Daily Papers

Understanding the locus of semantic representation in large language models (LLMs) is crucial for interpretability and architectural innovation. The dominant paradigm posits that trainable input embeddings serve as foundational "meaning vectors." This paper challenges that view. We construct Transformer models where the embedding layer is entirely frozen, with vectors derived not from data, but from the visual structure of Unicode glyphs. These non-semantic, precomputed visual embeddings are fixed throughout training. Our method is compatible with any tokenizer, including a novel Unicode-centric tokenizer we introduce to ensure universal text coverage. Despite the absence of trainable, semantically initialized embeddings, our models converge, generate coherent text, and, critically, outperform architecturally identical models with trainable embeddings on the MMLU reasoning benchmark. We attribute this to "representational interference" in conventional models, where the embedding layer is burdened with learning both structural and semantic features. Our results indicate that high-level semantics are not inherent to input embeddings but are an emergent property of the Transformer's compositional architecture and data scale. This reframes the role of embeddings from meaning containers to structural primitives. We release all code and models to foster further research.

Representation learning, and interpreting learned representations, are key areas of focus in machine learning and neuroscience. Both fields generally use representations as a means to understand or improve a system's computations. In this work, however, we explore surprising dissociations between representation and computation that may pose challenges for such efforts. We create datasets in which we attempt to match the computational role that different features play, while manipulating other properties of the features or the data. We train various deep learning architectures to compute these multiple abstract features about their inputs. We find that their learned feature representations are systematically biased towards representing some features more strongly than others, depending upon extraneous properties such as feature complexity, the order in which features are learned, and the distribution of features over the inputs. For example, features that are simpler to compute or learned first tend to be represented more strongly and densely than features that are more complex or learned later, even if all features are learned equally well. We also explore how these biases are affected by architectures, optimizers, and training regimes (e.g., in transformers, features decoded earlier in the output sequence also tend to be represented more strongly). Our results help to characterize the inductive biases of gradient-based representation learning. These results also highlight a key challenge for interpretability - or for comparing the representations of models and brains - disentangling extraneous biases from the computationally important aspects of a system's internal representations.

Recent work in mechanistic interpretability has shown that behaviors in language models can be successfully reverse-engineered through circuit analysis. A common criticism, however, is that each circuit is task-specific, and thus such analysis cannot contribute to understanding the models at a higher level. In this work, we present evidence that insights (both low-level findings about specific heads and higher-level findings about general algorithms) can indeed generalize across tasks. Specifically, we study the circuit discovered in Wang et al. (2022) for the Indirect Object Identification (IOI) task and 1.) show that it reproduces on a larger GPT2 model, and 2.) that it is mostly reused to solve a seemingly different task: Colored Objects (Ippolito & Callison-Burch, 2023). We provide evidence that the process underlying both tasks is functionally very similar, and contains about a 78% overlap in in-circuit attention heads. We further present a proof-of-concept intervention experiment, in which we adjust four attention heads in middle layers in order to 'repair' the Colored Objects circuit and make it behave like the IOI circuit. In doing so, we boost accuracy from 49.6% to 93.7% on the Colored Objects task and explain most sources of error. The intervention affects downstream attention heads in specific ways predicted by their interactions in the IOI circuit, indicating that this subcircuit behavior is invariant to the different task inputs. Overall, our results provide evidence that it may yet be possible to explain large language models' behavior in terms of a relatively small number of interpretable task-general algorithmic building blocks and computational components.

The effect of underrepresentation on the performance of minority groups is known to be a serious problem in supervised learning settings; however, it has been underexplored so far in the context of self-supervised learning (SSL). In this paper, we demonstrate that contrastive learning (CL), a popular variant of SSL, tends to collapse representations of minority groups with certain majority groups. We refer to this phenomenon as representation harm and demonstrate it on image and text datasets using the corresponding popular CL methods. Furthermore, our causal mediation analysis of allocation harm on a downstream classification task reveals that representation harm is partly responsible for it, thus emphasizing the importance of studying and mitigating representation harm. Finally, we provide a theoretical explanation for representation harm using a stochastic block model that leads to a representational neural collapse in a contrastive learning setting.

Distributional word representation methods exploit word co-occurrences to build compact vector encodings of words. While these representations enjoy widespread use in modern natural language processing, it is unclear whether they accurately encode all necessary facets of conceptual meaning. In this paper, we evaluate how well these representations can predict perceptual and conceptual features of concrete concepts, drawing on two semantic norm datasets sourced from human participants. We find that several standard word representations fail to encode many salient perceptual features of concepts, and show that these deficits correlate with word-word similarity prediction errors. Our analyses provide motivation for grounded and embodied language learning approaches, which may help to remedy these deficits.

Multilingual transformer-based models demonstrate remarkable zero and few-shot transfer across languages by learning and reusing language-agnostic features. However, as a fixed-size model acquires more languages, its performance across all languages degrades, a phenomenon termed interference. Often attributed to limited model capacity, interference is commonly addressed by adding additional parameters despite evidence that transformer-based models are overparameterized. In this work, we show that it is possible to reduce interference by instead identifying and pruning language-specific parameters. First, we use Shapley Values, a credit allocation metric from coalitional game theory, to identify attention heads that introduce interference. Then, we show that removing identified attention heads from a fixed model improves performance for a target language on both sentence classification and structural prediction, seeing gains as large as 24.7\%. Finally, we provide insights on language-agnostic and language-specific attention heads using attention visualization.

We consider concept generalization at a large scale in the diverse and natural visual spectrum. Established computational modes (i.e., rule-based or similarity-based) are primarily studied isolated and focus on confined and abstract problem spaces. In this work, we study these two modes when the problem space scales up, and the complexity of concepts becomes diverse. Specifically, at the representational level, we seek to answer how the complexity varies when a visual concept is mapped to the representation space. Prior psychology literature has shown that two types of complexities (i.e., subjective complexity and visual complexity) (Griffiths and Tenenbaum, 2003) build an inverted-U relation (Donderi, 2006; Sun and Firestone, 2021). Leveraging Representativeness of Attribute (RoA), we computationally confirm the following observation: Models use attributes with high RoA to describe visual concepts, and the description length falls in an inverted-U relation with the increment in visual complexity. At the computational level, we aim to answer how the complexity of representation affects the shift between the rule- and similarity-based generalization. We hypothesize that category-conditioned visual modeling estimates the co-occurrence frequency between visual and categorical attributes, thus potentially serving as the prior for the natural visual world. Experimental results show that representations with relatively high subjective complexity outperform those with relatively low subjective complexity in the rule-based generalization, while the trend is the opposite in the similarity-based generalization.

The quest for human imitative AI has been an enduring topic in AI research since its inception. The technical evolution and emerging capabilities of the latest cohort of large language models (LLMs) have reinvigorated the subject beyond academia to the cultural zeitgeist. While recent NLP evaluation benchmark tasks test some aspects of human-imitative behaviour (e.g., BIG-bench's 'human-like behavior' tasks), few, if not none, examine creative problem solving abilities. Creative problem solving in humans is a well-studied topic in cognitive neuroscience with standardized tests that predominantly use the ability to associate (heterogeneous) connections among clue words as a metric for creativity. Exposure to misleading stimuli - distractors dubbed red herrings - impede human performance in such tasks via the fixation effect and Einstellung paradigm. In cognitive neuroscience studies, such fixations are experimentally induced by pre-exposing participants to orthographically similar incorrect words to subsequent word-fragments or clues. The popular British quiz show Only Connect's Connecting Wall segment essentially mimics Mednick's Remote Associates Test (RAT) formulation with built-in, deliberate red herrings, which makes it an ideal proxy dataset to explore and study fixation effect and Einstellung paradigm from cognitive neuroscience in LLMs. In addition to presenting the novel Only Connect Wall (OCW) dataset, we also report results from our evaluation of selected pre-trained language models and LLMs (including OpenAI's GPT series) on creative problem solving tasks like grouping clue words by heterogeneous connections, and identifying correct open knowledge domain connections in respective groups. The code and link to the dataset are available at https://github.com/TaatiTeam/OCW.

Integrated Information Theory (IIT) provides a quantitative framework for explaining consciousness phenomenon, positing that conscious systems comprise elements integrated through causal properties. We apply IIT 3.0 and 4.0 -- the latest iterations of this framework -- to sequences of Large Language Model (LLM) representations, analyzing data derived from existing Theory of Mind (ToM) test results. Our study systematically investigates whether the differences of ToM test performances, when presented in the LLM representations, can be revealed by IIT estimates, i.e., Phi^{max} (IIT 3.0), Phi (IIT 4.0), Conceptual Information (IIT 3.0), and Phi-structure (IIT 4.0). Furthermore, we compare these metrics with the Span Representations independent of any estimate for consciousness. This additional effort aims to differentiate between potential "consciousness" phenomena and inherent separations within LLM representational space. We conduct comprehensive experiments examining variations across LLM transformer layers and linguistic spans from stimuli. Our results suggest that sequences of contemporary Transformer-based LLM representations lack statistically significant indicators of observed "consciousness" phenomena but exhibit intriguing patterns under spatio-permutational analyses. The Appendix and code are available as Supplementary Materials at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.nlp.2025.100163.

Do machines and humans process language in similar ways? A recent line of research has hinted in the affirmative, demonstrating that human brain signals can be effectively predicted using the internal representations of language models (LMs). This is thought to reflect shared computational principles between LMs and human language processing. However, there are also clear differences in how LMs and humans acquire and use language, even if the final task they are performing is the same. Despite this, there is little work exploring systematic differences between human and machine language processing using brain data. To address this question, we examine the differences between LM representations and the human brain's responses to language, specifically by examining a dataset of Magnetoencephalography (MEG) responses to a written narrative. In doing so we identify three phenomena that, in prior work, LMs have been found to not capture well: emotional understanding, figurative language processing, and physical commonsense. By fine-tuning LMs on datasets related to these phenomena, we observe that fine-tuned LMs show improved alignment with human brain responses across these tasks. Our study implies that the observed divergences between LMs and human brains may stem from LMs' inadequate representation of these specific types of knowledge.

Interpretability researchers have attempted to understand MLP neurons of language models based on both the contexts in which they activate and their output weight vectors. They have paid little attention to a complementary aspect: the interactions between input and output. For example, when neurons detect a direction in the input, they might add much the same direction to the residual stream ("enrichment neurons") or reduce its presence ("depletion neurons"). We address this aspect by examining the cosine similarity between input and output weights of a neuron. We apply our method to 12 models and find that enrichment neurons dominate in early-middle layers whereas later layers tend more towards depletion. To explain this finding, we argue that enrichment neurons are largely responsible for enriching concept representations, one of the first steps of factual recall. Our input-output perspective is a complement to activation-dependent analyses and to approaches that treat input and output separately.

Modern language models can imitate complex patterns through few-shot learning, enabling them to complete challenging tasks without fine-tuning. However, imitation can also lead models to reproduce inaccuracies or harmful content if present in the context. We study harmful imitation through the lens of a model's internal representations, and identify two related phenomena: "overthinking" and "false induction heads". The first phenomenon, overthinking, appears when we decode predictions from intermediate layers, given correct vs. incorrect few-shot demonstrations. At early layers, both demonstrations induce similar model behavior, but the behavior diverges sharply at some "critical layer", after which the accuracy given incorrect demonstrations progressively decreases. The second phenomenon, false induction heads, are a possible mechanistic cause of overthinking: these are heads in late layers that attend to and copy false information from previous demonstrations, and whose ablation reduces overthinking. Beyond scientific understanding, our results suggest that studying intermediate model computations could be a promising avenue for understanding and guarding against harmful model behaviors.

With the development in cognitive science and Large Language Models (LLMs), increasing connections have come to light between these two distinct fields. Building upon these connections, we propose a conjecture suggesting the existence of a duality between LLMs and Tulving's theory of memory. We identify a potential correspondence between Tulving's synergistic ecphory model (SEM) of retrieval and the emergent abilities observed in LLMs, serving as supporting evidence for our conjecture. Furthermore, we speculate that consciousness may be considered a form of emergent ability based on this duality. We also discuss how other theories of consciousness intersect with our research.

Mechanistic interpretability aims to understand model behaviors in terms of specific, interpretable features, often hypothesized to manifest as low-dimensional subspaces of activations. Specifically, recent studies have explored subspace interventions (such as activation patching) as a way to simultaneously manipulate model behavior and attribute the features behind it to given subspaces. In this work, we demonstrate that these two aims diverge, potentially leading to an illusory sense of interpretability. Counterintuitively, even if a subspace intervention makes the model's output behave as if the value of a feature was changed, this effect may be achieved by activating a dormant parallel pathway leveraging another subspace that is causally disconnected from model outputs. We demonstrate this phenomenon in a distilled mathematical example, in two real-world domains (the indirect object identification task and factual recall), and present evidence for its prevalence in practice. In the context of factual recall, we further show a link to rank-1 fact editing, providing a mechanistic explanation for previous work observing an inconsistency between fact editing performance and fact localization. However, this does not imply that activation patching of subspaces is intrinsically unfit for interpretability. To contextualize our findings, we also show what a success case looks like in a task (indirect object identification) where prior manual circuit analysis informs an understanding of the location of a feature. We explore the additional evidence needed to argue that a patched subspace is faithful.

Recent advances in Large Multimodal Models (LMMs) lead to significant breakthroughs in both academia and industry. One question that arises is how we, as humans, can understand their internal neural representations. This paper takes an initial step towards addressing this question by presenting a versatile framework to identify and interpret the semantics within LMMs. Specifically, 1) we first apply a Sparse Autoencoder(SAE) to disentangle the representations into human understandable features. 2) We then present an automatic interpretation framework to interpreted the open-semantic features learned in SAE by the LMMs themselves. We employ this framework to analyze the LLaVA-NeXT-8B model using the LLaVA-OV-72B model, demonstrating that these features can effectively steer the model's behavior. Our results contribute to a deeper understanding of why LMMs excel in specific tasks, including EQ tests, and illuminate the nature of their mistakes along with potential strategies for their rectification. These findings offer new insights into the internal mechanisms of LMMs and suggest parallels with the cognitive processes of the human brain.

We investigate the internal representations of vision-and-language models (VLMs) and how they encode task representations. We consider tasks specified through examples or instructions, using either text or image inputs. Surprisingly, we find that conceptually similar tasks are mapped to similar task vector representations, regardless of how they are specified. Our findings suggest that to output answers, tokens in VLMs undergo three distinct phases: input, task, and answer, a process which is consistent across different modalities and specifications. The task vectors we identify in VLMs are general enough to be derived in one modality (e.g., text) and transferred to another (e.g., image). Additionally, we find that ensembling exemplar and instruction based task vectors produce better task representations. Taken together, these insights shed light on the underlying mechanisms of VLMs, particularly their ability to represent tasks in a shared manner across different modalities and task specifications. Project page: https://task-vectors-are-cross-modal.github.io.

Most large language models are trained on linguistic input alone, yet humans appear to ground their understanding of words in sensorimotor experience. A natural solution is to augment LM representations with human judgments of a word's sensorimotor associations (e.g., the Lancaster Sensorimotor Norms), but this raises another challenge: most words are ambiguous, and judgments of words in isolation fail to account for this multiplicity of meaning (e.g., "wooden table" vs. "data table"). We attempted to address this problem by building a new lexical resource of contextualized sensorimotor judgments for 112 English words, each rated in four different contexts (448 sentences total). We show that these ratings encode overlapping but distinct information from the Lancaster Sensorimotor Norms, and that they also predict other measures of interest (e.g., relatedness), above and beyond measures derived from BERT. Beyond shedding light on theoretical questions, we suggest that these ratings could be of use as a "challenge set" for researchers building grounded language models.

How do transformer-based large language models (LLMs) store and retrieve knowledge? We focus on the most basic form of this task -- factual recall, where the model is tasked with explicitly surfacing stored facts in prompts of form `Fact: The Colosseum is in the country of'. We find that the mechanistic story behind factual recall is more complex than previously thought. It comprises several distinct, independent, and qualitatively different mechanisms that additively combine, constructively interfering on the correct attribute. We term this generic phenomena the additive motif: models compute through summing up multiple independent contributions. Each mechanism's contribution may be insufficient alone, but summing results in constructive interfere on the correct answer. In addition, we extend the method of direct logit attribution to attribute an attention head's output to individual source tokens. We use this technique to unpack what we call `mixed heads' -- which are themselves a pair of two separate additive updates from different source tokens.

Knowledge-dependent tasks typically use two sources of knowledge: parametric, learned at training time, and contextual, given as a passage at inference time. To understand how models use these sources together, we formalize the problem of knowledge conflicts, where the contextual information contradicts the learned information. Analyzing the behaviour of popular models, we measure their over-reliance on memorized information (the cause of hallucinations), and uncover important factors that exacerbate this behaviour. Lastly, we propose a simple method to mitigate over-reliance on parametric knowledge, which minimizes hallucination, and improves out-of-distribution generalization by 4%-7%. Our findings demonstrate the importance for practitioners to evaluate model tendency to hallucinate rather than read, and show that our mitigation strategy encourages generalization to evolving information (i.e., time-dependent queries). To encourage these practices, we have released our framework for generating knowledge conflicts.

Attention Model has now become an important concept in neural networks that has been researched within diverse application domains. This survey provides a structured and comprehensive overview of the developments in modeling attention. In particular, we propose a taxonomy which groups existing techniques into coherent categories. We review salient neural architectures in which attention has been incorporated, and discuss applications in which modeling attention has shown a significant impact. We also describe how attention has been used to improve the interpretability of neural networks. Finally, we discuss some future research directions in attention. We hope this survey will provide a succinct introduction to attention models and guide practitioners while developing approaches for their applications.

Modern language models can process inputs across diverse languages and modalities. We hypothesize that models acquire this capability through learning a shared representation space across heterogeneous data types (e.g., different languages and modalities), which places semantically similar inputs near one another, even if they are from different modalities/languages. We term this the semantic hub hypothesis, following the hub-and-spoke model from neuroscience (Patterson et al., 2007) which posits that semantic knowledge in the human brain is organized through a transmodal semantic "hub" which integrates information from various modality-specific "spokes" regions. We first show that model representations for semantically equivalent inputs in different languages are similar in the intermediate layers, and that this space can be interpreted using the model's dominant pretraining language via the logit lens. This tendency extends to other data types, including arithmetic expressions, code, and visual/audio inputs. Interventions in the shared representation space in one data type also predictably affect model outputs in other data types, suggesting that this shared representations space is not simply a vestigial byproduct of large-scale training on broad data, but something that is actively utilized by the model during input processing.

We investigate the internal structure of language model computations using causal analysis and demonstrate two motifs: (1) a form of adaptive computation where ablations of one attention layer of a language model cause another layer to compensate (which we term the Hydra effect) and (2) a counterbalancing function of late MLP layers that act to downregulate the maximum-likelihood token. Our ablation studies demonstrate that language model layers are typically relatively loosely coupled (ablations to one layer only affect a small number of downstream layers). Surprisingly, these effects occur even in language models trained without any form of dropout. We analyse these effects in the context of factual recall and consider their implications for circuit-level attribution in language models.

To build an artificial neural network like the biological intelligence system, recent works have unified numerous tasks into a generalist model, which can process various tasks with shared parameters and do not have any task-specific modules. While generalist models achieve promising results on various benchmarks, they have performance degradation on some tasks compared with task-specialized models. In this work, we find that interference among different tasks and modalities is the main factor to this phenomenon. To mitigate such interference, we introduce the Conditional Mixture-of-Experts (Conditional MoEs) to generalist models. Routing strategies under different levels of conditions are proposed to take both the training/inference cost and generalization ability into account. By incorporating the proposed Conditional MoEs, the recently proposed generalist model Uni-Perceiver can effectively mitigate the interference across tasks and modalities, and achieves state-of-the-art results on a series of downstream tasks via prompt tuning on 1% of downstream data. Moreover, the introduction of Conditional MoEs still holds the generalization ability of generalist models to conduct zero-shot inference on new tasks, e.g., video-text retrieval and video caption. Code and pre-trained generalist models shall be released.

Neural networks often suffer from catastrophic interference (CI): performance on previously learned tasks drops off significantly when learning a new task. This contrasts strongly with humans, who can sequentially learn new tasks without appreciably forgetting previous tasks. Prior work has explored various techniques for mitigating CI such as regularization, rehearsal, generative replay, and distillation methods. The current work takes a different approach, one guided by cognitive science research showing that in naturalistic environments, the probability of encountering a task decreases as a power-law of the time since it was last performed. We argue that a realistic evaluation of techniques for the mitigation of CI should be performed in simulated naturalistic learning environments. Thus, we evaluate the extent of mitigation of CI when training simple rehearsal-based methods in power-law environments similar to the ones humans face. Our work explores this novel rehearsal-based approach for a domain-incremental task: learning permutations in the MNIST task. We compare our rehearsal environment with other baselines to show its efficacy in promoting continual learning. Additionally, we investigate whether this environment shows forward facilitation, i.e., faster learning of later tasks. Next, we explore the robustness of our learning environment to the number of tasks, model size, and amount of data rehearsed after each task. Notably, our results show that the performance is comparable or superior to that of models trained using popular regularization methods and also to rehearsals in non-power-law environments. The benefits of this training paradigm include simplicity and the lack of a need for extra neural circuitry. In addition, because our method is orthogonal to other methods, future research can combine training in power-law environments with other continual learning mechanisms.

