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Significant Progress Report on the Los Angeles Helicopter Noise Initiative
January 16, 2015 5 |
Background: The May 2013 Report
Helicopter noise in the greater Los Angeles region has been a concern for residents for many years. In response to those concerns, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) solicited input from local communities and other stakeholders on helicopter noise and safety issues. On May 31, 2013, the FAA published the "Report on the Los Angeles Helicopter Noise Initiative." 1
In the report, the FAA expressed that the most satisfactory and widely accepted noise abatement measures are those developed by engaged stakeholders and the FAA at the local level and supported by local consensus. The FAA recommended engaging in a robust local process and is supporting such a process to pursue remedies aimed at reducing helicopter noise that are responsive to community quality-of-life and economic interests and are consistent with National Airspace System (NAS) safety and efficiency. |
The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2014
In January 2014, Congress included language in the Consolidated Appropriations Act , 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-76 (Jan. 3, 2014), directing the FAA to undertake six actions, which were previously identified in the May 2013 Report:
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1. Evaluate and adjust existing helicopter routes above Los Angeles to lessen noise impacts;
1. analyze whether helicopters could fly safely at higher altitudes;
1. develop and promote best practices for helicopter operators for limiting noise;
1. conduct outreach to helicopter operators on voluntary policies and increase awareness of noise sensitive areas and events;
1. work with stakeholders to develop a more comprehensive noise complaint system; and
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1
http://www.faa.gov/regulations policies/policy guidance/envir policy/media/la helicopter noise%20report final 0 53113.pdf
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1. continue to participate in collaborative engagement between community representatives and helicopter operators.
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The legislation also stated that within one year of enactment, the Secretary "shall begin a regulatory process related to the impact of helicopter use on the quality of life and safety of the people of Los Angeles County unless the Secretary can demonstrate significant progress in undertaking the actions . "
FAA has worked diligently for more than a year with various stakeholders to implement these six actions and significant progress has been made on each one, as demonstrated in this report . FAA believes that these efforts are producing positive results and will continue to work through the collaborative process. |
Significant Progress
FAA and the stakeholder working groups have made significant progress on each of the six actions over the past year.
Action 1: Evaluate existing helicopter routes to identify feasible modifications that could lessen impacts on residential areas and noise-sensitive landmarks.
The FAA has expended significant resources to analyze how helicopters integrate into the complex airspace of Los Angeles County, including developing new methodology and tools to identify helicopter flight tracks. Gaining a better understanding of existing helicopter operations was a necessary first step in evaluating existing helicopter routes, and the FAA shared its work -in -progress with stakeholders through detailed briefings and working group sessions. With this foundation, the FAA and stakeholders are making progress in identifying route adjustments that could lessen impacts on residential areas and noise -sensitive landmarks while avoiding shifting noise from one residential neighborhood to another. |
Achievements:
· Conducted analysis throughout the entire Los Angeles County to determine where helicopters are currently operating.
o Formulated a county-wide density map that depicts concentration of helicopter activities
o Developed an algorithm to differentiate fixed-wing and helicopters operating under visual flight rules
· Developed voluntary beacon codes to enhance safety by distinguishing helicopters from fixed-wing aircraft and increasing situational awareness of pilots and air traffic controllers.
· Completed extensive in-depth analysis of adherence to existing helicopter routes and potential for route adjustments for the Hollywood, Torrance, and Palos Verdes areas; similar analysis is underway in the Long Beach area.
· Provided stakeholder briefings to review and explain the results of the in-depth analysis.
o 5/8/2014: Residents/operators explaining the process used on the Torrance Safety Risk Management analysis
o 8/27/2014: South Bay community workgroup on initial analysis
o 8/29/2014: Cahuenga Pass workgroup on helicopter/fixed-wing operations
o 9/16/2014: Long Beach Routes workgroup on finalized analysis
o 9/17/2014: Best Practices workgroup on how the National Airspace System operates and the relationship to flight procedures
o 9/24/2014: South Bay community workgroup on FAA Safety Process
o 9/29/2014: Cahuenga Pass workgroup on fixed-wing aircraft through the Hollywood region of interest
o 11/13/2014: South Bay community workgroup on finalized analysis
o 12/3/2014: Cahuenga Pass workgroup on FAA subject matter expert recommendations
· Identified potential new voluntary off-shore routes based on analysis of coastal air traffic and stakeholder input; design of those routes is underway.
Action 2: Analyze whether helicopters could safely fly at higher altitudes in certain areas along helicopter routes and at specific identified areas of concern.
The FAA has combined work under Actions 1 & 2 to increase efficiency and leverage resources. In conjunction with its evaluation of routes, the FAA has begun to analyze options to safely raise altitudes and reduce impacts on communities. Adjusting the altitudes for helicopter traffic is an extremely difficult task given the busy airspace within Los Angeles County. The substantial analysis for Action 1 provides a foundation for identifying altitude adjustments along routes and over noise sensitive areas.
· Used the in -depth analysis of helicopter operations conducted to evaluate route modifications to support discussion of altitude adjustments in those areas.
· Provided data to the pilot community with recommendations to adjust altitudes where operations would safely allow.
· Conducted a Safety Risk Management (SRM) analysis of the city of Torrance proposed changes to Zamperini Field helicopter arrival/departure routes. FAA issued the SRM Decision Memorandums on the following routes:
o West Pacific Coast Highway
Raised altitude from 600 feet (ft.) MSL to 900 ft. MSL
o South Crenshaw
Raised altitude from 600 ft. MSL to 2,000 ft. MSL
Modified Route
o Southeast
Raised altitude from 600 ft. MSL to 1,000 ft. MSL
· Conducted analysis of helicopter and fixed-wing aircraft at various altitudes in multiple areas, a necessary step before adjusting routes or altitudes. |
Action 3: Develop and promote best practices for helicopter hovering and electronic news gathering.
The FAA has collaborated with community representatives and helicopter operators to identify and promote existing best practices to reduce noise. We will continue to issue Advisory Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs) for large events and encourage helicopter operators and news organizations to employ practices that reduce noise. As we obtain more insight into the location and nature of helicopter noise problems throughout the Los Angeles area we will continue to work with stakeholders to identify additional best practices targeted to those areas and events. |
Achievements:
· Worked with stakeholders to promote camera pooling for electronic news gathering helicopters to limit operations during major events .
o Carmageddon II
o Space Shuttle Endeavour
o Jamzilla
· Issued advisory NOTAMs requesting pilots to avoid overflying or hovering .
o 2012 Hollywood Bowl concerts
o 2013 Hollywood Bowl concerts
o 2014 Coachella Music Festival
· Enhanced efforts for the Hollywood Bowl 2014 Concert Season:
o Issue a graphic notice for the 2014 Hollywood Bowl season.
o Issued Letters to Airman regarding the noise sensitive location.
o Instituted the issuing of information on the Automatic Terminal Information Service at major airports in Los Angeles County for pilot awareness .
· Engagement from local stakeholders to enhance and promote best practices:
o Local law enforcement identified opportunities to fly neighborly when operations permit.
o Helicopter operators developed a brochure of local "hot spots" for the pilot community.
Action 4: Conduct outreach to helicopter pilots to increase awareness of noise-sensitive areas and events.
The FAA and helicopter groups have taken advantage of opportunities over the past year to educate pilots and encourage best practices. We remain alert to the potential to use regularly scheduled meetings, conferences , and special events that attract helicopter pilots as well as various methods of communication, including printed material, Web sites, and targeted emails to increase awareness of noise issues and best practices to reduce noise over noise-sensitive areas.
· Prepared and disseminated handouts describing noise sensitive areas to over 500 participants of the annual helicopter industry conference and 7 major local helicopter operators.
· Posted information at FAASafety.gov regarding noise sensitive areas for Los Angeles County helicopter pilots and issued email "Notice" blasts for various local events.
· Participated and briefed industry groups and professional associations at the annual safety event hosted by the FAA.
· Conducted several pilot/controller forums at local airports to address helicopter operating best practices and noise sensitive areas. |
Action 5: Explore a more comprehensive noise complaint system.
Implementation of a dedicated helicopter noise complaint system for Los Angeles County is well underway. The system will consist of a dedicated web portal, radar flight tracking, and a brokering system that can route complaints associated with a specific airport to that airport's noise office and forward helicopter noise complaints received by airports to the centralized helicopter noise portal. This system has the potential to form the basis of an on -going helicopter noise program, and the data it generates can help to inform decisions about modifications of helicopter routes and operations in the future. |
Achievements:
· The FAA and stakeholders investigated and evaluated currently available technology and options for a helicopter noise complaint system.
· FAA allocated funding to acquire 12 months of correlated noise complaint/flight track data for helicopters.
· A contractor was selected to develop and administer a complaint system that will provide this data.
· The contractor met with FAA and stakeholders to obtain feedback on the design of the complaint system .
· The Automated Complaint System went live in March 2015. The system allows individuals to make complaints about helicopter operations anywhere in the county, both via a website and by telephone.
Action 6: Continue the collaborative engagement between community representatives and helicopter operators, with interaction with the FAA.
Collaboration with community representatives and helicopter operators has been an essential part of the Los Angeles Helicopter Nosie Initiative. These stakeholders have contributed significant effort towards reaching agreement on a set of voluntary measures that could reduce helicopter noise and enhance quality of life . The success of the voluntary measures will depend in large part on this continuing collaboration. The FAA is committed to working with stakeholders as they further mature and oversee additional voluntary measures and encourages formation of an institutional structure to sustain this robust local engagement.
· Stakeholder working groups were established and used to formulate proposals for actions 1 through 5.
· FAA facilitated establishing a process to work issues and proposals through a stakeholder steering group and drafting a memorandum of understanding to
memorialize the organization of the stakeholders and document the roles and objectives for all participants in this process.
· The stakeholder steering group, with interaction from the FAA, has formulated a proposed set of over 20 voluntary measures for use by helicopter pilots and operators, ranging from voluntary helicopter routes to voluntary helicopter altitudes in specific areas that will reduce helicopter noise in noise-sensitive areas of Los Angeles County while maintaining adequate margins of safety.
· FAA has participated in over 50 meetings with stakeholders and has been the primary provider of technical support, flight data, and analysis to the stakeholders. |
Next Steps
Noise abatement measures developed with input from engaged stakeholders and the FAA remain the most effective approach to reducing helicopter noise. The FAA is committed to continuing its collaboration with stakeholders in pursuit of voluntary agreements on routes and altitudes, best practices, outreach and training, implementation of the noise complaint system , and other means of addressing the helicopter noise situation in Los Angeles County.
Over the next year, FAA will expand its evaluation of helicopter traffic throughout the entire Los Angeles County. FAA will review the correlated noise complaint data and work with stakeholders to consider the implications for helicopter routes and operations. FAA anticipates that a memorandum of understanding among all stakeholders, including the FAA, will be signed, and the initial set of voluntary measures will be finalized and implemented this year. |
APRIL 2025
Dr. Michael A. Garcia , Systems Engineering, Aireon LLC Dr. Giuseppe Sirigu, Systems Engineering, Aireon LLC John Dolan , Systems Engineering, Aireon LLC |
Observations of trends in GPS anomalies affecting aviation
The Global Positioning System (GPS) serves a central role in most aircraft systems: supporting communications, navigation, and surveillance. Recently, over the last few years, the scale and severity of jamming and spoofing of aircraft GPS systems has increased and diversified significantly. Aireon can observe such impacts via its comprehensive space-based Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) receiver system, which collects billions of aircrafttransmitted ADS-B messages per day in real-time. Patterns and trends of GPS anomalies can be analyzed in this extensive geo-temporal dataset, which can be used in applications such as airspace monitoring and flight planning. In this paper, the scope of GPS anomaly incursion from state and/or non-state actors is viewed at the global as well as the local level.
