longer expected period of benefit receipt. For a worker whose FRA is 66, the decision to claim benefits at the age of 62 results in a 25% reduction in his or her PIA. For a worker whose FRA is 67, the decision to claim benefits at the age of 62 results in a 30% reduction in his or her PIA. Similarly, if a worker claims benefits after the FRA, his or her monthly benefit is increased to take into account the shorter expected period of benefit receipt. Other Adjustments to Benefits (Including GPO and WEP) Other benefit adjustments may apply, such as those related to simultaneous entitlement to more than one type of Social Security benefit. Under the dual entitlement rule, for example, a Social Security spousal benefit is reduced if the person also receives a Social Security benefit based on his or her own work in covered employment (i.e., a retired-worker or disabled-worker benefit). Similarly, under the government pension offset (GPO), a Social Security spousal benefit is reduced if the person also receives a pension based on his or her own work in non covered employment. Under the windfall elimination provision (WEP), a modified benefit formula is used to compute a worker's Social Security benefit when he or she also receives a pension from non covered employment. The modified formula results in a lower initial monthly benefit compared to the regular benefit formula. Under the retirement earnings test (RET), a person's Social Security benefit is subject to withholding when he or she is below the FRA and has wage or salary income above an annual dollar threshold (i.e., above an annual exempt amount). Under the Social Security maximum family benefit rules, benefits payable to each family member (with the exception of the worker) are subject to reduction when total benefits payable to the family based on the worker's record exceed a specified limit. Disabled-Worker Benefit For Social Security disability benefits, "disability" is defined as the inability to engage in substantial gainful activity (SGA) by reason of a medically determinable physical or mental impairment that is expected to last for at least 12 months or result in death. Generally, the worker must be unable to do any kind of substantial work that exists in the national economy, taking into account age, education, and work experience. As noted previously, a worker generally needs 40 earnings credits to qualify for a Social Security retired-worker benefit. A worker under the age of 62 can qualify for a Social Security disabled-worker benefit with fewer earnings credits. The number of earnings credits needed varies, depending on the age of the worker when he or she became disabled; however, a minimum of six earnings credits is needed. Similarly, while the worker's highest 35 years of earnings are used to compute a retired-worker benefit, fewer years of earnings may be used to compute a disabled-worker benefit. Because a disabled worker's benefit is not reduced for entitlement before the FRA, a disabled worker's benefit is equal to his or her PIA. Benefits for the Worker's Family Members Although the majority of Social Security beneficiaries are retired or disabled workers, nearly 10.7 million beneficiaries (16.9% of the total) are the dependents and survivors of retired, disabled, or deceased workers. Social Security benefits are payable to the spouse, divorced spouse, or child of a retired or disabled worker. Benefits are also payable to the widow(er), divorced widow(er), child, or parent of a deceased worker. In addition, mother's or father's benefits are payable to a young widow(er) who is caring for a deceased worker's child; the child must be under the age of 16 or disabled, and the child must be entitled to benefits. Benefits payable to family members are equal to a specified percentage of the worker's PIA, subject to a maximum family benefit. For example, the spouse of a retired worker may receive up to 50% of the retired worker's PIA, and the widow(er) of a deceased worker may receive up to 100% of the deceased worker's PIA. Benefits payable to family members may be subject to adjustments based on the person's age at entitlement, receipt of a Social Security benefit based on his or her own work record, and other factors. Table 3 provides a summary of Social Security benefits payable to the family members of a retired, disabled, or deceased worker. It includes the basic eligibility requirements and basic benefit amounts before any applicable adjustments (such as for the maximum family benefit). Maximum Family Benefit The total amount of Social Security benefits payable to a family based on a retired, disabled, or deceased worker's record is capped by the maximum family benefit. The family maximum cannot be exceeded, regardless of the number of beneficiaries entitled to benefits on the worker's record. If the sum of all benefits payable on the worker's record exceeds the family maximum, the benefit payable to each dependent or survivor is reduced in equal proportion to bring the total amount of benefits payable to the family within the limit. In the case of a retired or deceased worker , the maximum family benefit is determined by a formula and varies from 150% to 188% of the worker's PIA. For the family of a worker who attains the age of 62 in 2019, or dies in 2019 before attaining the age of 62, the total amount of benefits payable to the family is limited to 150% of the first $1,184 of the worker's PIA, plus 272% of the worker's PIA over $1,184 and through $1,708, plus 134% of the worker's PIA over $1,708 and through $2,228, plus 175% of the worker's PIA over $2,228. The dollar amounts in the maximum family benefit formula ($1,184 / $1,708 / $2,228 in 2019) are indexed to average wage growth, as in the regular benefit formula. In the case of a disabled worker , the maximum family benefit is equal to 85% of the worker's AIME; however, the family maximum cannot be less than 100% or more than 150% of the worker's PIA. Social Security Beneficiaries In March 2019, there were approximately 63.3 million Social Security beneficiaries. As shown in Table 4 , retired-worker and disabled-worker beneficiaries accounted for 83.1% of the beneficiary population. The largest single category of beneficiaries was retired workers (69.7%), with an average monthly benefit of $1,467. The second-largest category was disabled workers (13.4%), with an average monthly benefit of $1,235. Family members of retired, disabled, or deceased workers accounted for the remainder of the beneficiary population (16.9%). Table 4 provides a breakdown of the Social Security beneficiary population in March 2019.

Social Security provides monthly cash benefits to retired or disabled workers and their family members, and to the family members of deceased workers. Among the beneficiary population, 83% are retired or disabled workers; family members of retired, disabled, or deceased workers make up the remainder. In March 2019, approximately 63.3 million beneficiaries received a total of $85.3 billion in benefit payments for the month; the average monthly benefit was $1,347. Workers become eligible for Social Security benefits for themselves and their family members by working in Social Security-covered employment. An estimated 93% of workers in paid employment or self-employment are covered, and their earnings are subject to the Social Security payroll tax. Employers and employees each pay 6.2% of covered earnings, up to an annual limit on taxable earnings ($132,900 in 2019). Among other requirements, a worker generally needs 40 earnings credits (10 years of covered employment) to be eligible for a Social Security retired-worker benefit. Fewer earnings credits are needed to qualify for a disabled-worker benefit; the number needed varies depending on the age of the worker when he or she became disabled. A worker's initial monthly benefit is based on his or her career-average earnings in covered employment. Social Security retired-worker benefits are first payable at the age of 62, subject to a permanent reduction for early retirement. Full (unreduced) retirement benefits are first payable at the full retirement age (FRA), which is increasing gradually from 65 to 67 under a law enacted by Congress in 1983. The FRA will reach 67 for persons born in 1960 or later (i.e., persons who become eligible for retirement benefits at the age of 62 in 2022 or later). In addition to payroll taxes, Social Security is financed by federal income taxes that some beneficiaries pay on a portion of their benefits and by interest income that is earned on the Treasury securities held by the Social Security trust funds. In 2018, the Social Security trust funds had receipts totaling $1,003 billion, expenditures totaling $1,000 billion, and accumulated assets (U.S. Treasury securities) totaling $2.9 trillion. The Social Security Board of Trustees (the trustees) notes, "Over the program's 84-year history, it has collected roughly $21.9 trillion and paid out $19.0 trillion, leaving asset reserves of $2.9 trillion at the end of 2018 in its two trust funds." Projections by the trustees show that, based on the program's current financing and benefit structure, benefits scheduled under current law can be paid in full and on time until 2035 (under the intermediate set of assumptions). Projections also show that Social Security expenditures are estimated to exceed income by at least 20% over the next 75 years. Restoring long-range trust fund solvency and other policy objectives (such as increasing benefits for certain beneficiaries) have made Social Security reform an issue of ongoing congressional interest. This report provides an overview of Social Security financing and benefits under current law. Specifically, the report covers the origins and a brief history of the program; Social Security financing and the status of the trust funds; how Social Security benefits are computed; the types of Social Security benefits available to workers and their family members; the basic eligibility requirements for each type of benefit; the scheduled increase in the Social Security retirement age; and the federal income taxation of Social Security benefits.

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T he Antiquities Act was enacted in 1906 in response to the destruction of prehistoric ruins and other archaeological sites in the western United States, often by amateur archaeologists and treasure hunters. The act authorizes the President to declare, by public proclamation, historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic or scientific interest located on federal land as national monuments. It also authorizes the President to reserve parcels of land surrounding these objects, but limits the size of such reservations to "the smallest area compatible with the proper care and management of the objects to be protected." Though the Antiquities Act was enacted with the primary goal of preserving archaeological sites, it has also been frequently used to protect naturally occurring objects, such as the geological features within the Grand Canyon National Monument. Once a national monument is established, use of the lands and resources within the monument's boundaries are subject to the limitations specified in the proclamation itself and other sources of law, without need of congressional authorization. Since its enactment, Presidents have used the Antiquities Act to establish 158 national monuments, reserving millions of acres of land in the process, and to modify existing monuments more than 90 times. Like many laws concerning federal lands, the Antiquities Act operates in the midst of an ongoing, and sometimes contentious, public policy debate regarding how to best reconcile the need to preserve natural resources and other objects located on public lands with the needs of the local communities affected by the limitations on land use that follow from the creation of a national monument. Though most monument proclamations have been uncontroversial, some have precipitated corrective legislation and litigation. In two instances, Congress passed legislation placing geographic limits on the President's authority to establish national monuments. Attempts to undo proclamations through litigation have been less successful, as courts have uniformly upheld challenged proclamations through a broad interpretation of the Antiquities Act. The Antiquities Act has received renewed attention in recent years as a result of President Trump's December 2017 proclamations reducing the size of the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument and the Bears Ears National Monument. Various groups have challenged those proclamations in federal district court, arguing (among other things) that the Antiquities Act does not empower the President to diminish the size of national monuments. These cases will be the first time a court has had an opportunity to address whether the President has such authority. This report begins by discussing the Antiquities Act's legislative history. It then provides an overview of the act's provisions before reviewing past presidential proclamations as well as judicial decisions and legislation related to certain monument proclamations. Finally, the report discusses the current litigation involving President Trump's proclamations diminishing the Grand Staircase-Escalante and Bears Ears monuments, with a focus on the parties' arguments addressing whether the Antiquities Act authorizes the President to diminish a national monument. Legislative History of the Antiquities Act Congress passed the Antiquities Act in 1906, and President Theodore Roosevelt signed it into law that same year. As this section discusses, this law's enactment marked the culmination of a multiyear effort to empower the federal government to take swift action to protect archaeological sites and other objects of historical and scientific value from destruction. In the 1880s, a growing interest emerged in the prehistoric ruins and other archaeological sites located in the western United States. Prehistoric ruins were initially discovered by ranchers and other prospectors in Colorado, New Mexico, and Arizona. Word of these discoveries spread rapidly, leading to extensive and unregulated excavation of these sites by antiquity hunters from around the world. Amateur excavators removed large quantities of artifacts from prehistoric sites and sold them to exhibitors, museum curators, and private collectors, often causing extensive damage to the ruins during the excavation process. These excavations continued throughout the 1880s and 1890s, leading one observer to bemoan that "[a] commercial spirit is leading to careless excavations for objects to sell, and walls are ruthlessly overthrown, buildings torn down in hope of a few dollars' gain." During this period, federal law did not provide general protection against the excavation or destruction of historic sites located on public lands or require a permit before excavation could commence. Nonetheless, some limited protections did apply. First, the General Land Office was authorized to "withdraw specific tracts of land from sale or entry for a temporary period," a power it exercised with increasing frequency as the threat to historic sites grew. Second, through the Forest Reserve Act of 1891, the President had authority to "create permanent forest reserves by executive proclamation." However, though lands within forest reserves were "withdrawn from disposition and entry under the homestead and other laws, they were not protected from other forms of development, especially mining." Thus, none of these laws authorized the President to make permanent and comprehensive reservations for the purpose of preservation. With the need for federal intervention apparent, Congress set out to empower the President to expeditiously protect historic sites from further destruction. Legislation to protect the nation's antiquities was first introduced in Congress in 1900, though the various proposals differed in how they defined the objects to be protected and how the objects were to be designated. The first bill, introduced by Representative Jonathan P. Dolliver of Iowa, would have authorized the President to designate as a park or reservation "any prehistoric or primitive works, monuments, cliff dwellings, cave dwellings, cemeteries, graves, mounds, forts, or any other work of prehistoric or primitive man" in addition to "any natural formation of scientific or scenic value or interest, or natural wonder or curiosity on the public domain." Under this bill, the President would have had authority to designate surrounding land needed for such preservation "as [the President] may deem necessary for the proper preservation or suitable enjoyment of said reservation," and the Secretary of the Interior would have been empowered to acquire private lands or interests within reservation areas. A proposal supported by the Department of the Interior that same year would have similarly vested protective powers in the President, but it defined the objects to be preserved more generally than Representative Dolliver's proposal, protecting "tracts of public land" based on their "scenic beauty, natural wonders or curiosities, ancient ruins or relics, or other objects of scientific or historic interest, or springs of medicinal or other properties." Neither of these proposals limited the amount of land the President could reserve. In contrast to these proposals, a bill introduced that same Congress by Representative John Shafroth of Colorado and reported out of the House Committee on the Public Lands provided much narrower authority to the executive branch. That legislation would have authorized the Secretary of the Interior—rather than the President—to "reserve from sale, entry, and settlement" any public lands containing "monuments, cliff dwellings, cemeteries, graves, mounds, forts, or any other work of prehistoric, primitive, or aboriginal man," but it would have limited the Secretary to creating monuments in Colorado, Wyoming, and the then territories of Arizona and New Mexico, with no monument to exceed 320 acres. None of these proposals passed either chamber of Congress. In the following Congress, the Senate did pass legislation aimed at protecting antiquities. That legislation would have authorized the Secretary of the Interior to make "temporary withdrawals" of land to protect "historic and prehistoric ruins, monuments, archaeological objects, and other antiquities," but only to the extent "necessary for the preservation" of those objects. Permanent withdrawals would have been authorized for "ruins and antiquities of special importance," but the amount of land reserved could not "exceed[] six hundred and forty acres in any one place." As these proposals were being considered, some Members of Congress sought to limit the total amount of land the Executive could withdraw. During a hearing before the House Committee on the Public Lands on the Senate-passed legislation, Delegate Bernard Rodey of New Mexico expressed his desire that the bill contain "some limit upon the amount of withdrawals that [the Executive] could make," noting that much of the land in New Mexico was already withdrawn from public use and that many archaeological sites in need of preservation were located within this territory. Delegate Rodey worried that the Executive could evade an acreage limitation—such as the 640-acre limitation in the Senate-passed bill—by creating multiple 640-acre tracts. Other committee members and witnesses, however, concluded that the Executive was "not . . . likely to" evade an acreage limitation in this way and that a 640-acre limitation "would prevent very extensive reservations in any one State." In response to Delegate Rodey's concerns, Edgar Lee Hewett—a prominent archaeologist who was closely involved in developing the Antiquities Act —suggested that the President's discretion could be sufficiently checked by language stating "that positively no more land shall be withdrawn than is necessary for the purpose." The House Committee on the Public Lands reported the Senate bill to the full House, but the legislation was opposed by the Smithsonian Institution and ultimately did not win passage. After more than half a decade of debate, the 59th Congress passed the Antiquities Act in 1906. Legislation drafted by Edgar Lee Hewett was introduced in both chambers of Congress in 1906. This proposal authorized the President (rather than the Secretary of the Interior) to issue "public proclamation[s]" to protect "historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic or scientific interest" on federal land as "national monuments." This proposal also limited the amount of land reserved for each monument "to the smallest area compatible with the proper care and management of the objects to be protected[.]" The Senate bill was passed by voice vote in that chamber on May 24, 1906. During the House debate, Representative John Lacey—chairman of the House Committee on the Public Lands—responded to an inquiry from Representative John Stephens of Texas as to "[h]ow much land will be taken off the market in the Western States by the passage of the bill?" Representative Stephens was particularly concerned that the bill provided authority similar to the Forest Reserve Act of 1891, under which Presidents had set aside tens of millions of acres of land. "Not very much," was Representative Lacey's reply, pointing to the language in the proposed legislation requiring that the amount of land reserved be "the smallest area necessary" to preserve designated objects. This assurance mirrored that found in the House report on the bill, which explained that "[t]he bill proposes to create small reservations reserving only so much land as may be absolutely necessary for the preservation of these interesting relics of prehistoric times." The House passed the Senate bill on June 5, unanimously and without amendment. President Theodore Roosevelt signed the bill into law on June 8, 1906. The Antiquities Act Overview The Antiquities Act consists of four sections. In its first section, the act imposes a fine or imprisonment for not more than 90 days (or both) on "any person who shall appropriate, excavate, injure, or destroy any historic or prehistoric ruin or monument, or any object of antiquity, situated on lands owned or controlled by the Government of the United States." As written, this section prohibits damaging objects of antiquity, regardless of whether the President had established a monument under the authority conferred by Section 2 of the act. The penalties of this section apply in addition to general federal prohibitions on the misappropriation of federal property. The second section—the core of the act—authorizes the President "in his discretion" "to declare by public proclamation historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic or scientific interest that are situated upon the lands owned or controlled by the Government of the United States to be national monuments." In addition to protecting the "objects" themselves, the act also authorizes the President to "reserve . . . parcels of land" to be part of the monuments, but requires that those parcels be "confined to the smallest area compatible with the proper care and management of the objects to be protected." The Antiquities Act does not require the President to produce an evidentiary record or to follow specific procedures in establishing a national monument. Moreover, because proclamations under the Antiquities Act are issued directly by the President, rather than by an executive agency, they are not subject to the procedural and judicial review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) or the procedural and administrative record requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). As a result, presidential proclamations under the Antiquities Act offer a more expeditious means of preserving federal lands than other environmental statutes. The act also does not specify what effect the establishment of a national monument has on the use of the objects and lands encompassed within the monument, other than by prohibiting the appropriation, excavation, injury, or destruction of "historic or prehistoric ruin[s]," "monument[s]," or other "object[s] of antiquity." Instead, limitations on the use of lands and resources within a monument follow from a variety of other sources. The Mineral Leasing Act prohibits new mineral leasing within national monuments, and a presidential proclamation may impose additional restrictions on mining and mineral claims, as well as oil and gas leases, timber harvesting, and hunting, fishing, and grazing. Use restrictions may also be found in the management plans developed by the agency responsible for overseeing a given monument. Monuments established in the last 50 years have also made accommodations for the continued exercise of valid rights existing at the time of the monument's creation. The act is also silent on which federal agency is responsible for managing a national monument once established. For much of the act's history, the National Park Service was most often selected for this task. Indeed, every monument from 1933 to 1978 was assigned to the National Park Service's care. However, some Presidents have departed from this practice and tasked other agencies (such as the Bureau of Land Management) with this responsibility. In its last sections, the act authorizes the executive branch to issue permits for "the examination of ruins, the excavation of archaeological sites, and the gathering of objects of antiquity" for the benefit of scientific or educational institutions in order to "increas[e] the knowledge of such objects" and for their "permanent preservation in public museums." The act also authorizes the responsible executive departments to issue "uniform rules and regulations" to effectuate the act's provisions. Past Presidential Proclamations President Theodore Roosevelt did not tarry long before using his new authority. On September 24, 1906, President Roosevelt issued his first proclamation under the Antiquities Act to protect Devil's Tower—a "lofty isolated rock" and "natural wonder" located in Wyoming —with a reservation of land totaling 1,152 acres. Most of President Roosevelt's initial designations similarly adhered to Representative Lacey's predication that "[n]ot very much" land would be reserved through presidential proclamations under the act. President Roosevelt's second designation in December 1906 (El Morro in New Mexico) consisted of 160 acres and his third (Montezuma Castle in Arizona, also in December 1906) was 161 acres. But it did not take long for the size of monuments to increase. As part of his establishment of the Chaco Canyon National Monument in March 1907, President Roosevelt reserved 20,629 acres, while his creation of the Petrified Forest National Monument in Arizona set aside 60,776 acres. Yet these designations were dwarfed by his establishment of the 808,120-acre Grand Canyon National Monument, by far the largest of President Roosevelt's monuments. All told, President Roosevelt designated 18 monuments in his final years in office. Over the last century, Presidents have utilized the Antiquities Act to varying degrees. Presidents from Taft through Eisenhower established or enlarged 10 or more monuments each, with President Franklin Roosevelt leading the pack with 30. Presidents after Eisenhower used the act to a lesser extent. Presidents Kennedy and Johnson each created or enlarged less than ten monuments, President Ford enlarged two, and Presidents Nixon, Reagan, and George H. W. Bush created or enlarged none. President Carter, however, created or enlarged 17 monuments. The Antiquities Act's three-term dormancy ended with the election of President Clinton. During his two terms in office, President Clinton established 19 new monuments and enlarged three more. These new monuments included the 1.7 million-acre Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument in Utah. Following a decline in use under President George W. Bush, who created six national monuments, President Obama exceeded all his predecessors by establishing 29 new monuments and enlarging another five. Among these was the 1.35 million-acre Bears Ears monument in Utah, designated in the last week of President Obama's presidency. To date, President Trump has established one national monument, the Camp Nelson National Monument in Kentucky. All told, Presidents Theodore Roosevelt through Trump have used the Antiquities Act to establish a total of 158 national monuments. These presidents also issued proclamations modifying existing monuments over 90 times. Though many of these monuments have retained their status as national monuments, Congress has exercised its authority under the Property Clause to alter certain monument designations, whether by incorporating the monument (or portions thereof) into the National Park System, transferring the monuments to state control, or abolishing the monument outright. No President has purported to abolish a national monument, but past Presidents have reduced the size of monuments on 18 separate occasions. President Franklin Roosevelt took such action four times during his presidency, while President Eisenhower did so on six occasions. Presidents Taft, Wilson, Coolidge, Truman, and Kennedy each reduced three or fewer monuments. In some instances, Presidents have simultaneously removed lands from a monument reservation while adding others. No President after Kennedy diminished an existing monument until President Trump's issuance of proclamations in December 2017 diminishing the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument by 700,000 acres and the Bears Ears National Monument by 1.15 million acres. Legislation and Litigation in Response to Proclamations Most monument declarations have not generated significant debate. Over the years, however, a few monuments have proved controversial, resulting in corrective legislation, litigation, or both. In two instances, Congress imposed restrictions on the President's authority to establish national monuments in Wyoming and Alaska, and in some cases it has abolished monuments altogether. But through all this, Congress has not fundamentally altered the authority of the President under the Antiquities Act. Courts also have broadly interpreted the President's authority to designate prehistoric ruins and other man-made structures (in addition to naturally occurring objections of scientific interest) and to determine the amount of lands needed for their preservation. Finally, though the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the scope of judicial review of a presidential proclamation, courts that have addressed the issue have concluded that such review is deferential. The Roosevelt Proclamations The first lawsuit implicating an Antiquities Act proclamation involved President Theodore Roosevelt's 1908 creation of the Grand Canyon National Monument, which reserved the land designated as part of that monument "subject to all prior valid adverse claims." A businessman and his associates continued to conduct mining operations within the bounds of the monument, arguing first that the President had "no authority" to establish the monument because it was not the type of object encompassed by the act, and second that they had a valid and preexisting "lode mining claim." In its 1920 decision in Cameron v. United States , the Supreme Court rejected this challenge. Recognizing the Grand Canyon as "the greatest eroded canyon in the United States" and "one of the great natural wonders," the Court noted that it "has attracted wide attention among explorers and scientists" and "affords an unexampled field for geological study." Thus, the Court concluded that the Grand Canyon was an "object[] of unusual scientific interest" for purposes of the Antiquities Act. President Franklin Roosevelt's 1943 establishment of the Jackson Hole National Monument—a 221,610-acre monument in Wyoming — generated both litigation and legislation. Litigants sued in federal district court in Wyoming to invalidate the proclamation, claiming (among other things) that the reserved land "contain[ed] no objects of an historic or scientific interest" and was "not confined to the smallest area compatible" with the preservation of the monument. The court concluded first that it had "limited jurisdiction to investigate and determine whether or not the Proclamation" was lawful. Though acknowledging that a court could void a proclamation lacking any evidentiary support, the court concluded that it lacked authority to determine the legality of the monument based on its own assessment of the preponderance of the evidence. The court thus held that its review was limited only to assessing whether the government had put forward "substantial evidence" to sustain the proclamation. Relying on that standard, the court upheld the Jackson Hole National Monument. It found that the United States' evidence of "trails and historic spots in connection with the early trappings and hunting of animals" and "structures of glacial formation and peculiar mineral deposits and [indigenous] plant life" was sufficient to sustain the proclamation with respect to both the nature of the objects designated and the amount of lands reserved. In so doing, the court placed the "burden . . . on the Congress to pass such remedial legislation as may obviate any injustice brought about" by the proclamation. Congress's response to the Jackson Hole monument has been described as "perhaps the most successful congressional opposition to a monument proclamation." Extensive hearings were held by committees in both chambers. The House Committee on the Public Lands emphasized the economic injury that the reservation of land would inflict on the local communities, including by reducing the tax base for local governments and "destroying the cattle business." The Senate Committee on Public Lands and Surveys went further, and concluded that the Jackson Hole proclamation "disregarded" the Antiquities Act's requirement that reserved lands be "confined to the smallest area" necessary for preservation. In this committee's judgment, the authority given the President in the Antiquities Act "was not broad enough to cover the establishment of the Jackson Hole Monument," and so it sought to "disestablish[]" that monument in order to eliminate "a dangerous precedent." Congress ultimately approved legislation abolishing the Jackson Hole monument, but President Roosevelt pocket-vetoed that bill. Responding in kind, Congress refused to fund the Jackson Hole monument for the next seven years. The fate of Jackson Hole was finally resolved when President Truman signed legislation to consolidate it with the existing Grand Teton National Park. But Congress further restricted the President's authority under the Antiquities Act by including a provision in this legislation that amended the Antiquities Act to prohibit the President from establishing monuments within Wyoming. Judicial Decisions in the 1970s Though the Antiquities Act authorizes the President to set aside "lands," the Supreme Court in the 1970s concluded that the act authorizes the preservation of waters and submerged lands as well. In Cappaert v. United States , the United States sought to prevent ranchers, the Cappaerts, from pumping groundwater on their ranch that was two and one-half miles from an underground pool known as "Devil's Hole," located within a 40-acre plot of land within the Death Valley National Monument. The Cappaerts' use of groundwater, the United States argued, reduced the water level of Devil's Hole and threatened the survival of a rare desert fish—the Devil's Hole pupfish—living within. The United States argued that this pumping was prohibited because the proclamation adding Devil's Hole to the Death Valley National Monument also reserved the groundwater feeding the pool. Relying on the Antiquities Act's legislative history, the Cappaerts argued that the inclusion of Devil's Hole in the Death Valley monument was unlawful because the act allows only the protection of land, not water or animals. In any event, the Cappaerts argued, the inclusion of thousands of square miles of groundwater for the preservation of the 40-acre Devil's Hole violated the requirement that land reservations "be confined to the smallest area compatible" with the preservation of the designated objects. The Supreme Court rejected the Cappaerts' arguments in a few brief sentences. Relying on Cameron , the Court concluded that the underground pool, and the endangered pupfish living within, were objects of scientific interest and thus appropriate subjects of protection under the Antiquities Act. Two years later, the Supreme Court in United States v. California reaffirmed that the Antiquities Act allows the President to withdraw bodies of water, as well as plots of land, when it upheld President Truman's expansion of the Channel Island National Monument. President Carter's Alaska Monuments In 1980, Congress also imposed an additional territorial restriction on the President's authority under the Antiquities Act, this time in response to President Carter's creation of numerous monuments in Alaska. In 1971, Congress passed and President Nixon signed the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, which authorized the Secretary of the Interior to propose up to 80 million acres for preservation and gave Congress five years to approve or disapprove the recommendation. During that five-year window, the lands would be temporarily withdrawn. But when it became clear that Congress would not act before this deadline, President Carter invoked his authority under the Antiquities Act to establish 17 new or expanded monuments within Alaska, totaling 56 million acres. These monument proclamations "sparked bitter opposition in Alaska," leading to protests throughout the state. Responding to these protests, and with the twin goals of securing environmental protection and providing for the economic needs of Alaskans, Congress passed and the President signed the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA). This law rescinded President Carter's monument designations, but simultaneously set aside over 100 million acres of land for conservation, much of which consisted of the same lands that had been included in President Carter's monuments. But to avoid a repeat of the controversy that surrounded President Carter's proclamations, Congress again limited the President's authority under the Antiquities Act, providing that "future executive branch action which withdraws more than five thousand acres, in the aggregate, of public lands within the State of Alaska" will not be "effective until notice is provided in the Federal Register and to both Houses of Congress" and that each "withdrawal shall terminate unless Congress passes a joint resolution of approval within one year after the notice of such withdrawal has been submitted to Congress." Like the Jackson Hole monument, several of President Carter's Alaska monuments were challenged in federal district court. The district court, while recognizing that the Antiquities Act limits the President's discretion as to which objects may be protected and how much land may be included in a monument, rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the Antiquities Act does not apply to naturally occurring objects of scientific interest. The court observed that prior Presidents had repeatedly used the Antiquities Act for this purpose and Congress had not amended the Antiquities Act in response, thus indicating Congress's tacit approval of the practice. No appeal was taken from the district court's decision in this case. Recent Lower Court Decisions Litigation over the Antiquities Act abated during the 1980s and early 1990s, as President Reagan and President H. W. Bush did not use the Antiquities Act to establish national monuments. That hiatus came to an end with challenges to several of President Clinton's monument designations, including the Grand Staircase-Escalante monument in Utah and the Giant Sequoia monument in California. The plaintiffs in two cases— Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Bush and Tulare County v. Bush —argued (among other things) that President Clinton exceeded his authority under the Antiquities Act because that law authorizes only designations of "man-made objects, such as prehistoric ruins and ancient artifacts," not natural phenomena, and because the monuments were not limited to the smallest area necessary for protecting the designated objects. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit rejected these arguments. The court of appeals disposed of the first objection based on the Supreme Court's holdings in Cameron and Cappaert . "[T]he President's Antiquities Act authority," the court explained, "is not limited to protecting only archaeological sites." The court of appeals then decided that it had no occasion to resolve the second argument—that the reserved land was not the smallest area compatible with the preservation of the objects—because it determined that the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of "identify[ing] the improperly designated lands with sufficient particularity to state a claim." Notably, the district court in each of these cases dismissed the suits by concluding that judicial review of proclamations under the Antiquities Act is limited "to the face of the Proclamation," thus prohibiting courts from reviewing "the President's determinations and factual findings." The D.C. Circuit, however, declined to "decide the availability or scope of judicial review of a Presidential Proclamation . . . under the Antiquities Act," based on its conclusion that the plaintiffs had failed to allege facts which could plausibly show noncompliance with the Antiquities Act. At the same time, the court of appeals suggested that judicial review of an Antiquities Act proclamation would be appropriate to the extent of ensuring that the President acted within his statutory authority. Relying on Cappaert and Cameron , the D.C. Circuit explained "that [judicial] review is available to ensure that the Proclamations are consistent with constitutional principles and that the President has not exceeded his statutory authority." Though the D.C. Circuit in Mountain States and Tulare did not purport to definitively resolve the scope of judicial review of a monument proclamation, a federal district court in Utah Association of Counties v. Bush did. This case involved a challenge to President Clinton's designation of the Grand Staircase-Escalante monument, with the plaintiffs taking the view that the President exceeded his authority under the Antiquities Act by "fail[ing] to designate the requisite objects of historic or scientific value" and "not limit[ing] the size of the monument to the 'smallest area' necessary to preserve the objects." The district court, however, declined to engage in an in-depth review of these claims, concluding instead that because the Antiquities Act commits the creation of monuments to the President's discretion, judicial review of those proclamations is limited to "ascertaining that the President in fact invoked his powers under the Antiquities Act"—that is, that he "considered the principles that Congress required him to consider." Under this deferential standard, the court rejected the plaintiffs' claims because it was "evident from the language of the Proclamation" that President Clinton had "considered the principles that Congress required him to consider." The most recent case to address the scope of presidential power under the Antiquities Act involved a challenge to President Obama's establishment of the 4,913-square mile Northeast Canyons and Seamounts Marine National Monument. As its name suggests, this monument is composed of "underwater canyons and mountains, and the ecosystems around them," sitting approximately 130 miles off of the coast of Massachusetts in an area of water known as the Exclusive Economic Zone. Those challenging the designation argued that the term "lands" in the Antiquities Act does not encompass submerged lands and, even if it does, that the amount of "land" reserved was not the smallest necessary for preserving the designated objects. In addition, the plaintiffs contended that the monument proclamation was invalid because the reserved waters were not completely controlled by the United States, thus violating the requirement in the Antiquities Act that reserved lands be "owned or controlled by the Federal Government." The district court began with the scope of its review. Relying on the Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit cases discussed above, the court distinguished between two types of challenges to a presidential proclamation. The first category involves those "that can be judged on the face of the proclamation," such as the argument in Cappaert that only archaeological sites qualify as objects of historic or scientific interest under the act. When a challenge is premised on a disputed question of law, judicial review is conducted without deference. The district court distinguished this category of challenge from those "requir[ing] some factual development," such as the argument raised in Mountain States and Tulare that the amount of land reserved was not "the smallest area compatible with the proper care and management of the objects to be protected." Though recognizing that "[t]he availability of judicial review of this category of claims . . . stands on shakier ground," the court relied on Mountain States and Tulare to conclude that a plaintiff asserting such a challenge must at least "offer plausible and detailed factual allegations that the President acted beyond the boundaries of authority that Congress set." With this framework, the district court rejected the plaintiffs' challenges. As to their first argument, the court relied on Capp a e rt and California to conclude that the Antiquities Act authorizes the President to reserve submerged lands and the water associated with them. As to the second argument, the district court recognized that it fell within the second category of challenges, thus potentially limiting the scope of the court's review. But, as in Mountain States and Tulare , the district court concluded that it did not need to resolve the scope of judicial review because it found that the plaintiffs failed to offer specific, nonconclusory factual allegations "establishing a problem with [the monument's] boundaries." The court also rejected the plaintiffs' argument that President Obama lacked authority under the Antiquities Act to establish the monument because the United States did not have "complete control" over the Exclusive Economic Zone. The court first concluded that the Antiquities Act does not require that the United States have complete control over the relevant area, only that the United States "'exercise directing or restraining influence.'" Applying this definition, the court concluded that the United States' "broad sovereign authority" to regulate and manage the Exclusive Economic Zone for conservation and other purposes—a level of influence unrivaled by any other sovereign—established the federal control necessary under the Antiquities Act. Conclusion In summary, Courts have consistently interpreted the Antiquities Act as giving the President broad authority to protect objects of historic and scientific interest and to determine the amount of lands needed for their preservation. Despite repeated arguments to the contrary, courts have uniformly concluded that the Antiquities Act is not limited to the protection of prehistoric ruins and other man-made structures, but encompasses naturally occurring objects of scientific interest, including bodies of water and submerged lands. And, though it has received less judicial attention, at least one court has held that the United States need not have absolute control over the lands (or waters) at issue in order for them to fall within the ambit of the Antiquities Act. However, the scope of judicial review of a monument proclamation has not been settled. Though courts appear to acknowledge that review of a presidential proclamation is deferential, particularly with respect to factual and discretionary determinations, they have not definitively decided what amount of review is appropriate. Presidential Authority to Diminish Monuments The President has clear authority under the Antiquities Act to establish national monuments. Less clear, however, is the President's authority to diminish a previously established monument or to abolish a monument altogether. As already discussed, several Presidents in the early and mid-20th century reduced the size of existing monuments, but none of those modifications was challenged in court, thus leaving the lawfulness of that practice unresolved. That may soon change. On December 4, 2017, President Trump issued two proclamations modifying the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument (established by President Clinton) and the Bears Ears National Monument (established by President Obama). This was the first time since President Kennedy that a President has diminished a national monument. President Trump's proclamations explained that each of the monuments contained objects that were "not . . . of any unique or distinctive scientific or historic significance" and were not in danger of being damaged or destroyed. The proclamations explained that other federal laws enacted after the Antiquities Act's passage protected many of these objects, such as the Archaeological Resources Protection Act and the Endangered Species Act. On these grounds, the proclamations concluded that the lands reserved for these monuments were "greater than the smallest area compatible with the protection of the objects for which the lands were reserved." All said, President Trump's proclamations reduced the Grand Staircase-Escalante monument from 1.7 million acres to 1 million acres and the Bears Ears monument from 1.35 million acres to 228,784 million acres. President Trump's proclamations attracted significant attention, leading many scholars to take a renewed look at presidential authority under the Antiquities Act. These proclamations have also been challenged in court, and those cases are now pending in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. As discussed below, the plaintiffs in these cases have raised multiple arguments to oppose the proclamations. First, the plaintiffs argue that the Antiquities Act does not authorize the President to abolish or diminish monuments once established. Second, the plaintiffs contend that, absent statutory authorization, President Trump's proclamations exceed his authority under the Constitution and conflict with Congress's constitutional power to regulate public lands. Third, and finally, some of the plaintiffs have brought a claim under the APA against the Secretary of the Interior and other federal officials, arguing that because President Trump's proclamations are unauthorized, these officials will be acting unlawfully in failing to abide by the original proclamations issued by President Clinton and President Obama. The United States contests the plaintiffs' standing to sue, contends that judicial review of Presidential proclamations is limited in scope, and argues that the plaintiffs' arguments are meritless in any event. The remainder of this report discusses the central arguments made by the plaintiffs and the United States in this litigation. Text and Implied Authority The parties advance competing interpretations of the Antiquities Act. The plaintiffs contend that the President's authority under the act is limited to the express grants of authority in the text itself, namely, the power to "declare" monuments and to "reserve" surrounding lands—neither of which includes or implies the distinct power to diminish or revoke a monument. "In ordinary parlance," the plaintiffs argue, "the phrases to 'declare national monuments' and to 'revoke' or 'shrink' national monuments are polar opposites[.]" Under this reading, the Antiquities Act authorizes the President to create national monuments in order to provide for the expeditious protection of objects of historical and scientific interest, but leaves with Congress the authority to modify monuments once established. The plaintiffs point to a number of contemporaneous statutes to support this reading, principally the Forest Service Organic Act of 1897, the Reclamation Act of 1902, and the Pickett Act. Because these statutes contain express grants of authority to the President to modify or otherwise alter an initial reservation of public lands, the plaintiffs argue that the absence of similar language in the Antiquities Act implies the absence of similar authority. In particular, the plaintiffs note that the Forest Reserve Act of 1891 authorized the President to "set apart and reserve . . . public land bearing forests" and to "declare the establishment of such reservations and the limits thereof," but did not also include authorization to revoke or modify a reservation once made. After President Cleveland and several Members of Congress expressed the view that the Forest Reserve Act did not authorize the President to alter an existing reservation, Congress passed the Forest Service Organic Act to fill that gap. That law expressly authorized the President to "revoke, modify, or suspend" existing forest reservations in order to "remove any doubt" regarding the President's authority to do so. Having just gone to the trouble of expressly authorizing the President to modify a prior land reservation, the plaintiffs argue that it "belies logic" that Congress would have intended the Antiquities Act to confer this authority sub silentio . And the plaintiffs highlight the fact that Representative Lacey—one of the primary supporters of the Antiquities Act—stated that the Forest Reserve Act did not authorize the President to alter existing reservations. The plaintiffs also point to the Reclamation Act of 1902—authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to "withdraw . . . lands" and "restore to public entry any of the lands so withdrawn" —and the Pickett Act of 1910—providing that lands withdrawn by the President will remain reserved "until revoked by him or by an Act of Congress" —to show that when Congress intends to authorize the President to alter a reservation of federal land, it confers that authority expressly. Finally, in addition to these laws, the plaintiffs identify other "near-contemporaneous statutes that expressly include language regarding modification or revocation of withdrawn land." By contrast, the United States argues that the Antiquities Act does authorize the President to modify a previously established monument. The United States places significant weight on the act's requirement that the area of land reserved "shall be confined to the smallest area compatible" for preserving the monument. That language, the United States argues, imposes a continuing obligation that cannot be met without the accompanying authority to reduce a monument when it is later determined that excess lands were included in the reservation. Moreover, the United States asserts that the President possesses authority to diminish existing monuments—even absent express statutory authorization—based on "the general principle that reconsideration 'is inherent in the power to decide.'" According to the United States, "[n]umerous statutes authorize various Executive Branch officers to regulate, administer, and make decisions, without expressly saying that those decisions can be repealed or modified." The Antiquities Act is, in the United States' view, no exception. Finally, the United States contests the plaintiffs' argument that contemporaneous public land laws imply the absence of modification authority in the Antiquities Act. With respect to the Pickett Act, the United States notes that this law provided that "withdrawals or reservations shall remain in force until revoked by [the President] or by an act of Congress ." Given that Congress has authority under the Property Clause of the Constitution to dispose of federal law as it sees fit, the United States argues that this language must be read as simply acknowledging existing authority vested in both Congress and the President. As for the Forest Service Organic Act, the United States contends that the legislative record shows mixed opinions among Members of Congress on whether the President had authority under that law to modify existing reservations. Thus, the United States contends that this law's inclusion of language authorizing the President to alter reservations does not reflect a congressional consensus that the President did not have this power already, but merely shows that Congress took a belt-and-suspenders approach in order to (in the words of the statute) "remove any doubt" on this question. Past Executive and Legislative Action Noting that historical practice may inform a court's understanding of executive power, the United States argues that the long-standing practice of executive monument modification and congressional acquiescence in this practice shows that the President has authority under the Antiquities Act to modify existing monuments. The United States first points to the fact that past Presidents have reduced the size of national monuments a total of 18 times, including President Taft's reduction of the Petrified Forest National Monument "[o]nly five years after passage of the Antiquities Act." Though Congress was no doubt aware of these modifications, the United States observes that Congress never passed legislation disapproving this practice, even as Congress did amend the Antiquities Act after President Franklin Roosevelt's creation of the Jackson Hole National Monument to prohibit the establishment of future monuments in Wyoming. The United States also relies on various legal opinions from the executive branch to bolster its argument that Congress has acquiesced in an executive assertion of authority to diminish monuments. In a series of opinions issued in 1915, 1935, and 1947, the Department of the Interior concluded that the President has authority under the Antiquities Act to reduce the size of existing monuments. These opinions identified two sources for that power. First, the Department of the Interior concluded that the President had an implied power to undo reservations or withdrawals of public land. For this, the Department of the Interior relied on the Supreme Court's 1915 decision in United States v. Midwest Oil , which held that Congress had implicitly delegated authority to the President to withdraw or reserve lands from public use by acquiescing in the Executive's "long-continued practice" of making such withdrawals and reservations. From this principle, the Department of the Interior concluded that the President had acquired an implied power to diminish the size of national monuments through congressional acquiescence in this practice, as well as the Executive's practice of reducing Indian reservations established by executive order pursuant to statutes that, like the Antiquities Act, did not expressly authorize modification. Second, in opinions from 1935 and 1947, the Department of the Interior argued for presidential modification authority based on the language in the Antiquities Act requiring that lands reserved be "the smallest area compatible" for the preservation of the designated objects. The plaintiffs contest the United States' reliance on congressional and executive practice. While noting that "past practice does not, by itself, create power," the plaintiffs further argue that history does not show the "systematic, unbroken, executive practice" "long pursued to the knowledge of Congress and never before questioned" that is necessary to support the United States' acquiescence argument. The plaintiffs note that even during the time when several Presidents were reducing monuments, various departments within the executive branch issued opinions concluding that the President does not have implied authority to undo a reservation of land. Thus, in a 1924 opinion, the Department of the Interior concluded that the President did not have authority to modify a monument because a monument once established "becomes a fixed reservation subject to restoration to the public domain only by legislative act." This view was reiterated in a 1932 opinion from the Department of the Interior. The U.S. Attorney General also issued opinions on this question, though the one opinion to address the scope of presidential authority under the Antiquities Act left the issue of monument modification unresolved. In a 1938 opinion, Attorney General Homer Cummings considered whether the President has authority under the Antiquities Act to abolish the Castle Pinckney National Monument. Noting that Presidents had "from time to time . . . diminished the area of national monuments . . . by removing or excluding lands therefrom," the Attorney General concluded that "[the President's] power so to confine that area" does not include "the power to abolish a monument entirely." In support of this conclusion, the 1938 opinion relied on a previous Attorney General opinion from 1862, which concluded that the President lacked implied authority to undo a military reservation made by executive order where the statute authorizing the initial reservation did not also authorize its reversal. "The grant of power to execute a trust, even discretionally," the Attorney General argued, "by no means implies the further power to undo it when it has been completed." Both the United States and the plaintiffs maintain that the 1938 Attorney General opinion supports their position. Though stating that it agrees with the 1938 Attorney General opinion with respect to monument abolition , the United States asserts that this opinion supports the existence of authority to modify monuments through its acknowledgment that prior Presidents had done so and through its reliance on the Antiquities Act's requirement that reservations be limited to the smallest area necessary. The plaintiffs, by contrast, argue that the same logic that led the Attorney General to conclude that the Antiquities Act does not confer authority to abolish monuments shows that the President also lacks authority to modify monuments. The plaintiffs also argue that the United States' claim of an unbroken assertion of, and congressional acquiescence in, executive authority to diminish national monuments is undermined by the numerous instances in which the executive branch itself sought statutory authorization to reduce existing monuments—requests that Congress uniformly denied. For example, the Secretary of the Interior in 1925—the year after that department issued an opinion disclaiming presidential modification authority —sent a letter to Congress requesting that it pass legislation to provide this authorization. Though legislation was introduced in both chambers to accomplish this end, neither became law. In fact, only a few months earlier the Department of the Interior had asked Congress to reduce the Casa Grande Ruins National Monument and at the same time grant the President authority "in his discretion to eliminate lands from national monuments by proclamation." But while Congress did pass legislation reducing the Casa Grande Ruins National Monument, it did so only after removing the language that would have given general modification authority to the President. Finally, the plaintiffs rely on the enactment of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA) to show that the President lacks authority to modify national monuments. Congress passed FLPMA to modernize and streamline the management of federal lands. In so doing, FLPMA repealed 29 separate statutes authorizing the President to make withdrawals of federal land and simultaneously "repealed" the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Midwest Oil Co. —one of the bases relied on by the Department of the Interior to find an implied presidential authority to diminish national monuments. At the same time, a provision in FLPMA prohibits "[t]he Secretary" from "modify[ing] or revok[ing] any withdrawal creating national monuments under [the Antiquities Act]," while leaving the act otherwise unchanged. While acknowledging that FLPMA's prohibition is directed to the "Secretary"—not the President—the plaintiffs point to the House report accompanying the legislation, which stated that FLPMA "reserve[s] to the Congress the authority to modify and revoke withdrawals for national monuments created under the Antiquities Act" —suggesting an intent to consolidate all withdrawal authority in Congress. The United States responds that FLPMA's use of the term "Secretary," rather than "President," is controlling, and that the legislative history on which the plaintiffs rely cannot overcome the plain statutory language. Scope of Judicial Review Assuming that the President has authority to diminish an existing monument, the parties dispute the scope of judicial review of a presidential proclamation that purports to exercise that authority. As previously discussed, the D.C. Circuit in Mountain States and Tulare , and the district court in Massachusetts Lobstermen's Association , did not definitively resolve the scope of judicial review of a monument designation, while the district court in Utah Association of Counties concluded that judicial review was limited to assessing whether the President considered the principles specified in the Antiquities Act. Both parties rely on these cases to support their positions. The United States contends that judicial review of Presidential proclamations is "extremely limited" to "addressing . . . whether the President's decision to modify the Monument is authorized by the Antiquities Act"—that is, "whether the President, on the face of the Proclamation, exercised his authority in accordance with [the] act's standard." On this view, if a proclamation invokes the standards specified in the Antiquities Act in the course of diminishing a monument, a court has no authority to evaluate the factual determinations underlying the proclamation or to review the manner in which the President chose to exercise his discretion in reducing the monument. The United States supports its position by noting that a President's discretionary decisions—unlike agency action—are not subject to "arbitrary and capricious" or "abuse of discretion" review under the APA. Thus, the United States asserts that President Trump's proclamations must be upheld because, on their face, they "'advert[] to the statutory standard' for designating monument objects and reserving monument lands." The plaintiffs, by contrast, contend that courts are not limited to assessing whether a proclamation purports to apply the Antiquities Act, but are authorized to conduct a more searching inquiry to ensure that the President "'has not exceeded his statutory authority.'" On this view, courts have authority to review the factual determinations and rationale underlying a proclamation that diminishes a national monument to ensure that the President did not abuse his discretion in modifying the monument's boundaries. Applying this more searching inquiry, the plaintiffs contend that President Trump's proclamations—though purporting to only "modify" the Grand Staircase-Escalante and Bears Ears monuments—effected "the wholesale dismantling" of these monuments, thus constituting an abuse of any presidential authority that might exist to diminish a national monument. Further, as required by Mountain States and Tulare , the plaintiffs identify particular objects that, in their view, should not have been removed from the boundaries of these monuments. At least one plaintiff has also argued that President Trump's proclamations were an abuse of discretion because they were "improperly motivated by potential energy production and resource extraction," rather than "the protection and preservation of sensitive resources." Some plaintiffs also note that President Trump's proclamations not only reduced the amount of land reserved for these monuments, but also removed certain objects from these monuments. They argue that because the "objects" selected for preservation under the Antiquities Act are the "monuments" under the act, the exclusion of any previously designated object is, in effect, a revocation of a monument —a power the Executive has disclaimed. Thus, these plaintiffs contend that President Trump's proclamations surpassed any authority that might exist under the Antiquities Act to "diminish" or "modify" the amount of land included in a monument designation. Considerations for Congress There are viable arguments on both sides of the debate over the President's authority to diminish monuments. Both parties purport to rely on the text of the Antiquities Act, and both have marshalled historical sources and practice to support their respective interpretations. As one scholar has concluded, "[r]isk is present all around," as "the legal authorities are mixed and none are clearly controlling." However, though the President's authority to diminish monuments may reasonably be questioned, it appears clear that Congress has authority to codify or repeal a presidential proclamation. The Property Clause of the Constitution gives Congress the "[p]ower to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States." The Supreme Court has long held that "the power over the public land thus entrusted to Congress is without limitations." And Congress has exercised this authority on several occasions in response to presidential proclamations issued under the Antiquities Act, whether by incorporating monuments (or portions thereof) into the National Park System, transferring certain monuments to state control, or by abolishing monuments outright. Legislation was introduced in the 115th and 116th Congresses in response to President Trump's proclamations diminishing the Grand Staircase-Escalante and Bears Ears monuments. Some proposals would have overridden President Trump's proclamations and expanded the monuments to their original (or greater) size. Other Members of Congress have proposed amending the Antiquities Act to limit the President's authority to declare national monuments and to bar the President from diminishing existing monuments, except in specified circumstances. At present, none of these proposals has passed either chamber of Congress. In the absence of congressional action, the President's authority to diminish national monuments will ultimately be decided by the courts.

Summary The Antiquities Act authorizes the President to declare, by public proclamation, historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic or scientific interest situated on federal lands as national monuments. The act also authorizes the President to reserve parcels of land surrounding the objects of historic or scientific interest, but requires that the amount of land reserved be confined to the smallest area compatible with the proper care and management of the objects to be protected. Since its enactment in 1906, Presidents have used the Antiquities Act to establish 158 monuments, reserving millions of acres of land in the process. Presidents have also modified existing monuments, whether by increasing or decreasing their size (or both), on more than 90 occasions. Though most monument proclamations have been uncontroversial, some have spurred corrective legislative action and litigation. Congress has twice imposed geographic limitations on the President's authority under the Antiquities Act in response to proclamations reserving millions of acres of land in Wyoming and Alaska. Litigants have also challenged the President's authority to establish certain monuments, disputing whether the historic or scientific objects selected for preservation were encompassed by the act, as well as whether the amount of land reserved exceeded the smallest area necessary for the objects' preservation. Courts, however, have uniformly rejected these challenges and adopted a broad interpretation of the President's authority under the Antiquities Act. No President has purported to revoke a national monument, but past Presidents have reduced the size of existing monuments on 18 occasions. In 2017, President Trump issued proclamations reducing the size of the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument and the Bears Ears National Monument. Various groups have sued to block these proclamations, arguing that the President exceeded his authority under the Antiquities Act. Because none of the prior proclamations diminishing monuments was challenged in court, these lawsuits offer the first opportunity for a court to decide whether the act empowers the President to diminish a national monument. Those challenging President Trump's proclamations argue that the Antiquities Act's authorization for the President to "declare" national monuments and "reserve" surrounding lands does not include the distinct power to revoke or diminish an existing monument. They underscore this point by noting that, unlike the Antiquities Act, several contemporaneous public land laws expressly authorized the President to undo a prior reservation of land. The plaintiffs also highlight a number of 19th and early 20th century legal opinions from the executive branch concluding that the President lacks authority to undo a reservation of land absent express statutory authorization. Finally, the plaintiffs argue that the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA)—which prohibited the Secretary of the Interior from modifying or revoking a national monument established under the Antiquities Act—demonstrates Congress's intent to consolidate modification power in the legislature. By contrast, the United States argues that the requirement that reserved land be "the smallest area compatible" with the preservation of the designated objects empowers the President to reduce the size of a monument when he determines that more land was reserved than necessary. The United States also contends that the Executive has implied authority to revisit prior discretionary decisions. Further, the United States argues that the President's authority to diminish monuments is confirmed by the 18 times past Presidents have done so and by several executive branch legal opinions that support this conclusion. Finally, the United States argues that FLPMA is irrelevant because that law prohibits the Secretary of the Interior, not the President, from diminishing monuments. While the President's authority to diminish a national monument has been questioned, there appears to be no dispute that Congress has authority to do so, a power it has exercised before. Several Members of Congress have introduced legislation either codifying or reversing President Trump's proclamations or placing limits on the President's authority under the Antiquities Act going forward.