Self-supervised models have revolutionized speech processing, achieving new levels of performance in a wide variety of tasks with limited resources. However, the inner workings of these models are still opaque. In this paper, we aim to analyze the encoded contextual representation of these foundation models based on their inter- and intra-model similarity, independent of any external annotation and task-specific constraint. We examine different SSL models varying their training paradigm -- Contrastive (Wav2Vec2.0) and Predictive models (HuBERT); and model sizes (base and large). We explore these models on different levels of localization/distributivity of information including (i) individual neurons; (ii) layer representation; (iii) attention weights and (iv) compare the representations with their finetuned counterparts.Our results highlight that these models converge to similar representation subspaces but not to similar neuron-localized concepts\footnote{A concept represents a coherent fragment of knowledge, such as ``a class containing certain objects as elements, where the objects have certain properties. We made the code publicly available for facilitating further research, we publicly released our code.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are nondeterministic, the same input can generate different outputs, some of which may be incorrect or hallucinated. If run again, the LLM may correct itself and produce the correct answer. Unfortunately, most LLM-powered systems resort to single results which, correct or not, users accept. Having the LLM produce multiple outputs may help identify disagreements or alternatives. However, it is not obvious how the user will interpret conflicts or inconsistencies. To this end, we investigate how users perceive the AI model and comprehend the generated information when they receive multiple, potentially inconsistent, outputs. Through a preliminary study, we identified five types of output inconsistencies. Based on these categories, we conducted a study (N=252) in which participants were given one or more LLM-generated passages to an information-seeking question. We found that inconsistency within multiple LLM-generated outputs lowered the participants' perceived AI capacity, while also increasing their comprehension of the given information. Specifically, we observed that this positive effect of inconsistencies was most significant for participants who read two passages, compared to those who read three. Based on these findings, we present design implications that, instead of regarding LLM output inconsistencies as a drawback, we can reveal the potential inconsistencies to transparently indicate the limitations of these models and promote critical LLM usage.

We analyse perception and memory, using mathematical models for knowledge graphs and tensors, to gain insights into the corresponding functionalities of the human mind. Our discussion is based on the concept of propositional sentences consisting of subject-predicate-object (SPO) triples for expressing elementary facts. SPO sentences are the basis for most natural languages but might also be important for explicit perception and declarative memories, as well as intra-brain communication and the ability to argue and reason. A set of SPO sentences can be described as a knowledge graph, which can be transformed into an adjacency tensor. We introduce tensor models, where concepts have dual representations as indices and associated embeddings, two constructs we believe are essential for the understanding of implicit and explicit perception and memory in the brain. We argue that a biological realization of perception and memory imposes constraints on information processing. In particular, we propose that explicit perception and declarative memories require a semantic decoder, which, in a simple realization, is based on four layers: First, a sensory memory layer, as a buffer for sensory input, second, an index layer representing concepts, third, a memoryless representation layer for the broadcasting of information ---the "blackboard", or the "canvas" of the brain--- and fourth, a working memory layer as a processing center and data buffer. We discuss the operations of the four layers and relate them to the global workspace theory. In a Bayesian brain interpretation, semantic memory defines the prior for observable triple statements. We propose that ---in evolution and during development--- semantic memory, episodic memory, and natural language evolved as emergent properties in agents' process to gain a deeper understanding of sensory information.

Large Language Models (LLMs) do not differentially represent numbers, which are pervasive in text. In contrast, neuroscience research has identified distinct neural representations for numbers and words. In this work, we investigate how well popular LLMs capture the magnitudes of numbers (e.g., that 4 < 5) from a behavioral lens. Prior research on the representational capabilities of LLMs evaluates whether they show human-level performance, for instance, high overall accuracy on standard benchmarks. Here, we ask a different question, one inspired by cognitive science: How closely do the number representations of LLMscorrespond to those of human language users, who typically demonstrate the distance, size, and ratio effects? We depend on a linking hypothesis to map the similarities among the model embeddings of number words and digits to human response times. The results reveal surprisingly human-like representations across language models of different architectures, despite the absence of the neural circuitry that directly supports these representations in the human brain. This research shows the utility of understanding LLMs using behavioral benchmarks and points the way to future work on the number representations of LLMs and their cognitive plausibility.

Informally, the 'linear representation hypothesis' is the idea that high-level concepts are represented linearly as directions in some representation space. In this paper, we address two closely related questions: What does "linear representation" actually mean? And, how do we make sense of geometric notions (e.g., cosine similarity or projection) in the representation space? To answer these, we use the language of counterfactuals to give two formalizations of "linear representation", one in the output (word) representation space, and one in the input (sentence) space. We then prove these connect to linear probing and model steering, respectively. To make sense of geometric notions, we use the formalization to identify a particular (non-Euclidean) inner product that respects language structure in a sense we make precise. Using this causal inner product, we show how to unify all notions of linear representation. In particular, this allows the construction of probes and steering vectors using counterfactual pairs. Experiments with LLaMA-2 demonstrate the existence of linear representations of concepts, the connection to interpretation and control, and the fundamental role of the choice of inner product.

Despite their recent successes, Transformer-based large language models show surprising failure modes. A well-known example of such failure modes is their inability to length-generalize: solving problem instances at inference time that are longer than those seen during training. In this work, we further explore the root cause of this failure by performing a detailed analysis of model behaviors on the simple parity task. Our analysis suggests that length generalization failures are intricately related to a model's inability to perform random memory accesses within its context window. We present supporting evidence for this hypothesis by demonstrating the effectiveness of methodologies that circumvent the need for indexing or that enable random token access indirectly, through content-based addressing. We further show where and how the failure to perform random memory access manifests through attention map visualizations.

Classical models of memory in psychology and neuroscience rely on similarity-based retrieval of stored patterns, where similarity is a function of retrieval cues and the stored patterns. While parsimonious, these models do not allow distinct representations for storage and retrieval, despite their distinct computational demands. Key-value memory systems, in contrast, distinguish representations used for storage (values) and those used for retrieval (keys). This allows key-value memory systems to optimize simultaneously for fidelity in storage and discriminability in retrieval. We review the computational foundations of key-value memory, its role in modern machine learning systems, related ideas from psychology and neuroscience, applications to a number of empirical puzzles, and possible biological implementations.

Many papers have shown that attention heads work in conjunction with each other to perform complex tasks. It's frequently assumed that communication between attention heads is via the addition of specific features to token residuals. In this work we seek to isolate and identify the features used to effect communication and coordination among attention heads in GPT-2 small. Our key leverage on the problem is to show that these features are very often sparsely coded in the singular vectors of attention head matrices. We characterize the dimensionality and occurrence of these signals across the attention heads in GPT-2 small when used for the Indirect Object Identification (IOI) task. The sparse encoding of signals, as provided by attention head singular vectors, allows for efficient separation of signals from the residual background and straightforward identification of communication paths between attention heads. We explore the effectiveness of this approach by tracing portions of the circuits used in the IOI task. Our traces reveal considerable detail not present in previous studies, shedding light on the nature of redundant paths present in GPT-2. And our traces go beyond previous work by identifying features used to communicate between attention heads when performing IOI.

Large-scale pretrained language models (LMs) are said to ``lack the ability to connect utterances to the world'' (Bender and Koller, 2020), because they do not have ``mental models of the world' '(Mitchell and Krakauer, 2023). If so, one would expect LM representations to be unrelated to representations induced by vision models. We present an empirical evaluation across four families of LMs (BERT, GPT-2, OPT and LLaMA-2) and three vision model architectures (ResNet, SegFormer, and MAE). Our experiments show that LMs partially converge towards representations isomorphic to those of vision models, subject to dispersion, polysemy and frequency. This has important implications for both multi-modal processing and the LM understanding debate (Mitchell and Krakauer, 2023).

While numerous works have assessed the generative performance of language models (LMs) on tasks requiring Theory of Mind reasoning, research into the models' internal representation of mental states remains limited. Recent work has used probing to demonstrate that LMs can represent beliefs of themselves and others. However, these claims are accompanied by limited evaluation, making it difficult to assess how mental state representations are affected by model design and training choices. We report an extensive benchmark with various LM types with different model sizes, fine-tuning approaches, and prompt designs to study the robustness of mental state representations and memorisation issues within the probes. Our results show that the quality of models' internal representations of the beliefs of others increases with model size and, more crucially, with fine-tuning. We are the first to study how prompt variations impact probing performance on theory of mind tasks. We demonstrate that models' representations are sensitive to prompt variations, even when such variations should be beneficial. Finally, we complement previous activation editing experiments on Theory of Mind tasks and show that it is possible to improve models' reasoning performance by steering their activations without the need to train any probe.

Language models show a surprising range of capabilities, but the source of their apparent competence is unclear. Do these networks just memorize a collection of surface statistics, or do they rely on internal representations of the process that generates the sequences they see? We investigate this question by applying a variant of the GPT model to the task of predicting legal moves in a simple board game, Othello. Although the network has no a priori knowledge of the game or its rules, we uncover evidence of an emergent nonlinear internal representation of the board state. Interventional experiments indicate this representation can be used to control the output of the network and create "latent saliency maps" that can help explain predictions in human terms.

A new prior is proposed for learning representations of high-level concepts of the kind we manipulate with language. This prior can be combined with other priors in order to help disentangling abstract factors from each other. It is inspired by cognitive neuroscience theories of consciousness, seen as a bottleneck through which just a few elements, after having been selected by attention from a broader pool, are then broadcast and condition further processing, both in perception and decision-making. The set of recently selected elements one becomes aware of is seen as forming a low-dimensional conscious state. This conscious state is combining the few concepts constituting a conscious thought, i.e., what one is immediately conscious of at a particular moment. We claim that this architectural and information-processing constraint corresponds to assumptions about the joint distribution between high-level concepts. To the extent that these assumptions are generally true (and the form of natural language seems consistent with them), they can form a useful prior for representation learning. A low-dimensional thought or conscious state is analogous to a sentence: it involves only a few variables and yet can make a statement with very high probability of being true. This is consistent with a joint distribution (over high-level concepts) which has the form of a sparse factor graph, i.e., where the dependencies captured by each factor of the factor graph involve only very few variables while creating a strong dip in the overall energy function. The consciousness prior also makes it natural to map conscious states to natural language utterances or to express classical AI knowledge in a form similar to facts and rules, albeit capturing uncertainty as well as efficient search mechanisms implemented by attention mechanisms.

We argue that representations in AI models, particularly deep networks, are converging. First, we survey many examples of convergence in the literature: over time and across multiple domains, the ways by which different neural networks represent data are becoming more aligned. Next, we demonstrate convergence across data modalities: as vision models and language models get larger, they measure distance between datapoints in a more and more alike way. We hypothesize that this convergence is driving toward a shared statistical model of reality, akin to Plato's concept of an ideal reality. We term such a representation the platonic representation and discuss several possible selective pressures toward it. Finally, we discuss the implications of these trends, their limitations, and counterexamples to our analysis.

Much of the excitement in modern AI is driven by the observation that scaling up existing systems leads to better performance. But does better performance necessarily imply better internal representations? While the representational optimist assumes it must, this position paper challenges that view. We compare neural networks evolved through an open-ended search process to networks trained via conventional stochastic gradient descent (SGD) on the simple task of generating a single image. This minimal setup offers a unique advantage: each hidden neuron's full functional behavior can be easily visualized as an image, thus revealing how the network's output behavior is internally constructed neuron by neuron. The result is striking: while both networks produce the same output behavior, their internal representations differ dramatically. The SGD-trained networks exhibit a form of disorganization that we term fractured entangled representation (FER). Interestingly, the evolved networks largely lack FER, even approaching a unified factored representation (UFR). In large models, FER may be degrading core model capacities like generalization, creativity, and (continual) learning. Therefore, understanding and mitigating FER could be critical to the future of representation learning.

Attending to what is relevant is fundamental to both the mammalian brain and modern machine learning models such as Transformers. Yet, determining relevance remains a core challenge, traditionally offloaded to learning algorithms like backpropagation. Inspired by recent cellular neurobiological evidence linking neocortical pyramidal cells to distinct mental states, this work shows how models (e.g., Transformers) can emulate high-level perceptual processing and awake thought (imagination) states to pre-select relevant information before applying attention. Triadic neuronal-level modulation loops among questions (Q), clues (keys, K), and hypotheses (values, V) enable diverse, deep, parallel reasoning chains at the representation level and allow a rapid shift from initial biases to refined understanding. This leads to orders-of-magnitude faster learning with significantly reduced computational demand (e.g., fewer heads, layers, and tokens), at an approximate cost of O(N), where N is the number of input tokens. Results span reinforcement learning (e.g., CarRacing in a high-dimensional visual setup), computer vision, and natural language question answering.

Sparse autoencoders have recently produced dictionaries of high-dimensional vectors corresponding to the universe of concepts represented by large language models. We find that this concept universe has interesting structure at three levels: 1) The "atomic" small-scale structure contains "crystals" whose faces are parallelograms or trapezoids, generalizing well-known examples such as (man-woman-king-queen). We find that the quality of such parallelograms and associated function vectors improves greatly when projecting out global distractor directions such as word length, which is efficiently done with linear discriminant analysis. 2) The "brain" intermediate-scale structure has significant spatial modularity; for example, math and code features form a "lobe" akin to functional lobes seen in neural fMRI images. We quantify the spatial locality of these lobes with multiple metrics and find that clusters of co-occurring features, at coarse enough scale, also cluster together spatially far more than one would expect if feature geometry were random. 3) The "galaxy" scale large-scale structure of the feature point cloud is not isotropic, but instead has a power law of eigenvalues with steepest slope in middle layers. We also quantify how the clustering entropy depends on the layer.

Why do large language models sometimes output factual inaccuracies and exhibit erroneous reasoning? The brittleness of these models, particularly when executing long chains of reasoning, currently seems to be an inevitable price to pay for their advanced capabilities of coherently synthesizing knowledge, pragmatics, and abstract thought. Towards making sense of this fundamentally unsolved problem, this work identifies and analyzes the phenomenon of attention glitches, in which the Transformer architecture's inductive biases intermittently fail to capture robust reasoning. To isolate the issue, we introduce flip-flop language modeling (FFLM), a parametric family of synthetic benchmarks designed to probe the extrapolative behavior of neural language models. This simple generative task requires a model to copy binary symbols over long-range dependencies, ignoring the tokens in between. We find that Transformer FFLMs suffer from a long tail of sporadic reasoning errors, some of which we can eliminate using various regularization techniques. Our preliminary mechanistic analyses show why the remaining errors may be very difficult to diagnose and resolve. We hypothesize that attention glitches account for (some of) the closed-domain hallucinations in natural LLMs.

The success of today's large language models (LLMs) depends on the observation that larger models perform better. However, the origin of this neural scaling law -- the finding that loss decreases as a power law with model size -- remains unclear. Starting from two empirical principles -- that LLMs represent more things than the model dimensions (widths) they have (i.e., representations are superposed), and that words or concepts in language occur with varying frequencies -- we constructed a toy model to study the loss scaling with model size. We found that when superposition is weak, meaning only the most frequent features are represented without interference, the scaling of loss with model size depends on the underlying feature frequency; if feature frequencies follow a power law, so does the loss. In contrast, under strong superposition, where all features are represented but overlap with each other, the loss becomes inversely proportional to the model dimension across a wide range of feature frequency distributions. This robust scaling behavior is explained geometrically: when many more vectors are packed into a lower dimensional space, the interference (squared overlaps) between vectors scales inversely with that dimension. We then analyzed four families of open-sourced LLMs and found that they exhibit strong superposition and quantitatively match the predictions of our toy model. The Chinchilla scaling law turned out to also agree with our results. We conclude that representation superposition is an important mechanism underlying the observed neural scaling laws. We anticipate that these insights will inspire new training strategies and model architectures to achieve better performance with less computation and fewer parameters.

The ability to control for the kinds of information encoded in neural representation has a variety of use cases, especially in light of the challenge of interpreting these models. We present Iterative Null-space Projection (INLP), a novel method for removing information from neural representations. Our method is based on repeated training of linear classifiers that predict a certain property we aim to remove, followed by projection of the representations on their null-space. By doing so, the classifiers become oblivious to that target property, making it hard to linearly separate the data according to it. While applicable for multiple uses, we evaluate our method on bias and fairness use-cases, and show that our method is able to mitigate bias in word embeddings, as well as to increase fairness in a setting of multi-class classification.

We introduce KiloGram, a resource for studying abstract visual reasoning in humans and machines. Drawing on the history of tangram puzzles as stimuli in cognitive science, we build a richly annotated dataset that, with >1k distinct stimuli, is orders of magnitude larger and more diverse than prior resources. It is both visually and linguistically richer, moving beyond whole shape descriptions to include segmentation maps and part labels. We use this resource to evaluate the abstract visual reasoning capacities of recent multi-modal models. We observe that pre-trained weights demonstrate limited abstract reasoning, which dramatically improves with fine-tuning. We also observe that explicitly describing parts aids abstract reasoning for both humans and models, especially when jointly encoding the linguistic and visual inputs. KiloGram is available at https://lil.nlp.cornell.edu/kilogram .

Large Language Models (LLMs) are claimed to be capable of Natural Language Inference (NLI), necessary for applied tasks like question answering and summarization. We present a series of behavioral studies on several LLM families (LLaMA, GPT-3.5, and PaLM) which probe their behavior using controlled experiments. We establish two biases originating from pretraining which predict much of their behavior, and show that these are major sources of hallucination in generative LLMs. First, memorization at the level of sentences: we show that, regardless of the premise, models falsely label NLI test samples as entailing when the hypothesis is attested in training data, and that entities are used as ``indices'' to access the memorized data. Second, statistical patterns of usage learned at the level of corpora: we further show a similar effect when the premise predicate is less frequent than that of the hypothesis in the training data, a bias following from previous studies. We demonstrate that LLMs perform significantly worse on NLI test samples which do not conform to these biases than those which do, and we offer these as valuable controls for future LLM evaluation.

This paper presents null-shot prompting. Null-shot prompting exploits hallucination in large language models (LLMs) by instructing LLMs to utilize information from the "Examples" section that never exists within the provided context to perform a task. While reducing hallucination is crucial and non-negligible for daily and critical uses of LLMs, we propose that in the current landscape in which these LLMs still hallucinate, it is possible, in fact, to exploit hallucination to increase performance in performing tasks compared to standard zero-shot prompting. Experiments with six LLMs show improvements in performance across the majority of eight datasets, including reading comprehension, arithmetic reasoning, and closed-book question answering. The observed inconsistency in increased relative performance across LLMs also potentially indicates a different degree of inherent hallucination in each model. These differences show that it is possible to utilize null-shot prompting as a way to detect degrees of hallucination in LLMs using existing benchmarking datasets. We also perform ablation studies, including experimenting with a modified version of null-shot prompting that incorporates ideas from zero-shot chain-of-thought prompting, which shows different trends of results.

While fine-tuned language models perform well on many tasks, they were also shown to rely on superficial surface features such as lexical overlap. Excessive utilization of such heuristics can lead to failure on challenging inputs. We analyze the use of lexical overlap heuristics in natural language inference, paraphrase detection, and reading comprehension (using a novel contrastive dataset), and find that larger models are much less susceptible to adopting lexical overlap heuristics. We also find that longer training leads models to abandon lexical overlap heuristics. Finally, we provide evidence that the disparity between models size has its source in the pre-trained model

Large language models (LLMs) can sometimes report the strategies they actually use to solve tasks, but they can also fail to do so. This suggests some degree of metacognition -- the capacity to monitor one's own cognitive processes for subsequent reporting and self-control. Metacognitive abilities enhance AI capabilities but raise safety concerns, as models might obscure their internal processes to evade neural-activation-based oversight mechanisms designed to detect harmful behaviors. Given society's increased reliance on these models, it is critical that we understand the limits of their metacognitive abilities, particularly their ability to monitor their internal activations. To address this, we introduce a neuroscience-inspired neurofeedback paradigm designed to quantify the ability of LLMs to explicitly report and control their activation patterns. By presenting models with sentence-label pairs where labels correspond to sentence-elicited internal activations along specific directions in the neural representation space, we demonstrate that LLMs can learn to report and control these activations. The performance varies with several factors: the number of example pairs provided, the semantic interpretability of the target neural direction, and the variance explained by that direction. These results reveal a "metacognitive space" with dimensionality much lower than the model's neural space, suggesting LLMs can monitor only a subset of their neural mechanisms. Our findings provide empirical evidence quantifying metacognitive capabilities in LLMs, with significant implications for AI safety.

As Large Language Models become more ubiquitous across domains, it becomes important to examine their inherent limitations critically. This work argues that hallucinations in language models are not just occasional errors but an inevitable feature of these systems. We demonstrate that hallucinations stem from the fundamental mathematical and logical structure of LLMs. It is, therefore, impossible to eliminate them through architectural improvements, dataset enhancements, or fact-checking mechanisms. Our analysis draws on computational theory and Godel's First Incompleteness Theorem, which references the undecidability of problems like the Halting, Emptiness, and Acceptance Problems. We demonstrate that every stage of the LLM process-from training data compilation to fact retrieval, intent classification, and text generation-will have a non-zero probability of producing hallucinations. This work introduces the concept of Structural Hallucination as an intrinsic nature of these systems. By establishing the mathematical certainty of hallucinations, we challenge the prevailing notion that they can be fully mitigated.

To fully understand the behavior of a large language model (LLM) requires our understanding of its input space. If this input space differs from our assumption, our understanding of and conclusions about the LLM is likely flawed, regardless of its architecture. Here, we elucidate the structure of the token embeddings, the input domain for LLMs, both empirically and theoretically. We present a generalized and statistically testable model where the neighborhood of each token splits into well-defined signal and noise dimensions. This model is based on a generalization of a manifold called a fiber bundle, so we denote our hypothesis test as the ``fiber bundle null.'' Failing to reject the null is uninformative, but rejecting it at a specific token indicates that token has a statistically significant local structure, and so is of interest to us. By running our test over several open-source LLMs, each with unique token embeddings, we find that the null is frequently rejected, and so the token subspace is provably not a fiber bundle and hence also not a manifold. As a consequence of our findings, when an LLM is presented with two semantically equivalent prompts, and if one prompt contains a token implicated by our test, that prompt will likely exhibit more output variability proportional to the local signal dimension of the token.