WHITE PAPER |
Introduction
GPS is a critical resource for modern aviation, not unlike fuel or weather data. Naturally, GPS is the primary system used for aircraft navigation although there are backup means through inertial reference systems and distance measurement equipment (DME). Additionally, accurate time is needed from GPS to exchange digital communication messages such as Controller-Pilot Data Link Communications (CPDLC) or internet services provided to the cockpit and passengers. Furthermore, GPS acts as the backbone of surveillance systems, supporting Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B), the successor to radar for tracking aircraft in a more scalable, efficient, and economical fashion.
Recently, over the last few years, the scale and severity of jamming and spoofing of aircraft GPS systems has increased and diversified significantly 1 . Estimates by OPSGROUP put the increase as high as 500% over the course of 2024 alone 2 . Their report includes interviews from pilots, controllers, and other aviation community members on this topic. Other models estimate an 80% increase in GPS outage events between 2021 and 2024 3 . The situation for aviation has become so significant that the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) issued a safety bulletin in July of 2024 warning of the increase in frequency and multitude of impacts from GPS interference 4 .
The EASA report includes potential impacts such as:
▶ Inconsistent navigation position and/or time
▶ Loss of or misleading surveillance (e.g., ADS-B)
▶ Loss of Airborne Collision Avoidance System
▶ Loss or misleading Terrain Awareness and Warning System (TAWS)
Aireon, a global space-based ADS-B service provider (Fig. 1) to over 20 Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs) and many commercial customers, has examined GPS jamming and spoofing issues in the aviation community and published several reports on the subject 5, 6, 7 . Given the recent increases in GPS interference and Aireon's intrinsic involvement in contributions to the increased operational safety of international aviation, Aireon was motivated to leverage its extensive ADS-B data set to build methods and applications that allow for the identification and even mitigation of intentional GPS interference worldwide. |
FIGURE 1
High level Aireon system architecture
Iridium Next satellites equipped with ADS-B receiver 1090ES
In this paper, the scope of GPS anomaly incursion from state and/or non-state actors is viewed at the global as well as the local level. Various regions of military conflict have accelerated the use of wide-spread GPS jamming and spoofing devices that (although likely intended for military aircraft and ground systems) have encroached on civil aircraft's use of GPS for navigation and timing. The anomaly types are categorized based on observations to begin to standardize the classification from the emerging methods and applications that are seeking to monitor airspaces. Once the categories are set, a combination of metrics in the form of heatmaps, trendlines, and other analytics are used to correlate changes in the GPS anomaly metrics to regional interference events. In this paper, recommendations will be given for using such metrics for airspace monitoring, flight planning, avionics monitoring, and traceability of interference pattern migration. |
A. Background
When an aircraft encounters a GPS interference source there are several different ways that its avionics may respond. If the navigation system is robust enough (e.g., multi-constellation or algorithmic defenses) then they may not exhibit any negative symptoms as they traverse a GPS interference source's coverage area. However, most operational avionics were not required or designed to defend against the level of jamming and spoofing currently being experienced. The vast majority only use GPS L1 since that was the only navigation constellation system certified for aviation use until the Galileo constellation achieved aviation certification in 2023.
Aireon can get a sense of what an aircraft's navigation system is experiencing via the ADS-B messages that are transmitted by the aircraft and received by its 66 satellites. However, this view is indirect and complicated by the fact that the navigation system is connected the transponder and the flight management system. Therefore, even if an aircraft is flying with an inertial reference unit or using distance measurement equipment (DME) to navigate, these data sources are typically not used by the ADS-B transponder. Additionally, there is often more than one GPS receiver operating in an aircraft and there are no means to determine which GPS an ADS-B message is getting its data from (although they tend to have similar position and time solutions). |
FIGURE 2
Depiction of the ADA-B reported PIC
Position Integrity Category (PIC) GPS Quality Integrity Bound
The most common way to detect GPS anomalies from ADS-B messages is to utilize the aircraft's reported Navigation Integrity Category (NIC) or the EUROCONTROL report equivalent known as the Position Integrity Category (PIC) 8, 9. This value is a horizontal position integrity bound (Fig. 2) that is calculated from the horizontal protection limit and quantized to fit into a limited number of bits in an ADS-B message. Generally, if the PIC is greater than or equal to some threshold (e.g., 7, representing a radius of containment < 0.6 NM) then it is assumed the aircraft navigation system has a high-quality GPS solution. However, if it is below this threshold, then either there is an avionics issue, a GPS constellation issue, or it is experiencing GPS jamming or spoofing. The first two cases can generally be ruled out if the symptoms are experienced by more than one aircraft in an area over several hours or longer. |
FIGURE 3
Examples of ADS-B duplicate address condition
One of the tenets of the ADS-B protocol is that each aircraft/airframe should have a unique 24-bit address that is set in the Mode S/ADS-B avionics upon installation (and almost never changed). These 24-bit addresses are registered with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and blocks of these addresses are given to different countries for local distribution. Occasionally, one of these addresses is mistakenly configured in more than one aircraft at the same time. This leads to a "Duplicate Address Condition" (Fig. 3) and can make it more challenging for ADS-B receiving systems to associate the appropriate message sets to each aircraft. This duplicate condition can also be triggered where GPS interference causes the aircraft's navigation system to experience position errors. If these position errors are greater than 6 NM and occur within a relatively small time window (30s) of otherwise accurately transmitted positions (i.e., noisy position data), this can result in the aircraft creating a duplicate "with itself" as viewed by another ADS-B receiver 10 . This condition can consequently be considered another indication of significant GPS interference. |
FIGURE 4
ADS-B messages transmitted with unknown lat and lon (FTC0)
If the aircraft navigation system experiences severe interference, the GPS solution may cease to operate, resulting in unreliable or unknown position data. When the latitude and longitude are unknown, the ADS-B position message is set to a special value known as Field Type Code 0 (FTC0) 10 . With a 5-bit encoding, there are 32 possible ADS-B message Field Type Codes and the FTC0 case was included primarily for when avionics are first powered on and the GPS is acquiring a signal lock on satellites, forming its initial solution. However, these symptoms are now being observed while the aircraft is airborne where GPS interference is prevalent. When ADS-B reports are plotted (Fig. 4), this can be observed as gaps in the track (although a system would need to capture and retain the raw FTC0 messages to separate these gaps from other causes such as unintentional 1090 MHz interference). |
FIGURE 5
Flight track “jumps” and shows discontinuity
If the position reported by the aircraft begins to "jump" or shows large offsets in short periods of time relative to expected trajectories, then these anomalies can be flagged as having position errors. Typically in these cases, ADS-B reports low PIC values and sometimes duplicate as well as FTC0 flags. |
FIGURE 6
“Circle pattern” caused by GPS spoofing with IPC field flagged
Detecting spoofing of an aircraft's navigation system (GPS) can be difficult depending on the nature of the device creating the spoofing signals. When false GPS signals are created and transmitted from the ground with a signal strength higher than true GPS signals from space, they can cause aircraft avionics to lock onto the false signals resulting in incorrect position broadcasted in ADS-B messages. For example, circular patterns have been observed (Fig. 6) while an aircraft is airborne 7 . Not only is the aircraft's position spoofed, but also the velocity (which is typically calculated from the doppler measurements of GPS signals). Fixed-wing aircraft flying above 18,000' are not expected to have velocities lower than 100 kts but aircraft spoofed into circular patterns are observed reporting velocities at around 60 kts. |
FIGURE 7
Spoofed GPS/ADS-B compared to Aireon’s reference track
Note that part of the track shown in Fig. 6 was flagged by Aireon's Independent Position Validation (IPV) algorithm 5, 6 6, which uses Time Difference of Arrival (TDOA) measurements from overlapping satellites and kinematics to calculate a 'reference track' that is independent of GPS-based positions reported from aircraft ADS-B messages. When the ADS-B-reported positions are measured to be greater than a configurable distance (e.g., 3 NM) from Aireon's calculated reference track, Aireon will set the Independent Position Check (IPC) flag to 1 (i.e., position check failed validity test) in its ADS-B reports to ANSP and commercial customers.
Fig. 7 shows both the ADS-B-reported position (green) and Aireon's reference track (blue) where the aircraft travelling from Bangkok to Vienna was subject to GPS interference near the Black Sea. This resulted in a FTC0 condition, and the aircraft subsequently having its position spoofed into Bulgaria, Hungary, and the Ukraine. These anomalies were detected by comparing the reported positions to Aireon's reference track and alerting on the track when the IPC flag was set. By having a more accurate estimate of the aircraft's state vector during the anomalies, the association of where and when GPS anomalies actually occurred (vs. where their "symptoms" were projected to occur) can be substantially more reliable. |
Data analysis aggregation methods
With several different anomaly types identified and billions of ADS-B messages collected globally every day, the aviation industry is in clear need of a suitable method for aggregating and normalizing counts of GPS Interference to more effectively compare patterns and trends from multiple regions of interest. A growing trend for geospatial data is to use H3 hexagonal tiles (developed by Uber 11 ) and bin the data to a chosen resolution to suit the need of the application. Since the H3 indexing system, aggregation applications, and many visualization tools are open source and fairly efficient to operate, it is a suitable solution through which to render counts from multiple time and space resolutions.
A balance is needed for the right duration of time and area to use to bin the data. Too short of a time will reduce the meaningful number of samples to make an inference, and too long will make it more difficult to determine when a transient event may have occurred. Similar issues are akin to the selected area of a tile. In this work, data was binned by hour over H3 resolution 3 (edge length of 69 km) tiles. For a given tile and individual aircraft, the counts of reports with anomalies are normalized by dividing the number of anomalous reports (e.g., IPC = 1) by the total number of reports in that hour (see Fig. 8). This gives an effective weighted aircraft movement count such that momentary "glitches" in the data flags have less weight than persistent data problems. |
FIGURE 8
Method for normalizing anomalies detected from ADS-B into H3 |
Results and analysis
Once the aggregation method and parameters are established, the event data detection triggers can be set algorithmically and counts of data can be appropriately added to their respective bins. However, the time horizon for the results will analyzed only over the most recent six months of data (even though Aireon has operational data dating back to 2019). This is primarily driven by the fact that several event detection features, such as the IPV/IPC flagging of events, had only reached algorithmic maturity and been deployed operationally within that timeframe. |
FIGURE 9
Global ADS-B aircraft movement density on Sept 1, 2024
To give a sense of the scale of the data being analyzed each day, the top-level zoom for the Sept 1, 2024 global aircraft movement density is shown in Fig. 9. This density is shown with plot points (rather than hexagons) at H3 resolution 3 tile centers with a size and color that scales based on counts to highlight higher traffic areas and oceanic routes. |
FIGURE 10
Normalized GPS anomaly rates at global scale
Applying the metric calculations for the GPS Anomaly types described in Section II (and further dividing by aircraft movements to factor out changes in flight counts from month to month), Fig. 10 shows the trends for these metrics between August 2024 and the end of January 2025. To compare the metrics on the same Y axis (and emphasize relative rather than absolute change), the metrics were each divided by their respective maximum value within the evaluation time window to normalize them.
