Daily Papers

As language models (LMs) become integral to fields like healthcare, law, and journalism, their ability to differentiate between fact, belief, and knowledge is essential for reliable decision-making. Failure to grasp these distinctions can lead to significant consequences in areas such as medical diagnosis, legal judgments, and dissemination of fake news. Despite this, current literature has largely focused on more complex issues such as theory of mind, overlooking more fundamental epistemic challenges. This study systematically evaluates the epistemic reasoning capabilities of modern LMs, including GPT-4, Claude-3, and Llama-3, using a new dataset, KaBLE, consisting of 13,000 questions across 13 tasks. Our results reveal key limitations. First, while LMs achieve 86% accuracy on factual scenarios, their performance drops significantly with false scenarios, particularly in belief-related tasks. Second, LMs struggle with recognizing and affirming personal beliefs, especially when those beliefs contradict factual data, which raises concerns for applications in healthcare and counseling, where engaging with a person's beliefs is critical. Third, we identify a salient bias in how LMs process first-person versus third-person beliefs, performing better on third-person tasks (80.7%) compared to first-person tasks (54.4%). Fourth, LMs lack a robust understanding of the factive nature of knowledge, namely, that knowledge inherently requires truth. Fifth, LMs rely on linguistic cues for fact-checking and sometimes bypass the deeper reasoning. These findings highlight significant concerns about current LMs' ability to reason about truth, belief, and knowledge while emphasizing the need for advancements in these areas before broad deployment in critical sectors.

Standard federated learning (FL) approaches are vulnerable to the free-rider dilemma: participating agents can contribute little to nothing yet receive a well-trained aggregated model. While prior mechanisms attempt to solve the free-rider dilemma, none have addressed the issue of truthfulness. In practice, adversarial agents can provide false information to the server in order to cheat its way out of contributing to federated training. In an effort to make free-riding-averse federated mechanisms truthful, and consequently less prone to breaking down in practice, we propose FACT. FACT is the first federated mechanism that: (1) eliminates federated free riding by using a penalty system, (2) ensures agents provide truthful information by creating a competitive environment, and (3) encourages agent participation by offering better performance than training alone. Empirically, FACT avoids free-riding when agents are untruthful, and reduces agent loss by over 4x.

Large language models (LLMs) have recently driven striking performance improvements across a range of natural language processing tasks. The factual knowledge acquired during pretraining and instruction tuning can be useful in various downstream tasks, such as question answering, and language generation. Unlike conventional Knowledge Bases (KBs) that explicitly store factual knowledge, LLMs implicitly store facts in their parameters. Content generated by the LLMs can often exhibit inaccuracies or deviations from the truth, due to facts that can be incorrectly induced or become obsolete over time. To this end, we aim to comprehensively evaluate the extent and scope of factual knowledge within LLMs by designing the benchmark Pinocchio. Pinocchio contains 20K diverse factual questions that span different sources, timelines, domains, regions, and languages. Furthermore, we investigate whether LLMs are able to compose multiple facts, update factual knowledge temporally, reason over multiple pieces of facts, identify subtle factual differences, and resist adversarial examples. Extensive experiments on different sizes and types of LLMs show that existing LLMs still lack factual knowledge and suffer from various spurious correlations. We believe this is a critical bottleneck for realizing trustworthy artificial intelligence. The dataset Pinocchio and our codes will be publicly available.

While there are numerous benchmarks comparing the performance of modern language models (LMs), end-task evaluations often conflate notions of *factual accuracy* ("truth") and *reasoning ability* ("rationality", or "honesty" in the sense of correctly reporting implications of beliefs). Our goal is a dataset that clearly distinguishes these two notions. Our approach is to leverage and extend a collection of human-annotated *entailment trees*, engineered to express both good and bad chains of reasoning, and using a mixture of true and false facts, in particular including counterfactual examples, to avoid belief bias (also known as the "content effect"). The resulting dataset, called BaRDa, contains 3000 entailments (1787 valid, 1213 invalid), using 6681 true and 2319 false statements. Testing on four GPT-series models, GPT3(curie)/GPT3(davinici)/3.5/4, we find factual accuracy (truth) scores of 74.1/80.6/82.6/87.1 and reasoning accuracy scores of 63.1/78.0/71.8/79.2. This shows the clear progression of models towards improved factual accuracy and entailment reasoning, and the dataset provides a new benchmark that more cleanly separates and quantifies these two notions.

Assessing factuality of text generated by large language models (LLMs) is an emerging yet crucial research area, aimed at alerting users to potential errors and guiding the development of more reliable LLMs. Nonetheless, the evaluators assessing factuality necessitate suitable evaluation themselves to gauge progress and foster advancements. This direction remains under-explored, resulting in substantial impediments to the progress of factuality evaluators. To mitigate this issue, we introduce a benchmark for Factuality Evaluation of large Language Models, referred to as felm. In this benchmark, we collect responses generated from LLMs and annotate factuality labels in a fine-grained manner. Contrary to previous studies that primarily concentrate on the factuality of world knowledge (e.g.~information from Wikipedia), felm focuses on factuality across diverse domains, spanning from world knowledge to math and reasoning. Our annotation is based on text segments, which can help pinpoint specific factual errors. The factuality annotations are further supplemented by predefined error types and reference links that either support or contradict the statement. In our experiments, we investigate the performance of several LLM-based factuality evaluators on felm, including both vanilla LLMs and those augmented with retrieval mechanisms and chain-of-thought processes. Our findings reveal that while retrieval aids factuality evaluation, current LLMs are far from satisfactory to faithfully detect factual errors.

When large language models are aligned via supervised fine-tuning, they may encounter new factual information that was not acquired through pre-training. It is often conjectured that this can teach the model the behavior of hallucinating factually incorrect responses, as the model is trained to generate facts that are not grounded in its pre-existing knowledge. In this work, we study the impact of such exposure to new knowledge on the capability of the fine-tuned model to utilize its pre-existing knowledge. To this end, we design a controlled setup, focused on closed-book QA, where we vary the proportion of the fine-tuning examples that introduce new knowledge. We demonstrate that large language models struggle to acquire new factual knowledge through fine-tuning, as fine-tuning examples that introduce new knowledge are learned significantly slower than those consistent with the model's knowledge. However, we also find that as the examples with new knowledge are eventually learned, they linearly increase the model's tendency to hallucinate. Taken together, our results highlight the risk in introducing new factual knowledge through fine-tuning, and support the view that large language models mostly acquire factual knowledge through pre-training, whereas fine-tuning teaches them to use it more efficiently.

Modern language models capture a large body of factual knowledge. However, some facts can be incorrectly induced or become obsolete over time, resulting in factually incorrect generations. This has led to the development of various editing methods that allow updating facts encoded by the model. Evaluation of these methods has primarily focused on testing whether an individual fact has been successfully injected, and if similar predictions for other subjects have not changed. Here we argue that such evaluation is limited, since injecting one fact (e.g. ``Jack Depp is the son of Johnny Depp'') introduces a ``ripple effect'' in the form of additional facts that the model needs to update (e.g.``Jack Depp is the sibling of Lily-Rose Depp''). To address this issue, we propose a novel set of evaluation criteria that consider the implications of an edit on related facts. Using these criteria, we then construct , a diagnostic benchmark of 5K factual edits, capturing a variety of types of ripple effects. We evaluate prominent editing methods on , showing that current methods fail to introduce consistent changes in the model's knowledge. In addition, we find that a simple in-context editing baseline obtains the best scores on our benchmark, suggesting a promising research direction for model editing.

This survey addresses the crucial issue of factuality in Large Language Models (LLMs). As LLMs find applications across diverse domains, the reliability and accuracy of their outputs become vital. We define the Factuality Issue as the probability of LLMs to produce content inconsistent with established facts. We first delve into the implications of these inaccuracies, highlighting the potential consequences and challenges posed by factual errors in LLM outputs. Subsequently, we analyze the mechanisms through which LLMs store and process facts, seeking the primary causes of factual errors. Our discussion then transitions to methodologies for evaluating LLM factuality, emphasizing key metrics, benchmarks, and studies. We further explore strategies for enhancing LLM factuality, including approaches tailored for specific domains. We focus two primary LLM configurations standalone LLMs and Retrieval-Augmented LLMs that utilizes external data, we detail their unique challenges and potential enhancements. Our survey offers a structured guide for researchers aiming to fortify the factual reliability of LLMs.

Large Language Models (LLMs) encapsulate vast amounts of knowledge but still remain vulnerable to external misinformation. Existing research mainly studied this susceptibility behavior in a single-turn setting. However, belief can change during a multi-turn conversation, especially a persuasive one. Therefore, in this study, we delve into LLMs' susceptibility to persuasive conversations, particularly on factual questions that they can answer correctly. We first curate the Farm (i.e., Fact to Misinform) dataset, which contains factual questions paired with systematically generated persuasive misinformation. Then, we develop a testing framework to track LLMs' belief changes in a persuasive dialogue. Through extensive experiments, we find that LLMs' correct beliefs on factual knowledge can be easily manipulated by various persuasive strategies.

Large Language Models are trained on vast amounts of text from the internet, which contains both factual and misleading information about the world. Can language models discern truth from falsehood in this contradicting data? Expanding on the view that LLMs can model different agents producing the corpora, we hypothesize that they can cluster truthful text by modeling a truthful persona: a group of agents that are likely to produce truthful text and share similar features. For example, trustworthy sources like Wikipedia and Science usually use formal writing styles and make consistent claims. By modeling this persona, LLMs can generalize truthfulness beyond the specific contexts in which each agent generated the training text. For example, the model can infer that the agent "Wikipedia" will behave truthfully on topics that were only generated by "Science" because they share a persona. We first show evidence for the persona hypothesis via two observations: (1) we can probe whether a model's answer will be truthful before it is generated; (2) finetuning a model on a set of facts improves its truthfulness on unseen topics. Next, using arithmetics as a synthetic environment, we show that language models can separate true and false statements, and generalize truthfulness across agents; but only if agents in the training data share a truthful generative process that enables the creation of a truthful persona. Overall, our findings suggest that models can exploit hierarchical structures in the data to learn abstract concepts like truthfulness.