Methods for understanding the decisions of and mechanisms underlying deep neural networks (DNNs) typically rely on building intuition by emphasizing sensory or semantic features of individual examples. For instance, methods aim to visualize the components of an input which are "important" to a network's decision, or to measure the semantic properties of single neurons. Here, we argue that interpretability research suffers from an over-reliance on intuition-based approaches that risk-and in some cases have caused-illusory progress and misleading conclusions. We identify a set of limitations that we argue impede meaningful progress in interpretability research, and examine two popular classes of interpretability methods-saliency and single-neuron-based approaches-that serve as case studies for how overreliance on intuition and lack of falsifiability can undermine interpretability research. To address these concerns, we propose a strategy to address these impediments in the form of a framework for strongly falsifiable interpretability research. We encourage researchers to use their intuitions as a starting point to develop and test clear, falsifiable hypotheses, and hope that our framework yields robust, evidence-based interpretability methods that generate meaningful advances in our understanding of DNNs.

In large language models (LLMs), certain neurons can store distinct pieces of knowledge learned during pretraining. While knowledge typically appears as a combination of relations and entities, it remains unclear whether some neurons focus on a relation itself -- independent of any entity. We hypothesize such neurons detect a relation in the input text and guide generation involving such a relation. To investigate this, we study the Llama-2 family on a chosen set of relations with a statistics-based method. Our experiments demonstrate the existence of relation-specific neurons. We measure the effect of selectively deactivating candidate neurons specific to relation r on the LLM's ability to handle (1) facts whose relation is r and (2) facts whose relation is a different relation r' neq r. With respect to their capacity for encoding relation information, we give evidence for the following three properties of relation-specific neurons. (i) Neuron cumulativity. The neurons for r present a cumulative effect so that deactivating a larger portion of them results in the degradation of more facts in r. (ii) Neuron versatility. Neurons can be shared across multiple closely related as well as less related relations. Some relation neurons transfer across languages. (iii) Neuron interference. Deactivating neurons specific to one relation can improve LLM generation performance for facts of other relations. We will make our code publicly available at https://github.com/cisnlp/relation-specific-neurons.

Hallucinations in large language models are a widespread problem, yet the mechanisms behind whether models will hallucinate are poorly understood, limiting our ability to solve this problem. Using sparse autoencoders as an interpretability tool, we discover that a key part of these mechanisms is entity recognition, where the model detects if an entity is one it can recall facts about. Sparse autoencoders uncover meaningful directions in the representation space, these detect whether the model recognizes an entity, e.g. detecting it doesn't know about an athlete or a movie. This suggests that models can have self-knowledge: internal representations about their own capabilities. These directions are causally relevant: capable of steering the model to refuse to answer questions about known entities, or to hallucinate attributes of unknown entities when it would otherwise refuse. We demonstrate that despite the sparse autoencoders being trained on the base model, these directions have a causal effect on the chat model's refusal behavior, suggesting that chat finetuning has repurposed this existing mechanism. Furthermore, we provide an initial exploration into the mechanistic role of these directions in the model, finding that they disrupt the attention of downstream heads that typically move entity attributes to the final token.

Representations from large language models (LLMs) are known to be dominated by a small subset of dimensions with exceedingly high variance. Previous works have argued that although ablating these outlier dimensions in LLM representations hurts downstream performance, outlier dimensions are detrimental to the representational quality of embeddings. In this study, we investigate how fine-tuning impacts outlier dimensions and show that 1) outlier dimensions that occur in pre-training persist in fine-tuned models and 2) a single outlier dimension can complete downstream tasks with a minimal error rate. Our results suggest that outlier dimensions can encode crucial task-specific knowledge and that the value of a representation in a single outlier dimension drives downstream model decisions.

Interventions targeting the representation space of language models (LMs) have emerged as an effective means to influence model behavior. Such methods are employed, for example, to eliminate or alter the encoding of demographic information such as gender within the model's representations and, in so doing, create a counterfactual representation. However, because the intervention operates within the representation space, understanding precisely what aspects of the text it modifies poses a challenge. In this paper, we give a method to convert representation counterfactuals into string counterfactuals. We demonstrate that this approach enables us to analyze the linguistic alterations corresponding to a given representation space intervention and to interpret the features utilized to encode a specific concept. Moreover, the resulting counterfactuals can be used to mitigate bias in classification through data augmentation.

While recent developments in text-to-image generative models have led to a suite of high-performing methods capable of producing creative imagery from free-form text, there are several limitations. By analyzing the cross-attention representations of these models, we notice two key issues. First, for text prompts that contain multiple concepts, there is a significant amount of pixel-space overlap (i.e., same spatial regions) among pairs of different concepts. This eventually leads to the model being unable to distinguish between the two concepts and one of them being ignored in the final generation. Next, while these models attempt to capture all such concepts during the beginning of denoising (e.g., first few steps) as evidenced by cross-attention maps, this knowledge is not retained by the end of denoising (e.g., last few steps). Such loss of knowledge eventually leads to inaccurate generation outputs. To address these issues, our key innovations include two test-time attention-based loss functions that substantially improve the performance of pretrained baseline text-to-image diffusion models. First, our attention segregation loss reduces the cross-attention overlap between attention maps of different concepts in the text prompt, thereby reducing the confusion/conflict among various concepts and the eventual capture of all concepts in the generated output. Next, our attention retention loss explicitly forces text-to-image diffusion models to retain cross-attention information for all concepts across all denoising time steps, thereby leading to reduced information loss and the preservation of all concepts in the generated output.

Despite their impressive capabilities, LLMs exhibit a basic generalization failure known as the Reversal Curse, where they struggle to learn reversible factual associations. Understanding why this occurs could help identify weaknesses in current models and advance their generalization and robustness. In this paper, we conjecture that the Reversal Curse in LLMs is a manifestation of the long-standing binding problem in cognitive science, neuroscience and AI. Specifically, we identify two primary causes of the Reversal Curse stemming from transformers' limitations in conceptual binding: the inconsistency and entanglements of concept representations. We perform a series of experiments that support these conjectures. Our exploration leads to a model design based on JEPA (Joint-Embedding Predictive Architecture) that for the first time breaks the Reversal Curse without side-stepping it with specialized data augmentation or non-causal masking, and moreover, generalization could be further improved by incorporating special memory layers that support disentangled concept representations. We demonstrate that the skill of reversal unlocks a new kind of memory integration that enables models to solve large-scale arithmetic reasoning problems via parametric forward-chaining, outperforming frontier LLMs based on non-parametric memory and prolonged explicit reasoning.

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) have shown impressive capabilities in document understanding, a rapidly growing research area with significant industrial demand in recent years. As a multimodal task, document understanding requires models to possess both perceptual and cognitive abilities. However, current MLLMs often face conflicts between perception and cognition. Taking a document VQA task (cognition) as an example, an MLLM might generate answers that do not match the corresponding visual content identified by its OCR (perception). This conflict suggests that the MLLM might struggle to establish an intrinsic connection between the information it "sees" and what it "understands." Such conflicts challenge the intuitive notion that cognition is consistent with perception, hindering the performance and explainability of MLLMs. In this paper, we define the conflicts between cognition and perception as Cognition and Perception (C&P) knowledge conflicts, a form of multimodal knowledge conflicts, and systematically assess them with a focus on document understanding. Our analysis reveals that even GPT-4o, a leading MLLM, achieves only 68.6% C&P consistency. To mitigate the C&P knowledge conflicts, we propose a novel method called Multimodal Knowledge Consistency Fine-tuning. This method first ensures task-specific consistency and then connects the cognitive and perceptual knowledge. Our method significantly reduces C&P knowledge conflicts across all tested MLLMs and enhances their performance in both cognitive and perceptual tasks in most scenarios.

Large language models (LLMs) often produce errors, including factual inaccuracies, biases, and reasoning failures, collectively referred to as "hallucinations". Recent studies have demonstrated that LLMs' internal states encode information regarding the truthfulness of their outputs, and that this information can be utilized to detect errors. In this work, we show that the internal representations of LLMs encode much more information about truthfulness than previously recognized. We first discover that the truthfulness information is concentrated in specific tokens, and leveraging this property significantly enhances error detection performance. Yet, we show that such error detectors fail to generalize across datasets, implying that -- contrary to prior claims -- truthfulness encoding is not universal but rather multifaceted. Next, we show that internal representations can also be used for predicting the types of errors the model is likely to make, facilitating the development of tailored mitigation strategies. Lastly, we reveal a discrepancy between LLMs' internal encoding and external behavior: they may encode the correct answer, yet consistently generate an incorrect one. Taken together, these insights deepen our understanding of LLM errors from the model's internal perspective, which can guide future research on enhancing error analysis and mitigation.

Interpretability research aims to bridge the gap between empirical success and our scientific understanding of the inner workings of large language models (LLMs). However, most existing research focuses on analyzing a single mechanism, such as how models copy or recall factual knowledge. In this work, we propose a formulation of competition of mechanisms, which focuses on the interplay of multiple mechanisms instead of individual mechanisms and traces how one of them becomes dominant in the final prediction. We uncover how and where mechanisms compete within LLMs using two interpretability methods: logit inspection and attention modification. Our findings show traces of the mechanisms and their competition across various model components and reveal attention positions that effectively control the strength of certain mechanisms. Code: https://github.com/francescortu/comp-mech. Data: https://huggingface.co/datasets/francescortu/comp-mech.

Attention mechanisms are ubiquitous components in neural architectures applied to natural language processing. In addition to yielding gains in predictive accuracy, attention weights are often claimed to confer interpretability, purportedly useful both for providing insights to practitioners and for explaining why a model makes its decisions to stakeholders. We call the latter use of attention mechanisms into question by demonstrating a simple method for training models to produce deceptive attention masks. Our method diminishes the total weight assigned to designated impermissible tokens, even when the models can be shown to nevertheless rely on these features to drive predictions. Across multiple models and tasks, our approach manipulates attention weights while paying surprisingly little cost in accuracy. Through a human study, we show that our manipulated attention-based explanations deceive people into thinking that predictions from a model biased against gender minorities do not rely on the gender. Consequently, our results cast doubt on attention's reliability as a tool for auditing algorithms in the context of fairness and accountability.

Recent advancements in large multimodal models (LMMs) have significantly enhanced performance across diverse tasks, with ongoing efforts to further integrate additional modalities such as video and audio. However, most existing LMMs remain vulnerable to hallucinations, the discrepancy between the factual multimodal input and the generated textual output, which has limited their applicability in various real-world scenarios. This paper presents the first systematic investigation of hallucinations in LMMs involving the three most common modalities: language, visual, and audio. Our study reveals two key contributors to hallucinations: overreliance on unimodal priors and spurious inter-modality correlations. To address these challenges, we introduce the benchmark The Curse of Multi-Modalities (CMM), which comprehensively evaluates hallucinations in LMMs, providing a detailed analysis of their underlying issues. Our findings highlight key vulnerabilities, including imbalances in modality integration and biases from training data, underscoring the need for balanced cross-modal learning and enhanced hallucination mitigation strategies. Based on our observations and findings, we suggest potential research directions that could enhance the reliability of LMMs.

Can large language models (LLMs) implement computations of psychopathology? An effective approach to the question hinges on addressing two factors. First, for conceptual validity, we require a general and computational account of psychopathology that is applicable to computational entities without biological embodiment or subjective experience. Second, mechanisms underlying LLM behaviors need to be studied for better methodological validity. Thus, we establish a computational-theoretical framework to provide an account of psychopathology applicable to LLMs. To ground the theory for empirical analysis, we also propose a novel mechanistic interpretability method alongside a tailored empirical analytic framework. Based on the frameworks, we conduct experiments demonstrating three key claims: first, that distinct dysfunctional and problematic representational states are implemented in LLMs; second, that their activations can spread and self-sustain to trap LLMs; and third, that dynamic, cyclic structural causal models encoded in the LLMs underpin these patterns. In concert, the empirical results corroborate our hypothesis that network-theoretic computations of psychopathology have already emerged in LLMs. This suggests that certain LLM behaviors mirroring psychopathology may not be a superficial mimicry but a feature of their internal processing. Thus, our work alludes to the possibility of AI systems with psychopathological behaviors in the near future.

Large language models (LLMs) are regularly evaluated using benchmark datasets. But what justifies making inferences about an LLM's capabilities based on its answers to a curated set of questions? This paper first introduces a formal framework to address this question. The key is to note that the benchmarks used to test LLMs -- such as AP exams -- are also those used to test people. However, this raises an implication: these benchmarks are only valid tests if LLMs misunderstand concepts in ways that mirror human misunderstandings. Otherwise, success on benchmarks only demonstrates potemkin understanding: the illusion of understanding driven by answers irreconcilable with how any human would interpret a concept. We present two procedures for quantifying the existence of potemkins: one using a specially designed benchmark in three domains, the other using a general procedure that provides a lower-bound on their prevalence. We find that potemkins are ubiquitous across models, tasks, and domains. We also find that these failures reflect not just incorrect understanding, but deeper internal incoherence in concept representations.

Hallucination has emerged as the most vulnerable aspect of contemporary Large Language Models (LLMs). In this paper, we introduce the Sorry, Come Again (SCA) prompting, aimed to avoid LLM hallucinations by enhancing comprehension through: (i) optimal paraphrasing and (ii) injecting [PAUSE] tokens to delay LLM generation. First, we provide an in-depth analysis of linguistic nuances: formality, readability, and concreteness of prompts for 21 LLMs, and elucidate how these nuances contribute to hallucinated generation. Prompts with lower readability, formality, or concreteness pose comprehension challenges for LLMs, similar to those faced by humans. In such scenarios, an LLM tends to speculate and generate content based on its imagination (associative memory) to fill these information gaps. Although these speculations may occasionally align with factual information, their accuracy is not assured, often resulting in hallucination. Recent studies reveal that an LLM often neglects the middle sections of extended prompts, a phenomenon termed as lost in the middle. While a specific paraphrase may suit one LLM, the same paraphrased version may elicit a different response from another LLM. Therefore, we propose an optimal paraphrasing technique to identify the most comprehensible paraphrase of a given prompt, evaluated using Integrated Gradient (and its variations) to guarantee that the LLM accurately processes all words. While reading lengthy sentences, humans often pause at various points to better comprehend the meaning read thus far. We have fine-tuned an LLM with injected [PAUSE] tokens, allowing the LLM to pause while reading lengthier prompts. This has brought several key contributions: (i) determining the optimal position to inject [PAUSE], (ii) determining the number of [PAUSE] tokens to be inserted, and (iii) introducing reverse proxy tuning to fine-tune the LLM for [PAUSE] insertion.

While large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities across a range of downstream tasks, a significant concern revolves around their propensity to exhibit hallucinations: LLMs occasionally generate content that diverges from the user input, contradicts previously generated context, or misaligns with established world knowledge. This phenomenon poses a substantial challenge to the reliability of LLMs in real-world scenarios. In this paper, we survey recent efforts on the detection, explanation, and mitigation of hallucination, with an emphasis on the unique challenges posed by LLMs. We present taxonomies of the LLM hallucination phenomena and evaluation benchmarks, analyze existing approaches aiming at mitigating LLM hallucination, and discuss potential directions for future research.

Instruction tuning improves the ability of large language models (LLMs) to follow diverse human instructions, but achieving strong performance on specific target tasks remains challenging. A critical bottleneck is selecting the most relevant data to maximize task-specific performance. Existing data selection approaches include unstable influence-based methods and more stable distribution alignment methods, the latter of which critically rely on the underlying sample representation. In practice, most distribution alignment methods, from shallow features (e.g., BM25) to neural embeddings (e.g., BGE, LLM2Vec), may fail to capture how the model internally processes samples. To bridge this gap, we adopt a model-centric strategy in which each sample is represented by its neuronal activation pattern in the model, directly reflecting internal computation. However, directly using raw neuron activations leads to spurious similarity between unrelated samples due to neuron polysemanticity, where a single neuron may respond to multiple, unrelated concepts. To address this, we employ sparse autoencoders to disentangle polysemantic activations into sparse, monosemantic representations, and introduce a dedicated similarity metric for this space to better identify task-relevant data. Comprehensive experiments across multiple instruction datasets, models, tasks, and selection ratios show that our approach consistently outperforms existing data selection baselines in both stability and task-specific performance.

Large language models (LLMs) often exhibit undesirable behaviors, such as hallucinations and sequence repetitions. We propose to view these behaviors as fallbacks that models exhibit under uncertainty, and investigate the connection between them. We categorize fallback behaviors -- sequence repetitions, degenerate text, and hallucinations -- and extensively analyze them in models from the same family that differ by the amount of pretraining tokens, parameter count, or the inclusion of instruction-following training. Our experiments reveal a clear and consistent ordering of fallback behaviors, across all these axes: the more advanced an LLM is (i.e., trained on more tokens, has more parameters, or instruction-tuned), its fallback behavior shifts from sequence repetitions, to degenerate text, and then to hallucinations. Moreover, the same ordering is observed throughout a single generation, even for the best-performing models; as uncertainty increases, models shift from generating hallucinations to producing degenerate text and then sequence repetitions. Lastly, we demonstrate that while common decoding techniques, such as random sampling, might alleviate some unwanted behaviors like sequence repetitions, they increase harder-to-detect hallucinations.

Attention mechanisms are a central property of cognitive systems allowing them to selectively deploy cognitive resources in a flexible manner. Attention has been long studied in the neurosciences and there are numerous phenomenological models that try to capture its core properties. Recently attentional mechanisms have become a dominating architectural choice of machine learning and are the central innovation of Transformers. The dominant intuition and formalism underlying their development has drawn on ideas of keys and queries in database management systems. In this work, we propose an alternative Bayesian foundation for attentional mechanisms and show how this unifies different attentional architectures in machine learning. This formulation allows to to identify commonality across different attention ML architectures as well as suggest a bridge to those developed in neuroscience. We hope this work will guide more sophisticated intuitions into the key properties of attention architectures and suggest new ones.

Language Models (LMs) often encounter knowledge conflicts when parametric memory contradicts contextual knowledge. Previous works attribute this conflict to the interplay between "memory heads" and "context heads", attention heads assumed to promote either memory or context exclusively. In this study, we go beyond this fundamental assumption by uncovering a critical phenomenon we term the "superposition of contextual information and parametric memory", where highly influential attention heads could simultaneously contribute to both memory and context. Building upon this insight, we propose Just Run Twice (JUICE), a test-time attention intervention method that steers LMs toward either parametric beliefs or contextual knowledge without requiring fine-tuning. JUICE identifies a set of reliable attention heads and leverages a dual-run approach to mitigate the superposition effects. Extensive experiments across 11 datasets and 6 model architectures demonstrate that JUICE sets the new state-of-the-art performance and robust generalization, achieving significant and consistent improvement across different domains under various conflict types. Finally, we theoretically analyze knowledge conflict and the superposition of contextual information and parametric memory in attention heads, which further elucidates the effectiveness of JUICE in these settings.

We investigate in-context temporal biases in attention heads and transformer outputs. Using cognitive science methodologies, we analyze attention scores and outputs of the GPT-2 models of varying sizes. Across attention heads, we observe effects characteristic of human episodic memory, including temporal contiguity, primacy and recency. Transformer outputs demonstrate a tendency toward in-context serial recall. Importantly, this effect is eliminated after the ablation of the induction heads, which are the driving force behind the contiguity effect. Our findings offer insights into how transformers organize information temporally during in-context learning, shedding light on their similarities and differences with human memory and learning.

Mathematical reasoning in large language models (LMs) has garnered significant attention in recent work, but there is a limited understanding of how these models process and store information related to arithmetic tasks within their architecture. In order to improve our understanding of this aspect of language models, we present a mechanistic interpretation of Transformer-based LMs on arithmetic questions using a causal mediation analysis framework. By intervening on the activations of specific model components and measuring the resulting changes in predicted probabilities, we identify the subset of parameters responsible for specific predictions. This provides insights into how information related to arithmetic is processed by LMs. Our experimental results indicate that LMs process the input by transmitting the information relevant to the query from mid-sequence early layers to the final token using the attention mechanism. Then, this information is processed by a set of MLP modules, which generate result-related information that is incorporated into the residual stream. To assess the specificity of the observed activation dynamics, we compare the effects of different model components on arithmetic queries with other tasks, including number retrieval from prompts and factual knowledge questions.

Large language models (LLMs) have complicated internal dynamics, but induce representations of words and phrases whose geometry we can study. Human language processing is also opaque, but neural response measurements can provide (noisy) recordings of activation during listening or reading, from which we can extract similar representations of words and phrases. Here we study the extent to which the geometries induced by these representations, share similarities in the context of brain decoding. We find that the larger neural language models get, the more their representations are structurally similar to neural response measurements from brain imaging. Code is available at https://github.com/coastalcph/brainlm.

While static word embedding models are known to represent linguistic analogies as parallel lines in high-dimensional space, the underlying mechanism as to why they result in such geometric structures remains obscure. We find that an elementary contrastive-style method employed over distributional information performs competitively with popular word embedding models on analogy recovery tasks, while achieving dramatic speedups in training time. Further, we demonstrate that a contrastive loss is sufficient to create these parallel structures in word embeddings, and establish a precise relationship between the co-occurrence statistics and the geometric structure of the resulting word embeddings.

This paper presents a systematic defense of large language model (LLM) hallucinations or 'confabulations' as a potential resource instead of a categorically negative pitfall. The standard view is that confabulations are inherently problematic and AI research should eliminate this flaw. In this paper, we argue and empirically demonstrate that measurable semantic characteristics of LLM confabulations mirror a human propensity to utilize increased narrativity as a cognitive resource for sense-making and communication. In other words, it has potential value. Specifically, we analyze popular hallucination benchmarks and reveal that hallucinated outputs display increased levels of narrativity and semantic coherence relative to veridical outputs. This finding reveals a tension in our usually dismissive understandings of confabulation. It suggests, counter-intuitively, that the tendency for LLMs to confabulate may be intimately associated with a positive capacity for coherent narrative-text generation.