Some initial observations from this data are that the Low PIC, FTC0, and Low Velocity/High Altitude trends appear to be nearly perfectly in sync over this 6-month period. The first two are generally indicators of GPS jamming (although they are also precursors for spoofing) and appear to be relatively steady with the exception of the 10% drop in October. Most of the indicators relating to GPS spoofing are showing increases: Duplicates, Position Errors (> 20 NM), and the IPC flag. However, the significant increase in the IPC rate in November comes with a caveat. This is when Aireon deployed an update to its IPV/IPC algorithm to increase its ability to detect false positions (although the increase from November to December is legitimate). One notable exception to the increasing trend in spoofing activity is the significant drop in circle patterns detected beginning in October. A significant shift in this baseline appears to have occurred recently, although this may mean that other spoofing patterns have been put into use that need to be added to the event detection application. |
FIGURE 11
Global GPS anomaly density map (all types)
Viewing the six months of anomaly data as a heatmap in Fig. 11 shows hotspots near conflict zones in the middle east and Russia with significant coverage of eastern Europe as well. Note that H3 tiles with fewer than 1% counts relative to the peak tile are not displayed to reduce clutter. The following sections will evaluate more specific areas and smaller time windows with a focus on environments that show more dynamic GPS anomaly behavior. |
FIGURE 12
Asia Pacific heatmap of duplicate anomalies in Dec 2024
Regional, anomaly type, and date/time filters can be set to adjust the contrast of the heatmaps to further explore those that may have a more visible impact in a local environment. Fig. 12 shows the density of duplicate address anomalies during the month of December 2024 over the Asia Pacific region. As noted in Section III, the counts of anomalies were higher in general, and some of the areas shown in Fig. 12 can also be seen highlighted in Fig. 11. The two areas with the highest concentration of duplicates in Asia are near Lahore, Pakistan and Yangon, Myanmar. This certainly seems to align with news reports and other anecdotes related to GPS jamming and spoofing from pilots 1 . |
FIGURE 13
North Atlantic tracks heatmap of IPC anomalies in Dec 2024
The North Atlantic Track (NAT) system between North America and Europe is the busiest oceanic airspace in the world. Although it is unlikely for aircraft to begin experiencing GPS jamming or spoofing when entering this airspace, some aircraft operating within the NAT system display persistent jamming and/or spoofing symptoms that originate from prior operations within other regions (e.g., the Black Sea). This has an impact on the aircraft's navigation as well as the surveillance of these aircraft, because Aireon's space-based ADS-B data is the primary source of surveillance for the ANSPs that manage this airspace (NAV Canada and NATS). Fig. 13 shows the IPC anomaly type singled out over the month of December 2024 in the NAT, which are probably indicating residual large position errors from previously jammed aircraft navigation systems. Filtering the time further to the peak day in December for IPC counts (Dec 12), Fig. 14 shows one of the aircraft with IPC flagged while crossing the NAT. This example shows how when examining GPS Interference one can start from a high level perspective, focus down into specific airspaces, and then continue on to the individual aircraft level. |
FIGURE 14
Flight crossing NAT on Dec 12, 2024 with IPC flagged |
FIGURE 15
US heatmap of low PIC anomalies Jan 22-25, 2025
The US is an airspace that tends to clearly show changes in GPS interference activity. This is partly because large-scale GPS interference over CONUS is relatively rare compared to Europe and Asia, but also because the US occasionally conducts testing on its interference capabilities. Fig. 15 shows significant interference near Boise, Idaho on Jan 22–25, 2025, which is likely due to military exercises as advertised by a notice from the USCG Navigation Center 12 . Fig. 16 shows the degree of change for the Salt Lake City (KZLC) Flight Information Region (FIR), where the counts of aircraft movements with Low PIC and FTC0 increased 13 times its baseline and then rapidly declined.
FIGURE 16 KZLC FIR low PIC and FTC0 counts |
Conclusions and future work
The methods and examples presented in this paper provide insights into an emerging application of ADS-B data to assess various types of GPS anomalies and determine how they evolve at small and large scales. Furthermore, Aireon proposes that GPS event monitoring/alerting applications could leverage this data for flight planning, incident investigation, and pattern of life analysis. Although using ADS-B is not a direct measurement of GPS interference since not all areas will be covered at all times (given that aircraft need to be present to "sample" the area) it nevertheless generates signals that could tip and queue more resource-intensive sensor networks. Additionally, if and when aircraft navigation systems are built more robustly to withstand interference these detection methods will lose some of their potency, however the application can be superseded by using new fields in ADS-B messages that report spoofing and/or jamming activity. Future work will certainly include investigating and trending more anomaly patterns, assessing trends by aircraft type, as well as refining and expanding the aggregation approaches introduced here. |
Acknowledgment
The authors of this paper would like to thank Valerie Cox, Vinny Capezzuto, and Don Thoma for their technical review and contributions to this paper. |
References
[1] M. Thurber, "GNSS Jamming and Spoofing Events Present a Growing Danger," March 2024. [Online]. Available: https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/air-transport/2024-03-04/ gnss-jamming-and-spoofing-events-present-growing-danger.
[2] OpsGroup, "GPS Spoofing: Final Report," 2024.
[3] IATA, "Global Navigation Satellite System GNSS Radio Frequency Interference," 2024.
[4] EASA, "GNSS Outage and Alterations Leading the Communication, Navigation, Surveillance Degradation," 2024.
[5] J. Dolan and M. A. Garcia, "Aireon independent validation of aircraft position via space-based ADS-B," in ESAVS, Berlin, 2018.
[6] J. Dolan, M. A. Garcia and G. Sirigu, "Aireon Space Based Aircraft Position Validation and Multilateration," in DASC, Barcelona, 2023.
[7] M. A. Garcia, J. Dolan and G. Sirigu, "GPS interference and spoofing in the Baltics," 2024. [Online]. Available: https://aireon.com/white-paper-gps-interference-spoofing-in-the-baltics/.
[8] M. A. Garcia, "Global surveillance and tracking of aircraft via satellite," in SCPNT Symposium, 2020.
[9] S. Ali, W. Schuster, W. Ochieng and A. Majumdar, "Analysis of anomalies in ADS-B and its GPS data," GPS Solutions, 2015.
[10] RTCA, "DO-260C MOPS for 1090 MHz Extended Squitter ADS-B and TIS-B," RTCA, Washington, DC, 2020.
[11] I. Brodsky, "H3: Uber's Hexagonal Hierarchical Spatial Index," 27 June 2018. [Online]. Available: https://www.uber.com/blog/h3/.
[12] US Coast Guard Nav Center, "GPS Service Interruptions," 1 Feb 2025. [Online]. Available: https://www.navcen.uscg.gov/gps-service-interruptions. |
AND RECORD OF DECISION FOR
Establishing the Playas Temporary Military Operations Area
New Mexico
July 2018 |
Introduction
This document serves as the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) adoption, in part, of the United States Marine Corps (USMC) Supplemental Environmental Analysis for Temporary Activation of Playas Military Operations Area 1 (SEA) dated July 2018. The FAA hereby adopt each section of the SEA except for the cumulative impacts analysis as explained below. |
Prior NEPA Documentation
On August 4, 2017, FAA adopted the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP) and Training Readiness Certification Exercise (CERTEX) for Playas, Temporary Military Operations Area (TMOA) Environmental Assessment (EA) dated June 23 , 2017, which is Appendix A in the SEA. The FAA adopted the EA and executed a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) and Record of Decision (ROD) in August 2017 . (See Appendix B of the SEA.) 2
The FAA's August 4, 2017 FONSI/ROD and the USMC's June 23, 2017 EA analyzed the potential environmental impacts associated with the temporary activation of FAA controlled airspace over the Playas, New Mexico Training and Research Center (PTRC). That FONSI provides the environmental impact determination and resulting decisions. Pursuant to section 102(C) of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969, and the Council on
1 A permanent Military Operations Area does not exist. This document allows FAA to create a Temporary Military Operating Area (TMOA) and publish the TMOA in the Notice to Airman (commonly referenced as NTAP) and activate the TMOA.
2 Inadvertently, the FONSI, dated August 4, 2017 references an August 3, 2017 EA in error; the correct date of the EA is June 23, 2017. The term in the EA and FONSI, "Military Operating Area" is a typo and should be Military Operations Area.
Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations (40 CFR parts 1500-1508), the FAA announced its decision to adopt the TRAP-CERTEX Playas TMOA and FONSI for the purpose of temporary activation of the airspace over the PTRC to allow for a Training and Readiness Certification Exercise.
On February 28, 2018, the FAA adopted the United States Air Force Playas Military Operating Area and Red Flag Rescue Supplemental Environmental Analysis dated February 2018. The USAF exercise gave combat air forces the opportunity to practice effective integrations with ground forces. The exercise occurred in May 2018.
The proposed actions analyzed in these prior NEPA documents had independent utility. Nevertheless, as explained in the SEA (see e.g., pages 2, 16-17) the USMC prior analyses are relevant to FAA's analysis of the current proposed action and are therefore incorporated herein by reference. As explained below, the USAF SEA was relevant to the FAA analysis of cumulative impacts and is also incorporated herein by reference. |
Background
Airspace Proposal
On November 30, 2017, the FAA received a formal airspace proposal from the US Navy for a TMOA. Appendix D of the SEA contains the proposal.
FAA Order JO 7400.2 describes the steps required to process a non-rule making Special Use Airspace (SUA) action. Primary service area responsibilities include tasking the controlling agency to conduct an aeronautical study, circularize the proposal to solicit public comment, review draft environmental documents, coordinate with other FAA Lines of Business, mitigate any Air Traffic or substantive public concerns, and prepare the final service area recommendation to Headquarters FAA.
FAA prepared a circular and mailed the circular to 56 interested aviation groups in the areas required by 7400.2. Circularization of the aeronautical proposal resulted in one public comment. The only comment supported the proposal. |
Military Operations Area (MOA)
A MOA is airspace designated outside of Class A airspace, to separate or segregate certain nonhazardous military activities from Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) traffic and to identify for Visual Flight Rules (VFR) traffic where these activities are conducted. MOAs are designed to contain nonhazardous, military flight activities including, but not limited to, air combat maneuvers, air intercepts, low altitude tactics, etc. According to FAA Order 7400.2L, Chapter 25, Section 25 -1 -7, a temporary MOA is defined as:
- a. Temporary MOAs are designated to accommodate the military's need for additional airspace to periodically conduct exercises that supplement routine training. When existing airspace is inadequate to accommodate these short−term military exercises, temporary MOAs may be established for a period not to exceed 45 days. On a
case−by−case basis, Airspace Regulations and ATC Procedures Group may approve a longer period if the proponent provides justification for the increase.
b. When it is determined that the need for a temporary MOA will occur on a regular and continuing basis, the airspace should be considered for establishment as a permanent MOA with provisions for activation by NOTAM/Special Notice disseminated well in advance of scheduled exercises.
c. Once a temporary MOA is approved, the military must be responsible for publicizing the exercise within 100 miles of the affected airspace. The publicity may be accomplished through the public media, pilot forums, distribution of information bulletins to known aviation interests, etc. |
Proposed Federal Action 34
FAA's proposed action is to establish a TMOA , publish the TMOA in the Notice to Airman (commonly referenced as NTAP) and provide , activation of the Playas TMOA for a period not to exceed a 5 -hour block between 1200 MST 27 August 2018 to 2345 MST 31 . More information, including the legal description and the types of aircraft , can be found in the USMC Proposal dated 30 November -2018 , included in Appendix D of this SEA.
The proposed Las Playas TMOA comprises a 20 nautical mile (NM) by 20 NM box of airspace extending from 300 feet (ft) above ground level (AGL) up to, but not including, flight level (FL) 180 (18,000 ft) in Playas, New Mexico. See Figures 1 and 2 of the SEA . |
Purpose and Need
The purpose of the proposed action is in support of First Marine Expeditionary Force Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force Certification Exercise 19.1 . The purpose of this exercise is to provide the Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force the opportunity to conduct training in unfamiliar environments during the final phase of its pre-deployment program. The need for the proposed action is to conduct challenging and realistic training to test its ability to conduct conventional and specialized missions.
