func
string | target
string | cwe
sequence | project
string | commit_id
string | hash
string | size
int64 | message
string | vul
int64 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
long SshIo::SshImpl::getFileLength()
{
long length = 0;
if (protocol_ == pSftp) { // sftp
sftp_attributes attributes = sftp_fstat(fileHandler_);
length = (long)attributes->size;
} else { // ssh
std::string response;
//std::string cmd = "stat -c %s " + hostInfo_.Path;
std::string cmd = "declare -a x=($(ls -alt " + hostInfo_.Path + ")); echo ${x[4]}";
if (ssh_->runCommand(cmd, &response) != 0) {
throw Error(1, "Unable to get file length.");
} else {
length = atol(response.c_str());
if (length == 0) {
throw Error(1, "File is empty or not found.");
}
}
}
return length;
} | Safe | [
"CWE-125"
] | exiv2 | 6e3855aed7ba8bb4731fc4087ca7f9078b2f3d97 | 3.0842833193169895e+38 | 21 | Fix https://github.com/Exiv2/exiv2/issues/55 | 0 |
readgifimage(char* mode)
{
unsigned char buf[9];
int local, interleaved;
unsigned char localmap[256][3];
int localbits;
int status;
if (fread(buf, 1, 9, infile) == 0) {
perror(filename);
return (0);
}
width = buf[4] + (buf[5] << 8);
height = buf[6] + (buf[7] << 8);
local = buf[8] & 0x80;
interleaved = buf[8] & 0x40;
if (local == 0 && global == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "no colormap present for image\n");
return (0);
}
if ((raster = (unsigned char*) _TIFFmalloc(width*height+EXTRAFUDGE)) == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "not enough memory for image\n");
return (0);
}
if (local) {
localbits = (buf[8] & 0x7) + 1;
fprintf(stderr, " local colors: %d\n", 1<<localbits);
fread(localmap, 3, ((size_t)1)<<localbits, infile);
initcolors(localmap, 1<<localbits);
} else if (global) {
initcolors(globalmap, 1<<globalbits);
}
if ((status = readraster()))
rasterize(interleaved, mode);
_TIFFfree(raster);
return status;
} | Safe | [
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] | libtiff | ce6841d9e41d621ba23cf18b190ee6a23b2cc833 | 2.509575659502841e+38 | 40 | fix possible OOB write in gif2tiff.c | 0 |
ossl_cipher_set_iv(VALUE self, VALUE iv)
{
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
int iv_len = 0;
StringValue(iv);
GetCipher(self, ctx);
#if defined(HAVE_AUTHENTICATED_ENCRYPTION)
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_flags(ctx) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)
iv_len = (int)(VALUE)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx);
#endif
if (!iv_len)
iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
if (RSTRING_LEN(iv) != iv_len)
ossl_raise(rb_eArgError, "iv must be %d bytes", iv_len);
if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, (unsigned char *)RSTRING_PTR(iv), -1) != 1)
ossl_raise(eCipherError, NULL);
return iv;
} | Safe | [
"CWE-326",
"CWE-310",
"CWE-703"
] | openssl | 8108e0a6db133f3375608303fdd2083eb5115062 | 2.593103654984471e+38 | 22 | cipher: don't set dummy encryption key in Cipher#initialize
Remove the encryption key initialization from Cipher#initialize. This
is effectively a revert of r32723 ("Avoid possible SEGV from AES
encryption/decryption", 2011-07-28).
r32723, which added the key initialization, was a workaround for
Ruby Bug #2768. For some certain ciphers, calling EVP_CipherUpdate()
before setting an encryption key caused segfault. It was not a problem
until OpenSSL implemented GCM mode - the encryption key could be
overridden by repeated calls of EVP_CipherInit_ex(). But, it is not the
case for AES-GCM ciphers. Setting a key, an IV, a key, in this order
causes the IV to be reset to an all-zero IV.
The problem of Bug #2768 persists on the current versions of OpenSSL.
So, make Cipher#update raise an exception if a key is not yet set by the
user. Since encrypting or decrypting without key does not make any
sense, this should not break existing applications.
Users can still call Cipher#key= and Cipher#iv= multiple times with
their own responsibility.
Reference: https://bugs.ruby-lang.org/issues/2768
Reference: https://bugs.ruby-lang.org/issues/8221
Reference: https://github.com/ruby/openssl/issues/49 | 0 |
camel_pop3_stream_new (CamelStream *source)
{
CamelPOP3Stream *is;
is = g_object_new (CAMEL_TYPE_POP3_STREAM, NULL);
is->source = g_object_ref (source);
return (CamelStream *) is;
} | Safe | [
"CWE-74"
] | evolution-data-server | ba82be72cfd427b5d72ff21f929b3a6d8529c4df | 1.3001831799026994e+38 | 9 | I#226 - CVE-2020-14928: Response Injection via STARTTLS in SMTP and POP3
Closes https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/evolution-data-server/-/issues/226 | 0 |
struct rb_node **__lookup_rb_tree_for_insert(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
struct rb_root *root, struct rb_node **parent,
unsigned int ofs)
{
struct rb_node **p = &root->rb_node;
struct rb_entry *re;
while (*p) {
*parent = *p;
re = rb_entry(*parent, struct rb_entry, rb_node);
if (ofs < re->ofs)
p = &(*p)->rb_left;
else if (ofs >= re->ofs + re->len)
p = &(*p)->rb_right;
else
f2fs_bug_on(sbi, 1);
}
return p;
} | Safe | [
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] | linux | dad48e73127ba10279ea33e6dbc8d3905c4d31c0 | 2.0818363736160868e+38 | 21 | f2fs: fix a bug caused by NULL extent tree
Thread A: Thread B:
-f2fs_remount
-sbi->mount_opt.opt = 0;
<--- -f2fs_iget
-do_read_inode
-f2fs_init_extent_tree
-F2FS_I(inode)->extent_tree is NULL
-default_options && parse_options
-remount return
<--- -f2fs_map_blocks
-f2fs_lookup_extent_tree
-f2fs_bug_on(sbi, !et);
The same problem with f2fs_new_inode.
Signed-off-by: Yunlei He <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]> | 0 |
static pj_str_t ssl_strerror(pj_status_t status,
char *buf, pj_size_t bufsize)
{
pj_str_t errstr;
unsigned long ssl_err = status;
if (ssl_err) {
unsigned long l, r;
ssl_err -= PJ_SSL_ERRNO_START;
l = ssl_err / MAX_OSSL_ERR_REASON;
r = ssl_err % MAX_OSSL_ERR_REASON;
ssl_err = ERR_PACK(l, 0, r);
}
#if defined(PJ_HAS_ERROR_STRING) && (PJ_HAS_ERROR_STRING != 0)
{
const char *tmp = NULL;
tmp = ERR_reason_error_string(ssl_err);
if (tmp) {
pj_ansi_strncpy(buf, tmp, bufsize);
errstr = pj_str(buf);
return errstr;
}
}
#endif /* PJ_HAS_ERROR_STRING */
errstr.ptr = buf;
errstr.slen = pj_ansi_snprintf(buf, bufsize,
"Unknown OpenSSL error %lu",
ssl_err);
if (errstr.slen < 1 || errstr.slen >= (int)bufsize)
errstr.slen = bufsize - 1;
return errstr;
} | Safe | [
"CWE-362",
"CWE-703"
] | pjproject | d5f95aa066f878b0aef6a64e60b61e8626e664cd | 1.840915801001489e+38 | 36 | Merge pull request from GHSA-cv8x-p47p-99wr
* - Avoid SSL socket parent/listener getting destroyed during handshake by increasing parent's reference count.
- Add missing SSL socket close when the newly accepted SSL socket is discarded in SIP TLS transport.
* - Fix silly mistake: accepted active socket created without group lock in SSL socket.
- Replace assertion with normal validation check of SSL socket instance in OpenSSL verification callback (verify_cb()) to avoid crash, e.g: if somehow race condition with SSL socket destroy happens or OpenSSL application data index somehow gets corrupted. | 0 |
const char *drill_g_code_name(drill_g_code_t g_code)
{
switch (g_code) {
case DRILL_G_ROUT:
return N_("rout mode");
case DRILL_G_LINEARMOVE:
return N_("linear mode");
case DRILL_G_CWMOVE:
return N_("circular CW mode");
case DRILL_G_CCWMOVE:
return N_("circular CCW mode");
case DRILL_G_VARIABLEDWELL:
return N_("variable dwell");
case DRILL_G_DRILL:
return N_("drill mode");
case DRILL_G_OVERRIDETOOLSPEED:
return N_("override tool feed or speed");
case DRILL_G_ROUTCIRCLE:
return N_("routed CW circle");
case DRILL_G_ROUTCIRCLECCW:
return N_("routed CCW circle");
case DRILL_G_VISTOOL:
return N_("select vision tool");
case DRILL_G_VISSINGLEPOINTOFFSET:
return N_("single point vision offset");
case DRILL_G_VISMULTIPOINTTRANS:
return N_("multipoint vision translation");
case DRILL_G_VISCANCEL:
return N_("cancel vision translation or offset");
case DRILL_G_VISCORRHOLEDRILL:
return N_("vision corrected single hole drilling");
case DRILL_G_VISAUTOCALIBRATION:
return N_("vision system autocalibration");
case DRILL_G_CUTTERCOMPOFF:
return N_("cutter compensation off");
case DRILL_G_CUTTERCOMPLEFT:
return N_("cutter compensation left");
case DRILL_G_CUTTERCOMPRIGHT:
return N_("cutter compensation right");
case DRILL_G_VISSINGLEPOINTOFFSETREL:
return N_("single point vision relative offset");
case DRILL_G_VISMULTIPOINTTRANSREL:
return N_("multipoint vision relative translation");
case DRILL_G_VISCANCELREL:
return N_("cancel vision relative translation or offset");
case DRILL_G_VISCORRHOLEDRILLREL:
return N_("vision corrected single hole relative drilling");
case DRILL_G_PACKDIP2:
return N_("dual in line package");
case DRILL_G_PACKDIP:
return N_("dual in line package");
case DRILL_G_PACK8PINL:
return N_("eight pin L package");
case DRILL_G_CIRLE:
return N_("canned circle");
case DRILL_G_SLOT:
return N_("canned slot");
case DRILL_G_ROUTSLOT:
return N_("routed step slot");
case DRILL_G_ABSOLUTE:
return N_("absolute input mode");
case DRILL_G_INCREMENTAL:
return N_("incremental input mode");
case DRILL_G_ZEROSET:
return N_("zero set");
case DRILL_G_UNKNOWN:
default:
return N_("unknown G-code");
}
} /* drill_g_code_name() */ | Safe | [
"CWE-787"
] | gerbv | 672214abb47a802fc000125996e6e0a46c623a4e | 9.875928820943308e+37 | 71 | Add test to demonstrate buffer overrun | 0 |
int phar_parse_tarfile(php_stream* fp, char *fname, int fname_len, char *alias, int alias_len, phar_archive_data** pphar, int is_data, php_uint32 compression, char **error TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
char buf[512], *actual_alias = NULL, *p;
phar_entry_info entry = {0};
size_t pos = 0, read, totalsize;
tar_header *hdr;
php_uint32 sum1, sum2, size, old;
phar_archive_data *myphar, **actual;
int last_was_longlink = 0;
if (error) {
*error = NULL;
}
php_stream_seek(fp, 0, SEEK_END);
totalsize = php_stream_tell(fp);
php_stream_seek(fp, 0, SEEK_SET);
read = php_stream_read(fp, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (read != sizeof(buf)) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: \"%s\" is not a tar file or is truncated", fname);
}
php_stream_close(fp);
return FAILURE;
}
hdr = (tar_header*)buf;
old = (memcmp(hdr->magic, "ustar", sizeof("ustar")-1) != 0);
myphar = (phar_archive_data *) pecalloc(1, sizeof(phar_archive_data), PHAR_G(persist));
myphar->is_persistent = PHAR_G(persist);
/* estimate number of entries, can't be certain with tar files */
zend_hash_init(&myphar->manifest, 2 + (totalsize >> 12),
zend_get_hash_value, destroy_phar_manifest_entry, (zend_bool)myphar->is_persistent);
zend_hash_init(&myphar->mounted_dirs, 5,
zend_get_hash_value, NULL, (zend_bool)myphar->is_persistent);
zend_hash_init(&myphar->virtual_dirs, 4 + (totalsize >> 11),
zend_get_hash_value, NULL, (zend_bool)myphar->is_persistent);
myphar->is_tar = 1;
/* remember whether this entire phar was compressed with gz/bzip2 */
myphar->flags = compression;
entry.is_tar = 1;
entry.is_crc_checked = 1;
entry.phar = myphar;
pos += sizeof(buf);
do {
phar_entry_info *newentry;
pos = php_stream_tell(fp);
hdr = (tar_header*) buf;
sum1 = phar_tar_number(hdr->checksum, sizeof(hdr->checksum));
if (sum1 == 0 && phar_tar_checksum(buf, sizeof(buf)) == 0) {
break;
}
memset(hdr->checksum, ' ', sizeof(hdr->checksum));
sum2 = phar_tar_checksum(buf, old?sizeof(old_tar_header):sizeof(tar_header));
size = entry.uncompressed_filesize = entry.compressed_filesize =
phar_tar_number(hdr->size, sizeof(hdr->size));
if (((!old && hdr->prefix[0] == 0) || old) && strlen(hdr->name) == sizeof(".phar/signature.bin")-1 && !strncmp(hdr->name, ".phar/signature.bin", sizeof(".phar/signature.bin")-1)) {
off_t curloc;
if (size > 511) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: tar-based phar \"%s\" has signature that is larger than 511 bytes, cannot process", fname);
}
bail:
php_stream_close(fp);
phar_destroy_phar_data(myphar TSRMLS_CC);
return FAILURE;
}
curloc = php_stream_tell(fp);
read = php_stream_read(fp, buf, size);
if (read != size) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: tar-based phar \"%s\" signature cannot be read", fname);
}
goto bail;
}
#ifdef WORDS_BIGENDIAN
# define PHAR_GET_32(buffer) \
(((((unsigned char*)(buffer))[3]) << 24) \
| ((((unsigned char*)(buffer))[2]) << 16) \
| ((((unsigned char*)(buffer))[1]) << 8) \
| (((unsigned char*)(buffer))[0]))
#else
# define PHAR_GET_32(buffer) (php_uint32) *(buffer)
#endif
myphar->sig_flags = PHAR_GET_32(buf);
if (FAILURE == phar_verify_signature(fp, php_stream_tell(fp) - size - 512, myphar->sig_flags, buf + 8, size - 8, fname, &myphar->signature, &myphar->sig_len, error TSRMLS_CC)) {
if (error) {
char *save = *error;
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: tar-based phar \"%s\" signature cannot be verified: %s", fname, save);
efree(save);
}
goto bail;
}
php_stream_seek(fp, curloc + 512, SEEK_SET);
/* signature checked out, let's ensure this is the last file in the phar */
if (((hdr->typeflag == '\0') || (hdr->typeflag == TAR_FILE)) && size > 0) {
/* this is not good enough - seek succeeds even on truncated tars */
php_stream_seek(fp, 512, SEEK_CUR);
if ((uint)php_stream_tell(fp) > totalsize) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: \"%s\" is a corrupted tar file (truncated)", fname);
}
php_stream_close(fp);
phar_destroy_phar_data(myphar TSRMLS_CC);
return FAILURE;
}
}
read = php_stream_read(fp, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (read != sizeof(buf)) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: \"%s\" is a corrupted tar file (truncated)", fname);
}
php_stream_close(fp);
phar_destroy_phar_data(myphar TSRMLS_CC);
return FAILURE;
}
hdr = (tar_header*) buf;
sum1 = phar_tar_number(hdr->checksum, sizeof(hdr->checksum));
if (sum1 == 0 && phar_tar_checksum(buf, sizeof(buf)) == 0) {
break;
}
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: \"%s\" has entries after signature, invalid phar", fname);
}
goto bail;
}
if (!last_was_longlink && hdr->typeflag == 'L') {
last_was_longlink = 1;
/* support the ././@LongLink system for storing long filenames */
entry.filename_len = entry.uncompressed_filesize;
/* Check for overflow - bug 61065 */
if (entry.filename_len == UINT_MAX) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: \"%s\" is a corrupted tar file (invalid entry size)", fname);
}
php_stream_close(fp);
phar_destroy_phar_data(myphar TSRMLS_CC);
return FAILURE;
}
entry.filename = pemalloc(entry.filename_len+1, myphar->is_persistent);
read = php_stream_read(fp, entry.filename, entry.filename_len);
if (read != entry.filename_len) {
efree(entry.filename);
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: \"%s\" is a corrupted tar file (truncated)", fname);
}
php_stream_close(fp);
phar_destroy_phar_data(myphar TSRMLS_CC);
return FAILURE;
}
entry.filename[entry.filename_len] = '\0';
/* skip blank stuff */
size = ((size+511)&~511) - size;
/* this is not good enough - seek succeeds even on truncated tars */
php_stream_seek(fp, size, SEEK_CUR);
if ((uint)php_stream_tell(fp) > totalsize) {
efree(entry.filename);
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: \"%s\" is a corrupted tar file (truncated)", fname);
}
php_stream_close(fp);
phar_destroy_phar_data(myphar TSRMLS_CC);
return FAILURE;
}
read = php_stream_read(fp, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (read != sizeof(buf)) {
efree(entry.filename);
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: \"%s\" is a corrupted tar file (truncated)", fname);
}
php_stream_close(fp);
phar_destroy_phar_data(myphar TSRMLS_CC);
return FAILURE;
}
continue;
} else if (!last_was_longlink && !old && hdr->prefix[0] != 0) {
char name[256];
int i, j;
for (i = 0; i < 155; i++) {
name[i] = hdr->prefix[i];
if (name[i] == '\0') {
break;
}
}
name[i++] = '/';
for (j = 0; j < 100; j++) {
name[i+j] = hdr->name[j];
if (name[i+j] == '\0') {
break;
}
}
entry.filename_len = i+j;
if (name[entry.filename_len - 1] == '/') {
/* some tar programs store directories with trailing slash */
entry.filename_len--;
}
entry.filename = pestrndup(name, entry.filename_len, myphar->is_persistent);
} else if (!last_was_longlink) {
int i;
/* calculate strlen, which can be no longer than 100 */
for (i = 0; i < 100; i++) {
if (hdr->name[i] == '\0') {
break;
}
}
entry.filename_len = i;
entry.filename = pestrndup(hdr->name, i, myphar->is_persistent);
if (entry.filename[entry.filename_len - 1] == '/') {
/* some tar programs store directories with trailing slash */
entry.filename[entry.filename_len - 1] = '\0';
entry.filename_len--;
}
}
last_was_longlink = 0;
phar_add_virtual_dirs(myphar, entry.filename, entry.filename_len TSRMLS_CC);
if (sum1 != sum2) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: \"%s\" is a corrupted tar file (checksum mismatch of file \"%s\")", fname, entry.filename);
}
pefree(entry.filename, myphar->is_persistent);
php_stream_close(fp);
phar_destroy_phar_data(myphar TSRMLS_CC);
return FAILURE;
}
entry.tar_type = ((old & (hdr->typeflag == '\0')) ? TAR_FILE : hdr->typeflag);
entry.offset = entry.offset_abs = pos; /* header_offset unused in tar */
entry.fp_type = PHAR_FP;
entry.flags = phar_tar_number(hdr->mode, sizeof(hdr->mode)) & PHAR_ENT_PERM_MASK;
entry.timestamp = phar_tar_number(hdr->mtime, sizeof(hdr->mtime));
entry.is_persistent = myphar->is_persistent;
#ifndef S_ISDIR
#define S_ISDIR(mode) (((mode)&S_IFMT) == S_IFDIR)
#endif
if (old && entry.tar_type == TAR_FILE && S_ISDIR(entry.flags)) {
entry.tar_type = TAR_DIR;
}
if (entry.tar_type == TAR_DIR) {
entry.is_dir = 1;
} else {
entry.is_dir = 0;
}
entry.link = NULL;
if (entry.tar_type == TAR_LINK) {
if (!zend_hash_exists(&myphar->manifest, hdr->linkname, strlen(hdr->linkname))) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: \"%s\" is a corrupted tar file - hard link to non-existent file \"%s\"", fname, hdr->linkname);
}
pefree(entry.filename, entry.is_persistent);
php_stream_close(fp);
phar_destroy_phar_data(myphar TSRMLS_CC);
return FAILURE;
}
entry.link = estrdup(hdr->linkname);
} else if (entry.tar_type == TAR_SYMLINK) {
entry.link = estrdup(hdr->linkname);
}
phar_set_inode(&entry TSRMLS_CC);
zend_hash_add(&myphar->manifest, entry.filename, entry.filename_len, (void*)&entry, sizeof(phar_entry_info), (void **) &newentry);
if (entry.is_persistent) {
++entry.manifest_pos;
}
if (entry.filename_len >= sizeof(".phar/.metadata")-1 && !memcmp(entry.filename, ".phar/.metadata", sizeof(".phar/.metadata")-1)) {
if (FAILURE == phar_tar_process_metadata(newentry, fp TSRMLS_CC)) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: tar-based phar \"%s\" has invalid metadata in magic file \"%s\"", fname, entry.filename);
}
php_stream_close(fp);
phar_destroy_phar_data(myphar TSRMLS_CC);
return FAILURE;
}
}
if (!actual_alias && entry.filename_len == sizeof(".phar/alias.txt")-1 && !strncmp(entry.filename, ".phar/alias.txt", sizeof(".phar/alias.txt")-1)) {
/* found explicit alias */
if (size > 511) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: tar-based phar \"%s\" has alias that is larger than 511 bytes, cannot process", fname);
}
php_stream_close(fp);
phar_destroy_phar_data(myphar TSRMLS_CC);
return FAILURE;
}
read = php_stream_read(fp, buf, size);
if (read == size) {
buf[size] = '\0';
if (!phar_validate_alias(buf, size)) {
if (size > 50) {
buf[50] = '.';
buf[51] = '.';
buf[52] = '.';
buf[53] = '\0';
}
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: invalid alias \"%s\" in tar-based phar \"%s\"", buf, fname);
}
php_stream_close(fp);
phar_destroy_phar_data(myphar TSRMLS_CC);
return FAILURE;
}
actual_alias = pestrndup(buf, size, myphar->is_persistent);
myphar->alias = actual_alias;
myphar->alias_len = size;
php_stream_seek(fp, pos, SEEK_SET);
} else {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: Unable to read alias from tar-based phar \"%s\"", fname);
}
php_stream_close(fp);
phar_destroy_phar_data(myphar TSRMLS_CC);
return FAILURE;
}
}
size = (size+511)&~511;
if (((hdr->typeflag == '\0') || (hdr->typeflag == TAR_FILE)) && size > 0) {
/* this is not good enough - seek succeeds even on truncated tars */
php_stream_seek(fp, size, SEEK_CUR);
if ((uint)php_stream_tell(fp) > totalsize) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: \"%s\" is a corrupted tar file (truncated)", fname);
}
php_stream_close(fp);
phar_destroy_phar_data(myphar TSRMLS_CC);
return FAILURE;
}
}
read = php_stream_read(fp, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (read != sizeof(buf)) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: \"%s\" is a corrupted tar file (truncated)", fname);
}
php_stream_close(fp);
phar_destroy_phar_data(myphar TSRMLS_CC);
return FAILURE;
}
} while (read != 0);
if (zend_hash_exists(&(myphar->manifest), ".phar/stub.php", sizeof(".phar/stub.php")-1)) {
myphar->is_data = 0;
} else {
myphar->is_data = 1;
}
/* ensure signature set */
if (!myphar->is_data && PHAR_G(require_hash) && !myphar->signature) {
php_stream_close(fp);
phar_destroy_phar_data(myphar TSRMLS_CC);
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 0, "tar-based phar \"%s\" does not have a signature", fname);
}
return FAILURE;
}
myphar->fname = pestrndup(fname, fname_len, myphar->is_persistent);
#ifdef PHP_WIN32
phar_unixify_path_separators(myphar->fname, fname_len);
#endif
myphar->fname_len = fname_len;
myphar->fp = fp;
p = strrchr(myphar->fname, '/');
if (p) {
myphar->ext = memchr(p, '.', (myphar->fname + fname_len) - p);
if (myphar->ext == p) {
myphar->ext = memchr(p + 1, '.', (myphar->fname + fname_len) - p - 1);
}
if (myphar->ext) {
myphar->ext_len = (myphar->fname + fname_len) - myphar->ext;
}
}
phar_request_initialize(TSRMLS_C);
if (SUCCESS != zend_hash_add(&(PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_fname_map), myphar->fname, fname_len, (void*)&myphar, sizeof(phar_archive_data*), (void **)&actual)) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: Unable to add tar-based phar \"%s\" to phar registry", fname);
}
php_stream_close(fp);
phar_destroy_phar_data(myphar TSRMLS_CC);
return FAILURE;
}
myphar = *actual;
if (actual_alias) {
phar_archive_data **fd_ptr;
myphar->is_temporary_alias = 0;
if (SUCCESS == zend_hash_find(&(PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_alias_map), actual_alias, myphar->alias_len, (void **)&fd_ptr)) {
if (SUCCESS != phar_free_alias(*fd_ptr, actual_alias, myphar->alias_len TSRMLS_CC)) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: Unable to add tar-based phar \"%s\", alias is already in use", fname);
}
zend_hash_del(&(PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_fname_map), myphar->fname, fname_len);
return FAILURE;
}
}
zend_hash_add(&(PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_alias_map), actual_alias, myphar->alias_len, (void*)&myphar, sizeof(phar_archive_data*), NULL);
} else {
phar_archive_data **fd_ptr;
if (alias_len) {
if (SUCCESS == zend_hash_find(&(PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_alias_map), alias, alias_len, (void **)&fd_ptr)) {
if (SUCCESS != phar_free_alias(*fd_ptr, alias, alias_len TSRMLS_CC)) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: Unable to add tar-based phar \"%s\", alias is already in use", fname);
}
zend_hash_del(&(PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_fname_map), myphar->fname, fname_len);
return FAILURE;
}
}
zend_hash_add(&(PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_alias_map), alias, alias_len, (void*)&myphar, sizeof(phar_archive_data*), NULL);
myphar->alias = pestrndup(alias, alias_len, myphar->is_persistent);
myphar->alias_len = alias_len;
} else {
myphar->alias = pestrndup(myphar->fname, fname_len, myphar->is_persistent);
myphar->alias_len = fname_len;
}
myphar->is_temporary_alias = 1;
}
if (pphar) {
*pphar = myphar;
}
return SUCCESS;
} | Vulnerable | [
"CWE-189"
] | php-src | c27f012b7a447e59d4a704688971cbfa7dddaa74 | 5.235776011030234e+37 | 473 | Fix bug #69453 - don't try to cut empty string | 1 |
static inline u16 l2cap_seq_list_pop(struct l2cap_seq_list *seq_list)
{
u16 seq = seq_list->head;
u16 mask = seq_list->mask;
seq_list->head = seq_list->list[seq & mask];
seq_list->list[seq & mask] = L2CAP_SEQ_LIST_CLEAR;
if (seq_list->head == L2CAP_SEQ_LIST_TAIL) {
seq_list->head = L2CAP_SEQ_LIST_CLEAR;
seq_list->tail = L2CAP_SEQ_LIST_CLEAR;
}
return seq;
} | Safe | [
"CWE-787"
] | linux | e860d2c904d1a9f38a24eb44c9f34b8f915a6ea3 | 2.99122861824304e+38 | 15 | Bluetooth: Properly check L2CAP config option output buffer length
Validate the output buffer length for L2CAP config requests and responses
to avoid overflowing the stack buffer used for building the option blocks.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ben Seri <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | 0 |
void sctp_v6_pf_exit(void)
{
list_del(&sctp_af_inet6.list);
} | Safe | [
"CWE-310"
] | net | 95ee62083cb6453e056562d91f597552021e6ae7 | 1.3096345439208982e+38 | 4 | net: sctp: fix ipv6 ipsec encryption bug in sctp_v6_xmit
Alan Chester reported an issue with IPv6 on SCTP that IPsec traffic is not
being encrypted, whereas on IPv4 it is. Setting up an AH + ESP transport
does not seem to have the desired effect:
SCTP + IPv4:
22:14:20.809645 IP (tos 0x2,ECT(0), ttl 64, id 0, offset 0, flags [DF], proto AH (51), length 116)
192.168.0.2 > 192.168.0.5: AH(spi=0x00000042,sumlen=16,seq=0x1): ESP(spi=0x00000044,seq=0x1), length 72
22:14:20.813270 IP (tos 0x2,ECT(0), ttl 64, id 0, offset 0, flags [DF], proto AH (51), length 340)
192.168.0.5 > 192.168.0.2: AH(spi=0x00000043,sumlen=16,seq=0x1):
SCTP + IPv6:
22:31:19.215029 IP6 (class 0x02, hlim 64, next-header SCTP (132) payload length: 364)
fe80::222:15ff:fe87:7fc.3333 > fe80::92e6:baff:fe0d:5a54.36767: sctp
1) [INIT ACK] [init tag: 747759530] [rwnd: 62464] [OS: 10] [MIS: 10]
Moreover, Alan says:
This problem was seen with both Racoon and Racoon2. Other people have seen
this with OpenSwan. When IPsec is configured to encrypt all upper layer
protocols the SCTP connection does not initialize. After using Wireshark to
follow packets, this is because the SCTP packet leaves Box A unencrypted and
Box B believes all upper layer protocols are to be encrypted so it drops
this packet, causing the SCTP connection to fail to initialize. When IPsec
is configured to encrypt just SCTP, the SCTP packets are observed unencrypted.