Despite their powerful chat, coding, and reasoning abilities, Large Language Models (LLMs) frequently hallucinate. Conventional wisdom suggests that hallucinations are a consequence of a balance between creativity and factuality, which can be mitigated, but not eliminated, by grounding the LLM in external knowledge sources. Through extensive systematic experiments, we show that these traditional approaches fail to explain why LLMs hallucinate in practice. Specifically, we show that LLMs augmented with a massive Mixture of Memory Experts (MoME) can easily memorize large datasets of random numbers. We corroborate these experimental findings with a theoretical construction showing that simple neural networks trained to predict the next token hallucinate when the training loss is above a threshold as it usually does in practice when training on internet scale data. We interpret our findings by comparing against traditional retrieval methods for mitigating hallucinations. We use our findings to design a first generation model for removing hallucinations -- Lamini-1 -- that stores facts in a massive mixture of millions of memory experts that are retrieved dynamically.

In an effort to understand the meaning of the intermediate representations captured by deep networks, recent papers have tried to associate specific semantic concepts to individual neural network filter responses, where interesting correlations are often found, largely by focusing on extremal filter responses. In this paper, we show that this approach can favor easy-to-interpret cases that are not necessarily representative of the average behavior of a representation. A more realistic but harder-to-study hypothesis is that semantic representations are distributed, and thus filters must be studied in conjunction. In order to investigate this idea while enabling systematic visualization and quantification of multiple filter responses, we introduce the Net2Vec framework, in which semantic concepts are mapped to vectorial embeddings based on corresponding filter responses. By studying such embeddings, we are able to show that 1., in most cases, multiple filters are required to code for a concept, that 2., often filters are not concept specific and help encode multiple concepts, and that 3., compared to single filter activations, filter embeddings are able to better characterize the meaning of a representation and its relationship to other concepts.

We uncover a surprising multilingual bias occurring in a popular class of multimodal vision-language models (VLMs). Including an image in the query to a LLaVA-style VLM significantly increases the likelihood of the model returning an English response, regardless of the language of the query. This paper investigates the causes of this loss with a two-pronged approach that combines extensive ablation of the design space with a mechanistic analysis of the models' internal representations of image and text inputs. Both approaches indicate that the issue stems in the language modelling component of the LLaVA model. Statistically, we find that switching the language backbone for a bilingual language model has the strongest effect on reducing this error. Mechanistically, we provide compelling evidence that visual inputs are not mapped to a similar space as text ones, and that intervening on intermediary attention layers can reduce this bias. Our findings provide important insights to researchers and engineers seeking to understand the crossover between multimodal and multilingual spaces, and contribute to the goal of developing capable and inclusive VLMs for non-English contexts.

When robots learn reward functions using high capacity models that take raw state directly as input, they need to both learn a representation for what matters in the task -- the task ``features" -- as well as how to combine these features into a single objective. If they try to do both at once from input designed to teach the full reward function, it is easy to end up with a representation that contains spurious correlations in the data, which fails to generalize to new settings. Instead, our ultimate goal is to enable robots to identify and isolate the causal features that people actually care about and use when they represent states and behavior. Our idea is that we can tune into this representation by asking users what behaviors they consider similar: behaviors will be similar if the features that matter are similar, even if low-level behavior is different; conversely, behaviors will be different if even one of the features that matter differs. This, in turn, is what enables the robot to disambiguate between what needs to go into the representation versus what is spurious, as well as what aspects of behavior can be compressed together versus not. The notion of learning representations based on similarity has a nice parallel in contrastive learning, a self-supervised representation learning technique that maps visually similar data points to similar embeddings, where similarity is defined by a designer through data augmentation heuristics. By contrast, in order to learn the representations that people use, so we can learn their preferences and objectives, we use their definition of similarity. In simulation as well as in a user study, we show that learning through such similarity queries leads to representations that, while far from perfect, are indeed more generalizable than self-supervised and task-input alternatives.

Despite rapid adoption and deployment of large language models (LLMs), the internal computations of these models remain opaque and poorly understood. In this work, we seek to understand how high-level human-interpretable features are represented within the internal neuron activations of LLMs. We train k-sparse linear classifiers (probes) on these internal activations to predict the presence of features in the input; by varying the value of k we study the sparsity of learned representations and how this varies with model scale. With k=1, we localize individual neurons which are highly relevant for a particular feature, and perform a number of case studies to illustrate general properties of LLMs. In particular, we show that early layers make use of sparse combinations of neurons to represent many features in superposition, that middle layers have seemingly dedicated neurons to represent higher-level contextual features, and that increasing scale causes representational sparsity to increase on average, but there are multiple types of scaling dynamics. In all, we probe for over 100 unique features comprising 10 different categories in 7 different models spanning 70 million to 6.9 billion parameters.

Pretrained generative models have opened new frontiers in brain decoding by enabling the synthesis of realistic texts and images from non-invasive brain recordings. However, the reliability of such outputs remains questionable--whether they truly reflect semantic activation in the brain, or are merely hallucinated by the powerful generative models. In this paper, we focus on EEG-to-text decoding and address its hallucination issue through the lens of posterior collapse. Acknowledging the underlying mismatch in information capacity between EEG and text, we reframe the decoding task as semantic summarization of core meanings rather than previously verbatim reconstruction of stimulus texts. To this end, we propose the Generative Language Inspection Model (GLIM), which emphasizes learning informative and interpretable EEG representations to improve semantic grounding under heterogeneous and small-scale data conditions. Experiments on the public ZuCo dataset demonstrate that GLIM consistently generates fluent, EEG-grounded sentences without teacher forcing. Moreover, it supports more robust evaluation beyond text similarity, through EEG-text retrieval and zero-shot semantic classification across sentiment categories, relation types, and corpus topics. Together, our architecture and evaluation protocols lay the foundation for reliable and scalable benchmarking in generative brain decoding.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive capabilities in various reasoning tasks, aided by techniques like chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting that elicits verbalized reasoning. However, LLMs often generate text with obvious mistakes and contradictions, raising doubts about their ability to robustly process and utilize generated rationales. In this work, we investigate CoT reasoning in LLMs through the lens of internal representations, focusing on how these representations are influenced by generated rationales. Our preliminary analysis reveals that while generated rationales improve answer accuracy, inconsistencies emerge between the model's internal representations in middle layers and those in final layers, potentially undermining the reliability of their reasoning processes. To address this, we propose internal consistency as a measure of the model's confidence by examining the agreement of latent predictions decoded from intermediate layers. Extensive empirical studies across different models and datasets demonstrate that internal consistency effectively distinguishes between correct and incorrect reasoning paths. Motivated by this, we propose a new approach to calibrate CoT reasoning by up-weighting reasoning paths with high internal consistency, resulting in a significant boost in reasoning performance. Further analysis uncovers distinct patterns in attention and feed-forward modules across layers, providing insights into the emergence of internal inconsistency. In summary, our results demonstrate the potential of using internal representations for self-evaluation of LLMs.

Many recent works have discussed the propensity, or lack thereof, for emergent languages to exhibit properties of natural languages. A favorite in the literature is learning compositionality. We note that most of those works have focused on communicative bandwidth as being of primary importance. While important, it is not the only contributing factor. In this paper, we investigate the learning biases that affect the efficacy and compositionality of emergent languages. Our foremost contribution is to explore how capacity of a neural network impacts its ability to learn a compositional language. We additionally introduce a set of evaluation metrics with which we analyze the learned languages. Our hypothesis is that there should be a specific range of model capacity and channel bandwidth that induces compositional structure in the resulting language and consequently encourages systematic generalization. While we empirically see evidence for the bottom of this range, we curiously do not find evidence for the top part of the range and believe that this is an open question for the community.

We report the presence of a simple neural mechanism that represents an input-output function as a vector within autoregressive transformer language models (LMs). Using causal mediation analysis on a diverse range of in-context-learning (ICL) tasks, we find that a small number attention heads transport a compact representation of the demonstrated task, which we call a function vector (FV). FVs are robust to changes in context, i.e., they trigger execution of the task on inputs such as zero-shot and natural text settings that do not resemble the ICL contexts from which they are collected. We test FVs across a range of tasks, models, and layers and find strong causal effects across settings in middle layers. We investigate the internal structure of FVs and find while that they often contain information that encodes the output space of the function, this information alone is not sufficient to reconstruct an FV. Finally, we test semantic vector composition in FVs, and find that to some extent they can be summed to create vectors that trigger new complex tasks. Taken together, our findings suggest that LLMs contain internal abstractions of general-purpose functions that can be invoked in a variety of contexts.

What are the root causes of hallucinations in large language models (LLMs)? We use Communication Complexity to prove that the Transformer layer is incapable of composing functions (e.g., identify a grandparent of a person in a genealogy) if the domains of the functions are large enough; we show through examples that this inability is already empirically present when the domains are quite small. We also point out that several mathematical tasks that are at the core of the so-called compositional tasks thought to be hard for LLMs are unlikely to be solvable by Transformers, for large enough instances and assuming that certain well accepted conjectures in the field of Computational Complexity are true.

In recent years, large-scale transformer decoders such as the GPT-x family of models have become increasingly popular. Studies examining the behavior of these models tend to focus only on the output of the language modeling head and avoid analysis of the internal states of the transformer decoder. In this study, we present a collection of methods to analyze the hidden states of GPT-2 and use the model's navigation of garden path sentences as a case study. To enable this, we compile the largest currently available dataset of garden path sentences. We show that Manhattan distances and cosine similarities provide more reliable insights compared to established surprisal methods that analyze next-token probabilities computed by a language modeling head. Using these methods, we find that negating tokens have minimal impacts on the model's representations for unambiguous forms of sentences with ambiguity solely over what the object of a verb is, but have a more substantial impact of representations for unambiguous sentences whose ambiguity would stem from the voice of a verb. Further, we find that analyzing the decoder model's hidden states reveals periods of ambiguity that might conclude in a garden path effect but happen not to, whereas surprisal analyses routinely miss this detail.

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) have resulted in increasingly anthropomorphic language concerning the ability of LLMs to reason. Whether reasoning in LLMs should be understood to be inherently different is, however, widely debated. We propose utilizing a representation engineering approach wherein model activations are read from the residual stream of an LLM when processing a reasoning task. The activations are used to derive a control vector that is applied to the model as an inference-time intervention, modulating the representational space of the model, to improve performance on the specified task. We publish the code for deriving control vectors and analyzing model representations. The method allows us to improve performance on reasoning benchmarks and assess how control vectors influence the final logit distribution of a model via metrics such as KL divergence and entropy. We apply control vectors to Mistral-7B-Instruct and a range of Pythia models on an inductive, a deductive and mathematical reasoning task. We show that an LLM can, to a certain degree, be controlled to improve its perceived reasoning ability by modulating activations. The intervention is dependent upon the ability to reliably extract the model's typical state when correctly solving a task. Our results suggest that reasoning performance can be modulated in the same manner as other information-processing tasks performed by LLMs and demonstrate that we are capable of improving performance on specific tasks via a simple intervention on the residual stream with no additional training.

Understanding what defines a good representation in large language models (LLMs) is fundamental to both theoretical understanding and practical applications. In this paper, we investigate the quality of intermediate representations in various LLM architectures, including Transformers and State Space Models (SSMs). We find that intermediate layers often yield more informative representations for downstream tasks than the final layers. To measure the representation quality, we adapt and apply a suite of metrics - such as prompt entropy, curvature, and augmentation-invariance - originally proposed in other contexts. Our empirical study reveals significant architectural differences, how representations evolve throughout training, and how factors like input randomness and prompt length affect each layer. Notably, we observe a bimodal pattern in the entropy of some intermediate layers and consider potential explanations tied to training data. Overall, our results illuminate the internal mechanics of LLMs and guide strategies for architectural optimization and training.

The Transformer architecture processes sequences by implementing a form of neural message-passing that consists of iterative information retrieval (attention), followed by local processing (position-wise MLP). Two types of information are essential under this general computational paradigm: "sensory" information about individual objects, and "relational" information describing the relationships between objects. Standard attention naturally encodes the former, but does not explicitly encode the latter. In this paper, we present an extension of Transformers where multi-head attention is augmented with two distinct types of attention heads, each routing information of a different type. The first type is the standard attention mechanism of Transformers, which captures object-level features, while the second type is a novel attention mechanism we propose to explicitly capture relational information. The two types of attention heads each possess different inductive biases, giving the resulting architecture greater efficiency and versatility. The promise of this approach is demonstrated empirically across a range of tasks.

Representational analysis explores how input data of a neural system are encoded in high dimensional spaces of its distributed neural activations, and how we can compare different systems, for instance, artificial neural networks and brains, on those grounds. While existing methods offer important insights, they typically do not account for local intrinsic geometrical properties within the high-dimensional representation spaces. To go beyond these limitations, we explore Ollivier-Ricci curvature and Ricci flow as tools to study the alignment of representations between humans and artificial neural systems on a geometric level. As a proof-of-principle study, we compared the representations of face stimuli between VGG-Face, a human-aligned version of VGG-Face, and corresponding human similarity judgments from a large online study. Using this discrete geometric framework, we were able to identify local structural similarities and differences by examining the distributions of node and edge curvature and higher-level properties by detecting and comparing community structure in the representational graphs.

Recent text-to-image generative models have demonstrated an unparalleled ability to generate diverse and creative imagery guided by a target text prompt. While revolutionary, current state-of-the-art diffusion models may still fail in generating images that fully convey the semantics in the given text prompt. We analyze the publicly available Stable Diffusion model and assess the existence of catastrophic neglect, where the model fails to generate one or more of the subjects from the input prompt. Moreover, we find that in some cases the model also fails to correctly bind attributes (e.g., colors) to their corresponding subjects. To help mitigate these failure cases, we introduce the concept of Generative Semantic Nursing (GSN), where we seek to intervene in the generative process on the fly during inference time to improve the faithfulness of the generated images. Using an attention-based formulation of GSN, dubbed Attend-and-Excite, we guide the model to refine the cross-attention units to attend to all subject tokens in the text prompt and strengthen - or excite - their activations, encouraging the model to generate all subjects described in the text prompt. We compare our approach to alternative approaches and demonstrate that it conveys the desired concepts more faithfully across a range of text prompts.

Generative language models often struggle with specialized or less-discussed knowledge. A potential solution is found in Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) models which act like retrieving information before generating responses. In this study, we explore how the Atlas approach, a RAG model, decides between what it already knows (parametric) and what it retrieves (non-parametric). We use causal mediation analysis and controlled experiments to examine how internal representations influence information processing. Our findings disentangle the effects of parametric knowledge and the retrieved context. They indicate that in cases where the model can choose between both types of information (parametric and non-parametric), it relies more on the context than the parametric knowledge. Furthermore, the analysis investigates the computations involved in how the model uses the information from the context. We find that multiple mechanisms are active within the model and can be detected with mediation analysis: first, the decision of whether the context is relevant, and second, how the encoder computes output representations to support copying when relevant.

We investigate applying audio manipulations using pretrained neural network-based autoencoders as an alternative to traditional signal processing methods, since the former may provide greater semantic or perceptual organization. To establish the potential of this approach, we first establish if representations from these models encode information about manipulations. We carry out experiments and produce visualizations using representations from two different pretrained autoencoders. Our findings indicate that, while some information about audio manipulations is encoded, this information is both limited and encoded in a non-trivial way. This is supported by our attempts to visualize these representations, which demonstrated that trajectories of representations for common manipulations are typically nonlinear and content dependent, even for linear signal manipulations. As a result, it is not yet clear how these pretrained autoencoders can be used to manipulate audio signals, however, our results indicate this may be due to the lack of disentanglement with respect to common audio manipulations.

Do large language models (LLMs) solve reasoning tasks by learning robust generalizable algorithms, or do they memorize training data? To investigate this question, we use arithmetic reasoning as a representative task. Using causal analysis, we identify a subset of the model (a circuit) that explains most of the model's behavior for basic arithmetic logic and examine its functionality. By zooming in on the level of individual circuit neurons, we discover a sparse set of important neurons that implement simple heuristics. Each heuristic identifies a numerical input pattern and outputs corresponding answers. We hypothesize that the combination of these heuristic neurons is the mechanism used to produce correct arithmetic answers. To test this, we categorize each neuron into several heuristic types-such as neurons that activate when an operand falls within a certain range-and find that the unordered combination of these heuristic types is the mechanism that explains most of the model's accuracy on arithmetic prompts. Finally, we demonstrate that this mechanism appears as the main source of arithmetic accuracy early in training. Overall, our experimental results across several LLMs show that LLMs perform arithmetic using neither robust algorithms nor memorization; rather, they rely on a "bag of heuristics".

Large language models (LLMs) have a tendency to generate plausible-sounding yet factually incorrect responses, especially when queried on unfamiliar concepts. In this work, we explore the underlying mechanisms that govern how finetuned LLMs hallucinate. Our investigation reveals an interesting pattern: as inputs become more unfamiliar, LLM outputs tend to default towards a ``hedged'' prediction, whose form is determined by how the unfamiliar examples in the finetuning data are supervised. Thus, by strategically modifying these examples' supervision, we can control LLM predictions for unfamiliar inputs (e.g., teach them to say ``I don't know''). Based on these principles, we develop an RL approach that more reliably mitigates hallucinations for long-form generation tasks, by tackling the challenges presented by reward model hallucinations. We validate our findings with a series of controlled experiments in multiple-choice QA on MMLU, as well as long-form biography and book/movie plot generation tasks.

We respond to the recent paper by Makelov et al. (2023), which reviews subspace interchange intervention methods like distributed alignment search (DAS; Geiger et al. 2023) and claims that these methods potentially cause "interpretability illusions". We first review Makelov et al. (2023)'s technical notion of what an "interpretability illusion" is, and then we show that even intuitive and desirable explanations can qualify as illusions in this sense. As a result, their method of discovering "illusions" can reject explanations they consider "non-illusory". We then argue that the illusions Makelov et al. (2023) see in practice are artifacts of their training and evaluation paradigms. We close by emphasizing that, though we disagree with their core characterization, Makelov et al. (2023)'s examples and discussion have undoubtedly pushed the field of interpretability forward.

Learning compatible representations enables the interchangeable use of semantic features as models are updated over time. This is particularly relevant in search and retrieval systems where it is crucial to avoid reprocessing of the gallery images with the updated model. While recent research has shown promising empirical evidence, there is still a lack of comprehensive theoretical understanding about learning compatible representations. In this paper, we demonstrate that the stationary representations learned by the d-Simplex fixed classifier optimally approximate compatibility representation according to the two inequality constraints of its formal definition. This not only establishes a solid foundation for future works in this line of research but also presents implications that can be exploited in practical learning scenarios. An exemplary application is the now-standard practice of downloading and fine-tuning new pre-trained models. Specifically, we show the strengths and critical issues of stationary representations in the case in which a model undergoing sequential fine-tuning is asynchronously replaced by downloading a better-performing model pre-trained elsewhere. Such a representation enables seamless delivery of retrieval service (i.e., no reprocessing of gallery images) and offers improved performance without operational disruptions during model replacement. Code available at: https://github.com/miccunifi/iamcl2r.

The ability to predict upcoming events has been hypothesized to comprise a key aspect of natural and machine cognition. This is supported by trends in deep reinforcement learning (RL), where self-supervised auxiliary objectives such as prediction are widely used to support representation learning and improve task performance. Here, we study the effects predictive auxiliary objectives have on representation learning across different modules of an RL system and how these mimic representational changes observed in the brain. We find that predictive objectives improve and stabilize learning particularly in resource-limited architectures, and we identify settings where longer predictive horizons better support representational transfer. Furthermore, we find that representational changes in this RL system bear a striking resemblance to changes in neural activity observed in the brain across various experiments. Specifically, we draw a connection between the auxiliary predictive model of the RL system and hippocampus, an area thought to learn a predictive model to support memory-guided behavior. We also connect the encoder network and the value learning network of the RL system to visual cortex and striatum in the brain, respectively. This work demonstrates how representation learning in deep RL systems can provide an interpretable framework for modeling multi-region interactions in the brain. The deep RL perspective taken here also suggests an additional role of the hippocampus in the brain -- that of an auxiliary learning system that benefits representation learning in other regions.

The recent phenomenal success of language models has reinvigorated machine learning research, and large sequence models such as transformers are being applied to a variety of domains. One important problem class that has remained relatively elusive however is purposeful adaptive behavior. Currently there is a common perception that sequence models "lack the understanding of the cause and effect of their actions" leading them to draw incorrect inferences due to auto-suggestive delusions. In this report we explain where this mismatch originates, and show that it can be resolved by treating actions as causal interventions. Finally, we show that in supervised learning, one can teach a system to condition or intervene on data by training with factual and counterfactual error signals respectively.

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) show reasoning promise, yet their visual perception is a critical bottleneck. Strikingly, MLLMs can produce correct answers even while misinterpreting crucial visual elements, masking these underlying failures. Our preliminary study on a joint perception-reasoning dataset revealed that for one leading MLLM, 29% of its correct answers to reasoning questions still exhibited visual perception errors. To systematically address this, we introduce "Do You See Me", a scalable benchmark with 1,758 images and 2,612 questions. It spans seven human-psychology inspired subtasks in 2D and 3D, featuring controllable complexity to rigorously evaluate MLLM visual skills. Our findings on 3 leading closed-source and 5 major open-source models reveal a stark deficit: humans achieve 96.49% accuracy, while top MLLMs average below 50%. This performance gap widens rapidly with increased task complexity (e.g., from 12% to 45% in the visual form constancy subtask). Further analysis into the root causes suggests that failures stem from challenges like misallocated visual attention and the instability of internal representations for fine-grained details, especially at or below encoder patch resolution. This underscores an urgent need for MLLMs with truly robust visual perception. The benchmark dataset, source code and evaluation scripts are available at https://github.com/microsoft/Do-You-See-Me.