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Recent Development On February 2, 2019, the United States suspended its participation in the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and notified Russia of its intent to withdraw from the treaty. Under Article XV of the treaty, the withdrawal will take effect in six months. Russian President Vladimir Putin also announced, on February 2, 2019, that Russia would suspend its participation in the treaty. U.S. and Russian officials had met in Geneva on January 15, 2019, in one last attempt to reach an agreement. According to press reports, Russian diplomats proposed that Russia display the 9M729 missile and demonstrate that it could not fly to INF range, while the United States, in exchange, could demonstrate that the MK-41 launchers in Romania could not be converted to launch INF-range cruise missiles. The United States rejected this proposal and indicated that the only acceptable solution would be for Russia to destroy the missile, its launchers, and its supporting infrastructure. Nevertheless, on January 23, 2019, Russia displayed the canister for the 9M729 cruise missile for an audience of foreign military attachés and the press. Russia noted that, although the missile was a little longer than the similar 9M728 cruise missile, the added length did not increase the range of the missile. It was needed to house a larger warhead and guidance system. No officials from the United States or NATO nations attended the display, arguing that it was a public relations event. U.S. officials also argued that a static display of the missile's canister would not address questions about the missile's range in flight. Over the past few years, NATO, as a whole, has echoed U.S. concerns about Russia's new missile, but some Members have expressed doubt about whether the United States had enough evidence to conclude that the missile violated the INF Treaty. This doubt has ebbed recently, as the allies have offered strong support for the U.S. decision to withdraw from the treaty. In the joint statement released after their December 4 meeting, NATO Foreign Ministers stated that they "strongly support the finding … that Russia is in material breach of its obligations under the INF Treaty." In a statement released on February 1, 2019, the North Atlantic Council noted that Russia had "taken no demonstrable steps toward returning to full and verifiable compliance" and that "Russia will bear sole responsibility for the end of the Treaty." At the same time, the statement noted that the "allies are firmly committed to the preservation of effective international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation" and "will continue to uphold, support, and further strengthen arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, as a key element of Euro-Atlantic security." Introduction The Russian Violation In July 2014, the State Department released the 2014 edition of its report Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments . This report stated that the United States had determined that "the Russian Federation is in violation of its obligations under the [1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces] INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles." The report did not offer any details about the offending missile or cite the evidence that the United States used to make this determination, but it did note that the United States "raised these concerns with the Russian Federation" several times during 2013 and "will continue to pursue resolution" of the issue. The 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018 State Department reports on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments repeated the claim that Russia had violated the INF Treaty and added a few details to the assertion. These reports state that "the United States determined the cruise missile developed by the Russian Federation meets the INF Treaty definition of a ground-launched cruise missile with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, and as such, all missiles of that type, and all launchers of the type used to launch such a missile, are prohibited under the provisions of the INF Treaty." The Obama Administration also noted that, as in past years, "the United States again raised concerns with Russia on repeated occasions in an effort to resolve U.S. concerns. The United States will continue to pursue resolution of U.S. concerns with Russia." The 2016 report did not, however, repeat the assessment mentioned in 2015 that "it is in the mutual security interests of all the Parties to the INF Treaty that Russia and the other 11 successor states to the Soviet Union remain Parties to the Treaty and comply with their obligations." The 2017 and 2018 reports include details on the types of information the United States has shared with Russia to bolster its claim of Russian noncompliance. The 2018 version of the State Department report confirmed that Russia continues to be in violation of its obligation "not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) with a range capability of 500 kilometers to 5,500 kilometers, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles." As in past reports, it did not contain details about the capabilities of the offending missile or confirm press reports about the missile's deployment. However, the report indicated that the United States has provided Russia with "information pertaining to the missile and the launcher, including Russia's internal designator for the mobile launcher chassis and the names of the companies involved in developing and producing the missile and launcher" and "information on the violating GLCM's test history, including coordinates of the tests and Russia's attempts to obfuscate the nature of the program." The report also indicated that the GLCM has a range capability of between 500 and 5,500 kilometers and that it is "distinct from the R-500/SSC-7 GLCM or the RS-26 ICBM." It stated that "the United States assesses the Russian designator for the system in question is 9M729." U.S. officials have since offered added details about U.S. assessment of Russian noncompliance with INF. In December 2018, Secretary of State Pompeo noted that Russia has deployed several battalions of the 9M729 missile. In addition, in late November 2018, the U.S. Director of National Intelligence, Daniel Coats, offered a more detailed explanation of the U.S. assessment of Russia's noncompliance He noted that Russia "began the covert development of an intermediate-range, ground-launched cruise missile designated 9M729 probably by the mid-2000s" and that it had "had completed a comprehensive flight test program" with launches from both fixed and mobile launchers by 2015. He also noted that "Russia conducted the flight test program in a way that appeared purposefully designed to disguise the true nature of their testing activity as well as the capability of the 9M729 missile." He noted that Russia first tested the missile to a range "well over" 500 kilometers from a fixed launcher, which would be permitted by the treaty if the missile were to be deployed as a sea-based or air-delivered cruise missile. But he noted that "Russia then tested the same missile at ranges below 500 kilometers from a mobile launcher." He then noted that "by putting the two types of tests together" Russia developed an INF-range missile that could be launched from a "ground-mobile platform." The DNI's timeline confirmed press reports that had indicated that the United States identified Russian activities that raised INF compliance concerns as early as 2008 and that the Obama Administration began to mention these concerns to Members of Congress in late 2011. Reports from October 2016 indicated that the Administration had concluded that Russia might be preparing to deploy the missile, as it is producing more missiles than it would need to support a test program. This deployment evidently occurred in December 2016, with one brigade remaining at the test site at Kapustin Yar and another moving to a different base within Russia. Reports indicate that some U.S. officials also believe Russia may be taking steps toward pulling out of the treaty. As noted below, Russia repeatedly denied that it had developed a cruise missile with a range that would violate the INF Treaty. After the United States released the designator for the missile, Russia acknowledged the existence of the 9M729 cruise missile but continued to deny that the missile has been tested to, or is capable of flying to, INF range. In a press briefing on November 26, 2018, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov stated that the U.S. claims are "fabrications" and are "inconsistent with reality and is an obvious attempt by the United States to distort reality." He claimed that Russia had engaged in detailed technical discussions with the United States about the capabilities of the missile and that Russia had told the United States that the missile is an "an upgraded version of the Iskander-M system missile" that was launched at its maximum range at the Kapustin Yar testing ground on September 18, 2017," and covered "less than 480 km." This would place the missile within the range permitted by the INF Treaty. In a statement to the press on December 5, 2018, Russian President Vladimir Putin noted that Russia did not "agree with the destruction of this deal. But if this happens, we will react accordingly." He further noted that if the United States developed INF-range missiles, Russia would do so as well. General Valery Gerasimov, the chief of staff of the Russian military, also told foreign military attaches that Russia would respond if the United States "were to destroy" the treaty. He indicated that U.S. missile sites on allied territory could become "the targets of subsequent military exchanges." The U.S. Reaction Obama Administration officials often stated that the INF Treaty remained in the security interest of the United States and its allies, and that the U.S. goal is to "to work to bring Russia back in to full compliance." However, because Russia was unwilling to address U.S. concerns or even acknowledge the existence of the offending cruise missile, the United States reviewed a broad range of economic and military options that might both provide an incentive for Russia to return to compliance with the treaty and provide the United States with the capability to counter Russian actions if it does not return to compliance. Secretary of Defense Mattis addressed the INF Treaty when responding to questions submitted prior to his nomination hearing in early 2017. He stated that Russia's violation of the treaty "increases the risk to our allies and poses a threat to U.S. forces and interests." He also noted that Russia's violation, if allowed to stand, "could erode the foundations of all current and future arms control agreements and initiatives." At the same time, he stated that the violation would not provide Russia with a "significant military advantage," although, if Russia chooses to "act as an adversary, we must respond appropriately and in league with our allies." Further, he echoed the Obama Administration's view that "returning to compliance is in Russia's best interest." Secretary Mattis reaffirmed this goal in November 2017, after a meeting with NATO defense ministers. Secretary Mattis offered a more blunt assessment prior to the NATO meeting of defense ministers in October 2018, when he stated that "the current situation, with Russia in blatant violation of this treaty, is untenable." He also said that "Russia must return to compliance with the INF Treaty or the U.S. will need to match its capabilities to protect U.S. and NATO interests." Press reports indicated that the Trump Administration was moving forward with efforts to begin research and development into a new U.S. ground-launched cruise missile of INF range. The Trump Administration conducted a review of the INF Treaty during its first year in office, and announced the results on December 8, 2017—the 30 th anniversary of the date the treaty was signed. The Administration identified an "integrated strategy" that it would implement to seek to resolve questions about Russia's compliance, to press Russia to return to compliance, and to prepare the United States to defend itself and its allies if Russia continued to violate the treaty and the treaty collapsed. Specifically, it noted that the United States will continue "to seek a diplomatic resolution through all viable channels, including the INF Treaty's Special Verification Commission (SVC)." Second, it stated that DOD "is commencing INF Treaty-compliant research and development (R&D) by reviewing military concepts and options for conventional, ground-launched, intermediate-range missile systems." It noted that this effort would not violate the INF Treaty, but would "prepare the United States to defend itself and its allies" if the treaty collapsed as a result of Russia's violation. Finally, the United States will take economic measures "tied to entities involved in the development and manufacture of Russia's prohibited cruise missile system." It noted that both the military steps and economic measures would cease if Russia returned to compliance with the treaty. When the Administration released its integrated strategy, it reaffirmed U.S. support for the INF Treaty and its interest in convincing Russia to return to compliance. In an interview with the Russian newspaper Kommersant , Thomas Shannon, who was the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, stated that "the Trump Administration values the INF Treaty as a pillar of international security and stability." He also noted that "in this time of increased tensions between the United States and Russia, INF and other arms control agreements are essential for ensuring transparency and predictability in our relationship." However, he also stated that while the United States is "making every effort to preserve the INF Treaty in the face of Russian violations," a "continuation of a situation in which the United States remains in compliance while Russia violates the agreement is unacceptable to us." Hence, he emphasized that "Russia needs to return to compliance with its obligations by completely and verifiably eliminating the prohibited missile system." In support of this objective, the United States called for a meeting of the Special Verification Commission; this meeting was held in Geneva from December 12 to 14, 2017. As the State Department noted, the participants agreed that "the INF Treaty continues to play an important role in the existing system of international security, nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and that they will work to preserve and strengthen it." But, according to some reports, Russia continued to deny that the 9M729 ground-based cruise missile had ever been tested to INF range or that telemetry from the tests supported a conclusion that it violated the INF Treaty. The United States has not disputed, publicly, Russia's assertion that it did not test the missile to INF range, but it did note, in the State Department's Annual Report, that Russia has attempted to "obfuscate the nature of the program." Although these statements from Trump Administration seemed to indicate that it would continue to press Russia to comply with the INF Treaty and that it continued to believe the treaty served U.S. national security interests, the President reversed course in October 2018. On October 20, he announced that the United States would withdraw from the treaty, citing both Russia's violation and China's nonparticipation. He noted that both nations were expanding their forces of intermediate-range missiles and that the United States was going to have to develop these weapons. His national security advisor, John Bolton, conveyed the U.S. intentions to Moscow on October 23. On December 4, 2018, after a meeting of the NATO foreign ministers, Secretary of State Pompeo declared that the United States "has found Russia in material breach of the treaty and will suspend our obligations as a remedy effective in 60 days unless Russia returns to full and verifiable compliance." He indicated that the United States would not "test or produce or deploy any systems" banned by the treaty during the 60-day period, but would provide its official notice of the intent to withdraw, and begin the six-month withdrawal period allowed by the treaty, at the end of the 60 days if Russia did not return to compliance. U.S. and Russian officials met in Geneva on January 15, 2019, but were unable to reach an agreement. According to press reports, Russian diplomats proposed that Russia display the 9M729 missile and demonstrate that it could not fly to INF range, while the United States, in exchange, could demonstrate that the MK-41 launchers in Romania could not be converted to launch INF-range cruise missiles. The United States rejected this proposal and indicated that the only acceptable solution would be for Russia to destroy the missile, its launchers, and its supporting infrastructure. Andrea Thompson, the Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, noted that an inspection of the missile would not allow the United States to "confirm the distance that missile can travel," and that the "verifiable destruction of the non-compliant system" was the only way for Russia "to return to compliance in a manner that we can confirm." While Russian officials indicated they were willing to continue the talks, Thompson also noted that there were no plans for additional meetings, and, if Russia did not agree to eliminate the missile, the United States would suspend its participation in the treaty and submit a formal notice of withdrawal on February 2, 2019. After the Obama Administration declared that Russia was in violation of the INF Treaty, Congress sought additional information in briefings by Administration officials. It also called on the Obama Administration, in both letters and legislation, to press U.S. compliance concerns with Russia, to hold Russia accountable for its actions, and to forgo additional reductions in U.S. nuclear weapons, either unilaterally or through a treaty, until Russia returns to compliance with the INF Treaty. In a letter sent after the October 2016 allegations, Representative Thornberry and Representative Nunes called on the Administration to not only forswear any further changes to U.S. nuclear doctrine and force structure but also to implement economic sanctions and military responses to "ensure Russia understood the cost of its illegal activity." Members also highlighted their concerns with Russia's compliance with the INF Treaty in legislation. The House version of the FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act ( H.R. 4435 , §1225) stated that Congress believes Russia is in "material breach of its obligations" under the INF Treaty and that "such behavior poses a threat to the United States, its deployed forces, and its allies." The legislation also called on the President to consider, after consulting with U.S. allies, whether remaining a party to the INF Treaty was still in their national security interests if Russia was in "material breach" of the treaty. The final version of this legislation ( H.R. 3979 , §1244) did not include these provisions, but did recognize that Russian violations of the INF Treaty are a serious challenge to the security of the United States and its allies. The final version also stated that it is in the national security interest of the United States and its allies for the INF Treaty to remain in effect and for Russia to return to full compliance with the treaty. At the same time, the legislation mandated that the President submit a report to Congress that includes an assessment of the effect of Russian noncompliance on the national security interests of the United States and its allies, and a description of the President's plan to resolve the compliance issues. The legislation also calls for periodic briefings to Congress on the status of efforts to resolve the U.S. compliance concerns. The FY2016 NDAA ( H.R. 1735 , §1243) also contained provisions addressing congressional concerns with Russia's actions under the INF Treaty. As is discussed in more detail below, it not only mandated that the President notify Congress about the status of the Russian cruise missile program, it also mandated that the Secretary of Defense submit a plan for the development of military capabilities that the United States might pursue to respond to or offset Russia's cruise missile program. In early 2017, following press reports that Russia had begun to deploy the missile, Senator Tom Cotton introduced legislation ( S. 430 )—titled the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty Preservation Act of 2017—that would authorize the appropriation of $500 million for the Pentagon to develop active defenses to counter ground-launched missile systems of INF range; to develop counterforce capabilities to prevent attacks from these missiles; and to facilitate "the transfer to allied countries" of missile systems of INF range. The legislation also stated that the United States should "establish a program of record" to develop its own INF-range ground-launched cruise missile system. The House and Senate both included provisions in their versions of the National Defense Authorization Act for 2018 that call for the development of a new U.S. land-based cruise missile. The House bill ( H.R. 2810 , §1244) mandated that the Secretary of Defense both "establish a program of record to develop a conventional road-mobile ground-launched cruise missile system with a range of between 500 to 5,500 kilometers" and submit "a report on the cost, schedule, and feasibility to modify existing and planned missile systems ... for ground launch with a range of between 500 and 5,500 kilometers." The bill (§1245) also mandated that the President submit a report to Congress that contains a determination of whether Russia has flight-tested, produced, or "continues to possess" a ground-launched cruise missile of INF range. If the President makes this determination, the bill states that the INF Treaty's ban on intermediate-range missiles will "no longer be binding on the United States as a matter of United States law." The Senate bill (§1635) did not use the phrase "program of record" in its response to Russia's INF violation, but stated that DOD should establish "a research and development program for a dual-capable road-mobile ground-launched missile system with a maximum range of 5,500 kilometers." The Senate also required a report on the feasibility of modifying other missile systems and mandates that the costs and feasibility of these modifications be compared to the costs and feasibility of a new ground-launched cruise missile. The conference report on the 2018 NDAA ( H.Rept. 115-404 ) retains the House language that mandates that the Secretary of Defense "establish a program of record to develop a conventional road-mobile ground-launched cruise missile system with a range of between 500 to 5,500 kilometers" and authorizes $58 million in funding for the development of active defenses to counter INF-range ground-launched missile systems; counterforce capabilities to prevent attacks from these missiles; and countervailing strike capabilities to enhance the capabilities of the United States. It does not include the House version's requirement that the President submit a report to Congress, but it does direct the Director of National Intelligence to notify Congress "of any development, deployment, or test of a system by the Russian Federation that the Director determines is inconsistent with the INF Treaty." Further, the conference report does not contain the House language stating that this determination would mean that the treaty is no longer binding on the United States. Instead, it requires a report outlining possible sanctions against individuals in Russia who are determined to be "responsible for ordering or facilitating non-compliance by the Russian Federation." Congress also addressed the INF Treaty in the National Defense Authorization act for FY2019 ( P.L. 115-232 , §1243). This legislation states that the President must submit a determination to Congress stating whether Russia "is in material breach of its obligations under the INF Treaty" and whether "the prohibitions set forth in Article VI of the INF Treaty remain binding on the United States as a matter of United States law." These are the prohibitions on the testing and deployment of land-based ballistic and cruise missiles with a range between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. The legislation also expressed the sense of Congress that Russia's testing and deployment of an INF-range cruise missile had "defeated the object and purpose of the INF Treaty" and, therefore, constituted a "material breach" of the treaty. As a result, it stated that it was the sense of Congress that the United States "is legally entitled to suspend the operation of the INF Treaty." The House version of the FY2019 NDAA ( H.R. 5515 ) had included this language as a "statement of policy" rather than a "sense of Congress." The change in language in the final version of the bill indicates that the President, not Congress, would make the determination of a "material breach." The legislation also stated that the United States should "take actions to encourage the Russian Federation to return to compliance" by providing additional funds for the development of military capabilities needed to counter Russia's new cruise missile and by "seeking additional missile defense assets … to protect United States and NATO forces" from Russia's noncompliant ground-launched missile systems. Some in Congress have also crafted legislation to constrain or delay U.S. withdrawal from the INF Treaty. In late November 2018, several Senators—led by Senators Merkley, Warren, Gillibrand, and Markey—introduced a bill that would prohibit funding for a new INF-range cruise missile or ballistic missile until the Trump Administration submitted a report that, among other things, identified a U.S. ally formally willing to host such a system on its territory; detailed recent diplomatic efforts to bring Russia back into compliance with the treaty; and assessed the risk to U.S. and allied security of if Russia deployed greater numbers of intermediate range missiles. This report describes the current status of the INF Treaty and highlights issues that Congress may address as the United States pursues its compliance concerns with Russia. It begins with a historical overview that describes the role of intermediate-range nuclear weapons in NATO's security construct in the late 1970s and the political and security considerations that affected the negotiation of the INF Treaty. In addition, the report summarizes the provisions of the INF Treaty, highlighting those central to the discussion about Russia's current activities. It then reviews the publicly available information about the potential Russian violation and Russia's possible motivations for pursuing the development of a noncompliant missile. Next, the report summarizes Russia's concerns with U.S. compliance with the treaty. The report concludes with a discussion of options that the United States might pursue to address its concerns with Russia's activities and options that it might pursue if Russia deploys new INF-range missiles. Background Nuclear Weapons in NATO During the Cold War Strategy and Doctrine During the Cold War, nuclear weapons were central to the U.S. strategy of deterring Soviet aggression against the United States and U.S. allies. Toward this end, the United States deployed a wide variety of nuclear-capable delivery systems. These included mines, artillery, short-, medium-, and long-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and gravity bombs. These weapons were deployed with U.S. troops in the field, aboard aircraft, on surface ships, on submarines, and in fixed, land-based launchers. The United States also articulated a complex strategy and developed detailed operational plans that would guide the use of these weapons in the event of a conflict with the Soviet Union and its allies. The United States maintained its central "strategic" weapons—long-range land-based missiles, submarine-based missiles, and long-range bombers—at bases in the United States. At the same time, it deployed thousands of shorter-range, or nonstrategic, nuclear weapons with U.S. forces based in Europe, Japan, and South Korea and on surface ships and submarines around the world. It maintained these overseas deployments to extend deterrence and to defend its allies in Europe and Asia. Not only did the presence of these weapons (and the presence of U.S. forces, in general) serve as a reminder of the U.S. commitment to defend its allies if they were attacked, the weapons also could have been used on the battlefield to slow or stop the advance of an adversary's conventional forces. In Europe, these weapons were part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO's) strategy of "flexible response." The United States and its NATO allies recognized that the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact had numerical superiority in conventional forces and that, without the possibility of resort to nuclear weapons, the United States and NATO might be defeated in a conventional conflict. As a result, the flexible response strategy was designed to allow NATO to respond, if necessary, with nuclear weapons and to control escalation if nuclear weapons were used. Controlling escalation meant that the United States and NATO might be the first to use nuclear weapons in a conflict, with the intent of slowing or stopping the Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces if they overran NATO's conventional defenses and advanced into Western Europe. If the conflict continued, and the Soviet Union responded with its own nuclear weapons in an effort to disrupt the NATO response, then NATO could have escalated beyond the battlefield and employed weapons with greater ranges or greater yields in attacks reaching deeper into Warsaw Pact territory. Ultimately, if the conflict continued and Western Europe remained under attack, the United States could have launched its longer-range strategic missiles and bombers against targets inside the Soviet Union. This nuclear posture was designed to couple U.S. and allied security and, therefore, complicate Soviet efforts "to pursue a divide and conquer strategy toward NATO." It had three overlapping objectives. First, the weapons and operational plans were designed to provide NATO with military capabilities that could have affected outcomes on the battlefield; in other words, NATO hoped it might at least disrupt the Soviet attack if not defeat Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces. Second, the ability of the United States and NATO to escalate the conflict, and hold at risk targets in the Soviet Union, was intended to deter an attack on Western Europe by convincing the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact that any conflict, even one that began with conventional weapons, could result in nuclear retaliation. Third, this approach was designed to assure U.S. allies in Europe that the United States would come to their defense, as mandated by Article V of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty, if any of the allies were attacked by Soviet or Warsaw Pact forces. Questions of Credibility As is often noted in discussions of extended deterrence today, the U.S. ability both to assure its allies of its commitment to their defense and to deter adversaries from attacking those allies rests on the credibility of the U.S. threat to resort to the use of nuclear weapons. While some argue that the existence of nuclear weapons may be enough to underscore the threat, most analysts agree that a credible threat requires plausible plans for nuclear use and weapons that can be used in executing those plans. During the Cold War, the United States often altered the numbers and types of nuclear weapons it deployed in Europe to bolster the credibility of its extended deterrent. Although many of these changes occurred in response to ongoing modernization programs and new assessments of Soviet capabilities, some were designed to respond to emerging concerns among U.S. allies about the credibility of the U.S. promise to fight in Europe in their defense. This was the case with the intermediate-range missiles that the United States deployed in Europe in 1983 and removed, under the terms of the INF Treaty, between 1988 and 1991. One concern about the credibility of the U.S. extended deterrent derived from the short range of many of the U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in Europe. As noted above, many of these weapons were designed for use on the battlefield to disrupt a conventional attack by Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces. To make the threat of the possible use of nuclear weapons credible to the Soviet Union and its allies, the United States based significant numbers of these weapons near the potential front lines of a conflict in West Germany. This placement increased the likelihood that NATO would use the weapons early in a conflict and was intended to convince the Soviet Union of the potential for their use, because, if they were not used early, they would likely be overrun by Warsaw Pact forces. At the same time, though, the early use of these weapons would have caused extensive damage on the territory of West Germany, leading some to question whether NATO would actually employ the weapons early in conflict. If the Soviet Union did not believe that NATO would use these weapons, it might believe that it could defeat at least some of the NATO allies (West Germany, in particular) without risking a response from the entire alliance or the escalation to nuclear war. Moreover, if some NATO allies did not believe that NATO would use the weapons to stop a Soviet attack, such allies might be vulnerable to coercion or intimidation from the Soviet Union prior to the start of a conflict. In this type of scenario, the Soviet Union might believe it could divide NATO by threatening some, but not all, of its members. As a result, many analysts argued that longer-range systems that could be deployed farther from the front lines and reach targets deeper inside enemy territory would provide a more credible deterrent. A second concern about the credibility of U.S. assurances to its allies derived from the Soviet ability to attack the continental United States in response to a U.S. attack on the Soviet Union. Leaders in some of the allied countries questioned whether they could rely on the United States to attack targets in the Soviet Union, as a part of an escalation following an attack in Europe, if the Soviet Union could respond with attacks on targets inside the United States with "potentially suicidal consequences" for the United States. Some of the allies feared that if U.S. vulnerability deterred the United States from attacking the Soviet Union in defense of Europe, then a war in Europe, even if it escalated to nuclear use, might remain confined to Europe, with the security of the NATO allies decoupled from the security of the United States. If the allies lacked confidence in the U.S. promise to escalate to strategic strikes on their behalf, then they might, again, be vulnerable to Soviet efforts to coerce or intimidate them before the war began. In addition, if the Soviet Union did not believe that the United States would escalate to strategic nuclear attacks, knowing that it was vulnerable to retaliation, then the Soviet Union might believe it could divide NATO with threats of war. Concerns about the decoupling of U.S. and allied security, or, as it was often phrased, the question of whether the United States would actually "trade New York for Bonn," grew during the latter half of the 1970s, after the Soviet Union began to deploy SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missiles. These three-warhead missiles, which nominally replaced older SS-4 and SS-5 missiles, had a range of 4,000 kilometers and could, therefore, strike targets in most NATO nations (although not in the United States or Canada) from bases inside the Soviet Union. NATO had no similar capability; it could not strike Moscow or other key Soviet cities with missiles or aircraft based in Western Europe. If the NATO allies or the Soviet Union believed that the United States would not attack the Soviet Union out of fear of a Soviet attack on the United States, then these missiles, and the threat they posed to all of Europe, might be sufficient to induce capitulation, or at least cooperation, from NATO's European allies. The Dual-Track Decision of 1979 In December 1979, NATO responded to this gap in intermediate-range forces, and concerns about its effect on alliance security, by adopting a "dual-track" decision that sought to link the modernization of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe with an effort to spur the Soviets to negotiate reductions in INF systems. In the first track, the United States and its NATO partners agreed to replace aging medium-range Pershing I ballistic missiles with a more accurate and longer-range Pershing II (P-II) while adding new ground-launched cruise missiles. They agreed to deploy 108 Pershing II ballistic missiles and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles, all with single nuclear warheads, between 1983 and 1986. The new weapons would be owned and controlled by the United States, but they would be deployed on the territories of five European allies. West Germany would house deployments of both Pershing II ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, while the United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, and Belgium would each house deployments of cruise missiles. The deployment decision was linked, technically and politically, to a second track where NATO agreed that the United States should attempt to negotiate limits with the Soviet Union on intermediate-range nuclear systems. While most of the allies agreed that NATO's security would be best served by eliminating the Soviet Union's ability to target all of Europe with SS-20 missiles, they recognized that the Soviet Union was unlikely to negotiate away those missiles unless it faced a similar threat from intermediate-range systems based in Western Europe. Few expected the Soviet Union to agree to the complete elimination of its SS-20 missiles, but all agreed that the negotiations were necessary, not just as a means to limit the Soviet threat, but also as a means to appeal to public opinion in Europe, where opposition to the new nuclear weapons was strong. The Deployment Track Although NATO adopted the dual-track decision by consensus, with all members of the alliance offering public support for both the deployment and negotiating plans, the governments of each of the five designated host nations still had to approve the deployments. Several had reservations and attached conditions to that approval. For example, West Germany did not want the Soviet Union to be able to single it out as the target for its political campaign against the new systems. Therefore, its leaders required that the NATO decision be unanimous and that at least one other nation on the European continent accept stationing of new nuclear systems. The planned deployments spurred massive public protests across Europe and the United States. These began in 1980, shortly after NATO reached the dual-track decision, and escalated through the first half of the decade. For example, in late 1981, protests occurred in Italy, Germany, Great Britain, and Belgium. Nearly 1 million people marched in Central Park in New York City in June 1982. Additional protests took place across the United States during October 1983. In addition, in October 1983, nearly 3 million people protested across Europe, with nearly 1 million marching in the Netherlands and around 400,000 marching in Great Britain. In one of the more well-known efforts, a Welsh group known as "Women for Life on Earth" established a peace camp at Greenham Common, the base where the United Kingdom would house 96 cruise missiles. The women camped outside the base for years, protesting the eventual deployment of the missiles. The governments in some of the nations that had accepted deployment of the missiles also faced political opposition to the weapons. In the Netherlands, the center-right coalition government supported the deployments but recognized that the weapons could become an issue in the 1986 elections, as the opposition Labor Party had threatened to block the deployment if it won. As a result, the government sought to link the deployments to progress in U.S.-Soviet negotiations on both strategic and theater nuclear weapons. In a compromise approved by Dutch parliament in 1984, the government delayed their deployment from 1986 until 1988, specifying that deployment could occur only if the Soviet Union increased the number of SS-20s above the number already deployed on June 1, 1984. The government in Belgium supported the deployments but also faced firm opposition from the Belgian Socialist Party. As a result, the government also supported efforts to move the arms control track forward, even though it did not link the deployment of cruise missiles on its territory to the completion of a treaty. In spite of the opposition, and after extensive debate, each of the five nations agreed to deploy the new missiles. When the deployments began in late 1983, the Soviet Union suspended the arms control negotiations and did not return to the negotiating table until March 1995. The Arms Control Track The United States and Soviet Union opened their first negotiating session in the fall of 1980, at the end of the Carter Administration. The United States did not present the Soviet Union with a specific proposal for limits or reductions on intermediate-range missiles; instead, it outlined a set of guidelines for the negotiations. Specifically, the United States sought an agreement that would impose equal limits on both sides' intermediate-range missiles—the SS-4, SS-5, and SS-20 missiles for the Soviet Union and the Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles for the United States. The Soviet Union, in its proposal, suggested that the two sides simply freeze the numbers of medium-range systems in Europe. This meant that it would stop deploying, but would not reduce, its SS-20 missiles in exchange for the cancellation of all Pershing II and GLCM deployments. Neither proposal was acceptable to the other side. The Reagan Administration, which took office in January 1981, spent most of its first year evaluating and reconsidering the U.S. approach to arms control with the Soviet Union. In November 1981, President Reagan announced that the United States would seek the total elimination of Soviet SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 missiles in return for the cancellation of NATO's deployment plans—a concept known as the "zero-option." The ban would be global, applying to Soviet missiles in both Europe and Asia. The Soviet Union, for its part, proposed that the two sides agree to a phased reduction of all medium-range nuclear weapons (which it defined as those with a range of 1,000 kilometers) deployed on the territory of Europe, in waters adjacent to Europe, or intended for use in Europe. This proposal would have not only avoided limits on Soviet missiles in Asia, it also would have captured some U.S. dual-capable aircraft based in Europe and U.S. sea-launched cruise missiles. Subsequently, in March 1982, the Soviet Union offered to freeze its deployments of SS-20 missiles unilaterally, and to maintain the moratorium until the two sides reached an agreement or the United States began to deploy the Pershing IIs and GLCMs. Although the two sides discussed possible compromise positions during 1982 and 1983, they made little progress. When the United States began to deploy its INF systems in Europe in late 1983, the Soviet Union withdrew from the negotiations. The negotiations resumed in March 1985 and began to gain traction in 1986. At the Reykjavik summit, in October 1986, Soviet President Gorbachev proposed that all intermediate-range missiles—the SS-20s, GLCMs, and Pershing IIs—be removed from Europe within five years of signing a treaty. He also indicated that the Soviet Union would reduce its SS-20s in Asia to 33 missiles, which would carry 99 warheads. In return, the United States could store a mix of 100 GLCMs and Pershing IIs within the United States, but it could not deploy them within range of the Soviet Union. Further, in April 1987, President Gorbachev indicated that the Soviet Union was prepared to eliminate all of its shorter-range missiles (those with ranges between 300 and 600 miles) in Europe and Asia as a part of an INF agreement. Then, in June, he proposed a global ban on shorter-range and longer-range INF systems, essentially accepting the U.S. zero-option proposal from 1982. The United States and the Soviet Union signed the Treaty on Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) on December 8, 1987. They exchanged the instruments of ratification, and the treaty entered into force June 1, 1988. The two nations had to eliminate their INF systems within three years of the treaty's entry into force, but the treaty, and its ban on the deployment of intermediate-range land-based ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, is of unlimited duration. The INF Treaty The INF Treaty contained several features that were new to the U.S.-Soviet arms control process. Although it was not the first treaty to ban an entire category of weapons (a treaty signed in 1975 had banned biological weapons and earlier treaties had banned the emplacement of nuclear weapons on a seabed or stationing them on celestial bodies), it was the first to ban a category that each nation had already deployed and considered vital for its national security needs. Moreover, where prior treaties imposed equal burdens on each side, the INF Treaty called for asymmetrical reductions. The Soviet Union destroyed 1,846 missiles, including 654 SS-20s, whereas the United States destroyed 846 missiles. Moreover, each of the Soviet SS-20 missiles carried three warheads, while all the U.S. missiles carried only a single warhead. The INF Treaty was also the first U.S.-Soviet treaty to employ intrusive monitoring mechanisms in its verification regime. Under prior treaties, the United States and Soviet Union had relied almost exclusively on their own satellites and remote sensing capabilities—known as national technical means (NTM) of verification—to monitor forces and verify compliance with the treaty. These systems served as the foundation of the monitoring regime under INF, but the treaty also permitted on-site inspections of selected missile assembly facilities and all storage centers, deployment zones, and repair, test, and elimination facilities. Although it did not permit the parties to conduct inspections at any location within the other's territory, it did allow up to 20 short-notice inspections at sites designated in the treaty. The two sides also agreed to participate in an extensive data exchange, which allowed them to account for all systems covered by the agreement. Further, it allowed each side to operate a continuous portal monitoring system outside one assembly facility in the other country, to confirm the absence of new INF missile production. These inspections continued for 10 years after the eliminations were complete, ending in May 2001. The INF Treaty also established the Special Verification Commission (SVC) "to promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty." The United States and Soviet Union agreed that, if either party requested, they would meet in the SVC to "resolve questions relating to compliance" with their treaty obligations and to agree on any new measures needed "to improve the viability and effectiveness" of the treaty. Central Limits Under the INF Treaty, the United States and Soviet Union agreed to destroy all intermediate-range and shorter-range ground-launched ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles. These are missiles with a range between 500 and 5,500 kilometers (300 and 3,400 miles). The launchers associated with the controlled missiles were also to be destroyed, although the warheads and guidance systems of the missiles did not have to be destroyed. They could be used or reconfigured for other systems not controlled by the treaty. Further, the treaty stated that neither party could produce or flight-test any new ground-launched intermediate-range missiles or produce any stages of such missiles or any launchers of such missiles in the future. Article III of the INF Treaty listed the U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles that existed at the time of treaty signing. For the Soviet Union, this list included the SS-20 intermediate-range missile, and the SS-4 and the SS-5 shorter-range missiles. The Soviet Union also agreed to destroy a range of older nuclear missiles, as well as the mobile, short-range SS-23, a system developed and deployed in the early 1980s. For the United States, the list of banned missiles included the new Pershing II ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles, along with several hundred older Pershing I missiles that were in storage in Europe. The INF Treaty made it clear that each of these types of missiles and their launchers would count as INF missiles and launchers, even if they were altered to fly to different ranges or perform different missions. For example, the treaty stated that if a type of ground-launched ballistic missile or ground-launched cruise missile "is an intermediate-range missile" then all missiles of that type "shall be considered to be intermediate-range missiles." The INF Treaty also stated that, "if a ballistic missile or a cruise missile has been flight-tested or deployed for weapon delivery, all missiles of that type shall be considered to be weapon-delivery vehicles." Further, it stated that "if a launcher has been tested for launching" a treaty-defined intermediate-range ground-launched ballistic or cruise missile, then "all launchers of that type shall be considered to have been tested for launching" missiles banned by the treaty. In other words, even if a nation sought to use a type of launcher for a different purpose or to launch a different type of missile, it would count as a treaty-limited launcher as long as even one launcher of that type had been tested or deployed with an INF-range missile. The INF Treaty's ban on intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles applied only to land-based missiles. The treaty did not ban the possession, testing, or production of sea-based or air-delivered intermediate-range ballistic or cruise missiles, even if they had a range of between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. Moreover, it permitted the parties to test sea-based or air-delivered weapons at land-based test ranges, as long as they were "test-launched at a test site from a fixed land-based launcher which is used solely for test purposes" and that is distinguishable from an operational launcher of ground-launched ballistic or cruise missiles. Testing such weapons at other locations, or from operational ground-based launchers, would constitute a violation of the treaty. Because the INF Treaty defined treaty-limited ballistic missiles and cruise missiles as "weapons delivery vehicles," rockets that were not designed or tested as weapons-delivery vehicles were not banned by the treaty, even if they were based on land and could fly to ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. The INF Treaty also did not ban the possession or testing and production of missile defense interceptors, even if they flew to ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. Specifically, Article VII stated that ground-launched ballistic missiles "of a type developed and tested solely to intercept and counter objects not located on the surface of the earth, it shall not be considered to be a missile to which the limitations of this Treaty apply." Determining Missile Range Article III of the INF Treaty lists the intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles in existence at the time the treaty was signed; these missiles were banned by the treaty and would remain banned, regardless of the range flown in tests conducted prior to, or possibly after, the signing of the treaty. Article VII describes how the parties will measure the range of new types of missiles to determine whether these missiles are covered by the limits in the treaty. Cruise Missiles Article VII states that the range of a ground-launched cruise missile is "the maximum distance which can be covered by the missile in its standard design mode flying until fuel exhaustion, determined by projecting its flight path onto the earth's sphere from the point of launch to the point of impact." Like airplanes, cruise missiles do not necessarily fly on a predictable trajectory—they can change direction in flight and can fly to less than their maximum distance. Moreover, the maximum range to fuel exhaustion can depend on the altitude and path of the flight. As a result, flight tests using the same type of missile can demonstrate significant variations for the range of the missile. Observations from a single flight of the missile would be unlikely to provide enough data to estimate the maximum range. Although the range demonstrated in the flight could provide a baseline, other data, including estimates of the maximum amount of fuel and the weight of the missile, could also affect the calculation. Ballistic Missiles Article VII states that the "the range capability" of a new type of ground-launched ballistic missile "shall be considered to be the maximum range to which it has been tested." If the range capability of a new missile, as identified by the maximum range demonstrated during flight tests, falls between 1,000 kilometers and 5,500 kilometers, then the missile is considered to be an intermediate-range missile. If the maximum range is greater than 5,500 kilometers, the missile is considered to be a strategic ballistic missile that will count under the limits in the New Strategic Offensive Arms Control Treaty (New START). Because ballistic missiles fly on a predictable trajectory, it is much easier to measure their range than the range of cruise missiles. However, ballistic missiles can also fly to less than their maximum range if they fly along a depressed trajectory or a lofted trajectory, if they carry a heavier payload, or if they consume only part of their fuel. Nevertheless, the INF Treaty does not ban, or even address, ballistic missile flight tests that fall within the 1,000 kilometer to 5,500 kilometer range if the missile in question demonstrated a maximum range greater than 5,500 kilometers in another flight test. In 1988, when the Senate was debating the ratification of the INF Treaty, members of the Armed Services Committee and Foreign Relations Committee expressed concerns about whether this provided a path for the Soviet Union to circumvent the treaty's ban on INF-range missiles. Some questioned whether the Soviet Union might be able to develop a new missile similar to the INF-range SS-20 and test it to a range greater than 5,500 kilometers, before testing it to INF ranges. Officials representing the Reagan Administration acknowledged that both these scenarios were possible and that neither was prohibited by the INF Treaty. In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Ambassador Maynard Glitman, the lead negotiator for the INF Treaty, stated that a missile tested even once to a range greater than 5,500 kilometers would be considered to be a strategic ground-launched ballistic missile and would not be covered by the INF Treaty, even if it flew to less than 5,500 kilometers in numerous subsequent tests. The State Department amended this answer in a letter to the Foreign Relations Committee after the hearings; it stated that the missile could be considered a new type of missile covered by the INF Treaty if it was tested at strategic range "with a configuration (booster stages, post-boost vehicle, RV's) that is unlike that used for remaining tests of the system at INF ranges." In other words, if the Soviet Union had tested a missile with only a single warhead, which would have allowed it to fly to a longer range, but then tested it at a reduced range with more warheads, it could be considered to be an intermediate-range missile in the multiple warhead configuration. The letter did not indicate, however, whether the Soviet Union agreed with this interpretation. Moreover, the letter reiterated that a ground-launched ballistic missile tested to ICBM ranges and then tested to INF ranges in the same configuration clearly would not be limited by the treaty. Others questioned whether the Soviet Union would be able to use longer-range strategic land-based and sea-based ballistic missiles to attack targets in Europe after it eliminated its INF systems. Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci responded to these concerns in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He agreed when Senator Sarbanes asked if "the Soviets could use other weapons to hit Europe" after they eliminated their INF missiles. He replied that "they could, with some disruption to their programming, retarget their strategic systems on Europe." He also indicated that the United States could do the same thing because there was "nothing in the treaty that prevents retargeting." Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger made a similar point in his testimony, noting that Soviet "ICBMs, SLBMs, and airplanes can carry out the missions assigned to the SS-20s." U.S. Concerns with Russian Compliance The United States officially charged Russia with violating the INF Treaty in late July 2014, when the State Department released the 2014 edition of its report Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments (the Compliance Report). At the same time, President Obama sent a letter to President Putin notifying him of the finding in the Compliance Report and suggesting that the two countries meet to discuss steps that Russia could take to come back into compliance with the treaty. According to press reports, Administration officials had first raised U.S. concerns with Russia during discussions held in May 2013, and had addressed the issue in subsequent meetings. The two sides met again, in September 2014, after the release of the Compliance Report. The State Department reported that the two sides had a "useful exchange of views" during that meeting, but that Russia had failed to "assuage" U.S. concerns. Russia, for its part, complained that the United States did not offer any details to back up its accusations and, as it had in previous meetings, denied that it had violated the INF Treaty. The Obama Administration repeated its accusation of Russian noncompliance in the 2015 edition of the State Department Compliance Report. This report added a little detail to the 2014 version, noting the "United States determined the cruise missile developed by the Russian Federation meets the INF Treaty definition of a ground-launched cruise missile with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, and as such, all missiles of that type, and all launchers of the type used to launch such a missile, are prohibited under the provisions of the INF Treaty." While Administration officials continue to withhold details about either the missile or the data used to determine that it is a violation, they have said specifically that the United States is "talking about a missile that has been flight-tested as a ground-launched cruise-missile system to these ranges that are banned under this treaty." The Administration repeated its accusation of testing of a ground-launched cruise missile in the 2016 and 2017 versions of the State Department Compliance Report. Both reports, again, declined to provide details about the offending missile. However, the 2017 report, in response to Russian assertions that the United States lacked proof of such a violation, states that the United States has provided "more than enough information for the Russian side to identify the missile in question." This includes "information pertaining to the missile and the launcher, including Russia's internal designator for the mobile launcher chassis and the names of the companies involved in developing and producing the missile and launcher and; information on the violating GLCM's test history, including coordinates of the tests and Russia's attempts to obfuscate the nature of the program." The United States has also provided Russia with information showing that the "violating GLCM has a range capability between 500 and 5,500 kilometers" and that, contrary to much public speculation, it is "distinct from the R-500/SSC-7 GLCM or the RS-26 ICBM." In October 2016, press reports for October 2016 indicated that the Obama Administration believed Russia was moving toward deployment of the new missile, because it had begun to produce the missile in numbers greater than what is needed for a test program. This was followed, in February 2017, by reports in the New York Times stating that Russia had begun to deploy a new ground-launched cruise missile, in violation of the 1987 Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. General Paul Selva, the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, confirmed this deployment during testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on March 8, 2017. General Selva noted that Russia had violated the "spirit and intent" of the treaty, that it had deliberately deployed the missile to pose a threat to NATO facilities, and that it showed no inclination to return to compliance with the treaty. Cruise Missile As noted above, the 2014 Compliance Report determined that Russia is in "violation of its obligation not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles." The State Department repeated this finding in the 2015 and 2016 Compliance Reports. The reports did not provide any details about the missile or cite the evidence that the United States used to make its determination. However, according to press reports, the intelligence community has "high confidence" in its assessment that the cruise missile and flight tests in question constitute a "serious violation." Press reports have noted that the missile tests, which took place at the Kapustin Yar test site in western Russia, began in 2008, during the George W. Bush Administration. The Obama Administration concluded that the tests constituted a violation of the INF Treaty and mentioned its concerns to Congress during briefings in late 2011. According to press reports, the Administration briefed U.S. allies in NATO about its concerns at a meeting of NATO's Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Committee in January 2014. The reports also states that the Administration does not believe that Russia has deployed the missile yet. Some in Congress have questioned why, if the tests began in 2008, the United States waited until 2011 to inform Congress, until 2013 to raise the issue with Russia, and until 2014 to inform U.S. allies of its concerns. They speculate that the Obama Administration may have hoped to conceal the issue so that it would not undermine its arms control agenda with Russia. For example, in February 2014, Senators Wicker and Ayotte asked whether the Administration delayed notifying Congress so that the issue would not interfere with the Senate debate on the ratification of the New START Treaty. On the other hand, it is possible that the Obama Administration held off on mentioning its concerns to Congress and U.S. allies until it had more information about the potential violation and more time to analyze that information. According to press reports, "it took years for American intelligence to gather information on Russia's new missile system." Therefore, it seems likely that the United States could not make its determination, with high confidence, using data gathered during only one, or even a few, test launches. Under Secretary of State Rose Goetemoeller underscored this dynamic in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee in late 2015. She noted that the United States knew that Russia had begun to test a cruise missile in 2008, but that "it was only over time did we accumulate the information that it was a ground launch cruise missile." The United States did not immediately assume Russia was testing a prohibited missile because "under the INF Treaty, sea launched cruise missiles and air launch cruise missiles are permitted, and there is no reason why the Russians could not have been developing during that period a new sea launched or air launched cruise missile." She repeated that "we didn't—simply did not know until later in the test series that it was a ground launch system." Daniel Coats, the Director of National Intelligence, confirmed this scenario in his statement to the press on November 30, 2018. He noted that Russia had conducted two types of tests—one to a range of greater than 500 kilometers from a static launcher and one to a shorter range from a mobile launcher. The United States has concluded that the same missile was involved in both types of tests. Experts outside government sought to determine which Russian missile constitutes the INF violation. Initial analyses focused on the Iskander system, a Russian missile launcher that can fire both ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. The ballistic missiles for the system have been tested to a maximum range of less than 500 kilometers and, therefore, do not raise treaty compliance issues. The R-500 cruise missile, which is also launched from an Iskander launcher, has been tested to a range of 360 kilometers but, according to some analyses, could have a maximum range "several times longer." Contrary to much of the speculation, however, Obama Administration officials stated that the R-500 cruise missile was not the missile in question. In addition, the 2017 version of the State Department Compliance Report indicated that the United States had provided Russia with information that demonstrates that the noncompliant cruise missile is distinct from the R-500 system. Some have also suggested that the violation may have occurred if Russia tested an intermediate-range sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM), such as the SS-N-21 SLCM, from a land-based launcher. The INF Treaty allows land-based tests of SLCMs, as long as they are launched from a "fixed land-based launcher which is used solely for test purposes and which is distinguishable from GLCM launchers." If Russia had launched a SLCM with a range greater than 500 kilometers from any other type of launcher, the test would constitute a violation of the treaty. Members of Congress raised this possibility during a joint hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia and Emerging Threats and Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade in April 2014. For example, Representative Brad Sherman said that Russia may have tested a missile for "sea-based purposes" on "what appears to be an operational, useable ground-based launcher." Press reports from Russia have also speculated about this. An October 2014 article mentioned that Russia had conducted a 2,600-kilometer test of a cruise missile in 2013, and quoted a source in Russia's Defense Ministry as saying the missile was a "naval cruise missile" tested from a "ground-based platform" rather than a ship to save money and simplify the collection of data on the test. This explanation resurfaced in early October 2015, after Russia used its new Kalibr-NK sea-launched cruise missiles in its attacks against targets in Syria. These cruise missiles, which were launched from ships deployed in the Caspian Sea, traveled to ranges of more than 1,500 km, which clearly exceeds the range permitted by the INF Treaty. So, according to one analyst, "if this missile was ever test-launched from a mobile land-based launcher, it would be considered GLCM for the purposes of the INF Treaty and this test would be a treaty violation." This explanation, was also imperfect. It presumed that the violation occurred during a single test, while the timeline discussed above indicated that the United States collected data across several tests. Moreover, there is no evidence in the public press that Russian officials have offered this type of explanation in the several meetings where the United States has raised its concerns. In addition, U.S. officials have repeatedly referred to the violation as a test of a ground-launched cruise missile, lending less credence to the view that the United States might have misidentified tests of a sea-launched missile. Moreover, Rose Goetmeoller stated, specifically, in an article published in September 2015, that this is not a technical violation, as is assumed by the theory that the missile is a SLCM tested from a GLCM launcher. Beginning in 2015, press reports identified another possible candidate for the suspect missile. An article published in late September 2015 noted that Russia had conducted another test of its new GLCM in on September 2. According to this article, the missile, which it identified as the SSC-X-8 cruise missile, did not fly to a range beyond the INF limit. However, it cited officials familiar with the test who claimed that the missile had an "assessed range" of "between 300 miles and 3,400 miles," giving it the capability to fly to ranges in excess of those allowed under the INF Treaty. The article also claimed that "an earlier flight test of the missile prompted the administration, backed by U.S. intelligence agencies, to declare the system a breach of the INF treaty." The Obama Administration did not comment on the allegations in 2015, but press reports from February 2017 have identified the SSC-X-8 cruise missile as the system that Russia deployed in December 2016; the designation is now the SSC-8, with the X dropped because the missile is no longer experimental. In late November 2017, the Trump Administration identified the Russian designator for the missile as the 9M729. Little is known about the missile's specific characteristics or the observed tests that led the United States to conclude the missile violated the INF Treaty, although some speculate that it may be a ground-based version of the Kalibr sea-launched cruise missile. Ballistic Missile Some analysts outside government also contend that Russia has violated the INF Treaty with the development of a new land-based ballistic missile, known as the RS-26, because Russia has tested this missile to ranges below 5,500 kilometers. Other analysts dispute this conclusion, noting that Russia has also tested the missile to more than 5,500 kilometers, which would place it outside INF range and characterize it as a long-range, intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). The Obama Administration did not mention this missile in the 2014 Compliance Report, possibly indicating that it either does not consider the missile to be an INF violation or does not have sufficient information to draw a conclusion. The Trump Administration, in the 2018 Compliance Report, specifically noted that the Russian GLCM tested in violation of the INF Treaty "is distinct from the ... RS-26 ICBM." Nevertheless, this missile remains in issue in discussions about the INF Treaty. According to unclassified reports, Russia conducted four flight tests of the RS-26 missile. Two of these flight tests—one that failed in September 2011 and one that succeeded in May 2012—flew from Plesetsk to Kura, a distance of approximately 5,800 kilometers (3,600 miles). The second two tests—in October 2012 and June 2013—were both successful. In both cases the missile flew from Kapustin Yar to Sary-Shagan, a distance of 2,050 kilometers (1,270 miles). Reports indicate that all four tests were conducted with "solid-propellant missiles launched from a mobile launcher." The missiles in the first three tests reportedly carried a single warhead, while the last test carried a "new combat payload" that may have consisted of multiple warheads. Russian officials have claimed that the RS-26 missile is an ICBM. At the time of the first test, in September 2011, an official Russian statement indicated that the failed missile was a part of a development program for a new "fifth generation ICBM." Russian officials continued to refer to the new missile as an ICBM after the two tests from Kapustin Yar to Sary-Shagan. According to General-Colonel Zarudnitskiy, the head of the Main Operational Directorate of Russia's General Staff, all four launches were part of the series of tests with "a new intercontinental-range ballistic missile with improved accuracy." Although Russian statements describing the RS-26 as a long-range ICBM cannot serve as definitive proof of the missile's intended range and targets, the existence of a test to more than 5,500 kilometers does seem to place it outside the range of missiles banned by the INF Treaty. Nevertheless, several observers have concluded that, even if it is not a technical violation, the missile's intermediate-range tests could still provide evidence of Russia's intent to circumvent the treaty limits by deploying a new missile optimized for attacks on targets in the INF-range. Ultimately, the question of whether the missile should raise compliance concerns, and, more specifically, whether it represents an actual violation of the INF Treaty, may rest on a more detailed, and possibly classified, analysis of the nature of the missile's payload and the rationale for the shorter-range tests. For example, several analysts have speculated that Russia tested the RS-26 on flights from Kapustin Yar to Sary-Shagan because the missile may have carried a payload that would help it evade ballistic missile defenses. Russia's Deputy Prime Minister, Dmitry Rogozin, reportedly called the missile a "killer of air defense" after the June 2013 test flight. Several press reports also indicated that it was designed to be able to evade and penetrate ballistic missile defense systems. For example, in May 2012, an official from Russia's missile industry stated that the missile uses "a new fuel making it possible to reduce the time of the missile engines' operation during the boost phase. This makes such a missile more capable of overpowering a missile defense system." Sary-Shagan serves as the test site for Russia's ballistic missile defense radars, so if Russia wanted to determine whether these radars could identify and track the new missile, it would need to fire the missile toward Sary-Shagan. Russia has also launched its older SS-25 ICBMs from Kapustin Yar to Sary-Shagan in recent years, according to the Russian Ministry of Defense, to gather information that could be used to develop "effective means for overcoming missile defense." If this rationale is consistent with data evident during the missile's flight test, then it might not be considered a violation of the INF Treaty. However, other explanations for the shorter-range tests are possible. As noted above, all long-range missiles can fly to targets at less than their maximum range. If a missile were initially tested with a single, light warhead, but then flew with a heavier payload, or with a greater number of warheads, or if it were flown on a flatter, depressed trajectory or higher, lofted trajectory, it would fly to a shorter range. Some have speculated that the RS-26 may have flown with a single warhead in its initial tests then carried multiple warheads in later tests. Russian press reports indicated that this was a possibility. For example, after the May 2012 test, the Russian press reported that the missile was "a further development on the Topol-M and Yars strategic missiles and is supposed to be armed with a multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle warhead." The Topol-M is a single warhead missile, while the Yars is a variation of the Topol that carries multiple warheads. But both fly to much longer ranges than the 5,800 kilometers demonstrated by the RS-26 in its second flight test. As a result, it is possible that the payload for the RS-26, particularly during its shorter-range tests, contained a substantially different payload than the missile tested to the longer range. If a change in the payload is evident in the data generated during the flight tests, then it may yet be determined to be a violation. Moreover, even if the missile does not violate the terms of the INF Treaty, it could allow Russia to circumvent the limits in the agreement. The United States has not, at this time, concluded that this ballistic missile violates the INF Treaty. In addition, the 2017 and 2018 Compliance Reports indicate that the noncompliant cruise missile at issue in the U.S. allegations is not the RS-26 ICBM. Russian Interests in Intermediate-Range Missiles Many analysts agree that Russia has been uncomfortable with the limits in the INF Treaty for nearly a decade. Some speculate that the Russian military has been interested in replacing its lost capabilities since shortly after the treaty was signed so that it could maintain a full complement of missile capabilities, regardless of the threat environment. According to some analysts, Russia has been pursuing a number of programs, including some focused on long-range cruise missiles that seem to seem to "pay no attention to the treaty limits." Others highlight comments from Russian officials that point to emerging threats to Russian security from countries along Russia's periphery that possess their own intermediate-range missiles. Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates notes in his recent memoir that Sergei Ivanov, a former Russian Minister of Defense, raised this issue with him in 2007. Ivanov, and others in subsequent comments, have noted that the United States and Russia are the only two countries in the world that cannot deploy intermediate-range missiles. Ivanov told Gates that Russia wanted to withdraw from the treaty so that it could deploy these missiles "to counter Iran, Pakistan, and China." Others have echoed this concern in recent years. Anatoly Antonov, Russia's current Deputy Minister of Defense, said in an interview in August 2014, "Nowadays almost 30 countries have such [intermediate-range] missiles in their arsenals. The majority of them are in close proximity to Russia." Others have been more specific, noting that countries from around the periphery of Russia, including North Korea, China, India, and Pakistan, all possess intermediate-range missiles. In 2007, Russia sought to address this concern by submitting a proposal to the United Nations that would convert the INF Treaty into a multilateral treaty that could be signed by all states with intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles. The United States issued a joint statement with Russia supporting this effort. But the proposal did not win any further adherents. Russia may have then focused its attention on the development of its own INF missiles. Recent reports that Russia will deploy the RS-26 missile at Irkutsk, which places it out of range of Europe but within range of China and other nations to its south and east, support the view that Russia may be developing INF-range missiles to address threats outside of Europe. Russian officials have also pointed to threats from NATO as the source of Russia's interest in escaping from the limits of the INF Treaty. Often, these threats have been linked to U.S. and NATO plans to deploy missile defense assets in Europe. For example, in 2007, when the Bush Administration was pursuing plans to deploy missile defense interceptors in Poland and radar in the Czech Republic, President Putin threatened to withdraw from the INF Treaty so that he could deploy missiles with the range needed to attack these sites. Although the Obama Administration cancelled the Bush Administration's planned deployments, it still plans to deploy missile defense interceptors in Poland and Romania as a part of its missile defense architecture known as the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA). The United States insists that these interceptors will pose no threat to Russia's strategic nuclear forces, but Russia has continued to threaten to deploy intermediate-range missiles to target these sites. Missiles in the range of 700-1,000 kilometers would be able to reach deployment sites in Poland and Romania, particularly if Russia moved launchers into its newly annexed Crimean territory. The United States has completed the installation of the Aegis Ashore site in Romania; it was certified as operational in May 2016. Russia continues to argue that this site can threaten Russian strategic forces and to insist that the launchers violate the INF Treaty because they could launch offensive cruise missiles. While it has not made a direct connection recently, it is possible that Russia may have used the operational status of the Aegis Ashore site as an excuse to prepare for the deployment of its treaty-noncompliant cruise missile. Russia may also view new intermediate-range missiles as a response to challenges it faces from NATO's advanced conventional capabilities, especially as NATO has enlarged eastward into nations close to Russia's western border. Russian defense and security documents have not only emphasized that Russia views NATO enlargement as a key threat to its security, they have also highlighted the need for Russia to be able to deter NATO's use of precision conventional weapons, such as the U.S. Navy's Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missiles. Russia already has a wide range of conventional and nuclear capabilities that can threaten U.S. allies in NATO. For example, its shorter-range systems, like the Iskander missiles, which can carry either conventional or nuclear warheads, can reach into Poland and the Baltic states, particularly if they are deployed in Belarus or Kaliningrad. But they cannot reach across Eastern Europe, particularly if they are deployed further east in Russia. As a result, Russia may believe that land-based intermediate-range cruise missiles could fill a gap in Russia's conventional capabilities. Missiles at the lower end of INF range could reach into eastern NATO allies, covering areas that some have noted could serve as staging grounds for NATO strikes against Russia. Systems in the 2,000 kilometer range could reach Germany, and those of 3,000 kilometer range could reach most other NATO states. As Yuriy Baluyevskiy, the former head of the Russian General Staff, said in a September 2014 interview, INF-range missiles would allow Russia "to erect a system of national security assurance" with missiles that could target cities in Poland, Romania, and the Baltic and, as a result, "cool the heads of these states' leaders." Some have suggested that Russia might use intermediate-range ballistic missiles to threaten NATO capitals at a greater distance from Russia, in part, to threaten the cohesion of the alliance. Although these capitals are still within range of Russian bombers and longer-range missiles, the nuclear threat to these cities eased considerably after the Soviet Union eliminated its SS-20 missiles. With these missiles eliminated, there was little risk the capitals would face nuclear retaliation if they invoked their Article V commitment to defend the allies closer to Russia. But, with a new threat to these more distant allies, some may question the strength of that commitment. In such a circumstance, the allies located closer to Russia might be more inclined to give in to coercion or intimidation from Russia. Although NATO can take steps to offset this impression and strengthen alliance cohesion, Russia's new intermediate-range missiles could introduce a dynamic similar to the one NATO faced during the Cold War, when some questioned whether the United States would come to the defense of its European allies, knowing that its own territory could be threatened by Soviet long-range missiles. Russian Concerns with U.S. Compliance Russian officials claim that three current and planned U.S. military programs violate the INF Treaty. They have raised at least one of these issues in diplomatic exchanges for the past several years, but have become more insistent on addressing these issues in recent months, following the State Department's publication of the 2014 Compliance Report. The three programs identified by Russia include (1) the use of intermediate-range missiles as targets during tests of U.S. missile defense systems; (2) the use of drones as weapons delivery vehicles; and (3) the planned deployment of missile defense interceptors on land in the Navy's MK-41 missile launchers. DOD reviews U.S. weapons programs to ensure that they are consistent with all U.S. arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament commitments. These reviews have found that none of these programs constitute a violation and that the United States is in full compliance with its INF obligations. The United States addressed Russia's concerns during the meeting on INF compliance in September 2014, providing Russia with treaty-based explanations to demonstrate how the programs are compliant with U.S. obligations under the INF Treaty. However, Russian officials continue to insist that the United States has violated the INF Treaty. Missile Defense Targets The United States has designed and produced numerous target missiles for use during its tests of missile defense interceptors. Several of these targets use modified engines from existing types of ballistic missiles, including retired Minuteman II long-range missiles. One such missile, known as the Hera, flew to ranges of around 1,000 kilometers. Russia claims that target missiles using Minuteman II motors violate the INF Treaty because they "have similar characteristics to intermediate-range missiles" and can fly to ranges covered by the INF Treaty. Russian officials have also claimed that the United States may have used guidance components from Pershing missiles in some target missiles. The United States reportedly disputed the Russian assertion in 2001, noting that the Hera missile was a "booster system" meant for research, not a weapons delivery system. In December 2014, the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Brian McKeon, raised the same point in testimony before subcommittees of the House Foreign Affairs and Armed Services Committees. He noted that the INF Treaty "explicitly permits the use of older booster stages for research and development purposes, subject to specific Treaty rules. This includes their use as targets for missile defense tests." The treaty bans land-based intermediate-range missiles that have been "flight-tested or deployed for weapons delivery." The target missiles have never been equipped with warheads and, therefore, have never been flight tested or deployed for weapons delivery. In addition, the use of guidance systems from an eliminated missile does not violate the INF Treaty, as the text allows the parties to remove guidance sets prior to missile elimination and to reuse them in systems not limited by the treaty. Armed Drones The United States operates several types of unmanned aerial vehicles—drones—to perform intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions. Some drones have been equipped to carry precision-guided weapons to attack ground targets. While the sizes and ranges of U.S. drones vary greatly, some, including those that can deliver weapons, can fly to ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. Russia claims that U.S. armed drones violate the INF Treaty because they are consistent with the treaty's definition of a ground-launched cruise missile. The treaty defines a cruise missile as "an unmanned, self-propelled vehicle that sustains flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of its flight path." It further specifies that a ground-launched cruise missile banned by the treaty means "a ground-launched cruise missile that is a weapon-delivery vehicle." While it is true that drones sustain flight through the use of aerodynamic lift, they do not necessarily meet the treaty's definition of unmanned and self-propelled. Although drones do not have pilots on board, they are piloted remotely, with pilots based at facilities on the ground. Moreover, although armed drones can deliver weapons to targets, they are platforms that carry weapons, not weapons themselves. Unlike a cruise missile with a separate launcher that remains behind after releasing the missile, a drone is self-contained, and takes off and lands like an aircraft. Further, although cruise missiles are destroyed when delivering their payload, drones release their payload then return to base, like an aircraft. Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Brian McKeon summed this up during recent congressional testimony when he noted that drones are not missiles, they are "two-way, reusable systems. The INF Treaty imposes no restrictions on the testing, production, or possession of two-way, reusable, armed UAVs." Land-Based Deployment of MK-41 Launchers As a part of its European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) for missile defense, the United States plans to deploy ballistic missile interceptors on land in Romania and Poland, in a construct known as Aegis Ashore. The site in Romania became operational in May 2016, as a part of phase 2 of the EPAA, while the site in Poland is scheduled for 2018, as a part of phase 3. According to the Missile Defense Agency, the United States will deploy SM-3 interceptor missiles at these sites in the same type of vertical launch system—the MK-41—used aboard Aegis ships. According to the U.S. Navy, the MK-41 vertical launch system (VLS) is a "multi-missile, multi-mission launcher" that can launch SM-2 interceptors and Tomahawk cruise missiles, along with a number of other systems. Russia claims that the MK-41 VLS will "be a flagrant violation" of the INF Treaty when it is based on land because it "can be used to launch intermediate-range cruise missiles." This complaint seems to assume that the launchers will meet the treaty's definition of a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) launcher because they can launch Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs), even though they have never been tested or deployed with GLCMs. Mikhail Ulyanov, the director of the nonproliferation and arms control department of the Russian Foreign Ministry, repeated this concern on October 12, 2015, when he stated that the deployment of the MK-41 launchers in Romania would be "a massive breach of the INF Treaty." The INF Treaty defines a GLCM launcher as "a fixed launcher or a mobile land-based transporter-erector-launcher mechanism for launching a GLCM." A GLCM is defined "as a ground-launched cruise missile that is a weapon-delivery vehicle." These definitions are somewhat circular: if a missile has been launched from a ground-based launcher, it is a ground-launched missile, and if a launcher has launched a ground-launched missile, it is a GLCM launcher. One could argue that a sea-based missile, such as the Tomahawk, could be launched from land if its launcher were deployed on land. In that case, the launcher could be considered a ground-based launcher, even if it had never been tested with a ground-launched missile. This seems to be the source of Russia's complaint. However, even if it seems somewhat logical, it is not consistent with the INF Treaty's definition. The treaty specifies that the launcher must launch an intermediate-range GLCM, not any intermediate-range cruise missile, to qualify as a system banned by the treaty. Moreover, U.S. officials have asserted that the version of the MK-41 system to be based in Romania and Poland will not be the same as the shipboard version that has been used to launch Tomahawk cruise missiles, even though it will use "some of the same structural components as the sea-based system." According to some reports, the "electronics and software of the Aegis Ashore Mk-41 launcher are different than the ship-borne variant." The Trump Administration reiterated this point in a fact sheet released by the State Department in December 2017. It noted that the Aegis Ashore system "is only capable of launching defensive interceptor missiles." The system uses "some of the same structural components as the sea-based Mk-41 Vertical Launch System" but it "is not the same launcher as the sea-based MK-41 Vertical Launch System." The system "lacks the software, fire control hardware, support equipment, and other infrastructure needed to launch offensive ballistic or cruise missiles such as the Tomahawk." This distinction would seem to undercut the Russian view that the launcher used in Aegis Ashore "can be used to launch intermediate-range cruise missiles." However, convincing Russia of this difference may be difficult. In past arms control agreements, the parties have mandated that similar systems with different purposes possess functionally related, observable differences. This is not required under the INF Treaty, and it is not clear at this time whether this will be the case for the land-based MK-41 launchers. As a result, even though the treaty definitions may not capture the system unless it actually launches a cruise missile from land, the United States may find it helpful, for political reasons, to take additional steps to address Russia's concerns and convince Russia that the system does not violate the INF Treaty. The U.S. Response The INF treaty is of unlimited duration, but it contains a withdrawal clause that states that each party shall "have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests." Russia could have withdrawn from the INF Treaty to address emerging threats from intermediate-range missiles deployed in China or in other nations on its periphery, or if it believed it needed intermediate-range missiles to address perceived threats from NATO. Yet, Russia has remained a party to the treaty while, according to U.S. allegations, developing new intermediate-range missile capabilities. It is possible that it has done so in the hope of delaying a U.S. response while reserving the option to withdraw later, after completing the development and testing of its new systems. The United States, for its part, has considered a number of options to address its compliance concerns, to encourage Russia to remain a party to the treaty, and to respond to security concerns emerging as a result of Russia's development and deployment of new intermediate-range ballistic or cruise missiles. It has now decided to withdraw from the treaty, both to demonstrate that Russia's violation will not go unanswered and to free itself to pursue the development of new intermediate-range missiles. As a result, Russia may now be able to continue its current course free from the limits in the INF Treaty. Options for Addressing Compliance Concerns Engage in Diplomatic Discussions According to press reports, the United States began to raise concerns about INF compliance with Russia during diplomatic meetings in 2013. Although not specified in the reports, it seems likely that the INF Treaty was only one of several issues discussed in these fora. The press reports note that Russia dismissed the U.S. concerns, stating that Russia had "investigated the matter and consider[s] the case to be closed." U.S. officials stated that Russia's answer "was not satisfactory to us" and indicated that it would continue to press the case in future meetings. With Russia unwilling to even acknowledge that it has conducted tests that could raise INF concerns, it seems unlikely that this level of engagement will succeed in resolving the issue. The United States raised the profile of the issue in July 2014 when the State Department released the 2014 Compliance Report. According to press reports, President Obama sent a letter to President Putin that "underscored his interest in a high-level dialogue with Moscow with the aim of preserving the 1987 treaty and discussing steps the Kremlin might take to come back into compliance." At the same time, Secretary of State John Kerry called the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, to emphasize the same point. The two nations then held a meeting on September 11, 2014, focused exclusively on the two nations' concerns with INF compliance. As noted above, the State Department reported that Russia had failed to "assuage" U.S. concerns during the September 2014 meeting. The Russian participants denied that Russia had violated the treaty, complained about the lack of evidence provided by the United States, and accused the United States itself of violating the treaty. The State Department indicated, in its 2016 Annual Report on Compliance with Arms Control Agreements, that "the United States again raised concerns with Russia on repeated occasions" in 2015 and it will "continue to pursue resolution of U.S. concerns with Russia" in the future. But Russia continued to refuse to address the issue and continued to deny that it has violated the treaty. In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Under Secretary of State Rose Gotemoeller stated that it has been "extraordinarily difficult" to address this issue "because the Russians simply have not wanted to engage in a way that would resolve this problem." She repeated that the United States is "committed to bringing them back into compliance with the INF Treaty and essentially recommitting to that treaty for the future." At the same time, Under Secretary Gotemoeller indicated that the diplomatic engagement had some value. In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee in December 2015, she noted that Russia realizes that its "program has been exposed" and that it "is not free to pursue this effort unconstrained, as this would confirm for the world that Russia has been violating an agreement that has been a key instrument of stability and security for nearly three decades." As a result Russia still has not begun to deploy the new missile. The Trump Administration initially continued to pursue a diplomatic solution to the INF problem. In the State Department's 2018 Compliance Report, the Administration noted that "the United States remains open to discussing any and all ways to facilitate the Russian Federation's return to full and verifiable compliance." It also highlighted, in a fact sheet released in December 2017, that "the United States continues to seek a diplomatic resolution through all viable channels." While Russia continued to deny that it violated the INF Treaty, some hoped the ongoing diplomatic exchanges could help move the process forward by emphasizing the magnitude of the U.S. concerns and opening channels for future discussions that focus exclusively on the INF Treaty. Public discussions of compliance concerns—in the State Department Compliance Report, press reports, and congressional hearings—could reinforce the U.S. position and complicate Russia's efforts to simply dismiss the U.S. accusations. With more attention focused on its programs, Russia could decide that it needed to explain why it seemed to be testing INF-range missiles and whether it planned to deploy the cruise missile in question on land or at sea. However, even as Russia began to discuss the status of its missile programs, it did not acknowledge that it had violated the treaty. Instead, it disputed U.S. assertions and denied that it had tested a missile to INF range. On the other hand, because Russia has at acknowledged U.S. concerns and offered its own version of events, there might be some room for further discussions during the 60-day period, announced by Secretary of State Pompeo in early December 2018, before the U.S. formally announces its withdrawal. Analysts outside government also suggested that the United States might provide Russia with a greater incentive to acknowledge, address, and possibly resolve this issue by bringing its allies into the discussion so that they could understand the implications of Russia's actions and raise their concerns with Russia directly. This would allow the violation to become "an issue between the Russian government and its neighbors" and not just an issue between Russia and the United States. The United States has pursued this process with its NATO allies by providing briefings and holding discussions during NATO meetings. For example, in the statement released after the summit in Wales in September 2014, the allies called on Russia "to preserve the viability of the INF Treaty through ensuring full and verifiable compliance." The United States has taken additional steps to brief its NATO allies on the Russian violation and to encourage the allies to address this issue with Russia. The State Department's 2018 Compliance Report notes that NATO issued a public statement in December 2017 "affirming U.S. compliance with the Treaty" and urging Russia to address the serious concerns raised by its missile system "in a substantial and transparent way, and actively engage in a technical dialogue with the United States." The issue has also been on the agenda during meetings of the NATO defense ministers. NATO's Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg highlighted this during his press conference prior to the meeting in October 2018. He stated that the NATO allies "remain concerned about Russia's lack of respect for its international commitments, including the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty." He stated that the INF Treaty is a "crucial element" of NATO security and is "in danger because of Russia's actions." He also noted that, although Russia has "acknowledged the existence of a new missile system, called 9M729," it has not "provided any credible answers on this new missile." He concluded by noting that the "allies agree that the most plausible assessment would be that Russia is in violation of the Treaty." This last statement indicated that, in spite of ongoing U.S. efforts to provide the allies with information about Russia's noncompliant missile, the allies' assessment of Russian activities still lacked some of the certainty evident in the U.S. determination that Russia is in violation of the INF Treaty. This difference seemed to disappear after the NATO Foreign Ministers meeting on December 4, 2018, when the Foreign Ministers released a statement accepting the U.S. claim of Russian noncompliance. They noted that the "allies have concluded that Russia has developed and fielded a missile system, the 9M729, which violates the INF Treaty" and that they "strongly support the finding of the United States that Russia is in material breach of its obligations under the INF Treaty." At the same time, they noted that the "allies are firmly committed to the preservation of effective international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation" and therefore, "will continue to uphold, support, and further strengthen arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, as a key element of Euro-Atlantic security, taking into account the prevailing security environment." They also called on Russia "to return urgently to full and verifiable compliance" with the INF Treaty. The German Foreign Minister, Heiko Maas, reiterated his nation's support for the INF Treaty following a meeting with Russia's Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, in January 2019. He noted that the treaty remained important for Germany's security, but also stated that Germany believes "that there is a missile violating this treaty and it should be destroyed in a verifiable manner to get back to the implementation of this agreement." The ongoing consultations among and statements by NATO allies likely signal to Russia that NATO remains united in its concerns about Russia's activities and would likely remain united in its response if Russia attempts to use its new missiles to divide the alliance. On the other hand, this coordinated NATO response could backfire if Russia reacted by claiming that the NATO cohesion on this issue provided further evidence of the threat that NATO poses to Russia and further evidence that Russia needs a full scope of military capabilities in response. Convene the Special Verification Commission Article XIII of the INF Treaty established the Special Verification Commission (SVC) as a forum where the parties could meet to discuss and resolve implementation and compliance issues. This body had not met since 2000, but according to the terms of the treaty, the parties agreed that a meeting could occur "if either Party so requests"; there is no mandate for consensus or mutual agreement on the need for a meeting. Press reports from October 2016 indicated that United States "has summoned Moscow to a mandatory meeting" of the SVC "to answer accusations that Moscow has violated the INF Treaty." This meeting occurred on November 15-16, 2016. The State Department released a statement that noted the meeting had occurred in Geneva, Switzerland, and that the United States, Belarusian, Kazakh, Russian, and Ukrainian Delegations "met to discuss questions relating to compliance with the obligations assumed under the Treaty." The statement did not provide any information about the substance of the discussions or about the possibility of future meetings. While some public press outlets reported that the meeting had occurred, the reports also did not provide any details about the substance of the meeting. Both the United States and Russia probably outlined all their compliance concerns, as that was the reason for calling the meeting, but, absent any reporting to the contrary, it is possible that they did not resolve their concerns or reach any new understandings. The United States called a second meeting of the SVC in late 2017. This meeting occurred in Geneva from December 12 to 14, 2017. Because the United States identified the noncompliant GLCM as the 9M729, Russia could no longer deny the existence of the missile. However, according to some reports, Russia continued to deny that this missile had been tested to INF range or that telemetry from the tests supported a conclusion that it violated the INF Treaty. The United States has not disputed, publicly, Russia's assertion that it did not test the missile to INF range, but it did note, in the State Department's Annual Report, that Russia has attempted to "obfuscate the nature of the program." Analysts outside government have suggested that, by meeting in the SVC, the parties could return to the more routine compliance process established by the treaty and remove the issue from the public debate. They expected this step to ease efforts to initiate a substantive discussion free of political posturing, while clearing the agenda of unrelated issues. Meetings in this forum would also provide Russia with the opportunity to raise its concerns about U.S. programs and U.S. compliance with the INF Treaty. Others questioned whether Russia would be willing to participate in an SVC meeting if it was required to at least acknowledge that it had conducted tests of a questionable missile. However, once the United States called for the meetings, Russia was obligated to attend under the terms of the treaty. While it is not clear what transpired, the meetings should have provided the two nations with an opportunity to share data and information outside the public spotlight. If the meetings had been successful, and Russia had been willing to acknowledge that it had conducted tests that appear inconsistent with the INF Treaty, then the United States and Russia could have used the SVC as a forum to discuss steps they might take to resolve and, if possible, reverse the violation. For example, the United States could provide Russia with a list of missile tests that raised concerns about compliance, and Russia could share data generated during those flight tests so that they could review the data together and try to reach an agreed conclusion on the parameters of the tests. Moreover, even if they could not reach agreed conclusions about past tests, they could seek to negotiate new definitions or procedures that might reduce the chances of future ambiguities or uncertainties. And if they did agree that past tests had violated the terms of the INF Treaty, they might seek to work out procedures to eliminate the offending missiles and restore the parties to compliance with the treaty. Even if Russia acknowledged that its missile violated the INF Treaty, the SVC meetings might not lead to a prompt resolution of the INF debate. The process could still take years to reach a conclusion. For example, in 1983, the United States detected Soviet construction of an early-warning radar that appeared to violate the 1972 Anti-ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. That treaty permitted the construction of early-warning radars on the periphery of a country facing out; the Soviet Union had constructed the radar in the country's interior, with the radar facing northeast over Soviet territory. The United States first declared this radar to be a violation of the ABM Treaty in January 1984, and it raised its concerns about the radar in numerous compliance meetings and reviews of the ABM Treaty. The Soviet Union dismissed the U.S. accusations and claimed that the facility was a space-track radar, not an early-warning radar, in spite of the fact that it looked exactly like other Soviet early-warning radars. Finally, in 1987, the Soviet Union suspended construction of the radar and, in 1989, agreed that the radar was a technical violation of the treaty. In 1990, seven years after the United States identified the violation, the Soviet Union began to dismantle the radar. Initiate Studies on New Military Capabilities Some analysts have suggested that the United States initiate studies that would explore whether the United States should eventually deploy new intermediate-range ballistic or cruise missiles to meet emerging military requirements. These studies would allow the United States to "negotiate from a position of strength" when addressing questions of Russian compliance and might provide the United States with "military breakout options" if the negotiations failed. According to Brian McKeon, the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Pentagon has already pursued this approach. In congressional testimony in December 2014, he noted that the Joint Staff had conducted a military assessment of the threat that new Russian INF-range missiles might create for U.S. allies in Europe and Asia and that "this assessment has led us to review a broad range of military response options." According to Under Secretary McKeon, these options could include the deployment of new defenses against cruise missiles, the development and possible deployment of new U.S. intermediate-range missiles, and the deployment of other military capabilities that could counter the new Russian capabilities. Reports indicate that DOD forwarded its results to the White House in early 2015. The Administration has not, however, released this report to either Congress or the public, noting that its contents remain classified. Under Secretary McKeon provided Congress with an update on the Pentagon's pursuit of options to respond to Russia's INF violation in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee in December 2015. At that time, he noted that the Pentagon remained "focused on ensuring that Russia gains no significant military advantage from its violation." But he also noted that the United States should "consider Russian actions with regard to the INF Treaty in the context of its overall aggressive and bellicose behavior that flouts international legal norms and destabilizes the European security order." As a result, instead of seeking a military response that specifically offset the threat introduced by the new ground-launched cruise missile, the Pentagon is "factoring Russia's increased cruise missile capabilities, including its INF violation into our planning." According to Under Secretary McKeon, the Pentagon is focusing on "developing a comprehensive response to Russian military actions" and is "committing to investments now that we will make irrespective of Russia's decisions to return to compliance with the INF Treaty." Congress first offered support for the development of a military response to Russia's INF violation in legislation proposed in both the House and the Senate in July 2014 ( H.R. 5293 and S. 2725 ). These bills called on the President to "carry out a program to research and develop ground-launched cruise missile and ground-launched ballistic missile capabilities, including by modification of existing United States military capabilities, with a range between 500 and 5,500 kilometers." The legislation also called on the President to study potential sites for the deployment of these new systems and to "consider selecting sites on United States overseas military bases and sites offered by United States allies." The FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act ( H.R. 3979 , §1651) also called on the Pentagon to submit a report to Congress that described steps that it plans to take in response to Russia's violation of the INF Treaty. These plans could include research, development, and testing or deployment of future military capabilities or plans to modify and deploy existing military systems, to deter or defend against the threat posed by new Russian INF systems. The FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act ( H.R. 1735 , §1243) expanded on this provision, calling not only for a study on possible options, but also for a plan for the development of the counterforce capabilities to prevent intermediate-range ground-launched ballistic missile and cruise missile attacks, countervailing strike capabilities to enhance the forces of the United States or allies of the United States, and active defenses to defend against intermediate-range ground-launched cruise missile attacks. As noted above, the National Defense Authorization Act for 2018 ( H.R. 2810 ) has taken this approach further, both by providing funding for research into defenses, counterforce capabilities, and countervailing capabilities, and by mandating that DOD begin a program of record to develop a new U.S. ground-launched cruise missile. Press reports indicate that the Pentagon has already begun research into a new ground-launched cruise missile. They note that the United States has told Russia about the new research program and has said it would "abandon the research program if Russia returns to compliance with the INF Treaty." Studies exploring possible U.S. military responses would not necessarily lead to the design of new land-based INF-range systems; the studies might conclude that the United States could meet its security challenges with sea-based or air-delivered weapons. However, if the studies did find that U.S. security could benefit from such systems, the United States could initiate research, development, and design work without violating the INF Treaty's ban on the testing or deployment of intermediate-range land-based missiles. Then, if Russia persisted in developing and deploying INF-range missiles, the United States would be able to move more quickly to respond and offset new threats to its security and the security of its allies. At the same time, these studies might boost the diplomatic dialogue by creating incentives for Russia to address U.S. concerns and preserve the INF Treaty. During the early 1980s, the Soviet Union was unwilling to ban INF-range systems, and was willing to limit its deployment only if the United States did not introduce any new missiles into Europe. It was only after the United States began to deploy its missiles in Europe that the Soviet Union became willing to reduce, and then eliminate, its systems. Some contend that this occurred because Soviet leaders recognized that U.S. INF systems could have struck targets in Moscow in minutes, and might have "decapitated" Soviet command and control systems early in a conflict. The only way to mitigate this threat was to agree to a ban on INF missiles. New U.S. research into INF systems might lead to similar, new Russian worries about its vulnerability to missile strikes from Europe, and therefore, new interests in limiting or banning intermediate-range missiles. There is some evidence that the potential for new U.S. INF deployments may have a similar effect on Russia. In June 2015, press reports focused on U.S. statements about the potential development of new military capabilities in response to Russia's INF violation. These articles, which highlighted the possibility that the United States might deploy new land-based missiles to Europe, caught the attention of Russian officials. An official speaking for the Kremlin noted that Moscow "placed much attention" on this report. A member of the Defense Committee of Russia's Federal Assembly stated that if the United States pursued such a deployment, Russia "would face the necessity of retaliating." While it is not yet clear whether Russia will conclude that its security is better served by pressing forward with its own deployments or by returning to compliance with the INF Treaty and forestalling a new U.S. cruise missile, it seems likely that Russia now knows that the United States might pursue a military response that affects Russia's security. On the other hand, if, as Secretary McKeon testified in December 2015, the United States is considering the challenge posed by Russia's INF violation to be a part of the broader challenge of Russian activities in Europe, these programs may do little to encourage Russia to return to INF compliance. Part of the incentive for that return would rest with the promise that the United States would refrain from deploying new capabilities in Europe if Russia returned to compliance. But, if the United States responds with investments "that we will make irrespective of Russia's decisions to return to compliance with the INF Treaty," the incentive could be lost. Suspend or Withdraw from Arms Control Agreements Some analysts have suggested that the United States suspend its participation in arms control agreements with Russia, both to demonstrate the magnitude of its concerns with Russia's missile developments and to preserve U.S. options for responding to military threats that might emerge if Russia deploys new INF missiles. Moreover, by suspending its participation in these agreements, the United States could make it clear that Russia would benefit from treaty-mandated limits on U.S. military capabilities only if its military capabilities were similarly limited. As with the studies on new U.S. military capabilities, this might boost the diplomatic process by providing Russia with an incentive to acknowledge and suspend its noncompliant missile tests. INF Even before President Trump announced that the United States would withdraw from the INF Treaty, analysts and observers outside government suggested that the United States withdraw both to protest Russia's noncompliance and to allow the United States to pursue the development and deployment of its own land-based INF-range missiles. Some also note that the United States has sought to convince Russia to return to compliance for several years, and that it no longer makes sense for the United States to be bound by INF if Russia is violating it. Many have also noted that, by withdrawing from the treaty, the United States will be free to deploy intermediate-range land-based missiles, not only as a response to emerging challenges from Russia, but also in response to China's growing missile capabilities in Asia. They note that land-based missiles would likely provide the United States with added flexibility in countering Chinese efforts to restrict U.S. operations in the region. While they acknowledge that the United States could deploy air-delivered and sea-based missiles without violating the INF Treaty, they argue that air bases in the region are vulnerable to attack and sea-based assets are already stretched thin with weapons deployed for other missions. Consequently, by deploying missiles on the territory of allies, like Japan, the Philippines, and possibly northern Australia, the United States could expand its reach and grow its capabilities without further stretching its naval forces. However, some argue that U.S. withdrawal could do more harm than good to U.S. and allied security interests because the United States has not yet determined whether it would want to deploy land-based INF missiles itself, and has not yet funded a program to develop such missiles. As a result, U.S. withdrawal would leave Russia as the only party able to benefit from the elimination of the treaty limits and might allow Russia to move quickly from testing to deployment. Moreover, as Stephen Rademaker noted during testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Russia might "welcome a U.S. decision to terminate the treaty," and it would "be a mistake to react in ways that will be seen by them as a reward rather than as a punishment." He added that "since Russia so clearly wants out, we should make sure that they alone pay the political and diplomatic price of terminating the treaty." Others have argued that U.S. withdrawal from INF could also damage NATO cohesion. Although NATO foreign ministers have accepted the U.S. assessment of a Russian violation, many of the individual nations in NATO continue to support the treaty and believe it continues to serve Europe's security interests. Moreover, even if the United States develops a new land-based missile, U.S. allies in Europe might be unwilling to host the missile on their soil; disputes over deployment of INF-range missiles disrupted NATO in the 1980s and could undermine alliance cohesion again. Consequently, some have suggested that the United States remain in the INF Treaty, continue to seek a resolution with Russia, and deploy air-delivered or sea-based systems around Russia to apply pressure that might bring Russia back into compliance, essentially implementing the strategy outlined by the Trump Administration in late 2017. Some have also questioned whether the United States needs a land-based missile to respond to challenges from China; they note that the United States can cover targets in Asia with sea-based and air-delivered missiles without violating INF. They note that there are far greater ocean areas than land areas within INF range of critical targets in China. Moreover, they question whether U.S. allies in Asia would be any more willing than those in Europe to host new U.S. missiles, particularly if the presence of the missiles might raise concerns among the civilian populations or increase the likelihood of attack early in a conflict. Regardless, some note that even if the United States and its allies could benefit from the deployment of land-based missiles in Asia, those benefits should be weighed against the risks of upsetting U.S. allies and undermining the current security structure in Europe, and possibly returning to the Cold War instabilities that gave rise to the INF Treaty in the first place. As one analyst noted, the United States "will only stoke anxiety if it looks as though it's willing to increase risk to allies in Europe in order to reduce risk to allies in Asia." New START Several analysts have called on the United States to suspend its participation in the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). This treaty, which entered into force in February 2011, limits the United States and Russia to 1,550 deployed warheads on 700 deployed delivery vehicles for long-range, strategic nuclear warheads. Both parties have reduced their forces, meeting the mandated limits in February 2018. During implementation, some analysts argued that the United States could suspend its participation, without withdrawing from the treaty, then resume reductions prior to the deadline if Russia returned to compliance with the INF Treaty. This step would "underscore to Moscow that the advantageous deal they achieved in the New START Treaty ... is being put in jeopardy." Others argued that this approach could have undermined U.S. national security interests, noting that Russia could have also suspended its reductions and, possibly, increased its nuclear forces above the limits. Russia could also have responded by suspending the data exchanges and on-site inspections mandated by New START, denying the United States access to data and information that is important not only to the treaty verification process, but also to the U.S. intelligence community. This option is no longer viable, as the United States and Russia have completed their New START reductions. However, the linkage between New START and INF compliance remains an issue, as the United States has begun to assess whether it should support the extension of New START for five years, as permitted by the treaty, when it expires in 2021. Reports indicate that the Trump Administration is currently conducting a review that will inform the U.S. approach to the treaty's extension. Administration officials addressed this review during testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on September 18, 2018. Both Under Secretary of State Andrea Thompson and Deputy Under Secretary of Defense David Trachtenberg emphasized how Russia's violation of the INF Treaty and its more general approach to arms control undermined U.S. confidence in the arms control process. Under Secretary Thompson noted that Russia's noncompliance "has created a trust deficit that leads the United States to question Russia's commitment to arms control as a way to manage and stabilize our strategic relationship and promote greater transparency and predictability." Deputy Under Secretary Trachtenberg also emphasized that "arms control with Russia is troubled because the Russian Federation apparently believes it need only abide by the agreements that suit it. As a result, the credibility of all international agreements with Russia is at risk." Nevertheless, before deciding whether to extend New START, the Administration is likely to weigh its concerns about Russia's compliance with INF against assessments of whether the limits in the treaty continue to serve U.S. national security interests, and whether the insights and data that the monitoring regime provides about Russian nuclear forces remain of value for U.S. national security. Options for Addressing Deployment of New INF Missiles In an interview published in November 2014, Under Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller, who led the U.S. discussions with Russia on the INF Treaty, stated that she believed there was a debate in Moscow about whether the INF Treaty continued to serve Russia's national security interests. She believed the issue was not settled and that "recent comments by Russian officials and by the Russian government overall about the viability and importance of the treaty for the time being give us time and space to negotiate." It is also possible, however, that the debate in Russia is less about whether to stay within the treaty and more about when and how to move beyond its limits. Some would argue that Russia's willingness to participate in discussions with the United States provided Russia with time and space to pursue its missile programs, before openly withdrawing from the treaty and prompting a U.S. response. Others have argued that Russia may be unwilling to withdraw from the treaty now, with the hope that the United States might eventually agree to a joint withdrawal or that the United States might withdraw itself and free Russia from its obligations. With the future of the treaty uncertain, the United States could consider a range of options for how it might address U.S. and allied security concerns now that Russia has begun to deploy the new INF-range cruise missile. These options include military responses—such as the development and deployment of new nuclear-armed cruise missiles or new conventional military capabilities—along with diplomatic and consultative steps taken with U.S. allies. Land-Based INF-Range Missiles As noted above, legislation proposed in July 2014 called on the President to conduct a study both on the need for new missiles and on locations overseas where the United States might deploy such systems. Others have been more direct in their support of new U.S. INF-range systems. Former Under Secretary of State John Bolton has argued that the INF Treaty interferes with the United States' ability "to preserve global security" and that other countries, like China, North Korea, and Iran, face no limits on their intermediate-range missiles. He believes the United States "should see Moscow's breach as an opportunity to withdraw" from the treaty so that it can "have access to the full spectrum of conventional and nuclear options." As noted above, Congress has mandated that the Pentagon begin a program of record on a new ground-launched intermediate-range cruise missile, and the Pentagon has begun to conduct research into such a system. Those who support programs to develop and deploy new U.S. INF-range missiles do not say, specifically, that these missiles should carry nuclear warheads or be based in Europe, although they also do not rule this out. Other analysts, however, argue that such an approach is unnecessary and would possibly do more to disrupt than support U.S. alliances overseas. They note that the United States should not need to deploy new nuclear weapons because U.S. conventional weapons are more than capable of responding to emerging threats and ensuring U.S. and allied security. They note that Russia also views U.S. conventional capabilities as a threat to Russian security, pointing out that Russian officials have repeatedly raised concerns about U.S. advanced conventional weapons and have suggested that Russia would be unwilling to reduce its nuclear forces any further unless the United States were willing to limit these capabilities in an arms control treaty. Moreover, even if the United States decided that it needed to counter Russia's new capabilities with nuclear-armed missiles, it could be very difficult to find an allied country in Europe or Asia that was willing to house those missiles. As noted above, even after NATO reached consensus on the need to deploy INF missiles in 1979, several allied governments nearly refused to accept the missiles on their territories and many faced widespread public protests against the deployment of new nuclear weapons. There would likely be even less support for new nuclear weapons among many of the U.S. allies in Europe now, with several recently calling for the removal of the nearly 200 U.S. nuclear weapons that remain in Europe. As a result, it is possible that U.S. efforts to deploy new nuclear-armed INF-range missiles in Europe could "exacerbate political divisions in Europe" and undermine the unity NATO would need to respond to Russian attempts at coercion. There is also likely to be little support for new U.S. land-based nuclear weapons in Asia, as the United States removed these weapons in the early 1990s and maintains long-range bombers with the capability to support extended deterrence in Asia. Other Military Capabilities If Russia deploys new intermediate-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles and seeks to use those capabilities to coerce or intimidate the United States or its allies, then the United States might deploy other military capabilities in response. These could include new air-delivered or sea-based cruise missiles that would be consistent with the terms of the INF Treaty and would not require basing on allied territories. The United States could also seek to expand the range of existing shorter-range systems, so that it could meet potential new military requirements without bearing the cost of developing new intermediate-range missile systems. For example, in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Jim Thomas, the Vice President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, suggested that the Department of Defense (DOD) assess the feasibility and cost to extend the range of the Army's tactical missile system (MGM-164 ATACMS), which currently has a range of about 80 miles. He also suggested that DOD consider developing a "road-mobile, land-based variant" of the Navy's MK-41 vertical launch system so that it could launch offensive missiles from land, if needed. Frank Rose and Robert Scher, former officials from the Obama Administration, made similar suggestions in a joint HASC/HFAC hearing in late March 2017. They both identified air-delivered and sea-based military capabilities as a means to not only offset threats to NATO nations but also remind Russia of the threats it could face if the INF Treaty were to collapse. The United States could also expand its missile defense capabilities in Europe and Asia in response to the deployment of new Russian missiles. At the present time, the United States and NATO are pursuing the European Phased Adaptive Approach, with missile defense interceptors deployed at sea and, eventually, on land in Poland and Romania. The interceptors and radars in this system are designed to defend against shorter- and intermediate-range missiles launched from Iran, with, eventually, some capability against longer-range Iranian missiles. The United States is deploying similar sea-based capabilities in Asia, in cooperation with allies there, in response to North Korea's missile program. The United States has insisted, repeatedly, that this system will have no capability against the larger numbers of far more capable Russian long-range missiles. However, several analysts in both the United States and Europe have suggested that NATO might reorient this system to defend against Russian intermediate-range missiles, if necessary. Others have argued that the United States and NATO should focus specifically on the development and deployment of cruise missile defenses "to protect key alliance assets in the event of a conflict with Russia." Consultation and Cooperation with Allies New intermediate-range missiles deployed in or near Russia would not have the range needed to reach targets in the continental United States. They would, however, be able to threaten U.S. allies in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. As a result, the United States would likely engage with its allies when determining how to respond if Russia deploys new INF-range missiles. U.S. allies' views on the nature of the threat from the missiles could inform the U.S. approach to responding to that threat. Some may favor continuing efforts to engage Russia through diplomatic channels, while others may prefer that the United States develop and deploy new capabilities to defend against any emerging Russian threat. However, there is little evidence that the United States consulted with its allies in Europe before deciding to withdraw from the treaty. Moreover, press reports indicate that the U.S. decision to delay its formal withdrawal from the treaty by 60 days occurred after "German Chancellor Angela Merkel and other European leaders persuaded Trump to delay the move to allow for additional consultations." The United States could also consider several steps to reassure its allies of its commitment to their defense. Some analysts believe that this has become increasingly important in recent months, following Russia's annexation of Crimea and aggression against Ukraine. For example, NATO could develop new plans and procedures for engaging with Russia in a crisis in which these missiles might come into play. NATO might also expand its ongoing joint training missions and exercises, both to reassure the allies of the U.S. commitment and to strengthen its ability to provide reinforcements if a conflict were to occur. Beyond NATO, the United States could also meet with allies in Asia and the Middle East to discuss possible military or diplomatic responses if they felt threatened by Russia's missiles, either generally or in response to specific scenarios. Although some analysts have suggested that the United States focus its response to Russia's noncompliance with the INF Treaty on military measures, and the development of new missile capabilities, others have argued for a more nuanced approach. They note that the United States may be able to defend its allies and respond to Russian aggression with conventional weapons and existing capabilities. But they also note that the full range of U.S. capabilities will do little to assuage the concerns of U.S. allies unless they are confident that the United States will come to their defense if they are threatened. In the absence of that confidence, some allies may feel more exposed than others and may be more vulnerable to Russian efforts at coercion. As a result, although the current crisis over the INF Treaty began with concerns about the development of new Russian missiles, the United States may need to respond with measures directed more at the political concerns of its allies than at the military capabilities of Russia. For example, some European allies, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe, have expressed concern about the United States' reduced conventional force posture in Europe, and particularly the withdrawal over the past two years of two of the Army's four brigade combat teams in Europe. Although the United States has augmented its military presence in Central and Eastern Europe in the wake of Russia's annexation of Crimea, many allies have asked for a more robust U.S. response. NATO addressed these concerns during the September 2014 summit in Wales and announced a number of collective defense measures that were designed to deter further Russian aggression. Although not directly connected to Russia's noncompliance with the INF Treaty, these measures may also serve to assuage security concerns that arise if Russia continues to develop new intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles. Congressional Oversight Both the House and Senate pressed the Obama Administration for information about Russia's arms control compliance record and options for the U.S. response during the 114 th Congress. The House Armed Services and Foreign Affairs Committees have held three hearings on this issue, to date, and both the House and Senate Armed Services Committees have raised the issues during other, related hearings. The National Defense Authorization Act for FY2015 ( H.R. 3979 ) mandates that the President submit a report to Congress that includes an assessment of the effect of Russian noncompliance on the national security interests of the United States and its allies, and a description of the President's plan to resolve the compliance issues. The legislation also calls for periodic briefings to Congress on the status of efforts to resolve the U.S. compliance concerns. The FY2016 NDAA ( H.R. 1735 , §1243) also addressed Russia's compliance with the INF Treaty and possible U.S. military responses. This legislation stated the sense of Congress that the development and deployment of a nuclear ground-launched cruise missile by Russia is a violation of the INF Treaty, that Russia should return to compliance with the INF Treaty, that efforts to compel Russia to return to compliance "cannot be open-ended," and that there are several U.S. military requirements that would be addressed by the development and deployment of systems currently prohibited by the INF Treaty. The legislation went on to require that the President notify Congress both about the status of Russia's compliance with the INF Treaty and the status and content of updates that the United States provides to its allies in NATO and East Asia about Russia's testing, operating capability, and deployment of INF-range ground-launched ballistic missiles or ground-launched cruise missiles. As was noted above, the legislation also mandated that the Secretary of Defense submit a plan to Congress for the development of counterforce capabilities to prevent intermediate-range ground-launched ballistic missile and cruise missile attacks, countervailing strike capabilities to enhance the forces of the United States or allies of the United States, and active defenses to defend against intermediate-range ground-launched cruise missile attacks. The FY2017 NDAA ( P.L. 114-328 §1231 and §1238) also addressed congressional concerns with Russia's compliance with the INF Treaty. In Section 1231, Congress withheld $10 million in funding for the Executive Office of the President until the Secretary of Defense completed "meaningful development" of military capabilities that would allow the United States to respond to risks created by Russia's deployment of a new ground-based cruise missile. Section 1238 mandated that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff submit a report containing, among other things, an assessment "of whether and why the Treaty remains in the national security interest of the United States, including how any ongoing violations bear on the assessment if such a violation is not resolved in the near-term." As is noted above, both the House and Senate versions of the FY2018 NDAA ( H.R. 2810 ) also mandate that the United States take steps to develop a military response to Russia's INF-range missile. The conference report ( H.Rept. 115-404 ) mandates that the Secretary of Defense "establish a program of record to develop a conventional road-mobile ground-launched cruise missile system with a range of between 500 to 5,500 kilometers" and authorizes $58 million in funding for the development of active defenses to counter INF-range ground-launched missile systems; counterforce capabilities to prevent attacks from these missiles; and countervailing strike capabilities to enhance the capabilities of the United States. The legislation also mandates that the President impose additional sanctions on Russia if it remains in noncompliance with the INF Treaty. Congress also addressed the INF Treaty in the National Defense Authorization act for FY2019 ( P.L. 115-232 , §1243). The conference report legislation states that the President must submit a determination to Congress stating whether Russia "is in material breach of its obligations under the INF Treaty" and whether "the prohibitions set forth in Article VI of the INF Treaty remain binding on the United States as a matter of United States law." These are the prohibitions on the testing and deployment of land-based ballistic and cruise missiles with a range between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. The legislation also stated that the United States should "take actions to encourage the Russian Federation to return to compliance" by providing additional funds for the development of military capabilities needed to counter Russia's new cruise missile and by "seeking additional missile defense assets … to protect United States and NATO forces" from Russia's noncompliant ground-launched missile systems. The FY2015 NDAA had stated that it was in the national security interest of the United States and its allies for the INF Treaty to remain in effect and for Russia to return to full compliance with the treaty. However, this assessment could change now that Russia appears to have deployed its new INF-range land-based cruise missile. Both Congress and the Trump Administration could now conclude that the United States may need to move beyond the diplomatic process to address emerging security concerns. While a decision to withdraw from the INF Treaty would have to come from the executive branch, Congress can express its views on that outcome both during hearings and through legislation. It cannot, however, mandate that outcome.

The United States and Soviet Union signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in December 1987. Negotiations on this treaty were the result of a "dual-track" decision taken by NATO in 1979 in response to concerns about the Soviet Union's deployment of new intermediate-range nuclear missiles. NATO agreed both to accept deployment of new U.S. intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles and to support U.S. efforts to negotiate with the Soviet Union to limit these missiles. In the INF Treaty, the United States and Soviet Union agreed that they would ban all land-based ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. The ban would apply to missiles with nuclear or conventional warheads, but would not apply to sea-based or air-delivered missiles. The U.S. State Department, in the 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018 editions of its report Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, stated that the United States has determined that "the Russian Federation is in violation of its obligations under the [1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces] INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles." In the 2016 report, it noted that "the cruise missile developed by Russia meets the INF Treaty definition of a ground-launched cruise missile with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km." In late 2017, the United States released the Russian designator for the missile—9M729. The United States has also noted that Russia has deployed several battalions with the missile. In late 2018, the Office of the Director for National Intelligence provided further details on the violation. The Obama Administration raised its concerns about Russian compliance with the INF Treaty in a number of meetings since 2013. Russia repeatedly denied that it had violated the treaty. In October 2016, the United States called a meeting of the Special Verification Commission, which was established by the INF Treaty to address compliance concerns. During this meeting, in mid-November, both sides raised their concerns, but they failed to make any progress in resolving them. A second SVC meeting was held in December 2017. The United States has also begun to consider a number of military responses, which might include new land-based INF-range systems or new sea-launched cruise missiles, both to provide Russia with an incentive to reach a resolution and to provide the United States with options for future programs if Russia eventually deploys new missiles and the treaty regime collapses. It might also suspend or withdraw from arms control agreements, although several analysts have noted that this might harm U.S. security interests, as it would remove all constraints on Russia's nuclear forces. The Trump Administration conducted an extensive review of the INF Treaty during 2017 to assess the potential security implications of Russia's violation and to determine how the United States would respond going forward. On December 8, 2017—the 30th anniversary of the date when the treaty was signed—the Administration announced that the United States would implement an integrated response that included diplomatic, military, and economic measures. On October 20, 2018, President Trump announced that the United States would withdraw from INF, citing Russia's noncompliance as a key factor in that decision. The United States suspended its participation in the treaty and submitted its official notice of withdrawal February 2, 2019. Russia responded by suspending its participation on February 2, 2019, as well. Congress is likely to continue to conduct oversight hearings on this issue, and to receive briefings on the status of Russia's cruise missile program. It may also consider legislation authorizing U.S. military responses and supporting alternative diplomatic approaches. This report will be updated as needed.

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Introduction From its headwaters in Colorado and Wyoming to its terminus in the Gulf of California, the Colorado River Basin covers more than 246,000 square miles. The river runs through seven U.S. states (Wyoming, Colorado, Utah, New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada, and California) and Mexico. Pursuant to federal law, the Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation, part of the Department of the Interior [DOI]) plays a prominent role in the management of the basin's waters. In the Lower Basin (i.e., Arizona, Nevada, and California), Reclamation also serves as water master on behalf of the Secretary of the Interior, a role that elevates the status of the federal government in basin water management. The federal role in the management of Colorado River water is magnified by the multiple federally owned and operated water storage and conveyance facilities in the basin, which provide low-cost water and hydropower supplies to water users. Colorado River water is used primarily for agricultural irrigation and municipal and industrial (M&I) purposes. The river's flow and stored water also are important for power production, fish and wildlife, and recreation, among other uses. A majority (70%) of basin water supplies are used to irrigate 5.5 million acres of land; basin waters also provide M&I water supplies to nearly 40 million people. Much of the area that depends on the river for water supplies is outside of the drainage area for the Colorado River Basin. Storage and conveyance facilities on the Colorado River provide trans-basin diversions that serve areas such as Cheyenne, WY; multiple cities in Colorado's Front Range (e.g., Fort Collins, Denver, Boulder, and Colorado Springs, CO); Provo, UT; Albuquerque and Santa Fe, NM; and Los Angeles, San Diego, and the Imperial Valley in Southern California ( Figure 1 ). Colorado River hydropower facilities can provide up to 42 gigawatts of electrical power per year. The river also provides habitat for a wide range of species, including several federally endangered species. It flows through 7 national wildlife refuges and 11 National Park Service (NPS) units; these and other areas of the river support important recreational opportunities. Precipitation and runoff in the basin are highly variable. Water conditions on the river depend largely on snowmelt in the basin's northern areas. Observed data (1906-2018) show that natural flows in the Colorado River Basin in the 20 th century averaged about 14.8 million acre-feet (MAF) annually. Flows have dipped significantly during the current drought, which dates to 2000; natural flows from 2000 to 2018 averaged approximately 12.4 MAF per year . In 2018, Reclamation estimated that the 19-year period from 2000 to 2018 was the driest period in more than 100 years of record keeping. The dry conditions are consistent with prior droughts in the basin that were identified through tree ring studies; some of these droughts lasted for decades. Climate change impacts, including warmer temperatures and altered precipitation patterns, may further increase the likelihood of prolonged drought in the basin. Pursuant to the multiple compacts, federal laws, court decisions and decrees, contracts, and regulatory guidelines governing Colorado River operations (collectively known as the Law of the River ), Congress and the federal government play a prominent role in the management of the Colorado River. Specifically, Congress funds and oversees Reclamation's management of Colorado River Basin facilities, including facility operations and programs to protect and restore endangered species. Congress has also approved and continues to actively consider Indian water rights settlements involving Colorado River waters, and development of new and expanded water storage in the basin. In addition, Congress has approved funding to mitigate drought and stretch basin water supplies and has considered new authorities for Reclamation to combat drought and enter into agreements with states and Colorado River contractors. This report provides background on management of the Colorado River, including a discussion of trends and agreements since 2000. It also discusses the congressional role in the management of basin waters. The Law of the River: Foundational Documents and Programs In the latter part of the 19 th century, interested parties in the Colorado River Basin began to recognize that local interests alone could not solve the challenges associated with development of the Colorado River. Plans conceived by parties in California's Imperial Valley to divert water from the mainstream of the Colorado River were thwarted because these proposals were subject to the sovereignty of both the United States and Mexico. The river also presented engineering challenges, such as deep canyons and erratic water flows, and economic hurdles that prevented local or state groups from building the necessary storage facilities and canals to provide an adequate water supply. Because local or state groups could not resolve these "national problems," Congress considered ideas to control the Colorado River and resolve potential conflicts between the states. Thus, in an effort to resolve these conflicts and prevent litigation, Congress gave its consent for the states and Reclamation to enter into an agreement to apportion Colorado River water supplies in 1921. The below sections discuss the resulting agreement, the Colorado River Compact, and other documents and agreements that form the basis of the Law of the River, which governs Colorado River operations. Colorado River Compact The Colorado River Compact of 1922, negotiated by the seven basin states and the federal government, was signed by all but one basin state (Arizona). Under the compact, the states established a framework to apportion the water supplies between the Upper Basin and the Lower Basin, with the dividing line between the two basins at Lee Ferry, AZ, near the Utah border. Each basin was apportioned 7.5 MAF annually for beneficial consumptive use, and the Lower Basin was given the right to increase its beneficial consumptive use by an additional 1 MAF annually. The agreement also required Upper Basin states to deliver to the Lower Basin a total of 75 MAF over each 10-year period, thus allowing for averaging over time to make up for low-flow years. The compact did not address inter- or intrastate allocations of water (which it left to future agreements and legislation), nor did it address water to be made available to Mexico, the river's natural terminus; this matter was addressed in subsequent international agreements. The compact was not to become binding until it had been approved by the legislatures of each of the signatory states and by Congress. Boulder Canyon Project Act Congress approved and modified the Colorado River Compact in the Boulder Canyon Project Act (BCPA) of 1928. The act ratified the 1922 compact, authorized the construction of a federal facility to impound water in the Lower Basin (Boulder Dam, later renamed Hoover Dam) and related facilities to deliver water in Southern California (e.g., the All-American Canal, which delivers Colorado River water to California's Imperial Valley), and apportioned the Lower Basin's 7.5 MAF per year among the three Lower Basin states. It provided 4.4 MAF per year to California, 2.8 MAF to Arizona, and 300,000 acre-feet (AF) to Nevada, with the states to divide any surplus waters among them. It also directed the Secretary of the Interior to serve as the sole contracting authority for Colorado River water use in the Lower Basin and authorized several storage projects for study in the Upper Basin. Congress's approval of the compact in the BCPA was conditioned on a number of factors, including ratification by California and five other states (thereby allowing the compact to become effective without Arizona's concurrence), and California agreeing by act of its legislature to limit its water use to 4.4 MAF per year and not more than half of any surplus waters. California met this requirement by passing the California Limitation Act of March 4, 1929. Arizona Ratification and Arizona v. California Decision Arizona did not ratify the Colorado River Compact until 1944, at which time the state began to pursue a federal project to bring Colorado River water to its primary population centers in Phoenix and Tucson. California opposed the project, arguing that under the doctrine of prior appropriation, California's historical use of the river trumped Arizona's rights to the Arizona allotment. California also argued that Colorado River apportionments under the BCPA included water developed on Colorado River tributaries, whereas Arizona claimed, among other things, that these apportionments included the river's mainstream waters only. In 1952, Arizona filed suit in the U.S. Supreme Court to settle the issue. Eleven years later, in the 1963 Arizona v. California decision, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Arizona, finding that Congress had intended to apportion the mainstream of the Colorado River and that California and Arizona each would receive one-half of surplus flows. The same Supreme Court decision held that Section 5 of the BCPA controlled the apportionment of waters among Lower Basin States, and that the BCPA (and not the law of prior appropriation) controlled the apportionment of water among Lower Basin states. The ruling was notable for its directive to forgo traditional Reclamation deference to state law under the Reclamation Act of 1902, and formed the basis for the Secretary of the Interior's unique role as water master for the Lower Basin. The decision also held that Native American reservations on the Colorado River were entitled to priority under the BCPA. Later decrees by the Supreme Court in 1964 and 1979 supplemented the 1963 decision. Following the Arizona v. California decision, Congress eventually authorized Arizona's conveyance project for Colorado River water, the Central Arizona Project (CAP), in the Colorado River Basin Project Act of 1968 (CRBPA). As a condition for California's support of the project, Arizona agreed that, in the event of shortage conditions, California's 4.4 MAF has priority over CAP water supplies. 1944 U.S.-Mexico Water Treaty27 In 1944, the United States signed a water treaty with Mexico (1944 U.S.-Mexico Water Treaty) to guide how the two countries share the waters of the Colorado River and the Rio Grande. The treaty established water allocations for the two countries and created a governance framework (the International Boundary and Water Commission) to resolve disputes arising from the treaty's execution. The treaty requires the United States to provide Mexico with 1.5 MAF of water annually, plus an additional 200,000 AF when a surplus is declared. During drought, the United States may reduce deliveries to Mexico in similar proportion to reductions of U.S. consumptive uses. The treaty has been supplemented by additional agreements between the United States and Mexico, known as m inutes . Upper Basin Compact and Colorado River Storage Project Authorizations Projects originally authorized for study in the Upper Basin under BCPA were not allowed to move forward until the Upper Basin states determined their individual water allocations, which they did under the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact of 1948. The Upper Basin Compact established Colorado (where the largest share of runoff to the river originates) as the largest entitlement holder in the Upper Basin, with rights to 51.75% of any Upper Basin flows after Colorado River Compact obligations to the Lower Basin have been met. Other states also received percentage-based allocations, including Wyoming (14%), New Mexico (11.25%), and Utah (23%). Arizona was allocated 50,000 AF in addition to its Lower Basin apportionment, in recognition of the small portion of the state in the Upper Basin. Basin allocations by state following approval of the Upper Basin Compact (i.e., the allocations that generally guide current water deliveries) are shown below in Figure 2 . The Upper Basin Compact also established the Upper Colorado River Commission, which coordinates operations and positions among Upper Basin states. Subsequent federal legislation paved the way for development of Upper Basin allocations. The Colorado River Storage Project (CRSP) Act of 1956 authorized storage reservoirs and dams in the Upper Basin, including the Glen Canyon, Flaming Gorge, Navajo, and Curecanti Dams. The act also established the Upper Colorado River Basin Fund, which receives revenues collected in connection with the projects, to be made available for defraying the project's costs of operation, maintenance, and emergency expenditures. In addition to the aforementioned authorization of CAP in Arizona, the 1968 CRBPA amended CRSP to authorize several additional Upper Basin projects (e.g., the Animas La Plata and Central Utah projects) as CRSP participating projects. It also directed that the Secretary of the Interior propose operational criteria for Colorado River Storage Project units (including the releases of water from Lake Powell) that prioritize (1) Treaty Obligations to Mexico, (2) the Colorado River Compact requirement for the Upper Basin to deliver 75 MAF to Lower Basin states over any 10-year period, and (3) carryover storage to meet these needs. The CRBPA also established the Upper Colorado River Basin Fund and the Lower Colorado River Basin Development Fund, both of which were authorized to utilize revenues from power generation from relevant Upper and Lower Basin facilities to fund certain expenses in the sub-basins. Water Storage and Operations Due to the basin's large water storage projects, basin water users are able to store as much as 60 MAF, or about four times the Colorado River's annual flows. Thus, storage and operations in the basin receive considerable attention, particularly at the basin's two largest dams and their storage reservoirs: Glen Canyon Dam/Lake Powell in the Upper Basin (26.2 MAF of storage capacity) and Hoover Dam/Lake Mead in the Lower Basin (26.1 MAF). The status of these projects is of interest to basin stakeholders and observers and is monitored closely by Reclamation. Glen Canyon Dam, completed in 1963, provides the linchpin for Upper Basin storage and regulates flows from the Upper Basin to the Lower Basin, pursuant to the Colorado River Compact. It also generates approximately 5 billion kilowatt hours (KWh) of electricity per year, which the Western Area Power Administration (WAPA) supplies to 5.8 million customers in Upper Basin States. Other significant storage in the Upper Basin includes the initial "units" of the CRSP: the Aspinall Unit in Colorado (including Blue Mesa, Crystal, and Morrow Point dams on the Gunnison River, with combined storage capacity of more than 1 MAF), the Flaming Gorge Unit in Utah (including Flaming Gorge Dam on the Green River, with a capacity of 3.78 MAF), and the Navajo Unit in New Mexico (including Navajo Dam on the San Juan River, with a capacity of 1 MAF). The Upper Basin is also home to 16 "participating" projects which are authorized to use water for irrigation, municipal and industrial uses, and other purposes. In the Lower Basin, Hoover Dam, completed in 1936, provides the majority of the Lower Basin's storage and generates about 4.2 billion KWh of electricity per year for customers in California, Arizona, and Nevada. Also important for Lower Basin Operations are Davis Dam/Lake Mohave, which regulates flows to Mexico under the 1944 Treaty, and Parker Dam/Lake Havasu, which impounds water for diversion into the Colorado River Aqueduct (thereby allowing for deliveries to urban areas in southern California) and CAP (allowing for diversion to users in Arizona). Further downstream on the Arizona/California border, Imperial Dam (a diversion dam) diverts Colorado River water to the All-American Canal for use in California's Imperial and Coachella Valleys. Annual Operating Plans Reclamation monitors Colorado River reservoir levels and projects them 24 months into the future in monthly studies (called 24-month studies ). The studies take into account forecasted hydrology, reservoir operations, and diversion and consumptive use schedules to model a single scenario of reservoir conditions. The studies inform operating decisions by Reclamation looking one to two years into the future. They express water storage conditions at Lake Mead and Lake Powell in terms of elevation, as feet above mean sea level (ft). In addition to the 24-month studies, the CRBPA requires the Secretary to transmit to Congress and the governors of the basin states, by January 1 of each year, a report describing the actual operation for the preceding water year and the projected operation for the coming year. This report is commonly referred to as the annual operating plan (AOP). The AOP's projected January 1 water conditions for the upcoming calendar year establish a baseline for future annual operations. Since the adoption of guidelines by Reclamation and basin states in 2007 (see below section, " 2007 Interim Guidelines "), operations of the Hoover and Glen Canyon Dams have been tied to specific pool elevations at Lake Mead and Lake Powell. For Lake Mead, the first level of shortage (1 st Tier Shortage Condition), under which Arizona and Nevada's allocations would be decreased, would be triggered if Lake Mead falls below 1,075 ft. For Lake Powell, releases under tiered operations are based on storage levels in both Lake Powell and Lake Mead (specific delivery curtailments based on lake levels similar to Lake Mead have not been adopted). As of January 2019, Reclamation predicted that Lake Mead's 2019 elevation would remain above 1,075 ft (approximately 9.6 MAF of storage) and that Lake Powell would remain at its prior year level (i.e., the Upper Elevation Balancing Tier) during 2019. However, Reclamation also projected that there was a 69% chance of a 1 st Tier Shortage Condition at Lake Mead beginning in January 2020. Reclamation predicted a small (3%) chance of Lake Powell dropping to 3,490 feet, or minimum power pool (i.e., a level beyond which hydropower could not be generated) by 2020; the chance of this occurring by 2022 was greater (15%). Improved hydrology for 2019 may decrease the likelihood of shortage in the immediate future. Mitigating the Environmental Effects of Colorado River Basin Development Construction of most of the Colorado River's water supply infrastructure predated major federal environmental protection statutes, such as the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA; 42 U.S.C. §§4321 et seq. ) and the Endangered Species Act (ESA; 87 Stat. 884, 16 U.S.C. §§1531-1544). Thus, many of the environmental impacts associated with the development of basin resources were not originally taken into account. Over time, multiple efforts have been initiated to mitigate these effects. Some of the highest-profile efforts have been associated with water quality (in particular, salinity control) and the effects of facility operations on endangered species. Salinity Control Salinity and water quality are long-standing issues in the Colorado River Basin. Parts of the Upper Basin are covered by salt-bearing shale (which increases salt content in water inflows), and salinity content increases as the river flows downstream due to both natural leaching and return flows from agricultural irrigation. The 1944 U.S.-Mexico Water Treaty did not set water quality or salinity standards in the Colorado River Basin. However, after years of dispute between the United States and Mexico regarding the salinity of the water reaching Mexico's border, the two countries reached an agreement on August 30, 1973, with the signing of Minute 242 of the International Boundary and Water Commission. The agreement guarantees Mexico that the average salinity of its treaty deliveries will be no more than 115 parts per million higher than the salt content of the water diverted to the All-American Canal at Imperial Dam in Southern California. To control the salinity of Colorado River water in accordance with this agreement, Congress passed the Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Act of 1974 ( P.L. 93-320 ), which authorized desalting and salinity control facilities to improve Colorado River water quality. The most prominent of these facilities is the Yuma Desalting Plant, which was largely completed in 1992 but has never operated at capacity. In 1974, the seven basin states also established water quality standards for salinity through the Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Forum. Endangered Species Efforts and Habitat Improvements Congress enacted the ESA in 1973. As basin species became listed in accordance with the act, federal agencies and nonfederal stakeholders consulted with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) to address the conservation of the listed species. As a result of these consultations, several major programs have been developed to protect and restore fish species on the Colorado River and its tributaries. Summaries of some of the key programs are below. Upper Colorado Endangered Fish Recovery Program The Upper Colorado Endangered Fish Recovery Program was established in 1988 to assist in the recovery of four species of endangered fish in the Upper Colorado River Basin. Congress authorized this program in P.L. 106-392 . The program is implemented through several stakeholders under a cooperative agreement signed by the governors of Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming; DOI; and the Administrator of WAPA. The recovery goals of the program are to reduce threats to species and improve their status so they are eventually delisted from the ESA. Some of the actions taken in the past include providing adequate instream flows for fish and their habitat, restoring habitat, reducing nonnative fish, augmenting fish populations with stocked fish, and conducting research and monitoring. Reclamation is the lead federal agency for the program and provides the majority of federal funds for implementation. It is also funded through a portion of Upper Basin hydropower revenues from WAPA; FWS; the states of Colorado, Wyoming, and Utah; and water users, among others. San Juan River Basin Recovery Implementation Program The San Juan River Basin Recovery Implementation Program was established in 1992 to assist in the recovery of ESA-listed fish species on the San Juan River, the Colorado's largest tributary. The program is concerned with the recovery of the Razorback sucker ( Xyrauchen texanus ) and Colorado pikeminnow ( Ptychocheilus Lucius ). Congress authorized this program in P.L. 106-392 with the aim to protect the genetic integrity and population of listed species, conserve and restore habitat (including water quality), reduce nonnative species, and monitor species. The Recovery Program is coordinated by FWS. Reclamation is responsible for operating the Animas-La Plata Project and Navajo Dam on the San Juan River in a way that reduces effects on the fish populations. The program is funded by a portion of revenues from power generation, Reclamation, participating states, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Recovery efforts for listed fish are coordinated with the Upper Colorado River Program discussed above. Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program The Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program was established in 1997 in response to a directive from Congress under the Grand Canyon Protection Act of 1992 ( P.L. 102-575 ) to operate Glen Canyon Dam "in such a manner as to protect, mitigate adverse impacts to, and improve the values for which Grand Canyon National Park and Glen Canyon National Recreation Area were established." This program uses experiments to determine how water flows affect natural resources south of the dam. Reclamation is in charge of modifying flows for experiments, and the U.S. Geological Survey conducts monitoring and other studies to evaluate the effects of the flows. The results are expected to better inform managers how to provide water deliveries and conserve species. The majority of program funding comes from hydropower revenues generated at Glen Canyon Dam. Lower Colorado Multi-Species Conservation Program (MSCP) The MSCP is a multistakeholder initiative to conserve 27 species (8 listed under ESA) along the Lower Colorado River while maintaining water and power supplies for farmers, tribes, industries, and urban residents. The MSCP began in 2005 and is planned to last for at least 50 years. The MSCP was created through consultation under ESA. To achieve compliance under ESA, federal entities involved in managing water supplies in the Lower Colorado River met with resource agencies from Arizona, California, and Nevada; Native American Tribes; environmental groups; and recreation interests to develop a program to conserve species along a portion of the Colorado River. A biological opinion (BiOp) issued by the FWS in 1997 served as a basis for the program. Modifications to the 1997 BiOp were made in 2002, and in 2005, the BiOp was renewed for 50 years. Nonfederal entities received an incidental take permit under Section 10(a) of the ESA for their activities in 2005 and shortly thereafter implemented a habitat conservation plan. The objective of the MSCP is to create habitat for listed species, augment the populations of species listed under ESA, maintain current and future water diversions and power production, and abide by the incidental take authorizations for listed species under the ESA. The estimated total cost of the program over its lifetime is approximately $626 million in 2003 dollars ($882 million in 2018 dollars) and is to be split evenly between Reclamation (50%) and the states of California, Nevada, and Arizona (who collectively fund the remaining 50%). The management and implementation of the MSCP is the responsibility of Reclamation, in consultation with a steering committee of stakeholders. Tribal Water Rights Twenty-two federally recognized tribes in the Colorado River Basin have quantified water diversion rights that have been confirmed by court decree or final settlement. These tribes collectively possess rights to 2.9 MAF per year of Colorado River water. However, as of 2015, these tribes typically were using just over half of their quantified rights. Additionally, 13 other basin tribes have reserved water rights claims that have yet to be resolved. Increased water use by tribes with existing water rights, and/or future settlement of claims and additional consumptive use of basin waters by other tribes, is likely to exacerbate the competition for basin water resources. The potential for increased use of tribal water rights (which, once ratified, are counted toward state-specific allocations where the tribal reservation is located) has been studied in recent years. In 2014, Reclamation, working with a group of 10 tribes with significant reserved water rights claims on the Colorado River, initiated a study known as the 10 Tribes Study . The study, published in 2018, estimated that, cumulatively, the 10 tribes could have reserved water rights (including unresolved claims) to divert nearly 2.8 MAF per year. Of these water rights, approximately 2 MAF per year were decreed and an additional 785,273 AF (mostly in the Upper Basin) remained unresolved. The report estimated that, overall, the 10 tribes are diverting (i.e., making use of) almost 1.5 MAF of their 2.8 MAF in resolved and unresolved claims. Table 1 shows these figures at the basin and sub-basin levels. According to the study, the majority of unresolved claims in the Upper Basin are associated with the Ute Tribe in Utah (370,370 AF per year), the Navajo Nation in Utah (314,926 AF), and the Navajo Nation in the Upper Basin in Arizona (77,049 AF). Drought and the Supply/Demand Imbalance in the Colorado River Basin When the Colorado River Compact was originally approved, it was assumed based on the historical record that average annual flows on the river were 16.4 MAF per year. According to Reclamation data, from 1906 to 2018, observed natural flows on the river at Lee Ferry, AZ—the common point of measurement for observed basin flows—averaged 14.8 MAF annually. Natural flows from 2000 to 2018 (i.e., during the ongoing drought) averaged considerably less than that—12.4 MAF annually. While natural flows have trended down, consumptive use in the basin has grown and has regularly exceeded natural flows since 2000. From 1971 to 2015, average total consumptive use grew from 13 MAF to over 15 MAF annually. Combined, the two trends have caused a significant drawdown of basin storage levels ( Figure 3 ). From 2009 to 2015, the largest consumptive water use occurred in the Lower Basin (7.5 MAF per year), while Upper Basin consumptive use averaged about 3.8 MAF annually. Use of Treaty water by Mexico (1.5 MAF per year) and evaporative loss from reservoirs (approximately 2 MAF per year) in both basins also factored significantly into total basin consumptive use. Notably, consumptive use in the Lower Basin, combined with mandatory releases to Mexico, regularly exceeds the mandatory 8.23 MAF per year that must be released from the Upper Basin to the Lower Basin and Mexico pursuant to Reclamation requirements. This imbalance between Lower Basin inflows and use, known as the structural deficit , causes additional stress on basin storage. The current drought in the basin has included some of the lowest flows on record. According to Reclamation, the 19-year period from 2000 to 2018 was the driest period in more than 100 years of record keeping. Observers have pointed out that flows in some recent years have been lower than would be expected given the amount of precipitation that has occurred, and have noted that warmer temperatures appear to be a significant contributor to these diminished flows. Based on these and other observations, some have argued that Colorado River flows are unlikely to return to 20 th century averages, and that future water supply risk is high. 2012 Reclamation Study A 2012 study by Reclamation projected a long-term imbalance in supply and demand in the Colorado River Basin. In the study, Reclamation noted that the basin had thus far avoided serious impacts on water supplies due to the significant storage within the system, coupled with the fact that some Upper Basin states have yet to fully develop the use of their allocations. However, Reclamation projected that in the coming half century, flows would decrease by an average of 9% at Lee Ferry and drought would increase in frequency and duration. At the same time, Reclamation projected that demand for basin water supplies would increase, with annual consumptive use projected to rise from 15 MAF to 18.1-20.4 MAF by 2050, depending on population growth. A range of 64%-76% of the growth in demand was expected to come from increased M&I demand. Reclamation's 2012 study also posited several potential ways to alleviate future shortages in the basin, such as alternative water supplies, demand management, drought action plans, water banking, and water transfer/markets. Some of these options already are being pursued. In particular, some states have become increasingly active in banking unused Colorado River surface water supplies, including through groundwater banks or storage of unused surface waters in Lake Mead (see below section, " 2007 Interim Guidelines "). Developments and Agreements Since 2000 Drought conditions throughout the basin have raised concerns about potential negative impacts on water supplies. Concerns center on uncertainty that might result if the Secretary of the Interior were to determine that a shortage condition exists in the Lower Basin, and that related curtailments were warranted. Some in Upper Basin States are also concerned about the potential for a c ompact call of Lower Basin states on Upper Basin states. Drought and other uncertainties related to water rights priorities (e.g., potential tribal water rights claims) spurred the development of several efforts that generally attempted to relieve pressure on basin water supplies, stabilize storage levels, and provide assurances of available water supplies. Some of the most prominent developments since the year 2000 (i.e., the beginning of the current drought) are discussed below. 2003 Quantitative Settlement Agreement Prior to the 2003 QSA, California had been using approximately 5.2 MAF of Colorado River on average each year (with most of its excess water use attributed to urban areas). Under the QSA, an agreement between several California water districts and DOI, California agreed to reduce its use to the required 4.4 MAF under the Law of the River. It sought to accomplish this aim by quantifying Colorado River entitlement levels of several water contractors; authorizing efforts to conserve additional water supplies (e.g., the lining of the All-American Canal); and providing for several large-scale, long-term agriculture-to-urban water transfers. The QSA also committed the state to a path for restoration and mitigation related to the Salton Sea, a water body in Southern California that was historically sustained by Colorado River irrigation runoff from the Imperial and Coachella Valleys. A related agreement between Reclamation and the Lower Basin states, the Inadvertent Overrun and Payback Policy (IOPP), went into effect concurrently with the QSA in 2004. IOPP is an administrative mechanism that provides an accounting of inadvertent overruns in consumptive use compared to the annual entitlements of water users in the Lower Basin. These overruns must be "paid back" in the calendar year following the overruns, and the paybacks must be made only from "extraordinary conservation measures" above and beyond normal consumptive use. 2004 Arizona Water Settlements Act The 2004 Arizona Water Settlements Act ( P.L. 108-451 , AWSA) significantly altered the allocation of CAP water in Arizona and set the stage for some of the cutbacks in the state that are currently under discussion. It ratified three water rights settlements (one in each title) between the federal government and the State of Arizona, the Gila River Indian Community (GRIC), and the Tohono O'odham Nation, respectively. For the state and its CAP water users, the settlement resolved a final repayment cost for CAP by reducing the water users' reimbursable repayment obligation from about $2.3 billion to $1.65 billion. Additionally, Arizona agreed to new tribal and non-tribal allocations of CAP water so that approximately half of CAP's annual allotment would be available to Indian tribes in Arizona, at a higher priority than most other uses. The tribal communities were authorized to lease the water so long as the water remains within the state via the state's water banking authority. The act also authorized funds to cover the cost of infrastructure required to deliver the water to the Indian communities, much of it derived from power receipts accruing to the Lower Colorado River Basin Development Fund. 2007 Interim Guidelines/Coordinated Operations for Lake Powell and Lake Mead Another significant development in the basin was the 2007 adoption of the Colorado River Interim Guidelines for Lower Basin Shortages and the Coordinated Operations for Lake Powell and Lake Mead (2007 Interim Guidelines). Development of the agreement began in 2005, when, in response to drought in the Southwest and the decline in basin water storage (and a record low point in Lake Powell of 33% active capacity), the Secretary of the Interior instructed Reclamation to develop coordinated strategies for Colorado River reservoir operations during drought or shortages. The resulting guidelines included criteria for releases from Lakes Mead and Powell determined by "trigger levels" in both reservoirs, as well as a schedule of Lower Basin curtailments at different operational tiers ( Table 2 ). Under the guidelines, Arizona and Nevada, which have junior rights to California, would face reduced allocations if Lake Mead elevations dropped below 1,075 ft. At the time, it was thought that the 2007 Guidelines would significantly reduce the risk of Lake Mead falling to 1,025 feet. The guidelines are considered "interim" because they were scheduled to expire in 20 years (i.e., at the end of 2026). The 2007 agreement also included for the first time a mechanism by which parties in the Lower Basin were able to store conserved water in Lake Mead, known as Intentionally Created Surplus (ICS). Reclamation accounts for this water annually, and the users storing the water may access the surplus in future years, in accordance with the Law of the River. From 2013 to 2017, the portion of Lake Mead water in storage that was classified as ICS ranged from a low of 711,864 AF in 2015 to a high of 1.261 MAF in 2017 ( Figure 4 ). Pilot System Conservation Program In 2014, Reclamation and several major basin water supply agencies (Central Arizona Water Conservation District, Southern Nevada Water Authority, Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, and Denver Water) executed a memorandum of understanding to provide funding for voluntary conservation projects and reductions of water use. These activities had the goal of developing new system water , to be applied toward storage in Lake Mead, by the end of 2019. Congress formally authorized federal participation in these efforts in the Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2015 ( P.L. 113-235 , Division D ), with an initial sunset date for the authority at the end of FY2018. The Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P.L. 115-244 , Division A ) extended the authority through the end of FY2022, with the stipulation that Upper Basin agreements could not proceed without the participation of the Upper Basin states through the Upper Colorado River Commission. As of mid-2018, Reclamation estimated that the program had resulted in a total of 194,000 AF of system water conserved. These savings were carried out through 64 projects conserving 47,000 AF in the Upper Basin and 11 projects conserving 147,000 AF in the Lower Basin. Minute 319 and Minute 323 Agreements with Mexico87 In 2017, the United States and Mexico signed Minute 323, which extended and replaced elements of a previous agreement, Minute 319, signed in 2012. Minute 323 included, among other things, options for Mexico to hold water in reserve in U.S. reservoirs for emergencies and water conservation efforts, as well as U.S. commitments for flows to support the ecological health of the Colorado River Delta. It also extended initial Mexican cutback commitments made under Minute 319 (which were similar in structure to the 2007 cutbacks negotiated for Lower Basin states) and established a Binational Water Scarcity Contingency Plan that included additional cutbacks that would be triggered if drought contingency plans (DCPs) are approved by U.S. basin states (see following section, " 2019 Drought Contingency Plans "). 2019 Drought Contingency Plans Ongoing drought conditions and the potential for water supply shortages prompted discussions and negotiations focused on how to conserve additional basin water supplies. After several years of negotiations, on March 19, 2019, Reclamation and the Colorado River Basin states finalized DCPs for both the Upper Basin and the Lower Basin. These plans required final authorization by Congress to be implemented. Following House and Senate hearings on the DCPs in early April, on April 16, 2019, Congress authorized the DCP agreements in the Colorado River Drought Contingency Plan Authorization Act ( P.L. 116-14 ). Each of the basin-level DCPs is discussed below in more detail. Upper Basin Drought Contingency Plan The Upper Basin DCP aims to protect against Lake Powell reaching critically low elevations; it also authorizes storage of conserved water in the Upper Basin that could help establish the foundation for a water use reduction effort (i.e., a "Demand Management Program") that may be developed in the future. Under the Upper Basin DCP, the Upper Basin states agree to operate system units to keep the surface of Lake Powell above 3,525 ft, which is 35 ft above the minimum elevation needed to run the dam's hydroelectric plant. Other large Upper Basin reservoirs (e.g., Navajo Reservoir, Blue Mesa Reservoir, and Flaming Gorge Reservoir) would be operated to protect the targeted Lake Powell elevation, potentially through drawdown of their own storage. If established by the states, an Upper Basin DCP Demand Management Program would likely entail willing seller/buyer agreements allowing for temporary paid reductions in water use that would provide for more storage volume in Lake Powell. Reclamation and other observers have stated their belief that these efforts will significantly decrease the risk of Lake Powell's elevation falling below 3,490 ft, an elevation at which significantly reduced hydropower generation is possible. Lower Basin Drought Contingency Plan The Lower Basin DCP is designed to require Arizona, California, and Nevada to curtail use and thereby contribute additional water to Lake Mead storage at predetermined "trigger" elevations, while also creating additional flexibility to incentivize voluntary conservation of water to be stored in Lake Mead, thereby increasing lake levels. Under the DCP, Nevada and Arizona (which were already set to have their supplies curtailed beginning at 1,075 ft under the 2007 Interim Guidelines) are to contribute additional supplies to maintain higher lake levels (i.e., beyond previous commitments). The reductions of supply would reach their maximums when reservoir levels drop below 1,045 ft. At the same time, the Lower Basin DCP would, for the first time, include commitments for delivery cutbacks by California. These cutbacks would begin with 200,000 AF (4.5%) in reductions at Lake Mead elevations of 1,040-1,045 ft, and would increase to as much as 350,000 AF (7.9%) at elevations of 1,025 ft or lower. The curtailments in the Lower Basin DCP are in addition to those agreed to under the 2007 Interim Guidelines and under Minute 323 with Mexico. Specific and cumulative reductions are shown in Table 2 . In addition to the state-level reductions, under the Lower Basin DCP, Reclamation also would agree to pursue efforts to add 100,000 AF or more of system water within the basin. Some of the largest and most controversial reductions under the Lower Basin DCP would occur in Arizona, where pursuant to previous changes under the 2004 AWSA, a large group of agricultural users would face major cutbacks to their CAP water supplies. Reclamation has noted that the Lower Basin DCP significantly decreases the chance of Lake Mead elevations falling below 1,020 ft, which would be a critically low level. Some parties have pointed out that although the DCP is unlikely to prevent a shortage from being declared at 1,075 ft, it would slow the rate at which the lake recedes thereafter. Combined with the commitments from Mexico, total planned cutbacks under shortage scenarios (i.e., all commitments to date, combined) would reduce Lower Basin consumptive use by 241,000 AF to 1.375 MAF per year, depending on Lake Mead's elevation. Drought Contingency Plan Opposition Although the DCPs and the related negotiations were widely praised, some expressed concerns related to the implementation of the DCPs as they relate to federal and state environmental laws. Most Colorado River contractors supported the agreements, but one major basin contractor, Imperial Irrigation District (IID, a major holder of Colorado River water rights in Southern California), did not approve the DCPs. IID has argued that the DCPs will further degrade the Salton Sea, a shrinking and ecologically degraded water body in southern California that relies on drainage flows from lands irrigated using Colorado River water. Following enactment of the DCPs, IID filed suit in state court alleging that state approval of the DCPs violated the California Environmental Quality Act. Others have questioned whether federal implementation of the DCPs without a new or supplemental Environmental Impact Statement might violate federal law, such as NEPA. Issues for Congress Funding and Oversight of Existing Facilities and Programs The principal role of Congress as it relates to storage facilities on the Colorado River is funding and oversight of facility operations, construction, and programs to protect and restore endangered species (e.g., Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program and the Upper Colorado River Endangered Fish Program). In the Upper Basin, Colorado River facilities include the 17 active participating units in the Colorado River Storage Projects, as well as the Navajo-Gallup Water Supply Project. In the Lower Basin, major facilities include the Salt River Project and Theodore Roosevelt Dam, Hoover Dam and All-American Canal, Yuma and Gila Projects, Parker-Davis Project, Central Arizona Project, and Robert B. Griffith Project (now Southern Nevada Water System). Congressional appropriations in support of Colorado River projects and programs typically account for a portion of overall project budgets. For example, the Lower Colorado Region's FY2017 operating budget was $517 million; $119.8 million of this total was provided by discretionary appropriations, and the remainder of funding came from power revenues (which are made available without further appropriation) and nonfederal partners. In recent years, Congress has also authorized and appropriated funding that has targeted the Colorado River Basin in general (i.e., the Pilot System Conservation Plan). Congress may choose to extend or amend these and other authorities specific to the basin. While discretionary appropriations for the Colorado River are of regular interest to Congress, Congress may also be asked to weigh in on Colorado River funding that is not subject to regular appropriations. For instance, in the coming years, the Lower Colorado River Basin Development Fund is projected to face a decrease in revenues and may thus have less funding available for congressionally established funding priorities for the Development Fund. Indian Water Rights Settlements and Plans for New and Augmented Water Storage Congress has previously approved Indian water rights settlements associated with more than 2 MAF of tribal diversion rights on the Colorado River. Only a portion of this water has been developed. Congress likely will face the decision of whether to fund development of previously authorized infrastructure associated with Indian water rights settlements in the Colorado River Basin. For example, the ongoing Navajo-Gallup Water Supply Project is being built to serve the Jicarilla Apache Nation, the Navajo Nation, and the City of Gallup, New Mexico. Congress may also be asked to consider new settlements that may result in tribal rights to more Colorado River water. For example, in the 116 th Congress, H.R. 244 would authorize the Navajo Nation Water Settlement in Utah. In addition to development of new tribal water supplies, some states in the Upper Basin have indicated their intent to further develop their Colorado River water entitlements. For example, in the 115 th Congress, Section 4310 of America's Water Infrastructure Act ( P.L. 115-270 ) authorized the Secretary of the Interior to enter into an agreement with the State of Wyoming whereby the state would fund a project to add erosion control to Fontenelle Reservoir in the Upper Basin. The project would allow the state to potentially utilize an additional 80,000 acre-feet of water storage on the Green River, a tributary of the Colorado River. Drought Contingency Plan Implementation Congress may remain interested in implementation of the DCPs, including their success or failure at stemming further Colorado River cutbacks and the extent to which the plans comply with federal environmental laws such as NEPA. Similarly, Congress may be interested in the overall hydrologic status of the Colorado River Basin, as well as future efforts to plan for increased demand in the basin and stretch limited basin water supplies.

The Colorado River Basin covers more than 246,000 square miles in seven U.S. states (Wyoming, Colorado, Utah, New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada, and California) and Mexico. Pursuant to federal law, the Bureau of Reclamation (part of the Department of the Interior) manages much of the basin's water supplies. Colorado River water is used primarily for agricultural irrigation and municipal and industrial (M&I) uses, but it also is important for power production, fish and wildlife, and recreational uses. In recent years, consumptive uses of Colorado River water have exceeded natural flows. This causes an imbalance in the basin's available supplies and competing demands. A drought in the basin dating to 2000 has raised the prospect of water delivery curtailments and decreased hydropower production, among other things. In the future, observers expect that increasing demand for supplies, coupled with the effects of climate change, will further increase the strain on the basin's limited water supplies. River Management The Law of the River is the commonly used shorthand for the multiple laws, court decisions, and other documents governing Colorado River operations. The foundational document of the Law of the River is the Colorado River Compact of 1922. Pursuant to the compact, the basin states established a framework to apportion the water supplies between the Upper and Lower Basins of the Colorado River, with the dividing line between the two basins at Lee Ferry, AZ (near the Utah border). The Upper and Lower Basins each were allocated 7.5 million acre-feet (MAF) annually under the Colorado River Compact; an additional 1.5 MAF in annual flows was made available to Mexico under a 1944 treaty. Future agreements and court decisions addressed numerous other issues (including intrastate allocations of flows), and subsequent federal legislation provided authority and funding for federal facilities that allowed users to develop their allocations. A Supreme Court ruling also confirmed that Congress designated the Secretary of the Interior as the water master for the Lower Basin, a role in which the federal government manages the delivery of all water below Hoover Dam. Reclamation and basin stakeholders closely track the status of two large reservoirs—Lake Powell in the Upper Basin and Lake Mead in the Lower Basin—as an indicator of basin storage conditions. Under recent guidelines, dam releases from these facilities are tied to specific water storage levels. For Lake Mead, the first tier of "shortage," under which Arizona's and Nevada's allocations would be decreased, would be triggered if Lake Mead's January 1 elevation is expected to fall below 1,075 feet above mean sea level. As of early 2019, Reclamation projected that there was a 69% chance of a shortage condition at Lake Mead in 2020; there was also a lesser chance of Lake Powell reaching critically low levels. Improved hydrology in early 2019 may decrease the chances of shortage in the immediate future. Drought Contingency Plans Despite previous efforts to alleviate future shortages, the basin's hydrological outlook has generally worsened in recent years. After several years of negotiations, in early 2019 Reclamation and the basin states transmitted to Congress additional plans to alleviate stress on basin water supplies. These plans, known as the drought contingency plans (DCPs) for the Upper and Lower Basins, were authorized by Congress in April 2019 in the Colorado River Drought Contingency Plan Authorization Act (P.L. 116-14). The DCPs among other things obligate Lower Basin states to additional water supply cutbacks at specified storage levels (i.e., cutbacks beyond previous curtailment plans), commit Reclamation to additional water conservation efforts, and coordinate Upper Basin operations to protect Lake Powell storage levels and hydropower generation. Congressional Role Congress plays a multifaceted role in federal management of the Colorado River basin. Congress funds and oversees management of basin facilities, including operations and programs to protect and restore endangered species. It has also enacted and continues to consider Indian water rights settlements involving Colorado River waters and development of new water storage facilities in the basin. In addition, Congress has approved funding to mitigate water shortages and conserve basin water supplies and has enacted new authorities to combat drought and its effects on basin water users (i.e., the DCPs and other related efforts).