In real world applications, knowledge graphs (KG) are widely used in various domains (e.g. medical applications and dialogue agents). However, for fact verification, KGs have not been adequately utilized as a knowledge source. KGs can be a valuable knowledge source in fact verification due to their reliability and broad applicability. A KG consists of nodes and edges which makes it clear how concepts are linked together, allowing machines to reason over chains of topics. However, there are many challenges in understanding how these machine-readable concepts map to information in text. To enable the community to better use KGs, we introduce a new dataset, FactKG: Fact Verification via Reasoning on Knowledge Graphs. It consists of 108k natural language claims with five types of reasoning: One-hop, Conjunction, Existence, Multi-hop, and Negation. Furthermore, FactKG contains various linguistic patterns, including colloquial style claims as well as written style claims to increase practicality. Lastly, we develop a baseline approach and analyze FactKG over these reasoning types. We believe FactKG can advance both reliability and practicality in KG-based fact verification.

With the rapid advancement of Large Language Models (LLMs), significant safety concerns have emerged. Fundamentally, the safety of large language models is closely linked to the accuracy, comprehensiveness, and clarity of their understanding of safety knowledge, particularly in domains such as law, policy and ethics. This factuality ability is crucial in determining whether these models can be deployed and applied safely and compliantly within specific regions. To address these challenges and better evaluate the factuality ability of LLMs to answer short questions, we introduce the Chinese SafetyQA benchmark. Chinese SafetyQA has several properties (i.e., Chinese, Diverse, High-quality, Static, Easy-to-evaluate, Safety-related, Harmless). Based on Chinese SafetyQA, we perform a comprehensive evaluation on the factuality abilities of existing LLMs and analyze how these capabilities relate to LLM abilities, e.g., RAG ability and robustness against attacks.

Theory of Mind (ToM) is a critical component of intelligence, yet accurately measuring it continues to be a subject of debate. Prior research has attempted to apply human ToM assessments to natural language processing models using either human-created standardized tests or rule-based templates. However, these methods primarily focus on simplistic reasoning and require further validation. In this study, we utilize dynamic epistemic logic, which has established overlaps with ToM, to generate more intricate problems. We also introduce novel verbalization techniques to express these problems using natural language. Our findings indicate that certain language model scaling (from 70M to 6B and 350M to 174B) does not consistently yield results better than random chance. While GPT-4 demonstrates improved epistemic reasoning capabilities, there is still room for enhancement. Our code and datasets are publicly available https://github.com/antoinelrnld/modlog https://huggingface.co/datasets/sileod/mindgames

Knowledge-grounded dialogue is a task of generating an informative response based on both the dialogue history and external knowledge source. In general, there are two forms of knowledge: manually annotated knowledge graphs and knowledge text from website. From various evaluation viewpoints, each type of knowledge has advantages and downsides. To further distinguish the principles and determinants from the intricate factors, we conduct a thorough experiment and study on the task to answer three essential questions. The questions involve the choice of appropriate knowledge form, the degree of mutual effects between knowledge and the model selection, and the few-shot performance of knowledge. Supported by statistical shreds of evidence, we offer conclusive solutions and sensible suggestions for directions and standards of future research.

This work presents a framework for assessing whether large language models (LLMs) encode more factual knowledge in their parameters than what they express in their outputs. While a few studies hint at this possibility, none has clearly defined or demonstrated this phenomenon. We first propose a formal definition of knowledge, quantifying it for a given question as the fraction of correct-incorrect answer pairs where the correct one is ranked higher. This gives rise to external and internal knowledge, depending on the information used to score individual answer candidates: either the model's observable token-level probabilities or its intermediate computations. Hidden knowledge arises when internal knowledge exceeds external knowledge. We then present a case study, applying this framework to three popular open-weights LLMs in a closed-book QA setup. Our results indicate that: (1) LLMs consistently encode more factual knowledge internally than what they express externally, with an average gap of 40%. (2) Surprisingly, some knowledge is so deeply hidden that a model can internally know an answer perfectly, yet fail to generate it even once, despite large-scale repeated sampling of 1,000 answers. This reveals fundamental limitations in the generation capabilities of LLMs, which (3) puts a practical constraint on scaling test-time compute via repeated answer sampling in closed-book QA: significant performance improvements remain inaccessible because some answers are practically never sampled, yet if they were, we would be guaranteed to rank them first.

Studies have underscored how, regardless of the recent breakthrough and swift advances in AI research, even state-of-the-art Large Language models (LLMs) continue to struggle when performing logical and mathematical reasoning. The results seem to suggest that LLMs still work as (highly advanced) data pattern identifiers, scoring poorly when attempting to generalise and solve reasoning problems the models have never previously seen or that are not close to samples presented in their training data. To address this compelling concern, this paper makes use of the notion of critical questions from the literature on argumentation theory, focusing in particular on Toulmin's model of argumentation. We show that employing these critical questions can improve the reasoning capabilities of LLMs. By probing the rationale behind the models' reasoning process, the LLM can assess whether some logical mistake is occurring and correct it before providing the final reply to the user prompt. The underlying idea is drawn from the gold standard of any valid argumentative procedure: the conclusion is valid if it is entailed by accepted premises. Or, to paraphrase such Aristotelian principle in a real-world approximation, characterised by incomplete information and presumptive logic, the conclusion is valid if not proved otherwise. This approach successfully steers the models' output through a reasoning pipeline, resulting in better performance against the baseline and its Chain-of-Thought (CoT) implementation. To this end, an extensive evaluation of the proposed approach on the MT-Bench Reasoning and Math tasks across a range of LLMs is provided.

Fact-checking is the task of verifying the veracity of claims by assessing their assertions against credible evidence. The vast majority of fact-checking studies focus exclusively on political claims. Very little research explores fact-checking for other topics, specifically subject matters for which expertise is required. We present the first study of explainable fact-checking for claims which require specific expertise. For our case study we choose the setting of public health. To support this case study we construct a new dataset PUBHEALTH of 11.8K claims accompanied by journalist crafted, gold standard explanations (i.e., judgments) to support the fact-check labels for claims. We explore two tasks: veracity prediction and explanation generation. We also define and evaluate, with humans and computationally, three coherence properties of explanation quality. Our results indicate that, by training on in-domain data, gains can be made in explainable, automated fact-checking for claims which require specific expertise.

To evaluate knowledge in large language models (LLMs), current methods query the model and then evaluate its generated responses. In this work, we ask whether evaluation can be done before the model has generated any text. Concretely, is it possible to estimate how knowledgeable a model is about a certain entity, only from its internal computation? We study this question with two tasks: given a subject entity, the goal is to predict (a) the ability of the model to answer common questions about the entity, and (b) the factuality of responses generated by the model about the entity. Experiments with a variety of LLMs show that KEEN, a simple probe trained over internal subject representations, succeeds at both tasks - strongly correlating with both the QA accuracy of the model per-subject and FActScore, a recent factuality metric in open-ended generation. Moreover, KEEN naturally aligns with the model's hedging behavior and faithfully reflects changes in the model's knowledge after fine-tuning. Lastly, we show a more interpretable yet equally performant variant of KEEN, which highlights a small set of tokens that correlates with the model's lack of knowledge. Being simple and lightweight, KEEN can be leveraged to identify gaps and clusters of entity knowledge in LLMs, and guide decisions such as augmenting queries with retrieval.

Recent advances in artificial intelligence reveal the limits of purely predictive systems and call for a shift toward causal and collaborative reasoning. Drawing inspiration from the revolution of Grothendieck in mathematics, we introduce the relativity of causal knowledge, which posits structural causal models (SCMs) are inherently imperfect, subjective representations embedded within networks of relationships. By leveraging category theory, we arrange SCMs into a functor category and show that their observational and interventional probability measures naturally form convex structures. This result allows us to encode non-intervened SCMs with convex spaces of probability measures. Next, using sheaf theory, we construct the network sheaf and cosheaf of causal knowledge. These structures enable the transfer of causal knowledge across the network while incorporating interventional consistency and the perspective of the subjects, ultimately leading to the formal, mathematical definition of relative causal knowledge.

How do transformer-based large language models (LLMs) store and retrieve knowledge? We focus on the most basic form of this task -- factual recall, where the model is tasked with explicitly surfacing stored facts in prompts of form `Fact: The Colosseum is in the country of'. We find that the mechanistic story behind factual recall is more complex than previously thought. It comprises several distinct, independent, and qualitatively different mechanisms that additively combine, constructively interfering on the correct attribute. We term this generic phenomena the additive motif: models compute through summing up multiple independent contributions. Each mechanism's contribution may be insufficient alone, but summing results in constructive interfere on the correct answer. In addition, we extend the method of direct logit attribution to attribute an attention head's output to individual source tokens. We use this technique to unpack what we call `mixed heads' -- which are themselves a pair of two separate additive updates from different source tokens.

Plain language summarization with LLMs can be useful for improving textual accessibility of technical content. But how factual are these summaries in a high-stakes domain like medicine? This paper presents FactPICO, a factuality benchmark for plain language summarization of medical texts describing randomized controlled trials (RCTs), which are the basis of evidence-based medicine and can directly inform patient treatment. FactPICO consists of 345 plain language summaries of RCT abstracts generated from three LLMs (i.e., GPT-4, Llama-2, and Alpaca), with fine-grained evaluation and natural language rationales from experts. We assess the factuality of critical elements of RCTs in those summaries: Populations, Interventions, Comparators, Outcomes (PICO), as well as the reported findings concerning these. We also evaluate the correctness of the extra information (e.g., explanations) added by LLMs. Using FactPICO, we benchmark a range of existing factuality metrics, including the newly devised ones based on LLMs. We find that plain language summarization of medical evidence is still challenging, especially when balancing between simplicity and factuality, and that existing metrics correlate poorly with expert judgments on the instance level.