Visual search is a ubiquitous and often challenging daily task, exemplified by looking for the car keys at home or a friend in a crowd. An intriguing property of some classical search tasks is an asymmetry such that finding a target A among distractors B can be easier than finding B among A. To elucidate the mechanisms responsible for asymmetry in visual search, we propose a computational model that takes a target and a search image as inputs and produces a sequence of eye movements until the target is found. The model integrates eccentricity-dependent visual recognition with target-dependent top-down cues. We compared the model against human behavior in six paradigmatic search tasks that show asymmetry in humans. Without prior exposure to the stimuli or task-specific training, the model provides a plausible mechanism for search asymmetry. We hypothesized that the polarity of search asymmetry arises from experience with the natural environment. We tested this hypothesis by training the model on augmented versions of ImageNet where the biases of natural images were either removed or reversed. The polarity of search asymmetry disappeared or was altered depending on the training protocol. This study highlights how classical perceptual properties can emerge in neural network models, without the need for task-specific training, but rather as a consequence of the statistical properties of the developmental diet fed to the model. All source code and data are publicly available at https://github.com/kreimanlab/VisualSearchAsymmetry.

How do sequence models represent their decision-making process? Prior work suggests that Othello-playing neural network learned nonlinear models of the board state (Li et al., 2023). In this work, we provide evidence of a closely related linear representation of the board. In particular, we show that probing for "my colour" vs. "opponent's colour" may be a simple yet powerful way to interpret the model's internal state. This precise understanding of the internal representations allows us to control the model's behaviour with simple vector arithmetic. Linear representations enable significant interpretability progress, which we demonstrate with further exploration of how the world model is computed.

Motivated by the hypothesis that neural network representations encode abstract, interpretable features as linearly accessible, approximately orthogonal directions, sparse autoencoders (SAEs) have become a popular tool in interpretability. However, recent work has demonstrated phenomenology of model representations that lies outside the scope of this hypothesis, showing signatures of hierarchical, nonlinear, and multi-dimensional features. This raises the question: do SAEs represent features that possess structure at odds with their motivating hypothesis? If not, does avoiding this mismatch help identify said features and gain further insights into neural network representations? To answer these questions, we take a construction-based approach and re-contextualize the popular matching pursuits (MP) algorithm from sparse coding to design MP-SAE -- an SAE that unrolls its encoder into a sequence of residual-guided steps, allowing it to capture hierarchical and nonlinearly accessible features. Comparing this architecture with existing SAEs on a mixture of synthetic and natural data settings, we show: (i) hierarchical concepts induce conditionally orthogonal features, which existing SAEs are unable to faithfully capture, and (ii) the nonlinear encoding step of MP-SAE recovers highly meaningful features, helping us unravel shared structure in the seemingly dichotomous representation spaces of different modalities in a vision-language model, hence demonstrating the assumption that useful features are solely linearly accessible is insufficient. We also show that the sequential encoder principle of MP-SAE affords an additional benefit of adaptive sparsity at inference time, which may be of independent interest. Overall, we argue our results provide credence to the idea that interpretability should begin with the phenomenology of representations, with methods emerging from assumptions that fit it.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown remarkable performance in various tasks but often fail to handle queries that exceed their knowledge and capabilities, leading to incorrect or fabricated responses. This paper addresses the need for LLMs to recognize and refuse infeasible tasks due to the required skills surpassing their capabilities. We first systematically conceptualize infeasible tasks for LLMs, providing formal definitions and categorizations that cover a spectrum of related hallucinations. We develop and benchmark a new dataset comprising diverse infeasible and feasible tasks to test multiple LLMs' abilities on task feasibility. Furthermore, we explore the potential of training enhancements to increase LLMs' refusal capabilities with fine-tuning. Experiments validate the effectiveness of our methods, offering promising directions for refining the operational boundaries of LLMs in real applications.

Large language models (LLMs) are susceptible to hallucinations-outputs that are ungrounded, factually incorrect, or inconsistent with prior generations. We focus on close-book Question Answering (CBQA), where previous work has not fully addressed the distinction between two possible kinds of hallucinations, namely, whether the model (1) does not hold the correct answer in its parameters or (2) answers incorrectly despite having the required knowledge. We argue that distinguishing these cases is crucial for detecting and mitigating hallucinations. Specifically, case (2) may be mitigated by intervening in the model's internal computation, as the knowledge resides within the model's parameters. In contrast, in case (1) there is no parametric knowledge to leverage for mitigation, so it should be addressed by resorting to an external knowledge source or abstaining. To help distinguish between the two cases, we introduce Wrong Answer despite having Correct Knowledge (WACK), an approach for constructing model-specific datasets for the second hallucination type. Our probing experiments indicate that the two kinds of hallucinations are represented differently in the model's inner states. Next, we show that datasets constructed using WACK exhibit variations across models, demonstrating that even when models share knowledge of certain facts, they still vary in the specific examples that lead to hallucinations. Finally, we show that training a probe on our WACK datasets leads to better hallucination detection of case (2) hallucinations than using the common generic one-size-fits-all datasets. The code is available at https://github.com/technion-cs-nlp/hallucination-mitigation .

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable in-context learning (ICL) capabilities. In this study, we explore a surprising phenomenon related to ICL: LLMs can perform multiple, computationally distinct ICL tasks simultaneously, during a single inference call, a capability we term "task superposition". We provide empirical evidence of this phenomenon across various LLM families and scales and show that this phenomenon emerges even if we train the model to in-context learn one task at a time. We offer theoretical explanations that this capability is well within the expressive power of transformers. We also explore how LLMs internally compose task vectors during superposition. Furthermore, we show that larger models can solve more ICL tasks in parallel, and better calibrate their output distribution. Our findings offer insights into the latent capabilities of LLMs, further substantiate the perspective of "LLMs as superposition of simulators", and raise questions about the mechanisms enabling simultaneous task execution.

The abilities to perceive, learn, and use generalities, similarities, classes, i.e., semantic memory (SM), is central to cognition. Machine learning (ML), neural network, and AI research has been primarily driven by tasks requiring such abilities. However, another central facet of cognition, single-trial formation of permanent memories of experiences, i.e., episodic memory (EM), has had relatively little focus. Only recently has EM-like functionality been added to Deep Learning (DL) models, e.g., Neural Turing Machine, Memory Networks. However, in these cases: a) EM is implemented as a separate module, which entails substantial data movement (and so, time and power) between the DL net itself and EM; and b) individual items are stored localistically within the EM, precluding realizing the exponential representational efficiency of distributed over localist coding. We describe Sparsey, an unsupervised, hierarchical, spatial/spatiotemporal associative memory model differing fundamentally from mainstream ML models, most crucially, in its use of sparse distributed representations (SDRs), or, cell assemblies, which admits an extremely efficient, single-trial learning algorithm that maps input similarity into code space similarity (measured as intersection). SDRs of individual inputs are stored in superposition and because similarity is preserved, the patterns of intersections over the assigned codes reflect the similarity, i.e., statistical, structure, of all orders, not simply pairwise, over the inputs. Thus, SM, i.e., a generative model, is built as a computationally free side effect of the act of storing episodic memory traces of individual inputs, either spatial patterns or sequences. We report initial results on MNIST and on the Weizmann video event recognition benchmarks. While we have not yet attained SOTA class accuracy, learning takes only minutes on a single CPU.

Representational spaces learned via language modeling are fundamental to Natural Language Processing (NLP), however there has been limited understanding regarding how and when during training various types of linguistic information emerge and interact. Leveraging a novel information theoretic probing suite, which enables direct comparisons of not just task performance, but their representational subspaces, we analyze nine tasks covering syntax, semantics and reasoning, across 2M pre-training steps and five seeds. We identify critical learning phases across tasks and time, during which subspaces emerge, share information, and later disentangle to specialize. Across these phases, syntactic knowledge is acquired rapidly after 0.5% of full training. Continued performance improvements primarily stem from the acquisition of open-domain knowledge, while semantics and reasoning tasks benefit from later boosts to long-range contextualization and higher specialization. Measuring cross-task similarity further reveals that linguistically related tasks share information throughout training, and do so more during the critical phase of learning than before or after. Our findings have implications for model interpretability, multi-task learning, and learning from limited data.

Despite their impressive capabilities, multimodal large language models (MLLMs) are prone to hallucinations, i.e., the generated content that is nonsensical or unfaithful to input sources. Unlike in LLMs, hallucinations in MLLMs often stem from the sensitivity of text decoder to visual tokens, leading to a phenomenon akin to "amnesia" about visual information. To address this issue, we propose MemVR, a novel decoding paradigm inspired by common cognition: when the memory of an image seen the moment before is forgotten, people will look at it again for factual answers. Following this principle, we treat visual tokens as supplementary evidence, re-injecting them into the MLLM through Feed Forward Network (FFN) as "key-value memory" at the middle trigger layer. This "look-twice" mechanism occurs when the model exhibits high uncertainty during inference, effectively enhancing factual alignment. Comprehensive experimental evaluations demonstrate that MemVR significantly mitigates hallucination across various MLLMs and excels in general benchmarks without incurring additional time overhead. The implementation is available from https://github.com/1zhou-Wang/MemVR

Despite the recent proliferation of large language models (LLMs), their training recipes -- model architecture, pre-training data and optimization algorithm -- are often very similar. This naturally raises the question of the similarity among the resulting models. In this paper, we propose a novel setting, imaginary question answering (IQA), to better understand model similarity. In IQA, we ask one model to generate purely imaginary questions (e.g., on completely made-up concepts in physics) and prompt another model to answer. Surprisingly, despite the total fictionality of these questions, all models can answer each other's questions with remarkable success, suggesting a "shared imagination space" in which these models operate during such hallucinations. We conduct a series of investigations into this phenomenon and discuss implications on model homogeneity, hallucination, and computational creativity.

Recent work has proposed the linear representation hypothesis: that language models perform computation by manipulating one-dimensional representations of concepts ("features") in activation space. In contrast, we explore whether some language model representations may be inherently multi-dimensional. We begin by developing a rigorous definition of irreducible multi-dimensional features based on whether they can be decomposed into either independent or non-co-occurring lower-dimensional features. Motivated by these definitions, we design a scalable method that uses sparse autoencoders to automatically find multi-dimensional features in GPT-2 and Mistral 7B. These auto-discovered features include strikingly interpretable examples, e.g. circular features representing days of the week and months of the year. We identify tasks where these exact circles are used to solve computational problems involving modular arithmetic in days of the week and months of the year. Finally, we provide evidence that these circular features are indeed the fundamental unit of computation in these tasks with intervention experiments on Mistral 7B and Llama 3 8B, and we find further circular representations by breaking down the hidden states for these tasks into interpretable components.

Recent visuolinguistic pre-trained models show promising progress on various end tasks such as image retrieval and video captioning. Yet, they fail miserably on the recently proposed Winoground dataset, which challenges models to match paired images and English captions, with items constructed to overlap lexically but differ in meaning (e.g., "there is a mug in some grass" vs. "there is some grass in a mug"). By annotating the dataset using new fine-grained tags, we show that solving the Winoground task requires not just compositional language understanding, but a host of other abilities like commonsense reasoning or locating small, out-of-focus objects in low-resolution images. In this paper, we identify the dataset's main challenges through a suite of experiments on related tasks (probing task, image retrieval task), data augmentation, and manual inspection of the dataset. Our analysis suggests that a main challenge in visuolinguistic models may lie in fusing visual and textual representations, rather than in compositional language understanding. We release our annotation and code at https://github.com/ajd12342/why-winoground-hard .

Recent language models have a mysterious tendency to generate false but plausible-sounding text. Such "hallucinations" are an obstacle to the usability of language-based AI systems and can harm people who rely upon their outputs. This work shows shows that there is an inherent statistical reason that pretrained language models hallucinate certain types of facts, having nothing to do with the transformer LM architecture or data quality. For "arbitrary" facts whose veracity cannot be determined from the training data, we show that hallucination is necessary for language models that satisfy a statistical calibration condition appropriate for generative language models. Specifically, if the maximum probability of any fact is bounded, we show that the probability of generating a hallucination is close to the fraction of facts that occur exactly once in the training data (a "Good-Turing" estimate), even assuming ideal training data without errors. One conclusion is that models pretrained to be sufficiently good predictors (i.e., calibrated) may require post-training to mitigate hallucinations on the type of arbitrary facts that tend to appear once in the training set. However, our analysis also suggests that there is no statistical reason that pretraining will lead to hallucination on facts that tend to appear more than once in the training data (like references to publications such as articles and books, whose hallucinations have been particularly notable and problematic) or on systematic facts (like arithmetic calculations). Therefore, different architectures and learning algorithms may mitigate these latter types of hallucinations.

While Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are widely used for a variety of vision-language tasks, one observation is that they sometimes misinterpret visual inputs or fail to follow textual instructions even in straightforward cases, leading to irrelevant responses, mistakes, and ungrounded claims. This observation is analogous to a phenomenon in neuropsychology known as Agnosia, an inability to correctly process sensory modalities and recognize things (e.g., objects, colors, relations). In our study, we adapt this similar concept to define "agnosia in MLLMs", and our goal is to comprehensively evaluate and mitigate such agnosia in MLLMs. Inspired by the diagnosis and treatment process in neuropsychology, we propose a novel framework EMMA (Evaluation and Mitigation of Multimodal Agnosia). In EMMA, we develop an evaluation module that automatically creates fine-grained and diverse visual question answering examples to assess the extent of agnosia in MLLMs comprehensively. We also develop a mitigation module to reduce agnosia in MLLMs through multimodal instruction tuning on fine-grained conversations. To verify the effectiveness of our framework, we evaluate and analyze agnosia in seven state-of-the-art MLLMs using 9K test samples. The results reveal that most of them exhibit agnosia across various aspects and degrees. We further develop a fine-grained instruction set and tune MLLMs to mitigate agnosia, which led to notable improvement in accuracy.

Instruction-tuning is a widely adopted method of finetuning that enables large language models (LLMs) to generate output that more closely resembles human responses to natural language queries, in many cases leading to human-level performance on diverse testbeds. However, it remains unclear whether instruction-tuning truly makes LLMs more similar to how humans process language. We investigate the effect of instruction-tuning on LLM-human similarity in two ways: (1) brain alignment, the similarity of LLM internal representations to neural activity in the human language system, and (2) behavioral alignment, the similarity of LLM and human behavior on a reading task. We assess 25 vanilla and instruction-tuned LLMs across three datasets involving humans reading naturalistic stories and sentences. We discover that instruction-tuning generally enhances brain alignment by an average of 6%, but does not have a similar effect on behavioral alignment. To identify the factors underlying LLM-brain alignment, we compute correlations between the brain alignment of LLMs and various model properties, such as model size, various problem-solving abilities, and performance on tasks requiring world knowledge spanning various domains. Notably, we find a strong positive correlation between brain alignment and model size (r = 0.95), as well as performance on tasks requiring world knowledge (r = 0.81). Our results demonstrate that instruction-tuning LLMs improves both world knowledge representations and brain alignment, suggesting that mechanisms that encode world knowledge in LLMs also improve representational alignment to the human brain.

Large language models frequently rely on both contextual input and parametric knowledge to perform tasks. However, these sources can come into conflict, especially when retrieved documents contradict the model's parametric knowledge. We propose a diagnostic framework to systematically evaluate LLM behavior under context-memory conflict, where the contextual information diverges from their parametric beliefs. We construct diagnostic data that elicit these conflicts and analyze model performance across multiple task types. Our findings reveal that (1) knowledge conflict has minimal impact on tasks that do not require knowledge utilization, (2) model performance is consistently higher when contextual and parametric knowledge are aligned, (3) models are unable to fully suppress their internal knowledge even when instructed, and (4) providing rationales that explain the conflict increases reliance on contexts. These insights raise concerns about the validity of model-based evaluation and underscore the need to account for knowledge conflict in the deployment of LLMs.

The Linear Representation Hypothesis (LRH) states that neural networks learn to encode concepts as directions in activation space, and a strong version of the LRH states that models learn only such encodings. In this paper, we present a counterexample to this strong LRH: when trained to repeat an input token sequence, gated recurrent neural networks (RNNs) learn to represent the token at each position with a particular order of magnitude, rather than a direction. These representations have layered features that are impossible to locate in distinct linear subspaces. To show this, we train interventions to predict and manipulate tokens by learning the scaling factor corresponding to each sequence position. These interventions indicate that the smallest RNNs find only this magnitude-based solution, while larger RNNs have linear representations. These findings strongly indicate that interpretability research should not be confined by the LRH.

We observe an empirical phenomenon in Large Language Models (LLMs) -- very few activations exhibit significantly larger values than others (e.g., 100,000 times larger). We call them massive activations. First, we demonstrate the widespread existence of massive activations across various LLMs and characterize their locations. Second, we find their values largely stay constant regardless of the input, and they function as indispensable bias terms in LLMs. Third, these massive activations lead to the concentration of attention probabilities to their corresponding tokens, and further, implicit bias terms in the self-attention output. Last, we also study massive activations in Vision Transformers. Code is available at https://github.com/locuslab/massive-activations.

Probing and enhancing large language models' reasoning capacity remains a crucial open question. Here we re-purpose the reverse dictionary task as a case study to probe LLMs' capacity for conceptual inference. We use in-context learning to guide the models to generate the term for an object concept implied in a linguistic description. Models robustly achieve high accuracy in this task, and their representation space encodes information about object categories and fine-grained features. Further experiments suggest that the conceptual inference ability as probed by the reverse-dictionary task predicts model's general reasoning performance across multiple benchmarks, despite similar syntactic generalization behaviors across models. Explorative analyses suggest that prompting LLMs with descriptionRightarrowword examples may induce generalization beyond surface-level differences in task construals and facilitate models on broader commonsense reasoning problems.

This paper presents a way of enhancing the reliability of Large Multimodal Models (LMMs) in addressing hallucination effects, where models generate incorrect or unrelated responses. Without additional instruction tuning paradigm, we introduce Counterfactual Inception, a novel method that implants counterfactual thoughts into LMMs using carefully chosen, misaligned counterfactual keywords. This method is grounded in the concept of counterfactual thinking, a cognitive process where humans consider alternative realities and outcomes. By applying this human-like reasoning mechanism to LMMs, we aim to reduce hallucination effects and improve the models' trustworthiness. We also propose Dual-modality Verification Process (DVP), a rigorous framework for selecting optimal counterfactual keywords to trigger counterfactual thinking into LMMs, concurrently considering visual and linguistic context. Our extensive experiments across various LMMs, including both open-source and proprietary models, corroborate that our method significantly mitigates hallucination phenomena across different datasets.

The training of modern large language models (LLMs) takes place in a regime where most training examples are seen only a few times by the model during the course of training. What does a model remember about such examples seen only a few times during training and how long does that memory persist in the face of continuous training with new examples? Here, we investigate these questions through simple recognition, recall, and retention experiments with LLMs. In recognition experiments, we ask if the model can distinguish the seen example from a novel example; in recall experiments, we ask if the model can correctly recall the seen example when cued by a part of it; and in retention experiments, we periodically probe the model's memory for the original examples as the model is trained continuously with new examples. We find that a single exposure is generally sufficient for a model to achieve near perfect accuracy even in very challenging recognition experiments. We estimate that the recognition performance of even small language models easily exceeds human recognition performance reported in similar experiments with humans (Shepard, 1967). Achieving near perfect recall takes more exposures, but most models can do it in just 3 exposures. The flip side of this remarkable capacity for fast learning is that precise memories are quickly overwritten: recall performance for the original examples drops steeply over the first 10 training updates with new examples, followed by a more gradual decline. Even after 100K updates, however, some of the original examples are still recalled near perfectly. A qualitatively similar retention pattern has been observed in human long-term memory retention studies before (Bahrick, 1984). Finally, recognition is much more robust to interference than recall and memory for natural language sentences is generally superior to memory for stimuli without structure.

Learning compositional representation is a key aspect of object-centric learning as it enables flexible systematic generalization and supports complex visual reasoning. However, most of the existing approaches rely on auto-encoding objective, while the compositionality is implicitly imposed by the architectural or algorithmic bias in the encoder. This misalignment between auto-encoding objective and learning compositionality often results in failure of capturing meaningful object representations. In this study, we propose a novel objective that explicitly encourages compositionality of the representations. Built upon the existing object-centric learning framework (e.g., slot attention), our method incorporates additional constraints that an arbitrary mixture of object representations from two images should be valid by maximizing the likelihood of the composite data. We demonstrate that incorporating our objective to the existing framework consistently improves the objective-centric learning and enhances the robustness to the architectural choices.

Transfer learning - i.e., further fine-tuning a pre-trained model on a downstream task - can confer significant advantages, including improved downstream performance, faster convergence, and better sample efficiency. These advantages have led to a proliferation of task-specific fine-tuned models, which typically can only perform a single task and do not benefit from one another. Recently, model merging techniques have emerged as a solution to combine multiple task-specific models into a single multitask model without performing additional training. However, existing merging methods often ignore the interference between parameters of different models, resulting in large performance drops when merging multiple models. In this paper, we demonstrate that prior merging techniques inadvertently lose valuable information due to two major sources of interference: (a) interference due to redundant parameter values and (b) disagreement on the sign of a given parameter's values across models. To address this, we propose our method, TrIm, Elect Sign & Merge (TIES-Merging), which introduces three novel steps when merging models: (1) resetting parameters that only changed a small amount during fine-tuning, (2) resolving sign conflicts, and (3) merging only the parameters that are in alignment with the final agreed-upon sign. We find that TIES-Merging outperforms several existing methods in diverse settings covering a range of modalities, domains, number of tasks, model sizes, architectures, and fine-tuning settings. We further analyze the impact of different types of interference on model parameters, highlight the importance of resolving sign interference. Our code is available at https://github.com/prateeky2806/ties-merging

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive performance on multimodal tasks, without any multimodal finetuning. They are the building block for Large Multimodal Models, yet, we still lack a proper understanding of their success. In this work, we expose frozen LLMs to image, video, audio and text inputs and analyse their internal representation aiming to understand their generalization beyond textual inputs. Findings. Perceptual tokens (1) are easily distinguishable from textual ones inside LLMs, with significantly different representations, and complete translation to textual tokens does not exist. Yet, (2) both perceptual and textual tokens activate similar LLM weights. Despite being different, (3) perceptual and textual tokens are implicitly aligned inside LLMs, we call this the implicit multimodal alignment (IMA), and argue that this is linked to architectural design, helping LLMs to generalize. This provide more evidence to believe that the generalization of LLMs to multimodal inputs is mainly due to their architecture. Implications. (1) We find a positive correlation between the implicit alignment score and the task performance, suggesting that this could act as a proxy metric for model evaluation and selection. (2) A negative correlation exists regarding hallucinations, revealing that this problem is mainly due to misalignment between the internal perceptual and textual representations. (3) Perceptual tokens change slightly throughout the model, thus, we propose different approaches to skip computations (e.g. in FFN layers), and significantly reduce the inference cost. (4) Due to the slowly changing embeddings across layers, and the high overlap between textual and multimodal activated weights, we compress LLMs by keeping only 1 subnetwork that works well across a wide range of multimodal tasks. Paper code: https://github.com/mshukor/ima-lmms.