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Introduction Each of the four major federal land management agencies has maintenance responsibility for tens of thousands of diverse assets in dispersed locations. These agencies are the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), and National Park Service (NPS), all within the Department of the Interior (DOI), and the Forest Service (FS) within the Department of Agriculture. These agencies maintain assets to preserve their functioning and to repair and replace components as needed. The infrastructure needs of the federal land management agencies have been a subject of significant federal and public attention for many years. Congressional and administrative attention has focused on deferred maintenance and repairs , defined as "maintenance and repairs that were not performed when they should have been or were scheduled to be and which are put off or delayed for a future period." "Maintenance and repair" include a variety of activities intended to preserve assets in an acceptable condition, including activities such as preventive maintenance and replacement of parts, systems, and components. These terms do not include activities intended to expand the capacity of assets to allow them to serve different purposes or significantly increased needs. Deferred maintenance and repairs often are called the maintenance backlog . The agencies assert that continuing to defer the maintenance and repair of facilities accelerates the rate of these facilities' deterioration, increases their repair costs, and decreases their value. Debate has focused on varied issues, including the level of funds needed to reduce deferred maintenance, whether agencies are using existing funding efficiently, the priority of deferred maintenance relative to regular maintenance, and whether additional sources of funds should be directed to maintenance. Other issues include how to balance the maintenance of existing infrastructure with the acquisition of new assets, whether disposal of assets is desirable given limited funding, and how much to prioritize maintaining infrastructure relative to other government functions. Another issue relates to the dollar amount of deferred maintenance and the reasons for fluctuations over time. This report focuses on these issues. It first provides agency deferred maintenance estimates for FY2018, the most recent fiscal year for which this information is available. It also discusses changes in deferred maintenance over the past decade (FY2009-FY2018) and then identifies some of the factors that likely contributed to these changes. Estimates The agencies typically identify deferred maintenance through periodic condition assessments of facilities. FS currently reports an annual deferred maintenance dollar total composed of estimates for 10 classes of assets. These classes include roads, buildings, trails, bridges, and water systems, among others. DOI currently reports annual deferred maintenance composed of estimates for four broad categories of assets: (1) roads, bridges, and trails; (2) irrigation, dams, and other water structures; (3) buildings; and (4) other structures. The "other structures" category includes a variety of assets (e.g., recreation sites and hatcheries). For each of the 10 years covered by this report, FS has reported the amount of deferred maintenance as a single figure. DOI agencies began reporting deferred maintenance as a single figure in FY2015. In prior years, DOI agencies reported estimates as a range. For FY2014, for instance, the range had an "accuracy level of minus 15 percent to plus 25 percent of initial estimate." According to DOI, a range had been used because "due to the scope, nature, and variety of the assets entrusted to DOI, as well as the nature of deferred maintenance itself, exact estimates are very difficult to determine." FS estimates of deferred maintenance included in this report generally are taken from the agency's annual budget justifications to Congress. The DOI Budget Office provided the Congressional Research Service (CRS) with a deferred maintenance range for each DOI agency for each fiscal year from FY2009 to FY2014. From these ranges, CRS calculated mid-range figures. For instance, DOI estimated NPS deferred maintenance for FY2014 at between $9.31 billion and $13.70 billion. The CRS-calculated mid-range figure is $11.50 billion. This report reflects CRS's mid-range calculations for FY2009-FY2014 to facilitate comparison with FS estimates. Since FY2015, the DOI Budget Office has provided CRS with a single estimate for each DOI agency, and those figures are used in this report. They represent deferred maintenance as of the end of the fiscal year (i.e., September 30). For both FS and DOI agencies, the deferred maintenance estimates generally reflect project costs. Finally, totals shown in the body and in tables of this report may not add to 100% due to rounding. FY2018 The four agencies had combined FY2018 deferred maintenance estimated at $19.38 billion. The agencies had widely varying shares of the total. NPS had the largest portion, 62%, based on an estimate of $11.92 billion. The FS share was 27% of the total, with an estimated deferred maintenance of $5.20 billion. The FWS portion was 7%, reflecting the agency's deferred maintenance of $1.30 billion. BLM had the smallest share, 5%, based on a backlog estimate of $0.96 billion. Each agency's deferred maintenance estimate for FY2018 consisted of various components. For FS, the single largest asset class was roads, which comprised 61% of the FY2018 total of $5.20 billion. The next largest asset class was buildings, which represented 24% of the FS FY2018 total. The next two largest asset classes were trails and bridges, each with 5%. Six other asset classes made up the remaining 6%. For NPS, the largest asset category was roads, bridges, and trails, which comprised 57% of the FY2018 deferred maintenance total of $11.92 billion. The buildings category comprised 19% of the total, followed by 18% for other structures and 6% for irrigation, dams, and other water structures. Roads, bridges, and trails also reflected the largest share of BLM's FY2018 deferred maintenance, with 69% of the $0.96 billion total. Two other categories of assets had relatively comparable portions, specifically 14% for buildings and 12% for other structures. The remaining 6% was for irrigation, dams, and other water structures. Roads, bridges, and trails made up the smallest portion of FWS's FY2018 deferred maintenance ($1.30 billion), unlike for the other agencies. Moreover, the four asset categories had roughly comparable portions, as follows: 27% for buildings; 27% for other structures; 24% for irrigation, dams, and other water structures; and 22% for roads, bridges, and trails. Overview of Decade (FY2009-FY2018) Changes in Estimates in Current and Constant Dollars As shown in Table 1 and Figure 1 , in current dollars, the total deferred maintenance estimate for the four agencies showed considerable variation over the 10-year period from FY2009-FY2018, with a peak in FY2012. It ended the decade relatively flat, with an increase of $0.36 billion overall, from $19.02 billion to $19.38 billion, or 2%. Both the BLM and NPS estimates increased, by $0.42 billion (80%) and $1.75 billion (17%), respectively. By contrast, both the FWS and FS estimates decreased, by $1.71 billion (57%) and $0.11 billion (2%), respectively. Within these overall changes, there was considerable variation among agency trends. The NPS estimate increased fairly steadily for several years, fell in FY2016, then rose again. The FS estimate was similar at the beginning and end of the decade, although it fluctuated between $5.10 billion and $6.03 billion throughout the 10-year period. The BLM estimate also fluctuated, falling in the first few years of the decade, then rising, leveling off, and rising again to a new high at the end of the decade. The FWS estimate had a generally steady decline during the first several years, leveled off somewhat after FY2015, and reached a decade low in FY2018. Figure 1 depicts the annual changes in current dollars for each agency and for the four agencies combined. Factors that might have contributed to the changes are discussed in the " Issues in Analyzing Deferred Maintenance " section, below. By contrast, as shown in Table 2 and Figure 2 , in constant dollars, the total deferred maintenance estimate for the four agencies decreased over the course of the ten-year period by $3.61 billion, from $22.99 billion to $19.38 billion, or 16%. Three agencies had overall decreases: $0.37 billion (3%) for NPS, $1.22 billion (19%) for FS, and $2.34 billion (64%) for FWS. However, the BLM estimate increased by $0.32 billion (50%) over the 10-year period. As was the case for current-dollar estimates, the overall changes in constant dollars reflected various fluctuations. The BLM estimate fell and rose during the period, with the lowest estimate in FY2011 and the highest at the end (FY2018). The FWS estimate exceeded $3 billion for each of the first four years before dropping steeply over the next six years to roughly one-third of the FY2009 level. The NPS estimate peaked in FY2010, then mainly declined, until increasing in FY2018. The FS estimate exceeded $6 billion for the first half of the 10-year period. It ranged roughly between $5 billion and $6 billion during the second half of the period, reaching a low of $5.20 billion in both FY2017 and FY2018. Figure 2 depicts the annual changes in constant dollars for each agency and for the four agencies combined. Agency Shares of Deferred Maintenance in Current and Constant Dollars Throughout the decade, agency shares of the deferred maintenance totals differed, as shown in Figure 3 and Figure 4 . In both current and constant dollars, in each fiscal year NPS had the largest portion of total deferred maintenance and considerably more than any other agency. FS consistently had the second-largest share, followed by FWS and then BLM. Moreover, in both current and constant dollars, each agency's portion of the total annual deferred maintenance changed over the decade. Specifically, the NPS portion of the annual total grew overall throughout the period, from 53% in FY2009 to 62% in FY2018. By contrast, the FS share of the total decreased over the 10-year period from 28% to 27%. The FWS component also declined, from 16% to 7%, whereas the BLM portion rose from 3% to 5%. The asset class or category that included roads typically comprised the largest portion of each agency's deferred maintenance. Roads represented the largest portion of FS deferred maintenance from FY2009 to FY2018. Over the 10-year period, the NPS roads, bridges, and trails category had the highest share of the agency's deferred maintenance, and irrigation, dams, and other water structures had the smallest. In some years, the portion of NPS deferred maintenance for the "other structures" category exceeded the buildings portion, but in some years the reverse was the case. Roads, bridges, and trails also was the biggest category of BLM's deferred maintenance from FY2009 to FY2018. Although this category typically represented a majority of the FWS total deferred maintenance in the earlier part of the period, this has not been the case since FY2013. A decline in the dollar estimate for roads, bridges, and trails resulted in a sizeable drop in overall FWS deferred maintenance beginning in FY2013, as discussed below. Issues in Analyzing Deferred Maintenance Fluctuations in deferred maintenance estimates are likely the result of many factors, among them estimation methods, levels of funding, and asset portfolios, as discussed below. The extent to which these and other factors affected year-to-year changes in any one agency's maintenance backlog is unclear, in part because comprehensive information is not readily available in all cases or has not been examined. Therefore, the data in this report may not fully explain the changes in deferred maintenance estimates over time. Methodology Methods for assessing the condition of assets and estimating deferred maintenance have changed over the years. As a result, it is unclear what portion of the change in deferred maintenance estimates is due to the addition of maintenance work that was not done on time and what portion may be due to changes in methods of assessing and estimating deferred maintenance. With regard to facility assessment, agencies have enhanced efforts to define and quantify the maintenance needs of their assets. Efforts have included collecting comprehensive information on the condition of facilities and maintenance and improvement needs. For instance, the first cycle of comprehensive condition assessments of NPS industry-standard facilities was completed at the end of FY2006. However, through at least FY2018, NPS continued to develop business practices to estimate the maintenance needs of nonindustry-standard assets. This category presents particular challenges because it includes unique asset types. Alterations in methodology have contributed to changes in deferred maintenance estimates, as shown in the following examples for roads. The FY2015 FWS budget justification states that [i]n 2012, Service leadership concluded that condition assessment practices and policies in place at that time were unintentionally producing higher than appropriate [deferred maintenance (DM)] cost estimates for some types of constructed real property. DM estimates for our extensive inventory of gravel and native surface roads are a major contributor to this challenge. In response, the FWS is refining its practices and procedures to improve consistency of DM cost estimates and their use in budget planning. Significant reductions in the DM backlog are resulting from this effort. Subsequent FWS budget justifications have elaborated on changes to methods of estimating deferred maintenance for roads. For instance, the FY2017 document states that "deferred maintenance estimates for our extensive inventory of roads were further classified to emphasize public use and traffic volume. As a result, minimally used administrative roads are now generally excluded from contributing to deferred maintenance backlog calculations." Of note is that the roads, bridges, and trails category of FWS deferred maintenance declined substantially (by $1.18 billion, 81%) in the past several years in current dollars, from $1.46 billion in FY2012 to $0.28 billion in FY2018. This decline is reflected in the smaller FWS deferred maintenance total for FY2018 ($1.30 billion). The FWS change in the method of estimating deferred maintenance for roads, bridges, and trails appears to be a primary reason for the decreased estimate for this category and total FWS deferred maintenance over the 10-year period. Similarly, FS attributes variations in deferred maintenance partly to changes in the methodology for estimating roads. For example, in FY2013 and FY2014, FS adjusted the survey methodology for passenger-car roads, with the goal of providing more accurate estimates of the roads backlog. The FS estimate of deferred maintenance for roads fell in current dollars by $0.84 billion (22%) from FY2012 to FY2014, from $3.76 billion to $2.92 billion. The extent to which the drop is attributable to changes in methodology, including regarding the types of roads reflected in the estimates, is not certain. Finally, in FY2014, the NPS first reflected deferred maintenance for unpaved roads as part of its total deferred maintenance estimate (in agency financial reports). The agency's total deferred maintenance increased in current dollars by $0.26 billion (4%) from FY2013 to FY2014, from $6.57 billion to $6.83 billion. DOI cited the inclusion of unpaved roads as among the reasons for changes in NPS deferred maintenance estimates, although the extent of the effect on NPS estimates is unclear. Broader changes in methodology also occurred during the decade. For example, DOI agencies had been using an accuracy range of -15% to +25% to derive the estimated range of deferred maintenance for industry-standard assets. The change to a single estimate beginning in FY2015 would have affected DOI deferred maintenance estimates as reflected in this report. Funding How much total funding is provided each year for deferred maintenance for the four agencies is unclear because annual presidential budget requests, appropriations laws, and supporting documents typically do not aggregate funds for deferred maintenance. Portions of deferred maintenance funding (for one or more of the four agencies) have come from agency maintenance and construction accounts, recreation fees, the Highway Trust Fund (Department of Transportation) for roads, the Timber Sale Pipeline Restoration Fund (for FS and BLM), NPS concession fees, and the NPS Centennial Challenge account, among other accounts. In addition, funding figures are not directly comparable to deferred maintenance estimates because the estimates are limited to project costs and thus do not reflect indirect costs, such as salaries and benefits for government employees. Annual appropriations figures typically reflect indirect costs. Evaluations of the sufficiency of federal funding for deferred maintenance may be hindered by the lack of total funding figures and by the incomparability of appropriations and deferred maintenance estimates. Deferred maintenance estimates might vary due to economic conditions that are not related to agency efforts or within the control of facility managers. For example, if deferred maintenance estimates reflect costs of needed materials, fuel, supplies, and labor, then the cost of deferred maintenance might change as the costs of these products and services change. Further, DOI has noted that NPS deferred maintenance estimates could fluctuate with market trends and inflation. Moreover, consistent and comprehensive information on the effect of federal funding on the condition of facilities and deferred maintenance over the decade does not appear to be available in budget documents. In particular, information based on the facilities condition index (FCI) seems to be incomplete or inconsistent in agency budget justifications. In some cases, budget justifications either do not provide FCI figures for assets or provide figures only for certain years. In other cases, it is not clear whether the FCI figures cover all agency assets or a subset of the assets. Together, the budget justifications present a mix of FCI information using quantitative measurements; percentage measurements; and qualitative statements, such as that a certain number or percentage of structures are in "good" condition, but without corresponding FCI figures. Although amounts and impacts of deferred maintenance funding may not be readily available, the agencies at times have asserted a need for increased appropriations to reduce their backlogs. As a recent example, the Interior Budget in Brief for FY2020 sets out a proposal for the establishment of a "Public Lands Infrastructure Fund," with revenues from energy development on federal lands, to be used for deferred maintenance needs of the four agencies (as well as the Bureau of Indian Education). As a second example, a 2017 audit report asserted that reducing the FS maintenance backlog "will require devoting the necessary resources over an extended period of time," and that "increasing wildfire management costs have left the agency without extra funding to concentrate on reducing deferred maintenance." Moreover, in the past, agencies sometimes attributed reductions in deferred maintenance (or slower rates of increase) in part to additional appropriations, such as those provided in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA; P.L. 111-5 ). The FY2016 FWS budget justification notes the ARRA funding as one factor contributing to a reduction in the backlog from the FY2010 high, for instance. Some observers and stakeholders have identified ways to potentially address deferred maintenance without solely relying on federal funding. For instance, a 2016 report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) on NPS deferred maintenance listed various actions that NPS is taking at some park units. They include using donations, volunteers, and partnerships to assist with maintenance; leasing assets to nonfederal parties in exchange for rehabilitation or maintenance; and partnering with states in seeking transportation grants. As another example, a 2016 report by a research institute set out options including outsourcing certain agency operations to the private sector, establishing a franchising system for new park units, and disposal of assets. Assets The asset portfolios of the four agencies vary considerably in terms of number, type, size, age, and location of agency assets. Although comprehensive data on these variables over the past decade are not readily available, it is likely that they affect agency maintenance responsibilities and maintenance backlogs. For instance, NPS has more assets than the other DOI agencies, a sizeable portion of which were constructed before 1900 or in the first half of the 20 th century. The 2016 GAO report assessed various characteristics of the NPS maintenance backlog, including the age of park units. The agency determined that of the total FY2015 NPS deferred maintenance, park units established over 100 years ago had the largest share (32%). Further, park units established more than 40 years ago collectively accounted for 88% of all NPS deferred maintenance. Moreover, some NPS assets are in urban areas or are iconic structures, which could affect maintenance costs. The effect of changes in agency asset portfolios on deferred maintenance is not entirely clear. However, it could be asserted that the acquisition of assets, such as a sizeable number of large or iconic assets in relatively poor condition, would increase regular maintenance needs and the backlog, if maintenance is not performed when scheduled. For instance, the NPS asserted that "when parks are created or when new land is acquired, the properties sometimes come with facilities that are in unacceptable condition or are unstable for the park or partner organizations.... When facilities are excess to the park ... they also contribute to the deferred maintenance backlog." Similarly, it could be argued that disposal of assets, such as a large quantity of old assets in poor condition, could reduce deferred maintenance. For example, a 2017 audit of the FS recommended that the agency "establish goals and milestones to aggressively reduce the number of unused or underused assets in the agency's portfolio" as one way to reduce maintenance backlogs given limited resources. Agencies examine whether to retain assets in their current condition or dispose of some assets, as the following examples indicate. FS has sought to reduce its maintenance backlog by conveying unneeded or underused administrative sites, as well as decommissioning roads, road and facility infrastructure , and nonpriority recreation sites. FWS has attributed reductions in deferred maintenance in part to "disposing of unneeded assets." NPS identifies assets that are not critical to the agency's mission and that are in relatively poor condition for potential disposal. In the past, the agency has noted that although the agency seeks to improve the condition of its asset portfolio by disposing of assets, "analysis of removal costs versus annual costs often precludes the removal option."

Each of the four major federal land management agencies maintains tens of thousands of diverse assets, including roads, bridges, buildings, and water management structures. These agencies are the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), National Park Service (NPS), and Forest Service (FS). Congress and the Administration continue to focus on the agencies' deferred maintenance and repair of these assets—in essence, the cost of any maintenance or repair that was not done when it should have been or was scheduled to be done. Deferred maintenance and repair is often called the maintenance backlog. In FY2018, the most recent year for which these estimates are available, the four agencies had combined deferred maintenance estimated at $19.38 billion. This figure includes $11.92 billion (62%) in deferred maintenance for NPS, $5.20 billion (27%) for FS, $1.30 billion (7%) for FWS, and $0.96 billion (5%) for BLM. The estimates reflect project costs. Over the past decade (FY2009-FY2018), the total deferred maintenance for the four agencies fluctuated, peaking in FY2012 and ending the decade relatively flat in current dollars. It increased overall by $0.36 billion, from $19.02 billion to $19.38 billion, or 2%. Both the BLM and NPS estimates increased, whereas the FWS and FS estimates decreased. By contrast, in constant dollars, the total deferred maintenance estimate for the four agencies decreased from FY2009 to FY2018 by $3.61 billion, from $22.99 billion to $19.38 billion, or 16%. The BLM estimate increased, whereas estimates for the other three agencies decreased. In each fiscal year, NPS had the largest portion of the total deferred maintenance, considerably more than any of the other three agencies. FS consistently had the second-largest share, followed by FWS and then BLM. Throughout the past decade, the asset class that included roads comprised the largest portion of the four-agency combined deferred maintenance. Congressional debate has focused on varied issues, including the level and sources of funds needed to reduce deferred maintenance, whether agencies are using existing funding efficiently, how to balance the maintenance of existing infrastructure with the acquisition of new assets, whether disposal of assets is desirable given limited funding, and the priority of maintaining infrastructure relative to other government functions. Some question why deferred maintenance estimates have fluctuated over time. These fluctuations are likely the result of many factors, among them the following: Agencies have refined methods of defining and quantifying the maintenance needs of their assets. Levels of funding for maintenance, including funding to address the maintenance backlog, vary from year to year. Economic conditions, including costs of services and products, also fluctuate. The asset portfolios of the agencies change, with acquisitions and disposals affecting the number, type, size, age, and location of agency assets. The extent to which these and other factors affected changes in each agency's maintenance backlog over the past decade is not entirely clear. In some cases, comprehensive information is not readily available or has not been examined.

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Introduction The U.S.-Mexico bilateral economic relationship is of key interest to the United States because of Mexico's proximity, the extensive cultural and economic ties between the two countries, and the strong economic relationship with Mexico under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The United States and Mexico share many common economic interests related to trade, investment, and regulatory cooperation. The two countries share a 2,000-mile border and have extensive interconnections through the Gulf of Mexico. There are also links through migration, tourism, environmental issues, health concerns, and family and cultural relationships. Congress has maintained an active interest on issues related to NAFTA renegotiations and the recently signed U.S.-Mexico-Canada trade agreement (USMCA); U.S.-Mexico trade and investment relations; Mexico's economic reform measures, especially in the energy sector; the Mexican 2018 presidential elections; U.S.-Mexico border management; and other related issues. Congress has also maintained an interest in the ramifications of possible withdrawal from NAFTA. Congress may also take an interest in the economic policies of Mexico's new President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, the populist leader of the National Regeneration Movement (MORENA) party, who won the July 2018 election with 53% of the vote. MORENA's coalition also won majorities in both chambers of the legislature that convened on September 1, 2018. Former President Enrique Peña Nieto successfully drove numerous economic and political reforms that included, among other measures, opening up the energy sector to private investment, countering monopolistic practices, passing fiscal reform, making farmers more productive, and increasing infrastructure investment. This report provides an overview and background information regarding U.S.-Mexico economic relations, trade trends, the Mexican economy, NAFTA, the proposed USMCA, and trade issues between the United States and Mexico. It will be updated as events warrant. U.S.-Mexico Economic Relations Mexico is one of the United States' most important trading partners, ranking second among U.S. export markets and third in total U.S. trade (imports plus exports). Under NAFTA, the United States and Mexico have developed significant economic ties. Trade between the two countries has more than tripled since the agreement entered into force in 1994. Through NAFTA, the United States, Mexico, and Canada form one of the world's largest free trade areas, with about one-third of the world's total gross domestic product (GDP). Mexico has the second-largest economy in Latin America after Brazil. It has a population of 129 million people, making it the most populous Spanish-speaking country in the world and the third-most populous country in the Western Hemisphere (after the United States and Brazil). Mexico's gross domestic product (GDP) was an estimated $1.15 trillion in 2017, about 6% of U.S. GDP of $19.39 trillion. Measured in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP), Mexican GDP was considerably higher, $2.35 trillion, or about 12% of U.S. GDP. Per capita income in Mexico is significantly lower than in the United States. In 2017, Mexico's per capita GDP in purchasing power parity was $17,743, or 30% of U.S. per capita GDP of $59,381 (see Table 1 ). Ten years earlier, in 2007, Mexico's per capita GDP in purchasing power parity was $13,995, or 29% of the U.S. amount of $48,006. Although there is a notable income disparity with the United States, Mexico's per capita GDP is relatively high by global standards, and falls within the World Bank's upper-middle income category. Mexico's economy relies heavily on the United States as an export market. The value of exports equaled 37% of Mexico's GDP in 2017, as shown in Table 1 , and approximately 80% of Mexico's exports were headed to the United States. U.S.-Mexico Trade The United States is, by far, Mexico's leading partner in merchandise trade, while Mexico is the United States' third-largest trade partner after China and Canada. Mexico ranks second among U.S. export markets after Canada, and is the third-leading supplier of U.S. imports. U.S. merchandise trade with Mexico increased rapidly since NAFTA entered into force in January 1994. U.S. exports to Mexico increased from $41.6 billion in 1993 (the year prior to NAFTA's entry into force) to $265.0 billion in 2018. U.S. imports from Mexico increased from $39.9 billion in 1993 to $346.5 billion in 2018. The merchandise trade balance with Mexico went from a surplus of $1.7 billion in 1993 to a widening deficit that reached $74.3 billion in 2007 and then increased to an all-time high of $81.5 billion in 2018. The United States had a surplus in services trade with Mexico of $7.4 billion in 2017 (latest available data), as shown in Figure 1 . U.S. services exports to Mexico totaled $32.8 billion in 2017, up from $14.2 billion in 1999, while imports were valued at $25.5 billion in 2017, up from $9.7 billion in 1999. U.S. Imports from Mexico Leading U.S. merchandise imports from Mexico in 2018 included motor vehicles ($64.5 billion or 19% of imports from Mexico), motor vehicle parts ($49.8 billion or 14% of imports), computer equipment ($26.6 billion or 8% of imports), oil and gas ($14.5 billion or 4% of imports), and electrical equipment ($11.9 billion or 3% of imports), as shown in Table 2 . U.S. imports from Mexico increased from $295.7 billion in 2014 to $346.5 billion in 2018. Oil and gas imports from Mexico have decreased sharply, dropping from $39.6 billion in 2011 to $7.6 billion in 2016, partially due to a decrease in oil production but also because of the drop in the price of oil around the world. In 2017, U.S. oil and gas imports from Mexico increased to $14.5 billion. U.S. Exports to Mexico Leading U.S. exports to Mexico in 2018 consisted of petroleum and coal products ($28.8 billion or 11% of exports to Mexico), motor vehicle parts ($20.2 billion or 8% of exports), computer equipment ($17.4 billion or 7% of exports), semiconductors and other electronic components ($13.1 billion or 5% of exports), and basic chemicals ($10.3 billion or 4% of exports), as shown in Table 3 . Bilateral Foreign Direct Investment Foreign direct investment (FDI) has been an integral part of the economic relationship between the United States and Mexico since NAFTA implementation. The United States is the largest source of FDI in Mexico. The stock of U.S. FDI increased from $17.0 billion in 1994 to a high of $109.7 billion in 2017. While the stock Mexican FDI in the United States is much lower, it has increased significantly since NAFTA, from $2.1 billion in 1994 to $18.0 billion in 2017 (see Figure 2 ). The liberalization of Mexico's restrictions on foreign investment in the late 1980s and the early 1990s played an important role in attracting U.S. investment to Mexico. Up until the mid-1980s, Mexico had a very protective policy that restricted foreign investment and controlled the exchange rate to encourage domestic growth, affecting the entire industrial sector. A sharp shift in policy in the late 1980s that included market opening measures and economic reforms helped bring in a steady increase of FDI flows. These reforms were locked in through NAFTA provisions on foreign investment and resulted in increased investor confidence. NAFTA investment provisions give North American investors from the United States, Mexico, or Canada nondiscriminatory treatment of their investments as well as investor protection. NAFTA may have encouraged U.S. FDI in Mexico by increasing investor confidence, but much of the growth may have occurred anyway because Mexico likely would have continued to liberalize its foreign investment laws with or without the agreement. Manufacturing and U.S.-Mexico Supply Chains Many economists and other observers have credited NAFTA with helping U.S. manufacturing industries, especially the U.S. auto industry, become more globally competitive through the development of supply chains. Much of the increase in U.S.-Mexico trade, for example, can be attributed to specialization as manufacturing and assembly plants have reoriented to take advantage of economies of scale. As a result, supply chains have been increasingly crossing national boundaries as manufacturing work is performed wherever it is most efficient. A reduction in tariffs in a given sector not only affects prices in that sector but also in industries that purchase intermediate inputs from that sector. Some analysts believe that the importance of these direct and indirect effects is often overlooked. They suggest that these linkages offer important trade and welfare gains from free trade agreements and that ignoring these input-output linkages could underestimate potential trade gains. A significant portion of merchandise trade between the United States and Mexico occurs in the context of production sharing as manufacturers in each country work together to create goods. Trade expansion has resulted in the creation of vertical supply relationships, especially along the U.S.-Mexico border. The flow of intermediate inputs produced in the United States and exported to Mexico and the return flow of finished products greatly increased the importance of the U.S.-Mexico border region as a production site. U.S. manufacturing industries, including automotive, electronics, appliances, and machinery, all rely on the assistance of Mexican manufacturers. In the auto sector, for example, trade expansion has resulted in the creation of vertical supply relationships throughout North America. The flow of auto merchandise trade between the United States and Mexico greatly increased the importance of North America as a production site for automobiles. According to industry experts, the North American auto industry has "multilayered connections" between U.S. and Mexican suppliers and assembly points. A Wall Street Journal article describes how an automobile produced in the United States has tens of thousands of parts that come from multiple producers in different countries and travel back and forth across borders several times. A company producing seats for automobiles, for example, incorporates components from four different U.S. states and four Mexican locations into products produced in the Midwest. These products are then sold to major car makers. The place where final assembly of a product is assembled may have little bearing on where its components are made. The integration of the North American auto industry is reflected in the percentage of U.S. auto imports that enter the United States duty-free under NAFTA. In 2017, 99% of U.S. motor vehicle imports from Mexico entered the United States duty-free under NAFTA, compared to 76% of motor vehicle parts. Only 56% of total U.S. imports from Mexico received duty-free treatment under NAFTA; the remainder entered the United States under other programs. Mexico's Export Processing Zones Mexico's export-oriented assembly plants, a majority of which have U.S. parent companies, are closely linked to U.S.-Mexico trade in various labor-intensive industries such as auto parts and electronic goods. Foreign-owned assembly plants, which originated under Mexico's maquiladora program in the 1960s, account for a substantial share of Mexico's trade with the United States. These export processing plants use extensive amounts of imported content to produce final goods and export the majority of their production to the U.S. market. NAFTA, along with a combination of other factors, contributed to a significant increase in Mexican export-oriented assembly plants, such as maquiladoras, after its entry into force. Other factors that contributed to manufacturing growth and integration include trade liberalization, wages, and economic conditions, both in the United States and Mexico. Although some provisions in NAFTA may have encouraged growth in certain sectors, manufacturing activity likely has been more influenced by the strength of the U.S. economy and relative wages in Mexico. Private industry groups state that these operations help U.S. companies remain competitive in the world marketplace by producing goods at competitive prices. In addition, the proximity of Mexico to the United States allows production to have a higher degree of U.S. content in the final product, which could help sustain jobs in the United States. Critics of these types of operations argue that they have a negative effect on the economy because they take jobs from the United States and help depress the wages of low-skilled U.S. workers. Maquiladoras and NAFTA Changes in Mexican regulations on export-oriented industries after NAFTA merged the maquiladora industry and Mexican domestic assembly-for-export plants into one program called the Maquiladora Manufacturing Industry and Export Services (IMMEX). NAFTA rules for the maquiladora industry were implemented in two phases, with the first phase covering the period 1994-2000, and the second phase starting in 2001. During the initial phase, NAFTA regulations continued to allow the maquiladora industry to import products duty-free into Mexico, regardless of the country of origin of the products. This phase also allowed maquiladora operations to increase maquiladora sales into the Mexican domestic market. Phase II made a significant change to the industry in that the new North American rules of origin determined duty-free status for U.S. and Canadian products exported to Mexico for maquiladoras. In 2001, the North American rules of origin determined the duty-free status for a given import and replaced the previous special tariff provisions that applied only to maquiladora operations. The initial maquiladora program ceased to exist and the same trade rules applied to all assembly operations in Mexico. The elimination of duty-free imports by maquiladoras from non-NAFTA countries under NAFTA caused some initial uncertainty for the companies with maquiladora operations. Maquiladoras that were importing from third countries, such as Japan or China, would have to pay applicable tariffs on those goods under the new rules. Worker Remittances to Mexico Remittances are one of the three highest sources of foreign currency for Mexico, along with foreign direct investment and tourism. Most remittances to Mexico come from workers in the United States who send money back to their relatives. Mexico receives the largest amount of remittances in Latin America. Remittances are often a stable financial flow for some regions as workers in the United States make efforts to send money to family members. Most go to southern states where poverty levels are high. Women tend to be the primary recipients of the money, and usually use it for basic needs such as rent, food, medicine, and/or utilities. The year 2017 was a record-breaking one for remittances to Mexico, with a total of $28.8 billion, which represents an increase of 7.5% over the 2016 level. In 2016, annual remittances to Mexico increased by 8.7% to a record high at the time of $27.0 billion (see Figure 3 ). Some analysts contend that the increase is partially due to the sharp devaluation of the Mexican peso after the election of President Donald Trump, while others state that it is a shock reaction to President Trump's threat to block money transfers to Mexico to pay for a border wall. The weaker value of the peso has negatively affected its purchasing power in Mexico, especially among the poor, and many families have had to rely more on money sent from their relatives in the United States. Since the late 1990s, remittances have been an important source of income for many Mexicans. Between 1996 and 2007, remittances increased from $4.2 billion to $26.1 billion, an increase of over 500%, and then declined by 15.2%, in 2009, likely due to the global financial crisis. The growth rate in remittances has been related to the frequency of sending, exchange rate fluctuations, migration, and employment in the United States. Electronic transfers and money orders are the most popular methods to send money to Mexico. Worker remittance flows to Mexico have an important impact on the Mexican economy, in some regions more than others. Some studies report that in southern Mexican states, remittances mostly or completely cover general consumption and/or housing. A significant portion of the money received by households goes for food, clothing, health care, and other household expenses. Money also may be used for capital invested in microenterprises throughout urban Mexico. The economic impact of remittance flows is concentrated in the poorer states of Mexico. Bilateral Economic Cooperation The United States has engaged in bilateral efforts with Mexico, and also with Canada, to address issues related to border security, trade facilitation, economic competitiveness, regulatory cooperation, and energy integration. High Level Economic Dialogue (HLED) The United States and Mexico launched the High Level Economic Dialogue (HLED) on September 20, 2013, to help advance U.S.-Mexico economic and commercial priorities that are central to promoting mutual economic growth, job creation, and global competitiveness. The initiative is led at the Cabinet level and is co-chaired by the U.S. Department of State, Department of Commerce, the Office of the United States Trade Representative, and their Mexican counterparts. Major goals of the HLED are meant to build on, but not duplicate, a range of existing bilateral dialogues and working groups. The United States and Mexico aim to promote competitiveness in specific sectors such as transportation, telecommunications, and energy, as well as to promote greater two-way investment. The HLED is organized around three broad pillars, including 1. Promoting competitiveness and connectivity; 2. Fostering economic growth, productivity, and innovation; and 3. Partnering for regional and global leadership. The HLED is also meant to explore ways to promote entrepreneurship, stimulate innovation, and encourage the development of human capital to meet the needs of the 21 st century economy, as well as examine initiatives to strengthen economic development along the U.S.-Mexico border region. High-Level Regulatory Cooperation Council Another bilateral effort is the U.S.-Mexico High-Level Regulatory Cooperation Council (HLRCC), launched in May 2010. The official work plan was released by the two governments on February 28, 2012, and focuses on regulatory cooperation in numerous sectoral issues including food safety, e-certification for plants and plant products, commercial motor vehicle safety standards and procedures, nanotechnology, e-health, and offshore oil and gas development standards. U.S. agencies involved in regulatory cooperation include the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Department of Agriculture, Department of Transportation, Office of Management and Budget, Department of the Interior, and Occupational Safety and Health Administration. 21st Century Border Management The United States and Mexico are engaged in a bilateral border management initiative under the Declaration Concerning 21 st Century Border Management that was announced in 2010. This initiative is a bilateral effort to manage the 2,000-mile U.S.-Mexico border through the following cooperative efforts: expediting legitimate trade and travel; enhancing public safety; managing security risks; engaging border communities; and setting policies to address possible statutory, regulatory, and/or infrastructure changes that would enable the two countries to improve collaboration. With respect to port infrastructure, the initiative specifies expediting legitimate commerce and travel through investments in personnel, technology, and infrastructure. The two countries established a Bilateral Executive Steering Committee (ESC) composed of representatives from the appropriate federal government departments and offices from both the United States and Mexico. For the United States, this includes representatives from the Departments of State, Homeland Security, Justice, Transportation, Agriculture, Commerce, Interior, and Defense, and the Office of the United States Trade Representative. For Mexico, it includes representatives from the Secretariats of Foreign Relations, Interior, Finance and Public Credit, Economy, Public Security, Communications and Transportation, Agriculture, and the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic. North American Leaders Summits Since 2005, the United States, Canada, and Mexico have made efforts to increase cooperation on economic and security issues through various endeavors. President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama, with the leaders of Mexico and Canada, participated in trilateral summits known as the North American Leaders' Summits (NALS). The first NALS took place in March 2005, in Waco, Texas, and was followed by numerous trilateral summits in Mexico, Canada, and the United States. President Obama participated in the last summit on June 29, 2016, in Ottawa, Canada, with an agenda focused on economic competitiveness, climate change, clean energy, the environment, regional and global cooperation, security, and defense. President Donald Trump has not indicated whether his Administration plans to continue NALS efforts. The United States has pursued other efforts with Canada and Mexico, many of which have built upon the accomplishments of the working groups formed under the NALS. These efforts include the North American Competitiveness Work Plan (NACW) and the North American Competitiveness and Innovation Conference (NACIC). Proponents of North American competitiveness and security cooperation view the initiatives as constructive to addressing issues of mutual interest and benefit for all three countries, especially in the areas of North American regionalism; inclusive and shared prosperity; innovation and education; energy and climate change; citizen security; and regional, global, and stakeholder outreach to Central America and other countries in the Western Hemisphere. Some critics believe that the summits and other trilateral efforts are not substantive enough and that North American leaders should make their meetings more consequential with follow-up mechanisms that are more action oriented. Others contend that the efforts do not go far enough in including human rights issues or discussions on drug-related violence in Mexico. The Mexican Economy Mexico's economy is closely linked to the U.S. economy due to the strong trade and investment ties between the two countries. Economic growth has been slow in recent years. The forecast over the next few years projects economic growth of above 2%, a positive outlook, according to some economists, given external constraints but falling short of what the country needs to make a significant cut in poverty and to create jobs. Over the past 30 years, Mexico has had a low economic growth record with an average growth rate of 2.6%. Mexico's GDP grew by 2.4% in 2017 and 2.1% in 2016. The country benefitted from important structural reforms initiated in the early 1990s, but events such as the U.S. recession of 2001 and the global economic downturn of 2009 adversely affected the economy and offset the government's efforts to improve macroeconomic management. The OECD outlook for Mexico for 2018 states that there are some encouraging signs for potential economic growth, including improvements in fiscal performance, responsible and reliable monetary policy to curb inflation, growth in manufacturing exports and inflows of foreign direct investment, and positive developments due to government reforms in telecommunications, energy, labor, education, and other structural reforms. According to the OECD, full implementation of Mexico's structural reforms could add as much as 1% to the annual growth rate of the Mexican economy. While these achievements may be positive, Mexico continues to face significant challenges in regard to alleviating poverty, decreasing informality, strengthening judicial institutions, addressing corruption, and increasing labor productivity. Trends in Mexico's GDP growth generally follow U.S. economic trends, as shown in Figure 4 , but with higher fluctuations. Mexico's economy is highly dependent on manufacturing exports to the United States, as approximately 80% of Mexico's exports are destined for the United States. The country's outlook will likely remain closely tied to that of the United States, despite Mexico's efforts to diversify trade. Informality and Poverty Part of the government's reform efforts are aimed at making economic growth more inclusive, reducing income inequality, improving the quality of education, and reducing informality and poverty. Mexico has a large informal sector that is estimated to account for a considerable portion of total employment. Estimates on the size of the informal labor sector vary widely, with some sources estimating that the informal sector accounts for about one-third of total employment and others estimating it to be as high as two-thirds of the workforce. Under Mexico's legal framework, workers in the formal sector are defined as salaried workers employed by a firm that registers them with the government and are covered by Mexico's social security programs. Informal sector workers are defined as nonsalaried workers who are usually self-employed. These workers have various degrees of entitlement to other social protection programs. Salaried workers can be employed by industry, such as construction, agriculture, or services. Nonsalaried employees are defined by social marginalization or exclusion and can be defined by various categories. These workers may include agricultural producers; seamstresses and tailors; artisans; street vendors; individuals who wash cars on the street; and other professions. Many workers in the informal sector suffer from poverty, which has been one of Mexico's more serious and pressing economic problems for many years. Although the government has made progress in poverty reduction efforts, poverty continues to be a basic challenge for the country's development. The Mexican government's efforts to alleviate poverty have focused on conditional cash transfer programs. The Prospera (previously called Oportunidades ) program seeks to not only alleviate the immediate effects of poverty through cash and in-kind transfers, but to break the cycle of poverty by improving nutrition and health standards among poor families and increasing educational attainment. Prospera has provided cash transfers to the poorest 6.9 million Mexican households located in localities from all 32 Mexican states. It has been replicated in about two dozen countries throughout the world. The program provides cash transfers to families in poverty who demonstrate that they regularly attend medical appointments and can certify that children are attending school. The government also provides educational cash transfers to participating families. Programs also provide nutrition support to pregnant and nursing women and malnourished children. Some economists cite the informal sector as a hindrance to the country's economic development. Other experts contend that Mexico's social programs benefitting the informal sector have led to increases in informal employment. Structural and Other Economic Challenges For years, numerous political analysts and economists have agreed that Mexico needs significant political and economic structural reforms to improve its potential for long-term economic growth. President Peña Nieto was successful in breaking the gridlock in the Mexican government and passing reform measures meant to stimulate economic growth. The OECD stated that the main challenge for the government is to ensure full implementation of the reforms and that it needed to progress further in other key areas. According to the OECD, Mexico must improve administrative capacity at all levels of government and reform its judicial institutions. Such actions would have a strong potential to boost living standards substantially, stimulate economic growth, and reduce income inequality. The OECD stated that issues regarding human rights conditions, rule of law, and corruption were also challenges that needed to be addressed by the government, as they too affect economic conditions and living standards. According to a 2014 study by the McKinsey Global Institute, Mexico had successfully created globally competitive industries in some sectors, but not in others. The study described a "dualistic" nature of the Mexican economy in which there was a modern Mexico with sophisticated automotive and aerospace factories, multinationals that could compete in global markets, and universities that graduated high numbers of engineers. In contrast, the other part of Mexico, consisting of smaller, more traditional firms, was technologically backward, unproductive, and operated outside the formal economy. The study stated that three decades of economic reforms had failed to raise the overall GDP growth. Government measures to privatize industries, liberalize trade, and welcome foreign investment created a side to the economy that was highly productive in which numerous industries had flourished, but the reforms had not yet been successful in touching other sectors of the economy where traditional enterprises had not modernized, informality was rising, and productivity was plunging. Energy Mexico's long-term economic outlook depends largely on the energy sector. The country is one of the largest oil producers in the world, but its oil production has steadily decreased since 2005 as a result of natural production declines. According to industry experts, Mexico has the potential resources to support a long-term recovery in total production, primarily in the Gulf of Mexico. However, the country does not have the technical capability or financial means to develop potential deepwater projects or shale oil deposits in the north. Reversing these trends is a goal of the 2013 historic constitutional energy reforms sought by President Peña Nieto and enacted by the Mexican Congress. The reforms opened Mexico's energy sector to production-sharing contracts with private and foreign investors while keeping the ownership of Mexico's hydrocarbons under state control. They will likely expand U.S.-Mexico energy trade and provide opportunities for U.S. companies involved in the hydrocarbons sector, as well as infrastructure and other oil field services. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) excluded foreign investment in Mexico's energy sector. Under NAFTA's energy chapter, parties confirmed respect for their constitutions, which was of particular importance for Mexico and its 1917 Constitution establishing Mexican national ownership of all hydrocarbons resources and restrictions of private or foreign participation in its energy sector. Under NAFTA, Mexico also reserved the right to provide electricity as a domestic public service. In the NAFTA renegotiations (see section below on " NAFTA Renegotiation and the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) "), the United States sought to preserve and strengthen investment, market access, and state-owned enterprise disciplines benefitting energy production and transmission. In addition, the negotiating objectives stated that the United States supports North American energy security and independence, and promotes the continuation of energy market-opening reforms. Mexico specifically called for a modernization of NAFTA's energy provisions. The USMCA retains recognition of Mexico's national ownership of all hydrocarbons. Some observers contend that much is at stake for the North American oil and gas industry in the bilateral economic relationship, especially in regard to Mexico as an energy market for the United States. Although Mexico was traditionally a net exporter of hydrocarbons to the United States, the United States had a trade surplus in 2016 of almost $10 billion in energy trade as a result of declining Mexican oil production, lower oil prices, and rising U.S. natural gas and refined oil exports to Mexico. The growth in U.S. exports is largely due to Mexico's reforms, which have driven investment in new natural gas-powered electricity generation and the retail gasoline market. Some observers contend that dispute settlement mechanisms in NAFTA and the proposed USMCA will defend the interests of the U.S. government and U.S. companies doing business in Mexico. They argue that the dispute settlement provisions and the investment chapter of the agreement will help protect U.S. multibillion-dollar investments in Mexico. They argue that a weakening of NAFTA's dispute settlement provisions would result in less protection of U.S. investors in Mexico and less investor confidence. Mexico's Regional Trade Agreements Mexico has had a growing commitment to trade integration and liberalization through the formation of FTAs since the 1990s, and its trade policy is among the most open in the world. Mexico's pursuit of FTAs with other countries not only provides domestic economic benefits, but could also potentially reduce its economic dependence on the United States. Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) Agreement Mexico signed the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a negotiated regional free trade agreement (FTA), but which has not entered into force, among the United States, Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam. In January 2017, the United States gave notice to the other TPP signatories that it does not intend to ratify the agreement. On March 8, 2018, Mexico and the 10 remaining signatories of the TPP signed the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). The CPTPP parties announced the outlines of the agreement in November 2017 and concluded the negotiations in January 2018. The CPTPP, which will enact much of the proposed TPP without the participation of the United States, is set to take effect on December 30, 2018. It requires ratification by 6 of the 11 signatories to become effective. As of October 31, 2018, Mexico, Canada, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and Singapore had ratified the agreement. Upon entry into force, it will reduce and eliminate tariff and nontariff barriers on goods, services, and agriculture. It could enhance the links Mexico already has through its FTAs with other signatories—Canada, Chile, Japan, and Peru—and expand its trade relationship with other countries, including Australia, Brunei, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, and Vietnam. Mexico's Free Trade Agreements Mexico has a total of 11 free trade agreements involving 46 countries. These include agreements with most countries in the Western Hemisphere, including the United States and Canada under NAFTA, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Peru, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras. In addition, Mexico has negotiated FTAs outside of the Western Hemisphere and entered into agreements with Israel, Japan, and the European Union. Given the perception of a rising protectionist sentiment in the United States, some regional experts have suggested that Mexico is seeking to negotiate new FTAs more aggressively and deepen existing ones. In addition to being a party to the CPTPP, Mexico and the EU renegotiated their FTA and modernized it with updated provisions. Discussions included government procurement, energy trade, IPR protection, rules of origin, and small- and medium-sized businesses. The new agreement is expected to replace a previous agreement between Mexico and the EU from 2000. The agreement is expected to allow almost all goods, including agricultural products, to move between Europe and Mexico duty-free. Mexico is also a party to the Pacific Alliance, a regional integration initiative formed by Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru in 2011. Its main purpose is to form a regional trading bloc and stronger ties with the Asia-Pacific region. The Alliance has a larger scope than free trade agreements, including the free movement of people and measures to integrate the stock markets of member countries. NAFTA NAFTA has been in effect since January 1994. Prior to NAFTA, Mexico was already liberalizing its protectionist trade and investment policies that had been in place for decades. The restrictive trade regime began after Mexico's revolutionary period, and remained until the early to mid-1980s, when it began to shift to a more open, export-oriented economy. For Mexico, an FTA with the United States represented a way to lock in trade liberalization reforms, attract greater flows of foreign investment, and spur economic growth. For the United States, NAFTA represented an opportunity to expand the growing export market to the south, but it also represented a political opportunity to improve the relationship with Mexico. NAFTA Renegotiation and the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) On November 30, 2018, the United States, Canada, and Mexico signed the proposed USMCA. Concluded on September 30, 2018, USMCA would revise and modernize NAFTA. The proposed USMCA would have to be approved by Congress and ratified by Mexico and Canada before entering into force. Pursuant to trade promotion authority (TPA), the preliminary agreement with Mexico was notified to Congress on August 31, 2018, in part to allow for the signing of the agreement prior to Mexico's president-elect Andreas Manuel Lopez Obrador taking office on December 1, 2018. TPA contains certain notification and reporting requirements that likely will push any consideration of implementing legislation into the 116 th Congress. USMCA, comprised of 34 chapters and 12 side letters, retains most of NAFTA's chapters, making notable changes to market access provisions for autos and agriculture products, and to rules such as investment, government procurement, and intellectual property rights (IPR). New issues, such as digital trade, state-owned enterprises, anticorruption, and currency misalignment, are also addressed. NAFTA renegotiation provided opportunities to modernize the 1994 agreement by addressing issues not covered in the original text and updating others. Many U.S. manufacturers, services providers, and agricultural producers opposed efforts to withdraw from NAFTA and asked the Trump Administration to "do no harm" in the negotiations because they have much to lose if the United States pulls out of the agreement. Contentious issues in the negotiations reportedly included auto rules of origin, a "sunset clause" related to the trade deficit, dispute settlement provisions, and agriculture provisions on seasonal produce. Possible Effect of Withdrawal from NAFTA President Trump stated on December 1, 2018, that he intends to notify Mexico and Canada that he intends to withdraw from NAFTA with a notice of six months. A NAFTA withdrawal by the United States prior to congressional approval of the proposed USMCA would have significant implications going forward for U.S. trade policy and U.S.-Mexico economic relations. Numerous think tanks and economists have written about the possible economic consequences of U.S. withdrawal from NAFTA: An analysis by the Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE) finds that a withdrawal from NAFTA would cost the United States 187,000 jobs that rely on exports to Mexico and Canada. These job losses would occur over a period of one to three years. By comparison, according to the study, between 2013 and 2015, 7.4 million U.S. workers were displaced or lost their jobs involuntarily due to companies shutting down or moving elsewhere globally. The study notes that the most affected states would be Arkansas, Kentucky, Mississippi, and Indiana. The most affected sectors would be autos, agriculture, and nonauto manufacturing. A 2017 study by ImpactEcon, an economic analysis consulting company, estimates that if NAFTA were to terminate, real GDP, trade, investment, and employment in all three NAFTA countries would decline. The study estimates U.S. job losses of between 256,000 and 1.2 million in three to five years, with about 95,000 forced to relocate to other sectors. Canadian and Mexican employment of low-skilled workers would decline by 125,000 and 951,000 respectively. The authors of the study estimate a decline in U.S. GDP of 0.64% (over $100 billion). The Coalition of Services Industries (CSI) argues that NAFTA continues to be a remarkable success for U.S. services providers, creating a vast market for U.S. services providers, such as telecommunications and financial services. CSI estimates that if NAFTA is terminated, the United States risks losing $88 billion in annual U.S. services exports to Canada and Mexico, which support 587,000 high-paying U.S. jobs. Opponents of NAFTA argue that it has resulted in thousands of lost jobs to Mexico and has put downward pressure on U.S. wages. A study by the Economic Policy Institute estimates that, as of 2010, U.S. trade deficits with Mexico had displaced 682,900 U.S. jobs. Others contend that workers need more effective protections in trade agreements, with stronger enforcement mechanisms. For example, the AFL-CIO states that current U.S. FTAs have no deadlines or criteria for pursuing sanctions against a trade partner that is not enforcing its FTA commitments. The AFL-CIO contends that the language tabled by the United States in the renegotiations does nothing to improve long-standing shortcomings in NAFTA. Canada and Mexico likely would maintain NAFTA between themselves if the United States were to withdraw. U.S.-Canada trade could be governed either by the Canada-U.S. free trade agreement (CUSFTA), which entered into force in 1989 (suspended since the advent of NAFTA), or by the baseline commitments common to both countries as members of the World Trade Organization. If CUSFTA remains in effect, the United States and Canada would continue to exchange goods duty free and would continue to adhere to many provisions of the agreement common to both CUSFTA and NAFTA. Some commitments not included in the CUSFTA, such as intellectual property rights, would continue as baseline obligations in the WTO. It is unclear whether CUSFTA would remain in effect as its continuance would require the assent of both parties. Selected Bilateral Trade Disputes The United States and Mexico have had a number of trade disputes over the years, many of which have been resolved. These issues have involved trade in sugar, country of origin labeling, tomato imports from Mexico, dolphin-safe tuna labeling, and NAFTA trucking provisions. Section 232 and U.S. Tariffs on Steel and Aluminum Imports The United States and Mexico are currently in a trade dispute over U.S. actions to impose tariffs on imports of steel and aluminum. The United States claims its actions are due to national security concerns; however, Mexico contends that U.S. tariffs are meant to protect domestic industries from import competition and are inconsistent with the World Trade Organization (WTO) Safeguard Agreement. On March 8, 2018, President Trump issued two proclamations imposing tariffs on U.S. imports of certain steel and aluminum products, respectively, using presidential powers granted under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. Section 232 authorizes the President to impose restrictions on certain imports based on an affirmative determination by the Department of Commerce that the targeted import products threaten to impair national security. The proclamations outlined the President's decisions to impose tariffs of 25% on steel and 10% on aluminum imports, with some flexibility on the application of tariffs by country. On March 22, the President issued proclamations temporarily excluding Mexico, Canada, and numerous other countries, giving a deadline of May 1, by which time each trading partner had to negotiate an alternative means to remove the "threatened impairment to the national security by import" for steel and aluminum in order to maintain the exemption. After the temporary exception expired on May 31, 2018, the United States began imposing a 25% duty on steel imports and a 10% duty on aluminum imports from Mexico and Canada. The conclusion of the proposed USMCA did not resolve or address the Section 232 tariffs on imported steel and aluminum from Canada and Mexico. The three parties continue to discuss the tariffs, which some analysts believe could result in quotas on imports of Mexican and Canadian steel and aluminum. In response to the U.S. action, Mexico and several other major partners initiated dispute settlement proceedings and announced their intention to retaliate against U.S. exports. Mexico announced it would impose retaliatory tariffs on 71 U.S. products, covering an estimated $3.7 billion worth of trade, as shown in Table 4 . Mexico is a major U.S. partner for both steel and aluminum trade. In 2017, Mexico ranked second, after Canada, among U.S. trading partners for both steel and aluminum. U.S.-Mexico trade in steel and aluminum totaled $10.3 billion in 2017, as shown in Table 5 . Dolphin-Safe Tuna Labeling Dispute The United States and Mexico are currently involved in a trade dispute under the WTO regarding U.S. dolphin-safe labeling provisions and tuna imports from Mexico. Mexico has long argued that U.S. labeling rules for dolphin-safe tuna negatively affect its tuna exports to the United States. The United States contends that Mexico's use of nets and chasing dolphins to find large schools of tuna is harmful to dolphins. The most recent development in the long trade battle took place on April 25, 2017, when a WTO arbitrator determined that Mexico is entitled to levy trade restrictions on imports from the United States worth $163.2 million per year. The arbitrator made the decision based on a U.S. action from 2013 (see section below on " WTO Tuna Dispute Proceedings "), but did not make a compliance judgment on the U.S. 2016 dolphin-safe tuna labeling rule that the United States has said brings it into compliance with the WTO's previous rulings. Dispute over U.S. Labeling Provisions The issue relates to U.S. labeling provisions that establish conditions under which tuna products may voluntarily be labeled as "dolphin-safe." Products may not be labeled as dolphin-safe if the tuna is caught by means that include intentionally encircling dolphins with nets. According to the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), some Mexican fishing vessels use this method when fishing for tuna. Mexico asserts that U.S. tuna labeling provisions deny Mexican tuna effective access to the U.S. market. The government of Mexico requested the United States to broaden its dolphin-safe rules to include Mexico's long-standing tuna fishing technique. It cites statistics showing that modern equipment has greatly reduced dolphin mortality from its height in the 1960s and that its ships carry independent observers who can verify dolphin safety. However, some environmental groups that monitor the tuna industry dispute these claims, stating that even if no dolphins are killed during the chasing and netting, some are wounded and later die. In other cases, they argue, young dolphin calves may not be able to keep pace and are separated from their mothers and later die. These groups contend that if the United States changes its labeling requirements, cans of Mexican tuna could be labeled as "dolphin-safe" when it is not. However, an industry spokesperson representing three major tuna processors in the United States, including StarKist, Bumblebee, and Chicken of the Sea, contends that U.S. companies would probably not buy Mexican tuna even if it is labeled as dolphin-safe because these companies "would not be in the market for tuna that is not caught in the dolphin-safe manner." WTO Tuna Dispute Proceedings The tuna labeling dispute began over 10 years ago. In April 2000, the Clinton Administration lifted an embargo on Mexican tuna under relaxed standards for a dolphin-safe label. This was in accordance with internationally agreed procedures and U.S. legislation passed in 1997 that encouraged the unharmed release of dolphins from nets. However, a federal judge in San Francisco ruled that the standards of the law had not been met, and the Federal Appeals Court in San Francisco sustained the ruling in July 2001. Under the Bush Administration, the Commerce Department ruled on December 31, 2002, that the dolphin-safe label may be applied if qualified observers certify that no dolphins were killed or seriously injured in the netting process. Environmental groups, however, filed a suit to block the modification. On April 10, 2003, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California enjoined the Commerce Department from modifying the standards for the dolphin-safe label. On August 9, 2004, the federal district court ruled against the Bush Administration's modification of the dolphin-safe standards and reinstated the original standards in the 1990 Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act. That decision was appealed to the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which ruled against the Administration in April 2007, finding that the Department of Commerce did not base its determination on scientific studies of the effects of Mexican tuna fishing on dolphins. In late October 2008, Mexico initiated WTO dispute proceedings against the United States, maintaining that U.S. requirements for Mexican tuna exporters prevent them from using the U.S. "dolphin-safe" label for its products. The United States requested that Mexico refrain from proceeding in the WTO and that the case be moved to the NAFTA dispute resolution mechanism. According to the USTR, however, Mexico "blocked that process for settling this dispute." In September 2011, a WTO panel determined that the objectives of U.S. voluntary tuna labeling provisions were legitimate and that any adverse effects felt by Mexican tuna producers were the result of choices made by Mexico's own fishing fleet and canners. However, the panel also found U.S. labeling provisions to be "more restrictive than necessary to achieve the objectives of the measures." The Obama Administration appealed the WTO ruling. On May 16, 2012, the WTO's Appellate Body overturned two key findings from the September 2011 WTO dispute panel. The Appellate Body found that U.S. tuna labeling requirements violate global trade rules because they treat imported tuna from Mexico less favorably than U.S. tuna. The Appellate Body also rejected Mexico's claim that U.S. tuna labeling requirements were more trade-restrictive than necessary to meet the U.S. objective of minimizing dolphin deaths. The United States had a deadline of July 13, 2013, to comply with the WTO dispute ruling. In July 2013, the United States issued a final rule amending certain dolphin-safe labelling requirements to bring it into compliance with the WTO labeling requirements. On November 14, 2013, Mexico requested the establishment of a WTO compliance panel. On April 16, 2014, the chair of the compliance panel announced that it expected to issue its final report to the parties by December 2014. In April 2015, the panel ruled against the United States when it issued its finding that the U.S. labeling modifications unfairly discriminated against Mexico's fishing industry. On November 2015, a WTO appellate body found for a fourth time that U.S. labeling rules aimed at preventing dolphin bycatch violate international trade obligations. The United States expressed concerns with this ruling and stated that the panel exceeded its authority by ruling on acts and measures that Mexico did not dispute or were never applied. On March 16, 2016, Mexico announced that it would ask the WTO to sanction $472.3 million in annual retaliatory tariffs against the United States for its failure to comply with the WTO ruling. The United States counterargued that Mexico could seek authorization to suspend concessions of $21.9 million. On March 22, 2016, the United States announced that it would revise its dolphin-safe label requirements on tuna products to comply with the WTO decision. The revised regulations sought to increase labeling rules for tuna caught by fishing vessels in all regions of the world, and not just those operating in the region where Mexican vessels operate. The new rules did not modify existing requirements that establish the method by which tuna is caught in order for it to be labeled "dolphin-safe." The Humane Society International announced that it was pleased with U.S. actions to increase global dolphin protections. Sugar Disputes 2014 Mexican Sugar Import Dispute On December 19, 2014, the U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC) signed an agreement with the Government of Mexico suspending the U.S. countervailing duty (CVD) investigation of sugar imports from Mexico. The DOC signed a second agreement with Mexican sugar producers and exporters suspending an antidumping (AD) duty investigation on imports of Mexican sugar. The agreements suspending the investigations alter the nature of trade in sugar between Mexico and the United States by (1) imposing volume limits on U.S. sugar imports from Mexico and (2) setting minimum price levels on Mexican sugar. After the suspension agreement was announced, two U.S. sugar companies, Imperial Sugar Company and AmCane Sugar LLC, requested that the DOC continue the CVD and AD investigations on sugar imports from Mexico. The two companies filed separate submissions on January 16, 2015, claiming "interested party" status. The companies claimed they met the statutory standards to seek continuation of the probes. The submissions to the DOC followed requests to the ITC, by the same two companies, to review the two December 2014 suspension agreements. The ITC reviewed the sugar suspension agreements to determine whether they eliminate the injurious effect of sugar imports from Mexico. On March 19, 2015, the ITC upheld the agreement between the United States and Mexico that suspended the sugar investigations. Mexican Economy Minister Ildefonso Guajardo Villarreal praised the ITC decision, stating that it supported the Mexican government position. The dispute began on March 28, 2014, when the American Sugar Coalition and its members filed a petition requesting that the U.S. ITC and the DOC conduct an investigation, alleging that Mexico was dumping and subsidizing its sugar exports to the United States. The petitioners claimed that dumped and subsidized sugar exports from Mexico were harming U.S. sugar producers and workers. They claimed that Mexico's actions would cost the industry $1 billion in 2014. On April 18, 2014, the DOC announced the initiation of AD and CVD investigations of sugar imports from Mexico. On May 9, 2014, the ITC issued a preliminary report stating that there was a reasonable indication a U.S. industry was materially injured by imports of sugar from Mexico that were allegedly sold in the United States at less than fair value and allegedly subsidized by the Government of Mexico. In August 2014, the DOC announced in its preliminary ruling that Mexican sugar exported to the United States was being unfairly subsidized. Following the preliminary subsidy determination, the DOC stated that it would direct the U.S. Customs and Border Protection to collect cash deposits on imports of Mexican sugar. Based on the preliminary findings, the DOC imposed cumulative duties on U.S. imports of Mexican sugar, ranging from 2.99% to 17.01% under the CVD order. Additional duties of between 39.54% and 47.26% were imposed provisionally following the preliminary AD findings. The final determination in the two investigations was expected in 2015 and had not been issued when the suspension agreements were signed. The Sweetener Users Association (SUA), which represents beverage makers, confectioners, and other food companies, argues that the case is "a diversionary tactic to distract from the real cause of distortion in the U.S. sugar market—the U.S. government's sugar program." It contends that between 2009 and 2012, U.S. sugar prices soared well above the world price because of the U.S. program, providing an incentive for sugar growers to increase production. According to the sugar users association, this resulted in a surplus of sugar and a return to lower sugar prices. The SUA has been a long-standing critic of the U.S. sugar program. Sugar and High Fructose Corn Syrup Dispute Resolved in 2006 In 2006, the United States and Mexico resolved a trade dispute involving sugar and high fructose corn syrup. The dispute involved a sugar side letter negotiated under NAFTA. Mexico argued that the side letter entitled it to ship net sugar surplus to the United States duty-free under NAFTA, while the United States argued that the sugar side letter limited Mexican shipments of sugar. In addition, Mexico complained that imports of high fructose corn syrup (HFCS) sweeteners from the United States constituted dumping. It imposed antidumping duties for some time, until NAFTA and WTO dispute resolution panels upheld U.S. claims that the Mexican government colluded with the Mexican sugar and sweetener industries to restrict HFCS imports from the United States. In late 2001, the Mexican Congress imposed a 20% tax on soft drinks made with corn syrup sweeteners to aid the ailing domestic cane sugar industry, and subsequently extended the tax annually despite U.S. objections. In 2004, the United States Trade Representative (USTR) initiated WTO dispute settlement proceedings against Mexico's HFCS tax, and following interim decisions, the WTO panel issued a final decision on October 7, 2005, essentially supporting the U.S. position. Mexico appealed this decision, and in March 2006, the WTO Appellate Body upheld its October 2005 ruling. In July 2006, the United States and Mexico agreed that Mexico would eliminate its tax on soft drinks made with corn sweeteners no later than January 31, 2007. The tax was repealed, effective January 1, 2007. The United States and Mexico reached a sweetener agreement in August 2006. Under the agreement, Mexico can export 500,000 metric tons of sugar duty-free to the United States from October 1, 2006, to December 31, 2007. The United States can export the same amount of HFCS duty-free to Mexico during that time. NAFTA provides for the free trade of sweeteners beginning January 1, 2008. The House and Senate sugar caucuses expressed objections to the agreement, questioning the Bush Administration's determination that Mexico is a net-surplus sugar producer to allow Mexican sugar duty-free access to the U.S. market. Country-of-Origin Labeling (COOL) The United States was involved in a country-of-origin labeling (COOL) trade dispute under the World Trade Organization (WTO) with Canada and Mexico for several years, which has now been resolved. Mexican and Canadian meat producers claimed that U.S. mandatory COOL requirements for animal products discriminated against their products. They contended that the labeling requirements created an incentive for U.S. meat processors to use exclusively domestic animals because they forced processors to segregate animals born in Mexico or Canada from U.S.-born animals, which was very costly. They argued that the COOL requirement was an unfair barrier to trade. A WTO appellate panel in June 2013 ruled against the United States. The United States appealed the decision. On May 18, 2015, the WTO appellate body issued findings rejecting the U.S. arguments against the previous panel's findings. Mexico and Canada were considering imposing retaliatory tariffs on a wide variety of U.S. exports to Mexico, including fruits and vegetables, juices, meat products, dairy products, machinery, furniture and appliances, and others. The issue was resolved when the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016 ( P.L. 114-113 ) repealed mandatory COOL requirements for muscle cut beef and pork and ground beef and ground pork. USDA issued a final rule removing country-of-origin labeling requirements for these products. The rule took effect on March 2, 2016. The estimated economic benefits associated with the final rule are likely to be significant, according to the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). According to USDA, the estimated benefits for producers, processors, wholesalers, and retailers of previously covered beef and pork products are as much as $1.8 billion in cost avoidance, though the incremental cost savings are likely to be less as affected firms had adjusted their operations. The dispute began on December 1, 2008, when Canada requested WTO consultations with the United States concerning certain mandatory labeling provisions required by the 2002 farm bill ( P.L. 107-171 ) as amended by the 2008 farm bill ( P.L. 110-246 ). On December 12, 2008, Mexico requested to join the consultations. U.S. labeling provisions include the obligation to inform consumers at the retail level of the country of origin in certain commodities, including beef and pork. USDA labeling rules for meat and meat products had been controversial. A number of livestock and food industry groups opposed COOL as costly and unnecessary. Canada and Mexico, the main livestock exporters to the United States, argued that COOL had a discriminatory trade-distorting impact by reducing the value and number of cattle and hogs shipped to the U.S. market, thus violating WTO trade commitments. Others, including some cattle and consumer groups, maintained that Americans want and deserve to know the origin of their foods. In November 2011, the WTO dispute settlement panel found that (1) COOL treated imported livestock less favorably than U.S. livestock and (2) it did not meet its objective to provide complete information to consumers on the origin of meat products. In March 2012, the United States appealed the WTO ruling. In June 2012, the WTO's Appellate Body upheld the finding that COOL treats imported livestock less favorably than domestic livestock and reversed the finding that it does not meet its objective to provide complete information to consumers. It could not determine if COOL was more trade restrictive than necessary. In order to meet a compliance deadline by the WTO, USDA issued a revised COOL rule on May 23, 2013, that required meat producers to specify on retail packaging where each animal was born, raised, and slaughtered, which prohibited the mixing of muscle cuts from different countries. Canada and Mexico challenged the 2013 labeling rules before a WTO compliance panel. The compliance panel sided with Canada and Mexico; the United States appealed the decision. NAFTA Trucking Issue The implementation of NAFTA trucking provisions was a major trade issue between the United States and Mexico for many years because the United States delayed its trucking commitments under NAFTA. NAFTA provided Mexican commercial trucks full access to four U.S.-border states in 1995 and full access throughout the United States in 2000. Mexican commercial trucks have authority under the agreement to operate in the United States, but they cannot operate between two points within the country. This means that they can haul cross-border loads but cannot haul loads that originate and end in the United States. The proposed USMCA would cap the number of Mexican-domiciled carriers that can receive U.S. operating authority and would continue the prohibition on Mexican-based carriers hauling freight between two points within the United States. Mexican carriers that already have authority under NAFTA to operate in the United States would continue to be allowed to operate in the United States. The United States delayed the implementation of NAFTA provisions because of safety concerns. The Mexican government objected to the delay and claimed that U.S. actions were a violation of U.S. commitments. A dispute resolution panel supported Mexico's position in February 2001. President Bush indicated a willingness to implement the provision, but the U.S. Congress required additional safety provisions in the FY2002 Department of Transportation Appropriations Act ( P.L. 107-87 ). The United States and Mexico cooperated to resolve the issue over the years and engaged in numerous talks regarding safety and operational issues. The United States had two pilot programs on cross-border trucking to help resolve the issue: the Bush Administration's pilot program of 2007 and the Obama Administration's program of 2011. A significant milestone in implementation of U.S. NAFTA commitments occurred on January 9, 2015, when the Department of Transportation's Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) announced that Mexican motor carriers would be allowed to conduct long-haul, cross-border trucking services in the United States. The International Brotherhood of Teamsters filed a lawsuit on March 20, 2015, in the Ninth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals, seeking to halt FMCSA's move. On March 15, 2017, a three-judge panel heard the oral arguments of the legal challenge by the Teamsters, the Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association, and two other organizations. These organizations argued that the FMCSA did not generate enough inspection data during the pilot program to properly make a determination about expanding the program. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the lawsuit on June 29, 2017, stating that FMCSA has the law-given discretion to grant operating authority to Mexican carriers. Bush Administration's Pilot Program of 2007 On November 27, 2002, with safety inspectors and procedures in place, the Bush Administration began the process to open U.S. highways to Mexican truckers and buses. Environmental and labor groups went to court in early December to block the action. On January 16, 2003, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that full environmental impact statements were required for Mexican trucks to be allowed to operate on U.S. highways. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed that decision on June 7, 2004. In February 2007, the Bush Administration announced a pilot project to grant Mexican trucks from 100 transportation companies full access to U.S. highways. In September 2007, the Department of Transportation (DOT) launched a one-year pilot program to allow approved Mexican carriers beyond the 25-mile commercial zone in the border region, with a similar program allowing U.S. trucks to travel beyond Mexico's border and commercial zone. Over the 18 months that the program existed, 29 motor carriers from Mexico were granted operating authority in the United States. Two of these carriers dropped out of the program shortly after being accepted, while two others never sent trucks across the border. In total, 103 Mexican trucks were used by the carriers as part of the program. In the FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act ( P.L. 110-161 ), signed into law in December 2007, Congress included a provision prohibiting the use of FY2008 funding for the establishment of the pilot program. However, the DOT determined that it could continue with the pilot program because it had already been established. In March 2008, the DOT issued an interim report on the cross-border trucking demonstration project to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. The report made three key observations: (1) the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) planned to check every participating truck each time it crossed the border to ensure that it met safety standards; (2) there was less participation in the project than was expected; and (3) the FMCSA implemented methods to assess possible adverse safety impacts of the project and to enforce and monitor safety guidelines. In early August 2008, DOT announced that it would extend the pilot program for an additional two years. In opposition to this action, the House approved on September 9, 2008 (by a vote of 396 to 128), H.R. 6630 , a bill that would have prohibited DOT from granting Mexican trucks access to U.S. highways beyond the border and commercial zone. The bill also would have prohibited DOT from renewing such a program unless expressly authorized by Congress. No action was taken by the Senate on the measure. On March 11, 2009, the FY2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act ( P.L. 111-8 ) terminated the pilot program. The FY2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act, passed in December 2009 ( P.L. 111-117 ), did not preclude funds from being spent on a long-haul Mexican truck pilot program, provided that certain terms and conditions were satisfied. Numerous Members of Congress urged President Obama to find a resolution to the dispute in light of the effects that Mexico's retaliatory tariffs were having on U.S. producers (see section below on " Obama Administration's 2011 Pilot Program "). Mexico's Retaliatory Tariffs of 2009 and 2010 In response to the abrupt end of the pilot program, the Mexican government retaliated in 2009 by increasing duties on 90 U.S. products with a value of $2.4 billion in exports to Mexico. Mexico began imposing tariffs in March 2009 and, after reaching an understanding with the United States, eliminated them in two stages in 2011. The retaliatory tariffs ranged from 10% to 45% and covered a range of products that included fruit, vegetables, home appliances, consumer products, and paper. Subsequently, a group of 56 Members of the House of Representatives wrote to the then-United States Trade Representative, Ron Kirk, and DOT Secretary Ray LaHood requesting the Administration to resolve the trucking issue. The bipartisan group of Members stated that they wanted the issue to be resolved because the higher Mexican tariffs were having a "devastating" impact on local industries, especially in agriculture, and area economies in some states. One reported estimate stated that U.S. potato exports to Mexico had fallen 50% by value since the tariffs were imposed and that U.S. exporters were losing market share to Canada. A year after the initial 2009 list of retaliatory tariffs, the Mexican government revised the list of retaliatory tariffs to put more pressure on the United States to seek a settlement for the trucking dispute. The revised 2010 list added 26 products to and removed 16 products from the original list of 89, bringing the new total to 99 products from 43 states with a total export value of $2.6 billion. Products added to the list included several types of pork products, several types of cheeses, sweet corn, pistachios, oranges, grapefruits, apples, oats and grains, chewing gum, ketchup, and other products. The largest in terms of value were two categories of pork products, which had an estimated export value of $438 million in 2009. Products removed from the list included peanuts, dental floss, locks, and other products. The revised retaliatory tariffs were lower than the original tariffs and ranged from 5% to 25%. U.S. producers of fruits, pork, cheese, and other products that were bearing the cost of the retaliatory tariffs reacted strongly at the lack of progress in resolving the trucking issue and argued, both to the Obama Administration and to numerous Members of Congress, that they were potentially losing millions of dollars in sales as a result of this dispute. In March 2011, President Obama and Mexican President Calderón announced an agreement to resolve the dispute. By October 2011, Mexico had suspended all retaliatory tariffs on U.S. exports to Mexico. Obama Administration's 2011 Pilot Program In January 2011, the Obama Administration presented an "initial concept document" to Congress and the Mexican government for a new long-haul trucking pilot program with numerous safety inspection requirements for Mexican carriers. It would put in place a new inspection and monitoring regime in which Mexican carriers would have to apply for long-haul operating authority. The project involved several thousand trucks and would eventually bring as many vehicles as are needed into the United States. The concept document outlined three sets of elements: 1. Pre-Operations Elements included an application process for Mexican carriers interested in applying for long-haul operations in the United States; a vetting process by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice; a safety audit of Mexican carriers applying for the program; documentation of Mexican commercial driver's license process to demonstrate comparability to the U.S. process; and evidence of financial responsibility (insurance) of the applicant. 2. Operations Elements included monitoring procedures with regular inspections and electronic monitoring of long-haul vehicles and drivers; follow-up review (first review) to ensure continued safe operation; compliance review (second review) upon which a participating carrier would be eligible for full operation authority; and FMCSA review that included insurance monitoring and drug and alcohol collection and testing facilities. 3. Transparency Elements included required Federal Register notices by the FMCSA; publically accessible website that provides information on participating carriers; establishment of a Federal Advisory Committee with representation from a diverse group of stakeholders; periodic reports to Congress; and requirements for DOT Office of the Inspector General reports to Congress. On July 6, 2011, the two countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to resolve the dispute over long-haul cross-border trucking. Within 10 days after signing of the MOU, Mexico suspended 50% of the retaliatory tariffs it had imposed on U.S. exports (see section below on Mexico's retaliatory tariffs). Mexico agreed to suspend the remainder of the tariffs within five days of the first Mexican trucking company receiving its U.S. operating authority. On October 21, 2011, Mexico suspended the remaining retaliatory tariffs. Mexican Tomatoes In February 2013, the United States and Mexico reached an agreement on cross-border trade in tomatoes, averting a potential trade war between the two countries. On March 4, 2013, the Department of Commerce (DOC) and the government of Mexico officially signed the agreement suspending the antidumping investigation on fresh tomatoes from Mexico. The dispute began on June 22, 2012, when a group of Florida tomato growers, who were backed by growers in other states, asked the DOC and the U.S. International Trade Commission to terminate an antidumping duty suspension pact on tomatoes from Mexico. The termination of the pact, which set a minimum reference price for Mexican tomatoes in the United States, would have effectively led to an antidumping investigation on Mexican tomatoes. Mexico's Ambassador to the United States at the time, Arturo Sarukhan, warned that such an action would damage the U.S.-Mexico trade agenda and bilateral trade relationship as a whole. He also stated that Mexico would use all resources at its disposal, including the possibility of retaliatory tariffs, to defend the interests of the Mexican tomato industry. The suspension pact dates back to 1996, when the DOC, under pressure from Florida tomato growers, filed an antidumping petition against Mexican tomato growers and began an investigation into whether they were dumping Mexican tomatoes on the U.S. market at below-market prices. NAFTA had eliminated U.S. tariffs on Mexican tomatoes, causing an inflow of fresh tomatoes from Mexico. Florida tomato growers complained that Mexican tomato growers were selling tomatoes at below-market prices. After the 1996 filing of the petition, the DOC and Mexican producers and exporters of tomatoes reached an agreement under which Mexican tomato growers agreed to revise their prices by setting a minimum reference price in order to eliminate the injurious effects of fresh tomato exports to the United States. The so-called "suspension agreement" remained in place for years and was renewed in 2002 and 2008. The 2013 suspension agreement covers all fresh and chilled tomatoes, excluding those intended for use in processing. It increases the number of tomato categories with established reference prices from one to four. It also raises reference prices at which tomatoes can be sold in the U.S. market to better reflect the changes in the marketplace since the last agreement was signed. It continues to account for winter and summer seasons. When they filed the 2012 petition asking for the termination of the suspension agreement, U.S. tomato producers argued that the pacts had not worked. The petitioners stated that it was necessary to end the agreement with Mexico in order to "restore fair competition to the market and eliminate the predatory actions of producers in Mexico." However, business groups urged the DOC to proceed cautiously in the tomato dispute since termination could result in higher tomato prices in the United States and lead Mexico to implement retaliatory measures. Some businesses urged a continuation of the agreement, arguing that it helped stabilize the market and provide U.S. consumers with consistent and predictable pricing. According to a New York Times article, Mexican tomato producers enlisted roughly 370 U.S. businesses, including Wal-Mart Stores and meat and vegetable producers, to argue their cause. Policy Issues U.S. policymakers may follow trade issues regarding the proposed USMCA and the possibility of a NAFTA withdrawal by President Trump. USMCA Policymakers may consider numerous issues as they begin to debate the proposed USMCA and consider its approval. Some issues could include the timetable for consideration under TPA, whether the proposed USMCA meets TPA's negotiating objectives and other requirements, and the impact of the agreement on U.S.-Mexico trade relations. The full effects of the proposed USMCA on U.S.-Mexico trade relations would not be expected to be significant because nearly all U.S. trade with Mexico is now conducted duty and barrier free. A USMCA would maintain NAFTA's tariff and nontariff barrier eliminations. If the agreement is approved by Congress, ratified by Mexico and Canada, and enters into force, some economists and other observers believe that it is not expected to have a measurable effect on overall U.S.-Mexico trade and investment, jobs, wages, or overall economic growth, and that it would probably not have a measurable effect on the U.S. trade deficit with Mexico. The U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) is conducting an investigation into the likely economic impacts of a USMCA, a required element of the TPA process. TPA 2015 states that the ITC must issue its report within 105 days of the President's signing of a trade deal. With President Trump's signing of the USMCA on November 30, 2018, the ITC report would be due by mid-March 2019. One exception to this overall economic evaluation may be the motor vehicle industry, which may experience more significant effects than other industries because of the changes in rules of origin in the USMCA and because of the high percentage of motor vehicle goods that enter duty-free under NAFTA. The highest share of U.S. trade with Mexico is in the motor vehicle industry, and it is also the industry with the highest percentage of duty-free treatment under NAFTA because of high North American content. In 2017, leading U.S. merchandise imports from Mexico were motor vehicles ($57.4 billion or 26% of imports) and motor vehicle parts ($45.5 billion or 20% of imports). About 99.4% of U.S. motor vehicle imports and about 75.6% of motor vehicle parts imports from Mexico entered the United States duty-free under NAFTA. In comparison, only 55.6% of total U.S. imports from Mexico in 2017 received duty-free benefits under NAFTA. Some analysts believe that the updated auto rules of origin requirements contained in the USMCA could raise compliance and production costs and could lead to higher prices, which could possibly negatively affect U.S. vehicle sales. The net impact, however, may be more limited depending on the capacity of U.S. automakers and parts manufacturers to shift suppliers and production locations and the ability to absorb higher costs, according to some observers. Some observers contend that manufacturers with a stronger presence in Mexico, such as General Motors and Fiat Chrysler Automobiles, may be more impacted. Other observers and stakeholders are continuing to review the provisions in the new agreement and what effect, if any, these changes would have on U.S. economic relations with Canada and Mexico. To some analysts, provisions in areas such as customs regulation, digital trade, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, and enforcement on labor and the environment are considered an improvement over similar provisions in NAFTA. Other proposed changes in the agreement, such as largely heightened IPR protections and generally less extensive investment provisions, have both supporters and detractors. For example, there is some concern that the ISDS provisions in the USMCA effectively may only apply to certain U.S. contracts in Mexico's energy sector and possibly leave out other sectors such as services. Under USMCA, investors would be limited to filing ISDS claims for breaches of national treatment, most-favored nation treatment, or expropriation, but not indirect expropriation Possible NAFTA Withdrawal President Donald Trump stated to reporters on December 1, 2018, that he intended to notify Canada and Mexico of his intention to withdraw from NAFTA in six months. Article 2205 of NAFTA states that a party may withdraw from the agreement six months after it provides written notice of withdrawal to the other parties. If a party withdraws, the agreement shall remain in force for the remaining parties. Private sector groups are urging the President to remain within NAFTA until the proposed USMCA enters into force. They claim that withdrawing from NAFTA would have "devastating" negative consequences. Congress may consider the ramifications of withdrawing from NAFTA and how it may affect the U.S. economy and foreign relations with Mexico. It may monitor and consider the congressional role in a possible withdrawal. If the United States withdraws from NAFTA, it could return to WTO most-favored-nation tariffs, the rate it applies to all countries with which the United State does not have an FTA. The United States and Canada maintain relatively low simple average MFN rates, at 3.5%. Mexico has a higher 7.0% simple average rate. However, both countries have higher "peak" tariffs on labor intensive goods, such as apparel and footwear, and some agriculture products. Of the three NAFTA parties, the United States has the lowest MFN tariffs in most categories. Applied tariffs are considerably higher in Mexico than the United States. Mexico's bound tariff rates are very high and far exceed U.S. bound rates. Without NAFTA, there is a risk that tariffs on U.S. exports to Mexico could reach up to 36.2% (see Table 6 ). In agriculture, U.S. farmers would face double-digit applied and trade-weighted rates in both Mexico and Canada. Mexico and Canada likely would maintain duty-free treatment between themselves through maintenance of a bilateral NAFTA, or through commitments made in conjunction with the CPTPP. If the United States withdrew from NAFTA without the proposed USMCA entering into force, certain commitments would be affected, such as the following: Services Access. The three NAFTA countries committed themselves to allowing market access and nondiscriminatory treatment in certain service sectors. If the United States withdrew from NAFTA, it would still be obligated to adhere to the commitments it made for the WTO's General Agreement on Trade in Services. While these commitments were made contemporaneously with NAFTA, given that the NAFTA schedule operated under a negative list basis—all sectors included unless specifically excluded—and GATS on a positive list—specific sectors are listed for inclusion—NAFTA is likely more extensive. Government Procurement. The NAFTA government procurement chapter sets standards and parameters for government purchases of goods and services. The schedule annexes set forth opportunities for firms of each party to bid on certain contracts for specified government agencies. The WTO Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) also imposes disciplines and obligations on government procurement. Unlike most other WTO agreements, membership in the GPA is optional. Mexico is not a member of the GPA, and U.S. withdrawal from NAFTA would allow Mexico to adopt any domestic content or buy local provisions. (Since U.S. firms are more competitive in obtaining Mexican contracts than Mexican firms in the United States, this may adversely affect some U.S. domestic firms.) Investment. Unlike many chapters in NAFTA that have analogous counterparts in the WTO Agreements, the investment chapter in the WTO does not provide the same level of protection for investors as do NAFTA, subsequent U.S. trade agreements, or bilateral investment treaties. If the United States withdrew from NAFTA, U.S. investors would lose protections in Mexico. Countries would have more leeway to block individual investments. U.S. investors would not have recourse to the investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism, but would need to deal with claims of expropriation through domestic courts, recourse to government-to-government consultation, or dispute settlement. Canada and Mexico likely would maintain investor protection between them through the prospective CPTPP or through maintenance of NAFTA provisions. Bilateral Economic Cooperation Policymakers may consider issues on how the United States can improve cooperation with Mexico in the areas of border trade, transportation, competitiveness, economic growth, and security enhancement through the HLED, HLRCC, and the 21 st Century Border Management programs mentioned earlier in this report. Some policy experts emphasize the importance of U.S.-Mexico trade in intermediate goods and supply chains and argue that the two governments can improve cooperation in cross-border trade and can invest more in improving border infrastructure. The increased security measures along the U.S.-Mexico border, they argue, have resulted in a costly disruption in production chains due to extended and unpredictable wait times along the border. Appendix. Map of Mexico

The economic and trade relationship with Mexico is of interest to U.S. policymakers because of Mexico's proximity to the United States, the extensive trade and investment relationship under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the conclusion of the NAFTA renegotiations and the proposed U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), and the strong cultural and economic ties that connect the two countries. Also, it is of national interest for the United States to have a prosperous and democratic Mexico as a neighboring country. Mexico is the United States' third-largest trading partner, while the United States is, by far, Mexico's largest trading partner. Mexico ranks third as a source of U.S. imports, after China and Canada, and second, after Canada, as an export market for U.S. goods and services. The United States is the largest source of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Mexico. Most studies show that the net economic effects of NAFTA, which entered into force in 1994, on both the United States and Mexico have been small but positive, though there have been adjustment costs to some sectors within both countries. Much of the bilateral trade between the United States and Mexico occurs in the context of supply chains as manufacturers in each country work together to create goods. The expansion of trade since NAFTA has resulted in the creation of vertical supply relationships, especially along the U.S.-Mexico border. The flow of intermediate inputs produced in the United States and exported to Mexico and the return flow of finished products greatly increased the importance of the U.S.-Mexico border region as a production site. U.S. manufacturing industries, including automotive, electronics, appliances, and machinery, all rely on the assistance of Mexican manufacturers. Congress faces numerous issues related to U.S.-Mexico trade and investment relations. The United States, Mexico, and Canada signed the proposed USMCA on November 30, 2018, which would have to be approved by Congress and ratified by Mexico and Canada before entering into force. A few days after signing the agreement, President Donald J. Trump stated to reporters that he intends to notify Mexico and Canada of his intention to withdraw from NAFTA with a six-month notice. Congress may consider policy issues and economic effects of the proposed USMCA, economic and political ramifications of possibly withdrawing from NAFTA, and the potential strategic implications of Mexico's new President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, who entered into office on December 1, 2018. Congress may also examine the congressional role in a possible withdrawal from NAFTA; evaluate the effects of U.S. tariffs on aluminum and steel imports from Mexico and Mexico's retaliatory tariffs on certain U.S. exports; and address issues related to the U.S. withdrawal from the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) free trade agreement among the United States, Canada, Mexico, and nine other countries, and the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), which will enact much of the proposed TPP without the participation of the United States. The CPTPP is set to take effect for Mexico and five other countries on December 30, 2018. Some observers contend that the withdrawal from TPP could damage U.S. competitiveness and economic leadership in the region, while others see the withdrawal as a way to prevent lower-cost imports and potential job losses. Congress also may maintain an active interest in ongoing bilateral efforts to promote economic competitiveness, increase regulatory cooperation, and pursue energy integration. Under the U.S.-Mexico High Level Economic Dialogue (HLED), which was first launched in September 2013, the United States and Mexico are striving to advance economic and commercial priorities through annual meetings at the Cabinet level that also include leaders from the public and private sectors. Two other initiatives that may be of interest to policymakers are the High-Level Regulatory Cooperation Council (HLRCC) and the bilateral border management initiative under the Declaration Concerning 21st Center Border Management.