In fact, using `socat sctp6-listen:3333 -` on one end and transferring "plaintext"
string on the other end, results in cleartext on the wire where SCTP eventually
does not report any errors, thus in the latter case that Alan reports, the
non-paranoid user might think he's communicating over an encrypted transport on
SCTP although he's not (tcpdump ... -X):
...
0x0030: 5d70 8e1a 0003 001a 177d eb6c 0000 0000 ]p.......}.l....
0x0040: 0000 0000 706c 6169 6e74 6578 740a 0000 ....plaintext...
Only in /proc/net/xfrm_stat we can see XfrmInTmplMismatch increasing on the
receiver side. Initial follow-up analysis from Alan's bug report was done by
Alexey Dobriyan. Also thanks to Vlad Yasevich for feedback on this.
SCTP has its own implementation of sctp_v6_xmit() not calling inet6_csk_xmit().
This has the implication that it probably never really got updated along with
changes in inet6_csk_xmit() and therefore does not seem to invoke xfrm handlers.
SCTP's IPv4 xmit however, properly calls ip_queue_xmit() to do the work. Since
a call to inet6_csk_xmit() would solve this problem, but result in unecessary
route lookups, let us just use the cached flowi6 instead that we got through
sctp_v6_get_dst(). Since all SCTP packets are being sent through sctp_packet_transmit(),
we do the route lookup / flow caching in sctp_transport_route(), hold it in
tp->dst and skb_dst_set() right after that. If we would alter fl6->daddr in
sctp_v6_xmit() to np->opt->srcrt, we possibly could run into the same effect
of not having xfrm layer pick it up, hence, use fl6_update_dst() in sctp_v6_get_dst()
instead to get the correct source routed dst entry, which we assign to the skb.
Also source address routing example from 625034113 ("sctp: fix sctp to work with
ipv6 source address routing") still works with this patch! Nevertheless, in RFC5095
it is actually 'recommended' to not use that anyway due to traffic amplification [1].
So it seems we're not supposed to do that anyway in sctp_v6_xmit(). Moreover, if
we overwrite the flow destination here, the lower IPv6 layer will be unable to
put the correct destination address into IP header, as routing header is added in
ipv6_push_nfrag_opts() but then probably with wrong final destination. Things aside,
result of this patch is that we do not have any XfrmInTmplMismatch increase plus on
the wire with this patch it now looks like:
SCTP + IPv6:
08:17:47.074080 IP6 2620:52:0:102f:7a2b:cbff:fe27:1b0a > 2620:52:0:102f:213:72ff:fe32:7eba:
AH(spi=0x00005fb4,seq=0x1): ESP(spi=0x00005fb5,seq=0x1), length 72
08:17:47.074264 IP6 2620:52:0:102f:213:72ff:fe32:7eba > 2620:52:0:102f:7a2b:cbff:fe27:1b0a:
AH(spi=0x00003d54,seq=0x1): ESP(spi=0x00003d55,seq=0x1), length 296
This fixes Kernel Bugzilla 24412. This security issue seems to be present since
2.6.18 kernels. Lets just hope some big passive adversary in the wild didn't have
its fun with that. lksctp-tools IPv6 regression test suite passes as well with
this patch.
[1] http://www.secdev.org/conf/IPv6_RH_security-csw07.pdf
Reported-by: Alan Chester <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Alexey Dobriyan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]>
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | 0 |
set_quantifier(Node* qnode, Node* target, int group, ScanEnv* env)
{
QtfrNode* qn;
qn = NQTFR(qnode);
if (qn->lower == 1 && qn->upper == 1) {
return 1;
}
switch (NTYPE(target)) {
case NT_STR:
if (! group) {
StrNode* sn = NSTR(target);
if (str_node_can_be_split(sn, env->enc)) {
Node* n = str_node_split_last_char(sn, env->enc);
if (IS_NOT_NULL(n)) {
qn->target = n;
return 2;
}
}
}
break;
case NT_QTFR:
{ /* check redundant double repeat. */
/* verbose warn (?:.?)? etc... but not warn (.?)? etc... */
QtfrNode* qnt = NQTFR(target);
int nestq_num = popular_quantifier_num(qn);
int targetq_num = popular_quantifier_num(qnt);
#ifdef USE_WARNING_REDUNDANT_NESTED_REPEAT_OPERATOR
if (!IS_QUANTIFIER_BY_NUMBER(qn) && !IS_QUANTIFIER_BY_NUMBER(qnt) &&
IS_SYNTAX_BV(env->syntax, ONIG_SYN_WARN_REDUNDANT_NESTED_REPEAT)) {
switch (ReduceTypeTable[targetq_num][nestq_num]) {
case RQ_ASIS:
break;
case RQ_DEL:
if (onig_warn != onig_null_warn) {
onig_syntax_warn(env, "regular expression has redundant nested repeat operator '%s'",
PopularQStr[targetq_num]);
}
goto warn_exit;
break;
default:
if (onig_warn != onig_null_warn) {
onig_syntax_warn(env, "nested repeat operator '%s' and '%s' was replaced with '%s' in regular expression",
PopularQStr[targetq_num], PopularQStr[nestq_num],
ReduceQStr[ReduceTypeTable[targetq_num][nestq_num]]);
}
goto warn_exit;
break;
}
}
warn_exit:
#endif
if (targetq_num >= 0) {
if (nestq_num >= 0) {
onig_reduce_nested_quantifier(qnode, target);
goto q_exit;
}
else if (targetq_num == 1 || targetq_num == 2) { /* * or + */
/* (?:a*){n,m}, (?:a+){n,m} => (?:a*){n,n}, (?:a+){n,n} */
if (! IS_REPEAT_INFINITE(qn->upper) && qn->upper > 1 && qn->greedy) {
qn->upper = (qn->lower == 0 ? 1 : qn->lower);
}
}
}
}
break;
default:
break;
}
qn->target = target;
q_exit:
return 0;
} | Safe | [
"CWE-125"
] | Onigmo | 29e7e6aedebafd5efbbd90655c8e0d495035d7b4 | 2.424421337643052e+38 | 81 | bug: Fix out of bounds read
Add boundary check before PFETCH.
Based on the following commits on https://github.com/kkos/oniguruma ,
but not the same.
* 68c395576813b3f9812427f94d272bcffaca316c
* dc0a23eb16961f98d2a5a2128d18bd4602058a10
* 5186c7c706a7f280110e6a0b060f87d0f7d790ce
* 562bf4825b301693180c674994bf708b28b00592
* 162cf9124ba3bfaa21d53ebc506f3d9354bfa99b | 0 |
static void device_create_release(struct device *dev)
{
pr_debug("device: '%s': %s\n", dev_name(dev), __func__);
kfree(dev);
} | Safe | [
"CWE-787"
] | linux | aa838896d87af561a33ecefea1caa4c15a68bc47 | 1.4235207190630657e+38 | 5 | drivers core: Use sysfs_emit and sysfs_emit_at for show(device *...) functions
Convert the various sprintf fmaily calls in sysfs device show functions
to sysfs_emit and sysfs_emit_at for PAGE_SIZE buffer safety.
Done with:
$ spatch -sp-file sysfs_emit_dev.cocci --in-place --max-width=80 .
And cocci script:
$ cat sysfs_emit_dev.cocci
@@
identifier d_show;
identifier dev, attr, buf;
@@
ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
<...
return
- sprintf(buf,
+ sysfs_emit(buf,
...);
...>
}
@@
identifier d_show;
identifier dev, attr, buf;
@@
ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
<...
return
- snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE,
+ sysfs_emit(buf,
...);
...>
}
@@
identifier d_show;
identifier dev, attr, buf;
@@
ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
<...
return
- scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE,
+ sysfs_emit(buf,
...);
...>
}
@@
identifier d_show;
identifier dev, attr, buf;
expression chr;
@@
ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
<...
return
- strcpy(buf, chr);
+ sysfs_emit(buf, chr);
...>
}
@@
identifier d_show;
identifier dev, attr, buf;
identifier len;
@@
ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
<...
len =
- sprintf(buf,
+ sysfs_emit(buf,
...);
...>
return len;
}
@@
identifier d_show;
identifier dev, attr, buf;
identifier len;
@@
ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
<...
len =
- snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE,
+ sysfs_emit(buf,
...);
...>
return len;
}
@@
identifier d_show;
identifier dev, attr, buf;
identifier len;
@@
ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
<...
len =
- scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE,
+ sysfs_emit(buf,
...);
...>
return len;
}
@@
identifier d_show;
identifier dev, attr, buf;
identifier len;
@@
ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
<...
- len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
+ len += sysfs_emit_at(buf, len,
...);
...>
return len;
}
@@
identifier d_show;
identifier dev, attr, buf;
expression chr;
@@
ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
...
- strcpy(buf, chr);
- return strlen(buf);
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, chr);
}
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/3d033c33056d88bbe34d4ddb62afd05ee166ab9a.1600285923.git.joe@perches.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> | 0 |
getElementType(XML_Parser parser, const ENCODING *enc, const char *ptr,
const char *end) {
DTD *const dtd = parser->m_dtd; /* save one level of indirection */
const XML_Char *name = poolStoreString(&dtd->pool, enc, ptr, end);
ELEMENT_TYPE *ret;
if (! name)
return NULL;
ret = (ELEMENT_TYPE *)lookup(parser, &dtd->elementTypes, name,
sizeof(ELEMENT_TYPE));
if (! ret)
return NULL;
if (ret->name != name)
poolDiscard(&dtd->pool);
else {
poolFinish(&dtd->pool);
if (! setElementTypePrefix(parser, ret))
return NULL;
}
return ret;
} | Safe | [
"CWE-611",
"CWE-776",
"CWE-415",
"CWE-125"
] | libexpat | c20b758c332d9a13afbbb276d30db1d183a85d43 | 3.234133923151853e+38 | 21 | xmlparse.c: Deny internal entities closing the doctype | 0 |
static MagickBooleanType InverseFourierTransform(FourierInfo *fourier_info,
fftw_complex *fourier_pixels,Image *image,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
CacheView
*image_view;
const char
*value;
double
*source_pixels;
fftw_plan
fftw_c2r_plan;
MemoryInfo
*source_info;
register Quantum
*q;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
ssize_t
y;
source_info=AcquireVirtualMemory((size_t) fourier_info->width,
fourier_info->height*sizeof(*source_pixels));
if (source_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed","`%s'",image->filename);
return(MagickFalse);
}
source_pixels=(double *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(source_info);
value=GetImageArtifact(image,"fourier:normalize");
if (LocaleCompare(value,"inverse") == 0)
{
double
gamma;
/*
Normalize inverse transform.
*/
i=0L;
gamma=PerceptibleReciprocal((double) fourier_info->width*
fourier_info->height);
for (y=0L; y < (ssize_t) fourier_info->height; y++)
for (x=0L; x < (ssize_t) fourier_info->center; x++)
{
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_HAVE_COMPLEX_H)
fourier_pixels[i]*=gamma;
#else
fourier_pixels[i][0]*=gamma;
fourier_pixels[i][1]*=gamma;
#endif
i++;
}
}
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp critical (MagickCore_InverseFourierTransform)
#endif
fftw_c2r_plan=fftw_plan_dft_c2r_2d(fourier_info->width,fourier_info->height,
fourier_pixels,source_pixels,FFTW_ESTIMATE);
fftw_execute_dft_c2r(fftw_c2r_plan,fourier_pixels,source_pixels);
fftw_destroy_plan(fftw_c2r_plan);
i=0L;
image_view=AcquireAuthenticCacheView(image,exception);
for (y=0L; y < (ssize_t) fourier_info->height; y++)
{
if (y >= (ssize_t) image->rows)
break;
q=GetCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,0L,y,fourier_info->width >
image->columns ? image->columns : fourier_info->width,1UL,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0L; x < (ssize_t) fourier_info->width; x++)
{
if (x < (ssize_t) image->columns)
switch (fourier_info->channel)
{
case RedPixelChannel:
default:
{
SetPixelRed(image,ClampToQuantum(QuantumRange*source_pixels[i]),q);
break;
}
case GreenPixelChannel:
{
SetPixelGreen(image,ClampToQuantum(QuantumRange*source_pixels[i]),
q);
break;
}
case BluePixelChannel:
{
SetPixelBlue(image,ClampToQuantum(QuantumRange*source_pixels[i]),
q);
break;
}
case BlackPixelChannel:
{
SetPixelBlack(image,ClampToQuantum(QuantumRange*source_pixels[i]),
q);
break;
}
case AlphaPixelChannel:
{
SetPixelAlpha(image,ClampToQuantum(QuantumRange*source_pixels[i]),
q);
break;
}
}
i++;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
image_view=DestroyCacheView(image_view);
source_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(source_info);
return(MagickTrue);
} | Safe | [
"CWE-125"
] | ImageMagick | 7c2c5ba5b8e3a0b2b82f56c71dfab74ed4006df7 | 2.890076791658479e+38 | 124 | https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1588 | 0 |
add_mtab(char *devname, char *mountpoint, unsigned long flags, const char *fstype)
{
int rc = 0, tmprc, fd;
uid_t uid;
char *mount_user = NULL;
struct mntent mountent;
struct stat statbuf;
FILE *pmntfile;
sigset_t mask, oldmask;
uid = getuid();
if (uid != 0)
mount_user = getusername(uid);
/*
* Set the real uid to the effective uid. This prevents unprivileged
* users from sending signals to this process, though ^c on controlling
* terminal should still work.
*/
rc = setreuid(geteuid(), -1);
if (rc != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unable to set real uid to effective uid: %s\n",
strerror(errno));
return EX_FILEIO;
}
rc = sigfillset(&mask);
if (rc) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unable to set filled signal mask\n");
return EX_FILEIO;
}
rc = sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &mask, &oldmask);
if (rc) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unable to make process ignore signals\n");
return EX_FILEIO;
}
rc = toggle_dac_capability(1, 1);
if (rc)
return EX_FILEIO;
atexit(unlock_mtab);
rc = lock_mtab();
if (rc) {
fprintf(stderr, "cannot lock mtab");
rc = EX_FILEIO;
goto add_mtab_exit;
}
pmntfile = setmntent(MOUNTED, "a+");
if (!pmntfile) {
fprintf(stderr, "could not update mount table\n");
unlock_mtab();
rc = EX_FILEIO;
goto add_mtab_exit;
}
fd = fileno(pmntfile);
if (fd < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "mntent does not appear to be valid\n");
unlock_mtab();
rc = EX_FILEIO;
goto add_mtab_exit;
}
rc = fstat(fd, &statbuf);
if (rc != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "unable to fstat open mtab\n");
endmntent(pmntfile);
unlock_mtab();
rc = EX_FILEIO;
goto add_mtab_exit;
}
mountent.mnt_fsname = devname;
mountent.mnt_dir = mountpoint;
mountent.mnt_type = (char *)(void *)fstype;
mountent.mnt_opts = (char *)calloc(MTAB_OPTIONS_LEN, 1);
if (mountent.mnt_opts) {
if (flags & MS_RDONLY)
strlcat(mountent.mnt_opts, "ro", MTAB_OPTIONS_LEN);
else
strlcat(mountent.mnt_opts, "rw", MTAB_OPTIONS_LEN);
if (flags & MS_MANDLOCK)
strlcat(mountent.mnt_opts, ",mand", MTAB_OPTIONS_LEN);
if (flags & MS_NOEXEC)
strlcat(mountent.mnt_opts, ",noexec", MTAB_OPTIONS_LEN);
if (flags & MS_NOSUID)
strlcat(mountent.mnt_opts, ",nosuid", MTAB_OPTIONS_LEN);
if (flags & MS_NODEV)
strlcat(mountent.mnt_opts, ",nodev", MTAB_OPTIONS_LEN);
if (flags & MS_SYNCHRONOUS)
strlcat(mountent.mnt_opts, ",sync", MTAB_OPTIONS_LEN);
if (mount_user) {
strlcat(mountent.mnt_opts, ",user=", MTAB_OPTIONS_LEN);
strlcat(mountent.mnt_opts, mount_user,
MTAB_OPTIONS_LEN);
}
}
mountent.mnt_freq = 0;
mountent.mnt_passno = 0;
rc = addmntent(pmntfile, &mountent);
if (rc) {
int ignore __attribute__((unused));
fprintf(stderr, "unable to add mount entry to mtab\n");
ignore = ftruncate(fd, statbuf.st_size);
rc = EX_FILEIO;
}
tmprc = my_endmntent(pmntfile, statbuf.st_size);
if (tmprc) {
fprintf(stderr, "error %d detected on close of mtab\n", tmprc);
rc = EX_FILEIO;
}
unlock_mtab();
free(mountent.mnt_opts);
add_mtab_exit:
toggle_dac_capability(1, 0);
sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &oldmask, NULL);
return rc;
} | Safe | [
"CWE-78"
] | cifs-utils | 48a654e2e763fce24c22e1b9c695b42804bbdd4a | 2.086599160646579e+38 | 124 | CVE-2020-14342: mount.cifs: fix shell command injection
A bug has been reported recently for the mount.cifs utility which is
part of the cifs-utils package. The tool has a shell injection issue
where one can embed shell commands via the username mount option. Those
commands will be run via popen() in the context of the user calling
mount.
The bug requires cifs-utils to be built with --with-systemd (enabled
by default if supported).
A quick test to check if the mount.cifs binary is vulnerable is to look
for popen() calls like so:
$ nm mount.cifs | grep popen
U popen@@GLIBC_2.2.5
If the user is allowed to run mount.cifs via sudo, he can obtain a root
shell.
sudo mount.cifs -o username='`sh`' //1 /mnt
If mount.cifs has the setuid bit, the command will still be run as the
calling user (no privilege escalation).
The bug was introduced in June 2012 with commit 4e264031d0da7d3f2
("mount.cifs: Use systemd's mechanism for getting password, if
present.").
Affected versions:
cifs-utils-5.6
cifs-utils-5.7
cifs-utils-5.8
cifs-utils-5.9
cifs-utils-6.0
cifs-utils-6.1
cifs-utils-6.2
cifs-utils-6.3
cifs-utils-6.4
cifs-utils-6.5
cifs-utils-6.6
cifs-utils-6.7
cifs-utils-6.8
cifs-utils-6.9
cifs-utils-6.10
Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14442
Reported-by: Vadim Lebedev <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (SUSE) <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Aurelien Aptel <[email protected]> | 0 |
generate_early_secrets(gnutls_session_t session,
const mac_entry_st *prf)
{
int ret;
ret = _tls13_derive_secret2(prf, EARLY_TRAFFIC_LABEL, sizeof(EARLY_TRAFFIC_LABEL)-1,
session->internals.handshake_hash_buffer.data,
session->internals.handshake_hash_buffer_client_hello_len,
session->key.proto.tls13.temp_secret,
session->key.proto.tls13.e_ckey);
if (ret < 0)
return gnutls_assert_val(ret);
ret = _gnutls_call_keylog_func(session, "CLIENT_EARLY_TRAFFIC_SECRET",
session->key.proto.tls13.e_ckey,
prf->output_size);
if (ret < 0)
return gnutls_assert_val(ret);
ret = _tls13_derive_secret2(prf, EARLY_EXPORTER_MASTER_LABEL, sizeof(EARLY_EXPORTER_MASTER_LABEL)-1,
session->internals.handshake_hash_buffer.data,
session->internals.handshake_hash_buffer_client_hello_len,
session->key.proto.tls13.temp_secret,
session->key.proto.tls13.ap_expkey);
if (ret < 0)
return gnutls_assert_val(ret);
ret = _gnutls_call_keylog_func(session, "EARLY_EXPORTER_SECRET",
session->key.proto.tls13.ap_expkey,
prf->output_size);
if (ret < 0)
return gnutls_assert_val(ret);
return 0;
} | Safe | [
"CWE-416"
] | gnutls | 75a937d97f4fefc6f9b08e3791f151445f551cb3 | 1.536622915233499e+37 | 35 | pre_shared_key: avoid use-after-free around realloc
Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <[email protected]> | 0 |
void pre_next_partition(ha_rows rownum)
{
at_partition_end= false;
cursor.on_next_partition(rownum);
} | Safe | [] | server | ba4927e520190bbad763bb5260ae154f29a61231 | 1.3231779951770783e+37 | 6 | MDEV-19398: Assertion `item1->type() == Item::FIELD_ITEM ...
Window Functions code tries to minimize the number of times it
needs to sort the select's resultset by finding "compatible"
OVER (PARTITION BY ... ORDER BY ...) clauses.
This employs compare_order_elements(). That function assumed that
the order expressions are Item_field-derived objects (that refer
to a temp.table). But this is not always the case: one can
construct queries order expressions are arbitrary item expressions.
Add handling for such expressions: sort them according to the window
specification they appeared in.
This means we cannot detect that two compatible PARTITION BY clauses
that use expressions can share the sorting step.
But at least we won't crash. | 0 |
static void read_dce_straps(
struct dc_context *ctx,
struct resource_straps *straps)
{
generic_reg_get(ctx, mmDC_PINSTRAPS + BASE(mmDC_PINSTRAPS_BASE_IDX),
FN(DC_PINSTRAPS, DC_PINSTRAPS_AUDIO), &straps->dc_pinstraps_audio);
} | Safe | [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-401"
] | linux | 104c307147ad379617472dd91a5bcb368d72bd6d | 2.502209377028047e+37 | 7 | drm/amd/display: prevent memory leak
In dcn*_create_resource_pool the allocated memory should be released if
construct pool fails.
Reviewed-by: Harry Wentland <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Navid Emamdoost <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]> | 0 |
void AsyncConnection::DelayedDelivery::do_request(int id)
{
Message *m = nullptr;
{
std::lock_guard<std::mutex> l(delay_lock);
register_time_events.erase(id);
if (stop_dispatch)
return ;
if (delay_queue.empty())
return ;
utime_t release = delay_queue.front().first;
m = delay_queue.front().second;
string delay_msg_type = msgr->cct->_conf->ms_inject_delay_msg_type;
utime_t now = ceph_clock_now();
if ((release > now &&
(delay_msg_type.empty() || m->get_type_name() == delay_msg_type))) {
utime_t t = release - now;
t.sleep();
}
delay_queue.pop_front();
}
if (msgr->ms_can_fast_dispatch(m)) {
dispatch_queue->fast_dispatch(m);
} else {
dispatch_queue->enqueue(m, m->get_priority(), conn_id);
}
} | Safe | [
"CWE-287",
"CWE-284"
] | ceph | 5ead97120e07054d80623dada90a5cc764c28468 | 3.387683267586613e+38 | 27 | auth/cephx: add authorizer challenge
Allow the accepting side of a connection to reject an initial authorizer
with a random challenge. The connecting side then has to respond with an
updated authorizer proving they are able to decrypt the service's challenge
and that the new authorizer was produced for this specific connection
instance.
The accepting side requires this challenge and response unconditionally
if the client side advertises they have the feature bit. Servers wishing
to require this improved level of authentication simply have to require
the appropriate feature.
Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit f80b848d3f830eb6dba50123e04385173fa4540b)
# Conflicts:
# src/auth/Auth.h
# src/auth/cephx/CephxProtocol.cc
# src/auth/cephx/CephxProtocol.h
# src/auth/none/AuthNoneProtocol.h
# src/msg/Dispatcher.h
# src/msg/async/AsyncConnection.cc
- const_iterator
- ::decode vs decode
- AsyncConnection ctor arg noise
- get_random_bytes(), not cct->random() | 0 |
static inline unsigned char *PopDoublePixel(QuantumInfo *quantum_info,
const double pixel,unsigned char *magick_restrict pixels)
{
double
*p;
unsigned char
quantum[8];
(void) memset(quantum,0,sizeof(quantum));
p=(double *) quantum;
*p=(double) (pixel*quantum_info->state.inverse_scale+quantum_info->minimum);
if (quantum_info->endian == LSBEndian)
{
*pixels++=quantum[0];
*pixels++=quantum[1];
*pixels++=quantum[2];
*pixels++=quantum[3];
*pixels++=quantum[4];
*pixels++=quantum[5];
*pixels++=quantum[6];
*pixels++=quantum[7];
return(pixels);
}
*pixels++=quantum[7];
*pixels++=quantum[6];
*pixels++=quantum[5];
*pixels++=quantum[4];
*pixels++=quantum[3];
*pixels++=quantum[2];
*pixels++=quantum[1];
*pixels++=quantum[0];
return(pixels);
} | Safe | [
"CWE-190"
] | ImageMagick | 5af1dffa4b6ab984b5f13d1e91c95760d75f12a6 | 2.1243633257649644e+38 | 34 | outside the range of representable values of type 'unsigned char' (#3083)
Co-authored-by: Zhang Xiaohui <[email protected]> | 0 |
void PacketFreeOrRelease(Packet *p)
{
if (p->flags & PKT_ALLOC)
PacketFree(p);
else
PacketPoolReturnPacket(p);
} | Safe | [
"CWE-20"
] | suricata | 11f3659f64a4e42e90cb3c09fcef66894205aefe | 1.4595722566831986e+38 | 7 | teredo: be stricter on what to consider valid teredo
Invalid Teredo can lead to valid DNS traffic (or other UDP traffic)
being misdetected as Teredo. This leads to false negatives in the
UDP payload inspection.
Make the teredo code only consider a packet teredo if the encapsulated
data was decoded without any 'invalid' events being set.
Bug #2736. | 0 |
mono_loader_get_last_error (void)
{
return (MonoLoaderError*)TlsGetValue (loader_error_thread_id);
} | Safe | [] | mono | 8e890a3bf80a4620e417814dc14886b1bbd17625 | 1.9058997689447228e+38 | 4 | Search for dllimported shared libs in the base directory, not cwd.
* loader.c: we don't search the current directory anymore for shared
libraries referenced in DllImport attributes, as it has a slight
security risk. We search in the same directory where the referencing
image was loaded from, instead. Fixes bug# 641915. | 0 |
static int sas_ex_discover_devices(struct domain_device *dev, int single)
{
struct expander_device *ex = &dev->ex_dev;
int i = 0, end = ex->num_phys;
int res = 0;
if (0 <= single && single < end) {
i = single;
end = i+1;
}
for ( ; i < end; i++) {
struct ex_phy *ex_phy = &ex->ex_phy[i];
if (ex_phy->phy_state == PHY_VACANT ||
ex_phy->phy_state == PHY_NOT_PRESENT ||
ex_phy->phy_state == PHY_DEVICE_DISCOVERED)
continue;
switch (ex_phy->linkrate) {
case SAS_PHY_DISABLED:
case SAS_PHY_RESET_PROBLEM:
case SAS_SATA_PORT_SELECTOR:
continue;
default:
res = sas_ex_discover_dev(dev, i);
if (res)
break;
continue;
}
}
if (!res)
sas_check_level_subtractive_boundary(dev);
return res;
} | Safe | [
"CWE-399",
"CWE-772"
] | linux | 4a491b1ab11ca0556d2fda1ff1301e862a2d44c4 | 3.279313635995755e+38 | 37 | scsi: libsas: fix memory leak in sas_smp_get_phy_events()
We've got a memory leak with the following producer:
while true;
do cat /sys/class/sas_phy/phy-1:0:12/invalid_dword_count >/dev/null;
done
The buffer req is allocated and not freed after we return. Fix it.
Fixes: 2908d778ab3e ("[SCSI] aic94xx: new driver")
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <[email protected]>
CC: John Garry <[email protected]>
CC: chenqilin <[email protected]>
CC: chenxiang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]> | 0 |
rsa_sec_unblind (const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
mp_limb_t *x, mp_limb_t *ri, const mp_limb_t *c)
{
const mp_limb_t *np = mpz_limbs_read (pub->n);
mp_size_t nn = mpz_size (pub->n);
size_t itch;
size_t i2;
mp_limb_t *scratch;
TMP_GMP_DECL(tp, mp_limb_t);
itch = mpn_sec_mul_itch(nn, nn);
i2 = mpn_sec_div_r_itch(nn + nn, nn);
itch = MAX(itch, i2);
TMP_GMP_ALLOC (tp, nn + nn + itch);
scratch = tp + nn + nn;
mpn_sec_mul (tp, c, nn, ri, nn, scratch);
mpn_sec_div_r (tp, nn + nn, np, nn, scratch);
mpn_copyi(x, tp, nn);
TMP_GMP_FREE (tp);
} | Safe | [
"CWE-20"
] | nettle | 485b5e2820a057e873b1ba812fdb39cae4adf98c | 3.1933676597766796e+37 | 24 | Change _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr to take a fix input size.
Improves consistency with _rsa_sec_compute_root, and fixes zero-input bug. | 0 |
static void des3_encrypt(struct ssh_cipher_struct *cipher, void *in,
void *out, unsigned long len) {
DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt(in, out, len, cipher->key,
(void*)((uint8_t*)cipher->key + sizeof(DES_key_schedule)),
(void*)((uint8_t*)cipher->key + 2 * sizeof(DES_key_schedule)),
cipher->IV, 1);
} | Safe | [
"CWE-310"
] | libssh | e99246246b4061f7e71463f8806b9dcad65affa0 | 2.846123111854852e+38 | 7 | security: fix for vulnerability CVE-2014-0017
When accepting a new connection, a forking server based on libssh forks
and the child process handles the request. The RAND_bytes() function of
openssl doesn't reset its state after the fork, but simply adds the
current process id (getpid) to the PRNG state, which is not guaranteed
to be unique.
This can cause several children to end up with same PRNG state which is
a security issue. | 0 |
static u32 hclge_tm_get_shapping_para(u8 ir_b, u8 ir_u, u8 ir_s,
u8 bs_b, u8 bs_s)
{
u32 shapping_para = 0;
hclge_tm_set_field(shapping_para, IR_B, ir_b);
hclge_tm_set_field(shapping_para, IR_U, ir_u);
hclge_tm_set_field(shapping_para, IR_S, ir_s);
hclge_tm_set_field(shapping_para, BS_B, bs_b);
hclge_tm_set_field(shapping_para, BS_S, bs_s);
return shapping_para;
} | Safe | [
"CWE-125"
] | linux | 04f25edb48c441fc278ecc154c270f16966cbb90 | 1.7568064188873197e+38 | 13 | net: hns3: add some error checking in hclge_tm module
When hdev->tx_sch_mode is HCLGE_FLAG_VNET_BASE_SCH_MODE, the
hclge_tm_schd_mode_vnet_base_cfg calls hclge_tm_pri_schd_mode_cfg
with vport->vport_id as pri_id, which is used as index for
hdev->tm_info.tc_info, it will cause out of bound access issue
if vport_id is equal to or larger than HNAE3_MAX_TC.