Despite the recent observation that large language models (LLMs) can store substantial factual knowledge, there is a limited understanding of the mechanisms of how they acquire factual knowledge through pretraining. This work addresses this gap by studying how LLMs acquire factual knowledge during pretraining. The findings reveal several important insights into the dynamics of factual knowledge acquisition during pretraining. First, counterintuitively, we observe that pretraining on more data shows no significant improvement in the model's capability to acquire and maintain factual knowledge. Next, there is a power-law relationship between training steps and forgetting of memorization and generalization of factual knowledge, and LLMs trained with duplicated training data exhibit faster forgetting. Third, training LLMs with larger batch sizes can enhance the models' robustness to forgetting. Overall, our observations suggest that factual knowledge acquisition in LLM pretraining occurs by progressively increasing the probability of factual knowledge presented in the pretraining data at each step. However, this increase is diluted by subsequent forgetting. Based on this interpretation, we demonstrate that we can provide plausible explanations for recently observed behaviors of LLMs, such as the poor performance of LLMs on long-tail knowledge and the benefits of deduplicating the pretraining corpus.

We propose an approach for estimating the latent knowledge embedded inside large language models (LLMs). We leverage the in-context learning (ICL) abilities of LLMs to estimate the extent to which an LLM knows the facts stored in a knowledge base. Our knowledge estimator avoids reliability concerns with previous prompting-based methods, is both conceptually simpler and easier to apply, and we demonstrate that it can surface more of the latent knowledge embedded in LLMs. We also investigate how different design choices affect the performance of ICL-based knowledge estimation. Using the proposed estimator, we perform a large-scale evaluation of the factual knowledge of a variety of open source LLMs, like OPT, Pythia, Llama(2), Mistral, Gemma, etc. over a large set of relations and facts from the Wikidata knowledge base. We observe differences in the factual knowledge between different model families and models of different sizes, that some relations are consistently better known than others but that models differ in the precise facts they know, and differences in the knowledge of base models and their finetuned counterparts.

Misinformation - false or misleading information - is considered a significant societal concern due to its associated "misinformation effects," such as political polarization, erosion of trust in institutions, problematic behavior, and public health challenges. However, the prevailing concept is misaligned with what is studied. While misinformation focuses on instances of information about factual matters, the broad spectrum of effects often manifests at a societal level and is shaped by a wide range of interdependent factors such as identity, values, opinions, epistemologies, and disagreements. Unsurprisingly, misinformation effects can occur without the prevalence of misinformation, and misinformation does not necessarily increase the effects studied. Here, we propose using disagreement - conflicting attitudes and beliefs between individuals and communities - as a way to study misinformation effects because it addresses the identified conceptual limitations of misinformation. Furthermore, unlike misinformation, disagreement does not require researchers to determine whether a given information is false or misleading. Thus, it can be studied and, more importantly, measured without the need to make a normative judgment about a given information, even when the specific topic is entirely removed, as we show in a longitudinal disagreement measurement. We demonstrate that disagreement, as a holistic concept, provides better explanations for the occurrence of misinformation effects, enhances precision in developing appropriate interventions, and offers a promising approach for evaluating them through quantification. Finally, we show how disagreement addresses current misinformation research questions and conclude with recommendations for research practice.

Are LLMs cultural technologies like photocopiers or printing presses, which transmit information but cannot create new content? A challenge for this idea, which we call bibliotechnism, is that LLMs often do generate entirely novel text. We begin by defending bibliotechnism against this challenge, showing how novel text may be meaningful only in a derivative sense, so that the content of this generated text depends in an important sense on the content of original human text. We go on to present a different, novel challenge for bibliotechnism, stemming from examples in which LLMs generate "novel reference", using novel names to refer to novel entities. Such examples could be smoothly explained if LLMs were not cultural technologies but possessed a limited form of agency (beliefs, desires, and intentions). According to interpretationism in the philosophy of mind, a system has beliefs, desires and intentions if and only if its behavior is well-explained by the hypothesis that it has such states. In line with this view, we argue that cases of novel reference provide evidence that LLMs do in fact have beliefs, desires, and intentions, and thus have a limited form of agency.

Misinformation about climate change is a complex societal issue requiring holistic, interdisciplinary solutions at the intersection between technology and psychology. One proposed solution is a "technocognitive" approach, involving the synthesis of psychological and computer science research. Psychological research has identified that interventions in response to misinformation require both fact-based (e.g., factual explanations) and technique-based (e.g., explanations of misleading techniques) content. However, little progress has been made on documenting and detecting fallacies in climate misinformation. In this study, we apply a previously developed critical thinking methodology for deconstructing climate misinformation, in order to develop a dataset mapping different types of climate misinformation to reasoning fallacies. This dataset is used to train a model to detect fallacies in climate misinformation. Our study shows F1 scores that are 2.5 to 3.5 better than previous works. The fallacies that are easiest to detect include fake experts and anecdotal arguments, while fallacies that require background knowledge, such as oversimplification, misrepresentation, and slothful induction, are relatively more difficult to detect. This research lays the groundwork for development of solutions where automatically detected climate misinformation can be countered with generative technique-based corrections.

Inductive reasoning is a core component of human intelligence. In the past research of inductive reasoning within computer science, formal language is used as representations of knowledge (facts and rules, more specifically). However, formal language can cause systematic problems for inductive reasoning such as disability of handling raw input such as natural language, sensitiveness to mislabeled data, and incapacity to handle ambiguous input. To this end, we propose a new paradigm (task) for inductive reasoning, which is to induce natural language rules from natural language facts, and create a dataset termed DEER containing 1.2k rule-fact pairs for the task, where rules and facts are written in natural language. New automatic metrics are also proposed and analysed for the evaluation of this task. With DEER, we investigate a modern approach for inductive reasoning where we use natural language as representation for knowledge instead of formal language and use pretrained language models as ''reasoners''. Moreover, we provide the first and comprehensive analysis of how well pretrained language models can induce natural language rules from natural language facts. We also propose a new framework drawing insights from philosophy literature for this task, which we show in the experiment section that surpasses baselines in both automatic and human evaluations. We discuss about our future perspectives for inductive reasoning in Section 7. Dataset and code are available at https://github.com/ZonglinY/Inductive_Reasoning.

A prominent weakness of modern language models (LMs) is their tendency to generate factually incorrect text, which hinders their usability. A natural question is whether such factual errors can be detected automatically. Inspired by truth-seeking mechanisms in law, we propose a factuality evaluation framework for LMs that is based on cross-examination. Our key idea is that an incorrect claim is likely to result in inconsistency with other claims that the model generates. To discover such inconsistencies, we facilitate a multi-turn interaction between the LM that generated the claim and another LM (acting as an examiner) which introduces questions to discover inconsistencies. We empirically evaluate our method on factual claims made by multiple recent LMs on four benchmarks, finding that it outperforms existing methods and baselines, often by a large gap. Our results demonstrate the potential of using interacting LMs for capturing factual errors.

The fluency and creativity of large pre-trained language models (LLMs) have led to their widespread use, sometimes even as a replacement for traditional search engines. Yet language models are prone to making convincing but factually inaccurate claims, often referred to as 'hallucinations.' These errors can inadvertently spread misinformation or harmfully perpetuate misconceptions. Further, manual fact-checking of model responses is a time-consuming process, making human factuality labels expensive to acquire. In this work, we fine-tune language models to be more factual, without human labeling and targeting more open-ended generation settings than past work. We leverage two key recent innovations in NLP to do so. First, several recent works have proposed methods for judging the factuality of open-ended text by measuring consistency with an external knowledge base or simply a large model's confidence scores. Second, the direct preference optimization algorithm enables straightforward fine-tuning of language models on objectives other than supervised imitation, using a preference ranking over possible model responses. We show that learning from automatically generated factuality preference rankings, generated either through existing retrieval systems or our novel retrieval-free approach, significantly improves the factuality (percent of generated claims that are correct) of Llama-2 on held-out topics compared with RLHF or decoding strategies targeted at factuality. At 7B scale, compared to Llama-2-chat, we observe 58% and 40% reduction in factual error rate when generating biographies and answering medical questions, respectively.

Most benchmark datasets targeting commonsense reasoning focus on everyday scenarios: physical knowledge like knowing that you could fill a cup under a waterfall [Talmor et al., 2019], social knowledge like bumping into someone is awkward [Sap et al., 2019], and other generic situations. However, there is a rich space of commonsense inferences anchored to knowledge about specific entities: for example, deciding the truthfulness of a claim "Harry Potter can teach classes on how to fly on a broomstick." Can models learn to combine entity knowledge with commonsense reasoning in this fashion? We introduce CREAK, a testbed for commonsense reasoning about entity knowledge, bridging fact-checking about entities (Harry Potter is a wizard and is skilled at riding a broomstick) with commonsense inferences (if you're good at a skill you can teach others how to do it). Our dataset consists of 13k human-authored English claims about entities that are either true or false, in addition to a small contrast set. Crowdworkers can easily come up with these statements and human performance on the dataset is high (high 90s); we argue that models should be able to blend entity knowledge and commonsense reasoning to do well here. In our experiments, we focus on the closed-book setting and observe that a baseline model finetuned on existing fact verification benchmark struggles on CREAK. Training a model on CREAK improves accuracy by a substantial margin, but still falls short of human performance. Our benchmark provides a unique probe into natural language understanding models, testing both its ability to retrieve facts (e.g., who teaches at the University of Chicago?) and unstated commonsense knowledge (e.g., butlers do not yell at guests).

Integer sequences are of central importance to the modeling of concepts admitting complete finitary descriptions. We introduce a novel view on the learning of such concepts and lay down a set of benchmarking tasks aimed at conceptual understanding by machine learning models. These tasks indirectly assess model ability to abstract, and challenge them to reason both interpolatively and extrapolatively from the knowledge gained by observing representative examples. To further aid research in knowledge representation and reasoning, we present FACT, the Finitary Abstraction Comprehension Toolkit. The toolkit surrounds a large dataset of integer sequences comprising both organic and synthetic entries, a library for data pre-processing and generation, a set of model performance evaluation tools, and a collection of baseline model implementations, enabling the making of the future advancements with ease.

Paywalls, licenses and copyright rules often restrict the broad dissemination and reuse of scientific knowledge. We take the position that it is both legally and technically feasible to extract the scientific knowledge in scholarly texts. Current methods, like text embeddings, fail to reliably preserve factual content, and simple paraphrasing may not be legally sound. We urge the community to adopt a new idea: convert scholarly documents into Knowledge Units using LLMs. These units use structured data capturing entities, attributes and relationships without stylistic content. We provide evidence that Knowledge Units: (1) form a legally defensible framework for sharing knowledge from copyrighted research texts, based on legal analyses of German copyright law and U.S. Fair Use doctrine, and (2) preserve most (~95%) factual knowledge from original text, measured by MCQ performance on facts from the original copyrighted text across four research domains. Freeing scientific knowledge from copyright promises transformative benefits for scientific research and education by allowing language models to reuse important facts from copyrighted text. To support this, we share open-source tools for converting research documents into Knowledge Units. Overall, our work posits the feasibility of democratizing access to scientific knowledge while respecting copyright.