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The Basics of Trade1 Economics of Trade Why do countries trade? Economics is largely the study of making the most efficient use of scarce resources. According to mainstream economic theory, trade occurs because it is mutually enriching and can leave both trade partners better off . Through trade, a country can enjoy a higher standard of living by producing those things it does efficiently and trading for things that it produces less efficiently, driven by comparative advantage (see below). This enables a country to produce more from its resources and enjoy a higher level of consumption than would be possible without trade. A major benefit of trade is the ability to import goods and services and boost consumer welfare. The United States imports for several reasons: some goods cannot be produced domestically in sufficient quantities to satisfy demand or would be costly to produce relative to other economic activities; other products and services are imported because they can be produced less expensively or more efficiently by foreign firms. Because of global value chains, many U.S. imports contain U.S.-made components (e.g., semiconductors in a computer) or U.S.-grown raw materials (e.g., cotton used to make t-shirts). Through trade, consumers can access a greater variety of goods at lower cost. Trade improves consumer purchasing power, particularly for lower-income households that spend a greater share of income on imported goods like clothing. These factors also help control the rate of inflation. Through trade, producers can access lower-cost inputs used in production and exports, which can improve global competitiveness. Overseas markets for exports provide opportunities for domestic firms to exploit economies of scale—expanding production to reduce average costs and take advantage of increasing returns to scale. In the long term, trade leads to greater competition and can pressure firms to innovate and invest in research and development (R&D), supporting increased productivity and economic growth. What is comparative advantage? Economist David Ricardo developed the idea of comparative advantage in the early 19 th century, and the theory's insights remain relevant to explaining how countries trade today. Ricardo argued that specialization and trade are mutually beneficial even if a country is more efficient than its trading partners at producing all goods: a country has absolute advantage if it produces a given good at a lower cost than another country. But Ricardo argued that because resources, particularly labor, are (assumed to be) immobile between countries, a comparison of a good's absolute cost of production in each country is less relevant for determining whether specialization and trade should occur. Instead, what matters is the opportunity cost —how much output of good Y must be forgone to produce one more unit of good X. If the opportunity costs of producing the two goods differ in each country, then each has a comparative advantage in one of the goods. Ricardo predicted that a country can realize gains from trade by specializing in goods that it can produce relatively well (and in which it has a comparative advantage) and then trading those for goods that it produces relatively less well (and in which it has a comparative disadvantage). Subsequent economic theories have expanded on and qualified the theory of comparative advantage. Economists continue to examine to what extent comparative advantage explains the increasingly complex trade patterns in the 21 st century with the rise of global value chains—where different stages of production of a single good take place in several countries—and with the rise of services and digital trade, and cross-border flows of data and technology. What determines comparative advantage and specialization in trade? Differences in comparative advantage between countries may arise and evolve because of differences in the relative abundance of factors of production—so-called factor endowments —such as labor, physical capital (plants and equipment), human capital (skills and knowledge, including entrepreneurial talent), as well as technology. Economic theory predicts that a country will have comparative advantage in activities that make intensive use of the country's relatively abundant factors of production. For example, compared to other countries, the United States has relative abundance of high-skilled labor and relative scarcity of low-skilled labor. Thus, U.S. comparative advantage is expected in the production of goods that use high-skilled labor intensively, such as aircraft rather than apparel. In addition, differences in productive technology among countries can affect relative efficiency and may be a basis for comparative advantage. The information and communications technology (ICT) revolution and new platforms for digital trade have broken down some barriers to technology and knowledge-flows across countries. Can governments shape or distort comparative advantage? Governments can potentially influence comparative advantage through certain policies that either indirectly nurture comparative advantage (often by compensating for market failures, but not targeted at a specific industry or activity) or directly nurture advantages in particular industries (often called industrial policy). For example, indirect influence can include policies that aim to eliminate corruption, enforce property rights, liberalize trade and foreign investment barriers, build transport and communication infrastructure, and support mass education. More direct influence can include policies (such as subsidies or tariffs) that promote and protect certain industries considered to have significant strategic and economic potential but that require initial government support to help a country reach its economic targets. There has been a broad debate on the impact and effectiveness of such targeted policies. Some economists contend that protectionist policies that arise through direct policy interventions can potentially distort a country's trade and investment flows, reduce economic efficiency, or undermine the development of competitive industries that do not receive support. What is intra-industry trade? A sizable portion of global trade occurs via countries exporting and importing goods within the same industry to each other—called intra-industry trade. This type of trade is particularly characteristic of the large flows of products between advanced economies, which have similar resource endowments and levels of development. These trade patterns suggest that there is another basis for trade, other than comparative advantage: the use of economies of scale or increasing returns to scale . Economies of scale exist when a production process is more efficient (i.e., has lower unit costs) the larger the scale at which it takes place. While the United States and Germany, for example, could be equally proficient at producing a wide array of goods such as autos and pharmaceuticals, neither has the productive capacity to produce the full range of goods optimally. Therefore, a pattern of specialization tends to occur with countries producing and trading some sub-set or "niche" of these goods. Trade, Jobs, and Wages What are the benefits and costs of trade expansion? From a broad perspective of the U.S. economy as a whole, trade is one of a number of forces that drive changes in employment, wages, the distribution of income, and ultimately the standard of living. There is a broad consensus that trade overall has a net positive effect on a country's economic well-being. Trade benefits can include the more efficient use of resources, greater competition, economies of scale, and consumption gains through lower prices and more choices for consumers. Increases in trade can boost GDP because of the increased competition, efficiency gains, and consumer welfare increases. According to the World Bank, liberalizing trade and investment globally has reduced the number of people in extreme poverty by half over the past 25 years. However, the benefits from trade are not necessarily distributed evenly within an economy. Trade can disrupt some sectors, and the costs, such as job losses and stagnant wages, may be concentrated in certain regions and import-sensitive industries. The economic impact of trade on jobs and wages is widely debated because there are numerous factors that impact jobs, including changes to technology. While economic analyses indicate that economy-wide gains from trade generally exceed the costs, the difficult policy issue is how to reap these gains while dealing equitably with those hurt by the process. Economists argue that policies that facilitate the adjustment and compensate for the losses of those harmed by market forces, including trade, are economically less costly than protective policies that insulate workers and industries from trade and greater competition. In addition, from a political standpoint, experts also view adjustment assistance for those who are potentially displaced as an important factor for maintaining political support for free trade. Policymakers continue to debate the effectiveness of existing policies that help communities affected by trade; in the United States, many experts conclude they have been inadequate. Does trade cause job loss in the United States? Trade "creates" and "destroys" jobs in the economy—often called "job churn"—just as other market forces, such as technological change, do. Trade can have different effects on workers in different occupations, which some economists call "occupational exposure" to trade. Such disruptions can also occur through domestic trade when firms relocate from one state to another for various economic reasons. As a result, trade liberalization can have a different effect not only between sectors of the economy, but also within the same industry. Economy-wide, trade causes jobs to shift into industries in which a country has comparative advantage and away from industries with comparative disadvantage. In the process, the composition of employment may change, but there may not be a net loss of jobs. Estimates suggest that job loss attributed to trade is a small share of jobs lost economy-wide each year—one study finds that between 2001 and 2016 more than 150,000 U.S. net jobs were lost annually due to expanded trade in manufactured goods, which accounted for 1% of workers laid off in a typical year. While some jobs might be displaced, some workers are likely to be reemployed elsewhere. On the other hand, some estimates find that the short-run costs to workers attempting to switch occupations or industries to obtain new jobs due to trade liberalization may be "substantial," including reduced wages. Studies suggest that increased import competition from China in particular negatively affected U.S. local labor markets and manufacturing jobs. Most economists argue, however, that equating net imports—or importing more than exporting, known as a trade deficit—with a specific amount of unemployment in the economy is questionable given the underlying drivers of the trade deficit (see " What is the trade deficit? "). Historically, during periods of economic growth, U.S. global trade has also expanded. The U.S. trade deficit and unemployment rate have generally moved in tandem (see Figure 1 )—GDP growth reduces the number of unemployed while increasing aggregate demand, including for imports as well as attracting increased capital inflows, which often leads to an increased trade deficit. Does trade reduce the wages of U.S. workers? International trade can positively and negatively affect the wages of workers. Several studies have examined this relationship. There is no overall consensus on the impact of trade and trade agreements on wages of U.S. workers (which have been relatively stagnant for decades) and income inequality in the United States (which has also deepened). Many studies have found that other factors, such as technological change, have had a significantly larger effect on relative wages. In economic theory, trade tends to increase the return to the abundant factors of production—capital and high-skilled workers in the United States—and to decrease the return to less-abundant factors—low-skilled labor in the United States. Therefore, other factors held constant, a large increase in imports, particularly from economies with vast supplies of low-skilled labor such as China, could negatively affect wages of low-skilled U.S. workers in import-sensitive industries (even though they too benefit from lower-priced imports from China). U.S. low-skilled workers have increasingly faced competition from lower-cost producers, largely in developing countries. The growth of global value chains has led some U.S. multinational corporations (MNCs) to shift low-value, labor-intensive production overseas. On the other hand, MNCs may keep or expand production in the United States or retain the high-end services aspects of their businesses; such jobs often require high levels of education and skills. In addition, U.S. workers in export-oriented industries earn, on average, more than workers in non-exporting industries. The U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) estimated, on average, a 16% earnings premium in export-intensive manufacturing industries and 15.5% premium in services. Economic Globalization What is economic globalization? In general, economic globalization broadly refers to the increasing integration of national economies around the world, particularly through trade and financial flows. Economic globalization involves trade in goods and services, capital flows and trade in assets (e.g., currency, stocks), the transfer of technology and ideas, and international flows of labor or migration. There have been several periods of economic globalization; some experts also contend there have been periods of deglobalization—the slowdown or reverse of globalization. Scholars have dated the start of the most recent period of economic globalization to sometime in decades following World War II. From 1960 to 2017, global trade as a percentage of global GDP increased from 25% to 57%. In the post-World War II period, global trade grew consistently faster than GDP (though this trend has not held in recent years). The stock of global foreign direct investment (FDI) grew from 6% of global GDP in 1980 to 39% in 2017. The growing integration of the world economy has been facilitated by myriad technical advances in transport and communication, which have significantly reduced natural geographic barriers that separate economies. In addition, both domestic and multilateral policies have steadily lowered man-made barriers to international exchange since World War II (such as tariffs, quotas, subsidies, immigration regulations, and capital controls). While most economists argue that globalization has lifted living standards worldwide, an ongoing debate remains regarding the extent to which greater economic integration has been inclusive, benefited some groups more than others, and contributed to inequality within countries. What are global value chains and how to they relate to globalization? A global value chain (GVC) is the interrelated organizations, resources, and processes that create and deliver a product to the final consumer. GVCs, organized mostly by multinational corporations (MNCs), mean that products once produced in one country may now be produced by assembling parts and components produced in several countries, often traded across borders multiple times. More than half of global manufacturing imports are intermediate goods traveling within supply chains, while over 75% of global services imports are intermediate services. The latest data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) suggests that, on average, more than a quarter of the value of national exports included foreign content in the form of imported inputs. For the United States, the foreign value-added share in U.S. exports increased in most industries from 1995 to 2011 (most recent data available) (see Figure 2 ). GVCs have been an important driver of globalization and are considered the "backbone of the global economy." The international fragmentation of production has raised the level of trade associated with a particular final product, as well as trade with advanced economies/emerging markets and developing countries. The growth of GVCs has helped facilitate lower trade barriers and technological advances, making international transport faster and accelerating the flow of information across borders. These linkages have blurred the distinction between exports and imports as strictly domestic or foreign activities. This, in turn, has made it increasingly difficult to understand who benefits from global trade and complicated the interpretation of bilateral trade balances. Trade in intermediates means that imports have become essential inputs into the production of exports; as a result, policies that affect a nation's imports ultimately affect its exports and vice versa. Analysts point to several fundamental shifts in GVCs as they continue to evolve that are likely to shape the latest wave of globalization and future policy challenges. What is the relationship between trade and foreign direct investment? Trade and investment flows are complements, and foreign direct investment (FDI) is considered to be a major driver of trade. FDI is a type of cross-border capital flow, which takes place when a resident of one country (including a company) obtains a lasting interest in—and a degree of influence over—the management of, a business enterprise in another country. FDI has supported the development of global value chains by multinational corporations (MNCs), which source production globally. As a result, the majority of trade takes place within MNCs that send components to and from locations at home and abroad to transform into final products. FDI has thus supported the significant expansion of inter- and intra-firm trade, which represents trade between parent companies and their foreign affiliates, and trade between affiliates of foreign firms and the foreign parent company (see " Link Between International Investment and Trade "). A predominant reason U.S. firms make investments abroad is to sell goods and services to foreign markets. Many firms want to maintain operations close to their customers to gauge preferences and tastes that may differ from U.S. consumers (e.g., SUVs preferred in the United States versus small cars in Japan). According to the latest data on activities of U.S. multinationals, in 2016, 11% of the sales of U.S. foreign affiliates went to U.S. parent companies, while 59% of sales went to the local market of the host country and 30% went to other foreign countries (see Figure 3 ). However, some firms may also establish operations abroad to replace exports or production, or to gain access to raw materials or less expensive labor abroad. Foreign firms may invest in the United States to access the U.S. consumer market, high-skilled labor, and other resources. How does globalization affect jobs? Greater global integration through trade and investment flows, combined with specialization in certain stages of production, can disrupt markets. This disruption may create concerns about "offshoring" or "outsourcing," the shift of manufacturing and business functions to countries with lower labor costs. For example, some U.S. multinational corporations (MNCs) focus on high-end activities associated with innovating products, such as research and development (R&D), while outsourcing production of components and final product assembly to suppliers and locations abroad. Although most economists maintain that globalization and trade liberalization are unlikely to affect the overall U.S. employment rate, greater volatility of U.S. worker incomes and employment in some sectors are possible effects. For example, the shifting of manufacturing assembly abroad may reduce the number of U.S. manufacturing jobs in some industries but boost the number of service-related jobs in others. Another issue is the impact of globalization on wealth distribution; for example, through dampening wages for U.S. lower-skilled workers facing greater foreign competition compared to higher-skilled workers, or through higher returns to capital over labor. In one study, the OECD concluded that "in advanced economies, at least 10% of the decline of the labour share [in total national income] is accounted for by increasing globalisation—and in particular by the pressures from the delocalisation of some parts of the production chain as well as from import competition from firms producing in countries with low labour cost." A range of studies suggests that within the United States, globalization has contributed marginally to rising U.S. wage inequality at a factor ranging from 10% to 20%. Key Trade Terms and Principles What is most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment? Most-favored-nation treatment (MFN) is the fundamental principle of nondiscrimination in the multilateral trading system. MFN requires World Trade Organization (WTO) members to grant each other member country treatment at least as favorable as it grants to its most-favored trade partner—in other words, every member must treat all members equally. For example, if a country grants a trade benefit or concession to one country, such as lower tariffs, it would have to extend the same benefit to all other members. There are a number of permitted exceptions to MFN treatment, however. For example, countries can establish trade agreements with one another outside of the WTO, granting additional preferences to those in the agreement, provided certain conditions are met. In addition, more favorable treatment can be given to developing countries, often called "special and differential treatment." What is national treatment? National treatment is another fundamental principle of nondiscrimination in the multilateral trading system. It obligates each trading partner not to discriminate between domestic and foreign products. In other words, once an imported product enters a country, it must be treated no less favorably than a "like" product produced domestically. The same concept is also applied to foreign and domestic services and intellectual property rights. What is Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) status? "Most-favored nation" (MFN) trade status, called permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) in U.S. law, denotes nondiscriminatory treatment of a trading partner. According to U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Cuba and North Korea do not have PNTR with the United States. Other countries at times have received temporary or conditional NTR status before graduating to PNTR. In practice, imports from countries with NTR status face lower duty rates than imports from countries without that status. Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974 prohibits the President from granting PNTR status to any country not receiving such treatment at the time of the law's enactment in January 1975 (in effect, the majority of then-communist countries). The so-called, Jackson-Vanik amendment further denies PNTR status for countries that deny citizens freedom of emigration (subject to presidential waiver). As a WTO member, the United States is required to extend MFN treatment "immediately and unconditionally" to all WTO members. Thus upon accession to the WTO for countries like China (joined in 2001), Vietnam (2007), and Russia (2012) for example, PNTR had to concurrently be established under U.S. law for the United States to receive the full benefits of their membership. What is the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States? The Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS) determines the tariffs (also known as duties) that are imposed on imported goods. The HTS uses a structure of tariff classification, based on standard commodity codes and descriptions developed by the World Customs Organization (WCO), the so-called Harmonized System (HS). The HS groups 1,200 product headings into 96 chapters. Each heading is divided into product subheadings at the four-digit and six-digit levels, for a total of 5,000 separate groups of goods at the 6-digit level, with harmonized digit and category descriptions. In other words, the higher the digits the more detailed the product category. For example, the 2-digit chapter 08 stands for "edible fruits and nuts." Within that chapter, "citrus fruits" are identified by the 4-digit HS code 0805; and within that subheading, "oranges" are identified by 6-digit HS code 0805.10. HS codes are standard worldwide up to the 6-digit level. The HTSUS further subdivides each product subheading into 8-digit and 10-digit tariff lines that are unique to the United States. The U.S. International Trade Commission publishes the HTS and keeps it up to date. U.S. Customs and Border Protection is responsible for interpreting and enforcing the tariff code. What are rules of origin? Rules of origin (ROO) determine the "nationality" of imported products. ROO are important for several reasons, including determining admissibility of imports, assessing duty rates, and establishing eligibility for preferential trade programs and free trade agreements (FTAs). Determining a product's origin can be relatively straightforward if the product's raw materials and parts are manufactured and assembled in a single country. However, in today's global economy, determining origin can be complex because goods such as autos, computers, and clothing are assembled with parts sourced from many countries. The United States negotiates different ROO within its FTAs to ensure that only eligible trading partners receive the agreement's tariff benefits. But some rules may also be crafted to limit the impact of liberalized trade on import-sensitive industries. For example, the "yarn-forward" rule requires that all yarn and fabric used in most apparel must come from FTA partners themselves, in addition to the assembly process. Some in Congress with retailers in their districts argue that the yarn-forward rule is relatively strict compared to the rules negotiated by other countries; others with textile interests maintain that the rule is crucial for the survival of the U.S. industry. U.S. Trade Trends53 The Role of Trade in the U.S. and Global Economy54 How important is trade to the global economy? Global trade is an important engine of the global economy—trade as a share of global GDP has risen from 25% in 1960 to about 57% in 2017. Greater openness to trade and trade reforms worldwide have been linked to higher growth in productivity and real incomes, as well as reduced poverty worldwide. For decades since World War II, annual real global trade growth outpaced GDP growth, growing on average 1.5 times faster (see Figure 4 ). This trend has not held in recent years as the global economy recovered from the financial crisis in 2008; 2016 marked the slowest pace of trade growth since 2009. Weakened trade growth in previous years had been attributed to several factors, including weak import demand, exchange rate fluctuations, and falling commodity prices. The slowdown in investment and China's rebalancing toward a consumption-driven economy were seen as major structural factors, while others considered growing trade protectionism to be an important factor. Trade growth has since rebounded, increasing from 2% in 2016 to above 5% in 2017—the strongest rate since 2011, driven mainly by cyclical factors, in particular increased investment and consumption expenditure. With the improving global economic outlook, the IMF and the WTO had projected a rebound in trade growth for 2018 and 2019. Amid several downside risks, including rising trade tensions between major economies like the United States and China, and heightened trade policy uncertainty, the IMF and WTO now expect global trade growth to slow. Restrictive trade policy measures imposed by the United States and some of its major trading partners may be affecting trade flows and prices in targeted sectors. Analysts claim that some recent policy announcements also have harmed businesses' outlooks and investment plans, due to heightened concern over possible disruptions to supply chains and the risks of potential increases in the scope or intensity of trade restrictions. What countries are the largest global trading economies? In 2017, the top-five largest trading economies (in terms of the value of goods and services trade) were the United States, China, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom (see Table 1 ). However, if the 28 EU members are treated as a single trading bloc, the EU would be the largest trading economy, with extra-EU trade of $6.0 trillion. China was the largest exporter, while the United States was the largest importer. In goods trade, the United States was the largest importer and second-largest exporter (behind China). In services trade, the United States was both the largest importer and exporter. The U.S. share of global goods exports fell from 15% in 1960 to 9% in 2017, largely due to the rapid increase of global trade, especially among developing countries and emerging markets. The U.S. export share of global services is 14%. In 2017, U.S. exports and imports of goods and services combined were equivalent to 27% of GDP. Although the United States is a major global trader, the size of trade relative to the size of the U.S. economy is smaller compared to other major trading economies. Various organizations have developed indexes to assess the "openness" or "competitiveness" of the U.S. economy relative to other economies. The United States ranked first out of 140 economies in the World Economic Forum's (WEF's) latest "Global Competitiveness Index." How important is trade to the U.S. economy? In 2017, the United States exported $2.4 trillion in goods and services and imported $2.9 trillion. Over the past decade, U.S. exports have grown more than 40%, while U.S. imports have grown more than 20%. Since 1960, trade relative to GDP has risen markedly (see Figure 5 ). U.S. exports as a percent of GDP expanded from 5% in 1960 to 12% of GDP in 2017, while U.S. imports expanded from 4% to 15% of GDP. What countries are the top U.S. trade partners? In 2017, China was the top U.S. trading partner, with $712 billion in total goods and services trade, followed by Canada, Mexico, Japan, and Germany (see Figure 6 ). China was the largest source of U.S. imports, while Canada was the largest destination for U.S. exports. However, considering the 28 EU member states as a single trading partner, the EU is both the largest export destination and source of imports for the United States. The majority of U.S. global trade, about 65%, is with countries with which the United States does not have a free trade agreement. (See " How many free trade agreements (FTAs) does the United States have? ") How do global value chains complicate interpretation of U.S. trade data? Today, multinational corporations (MNCs) produce worldwide, using inputs designed and produced by many countries; as a result, the "value added" occurs through multistage production processes and services. The growth of global value chains, intra-firm trade, and trade in intermediate goods has made it increasingly difficult to interpret the implications of trade data for the U.S. economy. Traditional trade statistics, which attribute the value of an import or export to a single country, do not fully reflect the source of resources used in producing goods and services, or who ultimately benefits from that trade. To illustrate, products of the U.S. firm Apple, such as iPhones, are developed in the United States but assembled in China using imported components from several countries. When the United States imports iPhones, it attributes the full value of those imports as occurring in China, even though the value added in China is quite small. Apple is the largest beneficiary in terms of the profits generated by the sale of its products; most of the product design, software development, product management, marketing, and other high-wage functions and employment occur in the United States. In this case and many others, U.S. imports from China in fact comprise imports from many countries, but the full value of the final imported product is attributed to China. This results in what might be considered an inflated bilateral trade deficit between the two countries. "Trade in value-added" (or TiVA, a joint initiative by the OECD and WTO) is a broad measure that attempts to identify the origin of the value added of goods and services according to the country where that value was added. According to TiVA estimates, the U.S trade deficit with China would have been reduced by one-third in 2011 if bilateral trade flows had been measured this way. The U.S. Trade Deficit What is the trade deficit? The "trade deficit" generally is used to refer to three things: the balance of trade in goods, balance of trade in goods and services, and balance on the current account. The trade balance is the difference between a country's exports and imports of goods and services; this applies to each bilateral trading relationship, as well as to the aggregate across all trading partners. A deficit occurs when a country imports more than it exports. A trade deficit is an indicator that a nation consumes more than it produces and does not save enough domestically to fund its investment needs (see below). The United States has run trade deficits annually for most of the post-WWII period. In 2017, the United States had a global trade deficit in goods and services of $552.3 billion. The deficit is driven by goods trade—the U.S. trade deficit in goods was $807.5 billion (down from a peak of $837.3 billion in 2006) (see Figure 7 ). A large and growing level of U.S. trade is in services, where the United States usually runs annual surpluses, exporting more than it imports. In 2017, the U.S. services trade surplus was $255.2 billion. The broadest measure of a country's trade balance is the current account, which includes trade in goods, services, net income (payments and receipts on foreign investments), and some official, or government, flows. The United States has experienced an annual current account deficit since the mid-1970s. In 2017, the United States had a $449.1 billion current account deficit, down from its historic peak of $806 billion in 2006. The shrinking deficit was largely due to the economic slowdown following the global financial crisis in 2008, which significantly reduced U.S. (and global) demand for imports, and the decline of commodity prices and U.S. oil imports in the wake of the shale oil and gas boom. Why does the United States run a trade deficit? Put simply, the U.S. global trade deficit reflects that the United States consumes more than it produces and imports more than it exports. Most economists argue that the trade deficit stems largely from U.S. macroeconomic policies, primarily an imbalance between domestic savings and total investment in the economy. The most significant cause of the trade deficit is the low rate of U.S. domestic savings by households, firms, and the government relative to its investment needs. To make up for that shortfall, Americans must borrow from countries abroad (such as China) with excess savings. Such borrowing enables Americans to enjoy a higher rate of economic growth than would be obtained if the United States had to rely solely on domestic savings. This boosts U.S. consumption and demand for imports, producing a trade deficit. A number of other factors can affect the size of the U.S. trade deficit in the short run, such as differences in economic growth between countries. The role of the dollar is also an important factor in sustaining the U.S. trade deficit. As a de facto global reserve currency, the U.S. dollar facilitates the trade deficit by broadening the availability of dollars and dollar-denominated assets. Foreign investors seek dollar-denominated assets as safe-haven assets, especially during times of economic stress. As long as foreigners (both governments and private entities) are willing to loan the United States the funds to finance the lack of savings in the U.S. economy, such as through buying U.S. Treasury securities, the trade deficit can continue. How significant is the size of the U.S. trade deficit, and how does it compare with other major economies? The U.S. trade deficit relative to the size of the economy provides a metric to examine trends over time and compare with other countries. The U.S. current account deficit relative to GDP reached a historic high of 5.8% of GDP in 2006, but it has declined since to 2.3% of GDP in 2017—consistent with the average trend in the mid-1980s (see Figure 8 ). Table 2 shows current account balances as a percentage of GDP for selected economies, as well as ratios of gross domestic savings to total investment. A ratio below 100 indicates savings are not enough to meet investment needs—such countries, including the United States, are net borrowers and typically run current account deficits. Among selected countries, as of 2017, the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States had the largest current account deficits as a percent of GDP, while the countries with the largest current account surpluses included the Netherlands, Germany, and South Korea. What role do foreign trade barriers play in causing trade deficits? Some policymakers view the size of U.S. bilateral trade deficits with certain countries—such as China, the largest single source of the U.S. overall trade deficit—as an indicator that the trade relationship is "unfair" and the result of market-distorting trade policies, such as trade barriers, subsidies, and discriminatory regulations. Such policies may potentially affect the volume of bilateral trade in specific products and with particular countries, but they have less effect on the size of the global U.S. trade deficit, which is largely a reflection of the low level of U.S. savings. The evidence suggests that high tariffs and trade barriers are not correlated with smaller overall trade deficits. If protectionist trade measures were reduced in certain countries, U.S. exporters might sell more products. However, if U.S. overall consumption and savings behavior did not change, increased demand for imports would leave the overall U.S. trade deficit relatively unchanged, all things held equal. Similarly, the reduction or imposition of protectionist trade measures in one country might simply result in trade diversion, the shifting of trade from one country to another, and do little to change the overall trade deficit. Bilateral trade balances provide a useful snapshot of the U.S. trade relationship with a particular country, but they are influenced by various factors beyond trade barriers including: the overall level of economic development and relative rates of economic growth, abundance of raw materials, and rates of technological change. Moreover, bilateral trade deficits with certain trading partners often marks complex supply chain relationships, where one country (such as China) is the final point of assembly for products (such as iPhones) or a supplier of inputs and components, where the added value that occurred in one country is relatively small compared to the value that occurred in other parts of the supply chain. How does the trade deficit affect the exchange value of the dollar? Without sufficient inflows of capital, a trade deficit causes other parts of the economy to adjust, in particular a country's exchange rate (e.g., the value of the dollar relative to the yen or euro). Net imports cause a surplus of U.S. dollars to flow abroad. If converted to other national currencies, the dollar's excess supply tends to lower its value relative to other currencies. In practice, this should make imports more expensive for Americans and exports cheaper for foreign buyers, gradually leading to a smaller trade deficit. However, the dollar holds a special status in global financial markets; countries use the dollar both as a medium of exchange and reserve currency. The U.S. economy is a safe haven for storing wealth and an attractive destination for investments, especially for countries with high savings rates, like China. When foreigners exchange their currency for U.S. dollars to buy U.S. Treasury securities, for example, the dollar appreciates, which makes U.S. exports more expensive. In addition, foreign governments (with large domestic savings) have intervened to keep the value of their currency from appreciating relative to the dollar by buying dollars and investing them back in the United States. Some analysts contend that past intervention in currency markets by China and other countries seeking to hold down the value of their currencies in order to boost exports has hampered the realignment of global trade balances. Is the trade deficit a problem for the U.S. economy? As discussed, trade deficits reflect the savings/investment shortfall, which means the United States is borrowing from abroad. One major concern is the debt accumulation from sustained trade deficits. Ultimately, whether borrowing to finance imports is worthwhile depends on whether those funds are used for greater investments in productive capital with high returns that raise future standards of living, or whether they are used for current consumption. If U.S. consumers, business, and the government are borrowing to finance new technology, equipment, or other productivity-enhancing products, borrowing results in a deficit and can be paid off because such investments are expected to result in a higher long-run economic growth. However, borrowing to finance consumer purchases (e.g., clothes, household electronics) pushes repayment to future generations, without investments to raise the ability to finance those repayments. Some economists also warn that under certain circumstances, a rising U.S. trade deficit could spark a large and sudden fall in the value of the dollar, risking financial turmoil in the United States and abroad. For example, foreigners could lose faith in U.S. ability to honor its debt or no longer see the United States as an optimal place to invest in. Many economists argue that attempting to reduce the U.S. trade deficit without addressing the underlying macroeconomic imbalances could negatively affect the economy, including reducing economic growth, and do little to affect the trade balance in the long run. The current account deficit could be reduced by boosting domestic savings (i.e., reducing domestic consumption and government budget deficits) or reducing foreign investment (i.e., reducing borrowing from abroad). Realigning exchange rates through the depreciation of the dollar, or ensuring other countries are not intervening in the market to artificially devalue their currencies, is another means. Trade policies are generally not viewed as the most effective policy tools for affecting the overall trade balance. Sector-Specific Issues in U.S. Trade How important are manufactured goods in U.S. trade? In 2017, the United States exported $1.3 trillion in manufactured goods and imported $2.0 trillion, creating a merchandise trade deficit of $698 billion (see Figure 9 ). U.S. manufactures exports accounted for 56% of total U.S. exports of goods and services and 70% of total U.S. imports of goods and services. Manufactures share of U.S. exports fell 4 percentage points over the past decade, as the services export share expanded; manufactures share of U.S. imports expanded by 4 percentage points. Top U.S. exports and imports by subsector included transportation equipment, computer and electronic products, chemicals, and machinery. Is the U.S. manufacturing sector shrinking due to increased trade? The growth of global value chains has transformed U.S. manufacturing in certain industries, with the expansion of production that requires advanced technology but relatively less labor. As a result, for many products, labor-intensive activities like assembly have moved abroad, while activities such as design, product development, and distribution increasingly drive the manufacturing process. Reports of some factory closings and layoffs, such as at the Carrier plant in Indiana and GM factories in the Midwest, and labels indicating merchandise made in China, Mexico, or other countries, have reinforced the perception that the U.S. manufacturing sector is shrinking. Many consider relative changes in output and employment, among other metrics, to examine the health of the sector (see Figure 10 ). Such data paint a mixed picture. The United States has seen a long-term decline in employment in manufacturing. At the same time, manufacturing output has increased, reflecting increased productivity, with fewer workers needed for a given level of production. While the sector's importance relative to the economy and relative to services has declined, manufacturing remains a significant component of the U.S. economy. To summarize: From 1980 to 2017, U.S. manufacturing real output increased more than 80%; since 2009, it increased by about 20%. At the same time, value-added of manufacturing as a share of GDP decreased, accounting for 11% of GDP in 2017 compared to 21% in 1980, just as value-added of services increased from 55% to 70% of GDP. U.S. employment in manufacturing, which peaked at 19.4 million in 1979, fell by more than one-third to 12.4 million in 2017. Despite this long-term trend, the level of employment has risen each year since 2010. In 2017, employment in manufacturing accounted for 8.5% of total nonfarm employment, compared to 20.7% in 1980; the services share expanded by 20 percentage points over the same time period. Business services employment within manufacturing has also increased in recent years. Falling employment and the declining importance of physical production in the manufacturing process are not unique to the United States and have occurred in most advanced economies. Although some changes in the sector may be a result of factors specific to the United States, others may be due to changes related to technology, consumer preferences, or broader macroeconomic factors. The role of trade has been widely debated. Some estimate that increased imports from China contributed to the steep decline in U.S. manufacturing employment in the 2000s; others estimate that job loss in manufacturing was substantially offset by job gains in services due to the expansion of U.S. exports globally. Others contend that trade has played a less dominant role compared to automation and other factors. Taking a broader view, a fundamental restructuring of the U.S. manufacturing sector was underway for more than two decades prior to China joining the World Trade Organization (WTO). Measuring manufacturing activity can be challenging, and existing data may not fully capture how manufacturing has changed, the sources of employment, and how value is created (see above). Manufacturing remains a significant component of the U.S. economy by many measures: U.S. manufacturers account for nearly 70% of all private-sector research and development (R&D), and nearly 60% of U.S. exports. While the U.S. share of global manufacturing value-added has declined, the United States remains a top global manufacturer. How important are agricultural goods in U.S. trade? In 2017, the United States exported $138 billion in agricultural goods and imported $121 billion, creating a trade surplus of $17 billion (see Figure 9 ). U.S. agricultural exports accounted for 6% of total U.S. exports of goods and services and 4% of total U.S. imports. Agriculture's share of U.S. exports has fallen slightly below the average of 8% over the past decade, while the import share remains on trend. Although small relative to trade in manufactured goods, trade remains a significant component of the U.S. agricultural sector, with exports accounting for about 20% of total farm production by value. Foreign markets are a major outlet for many agricultural goods; for example, wheat and cotton rely on other countries for absorbing over half of U.S. output. According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture, imports of certain products, such as coffee, cocoa and spices, fish, and juices, accounted for a large share of U.S. food consumption in recent years. What is trade in services, and how is it different from goods trade? "Services" refers to an expanding range of economic activities, such as audiovisual, construction, computer and related services, energy, express delivery, e-commerce, financial, professional, retail and wholesaling, transportation, tourism, and telecommunications. Services not only function as end-use products, but they also facilitate the rest of the economy. For example, transportation services move intermediate products along global value chains and final products to consumers; telecommunications services open e-commerce channels; and financial services provide credits for the manufacture of goods. Intermediate services embedded within a supply chain can include R&D, design and engineering, and business services. As with trade in goods, foreign barriers may prevent U.S. trade in services from expanding to its full potential, but services barriers are often different from those faced by goods suppliers. Many barriers to goods trade—tariffs and quotas, for example—are at the border. By contrast, restrictions on services trade occur largely within the importing country as "behind the border" barriers. Some restrictions are in the form of discriminatory regulations that may favor domestic service providers over foreign service providers. Because services transactions more often require direct contact between the consumer and provider, many of the trade barriers faced by companies relate to the ability to establish a commercial presence in the consumers' country in the form of direct investment or to the temporary movement of providers and consumers across borders. How important are services in U.S. trade? In 2017, the United States exported $798 billion in services and imported $542 billion, creating a trade surplus of $255 billion (see Figure 9 ). U.S. services exports accounted for 34% of total U.S. exports of goods and services, while services imports accounted for 19% of total U.S. imports. Although smaller relative to trade in goods, services trade plays an important role in the U.S. economy, accounting for about 79% of U.S. GDP and 82% of U.S. private sector full-time employment. Unlike trade in goods, each year the United States exports more services than it imports, thus surpluses in services trade have partially offset U.S. trade deficits in goods trade. Conventional trade data may underestimate trade in services because the data are not measured on a value-added basis and do not attribute any portion of the traded value of manufactured and agricultural products to services inputs. Intermediate services embedded within a value chain as inputs include not only transportation and distribution to help move goods along, but also R&D, design and engineering, and business services. The independent value of these services (as opposed to the value of the final product) can be captured in trade in value-added statistics. As manufacturing and agriculture grow more complex and technologically advanced, their consumption of value-added services also grows. How is digital trade different from other trade in goods and services? Digital trade includes not only end-products such as movies, software, or video games; it also serves as a means to facilitate economic activity, potentially enhancing productivity and competitiveness. Examples of digital trade include online shopping; transmission of information to manage business operations; online health or educational services; communication channels, such as email; and financial services used in e-commerce or electronic trading. Information and communication technologies (ICT) services are outpacing the growth of trade in ICT goods. As with traditional trade barriers, digital trade constraints can be classified as tariff or nontariff barriers. Nontariff barriers establish restrictions that may affect what a firm offers in a market or how it operates. Because digital trade is intangible and does not require direct interaction between individuals, trade barriers are often in the form of localization requirements that restrict the flow of commercial data. Digitally delivered exports and services in particular rely on cross-border data flows. But trade in manufactured goods and agricultural products also increasingly depends on data flows. For example, farmers may use real-time satellite data to optimize the productivity of crops and soil. Data transfer regulations that restrict cross-border data flows or require use of locally based servers or infrastructure, so-called data localization barriers, may limit the type of services that a firm can sell or how it can communicate and share data with subsidiaries or headquarters abroad. Such restrictions may also prevent the ability of providers that offer or rely on cloud-computing from entering a market. Formulation of U.S. Trade Policy Trade Policy Objectives and Functions What have been the overall objectives of U.S. trade policy? The United States was a key architect of the global economic order that evolved after World War II, which established multilateral institutions to advance a rules-based, open trading system. Historically, U.S. trade policy has focused on supporting economic growth and jobs through trade, liberalizing markets by reducing trade and investment barriers through trade agreements and negotiations, enforcing trade commitments and related laws, and providing time-limited relief to companies and workers facing unfair or injurious import competition. Another key objective of U.S. trade policy has been to advance U.S. strategic goals by supporting economic development and integration of developing countries, strengthening regional alliances, and extending U.S. influence abroad. U.S. administrations outline key trade policy objectives in an annual trade policy agenda established by the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). Based on the latest agenda, objectives of the current Administration include pursuing trade policies that support U.S. national security and preserve national sovereignty; negotiating "new and better trade deals"; strictly enforcing U.S. trade laws and protecting U.S. rights under trade agreements; and reforming the multilateral trading system. What are the key functions of U.S. trade policy? Key trade functions of the U.S. government include formulating and coordinating trade policy; negotiating trade and investment agreements; enforcing U.S. trade laws and U.S. rights under trade agreements; and administering trade and investment programs, such as export financing, import inspection and safety, and trade adjustment assistance. Congress plays a major role in U.S. trade policy through its legislative and oversight authority, working together with the executive branch to negotiate and implement trade agreements. The USTR and multiple U.S. agencies are generally involved in implementing trade policy, making interagency coordination an important part of the process. By statute, the USTR is the President's principal advisor on trade policy, chief U.S. trade negotiator, and head of the interagency trade policy coordinating process. Certain other agencies have primary roles in specific regards, such as the Commerce Department, which holds operational responsibility over key trade programs, and the Department of Agriculture, which aims to promote and regulate U.S. agricultural trade. Agency roles have evolved over time, both through legislative and administrative actions. Role of Congress What is the role of Congress in making trade policy? The U.S. Constitution designates Congress as the primary authority over trade policy. Article 1, Section 8, of the U.S. Constitution expressly grants Congress the power "To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises" and "To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States," as well as the general provision "To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper" to carry out these specific authorities. Congress exercises this power in many ways, such as through the enactment of tariff schedules and trade remedy laws, and the approval and implementation of reciprocal trade agreements. How does Congress make trade policy? U.S. trade policy is based on statutory authorities, as passed by Congress. These include laws authorizing trade programs and governing trade policy generally in areas such as tariffs, nontariff barriers, trade remedies, and import and export policies, as well as trade policy functions of the federal government. Congress also sets trade negotiating objectives in law, through trade promotion authority (TPA, see below); requires formal notification and consultation from the executive branch and opportunity to provide advice on trade negotiations; and conducts oversight hearings on trade programs and agreements to assess their conformity to U.S. law and congressional intent. Congress has delegated certain powers to the President to negotiate reciprocal trade agreements and take certain executive action regarding trade policy. In 1934, Congress enacted the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, which authorized the President to enter into reciprocal agreements to reduce tariffs within congressionally preapproved levels, and to implement the new tariffs by proclamation without additional legislation. Congress renewed this authority periodically until the 1960s. Subsequently, Congress enacted the Trade Act of 1974, combining tariff proclamation authority with a broader mandate for the executive branch to open markets and to negotiate nondiscriminatory international trade norms for nontariff barriers as well (see below). What committees lead in exercising congressional authority over trade? Because of the revenue implications inherent in most trade agreements and trade policy changes, the House Ways and Means Committee and Senate Finance Committee have primary responsibility for trade matters. Each committee has a subcommittee dedicated exclusively to trade issues. Other committees may also have a role should trade agreements, policies, and other trade issues include matters under their jurisdiction. For example, the House Foreign Affairs and Senate Banking Committees have jurisdiction over export controls. The foreign affairs committees in both chambers also examine trade relationships as part of their broader oversight of foreign relations. Congressional Advisory Groups on Negotiations (CAGs) consult and provide advice to USTR before and during trade agreement negotiations. Separate CAGs are established for both houses: a House Advisory Group on Negotiations (HAG), chaired by the chair of the Ways and Means Committee, and a Senate Advisory Group on Negotiations (SAG), chaired by the chair of the Finance Committee. CAGs can receive briefings and can access trade negotiating documents. How can individual Members of Congress affect trade policy decisions? Individual Members affect trade policy first as voting representatives who collectively determine the statutes governing trade matters. They may also exercise influence as sitting members on relevant committees, in testimony before committees whether or not they are members, in written letters to USTR weighing in on trade policy decisions, and in exercising informal influence over other Members through the exercise of the political authority and power invested in them by the electorate. What is Trade Promotion Authority (TPA)? Trade promotion authority (TPA), also at times called "fast track," refers to the process for approving and implementing most trade agreements. If a trade agreement negotiated by the President requires changes in U.S. law, Congress is responsible for implementing the agreement through legislation. TPA ensures expedited consideration of implementing legislation through a guaranteed, up-or-down vote with no amendments, provided the implementing bill and the negotiating process meet certain requirements (see Figure 11 ). To be eligible for expedited consideration, a trade agreement must be negotiated, concluded, and notified to Congress, during the time period in which TPA is in effect, and it must reflect the negotiating objectives specified in the TPA statute. In addition, negotiations must be conducted in conjunction with various notifications and consultations with Congress and other stakeholders. More broadly, TPA defines how Congress is to exercise its constitutional authority over trade policy, while affording the President added negotiating credibility, by giving U.S. trading partners an assurance that the final agreement will be considered by Congress in a timely manner and without amendments. Congress first enacted TPA under the Trade Act of 1974 and has renewed this authority four times. Some aspects of TPA have evolved during these renewals. The most recent legislation was signed into law on June 29, 2015 ( P.L. 114-26 ), and applies to concluded trade agreements, notified to Congress before July 1, 2021. Role of the Executive Branch What are the functions of the executive branch in U.S. trade policy? The executive branch executes trade policy in various ways. Under the Constitution, the President has the responsibility for conducting the nation's foreign relations and negotiating treaties with other nations. The executive branch negotiates, implements, and monitors U.S. trade agreements. The executive branch is also responsible for customs enforcement, collection of duties, implementation of trade remedy and other trade laws, budget proposals for trade programs and agencies, and administering export and import policies, among other functions. Who is in charge of U.S. trade policy? The President directs overall trade policy in the executive branch and performs specific trade functions granted by statute, such as adjusting tariff rates through delegated authority. The chief adviser on trade policy to the President is the USTR, a Cabinet-level appointment. The USTR has primary responsibility for developing, coordinating, and implementing trade policy, as well as negotiating multilateral, regional, and bilateral trade agreements and enforcing U.S. trade laws. The USTR reports annually on the President's trade policy agenda—due to Congress by March 1 st each year—and on foreign trade barriers. Congress created the USTR in 1962 (originally the Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations) to heighten the profile of trade and provide better balance between competing domestic and international interests in the formulation and implementation of U.S. trade policy and negotiations, previously managed by the State Department. Many trade functions have been delegated by Congress and the President to various departments and agencies within the executive branch. These agencies administer the government's trade functions, coordinating U.S. positions through an interagency process and with input from public and private sector advisory groups. Other key agencies with trade policymaking and enforcement responsibilities include the Departments of Commerce, Agriculture, State and the Treasury. The Departments of Homeland Security and Labor are also involved in trade enforcement. What is the interagency process? The USTR has primary responsibility for trade negotiations and trade policy decisions. However, such decisions often involve areas of responsibility that fall under other Cabinet-level departments, requiring a multidepartment interagency process. To implement this process, Congress initially established the Trade Policy Committee, chaired by USTR and consisting of the Secretaries of the Treasury, Commerce, State, Agriculture, Labor, and other department heads as USTR deems appropriate. Two sub-Cabinet groups were subsequently established—the Trade Policy Review Group (TPRG, sub-Cabinet or deputies level) and the Trade Policy Staff Committee (TPSC, staff level), composed of some 20 agencies. The executive branch also solicits advice from a three-tier trade advisory committee system mandated by Congress that consists of private sector and nonfederal government representatives (see below). When does the President get involved in trade decisions? The President is responsible for influencing the direction of trade legislation, signing trade legislation into law, and making other specific decisions on U.S. trade policies and programs when the President deems that the national interest or the political environment requires direct participation. This can take place in many areas of trade policy, such as requesting TPA, initiating critical trade remedy cases and/or deciding whether to impose recommended import restrictions in certain investigations. In addition, the President can influence trade relations through meetings or communications with foreign heads of state, and regarding other trade policy areas subject to or requiring high political visibility. Role of the Private Sector and Other Stakeholders What is the formal role of the private sector and other stakeholders in the formulation of U.S. trade policy? The role of the private sector and other stakeholders in the formulation of U.S. trade policy is embodied in a three-tiered committee system that Congress established in Section 135 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended. The advisory system consists of 28 committees (with about 700 citizen advisors), which is administered by USTR's Office of Intergovernmental Affairs & Public Engagement (IAPE) in cooperation with other agencies. The three-tier system consists of (1) the President's Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations (ACTPN); (2) five general policy advisory committees dealing with environment, labor, agriculture, Africa, and intergovernmental issues; and (3) 20 technical advisory committees in the areas of industry and agriculture. Committees were set up to ensure that U.S. public and private sector views are considered in trade policies and programs. The advisory system provides information and advice on negotiating objectives and bargaining positions for trade agreements, among other issues. What is the informal role of the private sector and other stakeholders? The private sector, nongovernment organizations (NGOs), labor groups, and other stakeholders shape U.S. trade policy in a number of other ways. For example, representatives from industry and NGOs may be invited to testify before congressional committees. Private sector representatives are also invited or requested to testify before the U.S. International Trade Commission, USTR, the Department of Commerce, or other government bodies to provide assessments of the potential impact of pending trade negotiations on their industries and sectors. In addition, the executive branch regularly seeks comments from interested stakeholders through Federal Register notices regarding a variety of trade initiatives, including new trade negotiations, eligibility for preferential trading programs, and trade investigations. Private sector, NGOs and labor groups also lobby Congress and the executive branch to promote their interests in U.S. trade policies and trade agreements. Why do groups attempt to lobby on trade decisions? Trade is an integral part of the U.S. economy. Virtually all kinds of agricultural and manufactured goods are tradeable—they can be exported and imported. In addition, a growing number of services—once considered non-tradeable because of their intangibility—can be bought and sold across borders because of technological advancements. As a result, implementing trade policy can affect a broad spectrum of interests in the United States. For some industries, firms, and workers, congressional decisions to support a particular trade agreement or rulings on antidumping and other cases could affect both employment and economic growth; those decisions also influence product choices and prices facing U.S. consumers. Such groups are also concerned with obtaining greater market access in various countries. In addition, the increasing focus of trade agreements on nontariff issues, such as intellectual property rights and labor and environmental protections, has broadened the scope of stakeholder interest. Consequently, groups representing businesses, farmers, workers, consumers, and various public interest groups strive to ensure that their views on trade policy decisions are represented. Role of the Judiciary How do federal courts get involved in trade? Legal challenges may be brought in federal court by importers, exporters, domestic manufacturers, and other injured parties to appeal governmental actions and decisions concerning trade. Cases may involve, for example, customs classification decisions, agency determinations in antidumping (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) proceedings, Section 201 safeguards, Section 232 national security investigations (see " Tariffs and Trade Remedies "), or the constitutionality of state economic sanctions. The federal government may also initiate legal proceedings against individuals and firms to enforce customs laws or statutory restrictions on particular imports and exports. Some trade statutes may preclude judicial review. For example, most preliminary determinations in AD and CVD proceedings and governmental actions involving the implementation of World Trade Organization (WTO) and free trade agreements may not be challenged in federal court. While most federal cases involving trade laws are heard in the U.S. Court of International Trade (see below), cases may also be filed in other federal courts depending on the nature of the cause of action or proceeding involved. Court decisions may significantly affect U.S. trade policy when they (1) examine whether an agency has properly interpreted its statutory mandate or has acted outside the scope of its statutory authority, (2) decide how much deference courts should accord actions of the executive branch undertaken pursuant to statutory grants of authority, or (3) rule on whether a trade statute violates the U.S. Constitution. What is the U.S. Court of International Trade? The U.S. Court of International Trade (USCIT) is an Article III federal court located in New York City with exclusive jurisdiction over a number of trade-related matters, including customs decisions, trade remedy determinations, import embargoes imposed for reasons other than health and safety, and the recovery of customs duties and penalties. Formerly known as the Customs Court, the USCIT was renamed in the Customs Court Act of 1980, which also significantly enlarged its jurisdiction. The court consists of nine judges, no more than five of whom may be from the same political party. Judges are appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. USCIT decisions may be appealed by right to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and possibly to the U.S. Supreme Court. Statutory provisions related to the USCIT can be found at 28 U.S.C. Sections 251-258 (establishment), 28 U.S.C. Sections 1581-1585 (jurisdiction), and 28 U.S.C. Sections 2631-2647 (procedure). U.S. Trade Policy Tools119 Trade Negotiations and Agreements Why does the United States negotiate trade liberalizing agreements? The United States negotiates trade liberalizing agreements for economic and commercial reasons, as well as foreign policy and national security reasons. Objectives include: encourage trade partners to reduce or eliminate tariffs and nontariff barriers and increase market access for U.S. exporters; gain competitive advantages for U.S. firms over foreign competitors in third country markets; increase access to lower-cost imports that offer domestic and industrial consumers a wider choice of products; encourage trading partners, especially developing countries, to liberalize their trade and investment regimes, and thereby improve the efficiency of their economies and their integration with the global economy; and strengthen alliances, forge new strategic relationships, and deepen U.S. presence and influence in a geographic region. What are the types of trade agreements? The United States participates in three major categories of trade agreements: Multilateral agreements are negotiated in the World Trade Organization (WTO), and include all 164 WTO members. F ree trade agreements (FTAs) are negotiated outside the WTO and can be further divided by the number of participants. Bilateral FTAs involve two countries, while regional FTAs , such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP or TPP-11) involve three or more countries, typically in a geographic region. Plurilateral agreements involve more than two countries but not all WTO members and typically focus on a specific sector, such as the Information Technology Agreement (ITA) or ongoing Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) negotiations. How many free trade agreements (FTAs) does the United States have? The United States currently has 14 FTAs in force, covering 20 countries (see Figure 12 ). Globally, nearly 300 trade agreements have been notified to the WTO and are in force as of late 2018. The majority of U.S. FTA partners are small, developing countries. While U.S. FTAs cover some major U.S. trading partners, like Canada and Mexico, only 35% of total U.S. trade is with FTA partners. More than 99% of U.S. trade is with WTO member countries and thus subject to WTO commitments and provisions—65% of U.S. trade is with WTO members with which the U.S. does not have an FTA. U.S. trade policy under the Trump Administration has brought a shift in approach to trade negotiations. In January 2017, President Trump withdrew the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)—a regional FTA negotiated during the Obama Administration with 11 other countries in the Asia-Pacific—and committed to negotiate future trade deals bilaterally. President Trump has also renegotiated two U.S. FTAs and proposed a number of new negotiations. The United States signed the proposed renegotiated NAFTA agreement, the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) on November 30, 2018. The renegotiation was conducted under TPA procedures, which potentially allows for expedited consideration by Congress of the implementing legislation required to bring the new agreement into force. The United States also recently negotiated amendments to the U.S.-South Korea FTA (KORUS). These more limited amendments were not negotiated under TPA procedures. The delayed reduction of the U.S. light truck tariff on imports from South Korea, the most significant of the negotiated amendments, took effect through presidential proclamation at the beginning of 2019. In October 2018, under TPA procedures, USTR notified Congress of its intent to negotiate new trade agreements with Japan, the European Union and United Kingdom—the negotiations could begin in early 2019. How do U.S. FTAs differ from FTAs negotiated among other countries? FTAs negotiated by the United States are often more comprehensive—both in terms of tariff coverage and the overall scope of enforceable commitments—than those negotiated among other countries. In general, U.S. FTA rules and obligations also go beyond those established in the WTO. Nearly all U.S. FTAs include not only the elimination of the majority of tariffs on trade in goods, but also reduction of barriers to services trade, rules on foreign investment, intellectual property rights protection, commitments on opening government procurement markets, and enforceable provisions on labor standards and the environment. The United States has sought to establish new trading rules within recent trade negotiations and agreements on emerging issues like digital trade and state-owned enterprises. What are Trade and Investment Framework Agreements (TIFAs)? A Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) is an agreement between the United States and another country or group of countries to consult on issues of mutual economic interest in order to promote trade and investment. The USTR is the U.S. lead representative in TIFA talks. The United States has more than 50 TIFAs, most of which are with developing countries. The United States and its TIFA partners can agree to establish a joint ministerial-level council as the overall mechanism for consultations, as well as issue-oriented working groups. A TIFA is a nonbinding agreement and does not involve changes in U.S. law; therefore, TIFAs do not require congressional approval. In some cases however, TIFAs have led to FTA or bilateral investment treaty (BIT) negotiations. What is the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)? The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was created in 1947 as a part of the post-WWII effort to build a stable, open international economic framework. The GATT was not a formal international organization, but it became the principal set of rules governing international trade for 47 years, until the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. With some slight modifications, the GATT continues to be applied today. The core principles and articles of the GATT committed the original 23 signatories, including the United States, to lower tariffs on a range of goods and to apply tariffs in a nondiscriminatory manner—the so-called most-favored nation, or MFN principle. Although the GATT mechanism for the enforcement of these rules or principles was viewed as largely ineffective, the agreement nonetheless brought about a substantial reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers. What is the World Trade Organization (WTO)? The WTO is a 164-member international organization that administers the trade rules and agreements negotiated by its members, including the United States, to eliminate barriers and create nondiscriminatory rules to govern trade. It also serves as a forum for trade liberalization negotiations and dispute settlement resolution. The United States was a major force behind the establishment of the WTO on January 1, 1995, as well as the new rules and trade agreements that resulted from multilateral trade negotiations (Uruguay Round, 1986-1994). The WTO succeeded and encompassed the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), established in 1947. The WTO administers a number of agreements and separate commitments including under the GATT (for trade in goods), the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS, for trade in services), the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), and others. It also oversees multilateral and plurilateral negotiations among subsets of WTO members, such as the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) and Information Technology Agreement (ITA). The last major negotiation—the Doha Development Agenda—began in 2001; however, it was beset with persistent differences among the United States, the EU, and developing countries on major issues, such as agriculture, industrial tariffs and nontariff barriers, services, and trade remedies. It has been in abeyance since the WTO Nairobi Ministerial did not reaffirm its continuation in 2015. At the latest WTO Ministerial Conference in December 2017, no major deliverables were announced. Several members committed to make progress on ongoing talks, such as in fisheries subsidies and e-commerce, and pursue new plurilateral negotiations, while other areas remain stalled. The WTO's effectiveness as a negotiating body for broad-based trade liberalization has come under intensified scrutiny since the collapse of the Doha Round, as has its role in resolving trade disputes. Several members believe the WTO needs to adopt reforms to continue its role as the foundation of the global trading system, and have begun to explore aspects of reform and future negotiations. Proposed reforms also aim to improve the working of the WTO's dispute settlement system. The Trump Administration is currently withholding approval for appointments to the WTO Appellate Body (AB)—the 7-member body that reviews appeals in a dispute case—amid concerns over "judicial overreach" and certain procedures. The dispute settlement system could cease to function by late 2019, if new appointments are not approved. How are disputes resolved at the WTO? A WTO member may initiate dispute settlement proceedings under the WTO to challenge another member's trade practices that allegedly violate a WTO agreement. The dispute settlement process begins with consultations between the two parties. If the consultations fail to resolve the dispute, the member may request a dispute panel to adjudicate the dispute; a panel decision may be appealed to the WTO Appellate Body (AB). If the defending member is found to have violated a WTO obligation, the member will be expected to remove the challenged measure within a compliance period; otherwise, the prevailing member may request authorization from the WTO to take temporary retaliatory action, such as increased tariffs, or seek compensation. Since 1995, 575 dispute settlement complaints have been filed in the WTO, as of January 2019. The United States has been an active user of the WTO dispute settlement system and, among WTO members, has been the complainant or respondent in the most WTO cases (see Figure 13 ). Several pending WTO disputes are of significance to the United States, including challenges by a number of countries to recent tariff measures imposed by the Trump Administration. WTO decisions do not have direct effect in U.S. law. Thus, if a panel finds a U.S. statute, policy or practice to be inconsistent with U.S. WTO obligations, the findings may not be implemented except through U.S. legislative action. Where an administrative action is successfully challenged, USTR decides what, if any, compliance action will be taken. If there is sufficient statutory authority to amend or modify a regulation or practice or to issue a new determination in a challenged administrative proceeding, USTR may direct the agency involved to make the change (provided certain statutory procedures for such actions are followed). In some cases, the United States may pay compensation to the complainant country instead changing U.S. rules or regulations. As a matter of policy, the United States generally seeks to comply with WTO decisions against it. This helps ensure that other WTO members also comply with the rulings in dispute cases initiated by the United States. How are disputes resolved under U.S. FTAs? U.S. FTAs establish procedures to resolve disputes in both state-to-state and investor-state fora. Similar to WTO dispute settlement, U.S. FTAs aim first to resolve disputes through consultations; otherwise, a panel can be requested to adjudicate the dispute. Once a decision is issued by the panel, the offending party is expected to come into compliance or can face possible suspension of trade benefits or other remedies. If a dispute is common to both FTA and WTO rules, a country may choose the forum in which to bring the dispute. State-state dispute settlement has not been frequently used under U.S. FTAs—three cases have been decided under NAFTA—and disputes are usually resolved via consultations. Most other U.S. disputes with FTA partners have been adjudicated under WTO rules. Other than NAFTA, the United States has brought one FTA labor dispute (with Guatemala under CAFTA-DR) to formal dispute settlement. Most U.S. FTAs also contain a separate dispute system for investment-related provisions, called investor-state dispute settlement. (See " What is investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS)? "). NAFTA contains (and the proposed USMCA maintains) a unique binational panel system to review an administrative agency application of a country's trade remedy laws. Trade and Development What are trade preferences programs? Trade preference programs provide temporary, nonreciprocal, duty-free access to the U.S. market for selected exports from eligible developing countries. Since 1974, Congress has created six programs: (1) Generalized System of Preferences (GSP); (2) Andean Trade Preference Act (APTA; expired July 2013); (3) Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA; permanent); (4) United States-Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA); (5) African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA); and (6) Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity Through Partnership Encouragement Act (HOPE). In 2016, Congress also passed country-specific trade preferences for Nepal. GSP is the largest U.S. trade preference program, covering 120 countries and territories. It provides duty-free treatment to about 3,500 products imported from designated beneficiary developing countries and 1,500 additional products from least-developed countries. In 2017, $21 billion imports entered the United States under the program, out of $220 billion total imports from GSP countries. Countries must meet such criteria specified by Congress to be eligible, including protections for intellectual property rights and worker rights. USTR is currently conducting eligibility reviews of several GSP beneficiary countries, including India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, and Turkey. What is trade capacity building? Trade capacity building (TCB) involves U.S. assistance, such as funding, training, and technical expertise, to support developing countries' integration and participation in international trade. According to USAID, in FY2016, the United States invested about $1.2 billion in 651 TCB activities across 134 countries, regions or trade groups. The U.S. government has viewed TCB as an important way to help developing countries "negotiate and implement market opening and reform-oriented trade agreements and improve their capacity to benefit from increased trade." Examples include U.S. assistance to implement customs reforms required by the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement, improve labor and environment protections, and meet export standards and phyto-sanitary rules. Currently no single agency is responsible for coordinating U.S. government TCB. USAID typically receives the most funding to implement TCB activities; the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) also comprises a large share of funds related to infrastructure. Other agencies have TCB responsibilities, including the Departments of Agriculture, Labor, and State, and the Trade and Development Agency. Tariffs and Trade Remedies What is U.S. tariff policy? The Constitution empowers Congress to set tariffs—a customs duty levied on imports and exports; this power has been partially delegated to the President. While historically tariffs were used as a primary means of collecting government revenue, today developed countries like the United States rely on other means for generating revenue. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) administers the collection of tariffs at U.S. ports of entry—in 2016, CBP collected $32 billion in tariffs, just 1% of total federal revenue. Over the past 80 years, the United States used its tariff policy to encourage global trade liberalization toward various ends, such as increasing global trade, supporting global peace and economic prosperity, and opening markets for U.S. exports. Toward these ends, the United States has reduced or eliminated many of its tariffs through bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations and agreements (see above). Beginning in 1934, Congress began periodically authorizing the President to negotiate reciprocal reductions in tariffs bilaterally. Following World War II, the United States encouraged tariff reduction globally by supporting a rules-based trading system under the GATT and the WTO. By 2012, global tariffs had fallen to less than 7% on average. As of 2016, the simple mean of U.S. tariffs applied across all products was 3.3% (see Figure 14 ), the lowest among the top five global economies by GDP. Roughly 70% of all products enter the United States duty free. The Trump Administration has been critical of low-tariff policies and has made greater use of its discretionary authority to increase tariffs on certain goods imported from key U.S. trading partners.  What are the main U.S. trade remedy laws? U.S. trade laws include trade remedies used by the United States to mitigate the adverse impact of various foreign trade practices on domestic industries and workers. The two most frequently used trade remedies aimed at unfair trade practices are antidumping (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) laws, found in Title VII or the Trade Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1671-1677n, as amended). These laws are administered primarily through the Department of Commerce's International Trade Administration (ITA), which determines the existence and amount of dumping or subsidies, and the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC), which determines the injury or threat thereof to U.S. industries. Other trade remedy laws include Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974, which focuses on import surges of fairly traded goods; Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, which focuses on violations of trade agreements or other foreign practices found to be unjustifiable and restrict U.S. commerce; and Section 337 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, which focuses on patent and copyright infringements, and counterfeit goods. All laws must comply with U.S. WTO obligations, including articles under the GATT, known as the Antidumping Agreement, Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, and the Agreement on Safeguards. Supporters of trade remedies say that they are necessary to shield U.S. industries and workers from unfair competition. Others, including some importers and downstream consuming industries, are concerned that AD/CVD actions can serve as disguised protectionism and create inefficiencies in the world trading system by "artificially" raising prices on imported goods. What is the purpose of the antidumping law? Antidumping (AD) is the most frequently used U.S. trade remedy law. Dumping generally refers to an unfair trade practice in which an exporter sells goods in one export market at lower prices than comparable goods sold in the home market or in other export markets. Companies sometimes dump products to gain market share, deter competition, or get rid of industrial overcapacity. U.S. law provides for the assessment and collection of AD duties when an administrative determination is made by the ITA that foreign goods are being sold at "less than fair value" in the United States, and if the ITC determines that such imports cause material injury to a U.S. industry or the threat thereof. AD orders are not permanent and are subject to annual review if requested by an interested party, and a sunset review every five years. As of mid-December 2018, the United States had 354 AD orders in place; more than one-third were against China (see Figure 15 ). What is the purpose of the countervailing duty law? After AD laws, countervailing duty (CVD) is the most frequently used U.S. trade remedy law. The purpose of the CVD law is to offset injurious competitive advantage that foreign manufacturers or exporters might enjoy over U.S. producers as a result of receiving a subsidy from the government or another public entity. Countervailing duties are designed to offset the net amount of the foreign subsidy and are levied upon imports of the subsidized goods into the United States. Although AD and CVD laws are intended to remedy fundamentally different kinds of unfair trade, the procedures for both investigations are similar. As of mid-December 2018, the United States had 113 CVD orders in place, nearly half of which were against China (see Figure 15 ). What is the Section 201 safeguards law? Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. §2251, as amended) authorizes the President to restrict temporarily imports that are found to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic industry. So-called "safeguard" actions are designed to provide temporary relief—for example, through additional tariffs or quotas—to facilitate "positive adjustment" of a domestic industry to import competition. Unlike AD and CVD cases, no allegation of "unfair" trade practices is required to trigger a safeguard investigation. The ITC conducts an investigation, generally initiated by petition filed by a trade association, company, or union representing a U.S. industry. If the ITC finds imports are a substantial cause of serious injury, it makes recommendations on temporary relief to the President, who takes the final action on whether or not to implement the recommendations. In 2017, two safeguard investigations were initiated under the Trump Administration. In January 2018, the President decided to impose a four-year safeguard measure on imports of solar cells and a three-year safeguard on large residential washing machines. The last safeguard investigation was in 2001 over steel products. From 1975 to 2001, the ITC conducted 73 investigations; the ITC determined in the negative in 32 cases and in the affirmative in 34 cases (6 cases ended in ties). The President imposed some type of safeguard measure in 19 cases during this time. What is Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962? Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. §1862, as amended) is often called the "national security clause," because it provides the President with the ability to impose restrictions on imports that the Secretary of Commerce determines are being imported in "such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security." If requested or upon self-initiation, the Commerce Department's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) consults with the Secretary of Defense and other agencies, and conducts the investigation. Section 232 specifies the factors that Commerce must consider regarding the impact of the U.S. imports on national security. Depending on the findings, the President has the discretion to impose tariffs, quotas, or other measures to offset the adverse effect, subject to few limits. Section 232 has been invoked infrequently, with about 28 investigations completed since 1963. In February 2018, Commerce completed two Section 232 investigations and determined that U.S. imports of steel and aluminum were a threat to national security. In March 2018, the President decided to impose a 25% tariff on steel imports and a 10% tariff on aluminum imports. The Administration is currently conducting Section 232 investigations of uranium imports and imports of autos and auto parts. What is Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974? Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, is one of the principal statutory means by which the United States can enforce U.S. rights under trade agreements and respond to certain "unfair" barriers to U.S. exports, including inadequate protection of intellectual property rights (IPR). Specifically, Section 301 applies to foreign acts, policies, and practices that USTR determines either (1) violate, or are inconsistent with, a trade agreement; or (2) are unjustifiable and burden or restrict U.S. commerce. Section 301 cases can be initiated by petition filed by a company or self-initiated by USTR. USTR must seek a negotiated settlement with the trading partner concerned, through compensation or elimination of the specific trade barrier or practice. For cases involving trade agreements, such as the WTO, USTR is required to use the agreement's formal dispute settlement proceedings. If a resolution is not reached, USTR determines whether or not to retaliate, usually through the imposition of tariffs on selected products. A separate provision, commonly called "Special 301," directs USTR to annually report to Congress on countries that deny adequate protection or market access for U.S. IPR. USTR issues a three-tier list (based on the level of U.S. concern) of countries considered to maintain inadequate IPR regimes. A designation of "Priority Foreign Country" indicates countries whose practices are considered to be the most serious or harmful; such countries can also be subject to Section 301 investigations. Since 1974, USTR has initiated 125 Section 301 cases, retaliating in 16 instances. Almost half of Section 301 cases took place during the 1980s. In 2017, USTR launched a new investigation of China's IPR technology policies that may harm U.S. economic interests. In March 2018, USTR found that certain Chinese policies and practices are "unreasonable or discriminatory and burden or restrict U.S. commerce." The Trump Administration subsequently increased tariffs on $250 billion worth of U.S. imports from China and threatened an additional $267 billion in new tariff increases. To date, China has responded by increasing tariffs on $110 billion worth of U.S. products. Both sides have also pursued dispute cases at the WTO. In November 2018, USTR reported that "China has not fundamentally altered its unfair, unreasonable, and market-distorting practices" that spurred the Section 301 investigation. On the sidelines of the 2018 G-20 Leaders' Summit, according to a White House statement, President Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping agreed to immediately begin negotiations on "structural changes" in regards to IP and technology issues related to the Section 301 case, along with agriculture and services, with the goal of achieving an agreement in 90 days. China reportedly agreed to make "very substantial" purchases of U.S. agricultural, energy, and industrial products. In turn, the United States agreed to suspend the Section 301 tariff increases (from 10% to 25%) that were planned to take effect on January 1, 2019, contingent on an agreement in 90 days. What is Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930? Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, prohibits unfair acts or unfair methods of competition in importing goods or selling imports in the United States. In recent years, the statute has become increasingly used for IPR enforcement. Section 337 prohibits imports that infringe U.S. patents, copyrights, processes, trademarks, semiconductor products produced by infringing a protected mask work (such as integrated circuit designs), or protected design rights. The import or sale of an infringing product is illegal only if U.S. industry is producing an article covered by the relevant IPR or in the process of establishing such production. Unlike other trade remedies, no proof of injury due to the import is required. The ITC is responsible for Section 337 investigations. If a violation is found, the ITC may issue an exclusion order and/or cease-and-desist order, subject to presidential disapproval. As of 2018, there were 130 active section 337 investigations. Trade Adjustment What is the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) Program? Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) programs provide federal assistance to workers and firms that have been adversely affected by trade. TAA programs are authorized by the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, and were last reauthorized by the Trade Adjustment Assistance Reauthorization Act of 2015 (Title IV of P.L. 114-27 ). TAA for Workers (TAAW) is the largest program, with appropriations of $790 million in FY2019. TAAW provides assistance to trade-affected workers who have been separated from their jobs due to foreign competition, either through increased imports or because their jobs were relocated abroad. The program is administered at the federal level by the Department of Labor and supports various benefits and services, including funding for career services and training, and income support for workers, formally known as Trade Readjustment Allowance. Table 3 presents program data from FY2017, the most recent year available. Actual benefits are provided to individual workers through state workforce systems and state unemployment insurance systems. Smaller TAA programs are also authorized for firms and farmers affected by foreign competition. What is the rationale for TAA? While trade liberalization may increase the overall economic welfare of the affected trade partners, it can cause adjustment problems for firms and workers facing import competition. Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) has long been justified on the grounds that it is among the least disruptive options for offsetting policy-driven trade liberalization. Justification for TAA rests on arguments for (1) economic efficiency, by facilitating the adjustment process and returning workers to work more quickly; (2) equity, by compensating those who lose out due to liberalized trade and spreading the costs to society as a whole; and (3) generating support for international trade, by defusing domestic opposition to trade agreements and other trade policy measures. TAA skeptics argue that assistance is costly and economically inefficient, reduces worker and firm incentives to relocate and adjust to increased competition, and may not be equitable given that many groups hurt by changing economic circumstances caused by factors other than trade policies are not afforded special economic assistance. Others argue that TAA programs are not extensive enough to be effective. Despite widespread disagreement, Congress has consistently reached compromise to maintain the program in some form over the past five decades. Export Promotion and Export Controls How does the U.S. government promote exports? Several federal agencies promote U.S. exports and support U.S. investment. The Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im Bank), the Department of Agriculture, and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) administer various finance programs aimed at helping U.S. firms export and invest in certain developing countries, including through fee-based services. The Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 (BUILD Act), enacted in October 2018, establishes a new successor agency for OPIC . Agency mandates vary in their emphasis on U.S. commercial interests and foreign policy objectives, but their activities can have implications in both areas. In some cases, U.S. trade financing intends to help U.S. firms obtain a "level playing field" against foreign firms that may be receiving subsidized financing from their governments. In addition, the Department of Commerce's International Trade Administration (ITA) promotes U.S. exports, particularly by small and medium-sized companies (SMEs), through various support services, such as export counseling. The Ex-Im Bank, the official U.S. export credit agency, provides direct loans, loan guarantees, and export credit insurance, backed by the U.S. government, to help finance U.S. exports to developing economies, in part to counter similar activities by foreign governments. It operates under a renewable general statutory charter (Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, as amended), which was extended by the Export-Import Bank Reform and Reauthorization Act of 2015 (Division E, P.L. 114-94 ) through September 30, 2019. Despite its reauthorization, Ex-Im Bank has not been fully operational as its board of directors lacks a quorum due to unfilled positions, which has constrained the board's approval of medium- and long-term export financing above $10 million. Presidential appointments to the board require Senate approval, and have been part of the broader debate over Ex-Im Bank and the role of government in financing exports. What is the purpose of export controls? Congress has authorized the President to control the export of various items for national security, foreign policy, and economic reasons. Export controls have been a controversial policy issue due to the difficulty striking a balance between national security goals and maintaining export competitiveness. Through the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), the Export Controls Act of 2018 (ECA), the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), and other authorities, the United States restricts exports of defense items or munitions; dual-use goods and technology; certain nuclear materials and technology; and items that would assist in the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons or related missile technology. U.S. export controls are also used to restrict trade with certain countries on which the United States imposes economic sanctions. The Departments of Commerce, State, Energy, and the Treasury administer export control programs and various types of licenses required before certain exports can be undertaken. The ECA ( P.L. 115-232 , Subtitle B, Part I), which became law on August 13, 2018, provides broad legislative authority for the President to implement dual-use export controls. The law repealed the Export Administration Act of 1979, which had been the underlying statutory authority for such controls until it expired in 2001. Notably, the ECA authorizes the Department of Commerce to establish controls on the export and transfer of so-called "emerging and foundational technologies" that are deemed essential to U.S. national security, but, as of yet, are not defined as an existing commodity, software, or technology. What are "dual-use" goods and technology? Dual-used goods are commodities, software, or technologies that have both civilian and military applications. Examples include product categories like nuclear materials, microorganisms, electronics and computers, and lasers and sensors. Exports of dual-use goods and technologies are licensed by the Commerce Department's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS). Licenses are issued depending on an item's technical characteristics, destination and end use, and other activities of the end user. Link Between International Investment and Trade159 What are the main kinds of capital flows? Generally, the two main kinds of capital flows are foreign direct investment (FDI) and foreign portfolio investment (FPI). FDI involves the acquisition of real assets such as real estate, a manufacturing plant, or controlling interest in an ongoing enterprise by a person or entity from another country. Foreign portfolio investment involves the purchase of foreign equities or bonds, loans to foreign residents, or the opening of foreign bank accounts. FDI often involves a long-term commitment and can have the advantage of stimulating direct employment for the host country. By contrast, portfolio investments are extremely liquid and can be withdrawn often at the click of a computer mouse. In addition, official capital flows are generated by governments for various purposes, such as humanitarian assistance and other foreign aid. Which is larger—trade or capital flows? It depends. From 1990 to 2017, global trade in goods and services, as measured by exports, grew more than five times, from about $4 trillion a year to $23 trillion. During the same period, gross capital flows, as measured in the balance of payments accounts (direct, portfolio, and other official investments), expanded from around $1 trillion a year to about $4 trillion—but with a pre-crisis peak of more than $12 trillion in 2007, which showed significant growth since the 1990s. During this time period, there was also an explosion in growth in other types of capital flows, known as foreign exchange and over-the-counter derivatives markets. These markets facilitate trade in foreign exchange and other types of assets. While the capital flows associated with these markets do not directly relate to transactions in the balance of payments, they do affect the international exchange value of the dollar, which in turn affects prices of goods and services and the cost of securities. The latest survey of the world's leading central banks indicated that the total daily trading of foreign currencies was more than $5.1 trillion in 2016. Why do companies invest abroad? Broadly, firms invest abroad to increase their profits. However, a range of factors can influence a firm's decision to invest. Multinational corporations (MNCs) generally invest abroad because they possess some special process or product knowledge or special managerial abilities, which give them an advantage over foreign firms. Major determinants of FDI include the presence of competitive advantages, resources such as low-cost labor in a host country, and greater commercial benefits through an intra-firm relationship as opposed to an arm's-length relationship between the investor and host country. MNCs are motivated by more than a single factor and likely invest abroad not only to gain access to low-cost resources, but to improve efficiency or market share. FDI has supported the development of global value chains by multinational corporations (MNCs), which source production globally. In addition, many firms find it advantageous to operate close to their customers in foreign countries, where tastes and preferences may differ from the home market. Foreign markets also enable MNCs to access various resources, such as a well-educated work force, which might contribute to a firm's R&D activities. Last, some FDI transactions involve mergers and acquisitions, which can help make a firm become more globally competitive. What countries are the largest source of and destinations for global foreign direct investment (FDI)? According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the total stock of global outward FDI in 2017 was $31 trillion. The United States remains the largest source of FDI worldwide, followed by Hong Kong, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Japan, all with individual outward investment positions about one-fourth or less than that of the United States. The United States is also the largest recipient of FDI, followed by Hong Kong, China, the United Kingdom, and Singapore. By region, developing Asia accounted for the largest share of global FDI inflows (33%), followed by Europe (26%), North America (21%), Latin America and the Caribbean (11%), and Africa (3%). What are the levels of U.S. outward and inward FDI? The United States is the largest source and the largest recipient of FDI. FDI to and from the United States has increased rapidly over the past few decades. From 1985 to 2017, the stock of U.S. FDI abroad rose from $238 billion to $6.0 trillion, while the stock of FDI in the United States increased from $184 billion to $4.0 trillion (see Figure 16 ). The largest destinations for cumulative (or the stock of) U.S. FDI outflows through 2017 included the Netherlands, United Kingdom, Luxembourg, Ireland, Canada, Singapore, Australia, Germany, and Japan. The largest sources of cumulative FDI inflows included the United Kingdom, Japan, Canada, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland, and France and Ireland. Nearly 60% of U.S. direct investment abroad is in Europe, while 68% of FDI in the United States comes from Europe. By sector, U.S. outward FDI is primarily concentrated in high-technology, finance, and services. The largest share of U.S. inward FDI is in manufacturing sector, primarily chemicals and transport industries. What are the benefits of FDI? Generally, economists argue for unimpeded international flows of capital, such as FDI, because such flows complement domestic economic activity and positively affect both the domestic (home) and foreign (host) economies. For the home country, direct investment benefits the firms that invest abroad, because they are better able to exploit their competitive advantages and acquire additional skills and other advantages in foreign markets. Direct investment is also associated with a strengthened competitive position, a higher level of skills of the employees, and higher incomes of firms that invest abroad. Host countries benefit from inward FDI because the investment adds permanently to the capital stock and often to the skill set of the economy. Direct investment also brings technological advances, since firms that invest abroad generally possess advanced technology and production processes, boosts capital formation and contributes to a more competitive business environment and productivity growth. More broadly, FDI contributes to international trade and global economic integration, since most firms investing abroad are established MNCs that operate within global value chains. Both inward and outward FDI play a role in U.S. trade, jobs, and production. In 2016, the affiliates of foreign firms in the United States employed 7.1 million workers, exported $369.8 billion in goods, and imported $649.9 billion in goods. Foreign firm affiliates contributed $894.0 billion value-added to U.S. GDP, with larger annual growth in value-added on average compared to other private U.S. firms. Are there costs associated with FDI? Some stakeholders raise concerns that U.S. firms invest abroad to send manufacturing and jobs overseas and that U.S. FDI in operations and production facilities abroad supplants U.S. production and exports, thereby reducing employment and wages in the United States. There have been examples of U.S. firms closing a domestic plant and opening another plant abroad, but no official sources track such activities. As a result, most data on the activity of U.S. firms shifting plants or jobs abroad remain anecdotal. More broadly, most U.S. outward FDI is concentrated in high-income developed countries, where markets and consumer tastes are broadly similar to those in the United States, and most of this production is consumed abroad. Most economists argue there is no conclusive evidence that U.S. direct investment abroad leads to fewer jobs or lower incomes overall for Americans. Instead, they generally argue that the loss of U.S. manufacturing jobs in recent decades reflects a broad restructuring of the sector, responding primarily to improvements in productivity and other domestic economic forces. That said, jobs in particular companies and sectors can be adversely affected when a company makes decisions to produce similar products abroad. What are international investment agreements (IIAs)? International investment agreements (IIAs) establish binding rules on investment protections. While World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements address some investment issues to a limited extent, there are no comprehensive multilateral rules on investment. IIAs have thus become the primary vehicle for promoting investment rules: there are over 2,600 IIAs in force globally. IIAs generally aim to reduce FDI restrictions and ensure nondiscriminatory treatment of investors and investments. The agreements also include provisions to safeguard a government's right to regulate in the public interest and generally provide for national security and prudential exceptions. U.S. IIAs entail reciprocal commitments; in exchange for specific protections offered to foreign investors in the United States, U.S. investors investing in partner countries expect to receive the same protections. The primary forms of U.S. IIAs are bilateral investment treaties (BITs), which must be ratified by the Senate with two-thirds approval, and investment chapters in free trade agreements (FTAs). USTR and the State Department negotiate U.S. IIAs. How many IIAs does the United States have? The United States has bilateral investment treaties (BITs) in force with 40 countries, most of which are with developing countries (see Figure 17 ). The latest BIT ratified by the U.S. Senate, with Rwanda, entered into force in 2012. The United States had been pursuing BIT negotiations with China and India, but both talks have stalled. The United States also has 14 FTAs in force covering 20 countries, most of which include chapters on investment. What is investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS)? Investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) enables private investors to bring claims against host country governments for alleged violations of investment agreements before an international arbitration panel. ISDS provisions are intended to establish a binding and impartial procedure for settling disputes, with proceedings conducted under the auspices of the World Bank-affiliated International Centre for Settlement for Investment Disputes (ICSID) or comparable rules. While a successful claim by an investor can result in monetary penalties, a country cannot be compelled to change its laws over a decision. The number of ISDS cases has expanded significantly with the growth of global FDI in recent decades (see Figure 18 ). U.S. investors account for about one-fifth of investment claims worldwide. Of 16 cases brought by foreign investors against the United States, the U.S. government has yet to lose a case. ISDS provisions are included in the majority of U.S. BITs and FTAs; nearly all ISDS cases brought against the United States were under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The use of ISDS, however, has become a subject of debate within recent U.S. trade negotiations. At the center of the debate is ensuring robust investor protections, while protecting the government's right to regulate in the public interest. The Trump Administration departed from past practice with major changes to ISDS under the NAFTA renegotiation. The proposed U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), signed in November 2018 and pending ratification by each country, would eliminate ISDS between the United States and Canada and places specific limits with respect to Mexico. ISDS was also a major point of contention in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP) talks during the Obama Administration. The EU has been pushing to include an investment court system in place of ISDS in its recent trade agreements and negotiations. What is the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS)? Foreign investment, particularly by firms owned or controlled by a foreign government, can raise concerns about national security. CFIUS is an interagency committee that assists the President in overseeing foreign investment transactions that could affect U.S. national security. The committee is composed of nine Cabinet members, two ex officio members, and other members as appointed. CFIUS was originally established by an executive order in 1975 with broad responsibilities and few powers. The authority to review foreign investments, known as the Exon-Florio provision, was formally established in 1988 with the passage of P.L. 100-418 . In 2007, the Foreign Investment and National Security Act ( P.L. 110-49 ) established CFIUS in statute and expanded the committee's role in reviewing FDI transactions that could affect "homeland security" and "critical industries." The Secretary of the Treasury serves as chairman of CFIUS, and a designated lead agency conducts a "risk-based analysis" of the threat posed by mergers, acquisitions, or takeovers of a U.S. firm by a foreign investor. The President has the authority to block proposed or pending transactions; this authority has been invoked five times since 1988. In some cases, issues and concerns raised by CFIUS have led foreign investors to cancel a planned purchase or to divest if the deal had already been completed. Most recently, President Trump blocked the acquisition of Lattice Semiconductor Corp. by a Chinese investment firm in 2017, and the acquisition of Qualcomm by Singapore-based Broadcom in 2018. The Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 (FIRRMA, P.L. 115-232 , Title XVII), signed into law on August 13, 2018, amends the current process for investment reviews under CFIUS and expands the scope of transactions subject to review, including any non-controlling investment in U.S. businesses involved in critical technology or critical infrastructure. Some have objected to an expanded role of CFIUS as being counter to the long-standing U.S. position of an open investment climate. How does the U.S. government promote investment? The United States promotes both inward and outward FDI. The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), which operates under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, provides political risk insurance, financing, and other services to help facilitate U.S. private investments abroad in developing countries and emerging markets. The Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 (BUILD Act), enacted on October 5, 2018 ( P.L. 115-254 , Division F) establishes a new U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) as a successor to OPIC by both expanding and consolidating the development finance functions of OPIC and USAID. SelectUSA, a Department of Commerce program established in 2011 via executive order, coordinates federal efforts to attract FDI in the United States. Primary functions of SelectUSA include providing information and data on investments to businesses and economic development organizations (EDOs), helping to resolve issues involving federal programs, and advocating at the national level for making investments in the United States over a foreign location.

Congress plays a major role in U.S. trade policy through its legislative and oversight authority. Since the end of World War II, U.S. trade policy has focused on fostering an open, rules-based global trading system, liberalizing markets by reducing trade and investment barriers through negotiations and agreements, and enforcing trade commitments and related laws. International trade and investment issues can affect the overall health of the U.S. economy and specific sectors, the success of U.S. businesses, U.S. employment opportunities, and the overall standard of living of Americans. The benefits and costs of international trade and the future direction of trade policy are active areas of interest for many in Congress. This report addresses frequently asked questions regarding U.S. trade policy and is intended to assist Members and staff who may be new to trade issues. The report provides context for basic trade concepts and data on key U.S. trade and investment trends. It also addresses how U.S. trade policy is formulated and describes the trade and investment policy tools used to advance U.S. objectives. The report is divided into five sections: The Basics of Trade explains key economic concepts, including why countries trade, the benefits and costs of trade expansion, and the role of global value chains in international trade. The section also highlights common trade terms and principles. U.S. Trade Trends provides data on key U.S. trade relationships, the U.S. trade deficit, and sector-specific issues related to manufacturing, agriculture, services, and digital trade. Formulation of U.S. Trade Policy describes key objectives and functions of trade policy. The section outlines the roles of Congress, the executive branch, private stakeholders, and the judiciary in the formulation and implementation of U.S. trade policy. U.S. Trade Policy Tools explains some of the key vehicles for advancing U.S. trade policy objectives, including trade negotiations and agreements, special trade programs, tariff policy and trade remedies, trade adjustment assistance, and export promotion programs and controls. Link Between International Investment and Trade explains the motivations of foreign direct investment (FDI) and its relationship to trade. The section provides data on top sources of FDI in the United States as well as destinations of U.S. FDI abroad, and explains the role of investment agreements and the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS). This report is intended as an introduction to U.S. trade policy and does not provide in-depth coverage of all trade and investment issues. For more detail on U.S. trade policy issues, refer to the following CRS products: CRS Report R45474, International Trade and Finance: Overview and Issues for the 116th Congress, coordinated by Rebecca M. Nelson and Andres B. Schwarzenberg. CRS Report R45420, U.S. Trade Trends and Developments, by Andres B. Schwarzenberg. CRS Report R44546, The Economic Effects of Trade: Overview and Policy Challenges, by James K. Jackson. CRS Report R45243, Trade Deficits and U.S. Trade Policy, by James K. Jackson. CRS In Focus IF10156, U.S. Trade Policy: Background and Current Issues, by Shayerah Ilias Akhtar, Ian F. Fergusson, and Brock R. Williams. CRS In Focus IF11016, U.S. Trade Policy Functions: Who Does What?, by Shayerah Ilias Akhtar.

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Introduction The nuclear power industry is facing severe economic challenges in the United States. High capital costs, low electricity demand growth, and competition from cheaper sources of electricity such as natural gas and renewables have dampened the demand for new nuclear power plants and accelerated the retirement of existing reactors. As of April 2019, seven nuclear reactors had closed in the United States since 2012, and another 12 had announced that they would retire by 2025. There are currently 98 operating U.S. reactors. As aging reactors reach the end of their operating licenses in 2030 and beyond, the number of retirements is projected to increase. In addition, cost and schedule overruns have hindered recent efforts to build new nuclear units in the United States. The only power reactors currently under construction in the United States—two new units at the Vogtle nuclear plant in Georgia—are five years behind schedule and nearly double their original estimated cost. All nuclear power in the United States is generated by light water reactors (LWRs), which were commercialized in the 1950s and early 1960s and are now used throughout most of the world. LWRs are cooled by ordinary ("light") water, which also slows ("moderates") the neutrons that maintain the nuclear fission chain reaction. Conventional LWRs are large—with 1,000 megawatts electric generating capacity (MWe) or more—in order to spread their high construction costs among the maximum possible number of kilowatt-hours of electricity over their operating lifetime. At the same time conventional reactors are facing an uncertain future, some in Congress contend that more nuclear power plants, not fewer, are needed to help reduce U.S. greenhouse gas emissions and bring low-carbon power to the majority of the world that currently has little access to electricity. Proponents of this view argue that the key to increasing the number of nuclear power plants is investment in "advanced" nuclear technologies, which they say could overcome the economic problems, safety concerns, and other issues that have stalled the growth of conventional LWRs. Congress enacted legislation in September 2018 that defines "advanced nuclear reactor" as "a nuclear fission reactor with significant improvements over the most recent generation of nuclear fission reactors" or a reactor using nuclear fusion ( P.L. 115-248 ). Titled the Nuclear Energy Innovation Capabilities Act of 2017 (NEICA), the law requires the Department of Energy (DOE) to take several actions to support advanced reactor development, including studying the need for a versatile fast neutron test reactor that could help develop fuels and materials for advanced reactors. Congress included $65 million for R&D to support development of the versatile test reactor in the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act for FY2019 (Division A of P.L. 115-244 ), and the Trump Administration has requested $100 million more for FY2020. A similar definition of "advanced nuclear reactor" is included in the Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization Act (NEIMA, P.L. 115-439 ), which was signed January 14, 2019. NEIMA would require the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to develop a regulatory framework that could be used for advanced nuclear technologies. Advocates of nuclear power cite a variety of reasons in addition to greenhouse gas reduction for preserving and expanding the U.S. nuclear industry. They contend that a robust domestic nuclear energy industry would contribute to such goals as energy security and diversification, electricity grid resilience and reliability, promotion of a domestic nuclear component manufacturing base and associated exports, clean air, and preservation and enhancement of geopolitical influence. The U.S. Navy uses nuclear energy to power submarines and aircraft carriers. Some observers have suggested that the Navy and other national security organizations benefit from maintaining a strong domestic nuclear energy industry, which provides a post-military career path for many naval reactor personnel, as well as expanding the base of qualified engineers and technicians, and strengthening the infrastructure for training and knowledge transfer. NEICA lists a number of potential advantages of advanced nuclear reactors over conventional LWRs, including "inherent safety features, lower waste yields, greater fuel utilization, superior reliability, resistance to proliferation, increased thermal efficiency, and the ability to integrate into electric and non-electric applications." Advanced reactors encompass a wide range of technologies, including next-generation water-cooled reactors (e.g., small modular light water reactors, supercritical water-cooled reactors), non-water-cooled reactors (e.g., lead or sodium fast reactors, molten salt reactors, and high temperature gas reactors), and fusion reactors. Some advanced reactor concepts are relatively new, while others have been under consideration for decades. Not all observers are optimistic about the potential safety, affordability, proliferation resistance and sustainability of advanced reactors. Because many of these technologies are in the conceptual or design phases, the potential advantages of these systems have not yet been established on a commercial scale. Testing and demonstration would be required to determine the validity of advocates' claims. Many environmental advocates contend that nuclear power would not be necessary to decarbonize world energy supplies, and that public policy should instead focus on renewable energy and efficiency. The U.S. advanced nuclear industry has expanded in recent years to encompass an array of developers, suppliers, and supporting institutions. By one count, there were 35 U.S. companies developing advanced nuclear reactor technologies as of November 2018. Some have projected that the first U.S. advanced reactor could be providing electricity to the grid by the mid-2020s. For example, the advanced reactor company NuScale predicts that its first nuclear plant will "achieve commercial operation in 2026." This report discusses the history of advanced reactor technologies, briefly describes major categories of advanced reactors, provides an overview of federal programs on advanced nuclear technology, and discusses current issues and legislation. Advanced Reactor Technologies Advanced or unconventional reactor designs seek to use combinations of new and existing technologies and materials to improve upon earlier generations of nuclear reactors in one or more of the following areas: cost, safety, security, waste management, and versatility. To achieve these improvements, advanced designs may incorporate one or more of the following characteristics: inherent or passive safety features, simplified or modular designs, enhanced load-following capabilities, high chemical and physical stability, fast neutron spectrums, and "closed" fuel cycles (see text box on Fast Reactors). Advanced reactor technologies are often referred to as "Generation IV" nuclear reactors, with existing commercial reactors constituting "Generation III" or, for the most recently constructed reactors, "Generation III+." Advanced reactor designs may be grouped into three primary categories: Advanced water-cooled reactors , which provide evolutionary improvements to proven water-based fission technologies through innovations such as simplified design, smaller size, or enhanced efficiency; Non-water-cooled reactors , which are fission reactors that use materials such as liquid metals (e.g., sodium and lead), gases (e.g., helium and carbon dioxide), or molten salts as coolants instead of water; and Fusion reactors , which seek to generate energy by joining small atomic nuclei, as opposed to fission reactors, which generate energy by splitting large atomic nuclei. A fourth, cross-cutting category of advanced reactors is the s mall m odular r eactor or SMR . DOE defines SMRs as reactors with electric generating capacities of no more than 300 MW, which "employ modular construction techniques, ship major components from factory fabrication locations to the plant site by rail or truck, and include designs that simplify plant site activities required for plant assembly." Both advanced water-cooled reactors and non-water-cooled reactors may be configured as SMRs. Microreactors are relatively small-capacity SMRs, defined by DOE as producing 1-20 megawatts of thermal energy (MWt), which could be used directly as heat for industrial processes or to generate electricity. Microreactors could be transported by truck and installed at a remote location or military base within a week, according to DOE. Advanced reactor concepts may be characterized along a continuum of technological maturity. Light water-cooled SMRs, high-temperature gas-cooled reactors, and sodium-cooled fast reactors are considered to be among the most mature of the unconventional reactor technologies. Molten salt reactors, gas-cooled fast reactors, and fusion reactors are generally considered to be further from commercialization. Expert estimates of timeframes for commercialization of these technologies range widely, from the mid-2020s for the first small modular LWRs to midcentury or later for some advanced reactor concepts, such as molten salt reactors and gas-cooled fast reactors. Companies developing similar reactor technologies may be at different stages of design and manufacturing readiness. While some experts predict that molten salt reactors will not be available before 2050, Chinese research institutions and a Canadian/U.S. company, Terrestrial Energy, have announced plans to bring a molten salt reactor online in the next decade. Advanced Water-Cooled Reactors Small Modular Light Water Reactors Small modular reactors are defined by DOE as reactors with an electric generating capacity of up to 300 MW, as opposed to the average capacity of existing U.S. commercial reactors of about 1,000 MW. Light water reactor SMR designs are based on existing commercial LWR technology but are generally small enough to allow all major reactor components to be placed in a single pressure vessel. The reactor vessel and its components are designed to be assembled in a factory and transported to the plant site for installation, potentially reducing construction time and costs from those of large LWRs. If large numbers of identical SMRs were ordered, mass production could further reduce manufacturing costs and construction schedules, according to proponents of the technology. Shortening the timeframe before a new reactor begins producing revenue could reduce interest payments and shorten payback periods. In addition, each SMR would require a fraction of the capital investment of a large conventional nuclear unit, further reducing the financial risk to plant owners. Some observers have suggested that the smaller size of SMRs would reduce the economies of scale available to larger reactors, potentially negating any SMR cost advantages. A 60 MWe reactor module by U.S. company NuScale Power is currently considered the most mature light water SMR design under development. The design would allow between 6 and 12 SMR modules—depending on the energy needs of the site—to be co-located in a central pool of water, which serves as a heat sink and passive cooling system. NRC plans to complete its safety evaluation report on the design in September 2020 and subsequently issue a final design certification, although no date is currently scheduled. NuScale is planning to begin operating its first 12-module plant in the mid-2020s. It is to be built at Idaho National Laboratory (an 890-square-mile DOE site) with a combination of federal government and non-federal support. As with other SMR concepts, the major components of the NuScale plant are designed to be factory-fabricated and shipped to the plant site for installation. Companies in several countries are currently developing light water SMRs. In addition to NuScale, examples of U.S.-based companies developing this technology include Holtec, Westinghouse, and GE Hitachi. Supercritical Water-Cooled Reactor The supercritical water-cooled reactor (SCWR) is a high-temperature variant of existing LWR technologies. SCWRs would use supercritical water—water which has been brought to a temperature and pressure at which the liquid and vapor states are indistinguishable—to improve plant efficiency (which may approach 44% in SCWRs, compared with 34-36% for current reactors). As in a conventional boiling water reactor (BWR), liquid water would pass upward through the reactor core and turn directly to steam, which would drive a turbine-generator ( Figure 1 ). The superheated conditions would eliminate the need in current BWRs for reactor coolant pumps and steam separators and dryers. Supercritical water has already been used to boost plant efficiency in some advanced coal- and gas-fired power plants. SCWRs could be designed to operate in either the fast or thermal neutron spectrums, and to use either light or heavy water as the coolant and/or moderator. Organizations in Canada, China, the European Union, Japan, and Russia are developing SCWRs. Non-Water-Cooled Reactors High Temperature Gas Reactors High temperature gas reactors (HTGRs), including very high temperature gas reactors (VHTRs), are helium-cooled, graphite-moderated thermal reactors. As their names imply, they would operate at higher coolant outlet temperatures than most existing reactors—700-1,000°C compared to 330°C for existing LWRs. This higher temperature threshold allows for the provision of heat for industrial processes, such as the cogeneration of electricity and hydrogen, and high-temperature processes in the iron, oil, and chemical industries. While previous R&D programs focused on achieving very high outlet temperatures, more recently the focus has shifted to reactor designs with more modest outlet temperatures (700-850°C), based on the assessment that lower temperature reactors may be more commercially viable in the short term. There are two primary design variants: In one, the core is composed of graphite blocks with removable sections that have been embedded with fuel particles; in the other, many billiard ball-sized graphite spheres, or "pebbles," with embedded fuel particles are loaded into the core to form a "pebble bed." The spheres are steadily removed from the bottom of the reactor, tested for their level of burnup, and returned to the top of the reactor if they are still viable as fuel and replaced if not. Many HTGRs have been designed as SMRs. A unique feature of these reactors is their fuel, which is composed of poppy seed-sized fuel particles that have been encased in silicon carbide and other highly heat-resistant coatings ( Figure 2 ). Coupled with the high heat capacity of the graphite moderator, the reactor and its fuel are designed to withstand the maximum core heat attainable during an accident. Therefore, according to HTGR proponents, even the loss of active cooling systems would not result in a core meltdown and radioactive releases to the environment. HTGRs are among the most technologically mature of the advanced reactor concepts. Since the 1960s a number of experimental and commercial HTGRs have been built in multiple countries, including the United States, United Kingdom, Japan, Germany, and China. A small, two-unit pebble bed HTGR plant is currently under construction in China. Development of HTGRs was promoted in the United States by the Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP) program, established by the Energy Policy Act of 2005 ( P.L. 109-58 ). In 2016, DOE awarded X-energy $53 million over five years to develop a modular pebble bed HTGR design. X-energy received a second DOE contract for $10 million in 2018. X-energy is also working with DOE and others to develop the fuel technology that would be used in an HTGR pebble bed reactor. Other U.S. companies developing HTGRs include HolosGen and Hybrid Power Technologies. Gas-Cooled Fast Reactor Gas-cooled fast reactors (GFRs) would be high-temperature, closed fuel cycle fast reactors using helium as a primary coolant ( Figure 3 ). The primary difference between the HTGR (see above) and the GFR is the neutron spectrum: HTGRs operate in the thermal spectrum, while GFRs operate in the fast spectrum. Therefore, the GFRs would not require the massive graphite moderator of HTGRs to slow the neutrons. The GFR would use a closed U-Pu fuel cycle in which the plutonium and uranium would be recycled from the spent fuel to provide a greatly expanded fuel source if configured as a breeder. GFRs would have operating temperatures similar to those of HTGRs—850°C compared to 330°C for existing LWRs—making them suitable for providing process heat for industrial purposes, in addition to producing electric power. One disadvantage of this design is the lower heat removal capability of the helium gas coolant compared to liquid metal coolants such as sodium and lead in the event of an accident. In 2015, a consortium of European countries, including the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia, launched a project to jointly develop a demonstration GFR based on a French design. The group set a goal of completing the conceptual design for the ALLEGRO reactor by 2025, with construction to begin thereafter. If successful, ALLEGRO would be the first demonstration of a GFR to date. General Atomics is an example of a U.S. company developing a GFR design, the Energy Multiplier Module (EM 2 ). Sodium-Cooled Fast Reactor Along with HTGRs, sodium-cooled fast reactors (SFRs) are among the most technologically mature of the unconventional nuclear concepts. SFRs use fast reactor technology with liquid sodium as the primary coolant. The use of a liquid metal as the coolant allows the primary coolant circuit to operate under lower, near-atmospheric pressure conditions. In addition, even in an emergency without backup electricity, the high heat-transfer properties of liquid sodium (100 times greater than water) would allow for passive cooling through natural circulation. The SFR coolant outlet would reach a temperature of 500-550°C. This lower temperature (compared to 850°C for the GFR) would allow for the use of materials that have been developed and proven in prior fast reactors. SFRs come in two main design variants: loop-type and pool-type designs (see Figure 4 ). In the pool-type SFR, the reactor core and primary heat exchanger are immersed in a single pool of liquid metal, while the loop-type houses the primary heat exchanger in a separate vessel. SFR technologies are conducive to modularization. A disadvantage that has been raised about using sodium as a coolant is that it reacts violently with both air and water. As a result, the primary sodium coolant system (which contains highly radioactive sodium) is often isolated from the steam generation system by an intermediary coolant to prevent a release of radioactivity in the case of an accident. This adds costs and complexity to the system, complicates maintenance and refueling, and introduces an additional safety concern. Fires resulting from sodium leaks have caused shutdowns in several SFRs that have been built to date. Most SFR designs would use a closed fuel cycle in which plutonium and uranium would be re-used from the spent fuel to provide an indefinite fuel source when configured as a breeder; the process would be similar to that used for the GFR (above). Other designs would rely on future advances in fuel technology to extend the fuel cycle to the point where refueling would only need to occur once in a number of decades. SFRs can achieve high burnup of actinides in spent fuel, potentially reducing the long-term radioactivity of high-level nuclear waste. The first SFR was built in the United States in 1951. Since then, approximately 20 SFRs have been built around the world, most of which have been experimental. The United States maintained SFRs as a high priority focus of its nuclear R&D program (primarily due to the technology's plutonium breeding capabilities) up until the cancellation of the Clinch River Breeder Reactor demonstration plant in 1983 amid public opposition, rising construction costs, and increased concern over weapons proliferation. There are five SFRs currently in operation worldwide: one in China, three in Russia, and one in India. Several others are expected to start up by 2020. Examples of U.S. companies developing SFRs include Advanced Reactor Concepts, Columbia Basin Consulting Group, General Electric-Hitachi, Oklo, and TerraPower. General Electric-Hitachi's PRISM design is the only SFR to have passed the NRC preapplication review process, and has been selected to support the Department of Energy's Versatile Test Reactor program. Lead-Cooled Fast Reactor Lead-cooled fast reactors (LFRs) are designed to use a closed fuel cycle with either molten lead or lead-bismuth eutectic (LBE) alloy as a primary reactor coolant (see Figure 5 ). The use of lead as a coolant is seen to confer several advantages. As with the SFR, the use of a liquid metal coolant allows for low-pressure operation and passive cooling in an accident. In contrast to liquid sodium, however, molten lead is relatively inert, adding additional safety and economic advantages. Lead also has a high rate of retention of radioactive fission products, which offers benefits in an accident that could release radioactive materials. In such an accident, the chemical properties of the lead could prevent many of the harmful radionuclides from escaping into the atmosphere. LFRs can also be designed for high burnup of waste actinides, allowing for reduced long-term radioactive wastes. Lead does present some challenges that may require further research and innovation to overcome. At high temperatures, lead tends to corrode structural steel. Achieving commercialization for designs in the higher temperature ranges would thus need further technological advances in corrosion-resistance for structural steel components coming into contact with the liquid lead coolant. Lead is also highly opaque, presenting visibility and monitoring challenges within the core, and very heavy, due to its high density. The high melting point of lead also presents challenges in terms of keeping the lead in liquid form so that it can continue to circulate under lower-temperature scenarios. Russia is the world leader in LFR R&D, with experience building and operating seven LFRs for use in submarines. Russia has announced near-term development of two pure LFR facilities and a third facility that would be capable of using lead coolant for test purposes, in addition to other coolants. Members of the European Union have also announced a collaboration to develop an LFR through the Advanced Lead Fast Reactor European Demonstrator (Alfred). Other countries exploring LFR technologies include China, Japan, Korea, and Sweden. U.S. companies pursuing LFRs include Hydromine and Westinghouse. Molten Salt Reactors and Fluoride Salt-Cooled High Temperature Reactors Any reactor that uses molten salts as a coolant or fuel may be considered a molten salt reactor (MSR). Salt-cooled MSRs (also known as fluoride-cooled high temperature reactors or FHRs) employ molten salts to cool the core, which is composed of solid fuel blocks configured much like an HTGR. Salt-fueled MSRs, by contrast, are unique in that the fuel is not solid, but rather is dissolved in the molten salt coolant. MSRs vary in their design; there are fast and thermal variants, and different moderator materials have been proposed for the thermal variants. Molten salt fast reactors (MSFRs) exhibit high potential for waste actinide burnup and fuel resource conservation. Different molten salts may also be used, depending on the other design features. Outlet temperature specifications range from 700-1000°C, although there are challenges to operating at these temperatures that would need technological advances to resolve. Unique to MSR salt-fueled designs is a safety feature called a "freeze plug" below the reactor core, consisting of a salt plug that is cooled to a solid state (see Figure 6 ). In the event of an incident that causes heat to rise in the core, the plug will melt, allowing the molten salt fuel to drain by gravity into a basin that is designed to prevent the fuel from undergoing further fission reactions and overheating. It is unknown whether spent MSR fuel could be safely stored in the long term without undergoing additional treatment after removal from the reactor. MSR technology has been under development for decades. Two thermal-spectrum experimental reactors were built in the United States at Oak Ridge National Laboratory in the 1950s and 1960s. The first molten salt fuel irradiation tests since the completion of those early experiments were conducted in 2017 in the Netherlands, where research on waste treatment is also being pursued. China is currently developing two prototype MSR microreactors with expected start dates in the 2020s. Terrestrial Energy, a Canadian company with a U.S. subsidiary, is in the second stage of design review with the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission for its integral molten salt reactor (IMSR). The IMSR is the first advanced reactor design to complete phase one of the Canadian pre-licensing process. Terrestrial Energy has announced a goal of commercialization by the late 2020s. Examples of other U.S. companies developing MSRs include Alpha Tech Research Corp., Elysium Industries, Flibe Energy, Kairos Power, TerraPower, Terrestrial Energy USA, ThorCon Power, Thoreact, and Yellowstone Energy. Fusion Reactors Fusion reactors would fuse light atomic nuclei—as opposed to the fissioning of heavy nuclei—to produce power. Fusion R&D has received significant R&D investment, including over $20 billion in international cooperative funding anticipated to build the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER), a fusion research and demonstration reactor under construction in France. The United States is a major participant in the project. Fusion power would require light atoms, generally isotopes of hydrogen, to be heated to 100 million degrees to form a plasma, a state of matter in which electrons are stripped away from the atomic nucleus. Holding the plasma together while it is heated sufficiently to create a fusion reaction is a major technical challenge. ITER would do this with a powerful magnetic field, while other approaches would compress a pellet of hydrogen with lasers or other intense energy sources. Fusion reactions are routinely produced at the laboratory scale, but none of these reactions have yet achieved "burning plasma," in which energy produced by fusion at least equals the energy needed to heat the plasma. A fusion power reactor would need to achieve "ignition," in which the fusion energy itself would keep the plasma heated. ITER is scheduled to produce its first plasma by the end of 2025, with full operations, including burning plasma experiments, scheduled to begin in 2035. Several U.S. companies are pursuing various approaches toward achieving burning plasma with the aim of commercializing fusion power. According to the Fusion Industry Association, "fusion produces no harmful emissions or waste fuel. A fusion power plant is physically incapable of having a meltdown. There is no fissile radioactive waste left over." However, some reactor materials would be made radioactive by neutron exposure during a fusion reaction, and tritium, a primary anticipated fuel source, is radioactive, although far less so than fission products. Examples of U.S. companies developing fusion technologies include AGNI Energy, Brillouin Energy, Commonwealth Fusion Systems, General Atomics, Helion Energy, HyperV Technologies, Lawrenceville Plasma Physics, Lockheed Martin, Magneto-Inertial Fusion Technologies, NumerEx, and TAE Technologies. Major Criteria for Evaluating Unconventional Technologies Cost Investment in electricity generating technologies is largely determined on the basis of cost. Nuclear energy has historically had high capital costs, but relatively low production costs. In recent years, however, conventional nuclear plants have struggled to compete with falling electricity prices driven largely by natural gas and renewables, particularly in parts of the country that are served by competitive electricity markets. The success of advanced reactors in entering these markets may depend on their ability to reduce capital costs relative to conventional reactors and to offer electricity prices that are competitive with non-nuclear sources of baseload power. Capital Costs High capital costs present a significant barrier to deployment of new nuclear plants in the United States. Conventional nuclear reactors are more expensive to build than most other electric power plants. Nuclear plants must submit to much more rigorous safety regulation and quality standards than other producers of electricity because of the risk posed by a release of radioactive materials. As a result, they require highly specialized construction materials (e.g., nuclear-grade steel), engineering knowledge, and construction expertise, all of which add to a plant's costs. Large conventional reactors also require a great deal of on-site fabrication of structures and components that are too large to be built in a factory, further adding to costs. Capital cost estimates for advanced reactors vary by technology and design. Some designs, such as SMRs, may allow for greater factory fabrication than conventional designs. Costs will remain highly uncertain until demonstration plants are constructed. According to an MIT study, conventional nuclear capital costs are dominated by labor and engineering costs (approximately 60%). By contrast, the actual reactor and associated turbine components comprise less than 20% of the capital cost of the median historical U.S. light water reactor. Accordingly, achieving cost reductions relative to these conventional plants would require that advanced reactor developers find ways to improve upon existing construction methods for nuclear reactors. One advanced reactor design innovation that holds potential for reducing construction costs is modularization of structures and components. Modularity is intended to increase factory production of nuclear components. Manufactured components could then be delivered to the construction site for installation, cutting down on onsite labor, reducing the specialized knowledge needed to custom-build each component on-site, and potentially improving quality. Modularized construction has been shown to improve the pace of construction and reduce costs in other industries, as well as in some recent nuclear construction projects in Asia. NuScale, a U.S.-based SMR vendor, has estimated "overnight" cost savings of approximately 10% due to modular construction of structures in its proposed SMR plant. Advanced reactor developers and advocates have also highlighted the cost reduction potential of such characteristics as simplified reactor designs, standardized reactor components, and smaller overall reactor sizes. Advanced reactors may also offer the potential to reduce financing costs as a result of shorter construction times and, in the case of SMRs, the ability to begin generating revenue after the installation of the first module, even as work continues on additional modules. Operational Costs Some advanced reactor concepts also show potential for reducing operational costs. Some designs would utilize simpler systems or increased automation to reduce human labor costs during operation. Many advanced reactor developers contend their designs would improve upon the thermal efficiencies of older generations of nuclear plants by operating at higher temperatures or through use of more efficient power conversion technologies. More-efficient plants may be able to reduce their payback periods relative to their less efficient peers. Not all aspects of advanced reactor concepts would lead to cost reductions. Some reactor designs would have lower power ratings and/or lower power densities (less power for a given core volume) than conventional reactors, which could reduce the cost advantages that existing large reactors achieve through economies of scale. The majority of advanced designs would require fuels with a fissile isotope enrichment of between 5% and 20%, compared with 3-5% for most existing commercial reactors. Enriching fuel to these higher percentages would add costs. Some designs would use as-yet-unlicensed fuel forms, which may be associated with higher fuel fabrication costs. Some advanced reactors would also require spent fuel reprocessing and treatment on the back end before wastes could be safety stored, which may in turn require higher levels of security in order to limit risks of proliferation. These factors have the potential to add substantial costs to reactor operations compared with those of existing light water reactors. Some research on SMRs has suggested that their small size will prevent them from achieving economies of scale. Modularization may allow this disadvantage to be balanced by so-called "economies of multiples." One analysis found that, while SMRs may be cheaper than traditional reactors to construct, the cost per unit of power generated is likely to be higher. Cost Estimates for Advanced Reactors It is difficult to accurately estimate the costs of advanced reactors. Many advanced reactor concepts remain in the early stages of design and development, and vendor companies generally do not include detailed costs in their publicly available content. Academic analyses of the costs of non-traditional reactors have produced a range of results. A common metric for measuring and comparing the cost of electricity production among sources is the levelized cost of electricity (LCOE). LCOE is a measure of the unit cost of producing electricity from a given generating source (e.g., coal, natural gas, solar, wind, etc.) and is calculated by dividing the total costs of constructing and operating a plant over its lifetime by its total electricity output over the same period. LCOE can be a useful tool for comparing production costs across sources; however, because there are additional factors that influence the economic competitiveness of a proposed plant, relying upon a single metric for comparison may be misleading. Other possible cost measures include the cost of construction per kilowatt or megawatt of electric generating capacity and the costs of air emissions. One standardized analysis of cost projections from eight advanced reactor vendors found the average projected LCOE for "nth-of-a-kind" (NOAK) reactors to be $60/MWh for the included reactor designs. A separate study projected LCOEs in the range of $110 to $120/MWh for included advanced reactor designs. By comparison, the LCOEs per MWh for competing electricity sources are estimated as follows: large LWRs, $112-$183; coal, $60-$143; natural gas combined cycle, $42-$78; wind, $30-$60; utility-scale solar, $43-$53. Such estimates typically exclude costs that are not currently the responsibility of plant owners, such as greenhouse gas emissions. Size Advanced reactor designs come in a wide range of sizes, from less than 15 MWe to 1,500 MWe or more. In some cases, the optimal reactor size may be influenced by the particular characteristics of a given design. In others, the size may be determined by the needs of the customer or site. A commonality among many unconventional reactor concepts is an increased focus on small reactor designs. As noted earlier, advanced SMRs, 300 MWe and below, "employ modular construction techniques, ship major components from factory fabrication locations to the plant site by rail or truck, and include designs that simplify plant site activities required for plant assembly," according to DOE. The smallest of these—under 20 MW of thermal energy—may also be referred to as microreactors. As noted above, most existing conventional reactors in the United States have an electrical generating capacity of 1,000 MWe or more. The small size and modular nature of SMRs gives them the potential to expand the types of sites and applications for which nuclear energy may be considered suitable (see section on Versatility). SMR designs with multiple reactor modules may allow for size customization based on the needs of the customer or characteristics of the host site. Safety Safety with respect to nuclear energy refers primarily to the minimization of the risk of release of radioactivity into the environment. Advanced reactor systems may have both safety advantages and disadvantages in comparison with existing reactors as a result of their size and design, and the chemical properties of their main components (e.g. the coolant, fuel, and moderator). Because many of these technologies are in the design phase, the operational safety of many of these systems has not yet been established in practice. Testing and demonstration would be needed to validate the safety claims of advanced reactor vendors. Conventional nuclear plants use multiple independent and redundant safety systems to minimize risk. In the majority of cases, these systems are "active," meaning that they rely on electricity or mechanical systems to operate. Advanced nuclear reactors tend to incorporate passive and inherent safety systems as opposed to active systems. Passive systems refer primarily to two types of safety features: (1) the ability of these reactors to self-regulate the rate at which fission occurs through negative feedback mechanisms that naturally reduce power output when certain system parameters (such as temperature) are exceeded, and (2) the ability to provide sufficient cooling of the core in the event of a loss of electricity or other active safety systems. The chemical properties of various advanced coolants, fuels, and moderators may also contribute inherent safety advantages. Examples include higher boiling points for coolants, higher heat capacities for fuels and moderators, and higher retention of radioactive fission products for some coolants. Some advanced reactor coolants (such as liquid metals) remain at atmospheric pressure under high reactor temperatures, putting less stress on primary reactor components than high-pressure coolants such as water. Advanced reactors that can operate at or near atmospheric pressure enable simplification of the coolant system design and safety systems, as well as the potential for improved economic performance. Proponents of small reactors have suggested that SMRs, and microreactors in particular, may pose less of a safety risk due to the smaller total volume of radioactive material on site and lower risk of release to the environment. Consequently, some have argued that they should face streamlined approval processes in line with the NRC's approach of risk-informed regulation. The smaller size of SMRs and microreactors may also enable innovations in siting that could contribute to plant safety. Some have suggested that siting these reactors underground or on floating platforms at sea could reduce risks related accidental release of radioactive materials and seismic activity, respectively. While some advanced reactor coolants and moderators may have the advantages described above, some also have chemical properties that pose safety concerns. Examples include reactivity, toxicity, or corrosiveness of the primary coolant in the case of sodium, lead, and molten salts, respectively. Molten salt-cooled reactors would incorporate the dissolved fuel into the coolant, posing a safety concern for plant workers who must be shielded from the higher levels of radioactivity flowing through the coolant system as a result. Opaque coolants present additional challenges to visual core monitoring and inspection compared to transparent coolants like water. Advanced reactors, and even some existing conventional reactors, may also make use of advances in fuel technologies and accident-tolerant fuels (ATFs). ATFs are designed to better withstand losses in cooling capacity during an accident, reducing the risk of fuel meltdown and allowing reactor operators more time to respond to accidents. Near-term ATF concepts (e.g. coated zirconium cladding, iron-chrome-aluminum-based cladding) may be commercially available as soon as the mid-2020s, while longer-term ATF concepts (e.g. metallic fuels, silicide fuel, and silicon carbide cladding) would need more testing before they could be licensed. Security and Weapons Proliferation Risk In addition to producing energy for peaceful purposes, nuclear fuels such as uranium and plutonium can be used by states to manufacture nuclear weapons material for military use or diverted by non-state actors to produce weapons of mass destruction. The risk of weapons proliferation from civilian nuclear materials presents a challenge for all nuclear energy reactors to varying degrees, and for international controls on nuclear materials. Advanced reactor designs may offer both advantages and disadvantages with respect to their potential effects on nuclear weapons proliferation. Advocates contend that many advanced reactor designs would be more resistant to weapons proliferation than existing LWRS because of factors such as "sealed" or difficult-to-access core designs, infrequent refueling, smaller inventories of fissile materials in the core, and remote monitoring capabilities, among others. Some designs may produce waste that is less attractive for weapons proliferation for a variety of reasons. Advanced reactors may also present unique inspection and monitoring challenges. In a 2017 workshop report, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which functions as an inspector of nuclear states to ensure compliance with international nonproliferation agreements, noted that some of the characteristics of advanced reactors may make them more difficult to monitor and safeguard. For instance, the opacity of certain advanced coolants, such as sodium, lead, and molten salts, may make it more difficult to monitor reactor cores to ensure nuclear materials are not being diverted. In contrast, inspectors can visually see through cooling water to determine whether fuel rods and assemblies are present or have been removed, possibly for plutonium separation. The IAEA report identified several advanced reactor technologies that pose unique and particularly difficult safeguarding challenges, including transportable reactors, pebble-bed design HTGRs, molten salt reactors, and certain waste reprocessing facilities. The report also noted that "proliferation resistance and ease to verify (safeguardability) are not interchangeable; and most of the features lending proliferation resistance to Generation-IV reactors actually make safeguards nuclear material accountancy more difficult." The utilization by some advanced reactors of more highly enriched fuels could create additional nonproliferation challenges. Many advanced designs would utilize fuel with a fissile isotope enrichment of between 5% and 20% or higher (compared to 5% or lower for most current reactors). At these higher enrichments, even very small reactors would likely contain more than enough fissile material to produce multiple nuclear weapons with further enrichment. The work required to enrich uranium to weapons-grade levels declines as the initial enrichment level rises. Some designs would also produce spent fuel with higher concentrations of isotopes that are desirable from the point of view of weapons production, making them a more attractive target of diversion than current LWR fuel. Additional security measures may be necessary to safeguard against such eventualities. The need to safeguard nuclear materials is present not just at reactor sites, but through the entirety of the nuclear supply chain. This includes during the fuel fabrication process, in transit, and, if applicable, during fuel reprocessing. Many advanced reactors would require or would offer the option to reprocess the spent fuel to extract remaining fissile materials. Some advanced reactor technologies rely on reprocessing to make them cost-effective. Separating these materials from the radioactive wastes makes them more attractive both to thieves for making radiological dispersal devices and to countries that might use them to produce weapons. France, Japan, and the United Kingdom have been engaged in civilian nuclear fuel reprocessing for decades. In the process, they have accumulated more than 290 metric tons of separated plutonium across various civilian facilities as of January 2017. For reference, the minimum fissile inventory required to produce a nuclear weapon from plutonium is generally cited as 10 kg of Pu-239. This figure may vary considerably based on the percentage of other plutonium isotopes mixed with Pu-239 and the sophistication of weapons designs. For existing nuclear power plants in the United States, security and proliferation risks are generally considered to be low, given the current fuel cycle and safeguards regimes in place. In particular, the low-enriched uranium fuel (3%-5% U-235) in U.S. reactors cannot be used for a nuclear explosive device without separation and further enrichment, and the United States lacks commercial facilities for chemical separation of plutonium. Many observers view the lack of reprocessing in the United States as a policy signal to other countries that the country with the largest number of nuclear power plants in the world has been able to support this fleet without reprocessing. The variety of advanced nuclear power plant designs have the potential to further reduce this relatively low risk, or to increase the risks, depending on the technical and policy choices and how they are implemented. Versatility Many advanced reactor designs are smaller than the existing fleet of LWRs and are designed for modular installation. Because the number of modules may be altered to meet the power and heating needs of the site, SMRs are intended to accommodate a range of sizes and types of uses, including those that may have been considered too small in the past. SMRs and microreactors have potential applications in providing power to remote and isolated areas, on-site heating for industrial or municipal clients, and heat or power to mobile or temporary clients (e.g. remote construction sites and temporary military stations). The Department of Defense (DOD) has expressed interest in using SMRs to power remote bases, such as the Eielson Air Force Base in Alaska. The John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 instructs DOE to produce a report on how a program could be undertaken to pilot at least one microreactor at a military or DOE site by the end of 2027. DOD issued a request for information about microreactor prototype designs on January 22, 2019, as a first step in its study. A recent MIT study cautioned that small size alone would not necessarily give advanced reactors a market edge: The industry's problem is not that it has overlooked valuable market segments that need smaller reactors. The problem is that even its optimally scaled reactors are too expensive on a per-unit-power basis. A focus on serving the market segments that need smaller reactor sizes will be of no use unless the smaller design first accomplishes the task of radically reducing per-unit capital cost. Advanced reactors may also be designed for new applications or to capture new markets. Many advanced nuclear reactors would operate at higher temperatures (500-1,000°C) than existing commercial reactors (approximately 300-330°C). Higher operating temperatures would allow some advanced reactors to tap into the large market for heat for industrial processes. Industrial users consume 25% of all primary energy produced in the United States, 80% of which is in the form of process heat. A report by MIT estimates that 17%-19% (or 134-151 GWt) of the U.S. market for industrial heat could be supplied by small (150-300 MWt) advanced reactors. Potential applications include providing process heat for district heating, desalination, petroleum refining and oil shale processing, steam reforming of natural gas, cogeneration, biomass or coal gasification, and hydrogen production, among others. Advanced reactors may nevertheless face steep barriers to entry into these markets in the form of competition from other sources, such as natural gas plants (with or without carbon capture and storage), that are perceived as being less risky, both physically and economically. Waste Management The radioactivity of nuclear waste presents waste management and facility contamination challenges that are unique to nuclear energy. Radioactivity builds up in a nuclear reactor in three primary ways: 1) through the accumulation of radioactive "fission products" that result from the splitting of fissile nuclei, 2) through the accumulation of radioactive "actinides" that form when heavy atoms in the reactor core absorb a neutron but do not undergo fission, and 3) through the generation of "activation products" in the coolant, moderator, or reactor components that occurs when these materials are made radioactive by absorbing neutrons. The vast majority of the initial radioactivity in nuclear waste comes from the fission products. Due to the long half-lives of some of these radioactive materials (several hundred thousand years and longer), nuclear waste poses long-term health hazards. In 2018, the U.S. inventory of spent nuclear fuel exceeded 80,000 metric tons of uranium (MTU). This is projected to rise at a rate of approximately 1,800 MTU per year, resulting in an estimated 138,000 MTU by 2050. Because no long-term repository or consolidated storage facility for high-level nuclear waste has been licensed by NRC, newly discharged spent nuclear waste is currently stored onsite at nuclear plant locations. Unconventional reactors may offer some waste management advantages over existing commercial reactors. Fast reactors, and some other unconventional reactors, would be more effective at destroying actinides compared with commercial reactors. Actinides are responsible for the vast majority of the radioactive hazard that remains in nuclear waste after the first few centuries. Reducing the prevalence of these long-lived waste products by transmuting them to short-lived radionuclides may reduce the health risk associated with a release of spent fuel that occurs far in the future (when storage containers may be more likely to fail). Actinides are not the only long-lived nuclear wastes, however; some fission products remain radioactive hazards for hundreds of thousands of years and longer. The presence of these fission products in nuclear wastes might not be appreciably reduced by unconventional reactors. As a result, some have argued that, even if advanced reactors are able to deliver the improvements in actinide management that some advocates have claimed are possible, adoption of these reactors at scale would not materially alter the need for a long-term waste repository. Some advanced reactors would use new or non-conventional fuel forms, such as metallic fuels or dissolved molten fuels. Some of these fuels pose additional waste management challenges as a result of their tendency to corrode storage containers or otherwise react with the environment in ways that complicate their safe storage and disposal. Research on the safe management and disposal of advanced reactor waste will be a key element in commercializing these technologies. Environmental Effects Environmental impacts for any electric power source must be evaluated based on air emissions, water discharges, and waste management challenges, considering the full life cycle of the technology. The recent focus for nuclear power environmental impacts has been on air emissions, specifically the greenhouse gas footprint. Historically, however, much attention has been given to the waste management challenges associated with nuclear power. The environmental impacts of current LWR nuclear technologies are well studied. The stated goal of many advanced reactor technologies is to reduce environmental impacts. The impacts for newer advanced technologies would need to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, and assessed empirically to determine whether the impacts are greater or less than current technologies, and whether advanced technologies eliminated any existing challenges in practice or raised new challenges requiring new technologies, regulatory systems, and support industries. Nuclear energy is a low-carbon source of electricity, with no direct emissions from the fission process. As such, it is one of a number of energy technologies available for reducing the carbon emissions associated with electricity production (and potentially other uses of energy, such as industrial heat). The nuclear energy industry is not zero-carbon, however. Historically, fossil fuel-powered plants and equipment have provided energy to support the nuclear supply chain. Uranium enrichment facilities, in particular, have high energy requirements, and U.S. enrichment plants in the past used electricity primarily from coal-fired power plants. Current uranium enrichment plants use only a fraction of the electricity of older enrichment technology and are generally less reliant on coal-fired generation. A study by the DOE National Renewable Energy Laboratory of the life-cycle greenhouse gas emissions of major electric generating technologies found that conventional nuclear reactor emissions were similar to those of renewable energy technologies and only a fraction of coal and natural gas plant emissions. Emissions of conventional air pollutants (e.g., sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides, mercury, and particulates) from nuclear power operations and fuel cycle activities are similarly very low. Advanced reactors are expected to have similar life-cycle air emissions, as non-combustion energy sources. Supporters of advanced reactor technologies contend that they could reduce the obstacles to nuclear power expansion related to cost, safety, waste management, and fuel supply and therefore allow nuclear power to play a greatly expanded role in worldwide greenhouse gas reduction strategies. Some have argued that decarbonization goals could be achieved more effectively through improvements in existing light water reactor technologies. In particular, such a strategy could avoid additional waste management technical challenges and potential costs associated with the processing of radioactive waste from some classes of advanced reactors. On the other hand, as noted above, proponents of advanced reactor technologies contend that nuclear fuel recycling/reprocessing could reduce the long-term radioactivity of nuclear waste and produce waste forms more resistant to deterioration than LWR spent fuel. Plants with higher thermal efficiencies reject less heat into the environment per kilowatt-hour (KWh) of electricity generated. This can help reduce ecosystem impacts related to heat rejection. For example, increased efficiency may contribute to significant reductions in the amount of water used for waste heat rejection (up to 50% less) per unit of electricity generated, and reduce the amount of heat absorbed by adjacent water bodies. This could have particularly significant implications for the use of nuclear energy in arid environments. DOE Nuclear Energy Programs The Department of Energy supports the development of advanced nuclear technologies through research and development (R&D) programs housed in two primary offices: the Office of Nuclear Energy and the Office of Science. Collectively, advanced nuclear R&D programs (advanced fission and fusion) within these two offices received 23% of funding for energy R&D in fiscal year (FY) 2019, more than existing nuclear, renewables, or fossil energy (see Figure 7 ). The Advanced Research Projects Agency—Energy (ARPA-E) also provides funding for early stage R&D for advanced nuclear projects. Office of Nuclear Energy The Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) "focuses on three major mission areas: the nation's existing nuclear fleet, the development of advanced nuclear reactor concepts, and fuel cycle technologies," according to DOE's FY2020 budget justification. NE primarily supports nuclear fission technologies. NE has established a goal for advanced reactor development that "by the early 2030s, at least two non-light water advanced reactor concepts will have reached technical maturity, demonstrated safety and economic benefits, and completed licensing reviews sufficient to allow construction to go forward." According to one analysis, NE reported spending approximately $2 billion on advanced reactor R&D between 1998 and 2015. Analysts have contended that much higher spending levels would be needed for DOE to support the latter stages of advanced reactor R&D, such as demonstrations and commercialization. In FY2019, Congress appropriated $753 million for NE's nuclear R&D programs. Of that, Congress directed $319.5 million (42%) to be used specifically for advanced nuclear technology R&D within the following programs and activities: S upercritical Transformational Electric Power R&D : $5 million appropriated to develop a supercritical carbon dioxide Brayton cycle for thermal-to-electric energy conversion in sodium-cooled fast reactors; Advanced Small Modular Reactor R&D : $100 million appropriated for this new, one-year subprogram that is to support "cost-shared public-private R&D partnerships" to address technical challenges and accelerate development of SMR reactor designs and supply chains; Advanced Reactor Technologies : $111.5 million appropriated to conduct early-stage R&D on advanced reactor technologies, including SMRs; Versatile Fast Test Reactor : $65 million appropriated for R&D to support development of a versatile fast test reactor, also called the versatile test reactor; Material Recovery and Waste Form Development : $38 million appropriated to activities related to "the improvement of the current back end of the nuclear cycle [waste management and reprocessing]," of which $27 million were specifically directed towards activities supporting advanced nuclear technologies. In addition to the programs that focus exclusively on advanced reactor R&D, several cross-cutting NE programs directly or indirectly support advanced nuclear technologies. NE's Nuclear Energy Enabling Technologies (NEET) program includes several subprograms focused on cross-cutting research to support both existing and advanced nuclear technologies. Subprograms of NEET support DOE's Gateway for Accelerated Innovation in Nuclear (GAIN) initiative, which provides technical, financial, and regulatory support for existing and advanced nuclear technologies by providing enhanced access to DOE's network of national labs and unique nuclear R&D capabilities, as well as through competitive industry funding opportunities. GAIN industry funding opportunities include U.S. Industry Opportunities for Advanced Nuclear Technology Development , a five-year funding opportunity announcement initiated in December of 2017 that offers cost-sharing opportunities for advanced reactor development, demonstration, and regulatory assistance, and for other nuclear R&D. Applications are reviewed and awards are announced on a quarterly basis. DOE expects to award a total of $400 million over the five-year program. Nuclear Energy Voucher Program , which provides industry awardees with access to DOE nuclear expertise and capabilities in the form of vouchers redeemable for research and technical support activities at one of DOE's national laboratories. Vouchers are not direct financial awards, but rather fund the work done by the national laboratory on behalf of the awardee. Recipients are required to provide a 20% minimum cost-share. As of October 16, 2018, GAIN had distributed vouchers worth approximately $10.7 million to 22 companies. In the past, NE has also provided support for the review and licensing of advanced reactors by NRC. From FY2012 to FY2017, the NE SMR Licensing Technical Support program provided cost-sharing arrangements with industry to support first-of-a-kind costs associated with NRC design certification, design licensing, and site licensing. The program provided support for the NRC's review of NuScale's SMR design. DOE brought the program to a close at the end of FY2017. Office of Science Support for nuclear fusion technologies comes from DOE's Office of Science. Congress appropriated $432 million for nuclear fusion R&D in FY2019, more than for all other advanced nuclear technologies combined. Congress provided a further $132 million for the U.S. contribution to the ITER fusion project, as discussed above. ARPA-E DOE's ARPA-E invests in early-stage energy technologies with high potential for transformational impact. In 2017, ARPA-E announced a funding opportunity for "technologies to enable lower cost, safer advanced nuclear plant designs" as part of a new program entitled Modeling-Enhanced Innovations Trailblazing Nuclear Energy Reinvigoration program (MEITNER). In June of 2018, MEITNER awarded $24 million in funding for 10 industry and university projects focused on advanced nuclear technologies. ARPA-E announced grants for five nuclear-related projects totaling $12 million in December 2018. Offices of Environmental Management and Legacy Management The DOE's Office of Environmental Management (EM) and Office of Legacy Management (LM) provide a variety of functions supporting advanced reactor R&D. First, EM provides waste management services for ongoing advanced reactor R&D activities. For example, EM manages the spent nuclear fuel from the Advanced Test Reactor at the Idaho National Laboratory. DOE describes the Advanced Test Reactor as "the only U.S. research reactor capable of providing large-volume, high-flux neutron irradiation in a prototype environment … to study the results of years of intense neutron and gamma radiation on reactor materials and fuels for … research and power reactors." Second, EM funds and manages environmental remediation and decontamination and decommissioning for several advanced reactor facilities, including the Energy Technology Engineering Center at the Santa Susana Field Laboratory in California, various facilities at the Idaho National Laboratory, and the Hanford site in the state of Washington. At Hanford, EM has conducted decontamination and decommissioning activities at the Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) since 1992, which operated for 10 years (1982-1992) as a 400 MWt liquid-metal (sodium)-cooled nuclear research and test reactor to develop and test advanced fuels and materials for the Liquid Fast-Breeder Reactor Program. Third, EM funds facility overhead operations for facilities where advanced reactor R&D is occurring or planned. "Overhead" (or "Landlord") costs can include infrastructure maintenance (e.g., power, water, roads, bridges), site safeguards and security, worker health and safety, and program direction and administration. For example, EM funds site overhead costs at the Hanford and Savannah River sites, home of the Pacific Northwest and Savannah River National Laboratories, where advanced reactor and fuels research has been conducted. Congressional Issues Role of the Federal Government in Technology Development What is the appropriate level of federal support for each stage of technology development? That is a fundamental question in the longstanding national debate over R&D policy writ large. For nuclear energy technology development, major stages include research on fuels and materials, development of reactor concepts and designs, component testing and evaluation, licensing by NRC, demonstration, and commercialization. Typically, the earliest stages of development involve laboratory-scale work and computer modeling and simulation, some of which may be relatively inexpensive and applicable to a broad range of nuclear technology. The later stages focus on specific reactor designs and require construction of full- or nearly full-scale nuclear power plants potentially costing billions of dollars. Even early-stage nuclear research often requires the construction and operation of test reactors, shielded hot cells for remote handling of intensely radioactive materials, and other expensive facilities and infrastructure. The Trump Administration contends that federal support should focus on the early stages of research, where the private sector may have a tendency to underinvest. "The Federal role in supporting advanced technologies is strongest in the early stages of research and development," according to DOE's FY2019 budget justification." Consistent with that policy, the Administration opposes funding for "late stage or near commercial ready technology." Opponents of federal funding for energy demonstration and commercialization contend that such activities should be conducted by the private sector, where market forces would determine which technologies would succeed. As asserted by the Heritage Foundation, "By attempting to force government-developed technologies into the market, the government diminishes the role of the entrepreneur and crowds out private-sector investment. This practice of picking winners and losers denies energy technologies the opportunity to compete in the marketplace, which is the only proven way to develop market-viable products." The conferees on FY2019 DOE appropriations did not adopt the Administration's proposed focus on early-stage research, saying, "The Department is directed throughout all of its programs to maintain a diverse portfolio of early-, mid-, and late-stage research, development, and market transformation activities." Supporters of a broader federal role contend that mid- and late-stage federal support is necessary for new technologies to survive the "valley of death," after federally funded early-stage research is completed but before a promising technology is able to attract private-sector funding for the more-expensive later development, demonstration, and commercialization phases. Obtaining funding for expensive and risky demonstration projects has been described as a particularly difficult obstacle. According to former DOE Under Secretary John Deutch, "energy innovation is constrained not by an absence of new ideas, but by the absence of early examples of successful implementation." Perceived Need for Advanced Nuclear Power and Competing Alternatives World electricity generation is projected by the U.S. Energy Information Administration to grow by nearly 50% between 2015 and 2040. While renewable energy and nuclear power are projected to rise substantially during that period, fossil fuels would still constitute about 55% of total generation if current policies and trends continue. Proponents of unconventional nuclear power contend that advanced reactors could mitigate the concerns about safety, cost, radioactive waste, weapons proliferation, and fuel supply that are seen as inhibiting greater utilization of nuclear energy. Under that view, advanced nuclear technology would be indispensable for meeting the world's rapidly increasing demand for electricity without emitting greenhouse gases. "In the 21 st century the world faces the new challenge of drastically reducing emissions of greenhouse gases while simultaneously expanding energy access and economic opportunity to billions of people," according to a recent study by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The study found that the cost of worldwide greenhouse gas reductions could be minimized by the deployment of lower-cost nuclear generation. That finding is disputed by various environmental and other groups that contend that a combination of renewable energy and efficiency is the lowest-cost option for eliminating greenhouse gas emissions and could be implemented more quickly. "With technology already available, renewable energy sources like wind, solar, and geothermal can provide 96 percent of our electricity and 98 percent of heating demand—the vast majority of U.S. energy use," according to the environmental advocacy group Greenpeace USA. Some environmental groups contend that the safety and other risks posed by nuclear make it unacceptable in any case, even with advanced technology. The Nuclear Information and Resource Service advocacy group says, "There is nothing environmentally friendly about nuclear power. It only creates different environmental problems than fossil fuel energy sources. But neither fossil fuels nor nuclear power are safe, sustainable, or healthy for humans and the environment." Germany adopted a policy after the Fukushima disaster in 2011 to greatly reduce carbon emissions through renewable energy and efficiency while eliminating nuclear power. The policy, called "Energiewende," or energy transition, calls for Germany's consumption of primary energy (the initial energy content of fuels and other energy sources) to be reduced by 50% in 2050 from its 2008 level, while greatly increasing the use of renewable energy throughout the economy. According to the German government, "By 2050 renewable energies should make up 60 percent of the gross final consumption of energy, and 80 percent of the gross electricity consumption." A 2017 study by an academic team developed "roadmaps" for 139 countries to convert to 100% renewable energy by 2050. The study concluded that renewable energy production could be expanded with more certainty than nuclear and other non-emitting sources. The National Renewable Energy Laboratory issued a study in 2012 of the impact of increasing U.S. renewable electricity generation to up to 90% by 2050. The study found that renewables could "adequately supply 80% of total U.S. electricity generation in 2050," with nuclear, coal, and gas supplying the remaining 20%. Nuclear power plants were projected to be located almost entirely east of the Mississippi River for economic and other reasons. Versatile Test Reactor Supporters of advanced reactor technologies are urging DOE to construct a fast spectrum Versatile Test Reactor (VTR), which they consider critical for the development of nuclear fuels, materials, instrumentation, and sensors for fast neutron and other advanced reactors. "To support the innovative R&D required to revive a competitive U.S. nuclear industry, a new test reactor is required with capabilities that far exceed those of the few remaining test reactors," a senior executive from the nuclear firm General Atomics testified to Congress in 2015. According to DOE's Idaho National Laboratory (INL), "Currently, only a few capabilities are available for testing fast neutron reactor technology in the world and none in the U.S." Requirements for DOE to plan and develop a "versatile reactor-based fast neutron source" by the end of 2025 are included in the Nuclear Energy Innovation Capabilities Act of 2017 (NEICA), signed into law September 28, 2018 ( P.L. 115-248 ). In the 116 th Congress, the Nuclear Energy Leadership Act (NELA, S. 903 ), introduced March 27, 2019, by Senator Murkowski, would authorize DOE to "provide" the facility. Funding of $65 million for R&D to support development of the VTR (referred to as a "versatile fast test reactor") is included in the Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2019 (Division A of P.L. 115-244 ). Citing the enactment of NEICA, Energy Secretary Rick Perry announced the official launch of the VTR project on February 28, 2019. The Trump Administration is requesting an additional $100 million for the VTR project in FY2020. DOE announced a contract award on November 13, 2018, to GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy to help develop a conceptual design and cost estimate for the VTR, which is to be adapted from the company's PRISM sodium-cooled fast reactor design. According to INL, which is managing the project, the conceptual design and cost and schedule estimates are to be completed in 2021, after which another contract would be awarded for final design and construction. The VTR is currently scheduled to be operational by October 2026. An INL official estimated in February 2019 that a sodium-cooled VTR would cost $3 billion to $3.5 billion in today's dollars. The Nuclear Energy Research Infrastructure Act of 2018 ( H.R. 4378 , 115 th Congress), which passed the House February 13, 2018, but was not enacted, would have authorized $1.99 billion through FY2025 for the project. Some who are skeptical of the VTR project have questioned whether there would be enough potential users—primarily companies developing fast reactors—to justify its construction and operating costs. Some advanced nuclear reactor developers have doubted that the VTR will begin operating before their designs are completed. Concerns have also been raised about whether new facilities would be required to fabricate fuel for the VTR, and how much those might cost, and the cost of handling and disposing of highly radioactive spent fuel from the reactor. The potential use of plutonium-based fuel in the VTR has drawn opposition because of the usability of such fuel in nuclear weapons. DOE Hosting of Private-Sector Experimental Reactors Proposals to authorize DOE to host privately funded experimental and demonstration reactors have been included in several bills in the 114 th and 115 th Congresses, including a provision enacted in NEICA. Supporters of the idea contend that reactor developers could benefit from the expertise and facilities at DOE national laboratories. Safety oversight of private-sector experimental reactors at national laboratories could possibly be conducted by DOE and not require NRC licensing. NEICA specifies that reactors intended to demonstrate commercial suitability would require NRC licenses, even at DOE sites. NEICA added section 958 to the Energy Policy Act of 2005 ( P.L. 109-58 ), which authorizes a DOE National Reactor Innovation Center (NRIC). This program would "enable the testing and demonstration of reactor concepts to be proposed and funded, in whole or in part, by the private sector." Such testing and demonstration would take place at DOE national laboratories or other Department-owned sites. In implementing the NRIC program, DOE is to coordinate with NRC on sharing technical expertise on the advanced reactor technologies under development. DOE announced an agreement on February 18, 2016, with Utah Associated Municipal Power Systems (UAMPS) "to support possible siting" of a first-of-a-kind NuScale SMR plant at INL. Under the agreement, "UAMPS is currently working to identify potential locations that may be suitable" at the 890-square-mile INL site for construction of the plant, according to DOE. The NuScale SMR is currently undergoing NRC review for a design certification, which is to be issued sometime after 2020. In 2012, DOE announced three agreements "to develop deployment plans" for privately funded SMRs at the Department's Savannah River Site in South Carolina. The agreements with Hyperion Power Generation (now Gen4 Energy), Holtec International, and NuScale were intended to help the companies "obtain information on potential SMR reactor siting at Savannah River and provide a framework for developing land use and site services agreements to further these efforts," according to DOE. Because NEICA says reactor testing and demonstration projects would be funded "in whole or in part" by the private sector, the potential federal share of such projects could be a future issue before Congress. NEICA requires DOE to submit a report to Congress on costs and other issues that could be raised by the hosting of reactor testing and demonstration projects, including DOE's capabilities for safety review and oversight of privately funded advanced reactor research; potential DOE sites that could host privately funded experimental advanced reactors; contractual mechanisms that could be used for such projects; and responsibility for management and disposal of waste. Funding of Demonstration Reactors A crucial stage in the commercialization of nuclear technology is the construction of demonstration reactors, which are expected to cost several billion dollars apiece, depending on their size and level of technical maturity. As noted above, the VTR, which would serve as a test reactor and as a demonstration of GE's PRISM reactor (although downsized from 840 MWt to 311 MWt), is estimated to cost up to $3.5 billion to construct. The first 12-module NuScale plant, at 684 MWe, is estimated to cost $3 billion. Including the demonstration stage, bringing a new reactor technology to the market could require up to 30 years and cost up to $15 billion, according to one recent estimate. The majority of U.S. advanced reactor companies surveyed in 2017 have raised only a small portion of the funding that would be necessary for commercial-scale demonstration of their designs. One analysis found that commercialization of advanced reactor concepts would require significantly higher levels of public funding. DOE has a range of options for supporting the construction of demonstration reactors and helping bring them to the commercial market. Cost Sharing DOE can carry out technology demonstration projects on a cost-shared basis under Sec. 988 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 ( P.L. 109-58 ). At least 50% of demonstration costs must come from non-federal sources, although the Secretary of Energy can reduce the non-federal share based on technological risk and other factors. Repayment of the federal contribution is not required. In addition to construction costs, federal cost sharing can apply to licensing, design work, and "first of a kind" engineering, such as the assistance provided to NuScale under the DOE small modular reactor licensing technical support program. Full Funding Construction of research facilities such as the VTR may be completely funded through congressional appropriations, with users of the facility paying to conduct research (sometimes with DOE grants or vouchers). The VTR would also demonstrate the PRISM technology, as noted above, but it would be smaller than the planned commercial version and would not produce power. Federal Payments for Power and Research Use The federal government can purchase power generated by demonstration reactors and also pay for research use of the reactors. For the proposed NuScale demonstration, DOE announced a memorandum of understanding (MOU) in December 2018 with the Utah Associated Municipal Power Systems (UAMPS), which would own the plant. The MOU calls for DOE to purchase power from one of the 60 MWe modules in the plant. DOE would use another module for research under the Joint Use Modular Plant (JUMP) program. "The research is expected to focus principally on integrated energy systems that support the production of both electricity and non-electric energy products," according to DOE's announcement. Loan Guarantees DOE can issue loan guarantees to build advanced nuclear reactors under Title XVII of the Energy Policy Act of 2005. DOE currently has $8.8 billion in loan guarantee authority for advanced nuclear energy projects. To receive a DOE loan guarantee, projects must be found financially viable and they must pay an up-front fee called a "subsidy cost." The subsidy cost is the present value of the government's potential cost of the loan guarantee that could result from future loan defaults. A project considered to be relatively risky would be assessed a relatively high subsidy cost. Title XVII loan guarantees cannot be given to projects that would use federal funds other than the federally guaranteed funding ( P.L. 111-8 , Division C). DOE has awarded $12 billion in Title XVII loan guarantees for the construction of two new reactors at the Vogtle nuclear power plant in Georgia. Tax Credits Power plants using advanced nuclear technology are eligible for a federal tax credit of 1.8 cents per kilowatt-hour of electricity generated, as extended by P.L. 115-123 . The nuclear production tax credits do not have an expiration date, but total credits are limited to 6,000 MW of capacity, limited to $125 million per year per 1,000 MW of capacity for eight years of operation. The availability of the tax credits could help nuclear demonstration projects procure financing and reduce the subsidy cost of DOE loan guarantees. Choosing Projects for Federal Funding Because the federal government may have limited funding for multibillion-dollar nuclear demonstration projects, a methodology for selecting which projects and technologies to support would likely be necessary. While this would appear to put DOE in the position of "picking winners," as discussed above, it is conceivable that some market-based selection criteria could be at least part of the selection process for demonstration reactor support. One such criterion could be evidence of a customer base, which could include letters of intent for future orders (perhaps conditioned on successful demonstration). Another market-based criterion could be the extent of private matching funds raised for the project, such as firm contracts for power sales from the demonstration plant, or other private funding. Many other criteria could also be considered, such as technology maturity level (the level of technical risk) and the financial and technical strength of the project sponsor. The potential goal of demonstrating the widest possible range of advanced technologies might also be a consideration. Licensing Framework for New Technologies The U.S. nuclear industry has argued that current NRC procedures for reviewing and licensing new nuclear reactors are overly burdensome and inflexible, contributing to high regulatory costs and long reviews. Existing licensing pathways and safety regulations, which tend to be based on conventional LWR designs, are not necessarily well-suited to accommodate newer, advanced reactors. Consequently, industry groups and some outside experts have argued for a transition to a technology-neutral regulatory framework, a process which these groups have estimated may take up to five years to complete. The industry has also called for greater flexibility in making changes during reactor construction without regulatory delays. In response to such concerns, NEIMA includes several provisions on advanced nuclear reactor licensing. In the near term, NRC is required to establish "stages in the licensing process for commercial advanced nuclear reactors," which would allow license applicants to gain formal approval for completing each step in the licensing process, such as a conceptual design assessment. A 2016 industry report recommending staged licensing noted that such a process is currently used in Canada and the United Kingdom. "The step-wise pre-licensing design review processes in Canada and the UK provide earlier opportunities for reactor vendors to demonstrate to their investors and potential investors that the reactor design technology will be licensable," according to the report. NEIMA also requires NRC to develop procedures for using "licensing project plans," which are described by the committee report as "agreements between the agency and applicants early in the application process that reflect mutual commitments on schedules and deliverables to support resource planning for both the agency and the applicant." NRC must also increase the use of risk-informed and performance-based licensing evaluation techniques "within the existing regulatory framework." Using such techniques, the evaluation of specific safety and other issues would be informed by the calculated level of risk, and performance standards would be used to evaluate safety, "when appropriate," rather than specific reactor design requirements. NEIMA requires NRC to issue a "technology-inclusive" regulatory framework for optional use by advanced reactor applicants. As noted above, NRC regulations currently focus on light water reactors, which are the only commercial reactors currently used in the United States. NRC also must issue a report that would include an evaluation of the need for additional legislation to implement such a regulatory framework. Prior to NEIMA's enactment, NRC had begun preparing for the potential licensing of advanced reactors, issuing implementation action plans for the near, mid-, and long terms. New nuclear fuels are also subject to NRC regulation. Depending on the design, it can take up to six years to develop, test, and license new fuels. Transporting these new fuel forms may require additional innovation and regulation. The nuclear industry has contended that fees charged by NRC for reviewing reactor designs, new fuels, and license applications constitute a significant obstacle to advanced reactor deployment, particularly by relatively small, independent companies. NEICA authorizes DOE to provide grants to advanced reactor license applicants to cover some of their NRC fees throughout the licensing process. Power Purchase Agreements Federal agency agreements to purchase power from advanced reactors could substantially improve the financial feasibility of such projects, both at the demonstration and commercialization stages. Such power purchase agreements (PPAs) would provide a projected revenue stream that could help advanced reactor projects obtain financing and potentially reduce their financing costs. Federal agencies could also offer above-market prices for the power to encourage commercialization of nuclear technologies, if authorized by Congress. Proposals to address this issue are included in NELA ( S. 903 ), noted above. Section 2 of NELA would authorize the General Services Administration (GSA) to enter into PPAs for up to 40 years, an increase from the current limit of 10 years. Under 40 U.S.C. §501, GSA can delegate all or part of this authority to other agencies. Under a PPA, the federal government signs a contract to purchase electricity from a public utility for a specific time period. Electricity payments during a PPA contract period, along with any other customer revenues, are intended to be sufficient to allow the power plant developer to recover its construction and other costs, plus a profit, if applicable. The proposed lengthening of the 10-year limit on PPAs is intended to allow enough time for nuclear reactor construction costs to be recovered, according to NELA's sponsors. NELA Section 3 would require DOE to enter into at least one PPA to purchase power from a commercial nuclear reactor by the end of 2023. "Special consideration" would be given to "first-of-a-kind or early deployment nuclear technologies" that could provide reliable power to important national security facilities, especially facilities disconnected from the electricity grid. If a PPA met those criteria, then electricity rates under the agreement could be higher than the average market rate. PPAs with currently operating commercial nuclear plants would not qualify for above-market rates. Federal PPAs of any duration are subject to cancellation each year if sufficient funds are not appropriated by Congress, and to cancellation at any time for the convenience of the government. DOE's Western Area Power Administration (WAPA), which markets electricity from federal dams and other projects in much of the Western United States, has the authority to sign power sale contracts for up to 40 years (43 U.S.C. 485h(c)). This authority could potentially facilitate PPAs for demonstration reactors at INL or elsewhere in the WAPA service area. According to a 2017 report produced for DOE, "A federal agency located within WAPA's jurisdiction may leverage WAPA's long-term contract authority by entering into an Interagency Agreement with WAPA and allowing WAPA, in turn, to enter into a PPA with a power provider on such federal agency's behalf for a term of up to 40 years." Under that scenario, WAPA could reach an interagency agreement with a military base in California under which WAPA would award a 40-year PPA on behalf of the base to a demonstration reactor at INL and then deliver the power to the base. Advanced Reactor Fuel Availability Many advanced reactors would use fuels that are not currently commercially available, either due to lack of demand or technological immaturity. These include higher-enriched versions of existing uranium fuel as well as new types of fuels that are currently under development. Without near-term investment in fuel processing and fabrication capabilities, there may be insufficient supply of next generation fuels to support the deployment of some advanced reactors. Particular concern has been raised about the availability of high-assay low enriched uranium (HALEU), which would be necessary to power many advanced nuclear reactors. Existing U.S. commercial nuclear reactors are fueled by uranium that has been enriched to between 3% and 5% of the fissile isotope U-235. HALEU is enriched to between 5% and 20%. (At 20% and above, uranium is considered highly enriched and potentially useable for weapons.) Because HALEU is not used in existing commercial reactors, it is not readily available for advanced reactor development, according to the nuclear industry. Section 7 of NELA would require DOE to sell, transfer, or lease high-assay low enriched uranium (HALEU) for use in advanced nuclear reactors. HALEU containing at least 2 metric tons of U-235 is to be made available by the end of 2022 and a total of at least 10 metric tons by the end of 2025. The FY2019 Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act ( P.L. 115-244 , Division A) requires DOE to submit a plan to Congress for HALEU development and provides $20 million for preparation and testing. DOE is currently pursuing two approaches for developing HALEU supplies. One approach is to use DOE-owned HALEU currently stored at INL to fabricate fuel for advanced reactors. DOE issued an environmental assessment on January 17, 2019, that found no significant environmental impact from fabricating the fuel at existing INL facilities. In the other approach, DOE announced January 7, 2019, that it intended to sign a sole-source contract with Centrus Energy to build 16 centrifuges at DOE's Portsmouth, OH, site to enrich "a small quantity" of uranium to 19.75% U-235 by October 2020. The Nuclear Energy Institute has estimated that it would take a minimum of seven years to establish the infrastructure to supply this fuel for commercial purposes. DOE has proposed to downblend a supply of high enriched uranium to bridge this gap. By some assessments, 32 GWe of deployed advanced reactor capacity would be required to ensure the economic viability of new fuel fabrication and other fuel cycle facilities. International Organizations International Framework on Nuclear Energy Cooperation The International Framework on Nuclear Energy Cooperation (IFNEC) is an international body dedicated to ensuring that the "use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes proceeds in a manner that is efficient and meets the highest standards of safety, security and non-proliferation." IFNEC was formed in 2010 by the members of its precursor organization, the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership. Its membership includes 34 participant countries, 31 observer countries, and 4 international observer organizations. The United States is a participating country. IFNEC working groups focus on issues related to nuclear infrastructure development, reliable fuel services and spent fuel management, and nuclear supply chains and supplier-customer relationships. Generation IV International Forum The Generation IV International Forum (GIF) is a collaborative international initiative to promote the development of the next generation of nuclear energy systems through shared R&D. GIF was created in 2000 with nine original members: Argentina, Brazil, Canada, France, Japan, South Korea, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Switzerland, the European Union, China, Russia, and Australia joined subsequently. In 2002, after reviewing 130 advanced reactor designs, the GIF identified 6 nuclear energy systems for further development. Collectively, these are known as Generation IV reactors. The six Generation IV reactor technologies are: Gas-Cooled Fast Reactor, Lead-Cooled Fast Reactor, Molten Salt Reactor, Sodium-Cooled Fast Reactor, Supercritical Water-Cooled Reactor, and Very High Temperature Reactor. Factors used in selecting the designs include safety, sustainability, economics, physical security, proliferation resistance, and waste minimization, and they represent a range of technologies. The GIF has suggested that commercialization of some of these technologies may occur as early as 2030, with demonstration of some technologies possibly occurring within the next decade. Each of these technologies is at a different level of technical maturity. Of these, sodium-cooled fast reactors are considered to be the most mature. Gas-cooled fast reactors, lead-cooled fast reactors, and molten salt reactors are not expected to reach commercialization until 2050 under current rates of development, although some vendors and academics have put forth more optimistic timelines. Appendix.