The USMC exercise provides military training and readiness activities for small, squad-sized units of up to 15 Marine Special Operations Command forces per aircraft. USMC search and rescue teams are tasked to quickly and quietly locate, medically assist (simulated) and recover (extract) "downed pilot(s)" (simulated/staged) during a five (5) hour exercise window, of which the search and rescue teams would remain on the ground from 1-3 hours. The "staged pilot(s)" would be situated somewhere within the existing, abandoned town site (a former residential housing area, abandoned since 1999 when the mining operations closed), which is referred to as
3 Page 2 of the SEA inadvertently uses the term establishment for activation. Activation is the use of the airspace while establishment is the creation of the airspace.
4 Although the SEA discusses ground activities, FAA does not have a federal action associated with ground activities. The helicopter activity below the proposed TMOA is authorized without this TMOA. CFR 14 part 91 has the regulations that define the operation of small non-commercial aircraft within the US.
PTRC. MV -22 aircraft would conduct the primary rescue role to retrieve a simulated downedpilot behind enemy lines, while all other aircraft types would support the training exercise. |
Alternatives
NEPA, the CEQ regulations, and FAA Order 1050.1F require consideration of a No Action Alternative. Detailed environmental impact analysis was therefore completed for two alternatives: the No Action Alternative and the Proposed Action. The Proposed Action is described above.
Under the No Action alternative, the FAA would not create the TMOA. The USMC training would be conducted either in a simulated manner, moved to more familiar training environments or would be canceled , resulting in reduced tactical realism and/or delayed/missed training objectives. The USMC has a requirement for a 450+-mile flight radius for this training. The flight distance (450+ mile radius), in combination with the operators lack of familiarity with the environment of the PTRCs facilities, and the many tactical amenities provided by the PTRC provide the necessary tactical realism essential for effective pre-deployment training. See page 7 of the SEA for more information on the No Action Alternative.
The No Action alternative does not meet mission requirements and/or training objectives for the USMC (purpose of and need for the Proposed Action). |
Impact Categories Not Affected:
The following NEPA environmental impact categories would not affect or be affected by the Proposed Action because the resource is either not present or would be minimally impacted by the proposed action . These impact categories were considered, but not carried forward for detailed analysis, as they were deemed individually and cumulatively to have negligible to no effect on the human and/or natural environment: land use; Section 4(f) 5 ; socioeconomics; environmental justice; climate; coastal resources; farmlands; hazardous materials; solid waste; pollution prevention; natural resources and energy supply; visual effects and light emissions (aesthetics); and water resources."
The following section contains the results of the FAA's independent evaluation regarding the potential environmental impacts associated with the Proposed Action . |
Impact Categories Affected
Noise and Land Use:
The USMC in the SEA discusses noise and land use. (see pages 8-13 of the SEA and Chapters One through Four in Appendix E of the SEA for a more thorough description). The strategy for modeling the noise and air quality is located on Page 10 of the SEA. Due to the different activities and models required for Department of Defense (DoD) and FAA and the activities within the TMOA and beneath the TMOA, the SEA lists three components of the modeling strategy.
5 U.S. Department of Defense Reauthorization Act, P.L. 105-85, Div. A, Title X, Section 1079, Nov. 18, 1997, 111 Stat. 1916.exempts military flight operations and designation of airspace for such operations from Section 4(f).
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1. Onset Rate -Adjusted Monthly Day-Night Average Sound Level (Ldnmr), for measuring distributed sound levels throughout the TMOA during the exercise;
1. Yearly Day-Night Average Sound Level (DNL), the FAA primary modeling metric 6
1. Single-event analysis of overflight levels and landing site operation during USMC-USAF PLAYAS TRAP CERTEX (August 2018)
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The noise analysis utilizes the DoD NOISEMAP (NMAP) suite of computer programs (Wasmer Consulting 2006a, 2006b) containing the MOA Range NOISEMAP (MRNMAP) version 3.0. (See Page 2-1 of Appendix E.) . FAA has approved the use of the U.S. Department of Defense's Military Operating Area and Range Noise Model (MR NMAP 7 ). MR NMAP calculates noise levels from subsonic aircraft operations on Military Training Routes (MTRs), Military Operating Areas (MOAs), and Special Use Airspaces (such as ranges). Chapter 3 of Appendix E describes the noise environment the single-event sound overflight levels computed for each aircraft type expected to operate during TRAP CERTEX . 8 The Take -Offs and Landings for the helicopters occur below the floor of the TMOA utilizes the Rotary Noise Model. See Attachment 1 of this FONSI for the Office of Energy and Environmental's Approval of the Rotary Noise Model for this study. Chapter 4 of Appendix E covers the landing and takeoffs and provides the dNL for the proposed action.
The metric used for portraying noise levels for aircraft operations, in special use airspace, and used for analyzing their impacts is the "Onset Rate-Adjusted Monthly Day-Night Sound Level", depicted by the symbol Ldnmr. The Onset Rate-Adjusted Monthly Day-Night Sound Level metric is similar to the "day night level represented by the symbols Ldn or DNL used at military and civilian airfields, in that it includes the same 10 decibel (dB) penalty (i.e., adjustment) for aircraft operations that occurs after 10 p.m. at night.
However, because flight operations in MOAs may result in noise levels increasing rapidly for a short period of time, another adjustment may be incorporated to account for the high onset rate of aircraft noise (sometimes referred to as the "surprise" effect). Aircraft events exhibiting a high onset rate are assessed a penalty ranging from 0-11 dB. The Ldnmr is calculated from the month with the most aircraft operations because airspace activity varies more than airfield activity. All noise metrics are weighted. Weighted sound levels have been shown to correlate moderately well with the human response to noise to emphasize the range of the frequency spectrum. When A-weighting is applied to noise levels, very high and very low sound frequencies that are outside the range of human hearing are screened out, thereby weighting the
6 The SEA states that DNL is comparable to Ldnmr in many respects but without an onset adjustment for assessing environmental noise impacts .
7 FAA uses the acronym MR NMAP while the SEA and Appendix E use MRNMAP. For purposes of this review, MR NMAP and MRNMAP are the same.
8 Due to the demands on the different types of aircraft, the aircraft modeled may be more than shown in the airspace proposal and more than may actually fly in the exercise. This overestimation of aircraft during modeling provides a more conservative approach.
sound to reflect what people actually hear. All metrics (Ldn and Ldnmr) used for aircraft noise are A -weighted.
For aviation noise analyses, the FAA has determined that the cumulative noise energy exposure of individuals to noise resulting from aviation activities must be established in terms of Yearly Day Night Average Sound Level (DNL), the FAA's primary noise metric. The compatibility of existing and planned land uses with proposed aviation actions is usually determined in relation to the level of aircraft noise. Federal compatible land use guidelines for a variety of land uses are provided in Table 1 in Appendix A of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) part 150, Land Use Compatibility with Yearly Day-Night Average Sound. These guidelines are included in the Noise and Noise -Compatible Land Use Chapter of the 1050.1F Desk Reference.
Under FAA Order 1050.1F, an action would cause a significant noise effect if it "would increase noise by DNL 1.5 dB or more for a noise sensitive area that is exposed to noise at or above the DNL 65 dB noise exposure level, or that will be exposed at or above the 65 DNL dB due to a 1.5 dB or greater increase, when compared to the no action alternative for the same timeframe." The Order also requires that special consideration be given to the evaluation of the significance of noise impacts on noise sensitive areas within certain specified types of properties, including national wildlife refuges and historic sites "including traditional cultural properties" where the land use compatibility guidelines in 14 CFR part 150 are not relevant.
Table 4 of the SEA and Appendix E's Table 2-3. Playas Temporary MOA –Distributed Sound Levels for Proposed Action show the busiest month Ldnmr would be 44 and the DNL would be 33. This is below the threshold of significance and below the levels FAA considers reportable.
Appendix E's Figure 4-6 shows the Yearly Day-Night Average Sound Level Contours for TRAP CERTEX Aircraft Activity with the entire TMOA having 30 dB and the area near the landing and take -offs to be 35 dB. A Noise Sensitive Area is an area where noise interferes with normal activities associated with its use. Normally, noise sensitive areas include residential, educational, health, and religious structures and sites, and parks, recreational areas, areas with wilderness characteristics, wildlife and waterfowl refuges, and cultural and historical sites. FAA Order 1050.1F, para. 11.5.b.(10). Therefore, the increased noise from this activity is not a significant impact nor is it reportable.
The proposed action will not significantly impact noise or land use. |
Air Quality:
Under FAA Order 1050.1F, an action would significantly affect air quality if it would "cause pollutant concentrations to exceed one or more of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS), as established by the Environmental Protection Agency under the Clean Air Act, for any of the time periods analyzed, or to increase the frequency or severity of any such existing violations." According to the CAA, the NAAQS are applicable to all areas of the United States and associated territories. For the poor air quality regions that have ambient concentrations of criteria pollutants above the NAAQS, the EPA has designated these areas as not being in attainment of the NAAQS, or "nonattainment areas."
The Playas TMOA, as well as the PTRC facility itself, is situated within a portion of the Air Quality Control Region that is currently in full attainment status for all monitored criteria pollutants, which include ozone, nitrogen dioxide (NO2), carbon monoxide (CO), SO2, particulate matter less than or equal to 2.5 microns in diameter (PM2.5), and particulate matter less than or equal to 10 microns in diameter (PM10). At present, only PM10 contaminants are being monitored during and after major storm and wind events. (See Pages 13 and 14 of the SEA and Chapter 5 of Appendix E for more information.)
Aircraft data were obtained from the U.S. Navy Aircraft Environmental Support Office (AESO) technical memoranda on individual aircraft types and the U.S. Air Force Air Emissions Guide for Air Force Mobile Sources (USAF 2017b). The analysis of the potential air quality impacts associated with the action was performed in accordance with Marine Corps Order 5090.2a, Chapter 12, Environmental Planning and Review. The calculations were performed for one TRAP CERTEX (one day). The results are provided in Table 5-1. The totals were added so the totals reflect emissions for the MV -22, F -18 A/C, A -10, C -130J, and H -60 for one day (one training event).
No significant impact to air quality is expected, as none of the estimated emissions exceed General Conformity Rule indicators. (See Appendix F for the Record of Non Applicability for General Conformity.) |
Historic Architectural, Archeological, and Cultural Resources:
The SEA contains the documentation between the USMC and the New Mexico State Historic Preservation Office (SHPO). The New Mexico SHPO issued its No-Effect determination on June 6 , 2018, which can be found in Appendix G of the SEA. Page 14 of the SEA provides additional information. |
Biological Resources:
A records search of the project location was conducted on the U.S. Fish and Wildlife web site yielded 18 listed species that may occur within the greater boot heel region of New Mexico. Appendix G contains a list, with additional information, of the species potentially present in the Playas region. Of the 18 species, 13 are primarily associated with aquatic or riparian habitat. There is no riparian or aquatic habitat at the PTRC location. Three (3) of the 18 species identified by the USFWS are primarily associated with forested habitat. There is no forested habitat within the Action Area or the PTRC. One (1) of the 18 species is a bat. They would not be active (flying) during daylight hours when activities are planned/to be executed, and the PTRC facility is not likely to support any roosts, maternity sites, or hibernaculum. The last of the 18 species is listed as experimental and non-essential, therefore consultation under Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act is not required. Lastly, no designated critical habitat exists within or adjacent to the PTRC facility. (See Pages 14 and 15 of the SEA and Appendix H.)
The likelihood of encountering a dispersing or migrating individual on the ground or in the air within the Action Area during the extremely brief exercise (5-hour TMOA activation) window is so low as to be insignificant and discountable. |
Cumulative Impacts:
Cumulative actions, when viewed with other proposed actions, have cumulatively significant impacts. Cumulative actions should be discussed in the same NEPA document (see 40 CFR § 1508.25(a)(2), CEQ Regulations). If the proposed action would cause significant incremental additions to cumulative impacts, an EIS is required.