Also hardware only support maximum speed of HCLGE_ETHER_MAX_RATE.
So this patch adds two checks for above cases.
Fixes: 848440544b41 ("net: hns3: Add support of TX Scheduler & Shaper to HNS3 driver")
Signed-off-by: Yunsheng Lin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peng Li <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Huazhong Tan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | 0 |
static void cmd_mode_sense(IDEState *s, uint8_t *buf)
{
int action, code;
int max_len;
max_len = ube16_to_cpu(buf + 7);
action = buf[2] >> 6;
code = buf[2] & 0x3f;
switch(action) {
case 0: /* current values */
switch(code) {
case MODE_PAGE_R_W_ERROR: /* error recovery */
cpu_to_ube16(&buf[0], 16 - 2);
buf[2] = 0x70;
buf[3] = 0;
buf[4] = 0;
buf[5] = 0;
buf[6] = 0;
buf[7] = 0;
buf[8] = MODE_PAGE_R_W_ERROR;
buf[9] = 16 - 10;
buf[10] = 0x00;
buf[11] = 0x05;
buf[12] = 0x00;
buf[13] = 0x00;
buf[14] = 0x00;
buf[15] = 0x00;
ide_atapi_cmd_reply(s, 16, max_len);
break;
case MODE_PAGE_AUDIO_CTL:
cpu_to_ube16(&buf[0], 24 - 2);
buf[2] = 0x70;
buf[3] = 0;
buf[4] = 0;
buf[5] = 0;
buf[6] = 0;
buf[7] = 0;
buf[8] = MODE_PAGE_AUDIO_CTL;
buf[9] = 24 - 10;
/* Fill with CDROM audio volume */
buf[17] = 0;
buf[19] = 0;
buf[21] = 0;
buf[23] = 0;
ide_atapi_cmd_reply(s, 24, max_len);
break;
case MODE_PAGE_CAPABILITIES:
cpu_to_ube16(&buf[0], 30 - 2);
buf[2] = 0x70;
buf[3] = 0;
buf[4] = 0;
buf[5] = 0;
buf[6] = 0;
buf[7] = 0;
buf[8] = MODE_PAGE_CAPABILITIES;
buf[9] = 30 - 10;
buf[10] = 0x3b; /* read CDR/CDRW/DVDROM/DVDR/DVDRAM */
buf[11] = 0x00;
/* Claim PLAY_AUDIO capability (0x01) since some Linux
code checks for this to automount media. */
buf[12] = 0x71;
buf[13] = 3 << 5;
buf[14] = (1 << 0) | (1 << 3) | (1 << 5);
if (s->tray_locked) {
buf[14] |= 1 << 1;
}
buf[15] = 0x00; /* No volume & mute control, no changer */
cpu_to_ube16(&buf[16], 704); /* 4x read speed */
buf[18] = 0; /* Two volume levels */
buf[19] = 2;
cpu_to_ube16(&buf[20], 512); /* 512k buffer */
cpu_to_ube16(&buf[22], 704); /* 4x read speed current */
buf[24] = 0;
buf[25] = 0;
buf[26] = 0;
buf[27] = 0;
buf[28] = 0;
buf[29] = 0;
ide_atapi_cmd_reply(s, 30, max_len);
break;
default:
goto error_cmd;
}
break;
case 1: /* changeable values */
goto error_cmd;
case 2: /* default values */
goto error_cmd;
default:
case 3: /* saved values */
ide_atapi_cmd_error(s, ILLEGAL_REQUEST,
ASC_SAVING_PARAMETERS_NOT_SUPPORTED);
break;
}
return;
error_cmd:
ide_atapi_cmd_error(s, ILLEGAL_REQUEST, ASC_INV_FIELD_IN_CMD_PACKET);
} | Safe | [] | qemu | ce560dcf20c14194db5ef3b9fc1ea592d4e68109 | 2.978525784416309e+38 | 105 | ATAPI: STARTSTOPUNIT only eject/load media if powercondition is 0
The START STOP UNIT command will only eject/load media if
power condition is zero.
If power condition is !0 then LOEJ and START will be ignored.
From MMC (sbc contains similar wordings too)
The Power Conditions field requests the block device to be placed
in the power condition defined in
Table 558. If this field has a value other than 0h then the Start
and LoEj bits shall be ignored.
Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <[email protected]> | 0 |
enum_field_types Item::string_field_type() const
{
enum_field_types f_type= MYSQL_TYPE_VAR_STRING;
if (max_length >= 16777216)
f_type= MYSQL_TYPE_LONG_BLOB;
else if (max_length >= 65536)
f_type= MYSQL_TYPE_MEDIUM_BLOB;
return f_type;
} | Safe | [] | server | b000e169562697aa072600695d4f0c0412f94f4f | 1.7486101951534783e+37 | 9 | Bug#26361149 MYSQL SERVER CRASHES AT: COL IN(IFNULL(CONST, COL), NAME_CONST('NAME', NULL))
based on:
commit f7316aa0c9a
Author: Ajo Robert <[email protected]>
Date: Thu Aug 24 17:03:21 2017 +0530
Bug#26361149 MYSQL SERVER CRASHES AT: COL IN(IFNULL(CONST,
COL), NAME_CONST('NAME', NULL))
Backport of Bug#19143243 fix.
NAME_CONST item can return NULL_ITEM type in case of incorrect arguments.
NULL_ITEM has special processing in Item_func_in function.
In Item_func_in::fix_length_and_dec an array of possible comparators is
created. Since NAME_CONST function has NULL_ITEM type, corresponding
array element is empty. Then NAME_CONST is wrapped to ITEM_CACHE.
ITEM_CACHE can not return proper type(NULL_ITEM) in Item_func_in::val_int(),
so the NULL_ITEM is attempted compared with an empty comparator.
The fix is to disable the caching of Item_name_const item. | 0 |
static void test_bug11111()
{
MYSQL_STMT *stmt;
MYSQL_BIND my_bind[2];
char buf[2][20];
ulong len[2];
int i;
int rc;
const char *query= "SELECT DISTINCT f1,ff2 FROM v1";
myheader("test_bug11111");
rc= mysql_query(mysql, "drop table if exists t1, t2, v1");
myquery(rc);
rc= mysql_query(mysql, "drop view if exists t1, t2, v1");
myquery(rc);
rc= mysql_query(mysql, "create table t1 (f1 int, f2 int)");
myquery(rc);
rc= mysql_query(mysql, "create table t2 (ff1 int, ff2 int)");
myquery(rc);
rc= mysql_query(mysql, "create view v1 as select * from t1, t2 where f1=ff1");
myquery(rc);
rc= mysql_query(mysql, "insert into t1 values (1,1), (2,2), (3,3)");
myquery(rc);
rc= mysql_query(mysql, "insert into t2 values (1,1), (2,2), (3,3)");
myquery(rc);
stmt= mysql_stmt_init(mysql);
mysql_stmt_prepare(stmt, query, strlen(query));
mysql_stmt_execute(stmt);
memset(my_bind, 0, sizeof(my_bind));
for (i=0; i < 2; i++)
{
my_bind[i].buffer_type= MYSQL_TYPE_STRING;
my_bind[i].buffer= (uchar* *)&buf[i];
my_bind[i].buffer_length= 20;
my_bind[i].length= &len[i];
}
rc= mysql_stmt_bind_result(stmt, my_bind);
check_execute(stmt, rc);
rc= mysql_stmt_fetch(stmt);
check_execute(stmt, rc);
if (!opt_silent)
printf("return: %s", buf[1]);
DIE_UNLESS(!strcmp(buf[1],"1"));
mysql_stmt_close(stmt);
rc= mysql_query(mysql, "drop view v1");
myquery(rc);
rc= mysql_query(mysql, "drop table t1, t2");
myquery(rc);
} | Safe | [
"CWE-284",
"CWE-295"
] | mysql-server | 3bd5589e1a5a93f9c224badf983cd65c45215390 | 2.9526513591674087e+38 | 55 | WL#6791 : Redefine client --ssl option to imply enforced encryption
# Changed the meaning of the --ssl=1 option of all client binaries
to mean force ssl, not try ssl and fail over to eunecrypted
# Added a new MYSQL_OPT_SSL_ENFORCE mysql_options()
option to specify that an ssl connection is required.
# Added a new macro SSL_SET_OPTIONS() to the client
SSL handling headers that sets all the relevant SSL options at
once.
# Revamped all of the current native clients to use the new macro
# Removed some Windows line endings.
# Added proper handling of the new option into the ssl helper
headers.
# If SSL is mandatory assume that the media is secure enough
for the sha256 plugin to do unencrypted password exchange even
before establishing a connection.
# Set the default ssl cipher to DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA if none is
specified.
# updated test cases that require a non-default cipher to spawn
a mysql command line tool binary since mysqltest has no support
for specifying ciphers.
# updated the replication slave connection code to always enforce
SSL if any of the SSL config options is present.
# test cases added and updated.
# added a mysql_get_option() API to return mysql_options()
values. Used the new API inside the sha256 plugin.
# Fixed compilation warnings because of unused variables.
# Fixed test failures (mysql_ssl and bug13115401)
# Fixed whitespace issues.
# Fully implemented the mysql_get_option() function.
# Added a test case for mysql_get_option()
# fixed some trailing whitespace issues
# fixed some uint/int warnings in mysql_client_test.c
# removed shared memory option from non-windows get_options
tests
# moved MYSQL_OPT_LOCAL_INFILE to the uint options | 0 |
//! Crop image region \overloading.
CImg<T>& crop(const int x0, const int x1, const unsigned int boundary_conditions=0) {
return crop(x0,0,0,0,x1,_height - 1,_depth - 1,_spectrum - 1,boundary_conditions); | Safe | [
"CWE-125"
] | CImg | 10af1e8c1ad2a58a0a3342a856bae63e8f257abb | 1.189174295227069e+38 | 3 | Fix other issues in 'CImg<T>::load_bmp()'. | 0 |
static RList *classes(RBinFile *bf) {
RDyldCache *cache = (RDyldCache*) bf->o->bin_obj;
if (!cache) {
return NULL;
}
RList *ret = r_list_newf (free);
if (!ret) {
return NULL;
}
if (!cache->objc_opt_info_loaded) {
cache->oi = get_objc_opt_info (bf, cache);
cache->objc_opt_info_loaded = true;
}
RListIter *iter;
RDyldBinImage *bin;
ut64 slide = rebase_infos_get_slide (cache);
RBuffer *orig_buf = bf->buf;
ut32 num_of_unnamed_class = 0;
r_list_foreach (cache->bins, iter, bin) {
struct MACH0_(obj_t) *mach0 = bin_to_mach0 (bf, bin);
if (!mach0) {
goto beach;
}
struct section_t *sections = NULL;
if (!(sections = MACH0_(get_sections) (mach0))) {
MACH0_(mach0_free) (mach0);
goto beach;
}
int i;
for (i = 0; !sections[i].last; i++) {
if (sections[i].size == 0) {
continue;
}
bool is_classlist = strstr (sections[i].name, "__objc_classlist");
bool is_catlist = strstr (sections[i].name, "__objc_catlist");
if (!is_classlist && !is_catlist) {
continue;
}
ut8 *pointers = malloc (sections[i].size);
if (!pointers) {
continue;
}
ut64 offset = va2pa (sections[i].addr, cache->n_maps, cache->maps, cache->buf, slide, NULL, NULL);
if (r_buf_read_at (cache->buf, offset, pointers, sections[i].size) < sections[i].size) {
R_FREE (pointers);
continue;
}
ut8 *cursor = pointers;
ut8 *pointers_end = pointers + sections[i].size;
for (; cursor < pointers_end; cursor += 8) {
ut64 pointer_to_class = r_read_le64 (cursor);
RBinClass *klass;
if (!(klass = R_NEW0 (RBinClass)) ||
!(klass->methods = r_list_new ()) ||
!(klass->fields = r_list_new ())) {
R_FREE (klass);
R_FREE (pointers);
R_FREE (sections);
MACH0_(mach0_free) (mach0);
goto beach;
}
bf->o->bin_obj = mach0;
bf->buf = cache->buf;
if (is_classlist) {
MACH0_(get_class_t) (pointer_to_class, bf, klass, false, NULL, cache->oi);
} else {
MACH0_(get_category_t) (pointer_to_class, bf, klass, NULL, cache->oi);
}
bf->o->bin_obj = cache;
bf->buf = orig_buf;
if (!klass->name) {
eprintf ("KLASS ERROR AT 0x%"PFMT64x", is_classlist %d\n", pointer_to_class, is_classlist);
klass->name = r_str_newf ("UnnamedClass%u", num_of_unnamed_class);
if (!klass->name) {
R_FREE (klass);
R_FREE (pointers);
R_FREE (sections);
MACH0_(mach0_free) (mach0);
goto beach;
}
num_of_unnamed_class++;
}
r_list_append (ret, klass);
}
R_FREE (pointers);
}
R_FREE (sections);
MACH0_(mach0_free) (mach0);
}
return ret;
beach:
r_list_free (ret);
return NULL;
} | Safe | [
"CWE-787"
] | radare2 | c84b7232626badd075caf3ae29661b609164bac6 | 7.308247685079897e+36 | 112 | Fix heap buffer overflow in dyldcache parser ##crash
* Reported by: Lazymio via huntr.dev
* Reproducer: dyldovf | 0 |
bool InstanceKlass::can_be_primary_super_slow() const {
if (is_interface())
return false;
else
return Klass::can_be_primary_super_slow();
} | Safe | [] | jdk17u | f8eb9abe034f7c6bea4da05a9ea42017b3f80730 | 1.8164797076921994e+38 | 6 | 8270386: Better verification of scan methods
Reviewed-by: coleenp
Backport-of: ac329cef45979bd0159ecd1347e36f7129bb2ce4 | 0 |
ByteVector ByteVector::fromUInt(uint value, bool mostSignificantByteFirst)
{
return fromNumber<uint>(value, mostSignificantByteFirst);
} | Safe | [
"CWE-189"
] | taglib | dcdf4fd954e3213c355746fa15b7480461972308 | 6.543828507671397e+37 | 4 | Avoid uint overflow in case the length + index is over UINT_MAX | 0 |
njs_array_prototype_to_string(njs_vm_t *vm, njs_value_t *args, njs_uint_t nargs,
njs_index_t unused)
{
njs_int_t ret;
njs_value_t value;
njs_lvlhsh_query_t lhq;
static const njs_value_t join_string = njs_string("join");
if (njs_is_object(&args[0])) {
njs_object_property_init(&lhq, &join_string, NJS_JOIN_HASH);
ret = njs_object_property(vm, &args[0], &lhq, &value);
if (njs_slow_path(ret == NJS_ERROR)) {
return ret;
}
if (njs_is_function(&value)) {
return njs_function_apply(vm, njs_function(&value), args, nargs,
&vm->retval);
}
}
return njs_object_prototype_to_string(vm, args, nargs, unused);
} | Safe | [
"CWE-703"
] | njs | 2e00e95473861846aa8538be87db07699d9f676d | 2.167034330240998e+38 | 26 | Fixed Array.prototype.slice() with slow "this" argument.
Previously, when "this" argument was not a fast array, but the "deleted" array
was a fast array, the "deleted" array may be left in uninitialized state if
"this" argument had gaps.
This fix is to ensure that "deleted" is properly initialized.
This fixes #485 issue on Github. | 0 |
static int rev_body(char *hostname, int s, unsigned char *context)
{
char *buf=NULL;
int i;
int ret=1;
SSL *con;
BIO *io,*ssl_bio,*sbio;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
KSSL_CTX *kctx;
#endif
buf=OPENSSL_malloc(bufsize);
if (buf == NULL) return(0);
io=BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer());
ssl_bio=BIO_new(BIO_f_ssl());
if ((io == NULL) || (ssl_bio == NULL)) goto err;
/* lets make the output buffer a reasonable size */
if (!BIO_set_write_buffer_size(io,bufsize)) goto err;
if ((con=SSL_new(ctx)) == NULL) goto err;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
if (s_tlsextdebug)
{
SSL_set_tlsext_debug_callback(con, tlsext_cb);
SSL_set_tlsext_debug_arg(con, bio_s_out);
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
if ((kctx = kssl_ctx_new()) != NULL)
{
kssl_ctx_setstring(kctx, KSSL_SERVICE, KRB5SVC);
kssl_ctx_setstring(kctx, KSSL_KEYTAB, KRB5KEYTAB);
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
if(context) SSL_set_session_id_context(con, context,
strlen((char *)context));
sbio=BIO_new_socket(s,BIO_NOCLOSE);
SSL_set_bio(con,sbio,sbio);
SSL_set_accept_state(con);
BIO_set_ssl(ssl_bio,con,BIO_CLOSE);
BIO_push(io,ssl_bio);
#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
io = BIO_push(BIO_new(BIO_f_ebcdic_filter()),io);
#endif
if (s_debug)
{
SSL_set_debug(con, 1);
BIO_set_callback(SSL_get_rbio(con),bio_dump_callback);
BIO_set_callback_arg(SSL_get_rbio(con),(char *)bio_s_out);
}
if (s_msg)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE
if (s_msg == 2)
SSL_set_msg_callback(con, SSL_trace);
else
#endif
SSL_set_msg_callback(con, msg_cb);
SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(con, bio_s_msg ? bio_s_msg : bio_s_out);
}
for (;;)
{
i = BIO_do_handshake(io);
if (i > 0)
break;
if (!BIO_should_retry(io))
{
BIO_puts(bio_err, "CONNECTION FAILURE\n");
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
goto end;
}
}
BIO_printf(bio_err, "CONNECTION ESTABLISHED\n");
print_ssl_summary(bio_err, con);
for (;;)
{
i=BIO_gets(io,buf,bufsize-1);
if (i < 0) /* error */
{
if (!BIO_should_retry(io))
{
if (!s_quiet)
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
goto err;
}
else
{
BIO_printf(bio_s_out,"read R BLOCK\n");
#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE)
delay(1000);
#elif !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) && !defined(__DJGPP__)
sleep(1);
#endif
continue;
}
}
else if (i == 0) /* end of input */
{
ret=1;
BIO_printf(bio_err, "CONNECTION CLOSED\n");
goto end;
}
else
{
char *p = buf + i - 1;
while(i && (*p == '\n' || *p == '\r'))
{
p--;
i--;
}
BUF_reverse((unsigned char *)buf, NULL, i);
buf[i] = '\n';
BIO_write(io, buf, i + 1);
for (;;)
{
i = BIO_flush(io);
if (i > 0)
break;
if (!BIO_should_retry(io))
goto end;
}
}
}
end:
/* make sure we re-use sessions */
SSL_set_shutdown(con,SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN|SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN);
err:
if (buf != NULL) OPENSSL_free(buf);
if (io != NULL) BIO_free_all(io);
return(ret);
} | Safe | [] | openssl | a70da5b3ecc3160368529677006801c58cb369db | 5.313471836456427e+37 | 139 | New functions to check a hostname email or IP address against a
certificate. Add options to s_client, s_server and x509 utilities
to print results of checks. | 0 |
parse_previous_duplicate_name (const char *name,
char **name_base,
const char **suffix,
int *count)
{
const char *tag;
g_assert (name[0] != '\0');
*suffix = strchr (name + 1, '.');
if (*suffix == NULL || (*suffix)[1] == '\0') {
/* no suffix */
*suffix = "";
}
tag = strstr (name, COPY_DUPLICATE_TAG);
if (tag != NULL) {
if (tag > *suffix) {
/* handle case "foo. (copy)" */
*suffix = "";
}
*name_base = extract_string_until (name, tag);
*count = 1;
return;
}
tag = strstr (name, ANOTHER_COPY_DUPLICATE_TAG);
if (tag != NULL) {
if (tag > *suffix) {
/* handle case "foo. (another copy)" */
*suffix = "";
}
*name_base = extract_string_until (name, tag);
*count = 2;
return;
}
/* Check to see if we got one of st, nd, rd, th. */
tag = strstr (name, X11TH_COPY_DUPLICATE_TAG);
if (tag == NULL) {
tag = strstr (name, X12TH_COPY_DUPLICATE_TAG);
}
if (tag == NULL) {
tag = strstr (name, X13TH_COPY_DUPLICATE_TAG);
}
if (tag == NULL) {
tag = strstr (name, ST_COPY_DUPLICATE_TAG);
}
if (tag == NULL) {
tag = strstr (name, ND_COPY_DUPLICATE_TAG);
}
if (tag == NULL) {
tag = strstr (name, RD_COPY_DUPLICATE_TAG);
}
if (tag == NULL) {
tag = strstr (name, TH_COPY_DUPLICATE_TAG);
}
/* If we got one of st, nd, rd, th, fish out the duplicate number. */
if (tag != NULL) {
/* localizers: opening parentheses to match the "th copy)" string */
tag = strstr (name, _(" ("));
if (tag != NULL) {
if (tag > *suffix) {
/* handle case "foo. (22nd copy)" */
*suffix = "";
}
*name_base = extract_string_until (name, tag);
/* localizers: opening parentheses of the "th copy)" string */
if (sscanf (tag, _(" (%'d"), count) == 1) {
if (*count < 1 || *count > 1000000) {
/* keep the count within a reasonable range */
*count = 0;
}
return;
}
*count = 0;
return;
}
}
*count = 0;
if (**suffix != '\0') {
*name_base = extract_string_until (name, *suffix);
} else {
*name_base = g_strdup (name);
}
} | Safe | [] | nautilus | ca2fd475297946f163c32dcea897f25da892b89d | 3.18072527111416e+37 | 93 | Add nautilus_file_mark_desktop_file_trusted(), this now adds a #! line if
2009-02-24 Alexander Larsson <[email protected]>
* libnautilus-private/nautilus-file-operations.c:
* libnautilus-private/nautilus-file-operations.h:
Add nautilus_file_mark_desktop_file_trusted(), this now
adds a #! line if there is none as well as makes the file
executable.
* libnautilus-private/nautilus-mime-actions.c:
Use nautilus_file_mark_desktop_file_trusted() instead of
just setting the permissions.
svn path=/trunk/; revision=15006 | 0 |
static void newcclass(struct cstate *g)
{
if (g->ncclass >= nelem(g->prog->cclass))
die(g, "too many character classes");
g->yycc = g->prog->cclass + g->ncclass++;
g->yycc->end = g->yycc->spans;
} | Safe | [
"CWE-703",
"CWE-674"
] | mujs | 160ae29578054dc09fd91e5401ef040d52797e61 | 7.695654586868005e+37 | 7 | Issue #162: Check stack overflow during regexp compilation.
Only bother checking during the first compilation pass that counts
the size of the program. | 0 |
njs_typed_array_constructor_intrinsic(njs_vm_t *vm, njs_value_t *args,
njs_uint_t nargs, njs_index_t unused)
{
njs_type_error(vm, "Abstract class TypedArray not directly constructable");
return NJS_ERROR;
} | Safe | [
"CWE-703"
] | njs | 5c6130a2a0b4c41ab415f6b8992aa323636338b9 | 2.00825684171355e+38 | 7 | Fixed Array.prototype.fill() for typed-arrays.
This closes #478 issue on Github. | 0 |
ext4_xattr_release_block(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode,
struct buffer_head *bh)
{
int error = 0;
BUFFER_TRACE(bh, "get_write_access");
error = ext4_journal_get_write_access(handle, bh);
if (error)
goto out;
lock_buffer(bh);
if (BHDR(bh)->h_refcount == cpu_to_le32(1)) {
__u32 hash = le32_to_cpu(BHDR(bh)->h_hash);
ea_bdebug(bh, "refcount now=0; freeing");
/*
* This must happen under buffer lock for
* ext4_xattr_block_set() to reliably detect freed block
*/
mb2_cache_entry_delete_block(EXT4_GET_MB_CACHE(inode), hash,
bh->b_blocknr);
get_bh(bh);
unlock_buffer(bh);
ext4_free_blocks(handle, inode, bh, 0, 1,
EXT4_FREE_BLOCKS_METADATA |
EXT4_FREE_BLOCKS_FORGET);
} else {
le32_add_cpu(&BHDR(bh)->h_refcount, -1);
/*
* Beware of this ugliness: Releasing of xattr block references
* from different inodes can race and so we have to protect
* from a race where someone else frees the block (and releases
* its journal_head) before we are done dirtying the buffer. In
* nojournal mode this race is harmless and we actually cannot
* call ext4_handle_dirty_xattr_block() with locked buffer as
* that function can call sync_dirty_buffer() so for that case
* we handle the dirtying after unlocking the buffer.
*/
if (ext4_handle_valid(handle))
error = ext4_handle_dirty_xattr_block(handle, inode,
bh);
unlock_buffer(bh);
if (!ext4_handle_valid(handle))
error = ext4_handle_dirty_xattr_block(handle, inode,
bh);
if (IS_SYNC(inode))
ext4_handle_sync(handle);
dquot_free_block(inode, EXT4_C2B(EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb), 1));
ea_bdebug(bh, "refcount now=%d; releasing",
le32_to_cpu(BHDR(bh)->h_refcount));
}
out:
ext4_std_error(inode->i_sb, error);
return;
} | Safe | [
"CWE-241",
"CWE-19"
] | linux | 82939d7999dfc1f1998c4b1c12e2f19edbdff272 | 3.396266813522165e+36 | 55 | ext4: convert to mbcache2
The conversion is generally straightforward. The only tricky part is
that xattr block corresponding to found mbcache entry can get freed
before we get buffer lock for that block. So we have to check whether
the entry is still valid after getting buffer lock.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]> | 0 |
int cifs_setup_session(unsigned int xid, struct cifsSesInfo *ses,
struct nls_table *nls_info)
{
int rc = 0;
struct TCP_Server_Info *server = ses->server;
ses->flags = 0;
ses->capabilities = server->capabilities;
if (linuxExtEnabled == 0)
ses->capabilities &= (~CAP_UNIX);
cFYI(1, "Security Mode: 0x%x Capabilities: 0x%x TimeAdjust: %d",
server->secMode, server->capabilities, server->timeAdj);
rc = CIFS_SessSetup(xid, ses, nls_info);
if (rc) {
cERROR(1, "Send error in SessSetup = %d", rc);
} else {
mutex_lock(&ses->server->srv_mutex);
if (!server->session_estab) {
server->session_key.response = ses->auth_key.response;
server->session_key.len = ses->auth_key.len;
server->sequence_number = 0x2;
server->session_estab = true;
ses->auth_key.response = NULL;
}
mutex_unlock(&server->srv_mutex);
cFYI(1, "CIFS Session Established successfully");
spin_lock(&GlobalMid_Lock);
ses->status = CifsGood;
ses->need_reconnect = false;
spin_unlock(&GlobalMid_Lock);
}
kfree(ses->auth_key.response);
ses->auth_key.response = NULL;
ses->auth_key.len = 0;
kfree(ses->ntlmssp);
ses->ntlmssp = NULL;
return rc;
} | Safe | [
"CWE-20"
] | linux | 70945643722ffeac779d2529a348f99567fa5c33 | 2.297609900677438e+37 | 43 | cifs: always do is_path_accessible check in cifs_mount
Currently, we skip doing the is_path_accessible check in cifs_mount if
there is no prefixpath. I have a report of at least one server however
that allows a TREE_CONNECT to a share that has a DFS referral at its
root. The reporter in this case was using a UNC that had no prefixpath,
so the is_path_accessible check was not triggered and the box later hit
a BUG() because we were chasing a DFS referral on the root dentry for
the mount.
This patch fixes this by removing the check for a zero-length
prefixpath. That should make the is_path_accessible check be done in
this situation and should allow the client to chase the DFS referral at
mount time instead.
Cc: [email protected]
Reported-and-Tested-by: Yogesh Sharma <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <[email protected]> | 0 |
ProtocolV2::~ProtocolV2() {
} | Safe | [
"CWE-323"
] | ceph | 20b7bb685c5ea74c651ca1ea547ac66b0fee7035 | 3.3898362412903036e+38 | 2 | msg/async/ProtocolV2: avoid AES-GCM nonce reuse vulnerabilities
The secure mode uses AES-128-GCM with 96-bit nonces consisting of a
32-bit counter followed by a 64-bit salt. The counter is incremented
after processing each frame, the salt is fixed for the duration of
the session. Both are initialized from the session key generated
during session negotiation, so the counter starts with essentially
a random value. It is allowed to wrap, and, after 2**32 frames, it
repeats, resulting in nonce reuse (the actual sequence numbers that
the messenger works with are 64-bit, so the session continues on).
Because of how GCM works, this completely breaks both confidentiality
and integrity aspects of the secure mode. A single nonce reuse reveals
the XOR of two plaintexts and almost completely reveals the subkey
used for producing authentication tags. After a few nonces get used
twice, all confidentiality and integrity goes out the window and the
attacker can potentially encrypt-authenticate plaintext of their
choice.
We can't easily change the nonce format to extend the counter to
64 bits (and possibly XOR it with a longer salt). Instead, just
remember the initial nonce and cut the session before it repeats,
forcing renegotiation.