All nuclear power in the United States is generated by light water reactors (LWRs), which were commercialized in the 1950s and early 1960s and are now used throughout most of the world. LWRs are cooled by ordinary ("light") water, which also slows ("moderates") the neutrons that maintain the nuclear fission chain reaction. High construction costs of large conventional LWRs, concerns about safety raised by the 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster in Japan, and other issues have led to increased interest in unconventional, or "advanced," nuclear technologies that could be less expensive and safer than existing LWRs. An "advanced nuclear reactor" is defined in legislation enacted in 2018 as "a nuclear fission reactor with significant improvements over the most recent generation of nuclear fission reactors" or a reactor using nuclear fusion (P.L. 115-248). Such reactors include LWR designs that are far smaller than existing reactors, as well as concepts that would use different moderators, coolants, and types of fuel. Many of these advanced designs are considered to be small modular reactors (SMRs), which the Department of Energy (DOE) defines as reactors with electric generating capacity of 300 megawatts and below, in contrast to an average of about 1,000 megawatts for existing commercial reactors. Advanced reactors are often referred to as "Generation IV" nuclear technologies, with existing commercial reactors constituting "Generation III" or, for the most recently constructed reactors, "Generation III+." Major categories of advanced reactors include advanced water-cooled reactors, which would make safety, efficiency, and other improvements over existing commercial reactors; gas-cooled reactors, which could use graphite as a neutron moderator or have no moderator; liquid-metal-cooled reactors, which would be cooled by liquid sodium or other metals and have no moderator; molten salt reactors, which would use liquid fuel; and fusion reactors, which would release energy through the combination of light atomic nuclei rather than the splitting (fission) of heavy nuclei such as uranium. Most of these concepts have been studied since the dawn of the nuclear age, but relatively few, such as sodium-cooled reactors, have advanced to commercial scale demonstration, and such demonstrations in the United States took place decades ago. The 115th Congress enacted two bills to promote the development of advanced nuclear reactors. The first, the Nuclear Energy Innovation Capabilities Act of 2017 (NEICA), was signed into law in September 2018 (P.L. 115-248). It requires DOE to develop a versatile fast neutron test reactor that could help develop fuels and materials for advanced reactors and authorizes DOE national laboratories and other sites to host reactor testing and demonstration projects "to be proposed and funded, in whole or in part, by the private sector." The second, the Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization Act (NEIMA, P.L. 115-439), signed in January 2019, would require the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to develop an optional regulatory framework suitable for advanced nuclear technologies. The 115th Congress also appropriated $65 million for R&D to support development of the versatile test reactor in the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act, FY2019, along with funding for ongoing advanced nuclear research and development programs (Division A of P.L. 115-244). Continued debate over advanced reactor issues is anticipated in the 116th Congress. A fundamental question may be the role of the federal government in advanced nuclear power development. DOE's budget request for FY2020 focuses the federal role on "early stage research" rather than the more expensive stages of demonstration and commercialization. Controversy is also likely to continue over the need for advanced nuclear power. Supporters contend that such technology will be crucial in reducing emissions of greenhouse gases and bringing carbon-free power to the majority of the world that currently has little access to electricity. However, some observers and interest groups have cast doubt on the potential safety, affordability, and sustainability of advanced reactors. Because many of these technologies are in the conceptual or design phases, the potential advantages of these systems have not yet been established on a commercial scale. Concern has also been raised about the weapons-proliferation risks posed by the potential use of plutonium-based fuel by some advanced reactor technologies. Other current issues related to advanced reactors include criteria for hosting private-sector demonstration reactors at DOE sites, the licensing framework for non-LWR reactors, longer time periods for federal agreements to purchase power from advanced reactors, and the supply of the high-assay low enriched uranium fuel that would be needed for some advanced reactor designs. There also may be congressional interest about potential federal assistance for demonstration reactors, which are expected to cost billions of dollars apiece. Major options for such assistance include federal cost sharing, loan guarantees, power purchase agreements, purchase of reactor capacity for research uses, and tax credits.

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Background The United States and Bosnia Many Members of Congress became actively engaged in foreign policy debates over U.S. intervention in the 1992-1995 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter, "Bosnia"). Congress monitored and at times challenged the Bush and Clinton Administrations' response to the conflict through numerous hearings, resolutions, and legislative initiatives. Many observers contend that the United States is a stakeholder in Bosnia's future because of the strong impact of U.S. intervention on the postwar Bosnian state. Nearly 25 years after warring parties in Bosnia reached the Dayton Agreement (see below), Bosnia faces numerous internal and external challenges, and the country retains geopolitical importance to U.S. interests in the Western Balkans. As Congress assesses ongoing and emerging security issues in the region, including resilience against malign external influence, renewed conflict, and radicalization, Bosnia's internal politics and its role in Balkan stability may merit further examination. Brief History and Population Bosnia has existed in various forms throughout its history: a medieval kingdom, territory held by two major empires, a federal unit, and, since 1992, an independent state. Bosnia's present international borders are largely consistent with its administrative boundaries under later periods of Ottoman Turkish rule. After World War I, Bosnia became part of the newly created Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. It was one of the six constituent republics of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from 1945 until 1992. Bosnia's constitution stems from the U.S.-brokered Dayton Peace Agreement that ended the country's 1992-1995 war. It recognizes three "constituent peoples": Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs. All three groups are Slavic. Religious tradition is considered a marker of difference among the three ethnic identities: Bosniaks are predominantly Muslim, Serbs are largely Orthodox Christian, and Croats are mostly Catholic. Although Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian are recognized in Bosnia as distinct official languages, they are mutually intelligible. Bosniaks comprise approximately 50.1% of the population, Bosnian Serbs 30.8%, and Bosnian Croats 15.4%. In this report, Bosnian is used as a non-ethnic term for a person or institution from Bosnia. A Bosnian Serb is an ethnic Serb from Bosnia and a Bosnian Croat is an ethnic Croat from Bosnia. Bosniak refers to Slavic Muslims. Bosnia's religious and cultural diversity is one of its distinctive characteristics. Islam was introduced to part of Bosnia's population during the Ottoman period, although there were also large Catholic, Orthodox Christian, and Jewish communities. Bosnia was the most heterogeneous Yugoslav republic and the only one where no ethnic group formed an absolute majority. During the 1990s, some popular accounts of Bosnia (and the former Yugoslavia) depicted its ethnic relations as "ancient hatreds," implying that the country's ethnic groups cannot peacefully coexist and that the 1992-1995 war was unavoidable. However, many experts on the region reject this thesis. Although Bosnia has experienced episodes of communal violence and bloodshed, most recently during World War II and the 1992-1995 war, its heterogeneous population also has lived in mixed communities for periods of peace. Many experts contend that ethnic conflict often was stoked by domestic leaders who manipulated historical memory and grievances to further their own agendas, or by external powers seeking to rule Bosnia or annex its territory. The Bosnian War (1992-1995) In the 1980s, Yugoslavia's escalating political and economic crises fueled nationalist movements. Nationalist leaders in Serbia and Croatia appealed to Bosnian Serbs and Croats as ethnic "kin." The party that ruled Croatia for most of the 1990s, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), established a sister party with the same name to mobilize Bosnian Croats and compete in Bosnia's elections. This gave Croatia an avenue of influence in Bosnian politics. Serbia, led by strongman Slobodan Milošević, likewise had influence over Bosnian Serb leaders. In Bosnia's November 1990 elections—the first competitive elections in decades—voters cast aside the ruling League of Communists party and elected ethnic parties that largely continue to dominate today. Bosnian voters backed independence in a 1992 referendum, following in the footsteps of Slovenia, Croatia, and Macedonia. Bosnian Serbs, who did not want to separate from Yugoslavia, boycotted the referendum. Bosnian Serb forces seized more than two-thirds of Bosnia's territory, and a three-year conflict followed that pitted Serb, Croat, and Bosniak forces against one another. Bosnian Serb leaders declared a "Serb Republic" ( Republika Srpska) in March 1992, while Bosnian Croat leaders proclaimed the Croat Community of Herceg-Bosnia in July. Some Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serb leaders advocated unification with Croatia and Serbia, respectively, where government factions—including their strongman leaders—likewise wanted to carve a Greater Croatia and Greater Serbia out of Bosnia's territory. Bosniak leaders opposed dismemberment of the state. Bosnia's war was one of the most lethal conflicts in Europe since World War II. Bosnian Serb forces besieged Sarajevo for 44 months. More than 10,000 people, mostly civilians, died due to shelling, sniping, and blockade-related deprivation. Paramilitary factions from neighboring Croatia and Serbia—some of which reportedly had ties to the Croatian and Serbian government—fought alongside Bosnian Croats and Serbs. The Serb-dominated Yugoslav National Army also aided Bosnian Serb forces, giving them a military advantage. In many areas, combatants from the three groups killed or expelled members of other ethnic groups to "purify" territory that they wanted to claim as their own. This "ethnic cleansing" changed Bosnia's demographic landscape. An estimated 100,000 or more Bosnians were killed in the conflict, and roughly half of its population displaced. In addition, an estimated 20,000 or more women and girls were victims of sexual violence. Hundreds of Bosnians have been prosecuted for war crimes at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and in Bosnian courts. In 2016, the ICTY convicted wartime Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić of genocide and war crimes. In 2019, the tribunal rejected his appeal and increased his sentence from 40 years to life. Citizens of Croatia and Serbia have also been indicted for crimes committed in the Bosnian war. Highly publicized incidents in 1994 and 1995 underscored the war's human toll. Bosnian Serb forces bombarded a Sarajevo market in 1994 and 1995, resulting in over 100 civilian deaths. In July 1995, Serb forces commanded by Ratko Mladić seized and executed more than 8,000 Bosniak men and boys in a U.N.-designated safe area around the city of Srebrenica, an incident subsequently seen by some as a consequence of the international community's muddled, ineffectual response to the conflict. The International Court of Justice and ICTY subsequently ruled that the Srebrenica massacres constituted an act of genocide. Mladić was convicted of genocide and other crimes in 2017. These incidents increased pressure on U.S. policymakers to take a stronger role in resolving a conflict that had largely been left to the EU and the United Nations. Under U.S. command, NATO intervened in August and September 1995 with air strikes against Bosnian Serb targets, while allied Bosniak and Croat forces launched a simultaneous offensive in western Bosnia. The United States played a key role in brokering several agreements. The 1994 Washington Agreement ended the "war within a war" between Bosniaks and Croats. In November 1995, leaders from Croatia, Bosnia, and Serbia met at the Wright-Patterson Air Force base in Dayton, OH, to negotiate a peace agreement. U.S. diplomat Richard Holbrooke played a crucial role in brokering the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, more commonly known as the Dayton Peace Agreement. Domestic Issues Bosnia's complex political system is a product of the Dayton Agreement; one of its annexes serves as Bosnia's constitution (Annex 4). Its provisions partly reflect the situation on the ground in 1995, including the subdivision of Bosnia into two ethnoterritorial entities ( Figure 1 ): Republika Srpska ("RS"), which Bosnian Serb leaders had proclaimed in 1992, and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina ("FBiH," predominantly populated by Bosniaks and Croats), which was created by the 1994 Washington Agreement. Entity borders were largely drawn to form ethnic majorities, even though they also reflected territorial seizure and ethnic cleansing. Many Bosniaks view the division of Bosnia into these roughly equal entities as awarding the spoils of war to Bosnian Serbs, whom they regard as the aggressors. Many Bosnian Serbs, however, view the Serb-majority entity as a protection against marginalization. The designation of Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs as Bosnia's three "constituent peoples" is a cornerstone of the Dayton system. Numerous government bodies have ethnic quotas requiring equal representation of the three groups. In these power-sharing institutions, delegates from each constituent group may veto measures that go against vital ethnic interests. While these arrangements make Bosnia's political system prone to gridlock, Dayton's negotiators viewed them as necessary to prevent any group from feeling marginalized in a context of low trust. Government Structure Bosnia is a parliamentary republic with a high degree of decentralization. Its complex, tiered structure includes a central ("state-level") government, the two entities, the autonomous Brčko district, and cantonal and municipal governments. State-level Government The central ("state-level") government covers the entirety of Bosnia. A three-member presidency is the head of state, and includes one Serb member who is elected by RS voters, and one Bosniak and one Croat member elected by FBiH voters. The Council of Ministers, led by a Chairperson, is roughly equivalent to a cabinet government and prime minister in other parliamentary systems. The Parliamentary Assembly is a state-level legislature with two chambers: a directly elected House of Representatives (42 members) and an indirectly elected House of Peoples (5 Serbs, 5 Croats, and 5 Bosniaks). The state-level government is considered to be weak, despite some expansion of its functions in the 2000s. Its major responsibilities include foreign relations; trade, customs, and monetary policy; migration and asylum policy; defense; and intelligence. The Two Entities Bosnia is further subdivided into two ethnoterritorial entities: Republika Srpska (RS), where Serbs are the largest ethnic group (82%), and the Federation entity (FBiH), where Bosniaks (70%) and Croats (22%) are the largest groups. The two entities have broader policy jurisdiction than the state-level government. Governing functions that are not assigned to the state-level government fall to the entities. These include civilian policing, economic policy, fiscal policy, energy policy, and health and social policy, as well as other issues. Each entity has its own constitution, as well as a president, vice presidents, legislature, and cabinet government with a prime minister. Each entity may establish "special parallel relationships" with neighboring states (i.e., Croatia and Serbia). Numerous entity bodies also incorporate ethnic quotas. Brčko District Brčko district, a border region in northeastern Bosnia, was initially administered by the international community to allay concerns about RS secession. Brčko's location interrupts RS's contiguity, and both entities initially claimed it. Brčko was later awarded to both entities, but remains a self-governing district whose population is a mix of all three constituent peoples. Some analysts believe it has been relatively more successful than the entities in passing reforms and reintegrating its divided population (e.g., ethnically mixed schools with a common curriculum). Cantonal and Municipal Government FBiH entity is further divided into ten cantons, many of which were drawn to form ethnic Bosniak or Croat majorities. The cantons have jurisdiction in many policy areas, including policing, housing, culture, and education. They also have their own constitutions—based on the FBiH constitution—as well as legislatures and cabinet-style governments. FBiH and RS are further divided into 79 and 64 municipalities, respectively. International Oversight The Dayton Agreement established a strong oversight role for the international community. The Office of the High Representative (OHR) was created to monitor the implementation of civilian aspects of Dayton. The High Representative is supported by the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), a group of 55 countries and agencies. A 1997 PIC conference empowered the High Representative to impose binding decisions and sanction politicians who obstruct Dayton. Until the mid-2000s, the High Representative used these powers to remove officials deemed to be obstructive to peace and to promote what are considered among the most constructive reforms since Dayton, including merging the entities' armed forces and intelligence services and putting them under new state-level ministries. However, the High Representative's proactive role has since decreased. This is partly due to criticism that the OHR lacks democratic legitimacy and accountability. Bosnian Serb politicians have claimed that the OHR's interventions support Bosniak leaders' preference for a more centralized state. At the same time, some U.S. and EU policymakers believed that the attraction of EU membership could incentivize reforms in place of the OHR's more top-down approach. The international community also plays an ongoing security role. NATO led the Implementation Force (IFOR) and the smaller Stabilization Force (SFOR) that monitored security aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement. The initial deployment of NATO ground forces to Bosnia numbered nearly 60,000, of which the largest share (approximately one-third) was from the United States. The number of troops subsequently decreased. In 2004, NATO's peacekeeping role was transferred to the EU with the understanding that NATO would assist if necessary. The size of the EU operation (EUFOR Althea) decreased from 7,000 troops in 2004 to roughly 600 troops today. Political Challenges Many analysts contend that the Dayton Agreement helped hold Bosnia together after the war; they point to the absence of widespread violence since 1995 as an indicator of its success. However, observers also question whether Bosnia can function much longer under the Dayton system. They identify several key challenges: Ethnic divisions Critics claim that Bosnia's political system reinforces the country's ethnic divisions and makes ethnicity a core basis of political identity. The ethnic parties that have dominated politics since the war generally appeal to voters from their respective ethnic communities rather than all Bosnians. Critics accuse ethnic party leaders of inflaming nationalist tensions and manipulating historical memory to distract from corruption and win elections, thus aggravating rather than bridging the deep wounds that remain from the war. In some parts of Bosnia, divisions are further reproduced at the societal level through institutions like segregated schools, which separate schoolchildren from different ethnic groups and teach them different curriculum. Gridlock Some analysts also contend that the system is too gridlock-prone to pass major political and economic reforms to be passed, even with the incentive of potential EU membership. Bosnia's fractured, overlapping institutions sometimes muddle policymaking jurisdiction and impede coordinated response. Furthermore, power-sharing arrangements create numerous veto points in the legislative process. Government coalitions are typically ideologically broad and unwieldy, creating a further source of potential dysfunction. One of the consequences of these barriers is that it is difficult to pass legislation. The previous state-level Parliament, for example, adopted twelve new laws over the course of its 2014-2018 term. Corruption Corruption in Bosnia has roots in the country's wartime economy. A 2000 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report stated that "organized crime and corruption pervade Bosnia's national political parties, civil service, law enforcement and judicial systems. [Ethnic] parties control all aspects of the government, the judiciary, and the economy, and in so doing maintain the personal and financial power of their members." Many observers claim that the situation has improved little since then. In 2018, the High Representative warned that the rule of law has deteriorated, while the U.S. State Department describes the rule of law as "an existential issue." Bosnia's major parties allegedly siphon from the state apparatus and public enterprises in their strongholds to amass wealth and power. Furthermore, parties in power reportedly politicize hiring in Bosnia's public sector, which employs an estimated third or more of the working population. For many Bosnians, satisfactory employment depends on having the right political connections, which creates a dependence that reportedly is exploited during elections. In 2018, the outgoing U.S. ambassador to Bosnia decried the "[Bosnian] politicians who seek to destabilize the country in order to remain in power at all costs for personal profit and protection." Weak Reform Incentives Many analysts believe that Bosnia's entrenched ethnic parties benefit tremendously from the status quo and have little incentive to reform the system. Bosnia's MPs are among the best-paid in Europe relative to local incomes, commanding six to eight times the average Bosnian salary. Parties and politicians who gain office in the government or administration often find "a remarkably efficient path to personal enrichment." Politicians are skilled at using veto points to block legislation that threatens their position in Bosnia's patronage system. According to one analyst, Bosnia's patronage system is "the raison d'etre of the political elites and is the main cause of the state's dysfunctionality and resistance to reform." Bosnia's entrenched political class may also fear penalty if serious reforms are enacted and shine the spotlight on malfeasance. Criminal indictments against leaders in neighborhood countries like Romania, Croatia, and North Macedonia highlight this risk. Analysts believe these disincentives make entrenched politicians resistant to external pressure for reform. Several major rounds of U.S.- and EU-brokered constitutional reform efforts, including in 2006, 2008, and 2009, ultimately failed. Germany and the United Kingdom launched a major initiative in 2014 to shift the focus from difficult constitutional reforms to seemingly more feasible socioeconomic reforms that they hoped would improve Bosnia's economy and dismantle patronage networks. The 2015 "Reform Agenda" identified economic, administrative, and legal measures to be adopted by entity- and state-level governments. The process, which required the major parties to commit in writing to the reform framework, was supported by the EU, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank Group, and the United States. As an incentive for politicians to agree to the Agenda, the EU offered the entry into force of Bosnia's long-stalled Stabilization and Association Agreement, which marked the first step toward EU membership. However, most observers view the Reform Agenda as largely unsuccessful; many of its provisions failed when entrenched parties objected to measures that would undercut their dominance. Lack of Consensus While many officials recognize that Bosnia's political system needs reform, there is little consensus on how to change it or to generate the political will to find common ground so long as the dominant parties remain entrenched. Bosnian Serb leaders have expressed a desire to return to the "original" Dayton system, when the entities had greater competencies in security and justice. Milorad Dodik, who has dominated politics in Republika Srpska since the 2000s, has gone further by repeatedly threatening RS secession. Bosnian Croat leaders from the largest Croat party, the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia (HDZ-BiH), call for more autonomy for Croats, and have raised the prospect of splitting FBiH to create a third Croat-majority entity. By contrast, Bosniak leaders generally prefer more centralization and the removal of some of the institutional arrangements that they believe contribute to dysfunction and gridlock. Some Bosniak officials also have proposed dismantling the entities or eliminating FBiH's cantons. Popular Discontent Survey research documents Bosnian citizens' anger toward the political class and their distrust of political institutions. In a 2018 International Republican Institute survey, 86% of respondents expressed belief that Bosnia is heading in the wrong direction. An estimated 170,000 individuals—disproportionately young and skilled—have emigrated since 2013. Dissatisfaction with education and healthcare, insecurity, and nepotism are cited as key motives to emigrate. Nevertheless, some analysts believe that periods of social discontent in 2014 and 2018, which challenged the system but appeared to transcend ethnic divides, suggest that strengthening Bosnian civil society could increase pressure for reform, and perhaps cultivate a new generation of party leaders. Other observers have put their hopes for reform in Bosnia's so-called "civic parties," which do not have nationalist platforms and typically mobilize voters on the basis of socioeconomic interests rather than ethnicity. While these parties have not matched the results of the ethnic parties, their electoral performance has improved in recent years. 2018 General Election Bosnia's challenges came to the forefront during its most recent general election on October 7, 2018 (see Table 1 ). The Central Election Commission (CEC) registered 60 parties and over 3,500 candidates for state-level, entity, and cantonal offices. Observers noted that the campaign climate was more divisive and nationalist in tone than usual. Despite broad voter dissatisfaction, entrenched ethnic parties won the largest vote shares. Almost six months after the election, the parties are still negotiating over government formation at the state level and in FBiH; however, it appears that entrenched ethnic parties will continue to dominate. In March 2019, the leaders of the largest Bosniak, Croat, and Serb parties stated that they had agreed to a set of principles to guide forming the state-level government (the Council of Ministers). Some observers viewed the improved result of civic parties (one-third of the vote in FBiH) as a positive development. Some of the most controversial outcomes concern the elections to the state-level presidency, composed of three members (one Bosniak, one Croat, and one Serb). In a closely fought race, Šefik Džaferović, candidate of the ethnic Bosniak SDA party, narrowly defeated the candidate of the civic SDP party (36.6% and 33.5%, respectively), retaining the lock that the SDA has had on the Bosniak seat in most elections since 1996, but perhaps auguring a future victory by a civic party candidate. Prior to the election, some analysts expressed concern at the prospect of two of the three seats on the presidency being held by the nationalist Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik and his ally, the nationalist Bosnian Croat politician Dragan Čović. Both politicians have explicitly or implicitly challenged the legitimacy of Bosnian statehood and called for greater ethnoterritorial autonomy. However, to the surprise of some observers, Željko Komšić of the civic Democratic Front defeated incumbent Čović for the Croat seat with 53% of the vote. Komšić was previously elected as the Croat member of the presidency in 2006 and 2010, and is considered to be a moderate political figure who generally supports centralizing reforms. In contrast to HDZ-BiH leader Čović, he does not have strong ties to the Croatian government. Komšić's election as the Croat member of the presidency in 2006 and 2010 was mired in controversy amid complaints that he only won with the support of Bosniaks who voted in the election for the Croat member on the presidency rather than the Bosniak member. Komšić identifies as Croat but has been leader of several civic parties. He comes from central Bosnia, and not from the Croat-majority western regions that are the stronghold of the HDZ. Although it is not illegal for Bosniaks to vote for the Croat seat on the presidency rather than the Bosniak seat, some Croat leaders (especially HDZ-BiH and HDZ-1990) claim that it violates the spirit of Dayton and results in illegitimate representation of Croats. Similar accusations of ethnic cross-voting surfaced after Komšić's victory in 2018. Some analysts expect Komšić's victory to harden the HDZ-BiH position on electoral reform (see "Legal Challenges," above) and possibly embolden politicians who seek a separate entity. As most pre-election polls anticipated, RS strongman Milorad Dodik defeated the more moderate incumbent Serb member of the presidency with 54% of the vote. Dodik has dominated entity politics in RS since the mid-2000s as entity prime minister and president. Analysts note that RS's political environment grew more closed as Dodik consolidated power. Dodik has run afoul of the United States and the EU by frequently threatening to hold a referendum on RS secession, questioning the legitimacy of Bosnian statehood, and cultivating close ties to Russia (see below). The U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned him in 2017 for actively obstructing Dayton. Many analysts have expressed concern that Dodik will use his new position to obstruct the workings of the central government while continuing to dictate politics in RS through loyal allies. Shortly after the election he vowed to "work above all and only for the interests of Serbs." One of his first acts as head of state was to call for Bosnia to recognize Ukraine's Crimea region as Russian territory. In December 2018, the National Assembly of RS approved the creation of several new ministries, an act that some view as an attempt to wrest competencies from the state-level government. In early 2019, the RS parliament courted controversy when it passed legislation to create a new commission to reinvestigate the events of Srebrenica, which many view as an attempt to deny or downplay the massacres. Since the election, the formation of governments has proceeded piecemeal, and legal challenges to election law in FBiH (see above, "Legal Challenges") initially cast doubt over the formation of that entity's government. The RS National Assembly approved the new entity government in December 2018. Party leaders continue to negotiate over forming governments in FBiH and the state-level Council of Ministers. Because the FBiH government did not fix electoral legislation before the election, the Electoral Commission adopted a decision to assign delegates to the House of Peoples based on the 2013 census. (The Electoral Commission's actions reportedly came amid strong pressure from U.S. and EU officials). Several Bosniak parties challenged the decision before the Constitutional Court; however, the Court declined to take on the case. Economy Bosnia is one of Europe's poorest countries. The 1992-1995 war caused an estimated $110 billion in damage, and Bosnia's economy contracted to one-eighth of its prewar level. Despite significant reconstruction and recovery since 1995, GDP per capita was $5,148 in 2017, well below the EU average ($33,715) and that of Bulgaria ($8,031), its lowest-ranking member. Nearly one in five Bosnians lives below the poverty level. Bosnia's unemployment rate was 18% in 2018, down from 28% in 2015. Youth unemployment also declined in recent years from 60% to 46%. Nevertheless, these rates are still high by European standards. Since 2015, annual GDP growth has averaged around 3%, but it is largely driven by consumption (much of which in turn is fueled by migrant remittances). The IMF has urged Bosnia to privatize or restructure the nearly 550 state-owned enterprises that comprise roughly 20% of its economy; many of them are unprofitable but allegedly are used by politicians as "cash cows and workplaces for loyal cadres." Bosnia participates in several free trade schemes. In 2006, it joined the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) alongside other non-EU countries in the region, including other ex-Yugoslav neighbors. Bosnia's Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the European Union, which entered into force in 2015, provides for almost fully free trade. A free trade agreement with the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) also entered into force in 2015. The EU is Bosnia's primary trade partner. Germany, Italy, Croatia, Slovenia, and Austria are Bosnia's key EU export markets, accounting for more than half of its exports in 2017. Serbia, another CEFTA signatory, is also an important export market. Bosnia's major exports include vehicle seats, raw materials, leather products, textiles, energy, and wood products. The EU is also Bosnia's primary source of foreign direct investment (FDI). In 2016, 63% of Bosnia's FDI came from EU countries, with Austria, Croatia, and Slovenia the top sources. Serbia is also a significant source of FDI (16.3%). However, Bosnia's fragmented legal and administrative structure create a challenging investment climate. Many relevant laws differ between the two entities. Corruption, entrenched economic interests, and political instability also deter investment. As a result, FDI amounts to just 2% of Bosnia's GDP, well below the Western Balkan average of 5%. Bosnia was the region's lowest-rated country in the World Bank's 2019 Ease of Doing Business Index. Foreign Relations and Security Issues European Union and NATO Membership U.S. and EU policymakers view the NATO and EU accession processes as a positive force for democratization and reform in the Western Balkans, including Bosnia. According to analysts, this assessment informed the United States' partial retreat from the region in the 2000s and 2010s. EU membership is one of the few policy issues for which there is relatively broad consensus among Bosnia's politicians and population. The EU's "fundamentals first" approach to enlargement in the Western Balkans frontloads the accession process with meeting the core requirements of having a democratic political system and functioning market economy; in Bosnia, the EU is currently focused on issues relating to the rule of law, public administration reform, and economic development. In 2016, Bosnia submitted its application to join the EU. Its current status is potential candidate , which entitles it to receive financial assistance from the EU's Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance II (IPA II). Between 2014 and 2020, Bosnia is expected to receive €552 million in IPA II allocations, making the EU Bosnia's largest source of foreign assistance. Many EU member states provide additional aid to Bosnia through domestic foreign assistance programs. Bosnia's EU membership prospects are uncertain. In a 2018 progress report, the European Commission (the EU's executive) flagged Bosnia's slow implementation of reforms, including the 2015 Reform Agenda (a flagship EU initiative in Bosnia) and numerous domestic and international court rulings (see "Legal Challenges," above). Some analysts question whether Bosnia, under its current political system, would be capable of meeting the membership requirement of harmonizing domestic legislation with the many thousands of provisions in the acquis communautaire, the cumulative body of EU legislation, case law, and regulations. In comparison to EU membership, Bosnian leaders are more divided over the issue of joining NATO. These divisions largely fall along Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat/Bosniak lines. Bosnian Serb opposition is rooted in resentment over NATO's role in the Bosnian war, and may also reflect a desire to remain in lockstep with neighboring Serbia, which also does not seek NATO membership. Bosnia joined NATO's Partnership for Peace in 2006 and secured an Individual Partnership Action Plan in 2008. In 2010, NATO indicated that it would launch a Membership Action Plan (MAP)—a program to help aspiring members meet membership requirements—once Bosnia meets several conditions, the most challenging of which is the reregistration of permanent defense installations from entity to state-level government. RS officials have resisted ceding control over defense installations on entity territory. Although Bosnia does not yet meet these requirements, in December 2018 NATO foreign ministers invited Bosnia to activate its MAP by submitting its first Annual National Program. Some analysts interpreted this invitation as a gesture to generate reform momentum in Bosnia's fragile post-election period. The Bosniak and Croat members of the presidency responded positively, but Bosnian Serb leaders (and most Bosnian Serbs) do not want Bosnia to join NATO. In October 2017, the RS National Assembly passed a resolution supporting military neutrality. RS President Željka Cvijanović reiterated this stance after NATO's invitation, and Dodik—now a member of the state-level presidency—also has vowed to pursue military neutrality. Relations with Croatia and Serbia Bosnia's relations with Croatia and Serbia are seen as an important component of regional stability. However, bilateral relations have often been fraught as a legacy of the Bosnian war, as well as sensitivities over Croatia and Serbia's relations with Bosnian Croats and Serbs. While democratic gains in Croatia and Serbia after 2000 contributed to improved relations with Bosnia, they remain reluctant to examine or acknowledge their role in the Bosnian war. At times, Bosnian leaders have objected to what they describe as Croatian and Serbian meddling in Bosnia's affairs. Ex-Bosnian Croat member of the presidency Dragan Čović and current Bosnian Serb member of the presidency Milorad Dodik draw support from leaders in Croatia and Serbia and reportedly hold Croatian and Serbian citizenship, respectively, alongside their Bosnian citizenship. The Croatian government financially and politically backed Čović in Bosnia's 2018 elections, and Croatian politicians have raised the issue of Bosnian Croats' constitutional challenges (see above, "Legal Challenges") in forums like the European Parliament, NATO, and the United Nations. These moves prompted three former High Representatives to Bosnia to issue a joint letter expressing alarm over Croatia's "meddling" in Bosnia's internal affairs. The Croatian government also challenged the legitimacy of Željko Komšić as the Croat member of the Bosnian presidency (see above, "2018 General Election"). Some parties in Croatia hold Croatian election campaign events on Bosnian territory to mobilize Bosnian Croat voters with dual citizenship to vote in Croatia's elections. The Serbian government likewise supports Dodik, who is a frequent visitor to Belgrade. Some Serbian politicians have made statements supporting convicted Bosnian Serb war criminals, inflaming an issue that remains highly sensitive in Bosnia. Bosnia and Serbia have an unresolved demarcation dispute over approximately 40 square kilometers of border area, including a railway segment and hydroelectric power stations. Bosnia has dual citizenship treaties with Croatia and Serbia, resulting in hundreds of thousands of Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs acquiring dual citizenship. This has raised jurisdictional issues in cases in which indicted war criminals hold dual citizenship. Despite occasional tensions in their relations, Croatia and Serbia are important economic partners for Bosnia. Both countries are among Bosnia's top export markets and top sources of FDI. As part of its enlargement strategy in the Western Balkans, the EU has embraced a connectivity agenda to improve regional transportation, energy, and infrastructural linkages, reserving up to €1 billion in grants for projects for the period 2015-2020. Officials believe that improved connectivity could benefit bilateral relations and contribute to regional stability. Other Bilateral Relations Given its strategic location and relatively small, weak states, the Balkan region has long drawn in more powerful states. Many analysts maintain that as the United States and the European Union have both scaled back their presence in the Balkans to address other issues since the late 2000s, Russia, Turkey, and China partly filled the vacuum. Russia U.S. and EU officials have expressed concern over Russian influence in the Western Balkans, particularly after Russia occupied Ukraine's Crimea region in 2014. Many analysts maintain that Russia does not have a grand strategy in the Western Balkans, but rather aims to prevent Euro-Atlantic integration and shore up its claims to great power status by asserting itself in the EU's "inner courtyard." Analysts have identified several Russian tools in the region, including playing a "spoiler" role, projecting soft power, and leveraging energy dominance. Observers contend that Russia plays a "spoiler" role in Bosnia by exacerbating ethnic divisions, backing illiberal or anti-Western political factions, and helping to militarize RS. They claim that these actions help sustain the dysfunction and gridlock that undermine Bosnia's Euro-Atlantic reform efforts. Russia has supported Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat nationalist leaders Milorad Dodik and Dragan Čović. Dodik's meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin just before Bosnia's October 7, 2018 general election was one of nearly ten meetings between the two over the past three years, signaling high-level Russian support. Many experts assert that Russia has been a key ally to Dodik in resisting Western pressure to cooperate on reforms. Moscow has also supported divisive RS policies. When Dodik violated a Bosnian Constitutional Court ruling in 2016 by holding a referendum to establish a controversial "Statehood Day," Russia stood apart from the High Representative and Western diplomats by supporting the initiative. More recently, Russia stated its support for RS's controversial Srebrenica commission (see above). Analysts have also expressed concern at Russia's apparent support for Čović, who has advocated greater autonomy for Croats and the creation of a third Croat entity. Some analysts have expressed concern at Russia's role in RS's security sector. Russian forces have trained RS police special forces on counterterrorism and intelligence. Some observers believe that these exercises contribute to militarization in RS, potentially pushing the police force beyond its civilian law enforcement mandate. Analysts caution that militarization could increase the scale of violence in any confrontation between RS and the Bosnian government. Some Bosnian Serb ultranationalist and veterans groups have fought alongside pro-Russia combatants in Ukraine, and analysts believe they could be mobilized to support RS leaders as well. Russian soft power draws upon religious and cultural kinship with Bosnian Serbs, as well as Russia's history of support during the wars of Yugoslav disintegration. Kremlin-linked media, like Sputnik and RT , amplify existing anti-Western narratives and positively shape public opinion toward Russia. Some local media further propagate Sputnik and RT articles. A 2018 National Democratic Institute media study found that RS media stories about Russia were overwhelmingly positive, while the tone of most stories about the United States and NATO was negative. Pro-Russian media glorifies the Russian military, highlights cultural and religious links between Serbs and Russians, and documents high-level meetings between RS and Russian officials. Economic relations between Russia and RS have deepened in recent years. Russia is the largest source of FDI in RS, and it is largely concentrated in the energy sector. In 2007, Russian state-owned oil company Zarubezhneft bought RS's Bosanski Brod oil refinery, motor oil processing facilities in nearby Modrica, and retailer Banjaluka Petrol. Some analysts believe that these assets—which were purchased without an open tender—give Zarubezhneft influence in RS. In addition to being an important employer, Zarubezhneft is RS's biggest taxpayer; its value-added tax and excise duty contributions reportedly account for 25% of RS budget revenue. Bosnia depends upon Russian natural gas imports via Ukraine. Energy policy is vested in the entities, and Russian natural gas provider Gazprom reportedly has used its market dominance to pit the two entities against one another and undermine projects that would diversify supplies. Turkey Many analysts believe that Turkey's influence in Bosnia has increased over the last two decades due to Ankara's close relationship with Bosniak leaders. Some Turkish officials reportedly view Bosnia as a natural sphere of influence given geographic and historical connections. Observers note that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has at times invoked Ottoman-era ties to Bosnia and religious kinship with Bosniaks as soft power tools. Turkish influence in Bosnia has expanded since Yugoslavia's collapse. During the 1992-1995 war, Turkey gained prestige among Bosniaks by condemning the international arms embargo against Bosnia, arguing that it prevented Bosniaks from defending themselves. Turkey, as well as other predominantly Muslim countries like Iran and Saudi Arabia, reportedly supplied Bosniak forces with arms. Turkish influence has continued since the war's end. Bosnia is one of the top recipients of Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency assistance; much of this support is earmarked for projects to restore Ottoman-era buildings and monuments. A Turkish Cultural Center was established in Bosnia in 2003, and in 2009 the Yunus Emre Foundation, an NGO founded by the Turkish government, opened an office in Sarajevo to promote Turkish language and culture. Turkey has popular support among Bosniaks. In a 2018 International Republican Institute survey, 76% of Bosniak respondents had positive views of Turkey—the strongest support among Bosniaks for any foreign state. Many Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs look to Croatia and Serbia as external protectors, and some analysts believe that Turkey has attempted to establish a similar role for itself vis-à-vis Bosniaks. Observers contend that Erdogan's ruling party has particularly strong ties to the largest Bosniak ethnic party, the SDA. Erdogan and Turkish state-owned media openly supported SDA candidate Bakir Izetbegović in his bid for the Bosniak seat on the presidency in 2014. Some observers believe that Izetbegović's clout within the SDA rests in part on his support from Erdogan. Economic relations between Bosnia and Turkey have deepened in recent years. Turkish FDI in Bosnia accounted for 5.6% of FDI flows in 2016. One notable project is a highway to connect Sarajevo to Belgrade, Serbia. After years of disagreement, Bosnian officials approved the route in February 2019. Turkey is expected to provide funding for some of the expected €3 billion in costs, although the terms of the contract are not yet resolved. Some officials, including French President Emmanuel Macron, have expressed concern over Turkey's alleged ambitions as part of broader EU concern over external influence in the Balkans. However, analysts caution that Turkey's ambitions and capabilities in the Balkans may be overstated. They note that the scope of Turkish investment is sometimes exaggerated in the media, and that proposed projects do not always come to fruition. China While Russian and Turkish influence in Bosnia relies in part on soft power, China's presence in Bosnia is primarily economic. Between 2011 and 2019, Chinese investments in Bosnia amounted to an estimated $3.6 billion, primarily in the form of direct lending for energy and transportation projects. Chinese firms have contracts to construct or expand energy plants, including a €350 million loan to construct a coal-fired plant in Stanari, RS. A €1.4 billion deal was signed to construct a highway between Banja Luka and Mlinište. In March 2019, the EU Energy Community criticized the FBiH entity government's decision to guarantee a €600 million loan from China's Exim Bank to build a coal-fired power plant in Tuzla. However, some analysts caution that China's economic influence in Bosnia may be overstated at present. While China's pledged investments in high-visibility projects garner media attention, the actual amount of Chinese FDI is far less than that of the EU. Moreover, many pledged projects do not come to fruition. Nevertheless, EU and U.S. officials have voiced concern over the scope of China's investments in the Balkans, as well as Chinese lending practices. Chinese loans often require recipient state governments to assume the loan burden, potentially leading to high external debt. The EU has also raised concerns that Chinese lending practices violate EU rules in public procurement because they frequently require use of Chinese contractors, laborers, or supplies. In contrast to EU funds, which are partly designed to spur reform, Chinese loans have few conditions and rules linked to transparency or reform. Finally, EU officials have expressed concern that China's economic might could be a source of leverage over recipient states that are candidates or potential candidates for EU membership and thus impede the EU's ability to speak with one voice on relations with China if they do become members. Transnational Issues Migration and Refugees Bosnia was not a core transit country in the "Balkan Route" that hundreds of thousands of migrants and refugees followed in an attempt to reach the EU during heightened flows in 2015 and early 2016. However, recent route shifts have brought more migrant and refugee traffic through Bosnia. Since early 2018, an estimated 23,000 migrants and refugees have entered Bosnia; approximately 25% of them remain in the country. Most of them hope to enter EU territory via Bosnia's neighbor, Croatia, and from there move on and enter the EU's visa- and passport-free Schengen Area. However, the Croatian government has expanded border policing, and apprehended individuals are sent back to Bosnia. The EU provided €2 million in 2018 to help Bosnia respond to the crisis and provide shelter to migrants and refugees who are effectively stranded in Bosnia. The migration crisis has triggered a backlash from some Bosnians, particularly in Una-Sana Canton, which borders Croatia and has the highest concentration of migrants and refugees. Some residents of Bihać, Una-Sana's administrative center, protested against camps situated in their municipality in October 2018, while local authorities in Velika Kladuša, another city in the canton, reportedly obstructed the Ministry of Security's plans to house migrants in a local building. The incident illustrates local backlash as well as the state-level government's difficulty enforcing its decisions, even when it has jurisdiction. Radicalization and Counterterrorism Islam was introduced to part of Bosnia's population during Ottoman rule. In socialist Yugoslavia, the semi-official Islamic Religious Community played a key role in religious affairs, including legal rulings and religious education. It was renamed the Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992, and remains an important religious institution. Islamic tradition in the Balkans, including Bosnia, is generally moderate and secular. The majority of Bosnia's practicing Muslims follow the Hanafi school of Sunni Islam. However, some analysts have expressed concern over the emergence of groups influenced or funded by state and non-state entities in the Arab Gulf states, where more conservative Hanbali Sunni practices are common. Aid workers, missionaries, and "mujahedeen" fighters from the Gulf States promoted transnational Islamist militancy and Salafist Hanbali religious doctrine during Bosnia's 1992-1995 war; Iran's government also supported Bosniak leaders and forces. After the war, Saudi Arabia provided an estimated $600 million in aid to repair and build hundreds of mosques and establish schools and cultural centers that promote socially conservative Sunni views. Iran has also maintained active cultural outreach and other ties to some Bosnian Muslims. Many analysts contend that Salafi groups have limited support in Bosnia because of the traditionally high level of secularism among Bosnian Muslims. They also note that few Bosnian Muslims who subscribe to Salafist ideas and practices have violent intentions, and many of them live in remote rural communities. While most of these groups were not originally affiliated with official religious organizations in Bosnia, the Grand Mufti of Bosnia's Islamic Community exerted pressure on them to acknowledge his authority and his right to monitor religious content. As a result, an estimated 90% of Salafi groups were brought under official structures. Nevertheless, some experts caution that radicalized groups and individuals may pose a terrorist threat despite their small numbers. Radicalized Muslims were implicated in the bombing of a police station in Bugojno in 2010 and a lone-gunman attack on the U.S. Embassy in Sarajevo in 2011. The Islamic State (IS) and Nusra Front's gains in Syria and Iraq in the 2010s altered the dynamic of the terrorism threat in Bosnia and broadened the use of social media in recruitment. Between 2012 and 2017, an estimated 350 Bosnian citizens traveled from Bosnia or Bosnian diaspora communities to fight with armed groups in Iraq and Syria. More recently, returned foreign fighters are seen as a potential threat as the position of the IS and other armed groups has weakened. Bosnia's stock of illegal weapons, mines, and explosives may exacerbate the risk posed by returnees. As of December 2017, officials believed that just over 100 Bosnians remained in Syria (including women and children), roughly 50 had returned to Bosnia, and 70 had been killed in the conflict. In 2014, the Bosnian government introduced new criminal offenses to prosecute foreign terrorist fighters and recruiters. Several dozen returned fighters and domestic recruiters have been convicted of these offenses. While the U.S. State Department describes Bosnia as a "cooperative counterterrorism partner," it warns that Bosnia's political fragmentation and dysfunction could undermine counterterrorism efforts. For example, in 2017 several ministries proposed new measures to tighten counterterrorism efforts; however, they were not enacted due to political gridlock in state-level and FBiH governments. U.S. Relations with Bosnia Initially viewed as a "European problem," the Bosnian conflict eventually helped shape the post-Cold War role of the United States and NATO in European security. When the United States assumed greater responsibilities in resolving the conflict, its role was considerable: leading NATO airstrikes, garnering diplomatic support from Russia and European allies, persuading warring parties to agree to a ceasefire, brokering the Dayton Peace Agreement, and deploying 20,000 troops to Bosnia. According to Richard Holbrooke, the U.S. official who brokered the talks, the Bosnian war was a pivotal period in U.S. foreign policy in Europe: "The three main pillars of [policy]—U.S.-Russian relations, NATO enlargement into Central Europe, and Bosnia—had often worked against each other. Now they reinforced each other: NATO sent its forces out of area for the first time in its history, and Russian troops, under an American commander, were deployed alongside them." Some analysts and policymakers believe that the United States' strong hand in resolving the conflict and in shaping Bosnia's political system have made it a stakeholder in Bosnia's future. U.S. officials, often in cooperation with the EU, have intervened to defuse crises and broker reform talks. The United States also has imposed sanctions against Bosnian officials: in addition to Dodik (see above), the U.S. State Department publicly designated Bosnian Serb politician Nikola Špirić (Dodik's associate) for "significant corruption or gross violation of human rights." U.S. policymakers attach strategic importance to Bosnia's stability; many analysts believe turbulence in Bosnia could reverberate in the Balkans and potentially draw in Croatia and Serbia, while instability in other parts of the region could spill over into Bosnia. When the Trump Administration indicated in 2018 that it would consider supporting a potential Serbia-Kosovo agreement to "adjust borders" between the two—a major break with the long-standing EU and U.S. policy to oppose redrawing borders in the Balkans along ethnic lines—some analysts expressed concern that the Administration could reshape long-standing U.S. policy toward Bosnia. However, the new U.S. Ambassador to Bosnia stated in February 2019 that the U.S. will continue to be "guarantor of Bosnia and Herzegovina's sovereignty and territorial integrity." On the other hand, many observers also note that U.S. engagement in Bosnia (and the Western Balkans) decreased under the administrations of President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama. During this time U.S. policymakers turned their focus to geopolitical crises and challenges in other parts of the globe while ceding the regional lead to the EU. Indeed, some analysts have urged the United States to assume a greater role in Bosnia, arguing that Bosnia's current crises warrant it, and that the EU and the United States are more effective in the region when they work together. Issues for Congress Congressional interest in Bosnia dates back to the 1992-1995 war. Many Members featured prominently in foreign policy debates over U.S. intervention in the conflict. In 2015, the House passed a resolution describing the Srebrenica massacres as a genocide and urging the United States to continue to support Bosnia's territorial integrity ( H.Res. 310 , 114 th Congress). In the 114 th and 115 th Congresses, a bill was introduced in the Senate to establish an enterprise fund to promote economic development and the private sector in Bosnia ( S. 2307 and S. 864 ). In April 2018, the House Foreign Affairs Committee's Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats held a hearing on Bosnia's prospects ahead of its October 2018 elections. Congress's engagement with Bosnia also continues within the broader context of policy concern over the external influence of China, Turkey, and Russia in the Western Balkans and energy security. As a potential candidate for EU membership and NATO partner, Bosnia is eligible for assistance through the Countering Russian Influence Funds under the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) enacted in 2017 ( P.L. 115-44 ). Through congressionally approved (and sometimes expanded) foreign assistance appropriations, Bosnia has received more than $2 billion in aid since 1995. Between 1996 and 1999, the United States pledged $1 billion of the $4 billion international commitment to implementing Dayton's civilian provisions and helping to rebuild Bosnia. The cost of U.S. military operations in Bosnia since 1992 is estimated at more than $10 billion ( Appendix I ). Bosnia continues to receive U.S. foreign assistance, although the amount has decreased in recent years. Assistance to Bosnia in FY2015 and FY2016 was approximately $33 million each year. In FY2017, it was $53.5 million, and $41.5 million in FY2018. The Administration requested $21 million for FY2019 and $16.9 million for FY2020. Potential Questions for Congress Nearly 25 years after the Dayton Peace Agreement, Bosnia faces many challenges. In considering U.S. relations with Bosnia, Members of Congress may consider the following questions: How can the United States encourage Bosnia's government to incorporate the legal rulings of the Bosnian Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human Rights into election legislation and the constitution? How can U.S. foreign assistance be used to counter Russian influence in Republika Srpska, in particular Russia's close ties to Bosnian Serb politicians and its use of local media and Sputnik to amplify anti-U.S. narratives and project pro-Russia soft power? What are the implications of potential militarization in Republika Srpska? How can the United States effectively address this alleged trend? How can the United States support a successful reform initiative that secures transparency and accountability, and facilitates a political community in which politicians and voters are committed to the Bosnian state and socioeconomic challenges that transcend all three ethnic groups? Can the Germany-U.K. initiative from 2015 be revived, or is it better to start from scratch? Are the approximately 600 troops in the European Union Force mission in Bosnia sufficient to stabilize Bosnia if violence breaks out? If Serbia and Kosovo agree to normalize relations by redrawing their borders, how can U.S. policymakers prevent this development from destabilizing Bosnia, particularly given Milorad Dodik's threats to seek RS secession if Kosovo is "partitioned"? How can the United States encourage Croatia and Serbia to engage in Bosnia in a manner that helps bridge ethnic divisions and contributes to Bosnia's territorial integrity and sovereignty? Given the pervasiveness of corruption in Bosnia, how can U.S. assistance most effectively be used to counter it? Does foreign assistance contribute to civic groups and independent media that could serve as a check against corruption? Appendix. DOD Funding 1992-2018

Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter, "Bosnia") drew heavily on U.S. support after gaining independence from Yugoslavia in 1992. The United States helped end the Bosnian war (1992-1995), one of the most lethal conflicts in Europe since the Second World War, by leading NATO airstrikes against Bosnian Serb forces, brokering the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995, and deploying 20,000 U.S. troops. Some Members of Congress became involved in policy debates over these measures, and Congress monitored and at times challenged the Bush and Clinton Administrations' response through numerous hearings, resolutions, and legislative proposals. Since 1995, the United States has been a major source of aid to Bosnia and firmly supports its territorial integrity. The United States also supports Bosnia's aspirations for NATO and European Union (EU) membership. Today, Bosnia faces serious challenges. Nearly 25 years after the Dayton Agreement, Bosnia continues to use part of the Agreement as its constitution, which divides the country into two ethnoterritorial entities. Critics charge that Bosnia's political system is too decentralized to enact the reforms required for NATO and EU membership. They also contend that the ethnic power-sharing arrangements and veto points embedded in numerous government bodies are sources of gridlock. Domestic and international courts have ruled against several aspects of Bosnia's constitution, yet the Bosnian government thus far has failed to implement these rulings. Since Bosnia's independence, its politics has been dominated by ethnic parties representing the country's three main groups: Bosniaks (Slavic Muslims), Croats, and Serbs. These parties have prospered under a system that critics charge lacks transparency and accountability. Critics also maintain that ethnic party leaders use divisive nationalist rhetoric to distract from serious issues affecting the country as a whole, including poverty, unemployment, and stalled political reforms. The Bosnian population exhibits low trust in political parties and the government, and disaffection toward the country's elite. U.S. and EU officials brokered several ultimately unsuccessful rounds of constitutional reform negotiations, and continue to call on Bosnia's leaders to implement reforms to make governance more efficient and effective, dismantle patronage networks, and bring Bosnia closer to EU and NATO membership. However, there is little consensus among the country's leaders on how the country should be reformed. Bosnian Serb leaders from the Serb-majority entity (Republika Srpska) have called for greater autonomy and even secession from Bosnia. Some Bosnian Croat leaders have called for partitioning Bosnia's other entity, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to create a separate Croat-majority entity. Bosniak leaders, by contrast, generally prefer a more centralized state. Many analysts caution that any move to partition the country could lead to renewed violence, while greater decentralization could make Bosnia's government less functional. U.S. policy has long been oriented toward preserving Bosnia's statehood. Bosnia's 2018 general elections largely returned to power the same entrenched ethnic parties. Of particular concern is the election of Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik to Bosnia's collective presidency. Dodik, a sharp critic of the United States and NATO, has periodically called for a referendum on Republika Srpska's secession. He is under U.S. sanctions for obstructing the Dayton Agreement. In addition to these internal challenges, U.S. and EU officials have expressed concern over external influence in the region. Russia reportedly relies on soft power, energy leverage, and "spoiler" tactics to influence Bosnia, particularly in the Serb-majority entity. Turkish soft power draws on Bosnia's Ottoman-era heritage and Turkey's shared religious tradition with Bosniaks. China is a more recent presence in the region, but its heavy investments and lending have prompted concern on both sides of the Atlantic. Policymakers have also expressed concern at the challenges posed by the return of Bosnians who fought with the Islamic State and Nusra Front in Syria and Iraq. Many observers contend that the United States remains a stakeholder in Bosnia's future because of its central role in resolving the conflict and shaping the postwar Bosnian state. Given the history of U.S. involvement in Bosnia, Bosnia's importance to regional stability in the Balkans, and concerns over Russian and Chinese influence in Bosnia, Members of Congress may be interested in monitoring how the country navigates its internal and external challenges. Congress may also consider future U.S. aid levels to Bosnia and the degree to which such assistance supports the long-standing U.S. policy objectives for Bosnia of territorial integrity, NATO and EU integration, energy security, and resilience against malign influence.