As mentioned in the "Prior NEPA Documentation" section above, the FAA adopted the USAF SEA February 28, 2018. This SEA overestimated USAF operations by a day, included twenty percent night time operations, and estimated operations with the USMC to ensure the cumulative noise impacts of the training exercises were captured and did not exceed significant thresholds. See pages 5-7 of the USAF SEA.
Due to the detailed analyses in the USAF SEA, the FAA chooses to continue to rely on that analysis and not to adopt the Cumulative Section of the USMC SEA.
The Proposed Action will not result in a significant cumulative impact as a result of the establishment of the additional TMOA . The USAF's SEA overestimated the noise and air quality impacts by using more aircraft and more time will cover the planned and past USMC activities and the twice a year USAF activities. Analysis of the Proposed Action , when considered cumulatively with past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions would not result in adverse and/or significant impacts to noise , biological resources (including fish, wildlife, and plants); historical, architectural, archeological and cultural resources. Based on independent review of the airspace proposal and the SEA, the FAA has determined there would be no significant cumulative impacts as a result of the establishment of the TMOA. |
Impact Analysis
Based on documentation contained in the SEA, no significant adverse environmental impacts are associated with the Proposed Action. The attached SEA addresses the effects of the Proposed Action on the human and natural environment and is made a part of this FONSI. The proposed action as described in the SEA is similar to the action in the EA and there are no substantial changes in the action that are relevant to environmental concerns. The SEA updates the noise and air quality data from the EA. FAA confirmed that the SHPO analysis is still valid. The remaining data and analyses contained in the EA and FONSI/ROD are substantially valid and there are no significant new circumstances or information relevant to environmental concerns and bearing on the proposed action or its impacts .
Because there are no environmental impacts associated with the Proposed Action that would exceed applicable thresholds of significance, the action is not one normally requiring preparation of an EIS, no special circumstances apply, and the brief duration of the Proposed Action, circulation and review of the Draft SEA was not warranted in accordance with FAA Order 1050.1F, Environmental Impacts: Policies and Procedures.
The FAA has conducted an independent evaluation of the SEA. Based on its independent evaluation; the FAA has determined that the SEA adequately assesses and discloses the environmental impacts of the Las Playas Temporary MOA and that adoption of the SEA by the FAA is authorized under 40 CFR 8 1506.3 and FAA Order 1050.1F, paragraph 8-2.c. |
Finding
The FAA has determined that no significant impacts would occur as a result of the Federal Action and therefore preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement is not warranted, and a Finding of No Significant Impact; in accordance with 40 CFR Partl501.4 (e), is appropriate. |
Statement
After careful and thorough consideration of the facts contained herein; the undersigned finds that the proposed Federal action is consistent with existing national environmental policies and objectives as set forth in Section 101 of the NEPA and other applicable environmental requirements will not significantly affect the quality of the human environment or otherwise include any condition requiring consultation pursuant to Section 102(2) (C) of NEPA. |
Order and Right of Appeal
This decision to adopt the airspace portion of the USMC?s SEA constitutes an order of the FAA Administrator pursuant to 49 U.S.C. $ 40103.It is subject to exclusive judicial review U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the circuit in which the person contesting the decision resides or has its principal place of business. party having substantial interest in this order may apply for review of the decision by a petition for review in the appropriate U.S. Court of Appeals no later than 60 days after the order is issued in accordance with the provisions of 49 US.C. 846110. party seeking to stay implementation of the ROD must file an application with the FAA to seeking judicial relief as provided in Rule 18a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Playas Any filing Any prior
Approved:
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Airspace Policy Group Mission Support Services Air Traffic Organization Federal Aviation Administration Rodger |
Working Environment
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Working Environment
Working Environment
The term Working Environment can be used to refer to a whole range of items and factors that may help or hinder a worker to perform effectively. These may include[1]:
Hardware – machinery, instruments, communication systems, tools, computers (and their interfaces), chairs etc.
Infrastructure – runways, control towers, nearby towns, roads etc.
Nature – topography, climate, weather, wildlife etc.
Software – Policies, Rules and Procedures, checklists, job-cards, computer programmes etc.
Colleagues (Liveware) – team/crew-members, supervisors, instructors, managers etc.
However, Working Environment is used most specifically to refer to the design and operation of aircraft cockpits and air traffic control towers[2] (or controller operating positions). The cockpit is the most extreme environment with regards to constraint of design and exposure to operational hazards. Therefore, this article will focus on introducing the working environment of aircraft cockpits. Design concepts and operational factors that affect other (less extreme) environments, such as air traffic control, the ramp and the maintenance work-station, can be easily extrapolated. |
Working Environment
Aeromedical Factors and Cockpit Design
Changes in design and operation of workplace environments have been closely linked with changes in medical assessments for licence holders[2] (pilots and air traffic controllers). Aeromedical examiners assess pilots’ physical, cognitive and psychological abilities to cope with modern cockpit designs.
Aircraft cockpits are designed to facilitate pilots to function optimally not only under normal but also under critical conditions such as peak workloads and emergencies[2]. Therefore, the design and operation of emergency checklists and personal protective equipment need to be even simpler and less prone to inducing errors. These are both key elements of a workplace environment which may become overlooked.
The size and shape of pilots directly affects the size and design of cockpits (anthropometry)[3] which in turn influences the positioning of instruments and controls (ergonomics). Traditionally four elements need to be balanced in designing a pilot’s work-station:
eye datum – the pilot, when sat in a neutral position, should be able to clearly see and read essential flight instruments
lookout – with minimal head and body movement, the pilot should be able to scan a suitable portion of the sky in flight, necessary visual references when landing, and necessary references when manoeuvring on the ground
controls – the pilot should be able to easily reach and manipulate all controls and functional mechanisms over their full range without undue effort or movement
comfort – the pilot’s seat needs to provide adequate adjustments to attain the three elements above (eye datum, lookout and controls) as well as protect the pilot’s back against undue stress on the spine and back muscles.
Because, for the pilot, the major portion of information gathering is by vision, the limitations of human vision must be considered in the design, with respect to: acuity, the size and shape of the peripheral visual fields, and colour perception. This is especially critical against a background of many other visual influences from both inside and outside the cockpit. |
Working Environment
Human Factors
Both Anthropometry and Ergonomics have been subsumed into the over-arching subject of Human Factors, which covers a much greater range of subjects and theories. Knowledge of Human Factors has directly affected the design of the pilot’s workplace environment, in particular the layouts, positioning, symbology and standardisation of critical flight and aircraft systems’ controls and displays. Perhaps a turning point in this knowledge came during the investigation of the Kegworth accident[4] The Human Factors principle underpinning all workplace environment design is that the job and the workspace should fit the man and not the other way round. |
Working Environment
Pressure Altitude
Human physiology has evolved to function effectively within a small range of pressure differences that equate to altitudes close to sea level and which provide us with the highest concentrations of oxygen. At altitudes up to 10,000 ft a slight deterioration in physical and cognitive performance can be measured in most people. At altitudes above 10,000 ft deterioration of performance becomes more rapid and obvious due to Hypoxia. At altitudes above 25,000ft incapacitation is almost guaranteed and eventually death will occur. Therefore, aircraft operating above 10,000 ft are required to utilise pressurisation systems which maintain a comfortable ‘cabin altitude’, usually between 5,000 and 8,000 ft. The pilot’s workplace is therefore unnatural, although safe, but with a constant small risk of rapid decompression to a potentially dangerous altitude. In this likelihood, personal oxygen systems are available to reduce the impact and prevent Hypoxia. |
Working Environment
Climate
Air at high altitude, as well as containing less oxygen, is extremely cold, can be very dry and also contain particles from the atmosphere. Aircraft use Environmental Control Systems (ECS) to regulate temperature, humidity and flow, and provide a very high quality of air to crew and passengers. The ECS will also filter-out particles, viruses and germs[5]. The ECS will also convert harmful Ozone (which is increasingly present at higher altitudes) into oxygen. |
Working Environment
Acceleration Effects
Due to the high speeds that aircraft attain and the potential for sudden changes in direction and speed, humans become susceptible to Spatial Disorientation due to limitations of our Vestibular System. |
Working Environment
Noise, Vibration and Fatigue
Noise in the workplace can greatly impact human performance, and whilst modern aircraft provide relatively quiet environments, at critical times of flight (e.g. below 10,000 ft) it is a requirement for pilots to wear protective headsets and communicate via the intercom. Vibration can also impact negatively on human performance, whether constant low-level or short-term severe, from air turbulence, an aircraft system malfunction, or damage to the aircraft structure. Both noise and vibration (and larger movements from turbulence) can induce fatigue in pilots earlier than might otherwise be expected. |
Working Environment
Cosmic Radiation
Everyone on Earth is exposed to constant background galactic and solar Cosmic Radiation and occasionally additional exposure due to single events, such as solar flare activity. At higher altitudes the protective element of the Earth’s atmosphere is reduced and therefore pilots and aircraft systems are exposed to higher levels of cosmic radiation[6]. |
Working Environment
Psychological
The working environment can also be affected by various psychological factors. As well as personal and workload stressors, more broad and pernicious factors can affect the workplace environment, such as Commercial Pressures and negative organisational cultures. |
Working Environment
Related Articles
Controller Position Design
Bird Strike
Flight Crew Licensing
Human Factors Update |
Working Environment
Further Reading
- Design for Humans, Steven Shorrock, Safeguard January/February 2018, Feb 2018. |
Working Environment
References
^ ICAO SHELL Model.
^ a b c ICAO Doc 8984 Manual of Civil Aviation Medicine Edition 3.
^ Green, R, G. 1996. Human Factors for Pilots. 2nd Edition. Aldershot, UK. Ashgate Publishing Ltd.
^ UK AAIB Aircraft Accident Report No: 4/90 (EW/C1095). British Midland Airways, Boeing 737-400, G-OBME, 8 January 1989.
^ SKYbrary The Common Cold.
^ EASA Safety Information Bulletin 2012-09. 23 May 2012. Effects of Space Weather on Aviation. |
Weight-Shift Control Aircraft Flying Handbook (FAA-H-8083-5) Addendum
The following information should be included in Chapter 13: Abnormal and Emergency Procedures of the Weight-Shift Control Aircraft Flying Handbook on page 13-10 and will be included in the next version of the handbook: |
Recovery from a Steep-banked Spiral Dive
At times, weight-shift control pilots find themselves in an unintentional steep-banked descending spiral turn. This may happen while performing an emergency descent but more commonly happens when the pilot spots something on the ground and wants to get a closer look. The pilot initiates a turn which steepens to 45 to 60 degrees of bank or greater. Through turbulence, wind gusts, or inattention the turn may develop into a steep-banked spiraling descent . If the pilot attempts to arrest the descent by pushing out the control bar and increasing pitch , the rate of turn and rate of descent will increase and an accelerated stall may ensue. It may require significant force to level the wing at this point and with some wings it may actually be impossible unless the correct technique is followed. If the maneuver began at low altitude, there will be very little time to correct the situation before a crash occurs. The appropriate recovery technique is to simultaneously reduce throttle, pull the control bar in to reduce pitch, and move the control bar to the side to level the wing . Pulling the control bar in to reduce pitch may seem contrary to a pilot's instinct when the ground is rushing up , but it must be done to unload the wing and reduce control forces sufficiently to allow the pilot to level the wing. Once the wings are leveled, the pilot should be careful not to stall the wing or build up excessive speed to accomplish a successful dive recovery.