Language models (LMs) are widely used by an increasing number of users, underscoring the challenge of maintaining factuality across a broad range of topics. We first present VERIFY (Verification and Evidence RetrIeval for FactualitY evaluation), a pipeline to evaluate LMs' factuality in real-world user interactions. VERIFY considers the verifiability of LM-generated content and categorizes content units as supported, unsupported, or undecidable based on the retrieved evidence from the Web. Importantly, factuality judgment by VERIFY correlates better with human evaluations than existing methods. Using VERIFY, we identify "hallucination prompts" across diverse topics, i.e., those eliciting the highest rates of incorrect and inconclusive LM responses. These prompts form FactBench, a dataset of 1K prompts across 150 fine-grained topics. Our dataset captures emerging factuality challenges in real-world LM interactions and can be regularly updated with new prompts. We benchmark widely-used LMs from GPT, Gemini, and Llama3.1 family on FactBench, yielding the following key findings: (i) Proprietary models exhibit better factuality, with performance declining from Easy to Hard hallucination prompts. (ii) Llama3.1-405B-Instruct shows comparable or lower factual accuracy than Llama3.1-70B-Instruct across all evaluation methods due to its higher subjectivity that leads to more content labeled as undecidable. (iii) Gemini1.5-Pro shows a significantly higher refusal rate, with over-refusal in 25% of cases. Our code and data are publicly available at https://huggingface.co/spaces/launch/factbench.

Models of language trained on very large corpora have been demonstrated useful for NLP. As fixed artifacts, they have become the object of intense study, with many researchers "probing" the extent to which linguistic abstractions, factual and commonsense knowledge, and reasoning abilities they acquire and readily demonstrate. Building on this line of work, we consider a new question: for types of knowledge a language model learns, when during (pre)training are they acquired? We plot probing performance across iterations, using RoBERTa as a case study. Among our findings: linguistic knowledge is acquired fast, stably, and robustly across domains. Facts and commonsense are slower and more domain-sensitive. Reasoning abilities are, in general, not stably acquired. As new datasets, pretraining protocols, and probes emerge, we believe that probing-across-time analyses can help researchers understand the complex, intermingled learning that these models undergo and guide us toward more efficient approaches that accomplish necessary learning faster.

Previous literature has proved that Pretrained Language Models (PLMs) can store factual knowledge. However, we find that facts stored in the PLMs are not always correct. It motivates us to explore a fundamental question: How do we calibrate factual knowledge in PLMs without re-training from scratch? In this work, we propose a simple and lightweight method CaliNet to achieve this goal. To be specific, we first detect whether PLMs can learn the right facts via a contrastive score between right and fake facts. If not, we then use a lightweight method to add and adapt new parameters to specific factual texts. Experiments on the knowledge probing task show the calibration effectiveness and efficiency. In addition, through closed-book question answering, we find that the calibrated PLM possesses knowledge generalization ability after fine-tuning. Beyond the calibration performance, we further investigate and visualize the knowledge calibration mechanism.

The emergence of generative pre-trained models has facilitated the synthesis of high-quality text, but it has also posed challenges in identifying factual errors in the generated text. In particular: (1) A wider range of tasks now face an increasing risk of containing factual errors when handled by generative models. (2) Generated texts tend to be lengthy and lack a clearly defined granularity for individual facts. (3) There is a scarcity of explicit evidence available during the process of fact checking. With the above challenges in mind, in this paper, we propose FacTool, a task and domain agnostic framework for detecting factual errors of texts generated by large language models (e.g., ChatGPT). Experiments on four different tasks (knowledge-based QA, code generation, mathematical reasoning, and scientific literature review) show the efficacy of the proposed method. We release the code of FacTool associated with ChatGPT plugin interface at https://github.com/GAIR-NLP/factool .

Unitary quantum theory, having no Born Rule, is non-probabilistic. Hence the notorious problem of reconciling it with the unpredictability and appearance of stochasticity in quantum measurements. Generalising and improving upon the so-called 'decision-theoretic approach' (Deutsch, 1999; Wallace, 2003, 2007, 2012), I shall recast that problem in the recently proposed constructor theory of information - where quantum theory is represented as one of a class of superinformation theories, which are local, non-probabilistic theories conforming to certain constructor-theoretic conditions. I prove that the unpredictability of measurement outcomes (to which I give an exact meaning via constructor theory), necessarily arises in superinformation theories. Then I explain how the appearance of stochasticity in (finitely many) repeated measurements can arise under superinformation theories. And I establish sufficient conditions for a superinformation theory to inform decisions (made under it) as if it were probabilistic, via a Deutsch-Wallace-type argument - thus defining a class of decision-supporting superinformation theories. This broadens the domain of applicability of that argument to cover constructor-theory compliant theories. In addition, in this version some of the argument's assumptions, previously construed as merely decision-theoretic, follow from physical properties expressed by constructor-theoretic principles.

Large language models (LLMs) have significantly impacted many aspects of our lives. However, assessing and ensuring their chronological knowledge remains challenging. Existing approaches fall short in addressing the accumulative nature of knowledge, often relying on a single time stamp. To overcome this, we introduce ChroKnowBench, a benchmark dataset designed to evaluate chronologically accumulated knowledge across three key aspects: multiple domains, time dependency, temporal state. Our benchmark distinguishes between knowledge that evolves (e.g., scientific discoveries, amended laws) and knowledge that remain constant (e.g., mathematical truths, commonsense facts). Building on this benchmark, we present ChroKnowledge (Chronological Categorization of Knowledge), a novel sampling-based framework for evaluating and updating LLMs' non-parametric chronological knowledge. Our evaluation shows: (1) The ability of eliciting temporal knowledge varies depending on the data format that model was trained on. (2) LLMs partially recall knowledge or show a cut-off at temporal boundaries rather than recalling all aspects of knowledge correctly. Thus, we apply our ChroKnowPrompt, an in-depth prompting to elicit chronological knowledge by traversing step-by-step through the surrounding time spans. We observe that our framework successfully updates the overall knowledge across the entire timeline in both the biomedical domain (+11.9%) and the general domain (+2.8%), demonstrating its effectiveness in refining temporal knowledge. This non-parametric approach also enables knowledge updates not only in open-source models but also in proprietary LLMs, ensuring comprehensive applicability across model types. We perform a comprehensive analysis based on temporal characteristics of ChroKnowPrompt and validate the potential of various models to elicit intrinsic temporal knowledge through our method.

We propose a many-sorted modal logic for reasoning about knowledge in multi-agent systems. Our logic introduces a clear distinction between participating agents and the environment. This allows to express local properties of agents and global properties of worlds in a uniform way, as well as to talk about the presence or absence of agents in a world. The logic subsumes the standard epistemic logic and is a conservative extension of it. The semantics is given in chromatic hypergraphs, a generalization of chromatic simplicial complexes, which were recently used to model knowledge in distributed systems. We show that the logic is sound and complete with respect to the intended semantics. We also show a further connection of chromatic hypergraphs with neighborhood frames.

Pre-trained Language Models (PLMs) are trained on vast unlabeled data, rich in world knowledge. This fact has sparked the interest of the community in quantifying the amount of factual knowledge present in PLMs, as this explains their performance on downstream tasks, and potentially justifies their use as knowledge bases. In this work, we survey methods and datasets that are used to probe PLMs for factual knowledge. Our contributions are: (1) We propose a categorization scheme for factual probing methods that is based on how their inputs, outputs and the probed PLMs are adapted; (2) We provide an overview of the datasets used for factual probing; (3) We synthesize insights about knowledge retention and prompt optimization in PLMs, analyze obstacles to adopting PLMs as knowledge bases and outline directions for future work.

Deductive reasoning plays a pivotal role in the formulation of sound and cohesive arguments. It allows individuals to draw conclusions that logically follow, given the truth value of the information provided. Recent progress in the domain of large language models (LLMs) has showcased their capability in executing deductive reasoning tasks. Nonetheless, a significant portion of research primarily assesses the accuracy of LLMs in solving such tasks, often overlooking a deeper analysis of their reasoning behavior. In this study, we draw upon principles from cognitive psychology to examine inferential strategies employed by LLMs, through a detailed evaluation of their responses to propositional logic problems. Our findings indicate that LLMs display reasoning patterns akin to those observed in humans, including strategies like supposition following or chain construction. Moreover, our research demonstrates that the architecture and scale of the model significantly affect its preferred method of reasoning, with more advanced models tending to adopt strategies more frequently than less sophisticated ones. Importantly, we assert that a model's accuracy, that is the correctness of its final conclusion, does not necessarily reflect the validity of its reasoning process. This distinction underscores the necessity for more nuanced evaluation procedures in the field.

The pervasiveness of large language models and generative AI in online media has amplified the need for effective automated fact-checking to assist fact-checkers in tackling the increasing volume and sophistication of misinformation. The complex nature of fact-checking demands that automated fact-checking systems provide explanations that enable fact-checkers to scrutinise their outputs. However, it is unclear how these explanations should align with the decision-making and reasoning processes of fact-checkers to be effectively integrated into their workflows. Through semi-structured interviews with fact-checking professionals, we bridge this gap by: (i) providing an account of how fact-checkers assess evidence, make decisions, and explain their processes; (ii) examining how fact-checkers use automated tools in practice; and (iii) identifying fact-checker explanation requirements for automated fact-checking tools. The findings show unmet explanation needs and identify important criteria for replicable fact-checking explanations that trace the model's reasoning path, reference specific evidence, and highlight uncertainty and information gaps.