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Small Business Access to Capital Congressional interest in small business access to capital has increased in recent years because of concerns that small businesses might be prevented from accessing sufficient capital to enable them to start, continue, or expand operations and create jobs. Small businesses have played an important role in net job growth during previous economic recoveries, particularly in the construction, housing, and retail sectors. For example, after the eight-month recession that began in July 1990 and ended in March 1991, small businesses (defined for this purpose as having fewer than 500 employees) increased their net employment in the first year after the recession, whereas larger businesses continued to experience declines in employment. During the most recent recession (December 2007-June 2009), small businesses accounted for almost 60% of net job losses. From the end of the recession through the end of FY2012, small businesses accounted for about 63% of net new jobs, close to their historical average share of net new job creation. Since then, small businesses have added about 65% of net new jobs. Some have argued that the federal government should provide additional resources to assist small businesses. Others worry about the long-term adverse economic effects of spending programs that increase the federal deficit. They advocate business tax reduction, reform of financial credit market regulation, and federal fiscal restraint as the best means to assist small businesses and create jobs. Several laws were enacted during the 111 th Congress to enhance small business access to capital. For example, P.L. 111-5 , the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), provided the Small Business Administration (SBA) an additional $730 million, including $375 million to temporarily subsidize SBA fees and increase the 7(a) loan guaranty program's maximum loan guaranty percentage from 85% on loans of $150,000 or less and 75% on loans exceeding $150,000 to 90% for all regular 7(a) loans. P.L. 111-240 , the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to establish a $30 billion Small Business Lending Fund (SBLF) ($4.0 billion was issued) to encourage community banks with less than $10 billion in assets to increase their lending to small businesses. It also authorized a $1.5 billion State Small Business Credit Initiative to provide funding to participating states with small business capital access programs, numerous changes to the SBA's loan guaranty and contracting programs, funding to continue the SBA's fee subsidies and the 7(a) program's 90% maximum loan guaranty percentage through December 31, 2010, and about $12 billion in tax relief for small businesses. P.L. 111-322 , the Continuing Appropriations and Surface Transportation Extensions Act, 2011, authorized the SBA to continue its fee subsidies and the 7(a) program's 90% maximum loan guaranty percentage through March 4, 2011, or until available funding was exhausted, which occurred on January 3, 2011. According to the SBA, the temporary fee subsidies and 90% maximum loan guaranty for the 7(a) program "engineered a significant turnaround in SBA lending.... The end result is that the agency helped put more than $42 billion in the hands of small businesses through the Recovery Act and Jobs Act combined." This report focuses on the SBLF. It begins with a discussion of the supply and demand for small business loans. The SBLF's advocates argued that the fund was an important part of a larger effort to enhance the supply of small business loans. After describing the program's structure, the report then examines other arguments that were presented both for and against the program's enactment. Advocates claimed the SBLF would increase lending to small businesses and, in turn, create jobs. Opponents contended that the SBLF could lose money, lacked sufficient oversight provisions, did not require lenders to increase their lending to small businesses, could serve as a vehicle for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) recipients to effectively refinance their TARP loans on more favorable terms with little or no resulting benefit for small businesses, and could encourage a failing lender to make even riskier loans to avoid higher dividend payments. The report concludes with an examination of the SBLF's implementation by the Department of the Treasury and a discussion of bills introduced during recent Congresses to amend the SBLF. For example, during the 112 th Congress, S. 681 , the Greater Accountability in the Lending Fund Act of 2011, would have, among other provisions, limited the program's authority to 15 years from enactment and prohibited TARP recipients from participating in the program. H.R. 2807 , the Small Business Leg-Up Act of 2011, would have transferred any unobligated and repaid funds from the SBLF when its investment authority expired on September 27, 2011, to the Community Development Financial Institutions Fund "to continue the program of making capital investments in eligible community development financial institutions in order to increase the availability of credit for small businesses." H.R. 3147 , the Small Business Lending Extension Act, would have, among other provisions, extended the Department of the Treasury's investment authority from one year following the date of enactment to two years. During the 113 th Congress, H.R. 2474 , the Community Lending and Small Business Jobs Act of 2013, would have transferred any unobligated and repaid funds from the SBLF to the Community Development Financial Institutions Fund. Two Indicators of the Supply and Demand for Small Business Loans Federal Reserve Board: Survey of Senior Loan Officers Each quarter, the Federal Reserve Board surveys senior loan officers concerning their bank's lending practices. The survey includes questions about both the supply and demand for small business loans. For example, the survey includes a question concerning their bank's credit standards for small business loans: "Over the past three months, how have your bank's credit standards for approving applications for C&I [commercial and industrial] loans or credit lines—other than those to be used to finance mergers and acquisitions—for small firms (defined as having annual sales of less than $50 million) changed?" The senior loan officers are asked to indicate if their bank's credit standards have "Tightened considerably," "Tightened somewhat," "Remained basically unchanged," "Eased somewhat," or "Eased considerably." Subtracting the percentage of respondents reporting "Eased somewhat" and "Eased considerably" from the percentage of respondents reporting "Tightened considerably" and "Tightened somewhat" provides an indication of the market's supply of small business loans. As shown in Figure 1 , senior loan officers reported that they generally tightened small business loan credit standards from 2007 through late 2009. Since 2009, small business credit markets have generally improved, with some tightening in 2016 and the end of 2018. The survey also includes a question concerning the demand for small business loans: "Apart from normal seasonal variation, how has demand for C&I loans changed over the past three months for small firms (annual sales of less than $50 million)?" Senior loan officers are asked to indicate if demand was "Substantially stronger," "Moderately stronger," "About the same," "Moderately weaker," or "Substantially weaker." Subtracting the percentage of respondents reporting "Moderately weaker" and "Substantially weaker" from the percentage of respondents reporting "Substantially stronger" and "Moderately stronger" provides an indication of the market's demand for small business loans. As shown in Figure 1 , senior loan officers reported that the demand for small business loans declined somewhat in 2007 and 2008, and declined significantly in 2009. Demand then leveled off (at a relatively reduced level) during 2010, increased somewhat during the first half of 2011, declined during the latter half of 2011, generally increased from 2012 through 2015, and has varied somewhat, increasing in some quarters and declining in others, since then. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation: Outstanding Loan Balance The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has maintained comparable small business lending data for the second quarter (June 30) of each year since 2002. Figure 2 shows the amount of outstanding small business loans (defined by the FDIC as commercial and industrial loans of $1 million or less) for nonagricultural purposes as of June 30 of each year from 2006 to 2018. As shown in Figure 2 , the amount of outstanding small business loans for nonagricultural purposes increased at a relatively steady pace from June 30, 2006, to June 30, 2008, declined over the next several years, and has increased each year since June 30, 2013. Although changes in small business outstanding debt are not necessarily a result of changes in the supply of small business loans, many, including the SBA, view a decline in small business outstanding debt as a signal that small businesses might be experiencing difficulty accessing sufficient capital to enable them to lead job growth. Factors that May Have Contributed to the Decline in the Supply of Small Business Loans in 2007-2010 According to an SBA-sponsored study of small business lending, several factors contributed to the decline in small business lending from 2007 to 2010. The report's authors noted that the 30% decline in home prices from their peak in 2006 to 2010 diminished the value of collateral for many small business borrowers, some of whom had relied on home equity loans to finance their small businesses during the real estate boom. The authors concluded that the absence of this additional source of collateral may have contributed to a decline in lending to small businesses. They also argued that many small businesses found it increasingly difficult to renew existing lines of credit as lenders became more cautious as a result of slow economic growth and an increasing risk of loan defaults, especially among small business start-ups, which are generally considered among the most risky investments. The authors argued that in this newly regulated market, smaller lenders are likely to be less profitable because they have fewer sales of products and services to spread out over the higher auditing and FDIC costs. Hence, they have less money to lend to small businesses and others; and the relative difficulty in assessing creditworthiness due to the lack of information about potential financial performance is very high in small business lending, especially in financial markets driven by factor—rather than relationship—lending. Therefore, one would expect the small business loan market to recover more slowly than other financial markets. The authors also noted that FDIC data indicated that small business lending had not only declined in absolute terms (the total amount of dollars borrowed and the total number of small business loans issued), but in relative terms as well (the market share of business loans): Over the eight years from 2003 through 2010, small business loans as a share of total business loans declined by more than 12 percentage points, from 81.7% in 2003 to 68.9% in 2010. Perhaps of most concern is the further decline in the ratios of small business loans to total assets and small business loans to total business loans. Small business loans constituted about 16.8% of total assets in 2005, but only 15.3% in 2010; hence, small business lending is becoming less significant for these lenders. Small business lending is also losing market share in the business loan market. In the eight-year period from 2003 to 2010, small business loans as a share of total business loans declined more than 10 percentage points from 81.7% in 2003 to 68.9% in 2010. Factors that May Have Contributed to the Decline in the Demand for Small Business Loans in 2007-2010 According to the previously mentioned SBA-sponsored study of small business lending, the demand for small business loans fell during the recession primarily because many small businesses experienced a decline in sales and many small business owners had a heightened level of uncertainty concerning future sales. The study's authors argued that given small business owners' lack of confidence in the demand for their goods and services, many small business owners decided to save capital instead of hiring additional employees and borrowing capital to invest in business expansions and inventory. The responses of small business owners to a monthly survey by the National Federation of Independent Business Research Foundation (NFIB) concerning small business owners' views of the economy support the argument that declining sales contributed to the reduced demand for small business loans. From 2008 through 2011, small business owners responding to the NFIB surveys identified poor sales as their number-one problem. Prior to 2008, taxes had been reported as their number-one problem in nearly every survey since the monthly surveys began in 1986. Also, employment data suggest that small businesses were particularly hard hit by the recession. As mentioned previously, small businesses accounted for almost 60% of the net job losses during the December 2007-June 2009 recession. According to testimony by the Secretary of the Treasury before the House Small Business Committee on June 22, 2011, small businesses were especially hard hit by the recession because [s]mall businesses are concentrated in sectors that were especially hard hit by the recession and the bursting of the housing bubble: construction and real estate. More than one-third of all construction workers are employed by firms with less than 20 workers, and an additional third are employed by businesses with fewer than 100 employees. Just over half of those employed in the real estate, rental, and leasing sectors work for businesses with less than 100 workers on their payrolls. More broadly, the rate of job losses was almost twice as high in small businesses as it was in larger firms during the depths of the crisis. The Congressional Response to the Decline in the Supply and Demand for Small Business Loans During the 111 th Congress, legislation designed to increase both the supply and demand for small business loans was adopted. For example, Congress provided more than $1.1 billion to temporarily subsidize fees for the SBA's 7(a) and 504/Certified Development Company (504/CDC) loan guaranty programs and to increase the 7(a) program's maximum loan guaranty percentage from 85% on loans of $150,000 or less and 75% on loans exceeding $150,000 to 90% for all regular 7(a) loans (funding was exhausted on January 3, 2011). The fee subsidies were designed to increase the demand for small business loans by reducing the cost of borrowing. The 90% loan guarantee was designed to increase the supply of small business loans by reducing the risk of lending. Congress also provided the SBA additional resources to expand its lending to small businesses. For example, ARRA included a $255 million temporary, two-year small business stabilization program to guarantee loans of $35,000 or less to small businesses for qualified debt consolidation, later named the America's Recovery Capital (ARC) Loan program (the program ceased issuing new loan guarantees on September 30, 2010); an additional $15 million for the SBA's surety bond program and a temporary increase in that program's maximum bond amount from $2 million to $5 million and up to $10 million under certain conditions (the higher maximum bond amounts ended on September 30, 2010); an additional $6 million for the SBA's Microloan program's lending program and an additional $24 million for the Microloan program's technical assistance program; and increased the funds ( leverage ) available to SBA-licensed Small Business Investment Companies (SBICs) to no more than 300% of the company's private capital or $150 million, whichever is less. Several other programs were also enacted during the 111 th Congress to increase the supply of small business loans. For example, ARRA authorized the SBA to establish a temporary secondary market guarantee authority to provide a federal guarantee for pools of first lien 504/CDC program loans that are to be sold to third-party investors. ARRA also authorized the SBA to make below-market interest rate direct loans to SBA-designated "Systemically Important Secondary Market (SISM) Broker-Dealers" that would use the loan funds to purchase SBA-guaranteed loans from commercial lenders, assemble them into pools, and sell them to investors in the secondary loan market. P.L. 111-240 extended the SBA's secondary market guarantee authority from two years after the date of ARRA's enactment to two years after the date of the program's first sale of a pool of first lien position 504/CDC loans to a third-party investor (which took place on September 24, 2010). The act also increased the loan guarantee limits for the SBA's 7(a) program from $2 million to $5 million, and for the 504/CDC program from $1.5 million to $5 million for "regular" borrowers, from $2 million to $5 million if the loan proceeds are directed toward one or more specified public policy goals, and from $4 million to $5.5 million for manufacturers. It also increased the SBA's Microloan program's loan limit for borrowers from $35,000 to $50,000 and for microlender intermediaries after their first year in the program from $3.5 million to $5 million. In addition, it temporarily increased for one year (through September 26, 2011) the SBA 7(a) Express Program's loan limit from $350,000 to $1 million. The act also authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to establish the $30 billion SBLF and a $1.5 billion State Small Business Credit Initiative to provide funding to participating states with small business capital access programs. The SBLF The SBLF was designed "to address the ongoing effects of the financial crisis on small businesses by providing temporary authority to the Secretary of the Treasury to make capital investments in eligible institutions in order to increase the availability of credit for small businesses." The SBLF's legislative history, including differences in the House- and Senate-passed versions of the program, appears in the Appendix . P.L. 111-240 authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to make up to $30 billion in capital investments in eligible institutions with total assets equal to or less than $1 billion or $10 billion (as of the end of the fourth quarter of calendar year 2009). The authority to make capital investments in eligible institutions was limited to one year after enactment. Eligible financial institutions with total assets equal to or less than $1 billion as of the end of the fourth quarter of calendar year 2009 could apply to receive a capital investment from the SBLF in an amount not exceeding 5% of risk-weighted assets, as reported in the FDIC call report immediately preceding the date of application. During the fourth quarter of 2009, 7,340 FDIC-insured lending institutions reported having assets amounting to less than $1 billion. Eligible financial institutions with total assets of $10 billion or less as of the end of the fourth quarter of calendar year 2009 could apply to receive a capital investment from the fund in an amount not exceeding 3% of risk-weighted assets, as reported in the FDIC call report immediately preceding the date of application. During the fourth quarter of 2009, 565 FDIC-insured lending institutions reported having assets of $1 billion to $10 billion. Risk-weighted assets are assets such as cash, loans, investments, and other financial institution assets that have different risks associated with them. FDIC regulations (12 C.F.R. §567.6) establish that cash and government bonds have a 0% risk-weighting; residential mortgage loans have a 50% risk-weighting; and other types of assets (such as small business loans) have a higher risk-weighting. Lending institutions on the FDIC problem bank list or institutions that have been removed from the FDIC problem bank list for less than 90 days are ineligible to participate in the program. A lending institution can refinance securities issued through the Treasury Capital Purchase Program (CPP) and the Community Development Capital Incentive (CDCI) program under TARP, but only if that institution had not missed more than one dividend payment due under those programs. Dividend Rates Participating banks (C corporations and savings associations) are charged a dividend rate of no more than 5% per annum initially, with reduced rates available if the bank increases its small business lending by specified amounts. For example, during any calendar quarter in the initial two years of the capital investments under the program, the bank's dividend rate is lowered if it increases its small business lending, as reported in its FDIC call reports, compared with the average small business lending it made in the four previous quarters immediately preceding the law's enactment, minus some allowable adjustments. Table 1 shows the dividend rates associated with small business lending increases by C corporation banks and savings associations. Table 2 shows the dividend rates associated with small business lending increases by participating S corporation banks and mutual lending institutions. These rates are slightly higher than those for C corporation banks and savings associations "to reflect after-tax effective rates equivalent to the dividend rate paid by other classes of institutions participating in the Fund through the issuance of preferred stock." As will be discussed later, an S corporation does not pay federal taxes at the corporate level. Any business income or loss is "passed through" to shareholders who report it on their personal income tax returns. Community Development Financial Institutions (CFDIs) are provided funding for an initial eight years with an automatic rollover for two additional years at the issuer's option. On the 10 th anniversary of the investment date the issuer repays the principal amount, together with all accrued and unpaid interest. Additionally, the dividend rate is 2% per annum for the first eight years from the investment date (payable quarterly in arrears on January 1, April 1, July 1, and October 1 of each year) and 9% thereafter. Lending Plan Requirement SBLF applicants are required to submit a small business lending plan to the appropriate federal banking agency and, for applicants that are state-chartered banks, to the appropriate state banking regulator. The plan must describe how the applicant's business strategy and operating goals will allow it to address the needs of small businesses in the areas it serves, as well as a plan to provide linguistically and culturally appropriate outreach, where appropriate. The plan is treated as confidential supervisory information. The Secretary of the Treasury is required to consult with the appropriate federal banking agency or, in the case of an eligible institution that is a nondepository community development financial institution, the Community Development Financial Institution Fund, before determining if the eligible institution may participate in the program. The act directed that all funds received by the Secretary of the Treasury in connection with purchases made by the SBLF, "including interest payments, dividend payments, and proceeds from the sale of any financial instrument, shall be paid into the general fund of the Treasury for reduction of the public debt." Arguments For and Against the SBLF The SBLF's advocates argued that it would create jobs by encouraging lenders, especially those experiencing liquidity problems (access to cash and easily tradable assets), to increase their lending to small businesses. For example, the House report accompanying H.R. 5297 , the Small Business Lending Fund Act of 2010, argued that the SBLF was needed to enhance small business's access to capital, which, in turn, was necessary to enable those businesses to create jobs and assist in the economic recovery: There has been a dramatic decrease in the amount of bank lending in the past several quarters. On May 20, 2010, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) released its Quarterly Banking Profile for the first quarter of 2010. The report shows that commercial and industrial loans declined for the seventh straight quarter, down more than 17% from the year before. Many companies, particularly small businesses, claim that it is becoming harder to get new loans to keep their business operating and that banks are tightening requirements or cutting off existing lines of credit even when the businesses are up to date on their loan repayments. Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner recently acknowledged the problem encountered by some banks, both healthy and troubled, which have been told to maintain capital levels in excess of those required to be considered well capitalized. Some banks say they have little choice but to scale back lending, even to creditworthy borrowers, and the most recent Federal Reserve data shows banks are continuing to tighten lending terms for small businesses. A dissenting view, endorsed by the House Committee on Financial Services' minority members, was included in the report. This view argued that the SBLF does not properly deal with the lack of financing for small businesses: Instead of addressing the problem by stimulating demand for credit by small businesses, H.R. 5297 injects capital into banks with no guarantees that they will actually lend. The bill allows a qualifying bank to obtain a capital infusion from the government without even requiring the bank to make a loan for two years. In fact, if a bank reduces or fails to increase lending to small business during those first two years, it would not face any penalty. It defies logic that the Majority would support a bill to increase lending that does not actually require increased lending. A more effective response to the challenges facing America's small businesses was offered by Representatives Biggert, Paulsen, Castle, Gerlach, and King, whose amendment would have extended a series of small business tax credits before implementing the Small Business Lending Fund. Advocates also argued that even if the SBLF were authorized "the program probably would not be fully operational for months; banks could shun the program for fear of being stigmatized by its association with TARP; and many banks would avoid taking on new liabilities when their existing assets are troubled." They contended that the bill did not provide sufficient oversight for effectively monitoring the program because the Inspector General of the Department of the Treasury, who was given that oversight responsibility under the bill, "might not be able to direct sufficient attention to this task given its other responsibilities." They argued that the Special Inspector General of TARP would be in a better position to provide effective oversight of the program. These, and other, arguments were presented during House floor debate on the bill. For example, Representative Melissa Bean advocated the bill's passage, arguing that the SBLF builds on the effective financial stabilization measures Congress has previously taken by establishing a new $30 billion small business loan fund to provide additional capital to community banks that increase lending to small businesses. This $30 billion investment on which the government will be collecting dividends and earning a profit per the CBO [Congressional Budget Office] estimates can be leveraged by banks into over $300 billion in new small business loans. This is an important investment by the Federal Government in our small business that brings tremendous returns. The terms of the capital provided to banks are performance based; the more a bank increases its small business lending, the lower the dividend rate is for the SBLF capital. If a bank decreases its small business lending, it will be penalized with higher dividend rates. This legislation includes strong safeguards to ensure that banks adequately utilize available funds to increase lending to small businesses, not for other lending or to improve their balance sheet. There will be oversight consistently throughout the program, plus it requires that the capital be invested only in strong financial institutions at little risk of default and the best positioned to increase small business lending. It's important for Americans to understand that although this fund has a maximum value of $30 billion, it is estimated to make a profit for taxpayers in the long run. And the money will ultimately go not to banks, but to the small businesses and their communities that they lend to. As our financial system stabilizes and our community banks recapitalize, these funds will be repaid to Treasury with full repayment required over the next 10 years. Representative Nydia Velázquez, then-chair of the House Committee on Small Business, added that the legislation had sufficient safeguards in place to ensure that the funds were targeted at small businesses: First, banks must apply to the Treasury to receive funds, with a detailed plan on how to increase small business lending at their institution. This language was included at my insistence that we need to make sure that small businesses will get the benefit of this legislation. Second, this capital, repayment of the government loans will be at a dividend rate starting at 5% per year. This rate will be lowered by 1% for every 2.5% increase in small business lending over 2009 levels. It can go as low as a total dividend rate of just 1% if the bank increases its business lending by 10% or more, incentivizing banks to do the right thing. To ensure that banks actually use the funding they receive, the rate will increase—and there are penalties—to 7% if the bank fails to increase its small business lending at their institution within 2 years. To ensure that all federal funds are paid back within 5 years, the dividend rate will increase to 9% for all banks, irrespective of their small business lending, after 4 1/2 years. Representative Velázquez added "let me just make it clear … CBO estimates that [the SBLF] will save taxpayers $1 billion over 10 years, as banks are expected to pay back this loan over 10 years, with interest." Representative Randy Neugebauer opposed the bill's adoption, arguing that the majority is repeating the same failed initiatives that have helped our national debt grow to $13 trillion in the past 2 years. This bill follows the model of the TARP program, minus [TARP's] stronger oversight, and it puts another $30 billion into banks in the hopes that lending to small businesses will increase. In the words of Neil Barofsky, the Special Inspector General who oversees the TARP, "In terms of its basic design," he says, "its participants, its application process, from an oversight perspective, the Small Business Lending Fund would essentially be an extension of the TARP's Capital Purchase Program." From the Congressional Oversight Panel for TARP, chaired by Elizabeth Warren, she says, "The SBLF's prospects are far from certain. The SBLF also raises questions about whether, in light of the Capital Purchase Program's poor performance in improving credit access, any capital infusion program can successfully jump-start small business lending." This bill allows for another $33 billion in spending that will be added to the government's credit card. The CBO tells us that the bank lending portion will ultimately cost taxpayers $3.4 billion when market risk is taken into account. The House passed H.R. 5297 by a vote of 241-182, on June 17, 2010. The arguments presented during House floor debate on H.R. 5297 were also presented during Senate consideration of the bill. Advocates argued that the SBLF would encourage higher levels of small business lending and jobs. For example, Senator Mary Landrieu argued on July 21, 2010, that the SBLF should be adopted because it "is not a government program for banks. It is a public-private partnership lending strategy for small business." She added that as chair of the Senate Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship, she talked with her colleagues, including the SBLF's opponents, and revised the program to address their concerns. She also argued that the SBLF has hundreds of endorsements from independent banks, the community banks and almost every small business association in America … makes $1 billion [according to the CBO score] … is not direct lending from the federal government. It is not creating a new bureaucracy … [It is] voluntary … there are no onerous restrictions.… The small business gets the loans. We create jobs. People are employed. The recession starts ending…. It has nothing to do with TARP money. It is not a TARP program. It is not a bank program. It doesn't have anything to do with banks except that we are working in partnership with banks to lend money to small businesses which are desperate for money. Opponents argued that the SBLF could lose money, lacked sufficient oversight provisions, did not require lenders to increase their lending to small businesses, could serve as a vehicle for TARP recipients to effectively refinance their TARP loans on more favorable terms with little or no resulting benefit for small businesses, and could encourage a failing lender to make even riskier loans to avoid higher dividend payments. In addition, there were disagreements over the number of amendments that could be offered by the minority, which led several Senators to oppose further consideration of the bill until that issue was resolved to their satisfaction. For example, on July 22, 2010, Senator Olympia Snowe argued that although "under a cash-based estimate, CBO listed the official score for the lending fund as raising $1.1 billion over 10 years," SBLF proponents "fail to mention" that when CBO scored the SBLF using an alternative methodology that adjusts for market risk, it estimated that the SBLF could cost $6.2 billion. Senator Snowe also argued that the bipartisan Congressional Oversight Panel for TARP stated in its May 2010 oversight report that the proposed SBLF "substantially resembles" the TARP and "is a bank-focused capital infusion program that is being contemplated despite little, if any, evidence that such programs increase lending." Senator Snowe noted that she regretted "that we are in a position where we have not been able to reach agreement allowing the minority to offer amendments, which is confounding and perplexing as well as disappointing." Senator Snowe later added that the SBLF's incentives to encourage lending to small businesses also "could encourage unnecessarily risky behavior by banks … to avoid paying higher interest rates." Opponents also questioned the SBLF's use of quarterly call report data as submitted by lenders to their appropriate banking regulator to determine what counts as a small business loan. Call report data denotes loans of $1 million or less as small business loans, regardless of the size of the business receiving the loan. As a result, the SBLF's opponents argued that "the data used to measure small business lending in the SBLF covers an entirely different set of small businesses than those that fall within the definition set out in the Small Business Act or used by the SBA." The Senate's version of H.R. 5297 was agreed to on September 16, 2010, by a vote of 68-38. The House agreed to the Senate-passed version of H.R. 5297 on September 23, 2010, by a vote of 237-187, and the bill, retitled the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, was signed into law by President Obama on September 27, 2010. The SBLF's Implementation On February 14, 2011, the Obama Administration issued its budget recommendation for FY2012. The budget anticipated that the SBLF would provide $17.399 billion in financings, well below its authorized amount of $30 billion. This was the first indication that the SBLF's implementation may not proceed as expected. The second indication that the program's implementation may not proceed as expected was an unanticipated delay in the writing of the program's regulations. Treasury's Rollout of the Program The U.S. Treasury was criticized by some for not implementing the program quickly enough. The first financing took place on June 21, 2011, about nine months after the program's enactment. The delay was largely due to the Treasury's need to finalize the SBLF's investment decision process with federal banking agencies and the need to create separate SBLF regulations for financial institutions established as C corporations, Subchapter S corporations, mutual lending institutions, and Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFIs). A C corporation is a legal entity established under state law and includes shareholders, directors, and officers. The profit of a C corporation is taxed to the corporation when earned and then is taxed to the shareholders when distributed as dividends. The majority of insured depository institutions, bank holding companies, and savings and loan holding companies are C corporations. A Subchapter S c orporation refers to a section of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) that allows a corporation to pass corporate income, losses, deductions, and credits through to its shareholders for federal tax purposes. Shareholders of S corporations report the flow-through of income and losses on their personal tax returns and are assessed tax at their individual income tax rates. This allows S corporations to avoid double taxation on the corporate income. Mutual lending institutions , which include many thrifts, are owned by their depositors or policyholders. They have no stockholders. CDFIs are financial entities certified by the CDFI Fund in the U.S. Department of the Treasury and provide capital and financial services to underserved communities. The establishment of separate regulations for each of these different types of financial institutions was largely related to issues involving whether the SBLF's financings would be counted by banking regulatory agencies as Tier 1 capital (core capital that is relatively liquid, such as common shareholders' equity, disclosed reserves, most retained earnings, and perpetual noncumulative preferred stocks) or as Tier 2 capital (supplementary capital that consists mainly of undisclosed reserves, revaluation reserves, general provisions, hybrid instruments, and subordinated term debt). The treatment of the SBLF's financings was important given that banks must maintain a minimum total risk-based capital ratio of 8% (the ratio measures bank capital against assets, with asset values risk-weighted, or adjusted on a scale of riskiness) to be considered adequately capitalized by federal banking regulators. In addition, banks must maintain a minimum Tier 1 risk-based ratio to assets, typically 3% for banking institutions with the highest financial ratings and 4% for others. According to Treasury officials, under Internal Revenue Service (IRS) rules, S corporations can have only a single class of stock (common shares). Consequently, these institutions cannot issue preferred stock to Treasury. As a result, Treasury had to consider purchasing subordinated debt from these institutions, which the banking regulatory agencies would likely designate as Tier 2 capital. Treasury officials believed that providing Tier 2 capital would probably result in fewer S corporation participants. Additionally, because mutual lending institutions do not issue stock, Treasury officials were unable to receive preferred stock as consideration for an investment in this type of institution. Therefore, Treasury had to consider purchasing subordinated debt from these institutions as well. Treasury completed its regulations for C corporation banks first. For C corporations, SBLF funds are treated as Tier I capital and the Treasury purchases senior perpetual noncumulative preferred stock (or an equivalent). The stock pays a quarterly dividend on the first day of each quarter after closing of the SBLF capital program funding. Tier 1 capital is the core measure of a bank's financial strength from a regulator's point of view. It is composed of core capital, which consists primarily of common stock and disclosed reserves (or retained earnings) but may also include nonredeemable, noncumulative preferred stock. In contrast, S corporations and mutual lending institutions receive unsecured subordinated debentures from the Treasury, which are considered Tier 2 capital for regulatory capital requirements. The application deadline for C corporation banks was May 16, 2011. The application deadline for Subchapter S corporations and mutual lending institutions was June 6, 2011, and the application deadline for CDFIs was June 22, 2011. A total of 926 institutions applied for $11.8 billion in SBLF funding. Treasury approved more than $4.0 billion in SBLF financing to 332 lending institutions ($3.9 billion to 281 community banks and $104 million to 51 CDFIs). SBLF recipients have offices located in 47 states and the District of Columbia. The average financing was $12.1 million, ranging from $42,000 to $141.0 million. Of the 332 lending institutions which received financing, 137 institutions had participated in TARP's Community Development Capital Initiative or its Capital Purchase Program. These institutions received nearly $2.7 billion in SBLF financing (66.8% of the total). Small Business Lending Progress Reports Treasury is required to publish monthly reports describing all transactions made under the SBLF program during the reporting period. It is also required to publish a semiannual report (each March and September) providing all projected costs and liabilities, operating expenses, and transactions made by the SBLF, including a list of all participating institutions and the amounts each institution has received under the program. Treasury must also publish a quarterly report describing how participating institutions have used the funds they have received. SBLF participants must submit an initial supplemental report to Treasury no later than five business days before closing. The report provides information from the institution's FDIC call reports or, for holding companies, from their subsidiaries' FDIC call reports, that Treasury uses to establish an initial baseline for measuring the SBLF participants' progress in making loans to small businesses. The initial baseline is the average amount of qualified small business lending that was outstanding for the four full quarters ending on June 30, 2010. It is derived by first adding the outstanding amount of lending reported for all commercial and industrial loans, owner-occupied nonfarm, nonresidential real estate loans, loans to finance agricultural production and other loans to farmers, and loans secured by farmland. Then, the outstanding amount of lending for large loans (defined as any loan or group of loans greater than $10 million), loans to large businesses (defined as businesses with annual revenues greater than $50 million), and the portion of any loans guaranteed by the U.S. government or for which the risk is assumed by a third party is subtracted from that amount. The lending institution then adds back any cumulative charge-offs with respect to such loans since July 1, 2010. This last adjustment is done to prevent lending institutions from being penalized for appropriately charging off loans. Each SBLF participant's small business lending baseline is also adjusted to take into account any gains in qualified small business lending during the four baseline quarters resulting from mergers, acquisitions, and loan purchases. This adjustment is designed to ensure that dividend rate reductions provided to any SBLF participant correspond to additional lending to small businesses and not to the acquisition of existing loans. In addition, the cumulative baseline for all SBLF participants will decrease over time as SBLF participants repay their SBLF loans and exit the program. For example, the initial small business lending baseline for the 332 SBLF participants as of March 31, 2011, was $35.52 billion ($34.75 billion for 281 banks and $770.48 million for 51 CDFIs). The small business lending baseline for the 50 institutions that continued to participate in the SBLF as of December 31, 2018, was $1.5 billion ($808.8 million for 7 banks and $714.5 million for 43 CDFIs). Table 3 provides the number and type of SBLF participating institutions, the small business lending baseline, the amount of small business lending by participants, the change in small business lending by participants, and the change in small business lending by both current and former participants from 2011 to 2018. The number of SBLF participating institutions is declining as institutions repay their loans and exit the program. As Treasury anticipated, this decline has accelerated following the first quarter of 2016 because the dividend rates for C corporation banks and savings associations and for S corporation banks and mutual lending institutions were increased at that time (to 9% and 13.8%, respectively). SBLF institutions are also required to submit quarterly supplemental reports, due in the calendar quarter following submission of the initial supplemental report and in each of the next nine quarters, to determine their dividend rate for the next quarter. Using information contained in the quarterly supplemental reports, Treasury announced in its April 2019 quarterly report on SBLF Participants' Small Business Lending Growth that, as of December 31, 2018 The 50 current SBLF participants (7 banks and 43 CDFIs) increased their small business lending by $1.347 billion over a $1.523 billion baseline. Since inception, the total increase in small business lending reported by both current and former SBLF participants is more than $19.1 billion over the baseline. All seven of the currently participating community banks and 39 of the 43 currently participating CDLFs increased their small business lending over baseline levels. Most current participants report that their small business lending increases have been substantial, with 43 of 50 current SBLF participants (86.0%) increasing small business lending by 10% or more. Treasury officials have praised the SBLF's performance. For example, on October 9, 2012, then-Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Neal Wolin announced that the SBLF quarterly use of funds report released that day "is further indication that the Administration's Small Business Lending Fund is continuing to help create an environment in which entrepreneurial small businesses can succeed and excel." He added that "banks in the SBLF program continue to show large increases in the lending available for small businesses to grow, create jobs, and support families in communities across the country." Some financial commentators have expressed a somewhat less sanguine view of the program's performance. For example, one commentator noted, after the release of the quarterly use of funds report in January 2012, that although the report of increased small business lending was positive news "it is difficult to isolate the proportion of new lending that would have occurred anyway" due to improvements in the economy. Another commentator noted that the data may have been skewed by SBLF participants who were entering the small business lending market for the first time, making the increases appear larger and more significant than they actually are; yet another noted that the reported growth in small business lending occurred over six quarters (since June 30, 2010) and that the results, although positive, are "not as impressive as it may seem." A commentator argued in September 2012 that "if the SBLF ends up being a success story, it will have been on a far smaller scale than either Obama or Congress had originally expected. What's more, it's become clear that even boatloads of financing won't change the fact that demand for the loans themselves has also fallen off, as small businesses themselves are reluctant to expand in a stagnant economy." In addition, on August 29, 2013, Treasury's Office of Inspector General (OIG) released an audit of Treasury's reporting of small business lending gains relative to small business lending levels prior to the lenders' participation in the program. The OIG found that "small business lending gains reported by Treasury are significantly overstated and cannot be linked directly to SBLF funding." Specifically, the OIG noted that "substantial amounts [$3.4 billion of the then reported $8.9 billion] of the reported gains occurred prior to participants receiving SBLF funding." As the OIG explained, the lending gains reported [by Treasury] were measured against the same baseline period that the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 (the Act) instructs Treasury to use for setting dividend rates for repayment of the SBLF capital, which is the four calendar quarters [which] ended [on] June 30, 2010. However, measuring program performance against a baseline with a midpoint seven quarters prior to when most participants received funding inflates program accomplishments and is not responsive to provisions in the Act that direct Treasury to report on participant use of the SBLF funds received. The OIG also argued that the reported lending gains cannot be directly linked to the SBLF capital that Treasury invested in the financial institutions because the lending gains reported "represent all small business lending gains that institutions participating in the SBLF achieved, regardless of how the loans were funded." In addition, the OIG noted, among other findings, that "a relatively small number (35 or 11%) of SBLF participants accounted for half of small business lending increases between the baseline figure and December 31, 2012." Proposed Legislation During the 112 th Congress, several bills were introduced to change the SBLF. None of the bills were enacted. For example, then-Senator Snowe introduced S. 681 , the Greater Accountability in the Lending Fund Act of 2011, on March 30, 2011. Senator Snowe argued that While I would prefer to terminate this fund altogether, it is unlikely based on the current political environment, which is why we must work to protect taxpayers from some of its most egregious provisions. My goal with this legislation is to ensure that only healthy banks have access to taxpayer money, that they are required to repay loans within a reasonable period of time, and that small businesses find the affordable credit they need. The bill would have, among other things, required recipients to repay SBLF distributions within 10 years of the receipt of the investment; terminated the program no later than 15 years after the date of the bill's enactment; prohibited the Secretary of the Treasury from making capital investments under the program if the FDIC is appointed receiver of 5% or more of the institutions receiving an investment under the program; prohibited participation by any institution that received an investment under TARP (effective on the date of the bill's enactment); removed provisions allowing the Secretary of Treasury to make a capital investment in institutions that would otherwise not be recommended to receive the investment based on the institution's financial condition, but are able to provide a matching investment from private, nongovernmental investors; required the approval of appropriate financial regulators when determining whether an institution should receive a capital investment; and revised the benchmark against which changes in the amount of small business lending is measured from the four full quarters immediately preceding the date of enactment to calendar year 2007. In addition, H.R. 1387 , the Small Business Lending Fund Accountability Act of 2011, would have provided the Special Inspector General for TARP responsibility for providing oversight over the SBLF. S.Amdt. 279 to S. 493 , the Small Business Innovation Research, Small Business Technology Transfer Reauthorization Act of 2011, would have prevented TARP recipients from using funds received in any form under any other federal assistance program, including the SBLF program. H.R. 2807 , the Small Business Leg-Up Act of 2011, would have transferred any unobligated and repaid funds from the SBLF to the Community Development Financial Institutions Fund beginning on the date when the Secretary of the Treasury's authority to make capital investments in eligible institutions expired (on September 27, 2011). The bill's stated intent was "to increase the availability of credit for small businesses." H.R. 3147 , the Small Business Lending Extension Act, would have extended the Department of the Treasury's investment authority from one year following enactment to two years and required the Treasury Secretary to provide any institution not selected for participation in the program the reason for the rejection, ensure that the rejection reason remains confidential, and establish an appeal process that provides the institution an opportunity to contest the reason provided for the rejection of its application. During the 113 th Congress, H.R. 2474 , the Community Lending and Small Business Jobs Act of 2013, would have, among other provisions, transferred any unobligated and repaid funds from the SBLF to the Community Development Financial Institutions Fund. Concluding Observations The SBLF was enacted as part of a larger effort to enhance the supply of capital to small businesses. Advocates argued that the SBLF would help to address the decline in small business lending and create jobs. Opponents were not convinced that it would enhance small business lending and worried about the program's potential cost to the federal treasury and its similarities to TARP. Participating institutions are reporting they have increased their small business lending. However, as has been discussed, questions have been raised concerning the validity of these reported amounts. Specifically, as Treasury's OIG argued in its August 2013 audit, more than one-third of the reported lending gains at that time occurred prior to September 30, 2011, the quarter in which most SBLF participants received their SBLF funds; the reported small business lending gains reflect all of the small business lending gains that the participants achieved, regardless of how the loans were funded; and previous OIG audits "have shown that a large number of participants misreport their small business lending activity." In those previous audits, "50% or more of the institutions reviewed submitted erroneous lending data to Treasury, either overstating or understating their small business lending gains." In addition to questions related to the validity of the reported small business lending gains, any analysis of the program's influence on small business lending is likely to be more suggestive than definitive because differentiating the SBLF's effect on small business lending from other factors, such as changes in the lender's local economy, is methodologically challenging, especially given the relatively small amount of financing involved relative to the national market for small business loans. The SBLF's $4.0 billion in financing represents less than 0.7% of outstanding small business loans (as defined by the FDIC). In terms of the concerns expressed about the program's potential cost, Treasury initially estimated in December 2010 that the SBLF could cost taxpayers up to $1.26 billion (excluding administrative costs that were initially estimated at about $26 million annually but actual outlays were $4.54 million in FY2014, $9.05 million in FY2015, $5.01 million in FY2016, and $3.4 million in FY2017). Treasury based that estimate on an expectation that about $17 billion in SBLF financings would be disbursed. In October 2011, Treasury estimated the program's costs based on actual participant data. It estimated that the SBLF would generate a savings of $80 million (excluding administrative costs), with the savings coming primarily from a lower-than-expected financing level and, to a lesser extent, improvements in projected default rates "due to higher participant quality than expected" and lower market interest rates. Treasury issues a semiannual report on SBLF costs. In its latest semiannual cost report, released on August 16, 2018, Treasury estimated that the SBLF will "generate a lifetime positive return of $31 million [excluding administrative costs] for the Treasury General Fund." One issue that arose relative to the program's projected cost is the noncumulative treatment of dividends. Treasury's OIG reported in May 2011 that Under the terms set by legislation, dividend payments are non-cumulative, meaning that institutions are under no obligation to make dividend payments as scheduled or to pay off previously missed payments before exiting the program. This dividend treatment differs from the TARP programs, in which many dividend payments were cumulative. This change in dividend treatment was driven by changes in capital requirements mandated by the Collins Amendment to the Dodd-Frank Act. The amendment equalizes the consolidated capital requirements for Tier 1 capital of bank holding companies by requiring that, at a minimum, regulators apply the same capital and risk standards for FDIC-insured banks to bank holding companies. Under TARP, the FRB [Federal Reserve Board] and FDIC treated capital differently at the holding company and depository institution levels. The FRB treated cumulative securities issued by holding companies as Tier 1 capital, while FDIC treated non-cumulative securities issued by depository institutions as Tier 1 capital. In order to comply with the Dodd-Frank Act requirement that securities purchased from holding companies receive the same capital treatment as those purchased from depository institutions, Treasury made the dividends under SBLF non-cumulative. Additionally, given that Tier 1 capital must be perpetual and cannot have a mandatory redemption date, the 10-year repayment period in the Small Business Jobs Act cannot be enforced. Treasury addressed this issue by placing the following additional requirements and restrictions on participants who miss dividend payments: the participant's CEO [Chief Executive Office] and CFO [Chief Financial Officer] must provide written notice regarding the rationale of the board of directors (BOD) for not declaring a dividend; no repurchases may be affected and no dividends may be declared on any securities for the applicable quarter and the following three quarters; after four missed payments (consecutive or not), the issuer's BOD must certify in writing that the issuer used best efforts to declare and pay dividends appropriately; after five missed payments (consecutive or not), Treasury may appoint a representative to serve as an observer on the issuer's BOD; and after six missed payments (consecutive or not), Treasury may elect two directors to the issuer's BOD if the liquidation preference is $25 million or more. Treasury's OIG agreed that Treasury's equity investment policy is consistent with the legislation and that "it has reasonably structured the program to incentivize payment of dividends." However, it recommended that "Congress consider whether an amendment to the Small Business Jobs Act and/or waiver from the Collins Amendment to the Dodd-Frank Act is needed to make the repayment of dividends a requirement for exiting the program." In conclusion, congressional oversight of the SBLF is currently focused on the program's potential long-term costs and effects on small business lending. Underlying those concerns are fundamental disagreements regarding the best way to assist small businesses. Some advocate the provision of additional federal resources to assist small businesses in acquiring capital necessary to start, continue, or expand operations and create jobs. Others worry about the long-term adverse economic effects of spending programs that increase the federal deficit. They advocate business tax reduction, reform of financial credit market regulation, and federal fiscal restraint as the best means to assist small businesses and create jobs. Appendix. The SBLF's Legislative History The SBLF's Legislative Origin On March 16, 2009, President Obama announced the first SBLF-like proposal. Under that proposal, the Department of the Treasury would have used TARP funds to purchase up to $15 billion of SBA-guaranteed loans. The purchases were intended to "immediately unfreeze the secondary market for SBA loans and increase the liquidity of community banks." The plan was dropped after it met resistance from lenders. Some lenders objected to TARP's requirement that participating lenders comply with executive compensation limits and issue warrants to the federal government. Smaller, community banks objected to the program's paperwork requirements, such as the provision of a small-business lending plan and quarterly reports. In his January 2010 State of the Union address, President Obama proposed the creation of a $30 billion SBLF to enhance access to credit for small businesses: When you talk to small business owners in places like Allentown, Pennsylvania, or Elyria, Ohio, you find out that even though banks on Wall Street are lending again, they're mostly lending to bigger companies. Financing remains difficult for small business owners across the country, even those that are making a profit. Tonight, I'm proposing that we take $30 billion of the money Wall Street banks have repaid and use it to help community banks give small businesses the credit they need to stay afloat. In response to the opposition community lenders had expressed concerning TARP's restrictions in 2009, the Obama Administration proposed that Congress approve legislation authorizing the transfer of up to $30 billion in TARP spending authority to the SBLF and statutorily establish the new program as distinct and independent from TARP and its restrictions. The Administration's legislative proposal was finalized and sent to Congress on May 7, 2010. Representative Barney Frank, then-chair of the House Committee on Financial Services, introduced H.R. 5297 , the Small Business Lending Fund Act of 2010, on May 13, 2010. The House Committee on Financial Services held a hearing on H.R. 5297 on May 18, 2010, and passed the bill, as amended to include a State Small Business Credit Initiative, the following day. The House passed the bill, as amended to include a Small Business Early-Stage Investment Program, a Small Business Borrower Assistance Program, and some small business tax reduction provisions, on June 17, 2010. The House-Passed Version of the SBLF Title I of the House-passed version of H.R. 5297 authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to establish a $30 billion SBLF "to address the ongoing effects of the financial crisis on small businesses by providing temporary authority to the Secretary of the Treasury to make capital investments in eligible institutions" with total assets equal to or less than $1 billion or $10 billion (as of the end of the fourth quarter of calendar year 2009) "in order to increase the availability of credit for small businesses." The authority to make capital investments in eligible institutions was limited to one year after enactment. Eligible financial institutions having total assets equal to or less than $1 billion as of the end of the fourth quarter of calendar year 2009 could apply to receive a capital investment from the SBLF in an amount not exceeding 5% of risk-weighted assets, as reported in the FDIC call report immediately preceding the date of application. During the fourth quarter of 2009, 7,340 FDIC-insured lending institutions reported having assets amounting to less than $1 billion. Eligible financial institutions having total assets equal to or less than $10 billion as of the end of the fourth quarter of calendar year 2009 could apply to receive a capital investment from the fund in an amount not exceeding 3% of risk-weighted assets, as reported in the FDIC call report immediately preceding the date of application. During the fourth quarter of 2009, 565 FDIC-insured lending institutions reported having assets of $1 billion to $10 billion. Risk-weighted assets are assets such as cash, loans, investments, and other financial institution assets that have different risks associated with them. FDIC regulations (12 C.F.R. §567.6) establish that cash and government bonds have a 0% risk-weighting; residential mortgage loans have a 50% risk-weighting; and other types of assets (such as small business loans) have a higher risk-weighting. Lending institutions on the FDIC problem bank list or institutions that have been removed from the FDIC problem bank list for less than 90 days were ineligible to participate in the program. Lending institutions could refinance securities issued through the Treasury Capital Purchase Program (CPP) and the Community Development Capital Incentive (CDCI) program under TARP, but only if the institution had not missed more than one dividend payment due under those programs. Participating banks would be charged a dividend rate of no more than 5% per annum initially, with reduced rates available if the bank increased its small business lending. For example, during any calendar quarter in the initial two years of the capital investments under the program, the bank's rate would be lowered if it had increased its small business lending compared to the average small business lending it made in the four previous quarters immediately preceding the enactment of the bill, minus some allowable adjustments. A 2.5% to less than 5% increase in small business lending would have lowered the rate to 4%, a 5% to less than 7.5% increase would have lowered the rate to 3%, a 7.5% to less than 10% increase would have lowered the rate to 2%, and an increase of 10% or greater would have lowered the rate to 1%. Table A-1 shows the dividend rates associated with small business lending increases for C corporation banks and savings institutions under H.R. 5297 . These rates were subsequently included in the final law. The bill also authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to adjust these dividend rates for S corporations "to take into account any differential tax treatment of securities issued by such eligible institution." Also, Community Development Financial Institutions were to be charged a dividend rate of 2% per annum for eight years, and 9% thereafter. SBLF applicants were also required to submit a small business lending plan to the appropriate federal banking agency and, for applicants that are state-chartered banks, to the appropriate state banking regulator. The plan was to describe how the applicant's business strategy and operating goals will allow it to address the needs of small businesses in the areas it serves, as well as a plan to provide linguistically and culturally appropriate outreach, where appropriate. The plan was to be treated as confidential supervisory information. The Secretary of the Treasury was required to consult with the appropriate federal banking agency or, in the case of an eligible institution that is a nondepository community development financial institution, the Community Development Financial Institution Fund, before determining if the eligible institution was to participate in the program. The bill specified that the SBLF would be "established as separate and distinct from the Troubled Asset Relief Program established by the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008. An institution shall not, by virtue of a capital investment under the Small Business Lending Fund Program, be considered a recipient of the Troubled Asset Relief Program." The bill also directed that all funds received by the Secretary of the Treasury in connection with purchases made by the SBLF, "including interest payments, dividend payments, and proceeds from the sale of any financial instrument, shall be paid into the general fund of the Treasury for reduction of the public debt." The Senate-Passed Version of the SBLF Title IV of the Senate-passed version of H.R. 5297 , which later became law, authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to establish a $30 billion SBLF to make capital investments in eligible community banks with total assets equal to or less than $1 billion or $10 billion. There were several differences between the Senate-passed version of H.R. 5297 's SBLF provisions and the SBLF provisions in the House-passed version of H.R. 5297 . Specifically, the House-passed version of H.R. 5297 indicated that eligible institutions may be insured depository institutions that are not controlled by a bank holding company or a savings and loan holding company that is also an eligible institution and is not directly or indirectly controlled by any company or other entity that has total consolidated assets of more than $10 billion, bank holding companies, savings and loan holding companies, community development financial institution loan funds, and small business lending companies, all with total assets of $10 billion or less (as of the end of 2009). The Senate-passed version of H.R. 5297 did not provide eligibility to small business lending companies. House-passed version of H.R. 5297 defined small business lending "as small business lending as defined by and reported in an eligible institution's quarterly call report, where each loan comprising such lending is made to a small business and is one the following types: (1) commercial and industrial loans; (2) owner-occupied nonfarm, nonresidential real estate loans; (3) loans to finance agricultural production and other loans to farmers; (4) loans secured by farmland; (5) nonowner-occupied commercial real estate loans; and (6) construction, land development and other land loans." The Senate-passed version of H.R. 5297 's definition of small business lending did not include nonowner-occupied commercial real estate or construction, land development and other land loans. Senate-passed version of H.R. 5297 had an exclusion provision prohibiting recipient lending institutions from using the funds to issue loans that have an original amount greater than $10 million or that would be made to a business with more than $50 million in revenues. The House-passed version of H.R. 5297 did not contain this provision. House-passed version of H.R. 5297 indicated that the incentives received in the form of reduced dividend rates during the first 4.5-year period following the date on which an eligible institution received a capital investment under the program would be contingent on an increase in the number of loans made. If the number of loans made by the institution did not increase by 2.5% for each 2.5% increase of small business lending, then the rate at which dividends and interest would be payable during the following quarter on preferred stock or other financial instruments issued to the Treasury by the eligible institution would be (i) 5%, if this quarter is within the two-year period following the date on which the eligible institution received the capital investment under the program; or (ii) 7%, if the quarter is after the two-year period. The Senate-passed version of H.R. 5297 did not contain this legislative language. House-passed version of H.R. 5297 included an alternative computation provision that would have allowed eligible institutions to compute their small business lending amounts for incentive purposes as if the definition of their small business lending amounts did not require that the loans comprising such lending be made to small business. This alternative computation would have been allowed if the eligible institution certified that all lending included by the institution for purposes of computing the increase in lending was made to small businesses. The Senate-passed version of H.R. 5297 did not contain this provision. House-passed version of H.R. 5297 indicated that an eligible institution that is a community development loan fund may apply to receive a capital investment from the SBLF in an amount not exceeding 10% of total assets, as reported in the audited financial statements for the fiscal year of the eligible institution that ended in calendar year 2009. The Senate-passed version of H.R. 5297 specifies 5%. House-passed version of H.R. 5297 would have required the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Community Development Financial Institutions Fund, to develop eligibility criteria to determine the financial ability of a Community Development Loan Fund to participate in the program and repay the investment. It provided a list of recommended eligibility criteria that the Secretary of the Treasury could use for this purpose. The Senate-passed version of H.R. 5297 provided a similar, but mandatory, list of eligibility criteria that must be used for this purpose. House-passed version of H.R. 5297 contained a temporary amortization authority provision which would have allowed an eligible institution to amortize any loss or write-down on a quarterly straight-line basis over a period of time, adjusted to reflect the institution's change in the amount of small business lending relative to the baseline. The Senate-passed version of H.R. 5297 did not contain this provision. The Senate's version of H.R. 5297 was agreed to in the Senate on September 16, 2010, after considerable debate and amendment to remove the Small Business Early-Stage Investment Program and Small Business Borrower Assistance Program, revise the SBLF, and add numerous other provisions to assist small businesses, including additional small business tax reduction provisions. The House agreed to the Senate amendments on September 23, 2010, and President Obama signed the bill, retitled the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 ( P.L. 111-240 ), into law on September 27, 2010.

Congressional interest in small business access to capital has increased in recent years because of concerns that small businesses might be prevented from accessing sufficient capital to enable them to start, continue, or expand operations and create jobs. Some have argued that the federal government should provide additional resources to assist small businesses. Others worry about the long-term adverse economic effects of spending programs that increase the federal deficit. They advocate business tax reduction, reform of financial credit market regulation, and federal fiscal restraint as the best means to assist small businesses and create jobs. Several laws were enacted during the 111th Congress to enhance small business access to capital. For example, P.L. 111-5, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), provided the Small Business Administration (SBA) an additional $730 million, including funding to temporarily subsidize SBA fees and increase the 7(a) loan guaranty program's maximum loan guaranty percentage to 90%. P.L. 111-240, the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to establish a $30 billion Small Business Lending Fund (SBLF), in which $4.0 billion was issued, to encourage community banks with less than $10 billion in assets to increase their lending to small businesses. It also authorized a $1.5 billion State Small Business Credit Initiative to provide funding to participating states with small business capital access programs, numerous changes to the SBA's loan guaranty and contracting programs, funding to continue the SBA's fee subsidies and the 7(a) program's 90% maximum loan guaranty percentage through December 31, 2010, and about $12 billion in tax relief for small businesses. P.L. 111-322, the Continuing Appropriations and Surface Transportation Extensions Act, 2011, authorized the SBA to continue its fee subsidies and the 7(a) program's 90% maximum loan guaranty percentage through March 4, 2011, or until available funding was exhausted, which occurred on January 3, 2011. This report focuses on the SBLF. It opens with a discussion of the supply and demand for small business loans. The SBLF's advocates claimed the SBLF was needed to enhance the supply of small business loans. The report then examines other arguments presented both for and against the program. Advocates argued that the SBLF would increase lending to small businesses and, in turn, create jobs. Opponents contended that the SBLF could lose money, lacked sufficient oversight provisions, did not require lenders to increase their lending to small businesses, could serve as a vehicle for Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) recipients to effectively refinance their TARP loans on more favorable terms with little or no resulting benefit for small businesses, and could encourage a failing lender to make even riskier loans to avoid higher dividend payments. The report concludes with an examination of the program's implementation and a discussion of bills introduced to amend the SBLF. For example, during the 112th Congress, S. 681, the Greater Accountability in the Lending Fund Act of 2011, would have limited the program's authority to 15 years from enactment and prohibited TARP recipients from participating in the program. H.R. 2807, the Small Business Leg-Up Act of 2011, would have transferred any unobligated and repaid funds from the SBLF to the Community Development Financial Institutions Fund "to increase the availability of credit for small businesses." H.R. 3147, the Small Business Lending Extension Act, would have extended the Department of the Treasury's investment authority from one year to two years. During the 113th Congress, H.R. 2474, the Community Lending and Small Business Jobs Act of 2013, would have transferred any unobligated and repaid funds from the SBLF to the Community Development Financial Institutions Fund.

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Introduction A plaintiff injured by a defendant's wrongful conduct may file a tort lawsuit to recover money from that defendant. To name an especially familiar example of a tort, "a person who causes a crash by negligently driving a vehicle is generally liable to the victim of that crash." By forcing people who wrongfully injure others to pay money to their victims, the tort system serves at least two functions: (1) "deter[ring] people from injuring others" and (2) "compensat[ing] those who are injured." Employees and officers of the federal government occasionally commit torts just like other members of the general public. Until the mid-20th century, however, the principle of "sovereign immunity"—a legal doctrine that bars private citizens from suing a sovereign government without its consent—prohibited plaintiffs from suing the United States for the tortious actions of federal officers and employees. Thus, for a substantial portion of this nation's history, persons injured by torts committed by the federal government's agents were generally unable to obtain financial compensation through the judicial system. Congress, deeming this state of affairs unacceptable, ultimately enacted the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) in 1946. The FTCA allows plaintiffs to file and prosecute certain types of tort lawsuits against the United States and thereby potentially recover financial compensation from the federal government. Some FTCA lawsuits are relatively mundane; for instance, a civilian may sue the United States to obtain compensation for injuries sustained as a result of minor accidents on federal property. Other FTCA cases, however, involve grave allegations of government misfeasance. For example, after naval officers allegedly sexually assaulted several women at the infamous Tailhook Convention in 1991, those women invoked the FTCA in an attempt to hold the United States liable for those officers' attacks. Family members of persons killed in the 1993 fire at the Branch Davidian compound in Waco likewise sued the United States under the FTCA, asserting that federal law enforcement agents committed negligent acts that resulted in the deaths of their relatives. Additionally, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed an award of over $100 million against the United States in an FTCA case alleging that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) committed "egregious government misconduct" resulting in the wrongful incarceration of several men who were falsely accused of participating in a grisly gangland slaying. Empowering plaintiffs to sue the United States can ensure that persons injured by federal employees receive compensation and justice. However, waiving the government's immunity from tort litigation comes at a significant cost: the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Bureau of the Fiscal Service (Bureau) reports that the United States spends hundreds of millions of dollars annually to pay tort claims under the FTCA, and the Department of Justice reports that it handles thousands of tort claims filed against the United States each year. Moreover, exposing the United States to tort liability arguably creates a risk that government officials may inappropriately base their decisions "not on the relevant and applicable policy objectives that should be governing the execution of their authority," but rather on a desire to reduce the government's "possible exposure to substantial civil liability." As explained in greater detail below, the FTCA attempts to balance these competing considerations by limiting the circumstances in which a plaintiff may successfully obtain a damages award against the United States. For example, the FTCA categorically bars plaintiffs from pursuing certain types of tort lawsuits against the United States. The FTCA also restricts the types and amount of monetary damages that a plaintiff may recover against the United States. Additionally, the FTCA requires plaintiffs to comply with an array of procedural requirements before filing suit. This report provides an overview of the FTCA. It first discusses the events and policy concerns that led Congress to enact the FTCA, including the background principle of sovereign immunity. The report then explains the effect, scope, and operation of the FTCA's waiver of the United States' immunity from certain types of tort claims. In doing so, the report describes categorical exceptions to the government's waiver of sovereign immunity, statutory limitations on a plaintiff's ability to recover monetary damages under the FTCA, and the procedures that govern tort claims against the United States. The report concludes by discussing various legislative proposals to amend the FTCA. Background A person injured by the tortious activity of a federal employee generally has two potential targets that he might name as a defendant in a tort lawsuit: (1) the federal employee who committed the tort and (2) the federal government itself. In many cases, however, suing the employee is not a viable option. For one, as explained in greater detail below, Congress has opted to shield federal officers and employees from personal liability for torts committed within the scope of their employment. Moreover, even if Congress had not decided to insulate federal employees from tort liability, suing an individual is typically an unattractive option for litigants, as individual defendants may lack the financial resources to satisfy an award of monetary damages. For many litigants, the legal and practical unavailability of tort claims against federal employees makes suing the United States a more attractive option. Whereas a private defendant may lack the financial resources to satisfy a judgment rendered against him, the United States possesses sufficient financial resources to pay virtually any judgment that a court might enter against it. A plaintiff suing the United States, however, may nonetheless encounter significant obstacles. In accordance with a long-standing legal doctrine known as "sovereign immunity," a private plaintiff ordinarily may not file a lawsuit against a sovereign entity—including the federal government—unless that sovereign consents. For a substantial portion of this nation's history, the doctrine of sovereign immunity barred citizens injured by the torts of a federal officer or employee from initiating or prosecuting a lawsuit against the United States. Until 1946, "the only practical recourse for citizens injured by the torts of federal employees was to ask Congress to enact private legislation affording them relief" through "private bills." Some, however, criticized the public bill system. Not only did private bills impose "a substantial burden on the time and attention of Congress," some members of the public became increasingly concerned "that the private bill system was unjust and wrought with political favoritism." Thus, in 1946, Congress enacted the FTCA, which effectuated "a limited waiver of [the federal government's] sovereign immunity" from certain common law tort claims . With certain exceptions and caveats discussed throughout this report, the FTCA authorizes plaintiffs to bring civil lawsuits 1. against the United States; 2. for money damages; 3. for injury to or loss of property, or personal injury or death; 4. caused by a federal employee's negligent or wrongful act or omission; 5. while acting within the scope of his office or employment; 6. under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the plaintiff in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred. Thus, not only does the FTCA "free Congress from the burden of passing on petitions for private relief" by "transfer[ring] responsibility for deciding disputed tort claims from Congress to the courts," it also creates a mechanism to compensate victims of governmental wrongdoing. In addition to this compensatory purpose, the FTCA also aims to "deter tortious conduct by federal personnel" by rendering the United States liable for the torts of its agents, thereby incentivizing the government to carefully supervise its employees. Significantly, however, the FTCA does not itself create a new federal cause of action against the United States; rather, the FTCA waives the United States's sovereign immunity from certain types of claims that exist under state tort law . Thus, in most respects, "the substantive law of the state where the tort occurred determines the liability of the United States" in an FTCA case. In this way, the FTCA largely "renders the Government liable in tort as a private individual would be under like circumstances." Critically, however, "although the FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity is significant and extensive, it is not complete." To address "concerns . . . about the integrity and solvency of the public fisc and the impact that extensive litigation might have on the ability of government officials to focus on and perform their other duties," the FTCA affords the United States "important protections and benefits . . . not enjoyed by other tort defendants" that are explained extensively below. Moreover, to limit the fora in which a plaintiff may permissibly litigate a tort suit against the United States, Congress vested the federal district courts (as well as a small number of territorial courts) with exclusive jurisdiction over FTCA cases. Furthermore, because Congress believed "that juries would have difficulty viewing the United States as a defendant without being influenced by the fact that it has a deeper pocket than any other defendant," FTCA cases that proceed to trial are generally "tried by the court without a jury." The Preclusion of Individual Employee Tort Liability Under the FTCA Notably, the FTCA only authorizes tort lawsuits against the United States itself; it expressly shields individual federal employees from personal liability for torts that they commit within the scope of their employment. In other words, the FTCA "makes the remedy against the United States under the FTCA exclusive" of "any other civil action or proceeding for money damages" that might otherwise be available "against the employee whose act or omission gave rise to the claim." Congress prohibited courts from holding federal employees personally liable for torts committed within the scope of their employment in order to avert what Congress perceived as "an immediate crisis involving the prospect of personal liability and the threat of protracted personal tort litigation for the entire Federal workforce." Critically, the individual employee generally remains immune from tort liability for torts committed within the scope of his employment even if a provision of the FTCA forecloses the plaintiff from recovering monetary damages from the United States itself. As the following subsections of this report explain, determining whether the FTCA governs a particular tort case—and, thus, whether the FTCA shields the individual who committed the alleged tort from personal liability—requires the court to ask two threshold questions: (1) whether the individual who committed the tort was in fact a federal employee, and, if so, (2) whether that individual committed the tort within the scope of his office or employment. Employees and Independent Contractors First, the FTCA only waives the United States's sovereign immunity as to torts committed by an " employee of the Government." Thus, if a plaintiff attempts to sue the United States for a tort committed by someone who is not a federal employee, the plaintiff's claim against the government will necessarily fail. For the purposes of the FTCA, the term "employee of the government" includes officers or employees of any federal agency; members of the military or naval forces of the United States; members of the National Guard while engaged in training or duty under certain provisions of federal law; persons acting on behalf of a federal agency in an official capacity; and officers and employees of a federal public defender organization (except when such employees are performing professional services in the course of providing representation to clients). As a result of this relatively broad definition of "employee," the FTCA effectively waives the government's immunity from torts committed by certain categories of persons who might not ordinarily be considered "employees" as a matter of common parlance. Because the FTCA applies only to torts committed by federal employees, the FTCA provision shielding federal employees from personal tort liability does not protect nonemployees. Thus, with certain caveats discussed below, a plaintiff injured by the tortious action of a nonemployee may potentially be able to sue that nonemployee individually under ordinary principles of state tort law, even though he could not sue the United States under the FTCA. Notably, the United States commonly hires independent contractors to carry out its governmental objectives. The FTCA, however, explicitly excludes independent contractors from the statutory definition of "employee." As a result, "the government cannot be held liable" under the FTCA "for torts committed by its independent contractors"; the plaintiff must instead attempt to seek compensation from the contractor itself. Different courts consider different sets of factors when evaluating whether an alleged tortfeasor is an independent contractor as opposed to a government employee. Most courts, however, hold that "the critical factor" when assessing whether a defendant is an employee or an independent contractor for the purposes of the FTCA is whether the federal government possesses the authority "to control the detailed physical performance of the contractor." "[A] contractor can be said to be an employee or agent of the United States within the intendment of the [FTCA] only where the Government has the power under the contract to supervise a contractor's day-to-day operations and to control the detailed physical performance of the contractor." Thus, to illustrate, courts have typically determined that certified registered nurse anesthetists (CRNAs) working for federal hospitals qualify as employees under the FTCA. These courts have justified that conclusion on the ground that CRNAs do not ordinarily enjoy broad discretion to exercise their independent judgment when administering anesthesia, but instead operate pursuant to the direct supervision and control of an operating surgeon or anesthesiologist working for the federal government. By contrast, courts have generally held that because physicians who provide medical services at facilities operated by the United States often operate relatively independently of the federal government's control, such physicians ordinarily qualify as "independent contractors, and not employees of the government for FTCA purposes." The Boyle Rule Because the FTCA's prohibition against suits by individual employees does not insulate independent contractors from liability, a plaintiff injured by the tortious action of an independent contractor working for the federal government may potentially be able to recover compensation directly from that contractor. Nevertheless, a plaintiff asserting a tort claim directly against a federal contractor may still encounter other obstacles to recovery. As the Supreme Court ruled in its 1988 decision in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. , a plaintiff may not pursue state law tort claims against a government contractor if imposing such liability would either create "a 'significant conflict'" with "an identifiable 'federal policy or interest'" or "'frustrate specific objectives' of federal legislation." Several courts have therefore rejected tort claims against defense contractors on the ground that allowing such suits to proceed could undesirably interfere with military objectives. Courts have been less willing to extend Boyle immunity to nonmilitary contractors, however. Scope of Employment As noted above, the FTCA applies only to torts that a federal employee commits "while acting within the scope of his office or employment." Thus, "[i]f a government employee acts outside the scope of his employment when engaging in tortious conduct, an action against the United States under the FTCA will not lie." Instead, the plaintiff may potentially "file a state-law tort action against the" employee who committed the tort, as the aforementioned protections from liability apply only when employees are acting within the scope of their employment. Courts determine whether a federal employee was acting within the scope of his employment at the time he committed an alleged tort by applying the law the state in which the tort occurred. Although the legal principles that govern the scope of a tortfeasor's employment vary from state to state, many states consider whether the employer hired the employee to perform the act in question and whether the employee undertook the allegedly tortious activity to promote the employer's interests. Two cases involving vehicular mishaps illustrate how courts perform the scope of employment inquiry in practice. In Barry v. Stevenson , for instance, two soldiers—one driver and one passenger—were returning to their headquarters in a government-owned Humvee military truck after completing a work assignment on a military base. The truck hit a dip in the trail, injuring the passenger. Because the driver "was engaged in annual Army National Guard training" and "driving a government vehicle . . . on government property" at the time of the accident, the court concluded that the driver "was acting within the course of his employment" as a federal officer "when the injury occurred." In Merlonghi v. United States , by contrast, a special agent employed by the Office of Export Enforcement (OEE) collided with a motorcyclist while driving home from work in a government vehicle. The agent and the motorcyclist had engaged in a verbal altercation and "swerved their vehicles back and forth towards each other" immediately prior to the collision. After brandishing a firearm at the motorcyclist, the agent sharply careened his vehicle into the motorcycle, throwing the motorcyclist to the ground and severely injuring him. The court determined that the agent "was not acting within the scope of his employment" at the time of the collision even though "he was driving a government vehicle and was on call." The court first observed that "engaging in a car chase while driving home from work [wa]s not the type of conduct that OEE hired [the agent] to perform." The court also emphasized that the agent "was not at work, responding to an emergency, or driving to a work assignment" at the time of the collision. The court further noted that the agent's actions were not "motivated . . . by a purpose to serve the employer," as the agent's "argument with [the motorcyclist] and the back-and-forth swerving leading to the altercation had nothing to do with an OEE assignment. His conduct related to personal travel and a personal confrontation." Because the agent "was not acting within the scope of his employment when he crashed into" the motorcyclist, the court ruled that the district court had correctly dismissed the motorcyclist's claims seeking compensation from the United States. Attorney General Certification Occasionally a plaintiff will file a tort suit against an individual without realizing that he is a federal employee. In such cases, the FTCA allows the Attorney General to certify "that the defendant employee was acting within the scope of his office or employment at the time of the incident out of which the claim arose." If the Attorney General files such a certification, then the lawsuit is "deemed an action against the United States" under the FTCA; the employee is dismissed from the action, and the United States is substituted as defendant in the employee's place; and the case proceeds against the government in federal court. In such instances, the United States "remain[s] the federal defendant in the action unless and until the [d]istrict [c]ourt determines that the employee . . . engaged in conduct beyond the scope of his employment." By creating a mechanism by which the United States may substitute itself as the defendant in the individual employee's place, the FTCA effectively "immunize[s] covered federal employees not simply from liability, but from suit." In this way, the FTCA "relieve[s] covered employees from the cost and effort of defending the lawsuit" and instead places "those burdens on the Government's shoulders." In some cases, the Attorney General's decision to substitute the United States in the officer's place may adversely affect the plaintiff's chances of prevailing on his claims. Generally speaking, once the Attorney General certifies that the federal employee was acting within the scope of his employment when he committed the allegedly tortious act, "the FTCA's requirements, exceptions, and defenses apply to the suit." Depending on the circumstances, those requirements, exceptions, and defenses can "absolutely bar [the] plaintiff's case" against the United States, as explained in greater detail below. Moreover, the individual federal employee remains immune from liability even when the FTCA "precludes recovery against the Government" itself. Thus, under certain circumstances, the FTCA will shield both the United States and its employees from liability for its tortious actions, thereby effectively "leav[ing] certain tort victims without any remedy." "In such cases, to try to preserve their lawsuits" against the federal employee, the plaintiff may attempt to "contest the Attorney General's scope-of-employment certification." That is, the plaintiff may argue that the government employee defendant was not acting within the scope of his employment, such that the suit should therefore proceed against the government official in his personal capacity. If the court agrees that the employee was acting within the scope of employment at the time of the alleged tort, then "the suit becomes an action against the United States that is governed by the FTCA." If, however, the court disagrees with the Attorney General's determination, the suit may proceed against the government employee in his personal capacity. A plaintiff may, however, prefer to litigate against the United States rather than against an individual government employee, especially if the employee does not have enough money to satisfy a judgment that the court might ultimately render in the plaintiff's favor. Because government employees may be "under-insured or judgment proof," they may lack sufficient assets to "satisfy judgments rendered against them" in tort cases. Thus, oftentimes the plaintiff does not object when the Attorney General certifies that the named defendant was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the alleged tort. If a plaintiff successfully obtains a judgment against the United States based on the tortious conduct of a federal employee, the government may not subsequently sue the culpable employee to recover the amount of money the government paid to the plaintiff. Consequently, if the government successfully substitutes itself for an individual defendant in an FTCA case, that substitution may effectively relieve the individual employee from all civil liability for his allegedly tortious action. Because this aspect of the FTCA is particularly favorable for government employees, if the Attorney General refuses to certify that an employee was acting within the scope of his employment, that employee may at any time before trial petition a federal district court for certification that he was acting within the scope of his employment for the purposes of the FTCA. If the court agrees that the employee was acting within the scope of his employment, then the case proceeds "against the Government, just as if the Attorney General had filed a certification." If, however, the court instead finds that the government employee was not acting within the scope of employment, then the lawsuit may proceed against the government employee in his personal capacity. Exceptions to the FTCA's Waiver of Sovereign Immunity As mentioned above, the FTCA imposes significant substantive limitations on the types of tort lawsuits a plaintiff may permissibly pursue against the United States. The Congress that enacted the FTCA, concerned about "unwarranted judicial intrusion[s] into areas of governmental operations and policymaking," opted to explicitly preserve the United States' sovereign immunity from more than a dozen categories of claims. Specifically, Section 2680 of the FTCA establishes the following exceptions preventing private litigants from pursuing the following categories of claims against the United States: "Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation . . . or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty"; "Any claim arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal matter"; certain claims arising from the actions of law enforcement officers administering customs and excise laws; certain admiralty claims against the United States for which federal law provides an alternative remedy; claims "arising out of an act or omission of any employee of the Government in administering" certain provisions of the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917; "Any claim for damages caused by the imposition or establishment of a quarantine by the United States"; certain claims predicated upon intentional torts committed by federal employees; "Any claim for damages caused by the fiscal operations of the Treasury or by the regulation of the monetary system" ; "Any claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war"; "Any claim arising in a foreign country"; "Any claim arising from the activities of the Tennessee Valley Authority"; "Any claim arising from the activities of the Panama Canal Company"; or "Any claim arising from the activities of a Federal land bank, a Federal intermediate credit bank, or a bank for cooperatives." Some of these exceptions are more doctrinally significant than others. The following sections of this report therefore discuss the most frequently litigated exceptions to the United States' waiver of immunity from tort claims. The Discretionary Function Exception First, Section 2680(a) —which is "commonly called the discretionary function exception" —"preserves the federal government's immunity . . . when an employee's acts involve the exercise of judgment or choice." Along with being one of the most frequently litigated exceptions to the FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity, the discretionary function exception is, according to at least one commentator, "the broadest and most consequential." For example, the United States has successfully invoked the discretionary function exception to avoid tort liability in cases involving exposures to radiation, asbestos, Agent Orange, and the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). The discretionary function exception serves at least two purposes. First, the exception "prevent[s] judicial 'second-guessing' of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy through the medium of an action in tort." According to one commentator, the Congress that enacted the FTCA viewed such second guessing to be "inappropriate" because (1) "such judgments are more appropriately left to the political branches of our governmental system;" and (2) "courts, which specialize in the resolution of discrete factual and legal disputes," may not be "equipped to make broad policy judgments." Second, the discretionary function exception is intended to "protect the Government from liability that would seriously handicap efficient government operations." By insulating the government from liability for the discretionary actions of its employees, the discretionary function exception arguably decreases the likelihood that federal employees will shy away from making sound policy decisions based on a fear of increasing the government's exposure to tort liability. Relatedly, exposing the United States to liability for discretionary acts could cause government officials to "spend an inordinate amount of their tax-payer compensated time responding to lawsuits" rather than serving the "greater good of the community." The discretionary function exception thus "marks the boundary between Congress' willingness to impose tort liability upon the United States and its desire to protect certain governmental activities from exposure to suit by private individuals." As explained in greater detail in the following subsections, to determine whether the discretionary function exception bars a particular plaintiff's suit under the FTCA, courts examine whether the federal employee was engaged in conduct that was (1) discretionary and (2) policy-driven. "If the challenged conduct is both discretionary and policy-driven," then the FTCA does not waive the government's sovereign immunity with respect to that conduct, and the plaintiff's FTCA claim must therefore fail. If, by contrast, an official's action either (1) "does not involve any discretion" or (2) "involves discretion," but "does not involve the kind of discretion—consideration of public policy—that the exception was designed to protect," then the discretionary function exception does not bar the plaintiff's claim. Whether the Challenged Conduct Is Discretionary When first evaluating whether "the conduct that is alleged to have caused the harm" to the plaintiff "can fairly be described as discretionary," a court must assess "whether the conduct at issue involves 'an element of judgment or choice' by the employee." "The conduct of federal employees is generally held to be discretionary unless 'a federal statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a course of action for an employee to follow.'" If "the employee has no rightful option but to adhere to the directive" established by a federal statute, regulation, or policy, "then there is no discretion in the conduct for the discretionary function exception to protect." Put another way, the discretionary function exception does not insulate the United States from liability when its employees "act in violation of a statute or policy that specifically directs them to act otherwise." Even where a federal statute, regulation, or policy pertaining to the challenged action exists, however, the action may nonetheless qualify as discretionary if the law in question "predominately uses permissive rather than mandatory language." In other words, where "a government agent's performance of an obligation requires that agent to make judgment calls, the discretionary function exception" may bar the plaintiff's claim under the FTCA. Notably, "[t]he presence of a few, isolated provisions cast in mandatory language" in a federal statute, regulation, or policy "does not transform an otherwise suggestive set of guidelines into binding" law that will defeat the discretionary function exception. "Even when some provisions of a policy are mandatory, governmental action remains discretionary if all of the challenged decisions involved 'an element of judgment or choice.'" The Fourth Circuit's decision in Rich v. United States exemplifies how courts evaluate whether a federal employee has engaged in discretionary conduct. The plaintiff in Rich —a federal inmate who was stabbed by members of a prison gang—attempted to file an FTCA suit alleging that the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) should have housed him separately from the gang members. Federal law permitted—but did not affirmatively require—BOP "to separate certain inmates from others based on their past behavior." Because federal law empowered prison officials to "consider several factors and exercise independent judgment in determining whether inmates may require separation," the Rich court held that BOP's decision whether or not to separate an inmate from others was discretionary in nature and therefore outside the scope of the FTCA. By contrast, in the Supreme Court case of Berkovitz ex rel. Berkovitz v. United States , the discretionary function exception did not shield the United States from liability. The plaintiff in Berkovitz alleged that the federal government issued a license to a vaccine manufacturer "without first receiving data that the manufacturer must submit showing how the product . . . matched up against regulatory safety standards," as required by federal law. After the plaintiff allegedly contracted polio from a vaccine produced by that manufacturer, the plaintiff sued the United States under the FTCA. Because "a specific statutory and regulatory directive" divested the United States of any "discretion to issue a license without first receiving the required test data," the Court held that "the discretionary function exception impose[d] no bar" to the plaintiff's claim. Courts have disagreed regarding whether the discretionary function exception shields tortious conduct that allegedly violates the U.S. Constitution, as contrasted with a federal statute, regulation, or policy. Most courts have held that "the discretionary-function exception . . . does not shield decisions that exceed constitutional bounds, even if such decisions are imbued with policy considerations." These courts reason that "[t]he government 'has no "discretion" to violate the Federal Constitution; its dictates are absolute and imperative.'" By contrast, a minority of courts have instead concluded that the discretionary function exception shields actions "based upon [the] exercise of discretion" even if they are "constitutionally repugnant." These courts base that conclusion on the fact that the text of 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) purports to shield discretionary judgments even when a government employee abuses his discretion. Still other courts have declined to take a side on this issue. Whether Policy Considerations Influence the Exercise of the Employee's Discretion If the allegedly tortious conduct that injured the plaintiff was discretionary, the court must then evaluate "whether the exercise or non-exercise of the granted discretion is actually or potentially influenced by policy considerations" —that is, whether the challenged action "implicate[s] social, economic, [or] policy judgments." As the Supreme Court has recognized, the discretionary function exception "protects . . . only governmental actions and decisions based on considerations of public policy." For instance, if a given decision requires a federal employee to "balance competing interests" —such as weighing the benefits of a particular public safety measure against that measure's financial costs —then that decision is likely susceptible to policy analysis within the meaning of the discretionary function exception. When applying the second prong of the discretionary function exception, courts employ an objective rather than a subjective standard. Courts therefore "do not examine . . . 'whether policy considerations were actually contemplated in making the decision'" —that is, "[t]he decision need not actually be grounded in policy considerations so long as it is, by its nature, susceptible to a policy analysis." Indeed, the discretionary function exception "applies 'even if the discretion has been exercised erroneously' and is deemed to have frustrated the relevant policy purpose." For that reason, whether the employee committed negligence in exercising his discretion "is irrelevant to the applicability of the discretionary function exception." Nor does it matter whether the allegedly tortious action was undertaken "by low-level government officials [or] by high-level policymakers." The nature of the conduct challenged by the plaintiff—as opposed to the status of the actor—governs whether the discretionary function exception applies in a given case. As long as the challenged conduct involves the exercise of discretion in furtherance of some policy goal, the discretionary function exception forecloses claims under the FTCA. If the first element of the discretionary function exception is satisfied, then courts will generally presume that the second element is satisfied as well. The Supreme Court has held that when an "established governmental policy, as expressed or implied by statute, regulation, or agency guidelines, allows a Government agent to exercise discretion, it must be presumed that the agent's acts are grounded in policy when exercising that discretion." Nevertheless, a plaintiff may rebut that presumption if "the challenged actions are not the kind of conduct that can be said to be grounded in the policy of the regulatory regime" at issue in the case. Courts assessing the applicability of the discretionary function exception utilize a "case-by-case approach. " Given the fact-intensive nature of the discretionary function inquiry, "deciding whether a government agent's action is susceptible to policy analysis is often challenging." Nevertheless, examples from the case law help illustrate which sorts of governmental actions are susceptible to policy analysis. For instance, in the Rich case discussed above, the court held that "prisoner placement and the handling of threats posed by inmates against one another are 'part and parcel of the inherently policy-laden endeavor of maintaining order and preserving security within our nation's prisons.'" The court explained that "factors such as available resources, proper classification of inmates, and appropriate security levels are 'inherently grounded in social, political, and economic policy.'" Accordingly, the court held that BOP's decision to house the plaintiff with inmates who ultimately attacked him was susceptible to policy analysis, such that the discretionary function exception shielded the United States from liability. By contrast, courts have held that decisions motivated solely by laziness or careless inattention "do not reflect the kind of considered judgment 'grounded in social, economic, and political policy'" that the discretionary function exception is intended to shield from judicial second-guessing. For example, the discretionary function exception does not shield "[a]n inspector's decision (motivated simply by laziness) to take a smoke break rather than inspect" a machine that malfunctions and injures the plaintiff, as a mere decision to act carelessly or slothfully "involves no element of choice or judgment grounded in policy considerations." Courts have similarly held that allowing toxic mold to grow on food served at the commissary on a naval base is not a decision influenced by "social, economic, or political policy," and that, as a result, the discretionary function exception does not bar a plaintiff sickened by that mold from suing the United States. The Intentional Tort Exception Another important exception to the FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity is known as the "intentional tort exception." An "intentional tort," as the name suggests, occurs "when the defendant acted with the intent to injure the plaintiff or with substantial certainty that his action would injure the plaintiff." A familiar example of an intentional tort is battery—that is, purposeful harmful or offensive physical contact with another person. Subject to a significant proviso discussed below, the intentional tort exception generally preserves the United States's immunity against claims arising out of assault; battery; false imprisonment; false arrest; malicious prosecution; abuse of process; libel; slander; misrepresentation; deceit; or interference with contract rights. As the Supreme Court has observed, however, this list "does not remove from the FTCA's waiver all intentional torts;" moreover, the list includes "certain torts . . . that may arise out of negligent"—and therefore unintentional—"conduct." Thus, while the phrase "intentional tort exception" provides a suitable "shorthand description" of the exception's scope, that moniker is, according to the High Court, "not entirely accurate." The FTCA's "legislative history contains scant commentary" discussing Congress's rationale for exempting these categories of torts from the FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity. However, at least some Members of the Congress that first enacted the FTCA appeared to believe (1) that "it would be 'unjust' to make the government liable" for the intentional torts of its employees; and (2) that "exposing the public fisc to potential liability for assault, battery, and other listed torts would be 'dangerous,' based on the notion that these torts are both easy for plaintiffs to exaggerate and difficult to defend against." The intentional tort exception has shielded the United States from liability for serious acts of misconduct allegedly committed by federal officers. In a particularly high-profile example, a group of women who were allegedly sexually assaulted by naval officers at the 1991 Tailhook Convention sued the United States under the FTCA "for the sexual assaults and batteries allegedly perpetrated by Naval officers at the Convention social events." The court ultimately ruled that the intentional tort exception defeated the plaintiffs' claims against the United States, as the alleged sexual assaults constituted intentionally tortious acts. The Exception to the Intentional Tort Exception:235 The Law Enforcement Proviso Critically, however, the intentional tort exception contains a carve-out known as the "law enforcement proviso" that renders the United States liable for certain intentional tort claims committed by "investigative or law enforcement officers of the United States Government." Congress added this proviso "in 1974 in response to widespread publicity over abuse of powers by federal law enforcement officers." Thus, although "private citizens are barred from bringing suit against federal employees for many intentional torts, they may nonetheless bring suit" against the United States for a subset of these torts "if the alleged act was committed by an 'investigative or law enforcement officer.'" Only the following torts fall within the law enforcement proviso's ambit: assault; battery; false imprisonment; false arrest; abuse of process; and malicious prosecution. The list of intentional torts that potentially qualify for the law enforcement proviso therefore contains "only half" of "the torts listed in the intentional tort exception." The proviso thereby only "waives immunity for the types of tort claims typically asserted against criminal law enforcement officers, while preserving immunity for other tort claims that are asserted more broadly against federal employees." To determine whether the proviso applies in any given case, the court must first assess whether the alleged tortfeasor qualifies as an "investigative or law enforcement officer[]." The FTCA defines that term to include "any officer of the United States who is empowered by law to" (1) "execute searches," (2) "seize evidence," or (3) "make arrests for violations of Federal law." Some courts have therefore concluded that the law enforcement proviso waives the United States's immunity only against claims for intentional torts committed by "criminal law enforcement officers," as contrasted with "federal employees who conduct only administrative searches" like Transportation Security Administration (TSA) screeners. Thus, as a general matter, the United States remains largely immune to claims arising from intentional torts committed by federal employees who are not criminal law enforcement officers. It is important to note that the law enforcement proviso waives the United States's immunity only for acts or omissions committed "while the officer is 'acting within the scope of his office or employment.'" The underlying tort need not arise while the officer is executing searches, seizing evidence, or making arrests; so long as the officer is "act[ing] within the scope of his or her employment" at the time the tort arises, "the waiver of sovereign immunity holds." In other words, the waiver of sovereign immunity "effected by the law enforcement proviso extends to acts or omissions of law enforcement officers that arise within the scope of their employment, regardless of whether the officers are engaged in investigative or law enforcement activity" at the time they commit the allegedly tortious act. To illustrate, the Supreme Court has held that the intentional tort exception will not necessarily bar a federal prisoner's claim "that correctional officers sexually assaulted . . . him while he was in their custody." Assuming that the correctional officers qualified as law enforcement officers within the meaning of the FTCA and were acting within the scope of their employment at the time of the alleged assault, the Court concluded that the law enforcement proviso rendered the intentional tort exception inapplicable even if the correctional officers were not specifically engaged in investigative or law enforcement activity during the assault itself. The Foreign Country Exception As the name suggests, the "foreign country exception" to the FTCA preserves the United States' sovereign immunity against "any claim arising in a foreign country." The Supreme Court has interpreted this exception to "bar[] all claims based on any injury suffered in a foreign country, regardless of where the tortious act or omission occurred ." The exception therefore "ensure[s] that the United States is not exposed to excessive liability under the laws of a foreign country over which it has no control," as could potentially occur if the United States made itself liable to the same extent as any private citizen who commits a tort in that country. The recent case of S.H. ex rel. Holt v. United States illustrates how courts apply the foreign country exception in practice. In that case, a family attempted to sue the United States pursuant to the FTCA, alleging that U.S. Air Force (USAF) officials in California "negligently approved the family's request for command-sponsored travel to a [USAF] base in Spain" with substandard medical facilities. When the mother ultimately gave birth prematurely in Spain, her daughter was injured during birth. After the family returned to the United States, American doctors diagnosed the daughter with cerebral palsy resulting from her premature birth. The court concluded that, because the daughter's "cerebral palsy resulted from the brain injury she sustained in Spain," the foreign country exception barred the family's FTCA claim even though doctors did not diagnose the daughter with cerebral palsy until after the family returned the United States. To support its conclusion, the court reasoned that, for the purposes of the foreign country exception, "an injury is suffered where the harm first 'impinge[s]' upon the body, even if it is later diagnosed elsewhere." The Military Exceptions Finally, two exceptions—one created by Congress, one created by the Supreme Court—preserve the federal government's immunity as to certain torts arising from the United States' military activities. The Combatant Activities Exception The first such exception, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j), preserves the United States' immunity from "[a]ny claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war." Although the FTCA's legislative history casts little light on the purpose and intended scope of the combatant activities exception, courts have generally inferred that "the policy embodied by the combatant activities exception is . . . to preempt state or foreign regulation of federal wartime conduct and to free military commanders from the doubts and uncertainty inherent in potential subjection to civil suit." The 1996 case of Clark v. United States illustrates how the combatant activities exception operates in practice. The plaintiff in Clark —a U.S. army sergeant who served in Saudi Arabia during Operation Desert Storm—conceived a child with his wife after he returned home to the United States. After the child manifested serious birth defects, the sergeant sued the United States, claiming that his "exposure to the toxins he encountered while serving in Saudi Arabia" during Operation Desert Storm "combined with the medications and shots he received from the U.S. Army" caused his child to be born with significant injuries. The court concluded that, because a state of war existed during Operation Desert Storm, the sergeant's claims arose "out of wartime activities by the military" and were therefore barred by the combatant activities exception. The Feres Doctrine In addition to the exceptions to liability explicitly enumerated in Section 2680, the Supreme Court has also articulated an additional exception to the United States' waiver of sovereign immunity known as the Feres doctrine. That doctrine derives its name from the 1950 case Feres v. United States , in which several active duty servicemembers (or their executors) attempted to assert a variety of tort claims against the United States. The executor for one of the servicemembers who died in a fire at a military facility, for instance, claimed that the United States had negligently caused the servicemember's death by "quartering him in barracks known or which should have been known to be unsafe because of a defective heating plant" and by "failing to maintain an adequate fire watch." The second plaintiff claimed that an Army surgeon negligently left a 30-by-18-inch towel in his stomach during an abdominal operation. The executor of a third servicemember alleged that army surgeons administered "negligent and unskillful medical treatment" that resulted in the servicemember's death. The Supreme Court dismissed all three claims, holding "that the Government is not liable under the [FTCA] for injuries to [military] servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to [military] service." The Feres doctrine thus "applies broadly" to render the United States immune from tort liability resulting from virtually "all injuries suffered by military personnel that are even remotely related to the individual's status as a member of the military." For instance, courts have frequently barred active duty servicemembers from suing the United States for medical malpractice allegedly committed by military doctors. Notably, the Feres doctrine is not explicitly codified in the FTCA . Instead, courts have justified Feres on the ground that subjecting the United States to liability for tort claims arising out of military service could "disrupt the unique hierarchical and disciplinary structure of the military." According to the Supreme Court, "complex, subtle, and professional decisions as to the composition, training, and . . . control of a military force are essentially professional military judgments." In the Supreme Court's view, requiring federal courts to adjudicate "suits brought by service members against the Government for injuries incurred incident to service" would thereby embroil "the judiciary in sensitive military affairs at the expense of military discipline and effectiveness." As discussed in greater detail below, the Feres doctrine has been the subject of significant debate. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed or expanded Feres on several occasions despite opportunities and invitations to overturn or confine its holding. Most recently, on May 20, 2019, the Court denied a petition asking the court to overrule Feres with respect to certain types of medical malpractice claims. Although the Supreme Court has stated that Congress may abrogate or modify Feres by amending the FTCA if it so chooses, Congress has not yet opted to do so. Other Limitations on Damages Under the FTCA Apart from the exceptions to the United States' waiver of sovereign immunity discussed above, the FTCA may also limit a plaintiff's ability to obtain compensation from the federal government in other ways. Although, as a general matter, the damages that a plaintiff may recover in an FTCA suit are typically determined by the law of the state in which the tort occurred, the FTCA imposes several restrictions on the types and amount of damages that a litigant may recover. With few exceptions, plaintiffs may not recover punitive damages or prejudgment interest against the United States. The FTCA likewise bars most awards of attorney's fees against the government. Furthermore, with limited exceptions, an FTCA plaintiff may not recover any damages that exceed the amount he initially requested when he submitted his claim to the applicable agency to satisfy the FTCA's exhaustion requirement, which this report discusses below. "[T]he underlying purpose of" requiring the plaintiff to specify the maximum amount of damages he seeks "is to put the government on notice of its maximum potential exposure to liability" and thereby "make intelligent settlement decisions." Critically, however, a plaintiff can potentially recover damages in excess of the amount he initially requested if the plaintiff can demonstrate "intervening facts" or "newly discovered evidence not reasonably discoverable at the time of presenting the claim to the federal agency" that warrant a larger award. Procedural Requirements In addition to the aforementioned substantive limitations on a plaintiff's ability to pursue a tort lawsuit against the United States, Congress has also established an array of procedural requirements a plaintiff must satisfy in order to validly invoke the FTCA. Most significantly, the FTCA contains statute-of-limitations and exhaustion provisions that limit when a plaintiff may permissibly file a tort lawsuit against the United States. For one, with certain exceptions, a plaintiff may not institute an FTCA action against the United States unless (1) the plaintiff has first "presented the claim to the appropriate Federal agency" whose employees are responsible for the plaintiff's alleged injury, and (2) that agency has "finally denied" the plaintiff's claim. These administrative exhaustion requirements afford federal agencies an opportunity to settle disputes before engaging in formal litigation in the federal courts. "[E]ncouraging settlement of tort claims within administrative agencies" in this manner arguably "reduce[s] court congestion and avoid[s] unnecessary litigation." Because litigation can be costly and time-consuming, "the settlement of claims within administrative agencies" arguably not only "benefits FTCA claimants by permitting them to forego the expense of full-blown litigation," but also "frees up limited [governmental] resources for more pressing matters." A claimant ordinarily has two years from the date of his injury to present a written notification of his FTCA claim "to the Federal agency whose activities gave rise to the claim." This written notification must "sufficiently describ[e] the injury to enable the agency to begin its own investigation." Once the agency receives such notice, it may either settle the claim or deny it. With limited exceptions, if the claimant fails to submit an administrative claim within the two-year time limit, then "his 'tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred.'" As a general rule, a plaintiff must "exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing suit"; a plaintiff usually cannot file an FTCA lawsuit and then cure his failure to comply with the exhaustion requirement by belatedly submitting an administrative claim. If, after the claimant submits his claim to the relevant administrative agency, the claimant and the agency agree on a mutually acceptable settlement, no further litigation occurs. Statistics suggest that "[t]he majority of FTCA . . . claims are resolved on the administrative level and do not go to litigation." If the agency does not agree to settle the claim, however, the agency may deny the claim by "mailing, by certified or registered mail, . . . notice of final denial of the claim" to the claimant. If no administrative settlement occurs, a claimant's right to a judicial determination "is preserved and the claimant may file suit in federal court." The claimant typically has six months from the date the agency mails its denial to initiate an FTCA lawsuit against the United States in federal court if he so chooses. With limited exceptions, if the plaintiff does not file suit before this six-month deadline, his claim against the United States will be "forever barred." If a federal agency does not promptly decide whether to settle or deny claims that claimants have presented to them, the FTCA establishes a mechanism for constructive exhaustion to prevent claims from being consigned to administrative limbo while the claimant awaits the agency's decision. Pursuant to Section 2675(a) of the FTCA, "[t]he failure of an agency to make final disposition of a claim within six months after it is filed shall, at the option of the claimant any time thereafter, be deemed a final denial of the claim for purposes of" the FTCA's exhaustion requirement. Thus, under these limited circumstances, Section 2675(a) authorizes a plaintiff to file an FTCA suit against the United States even before the agency has formally denied his administrative claim. Legislative Proposals to Amend the FTCA Since Congress first enacted the FTCA in 1946, the federal courts have developed a robust body of judicial precedent interpreting the statute. In recent decades, however, the Supreme Court has rejected several invitations by litigants to modify its long-standing doctrines governing the FTCA's application. In doing so, the Court has expressed reluctance to revisit settled FTCA precedents in the absence of congressional action. Thus, if Congress disapproves of some or all of the legal principles that currently govern FTCA cases, legislative action may be necessary to change the governing standards. Some observers have advocated a variety of modifications to the FTCA. Recent legislative proposals to alter the FTCA have included, among other things, carving out certain categories of claims, cases, or plaintiffs to which the FTCA does not apply; expanding or narrowing the FTCA's definition of "employee" —which, as discussed above, is presently relatively broad, but does not include independent contractors; and amending 28 U.S.C. § 2680 to create new exceptions to the federal government's waiver of sovereign immunity—or, alternatively, to broaden, narrow, or eliminate existing exceptions. Proposals to change the FTCA's substantive standards implicate policy questions that Congress may wish to consider. On one hand, broadening the FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity could enable a larger number of victims of government wrongdoing to obtain recourse through the federal courts, but could concomitantly increase the total amount of money the United States must pay to tort claimants each year and exacerbate "concerns . . . about . . . the impact that extensive litigation might have on the ability of government officials to focus on and perform their other duties." Conversely, narrowing the FTCA's immunity waiver could result in a larger number of private individuals bearing the costs of government employee misfeasance, but could result in a cost savings to the United States and decrease the potential for judicial interference with federal operations. Proposals to Abrogate or Modify Feres One particular proposal to amend the FTCA that has captured a relatively substantial amount of congressional attention is abrogating or narrowing the Feres doctrine. As discussed above, the Feres doctrine shields the federal government from liability "for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to [military] service." Opponents of Feres argue that the doctrine inappropriately bars servicemembers from obtaining recourse for their injuries. Critics maintain that Feres 's bar on FTCA suits creates especially unjust results with respect to servicemembers who suffer injuries in military hospitals and servicemembers who are victims of sexual abuse, as those types of tortious actions are far removed from the core functions of the military. Some Members of Congress, judges, and legal commentators have therefore advocated eliminating or narrowing the Feres doctrine to allow servicemembers to pursue certain tort claims against the United States under the FTCA. Supporters of Feres , by contrast, have instead urged Congress to retain the Feres doctrine in its current form. These commentators contend "that the abolition of the Feres doctrine would lead to intra-military lawsuits that would have a very adverse effect on military order, discipline and effectiveness." Supporters further maintain that entertaining tort suits by servicemembers against the United States would increase the government's exposure to monetary liability. Some who support the Feres doctrine argue that even though Feres bars servicemembers from suing the United States under the FTCA for injuries they sustain incident to military service, Feres does not necessarily leave servicemembers without any remedy whatsoever; depending on the circumstances, injured servicemembers may be entitled to certain benefits under other federal statutes. Congress has periodically held hearings to assess whether to retain, abrogate, or modify the Feres doctrine. The House Armed Services Committee's Subcommittee on Military Personnel conducted the most recent of those hearings on April 30, 2019. If Congress desires to authorize servicemembers to prosecute tort lawsuits against the United States, it has several options. For example, Congress could abolish Feres in its entirety and allow servicemembers to file tort suits against the United States subject to the same exceptions and prerequisites that govern FTCA lawsuits initiated by nonservicemembers. Alternatively, instead of abrogating Feres entirely, Congress could allow servicemembers to sue the United States for only certain injuries arising from military service, such as injuries resulting from medical malpractice. As an alternative to authorizing full-fledged litigation against the United States in federal court, Congress could also create alternative compensation mechanisms intended to provide relief to injured servicemembers whose claims would otherwise be barred by Feres . Such alternative compensation procedures could, for example, resemble the alternative compensation scheme Congress established for persons injured by vaccines. To that end, Congress has periodically introduced bills proposing to modify the Feres doctrine. Most recently, several Members of the 116th Congress cosponsored the Sfc. Richard Stayskal Military Medical Accountability Act of 2019 ( H.R. 2422 ), which would authorize "member[s] of the Armed Forces of the United States" to bring claims "against the United States under [the FTCA] for damages . . . arising out of a negligent or wrongful act or omission in the performance of medical, dental, or related health care functions" rendered at certain military medical treatment facilities under specified conditions. Private Bills In addition to proposals to modify the FTCA itself, Congress retains the authority to enact private legislation to compensate individual tort victims who would otherwise be barred from obtaining recourse from the United States under the FTCA in its current form. Although, as explained above, Congress enacted the FTCA in part to eliminate the need to pass private bills in order to compensate persons injured by the federal government, Congress still retains some authority to pass private bills if it so desires. Thus, rather than amend the FTCA to expand the universe of circumstances in which the United States will be liable to tort claimants, some have suggested that Congress should pass individual private bills to compensate particular injured persons or groups of persons who might otherwise lack recourse under the FTCA. To that end, Congress has occasionally "provided compensation [to plaintiffs] in situations where the courts have found that the FTCA waiver of immunity provides no relief."

A plaintiff injured by a defendant's wrongful act may file a tort lawsuit to recover money from that defendant. To name a particularly familiar example, a person who negligently causes a vehicular collision may be liable to the victim of that crash. By forcing people who wrongfully injure others to pay money to their victims, the tort system serves at least two functions: (1) deterring people from injuring others and (2) compensating those who are injured. Employees and officers of the federal government occasionally commit torts just like other members of the general public. For a substantial portion of this nation's history, however, plaintiffs injured by the tortious acts of a federal officer or employee were barred from filing lawsuits against the United States by "sovereign immunity"—a legal doctrine that ordinarily prohibits private citizens from haling a sovereign state into court without its consent. Until the mid-20th century, a tort victim could obtain compensation from the United States only by persuading Congress to pass a private bill compensating him for his loss. Congress, deeming this state of affairs unacceptable, enacted the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), which authorizes plaintiffs to obtain compensation from the United States for the torts of its employees. However, subjecting the federal government to tort liability not only creates a financial cost to the United States, it also creates a risk that government officials may inappropriately base their decisions not on socially desirable policy objectives, but rather on the desire to reduce the government's exposure to monetary damages. In an attempt to mitigate these potential negative effects of abrogating the government's immunity from liability and litigation, the FTCA limits the circumstances in which a plaintiff may pursue a tort lawsuit against the United States. For example, the FTCA contains several exceptions that categorically bar plaintiffs from recovering tort damages in certain categories of cases. Federal law also restricts the types and amount of damages a victorious plaintiff may recover in an FTCA suit. Additionally, a plaintiff may not initiate an FTCA lawsuit unless he has timely complied with a series of procedural requirements, such as providing the government an initial opportunity to evaluate the plaintiff's claim and decide whether to settle it before the case proceeds to federal court. Since Congress first enacted the FTCA, the federal courts have developed a robust body of judicial precedent interpreting the statute's contours. In recent years, however, the Supreme Court has expressed reluctance to reconsider its long-standing FTCA precedents, thereby leaving the task of further developing the FTCA to Congress. Some Members of Congress have accordingly proposed legislation to modify the FTCA in various respects, such as by broadening the circumstances in which a plaintiff may hold the United States liable for torts committed by government employees.