Practicing recovery from a steep spiral should only be performed after receiving instruction from an experienced and properly certificated flight instructor. The purpose of practicing this maneuver is to build recognition of and a reflexive response to a steep-banked spiraling dive . Start all practice at an altitude that will permit a recovery at no lower than 1,000 feet above the ground. An altitude of at least 2,500 AGL is recommended. Before starting the maneuver, the pilot should ensure that the area is clear of other traffic. Begin with a steep turn in level flight with adequate power to maintain altitude and at a speed well above the stall speed for the planned bank angle. The bank angle should be at least 45 degrees and below the manufacturer's maximum bank limitation. Allow the aircraft to begin a slow descent with a slight reduction in power, but be careful not to exceed the manufacturer's airspeed limitations. It may be necessary to push the control bar out somewhat as part of establishing the spiral and to control speed . Once the steep spiral is established the pilot may notice that the control forces required to level the wing or counter the wing's overbanking tendency will have increased. Do not push the control bar further out as it will likely result in an accelerated stall . Recovery should be initiated rapidly by simultaneously reducing the throttle to idle, pulling in the control bar, and reducing the bank angle to zero . A recovery must be performed by carefully controlling pitch and G-forces as the aircraft will naturally pitch up once the wings are level. As the airspeed returns to a normal cruise speed increase the throttle to maintain level flight . The pilot must be careful not to stall the aircraft or exceed airspeed limitations at all times.
The following are some errors that are commonly made during the recovery of a steep spiral:
· Failure to adequately clear the area.
· Entering the maneuver at a speed inadequate to prevent a stall at the selected bank angle.
· Allowing the airspeed to build rapidly without beginning a recovery.
· Leveling the wing without pulling the bar in and reducing throttle.
· Excessive pitch-up attitude during the recovery.
· Stalling the wing anytime during the maneuver.
· Failure to scan for other traffic before and during the maneuver. |
ATA Classification
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ATA Classification
Description
A numerical technical classification of all the systems and subsystems on an aircraft, which is universally used in aircraft engineering and aircraft maintenance. It was developed by the former Air Transport Association (ATA) since renamed Airlines for America (A4A). Following its first issue in 1956, the classification has been adopted industrywide in aircraft engineering and maintenance documentation. It is based on 100 numbered categories grouped into chapters, within which there are numbered sections and subsections. This original classification, the ATA "spec 100" was last revised in 1999, and in 2000 it was incorporated with another ATA "spec 2100," which had been developed to define specifications for electronic technical data interchange into a new ATA "iSpec 2200" called "Information Standards for Aviation Maintenance." At issue, the ATA described "iSpec 2200" as "a global aviation industry standard for the content, structure, and electronic exchange of aircraft engineering, maintenance, and flight operations information". It consists of a suite of data specifications pertaining to maintenance requirements and procedures, aircraft configuration control, and flight operations. |
Crew Incapacitation: Guidance for Controllers
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Crew Incapacitation: Guidance for Controllers
Introduction
Crew incapacitation is a situation where one or more crew members (or the entire flight crew) are no longer able to perform their job to the required level. It may range from one person being dizzy to the entire crew becoming unconscious. This is a special type of onboard medical emergency because the impact of the incapacitation may not be limited solely to the person(s) affected. Crew incapacitation can potentially hamper the ability to control the aircraft thus become a major safety hazard. On a number of occasions, flight crew incapacitation has lead to an incident or an accident. |
Crew Incapacitation: Guidance for Controllers
Incapacitation Types
Generally speaking, there are two categories of incapacitation: obvious and subtle. The former is usually easy to recognize and its implications are fairly obvious. However the latter is often the more dangerous of the two due to the fact that the problem could remain unnoticed (even by the incapacitated person themselves). This easily prevents any corrective action being taken in time.
Obvious (complete) incapacitation
The first indication of illness may be loss of consciousness, seizures, severe pain or paralysis.
Onset may be sudden.
The victim may interfere with aircraft controls, by e.g.:
Gripping controls during a seizure;
Slumping forward on the controls;
Behaving in a violent or aggressive manner;
The victim's condition may deteriorate rapidly and they may be in distress.
Subtle (incomplete) incapacitation
Skills or judgement may be lost with little or no outward sign.
The victim may not respond to stimulus, may make illogical decisions, or may appear to be manipulating controls in an ineffective or hazardous manner.
Symptoms may be evident only in moments of high stress or workload.
The victim's condition may lead to more dramatic or complete incapacitation. |
Crew Incapacitation: Guidance for Controllers
Causes of Incapacitation
In order to determine the most appropriate course of action to be taken by controllers, it is imperative they understand incapacitation cause(s) and potential effect(s). This understanding will provide the controller with reasonable expectations in terms of aircraft behaviour and allow them to determine the best ways to provide assistance. Some of the more common scenarios are:
Medical problems (e.g. heart attack, food poisoning etc.) – usually affect only one crew member. The effects of administered medication could also affect the judgement and the response. That risk is substantial, particularly in cases of self-medication and treatment (e.g. self administered treatment with sleeping pills, anti-depressants or anti-allergy medicine, etc.) ;
Depressurisation – the exposure to an oxygen-poor environment may affect the entire flight crew to the point that they are no longer capable of taking normal, corrective or protective actions. The depressurisation could be slow and undetected (also known as ‘gradual or insidious depressurisation’), rapid or explosive. (e.g. due to an explosion or a broken windshield). In any of these cases it may cause hypoxia and, potentially, death.
Laser blinding;
Injury; it can be:
accidental (e.g. due to turbulence, explosion, fire, etc)
deliberate (e.g. due to unlawful interference, unruly passenger, etc) |
Crew Incapacitation: Guidance for Controllers
Controller’s Actions
The advice in this section is derived from best practices and is not considered exhaustive nor is it intended to replace local procedures.
There is little that a controller can do about recognizing the state of incapacitation or in terms of assistance in flying the aircraft. After the situation has been positively identified (e.g. by a flight crew report), the controller should take some (or all) of the following actions, as appropriate:
Determine flight crew’s intentions; most likely they would elect to land at the nearest suitable aerodrome;
Provide room for manoeuvring (e.g. emergency descent, most appropriate route to the aerodrome chosen, etc.) by clearing the way of other aircraft;
Inform the supervisor as soon as practicable; they are usually expected to notify other authorities and may assist in the coordination activities with other units/the aerodrome/etc.;
Inform other appropriate authorities, e.g. law enforcement in case of laser blinding or of an unruly passenger;
Coordinate emergency response services at the aerodrome chosen;
Determine crew intentions after landing; it is possible that the aircraft would remain on the runway;
Determine whether the crew are in full control of the airplane;
Any runway operations should be stopped at a reasonable time before the expected landing; if there is only one runway at the aerodrome cancelling the start-ups should be considered; |
Crew Incapacitation: Guidance for Controllers
Further Reading
EUROCONTROL
Guidelines for Controller Training in the Handling of Unusual/Emergency Situations
ATC Refresher Training Manual, ed.1.0, March 2015
UK CAA
- CAP 745, Aircraft Emergencies, Considerations for air traffic controllers
FAA
- Safety Recommendation Report - Emergency Training for Air Traffic Controllers
Others
In-Flight Incapacitation – Flight Crew Training, IFALPA, 8 August 2013
TP 11629 - Pilot Incapacitation, Transport Canada
ICAO Doc 8984 "Manual of Civil Aviation Medicine", third edition 2012. Part 1, Chapter 3 Flight Crew Incapacitation
Diabetes mellitus and its effects on pilot performance and flight safety, Aviation Research report, ATSB, June 2005 |
Commercial Space Integration into the National Airspace System
Concept of Operations
May 2020 |
Concept of Operations
This document was developed in collaboration with key representatives from the following organizations: Air Traffic Organization (ATO), Office of Commercial Space (AST), Office of Airports (ARP), and Office of NextGen (ANG). |
For more information, please contact:
Name: Matt Modderno
Organizational Code: ANG-C5
Phone Number: 202-267-5151
Email address: [email protected] |
Abstract
This Concept of Operations (ConOps) is an update to the Space Vehicle Operations (SVO) ConOps , Version 1.1, 2014. It evolves the concepts put forth in that document for managing that National Airspace System (NAS) during commercial launch and reentry vehicle operations. The NAS is defined as the following: The common network of U.S. airspace; air navigation facilities, equipment and services, airports or landing areas; aeronautical charts, information and services; rules, regulations and procedures, technical information, and manpower and material. Included are system components shared jointly with the military 1 . Air traffic services (ATS) in U.S. are provided over the domestic U.S. and within. In the airspace over the contiguous U.S. and out to 12 nautical miles (NM) from the U.S. shores, domestic air traffic control (ATC) separation is applied (with certain limitations) along with additional services (e.g., traffic advisories, bird activity information, weather and chaff information, etc.). The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has also delegated some high seas airspace to the United States (U.S.) for the provision of ATS. ATS in U.S. delegated "Oceanic" (certain areas of the western half of the North Atlantic, the Gulf of Mexico, the Caribbean, and the North Pacific ) airspace are provided in accordance with (IAW) FAA Orders congruent with ICAO PANS ATM doc 4444. Depending on available CNS capabilities, ATS provided in oceanic airspace differs from services provided in domestic (continental) airspace. 2
Discussions in this concept do not address Department of Defense (DoD), National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) or other government agency launches. Since the NAS is a shared public resource managed by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), an approach to equitably allocating NAS resources (particularly airspace) must be developed. Launch/reentry vehicles traverse the NAS relatively quickly due to their speeds and flight profiles. The FAA has traditionally used airspace segregation, characterized by relatively large volumes of airspace and large time windows, to protect other NAS users from the hazards associated with potential offnominal events. Even as the frequency of launch/reentry operations has increased, this approach persists due to current planning and real-time shortfalls . As a result, today's methods contribute to inefficiencies for other NAS users, including reroutes, delays, longer flight times, and additional fuel burn leading to increases in operating costs.
Benefits from implementing this ConOps include improved NAS efficiency through a reduction of delays, reduced route deviations, reduced fuel burn, and reduced emissions . For launch/reentry operators, benefits include increased operations availability from more sites. Implementing this ConOps will also provide a strategy toward more efficient and predictable operations for all airspace users , through improved planning and situational awareness among stakeholders.