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Radoslaw Zarzynski <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <[email protected]>
Conflicts:
src/msg/async/ProtocolV2.h [ context: commit ed3ec4c01d17
("msg: Build target 'common' without using namespace in
headers") not in octopus ] | 0 |
void comps_objrtree_create_u(COMPS_Object * obj, COMPS_Object **args) {
(void)args;
comps_objrtree_create((COMPS_ObjRTree*)obj, NULL);
} | Safe | [
"CWE-416",
"CWE-862"
] | libcomps | e3a5d056633677959ad924a51758876d415e7046 | 1.6454572219582248e+37 | 4 | Fix UAF in comps_objmrtree_unite function
The added field is not used at all in many places and it is probably the
left-over of some copy-paste. | 0 |
string SummarizeArray(int64_t limit, int64_t num_elts,
const TensorShape& tensor_shape, const char* data,
const bool print_v2) {
string ret;
const T* array = reinterpret_cast<const T*>(data);
const gtl::InlinedVector<int64_t, 4> shape = tensor_shape.dim_sizes();
if (shape.empty()) {
for (int64_t i = 0; i < limit; ++i) {
if (i > 0) strings::StrAppend(&ret, " ");
strings::StrAppend(&ret, PrintOneElement(array[i], print_v2));
}
if (num_elts > limit) strings::StrAppend(&ret, "...");
return ret;
}
if (print_v2) {
const int num_dims = tensor_shape.dims();
PrintOneDimV2(0, shape, limit, num_dims, array, 0, &ret);
} else {
int64_t data_index = 0;
const int shape_size = tensor_shape.dims();
PrintOneDim(0, shape, limit, shape_size, array, &data_index, &ret);
if (num_elts > limit) strings::StrAppend(&ret, "...");
}
return ret;
} | Safe | [
"CWE-345"
] | tensorflow | abcced051cb1bd8fb05046ac3b6023a7ebcc4578 | 1.3991672754566388e+38 | 28 | Prevent crashes when loading tensor slices with unsupported types.
Also fix the `Tensor(const TensorShape&)` constructor swapping the LOG(FATAL)
messages for the unset and unsupported types.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 392695027
Change-Id: I4beda7db950db951d273e3259a7c8534ece49354 | 0 |
func_needs_compiling(ufunc_T *ufunc, compiletype_T compile_type)
{
switch (ufunc->uf_def_status)
{
case UF_TO_BE_COMPILED:
return TRUE;
case UF_COMPILED:
{
dfunc_T *dfunc = ((dfunc_T *)def_functions.ga_data)
+ ufunc->uf_dfunc_idx;
switch (compile_type)
{
case CT_PROFILE:
#ifdef FEAT_PROFILE
return dfunc->df_instr_prof == NULL;
#endif
case CT_NONE:
return dfunc->df_instr == NULL;
case CT_DEBUG:
return dfunc->df_instr_debug == NULL;
}
}
case UF_NOT_COMPILED:
case UF_COMPILE_ERROR:
case UF_COMPILING:
break;
}
return FALSE;
} | Safe | [
"CWE-416"
] | vim | 9c23f9bb5fe435b28245ba8ac65aa0ca6b902c04 | 2.2243809863439943e+38 | 32 | patch 8.2.3902: Vim9: double free with nested :def function
Problem: Vim9: double free with nested :def function.
Solution: Pass "line_to_free" from compile_def_function() and make sure
cmdlinep is valid. | 0 |
kex_setup(struct ssh *ssh, char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX])
{
int r;
if ((r = kex_new(ssh, proposal, &ssh->kex)) != 0)
return r;
if ((r = kex_send_kexinit(ssh)) != 0) { /* we start */
kex_free(ssh->kex);
ssh->kex = NULL;
return r;
}
return 0;
} | Safe | [
"CWE-522",
"CWE-399"
] | openssh-portable | ec165c392ca54317dbe3064a8c200de6531e89ad | 9.132909395633916e+37 | 13 | upstream commit
Unregister the KEXINIT handler after message has been
received. Otherwise an unauthenticated peer can repeat the KEXINIT and cause
allocation of up to 128MB -- until the connection is closed. Reported by
shilei-c at 360.cn
Upstream-ID: 43649ae12a27ef94290db16d1a98294588b75c05 | 0 |
virtual bool check_partition_func_processor(void *arg) { return 1;} | Safe | [
"CWE-617"
] | server | 2e7891080667c59ac80f788eef4d59d447595772 | 1.994092604269263e+38 | 1 | MDEV-25635 Assertion failure when pushing from HAVING into WHERE of view
This bug could manifest itself after pushing a where condition over a
mergeable derived table / view / CTE DT into a grouping view / derived
table / CTE V whose item list contained set functions with constant
arguments such as MIN(2), SUM(1) etc. In such cases the field references
used in the condition pushed into the view V that correspond set functions
are wrapped into Item_direct_view_ref wrappers. Due to a wrong implementation
of the virtual method const_item() for the class Item_direct_view_ref the
wrapped set functions with constant arguments could be erroneously taken
for constant items. This could lead to a wrong result set returned by the
main select query in 10.2. In 10.4 where a possibility of pushing condition
from HAVING into WHERE had been added this could cause a crash.
Approved by Sergey Petrunya <[email protected]> | 0 |
str_node_split_last_char(Node* node, OnigEncoding enc)
{
const UChar *p;
Node* rn;
StrNode* sn;
sn = STR_(node);
rn = NULL_NODE;
if (sn->end > sn->s) {
p = onigenc_get_prev_char_head(enc, sn->s, sn->end);
if (p && p > sn->s) { /* can be split. */
rn = node_new_str(p, sn->end);
CHECK_NULL_RETURN(rn);
if (NODE_STRING_IS_CRUDE(node))
NODE_STRING_SET_CRUDE(rn);
sn->end = (UChar* )p;
}
}
return rn;
} | Safe | [
"CWE-125"
] | oniguruma | aa0188eaedc056dca8374ac03d0177429b495515 | 6.253386500668289e+37 | 21 | fix #163: heap-buffer-overflow in gb18030_mbc_enc_len | 0 |
void ndpi_set_proto_defaults(struct ndpi_detection_module_struct *ndpi_str, ndpi_protocol_breed_t breed,
u_int16_t protoId, u_int8_t can_have_a_subprotocol, u_int16_t tcp_master_protoId[2],
u_int16_t udp_master_protoId[2], char *protoName, ndpi_protocol_category_t protoCategory,
ndpi_port_range *tcpDefPorts, ndpi_port_range *udpDefPorts) {
char *name;
int j;
if(protoId >= NDPI_MAX_SUPPORTED_PROTOCOLS + NDPI_MAX_NUM_CUSTOM_PROTOCOLS) {
#ifdef DEBUG
NDPI_LOG_ERR(ndpi_str, "[NDPI] %s/protoId=%d: INTERNAL ERROR\n", protoName, protoId);
#endif
return;
}
if(ndpi_str->proto_defaults[protoId].protoName != NULL) {
#ifdef DEBUG
NDPI_LOG_ERR(ndpi_str, "[NDPI] %s/protoId=%d: already initialized. Ignoring it\n", protoName, protoId);
#endif
return;
}
name = ndpi_strdup(protoName);
if(ndpi_str->proto_defaults[protoId].protoName)
ndpi_free(ndpi_str->proto_defaults[protoId].protoName);
ndpi_str->proto_defaults[protoId].protoName = name, ndpi_str->proto_defaults[protoId].protoCategory = protoCategory,
ndpi_str->proto_defaults[protoId].protoId = protoId, ndpi_str->proto_defaults[protoId].protoBreed = breed;
ndpi_str->proto_defaults[protoId].can_have_a_subprotocol = can_have_a_subprotocol;
memcpy(&ndpi_str->proto_defaults[protoId].master_tcp_protoId, tcp_master_protoId, 2 * sizeof(u_int16_t));
memcpy(&ndpi_str->proto_defaults[protoId].master_udp_protoId, udp_master_protoId, 2 * sizeof(u_int16_t));
for (j = 0; j < MAX_DEFAULT_PORTS; j++) {
if(udpDefPorts[j].port_low != 0)
addDefaultPort(ndpi_str, &udpDefPorts[j], &ndpi_str->proto_defaults[protoId], 0, &ndpi_str->udpRoot,
__FUNCTION__, __LINE__);
if(tcpDefPorts[j].port_low != 0)
addDefaultPort(ndpi_str, &tcpDefPorts[j], &ndpi_str->proto_defaults[protoId], 0, &ndpi_str->tcpRoot,
__FUNCTION__, __LINE__);
/* No port range, just the lower port */
ndpi_str->proto_defaults[protoId].tcp_default_ports[j] = tcpDefPorts[j].port_low;
ndpi_str->proto_defaults[protoId].udp_default_ports[j] = udpDefPorts[j].port_low;
}
} | Safe | [
"CWE-416",
"CWE-787"
] | nDPI | 6a9f5e4f7c3fd5ddab3e6727b071904d76773952 | 1.1652997829206164e+38 | 47 | Fixed use after free caused by dangling pointer
* This fix also improved RCE Injection detection
Signed-off-by: Toni Uhlig <[email protected]> | 0 |
static void handle_mmio_write(struct mdev_state *mdev_state, u16 offset,
char *buf, u32 count)
{
struct device *dev = mdev_dev(mdev_state->mdev);
int index;
u16 reg16;
switch (offset) {
case 0x400 ... 0x41f: /* vga ioports remapped */
goto unhandled;
case 0x500 ... 0x515: /* bochs dispi interface */
if (count != 2)
goto unhandled;
index = (offset - 0x500) / 2;
reg16 = *(u16 *)buf;
if (index < ARRAY_SIZE(mdev_state->vbe))
mdev_state->vbe[index] = reg16;
dev_dbg(dev, "%s: vbe write %d = %d (%s)\n",
__func__, index, reg16, vbe_name(index));
break;
case 0x600 ... 0x607: /* qemu extended regs */
goto unhandled;
default:
unhandled:
dev_dbg(dev, "%s: @0x%03x, count %d (unhandled)\n",
__func__, offset, count);
break;
}
} | Safe | [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-401"
] | linux | de5494af4815a4c9328536c72741229b7de88e7f | 2.9399883066798628e+38 | 29 | vfio/mbochs: Fix missing error unwind of mbochs_used_mbytes
Convert mbochs to use an atomic scheme for this like mtty was changed
into. The atomic fixes various race conditions with probing. Add the
missing error unwind. Also add the missing kfree of mdev_state->pages.
Fixes: 681c1615f891 ("vfio/mbochs: Convert to use vfio_register_group_dev()")
Reported-by: Cornelia Huck <[email protected]>
Co-developed-by: Alex Williamson <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <[email protected]> | 0 |
Bool gf_isom_cenc_has_saiz_saio_full(GF_SampleTableBox *stbl, void *_traf, u32 scheme_type)
{
u32 i, c1, c2;
GF_List *sai_sizes, *sai_offsets;
u32 sinf_fmt = 0;
Bool has_saiz, has_saio;
#ifndef GPAC_DISABLE_ISOM_FRAGMENTS
GF_TrackFragmentBox *traf=(GF_TrackFragmentBox *)_traf;
#endif
has_saiz = has_saio = GF_FALSE;
if (stbl) {
sai_sizes = stbl->sai_sizes;
sai_offsets = stbl->sai_offsets;
}
#ifndef GPAC_DISABLE_ISOM_FRAGMENTS
else if (_traf) {
sai_sizes = traf->sai_sizes;
sai_offsets = traf->sai_offsets;
}
#endif
else
return GF_FALSE;
c1 = gf_list_count(sai_sizes);
c2 = gf_list_count(sai_offsets);
for (i = 0; i < c1; i++) {
GF_SampleAuxiliaryInfoSizeBox *saiz = (GF_SampleAuxiliaryInfoSizeBox *)gf_list_get(sai_sizes, i);
u32 saiz_aux_info_type = saiz->aux_info_type;
if (!saiz_aux_info_type) saiz_aux_info_type = scheme_type;
if (!saiz_aux_info_type) {
GF_SampleEntryBox *entry = NULL;
GF_ProtectionSchemeInfoBox *sinf = NULL;
if (stbl) {
entry = gf_list_get(stbl->SampleDescription->child_boxes, 0);
} else {
entry = gf_list_get(traf->trex->track->Media->information->sampleTable->SampleDescription->child_boxes, 0);
}
if (entry)
sinf = (GF_ProtectionSchemeInfoBox *) gf_isom_box_find_child(entry->child_boxes, GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_SINF);
if (sinf && sinf->scheme_type) {
saiz_aux_info_type = sinf_fmt = sinf->scheme_type->scheme_type;
}
}
if (!saiz_aux_info_type && (c1==1) && (c2==1)) {
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_WARNING, GF_LOG_CONTAINER, ("[iso file] saiz box without flags nor aux info type and no default scheme, ignoring\n"));
continue;
}
switch (saiz_aux_info_type) {
case GF_ISOM_CENC_SCHEME:
case GF_ISOM_CBC_SCHEME:
case GF_ISOM_CENS_SCHEME:
case GF_ISOM_CBCS_SCHEME:
case GF_ISOM_PIFF_SCHEME:
has_saiz = GF_TRUE;
break;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < c2; i++) {
GF_SampleAuxiliaryInfoOffsetBox *saio = (GF_SampleAuxiliaryInfoOffsetBox *)gf_list_get(sai_offsets, i);
u32 saio_aux_info_type = saio->aux_info_type;
if (!saio_aux_info_type) saio_aux_info_type = scheme_type;
if (!saio_aux_info_type) saio_aux_info_type = sinf_fmt;
if (!saio_aux_info_type) {
GF_SampleEntryBox *entry = NULL;
GF_ProtectionSchemeInfoBox *sinf = NULL;
if (stbl) {
entry = gf_list_get(stbl->SampleDescription->child_boxes, 0);
} else {
entry = gf_list_get(traf->trex->track->Media->information->sampleTable->SampleDescription->child_boxes, 0);
}
if (entry)
sinf = (GF_ProtectionSchemeInfoBox *) gf_isom_box_find_child(entry->child_boxes, GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_SINF);
if (sinf && sinf->scheme_type) {
saio_aux_info_type = sinf_fmt = sinf->scheme_type->scheme_type;
}
}
if (!saio_aux_info_type && (c1==1) && (c2==1)) {
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_WARNING, GF_LOG_CONTAINER, ("[iso file] saio box without flags nor aux info type and no default scheme, ignoring\n"));
continue;
}
//special case for query on a file that has just been imported but not yet written: saio offset is NULL, we must use senc
if (saio->entry_count && !saio->offsets)
continue;
switch (saio_aux_info_type) {
case GF_ISOM_CENC_SCHEME:
case GF_ISOM_CBC_SCHEME:
case GF_ISOM_CENS_SCHEME:
case GF_ISOM_CBCS_SCHEME:
case GF_ISOM_PIFF_SCHEME:
has_saio = GF_TRUE;
break;
}
}
return (has_saiz && has_saio);
} | Safe | [
"CWE-476"
] | gpac | 3b84ffcbacf144ce35650df958432f472b6483f8 | 2.6951982492281865e+38 | 104 | fixed #1735 | 0 |
TPMT_TK_VERIFIED_Unmarshal(TPMT_TK_VERIFIED *target, BYTE **buffer, INT32 *size)
{
TPM_RC rc = TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
if (rc == TPM_RC_SUCCESS) {
rc = TPM_ST_Unmarshal(&target->tag, buffer, size);
}
if (rc == TPM_RC_SUCCESS) {
if (target->tag != TPM_ST_VERIFIED) {
rc = TPM_RC_TAG;
}
}
if (rc == TPM_RC_SUCCESS) {
rc = TPMI_RH_HIERARCHY_Unmarshal(&target->hierarchy, buffer, size, YES);
}
if (rc == TPM_RC_SUCCESS) {
rc = TPM2B_DIGEST_Unmarshal(&target->digest, buffer, size);
}
return rc;
} | Vulnerable | [
"CWE-787"
] | libtpms | 5cc98a62dc6f204dcf5b87c2ee83ac742a6a319b | 9.789856289257769e+37 | 20 | tpm2: Restore original value if unmarshalled value was illegal
Restore the original value of the memory location where data from
a stream was unmarshalled and the unmarshalled value was found to
be illegal. The goal is to not keep illegal values in memory.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <[email protected]> | 1 |
int mutt_buffer_printf (BUFFER* buf, const char* fmt, ...)
{
va_list ap, ap_retry;
int len, blen, doff;
va_start (ap, fmt);
va_copy (ap_retry, ap);
if (!buf->dptr)
buf->dptr = buf->data;
doff = buf->dptr - buf->data;
blen = buf->dsize - doff;
/* solaris 9 vsnprintf barfs when blen is 0 */
if (!blen)
{
blen = 128;
buf->dsize += blen;
safe_realloc (&buf->data, buf->dsize);
buf->dptr = buf->data + doff;
}
if ((len = vsnprintf (buf->dptr, blen, fmt, ap)) >= blen)
{
blen = ++len - blen;
if (blen < 128)
blen = 128;
buf->dsize += blen;
safe_realloc (&buf->data, buf->dsize);
buf->dptr = buf->data + doff;
len = vsnprintf (buf->dptr, len, fmt, ap_retry);
}
if (len > 0)
buf->dptr += len;
va_end (ap);
va_end (ap_retry);
return len;
} | Safe | [
"CWE-668"
] | mutt | 6d0624411a979e2e1d76af4dd97d03f47679ea4a | 2.7797229511252375e+38 | 39 | use a 64-bit random value in temporary filenames.
closes #3158 | 0 |
flatpak_dir_needs_update_for_commit_and_subpaths (FlatpakDir *self,
const char *remote,
const char *ref,
const char *target_commit,
const char **opt_subpaths)
{
g_autoptr(GVariant) deploy_data = NULL;
g_autofree const char **old_subpaths = NULL;
const char **subpaths;
g_autofree char *url = NULL;
const char *installed_commit;
const char *installed_alt_id;
g_assert (target_commit != NULL);
/* Never update from disabled remotes */
if (!ostree_repo_remote_get_url (self->repo, remote, &url, NULL))
return FALSE;
if (*url == 0)
return FALSE;
deploy_data = flatpak_dir_get_deploy_data (self, ref, FLATPAK_DEPLOY_VERSION_ANY, NULL, NULL);
if (deploy_data != NULL)
old_subpaths = flatpak_deploy_data_get_subpaths (deploy_data);
else
old_subpaths = g_new0 (const char *, 1); /* Empty strv == all subpaths*/
if (opt_subpaths)
subpaths = opt_subpaths;
else
subpaths = old_subpaths;
/* Not deployed => need update */
if (deploy_data == NULL)
return TRUE;
installed_commit = flatpak_deploy_data_get_commit (deploy_data);
installed_alt_id = flatpak_deploy_data_get_alt_id (deploy_data);
/* Different target commit than deployed => update */
if (g_strcmp0 (target_commit, installed_commit) != 0 &&
g_strcmp0 (target_commit, installed_alt_id) != 0)
return TRUE;
/* target commit is the same as current, but maybe something else that is different? */
/* Same commit, but different subpaths => update */
if (!_g_strv_equal0 ((char **) subpaths, (char **) old_subpaths))
return TRUE;
/* Same subpaths and commit, no need to update */
return FALSE;
} | Safe | [
"CWE-668"
] | flatpak | cd2142888fc4c199723a0dfca1f15ea8788a5483 | 2.6544666195792882e+38 | 54 | Don't expose /proc when running apply_extra
As shown by CVE-2019-5736, it is sometimes possible for the sandbox
app to access outside files using /proc/self/exe. This is not
typically an issue for flatpak as the sandbox runs as the user which
has no permissions to e.g. modify the host files.
However, when installing apps using extra-data into the system repo
we *do* actually run a sandbox as root. So, in this case we disable mounting
/proc in the sandbox, which will neuter attacks like this. | 0 |
do_cmdline(
char_u *cmdline,
char_u *(*fgetline)(int, void *, int, getline_opt_T),
void *cookie, // argument for fgetline()
int flags)
{
char_u *next_cmdline; // next cmd to execute
char_u *cmdline_copy = NULL; // copy of cmd line
int used_getline = FALSE; // used "fgetline" to obtain command
static int recursive = 0; // recursive depth
int msg_didout_before_start = 0;
int count = 0; // line number count
int did_inc = FALSE; // incremented RedrawingDisabled
int retval = OK;
#ifdef FEAT_EVAL
cstack_T cstack; // conditional stack
garray_T lines_ga; // keep lines for ":while"/":for"
int current_line = 0; // active line in lines_ga
int current_line_before = 0;
char_u *fname = NULL; // function or script name
linenr_T *breakpoint = NULL; // ptr to breakpoint field in cookie
int *dbg_tick = NULL; // ptr to dbg_tick field in cookie
struct dbg_stuff debug_saved; // saved things for debug mode
int initial_trylevel;
msglist_T **saved_msg_list = NULL;
msglist_T *private_msg_list = NULL;
// "fgetline" and "cookie" passed to do_one_cmd()
char_u *(*cmd_getline)(int, void *, int, getline_opt_T);
void *cmd_cookie;
struct loop_cookie cmd_loop_cookie;
void *real_cookie;
int getline_is_func;
#else
# define cmd_getline fgetline
# define cmd_cookie cookie
#endif
static int call_depth = 0; // recursiveness
#ifdef FEAT_EVAL
// For every pair of do_cmdline()/do_one_cmd() calls, use an extra memory
// location for storing error messages to be converted to an exception.
// This ensures that the do_errthrow() call in do_one_cmd() does not
// combine the messages stored by an earlier invocation of do_one_cmd()
// with the command name of the later one. This would happen when
// BufWritePost autocommands are executed after a write error.
saved_msg_list = msg_list;
msg_list = &private_msg_list;
#endif
// It's possible to create an endless loop with ":execute", catch that
// here. The value of 200 allows nested function calls, ":source", etc.
// Allow 200 or 'maxfuncdepth', whatever is larger.
if (call_depth >= 200
#ifdef FEAT_EVAL
&& call_depth >= p_mfd
#endif
)
{
emsg(_(e_command_too_recursive));
#ifdef FEAT_EVAL
// When converting to an exception, we do not include the command name
// since this is not an error of the specific command.
do_errthrow((cstack_T *)NULL, (char_u *)NULL);
msg_list = saved_msg_list;
#endif
return FAIL;
}
++call_depth;
#ifdef FEAT_EVAL
CLEAR_FIELD(cstack);
cstack.cs_idx = -1;
ga_init2(&lines_ga, sizeof(wcmd_T), 10);
real_cookie = getline_cookie(fgetline, cookie);
// Inside a function use a higher nesting level.
getline_is_func = getline_equal(fgetline, cookie, get_func_line);
if (getline_is_func && ex_nesting_level == func_level(real_cookie))
++ex_nesting_level;
// Get the function or script name and the address where the next breakpoint
// line and the debug tick for a function or script are stored.
if (getline_is_func)
{
fname = func_name(real_cookie);
breakpoint = func_breakpoint(real_cookie);
dbg_tick = func_dbg_tick(real_cookie);
}
else if (getline_equal(fgetline, cookie, getsourceline))
{
fname = SOURCING_NAME;
breakpoint = source_breakpoint(real_cookie);
dbg_tick = source_dbg_tick(real_cookie);
}
/*
* Initialize "force_abort" and "suppress_errthrow" at the top level.
*/
if (!recursive)
{
force_abort = FALSE;
suppress_errthrow = FALSE;
}
/*
* If requested, store and reset the global values controlling the
* exception handling (used when debugging). Otherwise clear it to avoid
* a bogus compiler warning when the optimizer uses inline functions...
*/
if (flags & DOCMD_EXCRESET)
save_dbg_stuff(&debug_saved);
else
CLEAR_FIELD(debug_saved);
initial_trylevel = trylevel;
/*
* "did_throw" will be set to TRUE when an exception is being thrown.
*/
did_throw = FALSE;
#endif
/*
* "did_emsg" will be set to TRUE when emsg() is used, in which case we
* cancel the whole command line, and any if/endif or loop.
* If force_abort is set, we cancel everything.
*/
#ifdef FEAT_EVAL
did_emsg_cumul += did_emsg;
#endif
did_emsg = FALSE;
/*
* KeyTyped is only set when calling vgetc(). Reset it here when not
* calling vgetc() (sourced command lines).
*/
if (!(flags & DOCMD_KEYTYPED)
&& !getline_equal(fgetline, cookie, getexline))
KeyTyped = FALSE;
/*
* Continue executing command lines:
* - when inside an ":if", ":while" or ":for"
* - for multiple commands on one line, separated with '|'
* - when repeating until there are no more lines (for ":source")
*/
next_cmdline = cmdline;
do
{
#ifdef FEAT_EVAL
getline_is_func = getline_equal(fgetline, cookie, get_func_line);
#endif
// stop skipping cmds for an error msg after all endif/while/for
if (next_cmdline == NULL
#ifdef FEAT_EVAL
&& !force_abort
&& cstack.cs_idx < 0
&& !(getline_is_func && func_has_abort(real_cookie))
#endif
)
{
#ifdef FEAT_EVAL
did_emsg_cumul += did_emsg;
#endif
did_emsg = FALSE;
}
/*
* 1. If repeating a line in a loop, get a line from lines_ga.
* 2. If no line given: Get an allocated line with fgetline().
* 3. If a line is given: Make a copy, so we can mess with it.
*/
#ifdef FEAT_EVAL
// 1. If repeating, get a previous line from lines_ga.
if (cstack.cs_looplevel > 0 && current_line < lines_ga.ga_len)
{
// Each '|' separated command is stored separately in lines_ga, to
// be able to jump to it. Don't use next_cmdline now.
VIM_CLEAR(cmdline_copy);
// Check if a function has returned or, unless it has an unclosed
// try conditional, aborted.
if (getline_is_func)
{
# ifdef FEAT_PROFILE
if (do_profiling == PROF_YES)
func_line_end(real_cookie);
# endif
if (func_has_ended(real_cookie))
{
retval = FAIL;
break;
}
}
#ifdef FEAT_PROFILE
else if (do_profiling == PROF_YES
&& getline_equal(fgetline, cookie, getsourceline))
script_line_end();
#endif
// Check if a sourced file hit a ":finish" command.
if (source_finished(fgetline, cookie))
{
retval = FAIL;
break;
}
// If breakpoints have been added/deleted need to check for it.
if (breakpoint != NULL && dbg_tick != NULL
&& *dbg_tick != debug_tick)
{
*breakpoint = dbg_find_breakpoint(
getline_equal(fgetline, cookie, getsourceline),
fname, SOURCING_LNUM);
*dbg_tick = debug_tick;
}
next_cmdline = ((wcmd_T *)(lines_ga.ga_data))[current_line].line;
SOURCING_LNUM = ((wcmd_T *)(lines_ga.ga_data))[current_line].lnum;
// Did we encounter a breakpoint?
if (breakpoint != NULL && *breakpoint != 0
&& *breakpoint <= SOURCING_LNUM)
{
dbg_breakpoint(fname, SOURCING_LNUM);
// Find next breakpoint.
*breakpoint = dbg_find_breakpoint(
getline_equal(fgetline, cookie, getsourceline),
fname, SOURCING_LNUM);
*dbg_tick = debug_tick;
}
# ifdef FEAT_PROFILE
if (do_profiling == PROF_YES)
{
if (getline_is_func)
func_line_start(real_cookie, SOURCING_LNUM);
else if (getline_equal(fgetline, cookie, getsourceline))
script_line_start();
}
# endif
}
#endif
// 2. If no line given, get an allocated line with fgetline().
if (next_cmdline == NULL)
{
/*
* Need to set msg_didout for the first line after an ":if",
* otherwise the ":if" will be overwritten.
*/
if (count == 1 && getline_equal(fgetline, cookie, getexline))
msg_didout = TRUE;
if (fgetline == NULL || (next_cmdline = fgetline(':', cookie,
#ifdef FEAT_EVAL
cstack.cs_idx < 0 ? 0 : (cstack.cs_idx + 1) * 2
#else
0
#endif
, in_vim9script() ? GETLINE_CONCAT_CONTBAR
: GETLINE_CONCAT_CONT)) == NULL)
{
// Don't call wait_return for aborted command line. The NULL
// returned for the end of a sourced file or executed function
// doesn't do this.
if (KeyTyped && !(flags & DOCMD_REPEAT))
need_wait_return = FALSE;
retval = FAIL;
break;
}
used_getline = TRUE;
/*
* Keep the first typed line. Clear it when more lines are typed.
*/
if (flags & DOCMD_KEEPLINE)
{
vim_free(repeat_cmdline);
if (count == 0)
repeat_cmdline = vim_strsave(next_cmdline);
else
repeat_cmdline = NULL;
}
}
// 3. Make a copy of the command so we can mess with it.
else if (cmdline_copy == NULL)
{
next_cmdline = vim_strsave(next_cmdline);
if (next_cmdline == NULL)
{
emsg(_(e_out_of_memory));
retval = FAIL;
break;
}
}
cmdline_copy = next_cmdline;
#ifdef FEAT_EVAL
/*
* Inside a while/for loop, and when the command looks like a ":while"
* or ":for", the line is stored, because we may need it later when
* looping.
*
* When there is a '|' and another command, it is stored separately,
* because we need to be able to jump back to it from an
* :endwhile/:endfor.
*
* Pass a different "fgetline" function to do_one_cmd() below,
* that it stores lines in or reads them from "lines_ga". Makes it
* possible to define a function inside a while/for loop and handles
* line continuation.
*/
if ((cstack.cs_looplevel > 0 || has_loop_cmd(next_cmdline)))
{
cmd_getline = get_loop_line;
cmd_cookie = (void *)&cmd_loop_cookie;
cmd_loop_cookie.lines_gap = &lines_ga;
cmd_loop_cookie.current_line = current_line;
cmd_loop_cookie.getline = fgetline;
cmd_loop_cookie.cookie = cookie;
cmd_loop_cookie.repeating = (current_line < lines_ga.ga_len);
// Save the current line when encountering it the first time.
if (current_line == lines_ga.ga_len
&& store_loop_line(&lines_ga, next_cmdline) == FAIL)
{
retval = FAIL;
break;
}
current_line_before = current_line;
}
else
{
cmd_getline = fgetline;
cmd_cookie = cookie;
}
did_endif = FALSE;
#endif
if (count++ == 0)
{
/*
* All output from the commands is put below each other, without
* waiting for a return. Don't do this when executing commands
* from a script or when being called recursive (e.g. for ":e
* +command file").