This paper introduces an efficient and robust method for discovering interpretable circuits in large language models using discrete sparse autoencoders. Our approach addresses key limitations of existing techniques, namely computational complexity and sensitivity to hyperparameters. We propose training sparse autoencoders on carefully designed positive and negative examples, where the model can only correctly predict the next token for the positive examples. We hypothesise that learned representations of attention head outputs will signal when a head is engaged in specific computations. By discretising the learned representations into integer codes and measuring the overlap between codes unique to positive examples for each head, we enable direct identification of attention heads involved in circuits without the need for expensive ablations or architectural modifications. On three well-studied tasks - indirect object identification, greater-than comparisons, and docstring completion - the proposed method achieves higher precision and recall in recovering ground-truth circuits compared to state-of-the-art baselines, while reducing runtime from hours to seconds. Notably, we require only 5-10 text examples for each task to learn robust representations. Our findings highlight the promise of discrete sparse autoencoders for scalable and efficient mechanistic interpretability, offering a new direction for analysing the inner workings of large language models.

While the successes of transformers across many domains are indisputable, accurate understanding of the learning mechanics is still largely lacking. Their capabilities have been probed on benchmarks which include a variety of structured and reasoning tasks -- but mathematical understanding is lagging substantially behind. Recent lines of work have begun studying representational aspects of this question: that is, the size/depth/complexity of attention-based networks to perform certain tasks. However, there is no guarantee the learning dynamics will converge to the constructions proposed. In our paper, we provide fine-grained mechanistic understanding of how transformers learn "semantic structure", understood as capturing co-occurrence structure of words. Precisely, we show, through a combination of experiments on synthetic data modeled by Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA), Wikipedia data, and mathematical analysis that the embedding layer and the self-attention layer encode the topical structure. In the former case, this manifests as higher average inner product of embeddings between same-topic words. In the latter, it manifests as higher average pairwise attention between same-topic words. The mathematical results involve several assumptions to make the analysis tractable, which we verify on data, and might be of independent interest as well.

Despite their remarkable capabilities, Large Language Models (LLMs) are prone to generate responses that contradict verifiable facts, i.e., unfaithful hallucination content. Existing efforts generally focus on optimizing model parameters or editing semantic representations, which compromise the internal factual knowledge of target LLMs. In addition, hallucinations typically exhibit multifaceted patterns in downstream tasks, limiting the model's holistic performance across tasks. In this paper, we propose a Comparator-driven Decoding-Time (CDT) framework to alleviate the response hallucination. Firstly, we construct hallucinatory and truthful comparators with multi-task fine-tuning samples. In this case, we present an instruction prototype-guided mixture of experts strategy to enhance the ability of the corresponding comparators to capture different hallucination or truthfulness patterns in distinct task instructions. CDT constrains next-token predictions to factuality-robust distributions by contrasting the logit differences between the target LLMs and these comparators. Systematic experiments on multiple downstream tasks show that our framework can significantly improve the model performance and response factuality.

"Induction heads" are attention heads that implement a simple algorithm to complete token sequences like [A][B] ... [A] -> [B]. In this work, we present preliminary and indirect evidence for a hypothesis that induction heads might constitute the mechanism for the majority of all "in-context learning" in large transformer models (i.e. decreasing loss at increasing token indices). We find that induction heads develop at precisely the same point as a sudden sharp increase in in-context learning ability, visible as a bump in the training loss. We present six complementary lines of evidence, arguing that induction heads may be the mechanistic source of general in-context learning in transformer models of any size. For small attention-only models, we present strong, causal evidence; for larger models with MLPs, we present correlational evidence.

Recent large language models have been trained on vast datasets, but also often on repeated data, either intentionally for the purpose of upweighting higher quality data, or unintentionally because data deduplication is not perfect and the model is exposed to repeated data at the sentence, paragraph, or document level. Some works have reported substantial negative performance effects of this repeated data. In this paper we attempt to study repeated data systematically and to understand its effects mechanistically. To do this, we train a family of models where most of the data is unique but a small fraction of it is repeated many times. We find a strong double descent phenomenon, in which repeated data can lead test loss to increase midway through training. A predictable range of repetition frequency leads to surprisingly severe degradation in performance. For instance, performance of an 800M parameter model can be degraded to that of a 2x smaller model (400M params) by repeating 0.1% of the data 100 times, despite the other 90% of the training tokens remaining unique. We suspect there is a range in the middle where the data can be memorized and doing so consumes a large fraction of the model's capacity, and this may be where the peak of degradation occurs. Finally, we connect these observations to recent mechanistic interpretability work - attempting to reverse engineer the detailed computations performed by the model - by showing that data repetition disproportionately damages copying and internal structures associated with generalization, such as induction heads, providing a possible mechanism for the shift from generalization to memorization. Taken together, these results provide a hypothesis for why repeating a relatively small fraction of data in large language models could lead to disproportionately large harms to performance.

Quantifying similarity between neural representations -- e.g. hidden layer activation vectors -- is a perennial problem in deep learning and neuroscience research. Existing methods compare deterministic responses (e.g. artificial networks that lack stochastic layers) or averaged responses (e.g., trial-averaged firing rates in biological data). However, these measures of _deterministic_ representational similarity ignore the scale and geometric structure of noise, both of which play important roles in neural computation. To rectify this, we generalize previously proposed shape metrics (Williams et al. 2021) to quantify differences in _stochastic_ representations. These new distances satisfy the triangle inequality, and thus can be used as a rigorous basis for many supervised and unsupervised analyses. Leveraging this novel framework, we find that the stochastic geometries of neurobiological representations of oriented visual gratings and naturalistic scenes respectively resemble untrained and trained deep network representations. Further, we are able to more accurately predict certain network attributes (e.g. training hyperparameters) from its position in stochastic (versus deterministic) shape space.

Modern vision models have achieved remarkable success in benchmarks where local features provide critical information about the target. There is now a growing interest in solving tasks that require more global reasoning, where local features offer no significant information. These tasks are reminiscent of the connectivity tasks discussed by Minsky and Papert in 1969, which exposed the limitations of the perceptron model and contributed to the first AI winter. In this paper, we revisit such tasks by introducing four global visual benchmarks involving path findings and mazes. We show that: (1) although today's large vision models largely surpass the expressivity limitations of the early models, they still struggle with the learning efficiency; we put forward the "globality degree" notion to understand this limitation; (2) we then demonstrate that the picture changes and global reasoning becomes feasible with the introduction of "visual scratchpads"; similarly to the text scratchpads and chain-of-thoughts used in language models, visual scratchpads help break down global tasks into simpler ones; (3) we finally show that some scratchpads are better than others, in particular, "inductive scratchpads" that take steps relying on less information afford better out-of-distribution generalization and succeed for smaller model sizes.

Large language models (LLMs) sometimes fail to respond appropriately to deterministic tasks -- such as counting or forming acronyms -- because the implicit prior distribution they have learned over sequences of tokens influences their responses. In this work, we show that, in at least some cases, LLMs actually compute the information needed to perform these tasks correctly, and we identify some interventions that can allow them to access this information to improve their performance. First, we show that simply prompting the language model to not rely on its prior knowledge leads to dramatic improvements in prior-dominated tasks. We then use mechanistic interpretability techniques to localize the prior within the LLM and manipulate the extent to which that prior influences its responses. Specifically, we show that it is possible to identify layers of the underlying neural network that correlate with the prior probability of a response and that lightweight finetuning of these layers with basic prompts on prior-dominated tasks achieves high performance on held-out answers. These results suggest that the information required to produce a correct response is contained within the representations of the problems formed by the models. Furthermore, we show that this finetuning is significantly more effective for prior-dominated tasks, and that the error after finetuning is no longer correlated with the prior. Our results suggest that it may be possible to define effective methods for manipulating the extent to which LLMs rely upon their priors in solving problems, potentially increasing their performance in settings where LLMs hallucinate for reasons related to the prior probability of token sequences.

The ability to process long contexts is crucial for many natural language processing tasks, yet it remains a significant challenge. While substantial progress has been made in enhancing the efficiency of attention mechanisms, there is still a gap in understanding how attention heads function in long-context settings. In this paper, we observe that while certain heads consistently attend to local information only, others swing between attending to local and long-context information depending on the query. This raises the question: can we identify which heads require long-context information to predict the next token accurately? We demonstrate that it's possible to predict which heads are crucial for long-context processing using only local keys. The core idea here is to exploit a simple model for the long-context scores via second moment approximations. These findings unveil simple properties of attention in the context of long sequences, and open the door to potentially significant gains in efficiency.

Why do brains have inhibitory connections? Why do deep networks have negative weights? We propose an answer from the perspective of representation capacity. We believe representing functions is the primary role of both (i) the brain in natural intelligence, and (ii) deep networks in artificial intelligence. Our answer to why there are inhibitory/negative weights is: to learn more functions. We prove that, in the absence of negative weights, neural networks with non-decreasing activation functions are not universal approximators. While this may be an intuitive result to some, to the best of our knowledge, there is no formal theory, in either machine learning or neuroscience, that demonstrates why negative weights are crucial in the context of representation capacity. Further, we provide insights on the geometric properties of the representation space that non-negative deep networks cannot represent. We expect these insights will yield a deeper understanding of more sophisticated inductive priors imposed on the distribution of weights that lead to more efficient biological and machine learning.

Despite superior reasoning prowess demonstrated by Large Language Models (LLMs) with Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting, a lack of understanding prevails around the internal mechanisms of the models that facilitate CoT generation. This work investigates the neural sub-structures within LLMs that manifest CoT reasoning from a mechanistic point of view. From an analysis of LLaMA-2 7B applied to multistep reasoning over fictional ontologies, we demonstrate that LLMs deploy multiple parallel pathways of answer generation for step-by-step reasoning. These parallel pathways provide sequential answers from the input question context as well as the generated CoT. We observe a striking functional rift in the middle layers of the LLM. Token representations in the initial half remain strongly biased towards the pretraining prior, with the in-context taking over abruptly in the later half. This internal phase shift manifests in different functional components: attention heads that write the answer token predominantly appear in the later half, attention heads that move information along ontological relationships appear exclusively in the initial half, and so on. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt towards mechanistic investigation of CoT reasoning in LLMs.

The prevalent use of large language models (LLMs) in various domains has drawn attention to the issue of "hallucination," which refers to instances where LLMs generate factually inaccurate or ungrounded information. Existing techniques for hallucination detection in language assistants rely on intricate fuzzy, specific free-language-based chain of thought (CoT) techniques or parameter-based methods that suffer from interpretability issues. Additionally, the methods that identify hallucinations post-generation could not prevent their occurrence and suffer from inconsistent performance due to the influence of the instruction format and model style. In this paper, we introduce a novel pre-detection self-evaluation technique, referred to as SELF-FAMILIARITY, which focuses on evaluating the model's familiarity with the concepts present in the input instruction and withholding the generation of response in case of unfamiliar concepts. This approach emulates the human ability to refrain from responding to unfamiliar topics, thus reducing hallucinations. We validate SELF-FAMILIARITY across four different large language models, demonstrating consistently superior performance compared to existing techniques. Our findings propose a significant shift towards preemptive strategies for hallucination mitigation in LLM assistants, promising improvements in reliability, applicability, and interpretability.

Although Visual-Language Models (VLMs) have shown impressive capabilities in tasks like visual question answering and image captioning, they still struggle with hallucinations. Analysis of attention distribution in these models shows that VLMs tend to processing textual tokens rather than visual tokens. This imbalance of attention distribution causes VLMs to favor textual knowledge in the case of multimodal knowledge conflicts, resulting in differences from the image information. In this paper, we propose Re-Balancing Contrastive Decoding (RBD) method, which employs textual and visual branches to recalibrate attention distribution in VLMs. Specifically, the textual branch injects image noise to stimulate the model's dependency on text, thereby reducing textual bias. Concurrently, the visual branch focuses on the selection of significant tokens, refining the attention mechanism to highlight the primary subject. This dual-branch strategy enables the RBD method to diminish textual bias while enhancing visual information. Experimental results demonstrate that our method, RBD, outperforms the existing methods by the CHAIR and POPE metrics, mitigate hallucinations without reducing the model's general capabilities.

A central goal for mechanistic interpretability has been to identify the right units of analysis in large language models (LLMs) that causally explain their outputs. While early work focused on individual neurons, evidence that neurons often encode multiple concepts has motivated a shift toward analyzing directions in activation space. A key question is how to find directions that capture interpretable features in an unsupervised manner. Current methods rely on dictionary learning with sparse autoencoders (SAEs), commonly trained over residual stream activations to learn directions from scratch. However, SAEs often struggle in causal evaluations and lack intrinsic interpretability, as their learning is not explicitly tied to the computations of the model. Here, we tackle these limitations by directly decomposing MLP activations with semi-nonnegative matrix factorization (SNMF), such that the learned features are (a) sparse linear combinations of co-activated neurons, and (b) mapped to their activating inputs, making them directly interpretable. Experiments on Llama 3.1, Gemma 2 and GPT-2 show that SNMF derived features outperform SAEs and a strong supervised baseline (difference-in-means) on causal steering, while aligning with human-interpretable concepts. Further analysis reveals that specific neuron combinations are reused across semantically-related features, exposing a hierarchical structure in the MLP's activation space. Together, these results position SNMF as a simple and effective tool for identifying interpretable features and dissecting concept representations in LLMs.

Bilingual lexical processing is shaped by the complex interplay of phonological, orthographic, and semantic features of two languages within an integrated mental lexicon. In humans, this is evident in the ease with which cognate words - words similar in both orthographic form and meaning (e.g., blind, meaning "sightless" in both English and German) - are processed, compared to the challenges posed by interlingual homographs, which share orthographic form but differ in meaning (e.g., gift, meaning "present" in English but "poison" in German). We investigate how multilingual Large Language Models (LLMs) handle such phenomena, focusing on English-Spanish, English-French, and English-German cognates, non-cognate, and interlingual homographs. Specifically, we evaluate their ability to disambiguate meanings and make semantic judgments, both when these word types are presented in isolation or within sentence contexts. Our findings reveal that while certain LLMs demonstrate strong performance in recognizing cognates and non-cognates in isolation, they exhibit significant difficulty in disambiguating interlingual homographs, often performing below random baselines. This suggests LLMs tend to rely heavily on orthographic similarities rather than semantic understanding when interpreting interlingual homographs. Further, we find LLMs exhibit difficulty in retrieving word meanings, with performance in isolative disambiguation tasks having no correlation with semantic understanding. Finally, we study how the LLM processes interlingual homographs in incongruent sentences. We find models to opt for different strategies in understanding English and non-English homographs, highlighting a lack of a unified approach to handling cross-lingual ambiguities.

Transformers struggle with length generalisation, displaying poor performance even on basic tasks. We test whether these limitations can be explained through two key failures of the self-attention mechanism. The first is the inability to fully remove irrelevant information. The second is tied to position, even if the dot product between a key and query is highly negative (i.e. an irrelevant key) learned positional biases may unintentionally up-weight such information - dangerous when distances become out of distribution. Put together, these two failure cases lead to compounding generalisation difficulties. We test whether they can be mitigated through the combination of a) selective sparsity - completely removing irrelevant keys from the attention softmax and b) contextualised relative distance - distance is only considered as between the query and the keys that matter. We show how refactoring the attention mechanism with these two mitigations in place can substantially improve generalisation capabilities of decoder only transformers.

We study whether Large Language Models (LLMs) latently perform multi-hop reasoning with complex prompts such as "The mother of the singer of 'Superstition' is". We look for evidence of a latent reasoning pathway where an LLM (1) latently identifies "the singer of 'Superstition'" as Stevie Wonder, the bridge entity, and (2) uses its knowledge of Stevie Wonder's mother to complete the prompt. We analyze these two hops individually and consider their co-occurrence as indicative of latent multi-hop reasoning. For the first hop, we test if changing the prompt to indirectly mention the bridge entity instead of any other entity increases the LLM's internal recall of the bridge entity. For the second hop, we test if increasing this recall causes the LLM to better utilize what it knows about the bridge entity. We find strong evidence of latent multi-hop reasoning for the prompts of certain relation types, with the reasoning pathway used in more than 80% of the prompts. However, the utilization is highly contextual, varying across different types of prompts. Also, on average, the evidence for the second hop and the full multi-hop traversal is rather moderate and only substantial for the first hop. Moreover, we find a clear scaling trend with increasing model size for the first hop of reasoning but not for the second hop. Our experimental findings suggest potential challenges and opportunities for future development and applications of LLMs.

Modelling compositional meaning for sentences using empirical distributional methods has been a challenge for computational linguists. We implement the abstract categorical model of Coecke et al. (arXiv:1003.4394v1 [cs.CL]) using data from the BNC and evaluate it. The implementation is based on unsupervised learning of matrices for relational words and applying them to the vectors of their arguments. The evaluation is based on the word disambiguation task developed by Mitchell and Lapata (2008) for intransitive sentences, and on a similar new experiment designed for transitive sentences. Our model matches the results of its competitors in the first experiment, and betters them in the second. The general improvement in results with increase in syntactic complexity showcases the compositional power of our model.

Understanding the connections between artificial and biological intelligent systems can reveal fundamental principles underlying general intelligence. While many artificial intelligence (AI) models have a neuroscience counterpart, such connections are largely missing in Transformer models and the self-attention mechanism. Here, we examine the relationship between attention heads and human episodic memory. We focus on the induction heads, which contribute to the in-context learning capabilities of Transformer-based large language models (LLMs). We demonstrate that induction heads are behaviorally, functionally, and mechanistically similar to the contextual maintenance and retrieval (CMR) model of human episodic memory. Our analyses of LLMs pre-trained on extensive text data show that CMR-like heads often emerge in the intermediate model layers and that their behavior qualitatively mirrors the memory biases seen in humans. Our findings uncover a parallel between the computational mechanisms of LLMs and human memory, offering valuable insights into both research fields.

Natural language is an appealing medium for explaining how large language models process and store information, but evaluating the faithfulness of such explanations is challenging. To help address this, we develop two modes of evaluation for natural language explanations that claim individual neurons represent a concept in a text input. In the observational mode, we evaluate claims that a neuron a activates on all and only input strings that refer to a concept picked out by the proposed explanation E. In the intervention mode, we construe E as a claim that the neuron a is a causal mediator of the concept denoted by E. We apply our framework to the GPT-4-generated explanations of GPT-2 XL neurons of Bills et al. (2023) and show that even the most confident explanations have high error rates and little to no causal efficacy. We close the paper by critically assessing whether natural language is a good choice for explanations and whether neurons are the best level of analysis.

In the study of LLMs, sycophancy represents a prevalent hallucination that poses significant challenges to these models. Specifically, LLMs often fail to adhere to original correct responses, instead blindly agreeing with users' opinions, even when those opinions are incorrect or malicious. However, research on sycophancy in visual language models (VLMs) has been scarce. In this work, we extend the exploration of sycophancy from LLMs to VLMs, introducing the MM-SY benchmark to evaluate this phenomenon. We present evaluation results from multiple representative models, addressing the gap in sycophancy research for VLMs. To mitigate sycophancy, we propose a synthetic dataset for training and employ methods based on prompts, supervised fine-tuning, and DPO. Our experiments demonstrate that these methods effectively alleviate sycophancy in VLMs. Additionally, we probe VLMs to assess the semantic impact of sycophancy and analyze the attention distribution of visual tokens. Our findings indicate that the ability to prevent sycophancy is predominantly observed in higher layers of the model. The lack of attention to image knowledge in these higher layers may contribute to sycophancy, and enhancing image attention at high layers proves beneficial in mitigating this issue.

Large Multi-modal Models (LMMs) have recently demonstrated remarkable abilities in visual context understanding and coherent response generation. However, alongside these advancements, the issue of hallucinations has emerged as a significant challenge, producing erroneous responses that are unrelated to the visual contents. In this paper, we introduce a novel contrastive-based decoding method, COuntering DEscription Contrastive Decoding (CODE), which leverages self-generated descriptions as contrasting references during the decoding phase of LMMs to address hallucination issues. CODE utilizes the comprehensive descriptions from model itself as visual counterpart to correct and improve response alignment with actual visual content. By dynamically adjusting the information flow and distribution of next-token predictions in the LMM's vocabulary, CODE enhances the coherence and informativeness of generated responses. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method significantly reduces hallucinations and improves cross-modal consistency across various benchmarks and cutting-edge LMMs. Our method provides a simple yet effective decoding strategy that can be integrated to existing LMM frameworks without additional training.

Interestingly, LLMs yet struggle with some basic tasks that humans find trivial to handle, e.g., counting the number of character r's in the word "strawberry". There are several popular conjectures (e.g., tokenization, architecture and training data) regarding the reason for deficiency of LLMs in simple word-based counting problems, sharing the similar belief that such failure stems from model pretraining hence probably inevitable during deployment. In this paper, we carefully design multiple evaluation settings to investigate validity of prevalent conjectures. Meanwhile, we measure transferability of advanced mathematical and coding reasoning capabilities from specialized LLMs to simple counting tasks. Although specialized LLMs suffer from counting problems as well, we find conjectures about inherent deficiency of LLMs invalid and further seek opportunities to elicit knowledge and capabilities from LLMs that are beneficial to counting tasks. Compared with strategies such as finetuning and in-context learning that are commonly adopted to enhance performance on new or challenging tasks, we show that engaging reasoning is the most robust and efficient way to help LLMs better perceive tasks with more accurate responses. We hope our conjecture validation design could provide insights into the study of future critical failure modes of LLMs. Based on challenges in transferring advanced capabilities to much simpler tasks, we call for more attention to model capability acquisition and evaluation. We also highlight the importance of cultivating consciousness of "reasoning before responding" during model pretraining.