Language models can store vast amounts of factual knowledge, but their ability to use this knowledge for logical reasoning remains questionable. This paper explores a language model's ability to manipulate its stored knowledge during inference. We focus on four manipulation types: retrieval (e.g., "What is person A's attribute X"), classification (e.g., "Is A's attribute X even or odd?"), comparison (e.g., "Is A greater than B in attribute X?") and inverse search (e.g., "Which person's attribute X equals T?") We observe that pre-trained language models like GPT2/3/4 excel in knowledge retrieval but struggle with simple classification or comparison tasks unless Chain of Thoughts (CoTs) are employed during both training and inference. They also perform poorly in inverse knowledge search, irrespective of the prompts. Our primary contribution is a synthetic dataset for a controlled experiment that confirms these inherent weaknesses: a language model cannot efficiently manipulate knowledge from pre-training data, even when such knowledge is perfectly stored and fully extractable in the models, and despite adequate instruct fine-tuning.

Before deploying a language model (LM) within a given domain, it is important to measure its tendency to generate factually incorrect information in that domain. Existing factual generation evaluation methods focus on facts sampled from the LM itself, and thus do not control the set of evaluated facts and might under-represent rare and unlikely facts. We propose FACTOR: Factual Assessment via Corpus TransfORmation, a scalable approach for evaluating LM factuality. FACTOR automatically transforms a factual corpus of interest into a benchmark evaluating an LM's propensity to generate true facts from the corpus vs. similar but incorrect statements. We use our framework to create two benchmarks: Wiki-FACTOR and News-FACTOR. We show that: (i) our benchmark scores increase with model size and improve when the LM is augmented with retrieval; (ii) benchmark score correlates with perplexity, but the two metrics do not always agree on model ranking; and (iii) when perplexity and benchmark score disagree, the latter better reflects factuality in open-ended generation, as measured by human annotators. We make our data and code publicly available in https://github.com/AI21Labs/factor.

Despite their impressive generative capabilities, LLMs are hindered by fact-conflicting hallucinations in real-world applications. The accurate identification of hallucinations in texts generated by LLMs, especially in complex inferential scenarios, is a relatively unexplored area. To address this gap, we present FactCHD, a dedicated benchmark designed for the detection of fact-conflicting hallucinations from LLMs. FactCHD features a diverse dataset that spans various factuality patterns, including vanilla, multi-hop, comparison, and set operation. A distinctive element of FactCHD is its integration of fact-based evidence chains, significantly enhancing the depth of evaluating the detectors' explanations. Experiments on different LLMs expose the shortcomings of current approaches in detecting factual errors accurately. Furthermore, we introduce Truth-Triangulator that synthesizes reflective considerations by tool-enhanced ChatGPT and LoRA-tuning based on Llama2, aiming to yield more credible detection through the amalgamation of predictive results and evidence. The benchmark dataset is available at https://github.com/zjunlp/FactCHD.

As events progress, news articles often update with new information: if we are not cautious, we risk propagating outdated facts. In this work, we hypothesize that linguistic features indicate factual fluidity, and that we can predict which facts in a news article will update using solely the text of a news article (i.e. not external resources like search engines). We test this hypothesis, first, by isolating fact-updates in large news revisions corpora. News articles may update for many reasons (e.g. factual, stylistic, narrative). We introduce the NewsEdits 2.0 taxonomy, an edit-intentions schema that separates fact updates from stylistic and narrative updates in news writing. We annotate over 9,200 pairs of sentence revisions and train high-scoring ensemble models to apply this schema. Then, taking a large dataset of silver-labeled pairs, we show that we can predict when facts will update in older article drafts with high precision. Finally, to demonstrate the usefulness of these findings, we construct a language model question asking (LLM-QA) abstention task. We wish the LLM to abstain from answering questions when information is likely to become outdated. Using our predictions, we show, LLM absention reaches near oracle levels of accuracy.

Large language models (LLMs) face issues in handling factual knowledge, making it vital to evaluate their true ability to understand facts. In this study, we introduce knowledge probing frameworks, BELIEF(-ICL), to evaluate the knowledge understanding ability of not only encoder-based PLMs but also decoder-based PLMs from diverse perspectives. BELIEFs utilize a multi-prompt dataset to evaluate PLM's accuracy, consistency, and reliability in factual knowledge understanding. To provide a more reliable evaluation with BELIEFs, we semi-automatically create MyriadLAMA, which has more diverse prompts than existing datasets. We validate the effectiveness of BELIEFs in correctly and comprehensively evaluating PLM's factual understanding ability through extensive evaluations. We further investigate key factors in learning facts in LLMs, and reveal the limitation of the prompt-based knowledge probing. The dataset is anonymously publicized.

Knowledge-intensive tasks (e.g., open-domain question answering (QA)) require a substantial amount of factual knowledge and often rely on external information for assistance. Recently, large language models (LLMs) (e.g., ChatGPT), have demonstrated impressive prowess in solving a wide range of tasks with world knowledge, including knowledge-intensive tasks. However, it remains unclear how well LLMs are able to perceive their factual knowledge boundaries, particularly how they behave when incorporating retrieval augmentation. In this study, we present an initial analysis of the factual knowledge boundaries of LLMs and how retrieval augmentation affects LLMs on open-domain QA. Specially, we focus on three primary research questions and analyze them by examining QA performance, priori judgement and posteriori judgement of LLMs. We show evidence that LLMs possess unwavering confidence in their capabilities to respond to questions and the accuracy of their responses. Furthermore, retrieval augmentation proves to be an effective approach in enhancing LLMs' awareness of knowledge boundaries, thereby improving their judgemental abilities. Additionally, we also find that LLMs have a propensity to rely on the provided retrieval results when formulating answers, while the quality of these results significantly impacts their reliance. The code to reproduce this work is available at https://github.com/RUCAIBox/LLM-Knowledge-Boundary.

Hallucinated outputs from language models pose risks in the medical domain, especially for lay audiences making health-related decisions. Existing factuality evaluation methods, such as entailment- and question-answering-based (QA), struggle with plain language summary (PLS) generation due to elaborative explanation phenomenon, which introduces external content (e.g., definitions, background, examples) absent from the source document to enhance comprehension. To address this, we introduce PlainQAFact, a framework trained on a fine-grained, human-annotated dataset PlainFact, to evaluate the factuality of both source-simplified and elaboratively explained sentences. PlainQAFact first classifies factuality type and then assesses factuality using a retrieval-augmented QA-based scoring method. Our approach is lightweight and computationally efficient. Empirical results show that existing factuality metrics fail to effectively evaluate factuality in PLS, especially for elaborative explanations, whereas PlainQAFact achieves state-of-the-art performance. We further analyze its effectiveness across external knowledge sources, answer extraction strategies, overlap measures, and document granularity levels, refining its overall factuality assessment.

Large language models (LLMs) encapsulate a vast amount of factual information within their pre-trained weights, as evidenced by their ability to answer diverse questions across different domains. However, this knowledge is inherently limited, relying heavily on the characteristics of the training data. Consequently, using external datasets to incorporate new information or refine the capabilities of LLMs on previously seen information poses a significant challenge. In this study, we compare two common approaches: fine-tuning and retrieval-augmented generation (RAG). We evaluate both approaches on a variety of knowledge-intensive tasks across different topics. Our findings reveal that while fine-tuning offers some improvement, RAG consistently outperforms it, both for existing knowledge encountered during training and entirely new knowledge. Moreover, we find that LLMs struggle to learn new factual information through fine-tuning, and that exposing them to numerous variations of the same fact during training could alleviate this problem.

Evaluating the factuality of long-form text generated by large language models (LMs) is non-trivial because (1) generations often contain a mixture of supported and unsupported pieces of information, making binary judgments of quality inadequate, and (2) human evaluation is time-consuming and costly. In this paper, we introduce FActScore (Factual precision in Atomicity Score), a new evaluation that breaks a generation into a series of atomic facts and computes the percentage of atomic facts supported by a reliable knowledge source. We conduct an extensive human evaluation to obtain FActScores of people biographies generated by several state-of-the-art commercial LMs -- InstructGPT, ChatGPT, and the retrieval-augmented PerplexityAI -- and report new analysis demonstrating the need for such a fine-grained score (e.g., ChatGPT only achieves 58%). Since human evaluation is costly, we also introduce an automated model that estimates FActScore, using retrieval and a strong language model, with less than a 2% error rate. Finally, we use this automated metric to evaluate 6,500 generations from a new set of 13 recent LMs that would have cost $26K if evaluated by humans, with various findings: GPT-4 and ChatGPT are more factual than public models, and Vicuna and Alpaca are some of the best public models.

In this work, we evaluate the capacity for foundation models to retrieve encyclopedic knowledge across a wide range of languages, topics, and contexts. To support this effort, we 1) produce a new dataset containing 303k factual associations in 20 different languages, 2) formulate a new counterfactual knowledge assessment, Polyglot or Not, and 3) benchmark 5 foundation models in a multilingual setting and a diverse set of 20 models in an English-only setting. We observed significant accuracy differences in models of interest, with Meta's LLaMA topping both the multilingual and English-only assessments. Error analysis reveals a significant deficiency in LLaMA's ability to retrieve facts in languages written in the Cyrillic script and gaps in its understanding of facts based on the location and gender of entailed subjects. Ultimately, we argue that the promise of utilizing foundation language models as bonafide polyglots is greatly diminished when they are tasked with retrieving information in languages other than English. Supporting code (https://github.com/daniel-furman/Polyglot-or-Not) and dataset (https://huggingface.co/datasets/Polyglot-or-Not/Fact-Completion) are openly released.

Factual recall from a reference source is crucial for evaluating the performance of Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) systems, as it directly probes into the quality of both retrieval and generation. However, it still remains a challenge to perform this evaluation reliably and efficiently. Recent work has focused on fact verification via prompting language model (LM) evaluators, however we demonstrate that these methods are unreliable in the presence of incomplete or inaccurate information. We introduce Facts as a Function (FaaF), a new approach to fact verification that utilizes the function calling abilities of LMs and a framework for RAG factual recall evaluation. FaaF substantially improves the ability of LMs to identify unsupported facts in text with incomplete information whilst improving efficiency and lowering cost by several times, compared to prompt-based approaches.