*/
if (!(flags & DOCMD_NOWAIT) && !recursive)
{
msg_didout_before_start = msg_didout;
msg_didany = FALSE; // no output yet
msg_start();
msg_scroll = TRUE; // put messages below each other
++no_wait_return; // don't wait for return until finished
++RedrawingDisabled;
did_inc = TRUE;
}
}
if ((p_verbose >= 15 && SOURCING_NAME != NULL) || p_verbose >= 16)
msg_verbose_cmd(SOURCING_LNUM, cmdline_copy);
/*
* 2. Execute one '|' separated command.
* do_one_cmd() will return NULL if there is no trailing '|'.
* "cmdline_copy" can change, e.g. for '%' and '#' expansion.
*/
++recursive;
next_cmdline = do_one_cmd(&cmdline_copy, flags,
#ifdef FEAT_EVAL
&cstack,
#endif
cmd_getline, cmd_cookie);
--recursive;
#ifdef FEAT_EVAL
if (cmd_cookie == (void *)&cmd_loop_cookie)
// Use "current_line" from "cmd_loop_cookie", it may have been
// incremented when defining a function.
current_line = cmd_loop_cookie.current_line;
#endif
if (next_cmdline == NULL)
{
VIM_CLEAR(cmdline_copy);
/*
* If the command was typed, remember it for the ':' register.
* Do this AFTER executing the command to make :@: work.
*/
if (getline_equal(fgetline, cookie, getexline)
&& new_last_cmdline != NULL)
{
vim_free(last_cmdline);
last_cmdline = new_last_cmdline;
new_last_cmdline = NULL;
}
}
else
{
// need to copy the command after the '|' to cmdline_copy, for the
// next do_one_cmd()
STRMOVE(cmdline_copy, next_cmdline);
next_cmdline = cmdline_copy;
}
#ifdef FEAT_EVAL
// reset did_emsg for a function that is not aborted by an error
if (did_emsg && !force_abort
&& getline_equal(fgetline, cookie, get_func_line)
&& !func_has_abort(real_cookie))
{
// did_emsg_cumul is not set here
did_emsg = FALSE;
}
if (cstack.cs_looplevel > 0)
{
++current_line;
/*
* An ":endwhile", ":endfor" and ":continue" is handled here.
* If we were executing commands, jump back to the ":while" or
* ":for".
* If we were not executing commands, decrement cs_looplevel.
*/
if (cstack.cs_lflags & (CSL_HAD_CONT | CSL_HAD_ENDLOOP))
{
cstack.cs_lflags &= ~(CSL_HAD_CONT | CSL_HAD_ENDLOOP);
// Jump back to the matching ":while" or ":for". Be careful
// not to use a cs_line[] from an entry that isn't a ":while"
// or ":for": It would make "current_line" invalid and can
// cause a crash.
if (!did_emsg && !got_int && !did_throw
&& cstack.cs_idx >= 0
&& (cstack.cs_flags[cstack.cs_idx]
& (CSF_WHILE | CSF_FOR))
&& cstack.cs_line[cstack.cs_idx] >= 0
&& (cstack.cs_flags[cstack.cs_idx] & CSF_ACTIVE))
{
current_line = cstack.cs_line[cstack.cs_idx];
// remember we jumped there
cstack.cs_lflags |= CSL_HAD_LOOP;
line_breakcheck(); // check if CTRL-C typed
// Check for the next breakpoint at or after the ":while"
// or ":for".
if (breakpoint != NULL)
{
*breakpoint = dbg_find_breakpoint(
getline_equal(fgetline, cookie, getsourceline),
fname,
((wcmd_T *)lines_ga.ga_data)[current_line].lnum-1);
*dbg_tick = debug_tick;
}
}
else
{
// can only get here with ":endwhile" or ":endfor"
if (cstack.cs_idx >= 0)
rewind_conditionals(&cstack, cstack.cs_idx - 1,
CSF_WHILE | CSF_FOR, &cstack.cs_looplevel);
}
}
/*
* For a ":while" or ":for" we need to remember the line number.
*/
else if (cstack.cs_lflags & CSL_HAD_LOOP)
{
cstack.cs_lflags &= ~CSL_HAD_LOOP;
cstack.cs_line[cstack.cs_idx] = current_line_before;
}
}
// Check for the next breakpoint after a watchexpression
if (breakpoint != NULL && has_watchexpr())
{
*breakpoint = dbg_find_breakpoint(FALSE, fname, SOURCING_LNUM);
*dbg_tick = debug_tick;
}
/*
* When not inside any ":while" loop, clear remembered lines.
*/
if (cstack.cs_looplevel == 0)
{
if (lines_ga.ga_len > 0)
{
SOURCING_LNUM =
((wcmd_T *)lines_ga.ga_data)[lines_ga.ga_len - 1].lnum;
free_cmdlines(&lines_ga);
}
current_line = 0;
}
/*
* A ":finally" makes did_emsg, got_int, and did_throw pending for
* being restored at the ":endtry". Reset them here and set the
* ACTIVE and FINALLY flags, so that the finally clause gets executed.
* This includes the case where a missing ":endif", ":endwhile" or
* ":endfor" was detected by the ":finally" itself.
*/
if (cstack.cs_lflags & CSL_HAD_FINA)
{
cstack.cs_lflags &= ~CSL_HAD_FINA;
report_make_pending(cstack.cs_pending[cstack.cs_idx]
& (CSTP_ERROR | CSTP_INTERRUPT | CSTP_THROW),
did_throw ? (void *)current_exception : NULL);
did_emsg = got_int = did_throw = FALSE;
cstack.cs_flags[cstack.cs_idx] |= CSF_ACTIVE | CSF_FINALLY;
}
// Update global "trylevel" for recursive calls to do_cmdline() from
// within this loop.
trylevel = initial_trylevel + cstack.cs_trylevel;
/*
* If the outermost try conditional (across function calls and sourced
* files) is aborted because of an error, an interrupt, or an uncaught
* exception, cancel everything. If it is left normally, reset
* force_abort to get the non-EH compatible abortion behavior for
* the rest of the script.
*/
if (trylevel == 0 && !did_emsg && !got_int && !did_throw)
force_abort = FALSE;
// Convert an interrupt to an exception if appropriate.
(void)do_intthrow(&cstack);
#endif // FEAT_EVAL
}
/*
* Continue executing command lines when:
* - no CTRL-C typed, no aborting error, no exception thrown or try
* conditionals need to be checked for executing finally clauses or
* catching an interrupt exception
* - didn't get an error message or lines are not typed
* - there is a command after '|', inside a :if, :while, :for or :try, or
* looping for ":source" command or function call.
*/
while (!((got_int
#ifdef FEAT_EVAL
|| (did_emsg && (force_abort || in_vim9script()))
|| did_throw
#endif
)
#ifdef FEAT_EVAL
&& cstack.cs_trylevel == 0
#endif
)
&& !(did_emsg
#ifdef FEAT_EVAL
// Keep going when inside try/catch, so that the error can be
// deal with, except when it is a syntax error, it may cause
// the :endtry to be missed.
&& (cstack.cs_trylevel == 0 || did_emsg_syntax)
#endif
&& used_getline
&& (getline_equal(fgetline, cookie, getexmodeline)
|| getline_equal(fgetline, cookie, getexline)))
&& (next_cmdline != NULL
#ifdef FEAT_EVAL
|| cstack.cs_idx >= 0
#endif
|| (flags & DOCMD_REPEAT)));
vim_free(cmdline_copy);
did_emsg_syntax = FALSE;
#ifdef FEAT_EVAL
free_cmdlines(&lines_ga);
ga_clear(&lines_ga);
if (cstack.cs_idx >= 0)
{
/*
* If a sourced file or executed function ran to its end, report the
* unclosed conditional.
* In Vim9 script do not give a second error, executing aborts after
* the first one.
*/
if (!got_int && !did_throw && !(did_emsg && in_vim9script())
&& ((getline_equal(fgetline, cookie, getsourceline)
&& !source_finished(fgetline, cookie))
|| (getline_equal(fgetline, cookie, get_func_line)
&& !func_has_ended(real_cookie))))
{
if (cstack.cs_flags[cstack.cs_idx] & CSF_TRY)
emsg(_(e_missing_endtry));
else if (cstack.cs_flags[cstack.cs_idx] & CSF_WHILE)
emsg(_(e_missing_endwhile));
else if (cstack.cs_flags[cstack.cs_idx] & CSF_FOR)
emsg(_(e_missing_endfor));
else
emsg(_(e_missing_endif));
}
/*
* Reset "trylevel" in case of a ":finish" or ":return" or a missing
* ":endtry" in a sourced file or executed function. If the try
* conditional is in its finally clause, ignore anything pending.
* If it is in a catch clause, finish the caught exception.
* Also cleanup any "cs_forinfo" structures.
*/
do
{
int idx = cleanup_conditionals(&cstack, 0, TRUE);
if (idx >= 0)
--idx; // remove try block not in its finally clause
rewind_conditionals(&cstack, idx, CSF_WHILE | CSF_FOR,
&cstack.cs_looplevel);
}
while (cstack.cs_idx >= 0);
trylevel = initial_trylevel;
}
// If a missing ":endtry", ":endwhile", ":endfor", or ":endif" or a memory
// lack was reported above and the error message is to be converted to an
// exception, do this now after rewinding the cstack.
do_errthrow(&cstack, getline_equal(fgetline, cookie, get_func_line)
? (char_u *)"endfunction" : (char_u *)NULL);
if (trylevel == 0)
{
// Just in case did_throw got set but current_exception wasn't.
if (current_exception == NULL)
did_throw = FALSE;
/*
* When an exception is being thrown out of the outermost try
* conditional, discard the uncaught exception, disable the conversion
* of interrupts or errors to exceptions, and ensure that no more
* commands are executed.
*/
if (did_throw)
handle_did_throw();
/*
* On an interrupt or an aborting error not converted to an exception,
* disable the conversion of errors to exceptions. (Interrupts are not
* converted anymore, here.) This enables also the interrupt message
* when force_abort is set and did_emsg unset in case of an interrupt
* from a finally clause after an error.
*/
else if (got_int || (did_emsg && force_abort))
suppress_errthrow = TRUE;
}
/*
* The current cstack will be freed when do_cmdline() returns. An uncaught
* exception will have to be rethrown in the previous cstack. If a function
* has just returned or a script file was just finished and the previous
* cstack belongs to the same function or, respectively, script file, it
* will have to be checked for finally clauses to be executed due to the
* ":return" or ":finish". This is done in do_one_cmd().
*/
if (did_throw)
need_rethrow = TRUE;
if ((getline_equal(fgetline, cookie, getsourceline)
&& ex_nesting_level > source_level(real_cookie))
|| (getline_equal(fgetline, cookie, get_func_line)
&& ex_nesting_level > func_level(real_cookie) + 1))
{
if (!did_throw)
check_cstack = TRUE;
}
else
{
// When leaving a function, reduce nesting level.
if (getline_equal(fgetline, cookie, get_func_line))
--ex_nesting_level;
/*
* Go to debug mode when returning from a function in which we are
* single-stepping.
*/
if ((getline_equal(fgetline, cookie, getsourceline)
|| getline_equal(fgetline, cookie, get_func_line))
&& ex_nesting_level + 1 <= debug_break_level)
do_debug(getline_equal(fgetline, cookie, getsourceline)
? (char_u *)_("End of sourced file")
: (char_u *)_("End of function"));
}
/*
* Restore the exception environment (done after returning from the
* debugger).
*/
if (flags & DOCMD_EXCRESET)
restore_dbg_stuff(&debug_saved);
msg_list = saved_msg_list;
// Cleanup if "cs_emsg_silent_list" remains.
if (cstack.cs_emsg_silent_list != NULL)
{
eslist_T *elem, *temp;
for (elem = cstack.cs_emsg_silent_list; elem != NULL; elem = temp)
{
temp = elem->next;
vim_free(elem);
}
}
#endif // FEAT_EVAL
/*
* If there was too much output to fit on the command line, ask the user to
* hit return before redrawing the screen. With the ":global" command we do
* this only once after the command is finished.
*/
if (did_inc)
{
--RedrawingDisabled;
--no_wait_return;
msg_scroll = FALSE;
/*
* When just finished an ":if"-":else" which was typed, no need to
* wait for hit-return. Also for an error situation.
*/
if (retval == FAIL
#ifdef FEAT_EVAL
|| (did_endif && KeyTyped && !did_emsg)
#endif
)
{
need_wait_return = FALSE;
msg_didany = FALSE; // don't wait when restarting edit
}
else if (need_wait_return)
{
/*
* The msg_start() above clears msg_didout. The wait_return we do
* here should not overwrite the command that may be shown before
* doing that.
*/
msg_didout |= msg_didout_before_start;
wait_return(FALSE);
}
}
#ifdef FEAT_EVAL
did_endif = FALSE; // in case do_cmdline used recursively
#else
/*
* Reset if_level, in case a sourced script file contains more ":if" than
* ":endif" (could be ":if x | foo | endif").
*/
if_level = 0;
#endif
--call_depth;
return retval;
} | Safe | [
"CWE-122"
] | vim | f50808ed135ab973296bca515ae4029b321afe47 | 7.978224192770086e+37 | 760 | patch 8.2.4763: using invalid pointer with "V:" in Ex mode
Problem: Using invalid pointer with "V:" in Ex mode.
Solution: Correctly handle the command being changed to "+". | 0 |
static void fdctrl_handle_readid(FDCtrl *fdctrl, int direction)
{
FDrive *cur_drv = get_cur_drv(fdctrl);
cur_drv->head = (fdctrl->fifo[1] >> 2) & 1;
timer_mod(fdctrl->result_timer, qemu_clock_get_ns(QEMU_CLOCK_VIRTUAL) +
(NANOSECONDS_PER_SECOND / 50));
} | Safe | [
"CWE-787"
] | qemu | defac5e2fbddf8423a354ff0454283a2115e1367 | 5.411686591239485e+37 | 8 | hw/block/fdc: Prevent end-of-track overrun (CVE-2021-3507)
Per the 82078 datasheet, if the end-of-track (EOT byte in
the FIFO) is more than the number of sectors per side, the
command is terminated unsuccessfully:
* 5.2.5 DATA TRANSFER TERMINATION
The 82078 supports terminal count explicitly through
the TC pin and implicitly through the underrun/over-
run and end-of-track (EOT) functions. For full sector
transfers, the EOT parameter can define the last
sector to be transferred in a single or multisector
transfer. If the last sector to be transferred is a par-
tial sector, the host can stop transferring the data in
mid-sector, and the 82078 will continue to complete
the sector as if a hardware TC was received. The
only difference between these implicit functions and
TC is that they return "abnormal termination" result
status. Such status indications can be ignored if they
were expected.
* 6.1.3 READ TRACK
This command terminates when the EOT specified
number of sectors have been read. If the 82078
does not find an I D Address Mark on the diskette
after the second· occurrence of a pulse on the
INDX# pin, then it sets the IC code in Status Regis-
ter 0 to "01" (Abnormal termination), sets the MA bit
in Status Register 1 to "1", and terminates the com-
mand.
* 6.1.6 VERIFY
Refer to Table 6-6 and Table 6-7 for information
concerning the values of MT and EC versus SC and
EOT value.
* Table 6·6. Result Phase Table
* Table 6-7. Verify Command Result Phase Table
Fix by aborting the transfer when EOT > # Sectors Per Side.
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Hervé Poussineau <[email protected]>
Fixes: baca51faff0 ("floppy driver: disk geometry auto detect")
Reported-by: Alexander Bulekov <[email protected]>
Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/339
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Hanna Reitz <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <[email protected]> | 0 |
int detect_shared_rootfs(void)
{
char buf[LXC_LINELEN], *p;
FILE *f;
int i;
char *p2;
f = fopen("/proc/self/mountinfo", "r");
if (!f)
return 0;
while (fgets(buf, LXC_LINELEN, f)) {
for (p = buf, i = 0; p && i < 4; i++)
p = strchr(p + 1, ' ');
if (!p)
continue;
p2 = strchr(p + 1, ' ');
if (!p2)
continue;
*p2 = '\0';
if (strcmp(p + 1, "/") == 0) {
/* This is '/'. Is it shared? */
p = strchr(p2 + 1, ' ');
if (p && strstr(p, "shared:")) {
fclose(f);
return 1;
}
}
}
fclose(f);
return 0;
} | Safe | [
"CWE-417"
] | lxc | c1cf54ebf251fdbad1e971679614e81649f1c032 | 5.006780540557844e+37 | 35 | CVE 2018-6556: verify netns fd in lxc-user-nic
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <[email protected]> | 0 |
lldpd_send(struct lldpd_hardware *hardware)
{
struct lldpd *cfg = hardware->h_cfg;
struct lldpd_port *port;
int i, sent;
if (cfg->g_config.c_receiveonly || cfg->g_config.c_paused) return;
if ((hardware->h_flags & IFF_RUNNING) == 0)
return;
log_debug("send", "send PDU on %s", hardware->h_ifname);
sent = 0;
for (i=0; cfg->g_protocols[i].mode != 0; i++) {
if (!cfg->g_protocols[i].enabled)
continue;
/* We send only if we have at least one remote system
* speaking this protocol or if the protocol is forced */
if (cfg->g_protocols[i].enabled > 1) {
cfg->g_protocols[i].send(cfg, hardware);
sent++;
continue;
}
TAILQ_FOREACH(port, &hardware->h_rports, p_entries) {
/* If this remote port is disabled, we don't
* consider it */
if (port->p_hidden_out)
continue;
if (port->p_protocol ==
cfg->g_protocols[i].mode) {
TRACE(LLDPD_FRAME_SEND(hardware->h_ifname,
cfg->g_protocols[i].name));
log_debug("send", "send PDU on %s with protocol %s",
hardware->h_ifname,
cfg->g_protocols[i].name);
cfg->g_protocols[i].send(cfg,
hardware);
sent++;
break;
}
}
}
if (!sent) {
/* Nothing was sent for this port, let's speak the first
* available protocol. */
for (i = 0; cfg->g_protocols[i].mode != 0; i++) {
if (!cfg->g_protocols[i].enabled) continue;
TRACE(LLDPD_FRAME_SEND(hardware->h_ifname,
cfg->g_protocols[i].name));
log_debug("send", "fallback to protocol %s for %s",
cfg->g_protocols[i].name, hardware->h_ifname);
cfg->g_protocols[i].send(cfg,
hardware);
break;
}
if (cfg->g_protocols[i].mode == 0)
log_warnx("send", "no protocol enabled, dunno what to send");
}
} | Safe | [
"CWE-617",
"CWE-703"
] | lldpd | 793526f8884455f43daecd0a2c46772388417a00 | 2.406895135233012e+38 | 59 | protocols: don't use assert on paths that can be reached
Malformed packets should not make lldpd crash. Ensure we can handle them
by not using assert() in this part. | 0 |
static void mld_send_cr(struct inet6_dev *idev)
{
struct ifmcaddr6 *pmc, *pmc_prev, *pmc_next;
struct sk_buff *skb = NULL;
int type, dtype;
/* deleted MCA's */
pmc_prev = NULL;
for (pmc = mc_dereference(idev->mc_tomb, idev);
pmc;
pmc = pmc_next) {
pmc_next = mc_dereference(pmc->next, idev);
if (pmc->mca_sfmode == MCAST_INCLUDE) {
type = MLD2_BLOCK_OLD_SOURCES;
dtype = MLD2_BLOCK_OLD_SOURCES;
skb = add_grec(skb, pmc, type, 1, 0, 0);
skb = add_grec(skb, pmc, dtype, 1, 1, 0);
}
if (pmc->mca_crcount) {
if (pmc->mca_sfmode == MCAST_EXCLUDE) {
type = MLD2_CHANGE_TO_INCLUDE;
skb = add_grec(skb, pmc, type, 1, 0, 0);
}
pmc->mca_crcount--;
if (pmc->mca_crcount == 0) {
mld_clear_zeros(&pmc->mca_tomb, idev);
mld_clear_zeros(&pmc->mca_sources, idev);
}
}
if (pmc->mca_crcount == 0 &&
!rcu_access_pointer(pmc->mca_tomb) &&
!rcu_access_pointer(pmc->mca_sources)) {
if (pmc_prev)
rcu_assign_pointer(pmc_prev->next, pmc_next);
else
rcu_assign_pointer(idev->mc_tomb, pmc_next);
in6_dev_put(pmc->idev);
kfree_rcu(pmc, rcu);
} else
pmc_prev = pmc;
}
/* change recs */
for_each_mc_mclock(idev, pmc) {
if (pmc->mca_sfcount[MCAST_EXCLUDE]) {
type = MLD2_BLOCK_OLD_SOURCES;
dtype = MLD2_ALLOW_NEW_SOURCES;
} else {
type = MLD2_ALLOW_NEW_SOURCES;
dtype = MLD2_BLOCK_OLD_SOURCES;
}
skb = add_grec(skb, pmc, type, 0, 0, 0);
skb = add_grec(skb, pmc, dtype, 0, 1, 0); /* deleted sources */
/* filter mode changes */
if (pmc->mca_crcount) {
if (pmc->mca_sfmode == MCAST_EXCLUDE)
type = MLD2_CHANGE_TO_EXCLUDE;
else
type = MLD2_CHANGE_TO_INCLUDE;
skb = add_grec(skb, pmc, type, 0, 0, 0);
pmc->mca_crcount--;
}
}
if (!skb)
return;
(void) mld_sendpack(skb);
} | Safe | [
"CWE-703"
] | linux | 2d3916f3189172d5c69d33065c3c21119fe539fc | 8.710390914054054e+37 | 68 | ipv6: fix skb drops in igmp6_event_query() and igmp6_event_report()
While investigating on why a synchronize_net() has been added recently
in ipv6_mc_down(), I found that igmp6_event_query() and igmp6_event_report()
might drop skbs in some cases.
Discussion about removing synchronize_net() from ipv6_mc_down()
will happen in a different thread.
Fixes: f185de28d9ae ("mld: add new workqueues for process mld events")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Taehee Yoo <[email protected]>
Cc: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Cc: David Ahern <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> | 0 |
void ip6t_unregister_table(struct net *net, struct xt_table *table,
const struct nf_hook_ops *ops)
{
nf_unregister_net_hooks(net, ops, hweight32(table->valid_hooks));
__ip6t_unregister_table(net, table);
} | Safe | [
"CWE-119"
] | nf-next | d7591f0c41ce3e67600a982bab6989ef0f07b3ce | 1.8631258883274915e+37 | 6 | netfilter: x_tables: introduce and use xt_copy_counters_from_user
The three variants use same copy&pasted code, condense this into a
helper and use that.
Make sure info.name is 0-terminated.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]> | 0 |
c_pdf14trans_is_friendly(const gs_composite_t * composite_action, byte cmd0, byte cmd1)
{
gs_pdf14trans_t *pct0 = (gs_pdf14trans_t *)composite_action;
int op0 = pct0->params.pdf14_op;
if (op0 == PDF14_PUSH_DEVICE || op0 == PDF14_END_TRANS_GROUP ||
op0 == PDF14_END_TRANS_TEXT_GROUP) {
/* Halftone commands are always passed to the target printer device,
because transparency buffers are always contone.
So we're safe to execute them before queued transparency compositors. */
if (cmd0 == cmd_opv_extend && (cmd1 == cmd_opv_ext_put_halftone ||
cmd1 == cmd_opv_ext_put_ht_seg))
return true;
if (cmd0 == cmd_opv_set_misc && (cmd1 >> 6) == (cmd_set_misc_map >> 6))
return true;
}
return false;
} | Safe | [] | ghostpdl | c432131c3fdb2143e148e8ba88555f7f7a63b25e | 1.2648789027226921e+38 | 18 | Bug 699661: Avoid sharing pointers between pdf14 compositors
If a copdevice is triggered when the pdf14 compositor is the device, we make
a copy of the device, then throw an error because, by default we're only allowed
to copy the device prototype - then freeing it calls the finalize, which frees
several pointers shared with the parent.
Make a pdf14 specific finish_copydevice() which NULLs the relevant pointers,
before, possibly, throwing the same error as the default method.
This also highlighted a problem with reopening the X11 devices, where a custom
error handler could be replaced with itself, meaning it also called itself,
and infifite recursion resulted.
Keep a note of if the handler replacement has been done, and don't do it a
second time. | 0 |
void msetCommand(client *c) {
msetGenericCommand(c,0);
} | Safe | [
"CWE-190"
] | redis | 92e3b1802f72ca0c5b0bde97f01d9b57a758d85c | 3.021764940760945e+38 | 3 | Fix integer overflow in STRALGO LCS (CVE-2021-29477)
An integer overflow bug in Redis version 6.0 or newer could be exploited using
the STRALGO LCS command to corrupt the heap and potentially result with remote
code execution.
(cherry picked from commit f0c5f920d0f88bd8aa376a2c05af4902789d1ef9) | 0 |
static int vfswrap_fchmod_acl(vfs_handle_struct *handle, files_struct *fsp, mode_t mode)
{
#ifdef HAVE_NO_ACL
errno = ENOSYS;
return -1;
#else
int result;
START_PROFILE(fchmod_acl);
result = fchmod_acl(fsp, mode);
END_PROFILE(fchmod_acl);
return result;
#endif
} | Safe | [
"CWE-665"
] | samba | 30e724cbff1ecd90e5a676831902d1e41ec1b347 | 3.2613852235359973e+38 | 14 | FSCTL_GET_SHADOW_COPY_DATA: Initialize output array to zero
Otherwise num_volumes and the end marker can return uninitialized data
to the client.
Signed-off-by: Christof Schmitt <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <[email protected]> | 0 |
static inline bool abs_cgroup_supported(void) {
return api_version >= CGM_SUPPORTS_GET_ABS;
} | Safe | [
"CWE-59",
"CWE-61"
] | lxc | 592fd47a6245508b79fe6ac819fe6d3b2c1289be | 1.4894728421744758e+38 | 3 | CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <[email protected]> | 0 |
ext4_xattr_set_handle(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode, int name_index,
const char *name, const void *value, size_t value_len,
int flags)
{
struct ext4_xattr_info i = {
.name_index = name_index,
.name = name,
.value = value,
.value_len = value_len,
.in_inode = 0,
};
struct ext4_xattr_ibody_find is = {
.s = { .not_found = -ENODATA, },
};
struct ext4_xattr_block_find bs = {
.s = { .not_found = -ENODATA, },
};
int no_expand;
int error;
if (!name)
return -EINVAL;
if (strlen(name) > 255)
return -ERANGE;
ext4_write_lock_xattr(inode, &no_expand);
/* Check journal credits under write lock. */
if (ext4_handle_valid(handle)) {
struct buffer_head *bh;
int credits;
bh = ext4_xattr_get_block(inode);
if (IS_ERR(bh)) {
error = PTR_ERR(bh);
goto cleanup;
}
credits = __ext4_xattr_set_credits(inode->i_sb, inode, bh,
value_len,
flags & XATTR_CREATE);
brelse(bh);
if (!ext4_handle_has_enough_credits(handle, credits)) {
error = -ENOSPC;
goto cleanup;
}
}
error = ext4_reserve_inode_write(handle, inode, &is.iloc);
if (error)
goto cleanup;
if (ext4_test_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_NEW)) {
struct ext4_inode *raw_inode = ext4_raw_inode(&is.iloc);
memset(raw_inode, 0, EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_inode_size);
ext4_clear_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_NEW);
}
error = ext4_xattr_ibody_find(inode, &i, &is);
if (error)
goto cleanup;
if (is.s.not_found)
error = ext4_xattr_block_find(inode, &i, &bs);
if (error)
goto cleanup;
if (is.s.not_found && bs.s.not_found) {
error = -ENODATA;
if (flags & XATTR_REPLACE)
goto cleanup;
error = 0;
if (!value)
goto cleanup;
} else {
error = -EEXIST;
if (flags & XATTR_CREATE)
goto cleanup;
}
if (!value) {
if (!is.s.not_found)
error = ext4_xattr_ibody_set(handle, inode, &i, &is);
else if (!bs.s.not_found)
error = ext4_xattr_block_set(handle, inode, &i, &bs);
} else {
error = 0;
/* Xattr value did not change? Save us some work and bail out */
if (!is.s.not_found && ext4_xattr_value_same(&is.s, &i))
goto cleanup;
if (!bs.s.not_found && ext4_xattr_value_same(&bs.s, &i))
goto cleanup;
if (ext4_has_feature_ea_inode(inode->i_sb) &&
(EXT4_XATTR_SIZE(i.value_len) >
EXT4_XATTR_MIN_LARGE_EA_SIZE(inode->i_sb->s_blocksize)))
i.in_inode = 1;
retry_inode:
error = ext4_xattr_ibody_set(handle, inode, &i, &is);
if (!error && !bs.s.not_found) {
i.value = NULL;
error = ext4_xattr_block_set(handle, inode, &i, &bs);
} else if (error == -ENOSPC) {
if (EXT4_I(inode)->i_file_acl && !bs.s.base) {
error = ext4_xattr_block_find(inode, &i, &bs);
if (error)
goto cleanup;
}
error = ext4_xattr_block_set(handle, inode, &i, &bs);
if (!error && !is.s.not_found) {
i.value = NULL;
error = ext4_xattr_ibody_set(handle, inode, &i,
&is);
} else if (error == -ENOSPC) {
/*
* Xattr does not fit in the block, store at
* external inode if possible.