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Introduction The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) was established by the National Housing Act of 1934 and became part of th e Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) in 1965. It insures private lenders against losses on certain home mortgages. If the borrower does not repay the mortgage and the home goes to foreclosure, FHA pays the lender the remaining amount that the borrower owes (that is, it pays a claim to the lender). FHA charges borrowers fees, called premiums, in exchange for the insurance. FHA insurance is intended to encourage lenders to offer mortgages to some borrowers who otherwise might be unable to access mortgage credit at affordable interest rates or at all. For example, FHA requires a smaller down payment than many other types of mortgages, potentially making it easier for lower-wealth borrowers, first-time homebuyers, or others for whom a large down payment may present a barrier to homeownership to obtain a mortgage. To qualify for FHA insurance, both the borrower and the mortgage must meet certain criteria. For example, the principal balance of the mortgage must be under a certain dollar threshold. Lenders that originate FHA-insured mortgages must be approved by FHA. This report describes certain measures of the financial health of the FHA insurance fund for home mortgages, the Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund. The discussion in this report assumes a certain degree of familiarity with FHA-insured mortgages. For more information on the basic features of FHA-insured mortgages and FHA's role in the mortgage market, see CRS Report RS20530, FHA-Insured Home Loans: An Overview . The Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund Most single-family mortgages insured by FHA are financed through an insurance fund called the Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund (MMI Fund). Since FY2009, the MMI Fund has included FHA-insured reverse mortgages as well as traditional "forward" home mortgages. Much of the discussion in this report focuses only on traditional forward mortgages, rather than reverse mortgages. However, certain specified sections discuss both forward and reverse mortgages. Money flows into the MMI Fund primarily from the mortgage insurance premiums paid by borrowers and from sales of foreclosed properties, and money flows out of the MMI Fund primarily from claims paid to lenders when FHA-insured mortgages default. The MMI Fund is intended to be self-supporting. It is meant to pay for costs related to insured loans (such as insurance claims paid to lenders) with money it earns on those loans (such as through premiums paid by borrowers), not through appropriations. The MMI Fund is also required to maintain a capital ratio of 2% to help pay for any unexpected increases in losses on its insured mortgages, beyond the losses that it currently anticipates. (Capital in this context is defined as the assets that the MMI Fund currently has on hand, plus the net present value of future cash flows associated with the mortgages that it currently insures. The capital ratio is the ratio of capital to the total dollar amount of mortgages insured under the MMI Fund.) As will be discussed in more detail later in this report, the MMI Fund, like all federal loan and loan guarantee programs subject to the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990, has permanent and indefinite budget authority to receive funds from the Department of the Treasury to cover increases in the costs of loan guarantees made in prior years. FHA faces an inherent tension between facilitating the provision of mortgage credit to underserved borrowers and safeguarding the health of the MMI Fund. In the years following the housing and mortgage market turmoil that began around 2007, rising mortgage default rates and falling home prices put pressure on the MMI Fund. This resulted in the capital ratio falling below the required 2% threshold in FY2009 and then turning negative for a period of time. The capital ratio became positive again in FY2014 and regained the 2% threshold in FY2015. The capital ratio falling below 2%, and then turning negative, raised concerns that the MMI Fund would not have enough money to cover all of its expected future losses on the loans that it was currently insuring. At the end of FY2013, the MMI Fund received $1.7 billion from Treasury using its permanent and indefinite budget authority to ensure that it was holding enough funds to cover expected future losses on insured loans. This represented the first time that the MMI Fund ever had to draw on its permanent and indefinite budget authority with Treasury for this purpose. The MMI Fund has not needed to draw such funds from Treasury in subsequent years. Congress has expressed ongoing interest in the MMI Fund's financial status and its prospects for needing additional funds to pay for future losses on its insured loans. This report focuses on the financial position of the MMI Fund. It begins with a brief overview of some of the major factors that affect the MMI Fund's financial soundness. The remainder of the report focuses on (1) how the MMI Fund is accounted for in the federal budget and (2) the results of annual independent actuarial reviews that are mandated by Congress. The budgetary treatment of FHA-insured mortgages and the actuarial review are two different processes, but both examine how the loans insured under the MMI Fund have performed and are expected to perform in the future and the effect of this loan performance on the financial position of the MMI Fund. The annual actuarial review is the basis for determining the capital ratio. However, it is the annual budget process that determines whether or not the MMI Fund requires assistance from Treasury. Major Factors Affecting the Stability of the MMI Fund This section briefly describes some of the major factors that can affect the MMI Fund's financial position. These factors include default and foreclosure rates on FHA-insured loans and the average loss to FHA when a loan goes to foreclosure, the amount of the premiums charged by FHA, the volume of loans that FHA insures, and current and future economic conditions. Foreclosures and Associated Loss Severities Traditionally, when an FHA-insured mortgage goes to foreclosure, FHA pays the lender the remaining amount that the borrower owes on the mortgage and takes ownership of the property. The payment to the lender is called a claim . The loss to FHA is the claim amount paid plus any other foreclosure-related expenses (such as the cost of maintaining the foreclosed property), minus any amount that FHA can recoup by selling the foreclosed home. FHA's total losses related to defaults and foreclosures can depend on, among other factors, (1) the number of delinquencies, defaults, and foreclosures on FHA-insured loans; (2) the success of efforts to help borrowers avoid foreclosure on FHA-insured loans or to minimize the costs to FHA associated with a foreclosure; and (3) how much FHA can recoup by reselling foreclosed homes. Number of Mortgage Delinquencies and Foreclosures The number of FHA-insured mortgages that become delinquent on mortgage payments impacts FHA's financial status because higher numbers of delinquencies are likely to translate into higher numbers of foreclosures and more claims paid out by FHA. Not all delinquent or defaulted mortgages will necessarily result in completed foreclosures, but higher delinquency and default rates are more likely to lead to higher foreclosure rates. During turmoil in the housing and mortgage markets starting around 2007, delinquency and foreclosure rates on all types of mortgages, including FHA-insured mortgages, increased, with FHA "serious delinquency" rates peaking in early 2012 at nearly 10%. (Seriously delinquent loans are generally defined as loans that are 90 or more days past due, in the foreclosure process, or in bankruptcy.) This increase in distressed mortgages put pressure on the MMI Fund. More recently, delinquency rates on FHA-insured mortgages have generally improved. As of December 2018, FHA reported that about 4% of its insured loans were seriously delinquent. A number of factors contributed to elevated delinquency and default rates on FHA-insured mortgages in the aftermath of the housing market turmoil. Unfavorable economic conditions, such as decreases in home prices and increases in unemployment, affected many regions of the country, leading to more defaults and foreclosures on FHA-insured loans. Other factors, such as the credit quality of some loans, also contributed to increased default rates. Similarly, many factors contributed to the improvement in loan performance beginning in 2013. These factors included improving economic conditions and better credit quality of newly insured loans. FHA data show that the loans insured by FHA in the years since 2009 have generally performed better to date than the loans insured in the years immediately preceding 2009, based on a comparison of serious delinquency rates at the same number of months after loan origination. Loss Mitigation Efforts Default and foreclosure rates can be affected by efforts to help borrowers avoid foreclosure, such as by offering mortgage modifications. Efforts to help borrowers avoid foreclosure and thereby mitigate the losses that the MMI Fund would experience due to a foreclosure are referred to as loss mitigation actions. When a borrower with an FHA-insured loan defaults, the servicer of the loan is required to evaluate whether the borrower is eligible for certain specified loss mitigation actions. If successful, these options can reduce the losses that FHA would otherwise bear on a troubled loan and help minimize losses to the MMI Fund. Some loss mitigation options are intended to result in a borrower keeping his or her home, such as loan forbearance or loan modifications. Other options will result in the borrower losing his or her home, but avoiding foreclosure, such as short sales and deeds-in-lieu of foreclosure. FHA pays incentive payments and, in some cases, partial insurance claim payments to lenders in connection with loss mitigation actions. These costs are likely to be less to FHA than the cost of paying a claim after a foreclosure. However, if the borrower defaults on the mortgage again in the future and the loan then goes to foreclosure, FHA could end up paying the full claim amount. Therefore, the extent to which loss mitigation actions minimize losses to FHA will depend on whether borrowers who receive any type of loan workout remain current on their mortgages or default again in the future. Loss Severity Rates If a mortgage must ultimately go to foreclosure, FHA may be able to recoup some of the claim amount that it pays to the lender by selling the property. In general, the amount that it recoups will usually be less than the claim amount. FHA also incurs costs related to managing and marketing foreclosed properties before they are ultimately sold. The amount of money that FHA loses on a given claim as a share of the outstanding loan balance, after accounting for any amounts it recoups from selling the property, is referred to as its loss severity rate. For the fourth quarter of FY2018, FHA reported that, on average, it lost about 41% of the unpaid principal balance of the loan when it paid insurance claims. (These rates can vary from quarter to quarter; for example, in FY2018 loss severity rates ranged from about 41% to about 46%; in FY2017 they ranged from about 46% to 54%.) FHA's loss severity rates have generally improved in recent years. For example, loss severity rates were 55% in the fourth quarter of FY2013 and 61% in the fourth quarter of FY2012, compared to about 41% in the fourth quarter of FY2018. This improvement has been driven in part by increased use of alternative methods of selling foreclosed properties, which have generally had lower loss severity rates than traditional foreclosures. However, the loss severity rates for traditional foreclosures have also decreased somewhat over time. A number of factors other than disposition methods can also affect loss severities, including home price appreciation or depreciation and the characteristics of the mortgages and properties in question. Mortgage Insurance Premiums FHA charges fees, or premiums, to borrowers who obtain FHA-insured mortgages. These premiums are intended to cover the costs of any claims that are paid out of the MMI Fund. Borrowers pay both an up-front premium and an annual premium. These fees represent the main source of revenue flowing into the MMI Fund. The amount of premium revenue that comes into the MMI Fund depends on a number of factors, including the amount of the premiums charged, the number and dollar amount of outstanding mortgages on which borrowers are paying premiums, and how many of these outstanding mortgages are ultimately prepaid—through refinancing the mortgage, paying off the loan, or going to foreclosure—resulting in the borrower no longer paying premiums. Raising premiums can bring more money into the insurance fund and help to ensure that FHA is pricing its insurance high enough to adequately cover its risks. However, if premiums are raised too high, fewer borrowers might choose to take out FHA-insured mortgages, potentially affecting the overall amount of premium revenue that FHA earns. Furthermore, raising premiums too high could reduce the overall quality of the mortgages that FHA insures by potentially making FHA-insured mortgages a less attractive option for all but the borrowers who present the largest credit risk. FHA raised the annual premiums that it charges multiple times in the years following the housing market turmoil before announcing a decrease in the annual premium in January 2015. The annual premiums that FHA is currently charging are lower than at any time since October 2010, though they are higher than the premiums that were charged prior to that date. Loan Volume The number and dollar volume of loans that FHA insures plays a role in its economic stability. On the one hand, more loans insured by FHA could lead to more premium revenue coming into the MMI Fund as more borrowers pay premiums on their FHA-insured loans. On the other hand, more mortgages insured by FHA also increases FHA's liability for loan defaults. Ultimately, the quality of the loans insured and their future performance influence the overall impact of loan volume on the financial stability of the MMI Fund. Economic Conditions and Projections Economic and housing market conditions impact FHA's financial position in several ways. First of all, economic conditions can contribute to default and foreclosure rates. If more people become unemployed or underemployed, or if home prices fall such that people cannot sell their homes if they can no longer afford their mortgages, then more people may face default or foreclosure. Falling house prices also limit the amount that FHA can recoup when it sells a foreclosed property. Projections of future economic conditions are also important factors in evaluating the health of the MMI Fund. The expected future paths of house prices and interest rates, in particular, play large roles in estimating how FHA-insured mortgages will perform in the future and, ultimately, how much money is expected to flow into and out of the MMI Fund. The future path of house prices is important because, as noted, house prices play a role in default and foreclosure rates and in how much FHA can recoup on foreclosures. Interest rates are important because they can affect home purchase activity as well as the decision by homeowners to refinance their mortgages, which affects how much premium revenue FHA expects to earn as well as affecting FHA's potential liability for future claims. If borrowers with FHA-insured mortgages refinance into new mortgages that are not insured by FHA, those borrowers will stop paying premiums to FHA, reducing the amount of revenue that FHA takes in. However, FHA's overall liabilities will also be reduced since it will no longer be responsible for repaying the lender if the borrower defaults on the mortgage. If assumptions about future economic conditions and their impact on loan performance are not accurate, then current estimates of the MMI Fund's financial position may also not be accurate. The MMI Fund in the Federal Budget This section describes how FHA-insured mortgages are accounted for in the federal budget in the year that the loans are insured and in the years thereafter. It includes a discussion of the circumstances under which the MMI Fund would need an appropriation in order to cover the cost of insuring new single-family loans in an upcoming fiscal year (a situation which has never occurred), and the circumstances under which the MMI Fund can draw on permanent and indefinite budget authority with Treasury to reserve for higher-than-expected costs of loans insured in past years (an event that occurred at the end of FY2013). Credit Reform Accounting and Credit Subsidy Rates The Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 (FCRA) specifies the way in which the costs of federal loan guarantees, including FHA-insured loans, are recorded in the federal budget. The FCRA requires that the estimated lifetime cost of guaranteed loans (in net present value terms) be recorded in the federal budget in the year that the loans are insured. The lifetime cost per dollar of loans guaranteed is reflected in the budget as a credit subsidy rate , and the credit subsidy rate multiplied by the total dollar volume of loans insured that year results in the total amount of credit subsidy for those loans. When a loan guarantee program is estimated to have a positive credit subsidy rate, it requires an appropriation to cover the cost of new loan guarantees before it can insure any new loans in that fiscal year. When a loan guarantee program is estimated to have a negative credit subsidy rate, it means that the present value of the lifetime cash flows associated with the guaranteed loans is expected to result in more money coming into the account than flowing out if it. Rather than requiring an appropriation, a negative credit subsidy rate generates negative subsidy, resulting in offsetting receipts. In the case of the MMI Fund, these offsetting receipts can offset other costs of the HUD budget. In accordance with the FCRA, each year as part of the President's budget request, FHA and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) estimate the credit subsidy rate for the loans expected to be insured in the upcoming fiscal year. These estimates are based on factors such as projections of how much mortgage insurance premium revenue the loans insured in the upcoming year are expected to bring in, projections of how much FHA will have to pay in future insurance claims related to those loans, and projections of how much money FHA will be able to recover by selling foreclosed properties. These projections, in turn, rest on assumptions about the credit quality of the loans being made and assumptions about future economic conditions (including house prices and interest rates). Since credit reform accounting was implemented, FHA's single-family mortgages have always been estimated to have negative credit subsidy in the year that they are insured. That is, over the life of the loans, the insured loans are projected to make money for the government rather than require an appropriation from the government to pay for their costs. (This applies only to the costs associated with the insured loans themselves; credit subsidy rates do not include the administrative costs of a program. FHA does receive appropriations for administrative contract expenses and for salaries. ) The original credit subsidy rate estimates for FHA-insured loans have ranged from a low of -0.05% in FY2009 to a high of -9.03% in FY2015. The total amount of money that FHA would expect to earn on loans insured in a given year depends on the total dollar amount of loans it insures in that year as well as the credit subsidy rate. If FHA's single-family program were ever estimated to have a positive credit subsidy rate for the upcoming fiscal year, it would require an appropriation to cover the difference between the amount of money FHA expected to take in and pay out over the life of the loans. If funding was not appropriated to cover a positive subsidy rate, then FHA would not be able to insure new loans in that year. (For a brief discussion of a proposed change in the required method of calculating credit subsidy rates that could result in the MMI Fund having a positive credit subsidy rate, see the nearby text box, " FHA and "Fair Value" Accounting .") In the President's FY2019 budget request, the credit subsidy rate for the MMI Fund, excluding reverse mortgages, was estimated to be negative 3.20% for FY2019. At an expected insurance volume of $230 billion, the budget estimated that the MMI Fund forward portfolio would earn about $7.4 billion in negative credit subsidy in FY2019. CBO does its own credit subsidy estimates, and these estimates are the ones that are used during the appropriations process. For FY2019, CBO estimated that FHA's single-family programs (excluding reverse mortgages) would generate about $6.9 billion in negative credit subsidy. CBO's lower credit subsidy estimate, as compared to the budget request, results from slightly lower estimates of both the credit subsidy rate and overall loan volume for the FHA forward portfolio in FY2019. Annual Credit Subsidy Rate Re-estimates The amount of money that loans insured by FHA in a given year actually earn for or cost the government over the course of their lifetime is likely to be different from the original credit subsidy estimates due to better or worse than expected performance of those loans. Federal credit reform accounting recognizes this, and provides permanent and indefinite budget authority to federal credit programs to cover any increased costs of loan guarantees in the future. Each year, in consultation with OMB, FHA re-estimates each prior year's credit subsidy rates based on the actual performance of the loans and other factors, such as updated economic projections. Although the original credit subsidy rate for the single-family mortgage insurance program each year has historically been estimated to be negative, the credit subsidy rate re-estimates for the loans insured in several fiscal years are currently estimated to be positive, suggesting that FHA will actually pay out more money than it earns on the loans insured in those years. Table 1 shows the original credit subsidy rate estimates and the most current re-estimated credit subsidy rates (as of the date of this report) for the loans insured in each fiscal year between 1992 and 2017. The first column shows the original credit subsidy rate. In all cases the original subsidy rate estimates were negative (shown in green), meaning that the loans insured in those years were originally expected to make money for the government. The second column shows the current re-estimated credit subsidy rate for each year. Re-estimated credit subsidy rates are shown in green if they remained negative (even if they are less favorable than the original estimate) and in red if they have become positive. (See the PDF version of this report to see the table in color.) For most years, the current re-estimated credit subsidy rate is less favorable than the original estimate, although many of the re-estimated credit subsidy rates are still negative. A lower, but still negative, credit subsidy estimate suggests that the loans insured in that fiscal year will still make money for the government, but less than was originally estimated. In the years between FY2000 and FY2009, the re-estimates of the subsidy rates are positive (shown in red), meaning that the loans insured in these years are currently expected to lose money overall. In six years—FY1992, FY2010, FY2011, FY2012, FY2013, and FY2016—the current re-estimated subsidy rate is more favorable than the original estimated subsidy rate, meaning that the loans insured in those years are now expected to make more money than originally estimated. MMI Fund Account Balances The credit subsidy rate re-estimates affect the way in which funds are held in the MMI Fund. The MMI Fund consists of two primary accounts: the Financing Account and the Capital Reserve Account. The Financing Account holds funds to cover expected future losses on FHA-insured loans. The Capital Reserve Account holds additional funds to cover any additional, unexpected future losses. Funds are transferred between the two accounts each year on the basis of the re-estimated credit subsidy rates to ensure that enough is held in the Financing Account to cover updated projections of expected losses on insured loans. If the credit subsidy rate re-estimates reflect an aggregate increase in expected losses, funds are transferred from the Capital Reserve Account to the Financing Account to cover the amount of the increase in expected losses. If the credit subsidy rate re-estimates reflect a decrease in aggregate expected losses, funds are transferred from the Financing Account to the Capital Reserve Account. Table 2 illustrates the changes in these account balances between FY2008 and FY2018. In the years following the housing market turmoil that began around 2007, the credit subsidy rate re-estimates showed aggregate increases in expected losses on FHA-insured loans, requiring large transfers of funds from the Capital Reserve Account to the Financing Account to cover these additional expected future losses. At the end of FY2008, the MMI Fund held $9 billion in the Financing Account and $19.3 billion in the Capital Reserve Account. The amounts needed in the Financing Account increased over the next several years and the amounts held in the Capital Reserve Account decreased, reaching zero at the end of FY2013 (when the MMI Fund received funds from Treasury to make a required transfer of funds to the Financing Account). By the end of FY2014, the MMI Fund had begun to rebuild its reserves, holding $7.3 billion in the Capital Reserve Account. As of the end of FY2018, the Capital Reserve Account held $27.2 billion. Although the total resources held in these accounts have increased over the last several years, the total dollar volume of mortgages insured by FHA has also increased, from about $400 billion at the end of FY2008 to about $1.3 trillion at the end of FY2018. Permanent and Indefinite Budget Authority Recognizing the fact that estimating the lifetime cost of loan guarantees is inexact, the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 includes permanent and indefinite budget authority for federal loan guarantee programs to cover the cost of credit subsidy rate re-estimates. Therefore, if FHA ever needs to transfer more money than it has in the Capital Reserve Account to the Financing Account to cover an increase in expected losses on insured loans, it can draw on its permanent and indefinite budget authority to receive funds from Treasury to make this transfer without additional congressional action. Any funds drawn from Treasury to make a required transfer of funds to the Financing Account are not spent immediately. Rather, they are held in the Financing Account, and used to pay claims to lenders only if the rest of the funds in the Financing Account are exhausted. If economic conditions and loan performance improve, or if loans insured in the future bring in enough money to both cover their own costs and pay for past loans that defaulted, it is possible that any money received from Treasury would never actually be spent. On the other hand, if future insured loans do not bring in enough funds to cover losses on past loans, or if economic conditions and loan performance do not improve, any funds received from Treasury could eventually be spent to pay actual claims. When the President's budget request for FY2014 was released in April 2013, it included an estimate that the MMI Fund would need a mandatory appropriation of $943 million from Treasury during FY2013 in order to make a required transfer of funds from the Capital Reserve Account to the Financing Account. FHA had until the end of FY2013 to make the required transfer of funds, and there was a possibility that the MMI Fund would bring in enough additional funds through the negative credit subsidy it earned on loans that it insured in FY2013 to make the required transfer without depleting the Capital Reserve Account. However, due to reduced loan volumes in FY2013, the MMI Fund earned less than anticipated during the year. At the end of September 2013, HUD announced that the MMI Fund needed about $1.7 billion to ensure that enough money was available in the Financing Account to cover all expected future losses on insured loans. It received these funds from Treasury using the permanent and indefinite budget authority provided under the FCRA. This amount was nearly twice what was anticipated in the President's budget, and represented the first time that FHA had ever needed funds from Treasury to make a required transfer of funds from the Capital Reserve Account to the Financing Account. FHA has not needed to draw additional funds from Treasury since that time. Annual Actuarial Review and Annual Report to Congress on the Financial Status of the MMI Fund Separately from the annual budget process, FHA is required by law to obtain an independent actuarial review each year that analyzes the financial position of the MMI Fund and to provide an annual report to Congress on the results of the actuarial review. This review traditionally analyzes the MMI Fund's financial position by reporting the amount of funds that it currently has on hand and estimating the net amount (in present value terms) that it expects to earn or lose in the future on loans that it currently insures. These numbers are added together to compute the "economic value" of the MMI Fund. The economic value is the amount of money that the MMI Fund would be projected to have on hand after all of the cash flows associated with its insured loans are realized, assuming that it does not insure any more loans going forward. The results of the actuarial review are presented in FHA's annual report to Congress on the financial status of the MMI Fund. The budgetary treatment and the actuarial review of the MMI Fund are two different ways of looking at the same thing—namely, how the loans insured under the MMI Fund have performed and are expected to perform in the future, and the effect of this loan performance on the financial position of the MMI Fund. However, the annual actuarial review is separate from the federal budget process, and uses somewhat different economic assumptions than those used in the federal budget. This section describes the actuarial review and accompanying annual report to Congress along with important related concepts. It then discusses the results of the FY2018 actuarial review and annual report that were released in November 2018. In the annual actuarial review, the independent actuary reviews the MMI Fund's financial information to estimate the MMI Fund's current financial position, including both forward and reverse mortgages insured under the fund. This usually includes reporting the amount of funds that the MMI Fund currently has on hand and estimating the cash flows that it expects in the future—such as premiums paid into the fund and claims paid out of the fund—on the loans that it currently insures. It uses economic modeling to project the MMI Fund's financial status for the current year and several years into the future under a "base case" scenario and several alternative economic scenarios. Some of the key terms used in the actuarial report and FHA's annual report on the financial status of the MMI Fund include the following: Capital resources are the net assets (assets minus liabilities) that the MMI Fund currently has on hand that can be converted into cash to pay claims on defaulted mortgages or other expenses. Present value of future cash flows on outstanding business is the estimated amount that the MMI Fund is currently expected to gain or lose in the future, in present value terms, on the loans that it currently insures (this estimate does not take into account any new loans that might be insured in the future). Economic value or economic net worth is the MMI Fund's capital resources plus the present value of its future cash flows on outstanding business. It represents the amount of capital resources that the MMI Fund would have after expected future cash flows on currently insured loans are realized. In other words, it represents the amount that the MMI Fund could use to pay for any additional, unexpected losses on its outstanding loans. The law also mandates that FHA meet a 2% capital ratio requirement, which means that the economic value of the MMI Fund must be at least 2% of the total dollar volume of mortgages that FHA currently insures. The capital ratio is calculated on the basis of the actuarial report. The capital ratio fell below this 2% requirement in FY2009 and remained below 2% for several years thereafter, turning negative in FY2012 and FY2013. The capital ratio was estimated to be positive again in FY2014 and was estimated to exceed 2% in FY2015 and each subsequent year to date. FY2018 Results The FY2018 annual actuarial review and FHA's accompanying annual report to Congress on the MMI Fund's financial status were released in November 2018. In its annual report, FHA reported the MMI Fund's total capital resources to be $49.2 billion. This is the amount of resources that FHA currently has on hand that can be converted into cash to pay claims. FHA estimated the present value of future cash flows on insured loans (including both forward and reverse mortgages) to be negative $14.4 billion. In other words, in net present value terms, the loans that FHA currently insures are expected to cost FHA about $14.4 billion over the remaining life of those loans. The economic value of the MMI Fund, therefore, was estimated by FHA to be approximately $34.9 billion ($49.2 billion-$14.4 billion), including both forward and reverse mortgages. The independent actuary separately estimated the present value of future cash flows on insured loans for the MMI Fund. While the actuary's estimate differed somewhat from FHA's, it found FHA's estimate to be reasonable. The estimated economic value of $34.9 billion was an increase of about $8.1 billion compared to FY2017, when the MMI Fund was estimated to have an economic value of $26.7 billion. In FY2012 and FY2013, the MMI Fund was estimated to have a negative economic value. A negative economic value means that the funds that the MMI Fund currently has on hand, plus the present value of the funds that it expects to earn in premiums on loans that it currently insures, would not be enough to pay for the present value of claims on the loans that are currently insured. For example, in FY2013 the MMI Fund was estimated to have an economic value of negative $1.3 billion. This meant that, based on the MMI Fund's capital resources and estimates of future cash flows on insured loans as of the time the report was prepared, FHA was expected to be short about $1.3 billion when all of its currently insured loans were eventually paid off. In contrast, the FY2018 economic value of positive $34.9 billion means that the MMI Fund would be estimated to have that amount left over after all of the expected future cash flows (including premium payments and insurance claims) on its currently insured mortgages were realized. This provides a "cushion" should future losses on insured mortgages be higher than currently anticipated. The projections included in the actuarial report and the annual report to Congress rely on several assumptions. For one thing, the estimates of the MMI Fund's current status assume that FHA will not insure any more mortgages. In actuality, FHA will likely continue to insure loans, which will bring in additional resources in the form of premium revenues, but will also create new liabilities in terms of claims. Furthermore, the actuarial review relies upon assumptions about future economic conditions. To the extent that actual future economic conditions differ from these assumptions, the estimates of the MMI Fund's value will also be different. Although FHA estimates that the MMI Fund's economic value in FY2018 is positive $34.9 billion, it notes that, under a variety of alternative future economic scenarios, the MMI Fund's economic value could be different, including potentially negative values in certain severe economic scenarios. Both the actuarial report and the annual report to Congress include an analysis of the MMI Fund's financial position under various alternative economic scenarios. The 2% Capital Ratio Requirement As noted earlier, the MMI Fund is also required by law to maintain a capital ratio of 2%. This is often referred to as the capital ratio requirement. Brief History of the Capital Ratio Requirement The capital ratio requirement for the MMI Fund was enacted in 1990 amid concerns about the solvency of the FHA single-family mortgage insurance program. At the time, the MMI Fund had a negative economic value. This meant that the expected future cash flows associated with the mortgages currently insured by the MMI Fund, when combined with the capital resources that the MMI Fund currently had on hand, were not expected to be enough to pay for all future claims on FHA-insured loans. In response to these concerns, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 ( P.L. 101-508 ) mandated that, going forward, the MMI Fund's economic value must be at least 2% of the total dollar amount of loans that it is currently insuring. The capital ratio is an expression of the economic value of the MMI Fund as a percentage of the total dollar volume of loans insured by the MMI Fund. It is a measure of how much capital the MMI Fund will have available to pay for unexpected losses on currently insured loans, after the amounts estimated to be needed to cover expected losses are taken into account. In addition to establishing the capital ratio requirement, P.L. 101-508 also directed FHA to make certain changes that were intended to improve the MMI Fund's financial condition. The changes that the law required included charging borrowers an annual mortgage insurance premium to go along with the existing premium that was paid upfront and suspending certain payments (known as distributive shares) that had previously been paid to borrowers under certain conditions. The law also established the requirement for the annual independent actuarial review of the MMI Fund. Some of these changes, such as the additional mortgage insurance premium, essentially meant that FHA would charge more to future borrowers to build up reserves to pay for losses on mortgages made to past borrowers. As Congress considered the legislation prior to enactment, there was debate over the appropriate level for the capital ratio requirement. This debate highlights the ongoing tension that FHA faces between maintaining its financial soundness and carrying out its purpose of expanding access to affordable mortgage credit for underserved borrowers. The 2% threshold was adopted because it was viewed as being high enough to provide FHA with a cushion to withstand some unexpected losses, but without imposing an undue financial burden on future FHA-insured borrowers. A higher capital ratio requirement would have likely required FHA to charge higher premiums for FHA insurance. It was recognized that a 2% requirement would likely be high enough to withstand moderate future economic downturns, but would likely not be high enough to allow the MMI Fund to withstand a catastrophic economic downturn. According to testimony from the General Accounting Office (GAO, now the Government Accountability Office) from 2000: Determining what constitutes an adequate reserve level is essentially a question of what kinds of adverse economic conditions—moderately severe or catastrophic—the reserve should be able to withstand.... In the actuarial review of the Fund conducted by Price Waterhouse for fiscal year 1989, the researchers concluded that actuarial soundness would be consistent with a reserve that could withstand adverse, but not catastrophic, economic downturns. They further concluded that the Treasury implicitly covers catastrophic risk.... By contrast, rating agencies have taken the position, when evaluating private mortgage insurers, that they should have enough capital to withstand catastrophic risk.... However, requiring FHA to hold capital equivalent to that held by private mortgage insurers would likely impair FHA's public purpose. While the law requires the Secretary of HUD to ensure that the MMI Fund maintains a capital ratio of 2%, it does not currently specify consequences or specific actions that the Secretary must take if the capital ratio falls below that threshold. Furthermore, GAO has noted that the 2% capital ratio requirement does not take into account specific economic conditions the MMI Fund should be expected to withstand. It has suggested that Congress could consider enacting legislation to specify such conditions, and to require FHA to maintain a capital ratio that is based on the MMI Fund's ability to withstand those specific economic scenarios. While the results of the actuarial review and the estimate of the capital ratio provide important information about the financial soundness of the MMI Fund, the results of the actuarial review and the capital ratio estimate do not determine whether or not FHA will need to draw on its permanent and indefinite budget authority with Treasury for funds to hold against expected future losses or to pay claims. That is determined as part of the re-estimate process that is done as part of the federal budgeting process each year, which is described in the " The MMI Fund in the Federal Budget " section of this report. FY2018 Capital Ratio The capital ratio is reported in FHA's annual report to Congress on the financial status of the MMI Fund, using the actuarial report's numbers for both traditional single-family forward mortgages and reverse mortgages insured by FHA. In FY2018, the annual report estimated the economic value of the MMI Fund to be $34.9 billion. The total dollar volume of mortgages currently insured by the MMI Fund was $1.265 trillion, which means that the capital ratio was estimated to be 2.76% ($34.9 billion divided by $1.265 trillion). This represents an increase from FY2017, when the capital ratio was estimated to be 2.18%. The capital ratio remained above 2% for the fourth straight year; FY2015 was the first time the capital ratio had exceeded 2% since FY2008. In FY2009, the capital ratio was estimated to be 0.53%. This was the first time that the capital ratio had fallen below 2% since the requirement was first met in FY1995. The capital ratio remained below 2% from FY2009 through FY2014, when the capital ratio was estimated to be 0.41%. In FY2012 and FY2013, the capital ratio was estimated to be negative 1.44% and negative 0.11%, respectively. FY2012 was the first time that the MMI Fund had been estimated to have a negative capital ratio since the early 1990s, when Congress enacted the series of changes aimed at ensuring the financial soundness of the MMI Fund, including the requirement for an independent annual actuarial review and the required capital ratio. A negative capital ratio by itself does not trigger any special assistance from Treasury, although it suggests that such assistance could be needed at some point. Rather, any assistance from Treasury is triggered if the credit subsidy rate re-estimates described in the " Annual Credit Subsidy Rate Re-estimates " section show that FHA needs to transfer more funds than it has in its Capital Reserve Account into its Financing Account to cover increases in expected future losses. The amount of assistance required from Treasury is based on the credit subsidy rate re-estimates, not on the capital ratio or the economic value of the MMI Fund as reported in the actuarial report. Table 3 shows the MMI Fund's financial position, including its economic value, dollar volume of insured mortgages, and capital ratio, as estimated by the independent actuary and FHA for each fiscal year between FY2006 and FY2018. The drop in the capital ratio in the years after 2008 resulted from both a decrease in the numerator of the ratio (the MMI Fund's economic value) and an increase in the denominator of the ratio (total dollar volume of mortgages outstanding), which reflects the fact that FHA is insuring a greater volume of loans than it has in the recent past. The decrease in the MMI Fund's economic value, in turn, was mostly due to the fact that the present value of future cash flows became increasingly negative for a time, suggesting that FHA was expecting large net cash outflows over the life of the loans that it was currently insuring. Selected Current Issues Related to the Financial Status of the MMI Fund This section briefly describes selected current issues related to the financial status of the MMI Fund, and in particular certain issues that are often discussed in the context of the annual actuarial review and annual report to Congress. Namely, it discusses the inclusion of reverse mortgages in the MMI Fund, debate over the appropriate level for the premiums charged for FHA-insured mortgages, and certain trends in FHA-insured mortgage characteristics that FHA identified in its FY2018 annual report as worthy of monitoring. Role of FHA-Insured Reverse Mortgages in the Annual Actuarial Review FHA-insured reverse mortgages, known as Home Equity Conversion Mortgages (HECMs), were moved into the MMI Fund beginning in FY2009. In contrast to traditional forward mortgages, HECMs are FHA-insured reverse mortgages for elderly homeowners who are seeking to access their accumulated home equity. HECMs that were insured by FHA prior to FY2009 are obligations of a different FHA insurance fund, but HECMs insured in FY2009 or later are obligations of the MMI Fund. The dollar amount of HECMs insured under the MMI Fund is much smaller than the amount of traditional forward mortgages: about $72 billion of the $1.3 trillion of insurance-in-force under the MMI Fund are HECMs. However, changes in the estimated value of HECMs can have a significant impact on the MMI Fund's overall economic value and on the capital ratio. Estimates of HECM performance are particularly sensitive to economic assumptions, such as future house prices and interest rates, making the value of the HECM portfolio volatile. While the value of forward mortgages insured under the MMI Fund has consistently increased since FY2012, the value of HECMs has fluctuated between negative and positive values and has become increasingly negative in recent years. The volatility in the HECM portfolio can be seen in the results of recent actuarial reviews and in the standalone capital ratios for the forward and HECM portfolios as reported by FHA. As shown in Figure 1 , the standalone capital ratio for the forward mortgage portfolio alone has steadily increased from negative 0.91% in FY2012 to positive 3.93% in FY2018. In comparison, the standalone capital ratio for HECMs has fluctuated during that time period, ranging from a high of positive 3.07% in FY2013 to a low of negative 18.83% in FY2018. (The capital ratio for the overall MMI Fund in FY2018 was estimated to be 2.76%.) Given the smaller overall insurance volume of the HECM portfolio, changes in the portfolio's economic value can have a larger impact on the HECM standalone capital ratio than a comparable dollar volume change in the larger forward portfolio would have on its standalone capital ratio. Nevertheless, the trends in the standalone capital ratios illustrate differences in the performance of the two portfolios. The volatility of HECMs and their inclusion in the MMI Fund potentially raise some policy questions. In its FY2015 annual report on the status of the MMI Fund, FHA noted that including both HECMs and forward mortgages in the fund could make it more difficult to independently assess the financial health of the separate programs, particularly since the capital ratio for the entire MMI Fund is often used as a proxy for the performance of the much larger forward mortgage portfolio. Furthermore, including both types of mortgages in the same fund could impact policies related specifically to forward mortgages, such as the level of fees paid by borrowers, in response to instability in the MMI Fund driven by HECMs. For these reasons, some industry groups and other observers have argued that Congress should consider legislation to remove HECMs from the MMI Fund. However, GAO and others have noted that removing HECMs from the MMI Fund would involve tradeoffs. Debate over FHA Premium Levels The upfront and annual mortgage insurance premiums charged by FHA account for most of the revenue coming into the MMI Fund. As described earlier in the " Mortgage Insurance Premiums " section of this report, the levels of the premiums charged can impact the MMI Fund's status in several potentially conflicting ways. All else being equal, higher premiums should bring more money into the MMI Fund. However, higher premiums have the potential to negatively impact FHA's finances by leading to a reduction in FHA loan volume or impacting the credit quality of the loans that FHA insures. Higher premiums also increase the costs of FHA-insured mortgages for homebuyers, potentially making FHA-insured mortgages less affordable or pricing some potential homebuyers out of the market. Therefore, setting the appropriate levels for the mortgage insurance premiums requires striking a balance between maintaining affordability of FHA-insured mortgages and managing risk to the insurance fund. In the years following the housing market turmoil that began around 2007, FHA increased the premiums that it charges for new FHA-insured forward mortgages several times. Most of these changes affected the annual premiums. Following several increases, FHA decreased the annual mortgage insurance premiums that it charges in January 2015. The current annual premiums are at their lowest levels since the beginning of October 2010, though they are higher than the premiums that FHA was charging previously. In recent years, as the capital ratio has increased over 2%, some industry groups and housing advocates have called for FHA to further reduce the mortgage insurance premiums it charges for forward mortgages (or to reduce the amount of time that it charges the premiums ), arguing that the MMI Fund is strong enough to take such steps to increase the affordability of FHA-insured mortgages. The improvement in the MMI Fund's capital ratio in FY2018 again led to calls from some advocates and industry groups to decrease the mortgage insurance premiums. However, FHA has reportedly indicated that it is not likely to reduce the premiums in the near future. Suspension of a Planned FHA Premium Decrease in 2017 On January 9, 2017, in the last weeks of the Obama Administration, FHA had announced that it would again decrease the annual mortgage insurance premiums charged to borrowers who took out new FHA-insured mortgages that closed on or after January 27, 2017. However, on the first day of the Trump Administration, before the new premiums had gone into effect, FHA announced that it was suspending the planned premium reduction. In its announcement, FHA indicated a need to further study the impact that the fee decrease could have on the insurance fund and the long-term financial viability of FHA. In its FY2017 annual report to Congress on the financial status of the MMI Fund, FHA estimated that had the premium decrease gone into effect, the capital ratio for the MMI Fund would have been 1.76% in FY2017, below the statutorily mandated level of 2%. The lower capital ratio would have resulted from the combination of an estimated decrease of $3.2 billion in the net present value of expected future cash flows on insured mortgages (stemming from lower premiums that would have been paid on FHA-insured mortgages originated in FY2017, including some borrowers refinancing their existing FHA-insured mortgages into new mortgages with lower premiums) and an estimated increase of $45 billion in FHA's insurance-in-force (stemming from more people obtaining FHA-insured mortgages as a result of the premium decrease). These estimated differences in the net present value of future cash flows and insurance-in-force also would have reduced the economic net worth and the capital ratio for the forward mortgage portfolio alone. However, based on the figures provided in the annual report, the estimated capital ratio for forward mortgages alone would still have remained above 2% if the premium decrease had gone into effect, even though the capital ratio for the MMI Fund as a whole (including both forward mortgages and HECMs) would have fallen below that threshold. The capital ratio for the MMI Fund as a whole is the only number that matters for the purposes of complying with the law. Nevertheless, the estimated impact that the premium decrease would have had on the forward portfolio alone may be relevant to the extent that some are concerned that the inclusion of HECMs in the MMI Fund may affect policy decisions related specifically to the forward portfolio. FHA-Insured Mortgage Origination Trends Identified by FHA in the FY2018 Annual Report In the FY2018 annual report to Congress, FHA identified several trends related to the credit quality of its forward mortgage insurance portfolio that it is monitoring due to their potential to increase risk to FHA. In particular, FHA noted the following five trends: Cash-Out Refinances : 75 Cash-out refinances are refinance transactions in which the borrower can access equity in the home by taking out a new mortgage for a higher amount than the remaining principal balance of the existing mortgage. The share of cash-out refinances insured by FHA has been increasing in recent years, reaching 63% of all FHA-insured refinance mortgages, and 15% of all FHA-insured forward mortgages, in FY2018. The share of cash-out refinances may be increasing for several reasons; for example, rising home prices may lead to more cash-out refinances by increasing borrowers' equity in their homes, and continuing low interest rates may be depressing other types of refinancing activity (making cash-out refinances a larger share of all refinance mortgages). Nevertheless, cash-out refinances have the potential to pose a risk to FHA by increasing borrowers' leverage and reducing the equity they have in their homes. If home prices should fall in the future, it is possible that some borrowers with higher loan-to-value ratios due to cash-out refinances could have difficulty repaying their mortgages. Debt-to-Income Ratios : 77 Debt-to-income ratios for borrowers with new FHA-insured purchase mortgages have been increasing in recent years. In FY2018, the average debt-to-income ratio for a new purchase borrower was about 43%, compared to 42% in FY2017 and 40% in FY2008. The share of FHA-insured purchase mortgages with borrower debt-to-income ratios above 50% has been increasing as well, reaching nearly 25% in FY2018. Higher debt-to-income ratios could increase the risk that some borrowers might have problems repaying their mortgages if they encounter financial difficulties. Credit Scores : 78 The average credit scores of borrowers who obtain FHA-insured mortgages have been decreasing since FY2011. In FY2018, the average borrower credit score for FHA-insured mortgages was 670, compared to 676 in FY2017 and 701 in FY2011. This in part reflects a return of FHA to its traditional role in the mortgage market; in the aftermath of the housing market turmoil that began around 2007, FHA insured a greater share of mortgages as mortgage credit conditions tightened, including mortgages for borrowers with higher credit scores who traditionally may not have sought FHA-insured mortgages. As mortgage credit conditions have eased somewhat, more high-credit-score borrowers may find it easier to obtain other types of mortgages. However, lower borrower credit scores could potentially suggest increased risk associated with these mortgages, and FHA has said that it "will continue to monitor declining credit scores for new FHA endorsements for the risk they pose to the MMIF." Down Payment Assistance : 80 FHA has also been monitoring the increasing share of mortgages that have some form of down payment assistance, and in particular down payment assistance provided by a federal, state, or local governmental entity (rather than other sources, such as a family member). In FY2018, about 38% of FHA-insured purchase mortgages included some type of down payment assistance, compared to about 30% in FY2011. FHA has noted that mortgages with down payment assistance, and down payment assistance provided by a governmental entity specifically, tend to have somewhat higher default rates than other FHA-insured mortgages. FHA has also expressed some concerns about certain types of governmental down payment assistance programs and has suggested that it may be necessary to take action to provide more clarity about what types of down payment assistance are allowed. Non b ank Mortgage Originations : 83 The share of FHA-insured mortgages originated by nonbanks, rather than by traditional depository institutions, has been increasing in recent years. In FY2018, nonbank lenders originated nearly 87% of new FHA-insured mortgages. While all lenders that originate FHA-insured mortgages are required to meet certain standards, mortgages originated by nonbanks may pose different types of risks to FHA than traditional depository institutions. In its annual report, FHA stated that it "believes it needs to strike a better balance in doing business" with both nonbank and depository lenders. There are several potential drivers of the trends identified by FHA, including, among other things, economic conditions and the availability of other types of mortgage credit. The overall impact of each of these trends on FHA loan performance and, by extension, its finances will depend on a variety of factors, and some of these trends may pose more of a potential risk to FHA than others.

The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) insures private lenders against losses on home mortgages that meet certain eligibility criteria. If the mortgage borrower defaults (that is, does not repay the mortgage as promised) and the home goes to foreclosure, FHA pays the lender the remaining principal amount owed. By insuring lenders against the possibility of borrower default, FHA is intended to expand access to mortgage credit to some households who might not otherwise be able to obtain affordable mortgages, such as those with small down payments. When an FHA-insured mortgage goes to foreclosure, the lender files a claim with FHA for the remaining amount owed on the mortgage. Claims on FHA-insured home mortgages are paid out of the Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund (MMI Fund), which is funded through fees paid by borrowers (called premiums), rather than through appropriations. However, like all federal credit programs covered by the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990, FHA can draw on permanent and indefinite budget authority with the U.S. Treasury to cover unanticipated increases in the cost of the loans that it insures, if necessary, without additional congressional action. Each year, as part of the annual budget process, the expected costs of mortgages insured in past years are re-estimated to take into account updated information on loan performance and economic assumptions. If the anticipated costs of insured mortgages have increased, then FHA must transfer funds from a secondary reserve account into its primary reserve account to cover the amount of the increase in the anticipated cost of insured loans. If there are not enough funds in the secondary reserve account, then the MMI Fund is required to take funds from Treasury using its permanent and indefinite budget authority in order to make the required transfer. Separately from the budget re-estimates, FHA is required by law to obtain an independent actuarial review of the MMI Fund each year. This review provides a view of the MMI Fund's financial status by estimating the MMI Fund's economic value—that is, the amount of funds that the MMI Fund currently has on hand plus the net present value of all of the expected future cash flows on the mortgages that are currently insured under the MMI Fund. The actuarial review is used to determine whether the MMI Fund is in compliance with a statutory requirement to maintain a capital ratio of at least 2%. The capital ratio is the economic value of the MMI Fund divided by the total dollar amount of mortgages insured under the MMI Fund. In the years following the housing and mortgage market turmoil that began around 2007, increased foreclosure rates, as well as economic factors such as falling house prices, contributed to increases in expected losses on FHA-insured loans. This put pressure on the MMI Fund and reduced the amount of resources that FHA had available to pay for additional, unexpected future losses. The capital ratio fell below 2% in FY2009 and remained below 2% for several years thereafter, turning negative in FY2012 and FY2013. Concerns about FHA's finances culminated at the end of FY2013, when FHA announced that it would need $1.7 billion from Treasury to cover an increase in anticipated costs of insured loans. This marked the first time that FHA needed funds from Treasury to make the required transfer of funds between the primary and secondary reserve accounts. More recently, the financial position of the MMI Fund has improved. The capital ratio again exceeded the 2% threshold in FY2015 and has remained above 2% in the years since. The FY2018 actuarial review of the MMI Fund estimated the economic value of the MMI Fund to be positive $34.9 billion and the capital ratio to be 2.76%. This suggests that the MMI Fund would have about $34.9 billion remaining after realizing all of its expected future cash flows on currently insured mortgages. The FY2018 results represent an increase from FY2017, when the capital ratio was estimated to be 2.18% and the economic value was estimated to be $26.7 billion.

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Introduction In FY2019 and FY2020, more than 90% of federal highway assistance is being distributed to the states by formula. Highway funding formulas have been in use to apportion federal highway authorizations among the states since the passage of the first federal-aid highway act more than a century ago. The resulting apportionments are widely used to evaluate how individual states benefit from federal highway assistance relative to other states. Although the procedure currently used to distribute federal highway funds is written into law and programs receiving funds in this manner are frequently referred to as "formula programs," the statutory language does not describe any formula in a straightforward way. In consequence, it can be difficult to understand how the apportionment of funds is determined, and whether that apportionment adequately reflects considerations that may be of concern to Members of Congress. This report describes the origins and development of highway formula funding, and then discusses how the use of various formula factors gave way to the current apportionment mechanism. A series of tables compares individual states' shares of the FY2018 apportionment with their shares of some factors relevant to highway needs. The Early Years of Formula Funding The Federal Aid Road Act of 1916 (39 Stat. 355), which created the first ongoing federal program to fund road construction, used three factors to apportion federal highway funds among the states. After setting some funds aside to cover administrative costs, the law apportioned the remaining authorization to the states according to three factors. These factors were selected, in part, because they were not difficult to compile and seemed relevant to individual states' costs to build and maintain a highway system. The three factors, which were weighted equally, were 1. land area: the ratio which the area of each state bore to the total area of all states; 2. population: the ratio which the population of each state bore to the total population of all the states, as shown by the latest available census; and 3. postal road mileage: the ratio which the mileage of rural free delivery routes and star routes in each state bore to the total mileage of such in all the states at the close of the preceding year. The selection of these factors had much to do with disagreement between urban and rural interests about the goals of the road program and with constitutional concerns regarding the appropriateness of federal spending on road construction. The population and land area factors were proxies for the rural and urban state interests. The population factor was seen as protecting the interests of the more densely populated eastern states and the land area factor as protecting the interests of large but less populated western states. The use of a postal road mileage factor helped allay any constitutional qualms, as Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution specifically grants Congress the power "To establish…post roads," but the factor also garnered favor from less populous states. The 1916 act also set the maximum federal share of the cost of any highway project at 50%. The 1916 act supported the construction of rural roads and excluded streets and roads in places having a population of 2,500 or more. The formula factors enacted in 1916 remained in place, with only temporary changes made in Depression-era emergency legislation and war legislation, until passage of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1944 (58 Stat. 838). The 1944 act began to shift the federal highway program away from construction of rural roads. It created three separate highway systems: a Primary System, a Secondary System, and an Urban System. Each system was authorized a percentage of the total funds provided, which were then apportioned among the states by formula. The Federal Highway Act of 1921 (42 Stat 22) retained the three formula factors adopted in 1916, but increased federal control over the use of funds by requiring the designation of a system of highways, limited to 7% of each state's total highway mileage, on which the federal funds could be spent. The 1921 act also guaranteed that each state would receive at least one-half percent of the total appropriation in any year. With this law, the three main characteristics of today's federal highway program were in place: funds were apportioned to the states by formula and implementation was left primarily to state governments; the states were required to provide matching funds; and the funds could be spent only on designated federal-aid highways. The Post-War Highway Program The Primary System funds were apportioned using the three formula factors established in 1916: each state's share of the national land area, population, and rural post road mileage, with each factor weighted equally. Funds for the Secondary System were apportioned based on each state's share of the national land area, rural population, and rural postal route mileage. The Urban System formula apportioned funds to the states based on one formula factor: each state's share of the national population living in urban areas of 5,000 or more residents. Although the act still favored rural areas, it was the first significant programmatic shift away from what had been essentially a rural road program. During the 1970s and 1980s, as Congress created many narrowly targeted programs within the Federal-Aid Highway Program, it frequently adopted formula factors specific to those programs. By FY1977, there were 35 separate authorized programs. Of those, 13, including all the larger programs, apportioned funds by a variety of statutory formulas. Examples of programs receiving more narrowly targeted funding were the new highway safety and hazard elimination programs, for which funds were apportioned based on both total state population and public road mileage. With the aging of the Interstate Highway System, a new Interstate Resurfacing, Restoration, Rehabilitation, and Reconstruction Program (Interstate 4R) was created, with funding apportioned based on each state's Interstate Highway lane miles and vehicle miles traveled on the Interstate System, as shares of the respective national totals. A 1986 report from the General Accounting Office (GAO) criticized the use of land area, decennial population, and postal road mileage in the distribution of highway funding. It recommended instead the use of vehicle miles traveled (on and off the Interstate System), lane miles, motor fuel consumption, annualized population statistics, and road deterioration. Although the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA; P.L. 102-240 ) substantially reorganized the highway programs, it apportioned the funds of the four largest apportioned programs (accounting for roughly 70% of all apportioned funds) according to each state's share of apportionments during the FY1987-FY1991 period rather than according to specific factors. According to a 1995 GAO report, this procedure, to a significant extent, made "the underlying data and factors… not meaningful because the funding outcome is largely predetermined." Under ISTEA, the apportionments from FY1992 through FY1998 were fixed for six years by the factors used in the FY1987-1991 apportionments. Significantly, they did not reflect the new 1990 census data. An exception was a new program, the Congestion Mitigation and Air Quality Improvement Program (CMAQ), which was apportioned according to population in each state's air quality non-attainment areas relative to the national population living in non-attainment areas. In 1998, the Transportation Equity Act for the 21 st Century (TEA-21; P.L. 105-178 ) reestablished apportionment formula factors for individual programs within the Federal-Aid Highway Program, often using new factors designed to act as proxies for the needs a program was intended to address. For example, the formula for the National Highway System program, one of several large programs, used four factors to apportion the annual authorization: 1. 25% based on the ratio of each state's lane miles on principal arterial routes (excluding the Interstate System) to the national total; 2. 35% based on the ratio of each state's vehicle miles traveled on principal arterial routes (excluding the Interstate System) to the national total; 3. 30% based on the ratio of each state's diesel fuel use on highways within each state to the national total; 4. 10% based on the ratio of each state's per capita lane miles of principal arterial highways to the national total. The Surface Transportation Program, the federal-aid program that the states had the greatest discretion in spending, was apportioned by a formula that used three weighted factors: 1. 25% based on the ratio of each state's total lane miles of federal-aid highways to the national total; 2. 40% based on the ratio of each state's vehicle miles on federal-aid highways to the national total; 3. 35% based on the ratio of each state's estimated tax payments attributable to highway users paid into the highway account of the Highway Trust Fund—the source of federal funding for highways—to the national total. The last surface transportation reauthorization that used formula factors to apportion individual program authorizations was the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: a Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU; P.L. 109-59 ), enacted in 2005. That law apportioned 13 programs using funding formulas. For example, funds under the Highway Safety Improvement Program were apportioned according to three equally weighted factors: (1) each state's share of lane miles of federal-aid-highways; (2) vehicle miles traveled on federal-aid highways; and (3) number of fatalities on the federal-aid system. In contrast, the Railway-Highway Crossings Program used the share of public railway-highway crossings in each state. The factors of land area and postal route mileage were no longer used for distributing any highway funds. Population figures were used for only two of the 13 formula programs authorized in SAFETEA-LU. Equity Programs Between 1982 and 2005, the formulas embedded in surface transportation authorization acts were not always decisive in determining how funds were apportioned. After some states objected that their residents paid more of the motor fuel and truck taxes that flowed into the highway account of the Highway Trust Fund than they received in federal highway funding, Congress enacted "equity" programs that generally did three things. First, each act included a guarantee that each state would receive federal funding at least equal to a specific percentage of the federal highway taxes its residents paid. Second, all or nearly all states were given an increase in funding from the equity program. Third, the program size was calculated in a way to assure that the states receiving less than their residents paid in highway taxes could be made whole up to their guaranteed percentage and most other states could get more funding as well. In the 1982 act, 5% of highway funding was distributed through the equity program, but in SAFETEA in 2005 the equity program received over 20% of the funds. The equity program distribution determined the total apportionment amount for each state and reduced the impact of the formula factors when it came to calculating each state's apportionments under the individual formula programs. Formulas in Recent Highway Legislation The Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21 st Century Act (MAP-21; P.L. 112-141 ), enacted in 2012, eliminated or consolidated two-thirds of the federal highway programs. It also made major changes in the way funds were apportioned among the states. Prior to MAP-21, Congress wrote authorizations for each individual apportioned program into law, and specified the formula factors that were used to determine each state's share of the authorization for that program. Beginning with MAP-21, all the large formula programs shared a single authorization amount, and the states' apportioned shares of the total authorization were determined before their amounts were divided among the specific programs. MAP-21 did not specify any formula factors that were to be used to apportion funds among the states. Instead, the apportionment was based primarily on each state's share of total apportionments in FY2012, the last year of SAFETEA, as extended. In practice, this meant that the main determinants of the totals apportioned among the states under MAP-21 were the relative distributions under the equity bonus program established in SAFETEA. In the MAP-21 formula, Congress addressed concerns about fairness from two different perspectives. On the one hand, it guaranteed that each state received an apportionment equal to at least 95 cents of every dollar the state's highway users paid in highway taxes. This represented an increase from the 92% return guaranteed in 2012, the final year of SAFETEA. On the other hand, by effectively fixing the apportionment shares at the FY2012 level Congress ensured that most states receiving more from the Federal-Aid Highway Program than their residents paid in federal highway taxes would still get increases in funding. As was true under the SAFETEA and earlier equity programs, some states could receive larger amounts without substantially reducing the amounts provided to other states only because of the large amounts of funding provided. This was possible because the bill transferred $18 billion from other Treasury accounts to the highway account of the Highway Trust Fund. Apportionment of Highway Funds Under Current Law The Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act (FAST Act; P.L. 114-94 ), enacted in 2015, is the current authorization of federal highway programs. It made only modest changes to the MAP-21 apportionment mechanism. As was true with MAP-21, the FAST Act authorizes a single amount for each year for all the apportioned highway programs combined. It retained the basic MAP-21 formula and the basic MAP-21 programmatic structure. This means that while apportionments are still based primarily on each state's share of total apportionments in FY2012, the final year of SAFETEA, each state is guaranteed an apportionment equal to at least 95% of the amount its residents pay into the highway account of the Highway Trust Fund. Calculating Each State's Apportionment Under the FAST Act, the authorization that funds six programs within the Federal-Aid Highway Program is apportioned among the states by formula. The programs are the National Highway Performance Program (NHPP), the Surface Transportation Block Grant program (STBG), the Highway Safety Improvement Program (HSIP), the Congestion Mitigation and Air Quality Improvement Program (CMAQ), Metropolitan Planning (MP), and the National Highway Freight Program (NHFP). As summary of the process follows. Prior to calculating states' apportionments for FY2020, the Federal Highway Administration is to reserve two amounts, $67 million for NHPP and $1.020 billion for STBG. These reserve funds will later supplement these programs. The remaining amount, net of these two amounts, is the "base apportionment amount." Each state's initial apportionment amounts are calculated for the three components (the base apportionment, supplemental NHPP, and supplemental STBG) by multiplying the base apportionment and two supplemental amounts by the ratio that each state's FY2015 apportionments bear to the nationwide total for FY2015. Next, the three initial amounts are adjusted, if necessary, to assure that each state's total base apportionment plus reserve funds is no less than 95 cents for every dollar the state contributed to the highway account of the Highway Trust Fund in the most recent fiscal year for which data are available. Any necessary upward adjustments for some states are offset by proportional decreases to the amounts of other states. However, basing initial apportionment amounts on FY2015 apportionment shares and guaranteeing a 95-cents-on-the-dollar return to all states without major reductions in some states' funding requires a larger program than the existing Highway Trust Fund taxes can fund. As was true under MAP-21, large transfers from the Treasury general fund to the highway account of the Highway Trust Fund authorized in the FAST Act made it possible to fund the Federal-Aid Highway Program in a way that would fulfill the 95% guarantee without having to reduce other states' apportionments significantly. Division of Each State's Apportionment Among the Programs Each state's base apportionment amount is used as the starting point in determining the division of the state's apportionment among the six apportioned programs. First, the amount determined for the NHFP is set aside from each state's base apportionment. Second, from the remaining amounts an amount is distributed for CMAQ (according to the state's FY2009 CMAQ apportionment share). Third, the state's MP program gets a distribution (based on the state's FY2009 apportionment share). Fourth, the remainder of the state's apportionment is divided among the three remaining core programs as follows: 63.7% is apportioned to the NHPP, 29.3% to the STBG, and 7% to the HSIP. Fifth, the STBG (each year FY2016-FY2020) and NHPP (for FY2019-FY2020 only) reserve funds are added to supplement each state's STBG and NHPP amounts calculated from the state's base apportionments. Evaluating States' Highway Apportionments As described above, the procedure currently used to apportion federal highway funds among the states is not based on any particular policy objectives other than ensuring the stability of state shares based on the apportionment shares in the last year of MAP-21, FY2015. In addition, each state is guaranteed an amount at least equal to 95 cents on the dollar of the taxes paid by its residents into the highway account of the Highway Trust Fund. Some policy-related factors used to distribute highway funds in the past are no longer in use, while other possible factors sometimes mentioned in policy discussions, such as states' rates of population growth and projected increases in truck traffic, have never been used as formula factors. The following tables compare each state's share of highway apportionments under current law to that state's proportion of various factors that have been used in the past in the distribution of federal highway funds. Table 5 provides a ranking of individual states' apportionment amounts as judged by these factors.

More than 90% of federal highway assistance is distributed to the states by formula. Between 1916, when Congress created the first ongoing program to fund road construction, and 2012, various formula factors specified in law were used to apportion highway funds among the states. After 1982, these factors were partially overridden by provisions to guarantee that each state received federal funding at least equal to a specific percentage of the federal highway taxes its residents paid. Since enactment of the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21; P.L. 112-141) in 2012, formula factors such as population and highway lane mileage have ceased to have a significant role in determining the distribution of funds. The apportionment among the states under the current surface transportation law, the Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act (FAST Act; P.L. 114-94), passed in 2015, is not based on any particular policy objectives other than ensuring the stability of states' shares of total funding based on their shares in the last year of MAP-21, In addition, each state is guaranteed an amount at least equal to 95 cents on the dollar of the taxes paid by its residents into the highway account of the Highway Trust Fund. Some policy-related factors used to distribute highway funds in the past are no longer in use, while other possible factors sometimes mentioned in policy discussions, such as states' rates of population growth and projected increases in truck traffic, have never been used as formula factors. This report describes mechanism by which Federal-Aid Highway Program funds are distributed today, and includes tables comparing individual states' shares of the FY2018 apportionment with their shares of some factors relevant to highway needs. Table 5 ranks states' apportionments based on the apportionment amount per resident, per square mile of land area, per federal-aid highway lane mile, and per million vehicle miles traveled on federal-aid highways.

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The HUBZone Program The Small Business Administration (SBA) administers several programs to support small businesses, including the Historically Underutilized Business Zone Empowerment Contracting (HUBZone) program. The HUBZone program is "a place-based contracting assistance program whose primary objective is job creation and increasing capital investment in distressed communities." It was authorized in 1997 ( P.L. 105-135 , the HUBZone Act of 1997; Title VI of the Small Business Reauthorization Act of 1997), and the SBA began accepting applications from interested small businesses on March 22, 1999. The HUBZone program provides participating small businesses located in areas with low income, high poverty, or high levels of unemployment with contracting opportunities in the form of set-asides , sole-source awards , and price-evaluation preferences . The Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 generally requires "full and open competition" for government procurement contracts. However, procurement set-asides are permissible competitive procedures. A set-aside restricts competition for a federal contract to specified contractors. Set-asides can be exclusive or partial, depending upon whether the entire procurement or just part of it is so restricted. In this case, the competition may be restricted to SBA-certified HUBZone businesses if there is a reasonable expectation of at least two SBA-certified HUBZone bidders and a fair market price. It is the most commonly used mechanism in the HUBZone program, accounting for about 78.4% of HUBZone program contract dollars ($1.49 billion of $1.90 billion) in FY2017. A sole-source award is a federal contract awarded, or proposed for award, without competition. Sole-source awards accounted for about 3.4% of HUBZone program contract dollars ($65.3 million of $1.90 billion) in FY2017. In addition, in any full and open competition for a federal contract "the price offered by a qualified HUBZone business shall be deemed as being lower than the price of another offeror if the HUBZone business price offer is not more than 10% higher than the other offer." Price-evaluation preferences accounted for about 18.2% of HUBZone program contract dollars ($346.9 million of $1.90 billion) in FY2017. In FY2017, the federal government awarded 81,082 contracts valued at $7.53 billion to HUBZone-certified businesses. About $1.90 billion of that amount was awarded with a HUBZone preference ($1.49 billion through a HUBZone set-aside, $65.3 million through a HUBZone sole-source award, and $346.9 million through a HUBZone price-evaluation preference). About $1.53 billion of that amount was awarded to HUBZone-certified businesses in open competition with other firms. The remaining $4.10 billion was awarded with another small business preference (e.g., set aside and sole source awards for small business generally and for 8(a), women-owned, and service-disabled veteran-owned small businesses). The program's administrative cost is about $9.8 million annually. It received an appropriation of $3 million for FY2019, with the additional cost of administering the program provided by the SBA's appropriation for salaries and general administrative expenses. Congressional interest in the HUBZone program has increased in recent years, primarily due to U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports of fraud in the program and efforts by small businesses to ease HUBZone eligibility requirements. This report examines arguments presented both for and against targeting assistance to geographic areas with specified characteristics as opposed to providing assistance to people or businesses with specified characteristics; assesses arguments presented both for and against the creation and continuation of the HUBZone program, starting with the arguments presented during consideration of P.L. 105-135 , which authorized the program; discusses the HUBZone program's structure and operation, focusing on the definitions of HUBZone areas and HUBZone small businesses and the program's performance relative to federal contracting goals; and provides an analysis of the SBA's administration of the HUBZone program and the SBA's performance measures. This report also examines HUBZone-related legislation, including P.L. 114-92 , the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, which expanded the definition of a Base Realignment and Closure Act (BRAC) military base closure area to make it easier for businesses located in those areas to meet the HUBZone program's requirement that at least 35% of its employees reside in a HUBZone area. It also extended BRAC base closure area HUBZone eligibility from five years to not less than eight years, provided HUBZone eligibility to qualified disaster areas, and added Native Hawaiian Organizations to the list of HUBZone eligible small business concerns. P.L. 115-91 , the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, which included provisions from several bills introduced during the 115 th Congress, including S. 929 , the Invest in Rural Small Business Act of 2017, and H.R. 3294 , the HUBZone Unification and Business Stability Act of 2017. Specifically, the act, among other provisions, allows small businesses that have HUBZone status on or before December 31, 2019, to retain that status from January 1, 2020, until the SBA prepares an updated online tool depicting HUBZone qualified areas (anticipated by the SBA to take place in December 2021). Once the new online tool (currently called the HUBZone map) is operational, the SBA must update it every five years for qualified census tracts and nonmetropolitan counties and when a change in status takes place for other HUBZone types (e.g., when an area becomes, or ceases to be, a redesignated area). The act also allows governors, starting on January 1, 2020, to petition the SBA each year to designate areas located in nonurban areas, with a population of 50,000 or fewer, and an average unemployment rate at least 120% of the national or state average, whichever is lower, as HUBZones; requires the SBA to process HUBZone certification applications with sufficient and complete documentation within 60 days of receipt; ensures that HUBZone-eligible BRAC areas receive HUBZone eligibility for a full eight years, beginning on the date they are designated a BRAC; and requires the SBA, not later than one year after enactment, to publish performance metrics measuring the HUBZone program's success in promoting economic development in economically distressed areas. In addition, P.L. 114-187 , the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA), includes a provision exempting Puerto Rico from the 20% population cap on qualified census tracts (QCTs) located in metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) for 10 years, or until the date on which the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico, created by PROMESA, ceases to exist, whichever comes first. The act also requires the SBA to implement a risk-based approach to requesting and verifying information from firms applying to be designated or recertified as a qualified HUBZone small business. Several bills are also discussed that would increase the federal government's small business contracting goals. For example, during the 113 th Congress, S. 259 , the Assuring Contracting Equity Act of 2013, would have increased the federal government's 23% contracting goal for small businesses generally to 25%, the 5% contracting goals for small disadvantaged businesses and women-owned small businesses to 10%, and the 3% contracting goals for HUBZone-certified small businesses and service-disabled veteran-owned small businesses to 6%. The bill's provisions were reintroduced in both the House and Senate during the 114 th Congress ( H.R. 3175 and S. 1859 ) and the 115 th Congress ( H.R. 2362 and S. 1061 ). Also, H.R. 273 , the Minority Small Business Enhancement Act of 2015, would have increased the federal government's 23% contracting goal for small businesses generally to 25% and the 5% contracting goals for small disadvantaged businesses and women-owned small businesses to 10%. Targeting Assistance to Geographic Areas The HUBZone program was authorized by P.L. 105-135 . Senator Christopher S. "Kit" Bond, the legislation's sponsor, described it as a "jobs bill and a welfare-to-work bill" designed to "create realistic opportunities for moving people off of welfare and into meaningful jobs" in "inner cities and rural counties that have low household incomes, high unemployment, and whose communities have suffered from a lack of investment." Its enactment was part of a broader debate that had been under way since the late 1970s concerning whether the federal government should target assistance to geographic areas with specified characteristics as opposed to providing assistance to people or businesses with specified characteristics. Discussion The idea that targeting government assistance to geographic areas with specified characteristics, as opposed to targeting government assistance to people or businesses with specified characteristics, would result in more effective outcomes had its origins in a British experiment in urban revitalization started during the late 1970s. In 1978, Sir Geoffrey Howe, a Conservative Member of Parliament, argued for the establishment of market-based enterprise zones that would provide government regulatory and tax relief in economically distressed areas as a means to encourage entrepreneurs "to pursue profit with minimum governmental restrictions." With the support of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's Conservative government (1979-1990), by the mid-1980s, more than two dozen enterprise zones were operating in England. Evaluations of the British enterprise zones' potential for having a positive effect on the long-term economic growth of economically distressed areas suggested that providing tax incentives and implementing regulatory relief in those areas were "useful but not decisive economic development tools for distressed communities." In the United States, the idea of targeting regulatory and tax relief to economically distressed places appealed to some liberals who had become frustrated by the lack of progress some economically distressed communities had experienced under conventional government assistance programs, such as federal grant-in-aid programs. They tended to view the idea as a supplement to existing government assistance programs. Some conservatives also supported the idea of providing additional regulatory and tax relief to geographic areas because it generally aligned with their views on reducing government regulation and taxes. They tended to view this approach as a replacement, as opposed to a supplement, for existing government assistance programs. As a result, support for targeting federal assistance to economically distressed places came from a diverse group of individuals and organizations that were often on opposing sides in other issue areas. Some of its leading proponents were the Congressional Black Caucus; the National Urban League; the National League of Cities; the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People; President Ronald Reagan; Republican Representative Jack Kemp, who introduced the first enterprise zone bill in Congress in May 1980 ( H.R. 7240 , the Urban Jobs and Enterprise Zone Act of 1980); and Democratic Representative Robert Garcia, who cosponsored with Representative Kemp H.R. 3824 , the Urban Jobs and Enterprise Zone Act of 1981. Opponents noted that targeting government assistance, in this case regulatory and tax relief, to economically distressed places would "provide incentives in designated areas, regardless of the nature of the industry which would benefit from the incentives." They argued that it would be more efficient and cost effective to target federal assistance to businesses that offer primarily high-wage, full-time jobs with benefits and have relatively high multiplier effects on job creation than to offer the same benefits to all businesses, including those that offer primarily low-wage, part-time jobs with few or no benefits and have relatively low multiplier effects on job creation. Others opposed the idea because they viewed it as a partisan extension of supply-side economics. Still others, including the National Federation of Independent Businesses, an organization representing the interests of the nation's small businesses, were not convinced that providing "marginal rate reductions or marginal reductions in taxes" would "stimulate the entry of new businesses into depressed areas." Further, some economists argued that it would be more efficient to let the private market determine where businesses locate rather than to have the government enact policies that encourage businesses to locate, or relocate, in areas they would otherwise avoid. In this view, "the locational diversion of economic activity reduces or may outweigh gains from the creation of economic activity." These disagreements may have had a role in delaying the enactment of the first fully functional federal enterprise zone program until 1993 ( P.L. 103-66 , the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993). In the meantime, 37 states and the District of Columbia had initiated their own enterprise zone programs. Evaluations of their effect on job creation and the economic status of the targeted distressed areas "provided conflicting conclusions, with some finding little or no program-related impacts, and others finding gains in the zones associated with the enterprise zone incentives." Evaluations of federal enterprise zones would later report similarly mixed findings. The Debate over HUBZones The federal enterprise zone program's enactment in 1993 established a precedent for the enactment of other programs, such as the HUBZone program, that target federal assistance, in this case government contracts, to places with specified characteristics. For example, the Senate Committee on Small Business's report accompanying the HUBZone program's authorizing legislation in 1997 presented many of the same arguments for adopting the HUBZone program that had been put forth for adopting the federal enterprise zone program: Creating new jobs in economically distressed areas has been the greatest challenge for many of our nation's governors, mayors, and community leaders. The trend is for business to locate in areas where there are customers and a skilled workforce. Asking a business to locate in a distressed area often seems counter to its potential to be successful. But without businesses in these communities, we don't create jobs, and without sources of new jobs, we are unlikely to have a successful revitalization effort. The HUBZone program attempts to utilize a valuable government resource, a government contract, and make it available to small businesses who agree in return to locate in an economically distressed area and employ people from these areas…. Contracts to small businesses in HUBZones can translate into thousands of job opportunities for persons who are unemployed or underemployed. HUBZone opponents expressed many of the same arguments that were raised in opposition to federal enterprise zones. For example, some Members opposed contract set-asides because they "unfairly discriminate against more efficient producers" and argued that "lower taxes, fewer mandates and freer markets are what stimulate the growth of small business." Others contended that the experiences under enterprise zones suggested that HUBZones would have, at best, a limited impact on the targeted area's economic prospects: the record of enterprise zones demonstrates that businesses that locate in an area because of tax breaks or other artificial inducements (such as HUBZone contract preferences), instead of genuine competitive advantages, generally prove not to be sustainable…. Thus, the incentives generally go to businesses that would have located in and hired from the target area anyway…. Therefore, we should be realistic about the impact the HUBZone legislation will have on business relocation decisions. HUBZone critics also argued that the program would compete with, and potentially diminish the effectiveness of, the SBA's Minority Small Business and Capital Ownership Development 8(a) program. The 8(a) program provides participating small businesses with training, technical assistance, and contracting opportunities in the form of set-asides and sole-source awards. Eligibility for the 8(a) program is generally limited to small businesses "unconditionally owned and controlled by one or more socially and economically disadvantaged individuals who are of good character and citizens of the United States" that demonstrate "potential for success." Small businesses owned by Indian tribes, Alaska native corporations, native Hawaiian organizations, and community development corporations are also eligible for the 8(a) program under somewhat different terms. In FY2017, about 5,100 firms participated in the 8(a) program and the federal government provided more than $22.3 billion in contracts to 8(a) firms. Others argued that the HUBZone self-certification process "while laudable in its effort to reduce certification costs and delays, invites inadvertent or deliberate abuses." As will be discussed in greater detail, the SBA's administration of the HUBZone program and the program's effectiveness in assisting economically distressed areas has been criticized. For example, GAO has argued that the program is subject to fraud and abuse and has recommended that the SBA "take additional actions to certify and monitor HUBZone firms as well as to assess the results of the HUBZone program." Several Members of Congress have also questioned the program's effectiveness. For example, in 2009, Representative Nydia M. Velázquez argued that When first introduced, the HUBZone program promised to create opportunities for small businesses in low-income communities. It was designed to do this by helping entrepreneurs access the Federal marketplace. In theory, the benefits will be twofold; HUBZones will not only bolster the small business community, but will also breathe new life into struggling neighborhoods. However, the program has been undermined by chronic underfunding, inherent program flaws and sloppy management. Instead of being incubators for growth and development, HUBZones have become breeding grounds for fraud and abuse. HUBZone Areas Defined Five HUBZone types (or classes) currently exist: qualified census tracts (QCTs), qualified nonmetropolitan counties, qualified Indian reservations/Indian Country, military bases closed under the BRAC, and qualified disaster areas. In addition, QCTs and qualified nonmetropolitan counties that lose their eligibility may temporarily retain their eligibility by becoming redesignated areas. Also, P.L. 115-91 , the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, authorizes governors, starting on January 1, 2020, to petition the SBA annually to grant HUBZone eligibility to designated covered areas in their state (or territory) which are located outside of an urbanized area, have a population of 50,000 or fewer, and have an unemployment rate at least 120% of the unemployment rate for the nation or state in which it is located, whichever is less. Qualified Census Tracts The term qualified census tract (QCT) has the meaning given that term in Section 42(d)(5)(B)(ii) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. That section of the Internal Revenue code refers to QCTs as determined by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) for its low-income housing tax credit program and has three subparts: (I) In general The term "qualified census tract" means any census tract which is designated by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development and, for the most recent year for which census data are available on household income in such tract, either in which 50 percent or more of the households have an income which is less than 60 percent of the area median gross income for such year or which has a poverty rate of at least 25 percent. If the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development determines that sufficient data for any period are not available to apply this clause on the basis of census tracts, such Secretary shall apply this clause for such period on the basis of enumeration districts. (II) Limit on MSA's designated The portion of a metropolitan statistical area which may be designated for purposes of this subparagraph shall not exceed an area having 20 percent of the population of such metropolitan statistical area. (III) Determination of areas For purposes of this clause, each metropolitan statistical area shall be treated as a separate area and all nonmetropolitan areas in a State shall be treated as 1 area. In MSAs in which more than 20% of the population qualifies, HUD orders the census tracts in that MSA from the highest percentage of eligible households to the lowest. HUD then designates the census tracts with the highest percentage of eligible households as qualified until the 20% population limit is exceeded. If a census tract is excluded because it raises the percentage above 20%, then subsequent census tracts are considered to determine if a census tract with a smaller population could be included without exceeding the 20% limit. As mentioned earlier, P.L. 114-187 , the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA) exempts Puerto Rico from the 20% population cap for 10 years, or until the date on which the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico ceases to exist, whichever comes first. The HUBZone map indicates that, as of June 1, 2018, 20.2% of all census tracts (14,980 of 74,002) had QCT status. The SBA's most recent update of QCT eligibility was released in January 2018. The SBA has announced that the next update of QCT status will not take place until December 2021. Those designations will then be updated every five years thereafter, as required by P.L. 115-91 , the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018. Qualified Nonmetropolitan Counties A qualified nonmetropolitan county is any county that is not located in a metropolitan statistical area as defined in Section 143(k)(2)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and in which the median household income is less than 80% of the nonmetropolitan state median household income, based on the most recent data available from the Bureau of the Census of the Department of Commerce; the unemployment rate is not less than 140% of the average unemployment rate for the United States or for the state in which such county is located, whichever is less, based on the most recent data available from the Secretary of Labor; or the county has been designated by the Secretary of HUD as a difficult development area (DDA). As of June 1, 2018, about 18.9% (613) of the nation's 3,242 counties had qualified nonmetropolitan county status (30.6% of the nation's 2,006 nonmetropolitan counties). This count includes 21 counties qualified as eligible solely due to their status as a DDA. The SBA's most recent update of nonmetropolitan county eligibility was released in January 2018. The SBA has announced that the next update of nonmetropolitan county eligibility will not take place until December 2021. Those designations will then be updated every five years thereafter, as required by P.L. 115-91 . As will be discussed, Congress created redesignated areas to delay the loss of HUBZone status for census tracts and nonmetropolitan counties that lose HUBZone eligibility. Qualified Indian Lands P.L. 105-135 , the HUBZone Act of 1997, provided HUBZone eligibility to "lands within the external boundaries of an Indian reservation." Since then, the term Indian reservation has been clarified and expanded to include Indian trust lands and other lands covered under the term Indian Country as used by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, portions of the state of Oklahoma designated as former Indian reservations by the Internal Revenue Service (Oklahoma tribal statistical areas), and Alaska native village statistical areas. As of June 1, 2018, there were 619 HUBZone-qualified Indian lands. A private firm's analysis of Indian reservations' economic characteristics conducted on behalf of the SBA indicated that for the most part—and particularly in states where reservations are numerous and extensive—mean income of reservations is far below state levels, and unemployment rates and poverty rates are far above state levels. There are some interesting exceptions, however, where reservations are basically on a par with the states they are in. Examples include Osage reservation in Oklahoma and reservations in Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Michigan. The factors at work here may be casinos and oil. In accordance with P.L. 115-91 , all HUBZone-qualified Indian lands designated on or before December 31, 2019, retain that status from January 1, 2020, until the SBA prepares an updated online tool depicting HUBZone qualified areas (anticipated by the SBA to take place in December 2021). The act does not address when the SBA is required to update its new online tool to reflect changes in the status of HUBZone-qualified Indian lands. Presumably, the online tool would be updated immediately to reflect any change in that status. Military Bases Closed Under BRAC P.L. 108-447 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, provided HUBZone eligibility for five years to "lands within the external boundaries of a military installation closed through a privatization process" under the authority of P.L. 101-510 , the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (BRAC—Title XXIX of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991); title II of P.L. 100-526 , the Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act; and any other provision of law authorizing military base closures or redevelopment. The military base's HUBZone eligibility commences on the effective date of the initial law (December 8, 2004) if the military base was already closed at that time or on the date of formal closure if the military base was still operational at that time. During the 113 th and 114 th Congresses, several bills were introduced to make it easier for businesses located in a BRAC military base closure area to meet the HUBZone requirement of having at least 35% of their employees reside within a HUBZone. As mentioned earlier, P.L. 114-92 contains such a provision. The act expands BRAC HUBZone eligibility to census tracts and nonmetropolitan counties that (1) contain a BRAC base closure area, (2) intersect with a BRAC base closure area, (3) are contiguous with a BRAC base closure area, or (4) are contiguous to any census tract or nonmetropolitan county described in (1) through (3). The act also extended HUBZone eligibility for BRAC base closure areas from five years to at least eight years. As of June 1, 2018, there were 125 HUBZone-qualified base closure areas. In accordance with P.L. 115-91 , all HUBZone-qualified base closure areas designated on or before December 31, 2019, retain that status from January 1, 2020, until the SBA prepares an updated online tool depicting HUBZone qualified areas (anticipated by the SBA to take place in December 2021). The act also requires the SBA to update its new online tool immediately after an area is designated as a HUBZone-qualified base closure area to reflect its change in status. Qualified Disaster Areas P.L. 114-92 provided HUBZone eligibility for qualified disaster areas, defined as "any census tract or nonmetropolitan county for which the President has declared a major disaster under section 401 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5170) or located in an area in which a catastrophic incident has occurred (on or after the date of enactment) if such census tract or nonmetropolitan county ceased to be qualified [as a HUBZone] ... during the period beginning 5 years before the date on which the President declared the major disaster or the catastrophic incident occurred and ending 2 years after such date." However, the following exceptions apply: (1) in the case of a major presidentially-declared disaster, such census tract or nonmetropolitan county may be designated a qualified disaster area only during the 5-year period beginning on the date on which the President declared the major disaster for the area in which the census tract or nonmetropolitan county is located; and (2) in the case of a catastrophic incident, such census tract or nonmetropolitan county may be designated a qualified disaster area only during the 10-year period beginning on the date on which the catastrophic incident occurred in the area in which the census tract or nonmetropolitan area is located. As of June 1, 2018, there were eight designated qualified disaster areas. In accordance with P.L. 115-91 , all qualified disaster areas designated on or before December 31, 2019, retain that status from January 1, 2020, until the SBA prepares an updated online tool depicting HUBZone qualified areas (anticipated by the SBA to take place in December 2021). The act also requires the SBA to update its new online tool immediately after an area is designated as a qualified disaster area to reflect its change in status. Redesignated Areas One of the implicit goals of the HUBZone program is to improve the economic standing of the geographic areas receiving assistance so they are no longer economically distressed areas. As a result, it could be argued that it is a program success when a QCT or a qualified nonmetropolitan county loses its HUBZone status when new economic data are published. However, because small businesses "that locate to a HUBZone may lose their eligibility in only one year due to changes in such data" and concerned that some HUBZone areas could "shift in and out of eligibility year after year," Congress included a provision in P.L. 106-554 , the HUBZones in Native America Act of 2000 (Title VI, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2001), to address this issue. The provision provided census tracts and nonmetropolitan counties that lose HUBZone eligibility an automatic extension "for the 3-year period following the date on which the census tract or nonmetropolitan county ceased to be so qualified." The act labeled these census tracts and nonmetropolitan counties as redesignated areas . As of June 1, 2018, there were 221 redesignated nonmetropolitan counties and 5,174 redesignated census tracts. In accordance with P.L. 115-91 , all redesignated areas on or before December 31, 2019, retain that status from January 1, 2020, until the SBA prepares an updated online tool depicting HUBZone qualified areas (anticipated by the SBA to take place in December 2021). The act also requires the SBA to update its new online tool immediately after an area becomes, or ceases to be, a redesignated area to reflect its change in status. Overall, as of June 1, 2018, 834 of the nation's 3,242 counties (about 25.7%) had HUBZone status, either as a qualified nonmetropolitan county, a DDA, or a redesignated nonmetropolitan county and 20,154 of the nation's 74,002 census tracts (about 27.2%) had HUBZone status, either as a QCT or as a redesignated QCT. During the 114 th Congress H.R. 5250 , the Growing and Reviving Rural Economies Through Transitioning HUBZone Redesignation Act of 2016, and S. 2838 , the Small Business Transforming America's Regions Act of 2016, would have extended the eligibility of redesignated HUBZones to seven years from three years. During the 115 th Congress, H.R. 2013 , the Growing and Reviving Rural Economies Through Transitioning HUBZone Redesignation Act of 2017, and S. 690 , the HUBZone Investment Protection Act, would extend the eligibility of redesignated HUBZones to seven years from three years. The Senate Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship reported S. 690 favorably, without amendment, on August 2, 2017. In addition, H.R. 2592 , the Expanding the Impact of the HUBZone Program Act of 2017, would extend HUBZone eligibility to not more than 10 years and H.R. 3294 , the HUBZone Unification and Business Stability Act of 2017, would provide HUBZone eligibility for at least five years beginning on January 1, 2020. HUBZone Businesses Defined Firms must be certified by the SBA to participate in the HUBZone program. Table 1 indicates the number of HUBZone-certified small businesses listed in the SBA's Dynamic Small Business Search database for selected dates from 2010 to 2018. The SBA's database contains information provided by small businesses interested in obtaining federal contracts when they registered in the federal System for Award Management (SAM). The data indicate that the number of HUBZone firms increased from May 2010 to May 2011 and then generally declined until mid-2015, with much of the reduction due to the previously mentioned expiration of grandfathered redesignated areas on October 1, 2011. Since then, the number of HUBZone firms has increased somewhat. As of April 3, 2019, the SBA's Dynamic Small Business Search database included 6,769 firms with active HUBZone certifications. To become certified, firms complete and submit specified SBA HUBZone application forms to the SBA, either online or by mail. Firms must meet SBA size standards for the firm's primary industry classification; be at least 51% owned and controlled by U.S. citizens, a community development corporation, an agricultural cooperative, or an Indian tribe (including Alaska native corporations); maintain a principal office located in a HUBZone; ensure that at least 35% of its employees reside in a HUBZone; represent, as provided in the application, that it will "attempt to maintain" having at least 35% of its employees reside in a HUBZone during the performance of any HUBZone contract it receives; represent, as provided in the application, that it will ensure that it will comply with certain contract performance requirements in connection with contracts awarded to it as a qualified HUBZone small business concern (such as spending at least 50% of the cost of the contract incurred for personnel on its own employees or employees of other qualified HUBZone small business concerns and meeting specified subcontracting limitations to nonqualified HUBZone small business concerns); provide an active, up-to-date Dun and Bradstreet profile and Data Universal Numbering System (DUNS) number that represents the business; and provide an active Central Contractor Registration profile for the business. Prior to 2010, the SBA's goal was to make its determination within 30 calendar days after receipt of a complete application package, subject to the need for additional information or clarification of information contained in the application. In response to reports of applicant fraud, in FY2009 the SBA began a two-year effort to reengineer its applicant review process (requiring applicants to submit documentation such as lease or rental agreements, three years of tax returns, citizenship documentation, and payroll records to prove they meet program requirements). Initially, depending on the complexity of the application and the need for additional information, the SBA took from 5 months to 12 months to make its determination. The SBA has since decreased the average time to process HUBZone applications, with about 61% of applications processed in three months or less. P.L. 115-91 requires the SBA, effective January 1, 2020, to process HUBZone certification applications with sufficient and complete documentation within 60 days of receipt. If the SBA approves an application, it sends a written notice to the business and adds the business to its list of certified HUBZone businesses. A decision to deny eligibility must be in writing and state the specific reasons for denial. In the past, the SBA's staff conducted random program examinations "to verify the accuracy of any certification made or information provided as part of the HUBZone application process, or in connection with a HUBZone contract." Examiners typically verified that the business met the program's eligibility requirements and that it met such requirements at the time of its application for certification, its most recent recertification, or its certification in connection with a HUBZone contract. In response to reports of fraud, the SBA, in addition to reengineering its applicant review process, now conducts program examinations of all firms that received a HUBZone contract in the previous fiscal year. SBA district field offices also conduct site visits to validate the geographic requirement for principal offices. In FY2018, SBA district field offices completed 529 on-site compliance reviews of HUBZone-certified firms, about 10% of the HUBZone-certified firms in the SBA's portfolio. Certified HUBZone small business concerns must recertify every three years to the SBA that they meet the requirements for being a HUBZone business. They must also immediately notify the SBA of any material change that could affect their eligibility, such as a change in the ownership, business structure, or principal office of the concern or a failure to meet the 35% HUBZone residency requirement. HUBZone Federal Contracting Goals Since 1978, federal agency heads have been required to establish federal procurement contracting goals, in consultation with the SBA, "that realistically reflect the potential of small business concerns and small businesses concerns owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals" to participate in federal procurement. Each agency is required, at the conclusion of each fiscal year, to report its progress in meeting the goals to the SBA. In 1988, Congress authorized the President to annually establish government-wide minimum participation goals for procurement contracts awarded to small businesses and small businesses owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals. Congress required the government-wide minimum participation goal for small businesses to be "not less than 20% of the total value of all prime contract awards for each fiscal year" and "not less than 5% of the total value of all prime contract and subcontract awards for each fiscal year" for small businesses owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals. Each federal agency was also directed to "have an annual goal that presents, for that agency, the maximum practicable opportunity for small business concerns and small business concerns owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals to participate in the performance of contracts let by such agency." The SBA was also required to report to the President annually on the attainment of the goals and to include the information in an annual report to Congress. The SBA negotiates the goals with each federal agency and establishes a small business eligible baseline for evaluating the agency's performance. The agency head is required to "make consistent efforts to annually expand participation by small business concerns from each industry category." If the SBA and the agency cannot agree on the goals, the agency may submit the case to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) for resolution. The small business eligible baseline excludes certain contracts that the SBA has determined do not realistically reflect the potential for small business participation in federal procurement (such as those awarded to mandatory and directed sources), contracts funded predominately from agency-generated sources (i.e., nonappropriated funds), contracts not covered by Federal Acquisition Regulations, acquisitions on behalf of foreign governments, and contracts not reported in the Federal Procurement Data System (such as contracts or government procurement card purchases valued less than $10,000). These exclusions typically account for 18% to 20% of all federal prime contracts each year. The SBA then evaluates the agencies' performance against their negotiated goals annually, using data from the Federal Procurement Data System—Next Generation, managed by the U.S. General Services Administration, to generate the small business eligible baseline. This information is compiled into the official Small Business Goaling Report, which the SBA releases annually. Each agency that fails to achieve any proposed prime or subcontract goal is required to submit a justification to the SBA on why they failed to achieve a proposed or negotiated goal with a proposed plan of corrective action. Agencies can take credit in every category that is applicable to the recipient of the contract. For example, "when counting goaling achievements, a contract awarded to a service-disabled Veteran-Owned Woman-Owned Small Business would be counted toward the Small Business (SB) goal, the Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Business (SDVOSB) goal and the Women-Owned Small Business (WOSB) goal. However, these category counts are not summed to triple the total count. The Sum of Parts Does Not Equal the Whole (italics in original)." Over the years, federal government-wide procurement contracting goals have been established for small businesses generally ( P.L. 100-656 , the Business Opportunity Development Reform Act of 1988, and P.L. 105-135 , the HUBZone Act of 1997—Title VI of the Small Business Reauthorization Act of 1997), small businesses owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals ( P.L. 100-656 ), women ( P.L. 103-355 , the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994), small businesses located within a HUBZone ( P.L. 105-135 ), and small businesses owned and controlled by a service-disabled veteran ( P.L. 106-50 , the Veterans Entrepreneurship and Small Business Development Act of 1999). The current federal small business contracting goals are at least 23% of the total value of all small business eligible prime contract awards to small businesses for each fiscal year, 5% of the total value of all small business eligible prime contract awards and subcontract awards to small disadvantaged businesses for each fiscal year, 5% of the total value of all small business eligible prime contract awards and subcontract awards to women-owned small businesses, 3% of the total value of all small business eligible prime contract awards and subcontract awards to HUBZone small businesses, and 3% of the total value of all small business eligible prime contract awards and subcontract awards to service-disabled veteran-owned small businesses. There are no punitive consequences for not meeting these goals. However, the SBA's Small Business Goaling Report is distributed widely, receives media attention, and serves to heighten public awareness of the issue of small business contracting. For example, agency performance as reported in the SBA's Small Business Goaling Report is often cited by Members during their questioning of federal agency witnesses during congressional hearings. As shown in Table 2 , the FY201 7 Small Business Goaling Report , using data in the Federal Procurement Data System, indicates that federal agencies met the federal contracting goal for small businesses generally, small disadvantaged businesses, and service-disabled veteran-owned small businesses in FY2017. Federal agencies awarded 23.88% of the value of their small business eligible contracts ($442.5 billion) to small businesses ($105.7 billion), 9.10% to small disadvantaged businesses ($40.2 billion), 4.71% to women-owned small businesses ($20.8 billion), 1.65% to HUBZone small businesses ($7.3 billion), and 4.05% to service-disabled veteran-owned small businesses ($17.9 billion). The percentage of total reported federal contracts (without exclusions) awarded to those small businesses in FY2017 is also provided in the table for comparative purposes. Congressional Issues Congressional interest in the HUBZone program has increased in recent years, primarily due to GAO reports of fraud in the program and efforts by small businesses to ease HUBZone eligibility requirements. Program Administration GAO and the SBA's Office of Inspector General (OIG) have audited the SBA's administration of the HUBZone program on many occasions over the years and have made a number of recommendations to improve the SBA's internal control and oversight practices in an effort to deter fraud in the program. In most instances, the SBA has endeavored to implement these recommendations, but both GAO and the OIG have argued that despite these efforts administrative challenges remain. SBA OIG and GAO Audits, 2006-2010 In 2006, the OIG reported that there was a two-year backlog in HUBZone program examinations. It noted that it was concerned "that workload resources had not been adequately devoted to eliminating this two-year backlog" and that firms that should be decertified from the program remained on the list of certified HUBZone businesses and potentially were "inappropriately receiving HUBZone contracts between the time they are initially certified and subsequently examined/recertified." In 2008, GAO reported that the map used by the SBA to publicize qualified HUBZone areas was inaccurate, resulting in ineligible small businesses participating in the program and excluding eligible businesses; the mechanisms used by the SBA to certify and monitor HUBZone firms provided limited assurance that only eligible firms participated in the program; the SBA had not complied with its own policy of recertifying HUBZone firms every three years (about 40% of those firms had not been recertified); and the SBA lacked formal guidance that would specify a time frame for processing HUBZone firm decertifications (1,400 of 3,600 firms proposed for decertification had not been processed within the SBA's self-imposed goal of 60 days). In 2008, GAO released another report that "identified substantial vulnerabilities in SBA's application and monitoring process, clearly demonstrating that the HUBZone program is vulnerable to fraud and abuse." Using fictitious employee information and fabricated documentation, GAO obtained HUBZone certification for four bogus firms. In one of its applications, GAO claimed that its principal office was the same address as a coffee store that happened to be located in a HUBZone. GAO argued that if the SBA "had performed a simple Internet search on the address, it would have been alerted to this fact." Two of GAO's applications used leased mailboxes from retail postal services centers. GAO argued that "a post office box clearly does not meet SBA's principal office requirement." In addition, it identified "10 firms from the Washington, D.C. metro area that were participating in the HUBZone program even though they clearly did not meet eligibility requirements." GAO subsequently selected four geographical areas for analysis to determine whether cases of fraud and abuse exist for HUBZone businesses located outside of the Washington, DC, metropolitan area: Dallas, TX; Huntsville, AL; San Antonio, TX; and San Diego, CA. GAO reported in March 2009 that it found "fraud and abuse" in all four metropolitan areas, including 19 firms that "clearly are not eligible," and highlighted 10 firms that it "found to be egregiously out of compliance with HUBZone program requirements." In 2010, GAO submitted applications for HUBZone certification for "four new bogus firms … using false information and fabricated documents ... fictitious employee information and bogus principal office addresses" including "the addresses of the Alamo in Texas, a public storage facility in Florida, and a city hall in Texas as principal office locations." The SBA certified three of the four bogus firms and lost GAO's documentation for its fourth application "on multiple occasions," forcing GAO to abandon that application. GAO reported that "the SBA continues to struggle with reducing fraud risks in its HUBZone certification process despite reportedly taking steps to bolster its controls." The SBA responded to these audits and congressional criticism of its administration of the HUBZone program by "reengineering business processes to reduce fraud and abuse within the program." In 2006, the SBA committed to reviewing 5% of all certifications "through a full-scale program of examinations." In 2009, it "moved from verifying a sample of HUBZone firms to verifications of 100% of HUBZone firms receiving contracts in the previous fiscal year." In 2010, the SBA reported that its standard HUBZone business process now requires all firms to submit supporting documentation verifying the information and statements made in their application. Previous practice required firms only to submit an electronic application. In addition, the Program Office implemented a new business process for recertifying HUBZone firms which requires all firms that are due for recertification to certify via wet signature that they still conform to the eligibility requirements. Previous practice required firms to submit an electronic verification. On April 21, 2010, Karen Mills, the SBA's Administrator at that time, testified before the House Committee on Small Business that the SBA is "working to ensure that only legitimate and eligible firms are benefiting from HUBZone" and has "made dramatic increases in the number of site visits to HUBZone firms." The SBA conducted 680 HUBZone site visits in FY2008, 911 in FY2009, 1,070 in FY2010, 988 in FY2011, 788 in FY2012, 511 in FY2013, 569 in FY2014, 518 in FY2015, 515 in FY2016, 505 in FY2017, and 529 in FY2018. The SBA's new, more labor-intensive certification process, coupled with an increase in applications for HUBZone certifications, resulted in what the SBA described as "significant delays in the processing of new applications for certification." Noting that individual applications "can vary greatly depending on the complexity of the case and the applicant's responsiveness to any requests for supporting information," the SBA reported in 2010 that the final HUBZone determination time frames "vary from 5 months to 12 months, with an average of 8 to 10 months." The SBA has since decreased the average time to process HUBZone applications, with about 61% of applications processed in three months or less. As mentioned previously, P.L. 115-91 requires the SBA, effective January 1, 2020, to process HUBZone certification applications with sufficient and complete documentation within 60 days of receipt. SBA's OIG Audit, 2013 On November 19, 2013, the OIG released the results of an audit of 12 of the 357 firms that received HUBZone certification between July 2012 and December 2012. The 12 firms accounted for 94% of the federal contract dollars awarded to those 357 firms during that time period. The OIG found that 3 of the 12 firms "received certification without meeting the requirements of the program." Specifically, the OIG found "one firm [that] did not meet the principal office requirement, one firm [that] did not meet the 35% residency requirement, and one instance where a possibly fraudulent application was missed." The OIG also noted that the HUBZone program's standard operating procedures (SOP) manual was last updated in November 2007, when firms self-certified their HUBZone eligibility, and does not account for the SBA's new certification process; the SBA did not make its eligibility determination within 30 calendar days of the receipt of a complete application for all 12 of the nonfraudulent applications reviewed as required under the SBA's existing regulations; and the SBA did not make its eligibility determination within its proposed 90 calendars days of the receipt of a complete application, a change to the existing regulations that the SBA is seeking due to the shift from self-certification to full document review, for 5 of the 12 firms. The SBA responded to the OIG's audit on November 12, 2013, indicating that it planned to update and publish a new HUBZone program SOP by the end of 2014, issue decertification notices for the three firms cited in the OIG's audit, and amend the certification process "so that actions are completed within an average of 90 days from the date the application is electronically verified." The new HUBZone SOP has not been published. The delay may be related to the SBA's ongoing review of the program's regulations. The SBA has announced that "several of the regulations governing the program should be amended in order to resolve certain issues that have arisen" and is working on a proposed rule that "would constitute a comprehensive revision of part 126 of SBA's regulations to clarify current HUBZone Program regulations and implement various new procedures." SBA's OIG Audit, 2019 On March 28, 2019, the OIG released the results of an audit of 15 of 39 firms that received HUBZone certification and a HUBZone contract between April 1, 2017, and March 31, 2018. The 15 firms obtained approximately $29.4 million in HUBZone contract dollars during that time period. Of these selected firms, five received more than $1 million in HUBZone contracts, five received HUBZone contacts amounting to $100,000 to $999,999, and five received HUBZone contacts amounting to less than $100,000. The OIG found that the SBA "did not detect indicators of fraud and certified 2 of the 15 firms … that did not meet principal office location requirements" and "certified a third firm … based on incomplete analysis of supporting documentation" related to the 35% residency requirement. The OIG questioned $598,000 in contract obligations for these firms and concluded that "these deficiencies occurred because the Program Office did not have a standardized review process of the analysis of oversight of HUBZone certifications" and "did not update its written policies despite a prior OIG audit recommendation to update its HUBZone guidance." The OIG also found that the SBA did not make its eligibility determinations for 4 of the 15 firms with the 90-day regulatory requirement and "did not timely assign applications to analysts for certified and pending firms." The OIG concluded that these delays were due to "a lack of formalized guidance, IT issues, and staff turnover." The OIG issued five recommendations for the SBA's consideration, including reexamine the three cited firm's eligibility, update and implement HUBZone written guidance, and implement a plan to mitigate information technology issues affecting the HUBZone certification process. The SBA responded to a draft of the OIG's audit on March 14, 2019, indicating that it agreed with all five recommendations and had already reexamined the eligibility of one of the three firms cited in the audit. Legislation During the 112 th Congress, S. 633 , the Small Business Contracting Fraud Prevention Act of 2011, which was introduced on March 17, 2011, and agreed to by the Senate, with amendment, by unanimous consent on September 21, 2011, would have required the SBA to implement GAO's recommendations to maintain a correct, accurate, and updated map to identify HUBZone areas; implement policies that ensure only eligible firms participate in the program; employ appropriate technology to control costs and maximize efficiency; notify the Small Business Committees of any backlogs in applications or recertifications with plans and timetables for eliminating the backlog; ensure small businesses meet the 35% HUBZone residency requirement at the time of bid as well as at the time of the contract award; and extend the redesignated status of HUBZone areas that lose that status due to the release of economic data from the 2010 decennial census for three years after the first date on which the SBA publishes a HUBZone map that is based on the results from that census. In addition, S. 3572 , the Restoring Tax and Regulatory Certainty to Small Businesses Act of 2012, was introduced on September 19, 2012, and referred to the Senate Committee on Finance. It included, among other provisions, the HUBZone provisions contained in S. 633 . The SBA did not formally respond to the legislation. It has argued at congressional hearings and in its congressional budget justification documents that it has taken steps to implement GAO's recommendations. During the 114 th Congress, P.L. 114-187 , the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA), includes a provision requiring the SBA to implement, within 270 days following PROMESA's enactment (which took place on June 30, 2016), a risk-based approach to requesting and verifying information from firms applying to be designated or recertified as a qualified HUBZone small business. GAO is required to begin an assessment of the SBA's risk-based approach within a year of the approach's implementation and complete the assessment, along with any recommendations for improvement, within the following six months. During the 115 th Congress, P.L. 115-91 , the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, among other provisions, requires the SBA, starting on January 1, 2020, to "conduct program examinations of qualified HUBZone small business concerns, using a risk-based analysis to select which concerns are examined, to ensure that any concern examined meets the [program's] requirements." The act also specifies that any small business that misrepresented its status as a qualified HUBZone small business concern shall be subject to liability for fraud. Performance Measures As part of its 2008 audit of the HUBZone program, GAO reported that the SBA had taken "limited steps" to assess the effectiveness of the HUBZone program. It noted that the SBA's performance measures—the number of applications approved and recertifications processed, the annual value of federal contracts awarded to HUBZone firms, and the number of program examinations completed—provide data on program activity but "do not directly measure the program's effect on firms (such as growth in employment or changes in capital investment) or directly measure the program's effect on the communities in which the firms are located (for instance, changes in median household income or poverty levels)." GAO recommended that the SBA "further develop measures and implement plans to assess the effectiveness of the HUBZone program that take into account factors such as the economic characteristics of the HUBZone area." The SBA responded to GAO's findings by announcing that it "would develop an assessment tool to measure the economic benefits that accrue to areas in the HUBZone program" and that it "would then issue periodic reports accompanied by the underlying data." On March 25, 2009, GAO reported that, as of that date, the SBA had not developed measures or implemented plans to assess the program's effectiveness. GAO noted that the SBA did commission an independent review of the HUBZone program's economic impact. That study was released in May 2008. It concluded that the HUBZone program has not generated enough HUBZone contract dollars to have an impact on a national scale. When spread over an eight-year period across 2,450 metropolitan areas and counties with qualified census tracts, qualified counties, and Indian reservations, $6 billion has a limited impact…. About two-thirds of HUBZone areas have HUBZone businesses; just under one-third have HUBZone vendors that have won HUBZone contracts; and about 4 percent of HUBZone areas have received annual-equivalent HUBZone contract revenues greater than $100 per capita, based on HUBZone population…. The program has a substantial impact in only a very small percentage of HUBZones. Where the impact is largest, there generally is at least one very successful vender in the HUBZone. Thus, the program can be effective. At present, however, the impact in two-thirds of all HUBZones is nil. GAO also noted that the SBA had issued a notice in the Federal Register on August 11, 2008, seeking public comment on a proposed methodology for measuring the economic impact of the HUBZone program. The notice presented a two-step economic model that the SBA had developed to estimate the impact on HUBZone areas directly attributable to the HUBZone program, the SBA's non-HUBZone programs, and other related federal procurement programs. The notice indicated that economic impact "will be measured by the estimated growth in median household income and employment (or a reduction in unemployment) in a specific HUBZone area." GAO criticized the SBA for relying on public comments to refine the proposed methodology "rather than conducting a comprehensive effort" that considered relevant literature and input from experts in economics and performance measurement. GAO concluded that "based on our review, we do not believe this effort was a sound process for developing measures to assess the effectiveness of the program" and reported that the SBA had abandoned that proposal and "had initiated a new effort to address this issue." The SBA indicated in its FY2011 budget justification report to Congress that it had developed "a methodology for measuring the economic impact of the HUBZone program" to "provide for the continuous study and monitoring of the program's effectiveness in terms of its economic goals." However, it did not provide any details concerning the methodology and has continued to use its previous performance measures—the number of small businesses assisted (applications approved and recertifications processed), the annual value of federal contracts awarded to HUBZone firms, and the number of program examinations completed—to assess the program's performance. Legislation During the 112 th Congress, S. 633 would have required the SBA to implement GAO's recommendation to "develop measures and implement plans to assess the effectiveness of the HUBZone program." It also would have required the SBA to identify "a baseline point in time to allow the assessment of economic development under the HUBZone program, including creating additional jobs" and take into account "the economic characteristics of the HUBZone and contracts being counted under multiple socioeconomic subcategories." The SBA did not formally respond to the legislation. It has argued at congressional hearings and in its congressional budget justification documents that it is taking steps to implement GAO's recommendation. During the 115 th Congress, P.L. 115-91 requires the SBA, starting on January 1, 2020, to publish performance metrics measuring the HUBZone program's success in meeting the program's objective of promoting economic development in economically distressed areas and to submit, not later than 90 days after the last date of each fiscal year, a report to the House Committee on Small Business and the Senate Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship "analyzing the data from the performance metrics." Similar provisions were included in H.R. 2592 , the Expanding the Impact of the HUBZone Program Act of 2017, and H.R. 3294 , the HUBZone Unification and Business Stability Act of 2017. Small Business Contracting Goals As mentioned previously, the federal government has established procurement contracting goals for small businesses generally (at least 23% of the total value of all small business eligible prime contract awards for each fiscal year), small disadvantaged businesses (5% of the total value of all small business eligible prime contract awards and subcontract awards for each fiscal year), women-owned small businesses (5% of the total value of all small business eligible prime contract awards and subcontract awards for each fiscal year), HUBZone small businesses (3% of the total value of all small business eligible prime contract awards and subcontract awards for each fiscal year), and service-disabled veteran-owned small businesses (3% of the total value of all small business eligible prime contract awards and subcontract awards for each fiscal year). A number of bills have been introduced over the past several Congresses to increase the small business procurement contracting goals. Generally speaking, the executive branch, during both Democratic and Republican Administrations, has not advocated increasing these goals. Although no official reason has been provided for not advocating an increase in these goals, it is generally recognized that the sitting Administration is often blamed when small business contracting goals are not achieved. Since 2005, the 5% contracting goal for small disadvantaged businesses has been achieved each fiscal year through FY2016, the 23% contracting goal for small businesses generally was achieved five times (23.41% in FY2005, 23.39% in FY2013, 24.99% in FY2014, 25.75% in FY2015, and 24.3% in FY2016), the 3% contracting goal for service-disabled veteran-owned small businesses was achieved four times (3.38% in FY2013, 3.68% in FY2014, 3.28% in FY2015, and 3.98% in FY2016), and the 5% contracting goal for women-owned small businesses was achieved once (5.05% in FY2015). The federal government did not achieve the 3% contracting goal for HUBZone small businesses in any of these fiscal years. Because the federal government has frequently not been able to meet most of its small business contracting goals, sitting Administrations have generally been reluctant to advocate an increase in these goals. From the executive branch's perspective, increasing the goals could subject the sitting Administration to a greater risk of being labeled as antibusiness or anti-small business even if the executive branch increases its contracting with small businesses from the previous fiscal year. As a result, proposals to increase the small business contracting goals have originated in the legislative, as opposed to the executive, branch. Legislation Several bills were introduced during the 112 th Congress to increase the federal government's small business contracting goals, including H.R. 2424 , the Expanding Opportunities for Main Street Act of 2011, and its companion bill in the Senate ( S. 1334 ); H.R. 2921 , the Expanding Opportunities for Small Businesses Act of 2011; H.R. 2949 , the Small Business Opportunity Expansion Act of 2011; H.R. 3850 , the Government Efficiency through Small Business Contracting Act of 2012; H.R. 6078 , the Small Business Contracting Opportunities Expansion Act of 2012; and S. 3213 , the Small Business Goaling Act of 2012. In addition, as passed by the House on May 18, 2012, H.R. 4310 , the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, included a provision that would have increased the 23% contracting goal for small businesses generally to 25%. The bill would have also established a 40% goal for small businesses generally of the total value of all subcontract awards for each fiscal year. These provisions were subsequently dropped from the bill. During the 113 th Congress, S. 259 , the Assuring Contracting Equity Act of 2013, would have increased the federal government's 23% contracting goal for small businesses generally to 25%, raised the 5% contracting goals for small disadvantaged businesses and women-owned small businesses to 10%, and increased the 3% contracting goals for HUBZone small businesses and service-disabled veteran-owned small businesses to 6%. The bill's provisions were reintroduced in both the House and Senate during the 114 th Congress ( H.R. 3175 and S. 1859 ) and the 115 th Congress ( H.R. 2362 and S. 1061 ). In addition, H.R. 4093 , the Greater Opportunities for Small Business Act of 2014, which was reported by the House Committee on Small Business on April 9, 2014, would have increased the federal government's 23% contracting goal for small businesses generally to 25% and established a 40% subcontracting goal for small businesses generally. H.R. 4435 , the Howard P. "Buck" McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, which was passed by the House on May 22, 2014, also contained these two provisions. The Senate's national defense reauthorization bill ( S. 2410 ) did not include this language. Also, H.R. 273 , the Minority Small Business Enhancement Act of 2015, would have increased the federal government's 23% contracting goal for small businesses generally to 25% and the 5% contracting goals for small disadvantaged businesses and women-owned small businesses to 10%. Advocates of increasing the federal government's small business contracting goals argue that higher goals are necessary to ensure that small businesses receive "a fair proportion of the total purchases and contracts for property and services for the government in each industry category." They also contend that higher goals will "increase prime contracting and subcontracting opportunities for small businesses" and that "each time the goal has previously been increased, small business contracting, with its inherent benefits, has increased." During consideration of H.R. 4310 , the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, the Obama Administration opposed the House's provisions that would have increased the 23% contracting goal for small businesses generally and established a 40% subcontracting goal for small businesses generally: The Administration strongly supports efforts to increase Federal contracting with small businesses, but opposes section 1631, which would establish a laudable but overly ambitious government-wide small business procurement goal and unrealistic individual agency goals that could undermine the goals process and take away the Government's ability to focus its efforts where opportunities for small business contractors are greatest. Concluding Observations Congressional interest in the SBA's HUBZone program has increased in recent years. Debates over the program's effect on economically distressed communities, as reflected in GAO's recommendation for new SBA performance measures; the federal government's difficulty in meeting the 3% contracting goal; the reduction in the number of HUBZone firms; and small business anxiety concerning the increased frequency of HUBZone eligibility determinations have all served to elevate congressional interest in the program. But perhaps the most influential reason for the increased level of congressional interest has been GAO's finding of fraud in the program. The SBA has overhauled the program. It reported in its FY2011 congressional budget justification that it had "met its primary goal during FY2009" to reengineer its "business processes to reduce fraud and abuse with the program." On April 21, 2010, then-SBA Administrator Karen Mills testified before the House Committee on Small Business that progress has been made but "we know there's more work to do." She testified that "At the front-end, it means more upfront certification and eligibility. For small businesses already in the program, it means more efforts with compliance and site visits. And if they're found to be out of compliance, it means pursuing and removing bad actors." Also, in its FY2013 congressional budget justification, the SBA indicated that To further reduce fraud, waste, and abuse, the HUBZone program began the systematic Legacy Portfolio Review of firms that were certified as a HUBZone prior to the FY2009 policy of full document review for initial certification. During FY2011, 2,040 firms completed the Legacy Portfolio Review. The SBA also conducted and received 987 site visit reports from its field staff conveying whether or not the firm appeared to be operating from the HUBZone principal office. This amount is in sharp contrast with the seven site visits that had been conducted in FY2008. In FY2012, the SBA will be rolling out a HUBZone recruitment initiative to target firms that may be HUBZone eligible and educate them on the benefits of the program. One of the immediate by-products of the SBA's new business processes was an increase in the processing time for new HUBZone certifications. In the past, the SBA had a self-imposed goal of making those certifications within 30 calendar days after receipt of a complete application package, subject to the need for additional information or clarification of information contained in the application. Now, depending on the complexity of the application and the need for additional information, the SBA reports that it takes, on average, about three months to make those certifications. Concerns about the processing times were reflected in P.L. 115-91 's provision requiring the SBA, effective January 1, 2020, to process HUBZone certification applications with sufficient and complete documentation within 60 days of receipt. It remains to be determined if the SBA's new processes will reduce the incidence of fraud within the program. The resolution of that question could determine the future of the HUBZone program.

The Historically Underutilized Business Zone Empowerment Contracting (HUBZone) program provides participating small businesses located in areas with low income, high poverty, or high unemployment with contracting opportunities in the form of set-asides, sole-source awards, and price-evaluation preferences. Its primary objectives are job creation and increased capital investment in distressed communities. Firms must be certified by the SBA to participate in the program. As of April 3, 2019, the SBA's Dynamic Small Business Search database included 6,769 firms with active HUBZone certifications. In FY2017, the federal government awarded 81,082 contracts valued at $7.53 billion to HUBZone-certified businesses. About $1.90 billion of that amount was awarded with a HUBZone preference ($1.49 billion through a HUBZone set-aside, $65.3 million through a HUBZone sole-source award, and $346.9 million through a HUBZone price-evaluation preference). About $1.53 billion of that amount was awarded to HUBZone-certified businesses in open competition with other firms. The remaining $4.10 billion was awarded with another small business preference (e.g., set aside and sole source awards for small business generally and for 8(a), women-owned, and service-disabled veteran-owned small businesses). The HUBZone program's administrative cost is about $8.4 million annually. It received an appropriation of $3.0 million for FY2019, with the additional cost of administering the program provided by the SBA's appropriation for salaries and general administrative expenses. Congressional interest in the HUBZone program has increased in recent years, primarily due to GAO reports of fraud in the program and efforts by small businesses to ease HUBZone eligibility requirements. This report examines arguments both for and against targeting assistance to geographic areas with specified characteristics as opposed to providing assistance to people or businesses with specified characteristics. It then assesses the arguments both for and against the continuation of the HUBZone program. The report also discusses the HUBZone program's structure and operation, focusing on the definition of HUBZone areas and HUBZone small businesses and the program's performance relative to federal contracting goals. It includes an analysis of the SBA's administration of the program and the SBA's performance measures. This report also examines HUBZone-related legislation, including P.L. 114-92, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, which, among other provisions, expanded the definition of a Base Realignment and Closure Act (BRAC) military base closure area to make it easier for businesses located in those areas to meet the HUBZone program's requirement that at least 35% of its employees reside in a HUBZone area. It also extended BRAC base closure area HUBZone eligibility from five years to not less than eight years, provided HUBZone eligibility to qualified disaster areas, and added Native Hawaiian Organizations to the list of HUBZone eligible small business concerns. P.L. 115-91, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, which, among other provisions, allows small businesses that have HUBZone status on or before December 31, 2019, to retain that status from January 1, 2020, until the SBA prepares an updated online tool depicting HUBZone qualified areas (anticipated by the SBA to take place in December 2021). Once the new online tool (currently called the HUBZone map) is operational, the SBA must update it every five years for qualified census tracts and nonmetropolitan counties and when a change in status takes place for other HUBZone types (e.g., when an area becomes or ceases to be a redesignated area). The act also allows governors, starting on January 1, 2020, to petition the SBA each year to designate areas located in nonurban areas, with a population of 50,000 or fewer, and an average unemployment rate at least 120% of the national or state average, whichever is lower, as HUBZones; requires the SBA to process HUBZone certification applications with sufficient and complete documentation within 60 days of receipt; ensures that HUBZone-eligible BRAC areas receive HUBZone eligibility for a full eight years, beginning on the date they are designated a BRAC; and requires the SBA, not later than one year after enactment, to publish performance metrics measuring the HUBZone program's success in promoting economic development in economically distressed areas.