The factuality of large language model (LLMs) tends to decay over time since events posterior to their training are "unknown" to them. One way to keep models up-to-date could be factual update: the task of inserting, replacing, or removing certain simple (atomic) facts within the model. To study this task, we present WikiFactDiff, a dataset that describes the evolution of factual knowledge between two dates as a collection of simple facts divided into three categories: new, obsolete, and static. We describe several update scenarios arising from various combinations of these three types of basic update. The facts are represented by subject-relation-object triples; indeed, WikiFactDiff was constructed by comparing the state of the Wikidata knowledge base at 4 January 2021 and 27 February 2023. Those fact are accompanied by verbalization templates and cloze tests that enable running update algorithms and their evaluation metrics. Contrary to other datasets, such as zsRE and CounterFact, WikiFactDiff constitutes a realistic update setting that involves various update scenarios, including replacements, archival, and new entity insertions. We also present an evaluation of existing update algorithms on WikiFactDiff.

A multi-decade exploration into the theoretical foundations of artificial and natural general intelligence, which has been expressed in a series of books and papers and used to guide a series of practical and research-prototype software systems, is reviewed at a moderate level of detail. The review covers underlying philosophies (patternist philosophy of mind, foundational phenomenological and logical ontology), formalizations of the concept of intelligence, and a proposed high level architecture for AGI systems partly driven by these formalizations and philosophies. The implementation of specific cognitive processes such as logical reasoning, program learning, clustering and attention allocation in the context and language of this high level architecture is considered, as is the importance of a common (e.g. typed metagraph based) knowledge representation for enabling "cognitive synergy" between the various processes. The specifics of human-like cognitive architecture are presented as manifestations of these general principles, and key aspects of machine consciousness and machine ethics are also treated in this context. Lessons for practical implementation of advanced AGI in frameworks such as OpenCog Hyperon are briefly considered.

Recently, Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has delivered success on complex reasoning tasks, which aims at designing a simple prompt like ``Let's think step by step'' or multiple in-context exemplars with well-designed rationales to elicit Large Language Models (LLMs) to generate intermediate reasoning steps. However, the generated rationales often come with mistakes, making unfactual and unfaithful reasoning chains. To mitigate this brittleness, we propose a novel Chain-of-Knowledge (CoK) prompting, where we aim at eliciting LLMs to generate explicit pieces of knowledge evidence in the form of structure triple. This is inspired by our human behaviors, i.e., we can draw a mind map or knowledge map as the reasoning evidence in the brain before answering a complex question. Benefiting from CoK, we additionally introduce a F^2-Verification method to estimate the reliability of the reasoning chains in terms of factuality and faithfulness. For the unreliable response, the wrong evidence can be indicated to prompt the LLM to rethink. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method can further improve the performance of commonsense, factual, symbolic, and arithmetic reasoning tasks.

Neural knowledge-grounded generative models for dialogue often produce content that is factually inconsistent with the knowledge they rely on, making them unreliable and limiting their applicability. Inspired by recent work on evaluating factual consistency in abstractive summarization, we propose an automatic evaluation metric for factual consistency in knowledge-grounded dialogue using automatic question generation and question answering. Our metric, denoted Q^2, compares answer spans using natural language inference (NLI), instead of token-based matching as done in previous work. To foster proper evaluation, we curate a novel dataset of dialogue system outputs for the Wizard-of-Wikipedia dataset, manually annotated for factual consistency. We perform a thorough meta-evaluation of Q^2 against other metrics using this dataset and two others, where it consistently shows higher correlation with human judgements.

In large language models (LLMs), certain neurons can store distinct pieces of knowledge learned during pretraining. While knowledge typically appears as a combination of relations and entities, it remains unclear whether some neurons focus on a relation itself -- independent of any entity. We hypothesize such neurons detect a relation in the input text and guide generation involving such a relation. To investigate this, we study the Llama-2 family on a chosen set of relations with a statistics-based method. Our experiments demonstrate the existence of relation-specific neurons. We measure the effect of selectively deactivating candidate neurons specific to relation r on the LLM's ability to handle (1) facts whose relation is r and (2) facts whose relation is a different relation r' neq r. With respect to their capacity for encoding relation information, we give evidence for the following three properties of relation-specific neurons. (i) Neuron cumulativity. The neurons for r present a cumulative effect so that deactivating a larger portion of them results in the degradation of more facts in r. (ii) Neuron versatility. Neurons can be shared across multiple closely related as well as less related relations. Some relation neurons transfer across languages. (iii) Neuron interference. Deactivating neurons specific to one relation can improve LLM generation performance for facts of other relations. We will make our code publicly available at https://github.com/cisnlp/relation-specific-neurons.

Knowledge-intensive language understanding tasks require Language Models (LMs) to integrate relevant context, mitigating their inherent weaknesses, such as incomplete or outdated knowledge. Nevertheless, studies indicate that LMs often ignore the provided context as it can conflict with the pre-existing LM's memory learned during pre-training. Moreover, conflicting knowledge can already be present in the LM's parameters, termed intra-memory conflict. Existing works have studied the two types of knowledge conflicts only in isolation. We conjecture that the (degree of) intra-memory conflicts can in turn affect LM's handling of context-memory conflicts. To study this, we introduce the DYNAMICQA dataset, which includes facts with a temporal dynamic nature where a fact can change with a varying time frequency and disputable dynamic facts, which can change depending on the viewpoint. DYNAMICQA is the first to include real-world knowledge conflicts and provide context to study the link between the different types of knowledge conflicts. With the proposed dataset, we assess the use of uncertainty for measuring the intra-memory conflict and introduce a novel Coherent Persuasion (CP) score to evaluate the context's ability to sway LM's semantic output. Our extensive experiments reveal that static facts, which are unlikely to change, are more easily updated with additional context, relative to temporal and disputable facts.

Neural language models (LMs) represent facts about the world described by text. Sometimes these facts derive from training data (in most LMs, a representation of the word "banana" encodes the fact that bananas are fruits). Sometimes facts derive from input text itself (a representation of the sentence "I poured out the bottle" encodes the fact that the bottle became empty). We describe REMEDI, a method for learning to map statements in natural language to fact encodings in an LM's internal representation system. REMEDI encodings can be used as knowledge editors: when added to LM hidden representations, they modify downstream generation to be consistent with new facts. REMEDI encodings may also be used as probes: when compared to LM representations, they reveal which properties LMs already attribute to mentioned entities, in some cases making it possible to predict when LMs will generate outputs that conflict with background knowledge or input text. REMEDI thus links work on probing, prompting, and LM editing, and offers steps toward general tools for fine-grained inspection and control of knowledge in LMs.

While hallucinations of large language models (LLMs) prevail as a major challenge, existing evaluation benchmarks on factuality do not cover the diverse domains of knowledge that the real-world users of LLMs seek information about. To bridge this gap, we introduce WildHallucinations, a benchmark that evaluates factuality. It does so by prompting LLMs to generate information about entities mined from user-chatbot conversations in the wild. These generations are then automatically fact-checked against a systematically curated knowledge source collected from web search. Notably, half of these real-world entities do not have associated Wikipedia pages. We evaluate 118,785 generations from 15 LLMs on 7,919 entities. We find that LLMs consistently hallucinate more on entities without Wikipedia pages and exhibit varying hallucination rates across different domains. Finally, given the same base models, adding a retrieval component only slightly reduces hallucinations but does not eliminate hallucinations.

Seeking health-related advice on the internet has become a common practice in the digital era. Determining the trustworthiness of medical claims found online and finding appropriate evidence for this information is increasingly challenging. Fact-checking has emerged as an approach to assess the veracity of factual claims using evidence from credible knowledge sources. To help advance the automation of this task, in this paper, we introduce a novel dataset of 750 health-related claims, labeled for veracity by medical experts and backed with evidence from appropriate clinical studies. We provide an analysis of the dataset, highlighting its characteristics and challenges. The dataset can be used for Machine Learning tasks related to automated fact-checking such as evidence retrieval, veracity prediction, and explanation generation. For this purpose, we provide baseline models based on different approaches, examine their performance, and discuss the findings.

Two commonly-employed strategies to combat the rise of misinformation on social media are (i) fact-checking by professional organisations and (ii) community moderation by platform users. Policy changes by Twitter/X and, more recently, Meta, signal a shift away from partnerships with fact-checking organisations and towards an increased reliance on crowdsourced community notes. However, the extent and nature of dependencies between fact-checking and helpful community notes remain unclear. To address these questions, we use language models to annotate a large corpus of Twitter/X community notes with attributes such as topic, cited sources, and whether they refute claims tied to broader misinformation narratives. Our analysis reveals that community notes cite fact-checking sources up to five times more than previously reported. Fact-checking is especially crucial for notes on posts linked to broader narratives, which are twice as likely to reference fact-checking sources compared to other sources. In conclusion, our results show that successful community moderation heavily relies on professional fact-checking.

Commonsense causality reasoning (CCR) aims at identifying plausible causes and effects in natural language descriptions that are deemed reasonable by an average person. Although being of great academic and practical interest, this problem is still shadowed by the lack of a well-posed theoretical framework; existing work usually relies on deep language models wholeheartedly, and is potentially susceptible to confounding co-occurrences. Motivated by classical causal principles, we articulate the central question of CCR and draw parallels between human subjects in observational studies and natural languages to adopt CCR to the potential-outcomes framework, which is the first such attempt for commonsense tasks. We propose a novel framework, ROCK, to Reason O(A)bout Commonsense K(C)ausality, which utilizes temporal signals as incidental supervision, and balances confounding effects using temporal propensities that are analogous to propensity scores. The ROCK implementation is modular and zero-shot, and demonstrates good CCR capabilities.

In many contexts, lying -- the use of verbal falsehoods to deceive -- is harmful. While lying has traditionally been a human affair, AI systems that make sophisticated verbal statements are becoming increasingly prevalent. This raises the question of how we should limit the harm caused by AI "lies" (i.e. falsehoods that are actively selected for). Human truthfulness is governed by social norms and by laws (against defamation, perjury, and fraud). Differences between AI and humans present an opportunity to have more precise standards of truthfulness for AI, and to have these standards rise over time. This could provide significant benefits to public epistemics and the economy, and mitigate risks of worst-case AI futures. Establishing norms or laws of AI truthfulness will require significant work to: (1) identify clear truthfulness standards; (2) create institutions that can judge adherence to those standards; and (3) develop AI systems that are robustly truthful. Our initial proposals for these areas include: (1) a standard of avoiding "negligent falsehoods" (a generalisation of lies that is easier to assess); (2) institutions to evaluate AI systems before and after real-world deployment; and (3) explicitly training AI systems to be truthful via curated datasets and human interaction. A concerning possibility is that evaluation mechanisms for eventual truthfulness standards could be captured by political interests, leading to harmful censorship and propaganda. Avoiding this might take careful attention. And since the scale of AI speech acts might grow dramatically over the coming decades, early truthfulness standards might be particularly important because of the precedents they set.