*/
if (ext4_has_feature_ea_inode(inode->i_sb) &&
!i.in_inode) {
i.in_inode = 1;
goto retry_inode;
}
}
}
}
if (!error) {
ext4_xattr_update_super_block(handle, inode->i_sb);
inode->i_ctime = current_time(inode);
if (!value)
no_expand = 0;
error = ext4_mark_iloc_dirty(handle, inode, &is.iloc);
/*
* The bh is consumed by ext4_mark_iloc_dirty, even with
* error != 0.
*/
is.iloc.bh = NULL;
if (IS_SYNC(inode))
ext4_handle_sync(handle);
}
cleanup:
brelse(is.iloc.bh);
brelse(bs.bh);
ext4_write_unlock_xattr(inode, &no_expand);
return error;
} | Safe | [] | linux | 54dd0e0a1b255f115f8647fc6fb93273251b01b9 | 2.5614346408018912e+38 | 146 | ext4: add extra checks to ext4_xattr_block_get()
Add explicit checks in ext4_xattr_block_get() just in case the
e_value_offs and e_value_size fields in the the xattr block are
corrupted in memory after the buffer_verified bit is set on the xattr
block.
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] | 0 |
ztokenexec(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p)
{
os_ptr op = osp;
stream *s;
scanner_state state;
check_read_file(i_ctx_p, s, op);
check_estack(1);
gs_scanner_init(&state, op);
return tokenexec_continue(i_ctx_p, &state, true);
} | Safe | [] | ghostpdl | 671fd59eb657743aa86fbc1895cb15872a317caa | 5.5721819879334845e+37 | 11 | Bug 698158: prevent trying to reloc a freed object
In the token reader, we pass the scanner state structure around as a
t_struct ref on the Postscript operand stack.
But we explicitly free the scanner state when we're done, which leaves a
dangling reference on the operand stack and, unless that reference gets
overwritten before the next garbager run, we can end up with the garbager
trying to deal with an already freed object - that can cause a crash, or
memory corruption. | 0 |
static int hci_sock_blacklist_del(struct hci_dev *hdev, void __user *arg)
{
bdaddr_t bdaddr;
int err;
if (copy_from_user(&bdaddr, arg, sizeof(bdaddr)))
return -EFAULT;
hci_dev_lock(hdev);
err = hci_blacklist_del(hdev, &bdaddr, 0);
hci_dev_unlock(hdev);
return err;
} | Safe | [
"CWE-200"
] | linux | 3f68ba07b1da811bf383b4b701b129bfcb2e4988 | 4.346024309852701e+37 | 16 | Bluetooth: HCI - Fix info leak via getsockname()
The HCI code fails to initialize the hci_channel member of struct
sockaddr_hci and that for leaks two bytes kernel stack via the
getsockname() syscall. Initialize hci_channel with 0 to avoid the
info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <[email protected]>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | 0 |
static int nf_tables_getsetelem(struct sock *nlsk, struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
const struct nlattr * const nla[])
{
const struct nft_set *set;
struct nft_ctx ctx;
int err;
err = nft_ctx_init_from_elemattr(&ctx, skb, nlh, nla, false);
if (err < 0)
return err;
set = nf_tables_set_lookup(ctx.table, nla[NFTA_SET_ELEM_LIST_SET]);
if (IS_ERR(set))
return PTR_ERR(set);
if (set->flags & NFT_SET_INACTIVE)
return -ENOENT;
if (nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_DUMP) {
struct netlink_dump_control c = {
.dump = nf_tables_dump_set,
};
return netlink_dump_start(nlsk, skb, nlh, &c);
}
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
} | Safe | [
"CWE-19"
] | nf | a2f18db0c68fec96631c10cad9384c196e9008ac | 1.099854945392245e+38 | 26 | netfilter: nf_tables: fix flush ruleset chain dependencies
Jumping between chains doesn't mix well with flush ruleset. Rules
from a different chain and set elements may still refer to us.
[ 353.373791] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 353.373845] kernel BUG at net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:1159!
[ 353.373896] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 353.373942] Modules linked in: intel_powerclamp uas iwldvm iwlwifi
[ 353.374017] CPU: 0 PID: 6445 Comm: 31c3.nft Not tainted 3.18.0 #98
[ 353.374069] Hardware name: LENOVO 5129CTO/5129CTO, BIOS 6QET47WW (1.17 ) 07/14/2010
[...]
[ 353.375018] Call Trace:
[ 353.375046] [<ffffffff81964c31>] ? nf_tables_commit+0x381/0x540
[ 353.375101] [<ffffffff81949118>] nfnetlink_rcv+0x3d8/0x4b0
[ 353.375150] [<ffffffff81943fc5>] netlink_unicast+0x105/0x1a0
[ 353.375200] [<ffffffff8194438e>] netlink_sendmsg+0x32e/0x790
[ 353.375253] [<ffffffff818f398e>] sock_sendmsg+0x8e/0xc0
[ 353.375300] [<ffffffff818f36b9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel.part.20+0x19/0x70
[ 353.375357] [<ffffffff818f44f9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel+0x19/0x30
[ 353.375410] [<ffffffff819016d2>] ? verify_iovec+0x42/0xd0
[ 353.375459] [<ffffffff818f3e10>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x3f0/0x400
[ 353.375510] [<ffffffff810615fa>] ? native_sched_clock+0x2a/0x90
[ 353.375563] [<ffffffff81176697>] ? acct_account_cputime+0x17/0x20
[ 353.375616] [<ffffffff8110dc78>] ? account_user_time+0x88/0xa0
[ 353.375667] [<ffffffff818f4bbd>] __sys_sendmsg+0x3d/0x80
[ 353.375719] [<ffffffff81b184f4>] ? int_check_syscall_exit_work+0x34/0x3d
[ 353.375776] [<ffffffff818f4c0d>] SyS_sendmsg+0xd/0x20
[ 353.375823] [<ffffffff81b1826d>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Release objects in this order: rules -> sets -> chains -> tables, to
make sure no references to chains are held anymore.
Reported-by: Asbjoern Sloth Toennesen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]> | 0 |
MetadataMapVector& ConnectionManagerImpl::ActiveStreamDecoderFilter::addDecodedMetadata() {
return parent_.addDecodedMetadata();
} | Safe | [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-703"
] | envoy | afc39bea36fd436e54262f150c009e8d72db5014 | 3.2022617476543174e+38 | 3 | Track byteSize of HeaderMap internally.
Introduces a cached byte size updated internally in HeaderMap. The value
is stored as an optional, and is cleared whenever a non-const pointer or
reference to a HeaderEntry is accessed. The cached value can be set with
refreshByteSize() which performs an iteration over the HeaderMap to sum
the size of each key and value in the HeaderMap.
Signed-off-by: Asra Ali <[email protected]> | 0 |
TRIO_PUBLIC_STRING int trio_string_size TRIO_ARGS1((self), trio_string_t* self)
{
assert(self);
return self->allocated;
} | Safe | [
"CWE-190",
"CWE-125"
] | FreeRDP | 05cd9ea2290d23931f615c1b004d4b2e69074e27 | 1.9356613190201248e+37 | 6 | Fixed TrioParse and trio_length limts.
CVE-2020-4030 thanks to @antonio-morales for finding this. | 0 |
static int cloop_read(BlockDriverState *bs, int64_t sector_num,
uint8_t *buf, int nb_sectors)
{
BDRVCloopState *s = bs->opaque;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < nb_sectors; i++) {
uint32_t sector_offset_in_block =
((sector_num + i) % s->sectors_per_block),
block_num = (sector_num + i) / s->sectors_per_block;
if (cloop_read_block(bs, block_num) != 0) {
return -1;
}
memcpy(buf + i * 512,
s->uncompressed_block + sector_offset_in_block * 512, 512);
}
return 0;
} | Safe | [
"CWE-190"
] | qemu | 509a41bab5306181044b5fff02eadf96d9c8676a | 1.4441963713970346e+38 | 18 | block/cloop: prevent offsets_size integer overflow (CVE-2014-0143)
The following integer overflow in offsets_size can lead to out-of-bounds
memory stores when n_blocks has a huge value:
uint32_t n_blocks, offsets_size;
[...]
ret = bdrv_pread(bs->file, 128 + 4, &s->n_blocks, 4);
[...]
s->n_blocks = be32_to_cpu(s->n_blocks);
/* read offsets */
offsets_size = s->n_blocks * sizeof(uint64_t);
s->offsets = g_malloc(offsets_size);
[...]
for(i=0;i<s->n_blocks;i++) {
s->offsets[i] = be64_to_cpu(s->offsets[i]);
offsets_size can be smaller than n_blocks due to integer overflow.
Therefore s->offsets[] is too small when the for loop byteswaps offsets.
This patch refuses to open files if offsets_size would overflow.
Note that changing the type of offsets_size is not a fix since 32-bit
hosts still only have 32-bit size_t.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <[email protected]> | 0 |
static int MP4_ReadBox_enda( stream_t *p_stream, MP4_Box_t *p_box )
{
MP4_Box_data_enda_t *p_enda;
MP4_READBOX_ENTER( MP4_Box_data_enda_t );
p_enda = p_box->data.p_enda;
MP4_GET2BYTES( p_enda->i_little_endian );
#ifdef MP4_VERBOSE
msg_Dbg( p_stream,
"read box: \"enda\" little_endian=%d", p_enda->i_little_endian );
#endif
MP4_READBOX_EXIT( 1 );
} | Safe | [
"CWE-120",
"CWE-191",
"CWE-787"
] | vlc | 2e7c7091a61aa5d07e7997b393d821e91f593c39 | 8.006307335170174e+37 | 15 | demux: mp4: fix buffer overflow in parsing of string boxes.
We ensure that pbox->i_size is never smaller than 8 to avoid an
integer underflow in the third argument of the subsequent call to
memcpy. We also make sure no truncation occurs when passing values
derived from the 64 bit integer p_box->i_size to arguments of malloc
and memcpy that may be 32 bit integers on 32 bit platforms.
Signed-off-by: Jean-Baptiste Kempf <[email protected]> | 0 |
rfbProcessClientNormalMessage(rfbClientPtr cl)
{
int n=0;
rfbClientToServerMsg msg;
char *str;
int i;
uint32_t enc=0;
uint32_t lastPreferredEncoding = -1;
char encBuf[64];
char encBuf2[64];
rfbExtDesktopScreen *extDesktopScreens;
rfbClientIteratorPtr iterator;
rfbClientPtr clp;
if ((n = rfbReadExact(cl, (char *)&msg, 1)) <= 0) {
if (n != 0)
rfbLogPerror("rfbProcessClientNormalMessage: read");
rfbCloseClient(cl);
return;
}
switch (msg.type) {
case rfbSetPixelFormat:
if ((n = rfbReadExact(cl, ((char *)&msg) + 1,
sz_rfbSetPixelFormatMsg - 1)) <= 0) {
if (n != 0)
rfbLogPerror("rfbProcessClientNormalMessage: read");
rfbCloseClient(cl);
return;
}
cl->format.bitsPerPixel = msg.spf.format.bitsPerPixel;
cl->format.depth = msg.spf.format.depth;
cl->format.bigEndian = (msg.spf.format.bigEndian ? TRUE : FALSE);
cl->format.trueColour = (msg.spf.format.trueColour ? TRUE : FALSE);
cl->format.redMax = Swap16IfLE(msg.spf.format.redMax);
cl->format.greenMax = Swap16IfLE(msg.spf.format.greenMax);
cl->format.blueMax = Swap16IfLE(msg.spf.format.blueMax);
cl->format.redShift = msg.spf.format.redShift;
cl->format.greenShift = msg.spf.format.greenShift;
cl->format.blueShift = msg.spf.format.blueShift;
cl->readyForSetColourMapEntries = TRUE;
cl->screen->setTranslateFunction(cl);
rfbStatRecordMessageRcvd(cl, msg.type, sz_rfbSetPixelFormatMsg, sz_rfbSetPixelFormatMsg);
return;
case rfbFixColourMapEntries:
if ((n = rfbReadExact(cl, ((char *)&msg) + 1,
sz_rfbFixColourMapEntriesMsg - 1)) <= 0) {
if (n != 0)
rfbLogPerror("rfbProcessClientNormalMessage: read");
rfbCloseClient(cl);
return;
}
rfbStatRecordMessageRcvd(cl, msg.type, sz_rfbSetPixelFormatMsg, sz_rfbSetPixelFormatMsg);
rfbLog("rfbProcessClientNormalMessage: %s",
"FixColourMapEntries unsupported\n");
rfbCloseClient(cl);
return;
/* NOTE: Some clients send us a set of encodings (ie: PointerPos) designed to enable/disable features...
* We may want to look into this...
* Example:
* case rfbEncodingXCursor:
* cl->enableCursorShapeUpdates = TRUE;
*
* Currently: cl->enableCursorShapeUpdates can *never* be turned off...
*/
case rfbSetEncodings:
{
if ((n = rfbReadExact(cl, ((char *)&msg) + 1,
sz_rfbSetEncodingsMsg - 1)) <= 0) {
if (n != 0)
rfbLogPerror("rfbProcessClientNormalMessage: read");
rfbCloseClient(cl);
return;
}
msg.se.nEncodings = Swap16IfLE(msg.se.nEncodings);
rfbStatRecordMessageRcvd(cl, msg.type, sz_rfbSetEncodingsMsg+(msg.se.nEncodings*4),sz_rfbSetEncodingsMsg+(msg.se.nEncodings*4));
/*
* UltraVNC Client has the ability to adapt to changing network environments
* So, let's give it a change to tell us what it wants now!
*/
if (cl->preferredEncoding!=-1)
lastPreferredEncoding = cl->preferredEncoding;
/* Reset all flags to defaults (allows us to switch between PointerPos and Server Drawn Cursors) */
cl->preferredEncoding=-1;
cl->useCopyRect = FALSE;
cl->useNewFBSize = FALSE;
cl->useExtDesktopSize = FALSE;
cl->cursorWasChanged = FALSE;
cl->useRichCursorEncoding = FALSE;
cl->enableCursorPosUpdates = FALSE;
cl->enableCursorShapeUpdates = FALSE;
cl->enableCursorShapeUpdates = FALSE;
cl->enableLastRectEncoding = FALSE;
cl->enableKeyboardLedState = FALSE;
cl->enableSupportedMessages = FALSE;
cl->enableSupportedEncodings = FALSE;
cl->enableServerIdentity = FALSE;
#if defined(LIBVNCSERVER_HAVE_LIBZ) || defined(LIBVNCSERVER_HAVE_LIBPNG)
cl->tightQualityLevel = -1;
#ifdef LIBVNCSERVER_HAVE_LIBJPEG
cl->tightCompressLevel = TIGHT_DEFAULT_COMPRESSION;
cl->turboSubsampLevel = TURBO_DEFAULT_SUBSAMP;
cl->turboQualityLevel = -1;
#endif
#endif
for (i = 0; i < msg.se.nEncodings; i++) {
if ((n = rfbReadExact(cl, (char *)&enc, 4)) <= 0) {
if (n != 0)
rfbLogPerror("rfbProcessClientNormalMessage: read");
rfbCloseClient(cl);
return;
}
enc = Swap32IfLE(enc);
switch (enc) {
case rfbEncodingCopyRect:
cl->useCopyRect = TRUE;
break;
case rfbEncodingRaw:
case rfbEncodingRRE:
case rfbEncodingCoRRE:
case rfbEncodingHextile:
case rfbEncodingUltra:
#ifdef LIBVNCSERVER_HAVE_LIBZ
case rfbEncodingZlib:
case rfbEncodingZRLE:
case rfbEncodingZYWRLE:
#ifdef LIBVNCSERVER_HAVE_LIBJPEG
case rfbEncodingTight:
#endif
#endif
#ifdef LIBVNCSERVER_HAVE_LIBPNG
case rfbEncodingTightPng:
#endif
/* The first supported encoding is the 'preferred' encoding */
if (cl->preferredEncoding == -1)
cl->preferredEncoding = enc;
break;
case rfbEncodingXCursor:
if(!cl->screen->dontConvertRichCursorToXCursor) {
rfbLog("Enabling X-style cursor updates for client %s\n",
cl->host);
/* if cursor was drawn, hide the cursor */
if(!cl->enableCursorShapeUpdates)
rfbRedrawAfterHideCursor(cl,NULL);
cl->enableCursorShapeUpdates = TRUE;
cl->cursorWasChanged = TRUE;
}
break;
case rfbEncodingRichCursor:
rfbLog("Enabling full-color cursor updates for client %s\n",
cl->host);
/* if cursor was drawn, hide the cursor */
if(!cl->enableCursorShapeUpdates)
rfbRedrawAfterHideCursor(cl,NULL);
cl->enableCursorShapeUpdates = TRUE;
cl->useRichCursorEncoding = TRUE;
cl->cursorWasChanged = TRUE;
break;
case rfbEncodingPointerPos:
if (!cl->enableCursorPosUpdates) {
rfbLog("Enabling cursor position updates for client %s\n",
cl->host);
cl->enableCursorPosUpdates = TRUE;
cl->cursorWasMoved = TRUE;
}
break;
case rfbEncodingLastRect:
if (!cl->enableLastRectEncoding) {
rfbLog("Enabling LastRect protocol extension for client "
"%s\n", cl->host);
cl->enableLastRectEncoding = TRUE;
}
break;
case rfbEncodingNewFBSize:
if (!cl->useNewFBSize) {
rfbLog("Enabling NewFBSize protocol extension for client "
"%s\n", cl->host);
cl->useNewFBSize = TRUE;
}
break;
case rfbEncodingExtDesktopSize:
if (!cl->useExtDesktopSize) {
rfbLog("Enabling ExtDesktopSize protocol extension for client "
"%s\n", cl->host);
cl->useExtDesktopSize = TRUE;
cl->useNewFBSize = TRUE;
}
break;
case rfbEncodingKeyboardLedState:
if (!cl->enableKeyboardLedState) {
rfbLog("Enabling KeyboardLedState protocol extension for client "
"%s\n", cl->host);
cl->enableKeyboardLedState = TRUE;
}
break;
case rfbEncodingSupportedMessages:
if (!cl->enableSupportedMessages) {
rfbLog("Enabling SupportedMessages protocol extension for client "
"%s\n", cl->host);
cl->enableSupportedMessages = TRUE;
}
break;
case rfbEncodingSupportedEncodings:
if (!cl->enableSupportedEncodings) {
rfbLog("Enabling SupportedEncodings protocol extension for client "
"%s\n", cl->host);
cl->enableSupportedEncodings = TRUE;
}
break;
case rfbEncodingServerIdentity:
if (!cl->enableServerIdentity) {
rfbLog("Enabling ServerIdentity protocol extension for client "
"%s\n", cl->host);
cl->enableServerIdentity = TRUE;
}
break;
case rfbEncodingXvp:
if (cl->screen->xvpHook) {
rfbLog("Enabling Xvp protocol extension for client "
"%s\n", cl->host);
if (!rfbSendXvp(cl, 1, rfbXvp_Init)) {
rfbCloseClient(cl);
return;
}
}
break;
default:
#if defined(LIBVNCSERVER_HAVE_LIBZ) || defined(LIBVNCSERVER_HAVE_LIBPNG)
if ( enc >= (uint32_t)rfbEncodingCompressLevel0 &&
enc <= (uint32_t)rfbEncodingCompressLevel9 ) {
cl->zlibCompressLevel = enc & 0x0F;
#ifdef LIBVNCSERVER_HAVE_LIBJPEG
cl->tightCompressLevel = enc & 0x0F;
rfbLog("Using compression level %d for client %s\n",
cl->tightCompressLevel, cl->host);
#endif
} else if ( enc >= (uint32_t)rfbEncodingQualityLevel0 &&
enc <= (uint32_t)rfbEncodingQualityLevel9 ) {
cl->tightQualityLevel = enc & 0x0F;
rfbLog("Using image quality level %d for client %s\n",
cl->tightQualityLevel, cl->host);
#ifdef LIBVNCSERVER_HAVE_LIBJPEG
cl->turboQualityLevel = tight2turbo_qual[enc & 0x0F];
cl->turboSubsampLevel = tight2turbo_subsamp[enc & 0x0F];
rfbLog("Using JPEG subsampling %d, Q%d for client %s\n",
cl->turboSubsampLevel, cl->turboQualityLevel, cl->host);
} else if ( enc >= (uint32_t)rfbEncodingFineQualityLevel0 + 1 &&
enc <= (uint32_t)rfbEncodingFineQualityLevel100 ) {
cl->turboQualityLevel = enc & 0xFF;
rfbLog("Using fine quality level %d for client %s\n",
cl->turboQualityLevel, cl->host);
} else if ( enc >= (uint32_t)rfbEncodingSubsamp1X &&
enc <= (uint32_t)rfbEncodingSubsampGray ) {
cl->turboSubsampLevel = enc & 0xFF;
rfbLog("Using subsampling level %d for client %s\n",
cl->turboSubsampLevel, cl->host);
#endif
} else
#endif
{
rfbExtensionData* e;
for(e = cl->extensions; e;) {
rfbExtensionData* next = e->next;
if(e->extension->enablePseudoEncoding &&
e->extension->enablePseudoEncoding(cl,
&e->data, (int)enc))
/* ext handles this encoding */
break;
e = next;
}
if(e == NULL) {
rfbBool handled = FALSE;
/* if the pseudo encoding is not handled by the
enabled extensions, search through all
extensions. */
rfbProtocolExtension* e;
for(e = rfbGetExtensionIterator(); e;) {
int* encs = e->pseudoEncodings;
while(encs && *encs!=0) {
if(*encs==(int)enc) {
void* data = NULL;
if(!e->enablePseudoEncoding(cl, &data, (int)enc)) {
rfbLog("Installed extension pretends to handle pseudo encoding 0x%x, but does not!\n",(int)enc);
} else {
rfbEnableExtension(cl, e, data);
handled = TRUE;
e = NULL;
break;
}
}
encs++;
}
if(e)
e = e->next;
}
rfbReleaseExtensionIterator();
if(!handled)
rfbLog("rfbProcessClientNormalMessage: "
"ignoring unsupported encoding type %s\n",
encodingName(enc,encBuf,sizeof(encBuf)));
}
}
}
}
if (cl->preferredEncoding == -1) {
if (lastPreferredEncoding==-1) {
cl->preferredEncoding = rfbEncodingRaw;
rfbLog("Defaulting to %s encoding for client %s\n", encodingName(cl->preferredEncoding,encBuf,sizeof(encBuf)),cl->host);
}
else {
cl->preferredEncoding = lastPreferredEncoding;
rfbLog("Sticking with %s encoding for client %s\n", encodingName(cl->preferredEncoding,encBuf,sizeof(encBuf)),cl->host);
}
}
else
{
if (lastPreferredEncoding==-1) {
rfbLog("Using %s encoding for client %s\n", encodingName(cl->preferredEncoding,encBuf,sizeof(encBuf)),cl->host);
} else {
rfbLog("Switching from %s to %s Encoding for client %s\n",
encodingName(lastPreferredEncoding,encBuf2,sizeof(encBuf2)),
encodingName(cl->preferredEncoding,encBuf,sizeof(encBuf)), cl->host);
}
}
if (cl->enableCursorPosUpdates && !cl->enableCursorShapeUpdates) {
rfbLog("Disabling cursor position updates for client %s\n",
cl->host);
cl->enableCursorPosUpdates = FALSE;
}
return;
}
case rfbFramebufferUpdateRequest:
{
sraRegionPtr tmpRegion;
if ((n = rfbReadExact(cl, ((char *)&msg) + 1,
sz_rfbFramebufferUpdateRequestMsg-1)) <= 0) {
if (n != 0)
rfbLogPerror("rfbProcessClientNormalMessage: read");
rfbCloseClient(cl);
return;
}
rfbStatRecordMessageRcvd(cl, msg.type, sz_rfbFramebufferUpdateRequestMsg,sz_rfbFramebufferUpdateRequestMsg);
/* The values come in based on the scaled screen, we need to convert them to
* values based on the main screen's coordinate system
*/
if(!rectSwapIfLEAndClip(&msg.fur.x,&msg.fur.y,&msg.fur.w,&msg.fur.h,cl))
{
rfbLog("Warning, ignoring rfbFramebufferUpdateRequest: %dXx%dY-%dWx%dH\n",msg.fur.x, msg.fur.y, msg.fur.w, msg.fur.h);
return;
}
if (cl->clientFramebufferUpdateRequestHook)
cl->clientFramebufferUpdateRequestHook(cl, &msg.fur);
tmpRegion =
sraRgnCreateRect(msg.fur.x,
msg.fur.y,
msg.fur.x+msg.fur.w,
msg.fur.y+msg.fur.h);
LOCK(cl->updateMutex);
sraRgnOr(cl->requestedRegion,tmpRegion);
if (!cl->readyForSetColourMapEntries) {
/* client hasn't sent a SetPixelFormat so is using server's */
cl->readyForSetColourMapEntries = TRUE;
if (!cl->format.trueColour) {
if (!rfbSetClientColourMap(cl, 0, 0)) {
sraRgnDestroy(tmpRegion);
TSIGNAL(cl->updateCond);
UNLOCK(cl->updateMutex);
return;
}
}
}
if (!msg.fur.incremental) {
sraRgnOr(cl->modifiedRegion,tmpRegion);
sraRgnSubtract(cl->copyRegion,tmpRegion);
if (cl->useExtDesktopSize)
cl->newFBSizePending = TRUE;
}
TSIGNAL(cl->updateCond);
UNLOCK(cl->updateMutex);
sraRgnDestroy(tmpRegion);
return;
}
case rfbKeyEvent:
if ((n = rfbReadExact(cl, ((char *)&msg) + 1,
sz_rfbKeyEventMsg - 1)) <= 0) {
if (n != 0)
rfbLogPerror("rfbProcessClientNormalMessage: read");
rfbCloseClient(cl);
return;
}
rfbStatRecordMessageRcvd(cl, msg.type, sz_rfbKeyEventMsg, sz_rfbKeyEventMsg);
if(!cl->viewOnly) {
cl->screen->kbdAddEvent(msg.ke.down, (rfbKeySym)Swap32IfLE(msg.ke.key), cl);
}
return;
case rfbPointerEvent:
if ((n = rfbReadExact(cl, ((char *)&msg) + 1,
sz_rfbPointerEventMsg - 1)) <= 0) {
if (n != 0)
rfbLogPerror("rfbProcessClientNormalMessage: read");
rfbCloseClient(cl);
return;
}
rfbStatRecordMessageRcvd(cl, msg.type, sz_rfbPointerEventMsg, sz_rfbPointerEventMsg);
if (cl->screen->pointerClient && cl->screen->pointerClient != cl)
return;
if (msg.pe.buttonMask == 0)
cl->screen->pointerClient = NULL;
else
cl->screen->pointerClient = cl;
if(!cl->viewOnly) {
if (msg.pe.buttonMask != cl->lastPtrButtons ||
cl->screen->deferPtrUpdateTime == 0) {
cl->screen->ptrAddEvent(msg.pe.buttonMask,
ScaleX(cl->scaledScreen, cl->screen, Swap16IfLE(msg.pe.x)),
ScaleY(cl->scaledScreen, cl->screen, Swap16IfLE(msg.pe.y)),
cl);
cl->lastPtrButtons = msg.pe.buttonMask;
} else {
cl->lastPtrX = ScaleX(cl->scaledScreen, cl->screen, Swap16IfLE(msg.pe.x));
cl->lastPtrY = ScaleY(cl->scaledScreen, cl->screen, Swap16IfLE(msg.pe.y));
cl->lastPtrButtons = msg.pe.buttonMask;
}
}
return;
case rfbFileTransfer:
if ((n = rfbReadExact(cl, ((char *)&msg) + 1,
sz_rfbFileTransferMsg - 1)) <= 0) {
if (n != 0)
rfbLogPerror("rfbProcessClientNormalMessage: read");
rfbCloseClient(cl);
return;
}
msg.ft.size = Swap32IfLE(msg.ft.size);
msg.ft.length = Swap32IfLE(msg.ft.length);
/* record statistics in rfbProcessFileTransfer as length is filled with garbage when it is not valid */
rfbProcessFileTransfer(cl, msg.ft.contentType, msg.ft.contentParam, msg.ft.size, msg.ft.length);
return;
case rfbSetSW:
if ((n = rfbReadExact(cl, ((char *)&msg) + 1,
sz_rfbSetSWMsg - 1)) <= 0) {
if (n != 0)
rfbLogPerror("rfbProcessClientNormalMessage: read");
rfbCloseClient(cl);
return;
}
msg.sw.x = Swap16IfLE(msg.sw.x);
msg.sw.y = Swap16IfLE(msg.sw.y);
rfbStatRecordMessageRcvd(cl, msg.type, sz_rfbSetSWMsg, sz_rfbSetSWMsg);
/* msg.sw.status is not initialized in the ultraVNC viewer and contains random numbers (why???) */
rfbLog("Received a rfbSetSingleWindow(%d x, %d y)\n", msg.sw.x, msg.sw.y);
if (cl->screen->setSingleWindow!=NULL)
cl->screen->setSingleWindow(cl, msg.sw.x, msg.sw.y);
return;
case rfbSetServerInput:
if ((n = rfbReadExact(cl, ((char *)&msg) + 1,
sz_rfbSetServerInputMsg - 1)) <= 0) {
if (n != 0)
rfbLogPerror("rfbProcessClientNormalMessage: read");
rfbCloseClient(cl);
return;
}
rfbStatRecordMessageRcvd(cl, msg.type, sz_rfbSetServerInputMsg, sz_rfbSetServerInputMsg);
/* msg.sim.pad is not initialized in the ultraVNC viewer and contains random numbers (why???) */
/* msg.sim.pad = Swap16IfLE(msg.sim.pad); */
rfbLog("Received a rfbSetServerInput(%d status)\n", msg.sim.status);
if (cl->screen->setServerInput!=NULL)
cl->screen->setServerInput(cl, msg.sim.status);
return;
case rfbTextChat:
if ((n = rfbReadExact(cl, ((char *)&msg) + 1,
sz_rfbTextChatMsg - 1)) <= 0) {
if (n != 0)
rfbLogPerror("rfbProcessClientNormalMessage: read");
rfbCloseClient(cl);
return;
}
msg.tc.pad2 = Swap16IfLE(msg.tc.pad2);
msg.tc.length = Swap32IfLE(msg.tc.length);
switch (msg.tc.length) {
case rfbTextChatOpen:
case rfbTextChatClose:
case rfbTextChatFinished:
/* commands do not have text following */
/* Why couldn't they have used the pad byte??? */
str=NULL;
rfbStatRecordMessageRcvd(cl, msg.type, sz_rfbTextChatMsg, sz_rfbTextChatMsg);
break;
default:
if ((msg.tc.length>0) && (msg.tc.length<rfbTextMaxSize))
{
str = (char *)malloc(msg.tc.length);
if (str==NULL)
{
rfbLog("Unable to malloc %d bytes for a TextChat Message\n", msg.tc.length);
rfbCloseClient(cl);
return;
}
if ((n = rfbReadExact(cl, str, msg.tc.length)) <= 0) {