1 FAA Aeronautical Information Manual Pilot/Controller Glossary (03.29.18).
2 Federal Register/Vol. 80, No. 126/Wednesday, July 1, 2015/Notices, pg. 37710, Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration [Docket No. FAA -2015 -1497; Airspace Docket No. 15-AWA-4], RIN 2120-AA66 Designation of Oceanic Airspace |
Contents
2.5.2 Types of Environmental Reviews ..............................................................................................., ............................................................................................ 29 = 29. 2.6 – – Current Safety Procedures, Review, and Approval Considerations ..............................................., ............................................................................................ 29 = 29. 2.6.1 AST Safety Review and Approval for Launch or Reentry Licenses ............................................., ............................................................................................ 29 = 29. 2.6.2 AST Safety Approvals Separate from Traditional Licensing ......................................................., ............................................................................................ 29 = 30. 3 Need for the Commercial Space Integration in the NAS ConOps ............................................................, ............................................................................................ 29 = 31. 3.1 System Shortfalls ..............................................................................................................................., ............................................................................................ 29 = 31. 3.2 Addressing Shortfalls with the CSINAS Concept of Operations ........................................................, ............................................................................................ 29 = 32. 4 Commercial Space Integration Future Operations .................................................................................., ............................................................................................ 29 = 34. 4.1 Assumptions and Constraints ..........................................................................................................., ............................................................................................ 29 = 34. 4.1.1 Assumptions ..............................................................................................................................., ............................................................................................ 29 = 34. 4.1.2 Constraints ................................................................................................ ................................, ............................................................................................ 29 = . 3 37. 4.2 Stakeholders ................................................................................................ ....................................., ............................................................................................ 29 = 38. 4.2.1 NAS Users ................................................................................................ ..................................., ............................................................................................ 29 = 38. 4.2.2 Air Navigation Service Providers ................................................................................................, ............................................................................................ 29 = 38. 4.2.3 FAA Aviation Safety Organizations ............................................................................................., ............................................................................................ 29 = 38. 4.2.4 Non - FAA Federal Agencies ........................................................................................................., ............................................................................................ 29 = 38. 4.2.5 Foreign Entities .........................................................................................................................., ............................................................................................ 29 = 38. 4.3 Future Operational Environment and Infrastructures ......................................................................, ............................................................................................ 29 = 39. 4.3.1 Airspace Management Methods ..............................................................................................., ............................................................................................ 29 = 39. 4.3.2 Supporting Capabilities, Tools and Procedures ........................................................................., ............................................................................................ 29 = 52. 4.3.3 New and Emerging Vehicle Concepts and Mission Types .........................................................., ............................................................................................ 29 = 58. 4.4 Description of Future Operations ....................................................................................................., ............................................................................................ 29 = 62. 4.4.1 Pre - Operational Planning ..........................................................................................................., ............................................................................................ 29 = 62. 4.4.2 Real - Time Operations ................................................................................................................, ............................................................................................ 29 = 64. 4.4.3 Post - Operations Review and Analysis ........................................................................................, ............................................................................................ 29 = 69. 4.4.4 Off - nominal Events ...................................................................................................................., ............................................................................................ 29 = 69. 4.5 Future Launch Sites/Reentry Sites and Dual-use Airports ................................................................, ............................................................................................ 29 = 71. 4.5.1 Overview ................................................................................................ ...................................., ............................................................................................ 29 = 71. 4.5.2 Site Selection, Planning Integration, and Design Standards ......................................................, ............................................................................................ 29 = 71. 4.5.3 Evolution of Regulations ............................................................................................................, ............................................................................................ 29 = 72. 4.5.4 Industry Trends and Evolution ..................................................................................................., ............................................................................................ 29 = 72. 4.6 – – Environmental Review for Commercial Space License or Permit Applicants ................................, ............................................................................................ 29 = 72
Figures |
1 – Introduction
This ConOps is the foundational document for managing the integration of commercial space launch/reentry operations into the NAS. The scope encompasses the FAA's mid-term to far-term time frames. It provides focus on and methods for efficiently integrating the operations with other NAS operations.
The development of the Commercial Space Integration into the NAS (CSINAS) ConOps is a Level 2, or Service Level, ConOps. This classification indicates that all future efforts will trace to this document as the high-level, long-term vision.
This ConOps will be used as guidance to derive concept-level requirements for services, systems, technologies, tools, procedures, training, and policies that support commercial space launch/reentry operations integration. It can also be used as a reference for assessing concept feasibility through research validation activities.
This section of the document provides an overview of the ConOps including the methods and tools proposed in this document. It includes the following subsections:
· Background – describes recent changes in the commercial space industry that necessitate the methods and procedures presented in this document
· Challenges of Integrating Launch/Reentry Operations into the NAS - describes the effects the new vehicles and operations have on the NAS using existing FAA planning procedures and data-sharing mechanisms
· Developing Organizations - lists the organizations involved in development this ConOps
· Guiding Principles for Development of the CSINAS ConOps – describes the set of guiding principles used in developing the ConOps
· Remaining Document Organization – lists the remaining sections of the ConOps and provides a brief description of each |
1.1 Background
Historically, launch/reentry operations occurred infrequently and were typically segregated from other operations by containing them within special activity airspace (SAA). These missions were also conducted almost exclusively by federal agencies (e.g., NASA and DoD). The operations historically originated from coastal sites, and air traffic was routed around the SAA to ensure public safety. Given their infrequency and national priority, there was little incentive to make these complex operations more efficient with respect to their effects on NAS efficiency and capacity.
NASA and the DoD are no longer the only participants in space launch/reentry operations. Leading commercial space is a priority objective for the United States. Private companies are now launching an increasing number of government and commercial industry missions into space. New launch sites are being licensed on the coasts and inland locations across the United States,
including dual-use airports (i.e., facilities that host both space and traditional aviation operations).
As the commercial space transportation industry evolves and becomes more efficient and economical, the tempo of commercial launch/reentry operations will continue to increase. The expansion of the industry and operations leads to an increased demand for NAS resources. Today's mission segregation approaches are quickly becoming less feasible . Fully integrating the operations into the NAS while meeting other user and stakeholder needs requires a more equitable approach for allocating NAS resources.
Additionally, as the commercial space industry continues to mature and evolve, new vehicle types with a variety of unique flight capabilities and characteristics will continue to emerge. In the Commercial Space Integration Concept of Operations, we consider both today's launch/reentry vehicles and other emerging vehicle types. The reader should note that not all operational concepts presented in this document will apply universally to all of these vehicle types, or to all phases of vehicle flight, and in fact it is likely the case that most of the concepts and ideas presented in this document will be better suited to one type or phase more than others. For example, presenting vehicle tracking data information to the controller may not be useful or feasible in some cases, particularly for very fast moving vehicles that spend little time in the airspace, however it may prove to be very useful in the case of more maneuverable vehicles. As the industry matures and new technological advancements emerge, the engagement of the FAA and its partnership with industry will also evolve. |
1.2 Challenges of Integrating Launch/Reentry Operations into the NAS
The FAA does not currently have the capabilities in place for meeting the anticipated growth in launch/reentry operations created by industry commercialization. The FAA relies on nonintegrated , operational systems not designed for launch/reentry operations. The capabilities of existing systems and procedures are used to the extent possible, to establish and maintain situational awareness. Situational awareness allows the FAA to ensure that plans developed in advance of the mission are safety implemented, executed as efficiently as possible, and that safety nets are in place in the event of a contingency. Current systems and procedures require data to be communicated by voice or other non-automated systems (e.g., memos, email, etc.) . This process is time consuming, labor-intensive , and leads to an increased probability of human error (e.g., transposition of safety data points). As a safety measure, intentional duplication of effort is used to reduce the potential for human error in manual data entry and transcription.
Additionally, current airspace management strategies for balancing the needs of all users during launch/reentry operations are not optimized, therefore limiting NAS efficiency, effectiveness, and capacity. Since the vehicles traverse NAS boundaries quickly due to their speeds and flight profiles, segregated airspace techniques are used. This airspace is characterized by large volumes of airspace that extend from the surface to an unlimited altitude, and long-time windows that
span from before the mission begins until after it has completed. This method does ensure the protection of other NAS users from the hazards associated with potential off-nominal events. This approach is standard NAS wide during launches due to the small number of operations and existing gaps in capabilities , preventing more dynamic and efficient approaches. Examples of these gaps include a reliance on manual interfaces, a lack of integrated safety and capacity/efficiency evaluation processes, a lack of standardized planning and real-time processes, a lack of surveillance and communication capability. There is also limited capability for ATC to maintain situation awareness and manage other NAS users more dynamically in the oceanic environment.
Finally, there is a limited ability to archive, analyze, and disseminate data and information gathered post-launch and reentry, inhibiting the continual evaluation and improvement of the FAA's integration approach. Without the capability to quickly share accurate, assimilated data across the FAA and amongst the stakeholders, the FAA will continue to be challenged in keeping pace with the space transportation industry.
The FAA and its partners are developing new technologies and capabilities to improve NAS efficiency , and to assist with mission planning and execution. Many of the technologies and capabilities are expected to improve overall system and mission performance during launch/reentry operations while ensuring safety, efficiency , and predictability for all NAS users. |
1.3 Primary Development Organizations
This ConOps is a collaborative effort that spans multiple agency lines of business (LOBs). The primary development team includes the Office of NextGen (ANG), the Office of Commercial Space (AST), the Air Traffic Organization (ATO), and the Office of Airports (ARP). The following subsections provide brief descriptions of each of these organizations. |
1.3.1 Federal Aviation Administration’s Office of NextGen (ANG)
ANG provides leadership in planning and developing the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen). The NextGen Office coordinates NextGen initiatives, programs, and policy development across the various FAA LOBs and staff offices. The office also works with other U.S. federal and state government agencies, the FAA's international counterparts, and members of the aviation community to ensure harmonization of NextGen policies and procedures. |
1.3.2 Federal Aviation Administration’s Office of Commercial Space (AST)
AST was established to:
· Regulate the U.S. commercial space transportation industry, to ensure compliance with international obligations of the U.S., and to protect the public health and safety, safety of property, and national security and foreign policy interests of the United States;
· Encourage, facilitate, and promote commercial space launches and reentries by the private sector;
· Recommend appropriate changes in Federal statutes, treaties, regulations, policies, plans, and procedures; and
· Facilitate the strengthening and expansion of the United States space transportation infrastructure.
AST manages its licensing and regulatory work, and varying programs and initiatives, to ensure the health and facilitate the growth of the U.S. commercial space transportation industry . |
1.3.3 Federal Aviation Administration’s Air Traffic Organization (ATO)
ATO is the operational arm of the FAA. It is responsible for providing safe and efficient air navigation services to 30.2 million square miles of airspace. The ATO is the body within the FAA that contains the nation's air traffic management and control workforce and is responsible for keeping aircraft safe, separated, and on-time 3 . It operates several various service units whose functions range across safety monitoring, workforce training, information technology, operational performance metrics, weather observation and interface with the DoD . |
1.3.4 Federal Aviation Administration’s Office of Airports (ARP)
ARP provides leadership in planning and developing a safe and efficient national airport system to satisfy the needs of the aviation interests of the United States, with consideration for economics, environmental issues, local proprietary rights, and safeguarding the public investment. As part of its central mission, ARP supports a broad range of goals focused on maintaining and optimizing airport and runway safety, capacity, efficiency, financial responsibility, and environmental sustainability. ARP is responsible for all airport program matters pertaining to standards for airport design, construction, maintenance, operations, safety, and data, including ensuring adequacy of the substantive aspects of FAA rulemaking actions relating to the certification of airports. ARP also supports airport planning and environmental review and permitting processes, Airport Improvement Program (AIP) grants, property transfers, and the Passenger Facility Charge (PFC) program administration. |
1.4 Guiding Principles for Development of CSINAS ConOps
The following are the guiding principles used in developing the CSINAS ConOps. These principles are consistent with the FAA's approach to other operations such as small Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) and Operations above Flight Level 600 (FL600), the expectation is that:
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1. Launch/reentry vehicles that can meet the flight characteristics and performance requirements of operating aircraft in the airspace being transited will be integrated into normal operations and within the Communication Navigation & Surveillance (CNS)/Air Traffic Management (ATM) procedures and infrastructure.
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- a. Class A domestic – Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) , Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS), direct voice and data communications with controller. If on board piloted launch/reentry vehicles ,
3 ATO Website: "We are the 35,000 controllers, technicians, engineers and support personnel whose daily efforts keep aircraft safe, separated and on time."
then some type of voice communication or an optional controller-pilot data communication; if ground operations direct ground communications to the FAA network demarcation.
```
1. Launch/reentry vehicles that are not integrated will have operations conducted in a cooperative environment with required information provided by the operator to the FAA network demarcation. Communications, Navigation and Surveillance (CNS) capabilities are operator provided.
1. To support this cooperative airspace management environment, the FAA will work with the launch/reentry operator community to develop standards for information exchange of surveillance, and intent with associated Adaptive Risk Envelope (ARE) .
1. There will be different levels of access resulting from risk-based assessments that consider vehicle/operator capabilities (e.g., CNS capabilities), the manner of operation, and the airspace transited.
```
The Guiding Principles and Philosophies assume that any attempt to integrate launch and reentry vehicles into the NAS would need to be accomplished incrementally as part of a phased approach. Likewise, any strategies developed to address launch and reentry operations would need to be flexible and readily adaptive to rapid advancements in technology.