Every day, humans perceive objects and communicate these perceptions through various channels. In this paper, we present a computational model designed to track and simulate the perception of objects, as well as their representations as conveyed in communication. We delineate two fundamental components of our internal representation, termed "observed" and "seen", which we correlate with established concepts in computer vision, namely encoding and decoding. These components are integrated into semiotic networks, which simulate perceptual inference of object perception and human communication. Our model of object perception by a person allows us to define object perception by {\em a network}. We demonstrate this with an example of an image baseline classifier by constructing a new network that includes the baseline classifier and an additional layer. This layer produces the images "perceived" by the entire network, transforming it into a perceptualized image classifier. This facilitates visualization of the acquired network. Within our network, the image representations become more efficient for classification tasks when they are assembled and randomized. In our experiments, the perceptualized network outperformed the baseline classifier on MNIST training databases consisting of a restricted number of images. Our model is not limited to persons and can be applied to any system featuring a loop involving the processing from "internal" to "external" representations.

By computing the rank correlation between attention weights and feature-additive explanation methods, previous analyses either invalidate or support the role of attention-based explanations as a faithful and plausible measure of salience. To investigate whether this approach is appropriate, we compare LIME, Integrated Gradients, DeepLIFT, Grad-SHAP, Deep-SHAP, and attention-based explanations, applied to two neural architectures trained on single- and pair-sequence language tasks. In most cases, we find that none of our chosen methods agree. Based on our empirical observations and theoretical objections, we conclude that rank correlation does not measure the quality of feature-additive methods. Practitioners should instead use the numerous and rigorous diagnostic methods proposed by the community.

Linear sequence modeling methods, such as linear attention, state space modeling, and linear RNNs, offer significant efficiency improvements by reducing the complexity of training and inference. However, these methods typically compress the entire input sequence into a single fixed-size memory state, which leads to suboptimal performance on recall-intensive downstream tasks. Drawing inspiration from neuroscience, particularly the brain's ability to maintain robust long-term memory while mitigating "memory interference", we introduce a novel architecture called Mixture-of-Memories (MoM). MoM utilizes multiple independent memory states, with a router network directing input tokens to specific memory states. This approach greatly enhances the overall memory capacity while minimizing memory interference. As a result, MoM performs exceptionally well on recall-intensive tasks, surpassing existing linear sequence modeling techniques. Despite incorporating multiple memory states, the computation of each memory state remains linear in complexity, allowing MoM to retain the linear-complexity advantage during training, while constant-complexity during inference. Our experimental results show that MoM significantly outperforms current linear sequence models on downstream language tasks, particularly recall-intensive tasks, and even achieves performance comparable to Transformer models. The code is released at https://github.com/OpenSparseLLMs/MoM and is also released as a part of https://github.com/OpenSparseLLMs/Linear-MoE.

Understanding and manipulating the causal generation mechanisms in language models is essential for controlling their behavior. Previous work has primarily relied on techniques such as representation surgery -- e.g., model ablations or manipulation of linear subspaces tied to specific concepts -- to intervene on these models. To understand the impact of interventions precisely, it is useful to examine counterfactuals -- e.g., how a given sentence would have appeared had it been generated by the model following a specific intervention. We highlight that counterfactual reasoning is conceptually distinct from interventions, as articulated in Pearl's causal hierarchy. Based on this observation, we propose a framework for generating true string counterfactuals by reformulating language models as Generalized Structural-equation. Models using the Gumbel-max trick. This allows us to model the joint distribution over original strings and their counterfactuals resulting from the same instantiation of the sampling noise. We develop an algorithm based on hindsight Gumbel sampling that allows us to infer the latent noise variables and generate counterfactuals of observed strings. Our experiments demonstrate that the approach produces meaningful counterfactuals while at the same time showing that commonly used intervention techniques have considerable undesired side effects.

As large language models continue to develop in the field of AI, text generation systems are susceptible to a worrisome phenomenon known as hallucination. In this study, we summarize recent compelling insights into hallucinations in LLMs. We present a novel taxonomy of hallucinations from various text generation tasks, thus provide theoretical insights, detection methods and improvement approaches. Based on this, future research directions are proposed. Our contribution are threefold: (1) We provide a detailed and complete taxonomy for hallucinations appearing in text generation tasks; (2) We provide theoretical analyses of hallucinations in LLMs and provide existing detection and improvement methods; (3) We propose several research directions that can be developed in the future. As hallucinations garner significant attention from the community, we will maintain updates on relevant research progress.

Compositionality, the notion that the meaning of an expression is constructed from the meaning of its parts and syntactic rules, permits the infinite productivity of human language. For the first time, artificial language models (LMs) are able to match human performance in a number of compositional generalization tasks. However, much remains to be understood about the representational mechanisms underlying these abilities. We take a high-level geometric approach to this problem by relating the degree of compositionality in a dataset to the intrinsic dimensionality of its representations under an LM, a measure of feature complexity. We find not only that the degree of dataset compositionality is reflected in representations' intrinsic dimensionality, but that the relationship between compositionality and geometric complexity arises due to learned linguistic features over training. Finally, our analyses reveal a striking contrast between linear and nonlinear dimensionality, showing that they respectively encode formal and semantic aspects of linguistic composition.

As we consider entrusting Large Language Models (LLMs) with key societal and decision-making roles, measuring their alignment with human cognition becomes critical. This requires methods that can assess how these systems represent information and facilitate comparisons to human understanding across diverse tasks. To meet this need, we developed Turing Representational Similarity Analysis (RSA), a method that uses pairwise similarity ratings to quantify alignment between AIs and humans. We tested this approach on semantic alignment across text and image modalities, measuring how different Large Language and Vision Language Model (LLM and VLM) similarity judgments aligned with human responses at both group and individual levels. GPT-4o showed the strongest alignment with human performance among the models we tested, particularly when leveraging its text processing capabilities rather than image processing, regardless of the input modality. However, no model we studied adequately captured the inter-individual variability observed among human participants. This method helped uncover certain hyperparameters and prompts that could steer model behavior to have more or less human-like qualities at an inter-individual or group level. Turing RSA enables the efficient and flexible quantification of human-AI alignment and complements existing accuracy-based benchmark tasks. We demonstrate its utility across multiple modalities (words, sentences, images) for understanding how LLMs encode knowledge and for examining representational alignment with human cognition.

A central question for neuroscience is how to characterize brain representations of perceptual and cognitive content. An ideal characterization should distinguish different functional regions with robustness to noise and idiosyncrasies of individual brains that do not correspond to computational differences. Previous studies have characterized brain representations by their representational geometry, which is defined by the representational dissimilarity matrix (RDM), a summary statistic that abstracts from the roles of individual neurons (or responses channels) and characterizes the discriminability of stimuli. Here we explore a further step of abstraction: from the geometry to the topology of brain representations. We propose topological representational similarity analysis (tRSA), an extension of representational similarity analysis (RSA) that uses a family of geo-topological summary statistics that generalizes the RDM to characterize the topology while de-emphasizing the geometry. We evaluate this new family of statistics in terms of the sensitivity and specificity for model selection using both simulations and functional MRI (fMRI) data. In the simulations, the ground truth is a data-generating layer representation in a neural network model and the models are the same and other layers in different model instances (trained from different random seeds). In fMRI, the ground truth is a visual area and the models are the same and other areas measured in different subjects. Results show that topology-sensitive characterizations of population codes are robust to noise and interindividual variability and maintain excellent sensitivity to the unique representational signatures of different neural network layers and brain regions.

Despite their impressive performance, generative image models trained on large-scale datasets frequently fail to produce images with seemingly simple concepts -- e.g., human hands or objects appearing in groups of four -- that are reasonably expected to appear in the training data. These failure modes have largely been documented anecdotally, leaving open the question of whether they reflect idiosyncratic anomalies or more structural limitations of these models. To address this, we introduce a systematic approach for identifying and characterizing "conceptual blindspots" -- concepts present in the training data but absent or misrepresented in a model's generations. Our method leverages sparse autoencoders (SAEs) to extract interpretable concept embeddings, enabling a quantitative comparison of concept prevalence between real and generated images. We train an archetypal SAE (RA-SAE) on DINOv2 features with 32,000 concepts -- the largest such SAE to date -- enabling fine-grained analysis of conceptual disparities. Applied to four popular generative models (Stable Diffusion 1.5/2.1, PixArt, and Kandinsky), our approach reveals specific suppressed blindspots (e.g., bird feeders, DVD discs, and whitespaces on documents) and exaggerated blindspots (e.g., wood background texture and palm trees). At the individual datapoint level, we further isolate memorization artifacts -- instances where models reproduce highly specific visual templates seen during training. Overall, we propose a theoretically grounded framework for systematically identifying conceptual blindspots in generative models by assessing their conceptual fidelity with respect to the underlying data-generating process.

Adaptive behavior often requires predicting future events. The theory of reinforcement learning prescribes what kinds of predictive representations are useful and how to compute them. This paper integrates these theoretical ideas with work on cognition and neuroscience. We pay special attention to the successor representation (SR) and its generalizations, which have been widely applied both as engineering tools and models of brain function. This convergence suggests that particular kinds of predictive representations may function as versatile building blocks of intelligence.

Hallucination is often regarded as a major impediment for using large language models (LLMs), especially for knowledge-intensive tasks. Even when the training corpus consists solely of true statements, language models still generate hallucinations in the form of amalgamations of multiple facts. We coin this phenomenon as ``knowledge overshadowing'': when we query knowledge from a language model with multiple conditions, some conditions overshadow others, leading to hallucinated outputs. This phenomenon partially stems from training data imbalance, which we verify on both pretrained models and fine-tuned models, over a wide range of LM model families and sizes.From a theoretical point of view, knowledge overshadowing can be interpreted as over-generalization of the dominant conditions (patterns). We show that the hallucination rate grows with both the imbalance ratio (between the popular and unpopular condition) and the length of dominant condition description, consistent with our derived generalization bound. Finally, we propose to utilize overshadowing conditions as a signal to catch hallucination before it is produced, along with a training-free self-contrastive decoding method to alleviate hallucination during inference. Our proposed approach showcases up to 82% F1 for hallucination anticipation and 11.2% to 39.4% hallucination control, with different models and datasets.

In this paper, we identify and characterize the emerging area of representation engineering (RepE), an approach to enhancing the transparency of AI systems that draws on insights from cognitive neuroscience. RepE places population-level representations, rather than neurons or circuits, at the center of analysis, equipping us with novel methods for monitoring and manipulating high-level cognitive phenomena in deep neural networks (DNNs). We provide baselines and an initial analysis of RepE techniques, showing that they offer simple yet effective solutions for improving our understanding and control of large language models. We showcase how these methods can provide traction on a wide range of safety-relevant problems, including honesty, harmlessness, power-seeking, and more, demonstrating the promise of top-down transparency research. We hope that this work catalyzes further exploration of RepE and fosters advancements in the transparency and safety of AI systems.

One of the roadblocks to a better understanding of neural networks' internals is polysemanticity, where neurons appear to activate in multiple, semantically distinct contexts. Polysemanticity prevents us from identifying concise, human-understandable explanations for what neural networks are doing internally. One hypothesised cause of polysemanticity is superposition, where neural networks represent more features than they have neurons by assigning features to an overcomplete set of directions in activation space, rather than to individual neurons. Here, we attempt to identify those directions, using sparse autoencoders to reconstruct the internal activations of a language model. These autoencoders learn sets of sparsely activating features that are more interpretable and monosemantic than directions identified by alternative approaches, where interpretability is measured by automated methods. Ablating these features enables precise model editing, for example, by removing capabilities such as pronoun prediction, while disrupting model behaviour less than prior techniques. This work indicates that it is possible to resolve superposition in language models using a scalable, unsupervised method. Our method may serve as a foundation for future mechanistic interpretability work, which we hope will enable greater model transparency and steerability.

Are pairs of words that tend to occur together also likely to stand in a linguistic dependency? This empirical question is motivated by a long history of literature in cognitive science, psycholinguistics, and NLP. In this work we contribute an extensive analysis of the relationship between linguistic dependencies and statistical dependence between words. Improving on previous work, we introduce the use of large pretrained language models to compute contextualized estimates of the pointwise mutual information between words (CPMI). For multiple models and languages, we extract dependency trees which maximize CPMI, and compare to gold standard linguistic dependencies. Overall, we find that CPMI dependencies achieve an unlabelled undirected attachment score of at most approx 0.5. While far above chance, and consistently above a non-contextualized PMI baseline, this score is generally comparable to a simple baseline formed by connecting adjacent words. We analyze which kinds of linguistic dependencies are best captured in CPMI dependencies, and also find marked differences between the estimates of the large pretrained language models, illustrating how their different training schemes affect the type of dependencies they capture.

This book is the result of a seminar in which we reviewed multimodal approaches and attempted to create a solid overview of the field, starting with the current state-of-the-art approaches in the two subfields of Deep Learning individually. Further, modeling frameworks are discussed where one modality is transformed into the other, as well as models in which one modality is utilized to enhance representation learning for the other. To conclude the second part, architectures with a focus on handling both modalities simultaneously are introduced. Finally, we also cover other modalities as well as general-purpose multi-modal models, which are able to handle different tasks on different modalities within one unified architecture. One interesting application (Generative Art) eventually caps off this booklet.

In visual decision making, high-level features, such as object categories, have a strong influence on choice. However, the impact of low-level features on behavior is less understood partly due to the high correlation between high- and low-level features in the stimuli presented (e.g., objects of the same category are more likely to share low-level features). To disentangle these effects, we propose a method that de-correlates low- and high-level visual properties in a novel set of stimuli. Our method uses two Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) as candidate models of the ventral visual stream: the CORnet-S that has high neural predictivity in high-level, IT-like responses and the VGG-16 that has high neural predictivity in low-level responses. Triplets (root, image1, image2) of stimuli are parametrized by the level of low- and high-level similarity of images extracted from the different layers. These stimuli are then used in a decision-making task where participants are tasked to choose the most similar-to-the-root image. We found that different networks show differing abilities to predict the effects of low-versus-high-level similarity: while CORnet-S outperforms VGG-16 in explaining human choices based on high-level similarity, VGG-16 outperforms CORnet-S in explaining human choices based on low-level similarity. Using Brain-Score, we observed that the behavioral prediction abilities of different layers of these networks qualitatively corresponded to their ability to explain neural activity at different levels of the visual hierarchy. In summary, our algorithm for stimulus set generation enables the study of how different representations in the visual stream affect high-level cognitive behaviors.

Large language models learn and continually learn through the accumulation of gradient-based updates, but how individual pieces of new information affect existing knowledge, leading to both beneficial generalization and problematic hallucination, remains poorly understood. We demonstrate that when learning new information, LLMs exhibit a "priming" effect: learning a new fact can cause the model to inappropriately apply that knowledge in unrelated contexts. To systematically study this phenomenon, we introduce "Outlandish," a carefully curated dataset of 1320 diverse text samples designed to probe how new knowledge permeates through an LLM's existing knowledge base. Using this dataset, we show that the degree of priming after learning new information can be predicted by measuring the token probability of key words before learning. This relationship holds robustly across different model architectures (PALM-2, Gemma, Llama), sizes, and training stages. Finally, we develop two novel techniques to modulate how new knowledge affects existing model behavior: (1) a ``stepping-stone'' text augmentation strategy and (2) an ``ignore-k'' update pruning method. These approaches reduce undesirable priming effects by 50-95\% while preserving the model's ability to learn new information. Our findings provide both empirical insights into how LLMs learn and practical tools for improving the specificity of knowledge insertion in language models. Further materials: https://sunchipsster1.github.io/projects/outlandish/

Hallucination poses a challenge to the deployment of large vision-language models (LVLMs) in applications. Unlike in large language models (LLMs), hallucination in LVLMs often arises from misalignments between visual inputs and textual outputs. This paper investigates the underlying mechanisms of hallucination, focusing on the unique structure of LVLMs that distinguishes them from large language models (LLMs). We identify that hallucinations often arise from the sensitivity of text decoders to vision inputs, a natural phenomenon when image encoders and text decoders are pre-trained separately. Inspired by this, we introduce Visual and Textual Intervention (VTI), a novel technique designed to reduce hallucinations by steering latent space representations during inference to enhance the stability of vision features. As a task-agnostic test-time intervention, VTI can be easily applied to any problem without additional cost. Extensive experiments demonstrate that it can effectively reduce hallucinations and outperform baseline methods across multiple metrics, highlighting the critical role of vision feature stability in LVLMs.

Recent development of Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) has attracted growing attention within the AI landscape for its practical implementation potential. However, ``hallucination'', or more specifically, the misalignment between factual visual content and corresponding textual generation, poses a significant challenge of utilizing LVLMs. In this comprehensive survey, we dissect LVLM-related hallucinations in an attempt to establish an overview and facilitate future mitigation. Our scrutiny starts with a clarification of the concept of hallucinations in LVLMs, presenting a variety of hallucination symptoms and highlighting the unique challenges inherent in LVLM hallucinations. Subsequently, we outline the benchmarks and methodologies tailored specifically for evaluating hallucinations unique to LVLMs. Additionally, we delve into an investigation of the root causes of these hallucinations, encompassing insights from the training data and model components. We also critically review existing methods for mitigating hallucinations. The open questions and future directions pertaining to hallucinations within LVLMs are discussed to conclude this survey.

Large language models have achieved impressive performance on various natural language processing tasks. However, so far they have been evaluated primarily on benchmarks where all information in the input context is relevant for solving the task. In this work, we investigate the distractibility of large language models, i.e., how the model problem-solving accuracy can be influenced by irrelevant context. In particular, we introduce Grade-School Math with Irrelevant Context (GSM-IC), an arithmetic reasoning dataset with irrelevant information in the problem description. We use this benchmark to measure the distractibility of cutting-edge prompting techniques for large language models, and find that the model performance is dramatically decreased when irrelevant information is included. We also identify several approaches for mitigating this deficiency, such as decoding with self-consistency and adding to the prompt an instruction that tells the language model to ignore the irrelevant information.

Large language models (LLMs) have had a huge impact on society due to their impressive capabilities and vast knowledge of the world. Various applications and tools have been created that allow users to interact with these models in a black-box scenario. However, one limitation of this scenario is that users cannot modify the internal knowledge of the model, and the only way to add or modify internal knowledge is by explicitly mentioning it to the model during the current interaction. This learning process is called in-context training, and it refers to training that is confined to the user's current session or context. In-context learning has significant applications, but also has limitations that are seldom studied. In this paper, we present a study that shows how the model can suffer from interference between information that continually flows in the context, causing it to forget previously learned knowledge, which can reduce the model's performance. Along with showing the problem, we propose an evaluation benchmark based on the bAbI dataset.

We present the Mixture-of-Tunable-Experts (MoTE), a method that extends the Mixture-of-Experts architecture of Large Language Models (LLMs). Without additional training, MoTE enables meaningful and focused behavior changes in LLMs on-the-fly during inference time. By analyzing the digital LLM brain of DeepSeek-R1 using a technique we dub 'functional Token Resonance Imaging' (fTRI) -- inspired by fMRI and using prompts designed to elicit specific behavior (e.g., 'What happened {time}{place}?') -- we empirically identify distinctive experts associated with behaviors like refusal responses. Using MoTE we are able to intervene and control such specific behavior. We switched off the top 10 most refusal-relevant experts (0.07% of R1's 14,848 routed experts), achieving a 52% refusal reduction on sensitive reference prompts without performance degradation on MT-Bench. Random expert deactivation resulted in smaller behavioral shifts with increased noise, whereas forced expert activation led to significantly higher refusal rates. Our approach shares similarities with sparse autoencoders (SAEs) in terms of explainability and steerability. Unlike SAEs, MoTE does not require large training efforts, as within MoEs with a vast number of experts, specialization already emerged naturally during pretraining. Our findings suggest that significant functional mechanisms in Mixture-of-Experts architectures can at least partially be localized in a small number of specific experts, rather than being distributed throughout the model's weights. Expert subgroups can be tuned to trigger significant behavior variations, providing insights into the inner workings of LLMs.

While the ability of language models to elicit facts has been widely investigated, how they handle temporally changing facts remains underexplored. We discover Temporal Heads, specific attention heads primarily responsible for processing temporal knowledge through circuit analysis. We confirm that these heads are present across multiple models, though their specific locations may vary, and their responses differ depending on the type of knowledge and its corresponding years. Disabling these heads degrades the model's ability to recall time-specific knowledge while maintaining its general capabilities without compromising time-invariant and question-answering performances. Moreover, the heads are activated not only numeric conditions ("In 2004") but also textual aliases ("In the year ..."), indicating that they encode a temporal dimension beyond simple numerical representation. Furthermore, we expand the potential of our findings by demonstrating how temporal knowledge can be edited by adjusting the values of these heads.

Large multimodal models extend the impressive capabilities of large language models by integrating multimodal understanding abilities. However, it is not clear how they can emulate the general intelligence and reasoning ability of humans. As recognizing patterns and abstracting concepts are key to general intelligence, we introduce PuzzleVQA, a collection of puzzles based on abstract patterns. With this dataset, we evaluate large multimodal models with abstract patterns based on fundamental concepts, including colors, numbers, sizes, and shapes. Through our experiments on state-of-the-art large multimodal models, we find that they are not able to generalize well to simple abstract patterns. Notably, even GPT-4V cannot solve more than half of the puzzles. To diagnose the reasoning challenges in large multimodal models, we progressively guide the models with our ground truth reasoning explanations for visual perception, inductive reasoning, and deductive reasoning. Our systematic analysis finds that the main bottlenecks of GPT-4V are weaker visual perception and inductive reasoning abilities. Through this work, we hope to shed light on the limitations of large multimodal models and how they can better emulate human cognitive processes in the future (Our data and code will be released publicly at https://github.com/declare-lab/LLM-PuzzleTest).