if (n != 0)
rfbLogPerror("rfbProcessClientNormalMessage: read");
free(str);
rfbCloseClient(cl);
return;
}
rfbStatRecordMessageRcvd(cl, msg.type, sz_rfbTextChatMsg+msg.tc.length, sz_rfbTextChatMsg+msg.tc.length);
}
else
{
/* This should never happen */
rfbLog("client sent us a Text Message that is too big %d>%d\n", msg.tc.length, rfbTextMaxSize);
rfbCloseClient(cl);
return;
}
}
/* Note: length can be commands: rfbTextChatOpen, rfbTextChatClose, and rfbTextChatFinished
* at which point, the str is NULL (as it is not sent)
*/
if (cl->screen->setTextChat!=NULL)
cl->screen->setTextChat(cl, msg.tc.length, str);
free(str);
return;
case rfbClientCutText:
if ((n = rfbReadExact(cl, ((char *)&msg) + 1,
sz_rfbClientCutTextMsg - 1)) <= 0) {
if (n != 0)
rfbLogPerror("rfbProcessClientNormalMessage: read");
rfbCloseClient(cl);
return;
}
msg.cct.length = Swap32IfLE(msg.cct.length);
/* uint32_t input is passed to malloc()'s size_t argument,
* to rfbReadExact()'s int argument, to rfbStatRecordMessageRcvd()'s int
* argument increased of sz_rfbClientCutTextMsg, and to setXCutText()'s int
* argument. Here we impose a limit of 1 MB so that the value fits
* into all of the types to prevent from misinterpretation and thus
* from accessing uninitialized memory (CVE-2018-7225) and also to
* prevent from a denial-of-service by allocating too much memory in
* the server. */
if (msg.cct.length > 1<<20) {
rfbLog("rfbClientCutText: too big cut text length requested: %u B > 1 MB\n", (unsigned int)msg.cct.length);
rfbCloseClient(cl);
return;
}
/* Allow zero-length client cut text. */
str = (char *)calloc(msg.cct.length ? msg.cct.length : 1, 1);
if (str == NULL) {
rfbLogPerror("rfbProcessClientNormalMessage: not enough memory");
rfbCloseClient(cl);
return;
}
if ((n = rfbReadExact(cl, str, msg.cct.length)) <= 0) {
if (n != 0)
rfbLogPerror("rfbProcessClientNormalMessage: read");
free(str);
rfbCloseClient(cl);
return;
}
rfbStatRecordMessageRcvd(cl, msg.type, sz_rfbClientCutTextMsg+msg.cct.length, sz_rfbClientCutTextMsg+msg.cct.length);
if(!cl->viewOnly) {
cl->screen->setXCutText(str, msg.cct.length, cl);
}
free(str);
return;
case rfbPalmVNCSetScaleFactor:
cl->PalmVNC = TRUE;
if ((n = rfbReadExact(cl, ((char *)&msg) + 1,
sz_rfbSetScaleMsg - 1)) <= 0) {
if (n != 0)
rfbLogPerror("rfbProcessClientNormalMessage: read");
rfbCloseClient(cl);
return;
}
if (msg.ssc.scale == 0) {
rfbLogPerror("rfbProcessClientNormalMessage: will not accept a scale factor of zero");
rfbCloseClient(cl);
return;
}
rfbStatRecordMessageRcvd(cl, msg.type, sz_rfbSetScaleMsg, sz_rfbSetScaleMsg);
rfbLog("rfbSetScale(%d)\n", msg.ssc.scale);
rfbScalingSetup(cl,cl->screen->width/msg.ssc.scale, cl->screen->height/msg.ssc.scale);
rfbSendNewScaleSize(cl);
return;
case rfbSetScale:
if ((n = rfbReadExact(cl, ((char *)&msg) + 1,
sz_rfbSetScaleMsg - 1)) <= 0) {
if (n != 0)
rfbLogPerror("rfbProcessClientNormalMessage: read");
rfbCloseClient(cl);
return;
}
if (msg.ssc.scale == 0) {
rfbLogPerror("rfbProcessClientNormalMessage: will not accept a scale factor of zero");
rfbCloseClient(cl);
return;
}
rfbStatRecordMessageRcvd(cl, msg.type, sz_rfbSetScaleMsg, sz_rfbSetScaleMsg);
rfbLog("rfbSetScale(%d)\n", msg.ssc.scale);
rfbScalingSetup(cl,cl->screen->width/msg.ssc.scale, cl->screen->height/msg.ssc.scale);
rfbSendNewScaleSize(cl);
return;
case rfbXvp:
if ((n = rfbReadExact(cl, ((char *)&msg) + 1,
sz_rfbXvpMsg - 1)) <= 0) {
if (n != 0)
rfbLogPerror("rfbProcessClientNormalMessage: read");
rfbCloseClient(cl);
return;
}
rfbStatRecordMessageRcvd(cl, msg.type, sz_rfbXvpMsg, sz_rfbXvpMsg);
/* only version when is defined, so echo back a fail */
if(msg.xvp.version != 1) {
rfbSendXvp(cl, msg.xvp.version, rfbXvp_Fail);
}
else {
/* if the hook exists and fails, send a fail msg */
if(cl->screen->xvpHook && !cl->screen->xvpHook(cl, msg.xvp.version, msg.xvp.code))
rfbSendXvp(cl, 1, rfbXvp_Fail);
}
return;
case rfbSetDesktopSize:
if ((n = rfbReadExact(cl, ((char *)&msg) + 1,
sz_rfbSetDesktopSizeMsg - 1)) <= 0) {
if (n != 0)
rfbLogPerror("rfbProcessClientNormalMessage: read");
rfbCloseClient(cl);
return;
}
if (msg.sdm.numberOfScreens == 0) {
rfbLog("Ignoring setDesktopSize message from client that defines zero screens\n");
return;
}
extDesktopScreens = (rfbExtDesktopScreen *) malloc(msg.sdm.numberOfScreens * sz_rfbExtDesktopScreen);
if (extDesktopScreens == NULL) {
rfbLogPerror("rfbProcessClientNormalMessage: not enough memory");
rfbCloseClient(cl);
return;
}
if ((n = rfbReadExact(cl, ((char *)extDesktopScreens), msg.sdm.numberOfScreens * sz_rfbExtDesktopScreen)) <= 0) {
if (n != 0)
rfbLogPerror("rfbProcessClientNormalMessage: read");
free(extDesktopScreens);
rfbCloseClient(cl);
return;
}
rfbStatRecordMessageRcvd(cl, msg.type, sz_rfbSetDesktopSizeMsg + msg.sdm.numberOfScreens * sz_rfbExtDesktopScreen,
sz_rfbSetDesktopSizeMsg + msg.sdm.numberOfScreens * sz_rfbExtDesktopScreen);
for (i=0; i < msg.sdm.numberOfScreens; i++) {
extDesktopScreens[i].id = Swap32IfLE(extDesktopScreens[i].id);
extDesktopScreens[i].x = Swap16IfLE(extDesktopScreens[i].x);
extDesktopScreens[i].y = Swap16IfLE(extDesktopScreens[i].y);
extDesktopScreens[i].width = Swap16IfLE(extDesktopScreens[i].width);
extDesktopScreens[i].height = Swap16IfLE(extDesktopScreens[i].height);
extDesktopScreens[i].flags = Swap32IfLE(extDesktopScreens[i].flags);
}
msg.sdm.width = Swap16IfLE(msg.sdm.width);
msg.sdm.height = Swap16IfLE(msg.sdm.height);
rfbLog("Client requested resolution change to (%dx%d)\n", msg.sdm.width, msg.sdm.height);
cl->requestedDesktopSizeChange = rfbExtDesktopSize_ClientRequestedChange;
cl->lastDesktopSizeChangeError = cl->screen->setDesktopSizeHook(msg.sdm.width, msg.sdm.height, msg.sdm.numberOfScreens,
extDesktopScreens, cl);
if (cl->lastDesktopSizeChangeError == 0) {
/* Let other clients know it was this client that requested the change */
iterator = rfbGetClientIterator(cl->screen);
while ((clp = rfbClientIteratorNext(iterator)) != NULL) {
LOCK(clp->updateMutex);
if (clp != cl)
clp->requestedDesktopSizeChange = rfbExtDesktopSize_OtherClientRequestedChange;
UNLOCK(clp->updateMutex);
}
}
else
{
/* Force ExtendedDesktopSize message to be sent with result code in case of error.
(In case of success, it is delayed until the new framebuffer is created) */
cl->newFBSizePending = TRUE;
}
free(extDesktopScreens);
return;
default:
{
rfbExtensionData *e,*next;
for(e=cl->extensions; e;) {
next = e->next;
if(e->extension->handleMessage &&
e->extension->handleMessage(cl, e->data, &msg))
{
rfbStatRecordMessageRcvd(cl, msg.type, 0, 0); /* Extension should handle this */
return;
}
e = next;
}
rfbLog("rfbProcessClientNormalMessage: unknown message type %d\n",
msg.type);
rfbLog(" ... closing connection\n");
rfbCloseClient(cl);
return;
}
}
} | Safe | [
"CWE-665",
"CWE-772"
] | libvncserver | d01e1bb4246323ba6fcee3b82ef1faa9b1dac82a | 2.2483803212469614e+38 | 799 | rfbserver: don't leak stack memory to the remote
Thanks go to Pavel Cheremushkin of Kaspersky for reporting. | 0 |
longlong Item_param::val_int()
{
switch (state) {
case REAL_VALUE:
return (longlong) rint(value.real);
case INT_VALUE:
return value.integer;
case DECIMAL_VALUE:
{
longlong i;
my_decimal2int(E_DEC_FATAL_ERROR, &decimal_value, unsigned_flag, &i);
return i;
}
case STRING_VALUE:
case LONG_DATA_VALUE:
{
int dummy_err;
return my_strntoll(str_value.charset(), str_value.ptr(),
str_value.length(), 10, (char**) 0, &dummy_err);
}
case TIME_VALUE:
return (longlong) TIME_to_ulonglong(&value.time);
case NULL_VALUE:
return 0;
default:
DBUG_ASSERT(0);
}
return 0;
} | Safe | [] | server | b000e169562697aa072600695d4f0c0412f94f4f | 3.3439755299049432e+38 | 29 | Bug#26361149 MYSQL SERVER CRASHES AT: COL IN(IFNULL(CONST, COL), NAME_CONST('NAME', NULL))
based on:
commit f7316aa0c9a
Author: Ajo Robert <[email protected]>
Date: Thu Aug 24 17:03:21 2017 +0530
Bug#26361149 MYSQL SERVER CRASHES AT: COL IN(IFNULL(CONST,
COL), NAME_CONST('NAME', NULL))
Backport of Bug#19143243 fix.
NAME_CONST item can return NULL_ITEM type in case of incorrect arguments.
NULL_ITEM has special processing in Item_func_in function.
In Item_func_in::fix_length_and_dec an array of possible comparators is
created. Since NAME_CONST function has NULL_ITEM type, corresponding
array element is empty. Then NAME_CONST is wrapped to ITEM_CACHE.
ITEM_CACHE can not return proper type(NULL_ITEM) in Item_func_in::val_int(),
so the NULL_ITEM is attempted compared with an empty comparator.
The fix is to disable the caching of Item_name_const item. | 0 |
static int pfkey_spddelete(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, const struct sadb_msg *hdr, void * const *ext_hdrs)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
int err;
struct sadb_address *sa;
struct sadb_x_policy *pol;
struct xfrm_policy *xp;
struct xfrm_selector sel;
struct km_event c;
struct sadb_x_sec_ctx *sec_ctx;
struct xfrm_sec_ctx *pol_ctx = NULL;
if (!present_and_same_family(ext_hdrs[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC-1],
ext_hdrs[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST-1]) ||
!ext_hdrs[SADB_X_EXT_POLICY-1])
return -EINVAL;
pol = ext_hdrs[SADB_X_EXT_POLICY-1];
if (!pol->sadb_x_policy_dir || pol->sadb_x_policy_dir >= IPSEC_DIR_MAX)
return -EINVAL;
memset(&sel, 0, sizeof(sel));
sa = ext_hdrs[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC-1];
sel.family = pfkey_sadb_addr2xfrm_addr(sa, &sel.saddr);
sel.prefixlen_s = sa->sadb_address_prefixlen;
sel.proto = pfkey_proto_to_xfrm(sa->sadb_address_proto);
sel.sport = ((struct sockaddr_in *)(sa+1))->sin_port;
if (sel.sport)
sel.sport_mask = htons(0xffff);
sa = ext_hdrs[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST-1];
pfkey_sadb_addr2xfrm_addr(sa, &sel.daddr);
sel.prefixlen_d = sa->sadb_address_prefixlen;
sel.proto = pfkey_proto_to_xfrm(sa->sadb_address_proto);
sel.dport = ((struct sockaddr_in *)(sa+1))->sin_port;
if (sel.dport)
sel.dport_mask = htons(0xffff);
sec_ctx = ext_hdrs[SADB_X_EXT_SEC_CTX - 1];
if (sec_ctx != NULL) {
struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx = pfkey_sadb2xfrm_user_sec_ctx(sec_ctx, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!uctx)
return -ENOMEM;
err = security_xfrm_policy_alloc(&pol_ctx, uctx, GFP_KERNEL);
kfree(uctx);
if (err)
return err;
}
xp = xfrm_policy_bysel_ctx(net, DUMMY_MARK, XFRM_POLICY_TYPE_MAIN,
pol->sadb_x_policy_dir - 1, &sel, pol_ctx,
1, &err);
security_xfrm_policy_free(pol_ctx);
if (xp == NULL)
return -ENOENT;
xfrm_audit_policy_delete(xp, err ? 0 : 1, true);
if (err)
goto out;
c.seq = hdr->sadb_msg_seq;
c.portid = hdr->sadb_msg_pid;
c.data.byid = 0;
c.event = XFRM_MSG_DELPOLICY;
km_policy_notify(xp, pol->sadb_x_policy_dir-1, &c);
out:
xfrm_pol_put(xp);
if (err == 0)
xfrm_garbage_collect(net);
return err;
} | Safe | [] | linux | 096f41d3a8fcbb8dde7f71379b1ca85fe213eded | 3.1962821396228796e+37 | 76 | af_key: Fix sadb_x_ipsecrequest parsing
The parsing of sadb_x_ipsecrequest is broken in a number of ways.
First of all we're not verifying sadb_x_ipsecrequest_len. This
is needed when the structure carries addresses at the end. Worse
we don't even look at the length when we parse those optional
addresses.
The migration code had similar parsing code that's better but
it also has some deficiencies. The length is overcounted first
of all as it includes the header itself. It also fails to check
the length before dereferencing the sa_family field.
This patch fixes those problems in parse_sockaddr_pair and then
uses it in parse_ipsecrequest.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]> | 0 |
const char* menu_cache_app_get_working_dir( MenuCacheApp* app )
{
return app->working_dir;
} | Safe | [
"CWE-20"
] | menu-cache | 56f66684592abf257c4004e6e1fff041c64a12ce | 1.931839497540971e+38 | 4 | Fix potential access violation, use runtime user dir instead of tmp dir.
Note: it limits libmenu-cache compatibility to menu-cached >= 0.7.0. | 0 |
static inline int conv_shader_type(int type)
{
switch (type) {
case PIPE_SHADER_VERTEX: return GL_VERTEX_SHADER;
case PIPE_SHADER_FRAGMENT: return GL_FRAGMENT_SHADER;
case PIPE_SHADER_GEOMETRY: return GL_GEOMETRY_SHADER;
case PIPE_SHADER_TESS_CTRL: return GL_TESS_CONTROL_SHADER;
case PIPE_SHADER_TESS_EVAL: return GL_TESS_EVALUATION_SHADER;
case PIPE_SHADER_COMPUTE: return GL_COMPUTE_SHADER;
default:
return 0;
};
} | Safe | [
"CWE-787"
] | virglrenderer | cbc8d8b75be360236cada63784046688aeb6d921 | 2.5180539724310965e+38 | 13 | vrend: check transfer bounds for negative values too and report error
Closes #138
Signed-off-by: Gert Wollny <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Emil Velikov <[email protected]> | 0 |
struct r_bin_pe_addr_t* PE_(r_bin_pe_get_entrypoint)(struct PE_(r_bin_pe_obj_t)* bin) {
struct r_bin_pe_addr_t* entry = NULL;
static bool debug = false;
PE_DWord pe_entry;
int i;
ut64 base_addr = PE_(r_bin_pe_get_image_base) (bin);
if (!bin || !bin->optional_header) {
return NULL;
}
if (!(entry = malloc (sizeof (struct r_bin_pe_addr_t)))) {
r_sys_perror ("malloc (entrypoint)");
return NULL;
}
pe_entry = bin->optional_header->AddressOfEntryPoint;
entry->vaddr = bin_pe_rva_to_va (bin, pe_entry);
entry->paddr = bin_pe_rva_to_paddr (bin, pe_entry);
// haddr is the address of AddressOfEntryPoint in header.
entry->haddr = bin->dos_header->e_lfanew + 4 + sizeof (PE_(image_file_header)) + 16;
if (entry->paddr >= bin->size) {
struct r_bin_pe_section_t* sections = PE_(r_bin_pe_get_sections) (bin);
ut64 paddr = 0;
if (!debug) {
bprintf ("Warning: Invalid entrypoint ... "
"trying to fix it but i do not promise nothing\n");
}
for (i = 0; i < bin->num_sections; i++) {
if (sections[i].flags & PE_IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE) {
entry->paddr = sections[i].paddr;
entry->vaddr = sections[i].vaddr + base_addr;
paddr = 1;
break;
}
}
if (!paddr) {
ut64 min_off = -1;
for (i = 0; i < bin->num_sections; i++) {
//get the lowest section's paddr
if (sections[i].paddr < min_off) {
entry->paddr = sections[i].paddr;
entry->vaddr = sections[i].vaddr + base_addr;
min_off = sections[i].paddr;
}
}
if (min_off == -1) {
//no section just a hack to try to fix entrypoint
//maybe doesn't work always
int sa = R_MAX (bin->optional_header->SectionAlignment, 0x1000);
entry->paddr = pe_entry & ((sa << 1) - 1);
entry->vaddr = entry->paddr + base_addr;
}
}
free (sections);
}
if (!entry->paddr) {
if (!debug) {
bprintf ("Warning: NULL entrypoint\n");
}
struct r_bin_pe_section_t* sections = PE_(r_bin_pe_get_sections) (bin);
for (i = 0; i < bin->num_sections; i++) {
//If there is a section with x without w perm is a good candidate to be the entrypoint
if (sections[i].flags & PE_IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE && !(sections[i].flags & PE_IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE)) {
entry->paddr = sections[i].paddr;
entry->vaddr = sections[i].vaddr + base_addr;
break;
}
}
free (sections);
}
if (is_arm (bin) && entry->vaddr & 1) {
entry->vaddr--;
if (entry->paddr & 1) {
entry->paddr--;
}
}
if (!debug) {
debug = true;
}
return entry;
} | Safe | [
"CWE-125"
] | radare2 | 4e1cf0d3e6f6fe2552a269def0af1cd2403e266c | 2.466705397674848e+38 | 84 | Fix crash in pe | 0 |
ippGetValueTag(ipp_attribute_t *attr) /* I - IPP attribute */
{
/*
* Range check input...
*/
if (!attr)
return (IPP_TAG_ZERO);
/*
* Return the value...
*/
return (attr->value_tag & IPP_TAG_CUPS_MASK);
} | Safe | [
"CWE-120"
] | cups | f24e6cf6a39300ad0c3726a41a4aab51ad54c109 | 5.083651862720567e+37 | 15 | Fix multiple security/disclosure issues:
- CVE-2019-8696 and CVE-2019-8675: Fixed SNMP buffer overflows (rdar://51685251)
- Fixed IPP buffer overflow (rdar://50035411)
- Fixed memory disclosure issue in the scheduler (rdar://51373853)
- Fixed DoS issues in the scheduler (rdar://51373929) | 0 |
static void tcp_ofo_queue(struct sock *sk)
{
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
__u32 dsack_high = tp->rcv_nxt;
bool fin, fragstolen, eaten;
struct sk_buff *skb, *tail;
struct rb_node *p;
p = rb_first(&tp->out_of_order_queue);
while (p) {
skb = rb_to_skb(p);
if (after(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq, tp->rcv_nxt))
break;
if (before(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq, dsack_high)) {
__u32 dsack = dsack_high;
if (before(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq, dsack_high))
dsack_high = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq;
tcp_dsack_extend(sk, TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq, dsack);
}
p = rb_next(p);
rb_erase(&skb->rbnode, &tp->out_of_order_queue);
if (unlikely(!after(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq, tp->rcv_nxt))) {
tcp_drop(sk, skb);
continue;
}
tail = skb_peek_tail(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
eaten = tail && tcp_try_coalesce(sk, tail, skb, &fragstolen);
tcp_rcv_nxt_update(tp, TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq);
fin = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_flags & TCPHDR_FIN;
if (!eaten)
__skb_queue_tail(&sk->sk_receive_queue, skb);
else
kfree_skb_partial(skb, fragstolen);
if (unlikely(fin)) {
tcp_fin(sk);
/* tcp_fin() purges tp->out_of_order_queue,
* so we must end this loop right now.
*/
break;
}
}
} | Safe | [
"CWE-190"
] | net | 3b4929f65b0d8249f19a50245cd88ed1a2f78cff | 2.9963904922153318e+38 | 46 | tcp: limit payload size of sacked skbs
Jonathan Looney reported that TCP can trigger the following crash
in tcp_shifted_skb() :
BUG_ON(tcp_skb_pcount(skb) < pcount);
This can happen if the remote peer has advertized the smallest
MSS that linux TCP accepts : 48
An skb can hold 17 fragments, and each fragment can hold 32KB
on x86, or 64KB on PowerPC.
This means that the 16bit witdh of TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_gso_segs
can overflow.
Note that tcp_sendmsg() builds skbs with less than 64KB
of payload, so this problem needs SACK to be enabled.
SACK blocks allow TCP to coalesce multiple skbs in the retransmit
queue, thus filling the 17 fragments to maximal capacity.
CVE-2019-11477 -- u16 overflow of TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_gso_segs
Fixes: 832d11c5cd07 ("tcp: Try to restore large SKBs while SACK processing")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Jonathan Looney <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <[email protected]>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <[email protected]>
Cc: Bruce Curtis <[email protected]>
Cc: Jonathan Lemon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | 0 |
void in_double::set(uint pos,Item *item)
{
((double*) base)[pos]= item->val_real();
} | Safe | [
"CWE-617"
] | server | 807945f2eb5fa22e6f233cc17b85a2e141efe2c8 | 2.1387841750281377e+38 | 4 | MDEV-26402: A SEGV in Item_field::used_tables/update_depend_map_for_order...
When doing condition pushdown from HAVING into WHERE,
Item_equal::create_pushable_equalities() calls
item->set_extraction_flag(IMMUTABLE_FL) for constant items.
Then, Item::cleanup_excluding_immutables_processor() checks for this flag
to see if it should call item->cleanup() or leave the item as-is.
The failure happens when a constant item has a non-constant one inside it,
like:
(tbl.col=0 AND impossible_cond)
item->walk(cleanup_excluding_immutables_processor) works in a bottom-up
way so it
1. will call Item_func_eq(tbl.col=0)->cleanup()
2. will not call Item_cond_and->cleanup (as the AND is constant)
This creates an item tree where a fixed Item has an un-fixed Item inside
it which eventually causes an assertion failure.
Fixed by introducing this rule: instead of just calling
item->set_extraction_flag(IMMUTABLE_FL);
we call Item::walk() to set the flag for all sub-items of the item. | 0 |
getPeerNames(prop_t **peerName, prop_t **peerIP, struct sockaddr *pAddr, sbool bUXServer)
{
int error;
uchar szIP[NI_MAXHOST+1] = "";
uchar szHname[NI_MAXHOST+1] = "";
struct addrinfo hints, *res;
sbool bMaliciousHName = 0;
DEFiRet;
*peerName = NULL;
*peerIP = NULL;
if (bUXServer) {
strncpy((char *) szHname, (char *) glbl.GetLocalHostName(), NI_MAXHOST);
strncpy((char *) szIP, (char *) glbl.GetLocalHostIP(), NI_MAXHOST);
szHname[NI_MAXHOST] = '\0';
szIP[NI_MAXHOST] = '\0';
} else {
error = getnameinfo(pAddr, SALEN(pAddr), (char *) szIP, sizeof(szIP), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST);
if (error) {
DBGPRINTF("Malformed from address %s\n", gai_strerror(error));
strcpy((char *) szHname, "???");
strcpy((char *) szIP, "???");
ABORT_FINALIZE(RS_RET_INVALID_HNAME);
}
if (!glbl.GetDisableDNS(runConf)) {
error = getnameinfo(pAddr, SALEN(pAddr), (char *) szHname, NI_MAXHOST, NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD);
if (error == 0) {
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(struct addrinfo));
hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
/* we now do a lookup once again. This one should fail,
* because we should not have obtained a non-numeric address. If
* we got a numeric one, someone messed with DNS!
*/
if (getaddrinfo((char *) szHname, NULL, &hints, &res) == 0) {
freeaddrinfo(res);
/* OK, we know we have evil, so let's indicate this to our caller */
snprintf((char *) szHname, sizeof(szHname), "[MALICIOUS:IP=%s]", szIP);
DBGPRINTF("Malicious PTR record, IP = \"%s\" HOST = \"%s\"", szIP, szHname);
bMaliciousHName = 1;
}
} else {
strcpy((char *) szHname, (char *) szIP);
}
} else {
strcpy((char *) szHname, (char *) szIP);
}
}
/* We now have the names, so now let's allocate memory and store them permanently. */
CHKiRet(prop.Construct(peerName));
CHKiRet(prop.SetString(*peerName, szHname, ustrlen(szHname)));
CHKiRet(prop.ConstructFinalize(*peerName));
CHKiRet(prop.Construct(peerIP));
CHKiRet(prop.SetString(*peerIP, szIP, ustrlen(szIP)));
CHKiRet(prop.ConstructFinalize(*peerIP));
finalize_it:
if(iRet != RS_RET_OK) {
if(*peerName != NULL)
prop.Destruct(peerName);
if(*peerIP != NULL)
prop.Destruct(peerIP);
}
if(bMaliciousHName)
iRet = RS_RET_MALICIOUS_HNAME;
RETiRet;
} | Safe | [
"CWE-787"
] | rsyslog | 89955b0bcb1ff105e1374aad7e0e993faa6a038f | 2.7662023134131525e+38 | 71 | net bugfix: potential buffer overrun | 0 |
numericoidValidate(
Syntax *syntax,
struct berval *in )
{
struct berval val = *in;
if( BER_BVISEMPTY( &val ) ) {
/* disallow empty strings */
return LDAP_INVALID_SYNTAX;
}
while( OID_LEADCHAR( val.bv_val[0] ) ) {
if ( val.bv_len == 1 ) {
return LDAP_SUCCESS;
}
if ( val.bv_val[0] == '0' && !OID_SEPARATOR( val.bv_val[1] )) {
break;
}
val.bv_val++;
val.bv_len--;
while ( OID_LEADCHAR( val.bv_val[0] )) {
val.bv_val++;
val.bv_len--;
if ( val.bv_len == 0 ) {
return LDAP_SUCCESS;
}
}
if( !OID_SEPARATOR( val.bv_val[0] )) {
break;
}
val.bv_val++;
val.bv_len--;
}
return LDAP_INVALID_SYNTAX;
} | Safe | [
"CWE-617"
] | openldap | 67670f4544e28fb09eb7319c39f404e1d3229e65 | 3.154944054888118e+38 | 42 | ITS#9383 remove assert in certificateListValidate | 0 |
TfLiteStatus ReverseSequenceImpl(TfLiteContext* context, TfLiteNode* node) {
const TfLiteTensor* input = GetInput(context, node, kInputTensor);
const TfLiteTensor* seq_lengths_tensor =
GetInput(context, node, kSeqLengthsTensor);
const TS* seq_lengths = GetTensorData<TS>(seq_lengths_tensor);
auto* params =
reinterpret_cast<TfLiteReverseSequenceParams*>(node->builtin_data);
int seq_dim = params->seq_dim;
int batch_dim = params->batch_dim;
TF_LITE_ENSURE(context, seq_dim >= 0);
TF_LITE_ENSURE(context, batch_dim >= 0);
TF_LITE_ENSURE(context, seq_dim != batch_dim);
TF_LITE_ENSURE(context, seq_dim < NumDimensions(input));
TF_LITE_ENSURE(context, batch_dim < NumDimensions(input));
TF_LITE_ENSURE_EQ(context, SizeOfDimension(seq_lengths_tensor, 0),
SizeOfDimension(input, batch_dim));
for (int i = 0; i < NumDimensions(seq_lengths_tensor); ++i) {
TF_LITE_ENSURE(context, seq_lengths[i] <= SizeOfDimension(input, seq_dim));
}
TfLiteTensor* output = GetOutput(context, node, kOutputTensor);
reference_ops::ReverseSequence<T, TS>(
seq_lengths, seq_dim, batch_dim, GetTensorShape(input),
GetTensorData<T>(input), GetTensorShape(output),
GetTensorData<T>(output));
return kTfLiteOk;
} | Vulnerable | [
"CWE-125",
"CWE-787"
] | tensorflow | 1970c2158b1ffa416d159d03c3370b9a462aee35 | 1.069544381285095e+37 | 31 | [tflite]: Insert `nullptr` checks when obtaining tensors.