Given the growing number of stakeholders involved with launch and reentry vehicle operations, collaboration with industry, other governmental agencies, and international bodies is a necessary component of this concept. In future implementation plans for this concept, the FAA will seek to ensure the safety of the NAS and minimize impacts on other NAS users and the environment. |
1.4.1 Phased Approach to Integration
The concept embodies that the FAA will take a phased approach to integration, using risk-based decision -making to efficiently respond to the growing operational needs, and technological evolution of the NAS and that of the launch and reentry vehicles and operations. The pace of launch and reentry vehicle integration is determined by the combined ability of industry, the operator community, other government agencies and the FAA to overcome technical, regulatory, and operational challenges; it will be a shared environment. |
1.4.2 Flexibility
In fulfilling its commitment to industry to integrate launch and reentry operations into the NAS safely and efficiently, the FAA will be flexible in addressing the changing needs and priorities of the industry. Risk-based decision-making and performance-based regulations are just two ways in which the FAA is already adapting more quickly to the rapidly advancing technologies and changing demands within the constraints of the Federal rulemaking process. This flexibility can
reduce regulatory delays in the continuing evolution of technology, while maintaining an acceptable level of safety within the NAS. |
1.4.3 Emphasis on Collaboration
Close collaboration with industry, state and local governments, other Federal Government agencies, international organizations, and foreign aviation authorities is a critical element of this concept and to successful integration of launch and reentry operations into the NAS. Because space vehicle technologies and community needs are expected to change rapidly, the FAA will need to leverage the research and knowledge of the space industry and research organizations in order to develop safety standards and regulations as well as policies and procedures more rapidly. Partnerships with the space community are key to implementation of this concept and successful development of standards for launch and reentry operations. Coordination and collaboration with organizations representing other airspace users will ensure that their views and changes in operations are also taken into consideration.
Coordination with other U.S. agencies, such as the DoD, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), NASA, and the Department of Commerce (DoC) will enable the FAA to leverage the technical and operational expertise of those stakeholders and ensure a consistent and comprehensive set of operational U.S. policies . The FAA will also collaborate with airports, state and local officials to support safe and efficient management of aircraft in their respective jurisdictions to ensure equitable access to the NAS and airport surfaces and facilities. Partnerships with international organizations and foreign authorities will enable the FAA to provide international leadership promoting a risk-based approach to permitting safe launch and reentry operations, and to encourage global industry standards and practices. |
1.4.4 Minimized Impacts on Other NAS Users
Safety and airspace access for other NAS users is a central theme in this concept. As future launch and reentry sites and dual-use airports are licensed, and standards and policies are developed, NAS safety and efficiencies are at the forefront. This concept supports a common strategy for management of the NAS that seeks to minimize negative impacts imposed by launch and reentry operations on other NAS users such as commercial air carriers, general aviation (GA), and helicopters as well as future new entrants. The FAA will support safe space vehicle operations within airspace shared with other air traffic provided necessary safeguards are available to maintain safe separation among all aircraft. |
1.4.5 Environmental Considerations
To achieve full integration of launch and reentry operations into the NAS the environment must be considered. As additional launch and reentry sites and dual-use airports are requested by industry, state and local governments, this concept considers the FAAs environmental review requirements . These requests include the review of the broad range of environmental
categories covered by the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) 4 and other special purpose environmental laws such as noise, air quality, visual effects, historical, architectural, archeological, tribal, and cultural resources. |
1.4.6 Data Exchange and Information is Essential for Success
This concept relies on the continual development and deployment of many of the NextGen technologies, policies, procedures and capabilities to stay abreast of the momentum of the space industry. Secure data sharing and distribution by industry and government is key to collaborative decision -making and shared awareness of NAS status. By improving the data handling and network capabilities to securely record, archive, retrieve, and distribute data will:
· Improve shared awareness and interoperability among the FAA, commercial space operators, federal ranges, and other NAS users.
· Take advantage of common, standard protocols, and formats for inputting, processing, transferring, and coordinating data and information so it can be fully integrated and facilitate decision -making, information sharing, and improving common situational awareness.
· Leverage use of commercial-off-the-shelf systems allowing for the use of advanced data handling capabilities being developed and rapid changes in technologies .
Note, the term telemetry is used throughout the document. As telemetry is a broad term, we will work to define the actual elements of telemetry exchange through our concept development processes . |
1.5 Remaining Document Organization
This ConOps describes a transformation in the approach to managing the NAS during commercial space launch/reentry operations. This transformation will improve NAS efficiency by:
· Integrating commercial space and other NAS operations where the degree of integration is commensurate with the potential benefit of increased system efficiency and capacity; safety will always be at the forefront
· Streamlining and standardizing processes for planning and executing commercial space operations
This ConOps focuses on launch/reentry operations occurring in the NAS, defined as the airspace in which the FAA provides air traffic control (ATC) services. Airspace management may be bounded by the limits of NAS automation.
The remainder of the ConOps is organized into six sections. These sections include:
- · Section 2: Current Operations and Capabilities - This section describes the existing methods, tools, and procedures for managing launch and reentry operations.
4 The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended, (Pub. L. 91-190, 42 U.S.C. 4321-4347, January 1, 1970, as amended by Pub. L. 94-52, July 3, 1975, Pub. L. 94-83, August 9, 1975, and Pub. L. 97-258, § 4(b), Sept. 13, 1982)
· Section 3: Need and Justification for the Concept - This section identifies and describes shortfalls in the current system and introduces strategies to address these shortfalls.
· Section 4: Future Operations and Capabilities - This section describes the future operational environment and presents a path to integrating launch/reentry operations fully into the NAS.
· Section 5: Operational Scenarios - This section provides representative scenarios depicting how specific mission types will be conducted in an integrated environment.
· Section 6: Impact of Concept - This section summarizes the anticipated impacts of the concept on various stakeholder types.
· Section 7 – References – This section lists the references used in the development of the ConOps. |
2 – Current Operations and Capabilities
This section describes the existing methods for managing commercial launch/reentry operations . It includes the following subsections:
· Stakeholders -This section describes the stakeholders involved in managing launch/reentry operations.
· Current Operational Environment and Infrastructure - This section describes the current processes and tools used for managing commercial launch/reentry operations.
· Description of Current Operations - This section describes how commercial launch and reentry operations are currently conducted, including planning, real-time operations, and post-operations analysis.
· Current Launch Sites , Reentry Sites, and Dual-use Airports - This section describes the evolution and use of launch sites, reentry sites, and dual-use airports . It also discusses the current regulatory structure in place for their operation.
· Environmental Review for Commercial Space License or Permit Applicants - This section describes current processes that ensure compliance with the NEPA and the types of environmental reviews conducted by FAA .
· Current Safety Procedures, Review, and Approval Considerations - This section describes today's safety considerations associated with commercial launch/reentry operations. |
2.1 – Stakeholders
Launch and reentry operations are currently supported by multiple operational stakeholders, each with tools that enable the responsibilities specific to their organization and function . For development of this concept, stakeholders involved in current operations were separated into NAS users and FAA support staff. |
2.1.1 NAS Users
NAS users include commercial operations (e.g., air carriers, air taxis, cargo, charter, business jets, etc.) , DoD, state aircraft, and general aviation operating under both Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) and Visual Flight Rules (VFR). The flight operator stakeholders most relevant to this ConOps include Flight Operations Center (FOC) personnel and flight crews. Under current operations, these users file flight plans consistent with published Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs) that avoid any airspace closures for the duration of the published closure. However, in some cases, the NOTAMs instruct IFR traffic to file their normal routes, and ATC uses tactical separation methods to manage the operation. Avoiding this airspace often requires flight operators to use longer routes than their preferred routes. This often results in additional fuel burn , loss of efficiencies, and therefore additional cost. They may also incur delays due to traffic management initiatives (TMIs) used to manage air traffic near the protected airspace.
A growing group of NAS users , referred to as launch and reentry operators , represent many organizations with varying degrees of sophistication in their internal analysis, planning, logistical capabilities , and mission requirements. Members of this group include private organizations such as research colleges launching small rockets. However, most of the operators are
commercial companies. Commercial companies performing launch/reentry operations receive licenses or permits from the FAA and coordinate with launch/reentry sites , dual -use airports , or federal ranges where the operation could take place . The operations of commercial launch/reentry sites are licensed by the FAA. Federal ranges are operated by the U.S. government, and include sites such as Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, Vandenberg Air Force Base, and NASA's Wallops Island. Commercial launch/reentry operators may enter into contracts with a host range to receive launch/reentry services, such as range safety and ground safety services. As with any other NAS user, they consider the effects of their operations on the NAS and consider alternatives to minimize those effects to the extent possible. |
2.1.2 FAA Organization Support
Various entities within the FAA are responsible for distinct aspects of integrating commercial launch/reentry operations into the NAS. These entities include AST, AVS, ARP , and the ATO. AST executes its licensing and permitting functions, evaluates applications , and makes authorization determinations. AVS and AST work closely together in the licensing and permitting of "hybrid vehicles" that can operate under airworthiness certificates and licenses, ensuring operators use consistent safety procedures under either authorization to the extent possible. ARP and AST work closely together in the licensing or permitting of operations that occur at or near existing airports, ensuring that any effects of launch/reentry operations on airport safety, efficiency, and capacity are addressed. Within the ATO, personnel at air traffic facilities and the Command Center participate in the licensing process through the development of agreements. These include facility airspace and procedures specialists, members of the Operations Support Groups at the Service Areas, the Central Altitude Reservation Function (CARF) at the Command Center, and members of the Joint Space Operations Group (JSpOG).
The JSpOG is comprised of representatives from AST and the Air Traffic Control System Command Center Space Operations Group (ATCSCC SOG). The JSpOG was established in 2014 as part of the answer to the FAA Administrator's Strategic Initiatives to develop the methods and processes for integrating launches and reentries into the NAS. For operations with national traffic management implications, the JSpOG manages the tactical decision-making of the airspace management planning process by assessing the proposed operation and alternate strategies for safely and efficiently accommodating the missions. The results of these assessments and a final strategy are captured in an Airspace Management Plan (AMP) as described in Section 2.3.1.
On the day of the launch/reentry operation, at least one JSpOG representative monitors and evaluates the status of operations in real-time, distributes necessary notifications and information, and remains prepared to respond to off-nominal events. Post-launch or reentry, the JSpOG evaluates the effectiveness of the AMP, gathers lessons learned, maintains historical launch/reentry information, and prepares operations reports for FAA management.
AST coordinates directly with launch/reentry operators and assists ATC facilities in developing agreements . Furthermore, as part of its licensing and permitting evaluation processes, AST
computes or evaluates the Aircraft Hazard Areas (AHA) 5 for operations that do not take place from federal ranges and validates an applicant's information . The coordinates for these AHAs are provided to Air Traffic personnel and provide the basis for what airspace must be segregated from live traffic. Currently, Altitude Reservations (ALTRVs) and Temporary Flight Restrictions (TFRs) are used for this.
Although the JSpOG is typically the lead for operations occurring from a federal range, they have not been historically involved in operations occurring at licensed launch/reentry sites, dual-use airports , and private sites. In these cases, the local ATC facility assesses the proposed operation for conflicts and constraints. The JSpOG/ATCSCC has recently become more involved in coordination and operations from these sites to ensure a national-level perspective .
The ATC facility that controls the airspace in which the launch/reentry operation occurs has a significant role in planning and managing the airspace. The affected facilities review the proposed activity and the effect on the facility's airspace, and if necessary, identifies and proposes alternative strategies. Traffic managers and airspace and procedure specialists work with AST and ATCSCC SOG to coordinate and implement the operation through various means, including TFRs and ALTRVs , a and communicate this information to operational staff and other impacted facilities. Traffic managers and controllers provide operational direction (e.g., ground delays, reroutes, etc.) to affected aircraft and traffic flows to safely manage the airspace and avoid the constraint areas. |
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