Factuality can play an important role when automatically processing clinical text, as it makes a difference if particular symptoms are explicitly not present, possibly present, not mentioned, or affirmed. In most cases, a sufficient number of examples is necessary to handle such phenomena in a supervised machine learning setting. However, as clinical text might contain sensitive information, data cannot be easily shared. In the context of factuality detection, this work presents a simple solution using machine translation to translate English data to German to train a transformer-based factuality detection model.

Machine learning (ML) enabled classification models are becoming increasingly popular for tackling the sheer volume and speed of online misinformation and other content that could be identified as harmful. In building these models, data scientists need to take a stance on the legitimacy, authoritativeness and objectivity of the sources of ``truth" used for model training and testing. This has political, ethical and epistemic implications which are rarely addressed in technical papers. Despite (and due to) their reported high accuracy and performance, ML-driven moderation systems have the potential to shape online public debate and create downstream negative impacts such as undue censorship and the reinforcing of false beliefs. Using collaborative ethnography and theoretical insights from social studies of science and expertise, we offer a critical analysis of the process of building ML models for (mis)information classification: we identify a series of algorithmic contingencies--key moments during model development that could lead to different future outcomes, uncertainty and harmful effects as these tools are deployed by social media platforms. We conclude by offering a tentative path toward reflexive and responsible development of ML tools for moderating misinformation and other harmful content online.

Pursuit of honest and truthful decision-making is crucial for governance and accountability in democracies. However, people sometimes take different perspectives of what it means to be honest and how to pursue truthfulness. Here we explore a continuum of perspectives from evidence-based reasoning, rooted in ascertainable facts and data, at one end, to intuitive decisions that are driven by feelings and subjective interpretations, at the other. We analyze the linguistic traces of those contrasting perspectives in Congressional speeches from 1879 to 2022. We find that evidence-based language has continued to decline since the mid-1970s, together with a decline in legislative productivity. The decline was accompanied by increasing partisan polarization in Congress and rising income inequality in society. Results highlight the importance of evidence-based language in political decision-making.

We investigated the evolution and transformation of scientific knowledge in the early modern period, analyzing more than 350 different editions of textbooks used for teaching astronomy in European universities from the late fifteenth century to mid-seventeenth century. These historical sources constitute the Sphaera Corpus. By examining different semantic relations among individual parts of each edition on record, we built a multiplex network consisting of six layers, as well as the aggregated network built from the superposition of all the layers. The network analysis reveals the emergence of five different communities. The contribution of each layer in shaping the communities and the properties of each community are studied. The most influential books in the corpus are found by calculating the average age of all the out-going and in-coming links for each book. A small group of editions is identified as a transmitter of knowledge as they bridge past knowledge to the future through a long temporal interval. Our analysis, moreover, identifies the most disruptive books. These books introduce new knowledge that is then adopted by almost all the books published afterwards until the end of the whole period of study. The historical research on the content of the identified books, as an empirical test, finally corroborates the results of all our analyses.

Previous work has showcased the intriguing capability of large language models (LLMs) in retrieving facts and processing context knowledge. However, only limited research exists on the layer-wise capability of LLMs to encode knowledge, which challenges our understanding of their internal mechanisms. In this paper, we devote the first attempt to investigate the layer-wise capability of LLMs through probing tasks. We leverage the powerful generative capability of ChatGPT to construct probing datasets, providing diverse and coherent evidence corresponding to various facts. We employ mathcal V-usable information as the validation metric to better reflect the capability in encoding context knowledge across different layers. Our experiments on conflicting and newly acquired knowledge show that LLMs: (1) prefer to encode more context knowledge in the upper layers; (2) primarily encode context knowledge within knowledge-related entity tokens at lower layers while progressively expanding more knowledge within other tokens at upper layers; and (3) gradually forget the earlier context knowledge retained within the intermediate layers when provided with irrelevant evidence. Code is publicly available at https://github.com/Jometeorie/probing_llama.

Since the recent prosperity of Large Language Models (LLMs), there have been interleaved discussions regarding how to reduce hallucinations from LLM responses, how to increase the factuality of LLMs, and whether Knowledge Graphs (KGs), which store the world knowledge in a symbolic form, will be replaced with LLMs. In this paper, we try to answer these questions from a new angle: How knowledgeable are LLMs? To answer this question, we constructed Head-to-Tail, a benchmark that consists of 18K question-answer (QA) pairs regarding head, torso, and tail facts in terms of popularity. We designed an automated evaluation method and a set of metrics that closely approximate the knowledge an LLM confidently internalizes. Through a comprehensive evaluation of 14 publicly available LLMs, we show that existing LLMs are still far from being perfect in terms of their grasp of factual knowledge, especially for facts of torso-to-tail entities.

The critical inquiry pervading the realm of Philosophy, and perhaps extending its influence across all Humanities disciplines, revolves around the intricacies of morality and normativity. Surprisingly, in recent years, this thematic thread has woven its way into an unexpected domain, one not conventionally associated with pondering "what ought to be": the field of artificial intelligence (AI) research. Central to morality and AI, we find "alignment", a problem related to the challenges of expressing human goals and values in a manner that artificial systems can follow without leading to unwanted adversarial effects. More explicitly and with our current paradigm of AI development in mind, we can think of alignment as teaching human values to non-anthropomorphic entities trained through opaque, gradient-based learning techniques. This work addresses alignment as a technical-philosophical problem that requires solid philosophical foundations and practical implementations that bring normative theory to AI system development. To accomplish this, we propose two sets of necessary and sufficient conditions that, we argue, should be considered in any alignment process. While necessary conditions serve as metaphysical and metaethical roots that pertain to the permissibility of alignment, sufficient conditions establish a blueprint for aligning AI systems under a learning-based paradigm. After laying such foundations, we present implementations of this approach by using state-of-the-art techniques and methods for aligning general-purpose language systems. We call this framework Dynamic Normativity. Its central thesis is that any alignment process under a learning paradigm that cannot fulfill its necessary and sufficient conditions will fail in producing aligned systems.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable proficiency in understanding and generating responses to complex queries through large-scale pre-training. However, the efficacy of these models in memorizing and reasoning among large-scale structured knowledge, especially world knowledge that explicitly covers abundant factual information remains questionable. Addressing this gap, our research investigates whether LLMs can effectively store, recall, and reason with knowledge on a large scale comparable to latest knowledge bases (KBs) such as Wikidata. Specifically, we focus on three crucial aspects to study the viability: (1) the efficiency of LLMs with different sizes in memorizing the exact knowledge in the large-scale KB; (2) the flexibility of recalling the memorized knowledge in response to natural language queries; (3) the capability to infer new knowledge through reasoning. Our findings indicate that while LLMs hold promise as large-scale KBs capable of retrieving and responding with flexibility, enhancements in their reasoning capabilities are necessary to fully realize their potential.

Large Language Models (LLMs) store and retrieve vast amounts of factual knowledge acquired during pre-training. Prior research has localized and identified mechanisms behind knowledge recall; however, it has primarily focused on English monolingual models. The question of how these processes generalize to other languages and multilingual LLMs remains unexplored. In this paper, we address this gap by conducting a comprehensive analysis of two highly multilingual LLMs. We assess the extent to which previously identified components and mechanisms of factual recall in English apply to a multilingual context. Then, we examine when language plays a role in the recall process, uncovering evidence of language-independent and language-dependent mechanisms.

The internet gives the world an open platform to express their views and share their stories. While this is very valuable, it makes fake news one of our society's most pressing problems. Manual fact checking process is time consuming, which makes it challenging to disprove misleading assertions before they cause significant harm. This is he driving interest in automatic fact or claim verification. Some of the existing datasets aim to support development of automating fact-checking techniques, however, most of them are text based. Multi-modal fact verification has received relatively scant attention. In this paper, we provide a multi-modal fact-checking dataset called FACTIFY 2, improving Factify 1 by using new data sources and adding satire articles. Factify 2 has 50,000 new data instances. Similar to FACTIFY 1.0, we have three broad categories - support, no-evidence, and refute, with sub-categories based on the entailment of visual and textual data. We also provide a BERT and Vison Transformer based baseline, which achieves 65% F1 score in the test set. The baseline codes and the dataset will be made available at https://github.com/surya1701/Factify-2.0.

We investigate the internal behavior of Transformer-based Large Language Models (LLMs) when they generate factually incorrect text. We propose modeling factual queries as Constraint Satisfaction Problems and use this framework to investigate how the model interacts internally with factual constraints. Specifically, we discover a strong positive relation between the model's attention to constraint tokens and the factual accuracy of its responses. In our curated suite of 11 datasets with over 40,000 prompts, we study the task of predicting factual errors with the Llama-2 family across all scales (7B, 13B, 70B). We propose SAT Probe, a method probing self-attention patterns, that can predict constraint satisfaction and factual errors, and allows early error identification. The approach and findings demonstrate how using the mechanistic understanding of factuality in LLMs can enhance reliability.

Modern abstractive summarization models often generate summaries that contain hallucinated or contradictory information. In this paper, we propose a simple but effective contrastive learning framework that incorporates recent developments in reward learning and factuality metrics. Empirical studies demonstrate that the proposed framework enables summarization models to learn from feedback of factuality metrics using contrastive reward learning, leading to more factual summaries by human evaluations. This suggests that further advances in learning and evaluation algorithms can feed directly into providing more factual summaries.