As part of ongoing refactoring, `tflite::GetInput`, `tflite::GetOutput`, `tflite::GetTemporary` and `tflite::GetIntermediates` will return `nullptr` in some cases. Hence, we insert the `nullptr` checks on all usages.
We also insert `nullptr` checks on usages of `tflite::GetVariableInput` and `tflite::GetOptionalInputTensor` but only in the cases where there is no obvious check that `nullptr` is acceptable (that is, we only insert the check for the output of these two functions if the tensor is accessed as if it is always not `nullptr`).
PiperOrigin-RevId: 332521299
Change-Id: I29af455bcb48d0b92e58132d951a3badbd772d56 | 1 |
get_cookies (SoupCookieJar *jar, SoupURI *uri, gboolean for_http, gboolean copy_cookies)
{
SoupCookieJarPrivate *priv;
GSList *cookies, *domain_cookies;
char *domain, *cur, *next_domain;
GSList *new_head, *cookies_to_remove = NULL, *p;
priv = soup_cookie_jar_get_instance_private (jar);
if (!uri->host || !uri->host[0])
return NULL;
/* The logic here is a little weird, but the plan is that if
* uri->host is "www.foo.com", we will end up looking up
* cookies for ".www.foo.com", "www.foo.com", ".foo.com", and
* ".com", in that order. (Logic stolen from Mozilla.)
*/
cookies = NULL;
domain = cur = g_strdup_printf (".%s", uri->host);
next_domain = domain + 1;
do {
new_head = domain_cookies = g_hash_table_lookup (priv->domains, cur);
while (domain_cookies) {
GSList *next = domain_cookies->next;
SoupCookie *cookie = domain_cookies->data;
if (cookie->expires && soup_date_is_past (cookie->expires)) {
cookies_to_remove = g_slist_append (cookies_to_remove,
cookie);
new_head = g_slist_delete_link (new_head, domain_cookies);
g_hash_table_insert (priv->domains,
g_strdup (cur),
new_head);
} else if (soup_cookie_applies_to_uri (cookie, uri) &&
(for_http || !cookie->http_only))
cookies = g_slist_append (cookies, copy_cookies ? soup_cookie_copy (cookie) : cookie);
domain_cookies = next;
}
cur = next_domain;
if (cur)
next_domain = strchr (cur + 1, '.');
} while (cur);
g_free (domain);
for (p = cookies_to_remove; p; p = p->next) {
SoupCookie *cookie = p->data;
soup_cookie_jar_changed (jar, cookie, NULL);
soup_cookie_free (cookie);
}
g_slist_free (cookies_to_remove);
return g_slist_sort_with_data (cookies, compare_cookies, jar);
} | Safe | [
"CWE-125"
] | libsoup | db2b0d5809d5f8226d47312b40992cadbcde439f | 3.3888579956177038e+38 | 55 | cookie-jar: bail if hostname is an empty string
There are several other ways to fix the problem with this function, but
skipping over all of the code is probably the simplest.
Fixes #3 | 0 |
static ssize_t bql_show_inflight(struct netdev_queue *queue,
char *buf)
{
struct dql *dql = &queue->dql;
return sprintf(buf, "%u\n", dql->num_queued - dql->num_completed); | Safe | [
"CWE-401"
] | linux | 895a5e96dbd6386c8e78e5b78e067dcc67b7f0ab | 1.4094316121813463e+38 | 7 | net-sysfs: Fix mem leak in netdev_register_kobject
syzkaller report this:
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff88837a71a500 (size 256):
comm "syz-executor.2", pid 9770, jiffies 4297825125 (age 17.843s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 ad 4e ad de ff ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 .....N..........
ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff 20 c0 ef 86 ff ff ff ff ........ .......
backtrace:
[<00000000db12624b>] netdev_register_kobject+0x124/0x2e0 net/core/net-sysfs.c:1751
[<00000000dc49a994>] register_netdevice+0xcc1/0x1270 net/core/dev.c:8516
[<00000000e5f3fea0>] tun_set_iff drivers/net/tun.c:2649 [inline]
[<00000000e5f3fea0>] __tun_chr_ioctl+0x2218/0x3d20 drivers/net/tun.c:2883
[<000000001b8ac127>] vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:46 [inline]
[<000000001b8ac127>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x1a5/0x10e0 fs/ioctl.c:690
[<0000000079b269f8>] ksys_ioctl+0x89/0xa0 fs/ioctl.c:705
[<00000000de649beb>] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:712 [inline]
[<00000000de649beb>] __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:710 [inline]
[<00000000de649beb>] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x74/0xb0 fs/ioctl.c:710
[<000000007ebded1e>] do_syscall_64+0xc8/0x580 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
[<00000000db315d36>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[<00000000115be9bb>] 0xffffffffffffffff
It should call kset_unregister to free 'dev->queues_kset'
in error path of register_queue_kobjects, otherwise will cause a mem leak.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <[email protected]>
Fixes: 1d24eb4815d1 ("xps: Transmit Packet Steering")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | 0 |
void MainWindow::setInToCurrent(bool ripple)
{
if (m_player->tabIndex() == Player::ProjectTabIndex && isMultitrackValid()) {
m_timelineDock->trimClipAtPlayhead(TimelineDock::TrimInPoint, ripple);
} else if (MLT.isSeekable() && MLT.isClip()) {
m_player->setIn(m_player->position());
int delta = m_player->position() - MLT.producer()->get_in();
emit m_player->inChanged(delta);
}
} | Safe | [
"CWE-89",
"CWE-327",
"CWE-295"
] | shotcut | f008adc039642307f6ee3378d378cdb842e52c1d | 1.3712382181098495e+38 | 10 | fix upgrade check is not using TLS correctly | 0 |
void st_select_lex_node::add_slave(st_select_lex_node *slave_arg)
{
for (; slave; slave= slave->next)
if (slave == slave_arg)
return;
if (slave)
{
st_select_lex_node *slave_arg_slave= slave_arg->slave;
/* Insert in the front of list of slaves if any. */
slave_arg->include_neighbour(slave);
/* include_neighbour() sets slave_arg->slave=0, restore it. */
slave_arg->slave= slave_arg_slave;
/* Count on include_neighbour() setting the master. */
DBUG_ASSERT(slave_arg->master == this);
}
else
{
slave= slave_arg;
slave_arg->master= this;
}
} | Safe | [
"CWE-476"
] | server | 3a52569499e2f0c4d1f25db1e81617a9d9755400 | 3.071590662196652e+38 | 22 | MDEV-25636: Bug report: abortion in sql/sql_parse.cc:6294
The asserion failure was caused by this query
select /*id=1*/ from t1
where
col= ( select /*id=2*/ from ... where corr_cond1
union
select /*id=4*/ from ... where corr_cond2)
Here,
- select with id=2 was correlated due to corr_cond1.
- select with id=4 was initially correlated due to corr_cond2, but then
the optimizer optimized away the correlation, making the select with id=4
uncorrelated.
However, since select with id=2 remained correlated, the execution had to
re-compute the whole UNION. When it tried to execute select with id=4, it
hit an assertion (join buffer already free'd).
This is because select with id=4 has freed its execution structures after
it has been executed once. The select is uncorrelated, so it did not expect
it would need to be executed for the second time.
Fixed this by adding this logic in
st_select_lex::optimize_unflattened_subqueries():
If a member of a UNION is correlated, mark all its members as
correlated, so that they are prepared to be executed multiple times. | 0 |
static void tipc_sock_destruct(struct sock *sk)
{
__skb_queue_purge(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
} | Safe | [
"CWE-703"
] | linux | 45e093ae2830cd1264677d47ff9a95a71f5d9f9c | 3.222313491826214e+38 | 4 | tipc: check nl sock before parsing nested attributes
Make sure the socket for which the user is listing publication exists
before parsing the socket netlink attributes.
Prior to this patch a call without any socket caused a NULL pointer
dereference in tipc_nl_publ_dump().
Tested-and-reported-by: Baozeng Ding <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Richard Alpe <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jon Maloy <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | 0 |
static void SerializeGltfModel(Model *model, json &o) {
// ACCESSORS
if (model->accessors.size()) {
json accessors;
JsonReserveArray(accessors, model->accessors.size());
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < model->accessors.size(); ++i) {
json accessor;
SerializeGltfAccessor(model->accessors[i], accessor);
JsonPushBack(accessors, std::move(accessor));
}
JsonAddMember(o, "accessors", std::move(accessors));
}
// ANIMATIONS
if (model->animations.size()) {
json animations;
JsonReserveArray(animations, model->animations.size());
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < model->animations.size(); ++i) {
if (model->animations[i].channels.size()) {
json animation;
SerializeGltfAnimation(model->animations[i], animation);
JsonPushBack(animations, std::move(animation));
}
}
JsonAddMember(o, "animations", std::move(animations));
}
// ASSET
json asset;
SerializeGltfAsset(model->asset, asset);
JsonAddMember(o, "asset", std::move(asset));
// BUFFERVIEWS
if (model->bufferViews.size()) {
json bufferViews;
JsonReserveArray(bufferViews, model->bufferViews.size());
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < model->bufferViews.size(); ++i) {
json bufferView;
SerializeGltfBufferView(model->bufferViews[i], bufferView);
JsonPushBack(bufferViews, std::move(bufferView));
}
JsonAddMember(o, "bufferViews", std::move(bufferViews));
}
// Extensions required
if (model->extensionsRequired.size()) {
SerializeStringArrayProperty("extensionsRequired",
model->extensionsRequired, o);
}
// MATERIALS
if (model->materials.size()) {
json materials;
JsonReserveArray(materials, model->materials.size());
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < model->materials.size(); ++i) {
json material;
SerializeGltfMaterial(model->materials[i], material);
if (JsonIsNull(material)) {
// Issue 294.
// `material` does not have any required parameters
// so the result may be null(unmodified) when all material parameters
// have default value.
//
// null is not allowed thus we create an empty JSON object.
JsonSetObject(material);
}
JsonPushBack(materials, std::move(material));
}
JsonAddMember(o, "materials", std::move(materials));
}
// MESHES
if (model->meshes.size()) {
json meshes;
JsonReserveArray(meshes, model->meshes.size());
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < model->meshes.size(); ++i) {
json mesh;
SerializeGltfMesh(model->meshes[i], mesh);
JsonPushBack(meshes, std::move(mesh));
}
JsonAddMember(o, "meshes", std::move(meshes));
}
// NODES
if (model->nodes.size()) {
json nodes;
JsonReserveArray(nodes, model->nodes.size());
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < model->nodes.size(); ++i) {
json node;
SerializeGltfNode(model->nodes[i], node);
JsonPushBack(nodes, std::move(node));
}
JsonAddMember(o, "nodes", std::move(nodes));
}
// SCENE
if (model->defaultScene > -1) {
SerializeNumberProperty<int>("scene", model->defaultScene, o);
}
// SCENES
if (model->scenes.size()) {
json scenes;
JsonReserveArray(scenes, model->scenes.size());
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < model->scenes.size(); ++i) {
json currentScene;
SerializeGltfScene(model->scenes[i], currentScene);
JsonPushBack(scenes, std::move(currentScene));
}
JsonAddMember(o, "scenes", std::move(scenes));
}
// SKINS
if (model->skins.size()) {
json skins;
JsonReserveArray(skins, model->skins.size());
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < model->skins.size(); ++i) {
json skin;
SerializeGltfSkin(model->skins[i], skin);
JsonPushBack(skins, std::move(skin));
}
JsonAddMember(o, "skins", std::move(skins));
}
// TEXTURES
if (model->textures.size()) {
json textures;
JsonReserveArray(textures, model->textures.size());
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < model->textures.size(); ++i) {
json texture;
SerializeGltfTexture(model->textures[i], texture);
JsonPushBack(textures, std::move(texture));
}
JsonAddMember(o, "textures", std::move(textures));
}
// SAMPLERS
if (model->samplers.size()) {
json samplers;
JsonReserveArray(samplers, model->samplers.size());
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < model->samplers.size(); ++i) {
json sampler;
SerializeGltfSampler(model->samplers[i], sampler);
JsonPushBack(samplers, std::move(sampler));
}
JsonAddMember(o, "samplers", std::move(samplers));
}
// CAMERAS
if (model->cameras.size()) {
json cameras;
JsonReserveArray(cameras, model->cameras.size());
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < model->cameras.size(); ++i) {
json camera;
SerializeGltfCamera(model->cameras[i], camera);
JsonPushBack(cameras, std::move(camera));
}
JsonAddMember(o, "cameras", std::move(cameras));
}
// EXTENSIONS
SerializeExtensionMap(model->extensions, o);
auto extensionsUsed = model->extensionsUsed;
// LIGHTS as KHR_lights_punctual
if (model->lights.size()) {
json lights;
JsonReserveArray(lights, model->lights.size());
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < model->lights.size(); ++i) {
json light;
SerializeGltfLight(model->lights[i], light);
JsonPushBack(lights, std::move(light));
}
json khr_lights_cmn;
JsonAddMember(khr_lights_cmn, "lights", std::move(lights));
json ext_j;
{
json_const_iterator it;
if (FindMember(o, "extensions", it)) {
JsonAssign(ext_j, GetValue(it));
}
}
JsonAddMember(ext_j, "KHR_lights_punctual", std::move(khr_lights_cmn));
JsonAddMember(o, "extensions", std::move(ext_j));
// Also add "KHR_lights_punctual" to `extensionsUsed`
{
auto has_khr_lights_punctual =
std::find_if(extensionsUsed.begin(), extensionsUsed.end(),
[](const std::string &s) {
return (s.compare("KHR_lights_punctual") == 0);
});
if (has_khr_lights_punctual == extensionsUsed.end()) {
extensionsUsed.push_back("KHR_lights_punctual");
}
}
}
// Extensions used
if (extensionsUsed.size()) {
SerializeStringArrayProperty("extensionsUsed", extensionsUsed, o);
}
// EXTRAS
if (model->extras.Type() != NULL_TYPE) {
SerializeValue("extras", model->extras, o);
}
} | Safe | [
"CWE-20"
] | tinygltf | 52ff00a38447f06a17eab1caa2cf0730a119c751 | 1.1503662247056874e+38 | 215 | Do not expand file path since its not necessary for glTF asset path(URI) and for security reason(`wordexp`). | 0 |
AP_DECLARE(const char *) ap_get_remote_host(conn_rec *conn, void *dir_config,
int type, int *str_is_ip)
{
int hostname_lookups;
int ignored_str_is_ip;
if (!str_is_ip) { /* caller doesn't want to know */
str_is_ip = &ignored_str_is_ip;
}
*str_is_ip = 0;
/* If we haven't checked the host name, and we want to */
if (dir_config) {
hostname_lookups = ((core_dir_config *)ap_get_core_module_config(dir_config))
->hostname_lookups;
if (hostname_lookups == HOSTNAME_LOOKUP_UNSET) {
hostname_lookups = HOSTNAME_LOOKUP_OFF;
}
}
else {
/* the default */
hostname_lookups = HOSTNAME_LOOKUP_OFF;
}
if (type != REMOTE_NOLOOKUP
&& conn->remote_host == NULL
&& (type == REMOTE_DOUBLE_REV
|| hostname_lookups != HOSTNAME_LOOKUP_OFF)) {
if (apr_getnameinfo(&conn->remote_host, conn->client_addr, 0)
== APR_SUCCESS) {
ap_str_tolower(conn->remote_host);
if (hostname_lookups == HOSTNAME_LOOKUP_DOUBLE) {
conn->double_reverse = do_double_reverse(conn->double_reverse,
conn->remote_host,
conn->client_addr,
conn->pool);
if (conn->double_reverse != 1) {
conn->remote_host = NULL;
}
}
}
/* if failed, set it to the NULL string to indicate error */
if (conn->remote_host == NULL) {
conn->remote_host = "";
}
}
if (type == REMOTE_DOUBLE_REV) {
conn->double_reverse = do_double_reverse(conn->double_reverse,
conn->remote_host,
conn->client_addr, conn->pool);
if (conn->double_reverse == -1) {
return NULL;
}
}
/*
* Return the desired information; either the remote DNS name, if found,
* or either NULL (if the hostname was requested) or the IP address
* (if any identifier was requested).
*/
if (conn->remote_host != NULL && conn->remote_host[0] != '\0') {
return conn->remote_host;
}
else {
if (type == REMOTE_HOST || type == REMOTE_DOUBLE_REV) {
return NULL;
}
else {
*str_is_ip = 1;
return conn->client_ip;
}
}
} | Safe | [
"CWE-416",
"CWE-284"
] | httpd | 4cc27823899e070268b906ca677ee838d07cf67a | 2.3225547336799265e+38 | 78 | core: Disallow Methods' registration at run time (.htaccess), they may be
used only if registered at init time (httpd.conf).
Calling ap_method_register() in children processes is not the right scope
since it won't be shared for all requests.
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1807655 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68 | 0 |
cr_input_new_real (void)
{
CRInput *result = NULL;
result = g_try_malloc (sizeof (CRInput));
if (!result) {
cr_utils_trace_info ("Out of memory");
return NULL;
}
memset (result, 0, sizeof (CRInput));
PRIVATE (result) = g_try_malloc (sizeof (CRInputPriv));
if (!PRIVATE (result)) {
cr_utils_trace_info ("Out of memory");
g_free (result);
return NULL;
}
memset (PRIVATE (result), 0, sizeof (CRInputPriv));
PRIVATE (result)->free_in_buf = TRUE;
return result;
} | Safe | [
"CWE-125"
] | libcroco | 898e3a8c8c0314d2e6b106809a8e3e93cf9d4394 | 1.775498700947039e+37 | 21 | input: check end of input before reading a byte
When reading bytes we weren't check that the index wasn't
out of bound and this could produce an invalid read which
could deal to a security bug. | 0 |
__acquires(bitlock)
{
va_list args;
struct ext4_super_block *es = EXT4_SB(sb)->s_es;
va_start(args, fmt);
printk(KERN_CRIT "EXT4-fs error (device %s): %s: ", sb->s_id, function);
vprintk(fmt, args);
printk("\n");
va_end(args);
if (test_opt(sb, ERRORS_CONT)) {
EXT4_SB(sb)->s_mount_state |= EXT4_ERROR_FS;
es->s_state |= cpu_to_le16(EXT4_ERROR_FS);
ext4_commit_super(sb, 0);
return;
}
ext4_unlock_group(sb, grp);
ext4_handle_error(sb);
/*
* We only get here in the ERRORS_RO case; relocking the group
* may be dangerous, but nothing bad will happen since the
* filesystem will have already been marked read/only and the
* journal has been aborted. We return 1 as a hint to callers
* who might what to use the return value from
* ext4_grp_locked_error() to distinguish beween the
* ERRORS_CONT and ERRORS_RO case, and perhaps return more
* aggressively from the ext4 function in question, with a
* more appropriate error code.
*/
ext4_lock_group(sb, grp);
return;
} | Safe | [
"CWE-703"
] | linux | 744692dc059845b2a3022119871846e74d4f6e11 | 5.264228746822959e+37 | 33 | ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]> | 0 |
gs_manager_deactivate (GSManager *manager)
{
g_return_val_if_fail (manager != NULL, FALSE);
g_return_val_if_fail (GS_IS_MANAGER (manager), FALSE);
if (! manager->priv->active) {
gs_debug ("Trying to deactivate a screensaver that is not active");
return FALSE;
}
remove_unfade_idle (manager);
gs_fade_reset (manager->priv->fade);
remove_timers (manager);
gs_grab_release (manager->priv->grab);
manager_stop_jobs (manager);
gs_manager_destroy_windows (manager);
/* reset state */
manager->priv->active = FALSE;
manager->priv->activate_time = 0;
manager->priv->lock_active = FALSE;
manager->priv->dialog_up = FALSE;
manager->priv->fading = FALSE;
return TRUE;
} | Safe | [] | gnome-screensaver | 2f597ea9f1f363277fd4dfc109fa41bbc6225aca | 9.833630921201363e+37 | 29 | Fix adding monitors
Make sure to show windows that are added. And fix an off by one bug. | 0 |
void mutt_pretty_size (char *s, size_t len, LOFF_T n)
{
if (n == 0)
strfcpy (s, "0K", len);
else if (n < 10189) /* 0.1K - 9.9K */
snprintf (s, len, "%3.1fK", (n < 103) ? 0.1 : n / 1024.0);
else if (n < 1023949) /* 10K - 999K */
{
/* 51 is magic which causes 10189/10240 to be rounded up to 10 */
snprintf (s, len, OFF_T_FMT "K", (n + 51) / 1024);
}
else if (n < 10433332) /* 1.0M - 9.9M */
snprintf (s, len, "%3.1fM", n / 1048576.0);
else /* 10M+ */
{
/* (10433332 + 52428) / 1048576 = 10 */
snprintf (s, len, OFF_T_FMT "M", (n + 52428) / 1048576);
}
} | Safe | [
"CWE-668"
] | mutt | 6d0624411a979e2e1d76af4dd97d03f47679ea4a | 2.1355295493204145e+38 | 19 | use a 64-bit random value in temporary filenames.
closes #3158 | 0 |
static void print_bad_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr,
pte_t pte, struct page *page)
{
pgd_t *pgd = pgd_offset(vma->vm_mm, addr);
pud_t *pud = pud_offset(pgd, addr);
pmd_t *pmd = pmd_offset(pud, addr);
struct address_space *mapping;
pgoff_t index;
static unsigned long resume;
static unsigned long nr_shown;
static unsigned long nr_unshown;
/*
* Allow a burst of 60 reports, then keep quiet for that minute;
* or allow a steady drip of one report per second.
*/
if (nr_shown == 60) {
if (time_before(jiffies, resume)) {
nr_unshown++;
return;
}
if (nr_unshown) {
printk(KERN_ALERT
"BUG: Bad page map: %lu messages suppressed\n",
nr_unshown);
nr_unshown = 0;
}
nr_shown = 0;
}
if (nr_shown++ == 0)
resume = jiffies + 60 * HZ;
mapping = vma->vm_file ? vma->vm_file->f_mapping : NULL;
index = linear_page_index(vma, addr);
printk(KERN_ALERT
"BUG: Bad page map in process %s pte:%08llx pmd:%08llx\n",
current->comm,
(long long)pte_val(pte), (long long)pmd_val(*pmd));
if (page)
dump_page(page, "bad pte");
printk(KERN_ALERT
"addr:%p vm_flags:%08lx anon_vma:%p mapping:%p index:%lx\n",
(void *)addr, vma->vm_flags, vma->anon_vma, mapping, index);
/*
* Choose text because data symbols depend on CONFIG_KALLSYMS_ALL=y
*/
pr_alert("file:%pD fault:%pf mmap:%pf readpage:%pf\n",
vma->vm_file,
vma->vm_ops ? vma->vm_ops->fault : NULL,
vma->vm_file ? vma->vm_file->f_op->mmap : NULL,
mapping ? mapping->a_ops->readpage : NULL);
dump_stack();
add_taint(TAINT_BAD_PAGE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
} | Safe | [
"CWE-20"
] | linux | 6b7339f4c31ad69c8e9c0b2859276e22cf72176d | 3.0908126017863717e+38 | 55 | mm: avoid setting up anonymous pages into file mapping
Reading page fault handler code I've noticed that under right
circumstances kernel would map anonymous pages into file mappings: if
the VMA doesn't have vm_ops->fault() and the VMA wasn't fully populated
on ->mmap(), kernel would handle page fault to not populated pte with
do_anonymous_page().
Let's change page fault handler to use do_anonymous_page() only on
anonymous VMA (->vm_ops == NULL) and make sure that the VMA is not
shared.
For file mappings without vm_ops->fault() or shred VMA without vm_ops,
page fault on pte_none() entry would lead to SIGBUS.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | 0 |
static struct transform *dce110_transform_create(
struct dc_context *ctx,
uint32_t inst)
{
struct dce_transform *transform =
kzalloc(sizeof(struct dce_transform), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!transform)
return NULL;
dce_transform_construct(transform, ctx, inst,
&xfm_regs[inst], &xfm_shift, &xfm_mask);
return &transform->base;
} | Safe | [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-401"
] | linux | 104c307147ad379617472dd91a5bcb368d72bd6d | 2.9177126177399228e+38 | 14 | drm/amd/display: prevent memory leak
In dcn*_create_resource_pool the allocated memory should be released if
construct pool fails.
Reviewed-by: Harry Wentland <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Navid Emamdoost <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]> | 0 |
zcurrentfile(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p)
{
os_ptr op = osp;
ref *fp;
push(1);
/* Check the cache first */
if (esfile != 0) {
#ifdef DEBUG
/* Check that esfile is valid. */
ref *efp = zget_current_file(i_ctx_p);
if (esfile != efp) {
lprintf2("currentfile: esfile=0x%lx, efp=0x%lx\n",
(ulong) esfile, (ulong) efp);
ref_assign(op, efp);
} else
#endif
ref_assign(op, esfile);
} else if ((fp = zget_current_file(i_ctx_p)) == 0) { /* Return an invalid file object. */
/* This doesn't make a lot of sense to me, */
/* but it's what the PostScript manual specifies. */
make_invalid_file(i_ctx_p, op);
} else {
ref_assign(op, fp);
esfile_set_cache(fp);
}
/* Make the returned value literal. */
r_clear_attrs(op, a_executable);
return 0;
} | Safe | [
"CWE-200"
] | ghostpdl | 34cc326eb2c5695833361887fe0b32e8d987741c | 1.3397389654224758e+38 | 31 | Bug 699927: don't include operator arrays in execstack output
When we transfer the contents of the execution stack into the array, take the
extra step of replacing any operator arrays on the stack with the operator
that reference them.
This prevents the contents of Postscript defined, internal only operators (those
created with .makeoperator) being exposed via execstack (and thus, via error
handling).
This necessitates a change in the resource remapping 'resource', which contains
a procedure which relies on the contents of the operators arrays being present.
As we already had internal-only variants of countexecstack and execstack
(.countexecstack and .execstack) - using those, and leaving thier operation
including the operator arrays means the procedure continues to work correctly.
Both .countexecstack and .execstack are undefined after initialization.
Also, when we store the execstack (or part thereof) for an execstackoverflow
error, make the same oparray/operator substitution as above for execstack. | 0 |
int dn_destroy_timer(struct sock *sk)
{
struct dn_scp *scp = DN_SK(sk);
scp->persist = dn_nsp_persist(sk);
switch (scp->state) {
case DN_DI:
dn_nsp_send_disc(sk, NSP_DISCINIT, 0, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (scp->nsp_rxtshift >= decnet_di_count)
scp->state = DN_CN;
return 0;
case DN_DR:
dn_nsp_send_disc(sk, NSP_DISCINIT, 0, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (scp->nsp_rxtshift >= decnet_dr_count)
scp->state = DN_DRC;
return 0;
case DN_DN:
if (scp->nsp_rxtshift < decnet_dn_count) {
/* printk(KERN_DEBUG "dn_destroy_timer: DN\n"); */
dn_nsp_send_disc(sk, NSP_DISCCONF, NSP_REASON_DC,
GFP_ATOMIC);
return 0;
}
}
scp->persist = (HZ * decnet_time_wait);
if (sk->sk_socket)
return 0;
if (time_after_eq(jiffies, scp->stamp + HZ * decnet_time_wait)) {
dn_unhash_sock(sk);
sock_put(sk);
return 1;
}
return 0;
} | Safe | [] | net | 79462ad02e861803b3840cc782248c7359451cd9 | 5.250172845111487e+37 | 41 | net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument
郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
using a simple program:
int socket_fd;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
addr.sin_port = 0;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
addr.sin_family = 10;
socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
connect(socket_fd , &addr,16);
AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
store a zero in the protocol fields.
This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
is NULL for raw sockets.
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: [<ffffffff816db90e>] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
kernel: [<ffffffff816db9a4>] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff81645069>] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
kernel: [<ffffffff810ac51b>] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff810236d8>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
kernel: [<ffffffff81645e0e>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
kernel: [<ffffffff81779515>] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89
I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.
CVE: CVE-2015-8543
Cc: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Reported-by: 郭永刚 <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | 0 |
int update_approximate_glyph_index_order(ORDER_INFO* orderInfo,
const GLYPH_INDEX_ORDER* glyph_index)
{
return 64;
} | Safe | [
"CWE-415"
] | FreeRDP | 67c2aa52b2ae0341d469071d1bc8aab91f8d2ed8 | 3.06591762528776e+37 | 5 | Fixed #6013: Check new length is > 0 | 0 |
static inline double MeshInterpolate(const PointInfo *delta,const double p,
const double x,const double y)
{
return(delta->x*x+delta->y*y+(1.0-delta->x-delta->y)*p);
} | Safe | [
"CWE-190"
] | ImageMagick | 406da3af9e09649cda152663c179902edf5ab3ac | 2.4972920270692428e+38 | 5 | https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1732 | 0 |
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