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Introduction This report provides background information and issues for Congress on the Virginia-class nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) program. The Navy's proposed FY2020 budget requests $9,925.5 million (i.e., about $9.9 billion) in procurement and advance procurement (AP) funding for the program. Decisions that Congress makes on procurement of Virginia-class boats could substantially affect U.S. Navy capabilities and funding requirements, and the U.S. shipbuilding industrial base. The Navy's Columbia (SSBN-826) class ballistic missile submarine program is discussed in another CRS report—CRS Report R41129, Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress , by Ronald O'Rourke. For an overview of the strategic and budgetary context in which the Virginia-class program and other Navy shipbuilding programs may be considered, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress , by Ronald O'Rourke. Background U.S. Navy Submarines1 The U.S. Navy operates three types of submarines—nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), nuclear-powered cruise missile and special operations forces (SOF) submarines (SSGNs), and nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs). The SSNs are general-purpose submarines that can (when appropriately equipped and armed) perform a variety of peacetime and wartime missions, including the following: covert intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), much of it done for national-level (as opposed to purely Navy) purposes; covert insertion and recovery of SOF (on a smaller scale than possible with the SSGNs); covert strikes against land targets with the Tomahawk cruise missiles (again on a smaller scale than possible with the SSGNs); covert offensive and defensive mine warfare; anti-submarine warfare (ASW); and anti-surface ship warfare. During the Cold War, ASW against Soviet submarines was the primary stated mission of U.S. SSNs, although covert ISR and covert SOF insertion/recovery operations were reportedly important on a day-to-day basis as well. In the post-Cold War era, although anti-submarine warfare remained a mission, the SSN force focused more on performing the other missions noted on the list above. Due to the shift in the strategic environment in recent years from the post-Cold War era to a new situation featuring renewed great power competition, ASW against Russian and Chinese submarines has once again become a more prominent mission for U.S. Navy SSNs. U.S. Attack Submarine Force Levels Force-Level Goal The Navy's force-level goal, released in December 2016, is to achieve and maintain a 355-ship fleet, including 66 SSNs. For a review of SSN force-level goals since the Reagan Administration, see Appendix A . Force Level at End of FY2018 The SSN force included more than 90 boats during most of the 1980s, when plans called for achieving a 600-ship Navy including 100 SSNs. The number of SSNs peaked at 98 boats at the end of FY1987 and declined after that in a manner that roughly paralleled the decline in the total size of the Navy over the same time period. The 51 SSNs in service at the end of FY2018 included the following: 31 Los Angeles (SSN-688) class boats; 3 Seawolf (SSN-21) class boats; and 17 Virginia (SSN-774) class boats. Los Angeles- and Seawolf-Class Boats A total of 62 Los Angeles-class submarines, commonly called 688s, were procured between FY1970 and FY1990 and entered service between 1976 and 1996. They are equipped with four 21-inch diameter torpedo tubes and can carry a total of 26 torpedoes or Tomahawk cruise missiles in their torpedo tubes and internal magazines. The final 31 boats in the class (SSN-719 and higher) were built with an additional 12 vertical launch system (VLS) tubes in their bows for carrying and launching another 12 Tomahawk cruise missiles. The final 23 boats in the class (SSN-751 and higher) incorporate further improvements and are referred to as Improved Los Angeles class boats or 688Is. As of the end of FY2018, 31 of the 62 boats in the class had been retired. The Seawolf class was originally intended to include about 30 boats, but Seawolf-class procurement was stopped after three boats as a result of the end of the Cold War and associated changes in military requirements and defense spending levels. The three Seawolf-class submarines are the Seawolf (SSN-21), the Connecticut (SSN-22), and the Jimmy Carter (SSN-23). SSN-21 and SSN-22 were procured in FY1989 and FY1991 and entered service in 1997 and 1998, respectively. SSN-23 was originally procured in FY1992. Its procurement was suspended in 1992 and then reinstated in FY1996. It entered service in 2005. Seawolf-class submarines are larger than Los Angeles-class boats or previous U.S. Navy SSNs. They are equipped with eight 30-inch-diameter torpedo tubes and can carry a total of 50 torpedoes or cruise missiles. SSN-23 was built to a lengthened configuration compared to the other two ships in the class. Virginia (SSN-774) Class Program General The Virginia-class attack submarine (see Figure 1 ) was designed to be less expensive and better optimized for post-Cold War submarine missions than the Seawolf-class design. The Virginia-class design is slightly larger than the Los Angeles-class design, but incorporates newer technologies. Virginia-class boats procured in recent years cost roughly $2.8 billion each to procure, but Virginia-class boats to be procured in coming years will be built to a lengthened configuration that includes the Virginia Payload Module (see discussion below) and have an estimated unit procurement cost of roughly $3.2 billion. The first Virginia-class boat entered service in October 2004. Annual Procurement Quantities Table 1 shows annual numbers of Virginia-class boats procured from FY1998 (the lead boat) through FY2019, the number requested for procurement in FY2020, and the numbers projected for procurement in FY2021-FY2024 under the FY2020-FY2024 Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP). Three Boats (Rather Than Two) Requested for FY2020 Navy plans previously called for procuring two Virginia-class boats in FY2020. The third boat requested for FY2020 was added to the budget request as part of the FY2020 budget-planning cycle. The Navy states that since this third boat has not received any prior-year advance procurement (AP) funding, it would execute (i.e., be constructed) on a schedule similar to that of a boat procured in FY2023. Multiyear Procurement (MYP) The Virginia-class submarines shown in Table 1 for FY2019-FY2023, which are referred to as the Block V boats, are being procured under a multiyear procurement (MYP) contract covering those years. This is the fourth consecutive MYP contract used by the Virginia-class program—three earlier MYP contracts were used to procure the 10 Virginia-class boats shown in the table for the period FY2014-FY2018 (the Block IV boats), the 8 Virginia-class boats shown in the table for the period FY2009-FY2013 (the Block III boats), and the 5 Virginia-class boats shown in the table for the period FY2004-FY2008 (the Block II boats). The four boats shown in the table for the period FY1998-FY2002 (the Block I boats) were procured under a block buy contract, which is an arrangement somewhat similar to an MYP contract. The boat procured in FY2003 fell between the FY1998-FY2002 block buy contract and the FY2004-FY2008 MYP contract, and was contracted for separately. Joint Production Arrangement Overview Virginia-class boats are built jointly by General Dynamics' Electric Boat Division (GD/EB) of Groton, CT, and Quonset Point, RI, and Huntington Ingalls Industries' Newport News Shipbuilding (HII/NNS), of Newport News, VA. The arrangement for jointly building Virginia-class boats was proposed to Congress by GD/EB, HII/NNS, and the Navy, and agreed to by Congress in 1997, as part of Congress's action on the Navy's budget for FY1998, the year that the first Virginia-class boat was procured. A primary aim of the arrangement is to minimize the cost of building Virginia-class boats at a relatively low annual rate in two shipyards (rather than entirely in a single shipyard) while preserving key submarine-construction skills at both shipyards. Under the arrangement, GD/EB builds certain parts of each boat, HII/NNS builds certain other parts of each boat, and the yards have taken turns building the reactor compartments and performing final assembly of the boats. The arrangement has resulted in a roughly 50-50 division of Virginia-class profits between the two yards and preserves both yards' ability to build submarine reactor compartments (a key capability for a submarine-construction yard) and perform submarine final-assembly work. Navy's Proposed Submarine Unified Build Strategy (SUBS) Under a plan it calls the Submarine Unified Build Strategy (SUBS), the Navy plans to build Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines jointly at GD/EB and HII/NNS, with most of the work going to GD/EB. As part of this plan, the Navy plans to adjust the division of work on the Virginia-class attack submarine program so that HII/NNS would receive a larger share of the work for that program than it has received in the past. Cost-Reduction Effort The Navy states that it achieved a goal of reducing the procurement cost of Virginia-class submarines so that two boats could be procured in FY2012 for a combined cost of $4.0 billion in constant FY2005 dollars—a goal referred to as "2 for 4 in 12." Achieving this goal involved removing about $400 million (in constant FY2005 dollars) from the cost of each submarine. (The Navy calculated that the unit target cost of $2.0 billion in constant FY2005 dollars for each submarine translated into about $2.6 billion for a boat procured in FY2012.) Schedule and Cost Performance on Deliveries Earlier Record As noted in CRS testimony in 2014, the Virginia (SSN-774) class attack program has been cited as an example of a successful acquisition program. The program received a David Packard Excellence in Acquisition Award from the Department of Defense (DOD) in 2008. Although the program experienced cost growth in its early years that was due in part to annual procurement rates that were lower than initially envisaged and challenges in restarting submarine production at Newport News Shipbuilding, the lead ship in the program was delivered within four months of the target date that had been established about a decade earlier, and until recently, ships had been delivered largely on cost and ahead of schedule. More-Recent Reported Delays Relative to Targeted Delivery Dates In March and April 2019, it was reported that GD/EB, HII/NNS, and their supplier firms were experiencing challenges in meeting scheduled delivery times as the Virginia-class program transitions over time from production of two "regular" Virginia-class boats per year to two VPM-equipped boats per year. As a result of these challenges, it was reported, the program has experienced months-long delays in efforts to build boats relative to their targeted delivery dates. Virginia Payload Module (VPM) The Navy plans to build the second of the two boats procured in FY2019, the second and third boats requested for procurement in FY2020, the second of the two boats planned for procurement in FY2021, and all subsequent Virginia-class boats with the Virginia Payload Module (VPM), an additional, 84-foot-long, mid-body section equipped with four large-diameter, vertical launch tubes for storing and launching additional Tomahawk missiles or other payloads. The VPM's vertical launch tubes are to be used to store and fire additional Tomahawk cruise missiles or other payloads, such as large-diameter unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs). The four additional launch tubes in the VPM could carry a total of 28 additional Tomahawk cruise missiles (7 per tube), which would increase the total number of torpedo-sized weapons (such as Tomahawks) carried by the Virginia class design from about 37 to about 65—an increase of about 76%. Building Virginia-class boats with the VPM is intended to compensate for a sharp loss in submarine force weapon-carrying capacity that will occur with the retirement in FY2026-FY2028 of the Navy's four Ohio-class cruise missile/special operations forces support submarines (SSGNs). Each SSGN is equipped with 24 large-diameter vertical launch tubes, of which 22 can be used to carry up to 7 Tomahawks each, for a maximum of 154 vertically launched Tomahawks per boat, or 616 vertically launched Tomahawks for the four boats. Twenty-two Virginia-class boats built with VPMs could carry 616 Tomahawks in their VPMs. The Navy's FY2020 budget submission shows that Virginia-class boats with and without the VPM have estimated recurring unit procurement costs of roughly $3.2 billion and $2.8 billion, respectively. The joint explanatory statement for the FY2014 DOD Appropriations Act (Division C of H.R. 3547 / P.L. 113-76 of January 17, 2014) required the Navy to submit biannual reports to the congressional defense committees describing the actions the Navy is taking to minimize costs for the VPM. Acoustic and Other Improvements In addition to the VPM, the Navy is introducing acoustic and other improvements to the Virginia-class design that are intended to help maintain the design's superiority over Russian and Chinese submarines. FY2020 Funding Request The Navy estimates the combined procurement cost of the three Virginia-class boats requested for procurement in FY2020 at $9.274.4 (i.e., about $9.3 billion). The boats have received $1,756.9 million in prior-year "regular" advance procurement (AP) funding and $361.6 million in additional Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) AP funding for components of boats being procured under the FY2019-FY2023 MYP contract. The Navy's proposed FY2020 budget requests the remaining $7,155.9 million in procurement funding needed to complete the boats' estimated combined procurement cost, as well as $1,887.6 million in "regular" AP funding for Virginia-class boats to be procured in future fiscal years and $882.0 million in additional EOQ AP funding for components of boats to be procured under the FY2019-FY2023 MYP contract, bringing the total amount of procurement and AP funding requested for the program in FY2020 to $9,925.5 million (i.e., about $9.9 billion), excluding outfitting and post-delivery costs. Submarine Construction Industrial Base U.S. Navy submarines are built by GD/EB and HII/NNS. These are the only two shipyards in the country capable of building nuclear-powered ships. GD/EB builds submarines only, while HII/NNS also builds nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and is capable of building other types of surface ships. In addition to GD/EB and HII/NNS, the submarine construction industrial base includes hundreds of supplier firms, as well as laboratories and research facilities, in numerous states. Much of the total material procured from supplier firms for the construction of submarines comes from sole-source suppliers. For nuclear-propulsion component suppliers, an additional source of stabilizing work is the Navy's nuclear-powered aircraft carrier construction program. In terms of work provided to these firms, a carrier nuclear propulsion plant is roughly equivalent to five submarine propulsion plants. Much of the design and engineering portion of the submarine construction industrial base is resident at GD/EB; smaller portions are resident at HII/NNS and some of the component makers. Projected SSN Force Levels Table 2 shows the Navy's projection of the number of SSNs over time if the Navy's FY2020 30-year shipbuilding plan were fully implemented. As can be seen in the table, the FY2020 30-year shipbuilding plan would achieve the Navy's 66-boat SSN force-level goal by FY2048. As also shown in the table, the number of SSNs is projected to experience (relative to a previous Navy SSN force-level goal of 48 boats) a valley or trough from the mid-2020s through the early 2030s, reaching a minimum of 42 boats (i.e., 24 boats, or about 36%, less than the current 66-boat force-level goal) in FY2027-FY2028. This projected valley is a consequence of having procured a relatively small number of SSNs during the 1990s, in the early years of the post-Cold War era. Some observers are concerned that this projected valley in SSN force levels could lead to a period of heightened operational strain for the SSN force, and perhaps also a period of weakened conventional deterrence against potential adversaries such as China. The projected SSN valley was first identified by CRS in 1995 and has been discussed in CRS reports and testimony every year since then. As one measure for mitigating this valley, the Navy's FY2020 budget submission proposes to refuel and extend the service life of two older Los Angeles (SSN-688) class submarines. The Navy states that this could be followed by refuelings and service life extensions for up to five more Los Angeles-class SSNs that would be funded in fiscal years beyond the FY2020-FY2024 Future Year Defense Plan (FYDP). SSN Deployments Delayed Due to Maintenance Backlogs In recent years, a number of the Navy's SSNs have had their deployments delayed due to maintenance backlogs at the Navy's four government-operated shipyards, which are the primary facilities for conducting depot-level maintenance work on Navy SSNs. Delays in deploying SSNs can put added operational pressure on other SSNs that are available for deployment. A November 2018 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on the issue stated: The Navy has been unable to begin or complete the vast majority of its attack submarine maintenance periods on time resulting in significant maintenance delays and operating and support cost expenditures. GAO's analysis of Navy maintenance data shows that between fiscal year 2008 and 2018, attack submarines have incurred 10,363 days of idle time and maintenance delays as a result of delays in getting into and out of the shipyards. For example, the Navy originally scheduled the USS Boise to enter a shipyard for an extended maintenance period in 2013 but, due to heavy shipyard workload, the Navy delayed the start of the maintenance period. In June 2016, the USS Boise could no longer conduct normal operations and the boat has remained idle, pierside for over two years since then waiting to enter a shipyard…. GAO estimated that since fiscal year 2008 the Navy has spent more than $1.5 billion in fiscal year 2018 constant dollars to support attack submarines that provide no operational capability—those sitting idle while waiting to enter the shipyards, and those delayed in completing their maintenance at the shipyards. The Navy has started to address challenges related to workforce shortages and facilities needs at the public shipyards. However, it has not effectively allocated maintenance periods among public shipyards and private shipyards that may also be available to help minimize attack submarine idle time. GAO's analysis found that while the public shipyards have operated above capacity for the past several years, attack submarine maintenance delays are getting longer and idle time is increasing. The Navy may have options to mitigate this idle time and maintenance delays by leveraging private shipyard capacity for repair work. But the Navy has not completed a comprehensive business case analysis as recommended by Department of Defense guidelines to inform maintenance workload allocation across public and private shipyards. Navy leadership has acknowledged that they need to be more proactive in leveraging potential private shipyard repair capacity. Without addressing this challenge, the Navy risks continued expenditure of operating and support funding to crew, maintain, and support attack submarines that provide no operational capability because they are delayed in getting into and out of maintenance. The House Appropriations Committee, in its report ( H.Rept. 115-769 of June 20, 2018) on the FY2019 DOD Appropriations Act ( H.R. 6157 ) stated: SUBMARINE MAINTENANCE SHORTFALLS The Committee recognizes that the nuclear-capable public naval shipyards are backlogged with submarine maintenance work, while private nuclear-capable shipyards have underutilized capacity. The Los Angeles (SSN–688) class submarines are especially impacted by this backlog, which significantly reduces their operational availability for missions in support of combatant commanders. The Committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to submit a report to the congressional defense committees not later than 90 days after the enactment of this Act that outlines a comprehensive, five-year submarine maintenance plan that restores submarine operational availability and fully utilizes both public and private nuclear-capable shipyards in accordance with all applicable laws. The plan should strive to provide both private and public shipyards with predictable frequency of maintenance availabilities and estimate any potential cost savings that distributing the workload may deliver. (Page 71) A March 2019 Navy report to Congress states that in response to the above committee report language, The Navy submitted an initial [submarine maintenance] plan in December 2018, that reflected FY 2019 budget information. The Navy has [now] updated this plan to incorporate data from the President's FY 2020 budget submitted on March 11, 2019…. … In the post-Cold War and post 9/11 era, there have been decades of decision making associated with the re-posturing of defense strategies, such as: the reduction in maintenance capacity and flexibility though Baes Realignment and Closures (BRAC), increased Operational Tempo (OPTEMPO), evolution of submarine life cycle maintenance plans, budget reductions, and budget uncertainties that have contributed to the current challenges facing the submarine fleet. The root cause of submarine idle time and associated loss of operational availability, as discussed in the recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report 19-229, "Actions Needed to Address Costly Maintenance Delays Facing the Attack Submarine Fleet" (issued November 2018), is largely due to public shipyard capacity not keeping pace with growing maintenance requirements that have been building for a number of years prior to the USS BOISE (SSN 764) FY 2016 Engineered Overhaul (EOH). The workload to capacity mismatch resulted in lower priority attack submarine (SSN) availabilities (as compared to ballistic missile submarines and nuclear-powered aircraft carriers) being delivered late and a bow-waving of workload from one fiscal year to the next that could not be executed. The workload backlog exacerbated the public shipyard workload-to-capacity mismatch and contributed to an increasing trend in late SSN [maintenance] deliveries. The Navy has taken several actions to improve the workload-to-capacity balance at the public shipyards. Notably, over 20,600 workers were hired from FY 2013 through FY 2018, which after accounting for attrition, increased total end strength from 29,400 to 36,700. However, the accelerated hiring resulted in 56 percent of the production workforce having less than five years of experience. The less experienced workforce requires a greater investment in training, as described in the Navy's Report to Congress on the Naval Shipyard Development Plan (issued March 2018), which offers some near term productivity gains. The Navy has also taken additional actions to balance workload at our public shipyards by outsourcing four submarine maintenance availabilities to the private sector and plans to outsource another two submarine availabilities to the private shipyards starting in FY 2020 and FY 2021. Additionally, to ensure on-time delivery from maintenance availabilities, availability inductions have been rescheduled to occur when the shipyards have the capacity to accomplish the availability(s) within programmed schedule durations. This necessary action to improve the on-time delivery of current maintenance availabilities has resulted in some additional submarine maintenance backlog and some accumulation of idle time. Based on actions and initiatives the Navy is currently pursuing to improve submarine operational availability and the outsourcing of two additional submarine availabilities to the private sector, the Navy assesses that the submarine idle time will be eliminated by the end of FY 2023 and the submarine maintenance backlog will be worked off by the end of FY 2023. Issues for Congress FY2020 Funding One issue for Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy's FY2020 procurement and advance procurement (AP) funding requests for the Virginia-class program. In considering this issue, Congress may consider several factors, including the amount of work the Navy is proposing to fund for the program in FY2020 and whether the Navy has accurately priced the work it is proposing to do in FY2020. Another element of this issue concerns the funding profile for the third Virginia-class boat requested for procurement in FY2020. This issue is discussed separately in the next section. Funding Profile for Third Virginia-Class Boast Requested for FY2020 Another issue for Congress concerns the funding profile for the third Virginia-class boat that the Navy has requested for procurement in FY2020. As discussed earlier, Navy plans previously called for procuring two Virginia-class boats in FY2020. The third boat requested for FY2020 was added to the budget request as part of the FY2020 budget-planning cycle. The Navy states that since this third boat has not received any prior-year advance procurement (AP) funding, it would execute (i.e., be constructed) on a schedule similar to that of a boat procured in FY2023. The Navy is proposing to fully fund the procurement of the third boat in FY2020. As discussed in Appendix B , Congress in the past has fully funded the procurement of nuclear-powered ships (specifically, aircraft carriers) for which no prior-year AP funding had been provided. Given the anticipated schedule for executing a third Virginia-class boat procured in FY2020, one alternative funding profile for this boat would be to provide AP funding for the boat in FY2020-FY2022, followed by full funding (i.e., the remainder of the boat's procurement cost, in the form of regular procurement funding) for the boat in FY2023 (or perhaps AP funding in FY2020-FY2021, followed by full funding in FY2022). Supporters of providing only AP funding for the boat in FY2020 could argue that it would reduce FY2020 funding requirements for the Virginia-class program, which could make more FY2020 funding available for other programs, such as, for example, the LPD-17 Flight II amphibious ship program, the LHA-9 amphibious assault ship program, the Expeditionary Support Base (ESB) ship program, the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program, Navy aircraft or weapon acquisition programs, Navy maintenance and readiness initiatives, or other DOD programs. Supporters of fully funding a third Virginia-class boat in FY2020 could argue that it would reduce FY2021-FY2023 funding requirements for the Virginia-class program, which could make available more funding in those years for other programs, including most of those mentioned above, as well as the Virginia-class program itself (where it could, for example, support the procurement of a third Virginia-class boat in FY2022 and/or a third Virginia-class boat in FY2023). They could also argue that fully funding the procurement of a third Virginia-class boat in FY2020 would send a signal of resolve to potential adversaries such as China, particularly since it would make FY2020 the first year since FY1989 in which three SSNs were procured in a single year. Industrial-Base Challenges of Building Both Columbia- and Virginia-Class Boats Another potential issue for Congress concerns the potential industrial-base challenges of building both Columbia-class boats and Virginia-class attack submarines (SSNs) at the same time. Along with continued production of Virginia-class SSNs, the Navy in FY2021 is to also begin building Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). Observers have expressed concern about the industrial base's capacity for building both Virginia- and Columbia-class boats without encountering bottlenecks or other production problems in one or both of these programs. Concerns about the ability of the submarine construction industrial base to execute an eventual procurement rate of two VPM-equipped Virginia-class boats and one Columbia-class boat per year have been heightened by recent reports of challenges faced by the two submarine-construction shipyards (GD/EB and HII/NNS), as well as submarine component supplier firms in meeting scheduled delivery times for Virginia-class boats as the Virginia-class program transitions over time from production of two "regular" Virginia-class boats per year to two VPM-equipped boats per year. Technical Risk in Virginia-Class Block V Design Another potential issue for Congress concerns technical risk in the design for the Block V version of the Virginia-class program—the version being procured in FY2019-2023. A May 2019 GAO report—the 2019 edition of GAO's annual report surveying DOD major acquisition programs—stated the following regarding the Block V version of the Virginia-class design: Current Status In 2019, the Navy plans to award a multibillion dollar, multiyear contract for construction of 10 Block V submarines. Under the Navy's plan, all Block V ships will include acoustic superiority improvements, while the VPM will be added starting with the second Block V submarine. According to program officials, the design of Block V submarines will differ from Block IV by approximately 20 percent. Of this 20 percent, the program office considers 70 percent to constitute major changes. The program office plans to complete basic and functional designs for VPM by construction start—an approach consistent with best practices. However, the shipbuilder is currently behind schedule in completing detail design work, where (1) the design advances to the highest level of fidelity, (2) specific fabrication and installation instructions for the shipyard are developed, and (3) required production materials are identified. The program now plans to complete 76 percent of this work by construction start, compared to the 86 percent it initially planned, in part due to the shipbuilder's challenges in using a new design tool. Going forward, the Navy and shipbuilder will need to balance staffing levels for the remaining Block V design work with design efforts for the new Columbia class ballistic missile submarine. Construction of Block V and the Columbia class will coincide beginning in fiscal year 2021.This will require the Navy and its shipbuilder to manage staffing demands and other resources across both programs. In addition, program officials said vendor quality issues with welding on VPM have caused a 3.5-month delay in the schedule for the payload tubes for the first two submarines with VPM. The Navy plans to recover some time by accelerating tube manufacturing with a second vendor, but this approach may increase program costs. The Block V effort is subsumed under the SSN 774 major defense acquisition program, and is not managed as a separate program. In 2015, the Office of the Secretary of Defense shifted the program's oversight to the Navy. SSN 774 had already completed its required defense acquisition system milestone reviews before Block V started, but program officials said the Navy continues to conduct regular oversight of the Block V. Program Office Comments In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office provided technical comments, which we incorporated where appropriate. Additional Issues Issues Raised in January 2018 DOT&E Report Another oversight issue for Congress concerns Virginia-class program issues raised in a January 2018 report from DOD's Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E)—DOT&E's annual report for FY2017. Problem with Hull Coating Reported in 2017 Another issue for Congress concerns a problem with the hull coating used on Virginia-class boats that was reported in 2017. Defective Parts Reported in 2016 Another issue for Congress concerns three Virginia-class boats that were reported in 2016 to have been built with defective parts, and the operational and cost implications of this situation. Legislative Activity for FY2020 Congressional Action on FY2020 Funding Request Table 3 summarizes congressional action on the Navy's FY2020 funding request for the Virginia-class program. Appendix A. Past SSN Force-Level Goals This appendix summarizes attack submarine force-level goals since the Reagan Administration (1981-1989). The Reagan-era plan for a 600-ship Navy included an objective of achieving and maintaining a force of 100 SSNs. The George H. W. Bush Administration's proposed Base Force plan of 1991-1992 originally called for a Navy of more than 400 ships, including 80 SSNs. In 1992, however, the SSN goal was reduced to about 55 boats as a result of a 1992 Joint Staff force-level requirement study (updated in 1993) that called for a force of 51 to 67 SSNs, including 10 to 12 with Seawolf-level acoustic quieting, by the year 2012. The Clinton Administration, as part of its 1993 Bottom-Up Review (BUR) of U.S. defense policy, established a goal of maintaining a Navy of about 346 ships, including 45 to 55 SSNs. The Clinton Administration's 1997 QDR supported a requirement for a Navy of about 305 ships and established a tentative SSN force-level goal of 50 boats, "contingent on a reevaluation of peacetime operational requirements." The Clinton Administration later amended the SSN figure to 55 boats (and therefore a total of about 310 ships). The reevaluation called for in the 1997 QDR was carried out as part of a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) study on future requirements for SSNs that was completed in December 1999. The study had three main conclusions: "that a force structure below 55 SSNs in the 2015 [time frame] and 62 [SSNs] in the 2025 time frame would leave the CINC's [the regional military commanders-in-chief] with insufficient capability to respond to urgent crucial demands without gapping other requirements of higher national interest. Additionally, this force structure [55 SSNs in 2015 and 62 in 2025] would be sufficient to meet the modeled war fighting requirements"; "that to counter the technologically pacing threat would require 18 Virginia class SSNs in the 2015 time frame"; and "that 68 SSNs in the 2015 [time frame] and 76 [SSNs] in the 2025 time frame would meet all of the CINCs' and national intelligence community's highest operational and collection requirements." The conclusions of the 1999 JCS study were mentioned in discussions of required SSN force levels, but the figures of 68 and 76 submarines were not translated into official DOD force-level goals. The George W. Bush Administration's report on the 2001 QDR revalidated the amended requirement from the 1997 QDR for a fleet of about 310 ships, including 55 SSNs. In revalidating this and other U.S. military force-structure goals, the report cautioned that as DOD's "transformation effort matures—and as it produces significantly higher output of military value from each element of the force—DOD will explore additional opportunities to restructure and reorganize the Armed Forces." DOD and the Navy conducted studies on undersea warfare requirements in 2003-2004. One of the Navy studies—an internal Navy study done in 2004—reportedly recommended reducing the attack submarine force level requirement to as few as 37 boats. The study reportedly recommended homeporting a total of nine attack submarines at Guam and using satellites and unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) to perform ISR missions now performed by attack submarines. In March 2005, the Navy submitted to Congress a report projecting Navy force levels out to FY2035. The report presented two alternatives for FY2035—a 260-ship fleet including 37 SSNs and 4 SSGNs, and a 325-ship fleet including 41 SSNs and 4 SSGNs. In May 2005, it was reported that a newly completed DOD study on attack submarine requirements called for maintaining a force of 45 to 50 boats. In February 2006, the Navy proposed to maintain in coming years a fleet of 313 ships, including 48 SSNs. Although the Navy's ship force-level goals have changed repeatedly in subsequent years, the figure of 48 SSNs remained unchanged until December 2016, when the Navy released a force-level objective for achieving and maintaining a force of 355 ships, including 66 SSNs. Appendix B. Options for Funding SSNs This appendix presents information on some alternative profiles for funding the procurement of SSNs. These alternatives include but are not necessarily limited to the following: two years of advance procurement (AP) funding followed by full funding —the traditional approach, under which there are two years of AP funding for the SSN's long-leadtime components, followed by the remainder of the boat's procurement funding in the year of procurement; one year of AP funding followed by full funding —one year of AP funding for the SSN's long-leadtime components, followed by the remainder of the boat's procurement funding in the year of procurement; full funding with no AP funding (single-year full funding , aka point-blank full funding ) —full funding of the SSN in the year of procurement, with no AP funding in prior years; incremental funding —partial funding of the SSN in the year of procurement, followed by one or more years of additional funding increments needed to complete the procurement cost of the ship; and advance appropriations —a form of full funding that can be viewed as a legislatively locked in form of incremental funding. Navy testimony to Congress in early 2007, when Congress was considering the FY2008 budget, suggested that two years of AP funding are required to fund the procurement of an SSN, and consequently that additional SSNs could not be procured until FY2010 at the earliest. This testimony understated Congress's options regarding the procurement of additional SSNs in the near term. Although SSNs are normally procured with two years of AP funding (which is used primarily for financing long-leadtime nuclear propulsion components), Congress can procure an SSN without prior-year AP funding, or with only one year of AP funding. Consequently, Congress at that time had the option of procuring an additional SSN in FY2009 and/or FY2010. Single-year full funding has been used in the past by Congress to procure nuclear-powered ships for which no prior-year AP funding had been provided. Specifically, Congress used single-year full funding in FY1980 to procure the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier CVN-71, and again in FY1988 to procure the CVNs 74 and 75. In the case of the FY1988 procurement, under the Administration's proposed FY1988 budget, CVNs 74 and 75 were to be procured in FY1990 and FY1993, respectively, and the FY1988 budget was to make the initial AP payment for CVN-74. Congress, in acting on the FY1988 budget, decided to accelerate the procurement of both ships to FY1988, and fully funded the two ships that year at a combined cost of $6.325 billion. The ships entered service in 1995 and 1998, respectively. The existence in both FY1980 and FY1988 of a spare set of Nimitz-class reactor components was not what made it possible for Congress to fund CVNs 71, 74, and 75 with single-year full funding; it simply permitted the ships to be built more quickly. What made it possible for Congress to fund the carriers with single-year full funding was Congress's constitutional authority to appropriate funding for that purpose. Procuring an SSN with one year of AP funding or no AP funding would not materially change the way the SSN would be built—the process would still encompass two or three years of advance work on long-leadtime components, and an additional five or six years or so of construction work on the ship itself. The outlay rate for the SSN could be slower, as outlays for construction of the ship itself would begin one or two years later than normal, and the interval between the recorded year of full funding and the year that the ship enters service would be longer than normal. Congress in the past has procured certain ships in the knowledge that those ships would not begin construction for some time and consequently would take longer to enter service than a ship of that kind would normally require. When Congress procured two nuclear-powered aircraft carriers (CVNs 72 and 73) in FY1983, and another two (CVNs 74 and 75) in FY1988, it did so in both cases in the knowledge that the second ship in each case would not begin construction until some time after the first. Appendix C. 2006 Navy Study on Options for Mitigating Projected Valley in SSN Force Level This appendix presents background information on a study initiated by the Navy in 2006 for mitigating the valley in the SSN force levels projected for the 2020s and 2030s. The study was completed in early 2007 and briefed to CRS and CBO on May 22, 2007. At the time of the study, the SSN force was projected to bottom out at 40 boats and then recover to 48 boats by the early 2030s. Principal points in the Navy study (which cite SSN force-level projections as understood at that time) include the following: The day-to-day requirement for deployed SSNs is 10.0, meaning that, on average, a total of 10 SSNs are to be deployed on a day-to-day basis. The peak projected wartime demand is about 35 SSNs deployed within a certain amount of time. This figure includes both the 10.0 SSNs that are to be deployed on a day-to-day basis and 25 additional SSNs surged from the United States within a certain amount of time. Reducing Virginia-class shipyard construction time to 60 months—something that the Navy already plans to do as part of its strategy for meeting the Virginia-class cost-reduction goal (see earlier discussion on cost-reduction goal)—will increase the size of the SSN force by two boats, so that the force would bottom out at 42 boats rather than 40. If, in addition to reducing Virginia-class shipyard construction time to 60 months, the Navy also lengthens the service lives of 16 existing SSNs by periods ranging from 3 months to 24 months (with many falling in the range of 9 to 15 months), this would increase the size of the SSN force by another two boats, so that the force would bottom out at 44 boats rather than 40 boats. The total cost of extending the lives of the 16 boats would be roughly $500 million in constant FY2005 dollars. The resulting force that bottoms out at 44 boats could meet the 10.0 requirement for day-to-day deployed SSNs throughout the 2020-2033 period if, as an additional option, about 40 SSN deployments occurring in the eight-year period 2025-2032 were lengthened from six months to seven months. These 40 or so lengthened deployments would represent about one-quarter of all the SSN deployments that would take place during the eight-year period. The resulting force that bottoms out at 44 boats could not meet the peak projected wartime demand of about 35 SSNs deployed within a certain amount of time. The force could generate a total deployment of 32 SSNs within the time in question—3 boats (or about 8.6%) less than the 35-boat figure. Lengthening SSN deployments from six months to seven months would not improve the force's ability to meet the peak projected wartime demand of about 35 SSNs deployed within a certain amount of time. To meet the 35-boat figure, an additional four SSNs beyond those planned by the Navy would need to be procured. Procuring four additional SSNs would permit the resulting 48-boat force to surge an additional three SSNs within the time in question, so that the force could meet the peak projected wartime demand of about 35 SSNs deployed within a certain amount of time. Procuring one to four additional SSNs could also reduce the number of seven-month deployments that would be required to meet the 10.0 requirement for day-to-day deployed SSNs during the period 2025-2032. Procuring one additional SSN would reduce the number of seven-month deployments during this period to about 29; procuring two additional SSNs would reduce it to about 17, procuring three additional SSNs would reduce it to about 7, and procuring four additional SSNs would reduce it to 2. The Navy added a number of caveats to these results, including but not limited to the following: The requirement for 10.0 SSNs deployed on a day-to-day basis is a current requirement that could change in the future. The peak projected wartime demand of about 35 SSNs deployed within a certain amount of time is an internal Navy figure that reflects recent analyses of potential future wartime requirements for SSNs. Subsequent analyses of this issue could result in a different figure. The identification of 19 SSNs as candidates for service life extension reflects current evaluations of the material condition of these boats and projected use rates for their nuclear fuel cores. If the material condition of these boats years from now turns out to be worse than the Navy currently projects, some of them might no longer be suitable for service life extension. In addition, if world conditions over the next several years require these submarines to use up their nuclear fuel cores more quickly than the Navy now projects, then the amounts of time that their service lives might be extended could be reduced partially, to zero, or to less than zero (i.e., the service lives of the boats, rather than being extended, might need to be shortened). The analysis does not take into account potential rare events, such as accidents, that might force the removal of an SSN from service before the end of its expected service life. Seven-month deployments might affect retention rates for submarine personnel.

The Navy has been procuring Virginia (SSN-774) class nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) since FY1998. The three Virginia-class boats that the Navy has requested for procurement in FY2020 would be the 31st, 32nd, and 33rd boats in the class. Virginia-class submarines are being procured under a multiyear procurement (MYP) contract covering at least 10 boats to be procured in FY2019-FY2023. Navy plans previously called for procuring two Virginia-class boats in FY2020. The third boat requested for FY2020 was added to the budget request as part of the FY2020 budget-planning cycle. The Navy states that since this third boat has not received any prior-year advance procurement (AP) funding, it would execute (i.e., be constructed) on a schedule similar to that of a boat procured in FY2023. The Navy plans to build the second of the two boats procured in FY2019, the second and third boats requested for procurement in FY2020, the second of the two boats planned for procurement in FY2021, and all subsequent Virginia-class boats with the Virginia Payload Module (VPM), an additional, 84-foot-long, mid-body section equipped with four large-diameter, vertical launch tubes for storing and launching additional Tomahawk missiles or other payloads. The Navy's FY2020 budget submission shows that Virginia-class boats with and without the VPM have estimated recurring unit procurement costs of roughly $3.2 billion and $2.8 billion, respectively. The Navy estimates the combined procurement cost of the three Virginia-class boats requested for procurement in FY2020 at $9.274.4 (i.e., about $9.3 billion). The boats have received $1,756.9 million in prior-year "regular" advance procurement (AP) funding and $361.6 million in additional Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) AP funding for components of boats being procured under the FY2019-FY2023 MYP contract. The Navy's proposed FY2020 budget requests the remaining $7,155.9 million in procurement funding needed to complete the boats' estimated combined procurement cost, as well as $1,887.6 million in "regular" AP funding for Virginia-class boats to be procured in future fiscal years and $882.0 million in additional EOQ AP funding for components of boats to be procured under the FY2019-FY2023 MYP contract, bringing the total amount of procurement and AP funding requested for the program in FY2020 to $9,925.5 million (i.e., about $9.9 billion), excluding outfitting and post-delivery costs. The Navy's SSN force included 51 boats at the end of FY2018. The Navy's force-level goal for SSNs is to achieve and maintain a force of 66 boats. From the mid-2020s through the early 2030s, the number of SSNs is projected to experience a valley or trough, reaching a minimum of 42 boats in FY2027-FY2028. Some observers are concerned that this projected valley—a consequence of having procured a relatively small number of SSNs during the 1990s, in the early years of the post-Cold War era—could lead to a period of heightened operational strain for the SSN force, and perhaps a period of weakened conventional deterrence against potential adversaries such as China. The projected SSN valley was first identified by CRS in 1995 and has been discussed in CRS reports and testimony every year since then. The Navy's 30-year shipbuilding plan projects that, after reaching its projected 42-boat minimum, the SSN force will increase to 66 boats by FY2048. Issues for Congress regarding the Virginia-class program include whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy's FY2020 procurement and advance procurement (AP) funding requests for the Virginia-class program; the funding profile for the third Virginia-class boat requested for procurement in FY2020; the potential industrial-base challenges of building both Columbia-class boats and Virginia-class attack submarines (SSNs) at the same time; and technical risk in the design for the Block V version of the Virginia-class program.

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A basic understanding of legislative procedure and processes is essential for congressional staff. Gaining familiarity with the key publications and websites listed in this report will assist congressional staff in obtaining this understanding, as well as providing a bibliography of sources to which staff ma y refer as questions arise in their work House and Senate Sources Congressional staff can find official overviews and explanatory information on the House's "Legislative Process" website at http://clerk.house.gov/legislative/legprocess.aspx and on the Senate's "Legislative Process" website at http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/legislative/d_three_sections_with_teasers/process.htm . Reference sources on the rules and procedure of the House and Senate are listed below. House Rules and Procedure Constitution, Jefferson's Manual, and Rules of the House of Representatives . Washington: GPO, 2017. https://www.govinfo.gov/app/collection/hman This publication, often referred to as House Rules and Manual , is prepared for each Congress by the House Parliamentarian and is issued as a House document, most recently for the 115 th Congress as H.Doc. 114-192. It includes the text of the Constitution; the rules of the House and currently relevant portions of Jefferson's Manual of Parliamentary Practice ; a portion of the Congressional Budget Act; and other statutory provisions that operate as procedural rules. Copies are distributed to House offices and are also available from the House Legislative Resource Center. House Practice: A Guide to the Rules, Precedents, and Procedures of the House . Washington: GPO, 2017. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-HPRACTICE-115/pdf/GPO-HPRACTICE-115.pdf This one-volume publication prepared by William Holmes Brown and updated by Charles W. Johnson, John V. Sullivan, and Thomas J. Wickham, Jr., all former House Parliamentarians, provides more current summary information on House rules and selected precedents than Procedure in the U.S. House of Representatives (see next entry). Organized alphabetically by topic, it reflects changes in the House rules and procedure adopted as of the 115 th Congress. This publication is sometimes referred to as Brown's. The Office of the House Parliamentarian has a limited number of copies to distribute to House offices upon request. Procedure in the U.S. House of Representatives, 97 th Congress: A Summary of the Modern Precedents and Practices of the House, 86 th Congress-97 th Congress . Washington: GPO, 1982. Frequently referred to as Deschler's Procedure , after a former Parliamentarian of the House, this one-volume work summarizes House procedure and provides a cumulated, condensed version of House precedents from 1959 to 1980. A 1986 supplement, Procedure in the United States House of Representatives: Annotations of the Precedents of the House for the 97 th , 98 th , and 99 th Congresses , covers 1981 through 1986. Both publications are out of print. These one-volume publications are not available on the Internet, but the full text of several related multivolume sets of House precedents— Deschler's Precedents of the U.S. House of Representatives , Cannon's Precedents , and Hinds' Precedents —are all available in the "Precedents of the U.S. House of Representatives" section of the Government Publishing Office's (GPO's) website at https://www.govinfo.gov/collection/precedents-of-the-house?path=/GPO/Precedents%20of%20the%20U.S.%20House%20of%20Representatives . Senate Rules and Procedure Senate Manual . Washington: GPO, 2014. https://www.govinfo.gov/app/collection/sman This manual, prepared periodically by the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, contains the standing rules, orders, laws, and resolutions affecting the Senate, as well as copies of historical U.S. documents and selected statistics on the Senate and other government entities. Issued as S.Doc. 1, copies are distributed to Senate offices and are available from the Senate document room. A current edition of just the Standing Rules of the Senate is available on the committee's website at https://www.rules.senate.gov/rules-of-the-senate . Riddick, Floyd M. and Alan S. Frumin. Riddick's Senate Procedure: Precedents and Practices . Washington: GPO, 1992. https://www.govinfo.gov/collection/riddicks-senate-procedure?path=/GPO/Riddick%2527s%20Senate%20Procedure This publication was revised and updated in 1992 by Floyd M. Riddick, who was then the Parliamentarian of the Senate, and published as S.Doc. 101-28. Organized alphabetically by topic, it contains currently applicable rulings by the presiding officer and practices related to Senate procedure. An appendix has suggested forms for various procedures, for example, offering motions or filing conference reports. Some of the most frequently used chapters of Riddick's Senate Procedure are available in an expanded format in the "Electronic Senate Precedents" section of the Senate's WEBSTER intranet site at http://webster.senate.gov/precedents . Senate Cloture Rule . Washington: GPO, 2011. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CPRT-112SPRT66046/pdf/CPRT-112SPRT66046.pdf This committee print (S.Prt. 112-31) was prepared for the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). It includes lists of selected filibusters, tables of cloture votes, a legislative history of the cloture rule, and a bibliography. CRS has a limited number of copies available for distribution to offices upon request. Lists of cloture motions and votes from the 65 th Congress (1917-1918) forward are also available on the Senate website at http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/reference/cloture_motions/clotureCounts.htm . Primers on the Legislative Process and Related Documents Our American Government . Washington: GPO, 2003. (H.Doc. 108-94) https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CDOC-108hdoc94/pdf/CDOC-108hdoc94.pdf This revised version of the popular introductory guide is written in a question-and-answer format that covers a broad range of topics dealing with the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of our government. The appendixes contain a glossary of legislative terms and a selective bibliography. Copies of each new edition are distributed to congressional offices. Members of Congress can also obtain printed copies of the current edition from the House Legislative Resource Center and the Senate Document Room. The Constitution of the United States of America As Amended: Unratified Amendments: Analytical Index . Washington: GPO, 2007. (H.Doc. 110-50) https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CDOC-110hdoc50/pdf/CDOC-110hdoc50.pdf This document contains the text of the Constitution, its amendments, and a useful index to the Constitution and amendments. The Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation . Washington: GPO, 2017. (H.Doc. 112-9) https://www.govinfo.gov/collection/constitution-annotated?path=/GPO/Constitution%20of%20the%20United%20States%20of%20America%253A%20Analysis%20and%20Interpretation . Popularly known as the Constitution Annotated , this document contains legal analysis and interpretation of each section of the U.S. Constitution and is updated regularly by CRS. It is available to congressional staff on the CRS website at http://www.crs.gov/conan/constitutionannotated , and to the public through GPO (see link above). For the public version, the most recent edition is listed at the top of the webpage. Dove, Robert B. Enactment of a Law: Procedural Steps in the Legislative Process. Washington: GPO, 1982. https://www.congress.gov/resources/display/content/Enactment+of+a+Law+-+Learn+About+the+Legislative+Process http://www.senate.gov/legislative/common/briefing/Enactment_law.htm Prepared by Robert B. Dove in 1982, who was then the Senate Parliamentarian, this primer on the legislative process traces procedures used in the Senate and the House of Representatives. No printed copies are available, but it was updated online in 1997. It is available on Congress.gov and on the Senate website. Sullivan, John V. How Our Laws Are Made . Washington: GPO, 2007. (H.Doc. 110-49) https://www.congress.gov/resources/display/content/How+Our+Laws+Are+Made+-+Learn+About+the+Legislative+Process https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CDOC-110hdoc49/pdf/CDOC-110hdoc49.pdf This pamphlet outlines stages in the legislative process and explains the uses of various publications, which track that process. It is prepared by the Parliamentarian of the House in consultation with the Parliamentarian of the Senate. This guide is updated periodically. Copies of new editions are distributed to congressional offices and can also be obtained from the House Legislative Resource Center and the Senate Document Room. CRS Sources CRS has a variety of resources and services on legislative procedure available to Members of Congress and their staff. CRS Website The CRS website is available at http://www.crs.gov . Congressional staff may obtain useful CRS materials on the "Legislative Reference Sources" page at http://www.crs.gov/resources/Pages/LegReference-Committees.aspx and legislative procedure from the "Congressional Process, Administration, & Elections" page at http://www.crs.gov/iap/congressional-process-administration-and-elections . The latter page includes short fact sheets on House and Senate procedure as well as materials on the budget process and on congressional oversight. Selected CRS Reports CRS Report 98-812, Amendments Between the Houses: A Brief Overview , by Elizabeth Rybicki and James V. Saturno. CRS Report 98-728, Bills, Resolutions, Nominations, and Treaties: Characteristics, Requirements, and Uses , by Richard S. Beth. CRS Report 98-242, Committee Jurisdiction and Referral in the Senate , by Judy Schneider. CRS Report RS20147, Committee of the Whole: An Introduction , by Judy Schneider. CRS Report RS20794, The Committee System in the U.S. Congress , by Judy Schneider. CRS Report 98-736, Floor Consideration of Conference Reports in the House , by James V. Saturno. CRS Report RS20200, General Debate in Committee of the Whole , by Judy Schneider. CRS Report RL30945, House and Senate Rules of Procedure: A Comparison , by Judy Schneider. CRS Report 98-339, House Committee Hearings: Scheduling and Notification , by Christopher M. Davis. CRS Report 98-175, House Committee Jurisdiction and Referral: Rules and Practice , by Judy Schneider. CRS Report RS20308, House Committee Markups: Commonly Used Motions and Requests , by Judy Schneider. CRS Report 98-309, House Legislative Procedures: Published Sources of Information , by Megan S. Lynch. CRS Report R44001, Introducing a House Bill or Resolution , by Mark J. Oleszek. CRS Report R44195, Introducing a Senate Bill or Resolution , by Mark J. Oleszek. CRS Report 98-721, Introduction to the Federal Budget Process , coordinated by James V. Saturno. CRS Report R42843, Introduction to the Legislative Process in the U.S. Congress , by Valerie Heitshusen. CRS Report 98-425, Invoking Cloture in the Senate , by Christopher M. Davis. CRS Report 95-563, The Legislative Process on the House Floor: An Introduction , by Christopher M. Davis. CRS Report 96-548, The Legislative Process on the Senate Floor: An Introduction , by Valerie Heitshusen. CRS Report RL30787, Parliamentary Reference Sources: House of Representatives , by Richard S. Beth and Megan S. Lynch. CRS Report RL30788, Parliamentary Reference Sources: Senate , by Megan S. Lynch and Richard S. Beth. CRS Report 98-143, Procedural Distinctions Between the House and the Committee of the Whole , by Judy Schneider. CRS Report 98-337, Senate Committee Hearings: Scheduling and Notification , by Valerie Heitshusen. CRS Report 98-308, Senate Legislative Procedures: Published Sources of Information , by Christopher M. Davis. CRS Report 98-612, Special Rules and Options for Regulating the Amending Process , by Megan S. Lynch. CRS Report RS22477, Sponsorship and Cosponsorship of House Bills , by Mark J. Oleszek. CRS Report 98-279, Sponsorship and Cosponsorship of Senate Bills , by Mark J. Oleszek. CRS Legislative Procedure Classes In addition to legislative procedure material, CRS offers several programs on legislative procedure for congressional staff. Legislative staff can attend Congress: An Introduction to Process and Resources , an introductory CRS program designed for and offered only to permanent, professional congressional staff who seek a foundation for understanding the legislative process and the resources available to monitor it. This CRS program is offered 10 or more times a year and is the prerequisite for the Advanced Legislative Process Institute . More information is available on the CRS website at http://www.crs.gov/Events/TrainingPrograms or by telephone at [phone number scrubbed]. CRS also offers a monthly introductory class, Legislative Concept s , to House staff and interns. Information is available on HouseNet ( http://housenet.house.gov ) under "Campus", then under "Congressional Staff Academy." Legislative staff members are also invited to attend the CRS Budget Process Institutes. The introductory Overview of the Federal Budget Process is offered several times each year and provides an introduction to federal budgeting procedures, particularly procedures used in Congress. The following six advanced institutes are offered during the year at times when they are most relevant to congressional staff: Budget Resolutions and Budget Enforcement Appropriations Process Consideration of Appropriations Bills in the House Consideration of Appropriation Bills in the Senate President and the Budget, and Continuing Resolutions Event dates and registration forms for CRS programs and institutes can be found on the CRS website at http://www.crs.gov/programs/Pages/eventscal.aspx . Supplementary Materials Congress A to Z. 6 th ed. Washington: CQ Press, 2014. Congress.gov Legislative Glossary. Written by CRS analysts and available to the public at https://www.congress.gov/help/legislative-glossary . Davidson, Roger H., Frances E. Lee, and Walter J. Oleszek. Congress and Its Members . 16 th ed. Washington: CQ Press, 2017. Congressional Quarterly's Guide to Congress. 7 th ed. Washington: CQ Press, 2012. Koempel, Michael L., and Judy Schneider. Congressional Deskbook: the Practical and Comprehensive Guide to Congress. Alexandria, VA: TheCapitol.Net, 2012. Kravitz, Walter. Congressional Quarterly's American Congressional Dictionary. 3 rd ed. Washington, CQ Press, 2001. Available to congressional offices in an updated and expanded edition on the CRS website at https://www.govinfo.gov/app/collection/sman . Oleszek, Walter J., Mark J. Oleszek, Elizabeth Rybicki, and Bill Heniff, Jr. Congressional Procedures and the Policy Process. 10 th ed. Washington: CQ Press, 2016. Tiefer, Charles. Congressional Practice and Procedure: A Reference, Research, and Legislative Guide . New York: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1989. United States Senate Glossary , at https://www.senate.gov/reference/glossary.htm . CRS Video WVB00003, An Act of Congress , by Walter J. Oleszek. A 58 minute video about the enactment of legislation, available at http://www.crs.gov/video/detail/WVB00003 . The Legislative Process video series on Congress.gov. Nine brief video clips explaining the legislative process, written by CRS analysts and available to the public at https://www.congress.gov/legislative-process . Where to Obtain Print Publications Some of the works on legislative procedure listed in this report are produced by GPO and may be obtained through its Congressional Liaison Office at http://www.gpo.gov/congressional/ . Other publications are only available from congressional sources, such as the House and Senate Parliamentarians, for congressional office use, and those listed in the " Supplementary Materials " section may be purchased from bookstores or publishers.

Written for congressional staff, this report identifies and provides details on how to obtain information on legislative procedures and process in the House and Senate. It provides references to selected CRS products and offers information on the CRS legislative institutes. A listing of selected supplementary materials is also provided. This report will be updated as new information is available.

crs_R45686

crs_R45686_0

Introduction Since the 1950s and the creation of the first federal student aid programs, one aim of federal higher education policy has been to promote access to postsecondary education, particularly for students with financial need. In recent years, the federal government has annually made available more than $100 billion in federal grants, loans, and work-study funds to millions of students to help cover the cost of higher education. As Congress continues to focus on expanding access to postsecondary education through federal student aid policies, understanding various characteristics of the population enrolling in postsecondary education may be helpful in informing policy deliberations. In academic year (AY) 2015-2016, there were approximately 19.3 million students enrolled as undergraduates in postsecondary education in the 50 states and the District of Columbia. In AY2007-2008, around the time of the last reauthorization of the Higher Education Act (HEA), there were approximately 20.5 million undergraduate students enrolled in postsecondary education. The composition of the current undergraduate population, how the composition has changed over time, and the types of institutions in which students enroll are issues that are likely to be of interest to Congress as it considers the reauthorization of the HEA. This report focuses on the income of the undergraduate student population. The report will explore the relationship between student income and certain student demographics such as race and dependency status, and explore how the income distribution of the undergraduate population compares with that of the national population of persons who do not have a postsecondary degree. Data Sources The analysis presented in this report relies on two data sources: the National Postsecondary Student Aid Study (NPSAS) and the Current Population Survey Annual Social and Economic Supplement (CPS ASEC). This section describes each data source, along with some of the limitations of the data. NPSAS The data used in this report were primarily derived from NPSAS. NPSAS is a nationally representative study of students enrolled in postsecondary education that focuses on how students finance their education. NPSAS is conducted by the U.S. Department of Education's National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) and is administered every four years. The most recent study available covers AY2015-2016, which ran from July 1, 2015, to June 30, 2016. To provide an illustration of how postsecondary student characteristics have changed over time, this report uses data from the last six administrations of NPSAS that are available—AY1995-1996, AY1999-2000, AY2003-2004, AY2007-2008, AY2011-2012, and AY2015-2016—covering a period of 20 years. The NPSAS data are used in this report to explore the income characteristics of the postsecondary population and the extent to which income is related to other student demographics, such as race and dependency status. The report also explores the relationship between income and type of institution(s) attended. To establish a student's income, the NPSAS variable for income as a percentage of the poverty guidelines is used. The poverty guidelines are based on family size and total income (more discussion on the poverty guidelines is provided in the subsequent section of this report). One advantage of using the poverty guidelines is that they provide income relative to the level of poverty at a certain point in time. Therefore, when looking at trends in income over time, no adjustments need be made for inflation. The individual(s) (i.e., a student, student's parents, or student's spouse) whose income is represented by the income as a percentage of the poverty level varies by the student's dependency status. For dependent students, the measure reflects the family size and income of the student's parents; for independent students, it reflects the family size and income of the student and, if applicable, the student's spouse. For simplicity, when this report refers to a student's income in the context of the NPSAS data, it is referring to the income of applicable family members. There are several studies that have explored the income characteristics of the postsecondary population. For example, NCES publishes an annual report on the income characteristics of students who enroll in college immediately after completing high school. Data from the most recent report suggest that for the past few years, low-income students have started to enroll in postsecondary education at a higher rate than middle-income students, but they also continue to enroll at a much lower rate than high-income students. However, in looking only at recent high school completers, the data exclude a large portion of the postsecondary population who are not recent high school graduates. Thus, one advantage of using NPSAS is that the data provide a representative sample of all types of students across all types of Title IV schools. One limitation of using NPSAS is that while much of the data are derived from information that students report on the Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA), the remaining data, for students who did not apply for aid, are collected through interview and/or are produced through stochastic imputation. As such, the data for non-FAFSA filers are likely considerably less precise than the data for FAFSA filers. For context, in the AY2015-2016 NPSAS study 70% of student respondents completed the FAFSA. CPS ASEC The CPS ASEC is sponsored jointly by the U.S. Census Bureau and the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and is the official source of annual estimates of poverty in the United States. The CPS is a monthly labor force survey that is used to compute monthly labor statistics, such as the unemployment rate. The ASEC, a supplementary set of questions asked after the basic CPS monthly questionnaire, is administered to about 100,000 addresses and asks the respondent to report information for the previous full calendar year. As a result, the income data obtained from the ASEC are annual measures. Respondents are asked about 18 types of income by a professional interviewer using a computerized questionnaire. The level of income detail is generally considered to be higher and more accurate than it is from surveys that rely on paper forms and are filled out by the respondents themselves. However, like all surveys based on a sample, the ASEC is subject to both sampling error and nonsampling error. Despite these limitations, the CPS ASEC is a widely used survey for analyzing household income. The CPS ASEC data are used in this report to explore the income of the national population relative to the postsecondary population. For consistency with the three most recent NPSAS studies, this report uses the CPS ASEC data from 2007, 2011, and 2015. To draw valid comparisons between the national and the postsecondary population groups, CRS created an income variable in CPS ASEC that closely resembles the NPSAS variable for income as a percentage of the poverty guidelines. However, CPS ASEC uses household and family definitions that are different from NPSAS. To create units of analysis that were most similar to those in NPSAS, it was necessary to make some assumptions and intermediate calculations. Further, the definitions of income in CPS ASEC and NPSAS are not identical. Despite the limitations of CRS's approach, the derived family income variable allowed for some valuable comparisons. An outline of CRS's approach to creating the family income variable in CPS ASEC and the assumptions embedded in this approach is provided in the Appendix . Income of Undergraduate Students The amount of federal student aid that is made available to a student is largely determined by the student's income. Individuals who are interested in applying for federal student financial aid are required to complete the FAFSA. Information reported on the FAFSA is shared with state agencies and institutions of higher education to help determine federal and nonfederal student aid. Thus, an important characteristic of postsecondary students with regard to federal policy is their income. This section of the report explores changes in the income distribution of students enrolled in postsecondary education over time using the NPSAS variable for income as a percentage of the poverty guidelines. The poverty guidelines are issued by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) every year, and many social programs such as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), the Children's Health Insurance Program, the National School Lunch Program, and certain parts of Medicaid use poverty guidelines to determine participant eligibility for benefits. The poverty guidelines are also used to determine monthly payment amounts under the student loan income-driven repayment plans and in student loan rehabilitation agreements. Table 1 provides the 2014 HHS poverty guidelines and multiples that were used in NPSAS: 2016. Using these guidelines, CRS created the following five poverty bands for its analysis: below 100%, 100% to 199.99%, 200% to 299.99%, 300% to 499.99%, and 500% and above. For purposes of this report, "low-income students" are considered to have income that falls within the first two poverty bands (below 200% of the poverty guidelines). This characterization of low-income status is consistent with standards used in some education and social service programs that use the poverty guidelines to determine eligibility for assistance. It is used here primarily as a descriptor of lower-income categories in the populations being examined, and no suggestion is being made with regard to whether the first two poverty bands should be used as thresholds in "low-income" determinations for the receipt of means tested assistance. As previously mentioned, one advantage of using the poverty guidelines is that they are indexed for inflation, which is useful when looking at trends in income over time. Another advantage is that they account for families of different sizes. For example, 200% of the poverty threshold for a family of four is $47,700. This same income level represents more than 300% of the poverty threshold for a single individual and for a family of two. Undergraduate Student Income Distribution Table 2 provides the number of undergraduate students enrolled by poverty bands during the period covered by the last six administrations of NPSAS that are available. Figure 1 provides a graphical illustration of the data presented in Table 2 . Postsecondary student enrollment has generally increased over the past two decades. In AY1995-1996 and AY1999-2000, there were about 16.3 million undergraduates. Enrollment increased to 18.9 million in AY2003-2004 and to 20.5 million in AY2007-2008, and reached a peak of 23.0 million in AY2011-2012. In AY2015-2016, enrollment dropped to 19.3 million undergraduates. There were also changes in the income composition of the undergraduate population that appear to coincide with the 2008 recession. Specifically, the number of students with income below 100% of the poverty guidelines grew from approximately 4 million in AY2007-2008 to 6.7 million in AY2011-2012, an increase of nearly 70%. Students with income below 100% of the poverty guidelines also constituted a larger portion of the undergraduate population (29%) in AY2011-2012 than in any prior study. While overall enrollment decreased in AY2015-2016, the proportion of students in the lowest poverty band increased to 31% of the undergraduate population. More than 50% of undergraduate students enrolled in AY2011-2012 and AY2015-2016 had incomes below 200% of the poverty guideline. The trend in enrollment of students in the upper and middle income categories differs from that of low-income students. From AY2007-2008 to AY2011-2012, the number of students in the upper poverty band (500% of the poverty guidelines and above) dropped by 17% while overall enrollment increased by 12%. In AY2015-2016, enrollment of upper-income students was 25% below the AY2007-2008 level. Similarly, enrollment of students with income between 200% and 499% of the poverty guidelines dropped by 25% between AY2007-2008 and AY2015-2016. Overall, the data suggest that low-income students are enrolling at higher levels than previously observed. Several conclusions could be drawn from this. For instance, it could suggest that institutions of higher education have become more effective at enrolling low-income students. It could also suggest a lack of opportunities in the labor market and that more low-income students are becoming convinced that they may realize economic benefits with higher educational credentials. At the same time, enrollment of students in the middle and upper income categories has declined. It is possible that the trend in the income composition of undergraduate students could be a reflection of changes in income of the national population. As is explored in more depth in a later section of this report, these changes in the composition of the student population in the higher and lower poverty bands do not seem to map closely with broader income trends in the general population, although there is some alignment with income trends for those of ages similar to traditional college students during this period. Student Demographics by Income The data presented thus far suggest differences in the trends in enrollment of undergraduate students from different income groups. To further explore the current population of students, CRS examined certain demographic characteristics of the undergraduate student population and how those characteristics are related to income using the most recent NPSAS. Race Figure 2 illustrates the racial composition of students by poverty bands in AY2015-2016. The data suggest that minority students accounted for nearly 50% of the enrolled undergraduate population, and these students tended to have lower incomes than white students. More specifically, white students constituted about 53% of all enrolled undergraduate students, Hispanic students constituted 19%, black students constituted 16%, and Asian students and students from other racial groups constituted 12%.While white students made up the majority of students in any income category, they were overrepresented in the higher income bands. For example, white students constituted 73% of students with income of 500% and above of the poverty guidelines. Black and Hispanic students, on the other hand, were overrepresented in the lower income bands. For example, while black and Hispanic students combined accounted for 35% of the total undergraduate population, they accounted for 45% of students with income below 100% of the poverty guideline. The proportionate share of Asian and other students was relatively stable across the different poverty bands. As Figure 1 illustrates, the majority of the undergraduate population has income below 200% of the poverty guidelines. Using counts presented in Figure 2 , it is possible to examine the concentration of these low-income students within racial groups in AY2015-2016. This reveals that 70% of black students, 64% of Hispanic students, 58% of "other" students, 55% of Asian students, and 42% of white students had income below 200% of the poverty guidelines. Traditional vs. Non-traditional Students When considering the postsecondary population, there is typically a distinction made between traditional and non-traditional students. While there is no consensus on the characteristics that distinguish traditional from non-traditional students at the undergraduate level, students identified as "independent" are often considered to be non-traditional students. An independent student is defined in the HEA as one who meets any of the following criteria: is 24 years of age or older by December 31 of the award year; is an orphan, in foster care, or a ward of the court; or was an orphan, in foster care, or a ward of the court at any time when the individual was 13 years of age or older; is, or was immediately prior to attaining the age of majority, an emancipated minor or in legal guardianship as determined by a court of competent jurisdiction in the individual's state of legal residence; is a veteran of the Armed Forces of the United States or is currently serving on active duty in the Armed Forces for other than training purposes; is a graduate or professional student; is a married individual; has legal dependents other than a spouse; or has been verified, by a qualified authority during the school year in which the application is submitted, as either an unaccompanied youth who is a homeless child or youth, or as unaccompanied, at risk of homelessness, and self-supporting. Under the HEA, a student who does not meet the criteria for an independent student is treated as a dependent student. Figure 3 illustrates dependency status of enrolled undergraduate students by poverty bands in AY2015-2016 and suggests that independent students constituted a large portion of this population. These "non-traditional students" also tended to be low income. More specifically, while independent students constituted 50% of the undergraduate population, they constituted nearly 70% of students in the lowest poverty band. Dependent students, on the other hand, were largely overrepresented in the upper income bands. For example, dependent students constituted 76% of students with income of 500% and above of the poverty guidelines and 33% of students with income below 100% of the poverty guidelines. The counts presented in Figure 3 can be used to examine the concentration of low-income students within each dependency group, showing that 44% of dependent students, 74% of independent students without dependents, and 80% of independent students with dependents had income below 200% of the poverty guidelines. Type of Institution Attended In discourse about which students are enrolling in postsecondary education, questions often surface regarding where students are enrolling. Figure 4 and Figure 5 explore types of institutions attended by students in different income categories and suggest some variation in the type of institutions attended by students with different income levels. As shown in Figure 4 , 40% of undergraduates attended public two-year institutions, 35% attended public four-year institutions, 15% attended private nonprofit institutions, and 10% attended private for-profit institutions in AY2015-2016. Low-income students are more likely to attend public two-year institutions (or community colleges). The likelihood of attending a private for-profit institution decreases as income increases. The counts presented in Figure 4 can be used to examine the concentration of low-income students within each type of institution, showing that 57% of students attending public two-year institutions, 46% of students attending public four-year institutions, 42% of students attending private nonprofit institutions, and 73% of students attending for-profit institutions had income below 200% of the poverty guidelines. Figure 5 illustrates the selectivity of four-year institutions attended by undergraduate students across the poverty bands. Twenty percent of all four-year students attended very selective institutions, 57% attended moderately selective institutions, and 23% attended open admission or minimally selective institutions. Within the lowest poverty band, 18% of students attended a very selective institution. In the second lowest poverty band, 14% attended a very selective institution. Thus, there was a larger percentage of students in the lowest poverty band attending highly selective institutions than there was in the second lowest poverty band. Generally, the proportion of students that attend open admission or minimally selective institutions decreases as income increases. The counts presented in Figure 5 can be used to examine the concentration of low-income students within four-year institutions based on their selectivity, showing that 36% of students at very selective institutions, 43% at moderately selective institutions, and 54% at open admission or minimally selective institutions have income below 200% of the poverty guidelines. Income Distribution of the National Population and the Undergraduate Population The NPSAS data suggest that low-income students have enrolled in postsecondary education at higher levels in more recent years. To explore the extent to which the influx of students is related to changes in the income distribution of the national population, this section uses the CPS ASEC to compare the income distribution of the national population with that of the undergraduate population. Given that the data suggest noteworthy trends for low-income students, the discussion in this section generally focuses on persons with income below 200% of the poverty guideline. Figure 6 provides a comparison of the income distribution of the national population aged 15 to 65 and the postsecondary population over three time periods. The data suggest that while the low-income national population grew from 2007 to 2011, the population of low-income undergraduate students grew at a higher rate than the national population of low-income persons. Specifically, from 2007 to 2011 the number of persons with income below 200% of the poverty guidelines grew from 58.5 million to 71.0 million, an increase of 22%.During the same time, the number of low-income students enrolled as undergraduates grew from 8.2 million to 11.7 million, an increase of 44%. Between 2011 and 2015, there was a slight increase in the number of low-income persons (about 2 million) in the national population, while the number of low-income students dropped (by about 1 million). However, the drop in low-income students seems to be associated with the overall drop in postsecondary enrollment. In terms of proportion, low-income persons constitute a much smaller portion of the national population than of the undergraduate postsecondary population. Specifically, low-income persons constituted 29% of the national population in 2007, and 34% of the national population in 2011 and 2015. Among the enrolled undergraduate population, low-income persons accounted for 40% in 2007 and more than 50% in 2011 and 2015. Figure 7 illustrates the income distribution of the population aged 15-23 who did not have a postsecondary degree and were not enrolled in postsecondary education. This population could have been considered "potential enrollees" and thus may have had characteristics similar to the enrolled population. Due to data limitations, "potential enrollees" who were aged 24 and older could not be considered. The data suggest that from 2007 to 2011, the number of low-income students aged 15-23 grew at a faster rate than the national population of persons in this age range. Specifically, from 2007 to 2011 the number of low-income potential enrollees grew from 10.8 million to 12.2 million, an increase of 13%, while the number of low-income enrolled students aged 15-23 grew from 4.0 million to 5.5 million, an increase of 37%. In 2015, the number of low-income persons aged 15-23 enrolled as undergraduates decreased by 6%, while the national population of the same age range decreased by 4%. Again, the drop in enrollment of low-income students appears to be related to the large decrease in total student enrollment. In terms of proportion, low-income persons aged 15-23 constituted a smaller portion of the undergraduate population than of the national population in 2007. However, in 2011 and 2015 low-income persons in this age range constituted similar shares of the national and undergraduate populations. Summary of Selected Data Findings Since the last reauthorization of the Higher Education Act, the number and proportion of low-income undergraduate students (defined in this report as students with income below 200% of the poverty guidelines) has increased, even as total enrollment has decreased in more recent years. Low-income students now constitute more than 50% of the postsecondary undergraduate population. This report's analysis also found the following: Certain student characteristics such as race, age, and dependency status show trends that tend to be associated with income. Independent undergraduate students who have historically been labeled as "non-traditional" constitute a large portion of enrolled postsecondary students. These "non-traditional" students generally tend to have lower incomes than more traditional students. Nonwhite students account for nearly 50% of the undergraduate population, and they tend to have lower income than white students. The majority of low-income students attend community colleges and a disproportionately high share attend private for-profit institutions. Low-income students were more likely to attend open admission or minimally selective institutions. Considerations for Congress The changing composition of the student population could have implications for policies designed to promote access to postsecondary education. One historical aim of student aid programs has been to increase postsecondary access for those students who demonstrate financial need. The findings in this report suggest that there has been an influx of low-income students enrolling in postsecondary education since the last HEA reauthorization. When compared with national income data, low-income individuals are overrepresented in the postsecondary population. This could suggest that federal policies have been effective at promoting access for low-income persons. Data also show that the number of students in the middle- and upper-income categories has declined somewhat in recent years. This finding could imply that there are challenges that these students face in enrolling in postsecondary education that may not be addressed in current federal policies. Related to access, there is growing interest in the extent to which students who enroll are completing a postsecondary credential. Research suggests that private nonprofit and public four-year institutions tend to have higher completion rates than public two-year institutions and private for-profit institutions. Data show that low-income students tend to be overrepresented at public two-year and for-profit institutions and less represented at public and private nonprofit four-year institutions. Policymakers face consideration of whether federal policies could play a role in encouraging students at various income levels to enroll at the highest performing types of schools. Data also show that undergraduate students historically labeled as "non-traditional" and minority students constitute about 50% of the undergraduate population. Some research suggests that non-traditional and minority students face a unique set of challenges when enrolling and completing postsecondary education. Policymakers face consideration of the extent to which HEA programs are designed to support the success of non-traditional and minority students. Another way in which the analyses presented here may be relevant to policy discussions is in identifying the distribution of students across poverty bands. When designing programs that provide assistance to lower-income individuals, poverty bands are often employed as a mechanism for targeting. Appendix. Technical Considerations and Methodology Family units in NPSAS correspond with HEA dependency definitions and reflect the individuals whose assets and income are considered in calculating an expected family contribution (EFC). These family units may differ from a family unit in CPS ASEC. To facilitate the analysis in this report, CRS used person-level data in the CPS ASEC data set to create new family units that are more comparable to the family units considered in calculating the EFC. This appendix briefly describes the methodology CRS used for dividing CPS ASEC larger "family household" units into smaller family units that resemble the family members and corresponding income reported on the FAFSA for the purposes of calculating a student's EFC. Family Units: CPS ASEC and the EFC Formulas A family household in CPS ASEC is a household maintained by a family and may include a related subfamily and unrelated subfamilies who live in the household. A family generally consists of "a group of two persons or more residing together and related by birth, marriage, or adoption." A related subfamily is "a married couple with or without children, or one parent with one or more of their own single (never married) children under 18 years old, living in a household and related to, but not including, the householder or spouse." An unrelated subfamily is "a family that does not include among its members the householder and relatives of the householder." Generally, when calculating a student's EFC, determining the relevant family members whose income would be included depends on the student's personal characteristics. The various aspects of the CPS make it possible to "separate" household members that would be a distinct family for the purposes of calculating a student's EFC. For example, a married person without children would be considered "independent" using the EFC formula, and the family would include the person and his or her spouse. An unrelated subfamily would also most likely be treated as a separate family by the EFC formula. As such, related subfamilies and unrelated subfamilies in CPS ASEC were treated as separate family units from the primary family for purposes of this report's analysis. The EFC formula considers several criteria for identifying a person as "independent." To capture a large portion of potentially independent students in CPS ASEC who were not addressed through the separation of subfamilies from families, all unmarried persons age 24 and older who do not have children were treated as a separate family unit in this report's analysis. While students can qualify as independent on the basis of characteristics other than age, marital status, and having dependents, it was assumed that any remaining independent students not captured in the analysis would constitute a small portion of the population and thus would not have a substantial impact. Income: CPS ASEC and EFC Formula Using the newly created EFC family unit described above, family income was calculated by taking the sum of each person's income in the unit. In some cases, this calculation of family income would likely include persons whose income would not be included under the EFC formula (e.g., the income of a student who is a dependent, the income of a student's siblings who live in the household with the student's parents). To facilitate the analysis, it was assumed that the income of the additional persons would be a negligible amount and would not greatly affect the family income. The definition of income for the purposes of the EFC formula is somewhat different from income reported in the CPS ASEC. Total income under the EFC formula considers adjusted gross income and several forms of untaxed income but excludes some forms of taxable income. The CPS ASEC measure of income includes money income before taxes or tax credits and excludes capital gains or noncash benefits. To facilitate the analysis, it was assumed that the two measures of income are comparable.

Since the 1950s and the creation of the first federal student aid programs, one aim of federal higher education policy has been to promote access to postsecondary education, particularly for students with financial need. In recent years, the federal government has annually made available more than $100 billion in federal grants, loans, and work-study funds to millions of students to help cover the cost of higher education. As Congress continues to focus on expanding access to postsecondary education through federal student aid policies, understanding various characteristics of the population enrolling in postsecondary education may be useful for policy deliberations. This report focuses on the income of the undergraduate student population. It analyzes (1) how the income distribution of the undergraduate population has changed over time; (2) the relationship between student income and certain student demographics, such as race and dependency status; and (3) how the income distribution of the undergraduate population compares with that of the population of persons who do not have a postsecondary degree. Major findings presented in this report include the following: The number and proportion of low-income students has increased in more recent years, even as total enrollment has decreased. Low-income student enrollment has increased at a faster pace than the nation's population of low-income persons. The majority of students enrolling in postsecondary education have incomes below 200% of the poverty guidelines. Independent undergraduate students who have sometimes been labeled as "non-traditional" constitute a large portion of enrolled postsecondary students and tend to have lower income than more "traditional" students. Nonwhite students account for nearly 50% of the undergraduate student population, and they tend to have lower income than white students. The majority of low-income students attend community colleges and a disproportionately high share attend private for-profit institutions. The changing composition of the student population could have implications for federal policies designed to promote access to postsecondary education. In particular, policymakers face consideration of whether federal policies could play a role in encouraging students at various income levels to enroll at the highest performing types of schools. Policymakers also face consideration of the extent to which Higher Education Act programs are designed to support the success of non-traditional and minority students.

crs_R45584

crs_R45584_0

Overview Cross-border data flows underlie today's globally connected world and are essential to conducting international trade and commerce. Data flows enable companies to transmit information for online communication, track global supply chains, share research, and provide cross-border services. One study estimates that digital commerce relying on data flows drives 22% of global economic output, and that global GDP will increase by another $2 trillion by 2020 due to advances in emerging technologies. However, while cross-border data flows increase productivity and enable innovation, they also raise concerns around the security and privacy of the information being transmitted. Cross-border data flows are central to trade and trade negotiations as organizations rely on the transmission of information to use cloud services, and to send nonpersonal corporate data as well as personal data to partners, subsidiaries, and customers. U.S. policymakers are considering various policy options to address online privacy, some of which could affect cross-border data flows. For example, new consumer rights to control their personal data may impact how companies can use such data. To enable international data flows and trade, the United States has aimed to eliminate trade barriers and establish enforceable international rules and best practices that allow policymakers to achieve public policy objectives, including promoting online security and privacy. Building consensus for international rules and norms on data flows and privacy has become increasingly important as recent incidents have heightened the public's awareness of the risk of personal data stored online. For example, the 2018 Cambridge Analytica scandal drew attention because the firm reportedly acquired and used data on more than 87 million Facebook accounts in an effort to influence voters in the 2016 U.S. presidential election and the UK referendum on continued European Union (EU) membership ("Brexit"). In addition, security concerns have been raised about data breaches, such as those that exposed the personal data of half a million Google users or 500 million Marriot hotel customers. Organizations value consumers' personal online data for a variety of reasons. For example, companies may seek to facilitate business transactions, analyze marketing information, detect disease patterns from medical histories, discover fraudulent payments, improve proprietary algorithms, or develop competitive innovations. Some analysts compare data to oil or gold, but unlike those valuable substances, data can be reused, analyzed, shared, and combined with other information; it is not a scarce resource. However, personal data is considered personal private property. Individuals often want to control who accesses their data and how it is used. Experts suggest that data may therefore be considered both a benefit and a liability that organizations hold. Data has value, but an organization takes on risk by collecting personal data; they become responsible for protecting users' privacy and not misusing the information. Data privacy concerns may become more urgent as the amount of online information organizations access and collect, and the level of global data flows, continue to expand. Countries vary in their policies and laws on these issues. The United States has traditionally supported open data flows and has regulated privacy at a sectoral level to cover data, such as health records, rather than create a comprehensive policy. U.S. trade policy has sought to balance the goals of consumer privacy, security, and open commerce, including eliminating trade barriers and opening markets. Other countries are developing data privacy policies that affect international trade as some governments or groups seek to limit data flows outside of an organization or across national borders for a number of reasons. Blocking international data flows may impede the ability of a firm to do business or of an individual to conduct a transaction, creating a form of trade protectionism. Research demonstrates not only the economic gains from digital trade and international data flows, but also the real economic costs of restrictions on such flows. For many policymakers, the crux of the issue is: How can governments protect individual privacy in the least trade-restrictive way possible? The question is similar to concerns raised about ensuring cybersecurity while allowing the free flow of data. In recent years, Congress has examined multiple issues related to cross-border data flows and online privacy. In the 115 th Congress, congressional committees held hearings on these topics, introduced multiple bills, and conducted oversight over federal laws on related issues such as data breach notification. Members are introducing new bills and holding hearings in the 116 th Congress. Congress may consider the proposed U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) and examine the digital trade chapter as an example of how to address the issues through trade agreements. Defining Online Privacy In most circumstances, a consumer expects both privacy and security when conducting an online transaction. However, users' expectations and values may vary and there is no globally accepted standard or definition of data privacy in the online world. In addressing online privacy, Congress may need to define personal data and differentiate between sensitive and nonsensitive personal data. In general, data privacy can be defined by an individual's ability to prevent access to personally identifiable information (PII). According to the U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance to federal agencies, PII refers to information that can be used to distinguish or trace an individual's identity, either alone or when combined with other information that is linked or linkable to a specific individual. Since electronic data can be readily shared and combined, some data not traditionally considered PII may have become more sensitive. For example, the OMB definition does not specifically mention data on location tracking, purchase history, o r preferences, but these digital data points can be tracked by a device such as a mobile phone or laptop that an individual carries or logs into. The EU definition of PII attempts to capture the breadth of data available in the online world: "personal data" means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person ('data subject'); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person. Policymakers may consider differentiating between sensitive and nonsensitive personal data. For example, sensitive personal data could include ethnic origin, political or religious affiliation, biometric data, health data, sexual orientation, precise geolocation data, etc. Cross-Border Data Flows and Online Privacy "Cross-border data flows" refers to the movement or transfer of information between computer servers across national borders. Cross-border data flows are part of, and integral to, digital trade and facilitate the movement of goods, services, people, and finance. A 2017 analysis estimated that global flows of goods, services, finance, and people increased world gross domestic product (GDP) by at least 10% in the past decade, adding $8 trillion between 2005 and 2015. Effective and sustainable digital trade relies on data flows that permit commerce and communication but that also ensure privacy and security, protect intellectual property, and build trust and confidence. Impeding cross-border data flows, including through some privacy regulations, may decrease efficiency and reduce other benefits of digital trade, resulting in the fracturing, or so-called balkanization, of the internet. In addressing online privacy, some policymakers focus on limiting access to online information by restricting the flow of data beyond a country's borders. Such limits may also act as protectionist measures. Online privacy policies may create barriers to digital trade, or damage trust in the underlying digital economy. For example, measures to limit cross-border data flows could block companies from using cloud computing to aggregate and analyze global data, or from gaining economies of scale, constrain e-commerce by limiting international online payments, hinder global supply chains seeking to use blockchain to track products or manage supply chains, customs documentation, or electronic payments, impede the trading of crypto-currency, or limit the use of advanced technology like artificial intelligence. According to the World Trade Organization (WTO), one of the most significant overall impacts of the growth of digital technologies is in transforming international trade. Technology can lower the costs of trade, change the types of goods and services that are traded, and may even change the factors defining a country's comparative advantage. The extent of the impact of digital technologies on trade, however, depends in large part on open cross-border data flows. One study of U.S. companies found that data localization rules (i.e., requiring organizations to store data on local servers) were the most-cited digital trade barrier. Some governments advocate privacy or security policies that require data localization and limit cross-border data flows. However, many industry stakeholders argue that blocking cross-border data flows and storing data domestically does not make such data more secure or private. Balancing Policy Objectives Many experts argue that policymakers should limit cross-border data flows in the least trade-restrictive manner possible and also ensure security and privacy. These objectives are not easily reconciled. Moreover, although an overlap exists between data protection and privacy, the two are not equivalent. Cybersecurity measures are essential to protect data (e.g., against intrusions or theft by hackers). However, they may not be sufficient to protect privacy. For example, if an organization shares user data with a third party, it may be doing so securely, but not in a way that protects users' privacy or aligns with consumer expectations. Similarly, breach notification requirements are not the same as proactive privacy protection measures. At the same time, policies that protect a consumer's privacy can align with security policies. Laws can limit law enforcement's access to information except in certain circumstances. Keeping user information anonymous may enable firms to analyze data while protecting individuals' identities. Some see an inherent conflict between online security, privacy, and trade; others believe that policies protecting all three can be coherent and consistent. The U.S. government has traditionally sought to balance these objectives. Some stakeholders note, however, that current U.S. policy has been inadequate in protecting online privacy and that change is needed. In some cases in the past, Congress has acted to address privacy concerns in particular sectors; for example, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996 led to health privacy standards regulations. The Trump Administration has begun an effort to devise an overarching data privacy policy (see " Defining the U.S. Approach ") and many Members of Congress are also considering possible approaches. Multilateral Rules There are no comprehensive multilateral rules specifically about privacy or cross-border data flows. However, the United States and other countries have begun to address these issues in negotiating new and updated trade agreements, and through international economic forums and organizations such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services The World Trade Organization (WTO) General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) entered into force in January 1995, predating the current reach of the internet and the explosive growth of global data flows. Many digital products and services that did not exist when the agreements were negotiated are not covered. On the other hand, privacy is explicitly addressed within GATS as an exception to allow countries to take measures that do not conform with the agreement in order to protect "the privacy of individuals in relation to the processing and dissemination of personal data and the protection of confidentiality of individual records and accounts," as long as those measures are not arbitrary or a disguised trade restriction. Efforts to update the multilateral agreement and discussions for new digital trade rules under the WTO Electronic Commerce Work Program stalled in 2017. Given the lack of progress on multilateral rules, some have suggested that the WTO should identify best practices or guidelines for digital trade rules that could lay the foundation for a future multilateral WTO agreement. WTO Plurilateral Effort In December 2017, a group of more than 70 WTO members, including the United States, agreed to "initiate exploratory work together toward future WTO negotiations on trade-related aspects of electronic commerce." Overall U.S. objectives include allowing the free flow of information for international trade and cross-border data flows, "subject to reasonable safeguards like the protection of consumer data when it is exported," but do not specifically address privacy. The group formally launched the e-commerce initiative in January 2019. The official joint statement lists the United States and EU as participants, and also several developing countries such as China and Brazil. India stated it will not join, preferring to maintain its flexibility to favor domestic firms, limit foreign market access, and raise revenue in the future. The statement did not define the scope of any potential agreement. After the meeting, the EU noted data localization measures among the potential new rules to be discussed when negotiations officially launch in March 2019. The U.S. Trade Representative's (USTR's) statement emphasized the need for a high-standard agreement that includes enforceable obligations. Although some experts note that harmonization or mutual recognition is unlikely given divergent legal systems, privacy regimes, and norms of the parties, a common system of rules to allow for cross-border data flows while ensuring privacy protection is reportedly under discussion. International Guidelines and Best Practices Personal privacy has received increasing focus with the growth of digital trade encouraging global cooperation. The United States has contributed to developing international guidelines or principles related to privacy and cross-border data flows, although none are legally binding. OECD The OECD 1980 Privacy Guidelines established the first international set of privacy principles emphasizing data protection as a condition for the free flow of personal data across borders. These OECD guidelines were intended to assist countries with drawing up national data privacy policies. The guidelines were updated in 2013, focusing on national level implementation based on a risk management approach and improving interoperability between national privacy strategies. The updated guidelines identify specific principles for countries to take into account in establishing national policies. The guidelines are to be reviewed and updated again in 2019. G-20 Building on the OECD principles and prior G-20 work, the 2018 G-20 Digital Economy Ministerial Declaration identified principles to "facilitate an inclusive and whole-of-government approach to the use of information and communication technology (ICT) and assist governments in reshaping their capacities and strategies, while respecting the applicable frameworks of different countries, including with regards to privacy and data protection." Japan is to host the 2019 G-20 and plans to focus on data governance, offering a forum to address potential global standards on privacy and cross-border data flows. APEC APEC is a regional forum for economic cooperation whose initiatives on privacy and cross-border data flows have influenced members' domestic policies. APEC's 21 members, including the United States, agreed to the 2005 APEC Privacy Framework , based on the OECD guidelines. The framework identifies a set of principles and implementation guidelines to provide members with a flexible approach to regulate privacy at a national level. Once the OECD publishes updated guidelines in 2019, APEC members may revise the framework and principles to reflect the updated guidelines. APEC CBPR The APEC Cross-Border Privacy Rules (CBPR), endorsed by APEC Leaders in 2011, is a privacy code of conduct, based on the framework. The CBPR system establishes a set of principles for governments and businesses to follow to protect personal data and allow for cross-border data flows between CBPR members. They aim to balance information privacy with business needs and commercial interests, and facilitate digital trade to spur economic growth in the region. Rather than creating a new set of international regulations, the APEC framework and CBPR system identify best practices that each APEC member can tailor to its domestic legal system and allow for interoperability between countries. The scope and implementation mechanisms under CBPR can vary according to each member country's laws and regulations, providing flexibility for governments to design national privacy approaches. To become a member of the CBPR, a government must 1. Be a member of APEC; 2. Establish a regulator with authority to sign the Cross-Border Privacy Enforcement Arrangement (CPEA); 3. Map national laws to the published APEC guidelines, which set baseline standards; and 4. Establish an accountability agent empowered to audit and review a company's practices, and enforce privacy rules and laws. If a government joins the CBPR system, every domestic organization is not required to also join; however, becoming a member of CBPR may benefit an organization engaged in international trade by indicating to customers and partners that the organization values and protects data privacy. With certified enrollment in CBPR, organizations can transfer personal information between participating economies (e.g., Mexico to Singapore) and be assured of compliance with the legal regimes in both places. To become a CBPR member, an individual organization must develop and implement data privacy policies consistent with the APEC Privacy Framework and complete a questionnaire. The third party accountability agent is responsible for assessing an organization's application, ongoing monitoring of compliance, investigating any complaints, and taking enforcement actions as necessary. Domestic enforcement authorities in each member country serve as a backstop for dispute resolution if an accountability agent cannot resolve a particular issue. All CBPR member governments must join the CPEA to ensure cooperation and collaboration between the designated national enforcement authorities. In the United States, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is the regulator and enforcement authority. TrustArc is the only accountability agent, but many expect the U.S. Department of Commerce to recognize additional agents soon. As of this writing, TrustArc lists about 20 U.S. firms that are APEC CBPR certified. Expanding CBPR Beyond APEC The CBPR grows in significance as the number of participating economies and organizations increases. The U.S. ambassador to APEC aims to have "as many APEC economies as possible as soon as possible to join the system." Currently, the United States, Japan, Mexico, Canada, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and Australia are CBPR members; the Philippines is in the process of joining. Russia, on the other hand, stated it has no plans to join. Although APEC initiatives are regionally focused, they can provide a basis to scale up to larger global efforts because they reflect economies at different stages of development and include industry participation. Due to its voluntary nature, APEC has served as a testbed for identifying best practices, standards, and principles and for creating frameworks that can lead to binding commitments in plurilateral or larger multilateral agreements (see " Data Flows and Privacy in U.S. Trade Agreements "). Expanding CBPR beyond APEC could represent the next step toward consistent international rules and disciplines on data flows and privacy. Foreign Government Policies Countries vary in their privacy policies and laws, reflecting differing priorities, cultures, and legal structures. According to one index, China is the most restrictive digital trade country among 64 countries surveyed, followed by Russia, India, Indonesia, and Vietnam (see Figure 1 ). The United States ranks 22 in the index, less restrictive than Brazil or France but more restrictive than Canada or Australia. The relatively high U.S. score largely reflects financial sector restrictions. The "restrictions on data" category covers data policies such as privacy and security measures; this category is included in the composite index. Looking specifically at the 64 countries' data policies, Russia is the most restrictive country, followed by Turkey and China. Russia's policies include data localization, retention, and transfer requirements, among others. Turkey's comprehensive Data Protection Law also establishes requirements in these areas. In contrast, the United States ranks 50 for data policy restrictions. Two of the top U.S. trading partners (the EU and China) have established their data policies from different perspectives. The EU's policies are driven by privacy concerns; China's policies are based on security justifications. Both are setting examples that other countries, especially those with (or seeking) closer trading ties to China or the EU, are emulating; thus, these policies have affected U.S. firms seeking to do business in those other countries as well. EU: Privacy First U.S.-EU Privacy Shield The EU considers the privacy of communications and the protection of personal data to be fundamental human rights, which are codified in EU law. Differences between the United States and EU in their approaches to data protection and data privacy laws have long been sticking points in U.S.-EU economic and security relations. The EU and United States negotiated the U.S.-EU Privacy Shield to allow for the transatlantic transfer of personal data by certified organizations. The bilateral agreement established a voluntary program with commitments and obligations for companies, limitations on law enforcement access, and transparency requirements. U.S. companies that participate in the program must still comply with all of the obligations under EU law (see below) if they process personal data of EU persons. The Privacy Shield is overseen and enforced by EU federal and U.S. agencies, including the Department of Commerce and the FTC, and is reviewed by both parties annually. EU GDPR The EU's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), effective May 2018, establishes rules for EU members, with extraterritorial implications. The GDPR is a comprehensive privacy regime that builds on previous EU data protection rules. It grants new rights to individuals to control personal data and creates specific new data protection requirements. The GDPR applies to (1) all businesses and organizations with an EU establishment that process (i.e., perform operations on) personal data of individuals in the EU, regardless of where the actual processing of the data takes place; and (2) entities outside the EU that offer goods or services (for payment or for free) to individuals in the EU or monitor the behavior of individuals in the EU. While the GDPR is directly applicable at the EU member state level, individual countries are responsible for establishing some national-level rules and policies as well as enforcement authorities, and some are still in the process of doing so. As a result, some U.S. stakeholders have voiced concerns about a lack of clarity and inadequate country compliance guidelines. Many U.S. firms doing business in the EU have made and are making changes to comply with the GDPR, such as revising and clarifying user terms of agreement and asking for explicit consent. For some U.S. companies, it may be easier and cheaper to apply GDPR protections to all users worldwide rather than to maintain different policies for different users. Large firms may have the resources to hire consultants and lawyers to guide implementation and compliance; it may be harder and costlier for small and mid-sized enterprises to comply, possibly deterring them from entering the EU market and creating a de facto trade barrier. Since the GDPR went into effect on May 25, 2018, some U.S. businesses, including some newspaper websites and digital advertising firms, have opted to exit the EU market given the complexities of complying with the GDPR and the threat of potential enforcement actions. European Data Protection Authorities (DPAs) have received a range of GDPR complaints and initiated several GDPR enforcement actions in the fall of 2018. In January 2019, the French DPA issued the largest penalty to date for a data privacy breach. The agency imposed a €50 million (approximately $57 million) fine on Google for the "lack of transparency" regarding how the search engine processes user data. Analysts contend that the high fine may set a benchmark and signal for future enforcement, raising concerns among some firms doing business in the EU. Exporting Personal Data Under EU GDPR Under the GDPR, a few options exist to transfer personal data in or out of the EU and ensure that privacy is maintained. 1. An organization may use specific Binding Corporate Rules (BCRs) or Model Contracts approved by the EU; 2. An organization may comply with domestic privacy regimes of a country that has obtained a mutual adequacy decision from the EU, which means that the EU has deemed that a country's laws and regulations provide an adequate level of data protection; currently, fewer than 15 jurisdictions are deemed adequate by the EU; or 3. A U.S.-based organization may enroll in the bilateral U.S.-EU Privacy Shield program for transatlantic transfer of personal data. The GDPR legal text seems to envision a fourth way, such as a certification scheme to transfer data, that the EU has yet to elaborate. A certification option(s) could create a less burdensome means of compliance for U.S. and other non-EU organizations to transfer personal data to or from the EU in the future. This could be an opportunity for the United States to work with the EU on creating a common system, perhaps even setting a global standard. Expanding GDPR Beyond the EU Some experts contend that the GDPR may effectively set new global data privacy standards, since many companies and organizations are striving for GDPR compliance to avoid being shut out of the EU market, fined, or otherwise penalized, or in case other countries introduce rules that imitate the GDPR. The EU is actively promoting the GDPR and some countries, such as Argentina, are imitating all or parts of the GDPR in their own privacy regulatory and legislative efforts or as part of broader trade negotiations with the EU. In general, the EU does not include cross-border data flows or privacy in free trade agreements. However, alongside trade negotiations with Japan, the EU and Japan agreed to recognize each other's data protection systems as "equivalent," allowing for the free flow of data between the EU and Japan and serving as a first step in adopting an adequacy decision. Under the agreement, Japan committed to implementing additional measures to address the handling of the personal data of EU persons on top of Japan's own privacy regime. China: Security First China's trade and internet policies reflect state direction and industrial policy, limiting the free flow of information and individual privacy. For example, the requirement for all internet traffic to pass through a national firewall can impede the cross-border transmission of data. China's 2015 counterterrorism law requires telecommunications operators and internet service providers to provide assistance to the government, which could include sharing individuals' data. Citing national security concerns, China's Internet Sovereignty policies, Cybersecurity Law, and Personal Information Security Specification impose strict requirements on companies, such as storing data domestically; limiting the ability to access, use, or transfer data internationally; and mandating security assessments that provide Chinese authorities access to proprietary information. In 2014, China announced a new social credit system, a centralized big-data-enabled system for monitoring and shaping businesses' and citizens' behavior that serves as a self-enforcing regulatory mechanism. According to the government, China aims to make individuals more "sincere" and "trustworthy," while obtaining reliable data on the creditworthiness of businesses and individuals. An individual's score would determine the level of government services and opportunities he or she could receive. China seeks to have all its citizens subject to the social credit system by 2020, forcing some U.S. businesses who do business in China, such as airlines, to participate. As of 2018, multiple government agencies and financial institutions contribute data to the platform. Pilot projects are underway in some provinces to apply various rewards and punishments in response to data collected. The lack of control an individual may have and the exposure of what some consider private data is controversial among observers in and out of China. Some countries, such as Vietnam, are following China's approach in creating cybersecurity policies that limit data flows and require local data storage and possible access by government authorities. Some U.S. firms and other multinational companies are considering exiting the Vietnamese market rather than complying, while some analysts suggest that Vietnam's law may not be in compliance with its recent commitments in trade agreements (see below). India has also cited security as the rationale for its draft Personal Data Protection Bill, which would establish broad data localization requirements and limit cross-border transfer of some data. Unlike the EU, these countries do not specify mechanisms to allow for cross-border data flows. U.S. officials have raised concerns with both Vietnam's and India's localization requirements. Defining the U.S. Approach The EU's emphasis on privacy protection and China's focus on national security (and the countries that emulate their policies) have led these countries to create data-focused policies that restrict international trade and commerce. The United States has traditionally sought a balanced approach between trade, privacy, and security. U.S. data flow policy priorities are articulated in USTR's Digital 2 Dozen report, first developed under the Obama Administration, and the White House's 2017 National Security Strategy. Both Administrations emphasize the need for protection of privacy, the free flow of data across borders, and an interoperable internet. These documents establish the U.S. position that the free flow of data is not inconsistent with privacy protection. Recent free trade agreements translate the U.S. position into binding international commitments. The United States has taken a data-specific approach to regulating data privacy, with laws protecting specific information, such as healthcare or financial data. The FTC enforces consumer protection laws and requires that consumers be notified of and consent to how their data will be used, but the FTC does not have the mandate or resources to enforce broad online privacy protections. There is growing interest among some Members of Congress and in the Administration for a more holistic U.S. data privacy policy. Data Flows and Privacy in U.S. Trade Agreements The United States has played an important role in international discussions on privacy and data flows, such as in the OECD, G-20, and APEC, and has included provisions on these subjects in recent free trade agreements. Congress noted the importance of digital trade and the internet as a trading platform in setting the current U.S. trade negotiating objectives in the June 2015 Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) legislation ( P.L. 114-26 ). TPA includes a specific principal U.S. trade negotiating objective on "digital trade in goods and services and cross-border data flows." According to TPA, a trade agreement should ensure that governments "refrain from implementing trade-related measures that impede digital trade in goods and services, restrict cross-border data flows, or require local storage or processing of data." However, TPA also recognizes that sometimes measures are necessary to achieve legitimate policy objectives and aims for such regulations to be the least trade restrictive, nondiscriminatory, and transparent. Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans‐Pacific Partnership (CPTPP /TPP-11 ) . The CPTPP is a recently concluded trade agreement among 11 Asia-Pacific countries. The CPTPP is based on the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement negotiated by the Obama Administration and from which President Trump withdrew the United States in January 2017. The electronic commerce chapter in TPP, left unchanged in CPTPP, contains the strongest binding trade agreement commitments on digital trade in force globally. CPTPP includes provisions on cross-border data flows and personal information protection. The text specifically states that the parties "shall allow the cross-border transfer of information." The agreement allows restrictive measures for legitimate public policy purposes if they are not discriminatory or disguised trade barriers. The agreement also prohibits localization requirements for computing facilities, with similar exceptions. On privacy, the CPTPP requires parties to have a legal framework in place to protect personal information and to have consumer protection laws that cover online commerce. It encourages interoperability between data privacy regimes and encourages cooperation between consumer protection authorities. United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). The released text for the proposed USMCA aims to revise and update the trilateral North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and illustrates the Trump Administration's approach. The USMCA chapter 19 on digital trade includes articles on consumer protection, personal information protection, cross-border transfer of information by electronic means, and cybersecurity, among other topics. Building on the TPP, the agreement seeks to balance the legitimate objectives by requiring parties to have a legal framework to protect personal information, have consumer protection laws for online commercial activities, and not prohibit or restrict cross-border transfer of information. While the agreement does not prescribe specific rules or measures that a party must take to protect privacy, it goes further than the TPP (or CPTPP) provisions and provides guidance to inform a country's privacy regime. In particular, the USMCA explicitly refers to the APEC Privacy Framework and OECD Guidelines as relevant and identifies key principles. In general, the proposed USMCA requires that parties not restrict cross-border data flows. Governments are allowed to do so to achieve a legitimate public policy objective (e.g., privacy, national security), provided the measure is not arbitrary, discriminatory, a disguised trade barrier, or greater than necessary to achieve the particular objective. In this way, the parties seek to balance the free flow of data for commerce and communication with protecting privacy and security. The agreement specifically states that the parties may take different legal approaches to protect personal data and also recognizes APEC CBPR as a "valid mechanism to facilitate cross-border information transfer while protecting personal information." The agreement aims to increase cooperation between the United States, Mexico, and Canada on a number of digital trade issues, including exchanging information on personal information protection and enforcement experiences; strengthening collaboration on cybersecurity issues; and promoting the APEC CBPR and global interoperability of national privacy regimes. The governments also commit to encourage private-sector self-regulation models and promote cooperation to enforce privacy laws. While the agreement is only between three parties, the provisions are written broadly to encompass global efforts. Some stakeholders look at USMCA as the basis for potential future trade agreements (such as with the UK). Cross-border data flows will likely be a key issue in future U.S.-EU trade negotiations. U.S. Federal Data Privacy Policy Efforts The United States has articulated a clear position on data privacy in trade agreements; however, there is no single U.S. data privacy policy. Nevertheless, the Trump Administration is seeking to define an overarching U.S. policy on data privacy. The Trump Administration's ongoing three-track process is being managed by the Department of Commerce (Commerce) in consultation with the White House. Different bureaus in Commerce are tasked with different aspects of the process, as follows. 1. The National Institutes of Standards and Technology (NIST) is developing a privacy framework. Similar to its cybersecurity framework, NIST aims to create a voluntary framework as a tool for organizations to adopt to identify, assess, manage, and communicate about privacy risks. By classifying specific privacy outcomes and potential approaches, the framework is intended to enable organizations to create and adapt privacy strategies, innovate, and manage privacy risks within diverse environments. As part of its transparent approach, NIST is currently consulting with public- and private-sector stakeholders through various forms of outreach to collect feedback and aims to have a draft framework before the end of 2019. 2. The National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) is developing a set of privacy principles to guide a domestic legal and policy approach. The NITA sought public comment on a proposed set of "user-centric privacy outcomes" and a set of high-level goals. 3. The International Trade Administration (ITA) engages with foreign governments and international organizations such as APEC. ITA is focusing on the international interoperability aspects of potential U.S. privacy policy. ITA's role is to ensure that the NIST and NTIA approaches are consistent with U.S. international policy objectives, including TPA, and principles, such as the OECD framework and APEC CBPRs. Like the EU and China, Commerce is seeking input through a public- and private-sector consultation process. However, unlike the EU or China, Commerce is expecting to create a voluntary privacy framework. Some observers question whether the Commerce approach is sufficient to result in strong privacy protections if it is not backed up by congressional action and federal legislation. Some suggest that Congress could lead a whole-of-government approach through new federal legislation. In the 115 th Congress, then-House Committee on Energy and Commerce Ranking Member Frank Pallone, Jr. requested that the Government Accountability Office (GAO) examine issues related to federal oversight of internet privacy. The January 2019 GAO report concluded that now is "an appropriate time for Congress to consider comprehensive Internet privacy." GAO stated that "Congress should consider developing comprehensive legislation on Internet privacy that would enhance consumer protections and provide flexibility to address a rapidly evolving Internet environment. Issues that should be considered include what authorities agencies should have in order to oversee Internet privacy, including appropriate rulemaking authority." Stakeholder Perspectives Recognizing the importance of protecting open data flows amid growing concerns about online privacy, some stakeholders seek to influence U.S. policies on these issues. In addition to submitting comments in response to NTIA and NIST requests and participating in their forums, multiple organizations issued their own sets of principles or guidelines, some referencing the EU GDPR. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce has also published model privacy legislation for Congress to consider. Though they vary in emphasis, these proposals share common themes: transparency on what data is being collected and how it is being used; user control, including the ability to opt out of sharing at least some information and to access and correct personal data collected; data security measures, like data breach notification requirements; and enforcement by the FTC; FTC commissioners also voiced support for the agency as the appropriate federal enforcer for consumer privacy. But these groups also differ in some areas, such as whether, or to what extent, to include certain aspects included in the GDPR, such as the right to deletion (so-called "right to be forgotten"), requirements for data minimization, or extraterritorial reach. There is not consensus on whether the FTC should be given rule-making authority or additional resources, the enforcement role of states, or if an independent data protection commission is needed similar to EU DPAs. Consistent with U.S. trade policy, industry groups generally point out the need to be flexible, encourage private-sector innovation, establish sector- and technology-neutral rules, create international interoperability between privacy regimes, and facilitate cross-border data flows. Private-sector stakeholders generally want to avoid what they regard as overregulation or high compliance burdens. These groups emphasize risk management and a harm-based approach, which they state keeps an organization's costs proportional to the consumer harm prevented. On the other hand, some consumer advocates point to a need for baseline obligations to protect against discrimination, disinformation, or other harm. In general, consumer advocates believe that any comprehensive federal privacy policy should complement, and not supplant, sector-specific privacy legislation or state-level legislation. Shaping a Global Approach Finding a global consensus on how to balance open data flows and privacy protection may be key to maintaining trust in the digital environment and advancing international trade. One study found that over 120 countries have laws related to personal data protection. Divergent national privacy approaches raise the costs of doing business and make it harder for governments to collaborate and share data, whether for scientific research, defense, or law enforcement. A system for global interoperability in a least trade-restrictive and nondiscriminatory way between different national systems could help minimize costs and allow entities in different jurisdictions with varying online privacy regimes to share data via cross-border data flows. Such a system could help avoid fragmentation of the internet between European, Chinese, and American spheres, a danger that some analysts have warned against. For example, Figure 2 suggests the potential of an interoperability system that allows data to flow freely between GDPR- and CBPR-certified economies. The OECD guidelines, G-20 principles, APEC CBPR, CPTPP, and USMCA provisions demonstrate an evolving understanding on how to balance cross-border data flows, security, and privacy, to create interoperable policies that can be tailored by countries and avoid fragmentation or the potential exclusion of other countries or regulatory systems. The various trade agreements and initiatives with differing sets of parties may ultimately pave the way for a broader multilateral understanding and eventually lead to more enforceable binding commitments founded on the key WTO principles of nondiscrimination, least trade restrictiveness, and transparency. Issues for Congress Future U.S. Trade Negotiations and Agreements Congress may consider the trade-related aspects of data flows in trade agreements, including through close examination of these provisions during the congressional debate and consideration of legislation to implement the proposed USMCA. Issues include whether the agreements make progress in meeting TPA's related trade negotiating objectives and if the provisions strike the appropriate balance among public policy objectives. In addition, USTR's specific trade negotiating objectives for future agreements with the EU and Japan include establishing rules to protect cross-border data flows. These future trade negotiations present challenges and provide opportunities for Congress to further engage USTR on the issues and to conduct oversight. Global Approach Congress may further consider how best to achieve broader consensus on data flows and privacy at the global level. Congress could, for example, conduct additional oversight of current best practice approaches (e.g., OECD, APEC) or ongoing negotiations in the WTO on e-commerce to create rules through plurilateral or multilateral agreements. Congress may consider endorsing certain of these efforts to influence international discussions and the engagement of other countries. Congress may want to examine the potential challenges and implications of building a system of interoperability between APEC, CBPR, and the EU GDPR. Related issues are the extent to which the EU is establishing its system as a potential de facto global approach through its trade agreements and other mechanisms, and how U.S. and other trade agreements may ultimately provide approaches that could be adopted more globally. Impact on U.S. Trade Congress may seek to better understand the economic impact of data flows and privacy regimes in other countries related to U.S. access to other markets and the extent to which barriers are being put in place that may discriminate against U.S. exporters. Congress may examine the lack of reciprocal treatment and limits on U.S. firms' access to some foreign markets. Congress may consider the implications of not having a comprehensive national data privacy policy. Will the EU GDPR and China cybersecurity policies become the global norms that other countries follow in the absence of a clear U.S. alternative? Domestic Policy Congress may enact comprehensive privacy legislation. In considering such action, Congress could investigate and conduct oversight of the Administration's ongoing privacy efforts, including requesting briefings and updates on the NTIA, NIST, and ITA initiatives to provide congressional feedback and direction and ensure they are aligned with U.S. trade objectives. Congress may also seek input from other federal agencies. In deliberating a comprehensive U.S. policy on personal data privacy, Congress may review the GAO report's findings and conclusions. Congress may also weigh several factors, including: How can U.S. trade and domestic policy achieve the appropriate balance to encourage cross-border commerce, economic growth, and innovation, while safeguarding individual privacy and national security? How would a new privacy regime affect U.S. consumers and businesses, including large multinationals who must comply with different national privacy regimes and small- and medium-sized enterprises with limited resources and technology expertise? Do U.S. agencies have the needed tools to accurately assess the size and scope of cross-border data flows to help analyze the economic impact of different privacy policies, or measure the costs of trade barriers? How should an evolving U.S. privacy regime align with U.S. trade policy objectives and evolving international standards, such as the OECD Guidelines for privacy and cybersecurity, and should U.S. policymakers prioritize interoperability with other international privacy frameworks to avoid further fragmentation of global markets and so-called balkanization of the internet? In addition, there are a host of other policy considerations not directly related to trade.

"Cross-border data flows" refers to the movement or transfer of information between computer servers across national borders. Such data flows enable people to transmit information for online communication, track global supply chains, share research, provide cross-border services, and support technological innovation. Ensuring open cross-border data flows has been an objective of Congress in recent trade agreements and in broader U.S. international trade policy. The free flow of personal data, however, has raised security and privacy concerns. U.S. trade policy has traditionally sought to balance the need for cross-border data flows, which often include personal data, with online privacy and security. Some stakeholders, including some Members of Congress, believe that U.S. policy should better protect personal data privacy and security, and have introduced legislation to set a national policy. Other policymakers and analysts are concerned about increasing foreign barriers to U.S. digital trade, including data flows. Recent incidents of private information being shared or exposed have heightened public awareness of the risks posed to personal data stored online. Consumers' personal online data is valued by organizations for a variety of reasons, such as analyzing marketing information and easing the efficiency of transactions. Concerns are likely to grow as the amount of online data organizations collect and the level of global data flows expand. As Congress assesses policy options, it may further explore the link between cross-border data flows, online privacy, and trade policy; the trade implications of a comprehensive data privacy policy; and the U.S. role in establishing best practices and binding trade rules that seek to balance public policy priorities. There is no globally accepted standard or definition of data privacy in the online world, and there are no comprehensive binding multilateral rules specifically about cross-border data flows and privacy. Several international organizations, including the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), G-20, and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, have sought to develop best practice guidelines or principles related to privacy and cross-border data flows, although none are legally binding. U.S. and other recent trade agreements are establishing new enforceable trade rules and disciplines. Countries vary in their data policies and laws; some focus on limiting access to online information by restricting the flow of data beyond a country's borders, aiming to protect domestic interests (e.g., constituents' privacy). However, these policies can also act as protectionist measures. The EU and China, two top U.S. trading partners, have established prescriptive rules on cross-border data flows and personal data from different perspectives. The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is driven by privacy concerns; China is focused on security. Their policies affect U.S. firms seeking to do business in those regions, as well as in other markets that emulate the EU and Chinese approaches. Unlike the EU or China, the United States does not broadly restrict cross-border data flows and has traditionally regulated privacy at a sectoral level to cover data, such as health records. U.S. trade policy has sought to balance the goals of consumer privacy, security, and open commerce. The proposed United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) represents the Trump Administration's first attempt to include negotiated trade rules and disciplines on privacy, cross-border data flows, and security in a trade agreement. While the United States and other countries work to define their respective national privacy strategies, many stakeholders seek a more global approach that would allow interoperability between differing national regimes to facilitate and remove discriminatory trade barriers to cross-border data flows; this could offer an opportunity for the United States to lead the global conversation. Although Congress has examined issues surrounding online privacy and has considered multiple bills, there is not yet consensus on a comprehensive U.S. online data privacy policy. Congress may weigh in as the Administration seeks to define U.S. policy on data privacy and engages in international negotiations on cross-border data flows.