Knowledge-dependent tasks typically use two sources of knowledge: parametric, learned at training time, and contextual, given as a passage at inference time. To understand how models use these sources together, we formalize the problem of knowledge conflicts, where the contextual information contradicts the learned information. Analyzing the behaviour of popular models, we measure their over-reliance on memorized information (the cause of hallucinations), and uncover important factors that exacerbate this behaviour. Lastly, we propose a simple method to mitigate over-reliance on parametric knowledge, which minimizes hallucination, and improves out-of-distribution generalization by 4%-7%. Our findings demonstrate the importance for practitioners to evaluate model tendency to hallucinate rather than read, and show that our mitigation strategy encourages generalization to evolving information (i.e., time-dependent queries). To encourage these practices, we have released our framework for generating knowledge conflicts.

Recent work has demonstrated the viability of using crowdsourcing as a tool for evaluating the truthfulness of public statements. Under certain conditions such as: (1) having a balanced set of workers with different backgrounds and cognitive abilities; (2) using an adequate set of mechanisms to control the quality of the collected data; and (3) using a coarse grained assessment scale, the crowd can provide reliable identification of fake news. However, fake news are a subtle matter: statements can be just biased ("cherrypicked"), imprecise, wrong, etc. and the unidimensional truth scale used in existing work cannot account for such differences. In this paper we propose a multidimensional notion of truthfulness and we ask the crowd workers to assess seven different dimensions of truthfulness selected based on existing literature: Correctness, Neutrality, Comprehensibility, Precision, Completeness, Speaker's Trustworthiness, and Informativeness. We deploy a set of quality control mechanisms to ensure that the thousands of assessments collected on 180 publicly available fact-checked statements distributed over two datasets are of adequate quality, including a custom search engine used by the crowd workers to find web pages supporting their truthfulness assessments. A comprehensive analysis of crowdsourced judgments shows that: (1) the crowdsourced assessments are reliable when compared to an expert-provided gold standard; (2) the proposed dimensions of truthfulness capture independent pieces of information; (3) the crowdsourcing task can be easily learned by the workers; and (4) the resulting assessments provide a useful basis for a more complete estimation of statement truthfulness.

The capabilities and limitations of Large Language Models have been sketched out in great detail in recent years, providing an intriguing yet conflicting picture. On the one hand, LLMs demonstrate a general ability to solve problems. On the other hand, they show surprising reasoning gaps when compared to humans, casting doubt on the robustness of their generalisation strategies. The sheer volume of data used in the design of LLMs has precluded us from applying the method traditionally used to measure generalisation: train-test set separation. To overcome this, we study what kind of generalisation strategies LLMs employ when performing reasoning tasks by investigating the pretraining data they rely on. For two models of different sizes (7B and 35B) and 2.5B of their pretraining tokens, we identify what documents influence the model outputs for three simple mathematical reasoning tasks and contrast this to the data that are influential for answering factual questions. We find that, while the models rely on mostly distinct sets of data for each factual question, a document often has a similar influence across different reasoning questions within the same task, indicating the presence of procedural knowledge. We further find that the answers to factual questions often show up in the most influential data. However, for reasoning questions the answers usually do not show up as highly influential, nor do the answers to the intermediate reasoning steps. When we characterise the top ranked documents for the reasoning questions qualitatively, we confirm that the influential documents often contain procedural knowledge, like demonstrating how to obtain a solution using formulae or code. Our findings indicate that the approach to reasoning the models use is unlike retrieval, and more like a generalisable strategy that synthesises procedural knowledge from documents doing a similar form of reasoning.

Multilingual language models (LMs) are expected to recall factual knowledge consistently across languages, yet they often fail to transfer knowledge between languages even when they possess the correct information in one of the languages. For example, we find that an LM may correctly identify Rashed Al Shashai as being from Saudi Arabia when asked in Arabic, but consistently fails to do so when asked in English or Swahili. To systematically investigate this limitation, we introduce a benchmark of 10,000 country-related facts across 13 languages and propose three novel metrics: Factual Recall Score, Knowledge Transferability Score, and Cross-Lingual Factual Knowledge Transferability Score-to quantify factual recall and knowledge transferability in LMs across different languages. Our results reveal fundamental weaknesses in today's state-of-the-art LMs, particularly in cross-lingual generalization where models fail to transfer knowledge effectively across different languages, leading to inconsistent performance sensitive to the language used. Our findings emphasize the need for LMs to recognize language-specific factual reliability and leverage the most trustworthy information across languages. We release our benchmark and evaluation framework to drive future research in multilingual knowledge transfer.

Recent language models have a mysterious tendency to generate false but plausible-sounding text. Such "hallucinations" are an obstacle to the usability of language-based AI systems and can harm people who rely upon their outputs. This work shows shows that there is an inherent statistical reason that pretrained language models hallucinate certain types of facts, having nothing to do with the transformer LM architecture or data quality. For "arbitrary" facts whose veracity cannot be determined from the training data, we show that hallucination is necessary for language models that satisfy a statistical calibration condition appropriate for generative language models. Specifically, if the maximum probability of any fact is bounded, we show that the probability of generating a hallucination is close to the fraction of facts that occur exactly once in the training data (a "Good-Turing" estimate), even assuming ideal training data without errors. One conclusion is that models pretrained to be sufficiently good predictors (i.e., calibrated) may require post-training to mitigate hallucinations on the type of arbitrary facts that tend to appear once in the training set. However, our analysis also suggests that there is no statistical reason that pretraining will lead to hallucination on facts that tend to appear more than once in the training data (like references to publications such as articles and books, whose hallucinations have been particularly notable and problematic) or on systematic facts (like arithmetic calculations). Therefore, different architectures and learning algorithms may mitigate these latter types of hallucinations.

One might think that, once we know something is computable, how efficiently it can be computed is a practical question with little further philosophical importance. In this essay, I offer a detailed case that one would be wrong. In particular, I argue that computational complexity theory -- the field that studies the resources (such as time, space, and randomness) needed to solve computational problems -- leads to new perspectives on the nature of mathematical knowledge, the strong AI debate, computationalism, the problem of logical omniscience, Hume's problem of induction, Goodman's grue riddle, the foundations of quantum mechanics, economic rationality, closed timelike curves, and several other topics of philosophical interest. I end by discussing aspects of complexity theory itself that could benefit from philosophical analysis.

Fact-checking is essential due to the explosion of misinformation in the media ecosystem. Although false information exists in every language and country, most research to solve the problem mainly concentrated on huge communities like English and Chinese. Low-resource languages like Vietnamese are necessary to explore corpora and models for fact verification. To bridge this gap, we construct ViWikiFC, the first manual annotated open-domain corpus for Vietnamese Wikipedia Fact Checking more than 20K claims generated by converting evidence sentences extracted from Wikipedia articles. We analyze our corpus through many linguistic aspects, from the new dependency rate, the new n-gram rate, and the new word rate. We conducted various experiments for Vietnamese fact-checking, including evidence retrieval and verdict prediction. BM25 and InfoXLM (Large) achieved the best results in two tasks, with BM25 achieving an accuracy of 88.30% for SUPPORTS, 86.93% for REFUTES, and only 56.67% for the NEI label in the evidence retrieval task, InfoXLM (Large) achieved an F1 score of 86.51%. Furthermore, we also conducted a pipeline approach, which only achieved a strict accuracy of 67.00% when using InfoXLM (Large) and BM25. These results demonstrate that our dataset is challenging for the Vietnamese language model in fact-checking tasks.

In this paper, we present a conceptual model game to examine the dynamics of asymmetric interactions in games with imperfect information. The game involves two agents with starkly contrasting capabilities: one agent can take actions but has no information of the state of the game, whereas the other agent has perfect information of the state but cannot act or observe the other agent's actions. This duality manifests an extreme form of asymmetry, and how differing abilities influence the possibility of attaining common knowledge. Using Kripke structures and epistemic logic we demonstrate that, under these conditions, common knowledge of the current game state becomes unattainable. Our findings advance the discussion on the strategic limitations of knowledge in environments where information and action are unevenly distributed.

Thanks to rapid progress in artificial intelligence, we have entered an era when technology and philosophy intersect in interesting ways. Sitting squarely at the centre of this intersection are large language models (LLMs). The more adept LLMs become at mimicking human language, the more vulnerable we become to anthropomorphism, to seeing the systems in which they are embedded as more human-like than they really are. This trend is amplified by the natural tendency to use philosophically loaded terms, such as "knows", "believes", and "thinks", when describing these systems. To mitigate this trend, this paper advocates the practice of repeatedly stepping back to remind ourselves of how LLMs, and the systems of which they form a part, actually work. The hope is that increased scientific precision will encourage more philosophical nuance in the discourse around artificial intelligence, both within the field and in the public sphere.

Generative search engines directly generate responses to user queries, along with in-line citations. A prerequisite trait of a trustworthy generative search engine is verifiability, i.e., systems should cite comprehensively (high citation recall; all statements are fully supported by citations) and accurately (high citation precision; every cite supports its associated statement). We conduct human evaluation to audit four popular generative search engines -- Bing Chat, NeevaAI, perplexity.ai, and YouChat -- across a diverse set of queries from a variety of sources (e.g., historical Google user queries, dynamically-collected open-ended questions on Reddit, etc.). We find that responses from existing generative search engines are fluent and appear informative, but frequently contain unsupported statements and inaccurate citations: on average, a mere 51.5% of generated sentences are fully supported by citations and only 74.5% of citations support their associated sentence. We believe that these results are concerningly low for systems that may serve as a primary tool for information-seeking users, especially given their facade of trustworthiness. We hope that our results further motivate the development of trustworthy generative search engines and help researchers and users better understand the shortcomings of existing commercial systems.

Recent pre-trained abstractive summarization systems have started to achieve credible performance, but a major barrier to their use in practice is their propensity to output summaries that are not faithful to the input and that contain factual errors. While a number of annotated datasets and statistical models for assessing factuality have been explored, there is no clear picture of what errors are most important to target or where current techniques are succeeding and failing. We explore both synthetic and human-labeled data sources for training models to identify factual errors in summarization, and study factuality at the word-, dependency-, and sentence-level. Our observations are threefold. First, exhibited factual errors differ significantly across datasets, and commonly-used training sets of simple synthetic errors do not reflect errors made on abstractive datasets like XSum. Second, human-labeled data with fine-grained annotations provides a more effective training signal than sentence-level annotations or synthetic data. Finally, we show that our best factuality detection model enables training of more factual XSum summarization models by allowing us to identify non-factual tokens in the training data.