Large language models (LLMs) have shown remarkable performances across a wide range of tasks. However, the mechanisms by which these models encode tasks of varying complexities remain poorly understood. In this paper, we explore the hypothesis that LLMs process concepts of varying complexities in different layers, introducing the idea of "Concept Depth" to suggest that more complex concepts are typically acquired in deeper layers. Specifically, we categorize concepts based on their level of abstraction, defining them in the order of increasing complexity within factual, emotional, and inferential tasks. We conduct extensive probing experiments using layer-wise representations across various LLM families (Gemma, LLaMA, QWen) on various datasets spanning the three domains of tasks. Our findings reveal that models could efficiently conduct probing for simpler tasks in shallow layers, and more complex tasks typically necessitate deeper layers for accurate understanding. Additionally, we examine how external factors, such as adding noise to the input and quantizing the model weights, might affect layer-wise representations. Our findings suggest that these factors can impede the development of a conceptual understanding of LLMs until deeper layers are explored. We hope that our proposed concept and experimental insights will enhance the understanding of the mechanisms underlying LLMs. Our codes are available at https://github.com/Luckfort/CD.

Does the dominant approach to learn representations (as a side effect of optimizing an expected cost for a single training distribution) remain a good approach when we are dealing with multiple distributions? Our thesis is that such scenarios are better served by representations that are richer than those obtained with a single optimization episode. We support this thesis with simple theoretical arguments and with experiments utilizing an apparently na\"{\i}ve ensembling technique: concatenating the representations obtained from multiple training episodes using the same data, model, algorithm, and hyper-parameters, but different random seeds. These independently trained networks perform similarly. Yet, in a number of scenarios involving new distributions, the concatenated representation performs substantially better than an equivalently sized network trained with a single training run. This proves that the representations constructed by multiple training episodes are in fact different. Although their concatenation carries little additional information about the training task under the training distribution, it becomes substantially more informative when tasks or distributions change. Meanwhile, a single training episode is unlikely to yield such a redundant representation because the optimization process has no reason to accumulate features that do not incrementally improve the training performance.

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) have achieved remarkable performance on complex tasks with multimodal context. However, it is still understudied whether they exhibit modality preference when processing multimodal contexts. To study this question, we first build a MC\textsuperscript{2} benchmark under controlled evidence conflict scenarios to systematically evaluate modality preference, which is the tendency to favor one modality over another when making decisions based on multimodal conflicting evidence. Our extensive evaluation reveals that all 18 tested MLLMs generally demonstrate clear modality bias, and modality preference can be influenced by external interventions. An in-depth analysis reveals that the preference direction can be captured within the latent representations of MLLMs. Built on this, we propose a probing and steering method based on representation engineering to explicitly control modality preference without additional fine-tuning or carefully crafted prompts. Our method effectively amplifies modality preference toward a desired direction and applies to downstream tasks such as hallucination mitigation and multimodal machine translation, yielding promising improvements.

Most of the recent works on probing representations have focused on BERT, with the presumption that the findings might be similar to the other models. In this work, we extend the probing studies to two other models in the family, namely ELECTRA and XLNet, showing that variations in the pre-training objectives or architectural choices can result in different behaviors in encoding linguistic information in the representations. Most notably, we observe that ELECTRA tends to encode linguistic knowledge in the deeper layers, whereas XLNet instead concentrates that in the earlier layers. Also, the former model undergoes a slight change during fine-tuning, whereas the latter experiences significant adjustments. Moreover, we show that drawing conclusions based on the weight mixing evaluation strategy -- which is widely used in the context of layer-wise probing -- can be misleading given the norm disparity of the representations across different layers. Instead, we adopt an alternative information-theoretic probing with minimum description length, which has recently been proven to provide more reliable and informative results.

Given that Transformers are ubiquitous in wide tasks, interpreting their internals is a pivotal issue. Still, their particular components, feed-forward (FF) blocks, have typically been less analyzed despite their substantial parameter amounts. We analyze the input contextualization effects of FF blocks by rendering them in the attention maps as a human-friendly visualization scheme. Our experiments with both masked- and causal-language models reveal that FF networks modify the input contextualization to emphasize specific types of linguistic compositions. In addition, FF and its surrounding components tend to cancel out each other's effects, suggesting potential redundancy in the processing of the Transformer layer.

Compositional understanding is crucial for human intelligence, yet it remains unclear whether contemporary vision models exhibit it. The dominant machine learning paradigm is built on the premise that scaling data and model sizes will improve out-of-distribution performance, including compositional generalization. We test this premise through controlled experiments that systematically vary data scale, concept diversity, and combination coverage. We find that compositional generalization is driven by data diversity, not mere data scale. Increased combinatorial coverage forces models to discover a linearly factored representational structure, where concepts decompose into additive components. We prove this structure is key to efficiency, enabling perfect generalization from few observed combinations. Evaluating pretrained models (DINO, CLIP), we find above-random yet imperfect performance, suggesting partial presence of this structure. Our work motivates stronger emphasis on constructing diverse datasets for compositional generalization, and considering the importance of representational structure that enables efficient compositional learning. Code available at https://github.com/oshapio/visual-compositional-generalization.

We create a reusable Transformer, BrainBERT, for intracranial recordings bringing modern representation learning approaches to neuroscience. Much like in NLP and speech recognition, this Transformer enables classifying complex concepts, i.e., decoding neural data, with higher accuracy and with much less data by being pretrained in an unsupervised manner on a large corpus of unannotated neural recordings. Our approach generalizes to new subjects with electrodes in new positions and to unrelated tasks showing that the representations robustly disentangle the neural signal. Just like in NLP where one can study language by investigating what a language model learns, this approach opens the door to investigating the brain by what a model of the brain learns. As a first step along this path, we demonstrate a new analysis of the intrinsic dimensionality of the computations in different areas of the brain. To construct these representations, we combine a technique for producing super-resolution spectrograms of neural data with an approach designed for generating contextual representations of audio by masking. In the future, far more concepts will be decodable from neural recordings by using representation learning, potentially unlocking the brain like language models unlocked language.

Understanding of video creativity and content often varies among individuals, with differences in focal points and cognitive levels across different ages, experiences, and genders. There is currently a lack of research in this area, and most existing benchmarks suffer from several drawbacks: 1) a limited number of modalities and answers with restrictive length; 2) the content and scenarios within the videos are excessively monotonous, transmitting allegories and emotions that are overly simplistic. To bridge the gap to real-world applications, we introduce a large-scale Subjective Response Indicators for Advertisement Videos dataset, namely SRI-ADV. Specifically, we collected real changes in Electroencephalographic (EEG) and eye-tracking regions from different demographics while they viewed identical video content. Utilizing this multi-modal dataset, we developed tasks and protocols to analyze and evaluate the extent of cognitive understanding of video content among different users. Along with the dataset, we designed a Hypergraph Multi-modal Large Language Model (HMLLM) to explore the associations among different demographics, video elements, EEG, and eye-tracking indicators. HMLLM could bridge semantic gaps across rich modalities and integrate information beyond different modalities to perform logical reasoning. Extensive experimental evaluations on SRI-ADV and other additional video-based generative performance benchmarks demonstrate the effectiveness of our method. The codes and dataset will be released at https://github.com/suay1113/HMLLM.

Binding precedents (S\'umulas Vinculantes) constitute a juridical instrument unique to the Brazilian legal system and whose objectives include the protection of the Federal Supreme Court against repetitive demands. Studies of the effectiveness of these instruments in decreasing the Court's exposure to similar cases, however, indicate that they tend to fail in such a direction, with some of the binding precedents seemingly creating new demands. We empirically assess the legal impact of five binding precedents, 11, 14, 17, 26 and 37, at the highest court level through their effects on the legal subjects they address. This analysis is only possible through the comparison of the Court's ruling about the precedents' themes before they are created, which means that these decisions should be detected through techniques of Similar Case Retrieval. The contributions of this article are therefore twofold: on the mathematical side, we compare the uses of different methods of Natural Language Processing -- TF-IDF, LSTM, BERT, and regex -- for Similar Case Retrieval, whereas on the legal side, we contrast the inefficiency of these binding precedents with a set of hypotheses that may justify their repeated usage. We observe that the deep learning models performed significantly worse in the specific Similar Case Retrieval task and that the reasons for binding precedents to fail in responding to repetitive demand are heterogeneous and case-dependent, making it impossible to single out a specific cause.

Figurative language (e.g., "he flew like the wind") is challenging to understand, as it is hard to tell what implicit information is being conveyed from the surface form alone. We hypothesize that to perform this task well, the reader needs to mentally elaborate the scene being described to identify a sensible meaning of the language. We present DREAM-FLUTE, a figurative language understanding system that does this, first forming a "mental model" of situations described in a premise and hypothesis before making an entailment/contradiction decision and generating an explanation. DREAM-FLUTE uses an existing scene elaboration model, DREAM, for constructing its "mental model." In the FigLang2022 Shared Task evaluation, DREAM-FLUTE achieved (joint) first place (Acc@60=63.3%), and can perform even better with ensemble techniques, demonstrating the effectiveness of this approach. More generally, this work suggests that adding a reflective component to pretrained language models can improve their performance beyond standard fine-tuning (3.3% improvement in Acc@60).

The recent wave of generative AI has sparked unprecedented global attention, with both excitement and concern over potentially superhuman levels of artificial intelligence: models now take only seconds to produce outputs that would challenge or exceed the capabilities even of expert humans. At the same time, models still show basic errors in understanding that would not be expected even in non-expert humans. This presents us with an apparent paradox: how do we reconcile seemingly superhuman capabilities with the persistence of errors that few humans would make? In this work, we posit that this tension reflects a divergence in the configuration of intelligence in today's generative models relative to intelligence in humans. Specifically, we propose and test the Generative AI Paradox hypothesis: generative models, having been trained directly to reproduce expert-like outputs, acquire generative capabilities that are not contingent upon -- and can therefore exceed -- their ability to understand those same types of outputs. This contrasts with humans, for whom basic understanding almost always precedes the ability to generate expert-level outputs. We test this hypothesis through controlled experiments analyzing generation vs. understanding in generative models, across both language and image modalities. Our results show that although models can outperform humans in generation, they consistently fall short of human capabilities in measures of understanding, as well as weaker correlation between generation and understanding performance, and more brittleness to adversarial inputs. Our findings support the hypothesis that models' generative capability may not be contingent upon understanding capability, and call for caution in interpreting artificial intelligence by analogy to human intelligence.

Formal and distributional semantic models offer complementary benefits in modeling meaning. The categorical compositional distributional (DisCoCat) model of meaning of Coecke et al. (arXiv:1003.4394v1 [cs.CL]) combines aspected of both to provide a general framework in which meanings of words, obtained distributionally, are composed using methods from the logical setting to form sentence meaning. Concrete consequences of this general abstract setting and applications to empirical data are under active study (Grefenstette et al., arxiv:1101.0309; Grefenstette and Sadrzadeh, arXiv:1106.4058v1 [cs.CL]). . In this paper, we extend this study by examining transitive verbs, represented as matrices in a DisCoCat. We discuss three ways of constructing such matrices, and evaluate each method in a disambiguation task developed by Grefenstette and Sadrzadeh (arXiv:1106.4058v1 [cs.CL]).

People can categorize the same entity at multiple taxonomic levels, such as basic (bear), superordinate (animal), and subordinate (grizzly bear). While prior research has focused on basic-level categories, this study is the first attempt to examine the organization of categories by analyzing exemplars produced at the subordinate level. We present a new Italian psycholinguistic dataset of human-generated exemplars for 187 concrete words. We then use these data to evaluate whether textual and vision LLMs produce meaningful exemplars that align with human category organization across three key tasks: exemplar generation, category induction, and typicality judgment. Our findings show a low alignment between humans and LLMs, consistent with previous studies. However, their performance varies notably across different semantic domains. Ultimately, this study highlights both the promises and the constraints of using AI-generated exemplars to support psychological and linguistic research.

Brain Signals, such as Electroencephalography (EEG), and human languages have been widely explored independently for many downstream tasks, however, the connection between them has not been well explored. In this study, we explore the relationship and dependency between EEG and language. To study at the representation level, we introduced MTAM, a Multimodal Transformer Alignment Model, to observe coordinated representations between the two modalities. We used various relationship alignment-seeking techniques, such as Canonical Correlation Analysis and Wasserstein Distance, as loss functions to transfigure features. On downstream applications, sentiment analysis and relation detection, we achieved new state-of-the-art results on two datasets, ZuCo and K-EmoCon. Our method achieved an F1-score improvement of 1.7% on K-EmoCon and 9.3% on Zuco datasets for sentiment analysis, and 7.4% on ZuCo for relation detection. In addition, we provide interpretations of the performance improvement: (1) feature distribution shows the effectiveness of the alignment module for discovering and encoding the relationship between EEG and language; (2) alignment weights show the influence of different language semantics as well as EEG frequency features; (3) brain topographical maps provide an intuitive demonstration of the connectivity in the brain regions. Our code is available at https://github.com/Jason-Qiu/EEG_Language_Alignment.

As LLMs are increasingly integrated into user-facing applications, addressing biases that perpetuate societal inequalities is crucial. While much work has gone into measuring or mitigating biases in these models, fewer studies have investigated their origins. Therefore, this study examines the correlation between gender-occupation bias in pre-training data and their manifestation in LLMs, focusing on the Dolma dataset and the OLMo model. Using zero-shot prompting and token co-occurrence analyses, we explore how biases in training data influence model outputs. Our findings reveal that biases present in pre-training data are amplified in model outputs. The study also examines the effects of prompt types, hyperparameters, and instruction-tuning on bias expression, finding instruction-tuning partially alleviating representational bias while still maintaining overall stereotypical gender associations, whereas hyperparameters and prompting variation have a lesser effect on bias expression. Our research traces bias throughout the LLM development pipeline and underscores the importance of mitigating bias at the pretraining stage.

Rebus puzzles, visual riddles that encode language through imagery, spatial arrangement, and symbolic substitution, pose a unique challenge to current vision-language models (VLMs). Unlike traditional image captioning or question answering tasks, rebus solving requires multi-modal abstraction, symbolic reasoning, and a grasp of cultural, phonetic and linguistic puns. In this paper, we investigate the capacity of contemporary VLMs to interpret and solve rebus puzzles by constructing a hand-generated and annotated benchmark of diverse English-language rebus puzzles, ranging from simple pictographic substitutions to spatially-dependent cues ("head" over "heels"). We analyze how different VLMs perform, and our findings reveal that while VLMs exhibit some surprising capabilities in decoding simple visual clues, they struggle significantly with tasks requiring abstract reasoning, lateral thinking, and understanding visual metaphors.

Large Language Models with transformer architecture have revolutionized the domain of text generation, setting unprecedented benchmarks. Despite their impressive capabilities, LLMs have been criticized for generating outcomes that deviate from factual accuracy or display logical inconsistencies, phenomena commonly referred to as hallucinations. This term, however, has often been misapplied to any results deviating from the instructor's expectations, which this paper defines as attention misdirection rather than true hallucinations. Understanding the distinction between hallucinations and attention misdirection becomes increasingly relevant in business contexts, where the ramifications of such errors can significantly impact the value extraction from these inherently pre-trained models. This paper highlights the best practices of the PGI, Persona, Grouping, and Intelligence, method, a strategic framework that achieved a remarkable error rate of only 3,15 percent across 4,000 responses generated by GPT in response to a real business challenge. It emphasizes that by equipping experimentation with knowledge, businesses can unlock opportunities for innovation through the use of these natively pre-trained models. This reinforces the notion that strategic application grounded in a skilled team can maximize the benefits of emergent technologies such as the LLMs.

As large language models are increasingly responsible for online content, concerns arise about the impact of repeatedly processing their own outputs. Inspired by the "broken telephone" effect in chained human communication, this study investigates whether LLMs similarly distort information through iterative generation. Through translation-based experiments, we find that distortion accumulates over time, influenced by language choice and chain complexity. While degradation is inevitable, it can be mitigated through strategic prompting techniques. These findings contribute to discussions on the long-term effects of AI-mediated information propagation, raising important questions about the reliability of LLM-generated content in iterative workflows.

Recent studies show that the attention heads in Transformer are not equal. We relate this phenomenon to the imbalance training of multi-head attention and the model dependence on specific heads. To tackle this problem, we propose a simple masking method: HeadMask, in two specific ways. Experiments show that translation improvements are achieved on multiple language pairs. Subsequent empirical analyses also support our assumption and confirm the effectiveness of the method.

By providing external information to large language models (LLMs), tool augmentation (including retrieval augmentation) has emerged as a promising solution for addressing the limitations of LLMs' static parametric memory. However, how receptive are LLMs to such external evidence, especially when the evidence conflicts with their parametric memory? We present the first comprehensive and controlled investigation into the behavior of LLMs when encountering knowledge conflicts. We propose a systematic framework to elicit high-quality parametric memory from LLMs and construct the corresponding counter-memory, which enables us to conduct a series of controlled experiments. Our investigation reveals seemingly contradicting behaviors of LLMs. On the one hand, different from prior wisdom, we find that LLMs can be highly receptive to external evidence even when that conflicts with their parametric memory, given that the external evidence is coherent and convincing. On the other hand, LLMs also demonstrate a strong confirmation bias when the external evidence contains some information that is consistent with their parametric memory, despite being presented with conflicting evidence at the same time. These results pose important implications that are worth careful consideration for the further development and deployment of tool- and retrieval-augmented LLMs.

Large language models (LLMs) and vision-language models (VLMs) have demonstrated remarkable performance across a wide range of tasks and domains. Despite this promise, spatial understanding and reasoning -- a fundamental component of human cognition -- remains under-explored. We develop novel benchmarks that cover diverse aspects of spatial reasoning such as relationship understanding, navigation, and counting. We conduct a comprehensive evaluation of competitive language and vision-language models. Our findings reveal several counter-intuitive insights that have been overlooked in the literature: (1) Spatial reasoning poses significant challenges where competitive models can fall behind random guessing; (2) Despite additional visual input, VLMs often under-perform compared to their LLM counterparts; (3) When both textual and visual information is available, multi-modal language models become less reliant on visual information if sufficient textual clues are provided. Additionally, we demonstrate that leveraging redundancy between vision and text can significantly enhance model performance. We hope our study will inform the development of multimodal models to improve spatial intelligence and further close the gap with human intelligence.

Following the success of Large Language Models (LLMs), Large Multimodal Models (LMMs), such as the Flamingo model and its subsequent competitors, have started to emerge as natural steps towards generalist agents. However, interacting with recent LMMs reveals major limitations that are hardly captured by the current evaluation benchmarks. Indeed, task performances (e.g., VQA accuracy) alone do not provide enough clues to understand their real capabilities, limitations, and to which extent such models are aligned to human expectations. To refine our understanding of those flaws, we deviate from the current evaluation paradigm, and (1) evaluate 10 recent open-source LMMs from 3B up to 80B parameter scale, on 5 different axes; hallucinations, abstention, compositionality, explainability and instruction following. Our evaluation on these axes reveals major flaws in LMMs. While the current go-to solution to align these models is based on training, such as instruction tuning or RLHF, we rather (2) explore the training-free in-context learning (ICL) as a solution, and study how it affects these limitations. Based on our ICL study, (3) we push ICL further and propose new multimodal ICL variants such as; Multitask-ICL, Chain-of-Hindsight-ICL, and Self-Correcting-ICL. Our findings are as follows. (1) Despite their success, LMMs have flaws that remain unsolved with scaling alone. (2) The effect of ICL on LMMs flaws is nuanced; despite its effectiveness for improved explainability, answer abstention, ICL only slightly improves instruction following, does not improve compositional abilities, and actually even amplifies hallucinations. (3) The proposed ICL variants are promising as post-hoc approaches to efficiently tackle some of those flaws. The code is available here: https://github.com/mshukor/EvALign-ICL.

Language models (LMs) have proven to be powerful tools for psycholinguistic research, but most prior work has focused on purely behavioural measures (e.g., surprisal comparisons). At the same time, research in model interpretability has begun to illuminate the abstract causal mechanisms shaping LM behavior. To help bring these strands of research closer together, we introduce CausalGym. We adapt and expand the SyntaxGym suite of tasks to benchmark the ability of interpretability methods to causally affect model behaviour. To illustrate how CausalGym can be used, we study the pythia models (14M--6.9B) and assess the causal efficacy of a wide range of interpretability methods, including linear probing and distributed alignment search (DAS). We find that DAS outperforms the other methods, and so we use it to study the learning trajectory of two difficult linguistic phenomena in pythia-1b: negative polarity item licensing and filler--gap dependencies. Our analysis shows that the mechanism implementing both of these tasks is learned in discrete stages, not gradually.

Hallucination has been widely recognized to be a significant drawback for large language models (LLMs). There have been many works that attempt to reduce the extent of hallucination. These efforts have mostly been empirical so far, which cannot answer the fundamental question whether it can be completely eliminated. In this paper, we formalize the problem and show that it is impossible to eliminate hallucination in LLMs. Specifically, we define a formal world where hallucination is defined as inconsistencies between a computable LLM and a computable ground truth function. By employing results from learning theory, we show that LLMs cannot learn all of the computable functions and will therefore always hallucinate. Since the formal world is a part of the real world which is much more complicated, hallucinations are also inevitable for real world LLMs. Furthermore, for real world LLMs constrained by provable time complexity, we describe the hallucination-prone tasks and empirically validate our claims. Finally, using the formal world framework, we discuss the possible mechanisms and efficacies of existing hallucination mitigators as well as the practical implications on the safe deployment of LLMs.